By Yağmur Erşan

Increasing tensions between Russia and the EU led Russia to prioritize developing its relations with Asian countries. Russia has recently increased its dialogue with Japan, South Korea, India, Indonesia, Pakistan and China, and has signed various agreements in different sectors. Among these Asian countries, extending relations with China is one of the most vital goals because China is the biggest trade partner of Russia, with $88bn in trade volume in 2014 and hopes of an increase to $100bn in 2015.

Moreover, the Russian economy largely depends on the export of energy resources, and China is most likely to be Russia’s biggest consumer for future gas deliveries due to China’s increasing energy consumption. Also, China is the only country in the region that can provide financial support to the Russian economy, which has recently been experiencing recession due to western sanctions.

Although Russia favors selling gas to Europe, there are economic and political limitations that Putin discussed at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum: “We have to admit that energy consumption in Europe is moving slowly due to low economic growth rates, while political and regulatory risks are increasing.” To further explain Russia’s desire to expand relations with China, Putin said “given these circumstances, our desire to open up new markets is natural and understandable.”

Energy agreements will link two giants

As a result of this economic rapprochement, Russia and China signed two mega energy agreements in last year that will help Russia to diversify its export destinations. The first was a $400bn mega deal, the biggest single trade agreement in history, which was signed between the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), China’s largest energy company, and Russian energy giant Gazprom in May, 2014.

According to the agreement, Russia will provide 38 bcm of gas to China for 30 years starting in 2018. The deal includes the construction of a pipeline called “Power of Siberia” that will transfer gas from eastern Siberia to northern China, Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei metropolitan area, and the Yangtze River Delta in the east. This new infrastructure will also make gas available for Russia’s Pacific ports. Thus, Russia could provide gas not only to China but also to Japan, South Korean and other Asian markets.

The economic burden is expected to be $70bn for the pipeline, related transportation and storage infrastructure. CNPC will provide $22bn to ensure that the shipment of gas will begin in 2018. Although negotiations for gas trade between Russia and China started almost a decade ago, they could not be finalized mainly because of the price mismatch. Russia insisted that China buy gas at the European prices while China insisted on the lower prices.

Although there is no certain statement about the price, looking at the cost of the deal and the amount of gas deliveries, analysts estimate that it is between $335-350 per thousand cubic meters. China was patient throughout negotiations regarding the price because its conditions are different than the EU. Although EU’s energy consumption consists of almost 25 percent natural gas, China’s dependence on natural gas is only about 6 percent of its total energy consumption. Coal is the major resource in China’s energy complex, making up 70 percent of China’s consumption, so China does not need to rush the deal. The Ukraine crisis provided great advantages to China and, due to the deterioration of the Russian economy by U.S. and EU sanctions, Russia consented to the prices that China wanted.

According to the second agreement that was signed in November, Russia will provide an additional 30 bcm of gas to China over 30 years from western Siberia by way of the Altai pipeline, negotiations for which began in 2006 but halted in 2013 due to the priority given to the “Power of Siberia.” This second agreement was discussed more than the first one because many experts, such as Mike Bird from Business Insider, interpreted it as a political move by Russia to give a message that Russia is not bound to the west. If this second deal were realized, it would be quite significant for China; Gordon Kwan from the Nomura Holding in Hong Kong claims that the two deals could meet nearly 17 percent of China’s natural gas needs by 2020, which is a crucial amount.

Possible challenges awaiting the Altai pipeline project

After the signing of this deal, Gazprom chairman Alexey Miller said, “The overall volume of gas exported to China might exceed supplies to Europe in the medium term.” “However, the idea that Russia’s exports to China may surpass its exports to Europe is quite unlikely because of the many challenges surrounding the fate of the agreement.”

First of all, this agreement is merely a memorandum of understanding, so it is not legally binding, and the price, which was very problematic for the realization of the “Power of Siberia,” has not yet been negotiated. Moreover, the gas prices in Asia are indexed to the oil prices, which have declined by more than half since June, strengthening China’s hand in the negotiations. The US and Canada are building LNG terminals to export gas to the Asian market, which will decrease the LNG prices in the Asian market.

China’s import of gas from Russia via the pipeline will increase the supply of gas in the region, which will also affect the fall of the LNG prices. As a result, China will likely be more assertive in obtaining a price reduction. Secondly, China finds the western route unfavorable because this pipeline would enter China from the northwest, in the Xinjiang province. Nevertheless, this area is rich in energy reserves, with around 425 bcm in total energy reserves in the region. Thus, it is able to produce around 23 bcm annually.

Further, Central Asia has already been suppliying gas to that region, which is far from the center of the population. Thirdly, local governments are still in favor of using coal, due to its low cost and rich reserves, instead of natural gas. Another big controversy is whether or not Russia can afford the Altai pipeline in these economic conditions when it is expected to spend $55bn for the “Power of Siberia.” Even if Russia can produce the money for this pipeline project, it would provide only 68 bcm of gas in total, which is still less than half of Russia’s exports to Europe – nearly 160 bcm in 2013. Miller’s claim could be possible if the EU decreases its gas import from Russia by developing its shale gas reserves, increasing efficiency and investing more on alternative energy routes.

Another important aspect of this agreement is that CNPC gained 10 percent stake from the Rosneft’s subsidiary Vankorneft operating in the Vankor oil field. This is crucial because Russia usually allows foreign companies to operate only in underdeveloped fields. However, with this sale, Russia sold a stake from an operational field to China. This way, Russia found a short-term solution for its immediate cash need.

Although leaders from both sides emphasize the developing relations, the increasing imbalance between the two powers, as well as overdependence, makes Russia uncomfortable. Although these agreements are seen as advantageous by Russia in the short term, due to China’s insistence on lower prices with the declining of the oil prices, it can harm the Russian economy in the long run. Joseph Nye, in his analysis in the Project Syndycate, points out that “the gas deals amplify a significant bilateral trade imbalance, with Russia supplying raw materials to China and importing Chinese manufactures. And the gas deals do not make up for Russia’s lost access to the western technology that it needs to develop frontier arctic fields and become an energy superpower, not just China’s gas station.”

To conclude, it is obvious that cooperation with China would help Russia to relieve its economy in the short term. However, due to the challenges of realizing the second agreement, concerns of Russia and historical mistrust between the two powers, their cooperation has limits. However, the current conjuncture has brought the two powers together for the time being. If the conditions change, the winds may blow from the opposite side.

The post Limits Of China And Russia Energy Deal – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

The revelation that Germanwings Flight 4U9525 was brought down deliberately by its co-pilot raises important questions concerning existing aviation security measures in aircraft. The time has come for a three-person rule as a way forward to prevent a recurrence of this tragedy.

By Eugene E G Tan*

The Germanwings Flight 4U9525 incident is the latest in air crashes caused by deliberate pilot action. In November 2013, 33 people were killed when an aircraft flying between Mozambique and Angola was brought down by the pilot. In October 1999, 217 people were killed when an Egypt Air plane crashed allegedly under similar circumstances after leaving New York.

Analyses of Flight 4U9525’s black box reveal that the co-pilot, Andreas Lubitz, locked the pilot out of the flight deck, and thereafter, put the aircraft in descent. Attempts by the pilot to regain access to the cockpit failed owing to Lubitz manually overriding the locking mechanism. This incident raises questions about existing in-flight security measures such as flight deck security mechanisms and access procedures, and pilot health. Proposed solutions have included introducing a mandatory two-person rule on all airlines as well as remotely-controlling a flight from the ground. In light of the limitations of these solutions, perhaps the time has come to introduce a three-person rule.

In-flight security measures backfiring?

The difficulty of re-accessing 4U9525’s flight deck can be attributed to enhanced in-flight security measures many airlines adopted since the September 11 attacks. Cockpit doors are heavily secured with bolts and designed to withstand small arms fire thereby making the flight deck virtually impregnable from the passenger cabin.

Furthermore, if the flight deck is indeed attacked, the pilot or co-pilot can manually override the locking mechanism to disallow access. This measure is both intended to prevent a hijack as well as enable the piloting crew to execute emergency procedures such as mayday calls.

When the manual override is in force, the cabin crew cannot access the flight deck through their emergency access codes as the manual override can ensure the door is locked for five to twenty minutes. Unfortunately, enhanced security measures seem to have back-fired in this instance.

