By O. Igho Natufe*
There are two phases of the Ukraine Crisis. The first phase dates from November 20, 2013 when the government of President Viktor Yanukovych suspended Ukraine’s Association Agreement (AA) talks with the European Union (EU). The second phase is from February 22, 2014 when President Yanukovych was ousted from office in a coup d’état orchestrated by anti-regime demonstrators and opposition parties against his suspension of the AA talks with the EU. According to the Ukrainian Government, the suspension was informed by the need to assess the economic cost of signing the AA vis-à-vis Russo-Ukrainian trade.
Russia, the United States (US), and the EU interfered in shaping the contours of the Ukraine crisis. They were each allied with contending domestic political forces in Ukraine. While the anti-regime demonstrators and opposition parties were aided and abetted by the US and its EU allies, who consistently interfered in Ukraine’s domestic debate of the issue between November 20, 2013 and February 22, 2014, Russia limited itself to applying subtle pressure on Yanukovych and his government at a CIS summit in Minsk and a private meeting with President Vladimir Putin in Sochi on October 24-25, 2013 and October 27, 2013, respectively.
As students of international politics will attest to, the concept of non-interference in the internal affairs of states is an oxymoron. Interference in the internal affairs of states is one way of exerting pressure on a given state to comply with the wishes or desires of the interfering state. The method used in exerting this pressure may differ; but the expectant end result is the same – to influence the strategic directions of the targeted state. The method can either be refined or unrefined. At the CIS Heads of State Supreme Euroasian Economic Council (the governing body of the Russian-led Customs Union), in Minsk on October 24-25, 2013, President Yanukovych was under intense pressure by his CIS colleagues to ditch the EU and sign with the Customs Union. Putin continued this conversation with Yanukovych in Sochi. Framed within the context of bilateral or multi-lateral heads of state meetings, I categorize this method of interference as refined. But the US and the EU opted for an unrefined approach by sending their representatives to participate in the anti-regime demonstrations at the Maidan Square in Kyiv.1
![Ukraine's Viktor Yanukovych]()
Ukraine’s Viktor Yanukovych
In an obvious reference to the US and EU representatives’ interference in Ukrainian domestic affairs, Yanukovych condemned “someone coming to our country and teaching us how we should live here” while Ukraine’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Leonid Kozhara “urged foreign officials to refrain from taking part in political processes in Ukraine”, maintaining that Ukraine “did not need any mediation.”2
Interestingly, the EU seemed to endorse the Ukrainian position against foreign interference in its domestic affairs. At its summit of December 20, 2013, the EU made three references to Ukraine. First, that the EU was ready to sign the AA “as soon as Ukraine is ready.” Second, “a democratic solution to the political crisis in Ukraine” should be sought. Third, that the EU recognized “the right of all sovereign States to make their own foreign policy decisions without undue external pressures.”3
US Senator John McCain, a Republican, was accompanied by Senator Christopher Murphy, a Democrat, to Kyiv in mid-December 2013. While they and US Assistant Secretary of State, Victoria Nuland met with government officials and opposition parties, it was what they said and did in Kyiv that defined the purpose of their mission. For example, in addressing the anti-regime demonstrators at the Maidan Square on December 15, 2013, McCain declared: “We are here together speaking for the American people in solidarity with you.” He led his audience to believe that his mission was a bi-partisan affair of the US Senate with support from the American people. He continued:
“People of Ukraine, this is your moment. The free world is with you. America is with you.”4
![John McCain]()
John McCain
According to The Guardian, the presence of McCain and Murphy at the anti-regime demonstrations at the Maidan Square “further highlighted the geo-political East-West tug of war which Ukraine is once again at the centre of. Politicians from Berlin and Brussels have paid morale-boosting trips to the square”, which drew “denunciation from the Russian prime minister, Dmitry Medvedev, for “crude” meddling in Ukraine’s affairs.”5 The depth of this interference was accentuated in a leaked transcript of Nuland’s conversation with Geoffrey Pyatt, the US Ambassador to Ukraine, in which both were discussing the composition of a post-Yanukovych government in Ukraine.6 Canada’s Foreign Minister, John Baird, had preceded McCain and Nuland to the Maidan Square in Kyiv on December 05, 2013 where he conveyed Canada’s support for the anti-regime demonstrations.7
Irrespective of EU’s lofty principle recognizing “the right of all sovereign States to make their own foreign policy decisions without undue external pressures,” it is instructive to note that EU and US officials continued to exert “undue external pressures” on the government of Ukraine by their appearance and participation at the anti-regime demonstrations in Kyiv. More troubling was the impotence of the Government of Ukraine to give substance to its condemnation of the intrusion of “foreign officials” in Ukraine’s domestic affairs. Its inability to take concrete action against these “foreign officials” exposed the weakness of Yanukovych; a weakness which was exploited by EU and US representatives as exemplified by their active involvement at the Maidan Square demonstrations.
It is doubtful if the US and EU member-states would permit foreign officials to interfere in their internal affairs as their representatives did so blatantly at the Maidan Square. One recalls the Oka Crisis (July 11, 1990 – September 26, 1990) in the Province of Quebec, Canada, when the Mohawk community of Kanesatake mounted a barricade in protest against the proposed conversion of their ancestral land to a golf course and a cemetery. We can only imagine the swift action of the Government of Canada against a representative of any country meeting with the Mohawk at the barricade declaring that the people and government of his country were in support of the Mohawk’s just cause. But Yanukovych lacked the gumption to act appropriately, as Prime Minister Brian Mulroney would have acted if a representative of a foreign government had interfered in the 1990 Oka Crisis, as the Canadian, EU and US representatives acted at the Maidan Square between November 2013 and February 2014.
