By Dan Steffens

Low oil prices today may be setting the world up for an oil shortage as early as 2016. Today we have just 2% more crude oil supply than demand and the price of gasoline is under $2.00/gallon in Texas. If oil supply falls too far, we could see gasoline prices doubling within 18 months. For a commodity as critical to our standard of living as oil is, it only takes a small shortage to drive up the price.

On Thanksgiving Day, 2014 Saudi Arabia decided to maintain their crude oil output of approximately 9.5 million barrels per day. They’ve taken this action despite the fact that they know the world’s oil markets are currently over-supplied by an estimated 1.5 million barrels per day and the severe financial pain it is causing many of the other OPEC nations. By now you are all aware this has caused a sharp drop in global crude oil prices and has a dark cloud hanging over the energy sector. I believe this will be a short-lived dip in the long history of crude oil price cycles. Oil prices have always bounced back and this is not going to be an exception.

To put this in prospective, the world currently consumes about 93.5 million barrels per day of liquid fuels, not all of which are made from crude oil. About 17% of the world’s total fuel supply comes from natural gas liquids (“NGLs”) and biofuels.

One thing that drives the Bears opinion that oil prices will go lower during the first half of 2015 is that demand does decline during the first half of each year. Since most humans live in the northern hemisphere, weather does have an impact on demand. I agree that this fact will play a part in keeping oil prices depressed for the next few months. However, low gasoline prices in the U.S. are certain to play a part in the fuel demand outlook for this year’s vacation driving season.

Global Demand For Hydrocarbon Based Liquid Fuels

Brent oil prices are now hovering around $60 a barrel. In my opinion, this is quite a bit lower than Saudi Arabia thought the price would go and may lead to an “Emergency” OPEC meeting during the first quarter. But for now, I am assuming that Saudi Arabia is willing to let the other OPEC members suffer until the next scheduled OPEC meeting in June.

The commonly held belief is that Saudi Arabia is doing this to put a stop to the rapid growth of production from the U.S. shale oil plays. Others believe it is their goal to crush the Russian and Iranian economies. If the oil price remains at the current level for a few months longer it will do all of the above.

My forecast models for 2015 assume that crude oil prices will remain depressed during the first quarter, then slowly ramp up and accelerate as next winter approaches. I believe that by December we will see a much tighter oil market and significantly higher prices. In a December 24, 2014 article in The National, Steven Kopits managing director of Princeton Energy Advisors states that, “In permitting low oil prices, the Saudis seek to bring the market back into equilibrium. At present, our calculation of break-even system-wide is in the $85–$100 a barrel range on a Brent basis.”

Mark Mobius, an economist and regular guest on Bloomberg TV recently said he sees Brent rebounding to $90/bbl by the end of 2015.

Since 2005, only North America has been able to add meaningful crude oil supply. Outside of Canada and the United States (including the Gulf of Mexico), the rest of the world’s crude oil production netted to a decline of a million barrels per day from December, 2010 to December, 2013. More than half of the OPEC nations are now in decline. We’ve been able to supplement our fuel supply during the last ten years with biofuels, but that is limited since we need the farmland for food supply.

I believe the current low crude oil price could be overkill and result in the next “Energy Crisis” by early 2016. Enjoy these low gasoline prices while they last.

The upstream U.S. oil companies we follow closely are all announcing 20% to 50% cuts in capital spending for 2015. We will start seeing the impact on supply at the same time the annual increase in demand kicks in. Our model portfolio companies are all expected to report year-over-year increases in production, but at a much slower pace than the last few years.

A study released by Credit Suisse two weeks ago shows that U.S. independents expect capital-expenditure (Capex) cuts of one-third against production gains of 10 per cent next year. This would imply production growth of 600,000 bpd of shale liquids, and perhaps another 200,000 bpd from Gulf of Mexico deepwater projects. At the same time, U.S. conventional onshore production continues to fall. I have seen estimates of 500,000 to 700,000 bpd declines within twelve months. If these forecasts are accurate, U.S. oil production growth would be barely positive next year and headed for a material downturn in 2016.

North American unconventionals (oil sands, shale and other tight formations) have been almost all of net global supply growth since 2005. If unconventional growth grinds to zero and conventional growth is falling outright, the supply side heading into 2016 looks highly compromised. At today’s oil price, only the “Sweet Spots” in the North American Shale Plays and the Canadian Oil Sands generate decent financial returns to justify the massive capital requirements needed to continue development. Global deepwater exploration is rapidly coming to a halt.

Were demand growth muted, this might not matter. Demand for liquid fuels goes up year-after-year. It even increased in 2008 during the “Great Recession” and ramped up sharply during 2009 and 2010 despite a sluggish global economy. Low fuel prices are increasing demand today and my guess is that, with U.S. GDP growth now forecast at 5% in 2015, we could see demand for fuels increase by close to 1.5 million barrels per day this year. The current IEA forecast is for oil demand to increase by 900,000 bpd in 2015.

If this plays out, the oil markets will be heading into a significant squeeze in the first half of 2016.

The last extended period of low oil prices was 1985 to 1990. In 1985, when oil prices collapsed similar to what’s happening now, the world had 13 million bpd of spare capacity, with 7 million bpd in Saudi Arabia alone. OPEC was well-positioned to comfortably meet any increase in demand.

Today, just about all of the world’s discretionary spare capacity resides in Saudi Arabia and amounts to an estimate 2 million bpd. Lou Powers, an EPG member and author of “The World Energy Dilemma,” has said that Saudi Arabia will have difficulty maintaining production at over 10 million bpd for an extended period. If we do swing to a supply shortage, Saudi Arabia may find itself in the position of needing to run the taps full out for much of 2016. In such an event, the world will be headed right back into an oil shock and we will see much higher oil prices than $100/bbl.

Low oil prices will hurt the unhedged upstream companies, but they will hurt the oilfield services sector the most. I’m expecting the onshore active rig count to drop by 30% by mid-2015. Oil price will need to firm up for several months before the upstream companies commit to higher spending levels. That said, the high quality drillers like Helmerich & Payne (HP), Patterson-UTI Energy (PTEN) and Precision Drilling Corp. (PDS) will be fine since a lot of their high end rigs will keep working on long-term contracts. By 2016, they will have gained market share.

Remember, North America and deepwater are the only places with meaningful production upside. If crude oil prices move below $60/bbl and stay there for even six months it could prove catastrophic to non-OPEC supply. At some point, OPEC action may become necessary.

“But perhaps not by the Saudis. Russia’s position is comparable to Saudi Arabia’s. Either could cut production by meaningful quantity, but the Russians need the incremental revenue more. Saudi Arabia would be right to argue that any calls for production cuts should be directed to Moscow. OPEC could cut production to prop up prices and increase revenues. But for now, a better strategy (for Saudi Arabia) would be to hang back, deflect criticism, and let events play out. If the Russians are thinking clearly, Moscow will cut first.” – Steven Kopits the managing director of Princeton Energy Advisors.

The best news for all of us is that Iran may be quite willing to put an end to their nuclear enrichment program a few months from now. I believe this is the real reason for what Saudi Arabia is doing.

Source: http://oilprice.com/Energy/Crude-Oil/Energy-Crisis-As-Early-As-2016.html

The post Energy Crisis As Early As 2016 – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Nick Simeone

The United States has begun training Iraqi army recruits, a central part of the strategy by the U.S.-led coalition that is working with the Iraqi government to retake territory and ultimately defeat Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant terrorists in the country.

Pentagon spokesman Army Col. Steve Warren told reporters today that six weeks of training began Dec. 27 for four battalions of Iraqi security forces at a base in Taji, north of Baghdad. Training began at Asad Air Base in Anbar province for members of the Iraqi 7th Division several days earlier.

Warren said all of the Iraqis going through the training by U.S. personnel already have been vetted.

Warren said the air base has been the target of “regular indirect enemy fire,” which he said has been wholly ineffective and has drawn no return fire from U.S. forces.

Part of Operation Inherent Resolve

The training mission is part of Operation Inherent Resolve, which — along with targeted coalition airstrikes being carried in both Iraq and Syria — is intended to degrade and defeat ISIL terrorists who hold large sections of territory along the countries’ shared border.

About 2,100 U.S. military personnel are in Iraq advising and assisting Iraqi forces and providing protection to U.S. personnel and missions. That figure is expected to grow by as many as 1,300 later this month as part of the expanded U.S. military presence President Barack Obama ordered in November to help Iraq reclaim territory taken by ISIL.

In total, 12 Iraqi brigades are expected to be trained — nine from the Iraqi security forces and three from the Kurdish peshmerga. Two other locations in Iraq, one in Irbil and another in Besmaya, are expected to host training missions as well.

The post US Military Begins Training Iraqi Forces To Fight Islamic State appeared first on Eurasia Review.

The Government will never allow any force to destroy hard won peace and ethnic harmony and bring back the dark era again, Sri Lanka President Mahinda Rajapaksa said.

According to Rajapaksa, Sri Lanka is ruled with a clear people-friendly vision, safeguarding ethnic and religious harmony.

Rajapaksa made the comments this weekend while addressing a UPFA election rally in Kantale.

“The Government is committed to create a better future for the younger generation. Even though the common opposition entered into agreements with several segments which are supportive of the LTTE and threatens the country’s sovereignty, the Government will never allow anyone to harm the territorial integrity of our motherland,” Rajapaksa said.

According to President Rajapaksa, several Muslim politicians assisting the common opposition are now trying to arouse communal feelings by leveling baseless allegations.

“These Muslim politicians are engaged in mud-slinging campaigns. They are also destroying the country’s communal harmony through false propaganda campaigns. They say that I will not allow Muslim women to wear the Purdha after becoming the President again. However, the intelligent people of the country totally reject this,” Rajapaksa said.

“The people of this country do not believe these fabricated stories since they are aware about the mud-slinging campaigns,” President Rajapaksa said.

“The result of arousing hatred among communities and destroying communal harmony is dangerous. For instance, Iraq, Libya, Afghanistan, Pakistan etc have been facing terrible consequences as a result of destroying ethnic and religious harmony in those countries,” said Rajapaksa.

He said at the same time, several Muslim leaders are asking for a unit controlled by the Muslims while auctioning the votes of the Muslims.

Speaking about the politicians who crossed over, the President said these politicians thought only of themselves without thinking about the country and the people.

Rajapaksa added that public entities have never been privatized under this government but the members of the common opposition privatized many government institutes for meager amounts.

“As I promised at the Presidential election in 2010, we regained several of these bodies including SriLankan Airlines and Shell Gas,” Rajapaksa added.

He said he is a person of one word.

“I say only what I can do and I do everything what I say,” he said.

The post Sri Lanka: Rajapaksa Says Govt Won’t Allow Any Force To Bring Back ‘Dark Era’ appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Linnea Y. Duvall and Evan O. Renfro

Since the early days of Cold War rivalry between the United States and Soviet Union, policymakers have recognized that low-intensity conflict and limited wars often occur in spite of deterrence—that is, using the threat of military force or coercion to change an adversary’s behavior. Because of this shortcoming and risk of escalation, the United States has applied deterrence haphazardly in its relationship with China. Yet U.S. policymakers have failed to identify an alternative approach for chronic disputes that are not readily shaped by military posturing. This deficiency is overlooked at the expense of muddling through commonplace confrontations with China over fishing rights, maritime borders, and cyberspace rather than establishing consistent mechanisms to reduce tension and prevent escalation. Some analysts, such as Richard K. Betts, see only two stark choices to address this dilemma: “accept China’s full claims as a superpower when it becomes one or draw clear redlines before a crisis comes.”1 However, we do not need to limit our options to deterrence or acceptance. Rather, we should complement deterrence with a more flexible, strategic framework focused on conflict management.

While deterrence has been an essential component of its military strategy, the United States requires the addition of a conflict management framework to address China’s violations of international norms that underpin regional stability. China has demonstrated its assertiveness by taking control of the Scarborough Reef in the South China Sea, entering Japan’s airspace over the Senkaku Islands (called the Diaoyu Islands by China), and infiltrating U.S. military and public cyber networks. This unlawful behavior is likely to continue in the absence of a coercive response from the United States or its allies. But the United States, and to a lesser extent Japan, have little appetite to escalate such nonviolent disputes into open military or diplomatic crises. An effective strategic approach must therefore mitigate the destabilizing impacts of China’s behavior without militarizing the disputes.

The objective of conflict management is to minimize the negative political, economic, and military impacts of disputes and avoid escalation. Conflict is here defined as a dispute with the potential to draw nations into war. A conflict often escalates into a crisis, a critical decision point at which military action is imminent or limited to less than the 1,000 deaths that normally define a war. In the case of the U.S.-China relationship, managing chronic conflict requires a greater emphasis on local information and awareness, law enforcement, and coordinated political-military responses to crises. This approach is similar to preventative diplomacy, but with the key distinction that conflict management implies a resolution is not possible either under current conditions or in any reasonable amount of time. Mediation and negotiation over specific claims are therefore less central to conflict management than conflict resolution. This is not to say that resolution is not desirable: by reducing tension in the near term, conflict management leaves open the option for a more permanent solution in the future. While deterrence will continue to underpin the prevention of war, dealing with China’s nonmilitary assertiveness requires a coherent conflict management framework to strengthen situational awareness, bilateral communication, and law enforcement while mitigating the risk of escalation and miscalculation.

How to Start Worrying and Loathe the Bomb

U.S. policymakers recognized the limitations of deterrence early in the Cold War. Even as Washington and Moscow assembled massive stockpiles of nuclear and conventional weapons that prohibitively raised the cost of war, they also competed for influence in proxy conflicts across the globe. Deterrence theorist B.H. Liddell Hart warned in 1954 that the threat of nuclear war reduced the likelihood for direct aggression but simultaneously increased the possibility of limited, peripheral conflict. As fictional character Dr. Strangelove commented, the reason deterrence is not practical in such contexts “must be all too obvious” as it fails when threats are not “completely credible and convincing.”

To mitigate the limitations of strategic deterrence during the Cold War, the United States developed flexible response options that prepared for military action across the spectrum of warfare. This approach complemented and was used in conjunction with strategic deterrence. It expanded the military options for limited war and therefore made deterrence more credible at the lower end of the conflict spectrum. Yet while the flexible response doctrine enabled more nuanced military action, it was still at its core a means to better deter the Soviet Union. It did not require policymakers to develop a more sophisticated political and social understanding of the conflicts they faced.

The Gulf of Tonkin incident illustrates the risk involved with this strategic framework. When North Vietnamese vessels fired on U.S. Navy ships in 1964, President Lyndon Johnson favored an increase in the American presence in South Vietnam to deter Soviet expansionism. In this mindset, the U.S. security architecture was limited in the courses of action it allowed itself: to respond with nuclear weapons to deter Russia, through the proxy of North Vietnam, or through a limited war. Yet the incident in the Gulf of Tonkin was a sideshow to the real conflict occurring within Vietnam between an illegitimate government and an ideological insurgency. While a deterrence strategy kept the United States focused on adversaries outside Vietnam, a conflict management approach would have emphasized preventing the spread of the discontent within Vietnam that was undermining the country’s stability. Such a view would have prioritized minimizing the negative fallout of Tonkin by focusing on the political and domestic context beforehand and allowing for a proportionate political and military response afterward.

This is not to say that Cold War leaders failed to consider conflict management. In crises that avoided hostile action, fear of escalation helped the United States and Soviet Union develop bilateral conflict management mechanisms, albeit in an ad hoc manner. A breakthrough in crisis management followed the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 when Washington and Moscow established a “red phone” hotline for leadership consultations. The two superpowers also signed an agreement for handling incidents at sea in 1972. Yet conflict management never became a strategic framework on par with deterrence or embedded as part of a multifaceted spectrum of response options.

Moving Up, Moving On

Today, the United States addresses disputes with China with a mindset stuck in the Cold War. Washington continues to rely on deterrence and flexible response options with too little appreciation for expanding its ad hoc approach to minor, nonmilitarized disputes and crises. Just as it developed flexible response options to complement strategic deterrence during the Cold War, the United States needs a coherent approach to conflict management to address incidents, such as cyber crime and incursions into sovereign territory, that remain below its threshold for a military response.

This is especially clear in the South China Sea, where the drivers of China’s excessive sovereignty claims—including access to fishing and hydrocarbon resources as well as resurgent national pride—have increased in recent years. Yet with each new incident, the United States seems taken aback, scrambling for an effective show of force but ultimately failing to curb the illicit actions. This confusion arises in part because diplomatic and military officials have approached the sovereignty disputes from opposite directions: the Department of State has focused on resolving the disputes while the Department of Defense talks in terms of deterring adversaries, even as both resort to conflict management in practice.

The State Department has approached the disputes through a lens of conflict resolution, arguing that stronger international codes of behavior, military posturing, and strategic dialogue will eventually convince China to abandon its excessive maritime claims. Yet this approach overlooks the intractability of the disputes, causing diplomats to scramble for ad hoc responses as each new incident occurs. A dialogue focused on resolution also misses the point that U.S. interests primarily lie in staying out of the conflicts, not in solving them. While Washington stands willing to back its allies in the event of an armed attack, it has been equally clear that it does not take sides in the South China Sea sovereignty disputes.

U.S. efforts to shape China’s behavior without getting drawn into specific disputes have led diplomats to pursue conflict management without clearly admitting they are doing so. For example, the United States has been supportive of a robust and enforceable Code of Conduct on the South China Sea. Such a document could significantly reduce tensions and inspire joint development of disputed waters. While China’s resistance and the need for consensus in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) make it unlikely that a Code of Conduct would be an enforceable document, it would at the least defuse tension by establishing norms of behavior for all claimants. Describing this effort as an element of a conflict management framework would set realistic expectations about the region’s ability to manage, but not necessarily solve, disagreements. It would also clarify that Washington’s underlying interest is in stability, whether that involves the repeal of excessive claims.

Like the State Department, the U.S. military is already conducting conflict management, but in ad hoc ways and without the benefit of a clearly articulated strategic framework. Many of these actions look like diplomacy: supporting cooperative security mechanisms through ASEAN, talking frankly to Chinese leadership in military-to-military dialogues, and encouraging U.S. allies to maintain a cool-headed response to aggression. A conflict management framework would connect these activities in an approach that is separate from, but complementary to, deterrence.

A clear framework would also help the military balance its priorities for conflict management and deterrence, particularly as resources are reduced. Guidance published in Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership in 2012 stated that the U.S. military would “continue to promote a rules-based international order that ensures underlying stability and encourages the peaceful rise of new powers, economic dynamism, and constructive defense cooperation.”2 However, the priority missions articulated in the guidance include deterring adversary aggression and countering adversary antiaccess capabilities, while military efforts to “provide a stabilizing presence”3 are to be carefully examined in light of shrinking budgets.

Differentiating the military’s conflict management activities from deterrence would help to bring it in line with the diplomatic discourse by addressing the behavior of all parties in the dispute. In the South China Sea, nearly all parties have made excessive maritime claims and engaged in provocations. As the United States attempts to reduce tensions without taking sides, it is more useful to think in terms of managing a complex situation than deterring a potential adversary. Establishing a discourse about conflict management would moderate the expectations of allies and alter the “us versus them” dynamic inherent in deterrence, which is by definition directed against a specific adversary. By eliminating an implied adversary, conflict management builds a more inclusive narrative consistent with the view that productive bilateral cooperation is possible despite inevitable points of friction around China’s periphery.

Sovereignty disputes in the South China Sea and Senkaku Islands are not the only aspect of the U.S.-China relationship that would benefit from a conflict management framework. Cyber security also falls within the category of confrontations that deterrence is not designed to prevent. As Betts correctly points out, retaliation in response to cyber attacks is rarely credible because of the difficulty of identifying the perpetrator.4 Conflict management, with its emphasis on mitigating the consequences of recurring attacks, provides a more flexible perspective. Such a framework would encourage open communication, publicly revealing perpetrators rather than fighting back, demonstrating one’s own commitment to cyber norms, and galvanizing multilateral support for enforcing those norms. This approach is broad enough to address the myriad cyber criminals who attack government and private-sector systems, while also being more agile than an adversary-focused deterrence strategic framework that risks escalation through retribution.