With regard to psychological health, a range of possible stress factors may have caused tremendous psychological strain on the co-pilot. Lubitz was placed on leave for depression in 2009 and was judged to be unfit to fly by the Lufthansa flight school in Arizona. Moreover, investigators have found a doctor’s note in Lubitz’s home dated for the day of the flight – a note that would have prevented him from flying that day.

Despite the importance of pilots’ mental health, they are only required to undergo medical tests every six months to a year to determine their physical competence to operate aircraft and not in-depth psychological tests. Many experts have in fact argued against regular psychological testing as they are far from fool proof as mental illness can be hidden from employers. If this argument is valid then regular psychological testing would not guarantee a recurrence of the 4U9525 incident.

Nevertheless, two proposals have emerged in the wake of the tragedy: mandatory two-person rule for all airlines and remotely controlling aircraft.

Two-person rule and remote control

The two-person rule requires two people to remain in the cockpit at all times. If one of the pilots has to leave the flight deck, a “qualified crew member” must take his/her place on the flight deck. While this requirement is mandatory for US carriers, it is not the case for airlines from Europe, Australia and Asia. Following the 4U9525 crash, many airlines have moved to introduce the two-person rule while some are still deliberating.

Assuming a crisis occurs, the “qualified crew member” who replaces the absent pilot/co-pilot in the flight deck must be adequately trained to handle a wide range of issues including the mental health of the pilot/co-pilot, technical knowledge of aircraft operations, personal security, and intermediate flight knowledge (to know when an aircraft is off-course or is in danger of crashing). However, in most cases, the individual does not possess the required skill set to handle the crisis.

Besides the two person rule, there have also been calls for aircraft to be remotely controlled from the ground in the event of a similar situation. However, this measure is likely to be expensive and may cause even more threats to overall aviation security. Currently, the aircraft operates in a closed system and is heavily reliant on pilots and on-board avionics to fly. By allowing an aircraft to be remotely controlled, the risks become higher as the system becomes vulnerable to cyberattacks.

Way forward: Three-person rule?

Perhaps a way forward is to strengthen the two person rule, by including an unknown “third person” on board the flight, and making in-flight information available to the other passengers. This unknown “third person” could be an employee of the airline or a government agent sitting in the cabin, who has the power to override the cockpit security measures, should the flight deck be locked.

Unlike the United States Air Marshal Service, these individuals are not law enforcement officers, and are not required to carry firearms. These individuals should be pilot-trained, and only be activated in times of distress. These “third persons” can also act as an alternative conduit to air control communication should a plane be placed in a distress situation.

As a matter of transparency, flight information should also be provided in real time to passengers, regardless of aircraft type or flight. Several airlines already provide data – flight path, altitude, time to arrival – to passengers. This should be made mandatory, so that the abovementioned “third person” can react and communicate any unexplained changes in flight patterns, while at the same time remaining anonymous. Although doing this has the capacity to cause panic to the passengers, the benefit of having a professional “third person” on board allows swift and decisive action to be taken before panic sets in.

Most rules regarding aircraft security are made to keep people out of the operation of the aircraft; perhaps it is time to look at the technology and the rules concerning in-flight security as the “enemy” could very well lurk within. While we cannot exclude other factors leading to air crashes, deliberate pilot action is preventable and the security risks can be minimised.

Pilot suicide is not new, and there have been incidences where the pilots have initiated a dive on purpose. Thus, the basic question of quis custodiet ipsos custodes – who will guard the guardians – needs to be revisited and current protocols reviewed to incorporate threats from both within and outside the cockpit.

*Eugene E G Tan is an Associate Research Fellow at the Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS), a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University in Singapore.

The post The Germanwings Tragedy: Time For Three-Person Rule? – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

(RFE/RL) — Iran and six world powers say they have reached an agreement on “key parameters” of a comprehensive nuclear agreement that must be finalized by June 30.

EU foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini, reading from a joint statement with Iran at a press conference in Lausanne, Switzerland, said the understanding reached on April 2 is a “decisive step” in the long negotiations to curb Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for relief for Tehran from economic sanctions.

She said Iran’s uranium-enrichment capacity will be reduced and another facility will be converted into a nuclear physics research center, among other things, in a future agreement.

She said another aspect of the understanding was that a certain amount of enriched uranium already produced would be taken out of Iran.

Mogherini added that the United States and the EU would lift economic sanctions against Iran only after the United Nations, through the International Atomic Energy Agency, verifies that Iran is meeting its obligations under a comprehensive agreement.

Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif said Iran and officials from France, Britain, Germany, the United States, Russia, and China are still “some time away from reaching where we want to be.”

He said all UN Security Council resolutions putting sanctions against Iran will be terminated under a comprehensive deal.

A U.S. “fact sheet” issued by U.S. officials said the UN resolutions would be lifted as Iran addresses a list of concerns about its nuclear program.

In remarks from the White House, U.S. President Barack Obama called it a “historic” understanding, saying it was a “good deal, a deal that meets our core objectives.” He called it “our best option by far.”

But Obama said our “work is not done” on reaching an Iranian nuclear deal and pledged to “always do what is necessary” to stop Iran from getting a nuclear weapon.

U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry tweeted that it was a “big day,” saying there was a deal “to resolve major issues on [Iran’s] nuclear program” and that all sides would be “back to work soon on a final deal.”

British Foreign Secretary Philip Hammond said the preliminary points agreed to are the basis for what could be “a very good deal.”

French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius said there is “still work to do” before a final deal is done.

The U.S. “fact sheet” said Iran has agreed not to build any new nuclear facilities for the purpose of enriching uranium for 15 years.

The U.S. document added that if Iran fails at any point to fulfill its commitments under an agreement, the economic sanctions would “snap back into place.” It also said that inspections of Iran’s uranium supply chain would last for 25 years after an agreement is signed.

Iran and the six world powers — who have held talks in the Swiss resort Lausanne for the past eight days — missed a March 31 deadline to establish a framework agreement.

Western nations want to ensure Iran cannot build a nuclear bomb, while Tehran wants a swift end to UN, U.S., and European Union sanctions that have badly hurt its economy. Iran maintains its nuclear program is for purely peaceful purposes.

Kerry, Zarif, and other negotiators spent all night working on the deal, stopping only at 6 a.m.

Negotiators were wrangling over the scope of uranium enrichment that Iran would be allowed to conduct, where stockpiles of enriched uranium should be stored, proposed limits on Iran’s nuclear research and development, and the timing and conditions for the removal of sanctions.

The five permanent UN Security Council nations and Germany are seeking verifiable curbs on Iran’s nuclear program that ensure Tehran is not able to develop nuclear weapons.

Securing a comprehensive deal after more than two decades of tension over Iran’s nuclear program would improve the chances of rapprochement between Iran and the United States, whose relations have been badly strained since the Middle East country’s 1979 Islamic Revolution.

But conservatives in both the United States and Iran are extremely wary of a deal, as are U.S. allies Israel and Saudi Arabia.

An interim deal was reached in November 2013, but negotiators have missed two self-imposed deadlines for a comprehensive agreement since then.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has repeatedly warned that a deal with Iran could pave its path to the bomb rather than block it.

On April 2, Israeli Intelligence Minister Yuval Steinitz said all options were on the table in the face of the threat of a nuclear-armed Iran.

Speaking to public radio, Steinitz said Israel would seek to counter any threat through diplomacy and intelligence but “if we have no choice…the military option is on the table.”

U.S. Defense Secratary Ashton Carter said in an interview earlier this week that if a nuclear deal with Iran is not reached, “the military option certainly will remain on the table.”

Iran’s defense minister, Brigadier General Hossein Dehghan, said on April 2 that Carter’s comments were “designed to affect the rational atmosphere of negotiations” in Lausanne.

Dehghan dismissed Carter’s remarks as an “empty” threat that would not affect Iran’s “reasonable, rational, and fair position” in the talks, the official IRNA news agency reported.

The post Iran: Framework Nuclear Deal Reached appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Below are the key parameters of a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran’s nuclear program that were decided in Lausanne, Switzerland, as released by the White House.