Both Russia and the West have contending strategic interests in Ukraine; irrespective of the legitimacy of these interests. In accordance with established diplomatic practice, it is expected that both parties will take actions to promote and protect their interests without a direct participation in any demonstrations in Ukraine. While the Kremlin acted within the norms of diplomacy by dealing with the legitimately elected president of Ukraine, for example, in Minsk, Sochi and Moscow, it is incomprehensible that the White House, Brussels, and 24 Sussex Drive allowed their officials to participate in anti-regime demonstrations in Kyiv.
The Crisis
The Ukraine crisis emerged because of the decision of the government of Ukraine to suspend its negotiations on the AA with the EU. While such a decision remains the exclusive right of a sovereign state, which the EU had said it recognized, the actions of the EU to force Ukraine into the organization betrays a hidden agenda. The EU had placed preconditions which challenged the jurisdiction of Ukraine over its internal affairs.8
![Ukraine]()
Ukraine
In February 2013, Ukraine’s Ambassador to the EU, Kostiantyn Yelisieiev rejected EU’s preconditions, arguing that, for example, “the United States is not being forced to abolish the death penalty before the EU moves forward in setting up a free trade area with its transatlantic partner.” While criticising un-named “individual member countries” that “were holding back the progress of bilateral relations”, he warned: “Don’t neglect the pro-Russia lobby in the EU.” Furthermore, he expressed Ukraine’s disappointment with “the very passive approach of Brussels” regarding Russian gas supply and transit through Ukraine.9 It is instructive to note the EU’s response to the position of Ukraine articulated by Yelisieiev. The EU President Herman Van Rompuy issued “a 3–month ultimatum” to Ukraine to comply with the EU pre-conditions “at the latest by May” 2013.10
For the government of Ukraine, the suspension of negotiations was to “ensure the national security of Ukraine” vis-à-vis the implications of the EU’s AA on trade with Russia. It asked for a mechanism to “resolve trade issues between” Ukraine, Russia, and the EU.11 President Yanukovych clarified: “As soon as we reach a level that is comfortable for us, when it meets our interests, when we agree on normal terms, then we will talk about signing.”12 In its statement criticising Russian pressure on Ukraine, the EU declared: “It is up to Ukraine to freely decide what kind of engagement they seek with the European Union.”13
That both Russia and the EU were exerting pressures on Ukraine over the EU’s AA was well known to all observers. At the scheduled Vilnius EU Eastern Partnership meeting on November 28-29, 2013, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, and Armenia were expected to initial and sign the AA. In early September 2013, Armenia withdrew from the proposed AA. In explaining his government’s position, President Serzh Sargsyan stressed Armenia’s “decision to join the Customs Union and get involved in the process of creating the Eurasian Economic Union” led by Russia. He continued: “This is a rational decision; it is a decision based on Armenia’s national interest. This decision is not a rejection of our dialogue with European institutions.” Interestingly, the reaction of the EU toward Armenia’s withdrawal was significantly different from its reaction to the Ukrainian decision. The EU Enlargement Commission, Stefan Fuele stated: “We take note of Armenia’s apparent wish to join the Customs Union.”14 The decision of Armenia is anchored on the same premise postulated by President Yanukovych and Prime Minister Mykola Azarov of Ukraine, who had declared: “We definitely do not want to be a battlefield between the EU and Russia. We want to have good relations with both the EU and Russia.”15
![Armenia]()
Armenia
Why did the EU behave differently toward Ukraine and Armenia on their decisions regarding the AA? Is it because of Ukraine’s population (almost 50 million) vis-à-vis Armenia’s small population (less than 3 million)? Or is it because of Ukraine’s strategic location (Crimea and the Black Sea ports, etc.)? What did the EU mean when it said it was “up to Ukraine to freely decide what kind of engagement they seek with the European Union”? Did they mean the Government of Ukraine or the Ukrainian population via mass demonstrations that followed the government’s suspension of negotiations on the AA?
The subsequent actions of the EU will suggest that they placed their hope on the anti-regime demonstrators at Maidan Square that greeted the government’s suspension. There were no such demonstrations in Yerevan; and neither were there Canadian, EU and US officials in Yerevan to urge the Government of Armenia to change their mind. After stating on December 20, 2013, that the EU was ready to sign the AA “as soon as Ukraine is ready”, it remained a bafflement that EU officials were regularly in Kyiv between December 2013 and February 2014, instead of waiting in Brussels for the Government of Ukraine to indicate when it was ready to sign the AA.