While its flexibility is ideal for multiparty disputes, conflict management also has a role in cases where there is a clear adversarial relationship. The stalemate with China over Taiwan illustrates the potential benefits of conflict management when an effective military deterrent is in place. Since rapprochement with China in the 1970s, Washington has politically prioritized conflict management in the Taiwan issue, warning Taipei against independence and acknowledging that China has a claim to the island. At the same time, the United States has maintained a deterrent capability through its forward presence in the western Pacific. While various administrations have waffled about whether deterrence or conflict management is more effective, as demonstrated by regular changes in arms sales policies to Taiwan, it is the two approaches working in concert that has provided the greatest stability. This two-pronged approach does not “undermine Washington’s readiness for a crisis,” as some argue.5 Rather, it mitigates the likelihood of a crisis while maintaining military readiness.

Easier Said Than Done

Conflict management makes sense for two powerful countries that recognize the costs of war, but a critical shortcoming of conflict management compared to deterrence is that it requires both countries to play along. While deterrence qua mutually assured destruction forced a process of conflict management with the Soviet Union, it fails with China. As the likelihood of an exchange of intercontinental ballistic missiles between Beijing and Washington today has decreased relative to Moscow and Washington in 1962, the influence of deterrence has dissipated, and with it the impetus for robust escalation controls. China often refuses to communicate at moments of high tensions. It has not established a “red phone” with Japan and at times does not respond to its crisis hotline with Washington. Beijing also actively works to undermine ASEAN unity on security issues, recognizing that a united ASEAN can counterbalance its own interests. Michael Swaine maintains that although China understands the dangers of miscalculation, it tends to view conflict in zero-sum terms and has a low threshold for the use of force, possibly to compensate for its perception of relative weakness.6

Even in areas where it recognizes the value of strategic dialogue, China has a different approach than the Soviet Union to its relationship with the United States. In testimony before Congress, former Commander of U.S. Pacific Command Admiral Robert Willard pointed to “differences in philosophy regarding the purpose of military-to-military relations in which China emphasizes strategic dialogue and the U.S. seeks comprehensive military contact from the strategic to tactical levels as a way to build confidence.”7

Optimists hope that gradual military modernization and experience as a world power will help China recognize the importance of tactical military contact for preventing crisis escalation. For example, it was reported on January 19, 2013, that a Chinese warship aimed its fire control radar at a Japanese military helicopter, an action that indicates either a careless radar operator or a precursor to locking on a gun or missile system. Greater military-to-military contact would help to normalize such accidents and clarify intentions. Yet China’s willingness to risk its relationship with the United States, in spite of, or perhaps because of, a strong bilateral strategic dialogue, suggests that China’s political maturity alone would not lead to better conflict management. Unilateral U.S. actions to limit the political, economic, and military consequences of enduring disputes would be essential for enduring what promises to be a rocky road ahead.

If It’s Broke, Fix It

To progress from a strategic framework based primarily on deterrence to one that integrates requirements for conflict management, the United States should focus on three critical areas: altering the definition of success for longstanding disputes, refocusing U.S. objectives on whole-of-government conflict management activities rather than flexible response options, and encouraging a broader dialogue on security issues and their economic and political impacts.

Perhaps the most significant impact of adding a conflict management framework is that it establishes feasible metrics for success. Deterrence is notoriously difficult to assess. The failure of deterrence to prevent war is readily apparent, but how does one know if a given absence of conflict is caused by a given policy of deterrence? Metrics for conflict management, however, could assess progress even if—or when—an incident occurs. Progress might include implementation of crisis communication mechanisms, incident response procedures, and institutionalized consultations on issues of concern. In addition, success would involve establishing realistic expectations among parties, and identifying “off-ramps” rather than “redlines” to ensure incidents do not escalate to crises. An ideal endstate need not include conflict resolution.

A few examples of moderate successes are already available in the South China Sea. Brunei and Malaysia are jointly developing their overlapping South China Sea maritime claims, and several other parties have shown an interest in multilateral exploration. This approach provides robust conflict management without solving the underlying sovereignty disagreement. The decision of the Philippines to send its claims to an arbitration tribunal is also a success for conflict management. Even if China rejects the findings of the tribunal, the Philippine effort represents a nonmilitary approach to the problem.

With a conflict management mindset, the Intelligence Community should reassess its intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) in order to address issues before they escalate. While ISR supports both deterrence and conflict management, conflict management prioritizes political and social factors that influence disputes. Tracking fishing boats in the South China Sea may seem a low priority from the classical deterrence perspective, but through the lens of conflict management, its strategic importance is made clear. Twenty-four hours can make the difference in whether Washington is involved in managing a dispute or reacting to a crisis, and imagery of incidents helps clarify who is acting contrary to international norms and galvanizes opinions against the aggressor. As data are disseminated, the United States should also improve coordination across the Intelligence Community and with nongovernmental organizations. Unlike strategic deterrence, the indications and warnings for escalation to crisis go beyond movements of military assets and require a detailed understanding of the broader environment, with special emphasis on both domestic and international political relationships.

In terms of military planning, a conflict management framework would restructure military peacetime objectives. Realistic objectives should acknowledge the limitations of deterrence while focusing attention on preventing escalation of inevitable incidents. The military might come to view disagreements over disputed islands in much the same way it views natural disasters: as detrimental to regional stability but addressed through consistent engagement and capacity-building that supports the work of other governmental agencies. While the Department of Defense must maintain its primary objective of deterring adversary militaries, it should reorient its approach to problems such as cyber security that are not suited to deterrence and address them more as issues of law enforcement.

One important conflict management objective is strengthening partner nation interoperability and combined exercises to reduce the political-military consequences of incidents—an area in which the U.S. military has already made significant progress. The U.S. invitation to China to join the Rim of the Pacific exercises in 2014, for example, contributes to conflict management efforts and should be prioritized accordingly. These activities will be even more important (and should be expanded) as greater military activity in disputed regions increases the risk of escalation. Indonesia, Vietnam, and Singapore are investing in new submarines, and defense spending is on the rise across the region. China has also been more visible since conducting a series of naval exercises in the South China Sea in 2008. A primary mission for the U.S. military in a period of fiscal austerity is to ensure these new forces learn to work and play together—and with the People’s Liberation Army Navy. A conflict management framework would prioritize these value-added engagements.

Differentiating deterrence and conflict management as two distinct efforts might generate cost savings by reorienting the military’s capability requirements. Whereas a credible military deterrent includes rapidly deployable bombers, aircraft carriers, and ballistic missiles, China used paramilitary vessels and fishing boats to gain control of Scarborough Reef. A U.S. aircraft carrier in Subic Bay is unlikely to dissuade these fishing vessels if its threat of force is not credible. Deterrence still requires an assured conventional response, but at the lower end of the conflict spectrum, destroyers could be as effective as carrier strike groups at demonstrating U.S. resolve to enforce international law, and F-16s are as obvious as F-35s at flying by disputed territories to show the flag. Only by clearly articulating distinct missions in support of conflict management can the military identify the right assets and partners to support nonmilitary confrontation.

However, military activities in conflict management will always be only a small part of the solution. China’s civil and paramilitary aggression requires a civil and paramilitary response. Therefore, more important than expanding the military’s role in conflict management is expanding the ability of U.S. law enforcement agencies to conduct capacity-building abroad. The best U.S. interlocutors to develop partner nation capabilities to patrol their exclusive economic zones and manage intrusions during the fishing season are the U.S. Coast Guard and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), which leads scientific exploration and fisheries management. Unfortunately, their international reach and blue-water resources are limited, so these organizations must rely on military assets to support their engagement and conflict management activities.

This does not mean that Coast Guard ships should be patrolling the islands in the South China Sea, but rather that nonmilitary agencies should be provided with extensive new resources to do international engagements and capacity-building missions with other partners. The Coast Guard, which primarily operates domestically, has one-sixteenth of the Navy’s budget, at just under $10 billion, while NOAA has half that amount. If the United States intends to build regional capabilities to counter China’s nonmilitary approach, Congress must ensure other agencies have the bandwidth to engage more internationally. As these resources increase, it might be possible to create a joint task force, similar to U.S. Pacific Command’s Joint Interagency Task Force–West for counternarcotics, and to establish truly cooperative approaches to domestic maritime issues, including patrolling exclusive economic zones, managing fisheries, and supporting other law enforcement activities. This professional maritime law enforcement capability would make it more difficult for China to establish and hold its excessive claims. A greater local law enforcement presence would also provide a clearer distinction between military and nonmilitary confrontation compared to a naval vessel operating with law enforcement authorities.

To ensure that partner nation military and law enforcement assets contribute to regional stability rather than undermine it, the United States must continue to support multilateral forums such as ASEAN and the annual China–Japan–Republic of Korea trilateral summit. These forums strengthen relationships among senior leaders, and when tensions are high, they work as a venue for claimants to voice their frustration without resorting to military coercion. During periods of cooperation, the forums could promote agreements on joint resource development and establish procedures for post-incident investigations. Focusing on institution-building by leveraging international governmental bodies would simultaneously ameliorate pathologies that spread political disagreements and empower multilateral cooperation toward conflict management. The extent to which China undermines these organizations would highlight its disruptive behavior. While this is consistent with the current U.S. approach, a conflict management framework would clarify the intent and purpose of multilateral engagements, particularly for defense cooperation, beyond just reinforcing international norms.

To develop these tools, a serious dialogue about conflict management requires experts from the fields of negotiation, mediation, and arbitration, while incorporating and expanding the tools of preventative diplomacy. Unlike deterrence, this broader dialogue offers an opportunity to better address historical and cultural factors vis-à-vis the most intractable problems in the region.

All of the above initiatives also require that the security dialogue be broadened domestically across the U.S. Government. Twenty-first-century security strategy must be built around the understanding that the domestic affects the international—an understanding which is acknowledged, but not fully implemented. The contemporary geopolitical landscape demands that diplomatic efforts blend with those of the military and vice versa. The crucial strategic move involves a reorientation, not a reallocation, of human and financial capital. Functioning interagency partnerships could be developed by instituting the type of cross-cultural pollination that already exists between the branches of the U.S. military, each of which has its own educational and training systems, while also ensuring that seats are given to officers of other Services. A feasible step to ensure a wide breadth of shared expertise and contacts throughout U.S. and allied public and private organizations is to design an educational system wherein this more eclectic crowd can work and learn together. Few things allow for enduring cooperation like time spent getting to know a comrade in the classroom, coffee shop, and pub.

Such cultural changes needed for a strategic reorientation are not as difficult to execute as they may at first appear, and they could effectively be instituted by congressional legislation. In 1986, Congress passed the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act, which ensures officers gain experience in joint Service positions as a prerequisite for promotion to senior ranks. A similar action would cause a much broader inter-Service outlook by mandating not only joint military Service positions, but also experience working in other nonmilitary departments and organizations entirely. This interagency development would operationalize Joseph Nye’s concept of “smart power” and ensure that all elements of national power are brought to bear on the intractable disputes of the Asia-Pacific.

It’s a Conflicted World after All

Conflict is endemic and will continue to occur. It is fortunate that, in some ways, we live in a safer world than that of the Cold War. No longer are we routinely forced to duck and cover under our desks to practice protecting ourselves from a nuclear blast. What we are faced with today, however, is hardly a halcyon international environment. If big wars are rare, smaller crises are not. A security strategy focused almost entirely on the rare, at the expense of serious thought and action regarding the common, is not the most useful framework to live with. A coherent security strategy must be both agile and predictable enough to deal with dangerous incidents while also preventing war.

Differentiating conflict management from deterrence would have a tangible impact on the U.S. approach to chronic conflicts in the Asia-Pacific and beyond. A focus on conflict management would improve military support of U.S. national interests by better reflecting the current diplomatic priorities and by refocusing military peacetime planning on new tools and objectives. It would modernize the current security dialogue from one focused on Cold War hard power approaches to one that better leverages civil-military power and the best practices of negotiation. Moving to such a strategic framework would also allow resources of time, money, and talent to be used more effectively to manage the unavoidable, while deterrence would be used to avoid the unthinkable. There is no reason why we should forget about deterrence, but it should not continue to monopolize our strategic thinking. The Cold War is long over, and it is time to implement what is already widely acknowledged but not acted on. Ultimately, by reducing tension and the risk of escalation in the near term, conflict management leaves open the possibility of a more permanent and secure solution in the future.

Source:
This article was originally published in the Joint Force Quarterly 76, which is published by the National Defense University.

Notes

1. Richard K. Betts, “The Lost Logic of Deterrence,” Foreign Affairs (March–April 2013), 99.
2. Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21^st Century Defense (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, January 2012), 2, available at <www.defense.gov/news/defense_strategic_guidance.pdf>.
3. Ibid., 5.
4. Betts, 88.
5. Ibid., 96.
6. Michael D. Swaine, passim, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Latest Analysis, available at <http://carnegieendowment.org/experts/index.cfm?fa=expert_view&expert_id=119>.
7. Robert F. Willard, “Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee on U.S. Pacific Command Posture,” February 28, 2012, 8.

The post Refocusing The US Strategic Security Perspective – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Salman, deputy premier and minister of defense, on Monday reassured the public about the health of Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques King Abdullah.

Presiding over a Cabinet meeting in Riyadh, Prince Salman thanked local and international well-wishers for their concern about the king, who was admitted to King Abdul Aziz National Guard Medical City in the capital with pneumonia on Dec. 31.

Prince Salman also prayed to the Almighty to preserve and grant King Abdullah good health. King Abdullah had earlier been placed on a respirator that would allow him to breathe easier.

The post Saudi Arabia Reiterates King Abdullah Is ‘Recovering From Illness’ appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Linda S. Heard

Oh what a tangled web the Arab country, considered to be the Cradle of Civilization, has become! When George W. Bush’s squads launched “Shock and Awe” on the false premise that Iraq had stocks of weapons of mass destruction, Pandora’s Box was opened and out popped a gift with the message “With love to Iran”, a message obliterated by the concept of democracy and freedom.

Iraqis proudly showed off their purple fingers which to them signified a bright future, free of dictatorship, and what did they get — heightened sectarianism, mass displacement, terrorist attacks, death and destruction. Some 15,000 Iraqis were robbed of their lives in 2014, so, however which way, the US cares to spin it, the Neoconservative-driven Bush administration was the catalyst of this eleven-year-long ongoing Iraqi tragedy. For all the western propaganda, prior to 2003, Iraqis of all ethnic and religious stripes lived together, socialized together, even prayed together — and inter-sectarian marriages were common. Furthermore, Saddam ran too much of a tight ship to permit terrorist infiltration.

Let’s quit fooling ourselves. Iraq and its Arab neighbors are certainly not better off following Saddam Hussein’s enforced exit. For all his many faults and security excesses, he was an Arab patriot who kept his country from splintering and under his watch Iraq was seen as a staunch Arab buffer against Iranian territorial ambitions within the region. Yes, he made very grave errors of judgment, such as Iraq’s invasion of a brotherly Arab state, Kuwait, and his chemical attacks on pro-Iranian Iraqi Kurds. But it appears that one devil has been swapped for a whole host of them.

Iraq today is a mere shadow of its former mighty self. Its army has become the stuff of jokes since it ran in the face of a relatively small band of crazies that have since morphed into the self-ascribed Islamic State (Daesh) and now occupies a significant swathe of the country. Former Prime Minister Al-Maliki has been blamed for expunging the military of Sunni generals while his security apparatus discriminated against Sunni tribes. And it’s only right that he should accept his share of blame for alienating the Sunni population. However, the US broke it and has a moral duty to fix it.

Instead, President Obama ignored Al-Maliki’s appeals for assistance in combating Daesh for months and until now is withholding a consignment of Apache helicopters that Iraq has already paid for. Obama reluctantly dipped his toes in the water with airstrikes only when many thousands of Yezidis fleeing from IS fighters were trapped on a mountaintop without sustenance. The US-led coalition has, in truth, succeeded in weakening the IS’ capabilities, but is nowhere close to eradicating the threat, despite the fact that, according to the Pentagon, the US alone has flown 13,232 combat missions and dropped 3,891 munitions. The US president has all but ruled out inserting ground troops due to domestic public opinion as well as his fraught relationship with Congress, when as most military strategists would tell him the only way to cleanse Iraq of these terrorists is to put boots on the ground.

Iraq was tentatively thrust under the sway of the Iranian ayatollahs with a Shiite-dominated government encompassing prominent figures, including Al-Maliki, who spent years in exile enjoying Iranian hospitality. Iraq’s foreign policy has closely mirrored Iran’s since the withdrawal of US-led coalition forces. Iran also trains and funds Iraqi Shiite militias and is Iraq’s primary trading partner.

Now that Obama’s lack of gumption vis-à-vis Daesh has been exposed, Iran is set to be the beneficiary. It is expanding its influence over this Arab country daily. Iran has launched airstrikes in eastern Iraq and has deployed Iranian Revolutionary Guards in country, “advisers” said to be engaged in armed combat. Iraq has recently signed a defense pact with Iraq, which includes the training, advising and assisting of Iraqi forces. “We assume Iran’s increased support for the Iraqi armed forces as a strategic necessity,” explained Khalid Al-Obeidi, Iraq’s Minister of Defense. Strange, when Iraq has a similar agreement with the US! This must surely imply that Washington isn’t up to the task.

The White House has expressed dismay over growing Iranian involvement in Iraq on the grounds that this undermines efforts to further Sunni-Shiite relations, but Obama has only himself to blame. His latest offering of less than 3,000 troops, supposedly there in an advisory capacity, is nothing more than a token force. On the other hand, Iran has announced it will do what it takes to rid its Arab neighbor of the IS menace that threatens Shiite holy sites throughout Iraq.

In fairness, the Arab world doesn’t deserve to be let off the hook either. Iran and its Shiite proxies now control four Arab capitals — Damascus, Beirut, Baghdad and Sanaa. Amid the mess the US purposefully or unwittingly created, the Iranians are the only ones laughing.

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US President Barack Obama should press President Enrique Peña Nieto to address Mexico’s failure to investigate and prosecute egregious abuses by Mexican security forces, Human Rights Watch said Monday in a letter to Obama.

Obama will host Peña Nieto at the White House on January 6, 2015. The United States has provided Mexico more than US$2 billion in funding since 2007 through the Merida Initiative, a joint US-Mexico effort to combat organized crime.

“Mexico is facing its worst human rights crisis in years, with security forces committing horrific abuses that are rarely punished,” said Daniel Wilkinson, Americas managing director at Human Rights Watch. “The Peña Nieto administration has so far failed to take this crisis seriously, and President Obama has been unwilling to call them on it.”

Two recent atrocities – the killing of 22 people by soldiers in Tlatlaya, Mexico state, in June 2014, and the enforced disappearance of 43 students in Iguala, Guerrero, in September – have drawn international media attention and prompted large-scale public protests in Mexico.

The two cases reflect a broader pattern of abuse and impunity, and are in large part the consequence of the Mexican government’s failure to address the issue, Human Rights Watch said. Since former President Felipe Calderón began a “war on drugs” in 2007, Mexican security forces have engaged in egregious violations, including torture, extrajudicial executions, and enforced disappearances. Human Rights Watch has documented such abuses by security forces throughout the country, including 149 cases of enforced disappearances. United Nations human rights monitors have found that torture is a “generalized” practice in the country, and that extrajudicial executions by security forces have been “widespread.”

The Peña Nieto administration has promised to take steps to investigate and prosecute the abuses, but has failed to follow through on its own initiatives.