These elements form the foundation upon which the final text of the JCPOA will be written between now and June 30, and reflect the significant progress that has been made in discussions between the P5+1, the European Union, and Iran.

The White House noted that important implementation details are still subject to negotiation, and nothing is agreed until everything is agreed.

“We will work to conclude the JCPOA based on these parameters over the coming months,” the White House said.

Enrichment

• Iran has agreed to reduce by approximately two-thirds its installed centrifuges. Iran will go from having about 19,000 installed today to 6,104 installed under the deal, with only 5,060 of these enriching uranium for 10 years. All 6,104 centrifuges will be IR-1s, Iran’s first-generation centrifuge.
• Iran has agreed to not enrich uranium over 3.67 percent for at least 15 years.
• Iran has agreed to reduce its current stockpile of about 10,000 kg of low-enriched
• uranium (LEU) to 300 kg of 3.67 percent LEU for 15 years.
• All excess centrifuges and enrichment infrastructure will be placed in IAEA monitored storage and will be used only as replacements for operating centrifuges and equipment.
• Iran has agreed to not build any new facilities for the purpose of enriching uranium for 15 years.
• Iran’s breakout timeline – the time that it would take for Iran to acquire enough fissile material for one weapon – is currently assessed to be 2 to 3 months. That timeline will be extended to at least one year, for a duration of at least ten years, under this framework.

Iran will convert its facility at Fordow so that it is no longer used to enrich uranium

• Iran has agreed to not enrich uranium at its Fordow facility for at least 15 years.
• Iran has agreed to convert its Fordow facility so that it is used for peaceful purposes only
• – into a nuclear, physics, technology, research center.
• Iran has agreed to not conduct research and development associated with uranium enrichment at Fordow for 15 years.
• Iran will not have any fissile material at Fordow for 15 years.
• • Almost two-thirds of Fordow’s centrifuges and infrastructure will be removed. The remaining centrifuges will not enrich uranium. All centrifuges and related infrastructure will be placed under IAEA monitoring.

Iran will only enrich uranium at the Natanz facility, with only 5,060 IR-1 first-generation centrifuges for ten years.

• Iran has agreed to only enrich uranium using its first generation (IR-1 models) centrifuges at Natanz for ten years, removing its more advanced centrifuges.
• Iran will remove the 1,000 IR-2M centrifuges currently installed at Natanz and place them in IAEA monitored storage for ten years.
• Iran will not use its IR-2, IR-4, IR-5, IR-6, or IR-8 models to produce enriched uranium for at least ten years. Iran will engage in limited research and development with its advanced centrifuges, according to a schedule and parameters which have been agreed to by the P5+1.
• For ten years, enrichment and enrichment research and development will be limited to ensure a breakout timeline of at least 1 year. Beyond 10 years, Iran will abide by its enrichment and enrichment R&D plan submitted to the IAEA, and pursuant to the JCPOA, under the Additional Protocol resulting in certain limitations on enrichment capacity.

Inspections and Transparency

• The IAEA will have regular access to all of Iran’s nuclear facilities, including to Iran’s enrichment facility at Natanz and its former enrichment facility at Fordow, and including the use of the most up-to-date, modern monitoring technologies.
• Inspectors will have access to the supply chain that supports Iran’s nuclear program. The new transparency and inspections mechanisms will closely monitor materials and/or components to prevent diversion to a secret program.
• Inspectors will have access to uranium mines and continuous surveillance at uranium mills, where Iran produces yellowcake, for 25 years.
• Inspectors will have continuous surveillance of Iran’s centrifuge rotors and bellows production and storage facilities for 20 years. Iran’s centrifuge manufacturing base will be frozen and under continuous surveillance.
• All centrifuges and enrichment infrastructure removed from Fordow and Natanz will be placed under continuous monitoring by the IAEA.
• A dedicated procurement channel for Iran’s nuclear program will be established to monitor and approve, on a case by case basis, the supply, sale, or transfer to Iran of certain nuclear-related and dual use materials and technology – an additional transparency measure.
• Iran has agreed to implement the Additional Protocol of the IAEA, providing the IAEA much greater access and information regarding Iran’s nuclear program, including both declared and undeclared facilities.
• Iran will be required to grant access to the IAEA to investigate suspicious sites or allegations of a covert enrichment facility, conversion facility, centrifuge production facility, or yellowcake production facility anywhere in the country.
• Iran has agreed to implement Modified Code 3.1 requiring early notification of construction of new facilities.
• Iran will implement an agreed set of measures to address the IAEA’s concerns regarding the Possible Military Dimensions (PMD) of its program.

Reactors and Reprocessing

• Iran has agreed to redesign and rebuild a heavy water research reactor in Arak, based on a design that is agreed to by the P5+1, which will not produce weapons grade plutonium, and which will support peaceful nuclear research and radioisotope production.
• The original core of the reactor, which would have enabled the production of significant quantities of weapons-grade plutonium, will be destroyed or removed from the country.
• Iran will ship all of its spent fuel from the reactor out of the country for the reactor’s lifetime.
• Iran has committed indefinitely to not conduct reprocessing or reprocessing research and development on spent nuclear fuel.
• Iran will not accumulate heavy water in excess of the needs of the modified Arak reactor, and will sell any remaining heavy water on the international market for 15 years.
• Iran will not build any additional heavy water reactors for 15 years.

Sanctions

• •Iran will receive sanctions relief, if it verifiably abides by its commitments.
• • U.S. and E.U. nuclear-related sanctions will be suspended after the IAEA has verified that Iran has taken all of its key nuclear-related steps. If at any time Iran fails to fulfill its commitments, these sanctions will snap back into place.
• The architecture of U.S. nuclear-related sanctions on Iran will be retained for much of the duration of the deal and allow for snap-back of sanctions in the event of significant non-performance.
• All past UN Security Council resolutions on the Iran nuclear issue will be lifted simultaneous with the completion, by Iran, of nuclear-related actions addressing all key concerns (enrichment, Fordow, Arak, PMD, and transparency).
• However, core provisions in the UN Security Council resolutions – those that deal with transfers of sensitive technologies and activities – will be re-established by a new UN Security Council resolution that will endorse the JCPOA and urge its full implementation. It will also create the procurement channel mentioned above, which will serve as a key transparency measure. Important restrictions on conventional arms and ballistic missiles, as well as provisions that allow for related cargo inspections and asset freezes, will also be incorporated by this new resolution.
• A dispute resolution process will be specified, which enables any JCPOA participant, to seek to resolve disagreements about the performance of JCPOA commitments.
• If an issue of significant non-performance cannot be resolved through that process, then all previous UN sanctions could be re-imposed.
• U.S. sanctions on Iran for terrorism, human rights abuses, and ballistic missiles will remain in place under the deal.

Phasing

• For ten years, Iran will limit domestic enrichment capacity and research and development – ensuring a breakout timeline of at least one year. Beyond that, Iran will be bound by its longer-term enrichment and enrichment research and development plan it shared with the P5+1.
• For fifteen years, Iran will limit additional elements of its program. For instance, Iran will not build new enrichment facilities or heavy water reactors and will limit its stockpile of enriched uranium and accept enhanced transparency procedures.
• Important inspections and transparency measures will continue well beyond 15 years. Iran’s adherence to the Additional Protocol of the IAEA is permanent, including its significant access and transparency obligations. The robust inspections of Iran’s uranium supply chain will last for 25 years.
• Even after the period of the most stringent limitations on Iran’s nuclear program, Iran will remain a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which prohibits Iran’s development or acquisition of nuclear weapons and requires IAEA safeguards on its nuclear program.

The post Parameters For Joint Comprehensive Plan Of Action Regarding Iran’s Nuclear Program appeared first on Eurasia Review.

(EurActiv) — The European Commission is scrutinising Apple Inc’s dealings with record labels and digital music companies to find if they are trying to unfairly limit free, ad-supported rivals, the Financial Times reported, citing people familiar with the matter.

The Commission has sought details from several music labels and digital streaming companies on their agreements with Apple, as the iPhone maker gears up to launch its own music streaming service this summer, the report said.

The European Commission is concerned that Apple would use it size, influence and relationships to get music labels to abandon rivals like Spotify, which rely on licensing with music companies for their catalogue, the FT said.