It is debatable whether the anti-regime demonstrators at Maidan Square would have lasted that long (November 2013 – February 2014) were it not for the morale boosting support they received from the NATO and EU member-states. On the other hand, as noted above, the Government of Ukraine was incapable of taking any actions to prevent “foreign officials” from interfering in Ukraine’s domestic political process. This weakness of the government, exemplified by its president, played a critical role in the deterioration of the situation leading up to its overthrow on February 22, 2014. President Yanukovych’s weakness was exploited by the US and EU to interfere in Ukraine’s domestic affairs as they blatantly did at the Maidan Square. Based on the preceding analysis, there is merit in John J. Mearsheimer’s thesis that the West engineered the Ukraine crisis.16
Between February 17 – 19, 2014, violence erupted in Kyiv,17 leading to the deaths of more than 75 persons. The West promptly accused the Government of Ukraine for this unfortunate situation. In his reaction to this development, the EU President Herman Van Rompuy announced that the “EU will respond quickly to deterioration including via targeted sanctions,”18 while the Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt placed the responsibility for the deaths on the shoulders of Ukrainian President Yanukovych, saying: “He has blood on his hands.”19 The Leader of Lithuanian opposition and former Prime Minister Andrius Kubilius declared: “After brutal bloodshed in EuroMaidan, Yanukovych must be tried in international court”20 apparently for crimes against humanity.
While it joined the global community in condemning the killings in Kyiv, Russia accused the West of duplicity. In its statement, the Russian Foreign Ministry blamed “the criminal activity of radical elements from the opposition” for causing the “bloodshed in Kiev and a series of other Ukranian cities.” It declared: “We do not see any clear response from European politicians and structures who refuse to admit that all the responsibility for the actions of radical elements inside Ukraine lies with the opposition.”21
It is interesting to note that, when the Estonian Foreign Minister, Urmas Paet informed the EU’s Catherine Ashton that the anti-regime demonstrators were responsible for the Maidan killings,22 the threats of sanctions against Ukraine for the deaths in Kyiv suddenly disappeared from Western public discourse. Surprisingly, none of the parties – Ukraine, Russia, the US and EU – pursued the contents of the Paet-Ashton telephone conversation. The focus was shifted to finding a reasonable compromise to a resolution of the crisis.
President Yanukovych and leaders of the opposition – Arseniy Yatseniuk (Batkivschyna Party), Vitali Klitschko (UDAR Party), and Oleh Tiahnybok (Freedom Party) – promptly recognized the urgency for a resolution of the crisis as they discussed with their respective external supporters. While the three opposition leaders, who had adopted the epithet – European Choice to depict their support for Ukraine’s signing of the AA – met in Kyiv with the German Foreign Minister, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, the French Foreign Minister, Laurent Fabius, and the Polish Foreign Minister, Radoslaw Sikorski on February 19, 2014,23 Yanukovych initiated a telephone conference with President Putin on February 20, requesting him to send a Russian “representative to Kyiv to participate in the negotiation process with the opposition as a mediator.”
President Putin obliged and dispatched Russian Ombudsman, Vladimir Petrovich Lukin to Kyiv.24 At the meeting of the opposition parties with the foreign ministers of Germany, France, and Poland, Klitschko had requested a “full resignation of the administration” as the only way to resolve the crisis. Prior to the meeting of the EU delegation with President Yanukovych, in what seemed like a moderation of Klitschko’s request, French Foreign Minister Fabius stated the EU’s demand: “Our purpose is to cause the Ukrainian administration to conduct elections. There is no solution other than elections.”25
The EU demand presupposed that an election in February 2014 was the panacea to repairing a fractured national consciousness in Ukraine, when regional authorities had de-registered political parties they deemed injurious to their respective interests, and ethnic hostilities were at a boiling point.
The EU and Russia, represented by German Foreign Minister Steinmeier and Polish Foreign Minister Sikorski, and Ombudsman Lukin, respectively, brokered a peace deal between the Ukrainian Government and the opposition on February 21. President Yanukovych, and opposition leaders Yatsenyuk, Klitschko, and Tiahnybok endorsed the deal which called for, inter alia, the withdrawal of opposition forces including the demonstrators from the city centre, a new constitution, the formation of a government of national unity within 10 days, and an early presidential election by December 2014. Two groups doubted the efficacy of the peace deal.
While Russian officials criticized the deal, the leader of the radical group, Pravy Sektor, “that has been a driver of violent clashes with police”, also rejected the deal declaring that “the national revolution will continue.”26 The Pravy Sektor’s rejection of the peace deal posed a serious challenge to the opposition leaders who had relied on the radical group and the Maidan demonstrations in building their credibility.
For example, while Klitschko was addressing the demonstrators at the Maidan Square to explain the peace deal, a protester got on stage and declared: “If tomorrow by 10 a.m. you don’t come and tell us that Yanukovich has resigned, we will put up a storm with weapons, I swear.” It was clear that the opposition leaders lacked the power and/or authority to mollify the demonstrators, many of whom had occupied the presidential residence in Kyiv.
Nikolay Rudkovskiy, head of the Socialist Party, which was part of the ruling Party of Regions coalition, introduced an impeachment bill in the Rada on February 21. President Yanukovich left Kyiv after its introduction, to participate at a meeting of the south-eastern regions in Kharkiv. It is instructive to note that, while Yanukovych honoured the government’s part of the peace deal by agreeing to call for early presidential elections, etc., the opposition leaders were unable and/or unwilling to convince the demonstrators to vacate the city centre. The leaders of the opposition became pawns of the demonstrators who used them, perhaps with their consent, to vitiate the terms of the peace deal.
By late February 22 the Ukrainian Rada voted to impeach President Yanukovych. This action plunged Ukraine into an unchartered territory and marked the second phase of the crisis. Denouncing the impeachment as unconstitutional and a coup d’état, Yanukovych insisted he was still Ukraine’s legitimate president.
