By Sarosh Bana

The path breaking agreement, dramatically ‘operationalised’ in the 25 January meeting between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Barack Obama, has raised high expectations in both India and the United States and elevated their partnership to a new dimension. However, the advances made by India hitherto in the atomic energy sector raise the question whether the country needs to be buttonholed into such an arrangement.

India’s planned $182 billion expansion of its nuclear capacity from the present 5,780 MW from 21 operating reactors to 14,600 MW by 2020 and 63,000 MW by 2032 is evoking a renaissance in the global nuclear energy industry. The 2.57 per cent share of nuclear power in India’s overall installed generation capacities of 224,680.24 MW, as on 31 December 2014, is aimed to be raised to 25 per cent by 2050.

This development is paving the way for the revival of the nuclear power industry in the United States, where no nuclear power plants have been built since 1973 after as many as 103 had been erected over the previous decade. American vendors like Westinghouse Electric Company, a Toshiba Corporation group company, and GEH (General Electric, allied with Hitachi Nuclear Energy) – apart from France’s Areva and Russia’s Atomstroyexport – have been enthused by the business potential India holds out for them.

Westinghouse has been provided land at Chhaya-Mithi Virdi in Gujarat to host six 1,110 MW Advanced Passive 1000 (AP1000) Pressurised Water Reactors (PWRs). The pre-project activity of ground breaking has already been done in 2012. GEH will be building six 1,520 MW generation III+ Economic Simplified Boiling Water Reactors (ESBWRs) on land allotted to it at Kovvada in Andhra Pradesh. The first concrete pour is expected early this year.

Obama exulted that a “breakthrough understanding” had been reached on two issues that were holding up the India-US civil nuclear cooperation, while Modi expressed relief that India was moving towards commercial cooperation on civil nuclear trade with the United States six years after the two sides had signed a landmark deal in this regard in 2008.

The process towards an agreement had actually begun much earlier, in July 2005, when then Prime Minister Manmohan Singh had signed the ‘joint statement’ with then President George W. Bush, a move that had seriously threatened the survival of the Indian government amidst political outrage on a perceived sell-out to Washington.

The two issues Obama was referring to included India’s Civil Liability for Nuclear Damages Act of 2010 that holds suppliers, designers and builders of NPPs directly liable in case of a nuclear accident. The US has been urging India to limit this liability to plant operators. The other issue pertained to “administrative arrangement”, a defined procedure Washington has been insisting on for it to monitor nuclear material supplied by it or produced in US-supplied reactors.

New Delhi has rejected multi-layered scrutiny, maintaining that all nuclear material supplied by the US as well as by other countries it has similar civil nuclear accords with, will anyway be subject to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. Washington has hence dropped its insistence, though there was previously the possibility that as India was not a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) which it finds discriminatory, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) was not likely to approve nuclear reactor sales to India in the absence of such US supervision. Obama has also backed India’s phased entry into the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, and the Australia Group to strengthen non-proliferation and export control regimes.

India overcame the liability impasse without amending its law, but by proposing an ‘insurance pool’ to indemnify suppliers against liability. State-owned GIC Re of General Insurance Corporation – India’s only reinsurance company – is considering an insurance-linked bond of Rs 750 crore ($122 million) towards an overall Rs 1,500 crore ($244 million) compensation fund to be set up by all general insurance companies in the country. No present policy covers nuclear risks in India as insurers lack the means to assess liabilities. The 2010 liability statute incorporated the proviso for a plant operator to seek secondary recourse against a supplier in view of the myriad unresolved claims from the 1984 chemical leak disaster at the U.S.-owned Union Carbide plant in Bhopal, which, by official estimates, had caused the death of 5,295 people. Union Carbide could virtually walk away from the episode in the absence of such a framework.

While the 2010 liability act limits any recourse sought by the operator against a supplier to $244 million, the Indian government will cover additional compensation of up to 300 million IMF Special Drawing Rights ($420 million). Beyond that, India will need to join the IAEA Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage (CSC) to access international funds, the Convention apportioning shared risk to the number of nuclear plants of each member state.

Curiously, the US, which pioneered the world’s first comprehensive nuclear liability law, the Price Anderson Act of 1957, is not party to any international nuclear liability convention, except for the CSC of 1997 and which moreover is yet to come into force. India signed the Convention in 2010 and is expected by the US to ratify it in the near future.

In the civil nuclear sector, countries are guided by their own legislations as also by the 1988 Joint Protocol that links the IAEA’s Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage of 1963 that entered into force in 1977, and the OECD’s Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy of 1960, which entered into force in 1968. The Price Anderson Act, however, provides for $10 billion in cover without cost to the public or government and without fault needing to be proved. It was renewed for 20 years in 2005 and requires individual operators to be responsible for two layers of insurance cover.

The fine print of the India-US agreement is, however, not yet public as the agreed text is to be finalised only in the next couple of months. The 25 January summit joint statement simply notes that the “Leaders welcomed the understandings reached on the issues of civil nuclear liability and administrative arrangements for civil nuclear cooperation”, implying that details were yet being worked upon.

India’s liability law will clearly impose a financial burden on nuclear suppliers as they will need to factor in supplementary safeguards and protective systems into their plants as also contribute towards the ‘nuclear pool’. Evidently, to recoup their outgoings, they will need to charge more for their plants.

Indigenous reactors are already reflecting this cost increase. The approved cost of the first two of the four 700 MW Pressurised Heavy Water Reactors (PHWRs) being built, and to be completed by 2020-21, at Gorakhpur in Haryana is Rs 20,594 crore ($3.35 billion), while that of units 5 and 6 at Kaiga in Karnataka, construction on which will begin in December 2016, is Rs 22,000 crore ($3.58 billion). In comparison, the earlier planned units 7 and 8 at Rawatbhatta in Rajasthan, scheduled for commissioning in June and December 2016, are being built at a cost of Rs 12,320 crore ($2 billion), and units 3 and 4 at Kakrapar in Gujarat, to be commissioned in June and December 2015, cost Rs 11,459 crore ($1.87 billion).

Even with this approximately 80 per cent inflation, Indian reactors are highly cost competitive and suit Indian needs. While an Indian-made two 700 MW-unit plant, that is, of 1,400 MW, is priced at around $3.5 billion, the cost of the US’s first nuclear project in over three decades – the two 1,117 MW AP1000 units 3 and 4 of Westinghouse at the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant in Georgia – has spiralled from $14 billion to $16.2 billion. In proportion, at 2,234 MW, Indian PHWRs would cost $5.59 billion, almost a third of the AP1000. GEH’s 1,520 MW ESBWR being built for Unistar, a consortium of Constellation Energy and Electricite de France, at Bell Band, Pennsylvania, is estimated to cost $9.6 billion.

The Indian government opted for GEH’s ESBWR, though the reactor is as yet untried and untested, having secured sanction for commercialising only in September 2014 when its design was approved by the NRC. Also, not a single AP1000 of Westinghouse is in commercial operation, though eight are under construction, two each at the Vogtle and V.C. Summer sites in the US and at the Sanmen and Haiyang sites in China. Cost escalation at Vogtle has, however, been driven by delays of about 20 months that has led to a $900 million lawsuit being filed by Westinghouse and Vogtle co-owner Georgia Power against each other, the latter citing deficiencies in design and poor execution for the cost overrun and delays. In 2013, Duke Energy cancelled its contract to Westinghouse for two AP1000 reactors and the matter ended up in court after project costs skyrocketed from $10 billion to $24 billion and original in-service dates were delayed by eight years. These instances belie the US Energy Information Administration (EIA) estimates that construction costs of new nuclear power plants will average $5,335 per kilowatt of capacity.

Neither GEH nor Westinghouse has disclosed the capital costs of their six reactors each planned for India. But it is clear they will extract huge investments, even though construction costs are lower in India than in the West. This will unquestionably affect the country’s hitherto moderate nuclear power tariff rates that range from 92 paisa (1.5 cents)/kWh for Tarapur 160 MW boiling water reactor (BWR) units 1 & 2 to Rs 2.4 (3 cents)/kWh for Narora 220 MW PHWR units 1 & 2 to Rs 3.4 (5.5 cents)/kWh for Rawatbhatta 220 MW PHWR units 5 & 6.

Nuclear plants in India are designed, executed, operated and maintained by the Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited (NPCIL), a public sector enterprise under the administrative control of the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE). The Corporation has achieved about 407 reactor years of experience in safe operation of nuclear power plants.

Since India’s new government came to power in May 2014, the country has been seized of the “Make in India” mantra of Prime Minister Narendra Modi that seeks to encourage indigenous manufacturing by building skills and competences. Nuclear power is one area in which India has indigenised to the highest degree of self-reliance, and competences, having managed to standardise and improve upon the Canadian-designed 220 MW PHWRs and then scale this up to 540 MW reactor size. A momentous milestone was reached in September 2005 when the country’s first indigenously designed and fabricated 540 MW PHWR unit 4 at Tarapur became commercial seven months ahead of schedule. Using the same core of 540 MW, Indian enterprise has designed and developed the 700 MW PHWR, eight of which are under construction. Capabilities have also been developed in front and back ends of the fuel cycle, from mining, fuel fabrication and storage of spent fuel, to reprocessing and waste management. Indeed, India is now capable of selling its 220 MW reactors, which are the best in their class, to developing countries that require compact, affordable and easily manageable plants.

India’s deal with the US is thus driven less by technology requirements than by the need to be integrated into the global nuclear community and thus gain access to uranium imports for fuelling its expansion plans. Its concerted indigenisation of its nuclear programme was prompted by technology, and uranium, sanctions imposed by the Western world, led by the US, in the wake of the nuclear tests of 1974 and 1988. As of now, the country’s nuclear power generation is largely dependent on its depleting, and poor grade, domestic supplies that are among the lowest grades in the world, of 0.06 per cent.

The on-going first stage of India’s three-stage nuclear power programme is based on indigenously available natural uranium. The subsequent stages, with manifold higher potential, do not need any additional uranium, but what India is looking at is the possibility of imported uranium as an additionality, which comes with the contracts for foreign reactors.

Instead of being drawn into an arrangement which may not be advantageous to it, India would be better placed to build on its own uranium resources. The country needs to avoid any recurrence of the sort that happened after its nuclear test of 1974. A year after the US Congress passed the Nuclear Non-Prolifera­tion Act (NNPA) in 1978, Washington reneged on its own 30-year agreement for fuel supplies – of low enriched uranium (LEU) – for India’s maiden atomic power station at Tarapur, almost leading to a shutdown of the facility and forcing its downgradation from 210 MW to 160 MW ratings.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India

Originally published by Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (www.idsa.in) at http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/NuclearDependenceEntrapment_sbana_100215.html

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The foreign trade competitiveness of the Spanish economy in the fourth quarter of 2014, taking the Consumer Price Indices as a reference, increased vis-à-vis the EU due to lower Spanish inflation compared with the average rate of inflation in the other EU countries and the depreciation of the Euro against the currencies of those countries.

Spain also gained competitiveness over the OECD. This was boosted significantly by the considerable depreciation of the Euro in the fourth quarter of the year and a greater contraction of Spanish prices in relation to the average year-on-year change in prices from the other OECD countries.

When considering the CTI calculated using the Export Unit Value (UVI) in the third quarter of the year, a gain in competitiveness was posted vis-à-vis the EU, the Eurozone and the non-Eurozone EU countries as a result of the greater downturn posted by Spanish export prices compared with the lower average downturn in export prices from the EU countries, coupled with the depreciation of the Euro against the currencies of those countries.

Spain also gained competitiveness over the OECD countries. In this case, the increased competitiveness was achieved through prices given that the appreciation of the Euro had a negative effect, albeit to a lesser degree than in previous periods.

Compared with the European Union

Compared with European Union countries (EU-28), the CTI fell by 1.2% year-on-year in the fourth quarter of 2014. This is the fifth consecutive quarter in which Spain has increased its competitiveness against this region. This price competitiveness improvement can be explained by falls in both the consumer relative price index of 0.9% and the exchange rate index of 0.2%.

Compared with the Eurozone (EMU-18), the CTI also fell by 0.9% in the fourth quarter of 2014 on the same quarter of the previous year, as did the consumer relative price index.

When compared with those European Union countries not forming part of the Eurozone (non-EMU-18 EU-28), the CTI fell by 2% in the fourth quarter of 2014. This gain in competitiveness can be explained by the simultaneous fall in the consumer relative price index of 1% and the exchange rate index which also stood at 1%. The depreciation of the Euro has been boosting competitiveness over these countries in the last two quarters.

Hence, competitiveness increased over all the three regions in 2014 as a whole, mainly due to the low inflation when compared with the average rate of inflation posted by the countries of the three regions and, to a lesser degree, the depreciation of the Euro.
Compared with the OECD

In the fourth quarter of 2014, a competitiveness increase was also posted versus the OECD countries, as well as versus those countries belonging to neither the Eurozone nor the EU. This was the second quarter in which there was a gain in competitiveness versus these regions since the end of 2012.

Hence, the CTI against the OECD fell by 3.1% year-on-year. This gain in competitiveness was the result of a 1.7% drop in the relative price index, enhanced by the 1.5% drop in the exchange rate index.

Versus the non-EMU-18 OECD countries, the CTI fell by 4.7% in the fourth quarter of 2014 due to the depreciation of the Euro in this period (compared with the significant appreciation in the first two quarters of the year), which was reflected in a significant decrease in the exchange rate index of 2.6% and a fall of 2.2% in the relative price index.

In comparison with the non-EU-28 OECD countries, the CTI decreased by 5.4% year-on-year in the fourth quarter of 2014. As was the case in the previous regions, this gain in competitiveness was mainly a result of decreases in both the relative price index, by 2.5%, and the exchange rate index, by 3%.

The slow-down in Euro appreciation in the third and fourth quarters enabled a gain in competitiveness in these regions, where Spain has been price competitive in the last five quarters. This enabled Spain to gain competitiveness over the OECD countries throughout 2014.

Compared with BRICS countries

The CTI calculated vis-à-vis the BRICS countries fell by 5.2% year-on-year in the fourth quarter of 2014, the second negative rate since the third quarter of 2013. This gain in competitiveness was caused by the reduction in the relative price index of 4.1%, further increased by a fall in the exchange rate index of 1.1% (a decrease that contrasts with the strong increases of 8.6%, 9.3% and 2.1% in the previous quarters of 2014).

The average rate of inflation in the BRICS countries has been higher than Spanish inflation since the fourth quarter of 2006, but the strong appreciation of the Euro against the currencies of these countries in previous quarters has prevented a gain in competitiveness when compared with this region. Therefore, the gain in competitiveness in the last two quarters has been unable to counteract the strong appreciation of the Euro in the early months of the year. Hence, a slight loss of competitiveness over the BRICS countries was recorded in 2014.

The post Spain: Euro And Low Inflation Boost Price Competitiveness appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Kenneth Katzman, Christopher M. Blanchard, Carla E. Humud, Rhoda Margesson and Matthew C. Weed*

The Islamic State (IS, aka the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, ISIL/ISIS) is a transnational Sunni Islamist insurgent and terrorist group that has expanded its control over areas of northwestern Iraq and northeastern Syria since 2013, threatening the security of both countries and drawing increased attention from the international community. The Islamic State has thrived in the disaffected Sunni Muslim-inhabited areas of Iraq and in the remote provinces of Syria torn by the civil war. The Islamic State’s tactics have drawn the ire of the international community, increasing U.S. attention on Iraq’s political problems and on the civil war in Syria.

Although the Islamic State is considered a direct threat to U.S. interests in the Middle East, it is unclear if it currently poses a significant direct threat to U.S. homeland security. In September 2014, then-National Counterterrorism Center Director Matthew Olsen stated that the group poses “a direct and significant threat to us—and to Iraqi and Syrian civilians—in the region and potentially to us here at home.”1 Olsen said that the group’s “strategic goal is to establish an Islamic caliphate through armed conflict with governments it considers apostate—including Iraq, Syria, and the United States.” Olsen further said that “we have no credible information that ISIL is planning to attack the U.S.,” and highlighted potential threats posed by foreign fighters with Western passports. U.S. officials report that as many as 16,000 foreign fighters from 90 countries have travelled to Syria, including more than 1,000 Europeans, and more than 100 U.S. citizens, with approximately 12 Americans believed to be fighting there as of September 2014.

According to Olsen, U.S. counterterrorism officials “remain mindful of the possibility that an ISIL-sympathizer—perhaps motivated by online propaganda—could conduct a limited, self- directed attack here at home with no warning.” However, Olsen noted that, “In our view, any threat to the U.S. homeland from these types of extremists is likely to be limited in scope and scale.” A CIA spokesperson provided an updated estimate of the IS organization’s size in September 2014, saying the group could muster 20,000 to 31,500 individuals. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey told the Senate Armed Services Committee on September 16 that two-thirds of the Islamic State organization’s personnel then remained in Syria.

Statements and media materials released by the Islamic State reflect an uncompromising, exclusionary worldview and a relentless ambition. Statements by Abu Bakr al Baghdadi and Islamic State spokesman Abu Mohammed al Adnani feature sectarian calls for violence and identify Shiites, non-Muslims, and unsupportive Sunnis as enemies in the group’s struggle to establish “the Islamic State” and to revive their vision of “the caliphate.”2 The group describes Iraqi Shiites derogatorily as “rejectionists” and “polytheists” and paints the Iraqi government as a puppet of Iran. Similar ire is aimed at Syrian Alawites and the Asad government, although some sources allege that operatives for the Islamic State and its antecedents have benefitted from evolving financial and security arrangements with Damascus that started during the 2003-2011 U.S. military presence in Iraq.

Al-Baghdadi speaking during Friday prayers at Great Mosque of al-Nuri in Mosul on July 4, 2014.

In July 2012, Al Baghdadi warned U.S. leaders that “the mujahidin have set out to chase the affiliates of your armies that have fled…. You will see them in your own country, God willing. The war with you has just begun.”3 In January 2014, Al Baghdadi threatened the United States directly, saying, “Know, O defender of the Cross, that a proxy war will not help you in the Levant, just as it will not help you in Iraq. Soon, you will be in direct conflict—God permitting— against your will.”4 English language propaganda and recruiting material released by the group in connection with its executions of U.S. citizens James Foley and Stephen Sotloff suggest the group is attempting to portray itself as responding to U.S. aggression, a posture adopted by its predecessors and now rivals in Al Qaeda.

Background

The Islamic State’s ideological and organizational roots lie in the forces built and led by the late Abu Musab al Zarqawi in Iraq from 2002 through 2006—Tawhid wal Jihad (Monotheism and Jihad) and Al Qaeda in the Land of the Two Rivers (aka Al Qaeda in Iraq, or AQ-I). Following Zarqawi’s death at the hands of U.S. forces in June 2006, AQ-I leaders repackaged the group as a coalition known as the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI). ISI lost its two top leaders in 2010 and was weakened, but not eliminated, by the time of the U.S. withdrawal in 2011. Under the leadership of Ibrahim Awad Ibrahim al Badri al Samarra’i (aka Abu Bakr al Baghdadi),5 ISI rebuilt its capabilities. By early 2013, the group was conducting dozens of deadly attacks a month inside Iraq. The precise nature of ISI’s relationship to Al Qaeda leaders from 2006 onward is unclear. In 2014, Islamic State leaders stated their view that their group “is not and has never been an offshoot of Al Qaeda,”6 and that, given that they view themselves as a state and a sovereign political entity, they have given leaders of the Al Qaeda organization deference rather than pledges of obedience.

In April 2013, Abu Bakr al Baghdadi announced his intent to merge his forces in Iraq and Syria with those of the Syria-based Jabhat al Nusra, under the name the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/ISIS). Jabhat al Nusra and Al Qaeda leaders rejected the merger, underscoring growing tensions among Sunni extremists in the region.

The Situation in Iraq

Many observers assessed that the Iraqi government was able to contain an IS-led insurrection in Iraq’s Anbar Province that captured the city of Fallujah and parts of the provincial capital of Ramadi in January 2014. Such forecasts were upended on June 10, 2014, when the Islamic State captured the northern city of Mosul amid mass desertions by ISF officers and personnel. According to one expert, about 60 out of 243 Iraqi army combat battalions could not be accounted for.7 The Islamic State offensive was reportedly joined by Sunni tribal fighters, former members of the late Saddam Hussein’s Baath Party and military, and other Sunni residents.8 The Sunni support for the offensive, despite reservations among many Sunnis about the Islamic State’s brutal tactics against opponents and its intention to impose its version of Islamic law, appeared to reflect broad Sunni dissatisfaction with the government of Prime Minister Nuri al Maliki that was then in power.9

Mosul, Iraq. Photo by Sgt. Michael Bracken, Wikipedia Commons.

After taking Mosul, the IS-led fighters advanced to Saddam’s hometown of Tikrit and other cities, and into Diyala Province, which has roughly equal numbers of Sunnis and Shiites. In the course of the offensive, IS and allied fighters looted banks, freed prisoners, and reportedly captured a substantial amount of U.S.-supplied military equipment, such as HMMWVs (“Humvees”) and artillery equipped with Global Positioning System (GPS) targeting systems.10 Islamic State–led fighters captured the city of Tal Afar west of Mosul on June 16 and reached the outskirts of Baqubah, capital of Diyala, about 38 miles northeast of Baghdad, by June 17. In mid-July, IS members in Mosul expelled remaining Christians there from the city.11

Shiite militias mobilized to try to help the government prevent IS forces from reaching Baghdad. The Iraqi capital is reportedly about 80% Shiite-inhabited, and many Shiites there and from elsewhere volunteered for militia service—in part answering a call by Iraq’s leading Shiite cleric, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani—to help the ISF. With support from these militias, the government forces regrouped to some extent and stalled the Islamic State advance on the capital.

Iraq Kurdistan

The ISF collapse in the north enabled the peshmerga (Kurdish militia) to capture Kirkuk and large nearby oil fields abandoned by the ISF. The Kurds have long sought to control that oil-rich region, which they claim is historic Kurdish territory, and to affiliate the province with their autonomous region run by a Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). On July 11, peshmerga reportedly seized control of two key oil fields near Kirkuk from a state-controlled company. Many experts assert that the Kurds are unlikely to willingly return control of Kirkuk and related areas to the central government.12 The peshmerga gains prompted renewed discussion among KRG leaders about seeking outright independence from Iraq. In early July, KRG President Masoud Barzani asked the KRG parliament to plan a referendum on independence.13 However, Kurdish leaders subsequently stated that the crisis the KRG faces from the Islamic State organization has caused KRG leaders to shelve the independence effort, at least temporarily. KRG leaders probably view the independence issue primarily as leverage in disputes with Baghdad, such as those over KRG oil exports and revenue-sharing.

The indirect benefits to the Kurds of the Islamic State offensive proved illusory when Islamic State–led forces advanced into territory controlled by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and its peshmerga militia fighters in early August. In the face of superior Islamic State firepower, the relatively lightly armed Kurdish forces retreated from several towns inhabited mostly by Christians and other Iraqi minorities, particularly the Yazidis. The Yazidis are mostly Kurdish speaking and practice a mix of ancient religions, including Zoroastrianism, which held sway in Iran before the advent of Islam.14 Fearing Islamic State threats to execute them if they did not convert to Islam, an estimated 35,000–50,000 Yazidis fled to Sinjar Mountain.15 By August 8, Islamic State–led fighters had also advanced to within about 40 miles of the KRG capital of Irbil, causing some flight from the city, and heightening U.S. concern about the security of U.S. diplomatic and military personnel there.