Gathering information is only the first step towards the probe, but if the European Commission – the EU’s top antitrust authority – finds any wrongdoing, it may require changes in business practices and impose hefty fines, the paper reported.

Representatives of Apple and the European Commission could not be immediately reached for comment.

Last year, Apple was fined $450 million over allegations of conspiring with five publishers to raise e-book prices.

The Cupertino, California-based company bought Beats Music, a company founded by recording mogul Jimmy Iovine and rapper Dr. Dre, for $3 billion last year, as the market moves away from digital downloads to a new generation of subscription and streaming services.

The post EU Regulators Probe Apple’s Music Streaming Plans appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Paulo Gorjåo*

Côte d’Ivoire’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Charles Diby, visited Portugal between 16 and 18 March to bolster bilateral relations.1 As it often happens during these occasions, the visit had a dual focus: economic and politico-diplomatic.

On the first day, Diby participated in a seminar co-organized by AICEP and its Côte d’Ivoire’s counterpart, CEPICI, with the aim of strengthening economic and trade relations between both countries. Côte d’Ivoire is a significant exporter of agricultural products in the African continent and has promising mining and hydrocarbons sectors, providing a favorable environment for investors. At the same time, the nation’s regained political stability has contributed to the acceleration of domestic and foreign investment, playing a big part in boosting regional trade.2 Côte d’Ivoire recorded an economic growth of 9.8% in 2012, and around 10% to 12% in 2013 and 2014, respectively,3 which is well above the 6% average in sub-Saharan African countries.

Currently there are some Portuguese companies operating in Côte d’Ivoire, namely in the construction industry.4 In normal circumstances, it is the field of public works that may arouse the greatest Portuguese interest—taking into consideration the ongoing public investment in infrastructures in the African country. However, having said this, since economic and trade relations between both countries have not been fully developed, it is worth noting the huge growth potential in the medium and long-term. In the short-term, however, neither economic nor trade relations will be the main drivers behind the two countries’ bilateral relationship. In other words, although Portugal is unquestionably interested in deepening its economic diplomacy with Côte d’Ivoire, currently it is not the main priority.

Portugal is mostly interested in exploring and deepening the politico-diplomatic front. Accordingly, Diby’s expressed intention of deepening cooperation between both countries, accompanied with the public announcement that Côte d’Ivoire is soon to open an embassy in Lisbon, is in the Portuguese government’s point of view, good news. During the meeting held with his counterpart, the Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Rui Machete, promised to reopen the Portuguese diplomatic representation in Abidjan as soon as possible,5 something which, at best, will definitely not happen before 2016.

For Portugal, Southern Africa is the most important region in sub-Saharan Africa. Despite not having the same politico- diplomatic weight, West Africa nevertheless is significantly relevant to the Portuguese foreign policy. For one simple reason: it is located at the centre of important Portuguese interests— direct and indirect—and also concerns the interests of some of Lisbon’s main African and European partners.

In addition, the strategic location of Cape Verde and Guinea- Bissau in West Africa is more than enough to attract Portugal’s attention. For historical, cultural, political and economic reasons, both countries are important for Portugal, as well as for the diplomacy of the other Portuguese-speaking countries, especially Angola.6

Portugal has therefore direct and indirect interests in Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau. Both are important for Portugal and also relevant for third-parties, in and outside West Africa. Conversely, given the fact that the region is important to relevant Portuguese partners, namely the Portuguese- speaking countries and some European ones—France, Spain, the United Kingdom, and others— it should therefore also be the case in relation to Portugal.

Within the framework of a wider strategy, Portugal has every interest in diversifying diplomatic relations with sub-Saharan Africa, namely in West Africa. As I have pointed out—although n a different context—,7 Portugal’s politico-diplomatic and economic relations with other sub-Saharan countries are excessively centered in the Portuguese-speaking African countries (PALOP in the Portuguese acronym). It would be extremely beneficial, both for Portugal and the PALOP—the same applies to the European Union— if Portuguese diplomacy succeeded in deepening bilateral relations with some crucial partners in West Africa, such as Côte d’Ivoire.

What is more, there is no lack of issues of mutual concern: instability in West Africa, the Sahel and the Gulf of Guinea, coupled with phenomena such as the Ebola virus, terrorism and piracy, all of which present a plethora of opportunities for bilateral cooperation. In the aftermath of Diby’s visit, it is now Portugal that bears the responsibility to proceed with the approximation effort. Naturally, that can only happen if there is political will to do so.

About the author:
*Paulo Gorjåo, Portuguese Institute of International Relations and Security (IPRIS)

Source:
This article was published by Portuguese Institute of International Relations and Security (IPRIS) as IPRIS Viewpoints 168, April 2015 (PDF)

Notes:
1. See “Coopération Côte d ́Ivoire-Portugal” (Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros da Costa do Marfim, 19 March 2015); and, “Rui Machete recebe o ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros da Costa do Marfim” (Governo de Portugal, 13 March 2015).
2. “Moody’s assigns first-time B1 issuer ratings to Government of Côte d’Ivoire; positive outlook” (Moody’s, 8 July 2014).
3. “Portugal e Costa do Marfim – Reforço das Relações Económicas e Comerciais” (AICEP: Governo de Portugal, 16 March 2015).
4. “Costa do Marfim vai abrir embaixada em Lisboa” (Lusa, 17 March 2015).
5. “Coopération Côte d ́Ivoire-Portugal” (Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros da Costa do Marfim, 19 March 2015). Worth adding that at the beginning of 2015 Rui Machete announced the opening, still during the same year, of new embassies in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Equatorial Guinea, Panama and Kenya, as well as a new consulate in Canton, China. See “Portugal vai abrir embaixadas e representações diplomáticas em seis países” (Lusa, 6 January 2015).
6. See Gustavo Plácido dos Santos, “A centralidade geopolítica subsaariana no desenvolvimento e consolidação institucional da Guiné-Bissau” (IPRIS Comentário, No. 20, 1 April 2015).
7. Paulo Gorjão, “Portugal and Ghana: The Gateway to West Africa?” (IPRIS Viewpoints, No. 113, January 2013).

The post Portugal And Côte d’Ivoire: Is There Any Interest In Deepening Bilateral Relationship? – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Following is the Joint Statement by EU High Representative Federica Mogherini and Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif, as released by the EU’s External Office.

We, the EU High Representative and the Foreign Minister of the I. R. of Iran, together with the Foreign Ministers of the E3+3 (China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States), met from 26 March to 2nd April 2015 in Switzerland. As agreed in November 2013, we gathered here to find solutions towards reaching a comprehensive resolution that will ensure the exclusively peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear programme and the comprehensive lifting of all sanctions.

Federica Mogherini. Photo source: EU

Today, we have taken a decisive step: we have reached solutions on key parameters of a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The political determination, the good will and the hard work of all parties made it possible. Let us thank all delegations for their tireless dedication.

This is a crucial decision laying the agreed basis for the final text of the JCPOA. We can now restart drafting the text and annexes of the JCPOA, guided by the solutions developed in these days.

Iran’s Mohamad Javad Zarif. File photo.

As Iran pursues a peaceful nuclear programme, Iran’s enrichment capacity, enrichment level and stockpile will be limited for specified durations, and there will be no other enrichment facility than Natanz. Iran’s research and development on centrifuges will be carried out on a scope and schedule that has been mutually agreed.

Fordow will be converted from an enrichment site into a nuclear, physics and technology centre. International collaboration will be encouraged in agreed areas of research. There will not be any fissile material at Fordow. 

An international joint venture will assist Iran in redesigning and rebuilding a modernized Heavy Water Research Reactor in Arak that will not produce weapons grade plutonium. There will be no reprocessing and the spent fuel will be exported.

A set of measures have been agreed to monitor the provisions of the JCPOA including implementation of the modified Code 3.1 and provisional application of the Additional Protocol. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will be permitted the use of modern technologies and will have enhanced access through agreed procedures, including to clarify past and present issues.

Iran will take part in international cooperation in the field of civilian nuclear energy which can include supply of power and research reactors. Another important area of cooperation will be in the field of nuclear safety and security. The EU will terminate the implementation of all nuclear-related economic and financial sanctions and the US will cease the application of all nuclear-related secondary economic and financial sanctions, simultaneously with the IAEA-verified implementation by Iran of its key nuclear commitments.

