Quantcast
Channel: Eurasia Review
Viewing all 73339 articles
Browse latest View live

Gangs Grow Rich On Smuggling Albanians To New York – Analysis

0
0

Traffickers use fake documents to smuggle ever-growing numbers of impoverished Albanian to the US via Central America and Mexico.

By Aleksandra Bogdani and Flamur Vezaj

The three-storey villa of the Malaj family in the small town of Bajza in the Malsia e Madhe region stands mostly empty.

The owner, a father of six children, Paloke Malaj, occupies one room with his wife and teenage son. The rest of the family has migrated to the US and Canada.

“Detroit, New York, Florida and Toronto, that’s where my kin is now,” Malaj says. “All of them have migrated illegally in search for better life,” he adds.

Malaj is a farmer who spends his days tending his land and waiting for news from America. By his count, 124 out of 164 members of his extended family are now either in the United States or in Canada, including four of his daughters.

Albania

Albania

Malaj has spent $80,000 in the last eight years on shipping his children across the ocean. Only his teenage son remains and he will go in time.

“We want him to finish school but he also has his mind set on leaving for the United States,” Malaj says with resignation.

Many neighbours have migrated as well. Their locked-up homes dot this small town at the foot of the Accursed Mountains. “Everyone is leaving and no one will ever come back,” Malaj says.

Migration has been a fact of life in this poor region of northern Albania bordering Montenegro for more than two decades, ever since the Communist regime collapsed and the country’s borders opened up.

Some locals, like Paloke Malaj’s uncle, left even during the Communist era, despite the threat of reprisal faced by families that were left behind.

However, in the last few years, migration from Malsia e Madhe to the Unites States has soared, facilitated by a smuggling ring that traffics migrants across borders.

A report that the US Embassy in Tirana sent to the Albanian state police in January 2014 says the number of Albanian illegal migrants captured on the US-Mexico border grew tenfold in 2013 compared to the previous year.

Official documents obtained by BIRN show that the number of Albanian migrants stopped at the US-Mexico border in 2012 was 56. It had jumped to 487 the following year.

Although Albanians account for only a fraction of the migrants that cross illegally from Mexico to the US every year, the route they take through Central America has caught the attention of US authorities.

A leaked intelligence report from the US Customs and Border Protection Agency reveals that hundreds of Albanian migrants were apprehended using this route to enter the US illegally from 2009 to 2013.

To America via Spain and Mexico:

Following the report of the US Embassy in Tirana, the Albanian Serious Crimes Prosecutors office launched a probe to indentify the smuggling rings that were running illegal migration to the US.

Through the infiltration of an undercover agent and the use of wiretaps, prosecutors were able to indentify the routes and a number of the facilitators who helped smuggle hundreds of Albanians from the Malsia e Madhe region to the US.

In May 2014, police arrested 15 suspected members of a smuggling ring who used fake documents to aid illegal migration to the US.

The route started in Albania, and followed to Macedonia, Bulgaria, Austria and Spain, countries to which Albanians can travel freely, thanks to the country’s free-visa travel agreement with the EU Schengen zone.

From Spain, the migrants would fly to Mexico with falsified Bulgarian documents. These are then returned to traffickers once they set foot in America.

Two other smuggling routes shipped migrants to Guatemala, from where they traveled for weeks by bus and train to the US-Mexico border.

The Albanian prosecutor’s documents show that the traffickers use other staging posts in Central America as well.

In the autumn of 2012, three Albanian citizens from the mountainous municipality of Kelmend in the Malsia e Madhe region were stopped in an airport in El Salvador carrying fake Bulgarian passports.

The trio were deported back to Bulgaria. However, on December 22, 2012 they were in the United States, where they filed asylum claims.

According to the testimonies they gave to US Homeland Security Deparement, on their second trip they traveled from Albania to Bulgaria and then Spain from where they flew to Costa Rica and then Honduras.

“In Honduras we took a bus and traveled across Guatemala in order to arrive in Mexico 17 days after we left Albania,” one of the migrants said in his testimony. “We passed the US-Mexico border on foot,” he added.

The three now in live in the Bronx with their asylum requests pending and often post updates on their lives in New York on Facebook.

Rich pickings for smugglers’ network:

The Albanian prosecutor’s office has charged six people, including an ethnic Albanian from Macedonia, as part of the smuggling ring that had trafficked hundreds of people from the Malsia e Madhe region in 2012 and 2013 to the US.

One of the smugglers who talked to BIRN on condition of anonymity said that each migrant would pay the traffickers $25,000 for his trip.

Migrants who traveled illegally to the US in 2013 and were identified by authorities have alone generated an estimated $12 million for the trafficking network.

“Most of the migrants have siblings and family members in the United States who foot the bill,” the smuggler explained. “Once in the US they work hard for one or two years to repay back the debt,” he added.

The scheme creates a domino effect. After paying off their debt, the newcomers finance the trips of other family members.

Back in Bajza, Paloke Malaj told BIRN that he paid the traffickers $25,000 once one of his daughters had called back from the States to tell him that she had arrived and was safe.

Albanian prosecutors believe that apart from the traffickers, middlemen play an important role in the smuggling rings because they guarantee that the money will be paid once the migrants arrive in the US.

Despite the crackdown, the smuggler told BIRN that illegal migration from the impoverished areas of northern Albania to the US would continue.

“The desire to migrate is high, so there will always be people around to facilitate it,” he said.

Paloke Malaj agrees, arguing that the tough part is only coming up with the money.

“The important thing is to have the money, then everything is possible,” he said.

The head of municipality of Kastrat, in the Malsia e Madhe region, Viktor Popaj, blames the Albanian government for the exodus.

“People leave because there are no job prospects,” he said. “The poor policies of the Albanian government are forcing many to abandon their homes,” he added.

New York a softer touch than Texas:

The Pew Research Center estimates that 11.2 million illegal migrants were present in the United States in 2012, the majority of coming from Mexico and Central America.

Many Albanians who travel to the United States illegally seek residency permits as asylum seekers.

The US Homeland Security Department has a number of criteria to obtain the asylum status.

An immigration officer, appeal board or judge will provide an asylum request if an applicant fits the definition of refugee.

This is “someone who is unable or unwilling to return to his or her country of nationality, because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion”.

When the applicant voluntarily shows up in front of an immigration officer after entering the Unites States illegally, he can file an affirmative asylum claim; otherwise, if the authorities catch him, he has to file a defensive claim against deportation.

Data from the US Office of Immigration Statistics show that from 2004 to 2013, the US authorities granted 3,782 asylum requests to Albanian citizens. Of these claims, 3,422 were affirmative claims while 486 were defensive.

A Federal Immigration Court translator, who spoke to BIRN on condition of anonymity, told BIRN that after arriving, Albanian illegal migrants turn themselves in to the Department of Homeland Security, often in the state of New York, and file their asylum claims.

“Albanians fear Texas judges, while New York courts are perceived as more liberal toward asylum requests,” he explained.

According to the court translator, many Albanians from the Malsia e Madhe region, which is known as stronghold of the right-wing Albanian parties, often play the card of political persecution in their asylum requests.

“The murder in 2009 of head of the Christian Democrats for the Malsia e Madhe region, Aleks Keka, is still producing green cards by association across the ocean,” he said.

“Others use judicial or extra-judicial conflicts to justify their asylum request, often enacting the whole Albanian eye-for-an-eye code of vengeance in front of the judges,” the translator added.

The post Gangs Grow Rich On Smuggling Albanians To New York – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.


Changing Position On Assad – OpEd

0
0

By Osama Al Sharif

As the Syrian crisis entered its fifth year with no end in sight, US Secretary of State John Kerry told an American news network Sunday that “the United States will have to negotiate with Syrian President Bashar Assad to remove him from power and bring the Syrian civil war to a close.”

He added: “We are working very hard with other interested parties to see if we can reignite a diplomatic outcome.” So was this a sign of a major shift in US policy over Syria?

Since the outbreak of the Syrian uprising, the US position has been largely in line with that of its European and most Arab allies.

Basically Washington believed that Assad had lost legitimacy and had no place in the future of Syria and must therefore remove himself from power. But the US never considered the use of force against Assad’s regime, and only when accusations that Assad’s forces had bombed rebel-held areas with chemical weapons surfaced did President Obama order its navy to move close to Syria’s shores. A last minute deal to dismantle Syria’s chemical arsenal, mediated by Moscow, succeeded in averting military intervention.

But differences between Washington and its allies remained.

Eventually the US declared that there was no military solution to the Syrian crisis and that all parties must push for a political breakthrough. Three UN emissaries to Syria had failed to dislodge Assad and force him to accept the components of the so-called Geneva I conference; when the US and Russia agreed on a political road map to resolve the crisis.

The main issue was and will continue to be the future of Assad. On this point both Tehran and Moscow, the two staunchest allies of Assad, are refusing to budge. On the other hand, the coalition of Syrian opposition groups rejects any dialogue that does not include the removal of the Syrian president.

So after four years and more than 200,000 dead in addition to over seven million displaced Syrians what prompted Kerry to alter his position? The rise of the so-called Islamic State (IS) has changed the geopolitical reality in the region. The moderate Free Syrian Army (FSA) has lost territory to IS militants who are now in control of over 40 percent of Syria. The regime has been unable to force a military solution, despite persistent brutal bombing of largely civilian areas, and now controls no more than 35 percent of Syrian territory, including Damascus and the coastal region.

The US has taken its time to train and arm moderate rebels. With their numbers dwindling, the training and arming of no more than 3,000 insurgents will not stem the militant’s expansion or pose a real challenge to Assad’s forces. A major player, Turkey, is not even engaged in the fight against the militants along its borders and insists that all means should be used to depose Assad.

Although Kerry said that the US was coordinating with its allies on the possibility of bringing Assad to the negotiating table, the fact is that this latest position will irk Washington’s allies in Europe and the region. Britain was the first to respond by insisting that Assad had no role in Syria’s future and that it will “continue applying sanctions pressure to the regime until it reassesses its position, ends the violence and engages in meaningful negotiations with the moderate opposition.” It is likely that Saudi Arabia and Turkey will also find Kerry’s call to negotiate with Assad perplexing.

For his part, Assad will be boosted by Kerry’s statements. He had repeatedly presented himself as a partner in the fight against terrorism, calling on the West and Arab countries to stop aiding his enemies. His position on his future as president will not change anytime soon. Even if he accepts to come to the negotiation table it will be at his own terms and the outcome will unlikely be different from the Geneva II and the recent Moscow talks.

Kerry’s latest statements came only two days after chief of the CIA John Brennan said the US does not want to see a chaotic collapse of the Syrian regime, as it could open the way to extremists taking power. Fear of who might replace Assad is a legitimate concern, he said.

This new realignment in Washington’s position on Syria will also draw criticism from a Republican controlled US Congress. Already US lawmakers are weary of a bad deal soon to be reached between the international community and Iran over the latter’s nuclear program.

Kerry’s statements will divide Washington’s allies further. In reality, time has already run out for a political deal to end Syria’s civil war.

Despite the weakening of the moderate opposition and the expansion of militants, the Damascus regime is not showing any willingness to compromise. The most likely scenario is that it will continue to fight to the bitter end. With the 2016 US presidential elections approaching, time is also running out for the Obama administration to achieve a diplomatic breakthrough. The de facto partition of Syria will continue for now.

The post Changing Position On Assad – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Iraq: Islamic State May Have Committed Genocide, War Crimes

0
0

A report released today by the United Nations human rights office says that the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) may have committed genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity in its attacks against ethnic and religious groups in the country.

The report found widespread abuses committed by ISIL that may amount to war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide, according to a news release issued by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR).

Compiled by investigators sent to the region last year by the High Commissioner, the report highlights violations, including killings, torture, rape and sexual slavery, forced religious conversions and the conscription of children.

ISIL’s attacks on the Yezidi population “pointed to the intent of ISIL to destroy the Yezidi as a group,” the report says, which “strongly suggests” that ISIL may have perpetrated genocide.

The report also highlights violations carried out by the Iraqi Security Forces and associated militia groups, including killings, torture and abductions, with some incidents pointing, at the very least, to a failure by the Government to protect persons under its jurisdiction.

More than 100 people who witnessed or survived attacks in Iraq between June 2014 and February 2015 helped the investigation team compile its report, which cites brutal and targeted killings of hundreds of Yezidi men and boys in the Ninewa plains in August 2014.

Yezidi populations rounded up, with men and boys over the age of 14 separated from the women and girls. The males were led away and shot by ISIL, while the women were abducted as the ‘spoils of war.’ “In some instances,” the report found, “villages were entirely emptied of their Yezidi population.”

Yezidi female escapees described being openly sold or handed over as “gifts” to ISIL fighters. Witnesses described rapes of girls as young as six and nine years old and a scene where ISIL members sat laughing as two teenage girls were raped in the next room.

Boys between the ages of eight and 15 also described horrific experiences, as they were separated from their mothers, transported to locations in Iraq and Syria and forced to convert to Islam. They were subjected to religious and military training, including how to shoot guns and fire rockets, and were forced to watch beheadings.

“This is your initiation into jihad,” one boy was told. “You are an Islamic State boy now.”

Christians, Kaka’e, Kurds, Sabea-Mandeans, Shi’a and Turkmen also suffered brutal treatment at ISIL’s hands, the report says, citing the thousands of Christians uprooted from their homes in June last year, when ISIL ordered them to choose between conversion, taxation or displacement, and the 600, mostly Shi’a prisoners who were massacred by ISIL members.

An Iraqi Government investigation into that incident and another into an ISIL massacre of over 1,500 cadets from Speicher army base have yet to reveal their conclusions publicly, the report notes, calling for investigations into all crimes detailed in the report, including those alleged to have been committed by Government forces.

Numerous sources told the investigation team that Iraqi Security Forces and affiliated militia had also committed serious human rights violations during their counter-offensive operations against ISIL, operating “with total impunity, leaving a trail of death and destruction in their wake.”

Retreating Iraqi forces allegedly set fire to an army base in Sinsil, where several dozen Sunni prisoners were held, and in another incident, at least 43 prisoners were allegedly shot dead in the al-Wahda police station in Diyala. Villagers reported being rounded up and taken to al-Bakr airbase at Salah-ad-Din where, the report says, torture is allegedly routine.

As one witness put it: “we hoped for the best when the Iraqi army and the ‘volunteers’ liberated the area from ISIL. Instead…they pillaged, burnt and blew up houses, claiming that all villagers are part of ISIL. This is not true; we are just ordinary poor people.”

The report urges the Government to become a party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and ensure that international crimes defined in that Statute are criminalised under domestic law.

It also calls on the Human Rights Council to urge the UN Security Council to address, “in the strongest terms, information that points to genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes,” and to consider referring the situation in Iraq to the International Criminal Court.

The post Iraq: Islamic State May Have Committed Genocide, War Crimes appeared first on Eurasia Review.

India: A Change Long Overdue – Analysis

0
0

There may or may not have been a deal over the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) between the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) in Jammu & Kashmir. The controversial Act, as a result, may or may not be diluted in the coming months. However, hundreds of kilometres away, in Manipur, situation is ripe to initiate a gradual downgrading of the Army deployment and let the state police take over the counter-insurgency (COIN) responsibilities.

On 18 February 1980, Lallan Prasad Singh, Governor of Manipur, in his address to the state legislative assembly, referred to the “seriously disturbed conditions in the valley” and the “serious of violent activities such as murders, including the killing of security personnel, armed robberies, looting of shops, banks and Government funds, and snatching of arms” by the extremist groups. In September that year, the entire state was declared as “Disturbed Area” and the Army called in to assist the civil administration in COIN measures.

For the next two and half decades, the Army remained the lead COIN force in the state, conducting offensive operations, cordon and search exercises, pain staking COIN duties and even road opening duties. So much was the dependence on the Army that even while the civil society organisations raised the banners that read “Indian Army-Go back” the ruling regime found it difficult to imagine a Manipur without the army’s presence. Backroom conversations reveal that some of the most virulent anti-AFSPA politicians and community leaders continued to demand for the deployment of the army as a guarantee of their safety.

The possible disastrous impact of pulling out the army from an active conflict theatre was narrated to me by a senior army official who had a prolonged stint in the state. During Operation Parakram (2001-02), the entire 3 Corps, headquartered at Dimapur, that looks after the states of Tripura, Mizoram, Nagaland, Manipur, and the hilly area of lower Assam, was moved to the western border. The 57 Mountain Division, a constituent of the 3 corps, was deployed in Jammu & Kashmir. As per the decisions taken at the highest level, 19 battalions of the Assam Rifles in Manipur remained posted at their original positions, mostly along the Indo-Myanmar border and the responsibility of carrying out the COIN duties in Manipur was given to eight battalions of the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) and three battalions of the Border Security Force (BSF). This was perhaps for the first time since the army was deployed in the state in 1980, that the para-military forces and the police had become the lead COIN force in Manipur.

By the time Operation Parakram ended, troops were withdrawn from the border, and the 3 corps returned to its original position towards the end of 2012, Manipur’s condition had degenerated to such an extent, the officer told me, that the entire state had to be ‘retaken’. The virtual absence of operations had reduced the state to becoming a militant den. “The unwritten understanding between the militants and the paramilitary was to ignore each other in the rare circumstances that they came face to face”, the officer told me. “The militants raised their own flag in the proximity of para-military camps on the Republic and Independence Days”.

The available data, however, points at no such “abject surrender to militants”- type situation. According to the Ministry of Home Affairs, in 2002, the year of the Army’s absence in Manipur, 268 militancy related incidents were reported from the state in which 60 civilians, 54 security forces and 125 militants were killed. In comparison, in 2001, 70 civilians, 25 security forces and 161 militants were killed. On 1 January 2003, the Manipur police released data detailing its own achievements “with the assistance of Central forces”. In 2002, it claimed, 80 militants were killed and 898 were arrested. In addition, 126 weapons of various make, 53 hand grenades, 29 walkie-talkie sets and a large number of ammunition were recovered from the militants.

In fact, Manipur’s degeneration into complete chaos started in 2004, coinciding with the valley based agitation against the AFSPA following the killing of the suspect People’s Liberation Army (PLA) cadre Manorama Devi by the Assam Rifles personnel and the withdrawal of the AFSPA from the Imphal municipal areas by the state government. The year registered 258 killings, of which 52 percent were militants. In the subsequent year, 410 killings were reported. While militants accounted for 49 percent of the dead, killings of civilians and security force personnel had increased by 80 and 31 percent respectively. In the subsequent years violence escalated further. Between 2006 and 2009, 1021 militants and 465 civilians were killed in the state. Indeed, Manipur’s slide to chaos took place while the Army was deployed in significant strength and was dominating the COIN operations.

Since 2010, the security situation in Manipur has been a narrative of declining militant capacities. Aided by Bangladesh which handed over Sanayaima, arguably the top most insurgent leader of the state to India in 2010, and a large number of arrests of senior militants in Manipur as well as other cities of the country in the successive years, militancy related fatalities have plummeted to a manageable annual average of 84 deaths between 2010 and 2014. In three of the last four years, the annual fatalities have remained below 100, an internationally accepted threshold level to define a low intensity conflict. Only 46 security force personnel have lost their lives in last five years indicating a clear advantage to the men in uniform vis-a-vis the militants on the run. In 2014, hill based miniscule Zeliangrong United Front (ZUF), with barely 10 killings to its credit, has replaced the more prominent valley based outfits as the most lethal outfit in the state. Much like other states of the region, smaller outfits with cadre strengths in the range of 20 to 50 cadres dominate the violence profile in the state. And yet, the Army continues to remain deployed in significant strength Manipur, where conditions for a purely police-led COIN approach has prevailed for nearly a half a decade.

Regular watchers of the COIN operations in the northeast would concur that the persistent dependence on the central forces has remained a bane for the state police forces. Availability of the central forces on demand has allowed the state governments to continue neglecting police modernisation projects. Manipur is no exception. Reports of the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) have repeatedly underlined the level of corruption, mismanagement, diversion of funds, and lack of leadership that has kept the 18000 strong police force in the state at a level of perpetual incapacity. Given that insurgency can only be successfully dealt with by the police, as the experience from neighbouring Tripura tells us, there is no better time to gradually shift the COIN responsibilities away from the Army to the state police. Gradual, and not abrupt withdrawal of the army would provide the state police the necessary preparatory time for a successful transition.

There can be two reasons why the Army should continue in its present strength in Manipur. One, there is a sound assessment that the state in future could return to its dreadful past. And second, conflict in Manipur can only be managed and never be solved. None of these are true.

Source: http://pragati.nationalinterest.in/2015/03/a-change-long-overdue/

The post India: A Change Long Overdue – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Brazil Implements Femicide Legislation As UN Assesses Global Gender Equality – Analysis

0
0

By Kate Sopcich

On March 9, 2015, a day after International Women’s Day, Brazil passed legislation that addresses femicide in the country. Facing heightened attention as a female leader, Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff played a key role in the legislative measure. With this move, Brazil has joined a global movement that seeks to appropriately respond to the severity of an endemic crime that results from deeply rooted power imbalances prevalent in many patriarchal societies.

In accordance with international law, Brazil’s new legislation specifically recognizes femicide as the act of murdering women because they are women. BBC News reports that Rousseff considers Brazil’s legislative action to be “part of a zero tolerance policy toward the killing of women” in the country.[1] Regarding the progress of the recognition of femicide, head of UN Women in Brazil Nadine Gasman commented to Reuters, “it has taken us a long time to say that the killing of a woman is a different phenomenon. Men are killed in the street, women are killed in the home.”[2]

Why Femicide?

Identifying an act of violence or murder as related to broader societal themes of misogyny, instead of merely an isolated or situational crime, indicates a federal and judicial cognizance of a systematic issue. Enshrining the distinction between homicide and femicide into law is crucial; such recognition is essential for progress towards true gender equality. On the importance of the legislative terminology, Gasman explains, “it’s a way to talk about this problem, make it visible by giving it a name and increasing sanctions for this crime.”[3] The sanctions referenced by Gasman are 12 to 30 year jail sentences for perpetrators of femicide, and increased sentences for crimes perpetrated against “pregnant women, girls under 14, women over 60 and people with disabilities.”[4]

These consequences have been deemed “strict” and “tough” in international news headlines, but they are not particularly harsh considering that, in many countries, homicide perpetrators can receive death penalty or life in jail. This specification may seem to impose vulnerability on the indicated groups. The intention here is not to imply that women are the weaker sex and require further protection, it is to emphasize the state’s recognition of past and present impunity for perpetrators of gender-based violence, and its desire to combat the systemic issue by offering a route of justice.

The legal adoption and implementation of the term femicide is monumental for Brazil and the other nations that have also employed the term in their legislations.

Despite accruing international attention and importance in recent years, femicide (also referred to as feminicide) remains a new and foreign concept for many throughout the world. Initially the word was coined by authors Diana Russell and Jill Radford in 1976 with their book “Femicide: the Politics of Woman Killing.” In the early 2000s, Mexican Congresswoman and anthropologist Marcela Lagarde appropriated the term to Latin American Academia.[5] Some interpret the term to merely connote an unwarranted, gendered rendition of the term homicide, particularly at first reaction. Despite its absence in the online resource of renowned Spanish dictionary Real Academia Española, the word feminicidio was included in the 23rd printed edition released in 2014.[6] Most English dictionaries have not yet recognized the word’s legitimacy, indicating the Spanish-speaking academic community’s relatively prompt acknowledgment of femicide as a valid issue.

