By Michael Lelyveld

China may have made a major breakthrough in its pattern of energy consumption last year, but questions about its slower-growing economy make it hard to tell.

In January, the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) reported that China used 4.8 percent less energy to produce each unit of economic output in 2014, beating its annual efficiency target of 3.9 percent for the first time in years.

China’s struggle to cut “energy intensity” has been at the heart of its efforts to trim waste, curb pollution and reduce reliance on smokestack industries for economic growth.

Last April, a member of the National People’s Congress Standing Committee, Wang Qingxi, noted that despite the efficiency efforts, China still used one-fifth of the world’s energy while accounting for only 11 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP), the official Xinhua news agency said.

Although China has routinely lowered its energy use on a per-unit-of-GDP basis, its total consumption has grown along with economic expansion, adding to emissions and smog.

But while last year’s GDP grew at a 24-year low rate of 7.4 percent, energy intensity fell at the fastest estimated pace since 1999, suggesting a significant efficiency gain.

By comparison, the intensity index dipped by a more modest 3.7 percent in 2013 as GDP rose 7.7 percent.

Signs of ‘decoupling’

Analysts have waited years for signs of “decoupling” in the Chinese economy that would break the near-lockstep link between growth in GDP and total energy demand.

Last year’s big drop in energy intensity offered hope that decoupling and economic restructuring are finally at hand.

In January, the international consulting firm Wood Mackenzie said 2014 was “a significant year for China as economic rebalancing led demand growth—for a range of major energy commodities—and GDP growth decoupling significantly for the first time.”

A recent study by the Paris-based International Energy Agency (IEA) also cited “notable increases in Chinese efficiencies” with the closing of excess capacity in high- polluting industries including coal and steel.

“Beijing’s efforts to fix its crippling air pollution problems through efficiency gains and cleaner-burning fuels will add to the de-emphasis on export-driven industries and construction-led growth,” the IEA said in its Medium-Term Oil Market Report.

While GDP grew 7.4 percent in 2014, power use rose by a far smaller 3.2 percent, the lowest rate since 1998, Reuters said.

The IEA also estimated that oil demand increased only 2.5 percent last year.

Diesel use fell 0.7 percent, declining for the first time in over a decade, Wood Mackenzie said.

Coal production was down 2.5 percent in the first drop since 2000, according to the China National Coal Association.

Overall energy use rose by a mild 2.7 percent, a research arm of state-owned China National Petroleum Corp. (CNPC) said.

The numbers all appear to tell the story of less energy consumed in creating economic growth.

But the numbers could also be signs that GDP growth has been considerably weaker than official estimates indicate.

In that case, lower increases in energy use may be largely the result of a sharper-than-reported economic slowdown rather than a greater efficiency gain.

Numbers frequently skewed

The NBS has been trying for over a decade to reform its GDP calculations, which have been frequently skewed by local officials seeking promotion by overstating production numbers.

In its latest attempt to reform data collection, the NBS announced in December that it would no longer use local GDP estimates from China’s 31 provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions in compiling national figures. But the plan is unlikely to take effect before 2016, Xinhua said.

In its report, the IEA argued that efficiency gains have been significant, but it added that “these economic numbers may be more fable than reality.”

The mixed message may leave the good news about the energy intensity index in doubt.

Derek Scissors, an Asia economist and resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington, said the NBS tries to “smooth” its GDP data to avoid implications of major or abrupt changes from year to year.

The effect is likely to show up in the energy intensity ratio, he said.

“In a slowdown, GDP growth is over-reported and energy use per unit of GDP is under-reported,” Scissors said.

He argued that the same thing happened in 1999 following the effects of the Asian currency crisis.

In that year, the NBS estimated that GDP rose 9.2 percent, while the international Monetary Fund put the figure at 7.6 percent.

“Suddenly, the energy intensity numbers looked better,” said Scissors.

For the year, energy use per unit of GDP fell 6 percent, according to data compiled by the China energy group at the U.S. Department of Energy’s Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory in California.

Similarly in 1998, the NBS reported GDP growth of 9.6 percent, compared with an IMF estimate of 7.8 percent. The drop in energy intensity was recorded as a whopping 11 percent.

Big drops in diesel fuel

Some recent reports cite successes in government efforts to cut overcapacity in major construction-related industries, leading to substantial drops in diesel fuel used for transporting coal to inefficient plants.

In 2013, the government ordered steel, cement and other industries to close outmoded facilities under a five-year anti-smog plan following estimates that capacity utilization had dropped to 70 percent or less.

But official reports on the steel industry may raise doubts about the effect that shutdowns have had on energy savings so far.

Last month, Mao Weiming, vice minister of the Ministry of Industrial and Information Technology (MIIT), told reporters that China had closed 31.1 million tons of steel-making capacity last year, topping an annual target of 27 million tons.

But the report did not appear to take into account the opening of new production capacity to replace the old plants.

On Feb. 19, the MIIT reported that China’s steel production capacity stood at 1.16 billion tons at the end of last year, a rise of 200 million tons since 2012, according to Bloomberg News.

Apparent steel consumption last year fell 4 percent to 740 million tons, Reuters reported, while output stood at 822.7 million tons, the World Steel Association said.

The China Iron & Steel Association expects production will fall 1.1 percent to about 814 million tons this year.

The reports raise further questions about the role that industrial capacity cuts may have played in energy savings last year.

“Generally, oversupply in the steel sector is unlikely to improve this year, exports will drop slightly, steel prices will stay at low levels and steel mills’ profitability may not be positive,” an MIIT statement said.

The post China’s Energy Figures Raise Doubts – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

The Spanish Army personnel and a large number of the Spanish Guardia Civil officers currently deployed in the Central African Republic (CAR) as part of the European EUFOR RCA mission will return to Spain in early March as the mission draws to a close, the Spanish government said.

The operation, which will conclude on 15 March, entered the withdrawal phase on 6 February. Deactivation of the Spanish troops has been gradual, with operational capacity maintained up until 24 February. Between 1 and 10 March, 73 members of the Special Operations Force and 17 Spanish Guardia Civil officers will leave Bangui (capital of the CAR) to return home.

The mission has been in operation for 10 months (since May 2014). A total of 197 Spanish military personnel have taken part, deployed in Bangui on two rotations. These forces have completed 447 operations, to which can be added over 150 Spanish Guardia Civil operations that add up to over 100,000 kilometres travelled in the city. In this time, two confrontations took place with local armed personnel but concluded without casualties.

Unstable region

This Spanish deployment was a response to the ongoing instability in the Central African Republic (CAR). In March 2013, President Bozizé was overthrown by Seleka rebels, whose leader – Michel Djotodia – assumed power. However, he was unable to clamp down on the violence perpetrated by the Seleka rebels against the Christian and animist populations, who stood up to him by forming the ‘anti-balaka militia groups’.

In October 2013, the UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, authorised the deployment of a peacekeeping force by the African Union – the Support Mission to the Central African Republic (MISCA). Two months later, France deployed a force of its own under Operation ‘Sangaris’.

A serious confrontation occurred between Seleka and anti-Balaka in December 2013, which left nearly 1,000 people dead. Michel Djotodia stepped down in January 2014 and the National Transitional Council appointed Catherine Samba-Panza as President of the CAR, forming a new provisional government.

Against this backdrop, the UN Security Council authorised the deployment of a European Union force on 28 January 2014 (Resolution 2134) aimed at establishing a stable and secure environment to enable transition from MISCA to a new United Nations mission.

EUFOR RCA

The European Union mission was designed as a bridging operation that would conclude in October, six months after reaching full operational capacity. However, the UN extended the operation to March 2015 under Resolution 2181 of October 2014. The operation entered its withdrawal phase on 6 February.

The EUFOR RCA military force deployed in Bangui was formed of 650 military personnel overall, structured into a Multinational Battalion, a Police unit (consisting of members of the French Gendarmerie and the Spanish Guardia Civil), a Special Operations Force and a Joint Multinational Logistics Centre.

The Operation Commander has his General Headquarters in Larissa (Greece) while the Force Commander and his General Headquarters are located in Bangui, with France acting as the framework nation for this operation.

EUFOR RCA has contributed to protecting the population from inter-ethnic conflict and criminal activity; helped establish the conditions to guarantee freedom of movement for civilians and humanitarian organisations; and has facilitated the reactivation of economic activity, as well as the return of displaced people.

Spanish contribution

On 21 March 2014, the Spanish Council of Ministers authorised participation by a Special Operations Force (Spanish acronym: FOE) and a Section of the Spanish Guardia Civil.

An initial Spanish contingent of 50 Special Operations personnel and 25 Guardia Civil officers arrived in Bangui in May 2014. Another ten Spanish military personnel were already deployed at the general headquarters facilities in Larissa and Bangui itself.

After the mission was extended in October, Spain decided to relieve its forces on the ground with a second contingent of 73 Spanish Army personnel and 24 Guardia Civil officers, which joined the six operational military personnel at the General Headquarters of the Operation Force in Bangui.

The Spanish forces deployed in CAR between 2014 and 2015 have made a significant contribution to improving the situation in this region. The Special Operations Force undertook reconnaissance missions by day and night, which enabled a precise assessment of the environment to be acquired as an essential tool in this type of operation.

Contact was maintained with various local leaders and permanent detachments were established in the third district of the capital, which improved understanding between the population and EUFOR forces, and increased the level of security and stability in the area. All this facilitated the return of those displaced from the various camps located in the capital.

The Spanish Guardia Civil provided citizen security services in the third and fifth districts of the capital, specifically and in a joint fashion together with patrols carried out by internal CAR security forces, with whom the Spanish officers carried out mentoring activities.

As from 15 March, only one contingent of eight Guardia Civil officers will remain in Bangui as part of MINUSCA.

The post Spain’s Armed Forces Conclude Mission In Central African Republic appeared first on Eurasia Review.

US Secretary of State John Kerry who addressed high-level segment of the 28th session of the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) yesterday said that Sri Lanka is among the significant successes of the Council and added that opportunities for real change exist in Sri Lanka.

While stating that no other state has worked harder than the USA to promote human rights, he added that although the ‘wheels of justice may not turn as rapidly as all of us would wish, the foundation for establishing justice has been prepared.’

Meanwhile Japan, UK and Botswana also expressed their hopes for real change in Sri Lanka.

Addressing the high- level segment, Takashi Uto, the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan said they welcome the constructive dialog between the Sri Lankan government and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR).

“At the same time, we welcome that the constructive dialogue is being had between Sri Lanka and OHCHR and expect that such actions will lead to genuine reconciliation, a goal towards Japan will as much cooperation as possible,” the Japanese representative said.

Baroness Anelay, UK Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Office, said the UK supports the Human Rights High Commissioner’s recommendation that the Council defer discussions on Sri Lanka and consideration of his office’s report on the investigation on Sri Lanka’s mandated by the UNHRC resolution, which was co-sponsored by the UK along with the US and 40 other countries.

She said the UK agrees with the High Commissioner that the report should be published no later than September.