A new UN Security Council Resolution will endorse the JCPOA, terminate all previous nuclear-related resolutions and incorporate certain restrictive measures for a mutually agreed period of time.

We will now work to write the text of a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action including its technical details in the coming weeks and months at the political and experts levels. We are committed to complete our efforts by June 30th. We would like to thank the Swiss government for its generous support in hosting these negotiations.

The post Joint Statement By EU High Representative Federica Mogherini And Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Siraj Wahab

Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques King Salman’s phone call to Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi on Monday in the wake of Operation Decisive Storm confirms the close relationship between the two nations, say analysts.

Arab News has learned that during the conversation, Modi thanked King Salman for the contact and wished him the best in resolving security challenges in the region “and early restoration of peace and stability under the king’s leadership.”

The prime minister also reaffirmed his commitment to further strengthening India’s ties with Saudi Arabia.

The king highlighted the two countries’ longstanding relations and gave assurances that everything would be done to protect Indians in Yemen, and assistance for their safe evacuation if needed.

“A conversation between friends in times of crisis is always significant,” said M.J. Akbar, national spokesman of the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party. He said Modi’s response had been warm and cordial. “Saudi-Indian ties have been good,” he said. “But under Modi, they will take a positive leap forward.”

He said India’s relationship with Saudi Arabia is based on peace and stability in the region and economic prosperity. “These are two guiding principles on which our prime minister is taking the relationship forward,” said Akbar.

“India has the highest possible stake in Gulf security,” said Talmiz Ahmad, former Indian ambassador to Saudi Arabia, who spent a large part of his diplomatic career in the region, and was awarded the King Abdul Aziz Medal in 2011 for promoting Saudi-India relations.

In Ahmad’s view, the king wanted to explain how the Kingdom views the Yemen imbroglio, including concerns about Iran’s military and political expansion in the region. “This, in the Saudi view, has left the Kingdom with no choice but to resort to military action in Yemen,” he said.

According to Ahmad, the king would have also wished to reassure India about the value the Kingdom attaches to its strategic partnership with India, cemented during the visit of former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in 2010, and explain that Pakistan’s participation in defending Saudi interests vis-a-vis Yemen should not be read as a dilution of Saudi ties with India.

“I am confident that Prime Minister Modi fully understands the importance of our ties with Saudi Arabia and will ensure that these relations are nurtured vigorously,” said Ahmad.

“Saudi Arabia has a special place in the hearts of all Indians,” Islamic scholar Akhtarul Wasey told Arab News from Delhi. “We welcome the talks between our prime minister and King Salman.”

“No Indian would ever like to see any harm come to Saudi Arabia,” said Wasey. “Our relationship with Saudi Arabia has spiritual and religious dimensions and we always pray for the protection of the land of the two holy mosques.”

The post Saudi Arabia’s King Salman, India’s PM Modi Stress Close Ties appeared first on Eurasia Review.

April 1st marks the start of Financial “Literacy” Month. Ironically, a group of researchers and experts say the month — declared by Congress in 2004 to promote smart money management — should be re-named Financial “Illiteracy” Month. Why? Because financial literacy as it is generally taught does not work.

Just look at student loan debt. According to new data from the U.S. Department of Education, young people are late on over 33 billion dollars’ worth of student loans. That overdue debt is just part of the problem. Many of these young people already have other credit issues that can impact their ability to get a good job, or ultimately buy a home or build a savings and retirement account.

Why isn’t financial literacy education working? Because financial literacy education is largely funded by the very same businesses that prosper when young people make poor money decisions — big banks, credit card companies and other huge financial industry businesses. These businesses are concerned with selling their wares, not in teaching customers to buy something that may be better or cheaper from a competitor or to not incur any debt at all. Too often, financial service businesses prosper when young people buy the wrong product, pay a higher interest rate than necessary, fall for the lure of high-interest credit card debt and impulse buying, or otherwise get injured financially by their lack of financial skills.

If you have trouble believing that conflicted businesses actually rule financial literacy, check out the national corporate sponsors of any financial literacy resource and you will find a rogue’s gallery of companies that profit from money mistakes or have paid heavy fines for committing financial misconduct against their own customers.

This means that financial education tools influenced by these businesses focus mainly on the dry mechanics of money — the difference between a stock and a bond or how interest makes your savings grow. The focus is not on teaching consumers how to be savvy in their financial dealings.

“It’s ironic that financial literacy resources influenced by conflicted businesses will tell you what to do if you’re in trouble with debt. Usually their advice includes a money-making proposition for the business. But these conflicted businesses will completely ignore the reasons you got in debt in the first place,” says Malcolm Kirschenbaum, the president of the FoolProof Foundation. FoolProof was formed with the help of former CBS anchor Walter Cronkite to deal with the problem of ineffective financial literacy education.

“None of the finance industry’s tools teach ‘defensive spending,’” Kirschenbaum adds. “None teach skepticism in financial transactions. None impart the critical need for caution in dealing with any situation that impacts a young person’s financial or personal well-being.”

“Is a credit card company going to support a financial literacy program that teaches kids to pay their credit card bill in full each month?” asks Will deHoo, head of FoolProof’s Walter Cronkite Project. “Is a bank going to sponsor a program that says, ‘Be sure and read about the billions in fines our sponsor has paid for hurting its own customers!’? Of course not.”

Ineffective programs lead to unprepared young people. Even the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland came to that conclusion in a major study in 2008: “The literature does not succeed in establishing the extent of the benefit provided by financial education programs, nor does it provide conclusive support that any benefit at all exists,” the study concludes. And the respected Jumpstart Coalition’s annual survey of high school students has consistently shown that financial education does not increase financial knowledge among high school students.

A solution to this ongoing crisis is emerging courtesy of the FoolProof Foundation’sWalter Cronkite Project. The project is offering a financial literacy curriculum that works. It is free, no strings attached — right now, to all teachers and educators. The curriculum is extensive — it offers up to 22 hours of financial literacy training, all turn-key for the teacher/mentor.

The Cronkite curriculum has now been tested by 5000 teachers nationally, and millions of people have looked at the FoolProof curriculum online. Because of its tough, ethical advocacy for young people, the curriculum has become the only financial literacy program in the United States that is endorsed by both the Consumer Federation of America and the National Association of Consumer Advocates. Teachers and other educators can review and test the curriculum immediately, for free atfoolproofteacher.com.

The Cronkite Project has also launched a web-driven version of its curriculum for college-age young people and others with limited financial skills called FoolProof Solo.

Conservatives like to tout personal responsibility as a hallmark of their political philosophy. FoolProof touts the same message: you are ultimately responsible for your financial mistakes and future. FoolProof Foundation programs deliver this tough message: you can learn to protect your rights as a consumer or you can be fleeced. A short video, appropriately titled “Sucker Punch“, explains the financial risks posed by irresponsibly entering the credit card economy.

Teaching young people how to be smart with their money is certainly a left/right convergence issue worth pursuing. The Walter Cronkite Project’s goal is to expand its reach nationally. If you are concerned about the financial future of young people, help the Cronkite project spread the word about the FoolProof curriculums. Tell teachers or any educators you know. Share the FoolProof links with media contacts. Visit the Cronkite Project website yourself. Access to all FoolProof resources is totally free, agenda-free, and online.

Let us use this financial “illiteracy” month to turn the tide on faulty financial literacy practices for young people today and for future generations to come.

The post Ralph Nader: Financial Literacy Month? – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Manoj Joshi*

The decision of key American allies like the UK, Germany, France, South Korea and Australia to join the Chinese-led Asian Infrastructure Development Bank (AIIB) marks another step forward in the shaping of a Chinese-led Asian economic and, possibly, security order.

It also underscores the missteps of the US in dealing with the consequences of the rise of China.

The Obama Administration actively discouraged its allies from participating in the AIIB, in which countries like India are founder members.

The US appears to be defensive in trying to preserve the American-led Bretton Woods system that dominated the world order since its creation in the wake of WW-II.

The AIIB, capitalised at $50billion, is no threat to either the Japan-led Asian Development Bank, or the US-led World Bank, which have higher assets.