There are strong threads of contention in the debate over the term, primarily questioning whether the specification of the murder of women is truly needed. Critics argue that legal recognition of femicide is unnecessary and actually risks worsening gender inequality. Professor at New Mexico State University Molly Molloy suggests that the way the term is used in “sensationalistic narratives of sexual murders,” specifically in Ciudad Júarez, Mexico, “distracts… from the real social dysfunction experienced by Mexicans living near the border.”[7] Additionally, some scholars argue that the creation of a specific classification of murder for the killing of women only serves to oppress them further by dividing society into marginalized groups.

Contrary to Professor Molloy’s conviction, acknowledgment of femicide is vital for women’s access to justice. Murder is complex, and at times does merit a degree of specification to indicate particularities. The term genocide is necessitated because committing a mass killing of people demands a different level of malicious intent, and also indicates a racial aspect to the nature of the crime. In a similar vein, the murder of women in connection with sexual aggression, domestic violence, and misogyny manifests as a distinct act from homicide, and stems from a long-established depreciation of women in patriarchal societies throughout the world.

Multiple factors distinguish femicide from homicide: overarching causes, perpetrators’ motives, location, tactics employed, and judicial response are all particularly notable. Commonly at the hands of former or current partners, femicide is typically sexualized or related to sexual relationships. UN Women reports to Reuters that, oftentimes, femicide occurs as an end-result of recurring domestic violence.[8] Gender-based violence can occur for the length of an abusive relationship, and is greatly hidden from the public sphere. It persists due to gender-imbalances in society; women may fear a violent reaction from their partner, unjust treatment from the police force, or feel too ashamed to come forth. The act, however, is not only limited to the private realm. In the public sphere, when sexual aggression or any sexualized detail is present in a crime or murder of a woman, it merits specification as femicide.

In its 2014 “Model Protocol” for the identification, investigation, and prosecution of femicide in Latin America, the UN delineates femicide to derive from “patriarchal and misogynist cultures prevalent in society, the excessive bureaucratization of legal procedures,” and “the difficulties in investigating the complex and cruel modalities of this violence.”[9] Simplifying the connection between societal and cultural norms and the justice system, Anastasia Maloney with Reuters expounds that femicide “stems from a macho culture that tends to condone violence against women and blames women for it, which, in turn, often leads to low prosecution rates for gender-related crimes.”[10] Regularity in judicial recognition of femicide will help to outline broader, intersecting societal issues at play. In addition to proper recognition, specialized training in the investigation and handling of femicide cases is increasingly necessary. Legislative recognition of the problem indicates the seriousness of the issue and can provide the impetus for future progress in these areas.

Forward motion for equality and justice throughout the hemisphere calls for a renovated approach, one that adequately emphasizes the real ramifications of gender inequality. With its new law, Brazil has laid down the necessary legal framework to promote a pathway to justice. Nadine Gasman contests, “it’s always a challenge implementing laws, but having this law makes it compulsory to investigate this crime with a gender perspective.”[11]

Femicide in the International Arena

Despite its prior academic and social emergence, the international community first recognized femicide in 2013, at the 57th session of the UN’s Commission on the Status of Women (CSW). During the Commission’s session, the UN called upon the governments in attendance to bolster their legislation and specifically identify femicide as a crime that is distinct from homicide. Furthermore, the international body called for the “integration of specific mechanisms and policies to prevent, investigate and eradicate femicide, and end impunity by ensuring accountability and the punishment of perpetrators of such crimes and reparation for the victims.”[12]

The UN has exhibited a regional focus on Latin America and the Caribbean that helps shed light on the severity of the phenomenon in the Western Hemisphere. In its investigations, husbands, boyfriends, or other family members were found to be the perpetrators in 66 percent of female murder cases in Chihuahua, Mexico.[13] In Honduras, murder is the leading cause of death in women and girls of the reproductive age.[14]

On a global scale, in the past as well as in the present, domestic violence, rape, femicide, stalking, and other gender-related crimes are notoriously mishandled, enabling the perpetuation of widespread impunity. Local police forces, judiciary sectors, and federal constitutions are generally ill equipped to appropriately manage these cases.

A 2014 report from the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) purports an impunity rate of 98 percent in cases of femicide and gender-based acts of crime in some Latin American countries, highlighting the turbulence of the situation.[15] As of 2012, El Salvador and Honduras each had estimated impunity rates of 77 percent for cases of femicide. And although general rates of impunity are high throughout many countries in Latin America for all crime, including the murder of men, the difference lies in the nature of femicide. Victims of femicide are not murdered while engaging in illicit or violent activity, they are murdered at the hands of their partners and family members, often in the presumed shelter of the private sphere. When these factors intersect with a lack of legal framework to properly identify, address, and persecute the crime, impunity represents more that just state ineptness, it illustrates the dangerous convergence of judiciary shortcoming and societal gender imbalances.

As a resource to address femicide in the region, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) has issued the “Model protocol for the investigation of gender-related killings of women in Latin America: Femicide/feminicide” on April 26, 2013. The UN considers the protocol to be a tool in combating impunity. Essentially, the document acts as an instruction manual for ensuring the pursuit of justice in cases of femicide as opposed to being forgotten or improperly handled. The UN statement declares, “this protocol will provide guidelines and instruments for the accurate investigation of these crimes, including in the collection of evidence and in criminal prosecutions, to guarantee women’s access to justice.” Such a protocol has unfortunately become necessary after repeated mishandling of femicide and other crimes pertaining to violence and discrimination against women.

In addition to the OHCHR’s protocol designed for the region as a whole, UN Women is directly working with select countries in Central America such as Guatemala, Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Honduras. Evidencing an impressive collaboration of national governments, local police forces, international entities, and nongovernmental women’s groups, efforts include the establishment of special justice units, the training of police forces in handling victims of gender-related crimes, and increased focus in the collection of empirical data regarding femicide and gender-based violence.

Brazil joins a number of Latin American nations that have extended legislative specification to femicide. These countries are Bolivia, Chile, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama and Peru.[16] Adoption of the term effectively serves to legitimize its cause within the judicial realm, as well as set an example for other nations worldwide. When a country’s legislation enshrines the word femicide in its constitution, it is establishing a legal framework that can provide access to justice. The idea is to end impunity that is overwhelmingly afforded to perpetrators of femicide, particularly throughout Latin America. Affirming the importance of legislative protection, the UN proffers that the absence of a “specialized penal code that adequately describes the murder of women based on reasons of hate, contempt, and asymmetrical power relations between men and women,” is the highest indicator of rampant impunity.[17]

International Initiative

UN Women claims that “the political will is there” to improve gender equality, and regional initiatives do appear to support this claim. The UN’s Commission on the Status of Women’s 59th Session is now coming to a close in New York at the UN Headquarters, taking place March 9-20.[18] This session marks the 20th anniversary of the 1995 Fourth World Conference on Women, which established the “Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action.” The objective of the conference is to assess the international community’s progress regarding its initiatives thus far. The session will serve as a catalyst to redirect focus and strategize for the post-2015 Millennium Development Goals era. In the forward to the republishing of the “Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action” in preparation for its re-analysis, Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon urged Member States to “renew their commitment” to the Platform and “carry it out in full,” twenty years after its adoption by 189 Member States.[19] The international community stands at a critical point in its examination of past actions, current status, and the shaping of future objectives.

The outcome document goes on to remind Member States and spectators, “Gender equality is not only a goal in itself, but serves to achieve all other goals on the global agenda.”[20] The UN aptly includes that “urgent and sustained action is needed to transform the structures, institutions and norms—economic, political and social—that are holding back progress on gender equality. These systematic changes must be deep and irreversible.”[21] Lamentably, what the UN is setting out to accomplish in the international community is to challenge and reform structures, institutions and norms that are, in fact, “deep and irreversible.” On a global scale, the principles established with the Platform in 1995 still remain alarmingly pertinent to the status of gender equality today.

Decades have passed without significant progress in diminishing gendered power imbalances, and the international community is increasingly focusing on themes of political stability, diplomacy, and alleviating poverty. What is typically overlooked, but emphasized by the rhetoric of the UN and its endeavors, is that gender equality is an integral part in the attainment of broader global development objectives. Implementation of democratic values, reduction of poverty and socio-economic disparity, and the long-term establishment of peace can only be strengthened and legitimated by greater gender equality, and vice versa.

The Curious Magic of March

At the beginning of the women’s movement in the early 1900s, the Socialist Party of America declared the first National Woman’s Day in the United States. The movement for women’s rights gained global momentum, and at an international conference in 1910, Clara Zetkin proposed the concept of an International Women’s Day.[22] Countries all over the world now choose to celebrate the holiday on March 8 to honor women’s achievements, assess their societal status, and plan for the future.

While this attention is positive for the women’s movement, and any advancement that results from these endeavors is always welcome, it can be an excuse to address issues of gender equality just once a year. Brazil’s Congress has managed to pass gender-related legislation the day after International Women’s Day, and right before a global assessment of the status of the world’s women in society. Why does legislation pertaining to the eradication of violence and discrimination against women only enjoy legitimacy in the days near and around International Women’s Day? Are local, regional, and international actors uncomfortable with consistently addressing gender issues? It is disparaging, yet paramount, to recognize that these themes, crucial to effective global development, merely receive annual attention. Gender-sensitive endeavors must be executed year-round to establish legitimate and comprehensive gender equality in the hemisphere and around the globe. Brazil’s legislative progress, as well as the greater Latin American effort to recognize and address femicide, does speak to the advancement of women’s rights in the hemisphere. However, the token March appearance of gender-related issues on local, regional, and international agendas demonstrates a lack of consistency in the fight for women’s rights

There is a mutual relationship between language and society. While it is true that society can shape language, language also shapes society. The utility of including the term femicide in federal constitutions may not be immediately recognizable, and its inclusion may not be capable of having an impact in the present moment or even the near future. The importance lies in what employing the term in the present moment can bring for the future. Normalizing the term femicide to recognize the common and prevalent differences in the ways women are murdered versus the ways men are murdered will illuminate deep gender imbalances in society. Utilization of the term will encourage the police and judicial forces to exercise gender-sensitivity when approaching the matter, or analyzing trends in crime. Widespread implementation of the term femicide can reshape society in how it perceives gender-based violence—its causes and perpetuators—and how it conceptualizes violence and discrimination against women. An instant change will not happen in Brazil simply due to the country’s legislative reform regarding femicide. However, the measure is part of a greater trend in the Western Hemisphere rising up to collectively reassess the state of violence and discrimination against women; heavily propelled by the United Nations, the movement is establishing the necessary rhetoric to facilitate future justice and equality.

*Kate Sopcich, research Associate at the Council On Hemispheric Affairs (COHA).

Reference:
[1] “Brazil Femicide Law Signed by President Rousseff.” BBC News: Latin American & Caribbean. Published March 9, 2015. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-31810284.

[2] Moloney, Anastia. “Brazil Passes Femicide Law to Tackle Rise in Gender Killings.” Thomas Reuters Foundation. Published March 10, 2015. http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/03/10/us-brazil-femicide-women-s-rights-idUSKBN0M61WV20150310.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid.

[5] “Femicide: A Term to Fight Gender Violence.” TeleSUR. Published November 25, 2014. http://www.telesurtv.net/english/news/Femicide-A-Term-to-Fight-Gender-Violence-20141125-0031.html.

[6] “Amigovio, papichulo, feminicidio, homoparental; las palabras que aceptó la RAE este año.” Animal Politico. Published October 17, 2014. http://www.animalpolitico.com/2014/10/amigovio-papichulo-feminicidio-homoparental-las-palabras-que-acepto-la-rae-este-ano/.

[7] “Q&A with Molly Molloy: The Story of the Juarez Femicides is a ‘Myth’,” by Christopher Hooks. Texas Observer. Published January 9, 2014. http://www.texasobserver.org/qa-molly-molloy-story-juarez-femicides-myth/.

[8] “Brazil Passes Femicide Law to Tackle Rise in Gender Killings.” Reuters. Written by Anastasia Maloney. Published March 10, 2015. http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/03/10/us-brazil-femicide-women-s-rights-idUSKBN0M61WV20150310.

[9] “Modelo de protocol latinoamericano de investigación de las muertes violentas de mjueres por razones de género (femicidio/feminicidio). La Oficina Regional para América Central del Alto Comisionado de las Naciones Unidas para los Derechos Humanos y la Oficina Regional para las Américas y el Caribe de la Entidad de las Naciones Unidas para la Igualdad de Género y el Empoderamiento de las Mujeres. Published 2014. http://www.un.org/es/women/endviolence/pdf/Modelo%20de%20Protocolo.pdf.

[10] “Brazil Passes Femicide Law to Tackle Rise in Gender Killings.” Reuters. Written by Anastasia Maloney. Published March 10, 2015. http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/03/10/us-brazil-femicide-women-s-rights-idUSKBN0M61WV20150310.

[11]“Brazil Passes Femicide Law to Tackle Rise in Gender Killings,” by Anastia Moloney. Thomas Reuters Foundation. Published March 10, 2015. http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/03/10/us-brazil-femicide-women-s-rights-idUSKBN0M61WV20150310.

[12] “UN Women calls for urgent and effective action against femicide.” Statement by Lakshmi Puri. Published May 15, 2014. http://www.unwomen.org/en/news/stories/2013/5/un-women-calls-for-urgent-and-effective-action-against-femicide.

[13] “Fast Facts: Statistics on Violence Against Women and Girls.” UN Women. Published 2014. http://www.endvawnow.org/en/articles/299-fast-facts-statistics-on-violence-against-women-and-girls-.html.

[14] “Femicide in Latin America.”UN Women. Published April 4, 2013. http://www.unwomen.org/en/news/stories/2013/4/femicide-in-latin-america.

[15] “Ending Impunity for Femicide in Latin America.” United Nations Human Rights: Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights. Published August 25, 2014. http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/EndingImpunityLAC.aspx.

[16] “La Platforma de Acción de Beijing Cumple 20 Años.” Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe. Published 2015. http://www.cepal.org/mujer/noticias/paginas/6/54036/51MDM-B20-P2-PaolaPabon.pdf.

[17] “Modelo de protocol latinoamericano de investigación de las muertes violentas de mjueres por razones de género (femicidio/feminicidio). La Oficina Regional para América Central del Alto Comisionado de las Naciones Unidas para los Derechos Humanos y la Oficina Regional para las Américas y el Caribe de la Entidad de las Naciones Unidas para la Igualdad de Género y el Empoderamiento de las Mujeres. Published 2014. http://www.un.org/es/women/endviolence/pdf/Modelo%20de%20Protocolo.pdf.

[18] “CSW59/Beijing+20 (2015).” UN Women. Published March 2015. http://www.unwomen.org/en/csw/csw59-2015.

[19] “Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action: Beijing +5 Political Declaration and Outcome.” Un Women. Published 2014. http://www.unwomen.org/~/media/headquarters/attachments/sections/csw/pfa_e_final_web.pdf.

[20] Ibid.

[21] Ibid.

[22] “About International Women’s Day (8 March).” International Women’s Day. Published 2015. http://www.internationalwomensday.com/about.asp#.VQIfY0L4tlI.

The post Brazil Implements Femicide Legislation As UN Assesses Global Gender Equality – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Ron Paul: Why Do American Weapons End Up In Our Enemies’ Hands? – OpEd

0
0

It happens so often you wonder whether it is due to total ineptness or a deliberate policy to undermine our efforts overseas. It’s most likely a result of corruption and unintended consequences, combined with a foreign policy that makes it impossible to determine who are our friends are and who are our enemies. One would think that so many failures in arming others to do our bidding in our effort to control an empire would awaken our leaders and the American people and prompt policy changes.

A recent headline in Mother Jones read: “US Weapons Have A Nasty Habit of Going AWOL.” The report was about $500 million worth of military equipment that is unaccounted for in Yemen. Just as in so many other places, our policy of provoking civil strife in Yemen has been a complete failure. At one time it was announced that there was a great victory in a war being won with drones assisting groups that claimed to be on our side in the Yemen Civil War. As usual, we could have expected that these weapons would end up in the hands of the militants not on the side of United States and would never be accounted for.

There are numerous examples of how our foreign intervention backfires and actually helps the enemy. Just recently a headline announced: “CIA cash sometimes refills al-Qaeda coffers.” This was a story of our government helping pay ransom to al-Qaeda for the release an Afghan diplomat. However this was a measly $5 million so it was not considered a big deal. Another headline just recently announced that, “Iraqi army downs two UK planes carrying weapons for ISIL.” The Iraqi army is supposed to be on our side, and many people believe the UK is also on our side as well. One thing for sure the American taxpayer pays for all this nonsense.

Building weapons and seeing them end up in the hands of the enemy is almost a routine event and one should expect it to continue to happen under the circumstances of the chaos in the Middle East. This represents a cost to the American taxpayer and is obviously a major contributing factor in what will be the ultimate failure of our plan to remake the Middle East. This is bad enough, and the only people who seem to benefit from it are those who are earning profits in the military-industrial complex. But there is something every bit as bad as our weapons ending up in the hands of the jihadists and being used against us. That is, the fact that our presence there, our weapons, and our bombs, are the best recruiting tool for getting individuals to join the fight against America’s presence in so many conflicts around the world.

If our leaders cannot understand the arguments against our current policies based on the Constitutional and moral principles, they ought to at least be willing to pay attention to the impracticality of a policy that almost always seems to backfire, is always very expensive, and is always detrimental to our national defense.

Someday out of necessity we will be forced to consider a policy that the Founders advocated. Friendship with all nations, peace, commerce, and avoidance of all entangling alliances while staying out of the internal affairs of other nations. Unless something miraculous happens, I fear that this will not be accomplished until we are forced to come to our knees in the midst of a colossal bankruptcy.

This article was published by RonPaul Institute.

The post Ron Paul: Why Do American Weapons End Up In Our Enemies’ Hands? – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

‘Turkish Stream': Russia’s Passing Alacrity Or Premeditated Ambition? – Analysis

0
0

By Hasan Selim Ozertem

The new pipeline project that Russia plans to construct beneath the surface of the Black Sea en route to Turkey is now being discussed under the title “Turkish Stream”. Although it has not officially been named yet, this pipeline, referred to as “temporary” on Gazprom Export’s official web site, has nonetheless come to take its place among the company’s most important projects. “South Stream”, on the other hand, is still to be found on Gazprom’s webpage. Whether this is simply because the site hasn’t been updated remains unknown but that the entire process is subject to increasing speculation is obvious.

The political turmoil in Ukraine has worked to shift geopolitical balances, and in turn, deeply affected energy politics. The cancellation of the “South Stream” pipeline project and its replacement seen in “Turkish Stream” are among the most prominent topics being discussed in this area.

As can be remembered, the pressure of the European Commission on Bulgaria was effective; despite enjoying the support of Austria and Hungary, the South Stream project was suspended in June 2014, thus leading to an inescapable quandary. Vladimir Putin ended this uncertainty during his visit to Turkey in December. The European Commission’s use of the project as a bargaining chip in its confrontation with Russia over its role in agitating the turmoil in Ukraine resulted in a stark retaliatory move by Putin: the project would be cancelled.

In a two-pronged declaration, Putin simultaneously announced that not only would South Stream be cancelled, but also a preliminary agreement with Turkey on a new pipeline had been reached. Additionally, Russia revealed that it planned to export gas to Europe via this route in the future. In this way, Russia put forth the impression that instead of pulling back, it was simply changing its position on its continued mission to open an alternative route to Ukraine.

Here, Russia figured that it could capitalize on a regional blind spot, as Turkey has not yet become a member of the EU and has not yet opened the energy chapter of the acquis within the framework of its negotiations with the EU. In this way, Russia’s move was twofold. First, it ignited a new debate within the EU, as the decision to cancel the project will directly harm Bulgaria as a member country. Second, with regard to Ukraine, Russia declared that it would not transport gas through the country after 2019.

Russia’s statements can be regarded as the Kremlin flexing its energy policy muscle at Europe. As a gas supplier, Russia has maneuvered in this way as a response to the liberalization policies of Europe and (if Europe is still willing to buy Russian gas) a manifestation of its continued efforts to set the rules of the game.

However, the fact that Russia set the clear date of 2019 to halt the transportation of gas through Ukraine has triggered some questions as to the future of gas provision to Eastern and Central Europe. For instance, Gazprom has already committed to providing Europe with gas through existing long-term contracts, some of which are valid even after 2020. In this regard, it is still debatable how Gazprom’s struggle to impose a change in the route to its European customers is going to be possible. Regarding the issue, Jonathan Stern from the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies emphasized that Gazprom should renegotiate these contracts, otherwise, it will not be easy to ship the gas through a new pipeline. [1]

Yet, Gazprom CEO Alexey Miller’s statements display an aversion to such a move: “Love cannot be forced,” Miller said, “If a customer doesn’t want doorstep delivery, then he apparently has to put on clothes and go shopping, and if it is winter time – he’ll have to bundle up and go out with any package he wants – …The EU and the European Commission simply presented Turkey with a ‘gas valve’. I believe Turkey might use it in its dialogue with Europe. And we got a new strategic partner in the gas business.”

Nonetheless, how strong Turkey could be in this new picture is not yet definitive. There is a need to note that the bargains between Russia and Turkey are ongoing. And on the other side, the EU needs to take a position against Russia in two ways: (i) it needs to understand the new strategy being carried out by Russia when calculating the steps it should take; (ii) it needs to protect the already fragile association of nation-states by balancing Russia’s proactive policy.

“Energy Union” (?)

The recent conceptualization of an “Energy Union” strategy is very important in the EU’s formulation of the two abovementioned policies. However, this strategy has already begun to face challenges just as it began to settle with the new team of top officials taking office in Brussels. Here, the most recent example can be seen in Vladimir Putin’s meeting with the Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orban on February 17, where the two reached a preliminary agreement on a large energy package.

In response, Vice-President of the European Commission and President of the Energy Union, Maroš Šefčovič, has stressed that the Commission should take part in negotiations with Russia while also applying the necessary provisions for the creation of a common energy policy. Yet, Orban’s response reveals the true nature of the paradox being faced by the EU: “the Energy Union project equates to intervention in EU member states’ bilateral relations, which in turn means the sacrifice of our sovereignty.”

Considering Orban’s statements, it can be said that Russia gained an important partner within the EU in Hungary by decreasing the gas prices it offers the country from $500 to $260 per 1,000 m3 in 2009 and by revoking the “take or pay” principle. On the other hand, with this 2009 agreement, Russia also prevented its Central European partner from sending additional gas to Ukraine by way of reverse flow. All these developments show that Russia – if it is able to repeat the successes of its policies directed as Hungary with other European countries – could expand its decreasing room for maneuver, and eventually, further strengthen its leverage over Ukraine.

Where is “Turkish Stream” going?

Putin’s press statement after his meeting with Orban contained some remarkable elements: “We are in talks [with our European partners] at the moment, but we will not abandon our cooperation with Turkey. Not only because this would not be decent behavior on our part, coming to an agreement with our Turkish friends and then saying, ‘No, Europe is making us a new offer now,’ but also because we could end up in a foolish situation. After all, the European Commission could refuse today, agree tomorrow, and then take its word back again the day after.” On the basis of discourse, this statement should be considered as Russia’s commitment to “Turkish Stream”. Yet, the question remains as to whether or not everyone understands the same thing when “Turkish Stream” is mentioned.

