By Ali Akbar Asadi*

Saudi Arabia moved to close down its embassy in Iraq soon after the former Iraqi dictator, Saddam Hussein, attacked and occupied its southern neighbor, Kuwait, in 1990. The lack of diplomatic relations between Riyadh and Baghdad has continued from that time for a period of a quarter of a century. Of course, not having diplomatic and political relations with Baghdad was logical and understandable for Iraq’s neighbors up to 2003 and in view of the aggressive and expansionist approach taken by the then Baathist Iraqi regime toward neighboring countries. However, continuation of that situation during the 12 years that have passed since the fall of Saddam has given rise to multitudes of assessments and has also elicited sharp criticism from analysts. At present, Saudi Arabia has apparently decided to reopen its embassy in Baghdad and has even dispatched a diplomatic delegation to take preliminary steps in this regard.

This comes at a time that Iraq is suffering from insecurity and is engaged in an all-out war with the terrorist group of ISIS. As a result, Saudi Arabia’s measure has raised various questions as to Riyadh’s new approach to Iraq. At the moment, the political structure and power pyramid in Iraq has not changed compared to past years and there have been also no major fundamental and strategic changes in the way that Iraq interacts with other countries. The country is even faced with the worst crisis of instability and insecurity in the past decade. So, the question is what factors have made Riyadh take positive moves in its relations with Baghdad?

Saddam Hussein

Following the fall of Saddam, Saudi Arabia made no move to support the new political and democratic process in Iraq. On the contrary, Riyadh even made important efforts to undermine the political process and stability in Iraq, especially by lending its support to insurgent Sunni groups as well as Takfiri terrorist currents in the Arab country.

The new power structure in Iraq and the present position of Shias at the center of that structure, in addition to improvement of relations between Iraq and the Islamic Republic of Iran were the main factors that made Riyadh adopt a totally negative and destructive approach toward the post-Saddam Iraq. During all these years, Saudi leaders have strongly believed that the new power structure in Iraq, especially the new chapter opened in Iran’s relations with its western neighbor, will greatly change the balance of regional power to the detriment of Arab states.

Therefore, the Saudi government believed in the necessity of preventing new conditions in Iraq from becoming stable and allowing Baghdad to continue its new relations with Iran. Such an assessment of Iraq’s situation was definitely behind the growth of terrorist group like ISIS and helped them turn into an essential threat to the Iraqi government. However, the positive step that Riyadh has been recently taking to expand relations with Baghdad under the present circumstances can be considered as a turnabout in Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy toward Iraq.

Iraq’s Dr. Haider al-Abadi. Picture of politician he posted himself on his Facebook page in order to identify himself, Wikipedia Commons.

Of course, an important factor that has been probably influential in Saudi Arabia’s adoption of this new policy is the new approach taken by the government of [the new Iraqi Prime Minister] Haider al-Abadi, who seeks to expand interactions with all neighboring countries, including Saudi Arabia. However, the main factor that has led Saudi officials to make their new decision can be nothing but the rise of ISIS as a new variable in regional and international political equations. In fact, the advent of ISIS has changed many regional and international equations and has, as such, led to serious changes in the understanding and assessment of the Saudi government of regional environment, including the situation in Iraq. The effect that the rise of ISIS has had on the regional policy of Saudi Arabia, especially with regard to Iraq, can be discussed from three angles.

The first angle is the fact that ISIS has turned into a critical and even essential threat to the government of Saudi Arabia after it managed to gain control of large swathes of land in Iraq and Syria, and even more importantly, after the group announced its Islamic caliphate led by the leader of ISIS, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Although Saudi Arabia tried to use terrorist groups as a tool to mount pressure on the new government of Iraq during the past years, the remarkable increase in the power of ISIS and announcement of its caliphate, has turned this group into a serious threat to national security of Saudi government. The fact that Saudi Arabia is neighboring Iraq and, in particular, existence of certain social grounds in Saudi Arabia, which may pave the way for the growth of ISIS in Saudi Arabia or at least help it win the sympathy of part of the Arab people, have helped make this terrorist group a major threat to Saudi government. As a result, the government of Saudi Arabia has come to grips with the reality and is trying to join hand with the government of Iraq in order to beat ISIS.

The second important angle is the intensification of international conditions to the detriment of extremist and terrorist groups in the Middle East. This has happened after the power of ISIS started to rise in the region and the United States decided to form an international coalition in order to fight this terrorist group. During past years, cooperation with or lending support to extremist groups had little, if any, cost for the Western and some regional countries. However, the intensification of international opposition to such groups has greatly increased the cost of possible cooperation with these groups with the purpose of using them as a tool. In addition, Saudi Arabia and other traditional allies of the United States in the Middle East have been forced to, even pretentiously, get aligned with Washington’s new policy for fighting ISIS. Under the present circumstances, any open and serious opposition to the United States policy in the region, especially on this issue, would deal severe blows to Saudi Arabia’s domestic and regional policies.

The third angle is about the relative impact that the rise of ISIS has had on old models of rivalry and cooperation in the Middle East as a result of which Saudi Arabia has been founding its regional role and position in great jeopardy. The emergence of ISIS threat as an important factor in regional equations has turned Iran into a pivotal player with objective capacities to fight ISIS. In addition, the overlap between the interests of Iran and the United States in fighting ISIS, and measures they have taken, though without coordination, have created new prospects for relations between Iran and the West in the Middle East in the coming months and years.

Such developments, in toto, have made it very difficult, if not impossible, for Saudi Arabia to continue its past policies in the region and have also undermined its ability to adopt radical policies vis-à-vis Iran and its regional allies. This is why Saudi Arabia has put on its political agenda reestablishment of diplomatic ties with Iraq as part of compulsory changes in the country’s regional policy and, in fact, in an effort to adapt its policies to new conditions that have come about following the rise of ISIS. Therefore, the reopening of Riyadh’s embassy in Baghdad may be a result of changing situation in Iraq, including changes in the political structure in the Arab country and may even be aimed at gaining new grounds in the face of Saudi Arabia’s regional rivals, including Iran. However, more than these factors, this measure is the beginning of a process of gradual reforms in Saudi policy to get more adapted to new conditions in the region in such a way as to reduce to minimum the existing threats to the national security of Saudi Arabia.

*Ali Akbar Asadi
PhD in International Relations & Middle East Analyst

The post Iran Viewpoint: Saudi Arabia Seeks Rapprochement With Iraq – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

The US Department of State’s Paper on China’s Maritime Claims in the South China Sea was published on 5 December 2014. It has confused China’s “dash-line” claim.

By Ye Qiang and Jiang Zongqiang*

China’s controversial “nine-dash line” claim in the South China Sea has triggered long-running misunderstanding in the United States government due to its perennial anxiety and repeated cross-examinations. This misunderstanding basically originates from the different thoughts over territorial and maritime legal matters between China and the West.

This has been reflected in the recent US DoS Paper on China’s Maritime Claims in the South China Sea, put out by the Department of State, which focuses on the coordinates of the dashes, and on the terminologies regarding the maritime laws and Notes Verbales of China, and comes to confusing conclusions.

The localised dimension

However, the US government ignored the inconvenient truth that the “dash-line” should not be seen as stricto sensu – that is, in the strict sense – a frontier in the Chinese context of the 1940s. That means it would be pointless to interpret the implications of the line from the perspective of modern international law. Therefore, any research, in the first place, should be confined to the localisation context of China; and the direction of end-point should go down the path of globalisation. These are two inseparable dimensions to understand China’s “dash-line” claim.

The localisation context refers to the Chinese traditional territorial and maritime legal thought in and before the 1930s and 1940s. In traditional Chinese thought, oceans cannot be monopolised by anyone and are open to all countries and peoples. Before the 20th century, China had never claimed any maritime sovereignty. This was unlike what the West did.

From the 13th century onwards, European countries have been embroiled in an increasingly fierce race for influence at sea. These countries imposed taxes and levies, and prohibited foreigners from fishing and sailing in the maritime zones they controlled, which broke the established maritime order. This situation was obviously not conducive to the interests of the Dutch, which was a maritime trading power at that time.

As a result, the Dutch jurist Grotius published The Mare Liberum in 1609, proposing the famous notion of the freedom of the seas. But Grotius was refuted and attacked by many British scholars headed by John Selden, who published The Mare Clausum in a bid to defend maritime sovereignty. Selden’s ideas prevailed in the 17th century, and European countries actively embarked on the policy of maritime sovereignty.

In the centuries-long debate about oceans, China has always maintained an open maritime policy. For the last thousands of years, China has been conducting economic activities, such as fishing, in the South China Sea, and has been living in peace with neighbouring countries in the process of developing and utilising oceans.

More than two thousand years ago, China opened up a maritime silk road and shared the prosperity of maritime trade with West Asian and European countries. Even in the Ming Dynasty, when Zheng He’s fleet pushed China’s navigation achievement to the peak, China never controlled sea lanes or impaired the freedom of navigation in the South China Sea.

What did the “dash-line” of the 1940s enclose?

In the second half of the 17th century, the principle of freedom of the seas was generally espoused, which was actually inseparable from the need of European countries to expand global trade and open up overseas market. When the vessels of all countries enjoyed the freedom of navigation across the world’s high seas, China still viewed land as the pillar of its economy and coastal defence remained lacking. Since the late Qing Dynasty, China has always been a victim in terms of the idea of territorial sovereignty, including the insular features.

After the middle of the 20th century, China gradually achieved national liberation and independence, and was able to take part in the international affairs as an equal actor. After the Second World War, China gradually recovered the lost sovereign rights and maintained its jurisdiction over major insular features in the South China Sea.

Therefore, it is easy to understand that, in February 1948, the Chinese government released a Map of the Location of South China Sea Islands, with the main purpose of clarifying China’s inherent territorial sovereignty under the post-war international order. Therefore, when publicising the map with the “dash-line”, China claimed the sovereignty over all the insular features rather than the maritime jurisdiction.

The globalisation dimension

The path of globalisation indicates that, according to modern law of the sea, China is entitled to maritime jurisdiction in certain maritime zones in light of Chinese sovereignty. That is the reason why China claims “sovereignty over the islands in the South China Sea and the adjacent waters” and “sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the relevant waters as well as the seabed and subsoil thereof” in the 2009 Notes Verbales.

Ironically, these maritime rights and jurisdictions are not created by China. These new concepts originate from Western-dominated law of the sea. China has claimed and exercised maritime jurisdiction in light of the four conventions established in 1958 during the first United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea and the 1982 UNCLOS. The maritime jurisdiction currently claimed by China follows the claims and practice of the international community, especially Western countries, and has never gone beyond the mainstream of the international community.

In addition, it refers to the development and evolution of the principles and rules of modern law of the sea. For example, the free sea is a relative idea. Along with the progress of the times, acts at sea are bound to meet with more and more regulations. This helps to promote maritime safety and sustainable development, conforms to the principle of balance between generations, and serves the common interests of mankind. This is especially true in the enclosed and semi-enclosed seas.

Therefore, China believes, on the one hand, that it enjoys all kinds of rights provided for in the Law of the Sea Convention as well as the customary international law within the “dash-line” other than the territorial sovereignty over insular features. On the other hand, it has been carefully evaluating whether or not to exercise each specific right, and the scope of the rights as well as the manner to exercise.

These are the reasons why China has not yet clarified the title of rights within the “dash-line”, and has not yet claimed specific maritime rights through an accurate frontier composed of coordinate points.

* Ye Qiang and Jiang Zong-qiang are Research Fellows at the National Institute for South China Sea Studies, China. They contributed this specially to RSIS Commentary.

The post China’s ‘Nine-Dash Line’ Claim: US Misunderstands – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

History rarely offers a second chance, but it surely repeats itself. And the world again floats in a glut of oil…

By Gulgiz Dadashova*

Few people remember the time when oil prices were $22 a barrel and how they hit $100 a barrel, giving trillions of dollars of benefit to energy producing countries. But the 50 percent drop in oil prices over the past six months has been shocking for all.

Observers and industry itself give plenty of reasons for the trend ranging from the Saudi Arabia’s wish to “crush” the U.S. shale industry, to the U.S. colluding with OPEC to flood the oil market to put Russia on knees and weaken Iran.

Journalists and analysts around the world claim that this is the end of the world, as Saudi Oil Minister Ali al-Naimi responded:”We may not” when asked if oil markets would ever lift prices to $100 a barrel again. Today, the fact is that oil prices have dropped and they may stay “low” for a while given the firmness of Saudi Arabia to keep the oil output unchanged and America’s wish to bankrupt Russia.