Fifteen percent of US assistance provided under the Merida Initiative is supposed to be conditioned on Mexico meeting a set of basic human rights requirements, which include ensuring that security force violations are investigated and prosecuted.

The Obama administration has repeatedly certified that the Merida requirements are being met, despite clear evidence to the contrary, Human Rights Watch said. When asked about the Merida funds that are subject to these requirements, Obama said in December 2014 that “the best thing we can do is to be a good partner and to build on the progress that’s been made.”

The administration should withhold further certification until Mexico makes significant progress in prosecuting abuses by security forces, Human Rights Watch said.

“If President Obama wants to be a genuinely good partner, he needs to be willing to say what the Mexican government needs to hear,” Wilkinson said.

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By Mawassi Lahcen

An extremist militia in Derna sent a distress call to the Islamic State (ISIS) after Libyan troops tightened the noose and other local Islamists tried to oust them.

The group was already in the crosshairs of Libyan troops and Operation Dignity. Last month, clashes erupted with Ansar al-Sharia’s allies, the Derna Revolutionary Shura Council, which refuses to swear allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s self-proclaimed caliphate in Iraq and Syria.

So the embattled Derna fighters, feeling heat from all directions, called on ISIS to provide its Libyan branch with money and fighters from Syria.

In a letter published on ISIS-related websites on December 15th, Abu Arhim al-Libi said weapons were available in abundance in Libya and his group just needed money to buy them.

The request for help came as a response to Daesh instructions to turn Libya into a centre for recruiting jihadists from Maghreb countries.

According to the letter, Maghreb jihadists, particularly Tunisians, are eager to join ISIS in Libya, especially after the group announced the establishment of the Islamic State of Cyrenaica and created Sharia courts, Islamic police and a hisba office in Derna. However, the document referred to difficulties facing ISIS because of the siege imposed by Operation Dignity forces.

Al-Qaeda-affiliated groups have seized control of the city. The situation became even more complex last fall, when ISIS supporters started to clash with other extremist groups.

In the last week of 2014, clashes broke out between ISIS’ Cyrenaica branch and Ansar al-Sharia-affiliated Derna Revolutionary Shura Council, which refuses to swear allegiance to Daesh. Several members of both groups were reportedly killed and wounded.

Just days earlier, Haftar’s forces had launched a ground assault – supported by airstrikes – on the Derna suburbs.

The December 12th operations targeted the town’s entrances and gates. Libyan forces also launched airstrikes on Derna’s seaport, which the terrorist groups use to get weapons, support and foreign fighters.

“The city has for three years been living under the mercy of extremist militias that allied with criminal gangs engaged in arms trafficking, trade and looting,” Motaz Laribi told Magharebia.

“Throughout this period, the city has been witnessing continuous bombings, blasts and the sounds of bullets,” said Laribi, a Derna resident forced to flee town with his family to al-Bayda. “There are assassinations and extrajudicial executions every day; anyone who just opposes the terrorist groups is killed under the pretext that he is infidel or a remnant of Kadhafi’s regime.”

The situation has become even worse since summer. “In July, a group of Egyptians, Tunisians and Saudis came to town from Syria,” he explained. “They were tasked with setting up an ISIS branch in Libya.”

Derna extremists didn’t welcome the newcomers, and clashes soon broke out between the radical groups. New ISIS reinforcements came to Derna in September via the seaport, tipping the scale of power in ISIS’ favour, and prompting the declaration of the Islamist state in Cyrenaica.

Benothmane al-Aqouri, an engineer from Derna, remarked that ISIS’ plans in Derna were doomed.

“It’s only a matter of time before the Libyan army launches a decisive battle to recover the town,” he said.

But a Derna battle won’t be easy, al-Aqouri added. “Derna is surrounded by rough terrain, mountains and valleys that terrorists exploit to isolate the stricken city from the rest of Libya and prevent the national army from entering it. However, Haftar forces have the advantage of air power,” he said.

Derna, home to about 90,000 residents, doesn’t have major economic resources or oilfields, and therefore, al-Aqouri expects that the siege will weaken the terrorists who control the town.

“It’s also clear from the document that the group is facing a financial crisis,” al-Aqouri added. “Therefore, it is asking the parent ISIS to supply it with money.”

In addition, victories made by Haftar’s forces have undermined ISIS dreams about turning Libya into a base for overrunning the Maghreb and North and West Africa, he said.

“However, this doesn’t mean that the danger is now over,” he said. “Libya will need years to regain its stability and peace. It urgently needs assistance from the international community to build its military and security capabilities.”

“It shouldn’t wait until Libya becomes another Iraq or Syria.”

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Republicans who now run Congress say they want to cooperate with President Obama, and point to the administration’s Trans-Pacific Partnership, or TPP, as the model. The only problem is the TPP would be a disaster.

If you haven’t heard much about the TPP, that’s part of the problem right there. It would be the largest trade deal in history — involving countries stretching from Chile to Japan, representing 792 million people and accounting for 40 percent of the world economy – yet it’s been devised in secret.

Lobbyists from America’s biggest corporations and Wall Street’s biggest banks have been involved but not the American public. That’s a recipe for fatter profits and bigger paychecks at the top, but not a good deal for most of us, or even for most of the rest of the world.

First some background. We used to think about trade policy as a choice between “free trade” and “protectionism.” Free trade meant opening our borders to products made elsewhere. Protectionism meant putting up tariffs and quotas to keep them out.

In the decades after World War II, America chose free trade. The idea was that each country would specialize in goods it produced best and at least cost. That way, living standards would rise here and abroad. New jobs would be created to take the place of jobs that were lost. And communism would be contained.

For three decades, free trade worked. It was a win-win-win.

But in more recent decades the choice has become far more complicated and the payoff from trade agreements more skewed to those at the top.

Tariffs are already low. Negotiations now involve such things as intellectual property, financial regulations, labor laws, and rules for health, safety, and the environment.

It’s no longer free trade versus protectionism. Big corporations and Wall Street want some of both.

They want more international protection when it comes to their intellectual property and other assets. So they’ve been seeking trade rules that secure and extend their patents, trademarks, and copyrights abroad, and protect their global franchise agreements, securities, and loans.

But they want less protection of consumers, workers, small investors, and the environment, because these interfere with their profits. So they’ve been seeking trade rules that allow them to override these protections.

Not surprisingly for a deal that’s been drafted mostly by corporate and Wall Street lobbyists, the TPP provides exactly this mix.

What’s been leaked about it so far reveals, for example, that the pharmaceutical industry gets stronger patent protections, delaying cheaper generic versions of drugs. That will be a good deal for Big Pharma but not necessarily for the inhabitants of developing nations who won’t get certain life-saving drugs at a cost they can afford.

The TPP also gives global corporations an international tribunal of private attorneys, outside any nation’s legal system, who can order compensation for any “unjust expropriation” of foreign assets.

Even better for global companies, the tribunal can order compensation for any lost profits found to result from a nation’s regulations. Philip Morris is using a similar provision against Uruguay (the provision appears in a bilateral trade treaty between Uruguay and Switzerland), claiming that Uruguay’s strong anti-smoking regulations unfairly diminish the company’s profits.

Anyone believing the TPP is good for Americans take note: The foreign subsidiaries of U.S.-based corporations could just as easily challenge any U.S. government regulation they claim unfairly diminishes their profits – say, a regulation protecting American consumers from unsafe products or unhealthy foods, investors from fraudulent securities or predatory lending, workers from unsafe working conditions, taxpayers from another bailout of Wall Street, or the environment from toxic emissions.

The administration says the trade deal will boost U.S. exports in the fast-growing Pacific basin where the United States faces growing economic competition from China. The TPP is part of Obama’s strategy to contain China’s economic and strategic prowess.

Fine. But the deal will also allow American corporations to outsource even more jobs abroad.

In other words, the TPP is a Trojan horse in a global race to the bottom, giving big corporations and Wall Street banks a way to eliminate any and all laws and regulations that get in the way of their profits.

At a time when corporate profits are at record highs and the real median wage is lower than it’s been in four decades, most Americans need protection – not from international trade but from the political power of large corporations and Wall Street.

The Trans Pacific Partnership is the wrong remedy to the wrong problem. Any way you look at it, it’s just plain wrong.

The post Why Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement Is A Pending Disaster – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Kenneth Katzman*

Kuwait’s optimism after the 2003 fall of its nemesis, Saddam Hussein, soured after the January 15, 2006, death of Amir (ruler) Jabir Ahmad al-Jabir Al Sabah. Since then, Kuwait has lurched from one political crisis to the next, producing a sense of economic and political stagnation. At the time of Amir Jabir’s death, his successor, Shaykh Sa’ad bin Abdullah Al Sabah, was very ill (he later died), and a brief succession dispute among rival branches of the ruling Al Sabah family ensued. It was resolved with then Prime Minister Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad al-Jabir Al Sabah, the younger brother of the late Amir, succeeding him on January 29, 2006. Shaykh Sabah is about 83 years old. The succession dispute was unprecedented in Kuwait and the broader Gulf region for the first involvement of an elected legislature in replacing a leader.

Although the leadership question was resolved, it produced a suspension of the tacit agreement to alternate succession between the Jabir and Salem branches of the family. Amir Sabah appointed two members of his Jabir branch as Crown Prince/heir apparent and as prime minister (Shaykh Nawwaf al-Ahmad Al Sabah and Shaykh Nasser al Muhammad al-Ahmad Al Sabah respectively). Tensions between the two branches of the family have since simmered.

Government Structure

The Bayan Palace serves as the seat of the Government of Kuwait. Photo by Chris Greenberg, White House.

Under Kuwait’s 1962 constitution, the Amir is the head of state and ruler of Kuwait. He serves as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, appoints all judges, and has the power to suspend the National Assembly for limited periods of time. The Amirs can be as involved in or detached from day-to-day governance as he chooses; Amir Sabah tends to be more directly involved in governance than was his predecessor.

The Amir appoints a Prime Minister, as head of government, who in turn appoints a cabinet. The Prime Minister has always been a member of the Sabah family, and until 2003 the Prime Minister and Crown Prince/heir apparent posts were held by a single person. Some in the Sabah family argue that the Prime Minister and Crown Prince positions should again be combined because the National Assembly is not constitutionally able to question the Crown Prince.

In typical Kuwaiti cabinets, three out of four deputy prime ministers are members of the family, as are the Defense Minister, Foreign Minister, Interior Minister, and at least a few other ministers. The Prime Minister is Shaykh Jabir al-Mubarak Al Sabah, who took office in December 4, 2011, and was reappointed following the July 2013 elections. The cabinet has 28 ministers, plus a Central Bank governor. Shaykh Nawwaf, mentioned above, remains Crown Prince/heir apparent.

The Elected National Assembly

Kuwait. Source: Graphic created by CRS. Boundaries and cities generated by Hannah Fischer using data from Department of State, Esri, and Google Maps (all 2013).

The National Assembly, established by Kuwait’s November 1962 constitution, is the longest- serving all-elected body among the Gulf monarchies. Fifty seats are elected, and up to 16 members of the cabinet serve in the Assembly ex-officio. The government has expanded the electorate gradually: in the 1990s, the government extended the vote to sons of naturalized Kuwaitis and Kuwaitis naturalized for at least 20 years (as opposed to 30) years. The prohibition on female suffrage began to break in May 2004, after the government submitted to the Assembly a bill to give women the same rights to vote and run as men. (A government attempt in May 1999 to institute female suffrage by decree was vetoed by the Assembly.) In May 2005, then Prime Minister Shaykh Sabah (now Amir) pressed the Assembly to adopt the government bill, which it did on May 16, 2005 (35-23); the bill was effective as of the 2006 National Assembly elections. In recent elections, about 400,000 Kuwaitis have been eligible to vote.

Assembly Authorities

Although Kuwait’s constitution enshrines the hereditary monarchy, the Kuwait National Assembly has more scope of authority than any legislative or consultative body in the Persian Gulf. It can introduce legislation as well as vote on government-introduced legislation. The Assembly does not confirm cabinet nominees (individually or en bloc), but it can, by simple majority, remove individual ministers in a vote of “no confidence.” When the Assembly takes that step, it generally does so after parliamentary questioning of that minister, referred to as “grilling.” The Assembly can vote no confidence in the prime minister by voting “inability to cooperate with the government,” and it can veto government decrees issued during periods of Assembly suspension. Amirs of Kuwait have, on several occasions (1976-1981, 1986-1992, 2003, 2006, 2008, 2009, 2011, and 2012), used their constitutional authority to dissolve the Assembly when it grilled or threatened to grill government ministers. Suspension of the Assembly mandates new elections within 60 days.

Those opposing the government have tended to seek greater authority for the Assembly and a limitation of the powers of the government and by extension, limitations of the political and economic power of the Al Sabah. The opposition, in general, seeks a constitutional monarchy in which the Assembly, or an elected majority faction within the Assembly, names a Prime Minister who in turn assembles a cabinet. The governmental infighting provided rationale and additional political space for various youth and other reform-oriented groups inspired by the 2011 Arab uprisings to support activist parliamentarians’ efforts to limit the ruling family’s powers.

Political Factions in and Outside the National Assembly

Political parties are still not permitted, but factions are organized and compete in Assembly elections as “currents,” “trends,” or “political societies.” Many of these factions meet and plan their strategies at a parallel Kuwaiti tradition called diwaniyyas—informal social gatherings, held at night, held by elites of all political ideologies and backgrounds. There are a growing number of diwaniyyas organized by women. Factions in Kuwait, both in and outside the National Assembly, are often fluid, but in general they group as follows:

The “Opposition”

• “Liberals.” Highly educated elites who tend to form the core of the opposition to the government. Many of the liberals had been part of Arab nationalist movements in the 1960s and 1970s, and in many cases have studied abroad. In prior years they had operated under the banner “Kuwait Democratic Forum.” Some liberal Kuwaitis often side with the government.
• Sunni Islamists. They are generally opposed to the government. Within this broad category, there are two major groupings: those linked to the Muslim Brotherhood, and harder line Sunnis called Salafists. Those linked to the Muslim Brotherhood have often operated under a banner called the Islamic Constitutional Movement (ICM).
• Youths and Intellectuals. The broader opposition, outside the National Assembly, the opposition includes youth and intellectuals, many of whom have become more active since the Arab uprisings began in early 2011 but have been active in Kuwait far longer than that. Since 2008, these groups have sometimes organized during election campaigns to support liberal deputies, using such names as the “Orange Movement” or “Fifth Fence.”

Government Supporters

• “Tribalists.” Generally less educated but who dominate two out of the five electoral districts and tend to support the government, although not universally. At times, some tribalists in the Assembly have grouped into a faction widely referred to as “service deputies”—Assembly members primarily focused on steering government largesse and patronage to their constituents.
• Shiites. Most in the Assembly are Islamists, assembled in a bloc called the National Islamic Alliance. They tend to side with the government, perhaps out of greater concern about Sunni Islamists.
• Women. When in the Assembly, female deputies, both Shiite and Sunni, have tended to align with the government.

Post-2006 Political Crises: Assembly Suspensions and Elections

The constant disputes between the Al Sabah and oppositionists in the Assembly during 2006-2013 manifested as repeated Assembly suspensions and subsequent elections. None of these actions has resolved fundamental differences over the power balance between the executive and the legislature.

Elections During 2006 – 2009

• Five months after becoming leader, Amir Sabah suspended the Assembly in May 2006 when 29 opposition members demanded to question the Prime Minister over the government’s refusal to reduce the number of electoral districts to five (from 25). The opposition wanted the larger districts to make it more difficult to influence the outcome through “vote buying” or tribal politics.
• June 29, 2006 election. In this election, the opposition, which attracted youth support under the “Orange” banner, won 34 out of the 50 seats. The election was the first in which women could vote or run, but none of the 27 women candidates won. After the election, the Amir accepted demands to reduce the number of electoral districts to five and a law to implement that change, as of the next election, took effect.
• May 17, 2008 Election. The disputes between the opposition and the government produced another crisis in March 2008 when the Assembly insisted on pay raises for state employees to help them cope with spiraling inflation. The government refused, the cabinet resigned, and the Amir dissolved the Assembly and set new elections for May 17, 2008. Sunni Islamists and conservative tribal leaders won a total of 24 seats—an increase of 4 and their allies—the so-called “liberals”—won seven seats. Shiites increased their representation by one, to a total of five seats. Pro-government and other independent tribalists held the remaining 14 seats. As in the 2006 election, none of the 27 female candidates was elected. In November 2008, the cabinet resigned when three Sunni Assembly deputies requested to question the Prime Minister about corruption and the visit of a radical Iranian Shiite cleric, but the Amir did not suspend the Assembly.
• May 16, 2009 Election. The power struggle between the government and opposition deputies flared anew in March 2009 when the Assembly insisted on questioning the Prime Minister on his handling of the global financial crisis and alleged misuse of public funds. On March 19, 2009, the Amir suspended the Assembly, triggering elections held on May 16, 2009. Turnout was relatively light at about 55% of the 385,000 eligible voters, and produced more than 20 new parliamentarians, including four women—the first women to be elected. They included Masouma Mubarak (a Shiite); Rola Dashti (who was narrowly defeated in 2006); and two professors. In December 2009, Assembly members questioned Prime Minister Shaykh Nasser for corruption in the earlier 2008 elections, marking the first time in the Gulf region that a head of government appeared before an elected body. On December 17, 2009, a new election was avoided when deputies voted 35-13 to express confidence in him, but he only narrowly survived a no-confidence vote on January 5, 2011 (22 of the 50 Assembly deputies supported the motion). 2

Arab Uprisings Intensify Kuwait’s Political Crisis

The Arab uprisings that began in early 2011 affected Kuwait by broadening the opposition beyond the National Assembly and other elites. In late January 2011, opposition deputies, supported by youths calling themselves the “Fifth Fence,” demanded Interior Minister Jabir al- Khalid Al Sabah resign for failing to prevent the alleged torturing to death of a man in custody. He acceded to that demand in advance of a February 8, 2011 protest. In March 2011, a Shiite parliamentarian requested a “grilling” of the Foreign Minister about Kuwait’s sending of naval forces as part of the GCC military intervention to support Bahrain’s government—a decision many Kuwaiti Shiites opposed as unjustly supporting the Sunni monarchy of Bahrain. To head off the questioning, the cabinet resigned, and Prime Minister Nasser formed a new cabinet on May 8, 2011 (the seventh cabinet formed by Shaykh Nasser after he became Prime Minister).

The government came under renewed popular pressure in September 2011 following reports that two of Kuwait’s largest banks had deposited at least $92 million into the accounts of several parliamentarians. The payments implied that the government had sought to buy the loyalty of parliamentarians. Thousands of Kuwait protesters took to the streets on September 21 and September 23, 2011 to call for the resignation of the Prime Minister. Probably as a direct response to the allegations, on September 25, 2011, the cabinet adopted an anti-corruption draft law. The protests were accompanied by strikes in the oil industry and the state-run banking and health care industry in September 2011. However, these job actions did not appear directly related to the political disputes, but rather to disputes over pay, benefits, and working conditions.

2012-2013: Frequent Elections and Demonstrations

With protests in the streets continuing, in October 2011 opposition Assembly deputies boycotted committee meetings, and moderate liberals joined opposition deputies to give the opposition enough votes for a successful no-confidence motion against the prime minister. On November 16, 2011, oppositionists in and outside the Assembly, including the Fifth Fence, forced their way into the Assembly building and demanded Prime Minister Nasser’s resignation. On November 28, 2011, he did so. The Amir subsequently appointed another royal family member, then-Defense Minister Shaykh Jabir al-Mubarak Al Sabah, as Prime Minister. He was sworn in, but without first naming a new cabinet, on December 4, 2011. Two days later, on December 6, 2011, he recommended—and Amir Sabah concurred—dissolution of the National Assembly and new elections. New Assembly elections were set for February 2, 2012 (within the constitutionally mandated 60 days).