Botswana Foreign Affairs and International Corporation Minister Pelonomi Venson Moitoi, congratulated Sri Lanka on the outcome of its Presidential election and expressed their willingness to work with the new government.

She said that it’s an opportunity to make further progress and further strengthen efforts towards democracy and resolve outstanding human rights issues.

The post Kerry Says Sri Lanka Among Significant Successes Of UNHRC appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Sultan al-Barei

A recently concluded counter-terrorism conference in Mecca has highlighted the need to tackle terrorism at its roots through improved education, conference organisers and participants said.

Around 400 prominent clerics and security experts from around the world took part in “Islam and the Fight Against Terrorism”, held February 22nd to 25th under the auspices of Saudi monarch Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud.

The Mecca-based Muslim World League, a group of non-government organisations, organised the event.

“The conference was held at a very sensitive time, during which Islam is facing a fierce attack and a systematic plan designed to distort its true image,” Sheikh Mohammed al-Shamly of the conference’s organising committee told Al-Shorfa.

Discussion focused on six key areas, he said: the concept of terrorism, religious causes of terrorism, social and economic causes, educational, cultural and media-related causes, terrorism and global regional interests and the effects of terrorism.

Several white papers on terrorism and how to confront it were presented and discussed during the conference, he said.

“The main feature that united those participating in the discussion was renouncing the precept of takfir,” he said, noting that extremist groups have been labeling people as infidels “simply due to a difference in opinion”.

“Another focal point was the importance of reaching out to youths who are targeted by takfiri terrorist groups and to focus on rehabilitating those who have been brainwashed, whether they have repented and returned to their countries or those that are still in such hot spots like Iraq and Syria,” he said.

The issue of ideologically rehabilitating extremists was the focus of discussion, he said. The Munasaha counselling programme Saudi Arabia has adopted was highlighted, as was the role of society in general and the family in particular in successfully expunging extremist ideology.

Al-Shamly stressed the importance of co-ordination among the security forces, programme officials and families in order to achieve the highest level of success.

Conference participant Abdullah al-Muqrin, who teaches comparative jurisprudence at Mecca’s Umm al-Qura University, said the key points discussed during the conference were those relating to youth and the importance of safeguarding them ideologically and culturally from terrorist ideologies.

“We have to take advantage of all modern technological means, particularly the Internet, in order to make sure that the [counter-terrorism] message is sent and received,” he told Al-Shorfa.

“Releasing correct fatwas and redoubling efforts to use the Internet are key to protecting young people, which should also go hand-in-hand with uncovering the deceitful methods used by preachers of takfiri organisations, especially the terrorist ‘Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant’ (ISIL), which distorts the interpretation of the Qur’an, hadith and historical and religious events,” he said.

Education key to enlightened thinking

“Terrorists take advantage of religion, money and ideology during their recruitment operations, which is why confrontation must go through these channels by focusing on education at all levels including university education, which is the most important,” al-Muqrin said.

“Special attention should equally be paid to general and religious culture in an attempt to spread enlightened thinking among young minds and to move from there to securing jobs for graduates and academic underachievers so as to protect them financially and avoid them joining for financial reasons,” he added.

“Those participating at the conference reached a conclusion that there are no specific reasons for terrorism, but a host of reasons that are exploited by terrorist groups to spread their ideology,” said Sheikh Mahmoud Abd al-Saadi, a member of the Al-Azhar delegation.

These include financial and economic factors such as poverty and job scarcity, he said, in addition to intellectual, political, social and educational reasons.

“The most important reason, for which everyone takes responsibility, is the obvious lack of sound religious education and the spread of religious ignorance,” he added. “This has opened the door for erroneous ideas.”

“Terrorists were aware of this gap and they decided to step in and implement their plan by spreading a group of unsanctioned preachers and clerics who spread their poison in society, which led some to rely on terrorist thinking as if it represented the correct principles of religion,” he told Al-Shorfa.

Islamic curricula slated for review

Conference participants discussed ways to confront takfiri and terrorist ideology, al-Saadi said, noting that their most important conclusion was the need to conduct a comprehensive review of Islamic curricula in most Islamic countries.

This is intended to eradicate incorrect fatwas that have found their way into religious curricula, he said, as well as to ensure that sound religious principles are spread in Muslim countries and in countries with Muslim populations.

“Recent events showed that ISIL is heavily targeting Muslims in western countries in order to recruit them,” he said.

Conference recommendations also included training a new group of moderate preachers and clerics to serve as ambassadors for Islam.

This group would go on world tours to introduce the correct principles of Islam to both Muslims and members of other faiths in order to assure these groups that Muslims are “partners in life and humanity”, he said.

The post Saudi Arabia: Mecca Conference Mulls Ways To Tackle Terrorism appeared first on Eurasia Review.

In the wake of the Charlie Hebdo massacre, how should Europe go about containing Islamic extremism and prevent similar attacks in the future? Gawdat Bahgat argues that it must continue to promote transparency as well as social, economic and political reforms around the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean.

By Gawdat Bahgat*

The attacks on the magazine Charlie Hebdo and the deaths of 17 people in Paris in early January 2015 have re-activated the ongoing debate about the place of Islam and Muslims in Europe. The attacks were carried out by French Muslims descended from recent waves of North and West African immigration. Regrettably, similar attacks (or plans for attacks) have either taken place or been discovered in other European cities in the last several years. In response, anti-immigration parties such as France’s far right National Front, and Germany’s Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the West (Pegida) have mobilized their members and sought to capitalize on popular sentiments. Nationalist, anti-immigrant parties have gained momentum and seats in last May’s elections for the European Parliament.

European leaders have sought to counter this rising trend and to re-assure their Muslim populations. According to French President Francois Hollande, “Muslims are the first victims of fanaticism, fundamentalism and intolerance. Islam is compatible with democracy and we must reject sweeping generalizations and confusion.” German Chancellor Angela Merkel reiterated that Islam belongs in Germany and called on Islamic leaders to clarify the relationship between their religion and the militants who claim to act in its name.

Rhetoric aside, the weeks following the Paris attacks have witnessed a variety of official responses in national and European arenas on counter-terrorism policies. These proposed responses address a broad range of issues including prevention of radicalization, border controls, information sharing, judicial response and illicit firearms trafficking. These law-enforcement measures are designed to prevent similar attacks. In the long-run, however, a more comprehensive political strategy is needed.

Islam and the West

The question of Islam’s compatibility with Western values has been debated for a long time. Some claim that there is an ideological war between Islam and the West. Within this context, it is important to highlight two important propositions. First, for more than half a century millions of immigrants from North Africa (and elsewhere) have arrived in Europe – lured by work, welfare and a refuge from wars and political instability. Most of them have contributed to Europe’s economic prosperity. For different reasons, the efforts to assimilate them into European societies have achieved very modest success. These marginalized Muslim communities provide fertile ground for extremism. Despite the lack of reliable data, most observers agree that the number of Muslims in Europe is large and growing. Second, this notion of ideological war assumes that Islam or militant Islam is monolithic. Muslims, like followers of other religions, have different interpretations of their religion. Stereotyping and generalizations can help to mobilize angry crowds but undermine efforts to understand Muslim communities in Europe.

A better counter-terrorism approach than promoting notions of an ideological war between Islam and the West would be to examine and address the socio-economic and political conditions in Europe’s backyard. Underdevelopment and political instability in South and East Mediterranean States are major forces behind terrorist attacks in Europe. Globalization means, among other things, that the security of Europe is intertwined with economic prosperity and political stability in the Arab/Muslim world.

Southern and Eastern Mediterranean States

Stagnant economies, declining standards of living, high unemployment rates, corruption, a lack of transparency, and the absence of independent judicial systems are characteristic of most of the nations in this region. These conditions have been the driving force behind waves of immigration to Europe. The political upheavals in the Arab world since early 2011 have made a bad situation much worse. According to a recent report by the World Bank the economic growth rate in the Middle East North Africa region has declined from five percent a year in 2000-10 to a little over two percent since 2011. The report estimated that the conflicts in Egypt, Tunisia, Syria and Libya, and their spillover into Jordan and Lebanon, had cost roughly $168 billion between 2011-13. A brief survey illustrates the challenges the region – and Europe – faces.

In Morocco, economic growth has declined in recent years and unemployment remains a challenge. The economy has not created enough jobs to absorb all the new job seekers, especially the urban youth and the educated, whose unemployment rates have reached 36.6 percent and 19.5 percent respectively. In Algeria, overall economic growth has been slow due to falling hydrocarbon output. The economy remains heavily dependent on the hydrocarbon sector which, despite declining production since 2006, still accounts for about a third of GDP and 98 percent of exports. President Bouteflika’s old age and fragile health also create a great deal of uncertainty regarding the country’s political stability.

Tunisia, the birthplace of the ‘Arab Spring,’ is probably the shining star in the region. After a short period of uncertainty, a new constitution was promulgated in early 2014, and legislative and presidential elections were held. Still, the security situation remains volatile, especially near the borders with Algeria and Libya. Tunisia’s future depends on the continuation of an orderly political transition and the implementation of sound economic reform.

Libya has been mired in violence and political divisions since Moammar Ghaddafi was killed in 2011. Shortly thereafter, a civil war broke out between the internationally recognized government based in the country’s east and a rebel faction known as Libya Dawn that controls the country’s capital of Tripoli. Oil has long been the country’s lifeblood with exports reaching up to 1.3 million barrels a day at peak production. At the beginning of the civil war there was an implicit agreement between the factions to avoid disrupting oil production. In recent months, however, these factions have started attacking oil fields and other facilities. In response several European oil companies such as Italy’s Eni, France’s Total and Germany’s Wintershall have recently suspended their operations. Oil production has fallen from nearly 900,000 barrels a day in October 2014 to about 300,000 barrels a day in January 2015.

In Egypt, the kidnapping and killing of 21 Coptic Christians in early 2015 illustrate the spillover effects of terrorism. Given the country’s large population (approximately 90 million) and its cultural and political weight in the Middle East, stability in Egypt will have significant implications all over the Arab World and in Europe. Since the toppling of President Mohammad Morsi in 2013 the security situation has improved but remains fragile as sporadic attacks on the police and the military continue, particularly in the Sinai Peninsula. President Abdel Fatah Al-Sisi has shown little tolerance of the opposition but has taken several initiatives to improve the economy. These initiatives are largely funded by Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait. It is too early to assess the success of these initiatives, but there are signs of modest economic recovery.

In the Eastern Mediterranean states, political and economic conditions are even worse than in North Africa. The Syrian civil war is in its fourth year with more than 200,000 deaths and half the population either internally displaced or refugees in neighboring countries. The advances of the Islamic State (IS) and the sharp divisions within the secular opposition have further aggravated the security situation. The prolonged civil war has attracted foreign fighters from many countries. Some of them are European citizens and might represent a major terrorist threat upon their return to their home countries. Moreover, the crisis in Syria has tremendously impacted its neighbors, particularly Lebanon. The country is home to more than 1.2 million Syrian refugees. This large number of refugees has put pressure on limited indigenous resources and contributed to rising inflation and unemployment. Meanwhile, political divisions have blocked the presidential elections and have added new security concerns.