As the plan stands today, it is known that “Turkish Stream” will consist of four pipelines with an overall capacity of 63 bcm. In the first stage, it is targeted for the first of these four lines to be finished in 2017. Thus, the direction of this 14 bcm gas flow that is normally transported over Ukraine would be diverted directly to Turkey.

Experts say that the pipes located along Bulgaria’s Varna coasts, which are left over from the South Stream project, are ready to be loaded on barges and used to help finish this stage quickly. Considering the estimates that $4.7 billion has already been spent on South Stream, this move is expected to prevent a great financial loss on the part of Russia.

While this first step may be more or less clear, the next step currently finds itself in a state of complete political ambiguity. Here, there are significant doubts as to what direction the upcoming process will take when observing that on the one hand, the ongoing negotiations between the West and Russia will be crucial in determining the route of the pipeline after it passes through Turkey, and that on the other hand, the ceasefire in Ukraine is on a knife-edge. Here, in order to reduce costs and to open up new avenues of cooperation with Moscow, Turkey is increasing its contacts with Russia. However, so far Turkey has only managed to receive a 6 percent discount on gas transported to the country.

Considering the 2014 figures, although the price scale was not transparent, it is estimated that Turkey paid around $390 1,000 m3 of gas with this discount. In this regard, the project represents an attractive opportunity for Turkey to pull down the price it pays for gas, which is already far above that paid in Europe, as in Hungary for example.

Alternately, that Russia is trying to strengthen its position in the Turkish market, which is one of the fastest growing markets in Europe, is a fact known by everyone. Glancing at the 2014 figures, (i) Turkey’s market continued to grow whereas a 15 percent contraction in demand was seen in Europe, and (ii) Russia agreed to transport an additional 3 bcm of gas to Turkey via the Blue Stream after Putin’s visit to Ankara in December of last year. These developments have made Turkey one of the most crucial destinations for Gazprom. In this respect, it is generally accepted that Russia, which has jumped at the opportunity to increase its market share with “Turkish Stream”, is resolute in its words, at least with regard to the first stage of the project.

However, the real issue is likely to be discussed further: will the Europeans really “put on their clothes and go shopping”, buying their much needed gas from the Turkish market? We will try to follow the hints to the answer to this question based on the developments taking place in different places and in different forms. Nonetheless, until then, it isn’t difficult to see that we will pass through a period in which specific dates will be up in the air and the macro political dynamics will be discussed with open speculation.

1. http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/eedfa430-b764-11e4-8807-00144feab7de.html#axzz3SIt2zYzF

*Turkish version of this op-ed was first published at Analist monthly journal’s March 2015 issue.

The post ‘Turkish Stream': Russia’s Passing Alacrity Or Premeditated Ambition? – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Kenya: The Return Of Tyranny – OpEd

0
0

By Henry Makori*

Nairobi’s Mutahi Ngunyi, a neo-liberal crystal ball-gazer, is credited with introducing the term “tyranny of numbers” into Kenya’s political lexicon. Ngunyi is a former quirky columnist – and nowadays a darling of Kenyan TV reporters – who ladles out his ruminations on Twitter. In the run-up to the fiercely contested 4 March 2013 elections, Ngunyi prophesied that although independent Kenya’s longest pro-democracy detainee and former Prime Minister Raila Odinga consistently led in the opinion polls, his opponent Uhuru Kenyatta, son of Kenya’s first President Jomo Kenyatta, would pull a surprise win based on votes from the country’s two largest ethnic blocs, the Kikuyu and the Kalenjin, and smaller groups associated with these Big Two. Kenyatta is Kikuyu and his then running mate William Ruto is Kalenjin.

Many critics laughed off Ngunyi’s theory as wild speculation. But he turned out to be prescient in the end. (Or was Ngunyi privy to insider ethnic calculations and was intent on swaying voters by a provocative self-fulfilling prophecy?) On 9 March 2013, the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) declared Kenyatta the winner with 50.51 percent of the vote, followed by Odinga with 43.70 percent. Voter turnout was the biggest in history, at 86 per cent. Kenyatta’s Jubilee Coalition won majorities in both houses of parliament. Odinga’s Coalition for Reforms and Democracy (CORD) cried foul and challenged the result, but the Supreme Court upheld Kenyatta’s win in a ruling that remains controversial. Another suit filed by members of civil society challenging the legitimacy of the election was also lost. Odinga accepted the court decision, but without agreeing with it.

What Mutahi Ngunyi and the many Kenyans who debated his “tyranny of numbers” theory might never have suspected at the time was that the victory of Uhuru Kenyatta would herald the return of actual tyranny to the country. This was generally not suspected for two main reasons. First, although still a neo-colonial state captured by ethnic elites, the ten years prior to Kenyatta’s win, under Mwai Kibaki (2002-2012), were the longest period since independence that Kenyans had lived relatively free, without extensive and systematic state repression – although neo-liberalism, imperialist ties, inequality and economic exploitation were deepened. The 24 years of President Daniel arap Moi were the worst. At his departure, Kenyans had heaved a collective sigh of relieve. Kenyatta, then Moi’s handpicked successor, was decisively trounced by the laidback, rich golfer Kibaki. It therefore seemed natural to hope that, with Kibaki’s election, Kenyans had tossed dictatorship into the dustbin of history.

The second reason, related to the first, is that in 2010 the country overwhelmingly voted a new constitution that enshrined extensive, some would say radical, changes in the way Kenya was governed. The new supreme law was underpinned by a robust Bill of Rights. The pervasive powers of the president, creating what pro-democracy activists had long derided as the “imperial presidency”, were whittled down. Gone was the colonial-era provincial administration headed by a ruthless cadre of bureaucrats sporting ridiculous pith helmets and khaki uniforms. Handpicked by the president, and always overzealous to please him, they acted as his eyes and ears through a network that ran right down to the remotest village. In place of this colonial relic came the devolved government with 47 semi-autonomous counties headed by governors with executive powers, directly elected by the people. Numerous independent commissions were set up to oversee service delivery to citizens. The bi-cameral parliament was back. An independent judiciary was created, topped with the Supreme Court…

These and many more changes assured Kenyans that state tyranny was gone forever, regardless of who came to power. Relentless agitation for the new constitution had lasted for at least two decades, claiming many lives and limbs. The euphoria around the country upon promulgation of the constitution on 27 August 2010 was similar to that witnessed at independence on 12 December 1963. Everyone was convinced that Kenya had been reborn.

In this buoyant political atmosphere, Uhuru Kenyatta’s victory three years up the road was largely unforeseen. The country was still basking in the bright afterglow of enactment of the new constitution. It was the first election under the new law. Whoever won would be widely expected to uphold, implement and popularise the constitution with revolutionary zeal. But Uhuru Kenyatta did not look like that person. Although he had supported the “Yes” side during the referendum, Kenyatta was not such an enthusiastic campaigner. In any case it did not really matter where he stood. Kenyatta had never articulated a principled position on anything. He was in politics purely as the son of Jomo Kenyatta to protect family and associated elite interests. Worse, his running mate was William Ruto, the most prominent and virulent crusader for the “No” side.

A fabulously wealthy KANU party loyalist entirely assembled by tyrant Moi, and a direct beneficiary of the neo-colonial state dating back to his father’s 15-year dictatorship, Uhuru Kenyatta had absolutely no record of championing democracy in Kenya. There was also some debate around the question of dynastic politics – electing the son of a former president. Another issue was the fact that Kenyatta, surreptitiously endorsed by the deceptively urbane outgoing President Kibaki, an ethnic Kikuyu as well, would be the third Kikuyu president out of four in a country where ethnicity is a very sensitive political subject.

But by far the biggest issue was that Uhuru Kenyatta and his running mate Ruto were standing trial for crimes against humanity at the International Criminal Court at The Hague. Both tainted men, previously allied to opposing political formations, had been accused of masterminding the deadly post-election violence that engulfed Kenya in 2007-8. They were charged at the ICC with several counts of crimes against humanity, charges which they vehemently denied. The victims of that violence had not received justice yet – not even from the local courts. Thousands of displaced persons were still languishing in makeshift camps or living with relatives. It did not seem likely that individuals whose names had been formally linked to those apocalyptic atrocities could be elected to the highest office in the land. Moreover, questions were raised about how Kenyatta and Ruto would discharge their duties at the presidency while attending court at the ICC. Concerns were also expressed that Kenya’s image would be tarnished internationally in the event that persons suspected of committing the vilest crimes on earth were elected to the exalted office of president. Crucial friends, especially traditional allies in the West who backed the ICC trials, would isolate Kenya.

Renowned scholar Prof Mahmood Mamdani, Director of Makerere Institute of Social Research at Makerere University in Uganda, has argued, correctly, that the ICC was “the single factor with the most influence on this election.” That the ICC process polarized politics in Kenya is true. “Led by individuals who [stood] charged before the ICC, one side in the electoral contest could not contemplate defeat; if defeated, they would lose all,” Mamdani observes. He is also correct to suggest that the devious Jubilee Coalition posed as “the coalition of victimized sacrificial lambs”. Kenyatta and Ruto vigorously campaigned on a rather nebulous platform of peace, national healing and reconciliation – of course without ever uttering a word about truth and justice.

But that is not what won them the election. Mamdani surprisingly fails to factor in his analysis a perceptive appreciation of Kenya’s ethnicised politics: Mutahi Ngunyi’s “tyranny of numbers”. Or the multi-million-dollar Jubilee war chest that made the 2013 polls the most expensive in the country’s history. Or the blatant lies and distortions employed to consolidate the ethnic vote, while deliberately confusing the rest of the mostly unsophisticated electorate.

A recent report by Corporate European Observatory titled ‘Spin doctors to the autocrats: how European PR firms whitewash repressive regimes’ reveals how “[i]n a few short months, thanks in part to the PR strategy of British firm BTP Advisers, presidential candidate Uhuru Kenyatta went from being seen as a dubious person wanted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) in the Hague to leader of his country in the 2013 elections. It was the most expensive campaign in Kenya’s history.” The Kenyatta Campaign, the report says, drummed up populist feelings against Western imperialism, targeted mostly at the ICC and diplomats in Nairobi who had suggested that Kenya would suffer internationally if Kenyatta was elected. “BTP Advisers used their local and international networks to present the ICC process as a machination of Western powers and to turn what was initially considered a disadvantage into an advantage for Uhuru.”

Unbeknownst to the proverbial Wanjiku (a popular reference to the struggling, short-changed ‘ordinary’ citizen) who had hoped for better life under the new constitution, the multi-million-dollar Kenyatta Campaign was sheer fraud: a strategic mudslinging of the West in a cynical ploy devised by a British PR firm. Even the lawyers handling Kenyatta’s case at the ICC were British. The Kenyatta family itself is believed to have extensive business interests in Europe and America. And in February 2015, whom did the Jubilee government hire to oversee their flagship projects? Tony Blair.

Eminent Pan-Africanist scholar-activist Horace Campbell, Professor of African American Studies and Political Science at Syracuse University, has described Uhuru Kenyatta’s campaign as “one of the most blatant manipulations of the anti-imperialist claims of the progressive forces in Africa.” Ruto and Kenyatta cleverly appropriated “the discourse of African radicals about defending the sovereignty of Africa” to win the election.

THE REAL WINNER

In a rousing inauguration speech on 9 April 2013, Uhuru Kenyatta sought to cut the image of an astute statesman; a grounded democrat; a single-minded, defender of the will of the Kenyan peoples as expressed, not in the divisive and highly choreographed election, but in the 2010 Constitution. Kenya was an open and free democracy, where a vibrant opposition played the vital role of holding the government to account, he said, pledging that “as president I will respect that role just as I will champion the right of every Kenyan to speak their mind free of fear of reprisal or condemnation.” He would lead the country towards abiding peace. “Peace is not simply about the absence of violence. It is defined by the presence of fundamental liberties and the prevalence of economic opportunities.”

Not everyone was duped by that high-sounding rhetoric crafted by dubious top-dollar PR gurus. Even before Kenyatta was inaugurated, already perceptive voices grounded in the man-eat-man reality of Kenya were starting to be heard doubting the direction the election winners would take the country. Just days after the election, Kenya’s top man of letters, Prof Ngugi wa Thiong’o, an avowed Leftist dissident detained by Uhuru Kenyatta’s father, made an insightful point in an article in the New York Times: “The real winner was a man who wasn’t on the ballot: Daniel arap Moi, the country’s leader from 1978 to 2002, who terrorized it for 24 years and destroyed all credible institutions, including political parties.”

Kenyatta and Ruto were Moi’s political protégés, Ngugi noted. When multi-party politics was re-introduced in Kenya in 1991 against the wishes of Moi, he had turned to Ruto, then a young upstart wheeler-dealer but who quickly distinguished himself as a lieutenant for Youth for Kanu ’92, which conducted a campaign of violence and intimidation in the Rift Valley Province, home to Moi. Thousands of residents were forced to flee. Some returned, only to have to flee again around the next election, in 1997. The Rift Valley was also the epicenter of the 2007-8 violence, which displaced hundreds of thousands of people. As for Kenyatta, it was Moi who fished him out of political obscurity by nominating him to parliament. Kenyatta later served in Moi’s Cabinet, as did Ruto, and in 2002 Moi tried, but failed, to foist him on Kenyans as his successor. “The sycophancy and corruption of [Moi’s] era are still ingrained in the political culture and are embodied by the rise of his allies in this election,” Ngugi observed.

Prof Campbell echoed Ngugi’s sentiments: “The faction of the political divide represented by Uhuru Kenyatta and his running mate William Ruto is that section of the Kenyan society that has monopolized political and economic power since independence in 1963. Both Kenyatta and Ruto represent entrenched interests of capital.”

Wangui Kamari of the Kenyan social movement Bunge La Mwananchi (People’s Parliament) also saw capital as the winner of the 2013 elections. She opined: “And while the new president and his party have made promises that may offer some form of short-term respite from our (dying) conditions, they are embedded in a global capitalist framework (reliant on getting ‘foreign investment’, dismal salaries and working conditions and increasing the surveillance and policing of citizens) that does not offer any break from a system that still treats the majority of our people like chattel.”

Former international journalist and author of the book ‘It is our time to eat: The story of a Kenyan whistleblower’, Michaela Wrong, wrote that “in confirming the election of a man indicted by the International Criminal Court for allegedly orchestrating the ethnic cleansing that followed Kenya’s 2007 polls, Chief Justice Willy Mutunga did more than solve a national wrangle over a ballot count. He secured Kenya’s place as a shining international symbol of impunity.” She went on: “Jingoistic and cynical while campaigning, the Jubilee alliance of Kenyatta and Ruto is likely to be bullying while in power, with foreign diplomats whose respect it demands and constituents alike.”

Poignantly, the current political situation in Kenya under the Kenyatta-Ruto ethnic combo fulfils these dire predictions.

“EVIL SOCIETY”

“We are committed to fostering an open, tolerant, forward-looking Kenya” – Jubilee Manifesto

One of the planks of Jubilee’s purported anti-imperialist crusade was a burning animosity towards civil society, especially critical organisations championing social justice, on the excuse that they were funded by foreigners (Who isn’t foreign funded? Government? Church? Crucially, does the freedom of association guaranteed by the constitution exclude foreigners or specify the nature of association?). In the immediate aftermath of Jubilee’s disputed victory, the term “evil society” emerged in social media, propagating a grotesque narrative created by bloggers allied to the fledgling administration. Denis Itumbi, allegedly a college drop-out – now the Director of Digital, New Media and Diaspora Affairs at Kenya’s presidency – is associated with the origins of this smear campaign through an insulting infographic that became the subject of some discussion on social media.

Jubilee’s animus towards civil society is connected to the ICC trials on which they rode to “win” the 2013 election. The organisations had whole-heartedly backed the ICC work in Kenya – given that the Kibaki government had failed to try the perpetrators – with some groups providing crucial support to the Office of the Prosecutor. That naturally made them the enemies of crimes against humanity suspects Kenyatta and Ruto. NGOs was falsely accused of taking the duo to The Hague, despite facts on record that it was politicians like Ruto who rejected a local tribunal, paving the way for the ICC intervention. In addition, some organisations were believed, rightly or otherwise, to have supported the candidature of Raila Odinga, Kenyatta’s top opponent.

Leading activists were openly vilified and some physically attacked. In September 2013 for example, a militia stormed the rural home of prominent activist Maina Kiai, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association. Kiai blamed the attack on operatives based at Kenya’s presidency. In a report on emerging threats to civil society presented at a UN forum, Kiai drew global attention to the situation in Kenya, where there was a sustained campaign to destroy civil society. Within months of Kenyatta’s inauguration, attacks and threats against human rights defenders and other activists had escalated to “acute” proportions, according to a Human Rights Watch statement published in October 2013.

That month, as the culmination of Jubilee’s relentless onslaught on civil society under the pretext of protecting the country’s sovereignty, the government quietly crafted a bill to amend the Public Benefit Organizations (PBO) Act of 2012, the law that governs the operations of non-governmental organisations. To many observers, the amendments were intended to strangle civil society with a financial noose. The bill proposed a cap on foreign funding for Kenyan PBOs, limiting such funds to 15 percent of their total budget. The proposed law also required that all PBOs funding be channelled through a government body, which would alone decide which organization got money and for what purpose. But the amendments were narrowly defeated in parliament after a massive local and international outcry.

Defeat of the attempt to amend the law to muzzle NGOs did not deter the government. Jubilee changed tact by forming a task force to collect views from stakeholders about a fresh raft of amendments to the PBO Act. The team completed this process on 5 March 2015. But civil society groups have accused the government of using the task force to reach a pre-determined outcome of clipping the wings of the sector.

Meanwhile, the harassment and intimidation of activists continues. In January for example, it emerged that well-known social justice campaigner Boniface Mwangi had written to Uhuru Kenyatta seeking his help following numerous death threats. “I am convinced that my life is in real danger. In the past one year, I have received many threats to my life, the most disturbing of which came from men who are considered loyal to you and your administration,” Mwangi wrote. But it is not just prominent activists facing such harassment. There are frequent reports from around country revealing a well-oiled government campaign to beat down civil society into submission and silence.

EMERGING AUTHORITARIANISM

Total chaos. Fisticuffs. Punches. Deafening yells. Insults. Jumping. Dancing. Pulling and pushing. Tearing. Hurling…. Those were the scenes in the National Assembly, the so-called “august house”, in Nairobi on 18 December 2014. It was a special sitting called for the final reading of the Security Laws (Amendment) Bill 2014. At the end of the unsightly free-for-all, House Speaker Justin Muturi of Jubilee declared that the government-sponsored bill had been passed. The following day Uhuru Kenyatta signed it into law. Unperturbed by the scenes in parliament and protests from citizens, Kenyatta brazenly lied to Kenyans in an address to the nation that there was nothing in the new law that contradicted the Bill of Rights or the constitution. The amendments came into force on 22 December. A whooping 22 separate laws had been amended in a marathon process lasting just over a week!

In the lead up to this saga, many progressive minds had been expressing alarm about the direction Jubilee was taking the country. Prominent activist and former Permanent Secretary for Governance and Ethics in the Kibaki government John Githongo had told a forum in Nairobi that “our current government has often made it clear that some of the rights Kenyans have come to take for granted are at best an inconvenience and at worst a risk to national security. While the messages are often mixed and confusing, it would seem that there are those within the regime – a minority it would seem – determined to craft Kenya into a militarized authoritarian state wrapped in the national flag and all the rituals and propagandised narratives of virulent nationalism.” Around that time Kenyatta had become the first Kenyan head of state to appear in public wearing military uniform. There were also claims, denied by Kenyatta himself, that the National Youth Service was being militarised for unknown reasons. The regime appears keen to control the youth through recruitment to the revamped and militarized NYS and the silencing or extrajudicial killing of those criminalized as “radicals.”

The amendments marathon had begun on 11 December 2014 when the parliamentary Committee on National Security and Administration sent the Security Laws (Amendment) Bill 2014 to parliament. Twenty-two laws were listed to be amended under the bill, ostensibly to strengthen the government’s hand to fight terrorism in the context of increased deadly attacks by the Somali-based militant group Al Shabaab. There was hardly any discussion in and outside parliament about the far-reaching changes proposed. The National Assembly allocated a mere three days for public participation – and this while the bill was being fast-tracked in the House. New criminal offenses with harsh penalties were created, the rights of arrested and accused persons were curtailed, and severe restrictions on the exercise of fundamental freedoms were imposed. Content aside, the entire process of rushing the bill flew in the face of the Constitution of Kenya 2010 and the rules of parliament. In sum, the Executive was using the ruling party-dominated National Assembly to abridge the celebrated Bill of Rights and return the country to dictatorship.

In a memorandum to the House, the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR), an independent human rights institution established under the constitution, rigorously questioned the rush, describing the proposed amendments as “momentous” and as seeking to “amend the Bill of Rights and fundamentally attach the principles of criminal justice.” The Bill of Rights can only be amended through a referendum. Several civil society organisations protested that the amendments were unconstitutional and amounted to clawing back on the democratic gains achieved under the constitution.

Jubilee was bullish at the time and would ride roughshod over anyone standing on their way. The bill had been taken to the House just days after the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court Fatou Bensouda withdrew crimes against humanity charges against Kenyatta, citing widespread witness tampering – deaths, disappearances, recanting of testimonies – and lack of cooperation by the Government of Kenya. Bensouda’s announcement, which was in no way a declaration of Kenyatta’s innocence, nevertheless sparked frenzied jubilation throughout Jubilee’s strongholds and wild partying at State House.

On 24 December, the opposition CORD, KNHRC and a Nairobi lawyer headed to court to fight the new security law. Civil society organisations were enjoined in the suit. Two months later on 23 February 2015, a 5-judge bench declared many provisions of the Security Laws Act unconstitutional in a ruling that castigated the Jubilee government, and which was hailed as a victory for civil liberties and a blow to emergent authoritarianism in Kenya.

REVIVING COLONIAL TACTICS

Four years ago when voters overwhelmingly passed the Constitution of Kenya 2010 at the referendum, a section of the civil service was very apprehensive. The supreme law demanded an overhaul of the much-loathed provincial administration that had been used by governments from the colonial days to brutalise and repress citizens. “Within five years after the effective date, the national government shall restructure the system of administration commonly known as the provincial administration to accord with and respect the system of devolved government established under this Constitution,” the constitution says. Although the government assured provincial commissioners, district commissioners, district officers, chiefs and their assistants that they would not be rendered jobless, the administrators knew for certain that, whatever alternative jobs they were offered, they would lose their immense powers and prestige.

The fate of these civil servants became a matter for public debate. Progressive voices were firm that the colonial relic should be entirely done away with, while supporters argued that it should be reformed and retained. Two months after coming to power, Uhuru Kenyatta announced he was keeping the provincial administration with minimal changes. Many saw this move as yet another move to consolidate powers back at the centre and weaken devolution.

Kenyan law scholar Prof Yash Pal Ghai who played key roles in the constitutional review process has written about the various ways in which Jubilee has flouted the constitution, concluding that, “We are rapidly slipping into the Kenyatta-Moi era.” Regarding the retention of the provincial administration, Ghai says: “The President’s county commissioners, with their new powers (and old hats), are so reminiscent of a British governor, Sir Evelyn Baring, who centralised the entire structure of provincial administration. He considered that the only way to defeat Mau Mau was for him to have firm control over all bureaucracy in districts and provinces, thus sidelining his ministers and senior administrators in Nairobi. Governors and presidents since then have retained this system, and ensured their lack of responsibility to anyone except themselves. The Constitution of Kenya Review Commission (CKRC) proposed to do away with this system, but the Bomas talks and the Committee of Experts retained it, although “restructured”. Now it has this new lease of life.”