The importance of money

The oil prices began to decline amid the growing debates over ineffectiveness of the Western sanctions alongside the rising number of opponents of Moscow over intervention in Ukraine.
The sanctions began to bite the economy but the West needed to wait for a real effect. But, the real damage to the Russian economy, which earned enormous petrodollars since beginning of the 21st century, came with an epic collapse in global oil prices.

Russia’s oil and gas revenues contributed about $73.5 billion annually from 2001 to 2004 to the country’s GDP. Russia’s growing wealth kept going on. From 2005-2008, annual hydrocarbon revenues were $223.6 billion higher than in 1999- $45 billion. In 2011-2013, Russia’s annual oil and gas income reached $394 billion, above 1999 levels.

Bright days of the Russian economy changed for “cloudy weather” with the introduction of sanctions and later with the plummeting oil prices. Russia’s finance minister estimates that the country’s losses since last spring have surpassed $140 billion. Moreover, the ruble has lost almost 50 percent of its value over the past six months.

Although the reasons behind the Saudis’ decision to drive down the oil price is not clear enough, Russian analysts began to claim that the US and Saudi Arabia are conspiring to bring Russia to “its knees”.

Back to the history

The crude prices had peaked in 1980 at over $35 per barrel ($100 per barrel today), fell in 1986 from $27 to below $10 ($58 to $22 today). The glut began in the early 1980s as a result of slowed economic activity in industrial countries and the energy conservation spurred by high fuel prices.

The drop in oil price led the Soviet Union to earn less profit for the oil it exported. Meanwhile, oil production stopped rising and by 1988, began to fall.

The Soviet Union lost $20 billion a year, funds without which the country simply could not survive. The country found itself in a financial difficulty – it failed to pay for food imports and to calm down its business circles, bringing the country to its ultimate collapse. The world powers kept the oil prices at low level for two years to fully crash the Soviet Union in the mid-1980s, and two more years to make sure that the Bolsheviks wouldn’t come to global scene again.

The oil industry did not see a rise until the end of the 20th century, when oil prices began increasing again and a different political system was in power – new Russia.

The price of a barrel of oil first broke the $100 mark in 2008, and frequently crossed it in the six years since then. But prices of oil have plunged since Brent crude oil hit $115 a barrel in early June.
Reverse effect

How history would be, if the Soviet Union had other sources? The answer for this can be given by Russia’s case.

If the Soviet Union had not collapsed, one of the things that likely would happened was that the world oil prices would have headed higher as the growing demand for oil would have helped holding world oil prices up.

Can this very scenario work in the present situation given that major energy producers will not be able to keep the low figure further than 2016? It will indeed be a heavy blow to their economies, while another opponent – China is emerging which can grow even more after weakening of Russia. The growing Chinese economy may be more dangerous for the United States.

So, countries imposing sanctions and interested in downing oil prices now must be prepared to address their own vulnerabilities. The West should understand that Russia is better to be acknowledged as an integral part of Europe, i.e. the country acting as a major consumer market for European producers. The Western strategy should be centered on a simple idea that the world cannot give a final rejection to Russia.

Although, the West has relied on a strategy of economic sanctions and international isolation to weaken Moscow, Russia gained several diplomatic successes by warming ties with Iran, North Korea, and Pakistan to evade the negative effects of its Crimea annexation.

As Russian President Vladimir Putin declared in one of his interviews, his country is committed to ensuring that Russia does not become internationally isolated behind a new iron curtain, the Kremlin had gone forward in strategies with countries of Iran, Turkey, North Korea and Pakistan, boosting Russia’s diplomatic leverage.

Russia’s recent maneuvers have hampered the Western diplomatic efforts considerably. Moscow in fact has become an alternative to key regional actors and countries of vital security importance to the West on issues like nuclear program. Thus, a dangerous global security situation could become even more so.

Thoughts for tomorrow

The collapse of the Soviet Union showed how dramatically the things can change in the world. The Union collapsed and the rest of the world was doing fairly well, although the effects were long lasting.

Today, a major part of the world’s economy is facing financial difficulties as bad effect of the plummeting oil prices seem to be even greater. Even the Saudi Arabia, the major oil producer in the OPEC, can withstand two or even three years at the current price relying on its over $740 billion foreign exchange reserves.

*Gulgiz Dadashova is Deputy Editor-in-Chief at the Baku-based AzerNews newspaper, and is engaged in developing analytical articles about energy issues. Follow the author on Twitter: @GulgizD

The post Oil Prices Vs. World Order – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

A pre-teen female player has attracted widespread attention with her fight to overturn a clerical ban on her right to play football alongside boys in a co-ed league. Backed by her parents, the player initially succeeded with an online and media campaign to force the clergy to lift the ban temporarily. However, the clergy has since rescinded its decision and definitively reinstituted the ban. Not taking no for an answer, the player earlier this month launched a renewed public campaign to force the clergy’s hand.

The player’s name is Caroline Pla. She is an Anglo-Saxon Catholic. She’s fighting her battle for equal women’s sporting rights with Catholic bishops in Philadelphia, not with Muslim imams somewhere in the Middle East or North Africa. Her battle is taking place today rather than decades ago and as such serves as evidence that resistance by Muslim clergy to women’s rights, including the right to play with or in proximity to men, is hardly unique. Ms. Pla’s case is not an isolated incident. The Diocese in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, adheres to the same policy. It recently ordered male Catholic youth wrestlers not to engage with their female counterparts.

Ms. Pla’s story also highlights the fact that whether Muslim or Christian, rejection of women’s’ unrestricted right to engage in sports whether as players in Philadelphia or Saudi Arabia or as spectators in Saudi Arabia and Iran where women are banned from attending competitions in stadia has little to do with religion and everything to do with culturally conservative attitudes towards women in different parts of the world cloaked in religious arguments.

Ms. Pla’s story is in many ways the same as that of Christian and Muslim players in the Palestinian women’s national soccer team who tell very similar tales about the societal obstacles they had to overcome. It is also fundamentally similar to that of women in most other Middle Eastern and North African societies. It is a story of women of whatever age and cultural or religious background who are frequently supported by at least one family member in their resolve to stand up to society as a whole or their sub-community for their rights.

The similarities between Ms. Pla’s story and that of women in the Middle East and North Africa takes on added significance in the wake of the Islamist violence that recently rocked Paris and that has sparked debate about whether and to what degree conservative Muslim norms differ from conservative Western values.

To be sure, Ms. Pla has a leg up on her Middle Eastern and North African counterparts. She is waging her battle in a society that encourages women’s sports, values freedom of expression and upholds the right to stand up to religious or temporal authority. Ms. Pla is also waging her campaign in a country that allows women to drive and does not refer cases of violators to courts that deal with terrorism as happened recently in Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia is a country that also puts itself in a separate category by not including physical education in the curriculum of public girl’s schools and forcing women’s soccer teams to exist in a nether land

Ms. Pla started playing co-ed American football when she was still in kindergarten. Five years later, Ms. Pla and a group of friends joined a team that plays in a Catholic Youth Organization (CYO) league outside of Philadelphia. Mid-way her second season, the archdiocese of Philadelphia advised her parents that Ms. Pla could not play because football was considered a boys sport in the league handbook. In response, Ms. Pla launched an online petition that was picked up by the media and forced the archdiocese to back off. It did so with a caveat: the archdiocese retained the right to reverse its decision whenever it wished to do so.

Last summer, the clerical body announced in a statement quoted by Yahoo Sports that “preparation for Christian adulthood…involves the development and encouragement of appropriate, dignified and respectful forms of contact between male and female students. The Diocese therefore believes that it is incompatible with its religious mission and with its effort to teach Gospel values to condone competitions between young men and women in sports that involve substantial and potentially immodest physical contact. Consequently, Diocese has adopted this policy prohibiting co-ed participation in the following sports: wrestling, tackle football, and tackle rugby.”

Take out the words Christian and Diocese, and the statement could have been issued by the Saudi Arabian Olympic Committee, which last year advised the International Olympic Committee (IOC) that it would allow women in a rare concession to compete in the 2016 Rio de Janeiro Olympics but only in traditional Islamic sports endorsed by a literal interpretation of the Qur’an. Mohammed al-Mishal, the secretary-general of the Saudi Arabian Olympic Committee said the kingdom was training women to compete in equestrian, fencing, shooting, and archery Olympic contests which are “accepted culturally and religiously in Saudi Arabia”.

In another incident, authorities in the Saudi province of Mecca removed public television screens during last year’s World Cup in Brazil to prevent men and women from mixing in violation of the kingdom’s strict gender segregation rules.

The move sparked protests on social media. “Those who removed the screens showing the World Cup in the gardens didn’t do it because of mixing but because they love to kill peoples’ pleasure,” thundered an angry soccer fan on Twitter. “If a person is sitting with his family, and he is in charge, what kind of mixing are they talking about?” asked another.

The dividing lines in Saudi Arabia were further evident in response to a YouTube video viewed by nearly half a million people. The video showed a rare female Saudi soccer fan clad in traditional all enveloping dress cheering her club, Al Hilal, against the United Arab Emirates’ Al Ain in an Asian Champions League match.

Commenters on the video lined up on both sides of the argument with 1,826 dislikes and 969 likes. A proponent of the ban on women attending sporting events in stadia asserted that “we do not allow women to have 100% freedom… Most Muslim women agree with this…so I don’t understand how most of the world’s women wear tight clothes and walk half naked on the streets and beaches as if it were normal ..! Don’t these women have brothers or fathers???”

Saudi women may be fighting their region’s toughest battle for women’s rights but women across the Middle East and North Africa are nonetheless making headway. To be sure, they fight their battles in an environment that is less welcoming and less conducive than that in which Ms. Pla operates. Ms. Pla’s struggle is however no less significant, if only because it shows that restrictive conservative attitudes towards women are universal rather than culture or religion-specific.

The post Women’s Sporting Rights: The Battle Is In Philadelphia… And Riyadh – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

If there is anything that keeps India and Pakistan in the news in the international media, it is the hasty statements each country continues to make against each other. The recent comments are that Pakistan is continuing a proxy war in Kashmir and that Pakistan will not continue talks without the Kashmir agenda.

The recent cancellation of secretary level talks provided yet another political storm between India and Pakistan and simultaneously another controversy in Kashmir witnessed another development yesterday when Pakistan denied any talks with India without Kashmir on the agenda.

After India cancelled the talks, Pakistan justified its stand and treated the separatist brigade as equal stakeholders, however India criticized such a stand and advised Pakistan of either choosing the side of the separatists or the Government of India. While separatists argue that the Kashmir issue has never been an internal matter of India, yet another political uprising has started when Pakistan ruled out any dialogue with India sans Kashmir talks.

Currently there are hardly any political leaders who enjoy the full credibility among general masses in the conflict ridden Kashmir Valley, yet the people in general want talks between two nuclear states for the sake of peace. People understand the reluctance of both the states against or for talks on Kashmir as ego-politics and perceive it as a power game of India and Pakistan.

While the mainstream brigade is highly criticized for their hollow cries and no practical role in the Kashmir solution, so far, the separatist camps are also not eulogized much by a significant section of society on the issues of their (separatists) internal divisions and lack of unity.

The fact remains that the separatists have always been close to the Pakistani governments, which has not been appreciated by the Indian State. It may not be wrong to say that Pakistan has been organizing such diplomatic events so unprofessionally and as per analysts, never stopped its instrument of terror policy against her neighbors. Back home, people also feel confused when Hurriyat elements readily subscribe to Pakistan’s irresponsible statements on Kashmir without even considering their own stand on Kashmir like the recent one by Pakistan Army Chief that Kashmir is its jugular vein and later the awkward justification by Pakistan PM’s advisor that the statement was in response to India’s statements on Kashmir (as its integral part) during its election speeches.

Conscious people in Kashmir ask the fundamental question. Their hopeless urging is, who are we the Kashmiris in this whole political game when the Indian government does not recognize any of our leaders for talks? Do we count anywhere in the whole Kashmir dispute, they ask? Does our opinion matter really as people of Kashmir, as this is our issue and we should have the discretion to explain our position at any such diplomatic plate form? They also maintain that the two nations play their politics of rivalry and settle scores with each other via a war of words, but who actually cares about the suffering of Kashmiris who are dying every day unaccounted for amid the mockery of probes and reports? Also it is being argued by masses that what makes our separatist brigade unwelcome for talks and why is there a flow of unreasonable statements both by Pakistan and the center? Why do the so-called leaders change their stance so briskly and get swayed by Pakistan statements? Why is there a so unreasonable bias for Pakistan’s unprofessional diplomacy and perpetual claims on Kashmir? And if Pakistan really loves Kashmir, why do they target civilian areas on the line of control (LoC) which continues even today and thousands of people have left their homes from the Indian side of the border.