Europe’s response

This lack of economic opportunities and political transparency has always been seen as a major economic, social and security challenge to Europe. For a long time the leaders of the European Union (EU) have concluded that economic prosperity and political stability in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean would substantially enhance their national security and counter-terrorism policies. After the 2004 enlargement of the EU with 10 new member states, the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) was adopted. Sixteen countries participate in the ENP: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, the occupied Palestinian territory, Syria and Tunisia in the south, and Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine in the east. The goal is to bring Europe and its neighbors closer and to promote good governance and social development through closer political links and partial economic integration. It is important to point out, however, that the ENP is not about enlargement. Although the EU works with its southern and eastern neighbors to achieve the closest possible political association and the greatest possible degree of economic integration, it does not offer the participating countries the possibility of accession. More specifically, the ENP focuses on four areas:

• Strengthen the rule of law, democracy and respect for human rights;
• Promote free market reforms;
• Generate jobs and social cohesion;
• Cooperate on key foreign policy and national security issues like counter-terrorism and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

According to the ENP, partner countries agree with the EU on an action plan in which they demonstrate their commitment to democracy, human rights, the rule of law, good governance, free-market principles, and sustainable development. In return, the EU provides financial support, economic integration, easier travel to the EU and technical and policy support. In response to political changes in several Arab countries in 2011 the EU introduced the “more for more” approach, pledging more European funds and other forms of assistance in return for participating countries implementing more economic and political reform.

Europe and its southern neighbors – the way forward

Ten years after the adoption of the ENP, it is clear that the policy has achieved modest success. Most of the participating countries lag behind in economic and political reform. One can argue that the recent wave of terrorist attacks in Europe are related to political and economic uncertainty as well as to the rise of failed and failing states in the south and east Mediterranean. Against this background European leaders are increasingly pressured to address the immediate terrorist threats. In mid-February, Italy warned that there was a grave danger of IS fighters in Libya allying with other Islamist extremist groups, establishing a foothold on the shores of the Mediterranean from where they could attack Europe. The Egyptian President Al-Sisi has also emerged as a champion in the war against extremism. Some European countries have recently softened their opposition to Syrian President Al-Assad, focusing instead on defeating IS and other extremist groups.

In the short-term, these policies might be necessary to contain and weaken extremist groups inside Europe and in its backyard. In the long-term, however, Europe should adhere to its commitment to promote transparency and reform in the south and east Mediterranean. In doing so, Europe must find the right balance between protecting its national security and citizens while maintaining its democratic values both at home and in its immediate neighborhood.

*Dr. Gawdat Bahgat is professor of National Security Affairs at the National Defense University’s Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Study. He is an Egyptian-born specialist in Middle Eastern policy, particularly Egypt, Iran, and the Gulf region. His areas of expertise include energy security, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, counter-terrorism, Arab-Israeli conflict, North Africa, and American foreign policy in the Middle East.

The post Europe And Islam: The Way Forward – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

A decline of traditional hierarchical criminal groups and networks will be accompanied by the expansion of a virtual criminal underground made up of individual criminal entrepreneurs, who come together on a project basis, according to a Europol report.

According to the EU law enforcement agency,  these people will lend their knowledge, experience and expertise as part of a ‘crime-as-a-service’ business model.

Europol notes that such dynamics can already be seen in the realm of cybercrime, but in the future these will extend to the domain of ‘traditional’ organized crime, governing crime areas such as drugs trafficking, illegal immigration facilitation and counterfeiting of goods.

These trends are detailed in Europol’s newly-released report ‘Exploring tomorrow’s organized crime’, which identifies a series of key driving factors that will impact the future landscape of serious and organized crime in Europe. The report also looks at how law enforcement authorities might counter and contain organized crime activities over the coming years.

“Organized crime is dynamic and adaptable and law enforcement authorities across the EU are challenged to keep pace with the changing nature of this substantial and significant threat. This report – the first of its kind for Europol – will enable us to look ahead and better allocate resources, plan operational activities and engage with policy- and law-makers to prevent certain types of crimes from emerging” said Rob Wainwright, Director of Europol.

The report is the outcome of Europol experts’ engagement with other experts from the private and public sectors, academia and partners in the European law enforcement community.

The Europol report notes that innovation in transportation and logistics will enable organized crime groups to increasingly commit crime anonymously over the Internet, anywhere and anytime, without being physically present.

Additionally, the report predicts that nanotechnology and robotics will open up new markets for organized crime and deliver new tools for sophisticated criminal schemes.

Relatedly, the increasing exploitation of Big Data and personal data will enable criminal groups to carry out complex and sophisticated identity frauds on previously unprecedented levels.

Europol also sees e-waste emerging as a key illicit commodity for organized crime groups operating in Europe.

According to the Europol report, economic disparity across Europe is making organized crime more socially acceptable as organized crime groups will increasingly infiltrate economically weakened communities, portraying themselves as providers of work and services.

On that backdrop, it is predicted that organised crime groups will increasingly attempt to infiltrate industries that depend on natural resources, to act as brokers or agents in the trade.

The report also notes that virtual currencies increasingly enable individuals to act as freelance criminal entrepreneurs operating on a crime-as-a-service business model without the need for a sophisticated criminal infrastructure to receive and launder money.

Organized criminal groups will increasingly target, but also provide illicit services and goods to, a growing population of elderly people exploiting new markets and opportunities, the report notes.

The post Europol Sees Massive Changes In Criminal Landscape appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Loro Horta*

The year 2014 saw a dramatic increase in terror attacks in China with nearly 300 people killed. Most of the attacks took place in the restive Xinjiang province where Islamist Uighur’s groups have been demanding an independent state. While terrorism is not new to Xinjiang the intensity is clearly growing due primarily, but not exclusively, to foreign influence from radical groups in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan and elsewhere.

In May 2014, Uighur terrorists carried out their most deadly attack on China killing bearly 40 people. In September Indonesia’s elite battalion 88 capture four Chinese citizens on suspicion of belonging to the terrorist organization Islamic State (IS). The four men are reported to be from the Uighur ethnic group and were in Indonesia to establish contact with local terrorist groups. In Aguste Iraqi authorities release pictures of a Chinese citizen captured while fighting with IS forces in northern Iraq. Dozens of terrorists from the Eastern Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) and other minor terrorist groups were killed by US and NATO forces in Afghanistan since 2001. China Central Television /8CCTV) reported that hundreds of Uighurs have left China illegally in 2014 to join IS in Iraq and Syria.

While many Western observers have dismissed groups like East Turkistan Islamic Movement as amateurs and claimed that China was exaggerating its capabilities, the fact of the matter is that Uighur extremist’s attacks have grown more frequent and deadly. Over 200 people were killed in China in 2014 in such attacks. While horrific these attacks were, they are rather low tech and used very primitive methods. However, as growing numbers of extremists gain experience in Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan this is change fast.

Certain Western analysts simplistically claim that the reason why terrorists have not been able to carry more attacks in China is because of the extremely repressive internal security apparatus. This explanation ignores several facts. First China trough the SCO had built strong cooperative security links with the Central Asian countries bordering Xinjiang. This has denied Uighur extremists vital sanctuary. China’s foreign policy has emphasized mutual respect and none interference in the domestic affairs of other states. This has in turn gain Beijing good will or at least the neutrality of the Muslim world who had by enlarge abstain from supporting extremists. Finally the rapid development of Xinjiang and growing educational level of its population has reduced the appeal of fundamentalists.

Western scholars tend to argue that oppression and lack of freedom is what drives young Chinese Uighurs to terrorism. Thousands of Muslims brought up in the free and democratic West have join terrorist organizations in far larger numbers than Uighurs. So lack of freedom it’s certainly not the reason why some Uighurs are joining IS and other terrorist groups. Unless these same Western scholars are willing to accept that France or Australia, from where hundreds of young Muslims have left a life of comfort and “infinity freedom” to fight in Iraq and Syria are not free after all. Its rather the appeal of a fanatic ideology to certain individuals that is behind this phenomenon. This is by no means to suggest that many of the grievances raised by ethnic Uighur citizens are not legitimate. Indeed, China could do much more to address the issue of severe unemployment and alcoholism among youths. The central government could also do more to promote Uighurs to top positions of authority.

As French President Francois Holland told a summit in Paris on September 15 in an effort to mobilize world opinion against IS.:

“With these terrorists you can’t reason with. You have to conquer them”

While some in the West tell China to improve freedom and cultural tolerance to deal with its extremists, they have no qualms in conquering those terrorists who threaten their interests. Are there good terrorists and bad ones?

Western diplomats in Beijing demanded to observe the trail of Ilhan Tohti to ensure human rights and legal impartiality standards. However, several terrorist suspects were tried in the US behind close doors for national security reasons. At least 16 Chinese nationals of the Uighur nationality were detained in Guantanamo Bay and the US authorities strangely refused their extradition to China on human rights concerns. Considering the poor record of that facility this could only be seen as a bad joke. Several US Congressional and Senate investigations have shown that the US government sent dozens of terrorist suspects to Jordan, Pakistan and ironically Syria in the 2000s where they were tortured. Has subsequent investigations showed some of those tortured where innocent. The West is in no position to lecture China on good counter terrorism methods or free trails.

Certain European countries gave asylum to Uighur terror suspects after they were released from Guantanamo .How would the West feel if China gave asylum to those who committed the Paris atrocities? While the world is right in condemning the barbarities committed in Paris. Western nations and media did not express the same solidarity when much worse attacks were committed in China.

Western governments fear the return of thousands of its Muslim radical citizens home where they could put their skills obtained in these conflict areas to devastating effect. Chinese leaders fear the same and their fears are as legitimate as those of Western leaders. The West and China have many points of disagreement, but on this one they must agree for the sake of the civilized world.

President Obama as accused China of “free riding” and not contrinuting enough to international efforts in Iraq. If the West wants greater cooperation from China it needs to treat China equally. There are no good or bad terrorists. Terror is terror.

*Loro Horta is a senior diplomat based in Beijing. He previously worked for the United Nations in Central Asia and as visited Xinjiang. He is a graduate of the Peoples Liberation Army National Defence University (PLANDU) senior officers course and also a graduate of the US Naval Post Graduate School and the American National Defence University. The views expressed here are strictly his own

The post Understanding Terrorism In China – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

The SAARC Yatra to be undertaken by Foreign Secretary S. Jaishankar from March 1 is an opportunity for India to improve relations, resurrect stalled projects and create new synergies with its neighbourhood. An initiative like this could hold the key to India shedding the ‘hegemon’ tag and pursuing mutually beneficial policies with its neighbours.