• February 2, 2012, Election. In the run up to the vote, 20 opposition deputies announced they would compete as one “Opposition Bloc.” Youth leaders announced they would back opposition deputies who would push for a fully elected government in which the prime minister is selected by the Assembly, not the ruling family; legalization of political parties; and election law changes. Such announcements affirmed the assertions of the royal family that calling new elections would empower oppositionists—liberal and Islamist—sympathetic to the 2011 Arab uprisings. However, refusing to call a new election would have portrayed the government as attempting to cover up alleged corruption. As shown in Table 1 below, groups opposed to the government won at least 32 of the 50 seats. Islamist groups increased their influence markedly, but liberals lost support. None of the 19 women who ran was elected. Turnout was about 62%, slightly higher than the 2009 election. A leading opposition figure, Ahmad al- Sadun, a previous speaker (1985-1999), returned to that post when the Assembly convened in February 2012, replacing the pro-government Jassim Al-Khurafi, a major figure in Kuwait’s merchant community.
• The government formed after the election was again headed by Prime Minister Shaykh Jabir al-Mubarak Al Sabah. He appointed 10 new ministers and retained the remainder. None was female. The government refused opposition demands to appoint oppositionists to at least nine cabinet positions, appointing only four such ministers. The Prime Minister was grilled by the Assembly on March 28, 2012, but opponents did not file a vote of no-confidence motion. With the Assembly insisting on “grilling” the Interior Minister, on June 18, 2012, the Amir exercised his prerogative under Article 106 of the constitution to suspend the Assembly for one month—a temporary suspension renewable for another two months (but with the concurrence of the Assembly). The suspension extended almost to the holy month of Ramadan, at which time the Assembly is not in session anyway, essentially closing the Assembly until October 2012.
• December 1, 2012 (Second Election in 2012) Triggered by Court Decision. On June 20, 2012, Kuwait’s constitutional court ruled that the December 2011 Assembly suspension was not conducted in accordance with the constitution because a new cabinet had not been sworn in before the Amir’s suspension was ordered. The court reinstated the May 2009 Assembly reinstated, but it did not meet at all. On October 8, 2012, after the constitutional court ruled against the government’s request to revisit the number of election districts, the Amir disbanded the National Assembly and set new elections for December 1, 2012.
• The Amir simultaneously issued a decree altering the election law to allow voters in each district to vote for only one candidate—not the four per district in prior law. The Amir’s decree was seen by the opposition as an effort to complicate opposition efforts to forge alliances in each district. On October 21, 2012, an unprecedented demonstration of an estimated 50,000-150,000 Kuwaitis was held. It was suppressed by security forces, who injured some, and arrested several parliamentarians and even some younger members of the Sabah family who were demonstrating. A demonstration on October 31, 2012, calling for the freeing of outspoken oppositionist Musallam al-Barrak, a former parliamentarian who was arrested on October 15, 2012, for allegedly “insulting the Amir.” On November 2, 2012, the government announced it would enforce an October 2012 ban on gatherings of over 20 persons.
• The government went forward with the December 1, 2012 vote, under the Amir’s revised election rules. Turnout was about 40%. Because the opposition boycotted the vote, the election produced an overwhelmingly “pro-government” Assembly on the strength of the seventeen pro-government Shiites elected—including five Islamist Shiites of the National Islamic Alliance. The number of Shiites was double that in any prior Assembly. Three females, including Masouma Mubarak, were elected. Some Sunni Islamists were elected, but—with the exception of two in the Salafi grouping—they were generally not affiliated with Sunni Islamist political societies that have been in the Assembly for decades. On December 5, 2012, the Amir asked Prime Minister Shaykh Jabir Mubarak to form a new cabinet. The opposition continued demonstrating to try to force change on the Al Sabah, and demonstrations became a regular occurrence.
• July 27, 2013: Another Court-Triggered Election. Even though the December 1, 2012 election took place, the Amir’s election decree remained under opposition legal challenge. On June 16, 2013, the Constitutional Court ruled that the Amir’s decree that each person would vote for only one candidate (reduced from four) was constitutional, but the court dissolved the Assembly on the basis of improper technicalities in the Amir’s election decree. The government subsequently set new elections (the sixth election in five years) for July 27, 2013.
• A total of 418 candidates registered, of which 8 were female. The turnout was just over half the electorate. Because some opposition societies, including those linked to the Muslim Brotherhood, boycotted, the vote produced a decidedly pro- government Assembly. The Muslim Brotherhood opposition was absent and only a few Salafi Islamists were elected. Pro-government deputies in the Assembly include a broad range of groups and reflected successful government outreach to the tribalists, and cooptation of many liberals. Shiite deputies number eight— close to the long term average number in the Assembly. The National Assembly speaker is Marzuq al-Ghanim, the nephew of former speaker al-Khurafi.
• A cabinet was named on August 4, 2013, with Shaykh Jabir continuing as Prime Minister. Among significant changes, Shaykh Khalid al-Hamad Al Sabah was promoted to first deputy prime minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs. A former head of domestic intelligence (National Security Bureau), Shaykh Mohammad Khalid Al Sabah, was made Minister of Interior. Lieutenant General Khalid Al Jarrah Al Sabah, formerly chief of staff of the Kuwaiti army, entered the government as Minister of Defense. The cabinet included two Shiites and two females (former Assembly deputy Rola Dashti as Minister of State for Planning and for National Assembly Affairs and Thikra al-Rashidi as Minister of Social Affairs and Labor). However, on January 7, 2014, possibly to garner support from Islamists in Kuwait, he replaced the two female ministers with only one— Hind al-Sabih, taking over both their portfolios. He replaced a member of the ruling family (Shaykh Salem Abd al-Aziz Al Sabah) as Finance Minister with Anas al-Salih, who is well known to the business community. He replaced the Minister of Oil with Ali al-Umair, a Salafist parliamentarian (one of two parliamentarians in the cabinet). He reduced the number of Shiite cabinet members to one—Yasser Abul as Minister of Housing. Housing registers as a major issue among Kuwaitis. The reshuffle brought the total Islamists in the cabinet to four, from two—but all are from the Salafist faction and not the Muslim Brotherhood.

Since the election, there have few major public demonstrations. Opposition demands remain confined to calls for a constitutional monarchy, in which the elected parliament selects the cabinet. However, the government has continued to arrest opposition activists who criticize the Amir on social media, as discussed below. Some unrest returned in June–July 2014 following a June 11, 2014, speech by opposition leader/former parliamentarian Musallam al-Barrak, mentioned above, alleging embezzlement by senior government officials. The speech drew thousands of opposition supporters. Barrak was arrested on July 2 for allegedly “insulting the judiciary,” sparking five days of rallies by pro-Barrak oppositionist demanding his release. Government security forces suppressed the demonstrations with tear gas. Barrak was released on bail on July 7.

Table 1. Composition of the National Assembly: 2008–2013

U.S. Responses and Implications for U.S. Interests

Despite the government’s use of security forces to end protests and its arrests of critics, there has been no evident alteration of the U.S.-Kuwait relationship. On October 23, 2012—following the large protest discussed above—the State Department said the United States “call[s] on all sides to exercise restraint,” and criticized the government’s ban on large public gatherings. The official statements following President Obama’s meeting with Amir Sabah at the White House on September 13, 2013, did not indicate that the political situation in Kuwait was discussed in depth.3

U.S. democracy programs in Kuwait continue. These programs, funded from the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) and other U.S. assistance accounts, included discussions with Kuwaiti leaders, public diplomacy, building civil society, enhancing the capabilities of independent Kuwaiti media, promoting women’s rights, and providing a broad spectrum of educational opportunities.

Broader Human Rights Issues4

On broader human rights issues, the latest State Department Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 2013, released February 27, 2014, largely reiterated the criticisms of previous reports. It identifies the key human rights problems as limitations on citizens’ rights to change their government, restrictions on freedom of speech and assembly, limitations on workers’ rights, and trafficking in persons within the foreign worker population. There has been broad criticism of Kuwait’s recent practice of revoking citizenship of perceived critics, as discussed below. In May 2011, Kuwait took over Syria’s bid for a seat on the U.N. Human Rights Council.

Women’s Rights

Women enjoy more rights and freedoms in Kuwait than in virtually any other GCC state, as exemplified by their running and winning election to the National Assembly and service at all levels of Kuwait’s government. In September 2012, the Higher Judicial Council appointed seven women as public prosecutors. Women in Kuwait can drive, unlike their counterparts in neighboring Saudi Arabia, and many women own businesses. There are several nongovernmental organizations run by Kuwaiti women, such as the Kuwait Women’s Cultural and Social Society, that are dedicated to improving rights for women and to agitating on several different issues unrelated to gender.

Still, Kuwait remains a traditional society and Islamists who want to limit women’s rights have substantial influence. The law does not specifically prohibit domestic violence, although courts try such cases as assault. Kuwaiti women who marry non-Kuwaiti men cannot give their spouses or children Kuwaiti citizenship. Numerous international reports assert that violence particularly against expatriate women working in domestic service roles, is frequent. Some expatriate women have also been subjected to nonpayment of wages and withholding of passports.5

Trafficking in Persons

Kuwait was, for the seventh year in a row, designated by the State Department’s Trafficking in Persons report for 2014 (issued July 2014, cited earlier) in “Tier Three” (worst level). The designation has been maintained because, according to the 2014 report, Kuwait was “not making sufficient efforts” to comply with minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking. Kuwait adopted an anti-trafficking law in March 2013, but it has not demonstrated significant efforts to prosecute and convict trafficking offenders and there is no lead national anti-trafficking coordinating body.

Status of “Stateless Persons“ (Bidoons)

Non-Gulf Arabs and Asians, and about 100,000—140,000 stateless residents (known as “bidoons”—the Arabic word for “without”) continue to face discrimination. The government asserts that the bidoons deliberately destroyed evidence of another nationality in order to obtain generous social benefits in Kuwait. Despite that suspicion, in October 2010 the government promised to implement a plan to resolve the legal and economic status of the bidoons. In March 2011, the government set up a “Central System for Remedying the Status of Illegal Residents,” with a mandate to resolve the status of the bidoons within five years. A separate decree approved provision of some government services and subsidies to bidoons.

During 2011-2014, the government has granted citizenship to several hundred bidoons each year. In March 2013, security forces used rubber bullets and tear gas to disperse bidoons demonstrating for greater rights. That demonstrating might have sparked One bill that was enactment by the National Assembly on March 20, 2013, of legislation giving about 4,000 “bidoons” (stateless residents, discussed below) citizenship. In November 2014, the government announced a plan to obtain for tens of thousands of bidoons “economic citizenship in the Union of the Comoros. The bidoons would be allowed to remain physically in Kuwait, but would not get Kuwaiti citizenship; human rights groups called the plan far from an acceptable solution to the bidoon issue.

Freedom of Expression and Media Freedoms

Official press censorship ended in 1992, fostering the growth of a vibrant press, but successive State Department human rights reports have asserted that the government does not always respect the constitutional provisions for freedom of speech and the press. By law, newspaper publishers must be licensed by the Ministry of Information. And, the government has made increasing use of existing and new laws to act against opponents—including revoking their citizenship—who use newspapers and social media to criticize the government and mobilize demonstrations.

Kuwait’s penal code (Article 25) provides for up to five years in jail for “objecting to the rights and authorities of the Amir or faulting him”—wording that sometimes takes varying forms in charging documents and other official announcements. The Constitutional Court rejected a challenged to Article 25 in December 2013. In 2013, cases were brought against at least 29 Kuwaitis who allegedly criticized the Amir or the government on social media platforms. Five persons charged with “faulting the Amir” were acquitted in February 2013, but in July 2013 an appeals court overturned the conviction of three former Assembly deputies on that charge. The same court upheld a 20 month sentence of Sarra al-Darees for Twitter messages “tarnishing the Amir’s authority.” In mid-April 2013, Musallam al-Barrak, mentioned earlier, was sentenced to five years in prison for insulting the Amir, but his sentence was overturned in May 2013. In November 2013, a Kuwaiti court sentenced a Kuwaiti man to five years in prison for a Twitter comment about Sunni and Shiite theology.

The government also has sought to silence media that expose internal discussions among the royal family. On April 20, 2014, a judge ordered two newspapers (Al Watan and Alam al Yawm) closed for two weeks for disobeying a court-ordered news blackout on a videotape purporting to show former senior officials plotting to try to remove the Amir from office.6 In June 2014, the government ordered the same two papers to stop publishing for five days over the same issue.

Thus far in 2014, the government has revoked the citizenship of 33 people, all for criticizing the government on social media and through other media outlets. One whose citizenship was revoked is Ahmad Jabir al-Shammari, owner of Alam al-Yawm newspaper, discussed above, and a television station. Others whose citizenship have been revoked on similar grounds include an Islamist former member of the National Assembly, Abdullah al-Barghash, and Saad al-Ajmi, an opposition spokesman.

Labor Rights

The law protects the right of workers to form and join unions, conduct legal strikes, and bargain collectively, but contains significant restrictions. The government allows one trade union per occupation, but the only legal trade federation is the Kuwait Trade Union Federation (KTUF). Foreign workers, with the exception of domestic workers, are allowed to join unions, and the government has tended not to impede strikes. On October 10, 2011, about 3,000 customs officers went on strike demanding higher wages and better working conditions; the action caused a temporary halt to Kuwaiti oil exports. On October 26, 2011, the government criticized the strikes as “tantamount to attacks on the state’s status, sovereignty, its interests, and its citizens,” and “cannot be tolerated.” In early 2012, strikes briefly grounded state-owned Kuwait Airways, and there have been occasional small strikes since.

Religious Freedom

The State Department religious freedom report for 2013 (released June 19, 2014), cited earlier, did not alter its assessment of the government’s respect for religious freedom from that of previous years. Shiite Muslims (about 30% of Kuwait’s population) continue to report official discrimination, including limited access to religious education and the perceived government unwillingness to permit the building of new Shiite mosques. Of Kuwait’s Shiite population, about half are Arab Shiites, some of whom are originally from the eastern provinces of Saudi Arabia, and half are or Persian origin. Unlike in Bahrain, Shiites are well represented in the police force and the military/security apparatus, although they generally are not offered leadership positions in those institutions. In 2012, the Kuwaiti ministry that oversees houses of worship began monitoring Shiite mourning houses known as Husseiniyas, but it also began providing state funds to Shiite mosques, as it does for Sunni mosques. In June 2012, the Amir refused to sign (vetoed) a National Assembly bill stipulating the death penalty for those who curse the major figures and symbols of Islam, including the Quran.

Kuwait has seven officially recognized Christian churches to serve the approximately 450,000 Christians (mostly foreign residents) in Kuwait. However, Islamists in the National Assembly have sometimes sought to prevent the building of new churches in Kuwait.7 Members of religions not sanctioned in the Quran—including about 400 Baha’i’s, 100,000 Buddhists, 600,000 Hindus, and 10,000 Sikhs—are mostly non-citizens working in Kuwait and have not been allowed to operate official places of worship. They have been permitted to worship in their homes. There are a few hundred Christians and some Baha’i’s among the citizenry.

U.S.-Kuwait Relations and Defense Cooperation

Kuwait was not strategically or politically close to the United States until the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988). Kuwait’s government was a pivotal partner of the United States in that war as well as through two subsequent Gulf wars: the 1991 Persian Gulf War to liberate Kuwait from Iraq’s occupation, and the 2003 U.S.-led war to oust Saddam Hussein. In all three of these Gulf wars, Kuwait’s security was directly at stake. In 2014, Kuwait has joined the U.S.-led coalition attempting to defeat the Islamic State organization in Iraq and Syria by placing its defense facilities at the disposal of U.S. and coalition partner forces. Kuwait did not contribute forces to the U.S.-led stabilization operations in post-Taliban Afghanistan or post-Saddam Iraq, and is not conducting military operations against the Islamic State.

Recognizing Kuwait’s consistent and multi-faceted cooperation with the United States, on April 1, 2004, the Bush Administration designated Kuwait as a “major non-NATO ally (MNNA),” a designation held by only one other Gulf state (Bahrain). Afghanistan obtained that designation in 2012. The designation opens Kuwait to buy the same U.S. equipment that is sold to U.S. allies in NATO.

Cooperation During the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War

Kuwait and the United States first grew politically and militarily close during the Iran-Iraq War because of its spillover to Kuwait. Through intimidation, Iran sought to compel Kuwait not to support Iraq in that war. Iran fired at and struck some Kuwaiti oil facilities, including the Al Ahmadi terminal, with Silkworm surface-to-surface missiles. In 1987-1988, the United States established a U.S. naval escort and tanker reflagging program to protect Kuwaiti and international shipping from Iranian naval attacks (Operation Earnest Will). As part of the skirmishes between the United States and Iran in the course of that operation, Iran attacked a Kuwaiti oil installation (Sea Island terminal).

Liberation of Kuwait/Operation Desert Storm

Believing incorrectly that Saddam Hussein would reward Kuwait for assisting Iraq financially and logistically during the Iran-Iraq War, Kuwait’s leaders were shaken by the August 2, 1990, Iraqi invasion. Iraq’s public justification was an accusation that Kuwait was overproducing oil and thereby harming Iraq’s ability to repay its debts and recover economically from the long war with Iran. However, most experts believe that the invasion was a result of Saddam’s intent to dominate the Persian Gulf politically, economically, and militarily. Iraq’s occupation lasted until a U.S.-led coalition forces of nearly 500,000 expelled Iraqi forces from Kuwait in “Operation Desert Storm” (January 16, 1991 – February 28, 1991). Kuwait’s leaders, who spent the occupation period in Saudi Arabia, were restored to power in Kuwait and eventually restored the all-elected National Assembly. Kuwait contributed financially to the 1991 war—it paid $16.059 billion to offset the U.S. incremental costs of Desert Shield/Desert Storm.

U.S.-Kuwait Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA)

The U.S.-led expulsion of Iraqi forces from Kuwait led to a deepening of the U.S.-Kuwait security relationship, the cornerstone of which was a broad 10-year Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) signed on September 19, 1991 for an initial 10-year period. The DCA remains in effect.8 Although the text is classified, the pact reportedly provides for mutual discussions in the event of a crisis; joint military exercises; U.S. evaluation of, advice to, and training of Kuwaiti forces; U.S. arms sales; prepositioning of U.S. military equipment; and U.S. access to a range of Kuwaiti facilities.

These facilities used by the United States military under the DCA have included Ali al-Salem Air Base; Shaykh Jabir Air Base; the main U.S. headquarters in Kuwait at Camp Arifjan (40 miles south of Kuwait City); a desert training base and firing range called Camp Buehring, far out in the desert, near the border with Saudi Arabia; and a naval facility called Camp Patriot.9 Under the DCA, enough U.S. armor to outfit at least one brigade is pre-positioned in at Camp Arifjan; the equipment pre-positioned there was used for the 2003 invasion of Iraq and returned after the U.S. mission in Iraq ended. (U.S. forces vacated Camp Doha, the headquarters for U.S. forces in Kuwait during the 1990s and former site for pre-positioned tanks, in December 2005.) The DCA includes a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) provides that U.S. forces in Kuwait be subject to U.S. rather than Kuwaiti law—a common feature of such arrangements.

Kuwait’s cooperation under the DCA was pivotal to U.S. and allied efforts to contain Saddam Hussein after the 1991 war. U.S. forces used Kuwaiti facilities to conduct containment operations, including the 1992-2003 enforcement of a “no fly zone” over southern Iraq (Operation Southern Watch). This operation involved 1,000 U.S. Air Force personnel in Kuwait, mostly at Kuwait air bases. As a deterrent to Iraq, as noted above, the United States prepositioned armor in Kuwait, there were generally about 4,000 or more U.S. troops stationed in Kuwait at any given time during the 1990s. Kuwait contributed about $200 million per year for U.S. military costs of these containment operations, according to U.S. observers.10 Kuwait also funded two-thirds of the $51 million per year U.N. budget for the 1991-2003 Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM) that monitored the Iraq-Kuwait border. Kuwait hosted an additional 5,000 U.S. forces during the major combat phases of Operation Enduring Freedom, which ousted the Taliban in Afghanistan.