In March last year, a bomb went off in a bustling suburb in Nairobi killing six people. Eastleigh is mostly populated by ethnic Somalis. Previously, the government had claimed that members of the Somalia-based militant group Al Shabaab had cells in Eastleigh and were radicalising youths and recruiting others to the group. Following the bomb attack, police launched a massive violent crackdown on ethnic Somalis in Nairobi. When police cells were full, police transported more than 1000 Somalis to Kasarani National Stadium and kept them there in deplorable conditions. The round-up caused an outcry, with Kenyans on Twitter using the hashtag #Kasaraniconcentrationcamp to demand the release of the citizens. There were many accounts of police brutality during the operation code-named Usalama Watch. Some commentators observed that the Jubilee government was using the same brutal strategies against Somalis as the British colonialists and the Kenyatta and Moi regimes.

The human rights campaign group Amnesty International said Operation Uslama [Security] Watch was being used as a pretext for the blanket punishment of the Somali community. “They have become scapegoats with thousands arrested and ill-treated, forcibly relocated and hundreds unlawfully expelled to a war-torn country,” said Michelle Kagari, AI’s Deputy Regional Director for Eastern Africa. “Whilst Kenya has legitimate national security concerns, the wholesale targeting of an already marginalized and vulnerable community is an appalling breach of national and international law.”

A monitoring report by the Independent Police Oversight Authority (IPOA), a constitutional body, delivered a damning indictment of the police. It found that hundreds of citizens were held in dirty, overcrowded cells in criminal violation of their constitutional rights. Abuses were widespread, including detention of children together with adults. Police officers used the operation to enrich themselves by extorting bribes. IPOA concluded that the operation “was not conducted in accordance with the law, respect for the rule of law, democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms as envisaged under Article 238(2) of the constitution. In addition, the police in their individual and collective capacities grossly failed to uphold the requirements of Article 244 of the constitution which binds them, among other things, to strive for professionalism and discipline and to promote and practice transparency and accountability.”

Kenya’s police force has not only refused to reform in accordance with the constitution; under the Kenyatta-Ruto regime, there is no political will to undertake the long-awaited reforms. Instead, the force is again being used for repression. The whole anti-terrorism narrative has been used as the entry point to legitimize increased surveillance and police brutality. The strengthening of arbitrary authoritarian police power is very much felt on the ground, with frequent reports of extortion and extrajudicial killings. In January, police violently broke up a march by school children in Nairobi who were protesting the grabbing of their playground by a hotel believed to be owned by a top Jubilee politician. Pictures of armed anti-riot police battling the brave children with tear gas and threatening them with dogs sparked outrage around the world. Days later, one person was killed when police confronted people protesting peacefully against the Jubilee governor of Narok County in south Kenya.

Colonial-era tactics are being deployed against activists and any form of activism and organizing. Threats against grassroots human rights defenders and the killing of those who are not in elitist civil society spaces have assumed a worrying trend. A community policing initiative dubbed Nyumba Kumi is being used to spy on and intimidate activists and to silence criticism of the government. All these tactics have created an atmosphere of control and violence against any activities that are for whatever reason seen as a threat by this government.

SILENCING MEDIA AND FREE SPEECH

“I will champion the right of every Kenyan to speak their mind free of fear of reprisal or condemnation.” Uhuru Kenyatta, inauguration speech, 9 April 2013.

Kenya has for long prided itself of having a vibrant and free media – although radical analysts insist that the so-called mainstream media are always at the service of the political class and big business. The leading media houses are owned either by powerful politicians or by business moguls allied to them. Upon coming to power Kenyatta praised the media for their “professionalism and responsibility.” Later he would host a media breakfast at State House, where he said he was happy that “in Kenya we do not have a debate about free media anymore.” That was in July 2013. In October, the government tabled two bills in parliament with draconian provisions to emasculate the media. Of course parliament passed the laws and Kenyatta signed them into law. Under the laws, a government-controlled body is mandated to punish journalists and media houses, whose reporting is perceived to be against the law. Steep fines of Kshs. 20 million [over $218,000] on media houses and Kshs. 1 million [over $10,000] on individual journalists are imposed. Journalists who contravene the law could be suspended from the profession.

“The media laws passed by the National Assembly are unconstitutional as they fail to ensure that media bodies are free from government, commercial or political control and interference,” said Henry Maina, Director ARTICLE 19 Eastern Africa. “These laws must not be allowed to be put into practice. Media freedom in Kenya will be seriously damaged if these laws are not reviewed.” Media owners and journalists rushed to court to challenge the laws. The laws were suspended pending hearing of the case.

But it is not just mainstream media that is under siege by the Kenyatta-Ruto regime in Kenya. In January 2015, Alan Wadi Okengo, a university student, was sentenced to a year in prison and fined $2,200 for “insulting Kenyatta” (speaking his mind?) on Facebook. Several other bloggers have been arrested or intimidated in the past on account of their social media posts that are considered hate speech. What is interesting is that pro-government bloggers and other commentators who post similar messages have not been so vigorously pursued for hate speech – like foul-mouthed Moses Kuria, the “honourable” Member of Parliament for Gatundu South, Kenyatta’s rural constituency.

CONCLUSION

A brief letter to the editor appeared in the Daily Nation newspaper of 5 March 2015, in which the author, James O Kihali, asks a number of questions, including: “Why is the Church silent even when the country drifts back to the dark days reminiscent of the Nyayo era [the 24-years of the Moi regime]? [1] How can the Church afford to look the other way when things are definitely not right?”

There is no doubt in many people’s minds that Kenya is headed back to tyrannical rule. And there is no shortage of citizens searching for a saviour. To be sure, the Church used to be a reliable ally in people’s struggles for justice; but it has long fallen silent having allowed its space to be invaded and desecrated by the political class. A day after the presidential election result was announced, William Ruto was cheered when he told a Nairobi congregation that it was “God who gave us victory against the odds”. He then proceeded to apparently break down into a fit of sobs in a dramatic show of gratitude to the Almighty. No fiery clerics any more boldly pointing out the glaring failings of the state and proposing alternatives. Hard-hitting sermons are no longer heard; nowadays pastoral letters and press statements are tepid, full of generalities.

Uhuru Kenyatta has arrogantly told off his critics to wait until he completes his ten years in power – he has a five-year mandate, but to his mind his re-election in 2017 is guaranteed. That means the Jubilee project to restore tyranny will be pursued with zeal. The Judiciary seems to be the last resort for Kenyans pushing back against this onslaught. But this option requires a lot of money and time; moreover litigation depoliticises the struggles for freedom and does nothing to redress underlying systemic causes. There are also reasonable fears that the regime might soon or later invent a strategy to deal with the bothersome independence of the courts. Already yet another a bill has been published that seeks to, among other things, remove the supervisory powers of the courts to question the constitutionality and legality of the proceedings and decisions of parliament.

Although pushed under intense pressure, civil society remains valiant. These groups, however, urgently need to review their ideological foundations and political strategies for mobilising and organising. In particular, civil society – and all conscious, progressive Kenyans – ought to go beyond merely reactive responses to systemic oppression and instead think about launching a sustained, long-term people’s struggle to totally dismantle the woefully unjust neo-colonial state in Kenya.

Forty years ago, just a decade after independence, a small group of committed patriots analysed the national situation and decided that the Jomo Kenyatta regime was an imperialist-allied dictatorship that should be removed. Fundamentally, nothing has really changed since then. Their observation remains true today:

“Kenya has never achieved true independence. Full independence can only be brought about by revolution. It is the culmination of popular, protracted revolutionary change during which the people seize control of the instruments of power under the leadership of a party dedicated to the eradication of the institutions and forms of the colonial state. In Amilcar Cabral’s words, ‘It is necessary to totally destroy, to break to ash, all aspects of the colonial state’ before independence can be achieved.”[2]

* Henry Makori is an editor with Pambazuka News.

END NOTES

[1] James O Kihali, Church’s silence amid injustices worrying, Daily Nation, 5 March 2015, pg.14.
[2] Maina wa Kinyatti, Mwakenya: The unfinished revolution, Mau Mau Research Centre, 2014; pg.151

The post Kenya: The Return Of Tyranny – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.


How Qatar Is Its Own Worst Enemy – Analysis

0
0

Qatar is proving to be its own worst enemy in achieving its soft power goals of embedding itself in the international community as a good citizen despite having put crucial blocks in place. Its failure to convincingly follow through on promises to reform its controversial migrant labour system, demonstrate its sincerity in stopping a flow of funds to jihadist organizations, and develop a robust communications strategy that counters legitimate criticism as well as attacks by its detractors has cost it significant reputational damage and diplomatic and political capital.

As a result, Qatar has found itself in recent years under continuous attack amid allegations of corruption in its successful bid to host the 2022 World Cup, denunciation by human rights and trade union activists of its migrant labour sponsorship system as a form of modern slavery,[1] and charges that it tolerates funding of militant Islamist groups ranging from Hamas, the group that controls the Gaza Strip, to the Islamic State, the jihadists that have conquered swaths of Syria and Iraq.[2]

Qatar suffered its setbacks despite its development of a foreign policy that emphasizes mediation and peace-making; a sports policy that seeks to garner empathy from a global public by hosting high-profile sports mega events and acquiring top league foreign soccer clubs; a strategy to acquire high profile commercial and cultural assets; a world class airline that positions Qatar as a hub connecting continents; and a global news and sports broadcaster that competes with the BBC and CNN.

These policies led to Qatar’s hosting of the Al-Udeid airbase, the largest US military facility in the Middle East as well as the U.S. Combat Operations Air Center for the Middle East, making it a key regional US ally. Yet, its alliance like sponsorship of BelN, a global sports broadcasting network that gives Qatar exposure to an audience in which many know little, if anything, about the Gulf state has earned little reputational capital.

Similarly, Qatar’s Arabic language Al Jazeera channel has lost much of the admiration it initially won the Gulf state by revolutionizing a Middle Eastern and North African media landscape that had been dominated by state-owned broadcasters and projected Qatar as a country that encouraged free and open debate – a key element of soft power. Al Jazeera Arabic’s success made it the most widely watched regional news channel until its image as a free-wheeling news channel was undermined by perceptions that it had become a partisan tool in backing controversial groups like the Muslim Brotherhood in the aftermath of the Arab popular revolts.

Qatar further earned few brownie points by accommodating an Israeli diplomatic presence in Doha until the 2009 Israeli attack on Gaza or being the only Arab country to have ever openly invested in Israel with funding for a soccer stadium in the Galilee city of Sakhnin and of two Israeli Palestinian clubs.[3]

Qatar’s successful mediation of the release of hostages held by Islamist groups and conflicts in various part of the Middle East and North Africa positioned it as the skilled and experienced go-to negotiator. Yet, the allegations of funding of terrorism, its differences with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates over the Brotherhood and corruption in its World Cup bid have offset whatever mileage Qatar earned from its mediation efforts.

Finally, Qatar’s engagement with critics such as human rights groups and trade unions served to project it as a forward looking state willing to embrace change in sharp contrast to other Gulf states that regularly bar entry to foreign activists and either deprive domestic critics of their nationality or imprison them. But its failure to follow through on promises has undermined activists’ confidence, sparked criticism and threatens to refuel demands that it be deprived of its right to host the World Cup. A member of the executive committee of world soccer body FIFA warned that Qatar could lose its hosting rights if it failed to implement recommendations that included the creation of a minimum wage for each category of construction worker made by a Qatar-sponsored review of its labour legislation by British-based law firm DLA Piper.[4]

The adoption in December of a human rights declaration at a summit in Doha by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)[5], the regional grouping of which Qatar is a member, opens Qatar up to a new line of criticism on the labour issue despite the fact that the flawed document was intended to enable Gulf states to deflect attacks on their human rights record. Overall, the declaration signalled the GCC’s refusal to recognize its citizen’s political rights including the right to freedom of thought and expression. It did however acknowledge that “people are equal in dignity and humanity, in rights and freedoms, and equal before the law” with “no distinction between them for reasons of origin, gender, religion, language, colour, or any other form of distinction.”

That acknowledgement strengthens demands by human rights and trade union activists that Qatar embrace the principle of collective bargaining that would eliminate its system of setting wages for migrant workers according to nationality. “It is not entirely certain how the comparative wage differences have been derived, or why. The QF (Qatar Foundation) Standards state clearly a universal principle in the world of work, namely,,, workers shall receive equal pay for equal work irrespective of their nationality, gender, ethnic origin, race, religion or legal status,” said a report by migration scholar Ray Jureidini, compiled for the Qatar Foundation.[6] QF is one of two Qatari institutions in the forefront of attempting to address activists’ concerns.

Screen Shot 2015-03-19 at 9.18.01 PMThe report recommended introduction of a minimum wage to eliminate discriminatory wage policies as part of an effort to ensure Qatar’s competitiveness. “If Qatar wishes to have wage rates of migrant workers set by supply and demand in a local labour market, then it will need to lift the current kafala sponsorship system, allow workers to change employers without sponsor approval (as is now the case in Bahrain) allow collective bargaining to take place that will establish wage rates, terms and conditions of all occupations filled by non-Qataris in the country”, the report’s said.[7] A similar recommendation was made by the United Nations Special Rapporteur for migrants’ human rights.[8] The kafala system puts workers at the mercy of their employers.

At the core of Qatar’s inability to turn the building blocks of its soft power strategy into successes from which it could reap the fruits is a lack of political will to respond to criticism it recognizes not only with words and window dressing but convincing deeds. Qatar’s ability to capitalize on its soft power assets is further hampered by a lack of management infrastructure to ensure monitoring and enforcement of existing legislation, rules and regulations; and a need to manage domestic public opinion, particularly within the factitious ruling Al Thani family. In addition, Qatar has been unable or unwilling to develop a communications strategy capable of addressing criticism stemming from its winning of the right to host the World Cup and a backlash from its shift in foreign policy from strict neutrality and mediation to proactive intervention in support of popular revolts that swept the Middle East and North Africa in the second decade of the 21st century.

Friend or Foe?

Qatar’s desired status as a good citizen of the international community has been called into question by statements by senior US Treasury officials as well as think tank reports alleging that it maintains links with jihadist groups and at the least turns a blind eye to the funding of such organizations. Prominent among the reports is a three-part study entitled ‘Qatar and Terror Finance’[9] by the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies. “Qatar’s performance in the fight against terror finance tests the notion that it is a reliable friend and ally,” the foundation report concluded. Qatar’s credibility is further called into question by its support for Hamas, the Islamist group that governs the Gaza Strip, its differences with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states over its alliance with the Muslim Brotherhood, and a United Arab Emirates-funded anti-Qatar media campaign that has succeeded in generating negative media reporting.

In many ways the debate about funding of jihadist groups by wealthy individuals in the Gulf and particularly Qatar is slanted. For one, most estimates of the income of the Islamic State conclude that donations account for a small fraction of its total revenues.[10] “These rich Arabs are like what ‘angel investors’ are to tech start-ups, except they are interested in starting up groups who want to stir up hatred. Groups like (Jabhat) al-Nusra and ISIS (the former acronym for the Islamic State) are better investments for them. The individuals act as high rollers early, providing seed money. Once the groups are on their feet, they are perfectly capable of raising funds through other means, like kidnapping, oil smuggling, selling women into slavery, etc,” said former U.S. Navy Admiral and NATO Supreme Commander James Stavridis, now the dean of the Fletcher School of Diplomacy at Tufts University.[11] Other sources of Islamic State’s include taxation of people, businesses and transport routes.

Although Qatar is but one of several Gulf states that hosts alleged jihadist financiers, it has taken the brunt of public criticism because of its high profile mediation-driven foreign policy that seeks to maintain relations with all parties, including some that are internationally proscribed; organized media campaigns to undermine its credibility by the UAE as well as Israel; and an inherent reluctance by Western governments to confront head on Saudi Arabia, the largest and wealthiest of the Gulf states, whose puritan interpretation of Islam, constitutes an ideological source for jihadist thinking and creates a breeding ground for militant Islamist views.

The argument against Qatar is strengthened by alleged links between suspected financiers and sports. In addition, Qatar’s emphasis on sports offers its critics an additional line of attack. Prominent among the alleged financiers is Abdulrahman Omar al Nuaimi, a historian of religion and former head of the Qatar Football Association (QFA), who was detained for three years in 1988 for his opposition to government-led reforms particularly regarding women’s rights. Al Nuaimi was released in 1991 on condition that he no longer would speak out publicly.[12] Although Al Nuaimi was originally arrested on the orders of the then emir, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani,[13] he was received by Hamad after the emir had ordered his release. Al Nuaimi was identified in late 2013 as a specially designated global terrorist by the US Treasury[14] and blacklisted in 2014 by the European Union and the United Nations.[15]

The Treasury charged that Al Nuaimi had “provided money and material support and conveyed communications to al-Qa’ida and its affiliates in Syria, Iraq, Somalia and Yemen for more than a decade. He was considered among the most prominent Qatar-based supporters of Iraqi Sunni extremists.”[16] The Treasury charged Al Nuaimi had transferred at least $2.6 million to Al Qaeda, had served as an interlocutor between Qatari donors and Al Qaeda in Iraq and assisted the group in its media communications. It also said Al Nuaimi had channelled funds to Al Shabab jihadists in Somalia and Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen.[17]

Al Nuaimi despite his designation has denied the allegations and is believed to remain a free man in Qatar fuelling allegations that he has close ties to senior officials in the Qatari government and ruling family. Al Nuaimi issued his initial denial at a news conference hosted by the Doha-based Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies (ACRPS).[18] ACRPS is headed by Azmi Bishara, a former Palestinian member of the Israeli parliament who left in Israel in 2006 after being accused of having spied for the Lebanese Shiite Muslim militia Hezbollah. Bishara has since become a Qatari national and a close associate of Qatari emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, who also serves as chairman of Qatar’s National Olympic Committee (NOC) and is a member of the International Olympic Committee (IOC). Tamim as NOC head gave Al Nuaimi an award for his contribution to Qatari sports in 2010.[19]

The politicization of the debate about Qatar was highlighted by the fact that the UAE in November 2014 designated 83 organizations as terrorists that included the bulk of usual jihadist suspects as well the Muslim Brotherhood and groups in the West believed to be affiliated with it. The list glaringly failed to list Hamas whose leader in exile Khaled Mishal is based in Doha.[20] Proscribing Hamas, which has strong links to the Brotherhood, would have put the UAE in direct confrontation with a significant segment of Palestinian public opinion and risked stirring significant segments of Middle Eastern and North African public opinion.

To be fair, the international community is divided on its judgement of both the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas. Arab states, even those like Egypt and Saudi Arabia that have turned against Hamas, have like the UAE stopped short of proscribing Hamas and insist on the Palestinians’ right to resist continued occupation of the Gaza Strip and parts of the West Bank. Egypt on the one hand has shut down underground tunnels linking the Sinai with Gaza in a bid to cut off supplies to anti-government insurgents in the Egyptian desert peninsula as well as Hamas but has so far maintained its lines open to Hamas in recognition of the fact that no interim or more permanent agreement with Israel is possible without its consent. A senior Hamas official, Mousa Abu Marzouk, moreover remains resident in Cairo. Similarly, Saudi Arabia has taken Hamas to task for its ‘mistakes’ that include in the words of former Saudi intelligence chief Prince Turki bin Faisal al Saud its “ill-advised alignment with Qatar and Turkey” but has been careful not to group it among Islamist groups targeted by the kingdom.[21]

This lay of the land could change with an Egyptian court hearing a petition to categorize Hamas’ military wing as a terrorist organization.[22] A possible outlawing could lead to similar measures in Saudi Arabia and the UAE. It would weaken Egypt’s ability to mediate between Israel and the Palestinians and strengthen Qatar’s credentials as one of the few backchannels to the group.

Nonetheless, Qatar walks a fine line in seeking to carve out a niche of its own and how it projects that effort to the world and maintaining its relations with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states. The Gulf states agree on the need to ring fence their neck of the woods against multiple threats, including widespread domestic discontent, jihadism and Iran. They differ however on how to accomplish that with Qatar believing that it can best achieve its goal by supporting popular and Islamist movements elsewhere in the Middle East and North Africa.

Qatar can afford to do so because despite domestic criticism of government policies, its rulers are among the least threatened in the region and Qatar’s success in assuring harmonious relations between its majority Sunni and minority Shiite Muslim communities. By contrast, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Bahrain and Kuwait have experienced various degrees of expression of popular discontent over the past four years while the UAE like others has cracked down on any form of dissent.

Banning the Brotherhood in Saudi Arabia and the UAE meant cracking down on a group that was at the least a strong influence on major underground opposition forces in the two countries. It also enabled Gulf states to attempt to distract public opinion from domestic grievances and concern about the economic fallout of dropping oil prices – issues that are of less concern to Qatari rulers.

Meanwhile, the Brotherhood and/or its affiliates remains legal in the United States and Europe and was only proscribed by Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the UAE in 2013. The banning of the group as a terrorist group was primarily driven by the Egyptian military’s protection of its vested interests with the coup in 2013 that toppled Mohammed Morsi, a Muslim Brother and Egypt’s first and only democratically elected president. Saudi opposition to the group is rooted in its threat perception of any Islamist group that offers an alternative to the kingdom’s version of Islamist rule, particularly if it involves free and fair elections. The UAE’s rulers have long seen the Brotherhood and Qatar, one of the group’s main supporters, as a threat because of the Brother’s appeal among a significant segment of the Emirati citizenry.

Abu Dhabi Crown Prince and Armed Forces Chief of Staff Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed bin Zayed warned US diplomats as far back as 2004 that “we are having a (culture) war with the Muslim Brotherhood in this country.“ The US embassy in Abu Dhabi reported that “Sheikh Mohammed and his brothers Hamdan and Hazza rarely miss an opportunity to talk to high-level USG (US Government) interlocutors about the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood on moderate-thinking Emiratis. In a meeting with Deputy Secretary Armitage on April 20, Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed noted that UAE security forces had identified ‘50 to 60’ Emirati Muslim Brothers in the Armed Forces, and that a senior Muslim Brotherhood sympathizer is within one of the ruling families – a reference, we believe, to Sharjah Ruler Sheikh Sultan Al Qassimi, whose ties to Saudi Arabia are well known. Sheikh Mohammed has told us that the security services estimate there are up to 700 Muslim Brotherhood sympathizers in the UAE. He also said that when the Armed Forces discovered Muslim Brotherhood sympathizers within their ranks, they were arrested and given a form of reverse brainwashing.”[23]

In 2009. Sheikh Mohamed went as far as telling US officials that Qatar is “part of the Muslim Brotherhood.”[24] He suggested that a review of Al Jazeera employees would show that 90 percent were affiliated with the Brotherhood. Sheikh Mohammed charged that Qatar was facilitating Iranian inroads into the Arab world and that “he sees Iranian influence in the Brotherhood very clearly as both a way to agitate the Arab populace and render the traditional leaders of Arab society impotent.”[25] Other UAE officials privately described Qatar as “public enemy number 3”, after Iran and the Brotherhood.[26]

Because of the Brotherhood’s inroads into the UAE, Sheikh Mohammed said he had sent his son with the Red Cross rather than the Red Crescent on a humanitarian mission to Ethiopia to cure him of his interest in Islamist teachings. “His son returned from the mission with his vision of the west intact and in fact corrected. He was astonished that the Christians with the Red Cross were giving food and support to anyone who needed the support, not just to Christians. His son had only heard the stories of the west through the lens of Al Jazeera and others similarly aligned,” the embassy recounted Sheikh Mohammed as saying.[27]

A war of words

Qatar’s ties to the Brotherhood notwithstanding, the significance of funding from other Gulf states, particularly Kuwait, cannot be underestimated according to senior Obama administration officials and theology scholar Zoltan Pall. “Kuwaiti Salafis have built up vast transnational networks by financially supporting Salafi groups worldwide, making them one of the main financiers of the international movement. This practice has provided them with significant influence over Salafism on the global level… The different Kuwaiti Salafi groups mobilize vast financial resources from Kuwaiti citizens to sponsor a variety of Salafi armed groups in Syria, which has contributed to fragmentation and sectarianism within the Syrian armed opposition,” said Pall in a study of Kuwaiti Salafism, the Islamic trend that seeks to emulate the period of the Prophet Mohammed and his immediate successors.[28] In a speech in April 2014, US Treasury Department Under-Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David Cohen warned that “our ally Kuwait has become the epicentre of fundraising for terrorist groups in Syria.”[29] Cohen added that “Qatar has become such a permissive terrorist financing environment, that several major Qatar-based fundraisers act as local representatives for larger terrorist fundraising networks that are based in Kuwait.”