Ukraine’s interim President, Oleksandr Turchynov “warned of the dangers of separatism following the ousting of President Viktor Yanukovych” in Ukraine’s regions “with large ethnic Russian populations.” He perceived this as a “serious threat” to Ukraine, and advised that the proposed “unity government” must be “a coalition of national faith”,27 in order for the new government to attain quick legitimacy.
Unfortunately for Ukraine, his warning and plea for “a coalition of national faith” was disregarded by the leaders of the opposition who seemed unable to extricate themselves from the overcoat of the Maidan Square demonstrators. The opportunity for a nationwide inclusive “coalition of national faith” was squandered in favour of narrow interests. A Ukrainian scholar, A. I. Veselovsky, vividly captured this vexing phenomenon in a critical paper he wrote in 2007. His views deserve full citation. As he aptly noted, the
“difficulties in identifying national interests are accompanied by the traditionally diverse views on national self-identification and lack of common views as to social and political organization, religious preferences, ethnic or even geographical origin and other issues. Recent political developments in our country – attempts by some political groups to take advantage of such discrepancies to promote their own political and economic dividends make this task more difficult.”
The seemingly irreconcilable approaches by the contending political groups, he argued, set “Ukraine apart from European and other countries and slow down its social, political and economic development.”28
His views are relevant for Ukraine today as they were in 2007. The failure of the post Yanukovych government to construct a genuine “coalition of national faith” and its reluctance to disband the demonstrators at Maidan Square played into the hands of pro-Yanukovych supporters, especially in Donetsk and Luhansk regions who viewed the new government in Kyiv as anti-Russian. In his 2005 analysis of ethnicity and politics in Ukraine, the eminent American scholar, Stephen Shulman identified two contrasting identities: an “eastern Slavic” vis-à-vis an “ethnic Ukrainian” polarization.29
The Ukraine crisis has profoundly brought this dichotomy to the surface, as majority of ethnic Russians in the Donbas region (Donetsk and Luhansk) the Odessa corridor and Crimea refused to recognize the new regime in Kyiv.
![Location of Crimea (red) with respect to Ukraine (white).]()
Location of Crimea (red) with respect to Ukraine (white).
Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March 2014 placed the country as a villain before the international community. This action was comprehensively condemned by member-states of the UN during the debate of Ukraine’s draft resolution on March 27, 2014, criticising Russia’s annexation. One hundred countries approved the resolution, with 58 abstentions, while only 11 (including Russia) rejected the resolution. This overwhelming condemnation of Russia dealt a huge blow to its search for allies as it grapples with the challenges of recapturing its lost influence.30 The subsequent declaration of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) and the Luhansk People’s Republic (LPR) was a product of the failure of politics in post February 22, 2014 Kyiv. It was also emboldened by Russia’s annexation of Crimea.
The Ukraine civil war between the government in Kyiv and the separatists has resulted in the death of more than four thousand persons since April 2014, plus the destruction of infrastructures (hospitals, schools, buildings, railway lines, etc.) worth billions of dollars. Russia was implicated in the civil war. While the Kremlin dismissed Russian citizens fighting on the side of the separatists in the Donbas region as volunteers, it lacked any explanation for the presence of Russian weapons and artillery in the region. Like in many wars – civil or interstate – there were several foreign soldiers of fortune engaged on both sides of the war in the Donbas region.31
The Minsk Protocol
Crisis is preventable if the conflicting parties agree to take coordinated measures to resolve the contending issues. Sadly for Ukraine, neither party were ready for peace between April and September 2014. First, the immediate post Yanukovych government in Kyiv and the candidates for the May 2014 presidential elections, including Petro Poroshenko considered the separatists in Donbas as “terrorists”, saying that they would never negotiate with “terrorists.”
Second, the separatists challenged the legitimacy of the post-Yanukovych government, insisting on a national dialogue to determine the future of Ukraine. They also questioned the inability of the government to disband the demonstrators at Maidan Square. It was only in late August 2014 that the government succeeded in evicting the demonstrators from Maidan Square. Since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack in the US, governments around the globe have been quick to employ the “terrorists” appellation against groups challenging their policies and legitimacy. By employing this tactic, the Ukrainian Government was hoping to secure the support – material or otherwise – of foreign governments in its fight against “terrorists.”
Third, when the “European Choice” coalition collapsed in the Ukrainian Rada in late July 2014, Prime Minister Yatsenyuk refused to consider members of the Party of Regions (Yanukovych’s political party) in a new coalition government. This was the second lost opportunity for the new regime to construct a “coalition of national faith.”