Supporting the U.S. Ousting of Saddam and Stabilization Mission: 2003-11

Because Saddam Hussein had invaded Kuwait, Kuwait enthusiastically supported the George W. Bush Administration’s decision to militarily overthrow Saddam Hussein (Operation Iraqi Freedom [OIF]). It hosted the vast bulk of the U.S. invasion force of about 250,000 forces, as well as the other coalition troops that entered Iraq. To secure that force, Kuwait closed off its entire northern half for weeks before the invasion. It also allowed U.S. use of two air bases, its international airport, and sea ports; and provided $266 million in burden sharing support to the combat, including base support, personnel support, and supplies such as food and fuel.

In order to promote Iraqi stability after the fall of Saddam Hussein, Kuwait took a number of major steps: it built a water line into Iraq, and it ran a humanitarian operation center (HOC) that gave over $550 million in assistance to Iraqis from 2003-2011. A Kuwaiti company, First Kuwaiti General Trading and Contracting, was lead contractor on the large U.S. embassy in Iraq that opened in January 2009. On April 22, 2008, Kuwait hosted a regional conference on Iraq’s stability, which included the United States, Iran, and other neighboring countries.

According to Defense Department budget documents, Kuwait contributed about $210 million per year in similar in-kind support to help defray the costs incurred by the U.S. military personnel that rotated through Kuwait into or out of Iraq for operations in Iraq. In FY2012, Kuwait contributed $350 million for these purposes, as stipulated in the FY2012 Consolidated Appropriation (P.L. 112-74). During 2003-2011, there was an average of 25,000 U.S. troops based in Kuwaiti facilities, not including those rotating into Iraq at a given time. These U.S. forces in Kuwait provided logistical and other support to the U.S. forces moving into or out of Iraq.

Cooperation Post-U.S. Withdrawal from Iraq in 2011

Kuwait served as the key exit route for U.S. troops as they withdrew from Iraq. The United States and Iraq had discussed retaining 3,000-15,000 U.S. troops in Iraq beyond 2011 to continue training Iraqi forces. However, Iraq and the United States were unable to agree on a legal status framework for retaining U.S. troops, and the last U.S. troops left Iraq on December 18, 2011.

There reportedly was discussion within the Administration that, because no U.S. troops were remaining in Iraq after 2011, the United States might build up forces in Kuwait to potentially be able to intervene in Iraq or to confront Iran.11 However, following the withdrawal the numbers of U.S. forces in Kuwait were not increased substantially, although the mix of forces did change. Then Defense Secretary Leon Panetta noted, in a trip to Kuwait in December 2012, that there were about 13,500 U.S. troops in Kuwait,12 and U.S. force levels in Kuwait have remained at that level since. This U.S. force level is higher than that positioned in Kuwait during the 1990s but lower than the 25,000 there for the 2003-2011 period of U.S. military involvement in Iraq. It also constitutes more than a third of the 35,000 U.S. forces in the Gulf. Tthe forces stationed in Kuwait include some combat troops, not purely support forces, as was the case prior to 2011.13

Cooperation Against the Islamic State Organization

The enhanced mix of U.S. forces in Kuwait indicates that the United States wanted to retain at least some combat power in close proximity to both Iraq and Iran. Unexpectedly, the need for U.S. forces to return to Iraq has arisen, although not in the form of ground combat units. U.S. advisers and other forces to train Iraqi units—some of which might be first transiting through Kuwait—have been sent to Kuwait to counter major gains in Iraq by the Islamic State organization. At a meeting between the United States and the GCC countries in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia on September 11, 2014, Kuwait formally joined the U.S.-led coalition against the Islamic State. Four GCC countries—Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, UAE, and Qatar—have flown air strike or air support missions against Islamic State forces in Syria. Kuwait has not militarily participated in anti-Islamic State operations in either Iraq or in Syria, but it has placed its military facilities at the disposal of the United States and several coalition partners flying strikes against the Islamic State in Iraq. Two coalition countries, other than the United States, that Kuwait has allowed to base reconnaissance and combat aircraft in Kuwait include Canada and Italy.14 Since U.S.-led military operations in Iraq began in August 2014, Kuwait has contributed an additional $10 million to help Iraqi victims of abuses by advancing Islamic State forces. In part because of sectarian demographics, Islamic State forces have advanced no further east or south than Baghdad and do not appear able to potentially advance to the border with Kuwait.

Kuwait’s Defense Cooperation with GCC Allies

Kuwait is also cooperating with U.S. efforts to improve the defense capabilities of the GCC as a whole. As noted below, Kuwait has purchased missile defense equipment that supports U.S. efforts to forge a joint GCC missile defense network for the Gulf. Kuwaiti naval forces participate in U.S.-led mine clearing exercises in the Persian Gulf—exercises apparently intended to signal to Iran the strength of a U.S.-led coalition to contain Iran.

At the GCC summit in Kuwait during December 10-11, 2013, Kuwait and the other GCC states announced intent to form a GCC joint military command. The decision reportedly reflected a view among some of the GCC leaders that the Obama Administration might be reluctant to use force or threaten force in the event of another crisis in the Gulf. Those apparent concerns have been reflected in an April 2014 GCC decision to recruit additional manpower from Jordan and Morocco, and a separate Kuwaiti decision in April 2014 to set up an office in Pakistan to recruit Pakistani trainers for Kuwait soldiers.15

Still, the GCC decision on joint military command was consistent with Obama Administration efforts to augment Gulf security by forging greater coordination and interoperability of equipment among the GCC states. That U.S. policy was supported by December 16, 2013, Presidential Determination authorizing U.S. defense sales to the GCC as a whole.

Possibly signaling that Kuwait wants to be fully integrated into long term security structures, including with other U.S. partners, it was reported in December 2011 that NATO discussed with Kuwait opening a center in Kuwait City as part of the “Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI)” initiated in 2004. Kuwait joined the ICI in December 2004. The NATO center in Kuwait did not open, in part because the ICI has languished as NATO member states face significant financial constraints.

U.S. Security Assistance

The United States continues to bolster Kuwait’s defense capabilities to promote interoperability with U.S. forces should a regional contingency arise. U.S. officials say that the U.S.-Kuwait defense relationship, enhanced in recent years by small amounts of U.S. assistance shown in Table 2 below, has improved the quality of the Kuwaiti military, particularly the Air Force. Kuwait receives very small amounts of U.S. assistance, if any, because of its ability to fund its own security requirements. Kuwait has been mainly a donor to U.S. operations rather than a recipient of U.S. funds. As a result of Kuwaiti recruitment efforts, its military has now nearly regained its pre-Iraq invasion strength of 17,000. In 2008, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) established in Kuwait a permanent platform for “full spectrum operations” in 27 countries in the region—among its objectives is to help Kuwait establish a more capable navy.

Major U.S. Arms Sales to Kuwait

Blackhawk helicopters in Kuwait

U.S. arms sales have sought to enhance Kuwait’s capability. U.S. sales to Kuwait are intended to comport with the overall goals of the “Gulf Security Dialogue” program designed to contain Iran by enhancing the individual and joint capabilities of the Gulf states. Kuwait is not eligible to receive U.S. excess defense articles. Major post-1991 Foreign Military Sales (FMS) include the following:

• Patriot Missile Defense System: In 1992, Kuwait bought five Patriot anti-missile fire units, including 25 launchers and 210 Patriot missiles, valued at about $800 million. Delivery was completed by 1998. Some of them were used to intercept Iraqi short-range missiles launched at Kuwait in the 2003 war. In 2007, Kuwait also bought 80 PAC-3 (Patriot) missiles and 60 PAC-2 missiles and upgrades, valued at about $1.3 billion. In August 2010, the Administration notified Congress of the potential sale to Kuwait of 209 Patriot “Guidance Enhanced Missile-T” (GEM-T) missiles valued at $900 million. The prime contractor for that system is Raytheon. On July 20, 2012, the Administration notified a potential sale of 60 Patriot Advanced Capability (“PAC-3”) missiles and 20 Patriot launching stations, plus associated equipment. The total value of the sale could reach $4.2 billion. On December 31, 2013, DOD said Lockheed Martin would deliver 14 of the missiles and seven launcher modification kits by June 30, 2016. There has been no announcement whether Kuwait might buy the more sophisticated missile defense system called the Theater High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) system that the United States has sold to UAE and Qatar.
• Combat Aircraft. The core of Kuwait’s fleet of combat aircraft are 40 FA-18 combat aircraft Kuwait bought in 1992. On December 4, 2013, DSCA notified a possible sale to Kuwait of technical support to its U.S.-made F-18s for an estimated cost of about $150 million. Kuwait is said to be considering adding more FA-18 aircraft, although it is evaluating and might instead order the Rafale or the Typhoon. The latter two combat aircraft are made by European manufacturers.
• Tanks. In 1993, Kuwait bought 218 M1A2 tanks at a value of $1.9 billion. Delivery was completed in 1998.
• Apache Helicopters. In September 2002, Kuwait ordered 16 AH-64 (Apache) helicopters equipped with the Longbow fire-control system, valued at about $940 million.
• Air-to-Air Missiles. In 2008, Kuwait bought 120 AIM-120C-7 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM), along with equipment and services, with a total value of $178 million. On February 27, 2012, the Administration notified Congress of a potential sale of 80 AIM-9X-2 SIDEWINDER missiles, and associated parts and support, with an estimated value of $105 million. The sale, if completed, would help Kuwait modernize its fighter aircraft and enhance interoperability with U.S. aircraft.
• DSCA announced on June 30, 2014, that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers would build a Kuwait Armed Forces Hospital in Kuwait at a cost to Kuwait of $1.7 billion.

International Military Education and Training (IMET)

Table 2. U.S. Aid to Kuwait and Purposes

As noted in Table 2, in recent years Kuwait has received very small amounts of funding under the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program. That funding has been provided primarily to qualify Kuwait for a discount in the rate it pays for Kuwait-funded trainees to participate in U.S. programs. Kuwaiti military students in the United States study intelligence, pilot training, and other disciplines. In FY2010, Kuwait spent about $9.7 million to provide such education for 216 Kuwaiti military students. There has been no U.S. assistance to Kuwait since FY2010.

Foreign Policy Issues

After the United States, Kuwait’s most important alliance is with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which consists of fellow Gulf monarchies. In May 2012, Saudi Arabia proposed a close political union among the GCC states—a proposal opposed by several GCC states, including Kuwait, and not adopted. Kuwait has a much longer and more extensive experience with elections and parliamentary process than does Saudi Arabia or the other GCC states, and most Kuwaitis are perceived as fearful of forfeiting their democratic tradition were there to be a GCC political union. The issue was discussed again at the annual GCC summit on December 10-11, 2013, in Kuwait, but continued Kuwait, Omani, and other opposition to the union concept led to a less sweeping GCC announcement to form the joint military command referenced earlier. Kuwait hosted a summit of Afro-Arab countries in November 2013 and hosted an Arab League summit meeting in March 2014.

As noted, until the 1980s, the United States and Kuwait were not close allies. A U.S. consulate was opened in Kuwait in October 1951; it was elevated to an embassy upon Kuwait’s independence from Britain in 1961. Kuwait was the first Gulf state to establish relations with the Soviet Union in the 1960s, perhaps reflecting the influence on Kuwaiti politics of many relatively left-wing figures who were attracted to the ideologies of Gamal Abd al-Nasser of Egypt and his patron, the Soviet Union.

As allies since the Iran-Iraq War, the United States and Kuwait now cooperate on a broad range of regional and international issues. Regional issues were the main focus of discussions between the Amir and President Obama on September 13, 2013, according to the White House statement issued after the meeting. The U.S. Ambassador to Kuwait is Douglas Silliman.

Resolving Residual Bilateral Issues With Iraq

Even though Iraq has not posed an existential threat to Kuwait since Saddam was ousted, Iraq’s stability and the bilateral Iraq-Kuwait relationship remain paramount Kuwaiti foreign policy concerns. Kuwait has tried to build political ties to all Iraqi factions in order to ensure there is no repeat of the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait or any Iraqi Shiite-led violence such as that which occurred in the 1980s. The Islamic State capture of substantial territory in Iraq has reportedly caused substantial concern in Kuwait because instability in Iraq might threaten the carefully- constructed set of post-Saddam understandings that Kuwait and Iraq have established. On July 18, 2008, Kuwait named its first ambassador to Iraq since the 1990 Iraqi invasion—Ali al Momen, a retired general and a Shiite Muslim.
Residual Issues from the 1990 Iraqi Invasion and Occupation
The Kuwait-Iraq relationship remains colored by the August 2, 1990, Iraqi invasion. Iraq-Kuwait relations were frozen during the rest of Saddam Hussein’s rule, and Kuwait and the other GCC states have been wary of the post-Saddam Iraqi governments that were dominated by Shiite Muslims. The potential for a major breakthrough in Iraq-Kuwait relations occurred on January 12, 2011, when then Prime Minister Nasser became the first Kuwait Prime Minister to visit Iraq since the Iraqi invasion. That visit occurred a few days after Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki said that Iraq’s former ambitions against Kuwait “have gone forever and will never return again.”16 Maliki made his first visit to Kuwait on February 16, 2011.

Later in 2011, some mutual suspicions briefly resurfaced. On July 23, 2011, Iraqi parliamentarians called on Kuwait to suspend construction for its Mubarak the Great port because it would impinge on Iraq’s attempts to expand its access to the Persian Gulf at the tip of the Faw peninsula. Other Iraqi parliamentarians alleged that Kuwait was slant drilling in the area and therefore stealing oil from Iraq. The disputes were reminiscent of the arguments made by Saddam Hussein to try to justify his invasion of Kuwait in 1990.
These recriminations quieted, helping resolve some issues during a March 15, 2012, Maliki visit to Kuwait. That visit paved the way for Amir Sabah’s attendance at the March 27-29, 2012, Arab League summit in Baghdad—an event Iraq considered crucial to its efforts to return to the Arab fold after decades of isolation. In August 2012, the Iraqi government said “Iraq will end all pending issues with Kuwait before the start of [2013].” The Iraqi statement appeared to be an Iraqi effort to garner support for the U.N. Security Council to remove any remaining “Chapter 7” (of the U.N. Charter) mandates on Iraq stemming from the 1990 invasion. Kuwait’s Prime Minister Jaber visited Iraq on June 12, 2013, and reached agreement on taking some of the bilateral issues involving missing Kuwaitis and Kuwaiti property out of the Chapter 7 supervision of the United Nations and replacing them with alternative mechanisms, as discussed below.

Issues Still Outstanding Between Iraq and Kuwait

Reparations Payments Continue. Kuwait has not dropped its insistence on full U.N.-supervised reparations by Iraq for damages caused from the 1990 invasion. Iraq wants the reparations issue closed out to cease the deduction of 5% of all its revenue that is used to pay compensation to the victims of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. To date, the U.N. Compensation Commission (UNCC) created by the post-Desert Storm U.N. resolutions has paid out over $38 billion to over 100 governments, encompassing nearly 1.5 million claimants. However, about $13.6 billion is still owed to Kuwaiti claimants, and the U.N. Secretary General’s December 14, 2012, report says it expects to complete the compensation process by April 2015. On December 15, 2010, the U.N. Security Council passed three resolutions—1956, 1957, and 1958 that ended Saddam-era sanctions against Iraq, but the resolutions did not fully end the “Chapter 7” U.N. mandate on Iraq and continued the 5% automatic revenue deductions.

Missing Kuwaitis and Kuwaiti National Archives. The U.N. resolutions adopted December 15, 2010, also continued the effort, required under post-1991 war U.N. resolutions (most notably 687), to resolve the fate of the 605 Kuwaitis and third party nationals missing and presumed dead from the 1991 war, as well as that of the missing Kuwaiti national archives. A special U.N. envoy, Gennady Tarasov, was U.N. High-Level Coordinator for these issues. In September 2011 and in June 2012, Iraq called for an end to the mandate of Tarasov and for Iraq and Kuwait to pursue the issue bilaterally. Tarasov retired on December 31, 2012, and the U.N. Secretary General appointed Victor Poliakov to assume Tarasov’s duties. The June 16, 2013, visit of the Kuwaiti Prime Minister to Iraq—which followed progress on border demarcations issues discussed below—resulted in an Iraq-Kuwait joint recommendation to remove these issues of missing property and persons from the Chapter 7 U.N. mandate, a recommendation that was endorsed in the U.N. Secretary General’s report of June 17, 2013. U.N. Security Council Resolution 2107 of June 27, 2013, formally abolished the High-Level Coordinator mandate and transferred the continuing supervision of these issues to the U.N. Assistance Mission—Iraq (UNAMI)—under Chapter VI of the U.N. Charter (which does not carry enforcement mechanisms as those adopted under Chapter VII).

The search process has resulted in finding the remains of 236 Kuwaitis. The cases of 369 Kuwaitis remain unresolved. In 2010, Kuwait made a $1 million grant to the Iraqi Ministry of Human Rights, which is the lead Iraqi agency trying to determine the fate of the Kuwaitis. A Tripartite Commission on the issue (Kuwait, Iraq, International Committee of the Red Cross) met on May 18, 2011, for the first time in many years. To date, more than 10,000 trenches have been dug to search for remains and jailed members of the Saddam regime have been interviewed. However, the December 14, 2012, and June 17, 2013, U.N. reports on these issues said no progress has been made recently, although some excavations were undertaken in Iraq in 2013.

As far as the Kuwaiti National Archives, U.N. reports on December 14, 2012, and June 17, 2013, say there has been no progress locating the archives. However, Annex I to the June 17, 2013, report (U.N. document S/2013/357) contains a list of all the Kuwaiti property returned to Kuwait by Iraq since 2002. Most recently, in June 2012, Iraq did return to Kuwait numerous boxes of recovered tapes from Kuwait’s state radio, as well as books belonging to Kuwait University, and keys to Kuwait’s Central Bank.

Kuwait-Iraq Border. Disputes over the Iraq-Kuwait border have also been mostly resolved. Under post-1991 Gulf War U.N. Security Council Resolution 833, the Council accepted the U.N.- demarcated border between them. Kuwait has sought that the post-Saddam government in Iraq formally acknowledge its commitments under the resolution to pay some of the costs of border markings and signs. In July 2010, Kuwait gave preliminary approval to open a special border crossing into Iraq that would facilitate the work of international oil companies working in Iraq. And, as a consequence of the March 15, 2012, Maliki visit to Kuwait, Iraq agreed to pay its portion of the costs of maintaining the border markings. The issue of the sea border markings and related issues was resolved in early 2013.

Other Outstanding Bilateral Disputes/Iraqi Airways. Among other residual issues from the Saddam era, in 2004, Kuwait reportedly pledged to forgive a substantial portion of the $25 billion Saddam era debt, but it has not written off the debt to date. Another major dispute concerned Kuwait Airways’ lawsuits alleging that Iraq owed Kuwait $1.2 billion for planes and parts stolen during the Iraqi invasion; the actions led to the long-term impoundment of Iraqi Airways jets. The March 15, 2012, Maliki visit resolved the issue with agreement for Iraq to pay Kuwait $300 million in compensation, and to invest $200 million in an Iraq-Kuwait joint venture to form a small new airline. Subsequent to the visit, Iraq-Kuwait direct flights resumed. In November 2013, Kuwait’s national airline, Kuwait Airways, made its first flight to Iraq (Najaf) since the 1990 Iraqi invasion.