None of this diminishes the fact that Qatar has systematically failed to act against proscribed financiers of jihadist groups that reside and operate from the Gulf state. Nevertheless, in shaping public opinion, particularly in the United States, the UAE and Israel critics have remained largely silent about Kuwait’s role but have been happy to pinpoint Qatar. Ron Posner, Israel’s ambassador to the United Nations, headline an opinion piece in The New York Times: Club Med for Terrorists. “It is time for the world to wake up and smell the gas fumes. Qatar has spared no cost to dress[30] up its country as a liberal, progressive society, yet at its core, the micro monarchy is aggressively financing radical Islamist movements,” Posner wrote.

In the only major manifestation of soccer fan discontent since protests in 2013 against world soccer body FIFA in Brazil in the walk-up to the World Cup, football supporters in London rallied in September outside the Qatar embassy to demand that the Gulf state be deprived of its right to host the 2022 competition because of its support for Hamas. The protest under slogans that included ‘Football fans deserve better than Qatar,’ ‘Kick Terrorism out of Football,’ and ‘Qatar: Stop Funding Terrorism,’ was organized by the Sussex Friends of Israel and the Israel Forum Task Force.

“We should not negotiate with terrorists, we should not finance terrorists and we should certainly not reward terror by awarding the World Cup to Qatar in honour of its role in financing terror… (It is) time for the referee of world opinion to blow the whistle and show a red card to Qatar. It’s time to kick Blatter out of FIFA and time to kick terrorism out of football and it’s time to kick the World Cup out of Qatar,” lawyer Mark Lewis, one of the protest’s organizers told the demonstrators referring to FIFA president Sepp Blatter. Organizers said the protest was the beginning of a campaign to deprive Qatar of the World Cup.[31]

Similarly, the UAE, the world’s largest spender on lobbying in the United States in 2013[32], sought, according to US media reports to plant anti-Qatar stories in American media. To do so it employed California-based Camstoll Group LLC that is operated by former high-ranking US Treasury officials who had been responsible for relations with Gulf state and Israel as well as countering funding of terrorism.[33] Camstoll signed a consulting agreement with Abu Dhabi’s state-owned Outlook Energy Investments LLC on December 2, 2012,[34] a week after it was incorporated in Santa Monica, California.[35] Camstoll reported receiving $4.3 million in 2012[36] and $3.2 million[37] from Outlook in 2013 as a retainer and compensation for expenses.

Under the contract, Camstoll would consult Outlook on “issues pertaining to illicit financial networks, and developing and implementing strategies to combat illicit financial activity.”[38] In its registration as a foreign agent, Camstoll reported that it “has conducted outreach to think tanks, business interests, government officials, media, and other leaders in the United States regarding issues related to illicit financial activity.”[39]

Camstoll’s “public disclosure forms showed a pattern of conversations with journalists who subsequently wrote articles critical of Qatar’s role in terrorist fund-raising,” The New York Times reported.[40] Camstoll’s reported multiple conversations with reporters of The New York Times, The Washington Post, The Daily Beast, Dow Jones News Wires, Financial Times, Bloomberg News, CNN and the Washington Free Beacon.[41]

The lobbying effort resulted among others in a Daily Beast feature entitled ‘U.S. Spies Worry Qatar Will ‘Magically Lose Track’ of Released Taliban’ that asserted that Qatar’s track record is troubling” and that “the emirate is a good place to raise money for terrorist organizations”[42]; a CNN special report asking ‘Is Qatar a haven for terror funding?’[43]; and stories in The Washington Post declaring that “private Qatar-based charities have taken a more prominent role in recent weeks in raising cash and supplies for Islamist extremists in Syria, according to current and former U.S. and Middle Eastern officials”[44] and “increasing U.S. concern about the role of Qatari individuals and charities in supporting extreme elements within Syria’s rebel alliance” and linking the Qatari royal family to a professor and U.S. foreign policy critic alleged by the U.S. government to be “working secretly as a financier for al-Qaeda.”[45]

The Washington Post story quoted among others “a former U.S. official who specialized in tracking Gulf-based jihadist movements and who spoke on the condition of anonymity because much of his work for the government was classified.” The description of the source fits the bios of Camstoll executives, including the company’s owner, Matthew Epstein, a former Treasury Department official who served as its financial attaché to Saudi Arabia and the UAE; Howard Mendelsohn, former Acting Assistant Secretary of Treasury, who according to a US State Department cable “met with senior officials from the UAE’s State Security Department (SSD) and Dubai’s General Department of State Security (GDSS)” to coordinate disruption of Taliban financing,[46] and other former Treasury officials who had been contact with Israel regarding their strategy to counter funding of Palestinian groups.[47]

In disclosing the UAE’s efforts to influence US media reporting on Qatar, The Intercept’s Greenwald argued that “the point here is not that Qatar is innocent of supporting extremists… The point is that this coordinated media attack on Qatar – using highly paid former U.S. officials and their media allies – is simply a weapon used by the Emirates, Israel, the Saudis and others to advance their agendas… What’s misleading isn’t the claim that Qatar funds extremists but that they do so more than other U.S. allies in the region (a narrative implanted at exactly the time Qatar has become a key target of Israel and the Emirates). Indeed, some of Qatar’s accusers here do the same to at least the same extent, and in the case of the Saudis, far more so.”[48]

Qatar’s response to the media campaign against it is illustrative of its inability to fight its public relations and public diplomacy battles, clumsiness in developing communication strategies, meek denials of various accusations and failure to convincingly defend its at time controversial policies. In response to the labour criticism, two key Qatari Institutions, the Qatar Foundation and the 2022 Supreme Committee for Delivery & Legacy, issued lofty charters governing the working and living conditions of migrant labours to be enshrined in contracts of companies contracting with them.[49]

Qatar has yet to enshrine in national legislation all of the principles established by the charters and sufficiently beef up its monitoring and supervision infrastructure, including a satisfactory number of labour inspectors, to ensure implantation of current rules and regulations. Such moves would convince its critics of its sincerity despite the evident hope that improvement of working and living conditions will fend off demands by human rights and trade union activists that it abolish its sponsorship system. As a result, Qatar is losing the confidence of human rights groups like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch that were willing to give it the benefit of the doubt.[50]

In a bid to counter its World Cup critics, Qatar contracted Portland Communications founded by Tony Allen, a former adviser to Tony Blair when he was prime minister, according to Britain’s Channel 4 News.[51] The television channel linked Portland to the creation of a soccer blog that attacked Qatar’s detractors by Alistair Campbell, Blair’s chief communications advisor at Downing Street Number Ten and a former member of Portland’s strategic council. Channel 4 reported that the blog projected itself as “truly independent” and claimed to represent “a random bunch of football fans, determined to spark debate” of “astro-turfing,” the creation of fake sites that project themselves as grassroots but in effect are operated by corporate interests. Portland admitted that it had helped create the blog but asserted that it was not part of its contractual engagement with Qatar. The blog stopped publishing after the television report.

Talking to the devil

On the terrorism finance front, Qatari officials have rejected allegations that they turn a blind eye to the flow of funds to jihadist groups but defend the importance of maintaining lines to all parties as part of their mediation-focused foreign policies that allows Qatar to step in at times that others are unable to propose solutions or build bridges. “I am very much against excluding anyone at this stage, or bracketing them as terrorists, or bracketing them as al-Qaeda. What we are doing is only creating a sleeping monster, and this is wrong. We should bring them all together, we should treat them all equally, and we should work on them to change their ideology, i.e. put more effort altogether to change their thinking,” Qatari Foreign Minister s Khalid bin Mohamed al-Attiyah told an international security conference in Manama in December 2012. Al-Attiyah was referring to Syria but his remarks go to the heart of Qatari policy.[52]

Speaking on CNN in September 2014, Qatar’s emir, Sheikh Tamim, said: “We have to see the difference between movements. I know that in America and some countries they look at some movements as terrorist movements. In our part of the region, we don’t. But if you’re talking about certain movements, especially in Syria and in Iraq, we all consider them terrorist movements. And we don’t accept any fund for those and we don’t accept anybody funding those groups… We have a strong law against funding terrorist groups. But as I said, there is differences between some countries, of who are the terrorists and who are the maybe Islamist groups, but we don’t consider them as terrorists… There are differences that some countries and some people that any group which is — which comes from an Islamist background are terrorists. And we don’t accept that. And all this is because of political difference. We don’t — we don’t accept that. But people, especially in Syria and Iraq and other Arab countries, who don’t believe in the freedom of speech, we don’t believe that they have to live with others and accept others, and also accept the choice of the people, their own people. Those are the people that we don’t fund.Other than that, I believe that we’ll make a big mistake for any Islamic movement. But we have differences, ideological differences with them. I’m talking about some countries, to consider them extremist, I think this is a big mistake and it’s a danger. Other than that, extremists are well-known. Terrorist groups are well- known and we know them. Everybody knows them.”[53]

Left unsaid in the statements of Qatari officials is the fact that maintaining relations with various groups serves to shield the Gulf state from being targeted. It also, like in the case of the Muslim Brotherhood enables Qatar, sandwiched between two regional giants and rivals, Saudi Arabia and Iran, with Islamic systems of government that Qatar goes to great effort to evade. The statements moreover have done little to prevent perceptions of Qatar from changing from that of a neutral mediator to one of a country that actively intervened by backing rebels in Libya and Syria as well as supporting the government of Muslim Brother Mohammed Morsi in Egypt. Instead, Qatar’s more activist foreign policy made it more vulnerable it to overt and covert attacks on its credibility by its detractors, prominent among which Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt and Israel.

Fundamental problems

A recent study of Qatari mediation efforts by The Brookings Institution concluded that “while Qatar’s record of success in these efforts is mixed, an in-depth analysis of its mediation history reveals a number of areas that, if fine-tuned, could potentially enable Qatar to play a much-needed role in regional conflict resolution… Both in terms of distance and cultural affinity, where opposing parties can meet to hash out their differences in a relatively neutral setting.”[54] The study recommended that Qatar establish an independent non-governmental entity to lay the groundwork for dialogue and mediation and use its financial muscle to invest in long-term development of areas prone to and affected by conflict, rather than to incentivize parties to come to the negotiating table. This would have to involve proper and systematic documentation of its mediation efforts as a resource for the training of diplomats and negotiators.

The recommendations reflected a more fundamental problem that Qatar confronts across the board in its soft power strategy whether it relates to the hosting of sports mega events like the 2022 World Cup or its mediation-focused foreign policy: a failure to anticipate potential roadblocks; a lack of institutional capacity and manpower to prepare and follow-up on issues and initiatives that result from its successful establishment of the building blocks of the strategy; differences within the ruling family and between various state institutions; centralization of decision making that restricts the ability of officials at lower levels to respond publicly in a timely and adequate fashion to public relations challenges; a need to balance its mediation with Saudi concerns about meddling in areas like Yemen which the kingdom views as proprietary; and an inability to develop a communications strategy that would allow it to manage public perceptions.

In addition Qatar at times appears more concerned about how its initiative help project its image than about their substance even though that is what would be crucial for cementing the reputation it is trying to create. That focus underlies its emphasis on articulating lofty labour principles rather than ensuring that they are nationally adopted and enforced. It at times also appeared to dictate Qatar’s approach to mediation. Barakat, the author of the Brookings report, quoted a negotiator from Darfur as saying that Qatar’s effort to resolve the conflict in the war-ravaged Sudanese province “often ends up placing more emphasis on the ‘news’ of mediation rather than the outcomes.”[55]

Barakat noted that “post-agreement implementation is the critical phase of conflict resolution, often overlooked as external actors lose interest following the signing of an agreement and direct their attention elsewhere… Key issues include the provision of mechanisms to resolve post-settlement disputes, building popular and political support for sustained peace, and ensuring civil society and local stakeholders’ participation in monitoring potential flashpoints and conflicts… This is an area where Qatari mediation is most glaringly lacking, with the country frequently criticized for failing to ensure that implementation plans are sufficiently robust and inclusive. Other criticisms identify a failure to follow through on agreements over the long-term… This kind of follow-up requires infrastructure for sustained engagement in the post-mediation phase even before negotiations begin. This is difficult for Qatar, however, given the scant number of civil servants with the requisite skills, knowledge, and experience to support such engagement… Qatar has also come under growing criticism regarding its weak portfolio of skills. Notably, critics target the country’s inadequate institutional knowledge of best practice strategies in mediation, post-settlement implementation, and ceasefire monitoring.”[56]

To be fair, Qatari complacency about widespread criticism was in part motivated by the international community’s failure since the Gulf state became independent in 1971 to tackle it on issues like the conditions of migrant labour, human rights and political freedoms. Similarly, Qatar was until 2013 and in fact is until today not the only Gulf state to engage with groups like the Muslim Brotherhood. Saudi Arabia as far back as the 1950s offered refuge to thousands of Brothers who fled repression in Egypt and Syria. Over time, they integrated into Saudi society, occupied key public sector positions, including in the education sector, and blended their politicized Islam with Wahhabism, the puritanical Saudi interpretation of Islam developed by the 18th century warrior priest, Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab. Bahrain, despite joining Saudi Arabia and the UAE in withdrawing its ambassador from Doha in 2014 for a period of eight months and inviting Saudi troops in 2011 to help in brutally repressing a popular revolt, remains hesitant to act against the Brotherhood. Bahraini rulers fear that a crackdown on the Brothers could undermine its support in their minority Sunni Muslim power base.

Qatar’s lack of preparedness for criticism and its failure to develop a communications strategy was evident in initial Qatari responses to the migrant labour criticism and its handling of high-profile labour disputes. Qatari officials believed when the migrant labour issue first exploded that it was a public relations battle they would not be able to win and therefore should best ignore in the conviction that it would eventually blow over. They rejected the notion that failure to engage amounted to surrender of the battlefield, losing an opportunity to conquer a moral high ground, and allowing a wound to fester.[57]

Hassan al Thawadi, secretary of the Qatar 2022 Supreme Committee that was later restyled as the Qatar Supreme Committee for Legacy and Delivery admitted as much at a Leaders in Football conference in 2011. “When Qatar was pulled from the envelope in Zurich on December 2nd (2010), amid all the celebrations and joy, we knew that the work was only just beginning. What we did not know or expect was the avalanche of accusations and allegations that we would face in the immediate aftermath of what was a historic day for sport in our country and for the wider region. I‘m sure all of you in this audience are well aware of the very tough challenges we have faced since our success last December. Baseless accusations were made against our bid. We were presumed guilty before innocent without a shred of evidence being provided,” Thawadi said.[58]

Yet even when an upcoming communications fiasco is evident, which Qatari officials recognize needs to be addressed swiftly and decisively, they find themselves hampered by vested interests of various institutions and a centralized decision making process. Employment-related complaints by two international players, one of whom was barred from leaving Qatar for 18 months and as a result saw his career wrecked and has since been forced to work as a waiter in France,[59] have undermined Qatari arguments in favour of its kafala system.

Belounis was locked into a salary dispute with Al Jaish SC, the club owned by the Qatari military that refused to let him leave the country until the labour dispute against the advice of others that Qatar would suffer greater reputational damage than the dispute was worth.[60] He said the dispute was about almost two years of unpaid salary. This is a crazy story… I cannot move around freely, I cannot work anymore, I’m 33 years old … Who wants a player who has not played for months? Frankly, my career takes a hit,” Belounis told Jeune Afrique.[61]

Similarly, Moroccan international Abdessalam Ouadoo, who was allowed to leave Qatar to join AS Nancy-Lorraine, complained about failure to honour his contract as well as ill treatment. Ouadoo who said he was owed five months of salary told the BBC’s World Football that “the Qataris showed me no respect and I can never forgive them for that. I know that money is king but you don’t treat a man like that without paying a price.”[62] He said he had been forced to train in the Gulf state’s excruciating summer heat when temperatures go up to 50 degrees Celsius “just to push me to forget my rights. They did everything to discourage me…. The Qataris think they can do everything because they think money can buy anything: buildings, jazz, beautiful cars and men… Human rights are not respected. Human beings are not respected. The workers are not respected. A country that does not respect all these things should not organize the World Cup 2022.”

A mixed record

On balance, Qatar’s mediation track record over the past decade proved its ability to bring parties to the table for negotiations that produced the defusing of an immediate crisis rather than a long-term solution. Qatar initially played a key role in talks in Cairo to end Israel’s assault on Gaza in the summer of 2014 before it was side lined by Egypt with the backing of Saudi Arabia and the UAE who not only wanted to isolate Qatar but position post-coup Egypt as a key player in regional geopolitics. Months before, Qatar arranged a prisoner exchange in which five Taliban detainees were released from the US detention facility in Guantanamo Bay into Qatari custody in return for the release of US Army Sgt. Bowe Bergdahl. US Secretary of State John Kerry said the deal “exemplifies how vital our partnership with Qatar is and will remain.”[63] The release of the Taliban came a year after an effort failed to allow the Taliban to open an office in Doha as a basis for negotiations with the United States in advance of the withdrawal of NATO forces from Afghanistan.[64] In March 2014, Qatar successfully negotiated the exchange of 13 Syrian and Lebanese nuns held by Jabhat al Nusra for 150 women and children held by the government of Bashar al-Assad.

Reports that Qatar had paid Jabhat al Nusra ransom money as part of the deal has fuelled questions about the Gulf state’s relations to jihadist groups.[65] A seven-country, in-depth investigation into efforts to persuade the Islamic State to release hostages established Qatar as the major alternative to private security firms operating on behalf of insurance companies that have extended kidnap and ransom policies mostly for Westerners employed by non-governmental organizations. “The alternative’s name is Qatar. The filthy rich dwarf state in the Persian Gulf likes to ingratiate itself as the international community’s best friend and when needed conducts negotiations and even foots the bill. The emir’s pockets are deep, the investments pay off in diplomatic weight,” the investigation concluded.[66]

Qatar’s successful negotiation of the release of hostages is in contrast to the durability of agreements to end regional disputes. Qatar’s success in negotiating an initial ceasefire between the government and Houthi rebels in 2007 and a peace agreement in 2008 ultimately failed to pave the way for a lasting solution to the conflict that addressed underlying grievances amid acrimony between the Qatari and Yemeni governments despite a Qatari pledge of up to $500 million in aid for development of Houthi areas. The failure ultimately led to a virtual Houthi takeover of the country in 2014.

Qatar successfully negotiated an agreement in 2008 to end the worst crisis in Lebanon since the end of the country’s civil war in 1990 that averted a new round of fighting but failed to address issues that would have built the confidence among the country’s multiple sectarian communities needed to shield it against threats emanating from the Shiite group Hezbollah’s continued existence as the foremost armed non-state actor and the fall-out of regional conflicts like Syria. Similarly, Qatar persuaded various parties in Darfur to agree on a ceasefire in 2011 that remained shaky because of the refusal of powerful rebel groups to accept it and its failure to tackle the grievances that had sparked the conflict.

Qatar’s mediation-focused foreign policy nonetheless challenged traditional academic wisdom on the limits on the ability of small states to project power and the assumption of an automatic link between size and power.[67] “Weak states are not entirely weak. They have important internal sources of strength which they have learned to use to their advantage. They have also learnt to manipulate the strength of the great powers on their own behalf, and to draw on this external source of strength to further their own national interest … In evaluating the relative strength or weakness of a state, its geographic location must be taken into account,” wrote sociologist Michael Handel.[68] In doing so, small states benefit from the ability to continue a successful policy of neutrality or alliance membership but replace a failed policy by a new choice. Such a simple alternative is not available to great powers, which are not only concerned with direct threats to their own security, but with broader national interests,” added political scientists Iver B. Neumann and Sieglinde Gstöhl.[69]

Qatar’s mixed record on mediation meant that it produced mixed results in achieving its soft power goals in terms of definitions of the strategy developed by political scientists Joseph Samuel Nye Jr. and Ira William Zartman as evidenced by the controversy over its relationship with Hamas and the allegation of funding of terrorism. Nye defined soft power as an “indirect way to get what you want … (and) set the agenda and attract others in world politics… This soft power – getting others to want the outcomes that you want – co-opts people rather than coerces them.[70] Zartman noted that “states use mediation as a foreign policy instrument. They seek a reduction (management or resolution) of conflict because it is in their interest. That interest may be merely one of reducing human cost, nothing else, but that reduction usually also has to bring benefits to the mediator for it to enter the fray. Mediating states are likely to seek terms that will increase the prospects of stability, earn them the gratitude of one or both parties, enable them to continue to have a role in future relations in the region, or deny their rivals opportunities for intervention, as well as simply ending the killing.”[71]

Qatar falls into both categories of mediators developed by political scientist Jacob Bercovitch: “trust-based mediators who basically clarify misunderstandings; and resource-based mediators “who at times rely on some positive or negative incentives to get things moving.”[72] Qatar frequently has acted as a go-between attempting to clarify positions and narrow differences while using its financial as an incentive.

In doing so, it benefitted from the fact that decision making being limited to a very small group of people. Yet, Qatari leaders have been hampered in their mediation efforts as well as their larger soft power strategy that involves among other things heavy investments in sports and the acquisition of foreign commercial and cultural assets by criticism of aspects of the policy within the ruling family and segments of Qatari society at large. Criticism has focused on issues such as

  • The huge expenditure on mediation efforts;
  • Qatar’s exposure to embarrassment and criticism as a result of the mixed results of its mediation efforts, its relations with controversial groups and the fall-out of its successful bid for the 2022 World Cup hosting rights;
  • A belief that a large portion of Qatar’s wealth should be invested domestically in things like health care, job creation for Qataris and education;[73]
  • Unfulfilled promises of change that would give Qataris a greater say in their country’s affairs;
  • A stark increase in foreign labour to complete ambitious infrastructure projects many of which are World Cup-related and have exposed Qatar for the first time to real external pressure for social change;
  • More liberal catering to Western expatriates by allowing the controlled sale of alcohol and pork in violation of religious restrictions;
  • Potential tacit concessions Qatar may have to make to non-Muslim soccer fans during the World Cup, including expanded areas where consumption of alcohol would be allowed, public rowdiness and dress codes largely unseen in the Gulf state, and the presence of gays.