Reports of human rights violations by the Islamic State emerged, including murder, kidnappings, forced conversions, and physical and sexual assault.16 Islamic State–led forces captured Iraq’s largest dam, the Mosul Dam, as well, which Kurdish leaders assert could have been damaged or used by the Islamic State to flood wide areas of northern and central Iraq. Subsequently, U.S. and allied efforts have helped the peshmerga reverse some Islamic State gains, and have helped the ISF limit any major IS advances.

Recent U.S. assessments of the 60-country coalition’s campaign against the Islamic State organization suggest that U.S. officials believe that air strikes and Iraqi and Kurdish ground operations have halted the IS fighters’ momentum and have placed them in a largely defensive posture. According to the Department of Defense, several hundred IS personnel have been killed, and “hundreds and hundreds” of vehicles, artillery positions, and checkpoints have been destroyed.17 Most recently, intense U.S. and coalition airstrikes have facilitated Kurdish peshmerga efforts to retake areas in the northwestern Sinjar region in December and January.

Iraq Government Alterations

Iraq’s Nouri al-Maliki

The Islamic State advance also led to changes in Iraq’s leadership. Elections for the Iraqi Council of Representatives (COR) were held on April 30, 2014, beginning the process of forming a new government. By informal agreement, the COR speakership is held by a Sunni Arab; the largely ceremonial presidency is held by a Kurd; and the powerful executive post of Prime Minister is held by a Shiite Arab. Even before the Islamic State’s capture of Mosul, several Iraqi factions and some within Prime Minister Maliki’s core coalition opposed a third Maliki term as Prime Minister, despite the strong electoral performance of his “State of Law” bloc. After the Islamic State capture of Mosul, senior Obama Administration officials publicly blamed Maliki for pursuing sectarian politics that generated Sunni support for the Islamic State, and indicated he needed to be replaced.18

Iraq’s Dr. Haider al-Abadi. Picture of politician he posted himself on his Facebook page in order to identify himself, Wikipedia Commons.

In July, the COR selected as COR Speaker Salim al Jabburi (a Sunni), and two deputies, and veteran Kurdish figure Fouad Masoum as Iraq’s President. On August 11, in line with the constitutional responsibilities of the president, Masoum formally asked Haydar al Abbadi, a 62- year old member of Maliki’s Da’wa Party, to become Prime Minister-designate. Al Abbadi’s selection attracted public support from U.S. officials as well as from senior figures in Iran, causing support for Maliki’s initial challenge of the Abbadi designation to collapse. The designation gave him 30 days (until September 10) to form and achieve parliamentary confirmation for a new cabinet. His work program and all but two of his ministerial nominations were approved by the COR on September 8, enabling Abbadi to assume the prime ministership. The two powerful security posts of Interior and Defense Minister were not immediately filled, but Abbadi achieved COR confirmation on October 18 of Mohammad Ghabban, who is linked to a Shiite militia organization (Badr Organization), as Interior Minister. That selection could potentially give many Iraqi Sunnis pause as to whether the Abbadi government will prove less sectarian than that of Maliki. The same day, the COR confirmed Khalid al Ubaydi, a Sunni ex- military officer during Saddam’s rule, as Defense Minister, perhaps partly mitigating the Ghabban nomination.

As part of his outreach to Sunnis, on September 10, 2014, in conjunction with a visit by Secretary of State John Kerry, Abbadi proposed to recruit Sunnis to a new “national guard” force that would protect Sunni-inhabited areas that might be taken back from Islamic State control. In early November, Abbadi visited tribal leaders and other notables in overwhelmingly Sunni-inhabited Anbar Province, much of which has been captured by Islamic State forces.

The Situation in Syria19

Since 2013, Islamic State fighters have used Syria both as a staging ground for attacks in Iraq and as a parallel theater of operations.20 In early 2014, IS fighters reestablished control in most areas of the northern Syrian province of Raqqah and reasserted themselves to the east in Dayr az Zawr, a province rich in oil and gas resources bordering the Anbar region of Iraq. Since late 2013, the Islamic State has controlled several oilfields in Dayr az Zawr and reportedly has drawn revenue from oil sales to the Syrian government. With the proceeds, the group was able to maintain operational independence from Al Qaeda’s leadership and pay competitive salaries to its fighters. The Islamic State derived additional revenue in Syria by imposing taxes on local populations and demanding a percentage of the funds involved in humanitarian and commercial operations in areas under its control.21 Anecdotal reporting suggests that the group relies on brutality and intimidation to manage communities under its control, and in some areas partnerships with local armed groups appear to facilitate IS control.

The Islamic State also has operated north of Dayr az Zawr in Hasakah province, establishing a connection to Iraq’s Nineveh province that it was apparently able to exploit in its eventual advance towards Mosul. At some point, the Islamic State’s wide theater of conflict could subject it to overextension. IS gains may also motivate the Iraqi and Syrian governments to cooperate more closely in seeking to counter the group, potentially altering the dynamics in both conflicts. Strikes on IS forces in the vicinity of the Syria-Turkey border town of Kobane continue, as do coalition strikes against IS personnel, vehicles, and facilities in other areas of northern and eastern Syria. However, as in Iraq, the IS forces largely retain their key strongholds.

With regard to Syria’s broader civil conflict, neither pro-Asad forces nor their opponents appear capable of defeating their adversaries in the short term. However, international intervention to degrade the capabilities of the Islamic State appears to be driving speculation among many parties to the conflict that dramatic changes could soon be possible in the dynamics of what has remained a grinding war of attrition. Some opposition forces seek to cast themselves as potential allies to outsiders who are opposed to both the Islamic State and the Syrian government, while others reject the idea of foreign intervention outright or demand that foreigners focus solely on toppling President Asad. Syrian officials have stated their conditional willingness to serve as partners with the international community in counterterrorism operations in Syria, a position that reflects their presumed desire to create an image and role for the Asad government as a bulwark against Sunni Islamist extremism.

Syria’s Bashar al-Assad

As discussed in more detail below, current relations among opposition groups in Syria and their varying views on cooperation with the United States create a challenging context for pursuing U.S. objectives. Syrian opposition forces are drawn from a broad ideological spectrum. They migrate in and out of cooperative and antagonistic relationships and pursue a range of goals— short and long term, local, personal, and national. By taking limited military action in Syria for narrowly defined purposes, the Obama Administration appears to be seeking to avoid amplifying internal disputes and rivalries among Syrian groups or creating perceptions that the United States seeks to bolster one group or trend over another. A number of variables shape whether U.S.-led military operations can meet U.S. objectives, and some observers voice strong views for or against the potential expansion of these operations.

One potential practical effect of U.S. operations (particularly strikes on terrorist targets associated with popular, capable Islamist forces) may be that some Syrians grow more polarized in their views about Syria’s future and the role of outside forces in building it. Perceived U.S. allies in Syria may be drawn further into conflict with anti-U.S. groups or feel more pressure to collaborate with them. This may amplify violence in some areas and could weaken the opposition’s overall ability to place coordinated pressure on the Asad government.

Key developments since September 2014 include:

• Jabhat al Nusra Targets Rebels. Since late October, the Al Qaeda-affiliated group Jabhat al Nusra has been conducting offensive operations in northwestern Idlib Province against the Syrian Revolutionaries Front (SRF) and Harakat Hazm (Steadfastness Movement), two armed opposition groups considered to be elements of the broader Free Syrian Army movement. Both the SRF and Harakat Hazm reportedly have received weaponry from U.S. allies, and Hazm fighters have released video footage showing their use of U.S.-origin anti-tank missile systems since early 2014. The Nusra offensive reportedly has led to the eviction of these groups from their strongholds in central Idlib Province and the defection of some of their fighters.
• New Revolutionary Command Council. In late November, more than 70 rebel groups announced the formation of a new Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) to coordinate anti-Asad military operations among its secular and Islamist signatories. The council initiative obtained support from several groups reported to have received U.S. military assistance, as well as from groups like Ahrar al Sham, which the U.S. government has characterized as an extremist group. Members of Ahrar al Sham and other select groups would be prohibited from receiving U.S. assistance authorized under the extended “train and equip” authority in H.R. 3979.
• U.S. Strikes on Khorasan Group Targets. On November 5, U.S. military aircraft launched airstrikes against targets belonging to Jabhat al Nusra and the Ahrar al Sham Islamic Movement near the Bab al Hawa border crossing with Turkey. The crossing is reportedly a key conduit for external military assistance to the SRF, Hazm, and other “FSA” groups, in addition to a humanitarian access point. A U.S. CENTCOM press release denied the strikes were related to Nusra attacks on moderate rebels and stressed that the targets were associated with active terrorist plotting by the Khorasan Group, an element of Jabhat al Nusra believed to be dedicated to transnational terrorism.22 Many observers argued that the U.S. strikes would inevitably be seen in the context of Nusra- SRF/FSA infighting, and some predict negative effects on the image of the United States and its supporters in northwestern Syria who see U.S. strikes as targeting powerful anti- Asad forces.
• Kobane. The United States and its partners have used extensive airstrikes to defend the Kurdish-populated town of Kobane, Syria (also known as Ayn al Arab). The town has been besieged by IS forces since mid-September. The United States on October 19 ordered the air drop of KRG-supplied weapons, ammunition, and medical supplies to Syrian Kurds defending the town, and intense airstrikes since have facilitated Kurdish and allied Syrian Arab operations to retake portions of the town, resulting in the deaths of IS fighters and leaders.23
• Rebel Offensive Gains in South. Armed opposition groups have consolidated control in parts of southwestern Quneitra and Daraa Provinces in areas adjacent to the borders with Israel and Jordan. Coordinated opposition operations have seen forces from Jabhat al Nusra, the Islamic Front, and various FSA groups including the SRF capture a number of villages and strategic points. This has placed new pressure on the regime’s control of the Nasib border crossing with Jordan and the M5 highway running from the Jordanian border north to Damascus. Social media footage suggests that U.S.-origin anti-tank missiles have been used in some related battles in the area.
• Chemical Weapons. Sigrid Kaag, who has led the OPCW-U.N. joint mission for the destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons, briefed the U.N. Security Council in a closed door session on November 5.

According to U.N. Security Council head Gary Quinlan, Kaag reported that an OPCW team traveled to Damascus in early November to begin plans for the destruction of 12 chemical weapons facilities, including seven hangers and five underground tunnels.24 The OPCW team in Damascus also intends to draw up plans for the destruction of four CW facilities that were not previously disclosed by the Syrian government, including a ricin production facility, according to Quinlan. The OPCW briefed the Security Council on these sites in October. In addition, allegations remain regarding the use of chlorine gas by government forces. Chlorine is not required to be declared or destroyed under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), although its use in warfare is still prohibited under the Convention.

Some ongoing IS operations in Syria are focused in Dayr az Zawr, as the group fights to consolidate its supply lines to the city of Abu Kamal, a key node along the Syria-Iraq border. Press and social media reports suggest that IS, by mid-July, had seized large sectors of the provincial capital of Dayr az Zawr, although some neighborhoods remain contested by the regime and other rebel groups.25 Following the IS declaration of a caliphate, many local and tribal rebel forces surrendered to the group and withdrew from their positions, further expanding the IS presence in the Dayr az-Zawr countryside.26 Others resisted the Islamic State’s advance, and were crushed. In December, Islamic State forces sought to capture the Syrian military air field at Dayr az Zawr, which many analysts argued could isolate remaining pro-Asad forces in the area and lead to the fall of the province to the group. U.S. efforts to disrupt IS operations near Abu Kamal or Dayr az Zawr could benefit Syrian military forces also operating in the area. Islamic State fighters also remain engaged in operations against Syrian Armed Forces southwest of Raqqah and against a range of armed Syrian opposition groups to the northeast of Aleppo.

Location of Ayn al-Arab, also known as Kobani, in northern Syria near border with Turkey.

Syrian Kurdish fighters from the People’s Protection Units (known as the YPG) continue to clash with IS fighters along the border with Iraq and Turkey.27 In August, YPG forces established security corridors along the Iraqi border, enabling some refugees fleeing IS violence in Iraq to cross into Kurdish-held areas of Syria, according to a Syrian Kurdish aid worker.28 The Islamic State’s siege of the Syrian-Turkish border town of Kobane/Ayn al Arab has drawn increasing regional and international attention. More than 150,000 residents of the area have been driven into Turkey by the fighting, and fears that Islamic State forces would massacre the predominantly Kurdish defenders and remaining residents of the town have grown over time. U.S. and coalition airstrikes against the Islamic State in Syria since September 23 have largely focused on “degrading the capacity of (the Islamic State) at its core to project power, to command itself, to sustain itself, to resource itself.”

Subsequent U.S. and coalition strikes against IS forces near and inside Kobane have destroyed some IS vehicles and personnel, but have not fully reversed the group’s gains or broken the siege of the town.

U.S. Responses and Options: U.S. Strategy to Combat the Islamic State Organization

At President Obama’s direction, elements of the U.S. government are leading a multilateral coalition that seeks to “degrade and ultimately destroy” the Islamic State organization by progressively reducing the geographic and political space, manpower, and financial resources available to it.29 The United States and other members of the coalition are undertaking various measures, including direct military action, support for Iraqi and Syrian partner ground forces, intelligence gathering and sharing, and efforts to restrict flows of foreign fighters and disrupt the Islamic State’s finances.30 President Obama and Administration officials have stated their view that the Islamic State’s capabilities, intentions, and potential to support transnational terrorist activities require the United States to act.
Retired General John Allen serves as Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL, and Brett McGurk, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs (Iraq and Iran), serves as General Allen’s deputy senior envoy with the rank of Ambassador. U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander General Lloyd Austin is the lead U.S. officer with respect to military operations against the Islamic State and other extremists in Iraq and Syria.

Administration officials have identified areas where they believe progress has been made in implementing U.S. strategy to date,31 but have stated clearly that it may take months, and in some cases years to achieve the full range of U.S. objectives. In October, President Obama said, “We’re still at the early stages. As with any military effort, there will be days of progress and there are going to be periods of setback.”32

Strikes Against IS Targets and U.S. Military Advisory Efforts

U.S. military operations as part of the anti-IS strategy have been termed “Operation Inherent Resolve.” U.S. forces have used combat aircraft, armed unmanned aerial vehicles, and sea- launched cruise missiles to conduct several hundred strikes in Iraq since August 8 and in Syria since September 22 with the support of coalition partners. The stated objectives of U.S. strikes have evolved: The initial focus was on stopping the advance of Islamic State forces and reducing threats to American personnel and religious minorities in northern Iraq; now it is supporting defensive and offensive military operations by Iraqi military and Kurdish forces and weakening the Islamic State organization’s ability to support its operations in Iraq from its bases inside Syria.

Other U.S. strikes have targeted individuals and locations associated with what U.S. officials describe as “the Khorasan Group,” that has reportedly engaged in preparations for transnational terrorist attacks. President Obama has stated that he does not believe the introduction of large- scale U.S. ground forces for combat operations is necessary in order to achieve U.S. objectives. Rather, he has stated that U.S. efforts to reverse Islamic State gains on the ground will pair continued airstrikes with expanded efforts to advise and strengthen local Iraqi and Syrian partner forces. Some U.S. military officials have indicated that they are prepared to recommend the introduction of some ground forces if they believe such forces are required to achieve U.S. objectives.33

Late 2013 and early 2014 were marked by growing Iraqi and U.S. concern about the strength and intentions of the Islamic State in northern and western Iraq. U.S. officials, with the support of Congress, responded to some Iraqi requests for enhanced support and expedited expanded weapons transfers. However, U.S. efforts and involvement did not change fundamentally until the Islamic State captured Mosul from Iraqi forces in June 2014.

President Obama has since authorized the deployment of approximately 3,600 U.S. military personnel to Iraq for the purpose of advising Iraqi forces, gathering intelligence on the Islamic State, and securing U.S. personnel and facilities.34 This total includes the approximately 2,140 personnel present in Iraq as of January 7 and 1,500 additional personnel President Obama authorized to be deployed. In December 2014, the Department of Defense authorized the deployment of 1,000 members of the Third Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division from Fort Bragg, NC, along with 300 enabling personnel drawn from various Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps units.35 As of early January, these forces are expected to arrive in Iraq over “the next 4 to 6 weeks” and will join approximately 500 U.S. military personnel currently in Iraq who are providing advisory support to Iraqi forces and preparing logistically for the arrival of the larger training and advisory force.36 On December 18, Lt. General James Terry, commander, Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve said, “We anticipate coalition contributions that should produce at least an additional 1,500 personnel” in support of U.S. efforts.37

After undertaking a new assessment of Iraqi military forces, U.S. advisers have concluded that only about half of all Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) units are sufficiently capable for U.S. advisers to help them regain captured territory through the provision of further targeted advisory assistance.38 The definition of “capable,” according to U.S. officials, includes whether an ISF unit integrates both Sunni and Shiite personnel. Some private assessments by nongovernment observers argue that even fewer ISF units are capable of reversing the Islamic State gains, and underscore the continuing role of Shiite militia groups in defending Iraqi-government held-territory and conducting offensive operations against IS forces.

Training and Equipping Partner Forces

U.S. strategy is implemented differently in Iraq and Syria in light of the different political and military conditions that prevail in each country. In Iraq, the United States has relatively welcoming, organized, and recognized partners on the ground in the form of the ISF and peshmerga commanded by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). In Syria, the long- standing U.S. position calling for the departure of Bashar al Asad from power and U.S. concerns about the unity and goals of the armed Syrian opposition present challenges for U.S. efforts to engage partners on the ground. Iran cooperates closely with and offers support to partner forces in both countries, in pursuit of its own interests.

Iraqi Security Forces

On November 7, the Department of Defense announced that President Obama had authorized the deployment of up to 1,500 U.S. military personnel to “expand our advise and assist mission and initiate a comprehensive training effort for Iraqi forces.”39 According to the department, CENTCOM “will establish two expeditionary advise and assist operations centers … to provide support for the Iraqis at the brigade headquarters level and above.” Department of Defense Press Secretary Rear Admiral John Kirby said in a related press briefing that up to 630 out of 1,500 U.S. personnel would be engaged in this aspect of the mission. In addition, CENTCOM intends to establish “several sites across Iraq” where the remaining 870 U.S. personnel will engage in a more hands-on building partnership capacity/training mission for 12 Iraqi brigades, specifically 9 Iraqi army and 3 peshmerga brigades (about 2,500 personnel each), with the support of 700 additional personnel contributed by coalition partners.40 These new advise and assist facilities may be located in Anbar, Irbil, Diyala, and Baghdad Provinces.

Training will continue over a period of about 8 to 10 months, and is expected to begin in February 2015. The reported intent of the training is to prepare the Iraqi forces to go on the offensive against Islamic State strongholds in Iraq as early as the spring of 2015, although U.S. officials stress that the counter-offensive is being planned by Iraqi forces and will be carried out on the Iraqis’ timetable.41 DOD leaders have emphasized that U.S. personnel will not accompany Iraqi forces in combat settings as part of the planned expansion of the advisory and training mission. However, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Martin Dempsey acknowledged in November 2014 that as the campaign against the Islamic State progresses and more complex operations are required by Iraqi Security Forces, he could recommend that U.S. personnel accompany Iraqi forces.42 Participant Iraqi brigades are in the process of being identified and site surveys are ongoing.

The Administration requested and Congress provided authority and $1.6 billion in FY2015 Overseas Contingency Operation funding for an “Iraq Train and Equip Fund” to support the expanded training mission—part of a broader $5.6 billion request for the anti-IS mission for FY2015.43 The funding provision (Iraq Train and Equip Fund in Division C of P.L. 113-235) stipulates that 40% of the requested U.S. train and equip funds are not be eligible to be expended unless foreign contributions equal to 40% of the $1.618 billion are contributed (of which half that contributed amount would come from the Iraqi government). The FY2015 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA, Section 1236 of P.L. 113-291) includes this cost-sharing provision, and also limits the availability of funds for newly authorized Iraq training program to 25% until the Administration submits required program and strategy reports to Congress. It also requires 90- day progress reporting.

Under the FY2015 NDAA, the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State, is authorized:

to provide assistance, including training, equipment, logistics support, supplies, and services, stipends, facility and infrastructure repair and renovation, and sustainment, to military and other security forces of or associated with the Government of Iraq, including Kurdish and tribal security forces or other local security forces, with a national security mission, through December 31, 2016, for the following purposes:

(1) Defending Iraq, its people, allies, and partner nations from the threat posed by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and groups supporting ISIL.

(2) Securing the territory of Iraq.

The United States also has undertaken new efforts to equip existing Iraqi forces. Since the Islamic State–led capture of Mosul in June, the United States has announced sales of over 5,000 additional HELLFIRE air-to-surface missiles to Baghdad. Deliveries of U.S.-made F-16s and Apaches, purchased in 2011 and 2012, are in their early stages. Deliveries of 250 U.S.-donated Mine Resistant Armor Protected Vehicles (MRAPs) are ongoing. In December 2014, U.S. officials also proposed sales to Iraq that may be worth nearly $3 billion for 1,000 M1151AI Up- Armored High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs) and 175 M1A1 tanks with spare parts, communications, and ammunition.

Iraqi and Syrian Kurds

In addition to support for the ISF, the Administration also reportedly has begun supplying mostly lighter weaponry and ammunition directly to the security forces (peshmerga) of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), through the Central Intelligence Agency.44 A number of European countries, such as Britain, Germany, and France, also have been supplying weaponry to the peshmerga. The central government in Baghdad and the KRG have had deep differences over territory, the exportation of oil, Kurdish ambitions for independence, and other issues. However, the threat posed by the Islamic State has led the two to make common cause, and since the crisis began, the ISF has permitted the United States to transfer some of the ISF’s weapons to the peshmerga.45

On December 2, the KRG and Baghdad signed a partial reconciliation agreement under which the KRG would provide up to 550,000 barrels46 per day of oil to Iraqi state authorities in exchange for a restoration of the KRG’s 17% share of national revenues (which would amount to about $600 million per month at December 2014 oil prices.)47 In addition, Baghdad will provide the KRG with approximately $100 million per month to pay for peshmerga salaries and weapons purchases. Baghdad reportedly also agreed to facilitate the transfer of some U.S. weapons to the peshmerga.48 The agreement is to be part of the 2015 Iraqi budget, which is subject to approval by the Iraqi parliament.

Kurdish and U.S. officials have said that, as part of a long-term strategy to drive IS forces back, the peshmerga will require heavy and long range weapons—in part to counter the Islamic State’s use of captured U.S. weapons.49 Providing these weapons, however, could incur opposition from Baghdad on the grounds that a more potent arsenal might enable the KRG and peshmerga to retain control of the disputed territory of Kirkuk, which the peshmerga seized as the ISF collapsed in June. The Turkish government also may protest the provision of such weaponry.

As noted above, the Administration sought authorization and funding to support an expanded train and equip mission for Iraqi security forces, including the peshmerga. The FY2015 NDAA and appropriations act authorize such assistance (Section 1236 of P.L. 113-291), and the NDAA joint explanatory statement prepared by House and Senate defense committee leaders states:

We note the significant contribution that Kurdish security forces have made to countering ISIL’s advance. We understand that the administration’s plan includes assistance to train and equip 3 brigades of Kurdish peshmerga. Accordingly, we expect that a significant portion of the assistance under this authority will be provided to meet the requirements of the Kurdish security forces and urge the Secretary of Defense to ensure that such assistance is delivered in a timely manner to such forces. We further expect the Secretary of Defense to keep the congressional defense committees fully informed as this plan is developed and implemented, including any arrangements to ensure that such assistance for Kurdish security forces is promptly delivered to those forces.