![President Barack Obama and President-elect Petro Poroshenko of Ukraine talk after statements to the press following their bilateral meeting at the Warsaw Marriott Hotel in Warsaw, Poland, June 4, 2014. (Official White House Photo by Pete Souza)]()
President Barack Obama and then President-elect Petro Poroshenko of Ukraine talk after statements to the press following their bilateral meeting at the Warsaw Marriott Hotel in Warsaw, Poland, June 4, 2014. (Official White House Photo by Pete Souza)
Unable to receive military hardware from any of Ukraine’s western supporters, and faced with the prospects of the separatists extending their hold to within reach of Mariupol, the government of President Poroshenko was compelled to negotiate with the separatists at a ceasefire meeting brokered by Russia and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in Minsk, Belorussia. The participants were Ambassador Heidi Tagliavini (OSCE), M. Yu. Zurabov (Russian Ambassador in Ukraine), Leonid Kuchma (Second President of Ukraine), A. A. Zakharchenko and I. V. Plotnitsky, the (then) Prime Minister of the self-proclaimed DPR and the Minister of Defence of the self-proclaimed LPR, respectively. While they all signed the Protocol indicating their designations, the designations of Zakharchenko and Plotnitsky were excluded. The Ceasefire Protocol is a 12-Point Peace Plan which the signatories hoped would restore peace and stability in Ukraine.32
Of special interest are points 1, 3, 7, and 9.
Point 1: “Ensure an immediate bilateral cessation of the use of weapons.”
Point 3: “Decentralization of power “On the temporary order of local self-government in separate districts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions.”
Point 7: “Continue an inclusive nationwide dialogue.”
Point 9: “Ensure the conduct of immediate local elections in accordance with the Laws of Ukraine “On the temporary order of local self-government in separate districts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions.”
Even though they participated in the negotiations, Zakharchenko and Plotnitsky of the self-proclaimed DPR and LPR, immediately after the Protocol was signed by all parties, declared that the ceasefire would not negate their decision on independence. The Minsk Protocol may have recognized the inviolability of Ukraine’s territory, with concessions of local self-government for the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, the government of Ukraine has been unable to exercise its jurisdictions in both regions.
For example, the national parliamentary elections of October 26, 2014 did not take place in the “separate districts” of both regions. The inability of the government to conduct national parliamentary elections in the districts under separatist control was regarded as a victory by the Donetsk and Luhansk authorities vis-à-vis their pursuit of independence.
While Point 9 of the Minsk Protocol called for an “immediate local elections in accordance with the Laws of Ukraine…in separate districts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions”, it was unclear which authority was to “ensure” that the elections take place. The separatists considered that the authority resided with them, hence they organized presidential elections in Donetsk and Luhansk on November 2, 2014, in a move that they argued buttressed their independence. In rejecting the elections, President Poroshenko accused the separatists of violating the Minsk Protocol, saying that the government of Ukraine would organize local government elections “in separate districts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions” on December 7, 2014. But the government of Ukraine was unable to organize any elections in these areas as it declared it would; a failure which underlined its lack of jurisdiction in the territories.
In response to the November 2, elections, President Poroshenko cancelled the devolution of powers his government had announced it would grant the “separate districts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions” as per Point 3 of the Minsk Protocol. No attempt has been made, as of the time of writing this paper, by the government of Ukraine to convene “an inclusive nationwide dialogue” as envisaged by the Minsk Protocol.
Which Way Ukraine?
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Washington and Brussels have coordinated a twin-policy of NATO and EU eastern expansion aimed at halting any sign of Russian resurgence. Russia considers this eastern expansion to be hostile to its national and strategic interests; an eastern expansion which reminds Russia of the western supported eastward policy of the Nazi regime, leading to Germany’s invasion of the Soviet Union on June 21, 1941.
![Gorbachev (right) being introduced to Barack Obama by Joe Biden, 20 March 2009]()
Gorbachev (right) being introduced to Barack Obama by Joe Biden, 20 March 2009
In fact, the darling of the West, the ex-President of the former Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev gave credence to this thesis in his recent criticism of the Western “anti-Russian sanctions” as he accused German politicians of plotting “a new division of Europe.” He averred: “During the Second World War, Germany tried to extend its sphere of influence eastwards. What other lessons do we need.”33
It is, however, debatable if this was a sufficient ground for Russia’s annexation of Crimea. But governments, especially the great powers, have their own logic in explaining the use of hard power to attain their strategic interests. Both Russia and the US have preferred hard power over soft power in advancing their competing strategic interests over the past two decades since 1991. Ukraine, either by its own commission or omission, has allowed itself to be a pawn in a 3-way power struggle by Russia, the US (read NATO) and the EU.
The Crimea Peninsula plays a critical role in this conundrum. Tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union placed great strategic premium on the Black Sea ports of Crimea for hosting their naval fleets. The collapse of the Soviet Union jeopardized this access as Crimea (since 1954) was considered an integral part of Ukrainian territory. Under the presidency of Leonid Kuchma, Russia and Ukraine signed an accord in 1997 granting Russia a lease on naval facilities in Crimea until 2017.
This decision was resented by Viktor Yushchenko’s government which considered it a violation of Ukranian national interests. His Prime Minister, Yulia Tymoshenko in September 2008 said the lease would be allowed to expire in 2017 in order “to make Ukraine a zone free of any military bases.” Ukraine’s desire to join NATO played a key role in Ukraine’s policy on this issue, a policy which prompted “some Western politicians to predict it could spark a new crisis in a region destabilized by Russia’s incursion” into Georgia in August 2008.34
As noted by Jana Kobzova and her colleagues, the western aided “coloured revolutions in 2003-2004 and the war in Georgia in 2008 forced Russia to rethink its strategy, and work proactively to re-assert its influence in the region.”