Concern about domestic criticism prompted Qatar’s emir, Tamim, to signal his intention to focus of domestic rather than foreign policy when he succeeded his father, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, the architect of the Gulf state’s soft power strategy, in June 2013. The policy shift was waylaid by the coup in Egypt almost immediately after Tamim’s ascension; the eight-month rupture in diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain less than a year after he took power; and the Islamic State’s expansion from Syria into Iraq and declaration of a caliphate.

Conclusion

Qatar has invested heavily in a soft power strategy whose pillars include sports and foreign policy as well as the forging of strategic alliances that were designed to enhance its global reputation as a prominent, forward-looking and modern good citizen of the international community. That investment has yet to pay off. Rather than being widely viewed as a reputable host of sport mega events and as a force for good in Middle Eastern and North African geopolitics, Qatar is under attack for allegedly being a slave state that treats migrant workers working on infrastructure, including facilities for the 2022 World Cup, as serfs. It successful bid to host the tournament is mired in controversy. Similarly, Qatar stands accused as allowing funding to flow to jihadist organization and as a promoter of militant Islamist organizations.

While there is certainly substance to the allegations, Qatar has valid counter arguments and has taken steps to address criticism. Those steps however have done little to halt escalating reputational damage let alone turn around a tidal wave of negative publicity. To do so, Qatar would not only have to match its promises and words with deeds but also develop a communications strategy to counter both legitimate criticism and its multiple distractors who are willing to go to significant length to undermine its credibility. Qatar has shown little inclination to do either.

This is the Accepted Manuscript of this article that was published by Taylor Francis Group in The International Journal of the History of Sport, DOI:10.1080/09523367.2015.1008212

[1] International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC). 2011. Hidden faces of the Gulf miracle, May, http://www.ituc-csi.org/IMG/pdf/VS_QatarEN_final.pdf

[2] David Weinberg. 2014. Qatar and Terror Finance, December, Foundation for Defence of Democracies, http://defenddemocracy.org/media-hit/qatar-and-terror-finance-part-1

[3] James M. Dorsey. 2014. Qatar invests in Israeli soccer despite Gaza and war of words with Jerusalem, July 30, The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer, http://mideastsoccer.blogspot.com/2014/07/qatar-invests-in-israeli-soccer-despite.html

[4] Adrian Franke. 2014. Theo Zwanziger: Ultimatum an Katar, December 17, Sportal.de, http://www.sportal.de/theo-zwanziger-ultimatum-an-katar-1-2014121745876500000

[5] Saudi-US Information Service. 2014. 35th GCC Summit Communique, December 11, http://susris.com/2014/12/11/35th-gcc-summit-communique/

[6] Ray Jureidini. 2014. Migrant Labour Recruitment to Qatar, Qatar Foundation, http://www.qscience.com/userimages/ContentEditor/1404811243939/Migrant_Labour_Recruitment_to_Qatar_Web_Final.pdf

[7] Ibid. Jureidini

[8] Francois Crepeau. 2013. UN Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants concludes country visit to Qatar, November 10, https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/?tab=wm#inbox

[9] Ibid. Weinberg

[10] A BBC investigation in late 2014 concluded that Islamic State’s sources of revenues were primarily $600 million in oil sales, $20 million in ransom from kidnappings and upwards of $20-30 million a year from taxation; bank robberies; sale of antiquities, livestock and crops; and human trafficking. Tom Keatinge. 2014. Finances of jihad: How extremist groups raise money, December 12, BBC News, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-30393832

[11] Robert Windrem. 2014. Who’s Funding ISIS? Wealthy Gulf ‘Angel Investors,’ Officials Say, September 21, NBC News, http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/isis-terror/whos-funding-isis-wealthy-gulf-angel-investors-officials-say-n208006

[12] James M. Dorsey. 2014. Wahhabism vs. Wahhabism: Qatar Challenges Saudi Arabia, July 10, Singapore Middle East Reflections, http://meisingapore.wordpress.com/publications/

[13] US Department of State. 2001. Qatar, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, February 23, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2000/nea/815.htm

[14] US Department of the Treasury. 2013. Treasury Designates Al-Qa’ida Supporters in Qatar and Yemen, December 18, http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/pages/jl2249.aspx

[15] United Nations Security Council Sanctions Committee. 2014. The List established and maintained by the Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee with respect to individuals, groups, undertakings and other entities associated with Al-Qaida, December 12, http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/AQList.htm

[16] Ibid. US Department of the Treasury

[17] Ibid. US Department of the Treasury

[18] Al Raya. 2013. ”,????? 1000 ???? ??? ???? ??????? ?????? ???????, December 24, http://www.raya.com/news/pages/006f8f55-e8ef-4499-b91b-fc809c9021b9

[19] Al Raya. 2010. ????? ??? ?? ???? ????? ?????? ???????? May 23, http://www.raya.com/home/print/f6451603-4dff-4ca1-9c10-122741d17432/79f2940a-f4e0-4662-b870-c43cd3cf4542

[20] The National. 2014. List of groups designated terrorist organisations by the UAE, November 16, http://www.thenational.ae/uae/government/list-of-groups-designated-terrorist-organisations-by-the-uae

[21] Prince Turki bin Faisal al Saud. 2014. Israel’s actions in Gaza trample hopes of Arab Peace Initiative, July 25, Al-Monitor, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/07/israel-gaza-brutalities-arab-peace-initiative-turki-faisal.html

[22] Ariel Ben Solomon. 2014. Egyptian court weighs labeling Hamas military wing as terror organization, December 15, The Jerusalem Post, http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Egyptian-court-weighs-labeling-Hamas-military-wing-as-terror-organization-384706

[23] US Embassy Abu Dhabi. 2004. ‘UAE Minimizing Influence Of Islamic Extremists,’ November 10, http://cablegatesearch.wikileaks.org/cable.php?id=04ABUDHABI4061

[24] US Embassy Abu Dhabi. 2009. ‘Strong Words in Private from MBZ at IDEX — Bashes Iran, Qatar, Russia.’ February 25, http://cablegatesearch.wikileaks.org/search.php?q=Strong+Words+in+Private+from+Mbz+at+Idex&qo=0&qc=0&qto=2009-02-26

[25] Ibid. US Embassy Abu Dhabi

[26] Andrew Hammond, Qatar’s Leadership Transition: Like Father, Like Son, February 2014, European Council on Foreign Relations, http://ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR95_QATAR_BRIEF_AW.pdf

[27] Ibid. US Embassy Abu Dhabi

[28] Zoltan Pall. 2014. Kuwaiti Salafism and its Growing Influence in the Levant, May, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/kuwaiti_salafists.pdf

[29] US Treasury Department. 2014. Remarks of Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David Cohen before the Center for a New American Security on “Confronting New Threats in Terrorist Financing”, April 3, http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl2308.aspx

[30] Ron Posner. 2014. Club Med for Terrorists, August 24, The New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/25/opinion/qatar-club-med-for-terrorists.html?_r=0

[31] James M. Dorsey. 2014. Israel mobilizes to deprive Qatar of the World Cup, September 23, The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer, http://mideastsoccer.blogspot.com/2014/09/israel-mobilizes-to-deprive-qatar-of.html

[32] Lindsay Young. 2014. What countries spent the most to influence the USA in 2013, May 8, Sunlight Foundation, http://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2014/05/08/what-countries-spent-the-most-to-influence-the-usa-in-2013/

[33] Glenn Greenwald. 2014. How former Treasury officials and the UAE are manipulating American journalists, September 26, The Intercept, https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/09/25/uae-qatar-camstoll-group/ / David D. Kirkpatrick. 2014. Qatar’s Support of Islamists Alienates Allies Near and Far, September 7, The New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/08/world/middleeast/qatars-support-of-extremists-alienates-allies-near-and-far.html?module=Search&mabReward=relbias%3Ar%2C%7B%221%22%3A%22RI%3A8%22%7D

[34] US Department of Justice. 2012. Exhibit A to Registration Statement Pursuant to the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as amended, December 10, http://www.fara.gov/docs/6144-Exhibit-AB-20121210-1.pdf

[35] Wysk B2B Data. 2014. Wysk Company Profile for CAMSTOLL GROUP LLC, THE, August 26, http://www.wysk.com/index/california/santa-monica/vvnan6g/camstoll-group-llc-the/profile

[36] US Department of Justice. 2013. Supplemental Statement Pursuant to the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938 as amended, July 30, http://www.fara.gov/docs/6144-Supplemental-Statement-20130730-1.pdf

[37] US Department of Justice. 2014. Supplemental Statement Pursuant to the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938 as amended, January 30, http://www.fara.gov/docs/6144-Supplemental-Statement-20140130-2.pdf

[38] Ibid. US Department of Justice, 2012

[39] Internet Archive. 2013. Camstoll Group, LLC Foreign Agents Registration Act filing, July 30, https://archive.org/stream/745411-camstoll-group-llc-foreign-agents-registration/745411-camstoll-group-llc-foreign-agents-registration_djvu.txt

[40] Ibid. Kirkpatrick

[41] Ibid. US Department of Justice 2013 and 2014

[42] Eli Lake. 2014. U.S. Spies Worry Qatar Will ‘Magically Lose Track’ of Released Taliban, June 5, The Daily Beast, http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/06/05/u-s-spies-worry-qatar-will-magically-lose-track-of-released-taliban.html

[43] Erin Burnett. 2014. CNN OUTFRONT SPECIAL REPORT: Is Qatar a haven for terror funding?, June 8, CNN, http://cnnpressroom.blogs.cnn.com/2014/06/18/outfrontcnn-special-report-is-qatar-a-haven-for-terror-funding/

[44] Joby Warrick. 2013. Syrian conflict said to fuel sectarian tensions in Persian Gulf, December 18, The Washington Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/syrian-conflict-said-to-fuel-sectarian-tensions-in-persian-gulf/2013/12/18/e160ad82-6831-11e3-8b5b-a77187b716a3_story.html

[45] Joby Warrick. 2013. Islamic charity officials gave millions to al-Qaeda, U.S. says, December 22, The Washington Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/islamic-charity-officials-gave-millions-to-al-qaeda-us-says/2013/12/22/e0c53ad6-69b8-11e3-a0b9-249bbb34602c_story.html

[46] US Embassy United Arab Emirates. 2010. US-UAE Further Cooperation to Disrupt Taliban Finance, January 7, Wikileaks, http://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/10ABUDHABI9_a.html

[47] US Embassy Tel Aviv. 2009. GOI’S New Terror Finance Designation Strategy, July 9, Wikileaks, https://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/07/09TELAVIV1502.html

[48] Ibid. Greenwald

[49] James M. Dorsey. 2014. The 2022 World Cup: A Potential Monkey Wrench for Change, The International Journal of History of Sport, Vol. 31:14, p. 1739-1754

[50] James M. Dorsey. 2014. Activists expand labour and human rights campaign beyond Qatar to include all Gulf states, November 24, The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer, http://mideastsoccer.blogspot.com/2014/11/activists-expand-labour-and-human.html

[51] Channel 4 News. 2014. FA chief slams attacks made on blog set up by Qatar’s PR, September 26, http://www.channel4.com/news/fa-chief-condemns-online-dirty-tricks-by-qatar-s-pr-firm

[52] International Institute for Strategic Studies, Priorities for Regional Security: Q&A Session,” 8 December 2012, http://www.iiss.org/en/events/manama%20dialogue/archive/manama-dialogue-2012-f58e/second-plenary-session-f3e9/qa-3d28

[53] CNN’s Amanpour. 2014. Key Coalition Partner Qatar on ISIS War; Imagine a World, September 25, http://edition.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1409/25/ampr.01.html

[54] Sultan Barakat. 2014. Qatari Mediation: Between Ambition and Achievement, November, The Brookings Institution, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2014/11/10%20qatari%20mediation/final%20pdf%20english.pdf

[55] Ibid. Barakat

[56] Ibid. Barakat

[57] Multiple interviews by the author with Qatari officials between 2011 and 2014

[58] Gulf Times. 2011. ‘Text Hassan al Thawadi Speech – Leaders in Football 2011, Gulf Times, October 7, http://www.gulf-times.com/site/topics/article.asp?cu_no=2&item_no=462347&version=1&template_id=36&parent_id=16

[59] James Masters. 2014. Zahir Belounis: From ‘soccer prisoner’ to waiter, November 27, CNN, http://edition.cnn.com/2014/11/27/sport/zahir-belounis-anniversary/index.html

[60] Interviews with the author

[61] Alexis Billebault. 2013. Algérie – Belounis : “Les Qataris ne veulent pas me délivrer mon visa de sortie,” April 23, Jeune Afrique, http://www.jeuneafrique.com/Article/ARTJAWEB20130423162839/alg-rie-france-football-qatar-football-alg-rie-belounis-les-qataris-ne-veulent-pas-me-d-livrer-mon-visa-de-sortie.html

[62] World Service World Football. 2013. Bad times for Qatar, April 26, BBC, http://wehearus.com/podcasts/episode/80067

[63] US Department of State. 2014. Sergeant Bowe Bergdahl, May 31, http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2014/05/227013.htm

[64] Lauren Williams. 2014. Prisoner exchange ‘strengthens hand of Taliban in Doha, June 24, The National, http://www.thenational.ae/world/qatar/prisoner-exchange-x2018strengthens-hand-of-taliban-in-dohax2019

[65] BBC News. 2014. Syria crisis: Nuns freed by rebels arrive in Damascus, March 10, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26510202

[66] Die Zeit. 2014. Die Geschäfte des Kalifen, November 27

[67] Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, ‘Small States with a Big Role: Qatar and the United Arab Emirates in the Wake of the Arab Spring, 2012, HH Sheikh Nasser al-Mohammad al-Sabah Publication Series, Kuwait, October 2012

[68] Michael Handel. 1990. Weak States in the International System, London: Routledge, p. 51

[69] Iver B. Neumann and Sieglinde Gstöhl. 2006. Introduction in Iver B. Neumann, Sieglinde Gstöhl, Christine Ingebritsen and jessica Bayer (eds), Small States in International Relations, Seattle: University of Washington Press, p. 3

[70] “Joseph S. Nye Jr. 2004. Soft Power, The Means to Success in World Politics, New York; Public affairs, p. 5

[71] I. William Zartman. 2013. Mediation roles for large small countries, Canadian Foreign Policy Journal, Vol. 19:1, p 13-25

[72] Jacob Bercovitch. 2011. Introduction: Or How to Study and Do Research On Mediation, in Jacob Bercovitch (ed), Selected Essays: Theory and Practice of International Mediation, London: Routledge, p 1-10.

[73] A survey conducted in 2013 by the Doha campuses of Northwestern and Georgetown University concluded that 77 percent of Qataris polled believes that more resources should be invested domestically rather than overseas. Only 13 percent wanted increased spending on “international affairs and investments,” while 10 percent said they were content with the current balance. The unpublished survey is quoted in Justin Gengler. 2013. Collective Frustration, But No Collective Action, in Qatar, December 7 Middle East Research and Information Project (MERIP), http://www.merip.org/mero/mero120713. The World Bank noted that Qatar lags in number of beds per 1,000 people with 1.2 per 1,000 behind the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) average of 3.8 per 1,000 (Source: The World Bank. 2014. Hospital beds (per 1,000 people), http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.MED.BEDS.ZS

The post How Qatar Is Its Own Worst Enemy – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Crosscurrents – OpEd

0
0

By the time I leave Kentucky’s federal prison center, where I’m an inmate with a 3 month sentence, the world’s 12th-largest city may be without water. Estimates put the water reserve of Sao Paulo, a city of 20 million people, at sixty days. Sporadic outages have already begun, the wealthy are pooling money to receive water in tankers, and government officials are heard discussing weekly five-day shutoffs of the water supply, and the possibility of warning residents to flee.

This past year United States people watched stunned as water was cut off, household by household, to struggling people in Detroit, less due to any total water shortage than to a drying up of any political power accessible to the poor in an increasingly undemocratic nation. A local privatization scheme left the city water department underfunded, while dictatorial “emergency management” imposed by the state chose to place the burden of repaying a corrupt government’s bad debt on Detroit’s most impoverished people. U.S. people were forced to remember the guarantee offered by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, entered into as a treaty obligation by world nations after WWII, that access to water is an inalienable human right. All over the world, water scarcity is becoming a dire threat to the possibility of, as Prof. Noam Chomsky phrases it, decent human survival.

Faced with such news, it is perhaps odd that I think of Professor Yang Yoon Mo, a South Korean activist I have met who, far from any area of drought, has fought instead, and with beautiful and irrepressible courage, to save a small lush rocky outcropping ringed by ocean, and with it both the shoreline, and the hopes for a peaceful future, of his home village.

In 2008, Prof. Yang returned to Jeju island, having left a rewarding life as a famed artist and film critic in the capital, Seoul, to join protests against construction of a planned naval base on the shores of Gangjeong, a village in Jeju Island. Though described as part of South Korea’s national defense, the base’s dimensions are fitted to the massive size of United States nuclear submarines and Aegis destroyers, part, as Larry Kerschner notes, of a military buildup forming “a semi-circle of naval and other bases surrounding China,” the United States’ “Asia Pivot” away from focus on the Middle East and toward its traditional superpower rivals. Nobody in Jeju is to be made safer by the base.

Professor Yang Yoon Mo was born on Jeju in 1956, when it was already illegal for traumatized survivors there to mention the recent massacres. Under U.S. occupation between 1948 and 1952, the military government had killed tens of thousands of independence protesters and militants. After a half century of official silence, the South Korean government has apologized and erected a memorial on Jeju memorializing perhaps 14,000-30,000 people killed on Jeju Island alone, many in their prison cells, during a tragic time referred to locally as the April 3rd massacre. Many residents are understandably less than eager to welcome a U.S. military presence back to the island.

When he was born, Professor Yang’s mother resolved to protect her son from the tragedy that had befallen her father and uncle, both killed in the massacres. She wanted to steer her son into a safe position in life, even if it meant becoming part of the government establishment.

But, at an early age, Professor Yang showed talent as an artist and he simply didn’t “fit in” to the narrow, safe routes his mother’s great fear for him dictated. As a teenager, he became fascinated by cartoons, including, to his mother’s alarm, political cartoons, and he tried to correspond with mainland South Korean cartoonists. His mother interfered with his correspondence and took to destroying his art. He began to mistrust her and even hate her. Understanding has come to him, since. It was through extensive research and time for reflection, during a recent imprisonment, that he finally began to understand why his mother had wanted so badly to protect him. Among some families on Jeju Island, discussions of the past are still considered off-limits. But professor Yang steadily developed his artistic instincts and his readiness to step beyond borders of acceptable communication. As an artist, he found that his mission was to discover beauty, to protect it, and make it known to the world.

When I met him, he told me, “I have become someone who was willing to die for a rock.”

In 2008, the Gureombi Rock was a kilometer-long volcanic outcropping rising stubbornly above the waves somewhat in the manner of a never-suppressed memory of injustice and lying squarely in the way of base construction. In 2008, after participating for 7 nights and 8 days in a pilgrimage to resist the construction, Prof. Yang decided to move to Gangjeong, and in 2009, he pitched a tent on the Gureombi Rock, an exquisitely beautiful, tiny island off the shore of Gangjeong, where he stayed until he was forcibly removed in 2011.

“I focused on Gureombi and not anything else,” he told me. “I felt full devotion, full immersion, full absorption.”

Over the coming years he would be imprisoned four times, for a total of 555 days. He almost has died. Along with his imprisonments Professor Yang, who is nearly sixty, has endured three prison fasts ranging in length from fifty to seventy-two days, refusing solid foods as a sign of his longing, his hunger, to protect the environment near his home. His most recent prison fast only ended when environmental and peace movement activists came to the prison to persuade him to continue working alongside them.

I visited Gangjeong, and met Professor Yang, in the spring of 2014. Taking a cue from organizers who have spent years protesting U.S. military bases elsewhere in the Pacific Basin, the activists in Gangjeong hold daily protests. Each morning, we would all assemble at the construction site gates, from which South Korean police would carry many of us away in our chairs to allow the passage of construction vehicles and crews to and from the site. Assemblies included Buddhist prayer chants, celebration of the Catholic daily mass and rosary recitation, dances of universal peace, songs and chants.

After several hours of spirited witness and protest, villagers and guests would go to the Gangjeong community kitchen, open seven days a week, 24 hours a day, and enjoy delicious meals together, accepting a free will offering. One afternoon, at the community kitchen, most of the activists had finished their lunch and left when I noticed a slight, unassuming man slipping into the dining hall, fixing himself a tray, and sitting down to eat, alone. I recognized Prof. Yang from the banners and posters that lined roadways up to the construction site and adorned the village community center, the library and the coffee house. His most recent imprisonment had lasted 435 days.

Along with Professor Yang, I met his friend and mentor, Brother Song, a Mennonite minister who, while the Gureombi Rock still stood, nonviolently resisted its destruction by attempting to swim to it, every day. Security posted at the site would roughly throw him back into the water every day, but Brother Song was undeterred.

The protests continue, the kitchen is still open, while inside the construction site, crews assault Gangjeong’s beautiful shoreline. Day and night, the South Korean government, in collusion with major companies like Samsung and Hyundai, deploys “construction” crews to rip up plant life, destroy coral reefs, bulldoze and explode entire small islands, threatening the way of life that villagers have long preserved, and arming the United States for cold war competition with China. Sasha David, at the start of his book The Empire’s Edge (p.7) writes that the U.S. military buildup in the region “is less about being able to defeat China militarily (that is already possible) and more about leverage in being able to dictate terms of trade in the region.”

Gureombi rock is gone from its place on the Jeju coastline. The base plans required its complete demolition: It can no longer be seen.

“Gureombi is inside of me,” says Prof. Yang.

Professor Yang Yoon Mo said that earlier in his life, he would have felt defeated after destruction of the Gureombi Rock and the continued construction of the naval site. Now, he says, he realizes that the purpose for peace and environmental action continues, and he is excited to continue envisioning demilitarized islands working together for peace and environmental protection. When I last met him, along with Brother Song, it was in Seoul, South Korea, upon Professor Yang’s return from a conference, held in Okinawa, Japan, uniting island activists throughout the region. They were coordinating future plans, and Professor Yang Yoon Mo said that he could even contemplate a fifth imprisonment if it would help broaden and diversify the movement.

I don’t think Gureombi is gone, with the way it has changed Prof. Yang, and his community, and incidentally me. We’re not permitted to ignore the beauty and hope of the present. If we close our eyes we can put ourselves in an all-too-plausible future where our resources are gone, and the human community, and the world is already barren, and by implication not worth working to save. That’s when we need to become someone willing to live and work for a rock.

Back at home, and growing in part out of Occupy Sandy’s grassroots humanitarian response to the recent climate-driven disaster in New York, the Detroit Water Brigade has responded to its own city’s horror both with political agitation and water distribution programs. They’re posting on their sites about Sao Paulo. Prof. Yang’s sometime mentor, the activist Bruce Gagnon writes: “From the point of view of corporate capital we are all expendable. We are not going to defeat these corporate forces by remaining isolated inside our single-issue silos … There is a direct connection between the massive $1 trillion a year Pentagon budget [ ] and the destruction of social progress. There is a direct connection between the military’s huge carbon bootprint and climate change.” The swim to our neighbor islands will tend to be part of saving our own.