State Department appropriations for FY2015 assistance to Iraq also are eligible for assistance to the Kurdistan Regional Government (Section 4041(c) of Division K, P.L. 113-235).

Iraqi National Guard and Other Local Forces

The United States has endorsed Iraqi efforts to establish a “national guard” to help Iraqi Sunni Arabs defend themselves from the Islamic State. Press reports citing unidentified U.S. officials suggest that “two to three brigades or as many as 15,000 troops” could be recruited and trained for such an effort.50 The national guard force, which reportedly will report to the governments of each province, is intended primarily to secure territory that is recaptured from the Islamic State. According to Department of Defense Press Secretary Rear Admiral John Kirby, the planned expansion of the advisory and training missions for the ISF will not initially support the creation of national guard forces, but related infrastructure and personnel could support such a mission in the future if requested by the government of Iraq and authorized by President Obama.51 U.S. officials have emphasized that any such efforts would be Iraqi-designed and led, and that specific planning for providing such assistance awaits the conclusion of further discussion with Iraqi leaders.

The Administration’s FY2015 OCO authority and funding request noted that requested funds would be used “to provide material support to tribal elements allied with Iraqi forces.” The FY2015 NDAA (Section 1236 of P.L. 113-291) authorizes the provision of assistance to security forces “of or associated with the Government of Iraq,” as well as “tribal security forces or other local security forces, with a national security mission.” According to the defense authorizing committee leaders who drafted the bill, their version of the authorization was amended to specifically:

add local security forces with a national security mission to the list of forces authorized to receive assistance under this section. We believe that, for purposes of this section, local security forces should include local forces that are committed to protecting highly vulnerable ethnic and religious minority communities in the Nineveh Plain and elsewhere from the ISIL threat.

Sunni communities remain suspicious of Shiite militia groups and the ISF, which is dominated by Shiite Muslims, seeing them to some extent as an occupation force. U.S. strategy presumes that having Sunni forces secure Sunni communities would ease this sectarian-based suspicion. Questions remain regarding the willingness of Sunnis to counter the Islamic State in the way many took U.S.-aided action against IS precursor Al Qaeda in Iraq in 2007 (the so-called sahwa, or awakening). This may depend largely on whether Prime Minister Haydar al Abbadi and other top Shiite leaders in the central government demonstrate a willingness to share power with or devolve local authority to Sunnis, Kurds, and other minorities. Islamic State forces continue to intimidate Sunni Arab communities and deter potential adversaries through mass killings of tribally organized fighters.

Support for Vetted Syrians

Engagement with Syrians in combatting the Islamic State presents similar challenges. President Obama said on November 5 that the United States seeks to isolate and reduce the areas where ISIL can operate in Syria in support of the top U.S. priority of rolling back IS gains in Iraq. To date, the Syrian government and Syrian military appear to be acquiescent observers rather than active partners in U.S. efforts to combat the Islamic State inside Syria. U.S. officials have notified the Syrian government of certain strikes, but President Obama has said that the United States will not coordinate its actions in Syria with the Asad regime, which he has said “terrorizes its own people” and “will never regain the legitimacy it has lost.”52 U.S. strategy seeks a negotiated settlement to the conflict in Syria and believes that President Asad and some of his supporters must leave office as part of such a settlement. Congress and the Administration have provided nonlethal aid and reportedly provided lethal support to some opposition groups in Syria. By all accounts, Syrian opposition forces remain divided in their goals, varied in their cohesiveness, and limited in their capabilities.

In September, Congress endorsed President Obama’s request for authority to train and equip vetted Syrians, in part to develop a partner force for U.S. operations against the Islamic State and other terrorist groups in Syria.53 Congress amended and extended this authority in the FY2015 NDAA (Section 1209 of P.L. 113-291) and FY2015 appropriations act (Section 9016 of P.L. 113- 235). The NDAA and its accompanying explanatory statement further specify the types of assistance to be provided, and expand reporting requirements, include human rights and rule of law commitment vetting requirements, authorize the provision of assistance to third countries for the purposes of the program, and create a broad waiver authority for the President relative to the assistance program, subject to a 30-day congressional notification period.

The Pentagon

On January 6, Pentagon spokesman Rear Admiral John Kirby said that the department expects that the training and equipping of vetted Syrians could commence in early spring 2015. Congress authorized such training and assistance in the FY2015 NDAA and FY2015 appropriations act. Initial funding for the program was approved by congressional defense committees in December 2014. According to Kirby, U.S. officials are now engaging with different Syrian groups in order to identify potential recruits for the program. Kirby also stated that related U.S. force deployments may be forthcoming. U.S. officials continue to consult with counterparts in Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar on hosting program activities.

Some Syrian opposition members and their U.S. supporters have criticized the Administration’s announced plans to train and equip an initial force of 5,400 vetted Syrians as insufficient in size. Others disagree strategically with the President and may believe that U.S.-backed forces should be trained for offensive operations against the Syrian government. For further discussion of these critiques and policy options under consideration, see “Defining the Way Forward in Syria” below.

Disrupting IS Financing

On October 23, Under Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David Cohen identified three components of U.S. policy aimed at reducing the financial resources available to the Islamic State.54 Broadly speaking, the U.S. government and its partners seek to disrupt IS revenue streams, limit the group’s access to formal financial systems, and impose sanctions on the group’s senior leadership and financial facilitators.

Disrupting revenue streams. Cohen stated that the United States seeks to disrupt the group’s revenue streams by targeting those who refine, transport, handle, or sell IS oil. The United States is also working with regional partners to identify cross-border smuggling routes and persons involved in smuggling networks. The United States has urged United Nations (U.N.) member states to help cut off resources to the Islamic State, and the U.N. Security Council in September passed resolution 2178 to combat the flow of money and foreign fighters to the Islamic State and the Al Qaeda-affiliated Jabhat al Nusra (Support Front).

In addition to financial and political measures, the United States is also employing military means to target IS funding streams. Since August 2014, U.S. military strikes against the Islamic State have targeted oil facilities, including collection points and mobile refineries. In late September and early October, the United States struck at least 12 out of an estimated 15-20 IS-held modular oil refineries in eastern Syria and rendered them inoperable, according to the Defense Department spokesperson.55 The Defense Department estimates that each refinery had the capacity to produce 300 to 500 barrels a day of refined petroleum. The International Energy Agency in mid-October reported that U.S. and coalition strikes in Iraq and Syria had reduced the Islamic State’s ability to produce, refine, and smuggle oil.56

Restricting access to the financial system. Cohen noted that the United States aims to restrict the Islamic State’s access to the international financial system and to limit its ability to move, store, and use funds it acquires locally. In particular, the United States plans to work with Iraqi authorities, banks’ headquarters, and the international financial community to prevent the Islamic State from using local bank branches in areas under its control.

Financial sanctions. The United States also plans to impose sanctions against IS officials and their external financial backers. On September 24, the Department of the Treasury designated 12 individuals for their role in soliciting funds, procuring military equipment, and recruiting foreign fighters, 2 of whom are based in Syria and are associated with the Islamic State.57

Restricting Flows of Foreign Fighters

U.S. officials from the intelligence community, State Department, and other agencies concerned with domestic security continue to assess, monitor, and respond to threats posed by foreign fighters active in Iraq and Syria. Diplomatic and intelligence efforts focus on coordinating with source, transit, and returnee destination countries to strengthen shared responses and preventive measures.58 In March 2014, the State Department named Ambassador Robert Bradtke as “senior adviser for partner engagement on Syria foreign fighters.” According to a department spokesperson, “Since then, Ambassador Bradtke has led a comprehensive effort, including marshalling representatives from a number of U.S. departments and agencies, to encourage key European, North African, and Middle Eastern partners to prioritize the threat, address vulnerabilities, and adapt to – and prevent – foreign fighters.”59 In December, Ambassador Bradtke told Congress that “The intelligence community estimates that since January 2012, over 16,000 foreign fighters have travelled to Syria from more than ninety countries, including the United States.”60

In August 2014, the U.S. government supported the adoption of U.N. Security Council Resolution 2170, which strengthened international sanctions measures designed to combat the Islamic State, Jabhat al Nusra, and Al Qaeda-affiliated entities. The resolution called upon all Member States “to take national measures to suppress the flow of foreign terrorist fighters to, and bring to justice, in accordance with applicable international law, foreign terrorist fighters of, ISIL, ANF and all other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with Al Qaida,” and reiterates Member States’ obligation to prevent terrorist travel, limit supplies of weapons and financing, and exchange information on the groups.

President Obama led a session of the United Nations Security Council on September 24 focused on strengthening international responses to the threat posed by foreign fighters travelling to conflict zones, especially in Syria and Iraq. The session concluded with the adoption of Security Council Resolution 2178, which requires Member States, consistent with international law, to prevent the “recruiting, organizing, transporting or equipping of individuals who travel to a State other than their States of residence or nationality for the purpose of the perpetration, planning of, or participation in terrorist acts.” In December 2014, Ambassador Bradkte said, “Several countries have already enacted or proposed legislation to permit [prosecution for foreign fighter facilitation]; other countries have stepped up their enforcement of existing laws. We continue to urge partners to meet their obligations under UNSCR 2178, and are offering assistance to partners who may need help in doing so.”61

What Has the Strategy Achieved to Date?

Experts and officials are debating the effectiveness of the strategy. The Administration has argued that the strategy will need time—measured in many months, not weeks—to reach its objectives. It asserts that there are distinct achievements, to date. Administration critics argue that the strategy lacks effective partners who can advance against Islamic State-held territory on the ground and suffers from a basic contradiction in not confronting the regime of President Asad of Syria. These critics assert that achieving stated Administration objectives requires U.S. or other ground combat troops and expansion of the mission to include pressuring Asad to accept a political solution.

Administration officials assert that the accomplishments of the strategy to date include the following:

• In Iraq, U.S.-led airstrikes halted the Islamic State advance on Irbil and enabled the peshmerga and ISF to safely evacuate most of the Yazidi internally displaced persons (IDPs) from Sinjar Mountain.62 In October, peshmerga forces recaptured the town of Zumar and the border crossing into Syria at Rabia, among other gains.
• In September, U.S. airstrikes helped peshmerga and ISF forces drive Islamic State fighters from Mosul Dam, which the Islamic State purportedly could have used to flood large parts of Iraq. Also that month, U.S. airstrikes facilitated efforts by the ISF and Shiite militias to break an Islamic State siege of the Shiite- inhabited town of Amerli.
• With intensive airstrikes and the airdrop of supplies and weaponry to defenders in October, the United States and its partners helped prevent the predominantly Kurdish-inhabited Syrian town of Kobane/Ayn al Arab from being captured by Islamic State forces. Still, that town remains an active battle site and the outcome is uncertain.
• In October, the ISF recaptured the town of Jurf al Sakhar, 40 miles south of Baghdad, and have made some gains in Diyala Province, helping secure ISF supply lines to northern Iraq. In November, the ISF claimed to have recaptured most of the town of Baiji, potentially positioning the force to relieve the IS siege of the large refinery outside the town. However, Islamic State forces regained control of the town in December.
• Kurdish forces recaptured Mt. Sinjar and areas of the neighboring town, although Islamic State forces continued to resist Kurdish advances in early January 2015.

The November 7 announcement of an expanded training and advisory mission for Iraqi forces appeared to reflect Administration optimism that additional U.S. inputs—coupled with the success in replacing Prime Minister Maliki with a more inclusive successor—could produce results. Others interpreted the announcement as an indication that the Administration assesses that Iraqi forces remain highly deficient and require substantially more help. In comments related to the November 7 announcement, President Obama stated:

What it [the expanded train and equip mission] signals is a new phase. What we knew was that phase one was getting an Iraqi government that was inclusive and credible, and we now have done that. And so now what we’ve done is rather than just try to halt ISIL’s momentum, we’re now in a position to start going on some offense. The airstrikes have been very effective in degrading ISIL’s capabilities and slowing the advance that they were making. Now what we need is ground troops, Iraqi ground troops, that can start pushing them back.63

Critics of the Administration strategy note some setbacks to the strategy as follows:

• That Islamic State forces have continued to gain control over territory in Iraq’s Al Anbar province, including in October seizing the town of Al Hit and capturing or encroaching on several ISF military bases in the province. Secretary of Defense Hagel told journalists in October that “Anbar Province is in trouble. We know that.”64
• Islamic State gains in Anbar have positioned Islamic State forces to approach Baghdad and to undermine security in the city—as well as the crucial Baghdad International Airport—through mortar barrages and infiltration by suicide and other bombers. Experts say this encroachment might hinder ISF efforts to take the offensive rather than react to Islamic State maneuvers. Others assert that the ISF, while supported by Shiite militias and unlikely to lose Baghdad entirely, might yet lose parts of the city.65
• There has been little evidence, to date, of a significant Iraqi Sunni shift to oppose Islamic State forces directly or to comprehensively assist ISF units in anti-IS operations. Many Sunnis continue to distrust the Baghdad government and its reliance on Shiite militias. Others Sunnis apparently have been cowed by IS massacres of Sunni tribalists and other Sunnis opposed to IS rule. In October, Islamic State fighters reportedly killed more than 300 members of the Albu Nimr tribe for resisting IS advances in western Iraq.

International Coalition

The outcomes of U.S. strategy might depend on the participation of other actors, both state and non-state. U.S. officials have recruited a coalition of countries to help defeat the Islamic State, in large part to build international legitimacy for a military campaign and enlist Sunni help with co- religionists in Iraq and Syria. The Administration has sought—and received—a range of support from international partners, including participation in airstrikes, assisting and training Iraqi government and Iraqi Kurdish forces, arming and training moderate Syrian rebels, increasing intelligence sharing, committing to curb the flow of fighters and resources to the Islamic State, and providing financial support.66

The State Department lists 60 countries as members of the “Coalition to Degrade and Defeat ISIL.” Many of the countries participating have been involved since 2012 in response to the evolving conflict in Syria. The participation of the various coalition members and summaries of some of their contributions are cited below.67

Those in the coalition that are participating in military operations in Iraq and Syria face significant challenges. Past attempts at coordination have exposed rifts among regional countries, prompting situations in which the common goal of supporting the Syrian opposition was not enough to overcome other, competing priorities among ostensibly partner states.68 Relations between Iraq’s government and the Sunni Arab Gulf states have been consistently strained in the post-Saddam Hussein period, in part because Iraq’s government has been dominated by Shiite factions politically close to Iran. Sunni Arab militaries have to date limited their airstrikes to Syria in part because strikes in Iraq might be seen by their populations as empowering Shiite elements in Iraq. The partner countries participating in airstrikes in Syria, according to CENTCOM, are Bahrain, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. Qatar reportedly participated in some of the first coalition strikes in Syria in September. To date, Western and other non-Middle Eastern allies of the United States, such as Australia, Britain, and France, are undertaking airstrikes in Iraq, and not in Syria—perhaps reflecting a hesitancy among Western allies to be drawn into involvement in Syria’s civil war in any way.

In Syria, Sunni coalition partners might assess that the U.S. focus on the Islamic State might not be contributing to the Sunni partner primary objectives of weakening the Asad regime and its supporters (Iran, Hezbollah, Russia). U.S. partners will likely base their calculations of the costs and benefits of their military operations in Syria and/or Iraq on their perceptions of various factors such as the urgency of acting directly, the soundness of U.S. strategy, the level of U.S. commitment, and potential progress toward political solutions (particularly in Iraq) that are more inclusive of Sunni Arabs or less conducive to Iranian strategic goals. The capture by Islamic State forces of a downed Jordanian pilot in December 2014 also has the potential to shape the calculations of coalition members.

The following sections will discuss the role that selected partner countries are playing in the coalition, and examine factors that could potentially constrain their participation.

As of December 3, the State Department listed more than 60 countries and organizations as members of the “Coalition to Degrade and Defeat ISIL.”69 To date, the Administration has sought—and received—a range of support from international partners, including participation in the air campaign against IS forces, financial support, assistance for Iraqi government and Iraqi Kurdish forces, offers of support for efforts to arm and train vetted Syrians, increased intelligence sharing, and actions to curb foreign fighter and financial flows.70

NATO and Arab Partners. The NATO alliance as a whole has not committed to a substantive response beyond stating in the September 2014 Wales summit communique that it would consider any future request from the Iraqi government to launch a training and capacity-building mission for Iraqi security forces.71 NATO previously conducted a military training mission in Iraq from 2008 to 2011. European countries continue to rule out using ground forces in combat operations in Iraq or Syria.

To date, Western and other non-Middle Eastern allies of the United States, such as Australia, Britain, and France, are undertaking airstrikes in Iraq, but not in Syria. Some Gulf Cooperation Council countries and Jordan are conducting airstrikes against Islamic State targets in Syria, in conjunction with U.S. forces. U.S. forces alone continue to conduct strikes against targets associated with the Khorasan Group, an element of Jabhat al Nusra engaged in transnational terrorist activity, according to U.S. officials. These strikes have targeted facilities shared with Jabhat al Nusra and other Islamist opposition groups, creating tension among opposition forces.

Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. File photo.

Turkey. Turkish leaders have indicated willingness to consider deeper participation in the anti-IS coalition in the wake of the September 20, 2014, release by the Islamic State of 49 hostages72 associated with the Turkish consulate in Mosul, Iraq. Turkey already is reportedly allowing the use of its territory and airspace for humanitarian and logistical purposes, and adopting additional measures to curb the flow of foreign fighters to Syria.73 Turkey’s parliament voted on October 2, 2014, to approve potential military operations in Syria and Iraq launched from Turkey by Turkish or foreign forces. However, a complicated array of considerations arguably affect Turkish calculations regarding direct military involvement or the furnishing of its territory or airspace for coalition use. This includes Turkey’s role to this point in Syria’s protracted conflict, as well as Turkish parliamentary elections scheduled for June 2015.74

Russia, China, Iran, and Asad. U.N. Security Council permanent members Russia and China are not members of the coalition, but Russia has pledged its support for counterterrorism efforts in Syria, while arguing that coalition members should include the Asad government in their efforts. The coalition includes several countries that have cooperated with the United States in joint efforts to support the Syrian people and Syrian opposition movements during the evolving civil conflict, underscoring the challenges of forging a common set of objectives between coalition members and backers of Asad.75 Common cause with Asad and his supporters might also entail risks and drive Sunni opponents of Asad and Iran to undermine coalition efforts.

Europe and Other Allies76

On the sidelines of NATO’s Wales Summit, held on September 4-5, the United States and United Kingdom (UK) co-chaired a discussion on the Islamic State. NATO member countries France, Germany, Canada, Turkey, Italy, Poland, and Denmark, and observer state Australia, reportedly joined the United States and UK in agreeing to coordinate efforts to fight the group.77 The alliance as a whole did not commit to a substantive response beyond stating in the summit communique that it would consider any future request from the Iraqi government to launch a training and capacity-building mission for Iraqi security forces.78 NATO previously conducted a military training mission in Iraq from 2008 to 2011.

France hosted a meeting of foreign ministers from 26 countries (including European and Middle Eastern countries as well as Russia and China), the Arab League, European Union, and U.N. on September 15 that produced further pledges to defeat the Islamic State and provide military assistance to the Iraqi government. Subsequently, various European countries announced specific military commitments and involvement in operations. The partner countries participating in airstrikes in Iraq are Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. As noted above, Western partner countries—including Denmark, Germany, Australia, and the United Kingdom—have pledged an estimated 700 total trainers plus additional advisers to assist Iraqi forces. France, Germany, and the UK have been providing weapons to Kurdish forces in Iraq, as well as non-lethal equipment and humanitarian aid.79 As in the United States, other Western countries encounter more difficult legal and political questions in relation to military action inside Syria.

Iranian Involvement in the Iraq and Syria Crises

Iran flag

Apparently pursuing its own interests, Iran has been generally cooperating with U.S. policy in Iraq, but the United States has ruled out formally bringing Iran into any U.S.-led anti-Islamic State coalition. However, on Syria, the United States and Iran have generally been on opposite sides: the United States supports Asad’s ouster in favor of a transition regime, whereas Iran is materially supporting Asad’s efforts to remain in power. Iran apparently views expanded U.S. efforts to provide support and training to Syrian opposition groups as a threat to its interests.

On Iraq, U.S. diplomats acknowledge that they have discussed the Islamic State crisis at margins of recent talks on Iran’s nuclear program. Iran abandoned its longtime ally Maliki80 and helped compel him to yield power in favor of Haydar al Abbadi. The U.S. State Department has consistently refuted assertions that the bilateral discussion on Iraq could provide Iran additional leverage in the ongoing nuclear talks with the United States and its partner countries.81 However, President Obama has acknowledged sending a letter in November 2014 to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamene’i, the contents of which have not been released but which was said to focus on the potential for further cooperation against the Islamic State if the issue of Iran’s nuclear program were resolved.82

In actions that appear to further U.S. objectives in Iraq, Iran reportedly has been delivering arms and ammunition to the ISF and the peshmerga. In early July, Iran returned to Iraq about a dozen of the 100+ Iraqi combat aircraft that were flown to Iran at the start of the 1991 war between Iraq and the United States-led coalition. Iranian pilots apparently also are flying the aircraft: in July 2014 Iran announced that one of its pilots had died in operations in Iraq.83 Iran reportedly has provided weapons to Syrian Kurds fighting Islamic State forces in northern Syria, and by all accounts continues to provide material support to Syrian government forces.

Many observers remain skeptical that the United States could or should cooperate with Iran in either Iraq or Syria. Iran helped establish many of the Shiite militias that fought the United States during 2003-2011, and Iran reportedly has sent Islamic Revolutionary Guard-Quds Force (IRGC- QF) personnel into Iraq to advise the Shiite militias fighting alongside the ISF. The participation of the militias has increased tensions with Iraq’s Sunnis, including those who live in mostly Shiite-inhabited Baghdad and in mixed provinces such as Diyala. Anecdotal reports indicate that some Shiite militia fighters have carried out reprisals against Sunnis who the militias accuse of supporting the Islamic State. Some of the Shiite militiamen who are fighting in Iraq had returned from Syria, where they were helping President Asad against Sunni-led armed rebels. On Syria, Iran continues to support Asad militarily, thereby countering U.S. efforts to compel Asad to yield power to a transition regime.

Overview of the Current Humanitarian Crisis in Iraq and Syria84

The humanitarian situations in both Iraq and Syria have been described as a “mega crisis” in part because displacements and movement of populations are intertwined between the two countries.85 Taken together, it is estimated that 17.4 million people living in either Iraq or Syria are affected by conflict and in need of humanitarian assistance. In addition, more than 3.3 million Syrians and nearly 0.2 million Iraqis are displaced as refugees. However, the funding streams and operational framework for the international humanitarian response in each country remain distinct, in part a reflection of the unique conditions unfolding in each country.