Sociologically speaking, a shift is being witnessed in political aspirations in Kashmir. While Pakistan is eager to increase its stance on the Kashmir issue, the so-called stake holders in Kashmir want to cash in on every such hasty opportunity. However, the government at the center, which has been maintaining that the Kashmir issue will be resolved under the ambit of humanity, seems irritated by such developments and treats such steps of Pakistan merely as an interference.

Actually peace building should have been the priority of all such stake holders, but the problem is that they see peace building efforts as a non-political activity. The worst is witnessed today as the already little manufactured peace in the Valley has not been institutionalized and with the result that the mass anger instead of decreasing has witnessed an upward trend. But on the same note, rural politics and rural political aspirations — a significant chapter of Kashmir politics — has undergone a drastic and confusing shift, i.e. a minor chunk still clings to freedom sentiment, while the majority has embraced the local mainstream politics and some of them are even active in political campaigning and active participation, etc, (still the sentiment never dies down).

Some of the sensitive rural belts have not been effectively tackled and the credit goes to a lack of vision and sloth-ridden strategies of the state. Either sensitivity has been treated by staying away from the people with no reaching out to young minds who live in their own fantasy world, or the maps of vulnerability have not been drawn at all to see through and scan the deteriorating parts.

What one could infer from these grass root observations is that a fatigue has been developed by the masses who have listened to and followed everything until the recent past. Most of the people want to live in peace and a secure atmosphere, however that very peace bade goodbye to the blissful Valley before 1989 — and is yet to return due to never ceasing political storms and  continued vulnerabilities. The public anger, and counter anger, and hatred has grown among the communities, people treat others as rivals even when sometimes the rivals are not known personally. Space for others and other ideologies has gone to the dogs and everyone wants his school of thought to prevail. Now a majority of angry young men argue that who-so-ever is in any sort of politics in Kashmir is a traitor of the nation Kashmir. They are not happy with the government, opposition or the separatists, but hopeless with the status quo. An alarming disconnect of the power elite is witnessed and this inability to connect makes people say that they have been voting now for decades for these political parties who tell them every time that Kashmir issue is going to be solved. And as the failures of talks or round tables continue, a deep pessimism strengthens among the youth mindset that actually makes them feel the violence as justified. They also say that they don’t know the politicians or other brigades personally, reflecting lack of reaching out by the so-called leaders of the Valley. People also ask, “Have they ever tried to know about our woes? Never ”.

After meeting the common masses in my area recently I picked up some clues of Kashmir’s politics of uncertainty. People have been giving extra Importance to personalities and a personality cult politics has emerged that has sent rationality to the gallows. The significant importance has been vested in some few individuals purely for personal interests otherwise their (the local leaders) idea of Kashmir is a disaster. People talk much about the need for effective leadership without knowing that effective leadership needs inclusive ideas of peace and development. We in Kashmir haven’t seen both. People talk of handling things better in Kashmir and are firm in the idea that things have never been handled in Kashmir politics, but instead the reverse has been happening. The accuracy at handling violence in Kashmir has been lessening as we go along. People talk of the conspiracies, of manufacturing dissent and consent in Kashmir historically, without even knowing that the very idea they cling to is also manufactured through excessive political socialization and decades of indoctrination. While observing this, my conjecture proved to be a reality, where there is instead of a right to cast a vote to leadership, everything is artificially manufactured and the consent of unknown is sought from masses.

Last Word

Pakistan’s tantrums and hasty steps hardly benefit Kashmir. There is a need to understand the Kashmir issue in a different way without displaying big brotherly attitude from either side, which US calls the historical mistrust between the two states.

The continuous tumultuous situations, the perpetual leadership crisis in Kashmir, status quo on Kashmir talks, and continuous human rights abuses and killing sprees have left the Valley masses literally confused about the future. Such a pathetic situation has to be considered while inviting any stakeholder for talks — and talks have to be effective for the sake of humanity now as the Kashmir issue so far has witnessed hundreds of ineffective round tables and failed negotiations. Endangered peace has taken away the feeling of a secure psyche of bemused masses as even criminals murder the masses under the garb of unknown gunmen besides a plethora of public issues in the absence of a peoples’ government at the moment. Even the government formation in Kashmir is a victim of ego clashes leaving the people to suffer — and who have been suffering now for decades and never yet seen a leader who could heal their wounds.

The post Of Indo-Pak Talks, Ego Clashes And Kashmir Crisis – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Can anyone in these United States imagine… if just as a passing thought… what would happen if Mad or the New Yorker had in their magazine front covers drawings mocking Jewish victims of Hitler’s Holocaust? Would American courts, B’nai B’rith, the Jewish Anti-Defamation League or myriad other Jewish-American political organizations tolerate, much less permit, such effrontery to human dignity in the name of satire, and the all-too-often misinterpreted shield that freedom of speech provides? No, that would not be allowed to occur in the US; and if it did, the consequences as an aftermath would be powerful and swift.

What in the US might be considered overt provocation to a minority of 2 to 3 percent of its population (Jewish), French courts have denied such assignation [Grand Mosque vs. UOIF, 2007] to the outrage of 5 to 10 percent of its population (Muslim). It may seem incongruous to obtain such opposite results from two countries, France and the US, where democracy is claimed to have such a prominent role. However, the answer is rather simple: the Jewish minority in the US, barely one-third the percentage of the Muslim minority in France, possesses an institutional influence in America probably a hundred-fold of that which Muslims have in France. For once, let’s dispense of our blindfolds, and see things the way they are without rancor or prejudice.

Enter Charlie Hebdo!

For Americans, the late Charles Schulz’ iconic comic strip, Peanuts, had characters we can love and identify with; particularly meek, unsure and confidence-lacking Charlie Brown; and also the girl cast from his reverse mold: abrasive, irreverent and streetwise, Lucy van Pelt. As much as Americans loved, and pitied, Charlie, it was Lucy who best represented success, even if at someone else’s expense.

Befitting Charlie Brown’s humble simplicity, it was little wonder that Hara-Kiri, a French magazine of satire banned from publication in 1970 would soon be re-launched as Charlie Hebdo, the name Charlie presumably honoring the character in the comic strip carried by the magazine. Never mind that Hara-Kiri had been banned for mocking the death of President Charles de Gaulle; the last laugh by the publishers who had adopted two Charlies (Brown and de Gaulle) to create one refuge for their political satire.

During its first decade of publication (1960-1970), Hara-Kiri had little financial success, and the name change in the decade which followed would not add any magic for them, closing its doors in 1981. A decade later, Charlie Hebdo would be resurrected (1992) with its satire centering far more in politics than in the aspects of popular culture. The demise of the Soviet Union and upsurge of a “terrorist class” resulting in great part from America’s flagrant and ever-increasing forceful intrusion in Middle East affairs, offered fertile ground for Charlie Hebdo to succeed… although the weekly circulation figure would usually stay below the 50,000 mark.

Now, a week after Al-Qaida (Yemen) took justice, or what they determined to be justice, on its own hands, three million copies of Charlie Hebdo are papering the streets of La Belle France. Financial viability for the publication, perhaps; but a sociopolitical major challenge as to how France responds from both Muslim and non-Muslim quarters! “Je suis Charlie” may have become an angry, symbolic response to what we in the West view as abhorrent terrorism… without taking the time and effort to analyze the birth and reason for such terrorism, and the hand we may have in its propagation.

No, we Americans are not Charlie; and most would not wish to appear center stage in Paris and be accused of first-degree hypocrisy. Many world leaders who did show up to fraternize and march in solidarity alongside France’s François Hollande could easily be taken to task on human rights, freedom of speech, war crimes or, at the very least, be branded as followers of America’s “nouveau-warmongering” (war via sanctions).

In her trimestral-fresh capacity as ambassador to France (and Monaco), Jane Hartley, was more than adequate to represent the Lucy in us. Let’s be reasonable: President Obama was still decompressing from his holiday in Hawaii, while America’s high profile diplomat, and French speaker (a language he learned during summer vacations in France as a child… Vive la élite americaine!), Secretary of State John Kerry, had an important engagement with India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi, the “I” in BRICS ménage-a-cinq. But worry not, Kerry will be making nice with Hollande this week.

No, we Americans are not Charlie… ask the Russians; sanctions-givers brandishing a Lucy attitude, that we certainly are.

[Charlie… nous? Jamais de la vie! Nous sommes tous Lucy: la justice americaine.]

The post Charlie Hebdo’s Dance Macabre With Freedom Of Speech – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Al-Qaeda’s branch in Yemen, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), has claimed responsibility for last week’s deadly attack on French satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo’s Paris headquarters, saying it had come on the orders of top Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri.

In a video posted on its Twitter account, the Yemen-based group said its leaders had “planned and financed the operation and chose who would carry it out based on orders from group leader Ayman al-Zawahiri.”

The video, dubbed “A message on the blessed Paris operation,” featured the voice of AQAP leader Nasr al-Assi, who asserts that preparations for the attack were carried out through Anwar al-Awlaki, the U.S.-born AQAP propagandist killed in a 2011 U.S. drone strike in Yemen.

Twelve people were killed last Wednesday when masked gunmen attacked the Paris headquarters of Charlie Hebdo, a satirical magazine known for printing offensive material, including derogatory cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad.

Said and Cherif Kouachi, two brothers and the suspected perpetrators, were killed by police on Friday in a warehouse in Dammartin-en-Goele, a small town north of Paris.

Original article

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By Arun Sahgal*

In the immediate aftermath of the Peshawar carnage, Pakistan’s National Assembly and Senate approved the 21st Constitutional Amendment on 8 January 2015. This paved the way for the establishment of Military Courts with the responsibility of ensuring the speedy trial of ‘hard core terrorists’. Although the amendment was passed by an overwhelming majority, a fairly large number of members in both the houses abstained. In the Senate, of the 114 members, 78 voted in favour and 36 abstained; similarly in the National Assembly, 218 out of 342 members voted in favour and 124 abstained. This clearly points to the underlying political opposition.

It is apparent that the military, in connivance with an embattled Nawaz Sharif, has pushed through the constitutional amendment which will have serious implications for the rule of law and the democratic fibre of Pakistan. Not only have the civil society and human right organizations come out strongly against this move, the two important mainstream parties – Pakistan Peoples’ Party (PPP) and Tehrik-i-Insaf Party (TIP) – have openly condemned the measure. Bilawal Bhutto tweeted his opposition to both the military courts and capital punishment. For its part, Imran Khan’s TIP, although it has otherwise adopted a soft stand towards Islamists and militants, has not been forthcoming in its support for the amendment either. The TIP’s abstention is particularly relevant since the carnage of school children took place in Peshawar, the capital of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, where it runs the government.

Why Military Courts?

Why is the Pakistan military pushing for these courts when the country already has a fairly robust “Anti Terrorism Act” together with designated Anti Terrorism Courts? The latter were specifically set up to try terrorism related offences, although they have failed to provide the desired speedy justice. Two reasons are offered for their poor track record: One, intimidation by radical organizations has either prevented judges from giving judgments against terrorists or simply slowed down the legal process; Two, there is a lack of admissible evidence primarily because people are scared of retribution and do not therefore come forward to give evidence. Under these circumstances, the obvious way forward was to address these issues by providing protection to both judges and witnesses and adopting other associated legal measures. Instead, what we are witnessing is a circumvention of the due process of law and a mockery of constitutional provisions for the sake of political expediency.

There is widespread perception within Pakistan that the situation the country finds itself in today is largely of its own making, as terrorism is a creation of the Army. The Army has been largely instrumental in supplying arms and equipment to state-sponsored terrorists, be it in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Southern Punjab, Sindh or Balochistan. The Army has for long been harbouring terrorists and radicals. It has been using terrorist organizations such as the Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad as strategic assets against India, and the Taliban and the Haqqani network as pawns in its strategy of acquiring strategic depth in Afghanistan. Under the circumstances, the establishment of military courts would mean allowing the sponsors of terrorism to become both the judge and the jury in punishing only those terrorists who refuse to play ball with the Army in its game of terror.

Some retired senior military officers, however, refute the above perspective by attempting to paint the Pakistan Army Chief General Raheel Sharif as a simple, straightforward, soldier who is against the policy of the selective use of terrorism as state policy. They regard his call for making no distinction between moderate and hard-core terrorists, as also the fact that he forced the Nawaz Sharif Government into supporting Operation “Zarb-e-Azab” in North Waziristan, as evidence of his sincerity in this regard. However, the Army’s claim that 1800 militants have been killed or wounded and nearly 200 tons of IED seized during this operation has been received with disbelief and refuted by many American and Western observers. According to the latter, cross border attacks from Pakistan into Afghanistan continue despite a high level dialogue and understanding with the new Afghan leadership.