By R. Abhyankar*

India’s Foreign Secretary S. Jaishankar has begun his South Asian yatra starting with Bhutan, then Bangladesh and Nepal, and followed by Pakistan and Afghanistan. He will visit Sri Lanka and the Maldives twice–the first time accompanying Prime Minister Narendra Modi on his trip to India’s neighbours to the south.

This visit should be seen as a separate string of interactions without planned reciprocal official exchanges. By focusing on SAARC’s development agenda, the yatra could surmount the diarchic entropy with which the organistion remains afflicted.

It will, for the first time, give equal priority and mind-space in India’s foreign policy to countries other than Pakistan. ASEAN has shown SAARC the way to boost commitment and delivery of regional projects and make common cause of confronting global challenges.

We tend to forget a few facts: India’s total land area exceeds that of all SAARC members combined. India has land borders with six states totalling 14,000 km, and is the only state to share borders—maritime and land—with all South Asian countries, except Afghanistan (if not for Pakistan-occupied Kashmir). Nepal and Bhutan are landlocked, Bangladesh and the Maldives fear rising sea-levels while India’s coastline is over 7,000 km. India accounts for 81% of South Asia’s total GDP, and is four time larger in area to the next largest country, Pakistan.

By deepening understanding of each other’s’ priorities and exploring new areas for cooperation, discussion will be freed from the strait-jacket of pre-ordered briefs, dynamism will be injected into a sterile situation and positivity will be introduced in each relationship.

Yet this is only the first step in a perpetual and delicate process. India will need to tread carefully in a situation where no amount of effort so far has surmounted latent sensitivities of India’s ”hegemony”. By emphasising the equality of each relationship, de-hyphenating relationships with diverse domestic political forces and building mutually acceptable structures for regular interaction, synergies could be created where none exist.

Suggested priority areas for joint action are a review of on-going projects, countering linkages between groups engaged in terror and extremist violence, management of disasters and pandemics, and confronting the effects of climate change.

Its corollary on the Indian side will be to build positively on the existing enmeshing of contiguous Indian states as economic partners and construct a bridge between Delhi and the neighbouring capital. The recent visit to Dhaka by West Bengal chief minister Mamata Banerjee, to be followed next week by the foreign secretary, illustrates this point.

There is a need to create a regular inter-ministerial mechanism or agency to ensure timely project delivery and that India makes good on its commitments. Some of its building blocks are regular periodic reviews of budget allocations and delivery schedules on SAARC commitments, the earmarking of an inter-services formation for emergency humanitarian assistance to SAARC, and a regular review of connectivity. Success on these fronts will provide the ballast for closer interaction on political, security and social challenges.

The continuing concern at delays, slow-footedness and a niggardly approach on Indian commitments to neighbours like Bangladesh and Afghanistan, would defeat the purpose behind this innovative policy. What seems to be being attempted is nothing short of breaking the mould of India’s traditional interaction with its neighbours, and aims to overcome the cycle of mutual distrust and animosity which has hindered the goal of security and prosperity for all. It calls for a determined, cohesive and enduring approach.

Inevitably, Jaishankar’s proposed SAARC yatra is already seen as sugar-coating the bitter pill of resuming the dialogue with Pakistan. The implied sotto voce is that U.S. President Barack Obama’s pressure has worked: Pakistan still calls the shots, India’s earlier bravado was a passing fancy and it is back to its old ways.

There is another way to consider this excellent initiative.

It maintains the dose of realism in India’s diplomatic practice we have seen under Modi: that India must constructively develop its relations within SAARC to ensure it becomes an asset in its global mission. The unilateral decision for a foreign secretary to visit all SAARC members, unmindful of reciprocity, is a unique step. It finally projects India’s readiness to pursue a proactive and mutually beneficial policy towards all its South Asian neighbours.

*Rajendra Abhyankar, a former diplomat, is Professor of the Practice of Diplomacy and Public Affairs at the School of Public and Environmental Affairs, Indiana University, Bloomington.

This feature was written  for Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations.

The post SAARC Sojourn: Surmounting The Entropy – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Indian Foreign Secretary S. Jaishankar’s visit to SAARC countries that began March 1 is an opportunity to examine the political trajectories in the region. While democracy in some countries like Sri Lanka is on an upswing, in others, like Bangladesh, it is in decline. With China’s growing economic influence in South Asia, can Indian democracy be an effective counterpoint?

By Neelam Deo*

Less than a month after he was appointed foreign secretary, S. Jaishankar has been tasked with injecting momentum into India’s relations with its neighbours—to this end, he has embarked on a “SAARC Yatra” starting from Bhutan on March 1.

It is now nearly three-quarters of a century since most South Asian countries became democracies, and this provides a milestone to assess democracy in the region. It is also an important moment because the political trajectories of South Asian countries in the medium term will be determined by the balance they can achieve between the attractions of India’s democratic model to their people, and the lure of China’s economic largesse to promote infrastructure projects, to their governments.

INDIAN DEMOCRACY

India is the gold standard for democracy in South Asia. Regular and fair elections among the world’s largest electorate of 814 million (in May 2014) is itself an extraordinary exercise. While other countries in the region have elected governments too, they are still making the difficult transition to representative democracy.

Equally importantly, the outcome of the polls in India is not repeatedly rejected by its political parties, Neither do they boycott elections—as Khaleda Zia’s Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) did in January 2014, nor do they challenge the result—as Imran Khan’s Tehreek-e-Insaaf has done since April 2014 in Pakistan. This gives India’s democratic processes and institutions significant credibility.

The Bharatiya Janata Party won the 2014 general election on the platforms of anti-corruption and anti-dynasty—and both issues have become the demand of electorates in India’s neighbouring countries as well. Last year’s electoral defeat of the Congress party in India was rooted in these issues—and was mirrored by the defeat of Sri Lanka’s unabashedly pro-China president Mahinda Rajapaksa. Opposition to dynasty is becoming an issue in Bangladesh too, which the incumbent Awami League should interpret as a rejection of undemocratic practices.

THE CHINA FACTOR

The West meanwhile is preoccupied with the multiple crises in West Asia, and its interest in South Asia—beyond the ISAF intervention in Afghanistan—is waning. This opens up greater spaces for countries in the region to emulate the Indian model of democracy, rather than the North American.

The West’s dwindling interest is now deflected in allegations of human rights abuses. This censure is couched in threats of economic sanctions (by the U.S. against Sri Lanka in 2014); the blocking of loans from multilateral bodies (for example, the U.S. threatened to block IMF loans to Sri Lanka in 2009); and the withdrawal of trade concessions (as the European Union did with Bangladesh in 2013).

In this scenario, China has stepped in to fill the financial and infrastructural gaps in South Asia. Over the past decade, China has made major economic inroads into South Asian countries through trade, investment, and large-scale construction projects. From $6.5 billion in 2001, China’s trade with SAARC countries multiplied to $73.9 billion in 2012. Chinese investments in South Asia stand at over $30 billion, and China has provided loans worth $25 billion to the region.

INFRASTRUCTURE POLITICS

China’s major projects in South Asia—including the development of the Gwadar Port in Pakistan, the Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka, and the Padma Multipurpose Bridge in Bangladesh—have enabled it to embed itself into these economies. Inevitably, its deepening economic relations with these countries have also translated into political influence in SAARC capitals.

This was evident at the SAARC Summit in Kathmandu in November 2014, when the three largest beneficiaries of China’s economic overtures in the region—Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives—called for China’s status to be changed from an observer member of the grouping to a full member.

Although India is the largest economy in South Asia, it cannot hope to match China’s economic allure to governments in the region. India must therefore become more creative in promoting people-to-people contacts by expanding educational and cultural exchanges.

NEW REALITIES

With Sri Lanka’s growing indebtedness to China—public debt crossed 75% of GDP last year—President Maithripala Sirisena said in his election campaign that Chinese infrastructure projects will be reviewed. After his election, however, it is clear that they will not be cancelled. But his questioning did highlight that future governments will have to be more accountable to electorates for how showcase projects are funded. Sirisena’s first foreign destination in February was India—clearly in an effort to forge a more balanced relationship with both India and China.

While India-Sri Lanka relations are improving, various other recent developments in South Asia are more ambiguous in their implications for the India-China tussle for influence in South Asia.

Bangladesh concluded a successful election in 2014, which the incumbent, India-friendly, Awami League won. But the country is nearly paralysed by violent clashes since the new year between the supporters of the Awami League and the BNP—and this has set back its process of democratisation.

Nepal, geographically and politically caught between India and China, froze relations in the 1980s with India in an effort to attract economic incentives from China. But China-funded infrastructure projects subsequently provoked charges of nepotism and corruption against the leaders of the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist). The party, which led the country’s 10-year-long anti-monarchy struggle, consequently lost the election in 2013. The successor government is working more closely with India to frame Nepal’s new Constitution. But, social and ethnic divisions are deep, and are being made more unbridgeable by the CPN(M) threatening to resume protest mode.

In the Maldives, India has criticised the recent arrest of former president Mohamed Nasheed—a self-proclaimed opponent of Chinese economic inroads into his country. During his presidency, Nasheed had awarded the contract to upgrade the Ibrahim Nasir International Airport in Malé to GMR, an Indian company. His successor, Mohammed Waheed Hassan, rescinded the contract in 2012 and instead awarded it to a Chinese firm. This vacillation exemplifies the tussle between India and China in the region.

But the country that has benefited the most from China’s attention and largesse is unequivocally Pakistan—it has received Chinese nuclear weapons and missile technologies, nuclear power plants, sophisticated weapons, and massive infrastructure projects, including the proposed $40 billion Pakistan-China Economic Corridor.

Chinese investment, however, is not a priority for the people of Pakistan, who continue to strive for more representative and efficient governance since the first military coup in the country in 1958. They have, so far, overthrown three pro-China and pro-West military dictators, but remain trapped in the machinations of the country’s armed forces. It is noteworthy that even the Pakistan Army now projects itself as pro-democracy, while it calls the shots from behind the scenes.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi has already visited Bhutan and Nepal, and is scheduled to visit Sri Lanka and the Maldives in March. Apart from Bangladesh so far, Pakistan remains a major gap on his itinerary. After Atal Behari Vajpayee’s visit in 1999, no Indian prime minister has visited Pakistan—and a proactive Modi is likely to be next.

While the presence of China in South Asian economies will continue to expand, democracy, as seen maturing in India, will remain the preoccupation of the people in the region.

*Neelam Deo is Co-founder and Director, Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations; She has been the Indian Ambassador to Denmark and Ivory Coast; and former Consul General in New York.

This article was published by Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations

The post An Indian Democracy Template For SAARC? – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

The B20 forum has become an important advisor to the G20, bridging the gap between business and foreign policy. Its effectiveness will depend on whether it can emerge as a solutions provider for the G20 and not just an advocacy forum. Indian business can play a vital role in shaping this mandate.