Iraq

Since January 2014, an urgent humanitarian crisis has unfolded in Iraq, with an estimated 5.2 million people in need of humanitarian and protection assistance. Of these, over 2.1 million people are Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), more than 1.7 million are in communities that are taking in the displaced (host communities), 1.5 million are in areas under the control of armed groups or impacted by the conflict, and 0.2 million are Syrian refugees.86 Close to half the newly displaced are thought to be children. Particularly in conflict areas in northern and central Iraq, it is difficult to monitor and track the mass and sometimes multiple displacements. Consequently, the actual number of affected individuals remains fluid and difficult to fully ascertain.

As of late October, of the 2.1 million IDPs, an estimated 850,000 are seeking shelter in Iraq’s Kurdistan region, mainly in Dohuk governorate, while increased movements to central and southern Iraq are straining the response capacities of host communities in these areas.87 All 18 governorates are hosting families fleeing violence. There are estimated to be over 700,000 displaced in the central region (with almost 400,000 in Anbar Governorate) and 200,000 in the south. The needs of all IDPs in Iraq remain significant, while basic government social services are limited and weak. In addition to winter preparedness, which includes the provision of shelter and winterization kits, there continue to be urgent needs for food, water and sanitation, and health services.88 With the large number of displaced children, emergency education support is also a priority for the humanitarian community.

There are also concerns about the rise in sectarian tensions across the country made worse by the conflict situation and large numbers of IDPs. An estimated 3.6 million Iraqis reside in areas under the control of the IS and other armed groups. Of these, 2.2 million are thought to be trapped in conflict-affected areas. These IDPs lack access to basic services and are considered to be in urgent need of humanitarian assistance.89

Syria

The ongoing conflict in Syria has created one of the most pressing humanitarian crises in the world. Three and a half years into the conflict, as of November 2014, an estimated 12.2 million people inside Syria, more than half the population, were in need of humanitarian assistance, of which more than 7.6 million were displaced inside the country.90 In addition, more than 3.3 million Syrians are displaced as refugees, with 97% fleeing to countries in the immediate surrounding region, including Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Egypt, and other parts of North Africa. According to the United Nations, in 2014, an average of more than 90,000 Syrians per month registered as refugees in countries in the region. The situation is fluid and continues to worsen, while humanitarian needs are immense and increase daily.

Access within Syria is severely constrained by violence and restrictions imposed by the Syrian government on the operations of humanitarian organizations. Several million people are estimated to be living in hard-to-reach areas and some have been besieged by either the Government of Syria or opposition forces at different points in the conflict. Reports of intentional policies of starvation in areas under siege by the government, attacks against civilians and indiscriminant use of heavy weapons, and a weak health infrastructure that is often under deliberate attack illustrate the dire conditions under which civilians are trying to survive. On November 14, 2014, the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, which was established on August 22, 2011, by the U.N. Human Rights Council, issued a report, Rule of Terror: Living under ISIS in Syria. The commission’s mandate is to investigate all alleged violations of international human rights law since March 2011 in Syria. The report describes the systematic atrocities and violations perpetrated by IS, particularly against the civilian populations in Aleppo, Ar Raqqah, Al Hassakah, and Dayr az Zawr governorates.91

The number of registered refugees (or those awaiting registration) in neighboring countries continues to increase. Experts recognize that some Syrians have not registered as refugees, presumably from fear or other reasons, and have chosen instead to blend in with the local population, living in rented accommodations and makeshift shelters, particularly in towns and cities. The U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) estimates that more than 80% of Syrian refugees are living outside camps in mostly urban settings. The types of assistance and shelter options available to refugees vary in the countries that are hosting them.

Winterization assistance, which includes the provision of shelter and winterization kits, is a key priority.

The added economic, energy, and natural resource pressures of large Syrian refugee populations weigh heavily, particularly in Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey. The governments of countries hosting refugees have concerns about the potential political implications of allowing displaced populations to remain, especially for a protracted period of time. The impact on many host communities has become overwhelming. Overcrowded schools, inadequate hospital services, and impacts on resources such as water all contribute to the burden for neighboring countries. Urgent priorities include protecting vulnerable refugees from violence and meeting their basic needs.

Urban refugees are often invisible and difficult to identify and assist. The United States and the international community have recognized the contribution of those countries hosting refugees and supported their efforts, while encouraging them to keep their borders open to those fleeing conflict in Syria. A conference in Berlin held on October 28, 2014, focused on the further development of a broad regional partnership strategy to address the Syrian refugee situation and impact on host countries.

Overview of the International and U.S. Humanitarian Response

Iraq

National and international humanitarian efforts have been severely constrained in providing assistance and protection to IDPs and others affected by the conflict due to ongoing fighting. In August 2014, the United Nations declared a “Level 3 Emergency” for Iraq to help facilitate mobilization of resources for the humanitarian response.92 With the Level 3 declaration, U.N. and humanitarian partners continue to increase staffing and resources, and they are calling for guarantees of safe and unhindered access of humanitarian staff and in the distribution of relief supplies. As of October 10, 2014, 36 international actors, including the U.N. system, Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are involved in the humanitarian operation. There are also approximately 70 national NGOs registered with the NGO Coordination Committee in Iraq (NCCI) that are engaged in the relief effort.

The U.N. Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI) is facilitating the humanitarian response by the U.N. Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) and some partner organizations, as well as supporting the coordination efforts of the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA).93 UNOCHA launched a revised Strategic Response Plan (SRP) for Iraq in June, requesting $312.1 million in international funding to include humanitarian support for the significantly increased caseload of IDPs and a wider geographical focus.94 The SRP was revised in October 2014 and expanded to cover 2014 and 2015. It identifies total requirements of $2.2 billion for this period, of which $653.6 million in funding had been received as of early December. Additional bilateral and other contributions and pledges made outside the SRP total $231 million.

In August 2014, USAID deployed a Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) to help coordinate U.S. humanitarian efforts in responding to the needs of newly displaced populations. Total U.S. government humanitarian funding to Iraq in FY2014 and FY2015 (as of December 19, 2014) is more than $213.8 million, which includes U.S. airdrops in support of Iraqi humanitarian efforts.95
Systematic violations of human rights and international humanitarian law (IHL) have reportedly been widespread by all parties to the conflict, including IS. UNOCHA estimates that 20,000 civilians have been killed or injured across Iraq in 2014.96 The U.N. Secretary-General issued a statement on August 7, 2014, condemning the attacks in Iraq and the impact on vulnerable minority communities.97 The members of the U.N. Security Council also issued a statement about attacks directed against a civilian population and urged the parties to enable humanitarian access and the delivery of assistance.98 Amid increasing reports of killings and kidnappings and gross abuses of human rights, on October 31, the members of the Security Council again expressed outrage and stressed accountability, noting that some of these acts may constitute war crimes and crimes against humanity.99

Syria

The international humanitarian response is massive and complex and struggles to keep pace with urgent developments that have escalated well beyond anticipated needs and continue to do so. Nearly a year ago, in mid-December 2013, the United Nations launched two appeals—taken together its largest appeal in history—requesting $6.5 billion in contributions to meet the ongoing humanitarian needs in Syria and the region. In July 2014, the Syria Regional Response Plan reduced its budget requirements slightly downward to reflect changed refugee population planning figures. Subsequent developments, including fighting in areas such as Kobane along the Turkish border, have led to additional displacements into Turkey of more than 190,000 people and could impact again the planning figures. As of early January, together the appeals are 55% funded. Limited funding for the Syria crisis has had immediate impacts; on December 1, 2014, the World Food Program announced that it was suspending food assistance to more than 1.7 million Syrian refugees in Lebanon for budget reasons.

Syrian refugee camp on Turkish border. Photo by Voice of America News, Henry Ridgwell

The U.N. Security Council adopted two resolutions in 2014 aimed at increasing humanitarian access and aid delivery in Syria. Resolution 2139 (February 2014) demanded that parties “promptly allow rapid, safe and unhindered humanitarian access,” and Resolution 2165 (July 2014) authorized United Nations humanitarian agencies and their implementing partners to provide cross-border assistance with notification to (rather than consent of) the Syrian government. U.N. officials reporting under mechanisms established by the resolutions have identified some improvements in humanitarian access and aid delivery in Syria. However, U.N. officials also report that sufficient aid cannot be delivered in hard-to-reach areas, including areas besieged by government forces, some areas under opposition control, and eastern provinces under Islamic State control.100 In general, violence, insecurity, government and opposition interference, and resource shortfalls continue to hinder aid delivery.

The United States is the largest donor of humanitarian assistance and is part of the massive, international humanitarian operation in parts of Syria and in neighboring countries. Beginning in FY2012, through December 12, 2014, the United States has allocated more than $3 billion to meet humanitarian needs using existing funding from global humanitarian accounts and some reprogrammed funding. U.S. humanitarian policy is guided by concerns about humanitarian access and protection within Syria; the large refugee flows out of the country that strain the resources of neighboring countries (and could negatively impact the overall stability of the region); and a protracted and escalating humanitarian emergency.

The Administration’s original FY2015 budget request sought $1.1 billion in humanitarian assistance for Syria and the region. The President’s June 2014 request for FY2015 Overseas Contingency Operations for Defense also included a request for a $1.5 billion Syria Regional Stabilization Initiative (RSI), $1 billion of which it planned to use in part “to meet identified regional needs for areas contending with refugees.” However, it is not clear what portion of the RSI funding, if any, might have been used specifically for humanitarian responses rather than for broader stabilization purposes in host countries. Congress appropriated an additional $1.01 billion in Migration and Refugee Assistance and an additional $505 million in International Disaster Assistance above the President’s budget request, and said in the explanatory statement accompanying the FY2015 appropriations act that “a significant portion” of the funds “should address growing humanitarian needs in the Middle East.”

Authority for Use of Military Force and the War Powers Resolution101

President Barack Obama and Syria

The Obama Administration has asserted that the President has authority under existing constitutional and statutory authority to conduct the current military campaign against the Islamic State and other groups in Iraq and Syria. Some in Congress have questioned this assertion, and several Members of Congress have introduced legislation that would specifically address the President’s continued use of military force in this situation. On November 5, President Obama said he intended to engage Congress on a new authorization for the use of military force (AUMF) and said his goal is “to right- size and update whatever authorization Congress provides to suit the current fight, rather than previous fights.”102

The President’s uses of military force are subject to the provisions of the War Powers Resolution (WPR; P.L. 93-148). In cases where the President has introduced Armed Forces into active or imminent hostilities, the WPR requires termination of the use of U.S. Armed Forces and withdrawal of those forces 60 days after a WPR report is required, unless Congress (1) has declared war or authorized the action; (2) has extended the 60-day period by law; or (3) cannot meet due to armed attack. The President can extend the deadline for withdrawal for 30 days if he certifies that it is needed to affect a safe withdrawal.

The Obama Administration has stated that two enacted authorizations for use of military force authorize ongoing U.S. military strikes against the Islamic State and other groups in Iraq and Syria:103

• The 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (P.L. 107-40) targets those who perpetrated and supported the 9/11 terrorist attacks, identified as Al Qaeda and the Taliban. The executive branch has interpreted this authorization to include targeting forces that are co-belligerent with these two groups, so-called “associated forces.” The Islamic State organization, whose antecedents had links to Al Qaeda, might fall within the definition of an associated force, but a public split between the Islamic State and Al Qaeda in early 2014 calls this association into question. The Obama Administration has stated that the Islamic State’s long ties to Al Qaeda, its continuing connection to and support from elements within Al Qaeda, and the similarity of its brutal tactics and its desire to establish an Islamic caliphate to those of Al Qaeda make the Islamic State a lawful target under the 2001 AUMF.104 The President’s notifications to Congress of military operations against IS forces and the Khorasan Group of Al Qaeda both state that the 2001 AUMF authorizes such actions.105 Alternatively, it has been argued recently that the Islamic State might be considered not as an associated force of Al Qaeda but instead as a former part of Al Qaeda that has now splintered from the original group.106 Under this interpretation, the Islamic State would fall among the original targets of the 2001 AUMF, and its associated forces could also be targeted, potentially expanding the number of lawfully targeted co- belligerent groups operating in Iraq, Syria, or elsewhere.
• The 2002 Authorization for Use of Military Force against Iraq (P.L. 107- 243) authorizes force in part to “defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq.” The original authorization focused on the former Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein and the destruction of suspected weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. The successes of Islamic State–led forces in Iraq, however, and their ties to former supporters of the Hussein regime, might be seen as falling within the broad 2002 AUMF authority to counter the “threat posed by Iraq.” The Obama Administration, however, might consider 2002 AUMF authority to extend to countering threats to Iraq as well, whether those threats exist within Iraq or are located elsewhere. In the President’s September 23, 2014, notification to Congress concerning airstrikes against IS forces in Iraq and Syria, the President cited the 2002 AUMF alongside the 2001 AUMF as authorizing strikes against IS forces. Such strikes are described largely in the context of assisting Iraqi forces and “at the request of the Government of Iraq.”107

Although the President has stated that he possesses 2001 and 2002 AUMF authority for his decision to conduct recent and future military actions against the Islamic State and other groups in Iraq and Syria, Congress could determine that these authorizations do not apply. Many observers and Members have argued that the 2001 and 2002 AUMFs are outdated and that their authorities no longer apply to the current challenges posed both by the Islamic State and by the global threat to the United States from terrorism in general.

If Congress determines that the existing AUMFs do not apply, it might assert that the President, pursuant to the War Powers Resolution, must (1) withdraw U.S. Armed Forces from and (2) terminate hostilities in Iraq and Syria within 60 days from the date when congressional notification of such actions was required unless Congress enacts a new AUMF. Several Members of Congress have called for a new AUMF specifically targeting the Islamic State and other groups in Iraq, Syria, and elsewhere, and a number of legislative proposals were introduced in September 2014.108

December 2014 Senate Foreign Relations Activities

In December 2014, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee conducted a hearing and considered legislation concerning a new authorization for use of military force against the Islamic State. After Senator Rand Paul reportedly intended to propose an amendment to S. 2946 prior to the committee’s vote on that bill that would have declared a state of war between the United States and the Islamic State, the committee decided to consider an IS AUMF proposed by Committee Chairman Robert Menendez. Prior to the committee’s markup of the proposal on December 11, the committee held a hearing on December 9 with Secretary of State John Kerry to discuss the Obama Administration’s views on enactment of a new IS AUMF.

Senator Menendez’s IS AUMF proposal, as amended and reported favorably out of committee on December 13 (S.J.Res. 47), would authorize the use of U.S. Armed Forces against the Islamic State and “associated persons or forces,” defined as “individuals and organizations fighting for or on behalf of the Islamic State … or a closely-related successor entity…. ” The authorization would prohibit “ground combat operations” except for the rescue or protection of U.S. Armed Forces or U.S. citizens, intelligence gathering, enabling kinetic strikes, operational planning, and providing assistance to forces fighting the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. The AUMF would repeal the 2002 AUMF and sunset the authorization in the 2001 AUMF three years after enactment of S.J.Res. 47. It states that the authority contained in the AUMF supersedes any previous authority that could apply to the use of force against the Islamic State. The AUMF’s authority would terminate three years after enactment, “unless reauthorized.”

At the hearing, Secretary Kerry reiterated President Obama’s earlier-stated position that the Administration supports enactment of a new AUMF targeting the Islamic State, agreeing with the goal of providing specific and limited authority to conduct operations against this organization and its associated forces. The Secretary informed the committee that the Administration supports the three-year sunset of the authorization contained in Senator Menendez’s proposal, “subject to provisions for extension” of that authorization. He stated the Administration’s view, however, that such authority “should give the President the clear mandate and flexibility he needs to successfully prosecute the armed conflict against [the Islamic State]…. ” The Administration, according to Secretary Kerry, therefore opposes inclusion of a limitation on the use of ground combat forces, and any geographic restriction limiting operations to Iraq and Syria. With regard to the definition of “associated persons or forces” in Senator Menendez’s proposed IS AUMF, Secretary Kerry stated that the Administration would prefer the definition be based on those “fighting alongside” the Islamic State, rather than the current language, which he stated might require a determination of “ideological association or other kind of affiliation.”109

With regard to the sunset provisions in Senator Menendez’s proposal, automatically terminating both the IS-specific authorization as well as the authorization in the 2001 AUMF after three years, there is concern that Congress placing time limitations on the campaigns against the Islamic State, as well as Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups targeted under the 2001 AUMF, would send the wrong message to such targeted groups and the world about U.S. resolve to defeat these groups. On the other hand, a sunset on authority to use military force could be utilized to ensure that the IS and 2001 AUMF authorizations are not interpreted to authorize the use of military force in perpetuity, and in a manner that some perceive as outside the scope and intent of the original authorizations. Given the Obama Administration’s continuing reliance on that authorization to conduct the current campaign against the Islamic State, for example, leaving the 2001 AUMF in place without amendment might be a continuing source of confusion and contention concerning presidential authority to use military force against the Islamic State, and in Iraq, Syria, and the Middle East/North Africa region in general. In any case, some argue, automatic terminations of authority might force Congress to reconsider previous AUMFs and their provisions in light of changed circumstances, amending and reauthorizing as Congress sees necessary.

In considering any proposals to limit the authority of an IS AUMF by prohibiting the use of ground forces or constraining operations to a certain geographic area, Congress must weigh competing interests. The limitation on the use of ground forces or prohibiting ground combat operations might, as some argue, significantly restrict the ability of the President and U.S. military leadership to prosecute conflict against the Islamic State in the manner they feel is most effective. Congress might consider such restriction acceptable, however, if it is determined to avoid the involvement of the U.S. Armed Forces in another large-scale ground conflict following so closely upon the end of two such conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.

A geographic limitation might hinder the President’s ability to strike IS and associated forces in countries other than Iraq and Syria, despite these forces’ proven ability to cross state borders when it suits their purposes. In addition, as more groups pledge to fight alongside the Islamic State in countries such as Egypt, Libya, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen, it could be reasonably expected that the President would determine U.S. military operations should expand outside Iraq and Syria in the future. Congress, however, might wish to include such a limitation to prevent a similar geographic expansion of military operations to the President’s expansion under the 2001 AUMF’s authority to several countries other than Afghanistan.

It can be argued that even if such limitations are perceived later to have a deleterious effect on the U.S. campaign against the Islamic State, either limitation could be removed or modified through subsequent legislative action if the need arises. Such limitations and an overall lack of flexibility in any IS AUMF, however, might be difficult to change legislatively if Members of Congress cannot agree to changes; neither the 2001 nor 2002 AUMF has been amended, for example, despite the stated need for amendments by observers and Members over the lifespan of those two measures.

Ground Combat Deployments?

President Obama has repeatedly ruled out deploying U.S. ground combat troops in Iraq or Syria.110 He has stated that intervention by U.S. combat troops is not capable of fixing the underlying political problems that caused the insurrection. However, comments by General Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, at a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on September 14, 2014, and since have presented a potentially more complex picture on this issue.111 At the hearing and in subsequent press interviews, General Dempsey indicated that he might recommend that U.S. advisers in Iraq work directly with Iraqi and peshmerga forces on the battlefield, for example if there were a decision to try to recapture Mosul from Islamic State forces. Still, General Dempsey and other Administration officials have distinguished such “close combat advisory” missions from the introduction of U.S. combat units that would conduct operations against Islamic State forces.

President Obama has not indicated whether he would approve such a close combat advisory recommendation, were it to be put forward. Debate outside the Administration centers on the potential efficacy of military operations without U.S. ground forces and larger questions about what circumstances might require the introduction of such forces in the future.

Maintaining and Deepening Coalition Support

Past U.S. efforts in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria suggest that U.S. policy makers may face challenges maintaining unity of purpose among coalition members, sustaining coalition material and financial contributions over time, and managing the risks and costs to the United States associated with limited or conditional commitments by coalition members or sudden shifts in coalition membership. Potential partners’ calculations about the costs and benefits of participating in coalition efforts might be affected by their views on the urgency of acting directly, the soundness of U.S. strategy, the level of U.S. commitment, and potential progress toward political solutions that are more inclusive of Sunni Arabs or less conducive to their strategic goals.

The subset of the coalition that is attempting to coordinate military operations in Iraq and Syria (the United States, some GCC states, Jordan, the United Kingdom, France, and Australia) appears to face significant challenges. Past attempts at coordination regarding Syria’s civil war have exposed rifts among regional countries, prompting situations in which the common goal of supporting the Syrian opposition was not enough to overcome other, competing priorities among ostensibly partner states.112 Relations between Iraq’s government and the Sunni Arab Gulf states have been strained in the post-Saddam Hussein period, in part because Iraq’s government has been dominated by Shiite factions politically close to Iran and seen as excluding Sunnis. The shift from the leadership of former Prime Minister Maliki to current Prime Minister Abbadi may not be sufficient to resolve related concerns.

As coalition militaries carry out strikes in Iraq and Syria, such strikes may be seen by the populations of Gulf countries as serving the interests of Iran or further empowering Shiite elements in Iraq. Iraqi government leaders, like their Syrian counterparts, may question the motives of Sunni Arab coalition members, some of whom reportedly have provided support to armed Sunni opposition groups in Syria. In Syria, Sunni Arab coalition partners might disagree on priorities for bolstering various Syrian forces against the Islamic State and the effect such efforts may have on the relative strength of the Asad regime and its supporters (Iran, Hezbollah, Russia).

Defining the Way Forward in Syria

President Obama has stated that U.S. engagement in Syria will remain focused “narrowly” on assisting Syrians in combatting the Islamic State, while continuing “to look for opportunities” to support a political resolution to Syria’s conflict.113 Some Syrian political and military opposition forces appear to resent such a narrow focus and some have indicated they may insist on broader support for their anti-Asad goals as a condition of working with the U.S.-backed coalition against the Islamic State. These parties also question why the United States and coalition partners are willing to act militarily to halt Islamic State atrocities but not protect Syrian civilians from attacks by government forces or opposition groups. On November 5, President Obama reiterated that:114

Our focus in Syria is not to solve the entire Syria situation, but, rather, to isolate the areas in which ISIL can operate.

… Now, there is a specific issue about trying to get a moderate opposition in Syria that can serve as a partner with us on the ground. That’s always been the hardest piece of—piece of business to get done.

…what we’re trying to do is to find a core group that we can work with, that we have confidence in, that we’ve vetted, that can help in regaining territory from ISIL and then ultimately serve as a responsible party to sit at the table in eventual political negotiations that are probably some ways off in the future.

…Remember, our first focus here is to drive ISIL out of Iraq. And what we’re doing in Syria is, first and foremost, in service of reducing ISIL’s capacity to resupply and send troops and then run back in over the Syrian border, to eventually reestablish a border between Iraq and Syria so that slowly Iraq regains control of its security and its territory. That is our number one mission. That is our number one focus.

In this context, U.S. strikes against Islamic State targets and other terrorist groups in Syria are illuminating several dilemmas faced by the Administration. On one hand, Syrian opposition forces who have been fighting the Islamic State welcome U.S. and coalition assistance in their campaign, but question why the United States does not take military action against the Asad government or take more robust action to degrade IS capabilities in Syria. The Administration hopes to continue to pressure the Asad government into negotiating with opposition groups and fulfilling its pledges with regard to chemical weapons. However, U.S. officials appear to be managing concerns that a full scale degradation of Islamic State forces in Syria could have unintended consequences. Specifically, U.S. officials may be concerned that a more aggressive campaign against the Islamic State may take military pressure off the Asad regime or create opportunities for other extremist groups such as the Al Qaeda-affiliated Jabhat al Nusra to advance.