Undoubtedly, the attack on the Army Public School in Peshawar has been a major setback for the Pakistan Army. The fact that nearly 40 per cent of the children killed were those of JCOs and NCOs has had a serious impact on the military leadership and its morale. Yet another factor that has necessitated the adoption of a tough stand by the Army is the growing radicalization not only among the rank and file but also among senior officers. Reasoned voices within the Army, it is learnt, believe that unless the radical elements are contained, a serious situation might ensue involving danger to the security of strategic weapons.

The Ramifications

A fundamental issue that the establishment of military courts raises is this: is it a soft coup by the Pakistan Army or is it a genuine effort to curb terrorism? Although it is too early to conclude either way, going down this path has serious ramifications. As noted above, Pakistan already has Anti Terrorism Courts. The creation of the specific institution of Military Courts now would imply the following:

• The judiciary is untrustworthy in the eyes of both the civilian and military establishment.
• In the battle for supremacy, the military is the clear winner, with Parliament reduced to a mere rubber stamp for the demands of the military establishment.
• A clear message to the people that the civilian leadership is incapable of providing strategic direction or addressing the core internal security interests, thereby questioning the democratic edifice of the state. In a sense, this implies a soft coup by the military and the subordination of the political leadership.
• These courts could be used to effectively stifle the voices of freedom and dissent in Sindh and Balochistan. There is every likelihood of a backlash in the region were such courts to be used to victimize pro-freedom organisations such as the Balochistan Liberation Army.

Problems with Military Courts

The main issue revolves around the necessity of military-run courts in Pakistan, a country which at best lives on the margins of democracy, and their implications. The rule of law and protection of citizen’s rights are likely to get compromised with the functioning of Military Courts.

A fundamental issue that the Military Courts will have to decide upon is the definition of a ‘hard-core terrorist’ and the criteria employed to determine this category. This will define the actual motive of the Army in pushing through the establishment of Military Courts. Second, there is the issue of legal protection to the defendant. The Pakistan Supreme Court’s ruling of the non-violability of individual fundamental rights has been partially responsible for forcing the current constitutional amendment. Questions are also being raised about the experience in jurisprudence of Army Officers and the Judge Advocate General (JAG) branch for dealing with such cases. Third is the nature of evidence and its admissibility. In case the ruling of Military Courts is unchallengeable in higher courts, as is the case with the opinions or directions of the JAG Branch, then these courts would become Kangaroo courts. This was recently witnessed in the execution of terror suspects even when their appeals were pending.

From an Indian perspective, the Pakistan military overriding the civilian leadership is a disquieting development that will make dialogue and discourse even more difficult. As we have seen in recent months, Pakistan’s agenda vis-a-vis India is fully guided by the military with the civilian leadership clearly acceding to the Army’s directions, be it firing along the Line of Control and International Border, bail to Hafiz Saeed, or the issue of resumption of dialogue. In the obtaining scenario, two things could happen: Pakistan escalates the border stand-off against India or perpetrates a major terror strike in Indian territory. In such a scenario, India may be compelled to lift its self-imposed restraint and respond militarily, thus unleashing an action-reaction cycle.

The growing salience of the Pakistan military in that country’s politics without any restraint and responsibility is a serious development. India needs to watch developments in Pakistan very closely as the drama of Military Courts unfolds and the Pakistan Army strengthens its control over the state apparatus. At the same time, India must work with countries like the United States, China and Russia to prevent Pakistan from going down the military rule route and restore civilian political control.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India

Originally published by Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (www.idsa.in) at http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/MilitaryCourtsinPakistan_asahgal_140115.html

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By Smruti S. Pattanaik and Rumel Dahiya

The election of Maithripala Sirisena, the common opposition candidate and Health Minister in Mahinda Rajapaksa’s government until November 2014, as Sri Lanka’s sixth Executive President is remarkable on many counts. When Rajapaksa announced his decision to seek a third term as president by amending the constitution, almost two years before the completion of his term, no one believed that he would lose the election. The main opposition party – the UNP – was internally divided and there was no credible opposition candidate in sight to challenge Rajapaksa. Although the signs of Rajapaksa’s reducing popularity were apparent during the Provincial elections conducted last year in March (Southern and Western Provincial councils) and September (Uva Provincial Council), his decision to advance the presidential election was based on two related assessments: one, the opposition would not be able to put up a credible common candidate; and two, he would be able to get re-elected before his support base dwindled further.

But the defection of Sirisena in November 2014 proved to be a political coup. Further, factors such as corruption, nepotism, arrogance, inflation and dynastic politics all worked against Rajapaksa. Power was completely monopolised by the Rajapaksa family and his cronies, and it was exercised blatantly. State agencies were involved in a number of attacks on journalists and critics of the regime. Rajapaksa appointed close family members in State-owned companies and leased out prime land in Colombo to foreign companies allegedly for a price. He also blatantly attacked the judiciary, curtailed its independence and impeached the Chief Justice when she objected to his move to introduce the Devi Neguma Bill that would have subverted the power of Provincial Councils. Rajapaksa also abolished the provisions to create independent commissions by steamrollering the 17th Amendment. Further, the 18th Amendment to the constitution effectively nullified any institutional checks and balances. As a result of all this, many people who hailed him as the saviour of the Sinhala nation when he defeated the LTTE grew chary of his autocratic tendencies.

At the same time, Rajapaksa also alienated the minorities. The orchestrated attacks on Muslims by the Bodu Bala Sena (BBS), especially the Aluthgama episode, and the attack on a church in Galle were grim indicators of the prevalent state of affair. The Tamils were also completely disillusioned. The promised political settlement was nowhere in sight. Rather, the Rajapaksa government reinvented the LTTE threat to justify the militarization of the North and East. And by granting greater power to the retired general and war veteran G.A. Chandrasiri, the Governor of Northern Province, Rajapaksa made the Northern Provincial Council politically defunct.
Tasks and Challenges before Sirisena

Though Sirisena cannot perform a miracle and resolve the numerous political and institutional crises, the most important task before him is to reduce the powers of the Executive Presidency, which had been introduced by J.R. Jayewardene in 1978 to safeguard his power from “the whims and fancies of Parliament”. But no other President exercised the overwhelming power vested in the Presidency and displayed arrogant authoritarian tendencies as Rajapaksa did, and that too after the end of the civil war and the decisive defeat of the LTTE. Sirisena will be expected to restore both the institutional checks and balances which saw an erosion as a result of the 18th Amendment to the constitution and the faith of minorities in the pluralistic character of Sri Lankan society. According to Sirisena’s election manifesto, “The new constitution structure would be essentially an Executive allied with the Parliament through cabinet instead of the present autocratic Executive Presidential System”.1

Sirisena is also likely to face some major challenges. The most important one is the management of the divergent interests of the coalition that supported him and ensured his victory. He will need to balance between two mutually contradictory elements within the coalition: on one side stand the JHU and JVP, the champions of Sinhala nationalism, who are against any devolution of power to the Tamil provinces; and on the other is the Tamil National Alliance, which has pinned its hope on devolution, demilitarization and release of land under the Army’s occupation. Since Sirisena has the support of the UNP and of former President Chandrika Kumaratunge, it appears that there may not be major opposition to his attempt to address the genuine concerns of the Tamils within the framework of the constitution. However, he will need to address the concerns of the JHU and JVP as well. The TNA, while announcing its support for his candidature, did not ask for any assurance on its long standing grievances because it did not wish to create unnecessary difficulties for Sirisena. In the short term, the TNA is likely to focus on issues of immediate concern: the reduction of the presence of the military, military interference in the provincial administration, the release of land held by the military in the High Security Zone, and possibly even the removal of the Governor of Northern Province which will have a salutary effect on the lives of the Tamils; but devolution would be its long term goal.

Another challenge before Sirisena will be to address the ethnic and religious polarization that Rajapaksa had engineered in order to divide and rule. The continued projection of the Tamils as the ‘ethnic other’ coupled with the effort to demonize the Muslim community as the ‘religious other’ have led to societal polarisation. For their part, of course, the Tamils need to marginalize the extremist voice within their community that feeds into this ethnic stereotype.

In addition, the new government needs to engage the international community and particularly the West. Sirisena’s government will have to handle the issue of the ongoing international investigation into the final phase of the civil war and address a number of questions that have been raised about the conduct of that war.

Finally, the immediate task before the new ‘National Unity Alliance Government’ is to strike a balance between different institutions, namely, President, Prime Minister and Parliament, and make the President responsible to the Parliament. It would also need to take steps to abolish the 18th Amendment to the constitution, which would restore the independence of various commissions that were originally envisaged under the 17th Amendment to the constitution.2 The process of democratization would also require limiting the excessive powers enjoyed by the central government and enhance those of the Provincial Councils to perform basic municipal functions. The unfettering of democracy would work to the advantage of all the stakeholders with an interest in fostering a multi-ethnic and plural polity and maintaining democratic stability.
Implications for India

It appears that India-Sri Lanka relations are set to see better days with the impending visit of President Sirisena to India next month as the destination of his first foreign visit. Sirisena does not have the political compulsions of Rajapakse and is unlikely to play the China card to put pressure on New Delhi.3 Since the minorities have contributed significantly to his election, it is likely that the new president would make an attempt to address the long standing grievances of the Tamils. And this time around the “home grown solution” would not take a decade to germinate. This too would contribute to the forging of mutually beneficial ties between India and Sri Lanka.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India

1. The new President has said in the manifesto that he would consider the proposals floated by both the Movement for a Just Society headed by The Venerable Sobitha Thera and the Pivituru Hetak Jatika Sabhava headed by The Venerable Atureliya of JHU to abolish the Executive Presidency under the proposed 19th amendment. The United National Party has proposed some amendments to these proposals.

2. The 17th Amendment passed in October 2001 proposed the establishment of Constitutional Councils (previously article 41A) to recommend appropriate persons to the various independent commissions. It laid down elaborate procedures for their appointment to ensure that they are free from political influence. The commissions in question include the Public Service Commission, Judicial Service commission, National Police Commission, Commission to investigate Bribery and Corruption, Election Commission, Human Rights Commission and Administrative Appeals Tribunal. The Constitution Council consisted of the President, Prime Minister, Leader of Opposition, one person appointed by the President, five persons appointed by the Prime Minister and Leader of Opposition, and one person nominated by Parliament or appointed by President. The President cannot appoint the Chairperson of any commission without the recommendation of the Constitutional Council. The name of the Constitutional Council was changed to Parliament Council under the 18th Amendment. It stated that “in appointing members to the Council, the President “shall seek the observations of the Parliament Council.” Under this amendment members of independent Commissions can be appointed by the President and removed by him.

3. Rajapakse projected himself as Dutugemu, the ancient Sinhala king who defeated the powerful Tamil king Elara. Since the end of the civil war in 2009, he built his political base on Sinhala nationalism and this resulted in extreme ethnic polarization. While he promised to build a national consensus to resolve the Tamil problem after the civil war, he did everything to subvert the emergence of a consensus. His answer to India’s insistence on resolving the ethnic conflict was to engage China. Some believe that his response to Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s suggestion to resolve the lingering Tamil problem was to allow the berthing of two Chinese nuclear powered submarines.

Originally published by Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (www.idsa.in) at http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/ANewErainSriLankasPolitics_PattanaikDahiya_120115.html

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The Central Bank of Sri Lanka issued a commemorative silver coin with a face value of Rs.500 to mark the visit of Pope Francis to Sri Lanka in recognition of the national importance of this event.

The coin was presented to Pope Francis and to and the President Maithripala Sirisena at the Presidential Secretariat in Colombo Tuesday (13th).

Sri Lanka coin commemorating Pope Francis visit.

On the obverse of the coin, in the middle, the bust of His Holiness Pope Francis is depicted surrounded by a ring of 33 honeysuckle flowers as portrayed in the traditional Sinhalese artistic style. The edge of the coin states the words ‘Papal Visit Sri Lanka’ and the dates of the visit, ’13-15 January 2015′, with the word ‘January’ in all three languages of Sinhala, Tamil and English.

On the reverse of the coin, the official logo for the Papal Visit to Sri Lanka 2015 is in the center. Below the logo is the face value of the coin ‘500’ in numerals with the word ‘Rupees’ in Sinhala, Tamil and English languages. The edge of the coin is decorated with a Liywela made out of 40 Na flowers, the national flower, 40×3 Na buds and 40×3 Na leaves and a circle of 120 dots.

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Iran’s Foreign Ministry has spoken out against the cartoon of the Prophet Mohammad on the latest cover of Charlie Hebdo, declaring that in the West there is abuse of freedom of speech.