By Akshay Mathur*

A powerful new fora for global business is emerging and it is called the B20. Business leaders were first invited to this forum at the G20 Finance Ministers’ meeting in Canada in 2010. Since then, the B20 has become an important bridge between business and foreign economic policy[1]. The forum has met regularly since then on the sidelines of the G20 Summits – South Korea (2010), France (2011), Mexico (2012), Russia (2013) and Australia (2014) – to advise world leaders on global economic governance. This year, Turkey is the President of the G20; its leadership of the accompanying B20 will be closely watched.

So far, the B20 has made over 400 recommendations to the world leaders. Many have been incorporated into the final G20 vision[2]. At the last G20 Summit in Australia, the B20 task forces comprising of 300 global business leaders made recommendations on a range of business issues from infrastructure to energy.

However, the impact of the B20 on the G20, and ultimately on global economic governance, has been uneven. A self-assessment done by the B20 forum during the Russian Presidency in 2013 concludes that only 35% of the recommendations were adopted by the G20 leadership[3]. Even in cases where acceptance was higher, like employment (97%), the effectiveness was marred by subsequent reports that called the G20 employment policies “ineffective” for working people, stating a bias towards big business[4].

What imperils B20 most is its job description. It sees itself as an advisor to G20 leaders – not as a practical implementer of G20 policies. This has resulted in repeated recommendations by business for the same things – invest in infrastructure, focus on green energy, remove trade barriers – without much headway in execution, the very expertise that business has.

Another challenge is that of aligning the B20 mission with the G20 vision. For instance, for Turkey to sync the G20 vision for 2015 (Inclusivity, Implementation, Investment) with the B20 vision (Inclusivity, Continuity, Connectivity) through the six B20 task forces (Trade, Infrastructure and Investment, Financing Growth, Employment, Anti-Corruption, SMEs and Entrepreneurship) is a 54-dimensional challenge. The relevance of the final recommendations will then be limited.  Better instead to follow the 2013 self-assessment report which found that in cases where a B20 task force focused directly on a G20 goal, the chances of its recommendations being accepted were higher[5]. This makes common sense.

In its defence, the B20 is only in its fifth year, an infant in the forum world (the World Economic Forum has been around since 1971). Assessing its impact may even be unfair. The forum has become more organised and representative since the 2013 self-assessment report. Turkey launched the first B20 meeting in Istanbul in December 2014 with a larger contingent of over 500 Turkish and international business leaders in attendance[6]. The chambers of commerce are now included in B20 meetings, and they claim that G20’s responsiveness to their suggestions has improved[7].

Yet, as the forum grows, there is a risk that competing interests will dilute its mandate to lobbying. The forum needs reconfiguration, without which its role may become ineffective.

First, it must shift from advisory to facilitation. The only Presidency that seems to have adopted this spirit publicly is Mexico in 2012. It specifically asked what business itself can do first, before it advised governments on what they should do[8].

For instance, at the Mexico Summit, the B20 leaders themselves created a club of international financial institutions – the Green Growth Action Alliance – for introducing a “programmatic” approach to private financing of green infrastructure instead of the ad hoc project-by-project financing that lending institutions such as the World Bank were used to[9]. This group was formally launched with more than 40 multilateral and multinational financial institutions with its secretariat at the World Economic Forum. It went on to incubate new financing models; two of them were related to renewable energy initiatives in India[10].

Second, the B20 must refrain from replicating the mission of the World Economic Forum (B20 collaborates with WEF as a partner). Rifat Hisarcıklıoğlu’s, the dynamic Chair of B20 Turkey, compared the G20 to the “world’s economic steering committee” and Davos as the “compass” at WEF 2015. This is contrary to the very raison d’etre of the B20 and Hisarciklioglu’s own mission of including small and medium enterprises as equal stakeholders. WEF’s purpose is to seek the support of the world’s political leaders for meeting business goals whereas the B20’s purpose should be the exact opposite — to galvanise the world’s business leaders for helping the political leaders meet nation-building goals.

Third, the B20 is underplaying the role of technology in the critical issue of job creation – a problem that affects developing and developed nations. This is not only a limitation of imagination but also a denial of reality. Technology firms can contribute as much to GDP and jobs as infrastructure. Google and Apple in the US or Flipkart and TCS in India are common examples. But technology barely makes it as a sub-category of the task forces and technology entrepreneurs remain underrepresented at B20.

The implications of this are evident. This year the B20 Infrastructure task force is brainstorming on how the $57 trillion needed for global infrastructure spending by 2030 can be galvanised[11]. No one has questioned (yet) why spending, say, $10 billion or (less than 2% of the estimate) on scientists at new infrastructure technology research centres in each of the 20 countries to discover affordable materials, would not be a better investment instead.

Lastly, the most game-changing proposals for global economic governance under the G20 have been made by institutions such as the International Securities Organization (IOSCO) on the credibility of global financial and energy benchmarks[12], by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) on the loopholes for money-laundering[13], or by the OECD on mechanisms for catching tax evasion[14]. The B20 can play a similar role for the G20, using its own competencies, of providing business solutions to global problems. For instance, both in 2011 and 2012, the B20 recommended that a multi-currency architecture be introduced, one that enables trade and investment in non-dollar currencies. But even when governments and central banks have tried, businesses have backtracked, reluctant to experiment for fear of costly hedging and transition costs. This could have been a model problem for the B20 to help central bankers to solve.

As the world’s economic health remains in intensive care, expectations from Turkey’s Presidency of the G20 are high. Turkey’s agenda for 2015 has been welcomed in India, which relates to Turkey as another emerging market. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s focus on business as the driver for foreign policy fits nicely with the objectives of the B20. India has played an important role in shaping the recommendations in previous years. If the B20 can reconfigure its approach, Indian business too can help the G20 in realising its priorities. As we know with the outsourcing wave, business solutions to global problems can emerge from India.

*Akshay Mathur is Head of Research at Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. This article was published at  Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations.

References
[1] G20 Information Centre, University of Toronto, From Toronto to Saint Petersburg: Assessing G20-B20 engagement effectiveness, <http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/g20-b20/G20-B20_engagement_effectiveness_report.pdf>

[2] B20 Turkey 2015, B20 Turkey: The Pillars, <http://b20turkey.org/the-b20/b20-turkey/>

[3] G20 Information Centre, University of Toronto, From Toronto to Saint Petersburg: Assessing G20-B20 engagement effectiveness, <http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/g20-b20/G20-B20_engagement_effectiveness_report.pdf>

[4] International Trade Union Confederation, L20 Tracking Report: Half of G20 policies rated as ineffective, 12 November 2014, <http://www.ituc-csi.org/l20-tracking-report-half-of-g20>

[5] G20 Information Centre, University of Toronto, From Toronto to Saint Petersburg: Assessing G20-B20 engagement effectiveness, <http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/g20-b20/G20-B20_engagement_effectiveness_report.pdf>

[6] International Chamber of Commerce, ICC helps launch 2015 B20 Turkey process in Istanbul, 15 December 2014 <http://www.iccwbo.org/News/Articles/2014/ICC-helps-launch-2015-B20-Turkey-process-in-Istanbul/>

[7] International Chamber of Commerce, ICC G20 Scorecard, 1 February 2014, <http://www.iccwbo.org/global-influence/g20/reports-and-products/icc-g20-scorecard/>

[8] B20 Australia 2014, Driving growth and jobs: B20 policy recommendations to the G20, 18 July 2014 <http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/b20/B20-2014-recommendations.pdf>

[9] World Economic Forum, Green Growth Action Alliance, <http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GreenGrowthActionAlliance_Overview_2012.pdf>

[10] World Economic Forum, The Green Growth Action Alliance: Progress Report from the First Year of Catalysing Private Investment, 1 June 2013, <http://www3.weforum.org/docs/IP/2013/ENVI/GreenGrowthActionAlliance_2013.pdf>

[11] B20 Turkey 2015, Infrastructure & Investment Taskforce, 14 December 2014, <http://b20turkey.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Infrastructure.pdf>

[12] International Securities Organization, Implementation of the Principles for Oil Price Reporting Agencies, 1 September 2014 <http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD448.pdf>

[13] Financial Action Task Force, Corruption, <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/topics/corruption/>

The post Reconfiguring The Role Of Business In G20 – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

The accusation against Cambodia following the controversial 2012 ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting in Phnom Penh fails to acknowledge the challenges that each member state faces with the rise of China. A strong and united ASEAN is needed as the group formalises this year its vision of a cohesive ASEAN Community.

By Phoak Kung

Three years after the controversial 2012 ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) in Cambodia which ended for the first time without a joint communiqué, opinion still weighed against Phnom Penh. As the region enters a crucial year to formalise its vision of a single, united and cohesive ASEAN Community, what lessons could be learned from the Phnom Penh debacle?

In 2012, all eyes were on Cambodia to see how it would handle the most contentious South China Sea maritime disputes between its close ally China and some ASEAN member states namely the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei. As expected, the Philippines and Vietnam pushed for their claims during the talks in Phnom Penh. When ASEAN failed to issue a joint communiqué for the first time in 45 years, many were quick to point their finger at Cambodia, accusing its leaders of putting their interests ahead of ASEAN’s unity and centrality.

Cambodia just one part of complex issue

The fallout affected relations between Cambodia and its colleagues, most notably the Philippines. The Cambodian Ambassador to Manila was also called back home after making a controversial comment on the Philippines and Vietnam. The widely cited cause of this fallout was that ASEAN’s member states could not agree on the wording of the joint communiqué relating to conflicting claims between the Philippines and China over the Scarborough Shoal.

Actually, this was only one aspect of the unprecedented changes in the regional and global order. In fact, the accusation against Cambodia was rather inflated and failed to address the fundamental problems facing ASEAN as a whole.

The reason Cambodia was singled out was its growing dependence on China economically. Over the past decades, China had given billions of dollars in aid, loans and investments to Cambodia, making it the largest investor to the country. In addition, Cambodian leaders were also seen as having close relations with the Chinese government. They consistently supported China on a number of issues including the ‘‘One China’’ policy.

However, Cambodia is hardly an exception. Many ASEAN leaders also looked to Beijing for a share of China’s new initiatives in the region. In November 2014, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced the establishment of a US$40 billion New Silk Road Strategy and a $50 billion Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB).

Therefore, it remains doubtful whether the 2012 foreign ministers meeting would have ended any differently if another ASEAN member country was the Chair instead. Of course, Cambodia should have handled this matter in a more effective way and found a solution acceptable to all stakeholders. The failure to issue the joint communiqué greatly damaged the country’s image and put it in an uneasy position vis-à-vis its colleagues.

Between a rock and a hard place

As a small and poor country, Cambodia does not want to take sides in regional and international disputes. If it could choose, it would stay neutral. It has consistently maintained such a position towards other disputes, not just the South China Sea. For example, the growing tension between Japan and China over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands puts Cambodia between a rock and a hard place.

When Prime Minister Hun Sen met his Japanese counterpart on the sidelines of the 40th ASEAN-Japan Commemorative Summit in December 2013, he reiterated Cambodia’s neutral position. The government also conveys the same messages to the Chinese government.