Some U.S. critics of the Obama Administration’s approach to the conflict and terrorism threats in Syria argue that current U.S. strategy lacks effective partners willing or able to advance against Islamic State and/or Al Qaeda-affiliate-held territory on the ground. These critics suggest the United States should either abandon its efforts to support a vetted partner force in Syria or drastically expand the size and scope of those efforts to create a more formidable partner force. Others argue that U.S. strategy is built on faulty assumptions or priorities because it is not based on an inherently confrontational posture toward the regime of President Asad. These critics argue that Asad’s departure or demise is the key to resolving the underlying conflict that has created opportunity for extremists to thrive. Still other critics assert that achieving stated Administration objectives will likely require U.S. or other ground combat troops or an expansion of the planned “train and equip” program for vetted Syrians to focus more aggressively on pressuring Asad to accept a negotiated solution.

For the moment, the Administration does not appear to view resolving the underlying conflict in Syria as its top priority and is taking steps in Syria designed to mitigate terrorism threats and advance U.S. goals for stabilizing Iraq. It remains to be seen whether or not this approach will succeed. It could so alienate potential partners in Syria that when the United States decides to give priority to the stabilization of Syria it will find itself bereft of local allies, or will confront stronger Islamist groups and/or an empowered Syrian government.

Possible Questions for Congressional Consideration115

What are overall U.S. priorities in the strategy against the Islamic State organization, and how are these priorities shaping the U.S. response?

What are the strengths and weaknesses of the strategy against the Islamic State? What successes and failures of the strategy can you point to, to date? What factors could hinder the implementation or effectiveness of the strategy?

With respect to Iraq, is it realistic and worthwhile for U.S. officials and lawmakers to act in expectation that Iraq’s government can resolve or manage the country’s sectarian, ethnic, and regional differences?

Please assess the range of Iraqi Sunni views of the Islamic State. With respect to Iraq, what concrete steps has Prime Minister Haydar al-Abbadi taken to reduce Sunni Arab support for the Islamic State? How have jihadist and tribal figures responded to the Islamic State’s declaration of a caliphate in areas under its control?

With respect to Syria, to what extent, if any, is the long-term success of U.S. strategy dependent on any changes in the composition of the Syrian government? How have various Syrian forces reacted to U.S. and coalition airstrikes since September 2014? How has the Syrian government responded, if at all? How have U.S. actions helped or hurt the Asad government since that time?

How, if at all, should the effort against the Islamic State shape congressional consideration of pending authorization and appropriations legislation for defense and foreign assistance?
To what extent do the Islamic State’s gains reflect its organizational capabilities? To what extent do these gains reflect the weaknesses, divisions, or limitations of its adversaries?

To what extent and how is U.S. strategy assisting locally organized forces in areas under Islamic State control, or in areas threatened by the Islamic State, who may effectively resist or disrupt the group’s operations?

To what extent do the interests of Iran and the United States conflict or coincide, with respect to the Islamic State issue? To what extent, if any, do efforts by Iran to support Iraq’s government and Shiite militia forces contradict or support those of the United States?

Please answer with respect to Iran’s policy of supporting the Asad regime in Syria?

What are the connections, if any, between this crisis and other key regional issues, such as international diplomacy on Iran’s nuclear program?

To what extent will the governments of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey support anti-Islamic State entities in areas adjacent to their territory?

What might be the broader strategic implications of increased U.S. assistance to the Iraqi government? What has been the reaction of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states to increased U.S. support for the Iraqi government, which the Gulf leaders assert is still aligned with Iran? How has Iran responded, if at all?

How are Kurdish efforts to control Kirkuk and its energy resources likely to affect the security situation in that area generally and in Iraq specifically? What is the likelihood that the Kurds will implement a formal secession from Iraq in the near future? How should these considerations affect U.S. policy toward the KRG?

Are changes to U.S. global counterterrorism policies and practices necessary in light of developments related to the Islamic State?
What are the humanitarian implications of the crisis? Please discuss the situation for Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), particularly those displaced in the last several months. What are the most pressing assistance needs and priorities?

What are the challenges for an effective humanitarian response by the international community? How would you assess the international humanitarian operation so far? What action is the U.S. government taking in support of international humanitarian efforts?

Timeline:The Roots of the Islamic State. Source: CRS.

*About the authors:
Kenneth Katzman, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

Christopher M. Blanchard, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

Carla E. Humud, Analyst in Middle Eastern and African Affairs

Rhoda Margesson, Specialist in International Humanitarian Policy

Matthew C. Weed, Analyst in Foreign Policy Legislation

Source:
Congressional Research Service Reports (PDF) released by US State Department.

Notes:
1 Remarks at the Brookings Institution by NCTC Director Matthew G. Olsen, September 3, 2014.
2 OSC Report GMP20130409405003, “ISI Emir Declares ISI, Al-Nusrah Front: ‘Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant,’” translated from Ansar al Mujahideen Network, April 9, 2013.
3 OSC Report GMP20120721586002, “Islamic State of Iraq Amir Calls on Sunni Tribes to ‘Repent,’” July 21, 2012.
4 OSC Report TRR2014011980831299, “Al-Furqan Establishment Releases Audio Statement by ISIL Emir
Condemning ‘War’ Against Group,” translated from Al Minbar al I’lami Jihadist Forum, January 19, 2014.
5 Al Baghdadi reportedly was arrested and detained by U.S. forces in Iraq.
6 OSC Report TRN2014051234500562, “Al-Furqan Releases ISIL Al-Adnani’s Message Criticizing Al-Zawahiri, Refusing to Leave Syria,” Twitter, May 11-12, 2014.
7 Michael Knights in “Iraq’s Dire Situation,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, June 17, 2014.
8 Tim Arango, “Uneasy Alliance Gives Insurgents an Edge in Iraq,” New York Times, June 19, 2014.
9 “Unlikely Allies Aid Militants in Iraq,” Wall Street Journal, June 16, 2014.
10 Mitchell Prothero, “Iraqi Army Remains on Defensive as Extent of June Debacle Becomes Clearer,” McLatchey Wire Service, July 14, 2014.
11 Alissa Rubin, “ISIS Expels Last Iraqi Christians from Mosul,” New York Times, July 19, 2014.
12 Author conversations with expert on the Iraqi Kurds, June-August 2014.
13 For more information on the Kurds and the potential for the Iraqi Kurds to declare independence, see CRS Insight IN10105, The Kurds and Possible Iraqi Kurdish Independence, by Jim Zanotti and Kenneth Katzman.
14 Ishaan Tharoor, “Who Are the Yazidis?” Washington Post, August 7, 2014.
15 UNOCHA, “Iraq: OCHA Flash Update: Iraq Crisis—Significant Displacement from Sinjar,” No. 2, August 4, 2014;
Assessment Capacities Project, “Humanitarian Implications of Violence in Northern and Central Iraq,” August 7, 2014.
16 UNAMI, Public Information Office, “UN Gravely Concerned About Situation in Northern Iraq; Calls for Urgent Response,” August 7, 2014.
17 Department of Defense Press Briefing by Rear Admiral John Kirby, January 6, 2014.
18 “Kerry Says U.S. Wants Iraqis to Find Inclusive Leadership,” Reuters, June 22, 2014.
19 Prepared by Carla Humud, Analyst in Middle Eastern and African Affairs. For more information see CRS Report RL33487, Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response, coordinated by Christopher M. Blanchard.
20 “Syria War Fueling Attacks by al Qaeda in Iraq, Officials Say,” New York Times, August 15, 2013.
21 “Sunni Fighters Gain as They Battle 2 Governments, and Other Rebels,” New York Times, June 11, 2014.
22 U.S. Central Command News Release #20141105, “U.S. Military Forces Conduct Airstrikes Against Khorasan Group Terrorist Network in Syria, November 6, 2014.
23 For more information on dynamics involving the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party (or PYD, whose militia is known as the YPG), which has spearheaded Kobane’s defense, along with the Islamic State, Turkey, and Iraqi Kurds, see CRS Report IN10164, Turkey-U.S. Cooperation Against the “Islamic State”: A Unique Dynamic?, by Jim Zanotti.
24 “Security Council hears plan to clear Syria of chemical weapons,” CNN, November 5, 2014.
25 “Syria’s Allies Are Stretched by Widening War,” Wall Street Journal, July 14, 2014; “Resistance Emerges as ISIS Consolidates in Deir az Zour,” July 15, 2014.
26 Institute for the Study of War, “ISIS Advances in Deir ez Zour,” July 5, 2014.
27 OSC Report EUR2014090645329482, September 6, 2014.
28 OSC Report EUR2014080850721279, August 8, 2014
29 White House Office of the Press Secretary, “Statement by the President on ISIL,” September 10, 2014.
30 The website of the Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL identifies five “lines of effort” guiding the coalition’s efforts: (1) Providing military support to our partners; (2) Impeding the flow of foreign fighters; (3) Stopping ISIL’s financing and funding; (4) Addressing humanitarian crises in the region; and (5)Exposing ISIL’s true nature.
31 In Iraq, U.S.-led airstrikes halted the Islamic State advance on Irbil and enabled the Kurdish peshmerga and Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) to safely evacuate most of the Yazidi internally displaced persons (IDPs) from Sinjar Mountain. Additional strikes helped peshmerga and ISF forces drive Islamic State fighters from Mosul Dam, which the Islamic State purportedly could have used to flood large parts of Iraq. In September, U.S. airstrikes facilitated efforts by the ISF and Shiite militias to break an Islamic State siege of the Shiite Turkmen-inhabited town of Amerli. DOD News release, “Obama Praises Success of Humanitarian Operations in Iraq,” August 14, 2014.
32 Remarks by President Obama After Meeting with Chiefs of Defense, Joint Base Andrews, October 14, 2014.
33 For example, see testimony of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey, Senate Armed Services Committee. “Hearing on the U.S. Policy Towards Iraq, Syria, and ISIL,” September 14, 2014.
34 Of the roughly 1,600 U.S. military personnel in Iraq as of November, more than 700 were advisers that are assessing the ISF and gathering intelligence on the Islamic State, working out of “Joint Operations Centers” in Baghdad (U.S.- ISF) and Irbil (U.S.-Peshmerga). Approximately 800 military personnel have been sent to help secure the U.S. Embassy and other U.S. facilities in Baghdad and Irbil; to protect evacuation routes such as the international airport in Baghdad; and to operate surveillance aircraft.
35 Department of Defense (DOD) Press Briefing by Rear Admiral John Kirby, December 19, 2014.
36 DOD Press Briefing by Rear Admiral John Kirby, January 6, 2014; and, Paul McLeary, “U.S. troops under mortar fire in Iraq,” January 5, 2015.
37 DOD Press Briefing by Lieutenant General James Terry, commander, CJTF-Operation Inherent Resolve, December 18, 2014.
38 Eric Schmitt and Michael Gordon, “U.S. Sees Risks in Assisting a Compromised Iraqi Force,” New York Times, July 14, 2014.
39 Statement by Rear Admiral John Kirby on the Authorization to Deploy Additional Forces to Iraq, Release No: NR- 562-14, November 7, 2014.
40 Denmark pledged to supply 120 trainers on November 7.
41 Michael Gordon and Eric Schmitt. “Iraqis Prepare ISIS Offensive, With U.S. Help,” New York Times, November 3, 2014.
42 Gen. Dempsey told the House Armed Services Committee on November 13, “I’m not predicting, at this point, that I would recommend that those [Iraqi] forces in Mosul and along the border would need to be accompanied by U.S. forces, but we’re certainly considering it.”
43 Office of Management and Budget, memorandum from Shaun Donovan, Director of OMB, November 10, 2014, p12.
44 That channel is a means of adapting to U.S. law and policy that requires all U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS, run by the Defense Department) to be provided to a country’s central government, and not to sub-national forces. Craig Whitlock and Greg Jaffe, “U.S. Directly Arms Kurdish Forces,” Washington Post, August 12, 2014.
45 The peshmerga, with U.S. assistance, have retransferred some weapons and ammunition to Syrian Kurdish forces battling Islamic State fighters in Syria. U.S. Central Command news release. “U.S. Resupplies Kurdish Forces Fighting ISIL Near Kobani.” October 20, 2014.
46 300,000 from the Kirkuk fields now controlled by the KRG and 250,000 barrels from fields in the KRG itself. It appears that the KRG would be able to itself export any amounts over the 250,000 barrels per day that it is required, under the December deal, to transfer to Baghdad’s control.
47 Ibid.
48 Tim Arango. “Iraq Government Reaches Accord with the Kurds.” New York Times, December 3, 2014.
49 Press briefing by the Director of Operations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Lt. Gen. William Mayville. August 11, 2014.
50 Gopal Ratnam, “Washington wants NATO allies to help retrain the Iraqi military,” Foreign Policy, October 16, 2014.
51 Press Briefing by Rear Admiral John Kirby on the Authorization to Deploy Additional Forces to Iraq, November 7, 2014.
52 White House Office of the Press Secretary, “Statement by the President on ISIL,” September 10, 2014.
53 The FY2015 continuing resolution (H.J.Res. 124, P.L. 113-164) authorizes the Department of Defense through December 11, 2014, or until the passage of a FY2015 defense authorization act to provide overt assistance, including training, equipment, supplies, and sustainment, to vetted members of the Syrian opposition and other vetted Syrians for select purposes. For more on this program and related legislation, see CRS Report R43727, Proposed Train and Equip Authorities for Syria: In Brief, by Christopher M. Blanchard and Amy Belasco.
54 Under Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David Cohen, Remarks at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 23, 2014.
55 Department of Defense Press Briefing by Rear Adm. Kirby in the Pentagon Briefing Room, September 30, 2014, and October 3, 2014.
56 International Energy Agency, Oil Market Report, October 14, 2014.
57 U.S. Treasury Department, Treasury Designates Twelve Foreign Terrorist Fighter Facilitators, September 24, 2014.
58 See White House, Fact Sheet: Comprehensive U.S. Government Approach to Foreign Terrorist Fighters in Syria and the Broader Region, September 24, 2014.
59 State Department Spokesperson Jen Psaki, Daily Press Briefing, Washington, D.C., August 27, 2014.
60 Ambassador Robert Bradtke, State Department Bureau of Counterterrorism Senior Advisor for Partner Engagement on Syria Foreign Fighters, Testimony before House Foreign Affairs Subcommittees on Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Trade, and the Middle East and North Africa, December 2, 2014.
61 Ibid.
62 DOD News release, “Obama Praises Success of Humanitarian Operations in Iraq,” August 14, 2014.
63 President Obama’s comments on CBS “Face the Nation,” as quoted in Eric Schmitt. “Obstacles Limit Targets and Pace of Strikes on ISIS,” New York Times, November 10, 2014.
64 Kirk Semple and Eric Schmitt. “Islamic State Keeps Up Pressure Near Baghdad as Iraqi Troops Stumble,” New York Times, October 18, 2014.
65 Eric Schmitt and Michael Gordon, “U.S. Sees Risks in Assisting a Compromised Iraqi Force,” New York Times, July 14, 2014.
66 For a summary of significant foreign contributions to the effort against the Islamic State, see Justine Drennan. “Who Has Contributed the Most in the Coalition Against the Islamic State.” Foreign Policy, October 14, 2014. http://complex.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2014/10/14/ whos_contributed_the_most_in_the_coalition_against_the_islamic_state?wp_login_redirect=0
67 In February 2012, the Administration helped organize the Friends of Syria Group, a coalition of Western and regional countries that met periodically to discuss ways to support the Syrian opposition, increase pressure on the Asad government, and encourage a negotiated settlement between the two sides. The group last met in Saudi Arabia in late August. The Friends of Syria “Core Group,” also known as the London 11, includes the United States, Egypt, France, Germany, Italy, Jordan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the UAE, and the United Kingdom.
68 Sunni Arab Gulf states have faced internal divisions—Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and UAE in March 2014 withdrew their ambassadors from Qatar, accusing Doha of pursuing policies at odds with other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states. At a meeting of the GCC Foreign Ministers Council in late August 2014, some officials claimed to have made progress in resolving outstanding issues among member states. See “Saudi, UAE and Bahrain Envoys’ Return ‘At Any Time,’” Gulf Times, August 31, 2014.
69 As of December 3, coalition members attending a joint strategy meeting included: Republic of Albania, Hungary, Sultanate of Oman, Australia, Republic of Iceland, Republic of Poland, Republic of Austria, Republic of Iraq, Portuguese Republic, Kingdom of Bahrain, Ireland, State of Qatar, Belgium, Italian Republic, Republic of Korea, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Japan, Romania, Republic of Bulgaria, Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Canada, Republic of Kosovo, Republic of Serbia, Republic of Croatia, State of Kuwait, Republic of Singapore, Republic of Cyprus, Republic of Latvia, Slovak Republic, Czech Republic, Republic of Lebanon, Republic of Slovenia, Denmark, Republic of Lithuania, Federal Government of Somalia, Arab Republic of Egypt, Luxembourg, Spain, Republic of Estonia, Macedonia, Sweden, European Union, Moldova, Taiwan, Republic of Finland, Montenegro, Republic of Turkey, French Republic, Morocco, United Arab Emirates, Georgia, Kingdom of the Netherlands, Ukraine, Federal Republic of Germany, New Zealand, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Hellenic Republic (Greece), Norway, and the United States of America.
70 For a summary of significant foreign contributions to the effort against the Islamic State, see Justine Drennan. “Who Has Contributed the Most in the Coalition Against the Islamic State.” Foreign Policy, October 14, 2014.
71 Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Wales, NATO Press Release (2014) 120, September 5, 2014.
72 The release reportedly occurred in exchange for Turkey’s release of 180 Islamic State detainees.
73 Murat Yetkin, “Turkey joins anti-ISIL coalition, opens İncirlik for logistics ops,” Hurriyet Daily News Online, September 10, 2014.
74 For a detailed analysis of Turkey’s policy and actions on the Islamic State issues, see CRS Report IN10164, Turkey- U.S. Cooperation Against the “Islamic State”: A Unique Dynamic?, by Jim Zanotti.
75 In February 2012, the Administration helped organize the Friends of Syria Group, a coalition of Western and regional countries that met periodically to discuss ways to support the Syrian opposition, increase pressure on the Asad government, and encourage a negotiated settlement between the two sides. The Friends of Syria “Core Group,” also known as “the London 11,” includes the United States, Egypt, France, Germany, Italy, Jordan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the UAE, and the United Kingdom. Arab members of the group met in Saudi Arabia in August 2014.
76 Prepared by Derek Mix, Analyst in European Affairs.
77 Sam Jones, “NATO States to Form Military Coalition to Fight ISIS,” Financial Times, September 5, 2014.
78 Julian Hale, “NATO Weights Training Mission to Iraq,” Defense News, September 12, 2014.
79 “Hollande Visits Iraq Ahead of Paris Conference on Fighting Islamic State,” RFI, September 12, 2014; Noah Barkin, “Defending Arming of Kurds, Merkel Calls Islamic State a Threat to Europe,” Reuters, September 1, 2014; and UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, “Iraq: UK Government Response,” September 13, 2014.
80 Babak Dehghanpisheh, “Iran Dramatically Shifts Iraq Policy to Confront Islamic State,” Reuters, September 2, 2014.
81 Ibid.
82 Michael Singh. “What Obama’s Letter to Khamenei Says About U.S. Policy Toward Iran,” Wall Street Journal, November 10, 2014.
83 “Iran News Agency Reports Death of Iranian Pilot in Iraq,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, July 5, 2014. 84 Prepared by Rhoda Margesson, Specialist in International Humanitarian Policy.
85 U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees Antonio Guterres, “Faced with ‘mega-crisis’, U.N. warns of refugee suffering and security threats,” PBS News Hour, November 20, 2014.
86 UNOCHA, Iraq Crisis, Situation Report No. 22 (November 22 – 28, 2014.) In addition, there are reportedly more than 1.1 million Iraqis who were earlier displaced. Many had sought refuge in Syria between 2003 and 2011 and are thought to remain displaced. According to the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, there are also over 400,000 Iraqi refugees living in other countries (October 29, 2014.)
87 In KR-I 18 camps have been established or are in the process of being completed out of a planned 26 camps. As of late October, 2014, Iraq is hosting more than 230,000 refugees from Syria, of which 209,000 are in the Kurdistan region and much smaller numbers are dispersed elsewhere in Iraq, including approximately 4,500 in Anbar province.
88 Assessment Capacities Project, “Humanitarian Implications of Violence in Northern and Central Iraq,” September 4, 2014.
89 UNOCHA, “Iraq Crisis: Situation Report No. 18,” October 25-31, 2014.
90 UNOCHA, Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Valerie Amos, Security Council Briefing on Syria, November 25, 2014.
91 Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, “Rule of Terror: Living Under ISIS in Syria,” November 14, 2014
92 U.N. Assistance Mission for Iraq, Press Release, “U.N. Declares a ‘Level 3 Emergency’ for Iraq to Ensure More Effective Humanitarian Response,” August 13, 2014.
93 On December 2, 2014, the U.N. Secretary-General appointed Lisa Grande of the United States as Deputy Special Representative of UNAMI. She will also serve as the U.N. Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq.
94 A subset of the SRP for Iraq, “Iraq: Immediate Response Plan (IRP) for the IDP Crisis in the KR-I: 15 September – 15 November 2014) represented a joint effort by the Kurdistan Regional Government and U.N. humanitarian agencies to address urgent humanitarian response priorities ahead of the winter season in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. According to UNOCHA, as of November 21, the Kurdistan Regional Government has proposed that a similar operational plan with information about needs and shortfalls through to March 2015, IRP2, be developed.
95 USAID, “Iraq—Complex Emergency,” Fact Sheet #3, Fiscal Year (FY) 2015, December 19, 2014. 96 UNOCHA, 2014/2015 Iraq Strategic Response Plan, October 2014.
97 United Nations, New York, “Statement Attributable to the Spokesman for the Secretary-General on Attacks on Yezidis and Other Minority Groups in Iraq,” August 7, 2014.
98 U.N. Security Council, Press Statement on Iraq, SC/11515, IK/683, August 7, 2014.
99 U.N. Security Council, Press Statement on Iraq, SC/11625, IK/694, October 31, 2014.
100 Ibid.
101 Prepared by Matthew Weed, Analyst in Foreign Policy Legislation.
102 President Barack Obama, Press Conference, November 5, 2014.
103 In his previous notifications to Congress of deployments and airstrikes against the Islamic State, however, the President stated that he was taking military action based upon his powers as commander in chief and chief executive under Article II of the Constitution.
104 See White House, Press Briefing by Press Secretary Josh Earnest, September 11, 2014.
105 Letter from President Barack Obama to Speaker of the House of Representatives and President Pro Tempore of the Senate (War Powers Resolution Regarding Iraq), September 23, 2014, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/ 2014/09/23/letter-president-war-powers-resolution-regarding-iraq; Letter from President Barack Obama to Speaker of the House of Representatives and President Pro Tempore of the Senate (War Powers Resolution Regarding Syria), September 23, 2014, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/23/letter-president-war-powers-resolution- regarding-syria.
106 See Marty Lederman, “Tentative First Reactions to the 2001 AUMF Theory [updated],” Just Security, September 11, 2014, at http://justsecurity.org/14804/first-reactions-2001-aumf-theory/.
107 See Letter from President Barack Obama to Speaker of the House of Representatives and President Pro Tempore of the Senate (War Powers Resolution Regarding Iraq).
108 For a comparison of these proposals, see CRS Report R43760, A New Authorization for Use of Military Force Against the Islamic State: Comparison of Proposals in Brief, by Matthew C. Weed.
109 Testimony of Secretary of State John Kerry, U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Authorization For The Use of Military Force Against ISIL , 113th Cong., 2nd sess., December 11, 2014.
110 White House, op. cit.
111 Senate Armed Services Committee. “Hearing on the U.S. Policy Towards Iraq, Syria, and ISIL,” September 14, 2014.
112 Sunni Arab Gulf states have faced divisions among themselves—Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and UAE in March 2014 withdrew their ambassadors from Qatar, accusing Doha of pursuing policies at odds with other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states. At a meeting of the GCC Foreign Ministers Council in late August 2014, some officials claimed to have made progress in resolving outstanding issues among member states. See “Saudi, UAE and Bahrain Envoys’ Return ‘At Any Time,’” Gulf Times, August 31, 2014.
113 The President said, “our attitude towards Asad continues to be that you know, through his actions, through using chemical weapons on his own people, dropping barrel bombs that killed innocent children that he—he has foregone legitimacy. But when it comes to our policy and the coalition that we’re putting together, our focus specifically is on ISIL. It’s narrowly on ISIL.” President Obama interview with NBC News Meet the Press, September 6, 2014.
114 President Barack Obama, News Conference, November 5, 2014.
115 Prepared by Christopher Blanchard and Jim Zanotti, Specialists in Middle Eastern Affairs.