Crisis

The G-20 was recast by the 2008 financial crisis with a view of promoting coordination between the G-8 and the emerging economies, but while declarations have been many, there has been little action.

The gridlocked US political system contributes to the US’ sticky footing.

Flush with cash, China is seeking to internationalise its financial clout. In the past year it has helped create the BRICS bank (aka New Development Bank) and laid down $40billion for the One Belt One Road Silk Route initiative.

This process should be welcomed, rather than be opposed.

Right from the outset, the US assumed AIIB would not have transparent lending practices and it would be an instrument of Chinese foreign policy.

Both charges may have some truth in them, but opposing it was not the best strategy. By joining the bank as founder-members, the various countries will have a say in its running and the ability to shape its behaviour.

The problem with the US is that even though its economy is closely intertwined to the Chinese, it seems to be committed to a strategy of countering China through initiatives like the Trans Pacific Partnership which excludes China.

The US has continuing frictions with China over cyber issues, as well as its territorial claims in the South China Sea.

No matter how you look at it, American policy seems to suggest that its goal is to contain China.

But there is another way of looking at the Asian giant. This is as a country which is desperately seeking to ensure that it does not become old before it becomes rich and whose foreign policy imperative is to ensure stability and prosperity of the country as a guarantor of the continuing rule of its Communist Party.

Investment

It is to this end that the goal of the Party leadership is to shift its economy from an investment and labour intensive model, to one that emphasises innovation and entrepreneurship.

Those who are looking at the “Make in India” plans of the Modi Government will be surprised to note that the workshop of the world-China, too, is raising the slogan for “Made in China 2025″.

China’s prowess in manufacturing is well established. But equally, it is well known that China is often the integrator of goods made by others.

The best example, perhaps, is the IPhone. Its chips and touch sensors are made in Taiwan, display panels in South Korea and Japan, Sony supplies front and rear cameras, TDK Japan provides inductor coils, Toshiba and Hynix of south Korea the storage, and the whole thing is assembled in China.

The whole phone costs around $200-250 to make, of which the Chinese reputedly make just $6.

Well, the Chinese are now focusing on moving up the manufacturing food chain.

In the meantime, China is undertaking reform of its state owned enterprises. Discussions are afoot to merge the two high-speed rail manufacturers, the China North Railway and the China South Railway. Earlier this month, during the annual meeting of China’s parliament, the National People’s Congress, Premier Li Keqiang unveiled the “Made in China 2025″ policy along with an “Internet Plus” plan which will centre around innovation, smart technology, mobile internet, cloud computing, big data and the internet of things.

A reshuffle of top leaders at the country’s two state-owned shipbuilders indicates the government is looking for a merger here as well.

Production

As ‘The Economist’ pointed out, the era of cheap Chinese labour has passed. In its time it was this cheap labour that gave a fillip to the notion of China being the factory of the world.

But as we have seen, China was really the low-cost integrator, dependent on complex supply chains. But now, average Chinese wages are surpassing those of the ASEAN.

Chinese manufacturing is also getting better at producing home-designed goods, an example being the Xiaomi smartphone.

A lot of low-wage Chinese production is shifting to countries like Vietnam and Indonesia. In an important speech to the Boao Forum on Saturday, China’s president Xi Jinping struck an “Asia for Asians” line emphasising his government’s goal to use China’s economic might to shape a new Asian economic and security order.

In the past few months we witnessed a shift in Chinese policy towards creating financial instruments to promote Asian integration.

At the same time, the Chinese are also trying to reshape the security arrangements in the region.

Last May, Xi had called for the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA) to come up with a new security architecture for Asia.

Compared to China, the moves of the US appear flatfooted and confused.

*The writer is Contributing Editor, Mail Today, and a Distinguished Fellow at Observer Research Foundation, Delhi

Courtesy: Mail Today

The post China’s Rise Is Cause Of Concern For ‘Flat-Footed’ US – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Dr. Odeen Ishmael*

On March 3, the Guyana government announced its intention to opt out of the United Nations Good Offices process—a mechanism anticipated to assist in resolving the renewed claim that Venezuela had made on a portion of the Essequibo region of Guyana. In explaining the country’s decision and its desire to request a judicial settlement, Foreign Affairs Minister Carolyn Rodrigues-Birkett, pointed out that the Good Offices process has yielded little results over the last past twenty-five years. She added that Guyana was examining other available options, while at the same time suggesting that Venezuela remained comfortable with the current process “because it suits their purpose – no movement.”

These “other options” will eventually have to be decided by the UN Secretary General. According to Article 33 of the UN Charter, they include, in addition to “Good Offices,” the resort to mediation, facilitation, dialogue processes, arbitration and judicial settlement. However, all, except a judicial settlement process, have already been tried.

The UN Good Offices Process

Since 1990, when Dr. Alister McIntyre was appointed as the UN special representative, the two countries have been obliged to keep within the ambit of the Good Offices process, which ended when the last special representative, Dr. Norman Girvan, died in April 2014.

This decision by Guyana to inform the UN that it has opted to no longer participate in the Good Offices process will, no doubt, push the Secretary General to determinedly act. It was clear since early 2014 that the Secretary General himself was becoming concerned with the process, which appeared to go nowhere, since he had not bothered to name a new representative.

This most recent development in this territorial controversy arose just after the Venezuelan foreign minister, at the beginning of March, objected to the exploratory drilling for oil by the American company, Exxon Mobil, in a concession granted by Guyana. Venezuela claimed that the area is located in its “territory” despite the fact that the drilling area is deep within Guyana’s maritime economic zone. In response, Guyana’s foreign affairs ministry stated that it requested the Venezuelan government to desist from taking any actions that could only result in hindering the development of Guyana and relations between the two countries.

In a rebuttal, Venezuela in a communiqué in mid-March, labeled as “unjust and false,” the claims that it was deliberately obstructing Guyana’s development and pointed to the instances of collaboration and support between the two states as evidence to the contrary.

At the same time, the communiqué insisted that Venezuela remained committed to the Good Offices process “as an optimal and convenient methodology to assume bilateral and amicable, without the irritating interference of foreign factors, negotiations in order to achieve a practical and satisfactory solution for both sides.”

Some observers feel that the Venezuelan objection arose because of the involvement of Exxon Mobil in the drilling at the time when the United States has imposed a series of political sanctions on Venezuela. Significantly, Venezuela was being ordered by an international arbitration panel in October 2014 to pay Exxon Mobil $1.6 billion USD for the company’s oil assets nationalized in 2007.

The Guyana government’s decision has received support across the national political spectrum, and wider afield from Caricom and Commonwealth governments. The former opposition spokesman on international affairs, Aubrey Norton, noted that little progress was recorded in the UN Good Offices process and proposed that the government and opposition should set up a joint committee to come up with a way forward. He insisted that territorial issues should transcend partisan political interest.

Meanwhile, the former foreign minister, Shridath Ramphal, who was the country’s top negotiator of the Protocol of Port of Spain in 1970, said that Venezuela has “abused” the Good Offices process while it lasted. He explained that all other modes of settlement such as arbitration were already explored and the only available option that remained would be a judicial settlement.

The Genesis of the Controversy

The boundary between Venezuela and Guyana (formerly British Guiana) was settled in 1899 by an international arbitration tribunal which, in its award regarded as a “full, perfect and final settlement,” described in detail the boundary between the two countries. Venezuela willingly accepted this decision and fully honored it.

However, in 1944, forty-five years after the arbitral award, Severo Mallet-Prevost, one of the four lawyers who had appeared for Venezuela before the arbitration tribunal, wrote a memorandum in which, for the first time, he attacked the award on the alleged grounds that it was the result of a political deal between Great Britain and Russia. This formed the basis of a claim the administration of President Romulo Betancourt, for reasons unrelated to legality, raised that matter before at the UN in 1962 when it unilaterally declared that the 1899 arbitral award was “null and void” and resuscitated the claim to almost all the area west of the Essequibo River—which in effect comprised about 50,000 square miles representing nearly two-thirds of the territory of British Guiana.

According to declassified US State Department documents, the Venezuelan government of that period was worried about an independent British Guiana with the socialist Cheddi Jagan as prime minister, a concern he shared with Washington. President Betancourt felt that if the claimed area came under Venezuelan sovereignty, it would undermine “the danger of infiltration of Venezuela by British Guiana if a Castro-type government ever were established.”