Cambodia is expected to take a similar approach towards resolving the South China Sea maritime disputes. It strongly supports a de-escalation of conflict between the claimants to avoid endangering peace and disrupting trade activities in the region and beyond. The recent clashes between China and two ASEAN states – the Philippines and Vietnam – pose a serious security concern.

Unilateral actions by the claimants do not necessarily give them the upper hand in the maritime disputes, but rather make any future negotiations more difficult. Worse, the current military build-up and the deployment of forces in the South China Sea might lead to potential miscalculation and misjudgement. It is important to note that these disputes cannot be solved through force.

Bilateral talks not enough for small states

Further, China insists on solving the maritime disputes through bilateral talks. China was furious when the Philippines brought the case to the Arbitral Tribunal of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), suggesting such unilateral action would only escalate the situation. But it makes a lot of sense for smaller states like the Philippines to use the international laws as a means to solve the disputes. The problem is that even if the tribunal decides in Manila’s favour, China might not comply, although this does not mean China’s interests would remain unaffected.

In fact, Cambodia has been through similar experience in its border disputes with Thailand. From Cambodia’s perspective, a sustainable solution to these disputes would be through bilateral talks with regional organisations like ASEAN and the international community taking on a mediating role and assisting smaller states in leveraging their bargaining power. The Philippines alone will not be able to hammer out a fair deal with its more powerful negotiating counterpart, China.

The good news is that any escalation of conflict will not benefit China either. Admittedly, China has been trying very hard to assure its nervous neighbours and other countries that its rise to global power status is not a threat but an opportunity for shared prosperity. Furthermore, China deeply understands that making enemies with countries in the region will only play into the hands of the United States, which is also seeking to maintain its sphere of influence in the Asia Pacific.

What Cambodia and other ASEAN member states should do is to push ahead with creating a channel of dialogue. ASEAN is rightly assisting the claimants in developing the Code of Conduct on the South China Sea maritime disputes. Despite the lack of progress thus far, it is the most promising route towards a peaceful resolution. More importantly, all the claimants should refrain from taking any unilateral actions that might undermine this process.

Putting the blame on Cambodia over the non-issuance of the joint communiqué is not the answer.

Whether they like it or not, China’s influence in the region will only grow, and retreating to ultra-nationalism is unrealistic and dangerous. The rise of China should not be seen as a zero-sum game. What is needed now is a strong and united ASEAN that can effectively represent the voice of its members.

*Phoak Kung is Co-founder and Co-President of the Cambodian Institute for Strategic Studies. He contributed this specially to RSIS Commentary.

The post The South China Sea Disputes: Three Years After Cambodia – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Ranjit Gupta*

Saudi Arabia had, for the immediate short-term, seemingly successfully launched the process of transition to monarchs coming from the next generation; however, there has been dissent about the two younger generation appointments which has been kept secret from the public. Moreover, continuing widespread, but unreported, unhappiness within the royal family about Prince Muqrin’s elevation means that he may not necessarily become King; Prince Ahmed, the youngest of the seven Sudairi brothers, though presently sidelined, cannot be ruled out from becoming King and then equations change for the future.

Thus, uncertainties on the domestic front remain. These add to Saudi Arabia facing the most challenging and daunting external security environment since the end of World War II. It is strongly besieged on all sides – the emergence of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria determined to recast the geopolitical map of West Asia while simultaneously posing an unprecedented ideological challenge to Wahhabi Saudi Arabia and to the very existence of its monarchical regime; Shiite Houthis taking control of the capital Sana’a and most of northern Yemen, with the country falling apart and staring at the South seceding and where the deeply anti-Saudi al Qaeda is likely to become even stronger than it is; the potential rapprochement between the US, Saudi Arabia’s preeminent ally for the past 70 years, and Iran, Saudi Arabia’s arch enemy since 1979; Obama’s West Asia policies being very different from that of previous Presidents even as US need for Saudi oil is diminishing very sharply. Saudi Arabia’s continuing troubled relations with two GCC partners – Oman since long and Qatar in recent times.

Saudi Arabia has little or no control over how events in the region will evolve. It is not a significant military power. Even though it is the swing producer in global oil dynamics and can singlehandedly influence the price of oil this still does not give Saudi Arabia the clout to meaningfully influence regional strategic dynamics. To compound matters, it has a new King in fragile health and a relatively inexperienced new senior team.

Iran is, has been and will remain the leading regional power in West Asia. Saudi Arabia is not and cannot be an equal power. Carried away by strong US animosity towards the new revolutionary Iran and its own ‘special relationship’ with the US, Saudi Arabia considered the new Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979 as a multi-pronged challenge and chose to respond by adopting a policy of unmitigated opposition to Iran. The US, shortsightedly, also adopted a similar approach which became progressively unsustainable in an increasingly inter-connected world in which Iran has become the preeminent strategic player in West Asia to the increasing disadvantage of the US and its regional allies. There is absolutely no possibility of any improvement in any of the conflict theatres in West Asia without Iran being an active participant in any such endeavours. The region is now caught in the vise of multiple crises forcing the US to finally recognise the reality of strong Iranian regional influence.

If Iran becomes a partner then there is every possibility that negotiated political solutions can be arrived at in Syria and Yemen and of the ground situation improving in Lebanon and the Palestinian Territories, including in Gaza.

Saudi Arabia has to realise that the challenge posed by the Islamic State is far more fundamental and lethal to the Saudi regime, State and system than Iran. Its first and overriding priority must be to ensure the defeat of the Islamic State, both militarily as well as ideologically, though the latter will take a long time. Given current political ground realities in Iraq and Syria and the enormous assistance that Iran has been giving to Iraq in fighting the Islamic State, Iran is the best placed regional country which can help ensure the defeat of the Islamic State.

Therefore, in more ways than one, a US/Western-Iranian deal is the key to stopping the increasing brutality, death and destruction in West Asia. There has to be a fundamental change of mindset by Saudi Arabia in relation to Iran. This is unavoidably necessary to ensure that the potential beneficial spin-offs of a nuclear deal can be translated onto the ground. This is also the only way that Islam-related extremism and militancy can be curbed and ultimately eliminated. Finally, this is absolutely essential to initiate the processes of controlling and ultimately eliminating deepening sectarian divides which have become the major fuel propelling the entirely unnecessary and avoidable killing of innocent people in the thousands. The new Saudi dispensation must play a statesman-like role, completely abjuring past counter-productive policies in relation to Iran.

Furthermore, absent Saudi hostility, there is no rational reason why Iran would be interested in destabilising the regime of any GCC country, including Bahrain. Finally, Iran must be an integral part of any new regional security structures in West Asia.

If the nuclear deal does not happen and Saudi Arabia does not change its attitudes then deepening cleavages in West Asia will become far worse; possibilities of Iraq, Syria and Yemen imploding will increase; moderate President Rouhani will be discredited and internal strife will in Iran will be aggravated; and, the prized calm in the GCC countries could give way to violence too.

 *Ranjit Gupta
Distinguished Fellow, IPCS and Former Indian Ambassador to Yemen and Oman

The post Saudi Arabia And Evolving Regional Strategic Dynamics – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

How will the growing US-India rapprochement, marked by their joint strategic vision, impact on Sino-American rivalry in the Asia-Pacific? As both China and India emerge as drivers of the global economy in the foreseeable future, will their military competition jeopardise the stability of the region?

By Sajjad Ashraf*

Media euphoria on India-United States bonhomie following President Barack Obama’s visit to India in late January has given way to some sober analysis of its effect on Sino-US rivalry in the Asia-Pacific region. Murmurings of a new ‘cold war’ heard within India should also give Asia cause for concern.

For the US, constantly in search of local sheriffs to maintain its predominance worldwide, none fits the chessboard better than India. A Western-style democracy, as big as China, the two are poised to be the leading economies of the world by mid-century. Both are vying for political and economic space amongst the developing world. Indian insecurities and regional ambitions converge with the US agenda, though at a cost – ie friction with China – which is reclaiming economic, political and military space from the US, especially in the Asia-Pacific.

Joint strategic vision

Sharing a disputed boundary in the Himalayas, India wants to erase the memories of its drubbing during the short India-China war in 1962. Occasional skirmishes between the two on the disputed border continue to inflame that scar.

The “Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean region,” which India and US signed during Obama’s visit, accords prominence to India in the area between Africa and East Asia. Not enough, the ‘strategic vision’ in a China-specific clause draws India into partnership with the US in policing maritime security, “navigation and over flights throughout the region especially in the South China Sea.” As China claims the area, its officials are not amused.

The Chinese are convinced, and so are many others, that the US is enlisting India as a partner in its ‘pivot to Asia’ strategy, but are typically guarded in reaction. State-controlled Chinese media have cautioned India against Western prodding towards a trap. But China also needs to understand New Delhi’s concerns over intrusions in India’s sphere of influence.

The ‘strategic vision’ declaration also needs to be read against the backdrop of rising Japanese nationalism and several years of US military approaches to Australia, Japan, South Korea, Philippines, Vietnam and other states of the region. The US also plans to redeploy its naval capabilities on a 60:40 basis in favour of the Pacific against the Atlantic and have committed to a US$6.4 billion sale of advanced weaponry to Taiwan in 2010.

China’s insecurities

Just like Russia’s fear of an encroaching NATO, China’s insecurities will increase if it feels hemmed in by a constellation of US allies or strategic commitments like the one India has made. Consequently, none suffers more than Southeast Asia that wants to gain from China’s rise and hopes to profit from the mutual rise of the two countries.

Referring to Southeast Asia Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong recently said in an interview with a German newspaper, “we do not want to choose between China and the US [also read India].” He added: “Everyone in the region wants to make friends with China and gain from the opportunities from its rise. Yet the world is large enough to accommodate the interests of most powerful players.”

By antagonising Beijing, India would only facilitate a de-facto understanding between China, Pakistan and Russia, claims Praful Bidwai, a respected Indian journalist and a peace activist. Former Foreign Secretary Kanwal Sibal bluntly warned against moving too close to the US, whose policies, he claims, India will be expected to endorse. “We are on the edge of becoming America’s Pakistan at the brink of Cold War II. History must serve as our guide as (PM) Modi takes the plunge,” cautioned Mani Shankar Aiyar a former diplomat and cabinet minister.

Pitting one against the other, while diverting focus from economic growth, provides the US, now the biggest arms supplier to India, with an opportunity to sell huge quantities of arms in a potentially volatile region. In a joint statement on a visit to Islamabad Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi declared that China wants to maintain the strategic balance in South Asia – meaning another arms race.

Jeopardising South Asia’s strategic balance

Both India and the US seek each other as an equaliser to an ascendant China. Yet, facilitating the presence of extra-regional powers in Asia undermines the very basis of Indian foreign policy for which it historically earned so much respect in the developing world.

China and India have a lot at stake. Together, they are the drivers of the global economy in the foreseeable future. Their complementary rise will benefit the region and the world at large. Their military competition, however, jeopardises growth and development chances of the two and the region. South and Southeast Asia should be particularly worried at the long term consequences of an arrangement that China thinks is meant to contain its peaceful rise.