The post The ‘Islamic State’ Crisis And US Policy – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Kalinga Seneviratne*

When President Mahinda Rajapakse was toppled by a “peoples’ power” anti-corruption vote on January 8 there were messages from Western leaders and op-eds in newspapers in London, New York, Toronto and Oslo welcoming the success of another “regime change” campaign to overthrow a leader who was hostile to the West and cuddling with the Chinese.

On January 19, the New York Times even ran an insensitive cartoon alongside an op-ed by New York University’s law and sociology professor Ryan Goodman under the heading “Helping Sri Lanka’s New Democracy” showing an American flag-carrying Yankee riding on top of the Sinhalese Lion on the Sri Lankan flag.

This month (February), the Obama administration rushed in their South Asian troubleshooter, Nisha Biswal, who even met with Tamil National Alliance (TNA) leaders in Colombo to discuss reconciliation. The U.S. National Security Advisor Susan Rice also chipped in pledging to assist Sri Lanka in a “transition” to democracy.

But, the new government’s U-turn towards close ties with China would sour this mood. Not only in Washington but also in New Delhi.

On February 5, a day after celebrating Sri Lanka’s 67th Independence (from British rule) Day, the government announced that all the Chinese projects would go ahead in Sri Lanka. The announcement was made following a two-day visit to Sri Lanka by Chinese President Xi Jingping’s special envoy Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs, Liu Jianchao – who was accompanied by a 10-member delegation of top Chinese foreign affairs officials.

Local media reported that during a meeting with the delegation, new President Maithripala Sirisena has paid gratitude for China’s assistance in the past, especially in eradicating terrorism, and has invited the Chinese government and its companies to invest even more in Sri Lanka. He has also indicated that he has accepted an invitation by President Xi to visit China in March.

During Rajapakse’s decade long rule, China rose to become Sri Lanka’s biggest trading partner, investor and closest ally helping to both defeat terrorism by selling sophisticated arms, which the West refused to give, and later helping to fend off any action by the UN Security Council on alleged “war crimes” by Sri Lankan security forces in the final push to eradication LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) terrorism. Today, trade between the two nations stands at over $3 billion U.S. dollars both ways.

In the lead up to the January 8 election, the opposition campaign focused heavily on alleged corruption on the Rajapakse regime’s multi-billion dollar development projects with the Chinese. Both the new President Sirisena (who was Rajapakse’s Health Minister for a long time and even acting as Defence Minister in the final two weeks of the war with LTTE) and his Prime Minister Ranil Wickremasinghe (opposition leader during the Rajapakse regime) vowed to review and even scrap some of the Chinese funded development projects, one of which is the 1.4 billion U.S. dollar Colombo Port City project, which was described as an “environment disaster” and a threat to Sri Lanka’s sovereignty by Wickremasinghe during the election campaign.

The ‘Colombo Port City’ project, designed with malls, hotels and marinas, built on reclaimed land by the Chinese, seeks to rival Singapore and Dubai. It was a major showpiece of the Rajapaksa regime’s slogan of making Sri Lanka the “Wonder of Asia”.

Cabinet Spokesman and Health Minister Rajitha Senaratne (a former Rajapakse government’s Cabinet member) addressing a press conference on February said that the Chinese project has been given the green light by the government. He said that the government is satisfied with the Environment Impact Assessment done by a local university and a second one will be done after the land reclamation was completed. He however said that the government would look into the land ownership issue, because under the agreement signed with China during President Xi’s visit to Sri Lanka in November 2014, China would own the reclaimed land. “Ownership of land by foreigners is illegal in Sri Lanka,” he said.

Possible splits

A day later, making a special statement in parliament, Prime Minister Wickremasinghe said the biggest foreign investment project in Sri Lanka’s history, has not been given the go-ahead yet, but was still under review.

This episode has brought into the open possible splits within the governing coalition, between the pro-Western sentiments of Wickremasinghe and his foreign minister Mangala Samaraweera as well as their United National Party (UNP) and President Sirisena’s Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) which was led until the elections by Rajapakse.

Sri Lanka’s Maithripala Sirisena. Official photo via Facebook.

Following the election victory of Sirisena – who challenged Rajapakse as the “common opposition candidate” without any party – after a one-to-one meeting between the two leaders, Rajapakse agreed to step down and become party patron while Sirisena moved in as the party President. This has created an unprecedented political scenario in Asia’s oldest democracy, where the President’s own party (SLFP) is the official opposition in parliament, yet, holding the largest number of seats by any single party. Former president’s brother, Chamal Rajapakse continues as the speaker of the House.

After his victory, President Sirisena appointed Wickremasinghe as the Prime Minister keeping to a pre-election pledge and in turn the PM selected a Cabinet that is dominated by UNP parliamentarians, even though they are not the majority party in the legislature. Many legal experts have pointed out that this was an unconstitutional act, which survived, because the SLFP did not challenge the appointment in the House.

With parliamentary elections expected to be called for June 2015, the power struggle between SLFP and the UNP as well as other minor parties, the Buddhist nationalist JHU (in government) and Marxist JVP (in opposition), is expected to intensify creating possible tensions between the President and Prime Minister.

The urbane Anglicized Wickremasinghe is known as a staunch American (and European) ally who is suspected by Sinhalese nationalists to be working with the West to undermine Sri Lanka’s national interests, especially the unitary state and its close relationship with China.

On the other hand, Sirisena, a son of a rice farmer raised in Pollonnaruwa – the rice growing Buddhist heartland – has even better Buddhist credentials than Rajapakse. The fact that, Sirisena was the “common opposition candidate” and not Wickremasinghe, is because the latter could not master a substantial Sinhalese Buddhist vote (which Sirisena did) to win the presidency.

Immediately after the election results, when statements from western leaders called for war crimes investigations and charges against the former president and his brother former Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapakse, President Sirisena and his SLFP and JHU allies were quick to assure the Rajapakse brothers that it will not be allowed under their government. Both are held in high esteem within the country’s Sinhalese majority and even among many Tamils who live inside the country, for having got rid of the terrorist menace – despite western obstacles on the way – and brought peace to the country.

Wanted peace and economic development

What people need in Sri Lanka most is peace and economic development, and in his Independence Day message on February 4, President Sirisena hinted as such when he said that eradicating poverty is essential to reconciliation in the country. This is a concept that the Chinese understand well.

It was well illustrated during the recent visit to the island by Obama’s special envoy Nisha Biswal (U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs) and the Chinese president’s special envoy Liu Jianchao. While the Americans focused on reconciliation and improving democratic institutions, even flirting openly with Tamil political leaders and civil society groups; the Chinese envoy concentrated in meeting government and business leaders and talked exclusively about economic relations and development assistance.

Sri Lanka is an important linchpin in China’s Maritime Silk Route project with the Chinese built Hambantota harbor and the Colombo harbor that is adjacent to the upcoming Colombo Port City, expected to play a pivotal role in trade flows between Asia and the rest of the world. In 10 to 15 years time, once infrastructure is completed on both the land and sea routes of the new Silk Routes envisaged by the Chinese, Sri Lankan ports could become the transshipment hub for exchange of goods between Asia, Africa, Middle East and Europe. This will bring enormous economic benefits to Sri Lanka because it has the educated workforce to establish the service industries needed for such trade flows.

The western media and some of the Indian media have been painting the Silk Route projects as Chinese attempts to dominate Asia. But, since Prime Minister Narendra Modi took office in New Delhi, India has begun to look at it from a more positive frame of mind. When Modi visits China in March, a number of deals are expected to be signed that would link India to the Silk Route projects.

If trans-shipment goods are going to go through Indian rail links to Sri Lanka, both neighbours would benefit. Modi would obviously look at it from that vision as long as Sri Lanka does not allow Chinese nuclear submarines to dock in its harbors without prior notification to India.

Japin Jacob, Assistant Director of the Institute of Chinese Studies in New Delhi points out that Sri Lankans have started to learn Mandarin in significant numbers and the Chinese have started sending students to study Sinhalese and Sri Lankan/Buddhist culture to local universities, reflecting the two countries common ambitions.

During President Xi’s visit to Sri Lanka in September, Sri Lanka accepted China’s invitation to become a founding member of the Asian Infrastructure Development Bank, and the Beijing Foreign Studies University signed MoUs with the Colombo University to establish a China-Sri Lanka Study Centre as well as a Confucius Institute with plans also for a joint degree program and scholarships.

Rather than being obnoxious and trying to lecture to Sri Lankans on how to run its democracy and community relations, the West, and the Americans in particular, would be well advised to take a leaf out of China’s approach to relations with economically weaker countries.

”Even though Rajapaksa is gone, Sri Lanka will continue to harbor ambitions of becoming a maritime, commercial, knowledge and energy hub linking Europe and Africa with Asia,” notes Jacob. “This ambition is well-supported by the current form and scope of the Chinese Maritime Silk Road strategy (and) the Colombo Port City project, despite criticism in the course of the election campaign (it) is still a rather attractive idea”.

*Dr Kalinga Seneviratne is IDN Special Correspondent for Asia-Pacific. He teaches international communications in Singapore.

The post Sri Lanka: New Government Makes U-Turn To China – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

When we say Novorossiya we are not referring to that territory Russia annexed over two centuries ago from the Ottoman Empire; nor do we mean the less than one year old confederation proclaimed in East Ukraine by the Donetsk People’s Republic and Lugansk People’s Republic. What we have in mind is a new Russia: an emerging, much stronger nation, or federation, callused by the pain inflicted from the United States and its EU-NATO toy-dog through economic sanctions; a wiser Russia… a deflowered maiden which resulted from Gorbachev’s well-meaning, but naïve, détente-glasnost days of promise by America’s deceiving Novus-Imperium.

And the beat goes on in the US media, unashamedly, placing the current impasse in East Ukraine in the boogeyman’s hands, holding President Putin responsible for daring respond to a sub-rosa understanding which was part and parcel in ending the Cold War; an understanding blatantly abused by the US through nationalist groups instigated by the CIA and a triumphalist US State Department. One needs but slowly walk the path of encroachment during the last 25 years; first through Warsaw Pact nations, followed by a subsequent intrusion in the politics of former member republics of the Soviet Union.

Obviously, the coefficient of patience’s elasticity in the Russian government had to end somewhere, and US’ final push in the Maidan protests, and a forced regime change, was the straw that broke Vladimir Putin’s diplomatic back.

Under a pseudo-banner of “territorial integrity,” Russia has been denounced for taking Crimea into its fold, and for lending aid to the separatist movement taking place in the Donetsk and Lugansk oblasts of eastern Ukraine. Never mind the problems birthed by an illegitimate government now operating from Kyiv throwing the entire Donbas region into turmoil because of economic-political-cultural-language-ethnic issues. As usual, the US government has simplified matters for its underrated citizenry via lies of omission as well as a propagandistic constant call to arms to ensure the US is always on top… not first among equals, but first-in-charge. And, of course, the pride-and-prejudice instilled in all of us is put to the test; and the jingoist American corporate media revels in it!

Not much dissent in ganging up against “irrational” Putin, or an enemy that will not go away: Russia – for most Americans, Russians have been, are, and will remain “commies” to the end of time… no matter the ignorance that such thought implies. Not uncommon to have presumably educated talking-heads in TV still referring to Russia as the Soviet Union, and not retracting their lapsus linguae even when they catch themselves.

As if this ignorant acrimony weren’t enough we, Americans, have our top statesmen representing us stupidly well… of late, by way of Joe Biden, our vice-president, through his imbecilic mouthy demeanor (remindful of his “regular guy” approach in getting the union vote); and, our Frenchie-trained top diplomat, John Kerry. Of course, they had to follow the no-words-minced example by the “leader of the free world” and his highly unsavory, belligerent remarks during his the state of the union message which delighted in Russia’s economic struggle; in our view, categorizing the pain as just deserts.

Obama just finished having a get-together with the German leader, Angela Merkel, and at the post-meeting Q&A session with the press, it was obvious the German mandatary is more patient and reasonable in dealing with the US-created Ukraine-Russia problem than the bellicosarian, fascist element which permeates American politics, and their eagerness to provide Kyiv with lethal weapons to fight the pro-Russia separatists.

What happens in this upcoming meeting in Belarus, we sense, will have a higher Euro-tone, a bit more independent from the vocal hawkish regulars portrayed by demented John McCain, Lindsey Graham and the all-inclusive GOP cast of warmongers. Not likely that a solution might be found, permanent or temporary, but perhaps some common ground may be reached for continued negotiations between these Slav-brothers.

Given both, historic reality and Russia’s uncompromising desire for self-preservation as an influential regional power, militarily and economically secure, it is unlikely that Putin will consent to anything less than a bona fide geopolitical buffer zone, one which will preclude NATO membership for Ukraine, or Kyiv dominance in the affairs which might take place below the 47th parallel, or east of the 35th meridian.

And no bully-nation or criminal sanctions will hold Vladimir Putin hostage to the true evil empire… the empire Ronald Reagan had confused in his state of dementia.

The post Phoenix Rose From The Ashes; Novorossiya Will Rise from Western Sanctions – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Julio Rivera for Syria Comment

J.K. Gani’s The Role of Ideology in Syrian-US Relations: Conflict and Cooperation is an excellent resource for scholars, policymakers, and Syria watchers alike who are interested in understanding how Washington’s policies from 1946 to 2000 have solidified Syria’s ongoing mistrust of and hostility toward the US role in the region, as well as a useful guide to identifying the limits of Syrian-US cooperation. This book fills a large gap in the history of Syrian-US relations, as prior works often dealt narrowly with the peace process, the post-9/11 era, or the post-Ottoman era up to the moment of Syria’s political union with Egypt in 1958—a time when Damascus still controlled the Golan Heights.

Author: J.K. Gani (Lecturer in IR at the University of St. Andrews, UK) Series: Middle East Today Hardcover: 256 pages Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan (October 2, 2014) Language: English ISBN-10: 1137358343 ISBN-13: 978-1137358349

Due to the dearth or inaccessibility of Syrian internal memos detailing their private perceptions and motivations during this period, Gani’s research draws primarily on US and British archival material that sheds light on the thinking of Syrian officials. The Role of Ideology in Syrian-US Relations makes the compelling argument that Syria’s Arab nationalist and anti-imperial outlook, hardened over time by what was perceived as the US’s disingenuous agenda in the region, has greatly influenced its foreign policy and contends that Syria’s decisions to either confront or cooperate with the West should be viewed as pragmatic calculations guided by—as opposed to a blind adherence to—ideology.

Gani’s primary research method is historical analysis, which helps to contextualize Syrian animosity towards Western hegemony over the years. The book is broken into four parts highlighting different stages of the Syrian-US relationship: 1) The emergence of US-Syrian relations from Truman to Kennedy; 2) Syria’s isolation and the birth of the US-Israeli special relationship (specifically as it relates to the 1967 Arab-Israeli War); 3) US-Syrian disengagement talks from 1973-1975; and 4) instances of US-Syrian cooperation in the post-Cold War era. The book argues that while Syrian uneasiness regarding Western intentions (due largely to the country’s experience under the French Mandate) pre-dated Damascus’ suspicious attitude towards Washington, the US’s actions following Syrian independence in 1946 would result in a perception of the US being “second-generation imperialists” from the viewpoint of Damascus.

However, Gani points out that to assume Syrian-US relations were doomed from the start (given Syria’s prior attitudes towards the mandate authorities) overlooks the hopes Syrians and the region in general had for the US to chart a different course. Unlike the French and the British, Washington maintained a largely isolationist policy following WWI, and the Wilsonian Principles of Self-Determination (1919) coupled with the US’s support for the dissolution of the mandate system within the UN positioned the US to play a positive role in supporting the aspirations of self-determination throughout the region. Despite its initial openness towards Arab self-determination, Washington’s backing of the creation of the state of Israel in 1948, which prompted an ensuing refugee crisis, and the shift in focus towards combating the spread of communism throughout the world, altered the paradigm and prompted the US to view the region solely through the lens of collecting resources to strengthen itself and its allies against the Soviets. In light of these changing dynamics, any critique by Syrian officials of the US or its regional allies made Damascus appear as if it were simply a Soviet satellite.  Such appearances prompted the Eisenhower administration in 1957 to support a coup in Syria, which was discovered and prevented by Damascus.

Although suspicion and aggression have continued to cast a shadow on Syrian-US relations even up through the present conflict, the book highlights moments, particularly during and after the First Gulf War, where Damascus appeared to shed its anti-Western ideology in favor of cooperation with the US. While Gani acknowledges that Damascus was likely motivated in part by Washington’s “unipolar” moment following the collapse of the Soviet Union, she notes that from Syria’s perspective, it wasn’t necessarily abandoning ideology but rather calibrating its response in light of the more global consensus in favor of US and coalition action, as well as the support from the UN. By allying with the West in this moment, Damascus was attempting to not only safeguard Arab unity by preventing inter-Arab warfare, but was also calling for Iraq’s withdrawal from Kuwait in an effort to create parallels with the peace process in the hopes of convincing the US of the rationale for Israel to similarly withdraw from the Golan Heights in exchange for peace.

Syria’s cooperation with the US did provide added reason to jumpstart the peace process in 1991, this time in Madrid; yet Syria’s hopes for achieving results were ultimately dashed.  Gani views Damascus’s willingness to compromise its longstanding principle of not holding separate bilateral negotiations with Israel, as an important step. For their part, Israeli negotiators, feeling insulated by prior promises from earlier US administrations, did not believe they had to compromise on the Golan Heights and even continued settlement construction at the time despite US pronouncements that such activity was “a deliberate effort to sabotage peace.” The Syrian track would soon result in a stalemate, while separate negotiations with the Palestinians and subsequent Oslo agreements in the mid-90s further convinced Damascus that such “second-generation imperialists” were merely looking to divide and conquer the Arab states.

By virtue of her historical analysis, Gani calls on her readers to understand Damascus’ adherence to an ideology which is pro-Arab nationalist, pro-self determination, and reasonably suspicious of the West’s regional ambitions. Unlike other works which often offer a very US-centric version of Syria as the “obstructionist” in the relationship, this book presents Damascus’ rationale for sticking to its anti-Western, Arab nationalist ideology in the face of repeated empty promises and outright hostility.

Ultimately, this work leaves the reader with the feeling that the prospects for genuine, long-term cooperation between both parties are slim to none. The US has done little over the years to convey that it has Syria’s interests at heart, which has only entrenched Syria’s confrontational attitude towards Western hegemony. So while temporary situations may present themselves as opportunities for cooperation between Damascus and Washington, they are likely to remain short lived as the overall trajectory portends continued mutual hostility. The current debates surrounding the question of whether or not the US should cooperate with the Asad regime in their mutual fight against ISIS is a prime example of the moments when interests align, yet such an approach is unlikely to translate into a long-term strategic partnership given the several other outstanding issues in the US-Syrian relationship.

It would have been useful had the book contained a developed suggestion on the most promising solution to the projected impasse in the relationship. Gani briefly mentions a few possible scenarios wherein the Syrians could give up their ideological stance or the US could drop its support to Israel, but both seem highly unlikely given the compounding US actions which continue to widen the gulf between the two and the limited positive signals from Damascus that could demonstrate its potential as an ally worth exchanging Israel for. While she does mention that an end to external interference or a handing over of Israeli-occupied lands is another alternative, she doesn’t seem to place the onus on either Syria or the US to bring about that change.

To extend a brief argument informed by Gani’s work, I would propose that from a long-term strategic perspective the ball is in the US’s court, regardless of whether the Asad regime or some other post-Asad system emerges from the current crisis. For the current regime—absent a more even-handed approach to Syria, and a clear US role in implementing an equitable resolution to Palestinian statelessness and the Israeli-occupied territories, including the Golan Heights—Washington’s policies will continue to aggravate a country that maintains its right to regain its lost territory, as Egypt did, on the basis of international agreements like UN Resolution 242 and 338. Without such a shift, Damascus will continue to provide support to Israel’s enemies—armed Palestinian resistance groups, Hizballah, and Iran—and thus fail to build confidence with its southern neighbor. This is another side to this discussion that this work could have benefited from. For the Syrian opposition, should the US fail to adequately respond to the humanitarian crisis and provide genuine assistance to anti-regime forces, not to mention prepare for the possibility of leading the post-Asad state building efforts, the Syrian oppositionists will determine—as many already have—that the US is not a true partner with the Syrian people and that they will have to look elsewhere, potentially among the US’s enemies, for support. Without such unlikely shifts in policy, the US should not hope that hedging its bets by not fully committing to either side will yield anything more than a short term status quo lacking any true long-term improvement in its relationship with either side in Syria.

It is important to consider the insights that Gani’s work can provide at a time when some US policymakers may entertain the possibility of an alliance with the Asad regime against ISIS. What policy makers need to decide at this juncture is whether the short-term gain of cooperating with the Asad regime in the fight against ISIS is worth the long-term consequences. Reports already suggest that the U.S. has spent over $1 billion with estimated projections ranging as high as $10-15 billion a year in an expanded air campaign. The U.S. could decide to work with Asad’s troops in the hopes of having a reliable ground force for combined air and ground operations against ISIS inside Syria, but such a strategy does not guarantee military success against ISIS in Iraq. Additionally, this level of cooperation will not erase the decades of mistrust Damascus has towards Washington (and vice versa) and without a major shift in the U.S.’s regional policies, Syria’s leaders will continue to hold political positions towards Israel that will remain unpalatable to Western officials. What Gani’s work teaches us is that there are limits to U.S. cooperation with the current Syrian regime, and Washington must decide if the billions it will spend are worth investing in a government that history has shown will not easily embrace a genuine strategic partnership.

All in all, The Role of Ideology in Syrian-US Relations provides a well defended argument for why Syrians justifiably felt cornered throughout their history and continue to remain suspicious of Western involvement in the region. Misunderstandings and perceptions of the other have negatively impacted Syrian-US relations over the years, and J.K. Gani’s scholarly contribution is not only timely but critical in a period of great uncertainty regarding the future of Syria and how the US will address this question. Gani’s book therefore serves as a great resource and a must have for scholars of modern Syria or US foreign policy after World War II, and those interested in contextualizing what a short-term alliance with the Asad regime against ISIS may or may not mean for their mutual long-term relationship.