Furthermore, the role of the West in engineering the over throw of President Yanukovych on February 22, 2014 accelerated the urgency for Russia to take proactive action on Crimea, concerned that growing anti-Russian sentiments and pro-NATO aspirations by leading political figures in Ukraine may lead to the cancellation of the extension of the lease on naval facilities in Crimea “beyond 2017 by 25 years with an additional five year renewal option.”35 Russia secured this lease extension until 2042 in an agreement reached with the Ukrainian Government on April 21, 2010, just two months after President Yanukovych assumed office. It was clear to Russia that a new Ukrainian government anchored on anti-Yanukovych and anti-Russian sentiments would cancel its lease in 2017. Thus, in the light of NATO and EU pressures on Ukraine to join these organizations, and the over throw of President Yanukovych, Russia elected to annex Crimea.
Immediately following the annexation, the Russian Government abrogated the 1997 treaty and the 2010 Kharkiv Pact to underline Ukraine’s loss of jurisdiction in Crimea, since the annexation had rendered null and void the legal constructs of those treaties.36
Ukraine faces severe challenges to its sovereignty – both in the Donbas region and in Crimea. While Russia’s role is critical in the resolution of the Donbas situation, it considers Crimea its territory.
The Russian Government has long distanced itself from the independence aspirations of the separatists in the Donbas region. Unlike Crimea, Russia does not attach any significant strategic value in annexing Donetsk and Luhansk. It serves the Kremlin’s strategic interest for Donetsk and Luhansk to remain component constitutes of Ukraine with a statehood status as proposed by Putin in late August 2014. The statehood concept will recognize the exclusive jurisdiction of all Ukrainian regions, including Donetsk and Luhansk, on, for example, language and culture, education, and history, etc.
Thus, the devolution of power which Ukraine agreed to in the Minsk Protocol will be universal and not exclusive to Donetsk and Luhansk, as a way of addressing the governance issue in Ukraine. The political structure needs not be federalism, but a strategically structured unitary system with federal properties, like in the United Kingdom (UK), will definitely facilitate the process of national reconciliation in Ukraine. There is a sense in Ukraine, from my conversations with several Ukrainian scholars and politicians, that only a unitary system can keep the country together. But a unitary system that treats the regions as vassals may be counter-productive.
Kyiv may wish to consult with either Washington or Ottawa on the benefits of federalism. Ukraine has two options on how to re-structure its political system: either the strategically structured unitary system with federal properties like in the UK, or a federal system – like the US or Canada. Either option will require an inclusive nationwide dialogue of all the regions, including Donetsk and Luhansk. The onus is on the government of President Poroshenko to initiate this dialogue as envisaged in the Minsk Protocol. It is very likely that a national compromise between the independence aspirations of Donetsk and Luhansk and the current policy of the Poroshenko regime can be achieved at such a nationwide dialogue.
Regarding Crimea, short of defeat in a world war, as some leading Russian scholars have told me, Russia will never give Crimea back to Ukraine. It is doubtful if NATO and the EU can force Russia to return Crimea to Ukraine. The March 27, 2014 UN resolution condemning Russian annexation has not yielded any tangible results for Ukraine on this issue, beyond the symbolism of the condemnation. Is it possible that Russia will ask Ukraine to recognize Crimea as Russian territory as a quid pro quo for Russia’s mediation in ensuring that the Donbas region remain Ukrainian? History will Judge.
PRESIDENTS OF UKRAINE: POST-SOVIET ERA
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Leonid Kravchuk
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December 15, 1991- July 19, 1994
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Leonid Kuchma
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July 19, 1994- January 23, 2005
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Viktor Yushchenko
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January 23, 2005- February 25, 2010
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Viktor Yanukovych
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February 25, 2010- February 21, 2014
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Oleksandr Turchynov (Acting President)
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February 23, 2014 – June 07, 2014
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Petro Poroshenko
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June 07 2014-present
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About the author:
*O. Igho Natufe is a Professor of Political Science at the Institute for African Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia. A retired Senior Policy Adviser with the Government of Canada, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada, Igho also taught Political Science and International Relations in Canadian, Ghanaian, and Nigerian universities. He is the author of Soviet Policy in Africa: From Lenin to Brezhnev, Bloomington, Indiana, 2011, and several publications on international politics and governance in scholarly journals. He is also the author of Russian Foreign Policy In Search of Lost Influence (Forthcoming). The views and opinions expressed in this lecture do not reflect the views and/or opinions of the Institute for African Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences.
Notes:
1. See, for example, “Top U.S. official visits protesters in Kiev as Obama admin. Ups pressure on Ukraine president Yanukovych”, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/us-vistoria-nuland-wades-into -ukraine-turmoil-over-yanukovych/ December 11, 2013. 4:45 AM. (Accessed December 12, 2013); “US’ Nuland treating Ukrainian protesters to cookies on Maidan”, http://sputniknews.com/voiceofrussia/news/2013_12_11/us-s-Nuland-treating-ukrainian-protesters-to-cookies-on-Maidan-1129/ 11 December 2013. 13.01 (Accessed December 13, 2013); “John McCain tells Ukrainian protesters: “We are here to support your just cause”. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/15/john-mccain-ukraine-protests-support-just-cause Suday 15, December 2013. 14.41 GMT (Accessed December 15, 2013); http://uk.reuters.com/video/2013/12/15/sen-john-mccain-to-ukrainian-protesters?videoId=274933667 (Accessed December 29, 2013)
2. Foreign Policy Research Institute, International Weekly #40-41 (09.12.2013 – 22.12.2013) http://fpri.kiev.ua/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/INTERNATIONAL-WEEKLY-engl-40-41-09.12.2013-22.12.2013.pdf (Accessed December 27, 2013)
3. European Council Conclusions, http://www.european-council.europa.eu/council-meetings/conclusions.aspx?lang=EN (Accessed December 28, 2013)
4. http://uk.reuters.com/video/2013/12/15/sen-john-mccain-to-ukrainian-protesters?videoId=274933667 (Accessed December 29, 2013)
5. “John McCain tells Ukrainian protesters: “We are here to support your just cause”. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/15/john-mccain-ukraine-protests-support-just-cause Sunday, 15 December 2013. 14.41 GMT (Accessed December 15, 2013)
6. “Ukraine Crisis: Transcript of leaked Nuland-Pyatt call”, http://www.bbc.com/news/world/europe-26079957 7 February 2014. Last updated at 11.39 GMT. (Accessed February 07, 2014).