Remaining Threat from Iraqi Extremist Groups. Even though Iraq and Kuwait have improved relations substantially, Kuwaiti leaders say they remain wary of extremist groups in Iraq. The December 1983 bombings of the U.S. and French embassies in Kuwait and an attempted assassination of the Amir in May 1985 were attributed to the Iran-inspired Iraqi Da’wa (Islamic Call) Party, composed of Shiites. Seventeen Da’wa activists were arrested for those attacks, and Da’wa activists hijacked a Kuwait Airlines plane in 1987. Da’wa is the party that Maliki heads, although the party no longer has a militia wing. The Prime Minister-designate of Iraq, Haydar al- Abbadi, who as of August 2014 is likely to succeed Maliki, also is a senior Da’wa member.

In July 2011, the Iran-supported militia of Shiite cleric Moqtada Al Sadr rocketed Kuwait’s embassy in Iraq and caused Kuwait to temporarily bring its diplomats back to Kuwait. Also that month, another Iraqi Shiite militia, Khata’ib Hezbollah, threatened to attack workers building the Mubarak the Great port (named after a past ruler) on Bubiyan Island. These and other Iraqi Shiite militias continue to operate in southern Iraq, although they are said to be entering the political process in Iraq and de-emphasizing their armed wings.

At the same time, Kuwait has become alarmed at the offensive by the Islamic State, which is composed of Sunnis but is radical in its ideology. Following the Islamic State’s capture of the large city of Mosul in June 2014, Kuwait announced a full military alert. As noted above, Kuwait has joined the U.S.-led anti-Islamic State coalition, even as some of its citizens apparently raise funds for the Sunni-led Syria rebellion and might be aiding the Islamic State financially.

Iran

For years after the 1990 Iraqi invasion, Kuwait supported Iran as a counterweight to Saddam Hussein. Kuwait often hosted pro-Iranian Iraqi Shiite oppositionists against Saddam, even though these same Shiite groups had conducted attacks in Kuwait in the 1980s. Since Saddam’s fall, Kuwait has, through defense cooperation discussed above, joined U.S. efforts to contain Iran and protect itself. The Qods Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC-QF) of Iran is the IRGC unit that supports pro-Iranian movements and conducts espionage in neighboring and other foreign countries. Qods Force activity in Kuwait suggests that Iran has sought to pressure Kuwait or to promote dissent among Kuwait’s Shiite minority. In May 2010, Kuwait confirmed that it had arrested some Kuwaiti civil servants and stateless residents for allegedly working on behalf of the Qods (Jerusalem) Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) of Iran in a plot to blow up Kuwaiti energy facilities.17 In March 2011, a Kuwait court sentenced two Iranians and a Kuwaiti to death in the alleged plot. Kuwait expelled three Iranian diplomats, and Iran expelled three Kuwaiti diplomats in response. The sentences were commuted to life in prison on May 28, 2012. In May 2011, the two countries agreed to return their respective ambassadors. In November 2011, Iran arrested several individuals in Iran who it alleged were “Kuwaiti spies.”

Kuwait also has cooperated with the growing global consensus to sanction Iran. This cooperation has come despite the comments by the Amir in November 2009 endorsing Iran’s right to purely peaceful nuclear energy. In July 2010, a U.S. law, P.L. 111-195 (the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010) was enacted that would penalize firms that supply gasoline to Iran. One Kuwaiti gasoline trading firm, Kuwait’s Independent Petroleum Group, was reported to be a supplier of gasoline to Iran,18 although it says it stopped doing so as of September 2010.
At the same time, Kuwait has sought to engage Iran at times when Iran tries to allay GCC suspicions. Like the other Gulf states, Kuwait hosted visiting Iranian officials following the November 2013 interim nuclear agreement between Iran and the six negotiating powers. Amir Sabah went somewhat further than the other GCC leaders in welcoming the apparent changed Iranian approach by visiting Iran during June 1-2, 2014. His visit included a meeting with Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamene’i, as well as elected President Hassan Rouhani.

Arab-Israeli Dispute

For many years after the Iraqi invasion, the positions taken by countries and factions on how to deal with the Iraqi invasion determined Kuwait’s foreign relations. Kuwait was more critical than were the other Gulf states of the late Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat because he had opposed war to liberate Kuwait from Iraq. Kuwait expelled about 450,000 Palestinian workers after liberation, viewing them as disloyal. Kuwait subsequently maintained ties and gave financial support to Arafat’s Palestinian antagonist, Hamas. Kuwait’s relations with Jordan were strained for many years because of then leader King Hussein’s opposition to a U.S.-led war to expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait.

In part because of Kuwait’s past antagonism to the mainstream Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) that still largely leads the Palestinian Authority (PA), Kuwait has not been a major mediator in intra-Palestinian disputes. Nor has it publicly advanced its own proposals for resolving the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. In line with the positions of the other GCC and Arab states, Kuwait supports U.N. recognition of the State of Palestine, requested formally by PA President Mahmoud Abbas at the U.N. General Assembly meetings in September 2011.

During the period of active Gulf-Israel negotiations (1992-1997), Kuwait attended multilateral working group peace talks with Israel—sessions on arms control, water resources, refugees, and other issues that were begun as part of the “Oslo Accords” process between Israel and the Palestinians. However, Kuwait did not host any sessions of the multilaterals. In 1994, Kuwait was key in persuading the other Gulf monarchies to cease enforcement of the secondary (trade with firms that deal with Israel) and tertiary (trade with firms that do business with blacklisted firms) Arab boycotts of Israel. However, Kuwait did not, as did Qatar and Oman, subsequently exchange trade offices with Israel and therefore Kuwait retained the “primary Arab boycott” (on direct trade with Israel). On the other hand, potentially signaling the Kuwait might join other GCC states such as UAE in cultivating private ties to Israel, Kuwait’s Foreign Minister Shaykh Sabah al-Khalid al-Hamad Al Sabah visited the Old City of Jerusalem in September 2014. The Kuwaiti government denied it represented a trip to Israel, stating that the Old City is a part of Palestine that is occupied. The visit required at least the tacit cooperation of Israeli authorities. Other press reports indicate that Kuwait Airways might organize visits by Kuwaiti tourists to Jerusalem.

Actions on 2011 Uprisings in the Region

Kuwait has generally acted in concert with—although not always as assertively as—other GCC states on regional issues such as those that have stemmed from recent uprisings in the Middle East.

Bahrain. Of all the countries affected by “Arab spring” uprisings, Kuwait has the most direct stake in the outcome in Bahrain, a GCC ally. Kuwait sent a naval unit to support the March 14, 2011, intervention of the GCC’s “Peninsula Shield” unit to assist Bahraini security forces. The nearly 2,000 GCC ground forces that entered Bahrain were Saudi troops and UAE police. The Kuwaiti naval unit departed Bahraini waters in July 2011 following the end of the state of emergency there. The GCC intervention was at odds with U.S. policy to support dialogue between Bahrain’s government and protesters, and Kuwait’s involvement came despite opposition from Kuwaiti Shiites, who have largely sympathized with Bahrain’s Shiites.

Libya. Kuwait supported the Arab League position in favor of U.N.-mandated intervention to protect civilians but, initially, it stopped short of recognizing the Transitional National Council (TNC) as the legitimate representative of the Libyan people (an action that Qatar and the UAE took). In April 2011, it pledged about $177 million in financial aid to the TNC. Kuwait did not contribute any air or other forces to the NATO coalition that conducted strikes in support of anti- Qadhafi rebels. It recognized the TNC as the sole legitimate representative after the fall of Tripoli in August 2011.

Yemen. Kuwait joined its GCC allies in developing and implementing a plan for a peaceful transition of power in Yemen. That effort bore fruit with the departure of President Ali Abdullah Saleh in January 2012 and the subsequent presidential elections in March 2012.

Syria. As noted above, Kuwait is hosting coalition air operations against Islamic State forces in Syria. However, as do the other GCC states, Kuwait views the ouster of Syria’s President Bashar Al Assad, an ally of Iran, as perhaps an even higher priority than combatting the Islamic State. The GCC countries voted with other Arab League countries to suspend Syria’s membership in the League in November 2011, and the GCC states closed their embassies in Damascus in April 2012.

The Kuwaiti government has been a major donor of humanitarian aid to victims of the civil war in Syria, but it has not provided government funds to the armed rebels. Kuwait has hosted two major donors’ conferences (January 30, 2013, and January 15, 2014) at which Kuwait has pledged a total of $600 million in humanitarian aid ($300 million at each conference. The funds were composed overwhelmingly of donations to nine U.N. agencies and to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Of the Kuwaiti government’s pledges, about $70 million was channeled through Kuwaiti agencies such as the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development and the Kuwait Red Crescent Society. At the same time, as discussed below under “Countering Terrorism Financing,” U.S. officials have stated that the Kuwaiti government has not done enough to curb private donations by wealthy Kuwaitis to extremist rebel groups in Syria.

Egypt. Kuwait has adopted a position on Egypt similar to that of Saudi Arabia and UAE, but at odds with Qatar. Qatar was the major Gulf financial benefactor of Egypt during the presidency of Muslim Brotherhood senior figure Mohammad Morsi. Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE assert that the Brotherhood in Egypt supports Muslim Brotherhood oppositionists in the Gulf states, including Kuwait. After Morsi was deposed by the Egyptian military on July 3, 2013, Kuwait contributed $2 billion in loans and oil grants19 to a Saudi-brokered $12 billion financial package to assist the beleaguered Egyptian economy. Kuwaiti leaders also have criticized U.S. cuts in aid to Egypt since the Morsi ouster, as reportedly discussed during the September 2013 White House meeting between the Amir and President Obama. However, Kuwait did not join Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and UAE in withdrawing their ambassadors from Qatar over the Egypt/Muslim Brotherhood dispute. The rift was resolved in November 2014 when Qatar signed an agreement to increase cooperation with the other GCC states on foreign policy issues and the three GCC states returned their ambassadors to Doha.

Kuwait has also made arrests of Egyptians in Kuwait for political activities. In April 2011, just after President Hosni Mubarak was overthrown, security officers arrested and deported 21 Egyptian nationals resident in Kuwait for attending meetings in support of Egyptian opposition figure Dr. Mohammad El Baradei. In August 2011, in line with Kuwait’s stance against the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, Kuwaiti authorities said they would deport nine pro-Morsi demonstrators who had been protesting outside the Egyptian embassy in Kuwait.

Other Assistance. In July 2011, Kuwait contributed $1 million to help relieve the effects of drought in Somalia. In November 2013, Kuwait donated $10 million in relief aid to the Philippines following a destructive typhoon there.

Performance on Countering Terrorism Financing/Islamic State Donations20

The Obama Administration and outside experts have been increasingly critical of Kuwait for failing to halt private Kuwaiti donations to Islamic extremist groups in Syria.21 According to press reports, Kuwaiti donors and donor aggregators use social media and other methods to collect funds for such Syrian factions as Al Nusra Front, which the U.S. government has designated as a terrorist organization.22 The total amounts of such Kuwaiti donations to Syrian rebel groups is not known, but the private donor effort reportedly has been highly organized, operating under such slogans as “Syria Calls,” launched by a group called the “Union of Kuwaiti Campaigns to Support Syria.” The donors involved purportedly do not consider the Syrian rebel factions as “terrorists” to which funds should be denied.

U.S. officials reportedly have urged the Kuwaiti government to try to stop this financial flow. Treasury Department Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David Cohen said publicly on March 4, 2014, that the appointment of a leading Kuwaiti donor to Al Nusra, Nayef al-Ajmi, as Minister of Justice and Minister of Islamic Endowments (Awqaf), was “a step in the wrong direction.”23 Subsequent to those comments, Ajmi resigned his government posts.24 On August 6, 2014, the Treasury Department imposed sanctions on two Ajmi tribe members and one other Kuwaiti, under Executive Order 13224 sanctioning support for international terrorism. The three sanctioned were Shafi Sultan al-Ajmi, Hajjaj al-Ajmi, and Abd al-Rahman al-Anizi.25 Hajjah al-Ajmi and another Kuwaiti, Hamid Hamad Al Ali, were sanctioned by the United Nations Security Council for allegedly providing financial support to the Al Nusra Front. In a speech on October 23, 2014, Cohen reiterated his earlier criticism, saying Kuwait (and Qatar) were still “permissive jurisdictions” for terrorism financing.26 Earlier, on August 17, 2014, the United Nations Security Council On Much earlier, in June 2008, the Treasury Department froze the assets of one of these charities—the Islamic Heritage Restoration Society—for alleged links to Al Qaeda, under E.O. 13224.

The government has taken some steps to accommodate U.S. views on this issue. In May 2014, the Ministry of Social Affairs warned Kuwaiti citizens that the campaigns are unauthorized and violate Kuwait law on financial donations. Kuwait law limits fundraising to only authorized charity organizations, including the Social Reform Society, Islamic Heritage Restoration Society, Direct Aid, Sheikh Abdullah al-Nuri Charitable Society, Prisoners Solidarity Society, Sunna Sciences Society, Kuwait Relief, Al-Najat Charitable Society, Good Tidings Charity, and Patients Helping Fund Society. The State Department report on global terrorism for 2013, cited above, credited Kuwait with passing, in May 2013, comprehensive money laundering and anti-terrorism financing legislation in 2013. According to the State Department report, the 2013 laws correct significant deficiencies an earlier 2002 law that had hampered Kuwaiti prosecutions of terrorism- related crimes. The 2013 laws also created a Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU), which will investigate terrorism financing and money laundering and prescribe a jail term of up to 15 years for those convicted of funding terrorist organizations. Kuwait is a member of the Middle East North Africa Financial Action Task Force (FATF), and the 2013 laws adopted apparently were the product of an action plan Kuwait developed with the FATF to address Kuwait’s weaknesses on the issue. In August 2014, Kuwait arrested three of its citizens suspected of funneling funds to extremist groups.

Previous State Department terrorism reports have also praised Kuwait’s programs to encourage moderation in Islam in Kuwait. There appeared to be no significant attacks attributed to terrorist organizations in Kuwait in 2013 or thus far in 2014. On November 27, 2011, security services arrested three Kuwaiti military officials on suspicion of links with a terrorist cell plotting to attack locations in Bahrain and Qatar.

In April 2011 Kuwait introduced biometric fingerprinting at Kuwait International Airport and has since extended that system to land and sea entry points. The NADR funds shown above have been used, in large part, to assist Kuwait with counterterrorism efforts, border control, and export controls.

Kuwait has long sought the return of two prisoners held at the U.S. facility in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, under accusation of belonging to Al Qaeda. Amir Sabah reportedly raised the issue with President Obama during their September 13, 2013, White House meeting. Kuwait has built a rehabilitation center for the two, Fayez al Kandari and Fawzi al-Udah, to reintegrate them into society after they are returned. On November 5, 2014, Fawzi al-Udah was released from Guantanamo and returned to Kuwait. Al Kandari remains in Guantanamo.

Kuwaiti Economic Policy

Kuwait oil fields. Source: Kuwait Oil Company (KOC)

In part because of the political disputes and unrest since 2006, Kuwait has underinvested in capital infrastructure and overspent on public sector salaries and subsidies, according to the IMF and other observers. Delayed spending on capital infrastructure projects has created an image of stagnation, particularly compared to the more vibrant GCC states Qatar and UAE. This impression has been augmented by a lag in foreign direct investment in Kuwait relative to other GCC states. Only $800 million has been invested in Kuwait in the past 10 years. In contrast, in the same time period, $10 billion was invested in Bahrain, $73 billion in UAE, and $130 billion in Saudi Arabia.27

Recent Kuwaiti budgets appeared intended to calm or avoid unrest rather than to set Kuwait up for long-term growth. As an example, in mid-2013, the National Assembly passed a law obligating the government to pay $2.5 billion in debts owed by Kuwaitis as a result of the 2008 financial crisis. Total subsidies cost the government about $17.7 billion annually. Observers say that the government benefits, if continued at current rates, are likely to put Kuwait’s budget into deficit during 2017-2020. In October 2013 Prime Minister Jaber said the subsidies system had produced a “welfare state” and was “unsustainable,” and he pledged to work to reduce them. Kuwait’s finances are likely to suffer further with the drop in oil prices in late 2014 from over $100 per barrel to about $75 per barrel—Kuwait’s budget is based on a “break even” price of $75 per barrel.

Compounding economic uncertainty, in late October 2014, Saudi Arabia closed an offshore oil field (Khafji) that it shares with Kuwait. The field produces 280,000 barrels per day, split between the two countries. The dispute might spill over into other disputes over production in their shared “neutral zone,” one of whose fields is operated by Chevron Corp. The neutral zone is the only place in either Saudi Arabia or Kuwait where foreign oil companies are permitted to have equity in oil fields.

On the other hand, Kuwait has a large sovereign wealth fund, managed by the Kuwait Investment Authority, with holdings estimated at about $550 billion as of mid-2014, which presumably would help Kuwait mitigate budgetary shortfalls in future years.28

The National Assembly passed some legislation, which took effect September 2010, to privatize major sectors of the Kuwait economy. In January 2014, the National Assembly approved legislation to privatize Kuwait Airways.

Political disputes have also prevented movement on several major potential drivers of future growth, the most prominent of which is Project Kuwait. The project, backed by the Kuwaiti government, would open Kuwait’s northern oil fields to foreign investment to generate about 500,000 barrels per day of extra production. The Assembly has blocked the $8.5 billion project for over a decade because of concerns about Kuwait’s sovereignty, and observers say no compromise is in sight. A project to build a fourth oil refinery, estimated to cost $8 billion, also has not advanced.

The 2008 financial crisis, coupled with the political infighting, earlier caused Kuwait to shelve a joint venture with Dow Chemical to form the largest maker of polyethylene. On December 29, 2008, the government cancelled the venture, which was to have required a Kuwaiti investment of $7.5 billion by state-run Petrochemical Industries Co.- Kuwait. Dow reportedly had planned to use the proceeds of the investment to fund its purchase of the Rohm and Haas chemical firm, although that deal ultimately went through anyway. In May 2013, an arbitrator decided in favor of Dow Chemical, ordering the Petrochemical Industries Co.-Kuwait to pay Dow $2.2 billion in damages for severing the venture.

The state-owned oil industry still accounts for 75% of government income and 90% of export earnings. The United States imports about 250,000 barrels per day in crude oil from Kuwait (about 3% of U.S. oil imports). Total U.S. exports to Kuwait were about $2.6 billion in 2013, the same as the few preceding years, consisting mostly of automobiles, industrial equipment, and foodstuffs. Total U.S. imports from Kuwait in 2013 were about $12.6 billion, of which almost all was crude oil and other petroleum products. Figures for the first half of 2014 show a slight increase in both exports to Kuwait and imports from Kuwait compared to 2013.

Like other Gulf states, Kuwait sees peaceful uses of nuclear energy as important to its economy, although doing so always raises fears among some in the United States, Israel, and elsewhere about the ultimate intentions of developing a nuclear program. Kuwait is cooperating with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to ensure international oversight of any nuclear work in Kuwait.

In 1994, Kuwait became a founding member of the World Trade Organization (WTO). In February 2004, the United States and Kuwait signed a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA), often viewed as a prelude to a free trade agreement (FTA), which Kuwait has said it seeks. Kuwait gave $500 million worth of oil to U.S. states affected by Hurricane Katrina.

About the author:
* Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

Source:
This article was published by the Congressional Research Service on Nov. 19, 2014, which may be accessed here (PDF).