*Julio Rivera is a PhD student in the department of Near Eastern Languages and Civilizations at the University of Chicago where he focuses on Syrian political history. Before pursuing his PhD, Julio spent three years working as a Syria political analyst for the Department of Defense, spanning the period prior to and during the current Syria crisis. Follow Julio on twitter: @juliorivera77

The post J.K. Gani’s ‘The Role Of Ideology In Syrian-US Relations’ – Book Review appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Colony Collapse Disorder (CCD) is a major threat to bee colonies around the world and affects their ability to perform vital human food crop pollination. It has been a cause of urgent concern for scientists and farmers around the world for at least a decade but a specific cause for the phenomenon has yet to be conclusively identified.

Bees usually begin foraging when they are 2-3 weeks old but when bee colonies are stressed by disease, a lack of food, or other factors that kill off older bees, the younger bees start foraging at a younger age. Researchers attached radio trackers to thousands of bees and tracked their movement throughout their lives. They found that bees that started foraging younger completed less foraging flights than others and were more likely to die on their first flights.

The researchers, from Queen Mary University of London (QMUL), Macquarie University in Sydney, Washington University in St Louis, and University of Sydney, used this information to model the impact on honey bee colonies.

They found that any stress leading to chronic forager death of the normally older bees led to an increasingly young foraging force. This younger foraging population lead to poorer performance and quicker deaths of foragers and dramatically accelerated the decline of the colony much like observations of CCD seen around the world.

Dr Clint Perry from the School of Biological and Chemical Sciences at QMUL, said, “Young bees leaving the hive early is likely to be an adaptive behaviour to a reduction in the number of older foraging bees. But if the increased death rate continues for too long or the hive isn’t big enough to withstand it in the short term, this natural response could upset the societal balance of the colony and have catastrophic consequences.”

According to Perry, “Our results suggest that tracking when bees begin to forage may be a good indicator of the overall health of a hive. Our work sheds light on the reasons behind colony collapse and could help in the search for ways of preventing colony collapse.”

The post ‘Stressed’ Young Bees May Be Cause Of Colony Collapse appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Many salmon rivers around Puget Sound have experienced increasing fluctuations in flow over the past 60 years, just as climate change projections predict – and that’s unfortunate news for threatened Chinook salmon, according to a new analysis of salmon survival and river flow.

More pronounced fluctuations in flow can scour away salmon eggs and exhaust young fish, especially when lower flows force adult fish to lay eggs in more exposed areas in the center of the channel. The new study published in the peer-reviewed journal Global Change Biology says such increased flow variability has the most negative effect on salmon populations of several climate factors considered.

“There’s more flooding in late fall and winter,” said Eric Ward, an ecologist at NOAA Fisheries’ Northwest Fisheries Science Center and lead author of the research. “This is happening when the eggs are in the gravel or when the juveniles are most susceptible.”

The good news is that many salmon habitat projects restore and reopen side channels and floodplains that provide rearing habitat for young salmon and refuge from fluctuating flows. Actions to reduce stormwater runoff in ways that allow water to infiltrate and move more slowly through the ground can also ease flooding and peak flows that otherwise threaten salmon redds.

While many studies have examined the expected impacts of climate warming on wildlife, the new research is one of only a few to evaluate the impacts of increased climate variability.

“We’re not talking just about warmer temperatures, but a more variable environment with more extremes on either side,” said Joseph Anderson, a fisheries biologist at the Washington Department of Fish and Wildlife and coauthor of the new research. “As these extremes get farther apart, the result is a negative impact on salmon.”

Climate models predict increasingly severe storms and droughts and, in the Pacific Northwest, more precipitation falling as rain instead of snow. That translates into rivers and streams that rise and fall more sharply and more often, making life harder for young salmon that hatch and spend their first few months in freshwater before migrating to the ocean. Rain falling on snow in fall or winter months can melt the snow, producing particularly sudden increases in stream flow.

The research found that fluctuations in river flow have already become more pronounced in many rivers around Puget Sound. Since 1950 the variation in winter flows has increased in 16 of 20 salmon rivers examined, with 11 rivers including the Skykomish, Elwha, Snoqualmie, Skokomish and Puyallup showing statistically significant increases of about 35 percent. The increased variation has occurred even with no change in the average overall winter flow.

“It’s basically the same amount of water, but it’s coming more sporadically than before,” Ward said.

Four rivers showed reduced variability in winter flow: the Cedar, Duwamish, Upper Skagit and Nisqually.

The researchers weighed several climate factors in freshwater and the ocean to determine which had the greatest effect on salmon populations. The freshwater factors included overall winter flows, peak flow timing and winter flow variability. The ocean factors included upwelling of nutrient-rich water and the Pacific Decadal Oscillation, a large-scale marine temperature pattern. Of all the factors, variation in winter river flows had the strongest influence on salmon populations, reducing their growth rate.

That does not mean that high river flows are all bad, Anderson noted. In fact, flooding often helps create and maintain salmon habitat by reopening side channels and replenishing spawning gravels. But at some level and in some conditions fluctuations may begin to take a toll on salmon populations.

“Rivers are dynamic environments, and some level of variability is to be expected in natural systems,” Anderson said. “The point here is that as strong variability becomes more common, it eventually begins to have a negative influence on populations.”

The post Puget Sound Salmon Face More Ups And Downs In River Flows appeared first on Eurasia Review.

The noose used to hang Saddam Hussein in 2006 is being auctioned as a piece of art. It is currently in the possession of former Iraqi official Movafagh Al-Rabi’i, who has put the noose around a bronze bust of Hussein and exhibits it in his home.

An unidentified Iraqi politician has told the daily Alarabiya Aljihad that several collectors and buyers from Israel, Iran and Kuwait have made offers to by the rope used to hang Saddam Hussein, and the highest bid has so far been seven million dollars.

The report indicates that Al-Rabii expects to get even more for it. The Iraqi government has said that if the rope is indeed sold, legally the money should be handed over to the Iraqi treasury.

Saddam Hussein was hanged in 2006, and Al-Rabi’i was present as an Iraqi government security official.

He told Al-Jazeera that Saddam Hussein was calm at the time of his hanging and held a Quran in his hands. They read the death sentence to him, and “like a broken man”, he surrendered to his fate, said his last prayer without any anxiety and put his head in the noose.

The post Saddam Hussein Noose Up For Auction? appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Geethanjali Nataraj and Richa Sekhani*

The Sino-African relationship is almost six decades old and has progressed from a single to multi-dimensional relationship. The first phase of the relationship, from 1948 to 1978, was an initiative from China to establish diplomatic ties with African countries that were free from colonial rule. The second phase began with the initiation of reforms in China in 1978 and ended with the Cold War in 1989.

The relationship stagnated after that and was rejuvenated only in 1996 with the visit of the then Chinese President to Africa. A forum on China-Africa cooperation was established. Since then, trade and investment ties between the partners have blossomed. The total trade between the two, which was only one per cent in 1995, saw a compound annual growth of about 25 per cent in 2013.

Total trade between the two reached $210 billion in 2013. Importing almost 80 per cent of minerals from Africa, China has overtaken the US as the world’s largest net importer of oil. China’s exports to Africa are a mixed bag, leading to China becoming one of the largest trading partners of Africa. Africa seeks to satisfy four broad interests of China i.e, politics, economics, security and ideology. From the political view point, Africa supports China’s ‘One China’ policy at multilateral levels. At the economic level, resource-rich Africa and its burgeoning population provides a ready market for China.

Also, the non-democratic set up in Africa supports the ideology of China to exercise its political control over the continent. However, growing Chinese investments in Africa has also led to scepticism and insecurity among Africans resulting in security issues for Chinese investors. Sino-African relations are often termed as a ‘Win-Win’ arrangement. With global attention being on boosting south-south cooperation, most of African economies have gained in importance. For several years, Chinese investments were concentrated in countries rich in natural resources like Algeria, Nigeria, South Africa, Sudan and Zambia.

Big investors like Sinopec, China National Petroleum Group, China State Construction Engineering Corporation and China Metallurgical Group Corporation formed partnerships with state oil companies in Nigeria, Angola, Sudan, Egypt, Chad and Niger. However, recent years have seen diversifications as Chinese firms have begun to branch out their investments into manufacturing, transport, real estate and construction. Countries like Ethiopia and Congo are getting more attention now. In 2013, Tanzania became the largest trading partner of China, with about 500 Chinese firms operating in the country.

It is expected that there will be new Chinese investments blooming in Africa. For instance, the new administration in China has proposed $30 billion credit loans to Africa for cross-border and inter-regional African infrastructure construction. The Chinese have also extended support in personnel training, capital accumulation and trade to foster China-Africa ties.

For Africa, investments in infrastructure, service sector expansions and increment in agricultural productivity is the result of China’s emergence as one of Africa’s main trade and investments partners.If this continues, Africa is likely to grow at a rate of 5.1 per cent in 2017. China’s support has resulted in manufacturing growth such as the Huajian Shoe factory in Ethiopia which opened in 2012. It turned profitable in its first year of operations. For China as well, the relationship is one worth nurturing. Africa provides raw materials, both natural resource and non natural-resource, for Chinese industries.

Further, cheap Chinese products find ready markets in Africa. The low value of Yuan compared to other major world trading currencies attracts foreign importers and boosts demand for Chinese goods. However, the picture is not that rosy as both partners pursue different economic strategies. According to many Africans, Chinese products are poor quality and their low prices are seen to be a strategy to destroy the local industries of Africa.

Many see China to be practicing a new form of imperialism in Africa as it imports primary goods from Africa and exports manufacturing goods to Africa, without transferring skills to the continent. China-Africa ties are not free from challenges but there is immense potential that exists for Africa which can be nurtured through this relationship. Africa can learn a lot from China’s growth story.

*The authors are researchers with Observer Research Foundation, Delhi

Courtesy: The Pioneer

The post Is China Practicing New Form Of Imperialism In Africa? – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

President Barack Obama will submit a proposal to Congress on Wednesday seeking a new, three-year Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) against the Islamic State that allows for the limited use of ground troops, according to Reuters.

All of the details of the AUMF are not finalized, according to administration officials, but some were shared with reporters. The new AUMF would limit military operations to three years but wouldn’t put any geographic limitation on the battlefield. Instead, the authorization would enable military action against the Islamic State and associated forces.

The proposal will also seek the use of limited ground troops in situations such as the search-and-rescue of US soldiers or intelligence operations, but would prohibit the use of ground troops in “enduring offensive ground operations.”

The White House has indicated it is ready to work with Congress to get the authorization passed.

“When we’re talking about something as weighty as an authorization to use military force, I would anticipate that it will require substantial effort from certainly the leaders in both parties in both chambers of Congress,” White House press secretary Josh Earnest said last Thursday, according to the Huffington Post. “But I think…the administration is also committed to dedicating some resources to the passage of this new AUMF.”

The Republican-led Congress, meanwhile, will insist on having a legislative debate about the extent of US engagement in Iraq and Syria, as well as the use of US ground troops.

Some hawkish Republicans oppose placing restrictions on military commanders, such as a ban on ground troops. Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.), chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, simply said “no” when asked Tuesday if he supports any limits in the new authorization.

Others are calling for a more extensive authorization, allowing US forces to challenge President Bashar Assad of Syria, where a four-year civil war has fueled the rise of the Islamic State group.

“If the authorization doesn’t let us counter Assad’s air power, I think it will fail,” said Senator Lindsey Graham, according to Reuters.

On the other hand, some Democrats have raised concern about wading into another open-ended war in the Middle East.

“I worry that this AUMF gives the ability for the next president to put ground troops back into the Middle East,” said Sen. Chris Murphy (Conn.), adding that such a provision would be a sticking point for himself and many other Democrats.

The post Obama To Seek Three-Year War Authority Against ISIS With Limited Ground Troops appeared first on Eurasia Review.

(RFE/RL) — A proposed summit is expected to take place on February 11 in Minsk, with the leaders of Ukraine, Russia, France, and Germany looking into ways to defuse the Ukraine crisis.

German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Francois Hollande plan to meet with Putin and Poroshenko in the Belarusian capital, but prospects for the talks remain uncertain amid a surge in fighting in eastern Ukraine.

U.S. President Barack Obama spoke by telephone with both Putin and Poroshenko on February 10.

The White House said Obama urged Putin to seize the opportunity of the Minsk peace talks to reach a peaceful resolution to the conflict, which has killed more than 5,300 people.

In the call to Putin, Obama reiterated U.S. support for Ukraine’s sovereignty and emphasized the importance of reaching a diplomatic resolution.

“However, if Russia continues its aggressive actions in Ukraine, including by sending troops, weapons, and financing to support the separatists, the costs for Russia will rise,” the White House said in a statement.

The Kremlin said the two presidents noted the necessity to safeguard rights of inhabitants of all Ukrainian regions, including the Russian-speaking ones in the east.

A Kremlin statement said Putin and Obama highlighted the need for a political solution to the “internal” conflict in Ukraine to swiftly end the bloodshed there.

Poroshenko’s office said he and Obama expressed hope that the Minsk summit would bring a halt to fighting.

Poroshenko earlier on February 10 said, “Tomorrow’s meeting in Minsk offers one of the last chances to declare an unconditional cease-fire and pull back heavy artillery.”

Representatives of Ukraine, Russia, the OSCE, and separatist-held regions of eastern Ukraine held a meeting of the so-called “Contact Group” on the eve of the talks to lay the groundwork for the summit, while senior officials from the four nations were holding parallel talks.

Russia’s Ambassador to Ukraine Mikhail Zurabov, former Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma, OSCE special representative Heidi Tagliavini, and the authorized representatives from the two separatist regions — Denis Pushilin from Donetsk and Vladislav Deinego from Luhansk, were all in the Belarusian capital for the February 10 meeting.

The Contact Group is the mechanism for talks which produced a September 5 agreement on a cease-fire, which failed to end the violence in east Ukraine.

The separatists used the meeting to submit settlement proposals, but Pushilin said on the separatists website “it is too soon to speak about a cease-fire.”

Meanwhile, French President Francois Hollande said, “We are going to Minsk with the firm will to succeed, without being certain that we can do so,” adding that he and German Chancellor Angela Merkel were committed to doing everything possible to achieve “an agreement, a global settlement.”

Hollande said a deal was also important for “a strong resumption of trade,” which was hit by Western sanctions against Moscow and Russian counter-sanctions.

France has suspended delivery of a helicopter carrier it built for Russia until progress was made toward settling the Ukraine crisis.

German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier spoke by phone with his Russian and Ukrainian counterparts.

Steinmeier said, “I hope that none of those involved in the fighting will push things so far that Minsk is called into question by an explosion of violence in the final hours.”

The EU foreign policy chief, Federica Mogherini, told the European Parliament in Strasbourg on February 10, “we have to do all that we can to make [the Minsk talks] work.”

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s spokesman, Dmitry Peskov, told the Russian News Service radio station that any talk about imposing new sanctions on Russia or arming the Ukraine government would destabilize the situation.

On February 9, Obama said after talks with Merkel in Washington that he was looking into the option of sending lethal defensive weapons to Kyiv “if diplomacy fails.”

Meanwhile, fighting has surged in eastern Ukraine as government forces and pro-Russian rebels try to make gains ahead of the tentative summit.

Officials said separatists rebels fired rockets on a key military base and a residential area in the eastern city of Kramatorsk, killing at least 15 civilians and wounding more than 60.

The Kyiv-controlled Donetsk regional administration said the rockets were fired from the separatist-held area of Horlivka, which is about 50 kilometers from Kramatorsk.

But Eduard Basurin, a self-proclaimed separatist defense official, said the rebels “did not strike Kramatorsk” and contended that it was out of their range.

Ukraine’s volunteer Azov battalion said on social media on February 10 that it has captured several villages northeast of Mariupol, pushing Russian-backed separatists away from the strategic Azov Sea port city.

On February 9, rebel military spokesman Eduard Basurin said separatist forces have surrounded the strategic town of Debaltseve, cutting it off from a major highway.

Most of Debaltseve’s 25,000 residents have been evacuated.

Government-controlled Debaltseve which straddles a transport junction between the rebel-held provincial capitals of Donetsk and Luhansk, has been the scene of fierce fighting in recent weeks.

The post Obama Calls Putin To Discuss Ukraine appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Sri Lanka President Maithripala Sirisena said that he will appoint a special presidential commission this week to probe the large scale frauds and corruption that has allegedly taken place in the country in the past few years.

Addressing a public meeting held yesterday at the Aralaganvila market complex in Polonnaruwa to felicitate the President, Sirisena said the Commission will be assigned to investigate any individual accused of corruption regardless of their positions or political affiliations.

President Sirisena also pointed out that investigating and cracking down on corruption was one of the pledges given by him to the people during the Presidential election campaign.

The President said he has already instructed the relevant sections to swiftly implement the necessary measures and added that the law will be sternly implemented against individuals who have misappropriated public funds and engaged in robbing the public.

However, Sirisena added that he too is confused over the delay in taking action against the persons accused of corruption by the relevant authorities.

The post Sri Lanka: Sirisena To Appoint Commission To Probe Large Scale Corruption appeared first on Eurasia Review.

On January 5, the first anniversary of the deeply contested 2014 elections, the most violent in Bangladesh’s history, clashes between government and opposition groups led to several deaths and scores injured.

The confrontation marks a new phase of the deadlock between the ruling Awami League (AL) and the Bangladesh National Party (BNP) opposition, which have swapped time in government with metronomic consistency since independence. Having boycotted the 2014 poll, the BNP appears bent on ousting the government via street power. With daily violence at the pre-election level, the political crisis is fast approaching the point of no return and could gravely destabilise Bangladesh unless the sides move urgently to reduce tensions. Moreover, tribunals set up to adjudicate crimes perpetrated at the moment of Bangladesh’s bloody birth threaten division more than reconciliation. Both parties would be best served by changing course: the AL government by respecting the democratic right to dissent (recalling its time in opposition); the BNP by reviving its political fortunes through compromise with the ruling party, rather than violent street politics.

With the two largest mainstream parties unwilling to work toward a new political compact that respects the rights of both opposition and victor to govern within the rule of law, extremists and criminal networks could exploit the resulting political void. Violent Islamist factions are already reviving, threatening the secular, democratic order. While jihadi forces see both parties as the main hurdle to the establishment of an Islamic order, the AL and the BNP perceive each other as the main adversary.

The AL and its leader, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina Wajid, emphasise that the absence from parliament of former Prime Minister Khaleda Zia and her BNP make them political non-entities. Yet, concerned about a comeback, the government is attempting to forcibly neutralise the political opposition and stifle dissent, including by bringing corruption and other criminal cases against party leaders, among whom are Zia and her son and heir apparent, Tarique Rahman; heavy-handed use of police and paramilitary forces; and legislation and policies that undermine fundamental constitutional rights.

The BNP, which has not accepted any responsibility for the election-related violence in 2014 that left hundreds dead (and saw hundreds of Hindu homes and shops vandalised), is again attempting to oust the government by force, in alliance with the Jamaat-e-Islami, which is alleged to have committed some of the worst abuses during that period. The party retains its core supporters and seems to have successfully mobilised its activists on the streets. Yet, its sole demand – for a fresh election under a neutral caretaker – is too narrow to generate the public support it needs to overcome the disadvantage of being out of parliament, and its political capital is fading fast as it again resorts to violence.

The deep animosity and mistrust between leaders and parties were not inevitable. Despite a turbulent history, they earlier cooperated to end direct or indirect military rule and strengthen democracy, most recently during the 2007-2008 tenure of the military-backed caretaker government (CTG), when the high command tried to remove both Sheikh Hasina and Khaleda Zia from politics. Rather than building on that cooperation, the two leaders have resorted to non-democratic methods to undermine each other. In power, both have used centralised authority, a politicised judiciary and predatory law enforcement agencies against legitimate opposition.

Underpinning the current crisis is the failure to agree on basic standards for multiparty democratic functioning. While the BNP claims to be the guardian of Bangladeshi nationalism, the AL has attempted to depict itself as the sole author and custodian of Bangladesh’s liberation. The International Crimes Tribunal (ICT), established by the AL in March 2010 to prosecute individuals accused of committing atrocities during the 1971 liberation war, should be assessed in this context. While the quest to bring perpetrators to account is justifiable, the ICTs are not simply, or even primarily, a legal tool, but rather are widely perceived as a political one, primarily for use against the government’s Islamist opposition. In short, the governing AL is seen to be using the nation’s founding tragedy for self-serving political gains.

The AL needs to realise that the BNP’s marginalisation from mainstream politics could encourage anti-government activism to find more radical avenues, all the more so in light of its own increasingly authoritarian bent. Equally, the BNP would do well to abandon its alliances of convenience with violent Islamist groups and seek to revive agreement on a set of basic standards for multiparty democracy. A protracted and violent political crisis would leave Sheikh Hasina and Khaleda Zia the ultimate losers, particularly if a major breakdown of law and order were to encourage the military to intervene; though there is as yet no sign of that, history suggests it is an eventuality not to be dismissed. The opportunities for political reconciliation are fast diminishing, as political battle lines become ever more entrenched. Both parties should restrain their violent activist base and take practical steps to reduce political tensions:

• the AL government should commit to a non-repressive response to political dissent, rein in and ensure accountability for abuses committed by law enforcement entities, reverse measures that curb civil liberties and assertively protect minority communities against attack and dispossession of properties and businesses;
• the AL should invite the BNP, at lower levels of seniority if needed, to negotiations aimed at reviving the democratic rules of the game, including electoral reform. It should also hold mayoral elections in Dhaka, a long-overdue constitutional requirement that would provide opportunities to begin that dialogue; and
• the BNP should commit to non-violent political opposition; refrain from an alliance with the Jamaat-e-Islami that is enhancing the Islamist opposition’s street power with little political return for the BNP; and instead demonstrate willingness to engage in meaningful negotiations with the AL to end a crisis that is undermining economic growth and threatening to subvert the political order.

The post Mapping Bangladesh’s Political Crisis – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

(Civil.Ge) — Five months after tightening visa and migration regulations, Georgia launched online visa application for travelers visiting Georgia for tourism and business.

Application for a short-term, single entry visa for citizens of those countries with which Georgia has no visa free rules is available on evisa.gov.ge website.

Applicants must submit a photo, a copy of their passport, proof of accommodation, round flight ticket, travel insurance, proof of financial means and USD 50 fee, plus 2% service fee; they will no longer be required to present documents to Georgian embassies or consular offices. It will take up to 10 days to get e-visa, according to information available on the website.

Georgia maintains visa free rules for citizens of about 104 countries and territories. Starting from September 1, 2014 citizens of these countries are able to stay in the country without visa for maximum of 90 days in any 180-day period, instead of previous 360 days.

The post Georgia Launches Online Visa Application System appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Parviz Azizi*

Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States and America’s subsequent military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, a power vacuum was opened stretching across the Greater Middle East. Iran has been quick to step in and fill it with the help of other Shiite groups in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon.

Since then, Iranian influence has become one of the core concerns and challenges for NATO. America’s war on ISIS is a potential boon to the theocratic government of Iran, since the most immediate and proximal threat to its existence has come under attack from US air power. Iran is considered a potential regional hegemony and for political reasons continues to intensify the execution of foreign policies contrary to American interests and those of the US’s biggest ally in the region, Israel. Accordingly, the Syrian-Iran alliance combined with the rise of regional non-state actors such as Hezbollah has created security concerns for NATO and its allies in the region. With the recent US and NATO drawdown from Afghanistan, Iran stands to extend its sphere of influence into Afghanistan through Afghan Shiite networks.