Both the government of the Great Britain (the colonial sovereign) and the ruling authorities in British Guiana rejected the Venezuelan claim. Nevertheless, records were again examined, and although Venezuela could not locate any document to prove its assertion, the governments of Venezuela, Great Britain, and British Guiana, in February 1966, signed an agreement at Geneva, Switzerland, by which a Mixed Commission (of Venezuelan and Guyanese representatives) was appointed to seek satisfactory solutions for the practical settlement of the controversy arising from the Venezuelan contention that the arbitral award was “null and void.”

But while this body was in existence, Venezuela, on a number of occasions, carried out military incursions over the border and shortly after British Guiana became the independent nation of Guyana in May 1966, it occupied the Guyanese half of the tiny border Ankoko Island in the Cuyuni River. Venezuela was also accused by the government of Guyana of interfering in Guyanese internal affairs.

This state of affairs dragged on until June 1970 when, by the Protocol of Port of Spain, both Venezuela and Guyana agreed to shelve the search for a solution to the controversy (as directed by the Geneva Agreement) for a period of at least twelve years. This protocol came to an end in 1982 when Venezuela refused to renew it. Subsequent discussions by the two governments under the terms of the Geneva Agreement, which was now again fully operational, eventually led to both governments agreeing to request the UN Secretary General to find a method, based on Article 33 of the UN Charter, for reaching a settlement. Subsequently, the UN secretary general in 1990 appointed a “good officer” to meet with representatives of Guyana and Venezuela to examine various proposals. Meetings involving the UN and both governments continued at regular intervals but reached no decision as to the method to be applied to reach a solution.

By the end of 2003, there was a marked cooling down of the belligerent voices on the border issue. President Hugo Chavez, who at first was adamant in asserting Venezuela’s claim to Guyanese territory, during a visit to Guyana in February 2004, announced that “the Venezuelan government will not be an obstacle to any project to be implemented in the Essequibo territory aimed at benefitting the population of that area. This includes projects such as access to water for human consumption, new roads, energy programs and agricultural activities.” He added, “The issues over the Essequibo territory will be dismissed from the context of social, political and economic relations between both countries.”

On March 2005, Chavez also took the position that the border issue was the result of an “imperialist” legacy, and at the same time expanded economic and political cooperation with Guyana. On his nationally televised program, Aló Presidente, he stated for the first time that the United States intended to use Venezuela in 1962 to overthrow Cheddi Jagan, allegedly “out of fear that Guyana could become a communist government along the lines of Cuba.”

This statement induced attacked from his political opponents who accused him of agreeing with the Guyana government’s position that the border issue was stirred up through connivance between the American and Venezuelan governments in 1962 with the aim of destabilizing the socialist government of Cheddi Jagan in Guyana.

Chavez maintained close friendly relations with Guyana and the border issue was kept out of the spotlight. After his death, President Nicolas Maduro continued his predecessor’s policy toward Guyana.

Proposals Considered in 1970

Going back to 1970, long before the involvement of the UN, proposals were tabled by both Venezuela and Guyana during bilateral official discussions to work out the terms of the report of the Mixed Commission (set up by the Geneva Agreement of 1966), but mutual agreement was never reached.

Guyana, from a logical point of view, insisted that Venezuela should prove its case of the nullity of the arbitral award of 1899 since that was the prime reason for the existing controversy. Surprisingly, the Venezuelan delegation felt that the question of nullity of the arbitral award was not a matter with which the Mixed Commission should concern itself, and that the only issue before the commission was how much land Guyana was prepared to make over to Venezuela. In other words, Venezuela was making the assumption that nullity of the award was a foregone conclusion.

Guyana, not unnaturally, declined to proceed in that way. The Venezuelan team then sought to circumvent argument about the contention of nullity by putting forward proposals for the “joint development” of the western Essequibo area claimed under an arrangement which would have effectively transferred to Venezuela substantial elements of sovereignty over the area. These “joint development” proposals were consequently unacceptable to Guyana.

By this time, negotiations had commenced on a moratorium arrangement (later to become known as the Protocol of Port of Spain) during which programs of economic cooperation would be discussed and implemented where possible.

At the official level meetings, three other proposals were made for reaching a resolution on the boundary controversy. These were:

(a) Neutral Observer Presence – Proposal by Guyana

Guyana’s unabated fears of possible Venezuelan military intervention during that period moved the Guyana government to insist that Venezuela’s acceptance of a neutral observer presence was an essential condition to its acceptance of any proposals for economic cooperation. Guyanese officials were at pains to explain that the government’s proposal for a neutral observer presence did not necessarily mean the existence of a permanent physical presence on the border but rather that there should be agreement regarding the need for such a team to visit the border area at agreed intervals and to be on call should any incidents occur in that area.

The added advantage of having such a team would be that any hostility on the frontier would be immediately investigated. This would serve to localize the area of conflict and prevent its escalation to the point of frustrating the moratorium and the programs of economic cooperation.

Despite these assurances, Venezuela rejected this proposal.

(b) Arbitration – Proposal by Venezuela

In an attempt to break the ensued deadlock, the government of Venezuela proposed that the issue of Venezuela’s claim to western Essequibo should be settled by arbitration under the principle of ex aequo et bono [according to what is right and good]. Under this proposal, the arbitrators would be given full scope to determine their own terms of reference as practiced under customary international law relating to arbitral proceedings. It was further contended that should the government of Guyana agree to this proposal, Venezuela would regard the existence of the controversy with Guyana as having been settled and in this regard would formally undertake, at the June 1970 meeting of OAS foreign ministers, to support the entry of Guyana into the hemispheric organization.

However, Guyana saw little merit in any recourse to a second arbitral tribunal since Venezuela was discrediting the work of the previous arbitral tribunal of 1899. Guyana further indicated that the very objections which the Venezuela was raising with respect to the 1899 arbitral tribunal might conceivably be equally raised with respect to any subsequent arbitral tribunal involving the two absolving countries.

(c) Recourse to the ICJ for a Judicial Settlement – Counterproposal by Guyana

Guyana then counter-proposed that recourse to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) would be a more practical and a definitive means of resolving the issue. A formal proposal for a reference to the ICJ was therefore made by the government of Guyana at a meeting of officials in Georgetown on May 10, 1970, on the basis that the court should decide whether the existing boundary between Guyana and Venezuela as demarcated by the arbitral award of 1899 was made binding on both parties. However, the government of Venezuela rejected this counter-proposal.

UN Secretary General to Decide

With the recent announcement that Guyana will opt out from the Good Offices process and support a judicial settlement, Venezuelan experts, on the other hand, are insisting that their government should not abandon the current mechanism. According to the Venezuelan newspaper, El Universal, retired Colonel Pompeyo Torrealba, the head of the Essequibo advisory unit of the Venezuelan foreign ministry, stated on March 4: “Venezuela should continue the procedure of the Good Offices because it enables us to hold a direct negotiation, without middlemen. We already know about the results where we have negotiated with intermediaries: we have lost valuable territory.”

El Universal stated that experts it had consulted had agreed that Venezuela’s approval would be always necessary for the case to be settled at the International Court of Justice in The Hague, or in any other court of competent jurisdiction, as determined by the Secretary General. They, therefore, felt that Guyana’s decision to move away from the Good Offices process “is irrelevant.”

However, contrary to this “expert” view, the Secretary General, under the terms of the Geneva Agreement of 1966, has the sole authority of deciding on a method of solution to the long-standing controversy, in the same manner as he had decided on the Good Offices mechanism back in 1990. Both parties had empowered him to take such action under the terms of the Geneva Agreement of 1966 but, no doubt, he will have to consult with both governments before he makes his decision.

*Dr. Odeen Ishmael, Ambassador Emeritus and historian, who served as Guyana’s ambassador to Venezuela from 2003 to 2011, and is currently a Senior Research Fellow at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs in Washington D.C. He is a premier researcher on Guyana-Venezuela relations and has already published two volumes of his three-part history of the border issue under the title, The Trail of Diplomacy.

The post Guyana Wants Judicial Settlement Of Border Issue With Venezuela – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany crawl in reaching agreement on Iran’s nuclear program.