Notes:
1. Much of this section is from the State Department’s country report on human rights practices for 2013 (released February 27, 2014), http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=2013&dlid= 220363#wrapper; the International Religious Freedom Report for 2013 (June 19, 2014), andhttp://www.state.gov/j/drl/ rls/irf/religiousfreedom/index.htm?year=2013&dlid=222299#wrapper; and the Trafficking in Persons Report for 2014 (July 2014), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/226847.pdf
2. “Kuwait’s Prime Minister Survives Parliament Vote.” Al Jazeera TV, January 5, 2011; Kristin Smith Diwan, “Kuwait: Too Much Politics, or Not Enough?,” Foreign Policy online, January 10, 2011.
3. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/09/13/remarks-president-obama-and-amir-sabah-al-sabah-kuwait- after-bilateral-m.
4. Much of this section is from the State Department’s country report on human rights practices for 2013 (released February 27, 2014), http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm#wrapper, and the Human Rights Watch World Report for 2014. Released January 2014.
5. Fahim, Kareem. “Away From Home, Fleeing Domestic Life.” New York Times, August 2, 2010.
6. “Kuwait Papers Closed for Violating “Plot” Blackout.” BBC News, April 20, 2014.
7. Middle East Media Research Institute. “In Kuwait, Public Debate Over Demand to Demolish Churches,” April 10, 2012.
8. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/09/13/remarks-president-obama-and-amir-sabah-al-sabah-kuwait- after-bilateral-m.
9. Hajjar, Sami. U.S. Military Presence in the Gulf: Challenges and Prospects. U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute. p. 27.
10. Author conversation with U.S. military official in the Kuwait. February 2014.
11. http://www.worldtribune.com/worldtribune/WTARC/2011/me_iraq1201_09_26.asp; Thom Shanker and Steven Lee Myers. “U.S. Is Planning Buildup in Gulf After Iraq Exit.” New York Times, October 30, 2011; Pauline Jelinek, “Kuwait, U.S. Still Talking About Troop Plan.” Associated Press, November 7, 2011.
12. Thom Shanker. “In Kuwait, Panetta Affirms U.S. Commitment to Middle East. New York Times, December 11, 2012.
13. Michelle Tan. “15,000 in Kuwait, At Least For Now.” Army Times, January 16, 2012.
14. “Kuwait Plays Uneasy Host as Canadian Jets Join Anti-ISIS Campaign.” Canada Television News, October 29, 2014.
15. Middle East Media Research Institute. April 22, 2014.
16. “No Claim on Sovereign Kuwait, Iraqi Ambitions Gone Forever.” Arab Times (Kuwait). January 9, 2011.
17. “Iran Spy Cell Dismantled in Kuwait.” Associated Press, May 6, 2010; “Iran Cell Planned Attacks in Kuwait, Minister Says. Reuters, April 21, 2011.
18. http://www.defenddemocracy.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=11788115&Itemid=105.
19. “Kuwait Offers Egypt $4B Aid, Fuel Package.” Associated Press, July 10, 2013.
20. Some information in this section is taken from the State Department country report on terrorism for 2013, released April 30, 2014. http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2013/224823.htm.
21. Joby Warrick, “Wealthy Donors Influence Syria War,” Washington Post, June 16, 2013.
22. Ben Hubbard. “Donors’ Funds Add Wild Card to War in Syria.” New York Times, November 13, 2013.
23. Department of the Treasury. Remarks of Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David Cohen before the Center for New American Security on “Confronting New Threats in Terrorist Financing.” March 4, 2014.
24. Karen DeYoung. “Kuwait Cabinet Minister Resigns After Allegations.” May 13, 2014.
25. Treasury Department, Office of the Press Secretary. August 6, 2014.
26. Remarks by Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David Cohen. “Attacking ISIL’s Financial Foundation.” October 23, 2014.
27. “Kuwait in Crisis As Ruling Family Splits, MP’s Rebel.” Reuters, June 7, 2011.
28. Jamal Hussein. “Kuwait Needs Better Resource Utilization to Close Gap.” Gulf News, July 21, 2014; “Oil Price Slide Hits Kuwait Government Income.” Naharnet, October 17, 2014.

The post Kuwait: Governance, Security And US Policy – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Dr Subhash Kapila*

China’s military provocations and brinkmanship in the South China Sea maritime expanse continued relentlessly in2014 belying the belief of those who claim that China is a responsible power and a stakeholder in Asia Pacific stability.

China imperiously continued with her strategies of attempting to reinforce her unilateral assertions that China has full sovereignty over the South China Sea and that the South China Sea region is a “Core Interest” of China to be defended by force if challenged.

Each year China’s military adventurism is aimed at what I have pointed out in international conferences is the “Full Spectrum Dominance” of the South China Sea maritime expanse.

In the pursuance of this strategic objective in 2014 major military provocations and brinkmanship in the South China Sea against Vietnam and the Philippines encompassed the move of a Chinese deep sea oil drilling rig in the vicinity of the Paracel Island in waters under Vietnamese sovereignty. Alarmingly also was Chin’s activities to construct “artificial islands” in Fiery Cross Reef in the Spratly Islands area and similar designs on other shoals and reefs in the area disputed both by Vietnam and the Philippines.

China’s move of a deep sea oil drilling rig in May 2014 into Vietnamese waters in vicinity of Paracel Island was militarily provocative and unprecedented. So far military provocations by China which resulted in confrontations in this area between China and Vietnam were restricted to survey ships of both countries. The Chinese provocative move first time of moving a Chinese deep sea oil drilling rig into the South China Sea in Vietnamese waters resulted in a highly explosive military confrontation with Chinese and Vietnamese ships ramming into each other.

Under intense international pressure and outcry within the ASEAN community, China finally withdrew the oil drilling rig in August 2014 maintaining that China had fished oil drilling exploration activities.

While the crisis may have been defused by China’s withdrawal of the oil rig but it was a foretaste of the pattern that was likely to be followed by China henceforth to reinforce her sovereignty claims over the South China Sea.

The creation of artificial islands in the Spratly Islands region also needs to be viewed in the same vein as China’s aim is to dot the South China Sea region with artificial islands to be developed as naval and air force bases facilitating China’s more effective projection of military force for effective control of the South China Sea.

Besides these two major militarily significant Chinese provocations, the intensity of China’s naval patrolling of the South China Sea along with naval exercises is also reported to have been at an all-time high. Also reported was an increase in the strength of Chinese maritime escorts of Chinese fishing fleets operating in the South China Sea.

Related to the increasing Chinese military provocations and conflict escalation in the South China Sea was the United States assertion in 2014 for the first time that the United Sates does not recognise China’s unilateral assertive so-called Nine Dash Line enclosing virtually the whole of the South China Sea Region.

United States displeasure and concerns over China’s highly provocative and brinkmanship activities in the South China Sea were also visible in the sharp criticism levelled by US Defense Secretary at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore in mid-2014.

Noticeably, for the first time ASEAN Nations made a ‘stand-alone’ statement made on their concerns at the ASEAN Summit in Myanmar in2014.

China on the other hand in 2014 continued with its rigid stand that it was not open to any multilateral ASEAN efforts for dialogue on the South China Sea disputes and that it could have only a bilateral dialogue with the disputant nations.

Such a rigid stand by China continuing in 2014 indicates that China is not open to nor has any inclinations for conflict resolution on the South China Sea issues.

So what are the perspectives that present themselves ae 2015 dawns? Regrettably, no optimistic indicators are available to suggest that China in recognition of emerging strategic realities is even remotely open for any conflict resolution initiatives. It is China’s-way or the highway.

With such Chinese intransigent stances the South China Sea is likely to witness continued military tension well into the short-term future. Vietnam and the Philippines are improving the military capabilities of their naval forces. External powers like the United States, Japan and India with significant stakes in Asia Pacific stability and security are also engaged in the capacity-building of these two nations to counter the Chinese threat in the South China Sea.

Concluding, what needs to be said is that it is the United States which has to be more assertive and that needs to take dissuasive stances against China to impose restraint on Chinese military adventurism in the South China Sea .After all what is emerging in the South China Sea is a Chinese challenge to United States predominance in the Asia Pacific.

*Dr Subhash Kapila is a graduate of the Royal British Army Staff College, Camberley and combines a rich experience of Indian Army, Cabinet Secretariat, and diplomatic assignments in Bhutan, Japan, South Korea and USA. Currently, Consultant International Relations & Strategic Affairs with South Asia Analysis Group. He can be reached at drsubhashkapila.007@gmail.com

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Disagreements persist about whether the Association of Serb-majority Municipalities in Kosovo should be a non-governmental organization aiming to facilitate cooperation between Serb-majority municipalities in specific areas, or whether it should be a political body with decision-making powers.

By Shpetim Gashi

Pristina and Belgrade agreed in 2013 in Brussels on the formation of an association of Serb-majority municipalities, but not on its mandate. Two years later, the bargaining process over the Association’s authority is about to begin. In a roundtable organized in Budva, Montenegro, in December 2014 by the Council on Inclusive Governance and funded by the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, political party representatives and government officials from Kosovo and Serbia discussed the challenges the negotiators responsible for drafting the Association’s statute would confront.

Kosovo officials maintain that the Association should be a non-governmental organization aiming to facilitate cooperation between Serb-majority municipalities in areas of education, healthcare, and urban planning, but it should not take these powers from municipalities, and it should be formed in compliance with Kosovo’s laws on local governance, just like the existing Association of Kosovo Municipalities. Serbian officials and Kosovo Serb representatives, on the other hand, argue that the Association should become a political body with decision-making powers on education, healthcare, urban planning, and to manage privatization of public assets in all ten Serb-majority municipalities.

They also demand that the Association have a separate budget and a substantial number of employees, mostly those that would lose their jobs when the parallel institutions are closed. But Kosovo’s Parliament rejected a proposal of the ten Serb members to include a separate budget for the Association in Kosovo’s 2015 budget. Belgrade’s earlier demands that the Association has a legislative body elected directly by the people and that it has authority over police and courts were dropped in the Brussels dialogue. Subsequently, the police officers have been integrated into Kosovo police and an agreement for the integration of the courts into Kosovo’s system has been reached, though not yet implemented.

Given these conflicting expectations – a non-governmental organization versus an autonomous political body – the bargaining process over the mandate of the Association will be tense.

Serbian representatives say that in addition to powers over local issues, the Association should serve as a bridge between Pristina and Belgrade and become some type of “government body” running the Serb-majority municipalities. The Albanians argue that this is precisely Belgrade’s unstated goal, to build a small “Republika Srpska” in Kosovo to undermine Kosovo’s constitutional order from within.

The Association would also include adoption of new laws in Kosovo’s parliament since the existing legislation does not provide for formation of such bodies. This could become a challenge in itself. The opposition parties and a number of members of governing parties have said that they would vote against such proposals. Even if the votes are secured, reconciling new laws on the Association with existing laws on local governance is challenging. The Albanians say that the Association should be adapted to the existing laws, not the other way around. But according to existing laws the municipal authorities are responsible for education, healthcare, and urban planning. The government simply transfers funds to municipalities, which then are in charge of paying salaries to employees, maintaining the premises, and electing school directors.

Albanians say that they would oppose giving such responsibilities to the Association because it not only violates Kosovo’s laws but it also creates a dependent relationship between the Association and the service institutions, and would give the Association full control over thousands of employees.

A similar resistance could also come from some of the mayors of the Serb-majority municipalities themselves, especially those south of the Ibar River. The six municipalities in the south have been exercising these powers for many years, and the mayors would not be happy to hand their most important responsibilities and perhaps a portion of their funds to an appointed body. At least, they would not do it voluntarily.

The formation of the Association would also require changing or adoption of new laws in Serbia’s parliament. Serbian existing laws do not recognize Kosovo’s institutions – which the Association would become – thus Belgrade would not be able to transfer funds to the Association. Serbian officials say that a solution to allow such transfers would be found but so far have offered no indications that their parliament plans to adopt such laws soon.

Another dispute over the Association is whether it should be formed before or after the closing of the remaining parallel institutions in the north. Kosovo officials argue that the parallel structures should be closed before the Association is established while Serb representatives suggest the opposite. Most likely, the process will be parallel. And how the Association will look like, we will see in the spring.

Shpetim Gashi is vice-president of the Council for Inclusive Governance, an international non-governmental organization promoting responsive governance. The views expressed in the article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the organization.

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A female suicide bomber has blown herself up inside a police station in Istanbul, wounding two officers.

According to Turkish media one of the officers has died of his injuries.

The woman is said to have spoken English as she entered the building in the tourist hub of Sultanahmet, but her nationality and identity remain unknown.

There has been no immediate claim of responsibility, but it comes one week after far-left group DHKP-C said it was behind an attack on police near the prime minister’s office in the city.

The Turkish prime minister said the authorities are investigating whether the suicide bomber was linked to any particular group.

A police cordon remains in place. Across the square from the attack stand the Aya Sofya museum and blue mosque, among the top tourist attractions in the city.

Original article

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By Alan Holdren and Andrea Gagliarducci

Although it’s still not official, the Vatican’s Secretary of State confirmed today that Pope Francis will most likely visit Washington D.C. and New York during his visit to the United States.

“I think the Pope will go to United Nations, everybody is speaking about that… but no official announcement has been delivered,” Cardinal Parolin told CNA Jan. 6.

Cardinal Pietro Parolin, the Vatican’s Secretary of State, spoke to American journalists at the end of the dedication ceremony for a new wing of the Pontifical North American College in Rome.

He added that “of course” a papal visit to the nation’s capital city of Washington, D.C. is possibly in the agenda, but he stressed that “no official confirmation has been made.”

Pope Francis announced his trip to the United States on Nov. 17 in an address to members of the “Humanum Conference.” During his visit, the pontiff will participate in the Sept. 22-27 World Meeting of Families in Philadelphia.

Although Cardinal Parolin hesitated to make an official confirmation, there has been speculation that the Roman Pontiff will make stops in both Washington D.C. as well as to the headquarters of the United Nations in New York while he is in the U.S.

The Holy See’s permanent observer to the U.N. in New York, Archbishop Bernardito Auza, strongly hinted last fall that a visit to the United Nations would be added to his stop in Philadelphia.

Details of the Pope’s participation in the Philadelphia meeting of families will likely be set either this spring or summer, and then made public together with the overall schedule of the papal voyage to the United States.

Pope Francis’ visit comes after the restoration of diplomatic relations between the United States and Cuba, which was achieved thanks to the pontiff’s intervention, as acknowledged by both U.S. president Barack Obama and Cuban president Raul Castro.

Asked if the normalization of Cuba – U.S. relations points toward a new “golden age” of Vatican diplomacy, Cardinal Parolin said that “the president of the United States has already thanked the Pope for the support he has given to this important step,” and stressed that “Holy See diplomacy is always there, to help to build bridges.”

Cardinal Parolin also mentioned that perhaps the Holy See’s diplomacy “is now more active…(not only) waiting, but also proposing (solutions for peace), since there are so many conflicts.”

The Vatican’s Secretary of State also spoke of how there are no Americans among the new cardinals to be elevated during the Feb. 14 consistory. This, he said, must not be considered “a sign of less appreciation for any Church.”

“I think the Holy Father wants to give a broader sense of the universality of the Church, giving a privilege to places where traditionally there is not so much attention by the Church,” the cardinal said.

He added that “we have to change our mind a little bit, our interpretation, and consider that the Holy Father’s criteria (in picking new cardinals) are not against anybody.”

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Oil importing nations celebrate while the exporters scramble to balance budgets and keep markets

By Chris Miller*

Oil shocks four decades ago transformed the world economy and geopolitical landscape, and the latest oil crisis threatens to do the same. The price of oil hovered near $100 per barrel during the past three years, and the recent vertiginous fall in price to near $50 per barrel has sent markets reeling. Ali al-Naimi, oil minister of Saudi Arabia, considered the industry’s most powerful decision maker, said oil could fall to $20 a barrel.

While oil-consuming nations celebrate, the exporting nations anticipate unprecedented economic and political challenges. Most countries are importers of oil, so they will benefit from lower prices.

Lower prices improve economic prospects by way of two main mechanisms:

The first is through better public finances. In many developing countries, governments heavily subsidize energy usage by selling fuel for automobiles far below the market price. These policies have been destructive on many levels. By reducing fuel prices, such subsidies discourage fuel efficiency, exacerbating global warming. And they impose a dangerous burden on public finances because governments are on the hook when oil prices increase. Though fuel subsidies are often rhetorically justified on the grounds that they help the poor, research suggests that in most countries the middle class receives the bulk of benefits.

Some developing countries have taken advantage of lower prices to cut or eliminate fuel subsidies. When prices are high, scrapping subsidies shifts costs to consumers and risks political backlash. Now, however, extremely lower oil prices provide political cover to undertake tough reforms. Indonesian President Joko Widodo, for example, is developing a plan to sharply cut fuel subsidies and redirect public spending to more productive uses, such as infrastructure or education. If more countries follow Indonesia, the policy changes facilitated by lower oil prices will underwrite more economic growth for years to come.

The second mechanism by which oil consumers benefit from lower prices is straightforward – households have more money to spend on other goods. In the United States, for example, consumers spent $370 billion on gasoline in 2013, according to analysis from Goldman Sachs. That constitutes roughly 3 percent of total household spending. Lower prices may save American consumers $125 billion over the coming year. Chinese consumers are less avid drivers than Americans, but they too will notice the economic effects as energy costs influence the price of food – Chinese spend near 27 percent of their income on food while Americans spend about 6.5 percent. Indeed, across the world, consumers will experience similar windfalls if oil prices stay low. In economic terms, this will function as a medium-size tax cut and boost consumption as people can afford to buy more goods or save.

Both the short and long-term effects of lower oil prices bode well for the global economy. But there are downsides, too, including threats for Japan and the European Union. Japan has suffered from years of falling prices and low inflation, and the governor of the Bank of Japan, Haruhiko Kuroda, has declared a goal of returning Japan to “normal” levels of inflation, meaning an increase in prices each year of at least 2 percent.

Similarly, falling prices in Southern Europe coupled with stagnation in Germany threaten to pull the entire eurozone into sustained deflation, thus dragging down regional economic growth yet further. For both Japan and the EU, lower oil prices complicate monetary policymaking as central bankers currently look for higher, not lower prices.

Japan has already embarked on one of history’s largest programs of so-called “quantitative easing,” by which the central bank increases the money supply in order to spark gross domestic product growth and higher prices. Many economists have urged the EU to do the same, but complicated politics – and Germans’ aversion to active monetary policy – restrict Europe’s ability to enact an expansive monetary policy.

Reversal of fortune: Abrupt drop in oil prices transforms economies of oil exporters when more than half of budgets rely on revenues from energy sales (Sources: Wall Street Journal; Ycharts and Nasdaq; Tax Policy Center) Enlarge Image (See footnote)

Although lower oil prices will likely help repair family budgets, central bankers in Europe and Japan are wary that falling oil prices will lead consumers to expect falling prices in the future. Consumers’ expectations about price movements have significant effects on spending habits. If they expect lower prices in the future, they may put off purchases, threatening overall reductions in consumer spending and economic growth.

The biggest losers from lower oil prices, however, are countries that depend on energy exports. Many of the Gulf exporters, such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, are rich enough to survive a period of low prices with only a bit of belt-tightening, though even Saudi Arabia posted a budget deficit this year. If oil prices stay low for a period of years, the Saudi social contract may face a wrenching revision. That is a long-term prospect, but other countries, like Iran, Venezuela and Russia are suffering immediate financial crisis as reduced oil-export revenue wrecks government budgets and sends those economies into a tailspin.

For example, Iran, one of the world’s largest oil exporters, is losing an estimated $1 billion per month because of reduced export revenue. Indeed, some analysts, such as David Gardner of the Financial Times, have speculated that Saudi Arabia’s willingness to tolerate low prices is a geopolitical move designed to place pressure on Iran to cut a deal over its nuclear program.

There is little evidence so far that the oil-price collapse has tempered Iran’s geopolitical ambitions. By contrast, Vladimir Putin’s Russia has seen a dramatic reversal of fortune over the past six months. This summer, Putin was riding high after managing to annex Crimea and set up rump states inside of Ukraine without provoking anything more serious than economic sanctions.