Hizb-e Wahdat Islami Mardum-e Afghanistan was established in 1989 with the support of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and it has played a significant political and military role in Afghan politics. This political party, Hizb-e Wahdad, is mainly composed of ethnic Hazaras (which compose an estimated 20% of the Afghan population) and under the leadership of Abdul Ali Mazari, the party’s main objective was to fight for the rights and political representation of the oppressed Hazara people. With the collapse of the Sunni-Wahhabi Taliban regime in Afghanistan in 2001, Iran was able to expand its foreign policies in Afghanistan even further. Today, Iran enjoys extensive economic, political, cultural, and religious influence over Afghanistan.

Iran’s ‘Dual Containment Policy’

The Bonn agreement in 2001 re-established the Afghan political system, ending the centuries-long domination of Pashtuns in Afghan politics. This new government, under the leadership of Hamid Karzai has allowed the non-Pashtun ethnic groups to be equally represented in the Afghan government. The Karzai administration was heavily dominated by Tajiks, Hazaras, and Uzbeks. Therefore, this major transformation in the Afghan political system has allowed Iran to potentially expand its sphere of influence into Afghan politics. In addition, the current National Unity Government under the leadership of President Ashraf Ghani will further consolidate Iranian influence in Afghanistan.

In other words, the ongoing political transformation in Afghanistan since 2001 has allowed Iran to consolidate its soft and hard power capabilities in Afghan domestic affairs. For instance, the government of Iran has significantly increased investment into Afghanistan’s infrastructure, industry, and mining. Iran has invested nearly $500 million into Afghanistan since 2002, and Iran’s exports to Afghanistan have increased to $2 billion in 2001, and it could increase to $6 billion in the upcoming years. Moreover, Iran has been successful in establishing a security and economic buffer-zone in the western province of Herat. The Iranian government is also aiming to project its soft power capabilities by promoting Iranian culture and Shiite Islam in Afghanistan.

Iran’s Five Primary Objectives in Afghanistan

1. Promote a stable central government in Kabul favoring Iranian interests, which means limiting the domination of Pashtuns over Afghan politics.
2. Maintain close ties with ethnic Tajik and Hazara blocs.
3. Accelerate the complete withdrawal of US and NATO troops from Afghanistan.
4. Limit and prevent Pakistani and Saudi influence over Afghan politics.
5. Cooperate closely with India in Afghanistan to destroy and eradicate Al-Qaida and the Taliban, and prevent the re-emergence of another Sunni-Salafist movement capable of dominating the entire country

Iran is thus pursuing a dual containment policy in Afghanistan, in which the Revolutionary Guards Corps is passively supporting Taliban insurgents in their war against NATO while also maintaining close ties with the “Farsiwan,” dari-speaking people (mostly ethnic Tajik and Hazara). In 2011, ISAF forces captured a Taliban commander in the province of Helmand claiming that Iran offered his insurgent groups $50,000 to destroy a dam project. There are other cases involving Iranian support to the Taliban.

The Iranians provided sophisticated weaponry and shared intelligences with the Taliban to conduct attacks in Kabul, Kandahar, Herat and other provinces against NATO and Afghan National Army (ANA) forces. In December 2010, the Iranian government did not allow Iranian oil shipments into Afghanistan, causing a political crisis in Kabul. The shock pushed the price of oil and diesel up 35% in Kabul and 60% in Herat. On February 5 2011, British forces stopped three trucks, which were carrying shipments of four dozen 122-milimeter rockets, from entering Afghanistan from Iran.

Moreover, Afghanistan’s secret services, the National Directorate of Security (NDS), reported that Quds Forces inside Iran ran a terrorist training camp. NDS agents reported that Afghan militants were obtaining terrorist training in Ahvaz, the capital city of Iran’s Khuzestan province. It was also reported that Quds Forces were engaged in training suicide bombers in Iran to attack key NATO targets in Afghanistan.

To better understand Iran’s foreign policy agenda in Afghanistan, one should also consider Iran–US nuclear negotiations. Iran is apparently willing to curb its nuclear ambitions. However, the United States and NATO member states are pushing for a restrictive deal. Iran can thus turn around and offer to cooperate with the United States in Afghanistan, but only if Iran is allowed to peacefully pursue its nuclear program on its own terms. The drawdown of NATO and US troops will open new opportunities for Iran to shape Afghan politics in its favor. Iran could use the post-NATO stability of Afghanistan as leverage for a better nuclear deal.

The emergence of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) has had a significant influence over Iranian foreign policy. Iran’s main ally in the region, Syria, is significantly weakened by the presence of ISIS and other Jihadist groups. By all means, the Islamic Republic of Iran is willing to support the Assad regime and destroy ISIS, thus containing the spread of this dangerous non-state actor in the Greater Middle East.

Similarly, the US drawdown from Afghanistan could also be an opportunity for ISIS to emerge across Afghanistan. Last month, General John Campbell, commander of the Resolute Support mission in Afghanistan announced that ISIS has presently begun its recruitment campaign in Pakistan and Afghanistan. The presence of ISIS in Afghanistan could be a major threat to Iran’s national security, because the Shiite country risks encirclement by Sunni-Salafist extremists on both sides (Iraq and Afghanistan). Therefore, the country’s pragmatic leader, President Hassan Rouhani, will cooperate closely with NATO and US forces in Afghanistan in eradicate the Taliban insurgents and prevent Afghanistan from falling in the hands of ISIS.

Iran will keep close ties with the Dari speaking people of Afghanistan (ethnic Tajiks and Hazara), which represent 50% of the total population, to maintain its cultural, political, and economic influence over Afghanistan. For instance, Shiite Afghans outside of Afghanistan have already showed their loyalty to Iran by joining Iran’s Afghan legions in Syria to fight for the Assad regime. Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has established the Shiite Afghan legions program in Syria by promising them a monthly salary of $500 and Iranian residency papers.

One might argue that Iran’s most secretive Quds force is working in Afghanistan to establish a network of Shiite fighters similar to Hizb-e Wahdad, to fight the presence of ISIS fighters across Afghanistan after the US drawdown. According to Afghanistan’s former intelligence chief, Amrullah Saleh, the government of Iran has assigned its three main institutions to maintain its sphere of influence in Afghanistan:

The clerical establishment in Qom. The Iranian clergies in Qom are assigned to promoting the expansion of Iran’s soft power and Shiite political influence in the rest of the Greater Middle East (Egypt to Pakistan) by directly supporting the Shiite minorities in those countries.

The Ministry of Intelligence. Iran’s foreign intelligence is assigned to establishing close ties with Afghan government officials in the ministries of foreign affairs, interior, defense, water, and energy to collect field intelligence across Afghanistan.

Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). According to Saleh, Iran’s secretive Quds force, based in the Ansar Headquarters in Mashhad and the 23rd Headquarters in Birjand, are assigned to conducting sabotage activates across Afghanistan. The reciprocal visa waiver program for diplomats has allowed many Revolutionary Guards and Iranian spies to enter Afghanistan for espionage activities. These Iranian spies most often are disguised as businessmen, aid workers, journalists, and civilians to enter Afghanistan. For instance, on May 7 2012, a news reporter, Abdol vahed Hakimi from Iran’s Fars News was arrested in Kabul for disclosing government secrets to Iran.

Future Outlook

On January 15 2015, TOLO News announced negotiations over a comprehensive security pact between Kabul and Tehran. After signing the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) with the United-States, the new Afghan president is looking to sign a security agreement with Iran. This pact will boost cooperation between Iran and Afghanistan on the fight against terrorism and cross-border drug trafficking, while promoting mutual economic and cultural exchange.

The news comes after President Ghani’s last visit to Islamabad, Pakistan, where he tried to persuade the Pakistani government to cooperate in the fight against insurgents, and also requested that the Pakistani military be more transparent in their actions against cross-border insurgents. Despite decades of efforts by Iran to train, finance, and provide military aid to the Hizb-e Wahdad Party, the new generations of Hazaras in Kabul are uncertain of Iran’s intentions.

This is also as a result of the decades-long experience during the Afghan Civil War in the 1990s, in which Iran played a double game strategy by supporting the forces of Hazara Hizb-e Wahdad against the Tajik coalition forces of Jamiat-e Islami under the leadership of Ahmad Shah Massoud. While they were fighting each other in the streets of Kabul in the 1990s, Iran was providing military assistance to both parties. Therefore, many young well-educated Hazaras do not trust Iran. Instead they accuse Iran for being responsible for promoting division among different ethnic groups by promoting ethnic and sectarian violence between Tajiks and Hazaras in the 90s.

During the Loya Jirga of November 2011, the Iranian government paid millions of dollars to elders who were attending to vote against the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) between the US and the Afghan government. However, the elder members of the Loya Jirga assembly voted in favor of the BSA, and the strategic agreement between the United States and Afghanistan was approved and ratified by the newly-elected president, Dr. Asraf Ghani. This episode suggests that the Afghan people are politically apt and able to make informed decisions on the future of their country free from Iranian or Pakistani influence.

*Parviz Azizi is a guest contributor to Geopoliticalmonitor.com, where this article was first published.

The post Elephant In The Jirga: Iran’s Interests In Afghanistan – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By John Kerry, US Secretary of State

All Americans mourn the loss of Kayla Mueller, a compassionate young American who represented everything good about the human spirit. There are no words to express to Kayla’s parents, Marsha and Carl, how sorry we are for their crushing loss, just how much so many wished for and worked to try and secure a better outcome, or how awe-inspiring is the example of their strength, determination, and devotion to faith and family. To them, and to Kayla’s brother Eric and his family, I hope they can know that our entire country grieves together with all those whose lives she touched.

I have learned a great deal about Kayla through the stories shared about her during this awful period. She was someone any of us would be lucky to know as a daughter, sister, friend, or colleague. She so purposefully had one mission in life from the very start, and that was to help people: people in India, Israel, and the Palestinian Territories, people at an HIV/AIDS clinic and a women’s shelter at home in Arizona, and, most recently, Syrian refugees in Turkey. While ISIL exploited the crisis in Syria to rule by violence and massacre the innocent, human tragedy moved Kayla to do the opposite. She embraced children who had lost their parents. She comforted the sick and the wounded. She gave people hope even as their world fell apart around them. Kayla’s sense of values, her humanity and generosity, her idealism – this is what will endure, and it will endure long, long after the barbarity of ISIL is defeated.

ISIL, and ISIL alone, is the reason Kayla is gone. Like our friends in Jordan, our resolve is unshaken to defeat this vile and unspeakably ugly insult to the civilized world and to defeat terrorists whose actions – killing women, killing children, burning people alive – are an insult to the religion they falsely claim to represent.

The post Kerry: ‘ISIL Alone, Is The Reason Kayla Is Gone’ – Statement appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Recent terrorist incidents highlight the widening spectrum of potential targets and attack methods by violent extremists. The increasing complexity of threats must be met with comprehensive initiatives which emphasize combined deterrence from governments and communities.

By Joseph Franco*

The fallout from the Charlie Hebdo incident triggered global introspection over the power of ideological narratives to drive individuals and groups to violence. Disagreements still remain over the specific role played by Islamist ideology in motivating the perpetrators of Paris shootings. There is however, tacit consensus over how the shootings demonstrate the expanding repertoire of attack methods employed attacks that have become more complex.

Firearms, not explosives, had been the most visible element in recent plots both reported in Western Europe as seen in France and Belgium. Compared to the randomized casualties created by explosive devices, targeted killings appear to have greater propaganda value. Firearms-based attacks allow terrorists to feed their self-constructed narrative of their potency against a specific group while avoiding collateral damages against co-religionists.

Singapore confronts complex terror threats

Singapore’s threat calculus is similarly becoming increasingly complex. As a cosmopolitan hub of finance and trade, the country is an attractive target for groups seeking to damage both symbolic and strategic targets. Further compounding the challenge is Singapore’s maritime environment, which can allow for the execution of maritime-borne swarm attacks similar to the 2008 Mumbai attack launched by Lashkar-e-Taiba.

Fortunately, Singapore has remained free from any successful terrorist plot. Complacency looms large in a peaceful scenario and must therefore be avoided considering the wide array of attack methodologies.

Such is the logic behind the sustained campaign of Singaporean authorities for a “Whole-of-Government” (WOG) approach to security; which is premised on proactive measures and the involvement of the community. For potential threats emanating within the country, there had been continual improvements in fostering public-private partnerships in preventing and mitigating attacks.

This can be seen in the annual iterations of exercises such as Heartbeat and Northstar, which stress-test the response capability of relevant agencies and stakeholders. On the other hand, threats from beyond Singapore’s borders are premised on the same comprehensive, WOG approach with emphasis on detecting threats as early and as far away as possible.

For instance, the Singapore Maritime Crisis Centre constantly updates the National Common Operating Picture (NCOP), which is vital to attain domain awareness. The NCOP incorporates inputs from various Singapore agencies from law enforcement entities such as the Police Coast Guard; the Republic of Singapore Navy; and even non-security agencies such as the Infocomm Development Authority that looks out for cybersecurity issues.

Private entities also provide indispensable inputs to the NCOP process. In totality, this multimodal sensemaking effort combines human intelligence, technical surveillance, and geospatial methods.

Terrorist cells versus lone actors: A false dichotomy?

Part of the growing complexity is the emergence of the lone-wolf attacker. A protracted siege by a gunman would often “trend” or go viral on social media amplifying its symbolic effect, in comparison with the truncated attention of the public to a one-off bomb attack. More problematic is the spate of attacks using innocuous everyday objects. In countries with strict gun laws, knives and motor vehicles had been used to cause injury against civilian targets from countries such as China and Israel. Stabbings and vehicle run-downs foster fear among a populace that the threat can emanate from everywhere and anyone in proximity.

Nonetheless, it must be stressed that the acts of small cells or lone actor terrorists have very limited objective and material effects. The perception of threat as echoed in both traditional and social media must not overtake the reality of threats. Mounting a successful terrorist operation requires planning, logistics, and more importantly a degree of organization for any would-be plotters. Hierarchy, up to a certain point, allows for more efficient use of resources.

As with any organization, a terrorist group would be more effective if the actual operative mounting an attack is supported by a coterie of specialists—the bomb maker, the recce specialist, logistician, and the recruiter. Security policies should therefore take into consideration the broadening threat continuum; from lone actors, independent cells, or organized attack teams.

Instead of overtly focusing on one organizational form which can be adopted by a terrorist or terrorists, stakeholders must bear in mind the blurred and overlapping lines between these different modes. Instead of looking at terrorist plots in isolation, it is more optimal to recognize the utility of lone actors to terrorist cells, and vice-versa.

Despite the recent attention to lone actor attacks, outside of Western Europe terrorist plots appear to have swayed towards more ambitious and organized operations against maritime targets. In November 2014, the Egyptian Navy had one of its patrol vessels taken over and razed by Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis militants, equipped with small arms onboard commandeered fishing vessels. Over in the Indian Ocean, the Indian Coast Guard reportedly foiled an attempt at another Mumbai-style attack in January 2015, after the interception of an explosives-laden fishing vessel from Karachi.

From Whole-of-Government to Whole-of-Nation

Collaborative approaches to security are arguably the best counterpoint for the emerging complexity of terrorist threats. Collaboration in turn, can only be attained by providing adequate and relevant information to all stakeholders, most especially the public. It is important however that the threat not be overblown. Exaggerating threats can only lead to “warning fatigue” among the populace or even outright cynicism or resentment.

Therefore, it is most prudent to seize the initiative in terms of terrorism and counter-terrorism discourse. Labels such as “lone wolves” must be downplayed to sap the terrorists the mystique and propaganda they seek. Terrorist offenses must be emphasized as criminal rather than politicized acts.

Messaging should also highlight the existing systems and mechanisms to defeat potential terrorist threats from either domestic or overseas threats. The combination of government initiative and active public involvement would ultimately act as deterrent against threats terrorists—from lone actors to cells to organized attack teams.

The increasing complexity of terrorist threats is inevitable. Reactive measures to mitigate and address threats by different types of organization and attack methods are counterproductive. Only comprehensive approaches that combine public and private stakeholders to attain situational awareness can serve as deterrent against terror.

*Joseph Franco is an Associate Research Fellow with the Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS), a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University.

The post Complex Terrorist Threats: Singapore’s Response – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

The usual definition of a ‘terrorist’ is simple: a person who uses violence in the pursuit of a political objective.

By this definition, the two major categories of terrorist are those political leaders who perpetrate state terror by attacking other countries (ranging from launching a war, perhaps following a false flag operation, to conducting a drone strike) – see the classic book ‘The Real Terror Network: Terrorism in Fact and Propaganda‘ – and those political leaders who use military violence in defense of a political objective. For insight into the damaged psychology of violent political leaders, see ‘Understanding Obama and other People Who Kill‘. For much greater detail, see ‘Why Violence?‘

However, the narrower Western public perception of a ‘terrorist’ is someone who attacks civilian targets usually, but not always, in the West (that is, far away from any war zone). This is why US drone strikes on civilians in countries like Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen, for example, do not attract similar condemnation. Nor is there any condemnation of the Western use of terrorist groups as proxies in the war against the Syrian government. Consequently, groups like al Qaeda, Islamic State, al-Shabab and Boko Haram are labelled ‘terrorist’, essentially because they are presented as targeting and attacking ‘our’ civilians (or, as in the case of the girls kidnapped in Nigeria in 2014, ones with whom we are allowed to identify).

In his extensive research in the discipline of critical terrorism studies, Professor Richard Jackson recently concluded that ‘every major terrorist attack on Western targets since 2001, including the attacks in Bali, Madrid, London and Boston, has been claimed by the perpetrators to be revenge for Western military intervention in the Middle East. Even the beheadings of Western hostages were justified by Islamic State captors as a response to US bombing. In fact, every major academic study of the past ten years has confirmed that Western military intervention and its policies in the Middle East, including support for the state of Israel, is the primary motivation for anti-Western terrorist attacks. In 1996, a major study by the CATO Institute concluded that U.S. military intervention overseas was the primary driver of anti-American terrorism. The Chicago Project on Suicide Terrorism has drawn the same fundamental conclusion.

Professor Jackson goes on to say ‘There is plenty of good research and information which could help to make reasonable and effective policies’. But, as Professor Jackson also knows, we would be naïve to believe that Western elites have any interest in such policies. And here’s why.

Terrorism is the global elite’s ultimate weapon and a primary instrument for achieving its policies. That is, terrorism enables the elite to manipulate geostrategic events in order to extend and consolidate its political, economic and social control over national societies and their resources. Here’s how it works.

Western elites and their allies wage war, in one form or another, on countries in other parts of the world (the Middle East and Africa being the preferred targets at the moment) specifically in order to induce a violent retaliation, including by groups which are secretly supported, materially and militarily, by these elites. See, for example, ‘A Shameless Movement: Boko Haram and the Politics of Terror‘. Elites also conduct false flag operations, such as 9/11 – see, for example, ‘The Destruction of the World Trade Center: Why the Official Account of 911 Cannot Be True’ – and the attack on Charlie Hebdo – see, for example, ‘Charlie Hebdo Massacre: Another Staged Event to Incite War and Destroy Freedom?‘ – to provoke public outrage. They then use the public outrage generated by these retaliations and the false flag operations to justify the continuation of their military attacks. This enables them to expand elite control both in the regions under attack and also domestically.

By harping on the ‘threat of terrorism’ to scare domestic populations, Western elites and their allies are able to maintain their perpetual war in pursuit of control of essential diminishing natural resources – particularly fossil fuels, strategic minerals and water – while increasing their social control of domestic populations through increasingly repressive domestic legislation that guts human rights and civil liberties, including those in relation to dissent, while increasing the powers of ‘intelligence’ services and the police as they consolidate the surveillance state. See, for example, ‘How Australia just became a “national security state”‘.

Needless to say, the elite makes good use of its paid agents in academia, think tanks, the corporate media and elsewhere to make sure that you are kept carefully misinformed and told what to think and how to react.

If you are inclined to resist the elite use of terror against the rest of us, you are welcome to sign the online pledge of ‘The People’s Charter to Create a Nonviolent World‘.

Terrorism is intended to frighten and kill fellow human beings. Those who conduct terrorism and those who endorse it are badly psychologically damaged.

The post Terrorism: Ultimate Weapon Of The Global Elite – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

“Coalition” seems to be the buzzword in contemporary politics. Both the term and what it denotes seem to be all pervasive, proliferating and permeating almost insidiously, every aspect of political life and governance. And coalition has come to stay.

Prevalent everywhere, whether it is relevant in today’s era either for running the government or for power show or to check the unbridled power of the other. Now it connotes a bigger power to rule or one power to crush another power in today’s date. Even the major powers have entered a coalition to wipe out the new violent brigade Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) massacring human beings at random and the coalition of 28 States called North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) with its full scale adventures right from Afghanistan to Iraq to Libya, are another manifestation or another example of a coalition. Even Israel’s Netanyahu hatched a backdoor deal with the opposition Kadima party to come to power and German Chancellor, Angela Merkel to the utter astonishment of all, celebrated a coalition deal with the rival Social Democrats.

In India, Bihar’s grand alliance was the recent shock where Nitish Kumar joined hands with arch rivals Lalu Prasad and Mulayam Singh to keep the BJP at bay. The latest speculation for the sensitive state of Jammu and Kashmir is the coalition of Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), ideologically too different to form the next government. Is the expected deal likely to develop and benefit Kashmir or will it simply unify the arch rivals, still remains a bigger question.

However, earlier PDP President Mehbooba Mufti’s all praise for former Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee and his policies for Kashmir in 2003, proved an indication of the possible alliance. Also her criticism of the UPA government for rolling back some of those policies which could have helped Kashmir, proved it further and diminished the chances of a PDP-Congress coalition.

Mehbooba’s saying that her party was looking to take forward the policies set forth by Vajpayee, sparked speculation of a BJP-PDP coalition. Now a month long hectic parleys and secret negotiations are underway between political parties in Kashmir that may finally lead to the government formation of PDP-BJP government. BJP amply needs to be in the government for the party has a significant mandate from Jammu province.

This strength in vote share somehow has encouraged the BJP to work for a possible alliance to gain further ground in Kashmir where they failed this time as well. The fact remains that Hindu dominated Jammu versus Muslim dominated Kashmir itself reflected a polarized vote share. It all proved that the BJP will not sit in opposition, I mean PDP, NC or PDP, NC, Congress and others does not make sense.

BJP has a strong mandate which cannot be ignored by any rational being and PDP has been given the mandate by masses to wipe out the prevailing injustice and work for devastated Kashmir. Such an opportunity needs to be utilized and work on a common minimum programme can only be a possible factor of union between the two, provided both the parties shun ego-clashes and unite primarily for the sake of the people.

It is fairly true that there are a plethora of issues besetting the state except emotional and sensitive issues like AFSPA, KP’s, Refugees and 370. How effectively PDP-BJP coalition works and what actually realizes as their common minimum programme remains to be seen and what its long-term ramifications are, only time will tell.
Also can Mufti Sayeed afford to join NDA or prefer to remain in a state coalition only, it looms as a big question.

This article was published at Rising Kashmir.

The post Kashmir’s Political Impasse – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.