The Fars News Agency reports that on Wednesday January 14, Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Marzieh Afkham said that Iran firmly condemns any terrorist attacks, then added: “Meanwhile, we also condemn provocative actions. What this magazine did is highly insulting and we completely condemn it.”

On Wednesday, a week after the attack on the Charlie Hebdo offices, which killed 12 people including four prominent cartoonists, the magazine was published on Wednesday with an image of Prophet Mohammad holding a placard that says: “I am Charlie” while a title above states: “All is forgiven.”

Afkham said the cartoon “provokes ill feelings and injures the feelings of Muslims around the world”. She went on to say that this act “perpetuates the cycle of extremism in the world”.

Afkham called for respect for what is held sacred by different religions.

The post Iran Denounces Charlie Hebdo’s Latest Depiction Of Prophet appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Birgül Demirtaş*

The classical type of international relations that we have known and studied since the Treaty of Westphalia has been rapidly losing its meaning in recent years. The global challenges that we face today incorporate so many different actors and issues that we cannot grasp their meaning if we continue to focus solely on our good-old nation-states. From north to south, or east to west, wherever we concentrate, we have to accept the fact that new realities have come to the surface. Terror organizations in the Middle East such as Al Qaeda and ISIL and paramilitary groups in the eastern part of Ukraine are just two recent examples of new non-state actors that play an important part in this new reality.

One of the basic targets of criticism for some of the critical IR theories has been the current nation-state system, which it is argued leads to various types of violent conflicts on the international stage. In response, different proposals have emerged, varying from the creation of supranational organizations to the foundation of a world government, as to how to shape the future of global politics so that we can have a more just, stable and peaceful world order. Yet before these different proposals can become a reality, we have to face the counter-challenge to the current international system by new types of non-state actors. The fundamental features of these actors have been their proneness to the use of violence, their rejection of the current international system and the predilection to base their ideologies on religion.

The brutal terrorist attack on the offices of French satire magazine Charlie Hebdo has led to an outcry from the entire world. The attack will be a turning point in many respects, not only in French history, but also in the history of Europe and the world as a whole. The fact that this incident occurred in a context in which we have seen the emergence of ISIL is worth remembering. ISIL’s terrible attacks against Christians and non-Sunni Muslims have prompted strong reactions from all over the world. We can assume that the Paris attack will lead to a reconsideration of the balance between freedom and security by the French government in internal politics and a rethinking of foreign policy actions taken against ISIL and other threats in the Middle East.

We should also expect that the attack against Charlie Hebdo will have a considerable impact on the Pegida (German: “Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes”) movement in Germany. Pegida represents “Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the West” and is a movement with a discourse against foreigners. With the aim of trying to push the government to take more measures against immigration, it argues that the western culture is pervaded by the influence of Christianity and Judaism at its core. Hence, its discourse is mainly posited opposite Muslim immigrants. The movement started in Dresden with a few hundred people, but by the beginning of January it grew to encompass 18,000 supporters . The representatives of Pegida have already stated that the attack in Paris confirmed what they have been trying to say. Their argument that they made public via their Facebook page is that the Paris attack is proof that “Islamists are not capable of democracy, but capable of violence and death as a solution”. It is now possible that more people will attend the Pegida rallies in Dresden and other German cities in the coming weeks.

Meanwhile, the anti-Euro party in Germany, the Alternative for Germany (AfD) has decided to support the cause of Pegida. The meeting between the leadership of Pegida and AfD on the day of the attack against Charlie Hebdo is of considerable importance. The declaration that came forth at the end of the meeting stated that the two have found intersectional elements and that together they will push the government to amend immigration legislation.

In fact, the Pegida rallies have consisted of different societal groups that are expressing reactions to the mainstream parties. Some of the participants can be conceived of as positioned to the right of center, holding the belief that the current parties in Germany do not offer any solutions to the societal and economic problems the country is facing. But some of the participants belong to the extreme right. Even the name of the group itself has discriminatory connotations. First of all, they call themselves patriots, assuming that the others are not patriots. Then they call themselves Europeans, hence implying that the others are not Europeans. They also try to create the image that there is a trend of Islamization, though Germany has not experienced any huge migratory flow as say Turkey has, with the Syrian refugees located there now numbering about 1.5 million. The concept of “Abendland” also deserves explanation, since it implies the Christian origins of Europe. This shows how the group is attempting to recreate a concept of Europe that is embedded in religion.

There are different reactions in Germany to the Pegida rallies. Some politicians think that these demonstrations are in fact a shame for Germany, as for example can be seen in the speech of Justice Minister Heiko Maas, and that they should be criticized by all means. However, others think that there is a need to understand these people and to establish a dialogue with them. Spokesperson of the AfD Konrad Adam states that he understands the concerns of Pegida. Although there are different interpretations of the Pegida demonstrations so far, one can assume that if the Paris attack were to lead to greater mass rallies, this atmosphere will have an impact on Germany’s future immigration policies. Even mainstream parties, like the CDU/CSU and SPD, can be expected to take this societal movement into account in their election campaigns.

Meanwhile, the reactions of European leaders to the Paris attack are an important sign of how the dichotomy of “we” versus “they” has been reconstituted. German Prime Minister Angela Merkel stated that this was an attack on freedom of thought and press, a core element of “our free democratic culture”. In a similar way, Donald Tusk, President of the European Council expressed his view that it was a brutal attack against “our fundamental values, freedom of speech, a part of our democracy”. In addition, Martin Schulz, President of the European Parliament, said, “We Europeans will always defend our values of press freedom and freedom of thought, tolerance and mutual respect.”

This discourse of “we Europeans” as the bearer of fundamental values as opposed to the unstated albeit latent “you inferiors, without values” has the potential of bringing about a resurgence of Huntingtonian arguments. Throughout history, Eastern and Western philosophers have always impacted one another. Therefore, attributing all the fundamental universal values just to “the Western civilization” does not contribute to global understanding.

As the whole of humanity passes through a critical period, “what to do in order to prevent mutual intolerance” is an important question that all individuals, decision-makers and societies should ask. First of all, we should recognize the fact that the chaos in the Middle East breeds the current wave of terrorism. To rethink ways of solving the Israeli-Palestinian issue would be an important step in addition to taking measures to stop Israeli violence perpetrated against Palestinians and the violence of terrorism perpetrated against Israelis. Second, international military interventions, as we have experienced in Afghanistan and Iraq, should not be repeated. Third, the problem of state failure in countries like Iraq and Syria should be solved. Fourth, the global “we” versus “they” discourse should be rethought and replaced by a more inclusive frame of reference. In the future, we will be discussing this issue of new actors and new challenges more than the classical notions of inter-state relations.

* Demirtaş is an Assoc. Prof. Dr., TOBB University of Economics and Technology, Department of International Relations.

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By Noam Chomsky*

Terrorism is not terrorism when a much more severe terrorist attack is carried out by those who are Righteous by virtue of their power

The world reacted with horror to the murderous attack on the French satirical journal Charlie Hebdo. In the New York Times, veteran Europe correspondent Steven Erlanger graphically described the immediate aftermath, what many call France’s 9/11, as “a day of sirens, helicopters in the air, frantic news bulletins; of police cordons and anxious crowds; of young children led away from schools to safety. It was a day, like the previous two, of blood and horror in and around Paris.” The enormous outcry worldwide was accompanied by reflection about the deeper roots of the atrocity. “Many Perceive a Clash of Civilizations,” a New York Times headline read.

The reaction of horror and revulsion about the crime is justified, as is the search for deeper roots, as long as we keep some principles firmly in mind. The reaction should be completely independent of what thinks about this journal and what it produces. The passionate and ubiquitous chants “I am Charlie,” and the like, should not be meant to indicate, even hint at, any association with the journal, at least in the context of defense of freedom of speech. Rather, they should express defense of the right of free expression whatever one thinks of the contents, even if they are regarded as hateful and depraved.

And the chants should also express condemnation for violence and terror. The head of Israel’s Labor Party and the main challenger for the upcoming elections in Israel, Isaac Herzog, is quite right when he says that “Terrorism is terrorism. There’s no two ways about it.” He is also right to say that “All the nations that seek peace and freedom [face] an enormous challenge” from murderous terrorism – putting aside his predictably selective interpretation of the challenge.

Erlanger vividly describes the scene of horror. He quotes one surviving journalist as saying that “Everything crashed. There was no way out. There was smoke everywhere. It was terrible. People were screaming. It was like a nightmare.” Another surviving journalist reported a “huge detonation, and everything went completely dark.” The scene, Erlanger reported, “was an increasingly familiar one of smashed glass, broken walls, twisted timbers, scorched paint and emotional devastation.” At least 10 people were reported at once to have died in the explosion, with 20 missing, “presumably buried in the rubble.”

These quotes, as the indefatigable David Peterson reminds us, are not, however, from January 2015. Rather, they are from a story of Erlanger’s on April 24 1999, which made it only to page 6 of the New York Times, not reaching the significance of the Charlie Hebdo attack. Erlanger was reporting on the NATO (meaning US) “missile attack on Serbian state television headquarters” that “knocked Radio Television Serbia off the air.”

There was an official justification. “NATO and American officials defended the attack,” Erlanger reports, “as an effort to undermine the regime of President Slobodan Milosevic of Yugoslavia.” Pentagon spokesman Kenneth Bacon told a briefing in Washington that “Serb TV is as much a part of Milosevic’s murder machine as his military is,” hence a legitimate target of attack.

The Yugoslavian government said that “The entire nation is with our President, Slobodan Milosevic,” Erlanger reports, adding that “How the Government knows that with such precision was not clear.”

No such sardonic comments are in order when we read that France mourns the dead and the world is outraged by the atrocity. There need also be no inquiry into the deeper roots, no profound questions about who stands for civilization, and who for barbarism.

Isaac Herzog, then, is mistaken when he says that “Terrorism is terrorism. There’s no two ways about it.” There are quite definitely two ways about it: terrorism is not terrorism when a much more severe terrorist attack is carried out by those who are Righteous by virtue of their power. Similarly, there is no assault against freedom of speech when the Righteous destroy a TV channel supportive of a government that they are attacking.

By the same token, we can readily comprehend the comment in the New York Times of civil rights lawyer Floyd Abrams, noted for his forceful defense of freedom of expression, that the Charlie Hebdo attack is “the most threatening assault on journalism in living memory.” He is quite correct about “living memory,” which carefully assigns assaults on journalism and acts of terror to their proper categories: Theirs, which are horrendous; and Ours, which are virtuous and easily dismissed from living memory.

We might recall as well that this is only one of many assaults by the Righteous on free expression. To mention only one example that is easily erased from “living memory,” the assault on Fallujah by US forces in November 2004, one of the worst crimes of the invasion of Iraq, opened with occupation of Fallujah General Hospital. Military occupation of a hospital is, of course, a serious war crime in itself, even apart from the manner in which it was carried out, blandly reported in a front-page story in the New York Times, accompanied with a photograph depicting the crime. The story reported that “Patients and hospital employees were rushed out of rooms by armed soldiers and ordered to sit or lie on the floor while troops tied their hands behind their backs.” The crimes were reported as highly meritorious, and justified: “The offensive also shut down what officers said was a propaganda weapon for the militants: Fallujah General Hospital, with its stream of reports of civilian casualties.”

Evidently such a propaganda agency cannot be permitted to spew forth its vulgar obscenities.

*Chomsky is an honorary board member of PalestineChronicle.com. He is an American linguist, philosopher, cognitive scientist, logician, political commentator and activist. Sometimes described as the “father of modern linguistics”. He has spent most of his career at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), where he is currently Professor Emeritus, and has authored over 100 books. He has been described as a prominent cultural figure, and was voted the “world’s top public intellectual” in a 2005 poll. (This article was published in teleSUR)

The post We Are All – Fill In The Blank – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

After the tragic shooting at a provocative magazine in Paris last week, I pointed out that given the foreign policy positions of France we must consider blowback as a factor. Those who do not understand blowback made the ridiculous claim that I was excusing the attack or even blaming the victims. Not at all, as I abhor the initiation of force. The police are not blaming victims when they search for the motive of a criminal.

The mainstream media immediately decided that the shooting was an attack on free speech. Many in the US preferred this version of “they hate us because we are free,” which is the claim that President Bush made after 9/11. They expressed solidarity with the French and vowed to fight for free speech. But have these people not noticed that the First Amendment is routinely violated by the US government? President Obama has used the Espionage Act more than all previous administrations combined to silence and imprison whistleblowers. Where are the protests? Where are protesters demanding the release of John Kiriakou, who blew the whistle on the CIA use of waterboarding and other torture? The whistleblower went to prison while the torturers will not be prosecuted. No protests.