Living, as I briefly do, in a world of imprisoned beauty, on an island inside that archipelago of U.S. prisons so unacceptably similar to that of our old superpower rival, it’s no wonder I’m thinking of Prof. Yang Yoon Mo. What we do to the environment, we’re doing to each other. What we let our state impose on those walled beyond our borders we will tend to inflict on more and more people walled up within them, until there is no world of beauty left to keep safe for our own use, and no trust left on which any safety can be built. Until it all dries up. Whereas if we recommit to risk and beauty, refusing paths of alleged safety which only avoid temporary danger by leading us toward certain doom, if we seek our security in treating other people fairly, we may find our way to decent lives, along the way toward “decent human survival.”

This article first appeared on TeleSUR.

Kathy Kelly, co-coordinator of Voices for Creative Nonviolence (www.vcnv.org) is in federal prison for participation in an anti-drone protest. She can receive mail at: KATHY KELLY 04971-045; FMC LEXINGTON; FEDERAL MEDICAL CENTER; SATELLITE CAMP; P.O. BOX 14525; LEXINGTON, KY 40512.

The post Crosscurrents – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

‘Carolina Butcher’ Crocodile Was Top Predator Before Dinosaurs Roamed North America

0
0

A newly discovered crocodilian ancestor may have filled one of North America’s top predator roles before dinosaurs arrived on the continent. Carnufex carolinensis, or the “Carolina Butcher,” was a 9-foot long, land-dwelling crocodylomorph that walked on its hind legs and likely preyed upon smaller inhabitants of North Carolina ecosystems such as armored reptiles and early mammal relatives.

Paleontologists from North Carolina State University and the North Carolina Museum of Natural Sciences recovered parts of Carnufex‘s skull, spine and upper forelimb from the Pekin Formation in Chatham County, North Carolina. Because the skull of Carnufex was preserved in pieces, it was difficult to visualize what the complete skull would have looked like in life.

To get a fuller picture of Carnufex‘s skull the researchers scanned the individual bones with the latest imaging technology – a high-resolution surface scanner. Then they created a three-dimensional model of the reconstructed skull, using the more complete skulls of close relatives to fill in the missing pieces.

The Pekin Formation contains sediments deposited 231 million years ago in the beginning of the Late Triassic (the Carnian), when what is now North Carolina was a wet, warm equatorial region beginning to break apart from the supercontinent Pangea.

“Fossils from this time period are extremely important to scientists because they record the earliest appearance of crocodylomorphs and theropod dinosaurs, two groups that first evolved in the Triassic period, yet managed to survive to the present day in the form of crocodiles and birds,” said Lindsay Zanno, assistant research professor at NC State, director of the Paleontology and Geology lab at the museum, and lead author of a paper describing the find. “The discovery of Carnufex, one of the world’s earliest and largest crocodylomorphs, adds new information to the push and pull of top terrestrial predators across Pangea.”

Typical predators roaming Pangea included large-bodied rauisuchids and poposauroids, fearsome cousins of ancient crocodiles that went extinct in the Triassic Period. In the Southern Hemisphere, “these animals hunted alongside the earliest theropod dinosaurs, creating a predator pile-up,” said Zanno.

However, the discovery of Carnufex indicates that in the north, large-bodied crocodylomorphs, not dinosaurs, were adding to the diversity of top predator niches.

“We knew that there were too many top performers on the proverbial stage in the Late Triassic,” Zanno added. “Yet, until we deciphered the story behind Carnufex, it wasn’t clear that early crocodile ancestors were among those vying for top predator roles prior to the reign of dinosaurs in North America.”

As the Triassic drew to a close, extinction decimated this panoply of predators and only small-bodied crocodylomorphs and theropods survived.

“Theropods were ready understudies for vacant top predator niches when large-bodied crocs and their relatives bowed out,” said Zanno. “Predatory dinosaurs went on to fill these roles exclusively for the next 135 million years.”

Still, ancient crocodiles found success in other places. “As theropod dinosaurs started to make it big, the ancestors of modern crocs initially took on a role similar to foxes or jackals, with small, sleek bodies and long limbs,” said Susan Drymala, graduate student at NC State and co-author of the paper. “If you want to picture these animals, just think of a modern day fox, but with alligator skin instead of fur.”

The post ‘Carolina Butcher’ Crocodile Was Top Predator Before Dinosaurs Roamed North America appeared first on Eurasia Review.

L.A. Fast-Food Ban Fails To Improve Diets Or Cut Obesity

0
0

A Los Angeles ordinance designed to curb obesity in low-income areas by restricting the opening of new fast-food restaurants has failed to reduce fast-food consumption or reduce obesity rates in the targeted neighborhoods, according to a new RAND Corporation study.

Since the fast-food restrictions were passed in 2008, overweight and obesity rates in South Los Angeles and other neighborhoods targeted by the law have increased faster than in other parts of the city or other parts of the county, according to findings published online by the journal Social Science & Medicine.

“The South Los Angeles fast food ban may have symbolic value, but it has had no measurable impact in improving diets or reducing obesity,” said Roland Sturm, lead author of the study and a senior economist at RAND, a nonprofit research organization. “This should not come as a surprise: Most food outlets in the area are small food stores or small restaurants with limited seating that are not affected by the policy.”

The policy is a zoning regulation that restricts the opening or expansion of any “stand-alone fast-food restaurant” in Baldwin Hills, Leimert Park, and portions of South Los Angeles and Southeast Los Angeles. The areas subject to the rule have about 700,000 residents. While the rule was not the nation’s first local regulation limiting fast-food outlets, it was the first one presented as a public health measure by advocates.

Sturm and co-author Aiko Hattori of the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, examined the fast-food ban by analyzing information from two sources. They tracked the opening of new food outlets across the city by reviewing permits issued by the Los Angeles County Department of Public Health, which licenses and inspects all food outlets.

Information about neighborhood eating habits and weight came from three different waves of the California Health Interview Survey, which polls residents across the state about an array of health issues. Participants from South Los Angeles and other neighborhoods targeted by the ordinance were compared to residents from other parts of Los Angeles.

Examining weight trends across the city, researchers found that both obesity and being overweight increased in all areas from 2007 to 2012, with the increase being significantly greater in areas covered by the fast-food ordinance. In addition, fast-food consumption increased in all areas since the ban was passed, but was statistically similar across all areas.

Before the ban was passed as well as three years later, the average body mass index (a ratio of weight to height) and the proportion of people who were obese or overweight were higher in South Los Angeles than in other areas of the city. That gap continued to widen from 2008 to 2012.

“The one bright spot we found is that soft drink consumption dropped, but the decrease was similar in all areas across Los Angeles,” Hattori said. “Unfortunately, the rates of overweight and obesity increased and they increased fastest in the area subject to the fast-food ban.”

Researchers found that about 10 percent of food outlets in Los Angeles are new since the regulation was approved, but there was no evidence that the composition of those establishments has changed as a result of the ordinance.

New food outlets in South Los Angeles were most likely to be small food stores while new food outlets in other parts of the city were most likely to be larger independent restaurants.

There were 17 new permits for outlets belonging to larger fast-food chains in South Los Angeles from 2008 to 2012, just slightly more than in other parts of the city, but none of them were stand-alone restaurants. The findings show the ordinance has done little to reshape the retail food landscape in the targeted neighborhoods.

The post L.A. Fast-Food Ban Fails To Improve Diets Or Cut Obesity appeared first on Eurasia Review.

China-Led Asian Bank Attracts More European Members

0
0

By Nurzhanat Ametbek

Last week, the UK became the first Western nation to join the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). Following the UK’s lead, three other European countries, namely Germany, France, and Italy, also joined the new bank on March 17. The United States urged countries on Tuesday “to think twice about signing up to a new China-led Asian development bank that Washington sees as a rival to the World Bank”.

According to Matthew Goodman, a senior advisor on Asian economics at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the central part of this new development is that the AIIB actually finds itself as a contender in a broader competition for global economic and political leadership.

The Obama administration opposes the AIIB, and has pressured US allies such as South Korea, Japan, and Australia not to join the new bank. United States government officials have expressed concerns as to whether the AIIB will maintain high standards of governance, put forth environmental and social safeguards, and exhibit transparency.

The AIIB is an international financial institution and multilateral development bank that was proposed by China. Its purpose is to provide finance to infrastructure projects in the Asia-Pacific region. Roughly $8 trillion dollars of infrastructure investment will be needed over the next decade, and Fred Bergsten, a senior fellow with the Peterson Institute for International Economics said that the AIIB will help fill that gap.

There’s a huge demand for infrastructural investment in much of Asia. The lack of infrastructure across the continent, whether roads, airports, ports, or power facilities, stands as the biggest barrier of development in Asia, reported NPR.

It is believed China is prepared to provide half of the Bank’s initial $100 billion budget, therewith allowing the country to obtain the power of veto within the institution, much like that the US enjoys in the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. In June 2014 China proposed doubling the registered capital of the Bank from $50 billion to $100 billion.

Twenty-one countries signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in Beijing in October last year to formally recognize the establishment of the Bank. The countries who signed the bill included: China, India, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Brunei, Cambodia, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Laos, Myanmar, Mongolia, Nepal, Oman, Qatar, Sri Lanka, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam.

As reported by Xinhua, Indonesia’s participation in the Bank was slightly delayed due to the new presidential administration in the country not being able to review membership in time. Nonetheless, Indonesian Finance Minister Bambang Brodjonegoro signed a MOU in Jakarta in November, thus establishing the country as the 22nd founding member of the Bank. It is believed the recent participation of European countries in the Bank will open the door for more Western countries to join as well.

China has said any countries that are interested in the AIIB are welcomed to join. It is expected that the Prospective Founding Members will complete the signing and ratification of the Articles of Agreement (AOA) in 2015, therewith facilitating the formal establishment of the Bank by the end of the same year.

The post China-Led Asian Bank Attracts More European Members appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Bundeswehr 2.0: A German Military For A New Normal – OpEd

0
0

By Felix K. Chang*

A visit to Germany’s military history museum in Dresden reveals just how deeply ambivalent modern Germany is about its military, the Bundeswehr. One account described it as “a meditation on mankind’s addiction to state violence.”

No wonder that Germany—despite being Europe’s most populous and wealthiest country—has continuously cut the size of the Bundeswehr since the end of the Cold War.

While much of that was warranted, given the disappearance of the Soviet threat, today’s Bundeswehr is not only a fraction of its former self (and half the size of the French military), but also apparently in a state of disrepair, according to an independent review of the Bundeswehr’s combat readiness last September.[1]germany_military

Hence, when German Chancellor Angela Merkel travelled to Moscow to persuade Russian President Vladimir Putin to end his aggression in Ukraine, she did so without the benefit of military power to back her efforts. Instead, German diplomats have sought to use Germany’s economic power as leverage to shape Russia’s behavior. Far better, they argue, to avoid competing with Russia on military terms, in which Germany is weak and Russia holds “escalation dominance.”

But economic power clearly has its limits, as Russia has yet to end its intervention in eastern Ukraine. That has led even those Germans who have long been sympathetic to Moscow to consider whether there has been a fundamental shift in Russian posture—one that might require Germany to address through a stronger defense. For the first time in decades, Bundestag legislators have begun to discuss the need to strengthen the Bundeswehr.[2]

But what kind of Bundeswehr is needed? Surely, it must be one that is consistent with Germany’s vision of itself, if Germans are ever to embrace it. It should be tailored for a mission that most German citizens can agree is in Germany’s national interest, such as the security of Central Europe. It should also be one that can meaningfully contribute to NATO’s collective defense, but does not put its neighbors ill at ease. As such, one could envision a Bundeswehr that is designed—through its armaments and force structure—to be fundamentally defensive, yet still beneficial to NATO.

From the way the German army chose to pare back its equipment after the Cold War, it is clear that its leaders sought to preserve as much of the combat capabilities of its heavy armored units as possible. But by 2010 that was no longer possible, as the numbers of its main battle tanks (MBT) and armored infantry fighting vehicles (AIFV) plunged. Rather than rebuild its army on a foundation of MBTs, Germany could equip it with more defensive weapon systems, like AIFVs that are fitted with long-range anti-tank missiles. Such systems wound provide an effective defense against armor without having the offensive strength of MBTs.

Meanwhile, the German navy could focus its attention on the defensive mission to protect NATO’s sea lines of communication to the alliance’s Baltic member states. Given the maritime environment of the Baltic Sea, that mission would primarily entail coastal diesel-electric submarines, corvettes, and minesweepers, rather than larger oceangoing combatants.

As a corollary to that mission, the German navy could contribute to NATO’s ability to send reinforcements to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania with landing ship tanks (LSTs). Finally, the German air force could focus its resources on filling an air-superiority role (which it apparently already has begun to do), rather than a more offensive ground-support role. Such an air force would have the added benefit of being able to enforce future defensive no-fly zones.

Even so, if the Bundeswehr is to be seen as non-threatening to its neighbors, one must also consider its force structure. The Bundeswehr should be appropriately sized relative to those of its neighbors, France and Poland—small enough that they would not find it menacing, but large enough that, when combined with the capabilities of other NATO countries, it would be useful to fend off a foreign threat to the alliance.

Within those criteria, one could envision an expanded German army that includes two armored brigades equipped with Leopard 2A7 MBTs and six mechanized brigades equipped with a new generation of missile-armed Marder AIFVs. When operating alongside Poland’s heavily armored units (which include 900 MBTs), the German force could help respond to any aggression from the east.

Similarly, a German navy equipped with 12 coastal diesel-electric submarines, 12 corvettes, and 36 minesweepers could help NATO keep its sea lines of communication open to its Baltic member states. Moreover, the navy could help NATO develop a credible sealift capability with 12 LSTs that could transport relief forces and supplies to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Finally, the German air force—if equipped with 240 air-superiority fighters (a mix of European-built Eurofighters and American-built F-22 fighters)—could help ensure that NATO controls the skies over Central Europe.

Such a Bundeswehr would be a largely defensive force, essentially incapable of offensive action without the support of its NATO allies. But it would be one that could make a meaningful contribution to the security of Central Europe and the integrity of the NATO alliance. Of course, this sort of transformation would not be costless. It will consume every bit of the military spending increase that Germany promised its NATO allies in the 2014 Wales Summit Declaration. But in making that investment, Berlin could create a force that is worthy of praise from its allies and, perhaps, Germans too.

About the author:
*Felix K. Chang is a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. He is also the Chief Strategy Officer of DecisionQ, a predictive analytics company in the national security and healthcare industries. He has worked with a number of digital, consumer services, and renewable energy entrepreneurs for years. He was previously a consultant in Booz Allen Hamilton’s Strategy and Organization practice; among his clients were the U.S. Department of Energy, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Department of the Treasury, and other agencies. Earlier, he served as a senior planner and an intelligence officer in the U.S. Department of Defense and a business advisor at Mobil Oil Corporation, where he dealt with strategic planning for upstream and midstream investments throughout Asia and Africa.

Source:
This article was published by FPRI.

Notes:
[1] “Consultants list Bundeswehr blunders,” Deutsche Welle, Oct. 6, 2014, http://dw.de/p/1DR9m; “Merkel peeks over Bundeswehr shortfall parapet,” Deutsche Welle, Oct. 3, 2014, http://dw.de/p/1DPdX; “A German army museum reopens,” Economist, Oct. 15, 2011.

[2] Anton Troianovski, “Ukraine Crisis Spurs Calls in Germany to Reverse Years of Trimming Army,” Wall Street Journal, Mar. 9, 2015, p. A10.

The post Bundeswehr 2.0: A German Military For A New Normal – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Why Mideast Elections Are Overrated And Often Counterproductive – Analysis

0
0

By Jordan Olmstead

In his 1997 piece “Was a Democracy Just a Moment?” Robert Kaplan predicted that like Christianity, democracy would not create a more moral or peaceful world, but rather, a more complex one. Right now the erstwhile young democracies of Pakistan and Afghanistan are finding this out the hard way.

In Pakistan, the past three months have been dominated by protests against Nawaz Sharif’s government fueled by popular (and manufactured) discontent with alleged electoral fraud, and the inability of Pakistan’s corrupt elite to manage pressing economic, infrastructural, and security issues.

Last autumn protesters led by the populist Canadian cleric Tahir ul-Qadri and Imran Khan, a former playboy cricketer turned leader of Pakistan’s largest opposition party, penetrated Islamabad’s heavily defended “Green Zone,” briefly occupied the state TV station and threatened to storm (the democratically elected) Nawaz Sharif’s residence unless he agreed to step down.

After letting Sharif sweat, the Pakistani defense establishment finally stepped in. In return for turning back the “rebellion” against him, Sharif was forced to relinquish Pakistan’s all-important foreign policy and defense portfolios.

Preserving a democratically-elected leader against a violent uprising through a partial military coup? Not very promising for a young democracy.

In Afghanistan, popular discontent against the political class is also high after the second round of Afghan presidential elections was marred by embarrassing levels of fraud. An “independent’ election commission was set up to audit questionable votes and broker an agreement between the two candidates–Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah.

After an auditing process which only examined 1% of ballot boxes Ashraf Ghani was declared President, and Abdullah Abdullah “Prime Minister.” Awkwardly, a report allegedly published by the Center of Naval Analyses claims that it was mathematically impossible for Ghani to have won the election. The independent election commission also refused to publish the final vote count for either candidate. Many Afghans, who braved the Taliban to cast their vote feel that this process “has been a slap in the face for democracy in Afghanistan”, as their supposedly democratic transition “actually avoided democratic means to determine who won the election”.

The resolution of a fraud riddled election with behind the scenes wrangling by the very politicians and warlords behind that fraud? Also not very promising for a young democracy.

Elections as Toxic to (some) Democracies

As it turns out, political scientists have known that young democracies are dangerous for a while. In a landmark 2001 paper, Demet Mousseau found an “inverse U” shaped relationship between democratization and violence in ethnically heterogeneous societies: As a country becomes more democratic (or moves across the x axis) the level of political violence increases (moves up the y axis) because the state’s capacity to violently contain conflict decreases. Tragically, actions undertaken by key actors in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and abroad are serving to keep Afghanistan and Pakistan in that precarious position.

To understand why, we have to look at why elections are overrated in immature and ethnically-heterogeneous democracies. Ethnic conflict–as well as other forms of identity conflict–is driven by “intense collective fears for the future”, which are in turn fed by weak state weakness, clientelism, and perceptions that other groups are gaining at the expense of your group. Elections in weak states provide a fertile breeding ground for these elements to coalesce. They are inherently zero-sum games that exacerbate existing collective fears about group survival.

Take Afghanistan, where ethnic tensions flared during the election, as the contest was framed as a competition between the interests of the dominant Pashtun majority (represented by Ashraf Ghani), and other minority groups (Abdullah Abdullah). Analysts feared that the country could devolve into ethnic warfare because of the uncertainty and anxiety produced by the election commission’s apparent inability to determine a winner.

So knowing all of this, what does every relevant actor do? Increase the salience and concomitantly–the perceived stakes– of elections. In Pakistan, Imran Khan increased the stakes of Pakistani elections and threatened to remove a democratically elected president, directing attention away from the incompetent bureaucrats and institutions responsible for the power and water shortages which infuriate so many Pakistanis. It also provided the military with an opportunity to reproduce its’ role as the “final arbiter” in Pakistani politics by quelling the protests.

In Afghanistan, the U.S. is largely to blame for making aid to the Pakistani government contingent on “free and fair elections”. Furthermore, by dispatching John Kerry to help broker an agreement between Ghani and Abdullah at the first sign of trouble, America sent the messages that

  1. this electoral dispute was so imperative that one of the most powerful men in the world had to be flown out to resolve it and
  2. that America, rather than Ghani, Abdullah, or the Afghan people writ large was responsible for the results. The Taliban, which has painted the elections as unrepresentative of Afghan interests, are undoubtedly ecstatic.

The Afghan government also did their part by crafting a deal which emphasized the powers of executive branch officials (the President and Prime Minister) to appoint officials and execute policy. Research by Milan Svolik demonstrates that the accumulation of too much power in the hands of the executive seems to be “a persistent threat” to democratic stability, because (my analysis) such a concentration of power increases the collective fear for the future held by different ethnic and religious groups by increasing the stakes of elections, and making them appear even more zero-sum.

The Best Way to Preserve Vulnerable Democracies? Make Elections Less Meaningful

While elections may be problematic, once established within a given context doing, it is difficult to so away with them while maintaining perceived legitimacy. A more feasible strategy for involved actors would be reducing the stakes of elections. It may appear counter-intuitive, but if the potential benefits of one’s own candidate winning are decreased while the potential costs of said candidate losing are also decreased, the incentives for ballot box stuffing, voter intimidation, and related maneuvers which undermine state institutions and democratic viability would also be decreased.

This hypothesis finds support in “dominant party theory”, which points to the ability of democracies like India to sustain democracies in ethnically heterogeneous contexts. The theory posits that in a “dominant party system”, a dominant party rules without serious fear of being displaced by gadfly “satellite” parties which represent regional interests. However, the dominant party must accommodate the most legitimate and pressing needs of the satellite parties, otherwise they could collectively drum up enough support to remove the dominant party. Thus, a status quo is created where collective fears for the future are dampened, because groups know that any issue with existential import must be competently and fairly managed by the dominant party if it wants to stay in power.

The chronic and widespread failure of corrupt, authoritarian and complacent dominant parties was the driver of the 2011 Arab Uprisings—although the international obsession with radical “regime changes” followed closely by elections was responsible for much of the chaos that followed. Going forward, the international community should put their time and energy into reforms of troubled systems for the sake of protecting minority rights while restructuring legislatures into a more durable and secure status quo, rather than fanning the flames of sectarian discontent by fetishizing elections.

This is because at its essence, democracy is more than a set of (liberal) institutions or occasional election rituals–instead that governments be representative of, and responsive to, the will and interests of as much of its citizenry as feasible. If we understand democracy in this broader sense, Robert Kaplan may have overstated the transience of the “democratic moment:” the arc of the political world is long, but it appears to bend towards further democratization. That said, reducing the emphasis placed on elections would likely prove beneficial for nascent democracies like Pakistan and Afghanistan.

The post Why Mideast Elections Are Overrated And Often Counterproductive – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.


After Nasheed’s Conviction, Maldives At Cross-Roads Again? – Analysis

0
0

By N Sathiya Moorthy*

Reminiscent of the era before multi-party democracy unfolded in 2008, the Opposition MDP has called for a nation-wide ‘civil disobedience movement’ after a three-judge Criminal Court Bench awarded a 13-year jail-term for former President Mohammed ‘Anni’ Nasheed in the ‘Judge Abdulla abduction case’. While the international community (read: West) has backed MDP against the legal and judicial processes in the country, President Abdulla Yameen has asked them not to interfere in the internal affairs of Maldives and asked Nasheed’s defence to avail of the existing opportunities for appealing against the trial court verdict.

If the fast-tracked trial proceedings had come in for criticism from the defence and the international community alike, the surprise came in the form of the court pronouncing the verdict only hours after it had concluded the trial on the night of Friday, March 13, an official weekly holiday across the island-nation. It’s unclear why the court did not complete the trial against Nasheed’s co-accused, who under the Maldivian criminal procedure, can be tried separately. Nor is it known when their trial would conclude and when the verdict would be pronounced. For now, the court has postponed the trial against co-accused and incumbent Defence Minister Moosa Ali Jameel, scheduled for Monday, March 16.