*Sajjad Ashraf is an adjunct professor at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore. He was Pakistan’s High Commissioner to Singapore, 2004-2008. He contributed this article specially to RSIS Commentary.

The post Growing India–US Engagement: Time For A Sober Review – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Linda S. Heard

The Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, is about to step into the lion’s den, but there’s little chance he’ll emerge unscathed. His currency with the White House and the Democrats stands at an unprecedented low not to mention his personal relationship with the US president that’s gone from cool to frosty, primarily due to his unwillingness to work toward peace with the Palestinians with serious intent. On that front, things are about to worsen.

Indeed, there’s an upcoming hurricane that may unsettle US-Israeli relations as never before. On Tuesday, Netanyahu is set to defy the Obama administration with an address to a Joint Session of Congress, on the invitation of the Republican Speaker of the House of Representatives, John Boehner, aimed at derailing America’s fledgling attempts to forge a détente with Iran.

Without a nod from the Oval Office, this is not only seen by his critics as an assault on protocol but also as blatant interference by a foreign government in America’s affairs. In reality, Israel has been swaying US foreign policy for decades on numerous topics in less obvious ways and it wasn’t so long ago that those who dared to publish exposes on the pro-Israel lobby’s reach were deemed by the mainstream to have breached a taboo with few escaping negative consequences.

It goes without saying that the lobby has always been fiercely defensive of Israel, but on this occasion, AIPAC has put out mixed messages. One of its prominent leaders, Ben Caspit, said the committee was “in shock” over Netanyahu’s upcoming address and had tried to dissuade him from coming. Yet AIPAC was quick to officially refute that assertion and has been actively reaching out to lawmakers for support. In truth, AIPAC hasn’t been exactly enthusiastic, but together with other pro-Israel lobbyists, it’s backing Netanyahu with the full force of its weight. The more liberal Israel advocacy organization J Street is anything but fired-up by the prospect. Its president said Netanyahu was “crossing some lines that haven’t been crossed before and is putting Israel into the partisan crossfire in way it has not been before.”

Nevertheless, Boehner is unrepentant and Netanyahu remains undeterred by administration snipes of the kind delivered by Obama’s Security Adviser Susan Rice, who termed his proposed visit as “destructive.”

Netanyahu’s a man with a mission, which is to persuade Congress to block the US getting cozy with Iran, a country which he considers to be Israel’s greatest existential threat. And, by all reports, he will tackle Obama head-on with the accusation that if US-led P5+1 talks with Iran to resolve nuclear issues reach fruition, Israel’s very existence will be threatened.

He says he intends to “speak up for the very survival” of his country and will explain to the American people the danger to Israel from “those who want to kill us” armed with technical details of how easily swiftly Iran’s peaceful nuclear program could be converted to military together with doom and gloom scenarios. Most Democrats aren’t buying it — or even if they are, they’re not saying.

Dozens of Democratic lawmakers have announced they plan to boycott his speech. Some openly accuse him of staging a political theatre targeting his home audience in order to fuel his re-election chances, although it’s difficult to see how eliciting a downward spiral in relations with Israel’s greatest ally, funder and weapons supplier, could win votes. With declining approval ratings and a mere five percent separating his own from his nearest rival — the Zionist Union’s Isaac Herzog — his Likud Party needs every vote it can get on March 17. Others condemn him for creating a bi-partisan rift in Congress, which, in reality, has been anything but united since Barack Obama took office.

Then there are those Congressional Democrats who are privately sympathetic to his cause or have been staunch backers of Israel throughout their political lives. They are in the unenviable position of having to choose between the policies of the Jewish State and those of their own Commander-in-Chief. There are some reports circulating that the lobby has warned errant lawmakers that they will pay a price for snubbing Israel’s premier.

Outside of his own country, Netanyahu is hardly Mr. Popularity, especially after Israel’s merciless onslaught on Gaza last year that robbed thousands of their lives, livelihoods and homes. However, setting aside the merits or otherwise of the messenger, his message that a nuclear Iran would constitute a danger is worth heeding.

Last month, several Arab states expressed their concerns that a deal permitting Iran to continue with its uranium enrichment program and leave most of its centrifuges in place, would result in regional nuclear proliferation on the grounds of self-defense. And now that Tehran effectively dominates four Arab capitals — Beirut, Damascus, Baghdad and Sanaa — via its proxies, the Arab world’s alarm is as justifiable as Israel’s.

The post Netanyahu’s Make-Or-Break Speech – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Sandip Kumar Mishra*

It has been announced that Kim Jong-un will be participating in the 70th anniversary celebrations of the Soviet Union’s victory in World War II, to be held in Russia in May 2015. Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un have been facing isolation of differing degrees and wish to assert their determination in the face of such sequestration. The visit was finalised in November 2014 during the visit of the Secretary of the North Korean Workers’ Party Choe Ryong-hae to Russia, who is considered to be the number two in the North Korean power hierarchy. In May 2014, Choe also made similar visit to Beijing to arrange a summit meet between the leaders of China and North Korea but did not succeed. If Kim Jong-un’s visit to Moscow happens, it will be the first foreign visit of the North Korean leader after assuming power in December 2011.

It is still too early to say whether Jong-un’s visit will actually take place, as other regional countries such as South Korea would not be willing to participate in the celebrations alongside Kim Jong-un. However, if it happens, it would be indeed an important episode in East Asian affairs, presenting the leader of the reclusive State an opportunity or compulsion to meet or face the leaders of many countries. It would therefore be interesting to explore the intentions of both Russia and North Korea in making these overt gestures, which are also intrinsically linked with North Korea’s relations with China.

North Korea has sought to maintain equidistance from its two closest allies – the USSR and China – from the days of the Cold War. The North Korean leadership has successfully played China against the USSR and in the process, has been able to garner economic and military help from both. In the recent sequence of events, North Korea had its third nuclear test in February 2013 along with several other provocative steps and statements, which have deteriorated the security situation in the region. North Korean behaviour has given an excuse to the US and South Korea to strengthen their security posture and preparedness in the region, which is definitely not good for China. As a result, China has shown its open displeasure with North Korea and has minimised its exchanges and support for North Korea. China has gone along with the international community in imposing various sanctions on North Korea. The Chinese President Xi Jinping has had two summit meets with the South Korean President Park Guen-hye in the last two years, but has held no such meeting with Jong-un. China has also reportedly been suggesting Chinese-style reforms to North Korea but this has not moved the latter yet – in fact, North Korea, in response, sent a strong message to China by executing Jang Seoung-thaek, probably the closest North Korean leader to China.

In this growing environment of isolation, Kim Jong-un has been looking at other openings. In 2014, Jong-un sent Kim Yong-nam, Chairman of the Presidium of Supreme People’s Assembly to Mongolia in the garb of participating in the Winter Olympics. However, by accepting Russian offer to visit Moscow, Kim Jong-un has decided to reuse North Korea’s old tactics and which is that when China is unhappy, go to Russia and vice versa.

From the Russian point of view, their presence and role in East Asian affairs would only be possible via North Korea. In the 1990s, when the Boris Yeltsin administration had very cold relations with North Korea, Russia had no opportunity to be part of the politics of the region. Russia had no role in the Nuclear Accord of 1994, the establishment of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organisation (KEDO) and the Four-Party Talks of 1995-96. Putin realised the mistake, and North Korea was his fourth foreign visit after coming to power in 2000. In the last few years again, it seems that Russia has become a non-player in East Asia and has been much busier in its western neighbourhood. Putin probably wants to rectify this imbalance and send a strong message to the West by demonstrating his connections with North Korea.

North Korean Foreign Minister Ri Su-yong visited a hydroelectric power plant in Russia in October 2014, and in January 2015, Russia has announced its assistance to North Korea in repairing and improving is power grid in exchange for rare earth metals from North Korea. Russia also announced in early February a joint military drill with North Korea.

The developments between Russia and North Korea are more significant for China as Beijing may have to rethink its policy vis-à-vis North Korea. The re-thinking has already begun with Xi Jinping sending a personal message through one of the top CCP leaders to the North Korean Embassy in Beijing on the occasion of the third death anniversary of North Korean leader Kim Jong-il. Many observers felt that China’s changing posture had to do with its disappointment with South Korea and the US but the change could also be attributed to Russia’s outreach programme, which must be dealt with.

In brief, it could be said that North Korea is well aware that its relationships with China and Russia are of mutual dependence. Moreover, they also compete with each other for closer proximity to North Korea, which gives North Korea some space for strategic manoeuvring. Thus, the recent episode of Russia’s invitation to Kim Jong-un and his acceptance could be a replay of the old game, which North Korea, China, and Russia have been playing with each other since the Cold War era.

 *Sandip Kumar Mishra
Assistant Professor, Department of East Asian Studies, University of Delhi

The post Russia And North Korea: Replaying Old Games – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Vijay Sakhuja*

Prime Minister Narendra Modi will visit Maldives, Mauritius Seychelles and Sri Lanka during this month to reinforce India’s foreign policy objectives. A number of political, economic, social and security issues would constitute the agenda and several agreements and memorandums of understanding are expected to be signed with the Indian Ocean States. At least three maritime issues merit attention.

Capacity-Building for Maritime Security

First, capacity-building for maritime security is a recurring theme in bilateral discussions between India and the Indian Ocean island States. The 2014 trilateral meeting (India, Maldives and Sri Lanka) held in New Delhi supported the idea of expanding the trilateral engagements to include Seychelles and Mauritius as observers. It was decided to build the capacity of the partners to enhance Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA), provide Search and Rescue (SAR) support, oil pollution response exercises, and cooperation in legal matters. The Indian Navy has supported hydrographic surveys in Seychelles, provided training to the Mauritius Coast Guard, undertaken surveillance for Maldives and worked closely with Sri Lanka in counter-terrorism against the LTTE. It has provided warships and aircraft to these countries to augment maritime security capabilities. These engagements have catapulted India to emerge as a ‘net security provider’ and be seen as a compassionate power in the Indian Ocean.

Before identifying what the Indian Prime Minister can offer during his visits to the four island States, it is useful to understand that these countries have similar security requirements which can be clubbed under MDA, a critical element of maritime security. For instance, Sri Lanka requires platforms, systems and technologies for fisheries patrol and to prevent transgressions that have been the bane of bilateral relations; Maldives requires surveillance assistance; Mauritius requires aircraft and ships for EEZ patrols; and Seychelles requires hydrographic support.

India can offer an institutionalised information and intelligence-sharing mechanism, and it will also be useful to explore if officials from these countries are co-located in the Indian Navy’s National Command Control Communication Intelligence (NC3I) network or the Information Management and Analysis Centre (IMAC). This is a practice in the Singapore-based Information Fusion Centre (IFC) established at Changi Command and Control Centre (CC2C), where an Indian Navy officer has been positioned. Significantly, the IFC has received much acclaim for its multilateral approach to maritime security.