If Islamic extremism is on the rise, the US and French governments are at least partly to blame. The two Paris shooters had reportedly spent the summer in Syria fighting with the rebels seeking to overthrow Syrian President Assad. They were also said to have recruited young French Muslims to go to Syria and fight Assad. But France and the United States have spent nearly four years training and equipping foreign fighters to infiltrate Syria and overthrow Assad! In other words, when it comes to Syria, the two Paris killers were on “our” side. They may have even used French or US weapons while fighting in Syria.

Beginning with Afghanistan in the 1980s, the US and its allies have deliberately radicalized Muslim fighters in the hopes they would strictly fight those they are told to fight. We learned on 9/11 that sometimes they come back to fight us. The French learned the same thing last week. Will they make better decisions knowing the blowback from such risky foreign policy? It is unlikely because they refuse to consider blowback. They prefer to believe the fantasy that they attack us because they hate our freedoms, or that they cannot stand our free speech.

Perhaps one way to make us all more safe is for the US and its allies to stop supporting these extremists.

Another lesson from the attack is that the surveillance state that has arisen since 9/11 is very good at following, listening to, and harassing the rest of us but is not very good at stopping terrorists. We have learned that the two suspected attackers had long been under the watch of US and French intelligence services. They had reportedly been placed on the US no-fly list and at least one of them had actually been convicted in 2008 of trying to travel to Iraq to fight against the US occupation. According to CNN, the two suspects traveled to Yemen in 2011 to train with al-Qaeda. So they were individuals known to have direct terrorist associations. How many red flags is it necessary to set off before action is taken? How long did US and French intelligence know about them and do nothing, and why?

Foreign policy actions have consequences. The aggressive foreign policies of the United States and its allies in the Middle East have radicalized thousands and have made us less safe. Blowback is real whether some want to recognize it or not. There are no guarantees of security, but only a policy of non-intervention can reduce the risk of another attack.

This article was published by the RonPaul Institute.

The post Ron Paul: Blowback And Lessons From Paris – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

An alleged jihadist from Cincinnati, Ohio, was arrested on Wednesday by members of a Joint Terrorism Task Force who claim the Muslim extremist planned to launch a terrorist attack on the US Capitol. A counterterrorism expert based in Washington, James O’Kallahan, told the Examiner that the alleged homegrown Islamist was originally identified as Raheel Mahrus Ubaydah, but it was later discovered his real name was Christopher Lee Cornell.

Cornell is charged with attempting to kill a US government officer and possession of firearms to be used in a crime of violence. Cornell used the social media website, Twitter, using the name Raheel Mahrus Ubaydah and openly tweeted messages that he supported a number of Islamic terrorist groups including the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, according to FBI officials.

The suspected Islamist’s messages were reported to the FBI by a Twitter user and a confidential government source tweeted Cornell contact to set up a face-to-face meeting. The FBI stated that Cornell and the confidential source met in Cincinnati twice — on Oct. 17 and 18 — and discussed launching an attack on the U.S. Capitol.

The 20-year-old Cornell told the confidential source that he needed weapons and ammunition. He also said that he wanted to attack in December, according to court documents. Before that attack, Cornell wished to show the source his collection of jihadist videotapes and plans and schematics in constructing bombs.

On more than one occasion he told the confidential source that the real enemies were the members of the United States Congress. Cornell wished to build, plant and detonate pipe bombs on US Capitol Hill targets, authorities said. Agents said he also planned to use firearms to kill employees and officials.

Cornell purchased firearms on Wednesday and federal agents quickly arrested him. The FBI and the Department of Homeland Security issued a memorandum notifying state and local law enforcement agencies across the country about the terrorism case.

The post Islamic State Sympathizer Plotted Attack On Capitol Hill – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Kazakhstan, an oil producer since 1911, has the second-largest oil reserves as well as the second-largest oil production among the former Soviet republics after Russia.

Kazakhstan is a major oil producer. The country’s estimated total petroleum and other liquids production was 1.70 million barrels per day (bbl/d) in 2014. The key to its continued growth in liquids production from this level will be the development of its giant Tengiz, Karachaganak, and Kashagan fields. Development of additional export capacity will also be necessary for production growth.

Although Kazakhstan became an oil producer in 1911, its production did not increase to a meaningful level until the 1960s and 1970s, when production plateaued at nearly 500,000 bbl/d, a pre-Soviet independence record production level. Since the mid-1990s and with the help of major international oil companies, Kazakhstan’s production first exceeded 1 million bbl/d in 2003.

Rising natural gas production over the past decade has boosted oil recovery (as a significant volume of natural gas is reinjected into oil reservoirs) and decreased Kazakhstan’s reliance on natural gas imports. Natural gas consumption, however, has been stagnant as the infrastructure and expense required to connect Kazakhstan’s widely dispersed population to production centers in the country’s northwest has impeded development.

Kazakhstan is landlocked and is far from international oil markets. The lack of access to the open ocean makes the country dependent mainly on pipelines to transport its hydrocarbons to world markets. Kazakhstan is also a transit country for natural gas pipeline exports from Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.

Kazakhstan consumed a total of 2.8 quadrillion Btu of energy in 2012, with coal accounting for the largest share of energy consumed at 63%, followed by oil and natural gas at 18% and 16%, respectively.

Kazakhstan is a Caspian Sea littoral state. The legal status of the Caspian area remains unresolved, mainly driven by a lack of agreement on whether the Caspian is a sea or a lake. Until all states agree on a definition, legal status of the area will remain unresolved.

Oil

According to the Oil & Gas Journal (OGJ), Kazakhstan had proved crude oil reserves of 30 billion barrels as of January 2014—the second largest endowment in Eurasia after Russia, and the twelfth largest in the world, just behind the United States.1 Kazakhstan’s current oil production is dominated by two giant onshore fields in the northwest of the country: Tengiz and Karachaganak, which produce about half of Kazakhstan’s total petroleum liquids output. The offshore Kashagan field, in Kazakhstan’s part of the Caspian Sea, will also play a major role in Kazakhstan’s liquids production in the coming years.

Sector organization

KazMunaiGas, Kazakhstan’s national oil company, has played an increasingly important role in the country’s oil and natural gas sector.

The Ministry of Energy oversees the oil and gas industry in Kazakhstan. In August 2014, Kazakhstan’s president, Nursultan Nazarbayev, announced an extensive government reorganization with the intention of creating a more compact and effective government. The number of ministries in the government was reduced from 17 to 12, and the Ministry of Energy was created to absorb the functions of the Ministry of Oil and Gas and parts of the functions of the Ministry for Industry and New Technologies and the Ministry for Environment and Water Resources.2

The national oil and natural gas company, KazMunaiGaz (KMG), represents the state’s interests in Kazakhstan’s oil and gas industry. KMG was created in 2002 and holds equity interests in Karachaganak (10%), Kashagan (16.8%), and Tengiz (20%), as well as interests ranging between 33% and 100% in many other production projects.3

Kazakhstan’s Law on Subsoil and Subsoil Use (Subsoil Use Law) governs investments in the oil and natural gas industries. The Subsoil Use Law has been amended several times, most notably in 2005, 2007, and 2010. Among other provisions, the Subsoil Use Law along with the December 2009 Local Content Law establish strict local content requirements for oil and gas contracts. Contracts that fail to meet specified requirements for local materials and labor can be unilaterally terminated by the government, although, no such terminations are known to have occurred. The Subsoil Use Law also establishes the government’s right to preempt any sale of oil and gas assets. In 2013 Kazakhstan preempted ConocoPhillips sale of its 8.4% stake in the Kashagan project to India’s ONGC. The preemption did not affect Conoco’s proceeds from the sale, but rather than going to ONGC, the stake was purchased by KMG before being resold to China’s CNPC.4

The government announced the re-introduction of oil export duties in August 2010 and increased them in January 2011. Export duties were first introduced in 2008 and then were suspended in January 2009. Export duties affect all oil exporters operating in Kazakhstan, with the exceptions of those that include a tax stabilization clause in their contracts.

Production

Kazakhstan’s two largest projects, Tengiz and Karachaganak, accounted for around half of the country’s 1.70 million bbl/d total petroleum liquids production in 2014.

In the 1970s, several large discoveries were made in presalt reservoirs including Karachaganak and Tengiz. However, the development of these fields was not possible at the time because of the technical challenges of developing the deep, high-pressure reservoirs. Since international oil companies began to participate in Kazakhstan’s petroleum sector and as presalt deposits became technically and commercially viable, these fields have become the foundation of the country’s petroleum liquids production.

Although it is the second-largest liquid fuels producer among Former Soviet Union republics, Kazakhstan’s future as a producer of petroleum liquids depends on the development and expansion of its three largest projects: Karachaganak, Kashagan, and Tengiz. Kazakhstan’s two largest projects, Tengiz and Karachaganak, accounted for 48% of the country’s production in the first nine months of 2014, according to data published by Energy Intelligence.5 A third large project, Kashagan, is due to start production in 2016 or 2017, with the combined output of all three projects likely to account for more than half of Kazakhstan’s total production going forward. Additionally, both Tengiz and Karachaganak consortia have discussed expansion plans that could result in increased production from these two fields within the next few years.

The Tengiz partners were due to make a final investment decision by the end of 2014 on the Future Growth Project, but by early January, no decision had been announced. The Karachagank Expansion Project is at a less-advanced stage of planning. Both expansion projects will focus on increasing handling and reinjection of natural gas to increase production and ultimate recovery levels of petroleum liquids. However, continued negotiations with the government on terms and lower global crude oil prices could delay decisions on these projects.

The Kashagan field, the largest known oil field outside the Middle East and the fifth largest in the world in terms of reserves, is located off the northern shore of the Caspian Sea near the city of Atyrau, Kazakhstan. Kashagan’s recoverable reserves are estimated at 7 to 13 billion barrels of crude oil.6 On September 11, 2013, production from the super-giant field commenced, eight years after the original scheduled startup date. In October 2013, just a few weeks after production began, production had to be halted because of leaks in the pipeline that transports natural gas from the field to shore. Production is not expected to resume until the second half of 2016 at the earliest.

Much of the repeated delays at Kashagan were the result of the field’s adverse operating environment and complexity, resulting in significant cost overruns. The Kashagan reservoir is located more than 13,000 feet below the seabed and is under very high pressure (770 pounds per square inch). The reservoir contains high levels of hydrogen sulfide. Hydrogen sulfide is both highly toxic and highly corrosive and has been blamed for the pipeline leaks. In addition, conventional drilling and production technologies such as fixed or floating platforms cannot be used because of the shallow water and cold climate. Instead, offshore facilities are installed on artificial islands (drilling and hub islands) that house drilling and processing equipment. The processing facilities separate recovered liquid from the gas, then reinject a portion of the gas, sending the liquids and the remainder of the gas to shore for further processing. Before production can restart, these pipelines connecting the field with the onshore processing facilities will have to be replaced using higher grade materials that are more resistant to corrosion.

Exports

Kazakhstan is an exporter of light, sweet crude oil. In 2013, Kazakhstan exported nearly 1.4 million bbl/d of crude oil and condensate, according to the Global Trade Information Service.7 More than three-quarters of Kazakhstan’s crude exports travel around or across the Caspian Sea headed to European markets. An additional 16% of Kazakhstan’s crude exports head east via a pipeline to China. Kazakhstan’s exports will likely increase in the coming years, as production begins at Kashagan and expands at Tengiz and Karachaganak. However, the rapid growth of oil production and exports will require an expansion of export capacity.

Export oil grades

Kazakhstan currently has four main export oil grades: the CPC Blend, Tengiz, Karachaganak condensate, and Kumkol. With the start of production at the Kashagan field, the Kashagan grade will become part of the export mix.

CPC Blend is a very light (45.3° API), sweet crude (0.56% sulfur), and it is valued for its high yield of gasoline and light distillates. Tengiz grade accounts for about 45% of the CPC blend.8 Other components include some Russian grades such as Siberian Light, as well as Kumkol and Karachaganak condensate, along with a variety of other Russian and Kazakh grades.

Tengiz grade is a blend of crudes from the Tengiz and Korolev fields, and, with an API gravity of 46.42° and 0.51% sulfur content, it is very similar in quality to Saudi Arabia’s Arab Light. Tengiz has been available as a distinct grade since 2007, when the production at Tengiz field expanded beyond the capabilities of the CPC pipeline. Most Tengiz grade crude travels via rail car, at least for the first leg of its journey.9

Karachaganak condensate, originating from the Karachaganak natural gas and condensate field near the Russian border, is mainly exported as part of the CPC Blend. Remaining quantities are exported via the Uzen-Atyrau-Samara pipeline, or sold as condensate in local markets in Kazakhstan and Russia.10 Karachaganak liquids range from 36° to 44° API and are very sour with a sulfur content of 0.9%.11

Kumkol grade (41.2° API, 0.11% sulfur) originates from a variety of fields in central Kazakhstan. This grade is a waxy crude prized by many European refiners. It is exported both as a blend (through the Kazakhstan-China pipeline) and as a distinct grade (via the Black Sea port of Batumi in Georgia), although much of it is refined domestically, providing oil products to southern Kazakhstan.
Kazakhstan’s crude exports by destination, 2013

Oil export routes

Major Caspian oil and natural gas export routes. Source EIA.