Almost from the start, Nasheed’s defence had cried foul over the procedure, the denial of demanded time for preparing their case, refusal for two of the three judges to recuse themselves as they were present at the time of Judge Abdulla’s arrest, and for their appearing as defence witnesses along with the nation’s prosecutor-general. Protesting against the denial of time after they had been given only an additional day, the defence lawyers quit.

During the three-week long trial, the presiding Judges ruled that there was no need for them to recuse themselves, nor was there any need for them to appear as witnesses, possibly holding that the case would have stood even without either. The court also declined Nasheed’s personal request for appointing a new lawyer after his team had quit, but did not deny him the right to appoint one even as they continued with the trial, whatever that meant in real terms.

Appearing as a prosecution witness, Judge Abdulla recalled how he was hauled out of his home from the dinner table in the middle of night and taken away to what he learnt the next day was an island-prison. He also named names of those who had met him or otherwise asked him to quit service or settle overseas when he was still in detention/prison. Other prosecution witnesses mostly confirmed the Judge’s version.

The prosecution also provided video-footage of Nasheed, then the nation’s President, defending Judge Abdulla’s arrest, in rallies and public statements. Media reports do not indicate that the defence team, when present, had contested the same. It is unlikely under the circumstances if the defence would have been able to disprove then President Nasheed’s knowledge of the detention, even if they were, if at all, able to establish that he did not give the ‘abduction’ orders.

In the last sitting of the hearing, the Judges however denied Nasheed the 20 days’ time sought for preparing his defence. If the authorities apprehended that the ex-President with established contacts in the western world could/would use the time to campaign his cause, rather than prepare his defence, they did not make out the point, either inside or outside the courtroom. Ditto with the absence of explanation, if any, about the surprise arrest of Nasheed and the subsequent denial of his submission for house-arrest to help him meet his lawyers and prepare his defence better.

U-turn for the worse

Observers were surprised when overnight the prosecution withdrew the pending criminal case against Nasheed and the rest under the nation’s penal code, entailing a maximum prison term of three years if charges were proved, in mid-February. The surprise was compounded when a new case was filed, under the anti-terror law of 1989, which prescribes a 10-15 year prison-term for unlawful confinement, abduction, etc. When the U-turn thus came, it was for the worse.

Either way, Nasheed would have been barred from contesting the presidential polls of 2018. With the longish prison-term now, he might not be able to contest for an additional 15 years or so, unless the High Court and/or the Supreme Court overturned the trial court’s verdict. Penalty under the two courses anyway entails an opportunity for presidential pardon. It comes with a caveat that Nasheed would still be disqualified from contesting the polls.

President Yameen has since talked about Nasheed’s “constitutionally-guaranteed right of appeal”, which he should avail of. If that is a political message to Nasheed’s Maldivian Democratic Party (MDP) not to do anything drastic outside the court room, they have already decided on a ‘civil disobedience movement’. Past-masters at street-protests, the MDP is also now bound by Nasheed’s exit lines in the courtroom, extolling ‘em all to take to the streets in defence of ‘rule of law’ and due process.

On earlier occasions, Nasheed had told the court that the trial was a ‘travesty of democracy’ and ‘injustice’. He also protested the media from being barred from the trial, which was when he was photographed falling outside Male’s ‘Justice Building’ and being pulled/pushed by police men. After the trial court’s verdict, the High Court has dismissed his petition to nullify the trial over the denial of ‘public trial’, guaranteed under the 2008 Constitution. Though details are not known, the courts might have stuck to exemptions under the provision, it is said.

Politics all the way

Nasheed’s defence has since said that they would appeal the verdict in the nation’s High Court. If that were the case, the question arises why they had to walk out of the case at the trial stage. Whatever intervention that was allowed in the trial stage would still have helped them in the appeal hearings. By using the courtroom to make political statements, including those condemning the procedure and the judiciary as a whole, Nasheed might have made things even more difficult for himself.

Yet, there is no knowing why the court could not have granted the time sought by the defence, or by Nasheed, later, to prepare the case. As the defence team has since pointed out, the Supreme Court, through a sudden change of procedure in January, has reduced the appeal-filing time from three months to 10 days. That was before Nasheed’s arrest and trial had been in the news, but even then the MDP had expressed consternation. The defence now says that the Supreme Court did not have the powers to change the procedure, which was an exclusive preserve of the Legislature.

Nothing, however, can explain and/or defend how incumbent Defence Minister Moosa Ali Jaleel, a co-accused in the case already being tried separately from Nasheed, could lead a motor-bike rally, demanding ‘immediate sentence’ for the former President. A retired lieutenant-general of the Maldivian National Defence Force (MNDF), Jaleel was the nation’s army commander at the time of Judge Abdulla’s arrest and detention, and has pleaded ignorance about the instructions that went up and down, claiming that he was bypassed on those occasions.

With or without his possible future acquittal by the court (and upheld by the higher ones), Jaleel could not have participated in a political rally, telling the court what to do in a pending trial. Ironically, only days after Nasheed’s conviction, a parliamentary committee has since confirmed Jaleel’s appointment as Defence Minister, and it will now has to be cleared by the full House of the People’s Majlis, or Parliament.

In the ordinary circumstances, political and administrative propriety demands that anyone accused of a grave charge such as this does not occupy, or continued to occupy such a high office. The prosecution would have also expressed natural apprehensions about the greater possibilities of an accused such as Jaleel influencing the witnesses. In this case however, the Yameen presidency had first named Jaleel, Maldivian envoy to Pakistan, and followed it more recently with elevation as Defence Minister – even as the original case regarding Judge Abdulla’s abduction was still pending before the criminal court.

Minister Jaleel and the rest of President Yameen’s ruling Progressive Party of Maldives (PPM) have only been out-matched however by the MDP along with the new-found/re-found Jumhooree Party (JP) ally, who together had launched a daily rally through the previous weeks and whose demands came to include protesting the arrest and trial of Nasheed and that of predecessor Defence Minister Col Mohamed Nazim, who has since been charged with attempting a coup and plotting to target President Yameen and other Government leaders. If authorities had suspected that the MDP-JP combine’s protests in ‘defence of Constitution’ was aimed at destabilising the government and the Maldivian State, the question would arise if there were independent political and legal ways to countering the same.

It’s cases such as Col Nazim’s overnight arrest and fall from grace, coupled with the Government’s earlier decision to cut down the number of Supreme Court judges from seven to five and ‘impeach’ two incumbents, again, in a fast-track mode, that has made the Government’s motives more questionable than already. Government leaders however have stood the ground and have also been parroting that under the post-democracy constitutional norms, the powers of the Executive, Judiciary and Legislature have been separated and the Executive cannot be expected to influence the Judiciary to put a stop to the Nasheed trial or any other. Or, so goes the argument.

India ‘deeply concerned’, but…

After the court sentencing of Nasheed, India has expressed ‘deep concern over the developments’ and said that it was watching the situation. Yet, it may not be the best of time for Nasheed’s supporters in Maldives and sympathisers in India, particularly over implied and explicit charges of partisanship against the Maldivian judiciary. Nearer home, a Delhi court has since summoned former Congress Prime Minister Manmohan Singh on April 8, to be examined for possible inclusion as a co-accused in the multi-billion ‘coalgate scam’ when he was in office.

In doing so, the court has rejected two successive ‘closure’ applications filed by the lead investigating agency, namely, the Central Bureau of Investigations (CBI). The investigations and trial in the case are being supervised by the nation’s Supreme Court. The ruling BJP leaders have since defended the trial court’s right to summon the former PM, though they may or may not possibly share the court’s view. In this background, the government of Prime Minister Narendra Modi cannot be expected to comment on the performance of the Judiciary in a neighbouring country.

In the surprise arrest of Nasheed ahead of what his supporters say was a hasty trial at best, the Maldivian authorities might have been acknowledging his ingenuity and political acumen. The last time he was to have appeared before the trial court in the original criminal proceeding in the ‘Judge Abdulla case’, Nasheed surprised everyone, including the host (?), by staging a 10-day stay-in at the Indian High Commission (IHC) instead.

The Nasheed ‘stay-in’ had every potential component to become a ‘diplomatic incident’ of sorts but was handled deftly. For days before his arrest this time, which was not in the news anyway, Nasheed had begun openly calling upon India to ‘protect’ him if jailed. Both after his arrest and now conviction, the MDP appealed to the larger Indian neighbour and regional power in particular to intervene ‘strongly’ and in the name of ‘democracy’. This view may be shared by many in the Indian strategic community, but such steps come with caveats and consequences.

That the Yameen government did reopen the case even as it was talking to India about the imminent visit of Prime Minister Narendra Modi should mean that either they did not care for India’s genuine concerns that revolve around stability in and of Maldives, or could not risk delaying decisions on the Nasheed/MDP front only at their own peril, or both. PM Modi did drop Maldives from his four-nation Indian Ocean neighbourhood itinerary, but there was also no knowing if he would have faced political protestors if he had made it to Male for what was seen as the beginning of an epoch-making, cooperative IOR initiative.

On the night of his election as president, Yameen had sworn against ‘political vendetta’ against Nasheed, who had given him the best of electoral fights and lost only narrowly. Possibly, he was referring to the possible reopening of Judge Abdulla case. However, throughout the past year and half, the government did not close the case, however. Nor did Judge Abdulla withdraw his police complaint. There is also nothing to suggest that either Nasheed or the MDP or anyone else had done anything legally or politically to try and set right things, if they were aggrieved over the status of the ‘Judge Abdulla abduction case’.

Engage constructively: Yameen

Seeking to silence international criticism, Maldivian government leaders, including President Yameen and his half-niece and Foreign Minister, Dunya Maumoon, have clearly drawn the red-line that they should not cross when commenting or dealing with domestic issues in their country. Addressing the UNHRC at Geneva after Nasheed’s trial had gone under way, Minister Dunya asked why the international community was keeping quiet when President Nasheed had ordered Judge Abdulla’s illegal arrest, preceded two years by present-day President Yameen.

Minister Maumoon has also reiterated the Government’s resolve to consider quitting the Commonwealth, for instance, if they were seen as interfering in Maldivian affairs. Before this one, the erstwhile government of then President Mohammed Waheed had held out a similar threat, only to invite/accept a Commonwealth panel to probe the events of 7 February 2012, leading to President Nasheed exiting office. The CoNI Report, as the probe was named, sort of absolved Nasheed’s opponents of much wrong-doing in his exit.

Today, with President Nasheed behind bars, the Yameen leadership may not be disinterested in negotiating from a position of relative strength. As a statement from the President’s Office said after Nasheed’s conviction, “The government calls on its international partners to engage constructively, based on mutual respect and dialogue in consolidating and strengthening democratic values and institutions in the country”.

It is unlikely that the government would be willing to let other nations or international organisations to enter the scene in a big way. Nor may any of them want to negotiate on someone else’s behalf without being in a position to guarantee absolute compliance, if and where required. Experience from the 2012 past, when India and the Commonwealth intervened after Nasheed left office on 7 February showed that all stake-holders in the country have had the wonderful habit of ‘shifting the goal-post’ instantly and constantly and blaming the rest, including the facilitator, whenever and wherever possible.

*The writer is a Senior Fellow at Observer Research Foundation, Chennai Chapter

The post After Nasheed’s Conviction, Maldives At Cross-Roads Again? – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

US Talk Show Star Glenn Beck Quits Republican Party Over Immigration Policies – OpEd

0
0

One of the nation’s most popular conservative talk show host and activist Glenn Beck on Wednesday declared on his personal website that he’s quitting membership in Republican Party. He did not mention which party he plans to join, although he is known for having libertarian leanings.

“I’ve made my decision — I’m out,” Beck declared on Wednesday. “I’m out of the Republican Party. I am not a Republican. I will not give a dime to the Republican Party. I’m out.” Beck said that the Republican Party lost him because of their lawmakers’ inability to articulate a strategy and implement a plan addressing illegal immigration and their failure to stop Obamacare.

“All this stuff that they said and they ran and they said they were doing all of these great things and they were going to stand against ObamaCare and illegal immigration — they set us up. They set us up. Enough is enough. They’re torpedoing the Constitution and they’re doing it knowingly,” accuses the best-selling author.

Beck also immensely dislikes the treatment of Tea Party lawmakers by so-called “establishment Republicans.” Beck said that many Republicans and Republican pundits have disrespected Sens. Mike Lee (R-Utah) and Ted Cruz (R-Texas), a likely 2016 GOP presidential candidate “They’re taking on people like Mike Lee and Ted Cruz and they’re torpedoing them,” Beck claims. “And [Lee and Cruz] are standing up for the U.S. Constitution.”

Last Friday, the National Rifle Association’s website indicated it would investigate board member and right-wing activist Grover Norquist over possible sympathies for the Muslim Brotherhood. Beck fired both barrels saying, “The people [Norquist] hangs out with and the people he helps empower, they are agents of influence for the Muslim Brotherhood.”

Anyone who listens to Glenn Beck regularly already knew Beck is outspoken about his disappointment with the GOP establishment’s leaders, including John Boehner, Mitch McConnell, and Lindsey Graham. He said he has watched those same establishment politicians try to destroy passionate conservatives like Ted Cruz and Mike Lee.

Several listeners who serve as military, intelligence and law enforcement officers have the same feelings about the GOP as Beck and other conservative celebrities. “I am very upset that the so-called GOP establishment — including so-called conservatives on Fox News Channel — are quick to denigrate or ridicule Tea Party members and events. They also disappear from the public view when cops, soldiers and spies are accused of crimes rather than defending them from Democratic politicians who lie and deceive Americans about the nation’s true patriots,” former U.S. Marine and NYPD police detective Sid Franes told Examiner. “Personally, I re-registered as an independent after the 2012 election that should seen Obama ousted from the White House,” said Franes, who says he is an African American conservative.

The post US Talk Show Star Glenn Beck Quits Republican Party Over Immigration Policies – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Iran’s Growing Interference In Iraq – OpEd

0
0

By Abdulrahman Al-Rashed

The battle to rid Tikrit of the Islamic State has revealed the depth of the Iranian military’s role in Iraq, as well as the Iranian Revolutionary Guard leaders’ authority over what has been dubbed the “popular mobilization” units — militias parallel to the Iraqi army.

Iran has sent forces, consultants and arms to Iraq and its security leaders claim that they are the ones who saved the Iraqi regime and Baghdad. A New York Times report said Iran deployed rockets and missiles in Iraq, while several Iraqi leaders spoke about a military deal struck with Iran worth $10 billion.

This is not merely a temporary Iranian support for Iraq during its ordeal. It’s more a plan by the Iranians to dominate and seize control of their oil-rich Iraqi neighbor, which has a significant geo-strategic location.

What changed since September is that Iran no longer counts on the office of Prime Minister Nuri Al-Maliki — who was its close ally — now that he’s been constitutionally toppled by the majority of Iraqi forces. Iran has therefore decided to be present in all Iraqi political, military, partisan and religious posts.

The Iranian involvement in Iraq and its domination over Baghdad’s decision-making process reflects Iran’s desire to dominate Syria and Iraq, and this automatically means a domination over the Arab Levant, including the Gulf.

Iran was worried when Iraqis forced Al-Maliki to exit at a time when he was holding on to his post and intending to renew his premiership term for four more years. In this way he would have ended up governing Iraq for 12 consecutive years by resorting to absolute power that resembles the former regime of Saddam Hussein. The United States supported the plan to eliminate Al-Maliki by cooperating with Iraq’s political parties including Al-Maliki’s Dawa party which turned against him.

His comrade Haidar Al-Abadi was chosen to take over the premiership. It seems that eliminating Al-Maliki emboldened the Iranian regime to directly interfere in Iraq and obstruct the political reconciliation which Abadi pledged to achieve with Sunni Arabs and Kurds. The Iranians have also aborted the project to establish a National Guard force, and instead have established a combination of extremist Shiite militias which they call “the popular mobilization” units and which currently handle the fighting in Sunni areas.

The process of Iran’s seizure of Iraq resembles that of the Syrian model in Lebanon — it started under the banner of the Arab Deterrent Force and later, during the 1970s, Syrian troops resorted to confronting Palestinian militias.

Even after the defeat of forces hostile to the Lebanese authority, the Syrian troops stayed in Lebanon within the context of a comprehensive domination formula which got rid of historical political figures either by assassinating or marginalizing them.
The Syrians also controlled all aspects of the economy, established the party of Hezbollah as their military arm and fully controlled Lebanon for a quarter of a century.

Iranian intelligence and Revolutionary Guard forces are currently heavily present inside Iraq and most of them are deployed under the slogan of confronting IS. However the size of Iranian interference — in my view — confirms that Iran is not present in Iraq for a temporary military cooperation plan.

What enhances these fears is comments from Iraqi leaders that it bought weapons worth $10 billion. Since the amount of money is huge and since Iran does not have weapons worth this amount, it proves correct several politicians’ statements that in the past few years Al-Maliki government funded Iranian activities in the region under different excuses which were either described as financial compensation or as the cost of military purchases.

Truth be told, the amount of money paid by the Iraqis to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard — regardless of how hefty they are — are not the case here.

What’s more important is Iran’s intentions of this presence in Iraq and of managing Iraqi forces and controlling Iraqi political decisions. So is an Iranian seizure of Iraq imminent?

The post Iran’s Growing Interference In Iraq – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Israel Votes In Favor Of Apartheid – OpEd

0
0

Benjamin Netanyahu is truly a magician. Just this past Friday, most polls indicated that his Likud party would likely receive around 21 seats in the Israeli Knesset, four seats less than Yitzhak (Bougie) Herzog’s Zionist Camp (Labor Party’s new name). Revelations of corruption at the Prime Minister’s residence followed by a damning comptroller report about the real estate crisis, alongside industrial downsizing, union strikes, predictions of a weakening economy, a diplomatic stalemate, and increasing international isolation all seemed to indicate that Netanyahu was on his way out. But just when it seemed that the Zionist camp would replace the nationalist camp, the crafty campaigner began pulling rabbits out of his hat.

As if his decision to alienate the Obama Administration over the Iran negotiations was not enough, Netanyahu began pandering to the right by notifying the world that Palestinians were destined to remain stateless since he no longer believed in the creation of another Arab state alongside Israel. He presented the Likud party as the victims of a leftist media conspiracy aimed at ousting the right-wing government, while conveniently ignoring that his ally Sheldon Adelson owned Yisrael Hayom, Israel’s most widely circulated paper. He entreated his voters to return “home” promising to address their economic needs. And on Election Day itself, he frightened the Jews by declaring that Israel’s Palestinian citizens were rushing to the polls in droves, thus presenting Palestinians who cast votes for their own representatives as an existential threat.

Pandering and fear mongering together with hatred for Arabs and the left are the ingredients of Netanyahu’s secret potion, and it now appears that many voters were indeed seduced. Within a matter of a few days Netanyahu garnered almost ten additional seats for his party, cannibalizing two of his extreme right allies: Avigdor Lieberman’s Yisrael Beiteinuand Naftali Bennett’s Habayit Hayehudi. Owing to his magic, the Likud did much better than expected, and together with the ultra-Orthodox parties and a new party recently formed by a former Likud minister, Kulanu (All of US), an extreme right wing bloc with 67 out of 120 seats will almost certainly be created (and this even before the soldier’s votes have been calculated, which are usually right of center).

The outcome is clear: the people of Israel have voted for Apartheid.

It is now extremely likely that a spate of anti-democratic laws that had been shelved will soon resurface. These include laws that monitor and limit the financing of human rights NGOs, restrict freedom of the expression, reduce the authority of the Supreme Court, cancel the official status of Arabic, and, of course, bring to a vote the nation-state law. This bill, which was originally drafted by a Likud member, defines Jewishness as the state’s default in any instance, legal or legislative, in which the state’s Jewishness and its democratic aspirations clash. This means that Laws that provide equal rights to all citizens can be struck down on the pretense that they violate the state’s Jewish character. Moreover, this law reserves communal rights for Jews alone, thus denying Palestinian citizens any kind of national identity.

Alongside anti-democratic legislation, we can also expect an array of discriminatory policies to be enacted. The new government will likely implement some variation of the Prawer plan, which intends to forcefully relocate thousands of Palestinian Bedouins and take over their land. It will continue pouring billions of dollars on Israel’s settlement in the West Bank and Golan Heights and expropriate more houses and land in East Jerusalem. And it will probably imprison thousands of refugees and “illegal” migrant laborers from Africa currently workers in Israeli cities.

There is, however, one clear advantage to the election results: clarity. At least now there will be no liberal Zionist façade, camouflaging Israel’s unwillingness to dismantle its colonial project. The Israeli refrain that a diplomatic solution with the Palestinians cannot be achieved because the Palestinians lack leadership will ring even more hollow. Finally, the claim that Israel is the only democracy in the Middle East will exposed for what it is: a half truth. While Israel is a democracy for Jews it is a repressive regime for Palestinians.

We can also expect little resistance to the right-wing government, since Herzog’s Zionist Camp and Yair Lapid’s Yesh Atid are also Arabphobes and therefore less against the substance of such a government and more against Netanyahu’s blatant right wing style. After all it was a political pac associated with Herzog’s party that in the days leading to the elections paid for large billboards with a picture of (Bibi) Netanyahu and his extreme right contender Naftali Bennett warning the viewers that “With Bibibennet we will remain stuck with the Palestinians for eternity.”  The pac must have overlooked the fact that 20 percent of Israeli citizens are Palestinians.

And yet, during these elections there was one ray of light that shimmered through the darkness. The attempt by most of the Jewish parties to sideline the Palestinian citizens produced an unintended result. Creating a united front, the Palestinians garnered 14 seats, almost 25 percent more than they received in the previous elections, and they are now the third biggest faction in the Knesset. Unlike many of his counterparts, Ayman Odeh, the head of the new Joint Arab List, is a true leader. Extremely incisive, he often uses irony and wit to undermine his detractors while advancing an egalitarian vision for the future. In a moment of candor, a well-known Israeli commentator characterized his demeanor as a serious threat: “He’s really dangerous,” she said, “he projects something every Israeli can relate to.”

Will this threat be able to stop the imminent entrenchment of a tide of new Apartheid laws? I sincerely doubt it.

This article originally appeared in Al-Jazeera, and is reprinted with permission.

The post Israel Votes In Favor Of Apartheid – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Yemen: Death Toll Hits 142 In Attacks On Mosques

0
0

At least 142 people were killed and hundreds more wounded after four suicide bomb attackers targeted mosques during Friday prayers in Yemen’s capital, Al Arabiya reported.

Daesh has claimed responsibility for the attacks, though the group’s involvement in unconfirmed. The White House said there is no evidence linking the militants to the explosions, AP reported.

The bombs detonated in al-Badr and al-Hashahush mosques in Sanaa. Both are known to be primarily attended by Houthi supporters.

The attacks come a day after President Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s palace in Aden was targeted with airstrikes. The country has been divided since Houthi fighters stormed Sanaa in September and later forced Hadi’s administration to resign. The rebel group dissolved the parliament and took control of the government in February.

The international community continues to recognize Hadi as leader of Yemen and has refused to acknowledge Houthis.

A top Houthi leader, Abdel-Karim al-Kheiwan was shot dead in Sanaa on Wednesday. Al-Qaeda has claimed responsibility for the assassination.

 

Original article

The post Yemen: Death Toll Hits 142 In Attacks On Mosques appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Viewing all 73339 articles
Browse latest View live




Latest Images