‘India or China’ Dilemma

Second, China’s overt military support to Maldives, Sri Lanka, Seychelles and Mauritius is an issue, which has caused enormous anxiety in India. Notwithstanding that, it will be prudent for Modi to avoid raising the issue, which could result in an ‘India or China’ dilemma. These island countries are recipients of generous financial and material support (preferential loans for military/commercial infrastructure projects, sale of military hardware at friendly prices and military training and education) from China and may not be willing to address India’s concerns. The docking of the Chinese submarine in Colombo port invited sharp reactions in New Delhi and apparently, under pressure, Sri Lanka decided to review the project but quickly backtracked to state that any decision on the future of the project would be taken in consultation with the Chinese. Further, these countries are keen to participate and partake in China’s Maritime Silk Road (MSR) initiative, and build infrastructure to support economic growth. These drivers shape their India policy and these States would like to avoid any pressure from New Delhi.

Blue Economy

Third, Blue Economy is the current ‘mantra’ of the Small Island Developing States (SIDS) and the respective leaderships have championed it at national and international forums. In the Indian Ocean, Seychelles and Mauritius have been spearheading the discourse on Blue Economy and the concept has found favour across the globe including the United Nations. A number of countries and regional groupings have agreed to support the SIDS in their vision of sustainable development of oceanic resources for economic growth.

India’s ability to harness the seas is noteworthy and it has developed sophisticated mechanisms for the sustainable development of living and non-living oceanic resources. A number of scientific institutions for oceanic research, environment studies, offshore exploration and development of fisheries have been set up to harness the seas in a sustainable manner. India is working closely with its maritime neighbours and has endorsed Bangladesh’s call for the Bay of Bengal Partnership for Blue Economy. Maldives, Sri Lanka, Seychelles and Mauritius are natural partners for India towards developing the Blue Economy.

 *Vijay Sakhuja
Director, National Maritime Foundation (NMF), New Delhi

The post Indian Ocean: Modi On A Maritime Pilgrimage – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Rules for sharing information on traffic offenses committed by drivers of foreign vehicles will apply to all EU countries from 2017. The extension of the existing rules to include the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark is the main change brought about by the new cross-border enforcement directive adopted by the Council on 2 March 2015.

The EU already has a directive on sharing information on road traffic offenses. This was adopted in 2011 with police cooperation as its legal basis. Due to their special position with regard to police cooperation, the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark did not participate.

A new directive became necessary when the Court of Justice ruled on 6 May 2014 that the legal basis should be transport. The old directive was annulled, but the Court provided a period of one year for a new legal act to be in place.

The rapid adoption of the new directive means that there will be no gap in the application of the rules. It also underlines the importance of EU action in this area.

Improving road safety

The aim of the directive remains unchanged: it is to improve road safety and ensure equal treatment of all drivers.

Under the directive, member states may access each other’s national vehicle registration data to track down persons liable for certain offences that jeopardise road safety. The presumed offender can be contacted using a model letter included in the directive. It is up to the member state in which the offense took place to decide on the follow-up, such as imposing a fine. The sharing of data covers eight major road-safety-related offenses: speeding, not using a seat belt, failing to stop at red lights, drink driving, driving under the influence of drugs, not wearing a safety helmet, using a forbidden lane, and illegally using a mobile phone, or any other communications device, while driving.

According to the Commission, a driver of a car registered abroad is three times more likely to commit offenses than a resident driver. In busy transit and tourist countries speeding offenses committed by non-residents can reach 50% of the total number of offenses during the peak season.

The new directive will enter into force four days after its publication in the EU Official Journal. This is expected to take place a few days after the directive has been signed by representatives of the Council and the European Parliament. Member states must incorporate it into their national laws by 6 May 2015.

As the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark will need to make an additional effort to put the system in place, they will have two more years to adopt their national provisions (until 6 May 2017).

The Commission will assess the effectiveness of the directive by November 2016. At that stage it may propose changes to it.

The post Traffic Offenses To Be Traceable Across EU appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Following a parliamentary inquiry into the use of immigration detention in the UK, a cross-party panel of MPs has released a hard-hitting report calling for major reforms of a system it describes as “expensive, ineffective and unjust”.

“We detain far too many people unnecessarily and for far too long,” said Sarah Teather, a Liberal Democrat MP who chaired the inquiry which was launched in July 2014 following a number of high profile incidents of abuse at the country’s 11 Immigration Removal Centres (IRCs).

Although government guidelines state that “detention must be used sparingly, and for the shortest period necessary”, the inquiry found that in practice this policy was not being followed. Compared to other European countries, the UK detains more migrants and asylum seekers for longer periods of time. The report notes that over 30,000 people entered the UK’s detention centres in 2013 compared to just over 4,000 in Germany which receives four times as many asylum applications. It is also the only European Union country that lacks a time limit on immigration detention.

During three oral evidence sessions, the panel listened to phone calls from current detainees who had spent as long as three years in prison-like detention centres. In a written submission, one former detainee wrote: “the lack of time limit is the worst part of it as you don’t know when/if you will get out. You can’t say to yourself tomorrow I’ll be OK. Tomorrow you will be locked in, or flown back to the country where you are afraid for your life.”

Mental health practitioners told the panel that individuals who spent less than a month in detention mainly required treatment for underlying mental health problems. “After longer than a month, practitioners told us they are trying to deal with problems associated with detention itself,” Teather told IRIN.

Recommendations

The report recommends that immigration detention be limited to a maximum duration of 28 days, but it also calls for detention to be used much less frequently. Instead, it recommends the use of community-based alternatives such as those already being used in countries including Sweden and Australia that are both considerably cheaper than the UK’s current system and achieve high compliance rates.

The report also makes a number of recommendations relating to conditions inside detention centres and the treatment of detainees. It argues that detainees should have better access to both legal representation and health care and that screening processes be improved to avoid the detention of trafficking and torture victims and people with mental illnesses.

“Many individuals who are currently detained have experienced trauma in their past and detention is wholly unsuitable,” it notes.

More fundamentally, however, the report calls for “a wholesale change in culture” and “a very radical shift in current thinking” about the use of detention for the purposes of immigration enforcement.

Cross-party support

Teather emphasized that the panel was made up of MPs from across the political spectrum with wide ranging views on immigration policy generally, “but we were all united in the view that the current system…is not working and must be substantially changed.”

As the UK gears up for a general election in May, she told IRIN, “We hope the incoming government will realize there’s cross-party support for this, but also that it’ll give a bit of momentum to campaigners ahead of the election.”

Jerome Phelps, executive director of London-based NGO, Detention Action, welcomed the report as “a significant first step” towards reforming what he described as a “dysfunctional” system. “The report makes clear that reform [of the immigration detention system] is a mainstream concern and that whichever party forms the next government will have to wrestle with it.”

The post UK Detention Report Calls For ‘Radical Shift’ appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Joshua Kucera

Kazakhstan has reached an agreement with Russia to take over most of a Russian military training facility in far western Kazakhstan. The deal represents the latest step in Kazakhstan’s efforts to regain control over the many Soviet-legacy military and other strategic facilities that Russia still operates in the country.

Under the agreement, Russia will hand over about 90 percent of the Taysoygan testing facility near Atyrau, Senator Sarsenbay Engsegenov told Astana TV. President Nursultan Nazarbayev instructed the Ministry of Defense to work out the details of the agreement, which should be ratified by parliament by the end of March, Engsegenov said. There hasn’t yet been any comment from the Russian side.

This follows recent agreements that Astana has made with Moscow to get more control of the Balkhash missile testing site and the Baikonur space launch facility.

The Taysoygan facility is currently used for Russian testing of pilots and aircraft, but in the Soviet era it was used for nuclear testing (it was reportedly subject to 24 nuclear explosions in the 1960s and 70s), and today residents still talk about the environmental impact of that: there have been calves born with five legs or one eye, children with a variety of developmental disabilities, and adults tend to have short lifespans.

But that’s in the past, Russian officials say. “In recent years we haven’t done any kind of testing that could harm the environment,” said Aleksandr Zimin, a representative of the facility, in an interview with local media in 2011. “We use this area as an air polygon, only for flights — we don’t drop anything, don’t explode anything. … I can say with confidence, that for the last three years nothing has fallen or blown up.”

In spite of the environmental damage already done, the area is thought to be rich pastureland, and though locals already graze their livestock there, they say being able to do so legally will be much easier.

Probably higher on the agenda than livestock grazing: the fact that oil has been discovered in the area and Kazakhstan needs full control to be able to exploit it.

The post Kazakhstan Takes Control Of Russian Military Testing Range appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Marina Stojanovska

In an effort to hasten its accession to NATO, Macedonia plans to conduct joint military exercises with the United States.

The country is ready to become a full-fledged member of the military alliance, Defence Minister Zoran Jolevski said February 24th during his first meeting with Jess Baily, the new US ambassador to Macedonia.

Jolevski described defence reforms, the development of the Military Academy and efforts to improve the capacity of soldiers. He also noted Macedonia’s contributions to NATO-led missions in Afghanistan.

“Macedonia and the United States are strategic partners with long experience in the field of co-operation,” the Macedonian Defence Ministry told SETimes.

“I start my tenure with a great appreciation for the strong friendship between our two countries,” Baily said. “We are partners and allies. Our soldiers stand shoulder to shoulder in Afghanistan.”

“For over 20 years, and through some difficult times, we have worked together and accomplished much in pursuit of shared goals, most particularly to build a Europe, whole, free and at peace, and with Macedonia fully integrated into NATO and the EU,” he added.

The subject of joint training and its benefit to Macedonia’s NATO accession arose at the end of January, when Jolevski met with General Walter Lee Miller at the United States Special Operations Command in Tampa, Florida.

General Vasko Gurcinovski, the commander of the Macedonian Army’s Special Operations Unit, joined the defence minister for the trip to the US military site.

Macedonia Army (ARM) units that would participate in NATO peacekeeping operations “in the Middle and Near East” already use the Krivolak army training centre, Jolevski said. The minister proposed using the military range for joint exercises by special units of the Macedonian and US armies.

Jolevski and Miller also discussed the possibility of having US special operations forces train Macedonian troops.

The partnership between the two countries “dates back to 1994, in all fields,” said Colonel Mirce Gorgovski, the ARM spokesman.

“This partnership helped the Macedonian Army, not only in the strengthening of its capacities and the training for participation in NATO missions, but also in terms of structuring the army according to NATO standards,” Gorgovski told SETimes.

“So far more than 6,000 members of the ARM have been trained in units or the schools of the US Army, a number that indicates the greatness and the relevance of the bilateral co-operation,” he added.

Support from the US Army is not limited to training. Last year at the Ilinden Army Base near Skopje, Macedonian military police received nearly $1 million worth of equipment.

“Interoperability is one of the most important principles of adaptation of every army that strives to become closer to the military standards of the Euro-Atlantic Alliance,” said Nano Ruzin, Macedonia’s former ambassador to NATO.

The post Macedonia To Hold Joint Military Exercises With US appeared first on Eurasia Review.