Kazakhstan’s pipeline system is operated by the state-run KazTransOil, a subsidiary of KazMunaiGas, which runs approximately 3,400 miles of pipelines. Because of Kazakhstan’s landlocked location and the continued use of Soviet-era infrastructure, much of Kazakhstan’s oil and gas export infrastructure is integrated with major Caspian oil and natural gas export routes that interlink the region. Since independence, Kazakhstan has successfully expanded and diversified its export capabilities. Major crude oil export pipelines currently include the Caspian Pipeline Consortium pipeline to the Black Sea port of Novorossiysk, the Kazakhstan-China pipeline, and the Uzen-Atyrau-Samara pipeline to Russia.

Kazakhstan also exports crude oil via the Caspian Sea and via rail. Oil is loaded onto tankers or barges at Kazakhstan’s port of Aktau or the smaller Atyrau port and then shipped across the Caspian Sea, where it is loaded onto the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline or the Northern Route pipeline (Baku-Novorossiysk) for onward transport, mainly to Europe. Additionally, Kazakhstan has an extensive rail network, which it increasingly uses to transport liquid fuels both for domestic consumption and for exports. Tengizchevroil is the largest petroleum user of the rail network. It loaded approximately 70,000 bbl/d of petroleum liquids onto rail cars for transport in 2013.12 Continued expansion and diversification of Kazakhstan’s petroleum liquids transport capacity, particularly export capacity, is key to its future ability to increase production.

Another potential export route for Caspian crude oil is via swaps with Iran. For years, Kazakhstan and other Central Asian countries delivered their crude to Iran’s Caspian Sea port of Neka. From there the crude was delivered to refineries in Tehran and Tabriz, with the refined products distributed and consumed in northern Iran. In exchange, Iran exported equal volumes of crude out of its Persian Gulf ports on behalf of Kazakhstan. Swap volumes have varied over the years, with little to no crude swapped over the past two or three years. Sanctions against Iran reportedly complicated swap arrangements, especially the marketing of the crude exported in the Persian Gulf, which had been done by the Iranians. Also complicating the swap arrangements was Iran’s desire to raise the fee it charged Kazakhstan for each barrel of crude swapped. Since at least late 2013, Iran and Kazakhstan have been discussing resumption of the swap arrangement and have periodically announced their intentions to resume swaps, but no swaps have occurred as of the end of 2014.

Downstream and refining

Kazakhstan had crude oil distillation capacity of 345,093 bbl/d, as of January 1, 2014, according to OGJ.13 There are three oil refineries in Kazakhstan: Pavlodar, Atyrau, and Shymkent. The Pavlodar refinery is in north-central Kazakhstan and is supplied mainly by a crude oil pipeline from western Siberia, because Russian supplies are well-placed geographically to serve that refinery. The Atyrau refinery uses only domestic crude from northwest Kazakhstan, and the Shymkent refinery currently uses crude from the oil fields at Kumkol and the nearby area in central Kazakhstan.

In 2013, the three refineries met approximately 70% of Kazakhstan’s gasoline and diesel demand, with most of the remaining demand met by imports from Russia. Upgrading projects were underway in 2014 at all three refineries. The upgrades will allow the three plants to produce fewer heavy products and more high-quality transportation fuels. In October 2014, the government of Kazakhstan officially backed a plan to expand the Shymkent refinery instead of building a fourth refinery in the country. With these upgrades and expansions, Kazakhstan aims to meet all domestic demand for gasoline and diesel production by 2017.

Natural gas

Kazakhstan’s largest petroleum liquids fields also contain substantial volumes of natural gas, most of which is reinjected into oil wells to improve oil recovery rates.

OGJ estimated Kazakhstan’s proven natural gas reserves at 85 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) as of January 1, 2014.14 The majority of Kazakhstan’s gas reserves are in crude or condensate-rich fields. The two largest petroleum liquids fields, Karachaganak and Tengiz, are also the two largest natural gas fields.

Production

Over the past decade, annual gross natural gas production almost tripled, from 0.6 Tcf in 2003 to 1.6 Tcf in 2012. Reinjected natural gas has accounted for most of the increase in gross production, while dry natural gas production has remained relatively stable. In 2012, reinjected natural gas production was more than double dry natural gas production.

In 2013, the Karachaganak and Tengiz fields combined accounted for more than 90% of Kazakhstan’s raw marketed natural gas production. The Tengiz project includes a gas processing plant, which according to Chevron produced 251 billion cubic feet (Bcf) of dry marketed natural gas in 2013 that was sold to local consumers. The Karachaganak project has insufficient gas processing capacity. Most of the raw marketed production from the Karachaganak field has to be exported to Russia to be processed at a gas processing plant in Orenberg. In 2013, about 30% of this processed gas was sold in Russia, with the remainder of the dry gas returned to Kazakhstan to help meet local demand. The next phase of development at Karachaganak originally included plans for facilities to process its own gas and boost dry natural gas supplies to consumers within Kazakhstan. However, the project developers have since changed their plans, and gas produced under Karachaganak’s next expansion will largely be reinjected into the field to boost liquids recovery.

When it comes online, the first phase of the Kashagan project is expected to marginally boost supplies of dry gas to consumers in Kazakhstan. However, like the Karachaganak and Tengiz projects, much of the gas produced from Kashagan will be either reinjected into the well to boost liquids recovery or used at the project site to produce electricity.

Consumption, imports, and exports

Kazakhstan has two major export pipelines for natural gas. The Central Asia Centre pipeline (CAC), which traverses the western edge of Kazakhstan on its way to Russia and points further west, and the Turkmenistan-China pipeline, which traverses the southern edge of the country on its way to China. Both pipelines are part of the regional Caspian export infrastructure and mainly carry natural gas exports from Turkmenistan, along with smaller but still significant volumes of exports from Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. The CAC pipeline also serves local natural gas demand in western Kazakhstan, including northwestern Kazakhstan where most of the country’s production is located. A third major pipeline, the Bukhara-Tashkent-Bishkek-Almaty pipeline serves local demand in southern Kazakhstan with imported gas from Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Two of Kazakhstan’s three underground gas storage facilities are located along this pipeline.

The domestic pipeline system in Kazakhstan is underdeveloped. Natural gas production in the country is concentrated in the northwest and is not connected to population centers in the south, north, center, and east. A government objective is to develop a domestic natural gas system that would connect the country’s producing and consuming areas. Kazakhstan is already on its way to meeting the first part of this challenge, connecting the existing gas pipeline infrastructure in the West to the existing infrastructure in the densely-populated South. The Beineu-Bozoi-Shymkent pipeline is under construction and is expected to be completed by the end of 2015 with a capacity of approximately 350 Bcf per year.15 This pipeline will allow Kazakhstan to gasify communities along the route of the pipeline that previously had no access to gas. It will also connect to the existing pipeline serving southern Kazakhstan, replacing imported natural gas in those markets. Finally, it will connect to the pipeline to China, allowing production from northwestern Kazakhstan to be exported to China.

Plans for gasifying other parts of the country and connecting them to the existing infrastructure in the West and South are more uncertain. The vast distances and relatively low population density in the north, center, and east make the economics challenging for any potential gas pipeline projects to serve the region.

Coal

In 2012, coal accounted for 63% of Kazakhstan’s total energy consumption.

Kazakhstan had 37,038 million short tons (MMst) of total recoverable coal reserves in 2011. It is in the top ten countries in the world in terms of coal reserves, coal production, and coal exports. It is also 12th in the world in terms of coal consumption. Despite being among the top coal countries, Kazakhstan is a relatively small contributor to global coal volumes. The top three countries globally account for disproportionate shares of total global coal reserves, production, consumption, and exports (between 60% and 70% combined), while Kazakhstan accounts for between 1% and 4%.

About a quarter of Kazakhstan’s coal production is exported, with most of that going to Russia.16 All of Kazakhstan’s coal exports and most of its production consist of steam coal, suitable for burning in electric power plants or in other applications to generate steam and heat. Kazakhstan also produces smaller quantities of metallurgical coal that are consumed domestically. Kazakhstan is rich in a variety of minerals, with mineral and coal deposits concentrated in the north and center of the country. Coal is a major energy source for the mining and smelting industries and for the electricity sector in Kazakhstan.

Electricity

Most of Kazakhstan’s power generation comes from coal-fired power plants, concentrated in the north of the country near the coal-producing regions.

Kazakhstan’s total installed generating capacity was approximately 17.8 gigawatts (GW) at the end of 2012, 87% of which was fossil fuel-fired, 13% was hydropower, and less than 1% was other renewables. Kazakhstan’s total net generation in 2012 was approximately 86.1 billion kilowatthours (kWh) of electricity.

Kazakhstan’s only nuclear power plant, a BN-350 nuclear reactor at Mangyshlak, was decommissioned in 2001. Kazakhstan has some of the largest uranium deposits in the world and is the world’s largest uranium producer.17 Although plans have long existed to build additional nuclear power plants, there has been little progress on constructing these units.

Kazakhstan’s national grid is operated by the Kazakhstan’s Electricity Grid Operating Company, a state-owned company. It is responsible for electric transmission and network management. There are 15 regional electricity distribution companies, a number of which are privately owned. The electricity transmission and distribution sectors are considered to be natural monopolies and are regulated by the government, however, wholesale generation of power is considered to be a competitive market with most generation assets owned by private enterprises.

Notes

• Data presented in the text are the most recent available as of January 14, 2015.
• Data are EIA estimates unless otherwise noted.

Endnotes:
1.Oil & Gas Journal, “Worldwide look at reserves and production,” (January 1, 2014).
2. Tengrinews, “Nazarbayev rearranges Kazakh government,” (August 6, 2014).
3. KazMunaiGas Exploration Production, Annual Report 2013, About the Company, Ownership Structure, accessed December 17, 2014.
4. U.S. Department of State, 2014 Investment Climate Statement – Kazakhstan, accessed December 18, 2014 and Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, 2014 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers, Kazakhstan, accessed December 18, 2014.
5. Energy Intelligence, Nefte Compass, “Kazakh Crude Oil and Gas Condensate Production, September 2014″ (October 23, 2014) p. 9.
6. Eni, Innovation & Technology: Kashagan, accessed December 15, 2014.
7. Global Trade Information Services, Customs data from destination countries, accessed December 10, 2014 (subscription).
8. Chevron Crude Oil Marketing, CPC Blend and Tengiz, accessed December 9, 2014.
9. Chevron Crude Oil Marketing, CPC Blend and Tengiz, accessed December 9, 2014.
10. Chevron, Kazakhstan Fact Sheet, accessed December 9, 2014.
11. Lukoil, Fact Book – 2013, International projects – Kazakhstan, p. 38.
12. Chevron, Kazakhstan Fact Sheet, accessed December 9, 2014.
13. Oil & Gas Journal, “Worldwide Refining,” (December 2, 2013).
14. Oil & Gas Journal, “Worldwide look at reserves and production,” (January 1, 2014).
15. KazTransGaz, MG “Beyneu – Shymkent” building, accessed December 10, 2014.
16. Tengrinews, “Kazakhstan wants to export coal to Ukraine, China and Europe,” (June 2, 2014).
17. World Nuclear Association, World Uranium Mining Production, accessed December 15, 2014.

The post Kazakhstan Energy Profile: Second-Largest Oil Reserves Among Former Soviet Republics – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

December was the sixth consecutive month in which monthly average Brent crude oil prices decreased, falling $17/barrel (bbl) from November to a monthly average of $62/bbl, the lowest since May 2009. The December price decline, and its continuation into early January, reflects continued growth in U.S. tight oil production, strong global supply, and weakening outlooks for the global economy and oil demand growth.

As oil prices have sharply declined, market expectations of uncertainty in the price outlook have increased, as reflected in the current values of futures and options contracts (Market Prices and Uncertainty Report). West Texas Intermediate (WTI) futures contracts for April 2015 delivery, traded during the five-day period ending January 8, averaged $51/bbl, with the value of options contracts establishing the lower and upper limits of the 95% confidence interval for the market’s expectations of monthly average WTI prices that month at $34/bbl and $76/bbl, respectively (Figure 1). The 95% confidence interval for market expectations widens considerably over time, with lower and upper limits of $28/bbl and $112/bbl for prices in December 2015. Volatility in front-month contracts also moved higher for both WTI and Brent in December and the first week of January, crossing the 50% level for the first time since August 2011.