7. “Baird attends protest in Ukraine”, http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/baird-attends-protest-in-ukraine-1.2457018 (Accessed December 06, 2013)
8. See, for example: “EU-Ukraine Association Deal might hit ratification problems if Tymoshenko situation remains unchanged”, By Interfax-Ukraine, Kyiv Post, http://www.kyivpost.com/content/politics/eu-ukraine-association-deal-might-hit-ratification-42197.html September 05, 2011. 2.05 pm (Accessed December 28, 2013); “EU Leaders: Ratification of Association Agreement and DCFTA depends on settlement of Tymoshenko-Lutsenko issue”, By Interfax-Ukraine, Kyiv Post, http://www.kyivpost.com/content/politics/eu-leaders-ratification-of-association-agreement-a-310272.html July 20, 2012. 7.21 pm (Accessed December 28, 2013); Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions on Ukraine: 3209th Foreign Affairs Council Meeting, Brussels, 10 December 2012, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/134136.pdf (Accessed December 29, 2013)
9. “Ukraine rejects pre-conditions for EU deal”, http://www.euractiv.com/europes-east/ukraine-rejects-pre-conditions-e-news-517934 Published: February 20, 2013. 08.48; Updated: February 21, 2012. 17.08 (Accessed February 28, 2013)
10. Daryna Krasnolutska and James G. Neuger, “Ukraine Faces EU Reform deadline as Key to Association Pact”, http://www.businessweek.com/news/2013-02-25/ukraine-faces-eu-reform-deadline-as-key-to-association-pact February 25, 2013. (Accessed February 28, 2013)
11. “Ukraine drops EU plans and looks to Russia”, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2013/11/ukraine-drops-eu-plans-looks-russia-20131121145417227621.html November 21, 2013. 18.14 (Accessed November 23, 2013).
12. “Ukraine-EU trade deal ‘big threat’ to Russia’s economy”, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-25108022 November 26, 2013. Last updated at19.40 GMT. (Accessed November 26, 2013)
13. “Ukraine protest: EU deplores ‘Russian pressure’ “, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-25088608 November 25, 2012. Last updated at 12.58 GMT. (Accessed November 25, 2013).
14. Laurence Peter, “Armenia rift over trade deal fuels EU-Russia tension”, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-23975951 September 5, 2013. Last updated 17.51 GMT (Accessed September 05, 2013).
15. “Ukraine-EU trade deal ‘big threat’ to Russia’s economy”, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-25108022 November 26, 2013. Last updated at19.40 GMT. (Accessed November 26, 2013)
16. John J. Mearsheimer, “Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault: The Liberal Delusions That Provoked Putin”, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141769/john-j-mearsheimer/why-the-ukraine-crisis-is-the-wests-fault?cid=emc-dec14promod-content-120314&sp_mid=47545890&sp_rid=c3RyYXRlcG9sQGdtYWlsLmNvbQS2 For a counter of Mearsheimer’s views, the Editorial Board of Foreign Affairs organized a special response. For details, see: “Who Is at Fault in Ukraine? Foreign Affairs’ Brian Trust Weighs In”, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/142345/who-is-at-fault-in-ukraine?cid=nlc-foreign_affairs_this_week-111314-who_is_at_fault_in_ukraine_5-111314&sp_mid=47406003&sp_rid=c3RyYXRlcG9sQGdtYWlsLmNvbQS2 See also, “Top US Foreign Policy Experts Increasingly Disagree with White House on Russia”,
http://russia-insider.com/en/politics_ukraine/2014/11/19/06-58-46pm/internal_dissent_over_us_anti-russian_line_rises
17.See, for example, “Foreign Ministry calls on foreign states and international organizations to strongly condemn actions of radicals in Kyiv”, Interfax-Ukraine, February 18, 2014, http://en.interfax.com.ua/news/general/190645.html; “Police declares: radical protesters use firearms against police officers”, National Radio Company of Ukraine, February 18, 2014, http://en.interfax.com.ua/news/general/190645.html; “Militia: activists seize building of KCSA again”, UNIAN, February 18, 2014, http://www.unian.info/politics/885820-militia-activists-seize-building-of-kcsa-again.html; “Ukraine Defense Ministry urges protestors to vacate Central House of Officers”, Interfax, February 18, 2014, http://www.interfax.com/newsinf.asp?id=481487 ; “Radical protesters burst into Party of Regions’ Kyiv office”, National Radio Company of Ukraine, February 18, 2014, http://www.nrcu.gov.ua/en/148/556437/; “ Government loyalists in Kyiv preparing to counter opposition protestors”, Interfax , February 18, 2014,
http://www.interfax.com/newsinf.asp?pg=3&id=481426