The oil-price crash has changed that. Because Russia’s economy is dependent on hydrocarbon exports for two-thirds of its export revenues, lower prices have led the ruble to collapse vis-à-vis the euro and dollar. That has created sharp problems for the Russian economy, since many large firms have debts denominated in foreign currency which they will struggle to repay.

Russia’s economic problems are forcing the country’s elite to reconsider its geopolitical position. Earlier this year, many in Moscow speculated that Russia had the resources to survive a serious deterioration in ties with the West, and to sell gas to China instead. With plummeting oil prices, however, many in Russia’s elite now realize that their country’s main export – energy – is far less scarce than it used to be. Oil is a much less influential geopolitical tool. As a result, some Kremlin advisors have urged Putin to improve relations with the West.

Indeed, as oil prices slide, the Kremlin adopted a more conciliatory policy toward Ukraine in order to regain confidence of financial markets and stabilize its economic position. Russia appears to have abandoned efforts to set up independent statelets in Eastern Ukraine, and fighting in the region has fallen sharply since early December.

Similarly, petroleum products constitute almost all Venezuelan exports, so lower oil prices put serious pressure on the country’s budget and current account. Inflation has spiked, and shortages are already widespread, so the crisis places further pressure on Caracas to cut subsidized oil shipments to likeminded Latin American states and adopt a less costly foreign policy.

The effects of lower oil portend big changes – so long as energy prices don’t rise again soon. Across the world, the new energy landscape portends sharp and controversial changes, from public finances to monetary policy to geopolitics. Oil exporters have grown used to throwing around their weight and their petrodollars to get their way, from Saudi Arabia’s network of extremist madrassas to Russia’s support for warlords across the former Soviet space. If oil prices stay low, countries will find that shrinking budgets no longer support grand geopolitical ambitions.

*Chris Miller is a PhD candidate at Yale University and a research associate at the Hoover Institution. He is currently finishing a book manuscript on Russian-Chinese relations.

Graphic: Reversal of fortune: Abrupt drop in oil prices transforms economies of oil exporters when more than half of budgets rely on revenues from energy sales (Sources: Wall Street Journal; Ycharts and Nasdaq; Tax Policy Center)
Enlarge Image

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The 13-year NATO combat mission in Afghanistan formally ended on Dec 28, 2014 with a ceremonial lowering of its green flag and a pledge by top officials of the US-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to partner Afghanistan in its unfinished war against the Afghan Taliban and other militant groups.

US General John Campbell, the ISAF commander, led the ceremony at the force’s headquarters in Kabul, which was held at a basketball gym inside the headquarters, accompanied by a brass band and a colour guard. The base was on high alert in case of a Taliban attack; non-resident staff had been told to stay home and facilities inside the base such as shops and coffee bars had been closed.

With effect from Jan 1, 2015, General Campbell is now leading a new North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) support mission, tasked to advise, train and assist the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). The Taliban which saw its victory in this transition of NATO forces said, “We consider this step a clear indication of their defeat and disappointment.”

Earlier, US President Barack Obama in his Christmas Day address remarked that in just a few days’ time the US “combat” mission in Afghanistan will be over and that “Our longest war will come to a responsible end”. However, some observers feel that the transition from combat to training and Counter Terrorism (CT) missions is a mere rebranding of the US military capability in Afghanistan; which though scaled down retains its potency as well as most tasks of its earlier mission. This article looks at the US military presence in Afghanistan in 2015.

Resolute Support

The end of the UN mandated NATO-led ISAF mission also saw the transition to a new NATO mission in Afghanistan, Operation Resolute Support, which commenced Jan 1, 2015. It is a two-year mission, with the primary function to advise, train and assist the ANSF. Twenty-eight NATO allies and 14 partner nations will contribute in different ways to Operation Resolute Support. The total number of international troops in Afghanistan, which peaked in 2009 at about 142,000, has gradually shrunk to about 17,000. Under Resolute Support, it is estimated that in 2015, about 12,500-13,500 NATO troops will be operating in Afghanistan, which includes about 5,000 US troops.

The legal framework for Operation Resolute Support is provided by a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), which was signed in Kabul on Sep 30, 2014 by the newly inaugurated Afghan President Ashraf Ghani and NATO’s Senior Civilian Representative to Afghanistan, and later ratified by the Afghan parliament on Nov 27, 2014.

Freedom’s Sentinel

As President Obama had decreed, Operation Enduring Freedom’s combat mission in Afghanistan too came to an end and a new US training and advisory mission called Operation Freedom’s Sentinel (OFS) has been launched in its place. According to US Defence Secretary Chuck Hagel, OFS includes two core components: working with NATO allies and partners on Resolute Support, and continuing “counterterrorism operations against the remnants of Al Qaeda to ensure that Afghanistan is never again used to stage attacks against our homeland.” OFS is the US mission in coordination with Operation Resolute Support. OFS has a separate “non-NATO” contingent of US forces which will participate in force protection, logistical support and CT activities. Officials said about 5,500 US troops will be part of this second contingent, which will be based in Kabul.

Rules of Engagement: 2015

It was understood that after the end of Operation Enduring Freedom, US troops in Afghanistan in 2015 will not conduct regular patrols or offensive missions against the Taliban and that they would restrict their operations to CT actions against the Al Qaeda. However, in November 2014, Obama decided to authorize a more expansive mission than the one he had declared in May for the military in Afghanistan in 2015, which included a broadened remit for CT missions.

The order, which was seen as extending the direct fighting role of US troops for at least another year, allowed the US military authority to carry out three actions in 2015; One, protect US troops and coalition partners; two, conduct CT operations against al Qaeda, the Haqqani network and other militants including the Afghan Taliban if it provided direct support to al Qaeda; three, provide close air support to ANSF in extremis.

The order therefore allows US forces to continue with offensive action against the Taliban and other militant groups, subject to them threatening US troops or the Afghan government. The new authorization also allows US airplanes and drones to support ANSF on combat missions and ground troops to occasionally accompany ANSF on operations against the Taliban.

The extension of the CT mission to include other groups was expected, given the emergence of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) and the realignment of various smaller terror groups with them in Af-Pak. The point regarding attacking Taliban and other militant groups when threatening US troops is a mere reiteration of a principle inherent in most rules of engagement, but what the order does is that it extends the US protection to the Afghan government, permits joint operations where required and makes available the option to deploy US airpower in support of ANSF operations.

It terms of US capability in Afghanistan post 2014 it appears to only balance the reduced availability of combat resources by restricting the situations where they may be used. The order was seen by some analysts as a “rebranding” exercise, while some saw it as a move to effect due corrections after the lessons learnt from the rise of ISIS in Iraq.

Indian Perspective

Irrespective of the nomenclature and reduced numbers, India would welcome the continued active role of the US and its NATO allies in Afghanistan into 2015, as it provides the required breathing space to train key enablers such as pilots, medics, logisticians for the ANSF. This is a key task for which at the moment US-led NATO is best placed to carry out, given their operational familiarity with the ANSF. The alignment of the CT mission of the US troops with the emerging threats and ground realities is crucial for its effectiveness. Further, besides providing more staying power to the ANSF, the two missions will also provide more time to the fledgling national unity government in Kabul and to democracy in Afghanistan.

However, what India would be wary of is the influence of the current US policy towards Pakistan on these events in Afghanistan. There is a sense that the US is not seeing the Pakistani transgressions on the Durand line and those on its border with India in equal light.

(Monish Gulati is Associate Director with the Society for Policy Studies. He can be contactedatm_gulati_2001@yahoo.com)

This article was published at South Asia Monitor.

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A decision by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) that groups wealthy Gulf states to abandon plans to adopt a unified contract for domestic workers increases pressure on Qatar to significantly revamp its controversial labour regime in a bid to fend off efforts to deprive it of its right to host the 2022 World Cup. It also highlights the pitfalls Qatar and other Gulf states have encountered in tinkering with their labour systems amid mounting international criticism.

The GCC’s failure to agree on a unified contract for domestic workers, the most vulnerable group operating under the controversial kafala or sponsorship system, comes as Qatar braces itself for a debate on reform of world soccer body FIFA at the European Parliament on January 21 hosted by British parliamentarian Damien Collins, a critic of the integrity of Qatar’s World Cup bid, that could potentially generate more negative headlines.

It also comes against the backdrop of a recent warning by Theo Zwanziger, the FIFA executive committee member tasked with monitoring reform of the Qatari labour regime, that Qatar has yet to show progress and risks being deprived of its right to host the World Cup at FIFA’s congress in May.

Mr. Zwanziger said Qatar need to establish by March 10 an independent commission to monitor its labour reforms to avoid the risk of losing one of the world’s foremost mega sporting events. The creation of the commission was one of numerous recommendations made by a Qatar-sponsored review of its labour legislation by British-based law firm DLA Piper.

Charges by migrant and labour right activists that the abandonment of a unified contract reflects a lack of sincerity on the part of Gulf countries goes to the heart of mounting impatience among human rights groups and reflected in Mr. Zwanziger’s comments that Qatar is not serious about revamping if not abolishing its kafala system that puts employees at the mercy of their employers.

“Since the draft contract first emerged in early 2013, GCC states have eschewed transparency and avoided accountability through purposefully ambiguous rhetoric. The refusal to release drafts of the contract prevented civil society and other stakeholders from providing valuable perspectives and input that help to ensure the comprehensiveness of reform,” Migrant Rights, an NGO focused on migrant worker rights in the Middle East, said in a statement. The group noted that activists favoured a unified contract “because it could provide for a much-improved baseline for all domestic workers.”

The group cautioned that a “unified contract would not have been a panacea; it is not a substitute for inclusive labour laws, and it does not resolve the deep-rooted issues that traverse migrants’ experiences, such as deceptive recruitment or obstacles to accessing justice. But the unified contract represented a critical intermediary step towards more complete legal reform.” It charged that “each year GCC states recycle the same promises for domestic worker reform, and each year the changes actually implemented are marginal at best… The failure of the Gulf states to implement meaningful reform, and their deliberate obscurity and incoherence in doing so, evidences the low priority accorded to protecting domestic workers and other migrant labourers.”

Qatar has been slow in acting on pledges it has made as well as recommendations in a slew of reports published by the United Nations, trade unions and human rights groups in recent years. Qatari officials have announced changes to its labour law and regime that have so far fallen short of the demands of activists and the recommendations made in the various reports.

In addressing the labour issue, which has emerged as a potentially greater threat to Qatar’s World Cup hosting rights than allegations of wrongdoing in its successful bid for the tournament, Qatar is caught in a Catch-22. It needs to respond quickly and decisively to international demands for reform but gradually and carefully to alleviate widespread fear at home.

Many Qataris, who constitute a mere 12 percent of the tiny Gulf state’s population agree that migrant workers’ working and living conditions need to be improved but fear that granting rights to foreigners would threaten their grip on their culture and society. Implicit in the fear is the realization that there are no solutions to Qatar’s existential demographic problem that would ensure continued dominance of Qatari culture and Qatari control of their society and politics.

That fear has in effect prevented Qataris from taking a number of steps that would not endanger their rights and position as citizens but would have gone some way to demonstrate sincerity and maintained credibility with the Gulf state’s critics. Such steps could have included adopting as a nationwide model standards and contracts drafted by the Qatar Foundation and the 2022 Supreme Committee for Delivery & Legacy that go a far but non-controversial way in improving workers’ and living conditions and massively rather than incrementally boosting the number of labour inspectors monitoring compliance with Qatari laws, rules and regulations.

Qatar’s failure to take such steps has undermined a key goal of its sports strategy: the building of soft power as a pillar of its defence and security strategy. Qatar’s image, tarnished by the labour issue, is further on the defensive by allegations that it turns a blind eye to funding of terrorism, a charge the Gulf state has strenuously denied, and its support for Islamist groups, prominent among which the embattled Muslim Brotherhood.

While deeds rather than words will be needed to repair reputational damage, Qatar has not been helped by a seeming absence of an effective communications strategy that has opened it to criticism by parties with a vested interest, including some of its Gulf partners and Israel, as well as opponents of Qatar’s hosting of the World Cup.

Qatar appears to be banking on pledges by world soccer body FIFA president Sepp Blatter in contradiction to Mr. Zwanziger’s comments that only an earthquake could deprive the Gulf state of its World Cup hosting rights. With Mr. Blatter under increased pressure because of his management of multiple corruption scandals and FIFA’s lack of transparency and accountability, that assurance could over time prove to be less ironclad.

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Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany should press Ukrainian Prime Minister Arseny Yatseniuk to ensure that Ukrainian forces take all feasible precautions to minimize harm to civilians. Merkel and Yatseniuk are scheduled to meet in Berlin on January 8, 2015.

Merkel should emphasize the need for Ukraine’s Defense Ministry to issue clear and specific orders to troops fighting a Russian-backed insurgency in eastern Ukraine not to use certain explosive weapons in areas populated by civilians. Merkel should also press the Ukraine authorities to conduct further investigations into allegations that Ukrainian forces were responsible for attacks in the east that failed to distinguish between civilian and military objects, causing civilian casualties.

“Ukraine is in the throes of multiple crises and needs Germany’s assistance,” said Rachel Denber, deputy Europe and Central Asia director at Human Rights Watch. “As one of Ukraine’s most important allies, Germany has a special responsibility to make sure that the country’s leadership is actively enforcing the obligation to respect the laws of war and protect civilians.”

The United Nations estimated combined civilian and military casualties on all sides in the armed conflict in eastern Ukraine at 4,364 killed and 10,064 wounded as of November 30, 2014.

Human Rights Watch has documented government and rebel forces’ use of cluster munitions and Grad rockets in areas populated by civilians. The use of such weapons in populated areas is indiscriminate since the weapons affect a wide area and cannot distinguish between military targets and civilian objects.

In meetings with Human Rights Watch in December, Ukrainian officials said that their initial investigations concluded that Ukrainian forces were not responsible for the indiscriminate attacks that Human Rights Watch documented. Human Rights Watch said the investigations were incomplete, however. The Ukrainian investigation into the attacks using unguided Grad rockets was based solely on records kept by the agency responsible for counter-insurgency operations in eastern Ukraine and did not examine any forensic evidence on the ground, including impact sites in areas government forces control. Ukraine’s cluster munitions investigation apparently did not consider the specific weapon used in the attacks that Human Rights Watch documented.

“Ukrainian authorities have done the right thing by starting an investigation, but that will mean nothing if they do not investigate thoroughly,” Denber said. “We urge Merkel to encourage Yatseniuk to ensure that the job gets done.”

During the December meetings, defense officials told Human Rights Watch that the ministry had circulated instructions to all its commanders to inform troops about criminal responsibility under Ukrainian law for violating the laws of war and that international humanitarian law should be strictly respected.

Grad rockets should not be used in populated areas, even in response to attacks launched by rebels from civilian areas. In line with the global treaty addressing their prohibition, cluster munitions should never be used under any circumstances. Merkel should also encourage Ukraine’s leadership to join the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions.

“The Defense Ministry’s instructions are a step in the right direction, but we are counting on Merkel to firmly underscore the importance of specific instructions not to use certain weapons in populated areas,” Denber said.

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By Dr. Sridhar Krishnaswami and Archana Arul*

If one were to go by strictly civilisational and historical contexts India and Sri Lanka should have had the best of bilateral relationships in the region of South Asia.

But sadly that has not been the case, for the two nations have been involved in bitter acrimony over the last few decades, some of it having to do with strategic compulsions and a lot that can be pinned down to the fashion in which the minority Tamils have been subjected to, both during the brutal ethnic conflict that plagued that island nation for nearly three decades and in the last five years after the end of that traumatic period.

Unfortunately for India, decision makers in New Delhi have been weighed down by domestic political compulsions where the mere survival of the political order in our nation’s capital meant that the government there has had to dance to the tunes of political partners in Tamil Nadu. It was not merely that India’s foreign policy was mortgaged to the whims and fancies of alliances in Tamil Nadu — one could say the same as far as New Delhi’s relations with Nepal, Bangladesh and Myanmar as well, to mention a few.

But May 2014 signalled a chance of a definite shift in foreign policy making where the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) coalition have made a significant difference. The fact that new Indian Prime Minister, Narendra Modi made a conscious and deliberate effort to reach out to South Asia and its leaders sent a strong signal that foreign policy interests of India were going to be calculated on national and strategic factors, and not in a desperate attempt to cling on to power. For the first time in a very long period, New Delhi made it clear to its neighbours that reaching out was a two way street.

January 2015 can be seen as yet another milestone in bilateral relations in the sense that the forthcoming presidential elections in Sri Lanka on Jan 8 could make all the difference. It may not be a game changer, for foreign policies do not abruptly change course; yet the emerging scheme of things in Colombo could be an eye opener for both bilateral ties and the regional balance of power. President Mahinda Rajapaksa has his political challenges cut out even if he manages to hold on to a substantial base of support in his country. And that raises a very pertinent question: What should New Delhi’s stance be in this forthcoming presidential election in the island nation. The prudent and sober voices will say only one thing: Stay clear of the democratic political and electoral process evolving in Sri Lanka. And the first impressions are that the Modi government may well just do that.

Irrespective of what emerges in the presidential polls in Sri Lanka, it is a rare opportunity for the political leadership in that country to come to terms with some of the troubling questions it has been facing in the last five years, especially as it pertains to the future of the Tamils. Simply maintaining that he has got rid of “terrorists” and “terrorism” may get Rajapaksa votes and propel him to victory on Jan 8, but that is not the end of the story both for his own country and the relationship with India.

It is well within Colombo’s rights to nurture relationships with countries like China and Pakistan; but it is politically and strategically imprudent to wave those cards when difficult and pertinent questions are raised by India and the world community on issues of accountability and “real” devolution of powers. Both Rajapaksa and his presidential contest opposition leaders will have to realise that if Sri Lanka is being hammered within the Commonwealth and outside, it is on account of a deliberate unwillingness to come to terms with ground realities.

And if the world body is asking for an international probe for accountability and war crimes, it has precisely to do with powers-that-be in Colombo refusing to account for how some 40,000 — or more — people could have died in the closing stages of the ethnic conflict. And this does not include the thousands who are unaccounted for. Military personnel absolving the military for any misconduct during the last phase of the conflict is simply not going to wash. And this is precisely what the international community and the non-governmental organizations are telling Sri Lanka. Making the point that all these institutions and individuals calling for accountability are “sympathizers” of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), or somehow on its payroll, is not going to work either.

For that matter, the challenge for Modi, the BJP and the NDA is not simple by any stretch of imagination. For a party that is making steady inroads in many states since May 2014, the BJP cannot wish away the domestic compulsions in Tamil Nadu as it searches for allies and alliances to make a mark in the 2016 state assembly elections. As much politically savvy it may be nationally, the BJP cannot wish away the future of the Tamils in Sri Lanka as it seeks to make political inroads in Tamil Nadu. Rajapaksa releasing Indian fisher folk and even saving some from the gallows may be good gestures, but they certainly fall short of the larger picture.

The year 2015 and beyond is something to be watched very closely for both New Delhi and Colombo for the road to genuine strengthening of the bilateral relationship depends very much on what happens in the island nation and the next steps that are going to be taken by Rajapaksa or any of his major challengers in the presidential poll. The winning strategy in Sri Lanka is not in words, or occasionally waving the China card, but in deeds.

*Sridhar Krishnaswami is a former senior journalist with The Hindu in Chennai, Singapore and Washington. He is presently Head of the departments of Journalism and Mass Communication and International Relations of the Faculty of Science and Humanities at SRM University, Chennai. Archana Arul is a Research Scholar in the Department of Journalism and Mass Communication of the same university. They can be reached at either sridhar54k@gmail.com or arul.archana25@gmail.com

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