The growing uncertainty surrounding oil prices presents a major challenge to all price forecasts. EIA’s January Short-Term Energy Outlook (STEO), released yesterday, forecasts Brent crude oil prices averaging $58/bbl in 2015 and $75/bbl in 2016, with annual average WTI prices expected to be $3/bbl to $4/bbl below Brent.

These price projections reflect a scenario in which supply is expected to continue to exceed demand, leading to inventory builds through the first three quarters of 2015. With increased demand and weakening supply, the market becomes more balanced beyond mid-2015 (Figure 2), and prices are expected to begin to rise.

Recent global economic data outside the United States have generally been below expectations. With most of the projected increases in future global petroleum consumption expected in developing countries, disappointing international economic news had more downward influence on crude oil prices than positive U.S. economic data. The manufacturing Purchasing Managers Index (PMI), which serves as a leading indicator for manufacturing activity, was below expectations in December for the United States, China, and Europe. Slowing manufacturing activity increases the risk that future economic growth may fall below projections and potentially reduce future consumption of crude oil and petroleum products, thus putting downward pressure on crude oil prices. This situation is exacerbated by the current excess of crude oil supplies and inventory builds.

EIA expects global petroleum and other liquids demand to grow by 1.0 million barrels per day (bbl/d) in both 2015 and 2016 from an average of 91.4 million bbl/d in 2014. Nearly all the forecast demand growth comes from non-OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) countries. The biggest reduction in forecast non-OECD consumption growth in 2015 comes from a 0.2-million-bbl/d decline in Russia’s consumption because of its economic downturn. Russia’s consumption is expected to decline by a similar amount in 2016. China is the leading contributor to projected global consumption growth, with consumption expected to increase by an annual average of 0.3 million bbl/d over the next two years. As always, weaker-than-expected demand in Russia, China, or elsewhere would put further downward pressure on prices.

EIA estimates that non-OPEC (Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries) production grew by 2.0 million bbl/d in 2014, averaging 56.2 million bbl/d for the year. Non-OPEC supply growth is expected to slow over the next two years, mostly because of lower projected oil prices. EIA expects non-OPEC production to grow by 0.7 million bbl/d in 2015 and by 0.5 million bbl/d in 2016, with the United States as the leading contributor. Given the rapid growth in oil production throughout 2014, the year-over-year comparisons between 2015 and 2014 oil production overstate projected growth in 2015 relative to levels at the end of 2014. For example, U.S. oil production in December 2014 is estimated at 9.2 million barrels per day, only slightly below the average daily 2015 production level in EIA’s STEO forecast. In considering its U.S. production forecast, EIA recognizes that tight U.S. oil production, a key component of lower-48 onshore production, is more sensitive to short-term price movements than production in the Federal Gulf of Mexico, which is expected to increase through 2016 as production from projects nearing completion begins, or Alaska production that is expected to continue its gradual long-term decline.

Oil prices could deviate significantly from current projections under different supply and demand conditions. Weaker-than-expected global demand growth would increase the supply overhang requiring larger production cuts to bring the market into balance. Producers’ responsiveness to lower prices will determine how soon, and by how much, production is cut. The price decline and lag time required to cause a reduction in forecast non-OPEC supply growth, particularly U.S. tight oil, vary by producer and are also difficult to gauge.

U.S. gasoline and diesel fuel prices continue to decrease

The U.S. average price for regular gasoline fell eight cents from the previous week to $2.14 per gallon as of January 12, 2014, $1.19 per gallon lower than the same time last year. The Rocky Mountain price declined 13 cents to $1.99 per gallon, becoming the third region to have an average price below $2 per gallon. The East Coast price declined 10 cents to $2.25 per gallon, while the West Coast price fell nine cents to $2.49 per gallon. The Gulf Coast price was down eight cents to $1.91 per gallon, and the Midwest price shed two cents to $1.95 per gallon.

The U.S. average price for diesel fuel declined eight cents to $3.05 per gallon, 83 cents less than a year ago. The Gulf Coast price fell eight cents to be the first region with an average price below $3 per gallon since 2010, at $2.96 per gallon. The Rocky Mountain price decreased 11 cents to $3.03 per gallon. The Midwest and West Coast prices fell nine cents, to $3.01 per gallon and $3.13 per gallon, respectively. The East Coast price declined seven cents to $3.13 per gallon.

Propane inventories fall

U.S. propane stocks decreased by 0.8 million barrels last week to 74.9 million barrels as of January 9, 2015, 36.2 million barrels (93.6%) higher than a year ago. Midwest inventories decreased by 1.0 million barrels and East Coast inventories decreased by 0.4 million barrels. Rocky Mountain/West Coast inventories decreased by 0.2 million barrels while Gulf Coast inventories increased by 0.8 million barrels. Propylene non-fuel-use inventories represented 5.2% of total propane inventories.

Residential fuel prices decrease

As of January 12, 2015, residential heating oil prices averaged less than $2.91 per gallon, 6 cents per gallon lower than last week, and $1.10 per gallon less than last year’s price for the same week. Wholesale heating oil prices averaged $1.79 per gallon, 12 cents per gallon lower than last week and $1.30 per gallon lower when compared to the same time last year.

Residential propane prices averaged less than $2.35 per gallon, 1 cent per gallon lower than last week, and 51 cents per gallon less than the price at the same time last year. The average wholesale propane price decreased by almost 2 cents per gallon this week to 57 cents per gallon, just under $1.14 per gallon lower than the January 13, 2014 price.

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Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) strongly condemned the atrocities committed by Boko Haram in Nigeria and voiced their solidarity with the families of victims and the Nigerian people, in a debate with EU foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini on Wednesday.

The MEPs also deplored the lack of international attention to the massacre committed in the city of Baga and called on the international community to help Nigeria to eradicate the causes of terrorism there.

MEPs called for an international inquiry into the massacre last week, The which reportedly left 2,000 dead. They urged the EU to step up its assistance to Nigeria and its neighbours in fighting terrorism and its deep causes.

Special attention should be paid to strengthening Nigeria’s democratic institutions and ensuring peaceful and genuinely democratic presidential and parliamentary elections later this year, they added.

A resolution on the recent atrocities in Northern Nigeria will be voted at the European Parliament’s February plenary session.

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At the request of Ukrainian authorities Red Notices, or international wanted persons alerts, have been issued for four individuals including former President Victor Yanukovych and Prime Minister Mykola Azarov, INTERPOL said.

The Red Notices, for charges including embezzlement and misappropriation, were issued on Monday following a thorough review by INTERPOL’s Office of Legal Affairs to ensure that Ukraine’s request for the notices was in compliance with the Organization’s rules and regulations.

INTERPOL said that two other Red Notices linked to the case have also been issued for former Minister of Finance Iiuri Kolobov and Georgii Dzekon.

INTERPOL said these Red Notices are not connected to a previous request made by Ukraine in March 2014 for a Red Notice to be issued for Victor Yanukovych on charges including abuse of power and murder. This request was assessed by INTERPOL as not compliant with the Organization’s rules and regulations and was refused.

A Red Notice is not an international arrest warrant and INTERPOL cannot compel any member country to arrest the subject of a Red Notice.

Red Notices are one of the ways in which INTERPOL informs its member countries that an arrest warrant has been issued for an individual by a judicial authority. A Red Notice seeks the location and arrest of wanted persons with a view to extradition or similar lawful action.

The individuals concerned are wanted by national jurisdictions (or International Criminal Tribunals, where appropriate) and INTERPOL’s role is to assist national police forces in identifying or locating those individuals with a view to their arrest and extradition.

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By Hafsa Khalid*

Over centuries wars have been the major source of pride and revenge, but what is often ignored is the fact that wars create such a destructive mess all too often generates even bigger problems for generations to come. Afghanistan, sadly is just another example of this.

The decade long war in Afghanistan after 9/11 has left nothing, but sobs and cries with millions of Afghan civilians displaced, slaughtered and abducted.  Afghans have been deprived of economical and social opportunities of connecting with the outer world. For the US, the war ended last year, but for Afghans this is the beginning of yet another war where they have been left stranded to fight an imminent insurgency. The Afghan economy is likely to hit an impasse after the departure of foreign capital and the buying capacity of the consumers could be cut in half.

People in Afghanistan are living a life under appalling circumstances, the health conditions are deplorable and education facilities are almost nonexistent, and additionally it is impossible to calculate the dead and injured. Most families have lost their only breadwinner and the country has lost innumerable human resources. Add to this the current situation, where the laws of conducting warfare are absent and there is, absolutely no measuring scale in the world that can differentiate the civilians from the terrorists or insurgents — no one is sure whether the deceased is a terrorist or not, and the assassin is left unidentified.

Houses are raided on a daily basis and privacy remains perturbed. Civilians continue with uncertainty and and no one knows what lies ahead. Fear and corruption are rampant and human rights are violated every day. The use of cluster bombs and destructive weapons in populated areas seem to easily achieve world-wide acceptance, and the damage to infrastructure and human life that such weaponry cause receives no compensation.

The time has come that the repercussions of the Afghan war must be realized and instead of being concerned for their own security, the regional countries must play a role in pressuring the US and NATO forces to help reduce civilian sufferings and to promote stability in the country.

The USA, however, seems to have resorted to a politically respectable exit from Afghanistan. The diplomatic exit incorporated a Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA), signed by the current Afghan government,  is perceived to be a tool providing the US an opportunity of face saving. A stable Afghanistan seems to be no-where in the immediate political objectives of Washington.

Since the US has almost departed from Afghanistan, various problems seem to have emerged for the regional countries. Understandably, there is no military solution to the problem of Afghanistan, however, a solution can only be achieved through dialogue. The situation of Afghanistan is significant for the peace of the region. And while Afghan forces have taken the command, the biggest challenge is the insurgency that could haunt the neighbouring states for the years to come.

After the withdrawal of US/NATO forces‚ neighboring countries, surely, share an important role to play in the development of Afghanistan.

The results of the post-2014 appear to be disastrous not only for Afghanistan, but also for the surrounding states. Afghanistan’s neighbors need to make sure that the country does not plunge into civil war. Instead, they should help the peace process. The impact of the situation in Afghanistan also impacts Pakistan, therefore, the concerns of Pakistan must be given due consideration. It is the need of the time that the regional partners should have a common perspective regarding Afghanistan. In fact, all the regional countries desire a stable and peaceful Afghanistan as a stable Afghanistan will act as a bridge between South Asia-Central Asia-West Asia-China. The benefits will be in the form of trade routes, energy corridors and the exploitation of Afghanistan’s rich mineral resources (Ainak copper mines, iron ore deposits and other valuable mineral deposits).

The cooperation between Pakistan, China and Afghanistan would help ensure that Afghan territory is not used to destabilize other countries. Reintegration and Reconciliation approaches must be adopted if in the post-US pullout uncertainties are to be avoided. For the Afghan Reconciliation and Rehabilitation process, a comprehensive strategy is needed at multiple fronts including international, regional and at domestic level. Afghanistan as an energy corridor offers the best space for exploiting Central Asian resources for meeting growing needs of the energy-starved economies of the region. All regional countries must cooperate  to turn the challenges into opportunities and to tackle the Afghan crisis peacefully.

Efforts must be made to reduce the humanitarian harm and sufferings of the Afghan people by involving the civil society and the international community. The most acute needs of the people must be provided for, along with safe drinking water and proper food. Good health facilities must be assured to reduce post-war psychological disorders and counseling must be provided to help the people. The Afghan government must ensure full accountability and good governance to reduce corruption. The ANSF forces must be given the required facilities and proper training to fight the insurgency and to reduce the threat of a reemergence of Afghan Taliban. The regional countries must extend humanitarian support to their Afghan brethren since a stable and prosperous Afghanistan is in the interests of all.

The regional countries shouldn’t play favorites in Afghanistan and instead help to bring genuine reconciliation. The militants’ safe havens must not be allowed in their territories of the surrounding countries. Immediate neighbors sharing borders with Afghanistan, as well as others like India, Turkey, Russia, EU and the US need to play an active role in Afghanistan’s peace, stability and economic development post-US drawdown. Regional organizations like SAARC, ECO and SCO can play useful roles in the post-drawdown and Afghanistan should become actively involved. There is, therefore, a dire need to reach a peaceful agreement with the Taliban to avoid severe repercussions.

About the Author
*The author holds an M. Phil degree in Peace and Conflict Studies and is currently associated with Strategic Studies Institute (SSII) as a Research Associate.

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