18. “Rompuy promises to respond to events in Ukraine with sanctions”, Interfax-Ukraine, February 19, 2014 http://en.interfax.com.ua/news/general/191068.html (Accessed February 19, 2014) See also: “Ukraine crisis: EU sanctions push over Kiev bloodshed”, http://www.bbc.co.uk/go/em/fr/-/news/world-europe-26258998 19 February 2014 Last updated at 17:03 GMT (Accessed February 19, 2014)
19. “Russia, EU Clash as World Condemns Violence in Ukraine”, Russian Information Agency Novosti, February 19, 2014, http://en.ria.ru/world/20140219/187685915/Russia-EU-Clash-as-World-Condemns-Violence-in-Ukraine.html
20. “Leader of Lithuanian opposition, ex- Prime Minister Kubilius believes that Yanukovych must be tried in international court”, UNIAN, February 19, 2014, http://www.unian.info/politics/886274-leader-of-lithuanian-opposition-ex-prime-minister-kubilius-believes-that-yanukovych-must-be-tried-in-international-court.html (Accessed February 19, 2014)
21. “Russia, EU Clash as World Condemns Violence in Ukraine”, Russian Information Agency Novosti, February 19, 2014, http://en.ria.ru/world/20140219/187685915/Russia-EU-Clash-as-World-Condemns-Violence-in-Ukraine.html (Accessed February 19, 2014)
22. “Ukraine Crisis: Bugged call reveals conspiracy theory about Kiev snipers”, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/05/ukraine-bugged-call-catherine-ashton-urmas-paet Wednesday, 5 March 2014 2014. 19.06 GMT (Accessed March 05, 2014)
23. “Ukrainian opposition leaders meet with foreign ministers of France, Germany, and Poland”, Interfax
February 20, 2014, http://en.interfax.com.ua/news/general/191376.html (Accessed February 20, 2014)
24. “Putin meets Russia’s Security Council members to discuss Ukraine crisis”, Voice of Russia
February 21, 2014, http://voiceofrussia.com/news/2014_02_21/Putin-meets-Russias-Security-Council-members-to-discuss-Ukraine-crisis-3747/ (Accessed February 21, 2014)
25. “EU demands elections in Ukraine – French foreign minister”, Interfax-Ukraine, February 20, 2014, http://en.interfax.com.ua/news/general/191277.html (Accessed February 20, 2014)
26. “Ukraine president, opposition sign deal to end crisis”, The Associated Press Posted: Feb 21, 2014 12:24 AM ET Last Updated: Feb 21, 2014 11:02 AM ET, http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/ukraine-president-opposition-sign-deal-to-end-crisis-1.2545804 Accessed February 21, 2014)
27. “Ukraine Crisis: Turchynov warns of “separatism” risk”, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26333587 25 February 2014. Last updated at 21.33 GMT. (Accessed February 25, 2014)
28. A. I. Veselovsky, “Identification of the National Interests of Ukraine”, Foreign Policy Research Institute, Foreign Policy of Ukraine 2006: Strategic Assessments, Forecasts and Priorities. Annual Strategic Review, Edited by Prof. G. M. Perepelytsia, Kyiv, 2007, p.89
29. S. Shulman, “National Identity and Public Support for Political and Economic Reform in Ukraine”, Slavic Review, 64, 1, 2005, p.60.
30. For a detailed analysis of this issue, see Chapter Four: “The Ukraine Crisis” in O. Igho Natufe Russian Foreign Policy In Search of Lost Influence, (Forthcoming).
31. Patrick Jackson, “Ukraine war pulls in foreign fighters”, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-28951324 31 August 2014. Last updated at 23.32 GMT. (Accessed September 01, 2014)
32. See, PROTOKOL po itogam konsultatsii Trekhstoronnei kontaktnoi gruppyi otnositelno sovmestnyikh shagov napravlennyikh na implementatsii mirnogo plana Prezidenta Ukrainyi P. Poroshenko i initsiativ Prezidenta Rossii V. Putina, http://www.osce.org/ru/home/123258?download+true (Accessed September 10, 2014)
33. “Gorbachev criticizes policy of anti-Russian sanctions”, http://itar-tass.com/en/russia/770597 January 10, 2015. 4.01 hours. (Accessed January 10, 2015)
34. “No Russian Fleet in Ukraine beyond 2017 – Ukrainian PM”, http://www.unian.info/society/148224-no-russian-fleet-in-ukraine-beyond-2017-ukrinian-pm.html 24.09.2008. 18.25 hours (Accessed February 25, 2014)
35. Jana Kobzova, Nicu Popescu and Andrew Wilson, “Russia and EU’s Competitive Neighbourhood”, The Great Power (mis) Management. The Russian-Georgian War and Its Implications for Global Political Order, Edited by Alexander Astrov, Surrey, England, 2011, pp. 81 & 82.
36. “Putin submits proposals on denouncing some Russian-Ukrainian agreements on Black Sea Fleet”, http://itar-tass.com/en/russia/725725 March 28, 2014. 17.17 hours. (Accessed March 29, 2014)
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