By Dilip Hiro*

Extended negotiations on Tehran’s nuclear program between Iran and six major powers revealed differences among the key five permanent members of the UN Security Council. At the two extremes, Russia tilted toward Iran whereas France insisted on a robust deal with detailed checks. China urged all sides to meet one another halfway. And the United States, after threatening to walk away on Tuesday if current negotiations failed to yield a political framework accord, was once again at the center of the talks.

The negotiators reached a tentative agreement on the rough outline of a public statement on the progress made so far, which will also highlight areas of disagreement. Last-minute haggling was about the crucial details in the political framework that could form the basis of a future nuclear agreement to be signed by 30 June. All the same, some parts of the agreement reached by the parties will probably remain confidential.

The bottom line for the United States and five other powers – Britain, China, France, Germany and Russia – has been to keep Iran at least one year away from being able to produce enough nuclear fuel for a single weapon. A year is universally considered to provide enough warning time to head off an Iranian race for an atom bomb by re-imposing tight economic pressure or, if need be, to stage a few bombing raids by the Pentagon.

The hard-knuckle bargaining that has marked high-level negotiations over the past several days at the Swiss resort of Lausanne centered chiefly around three contentious points: the length of restrictions on Tehran’s nuclear program within the general agreement; the pace or modality of lifting UN sanctions on Iran; and the penalty for Iran in case of its non-compliance with the agreed protocol.

Iran wanted the life of the agreement to be 10 years with restrictions on its nuclear program to apply over that period. The five permanent members of the UN Security Council (P5) and Germany favored 15 years. They wish to extend the limitations on Tehran for a further five years on the assumption that, with advanced centrifuges available to Iran, its breakout time to produce an atom bomb – should it decide to do so – would be reduced. Iran’s leaders reject prolonged curbs on their centrifuge development, arguing that would make their country dependent on foreign technology.

A compromise could be to impose strict restrictions on the research and development of centrifuges for 10 years and then lift them.

On the modality of lifting UN sanctions on Iran, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei outlined his position; on 30 March morning his website noted, “sanctions must be lifted in one go, not as a result of future Iranian actions.” He seemed to take on board the open letter that 47 US Republican Senators addressed to the Leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran on 9 March, warning that “The next president [after Barack Obama] could revoke such an executive agreement with the stroke of a pen, and future Congresses could modify the terms of the agreement at any time.” Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, head of Iran’s negotiating team, described the letter as a propaganda ploy, adding that revocation by a future US administration would violate international law.

Obama found it “somewhat ironic” to see some members of US Congress form “an unusual coalition” to make common cause with the hardliners in Iran. Actually, hardliners in the Islamic Republic have been quiet recently, noting Khamenei’s repeated backing for the Iranian negotiators.

The six UN Security Council resolutions on sanctions passed during 2006 to 2010 under Chapter 7 of the UN charter were based on the premise that Iran’s nuclear program was illegitimate and a threat to international peace and stability. Once a document on Iran’s nuclear activities is signed between Iran and the five permanent members of the Security Council, the very basis of these resolutions would collapse.

Russia, which has been closer to Iran than the rest of the negotiators, seems to agree. During his break from the talks on Monday, Russia’s foreign minister Sergey Lavrov said that all UN Security Council sanctions should cease after a final deal in June. This was a departure from the earlier common position of the P5+1 that the sanctions should be lifted in stages in response to Iranian steps to dismantle part of its nuclear infrastructure. “There are different options,” Lavrov said. “A full cancellation, or an initial suspension followed by abolition in the legal sense… but in practice this must mean that sanctions must cease to work.”

The argument in favor of suspension of sanctions – this would make it possible to automatically reactivate sanctions if Tehran is non-compliant. But that seems unacceptable not only to Russia but also to China and France since it would deprive them of the right of veto.

The issue of non-compliance by Tehran, though in theory assigned to the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency, will need to be fleshed out thoroughly. This could only be achieved during detailed discussions during the runup to 30 June, the final date for a written agreement with technical annexes.

Much can happen before 30 June. The Republicans in US Congress are set to play the spoiler role. On 14 April, a US Senate bill is due to be voted on in committee and go to the floor. If passed, it would deprive President Obama of the right to approve or reject a nuclear deal with Tehran. It would also give a green signal to the imposition of further US sanctions.

Obama is therefore keen to see the framework deal as a formal written document, one that preferably quantifies Iran’s commitments, for presenting it to US Congress and the general public. Specifically, quantification applied to the reduction of 40 percent in the number of functioning centrifuges by Iran from the present 9,500.

Obama has said that if the Senate passes the bill, he would veto it. The only way that his adversaries could override it would be to line up 67 senators. That would mean gaining 13 defectors from the Democratic side, which is highly unlikely.

US public opinion favors Obama’s stand. The latest Washington Post-ABC News poll shows that 59 percent of the respondents back an agreement with Iran that would restrict its nuclear program in exchange for the lifting of sanctions.

In the long-running negotiations the technical aspect is intertwined with political diplomacy. To smooth the technical path, Obama appointed Energy Secretary Ernest Moniz in February as second to Secretary of State John Kerry who has been leading the American team. Iran’s President Hassan Rouhani dispatched Ali Akbar Salehi, current head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization and confidante of Khamenei, to Geneva the next day to act as number two to Zarif.

As it happens, in the early 1970s Salehi was a student of nuclear engineering at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology where Moniz was a faculty teacher. As a result of the Salehi-Moniz talks in Geneva lasting 20 hours, the issue of research and development of centrifuges by Iran was settled before the final round of political negotiations by seven foreign ministers in Lausanne in late March. Iran may have agreed to suspend R&D in this field for 10 years.

In the coming weeks it falls to Moniz to convince skeptical US lawmakers, Israel and Washington’s Arab allies that Iran would be incapable of assembling the raw materials for an atom bomb in less than a year.

*Dilip Hiro’s latest book is The Longest August: The Unflinching Rivalry Between India and Pakistan (Nation Books, New York and London). His earlier book is A Comprehensive Dictionary of the Middle East (Interlink Publishing Group, Northampton, Massachusetts, and London).

The post Iran Deal Reached, Struggle For Acceptance Begins – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Scott N. Romaniuk

During the Cold War, the primary threat to the United States (US) was the Soviet Union and its military capabilities in terms of conventional and unconventional weapons (including weapons of mass-effect or weapons of mass destruction [WMDs]).

Today, it is smaller states which are pursuing nuclear weapons programs. It is also feared that militant and terrorist groups might develop the capability in the future to detonate a nuclear device in the heart of the United States, and large and aspiring powers like China have begun augmenting it nuclear arsenal. As these (re-)emerging threats have been recognized by US allies in Europe, other states like the United Kingdom (UK) and France have realized the need to maintain and possibly even strengthen their nuclear forces. The US’ operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons (ODSNWs) have been reduced significantly in the past 15 years, in accordance with the Moscow Treaty (2002), with further reductions planned and more reductions initiated since the end of the Cold War with regards to its non-strategic nuclear weapons. Continued reductions comes at a time when Russia has begun to revamp its non-strategic nuclear weapons program in an attempt to adapt to foreseeable threats and prepare for future uncertainty in both conventional and unconventional terms. If the United States is to keep pace with its allies and its potential enemies, it needs to realign its strategic commitments with the aim of preparing itself for confronting the same threats as have the UK, France, Russia and China, as well as those states such as Iran and North Korea that will eventually possess nuclear weapons capabilities.

Rather than outright dismissing its need for nuclear weapons, Washington must reorient its understanding and efforts in a manner that enables it to meet the demands placed on it in the 21st century. It also must see to its obligation of maintaining national and international security in the context of Cold War era-threats that have not entirely dissipated. In short, nuclear weapons stockpiles should not be reduced to the point that the U.S. finds herself falling behind other states. An understanding must also be made of the changing nature of the international system and the complexity of the international security environment. During the Cold War, the course of weapons delivery could be measured from the Soviet Union to US soil in mere minutes. While this has not changed, the extent to which the US might face the delivery of nuclear weapons from places other than Russia today has increased. A newer and more offensive-defensive oriented nuclear weapons program that boasts diversified delivery modes and weapons types will greater enhance the flexibility of the U.S. and its weapons portfolio in an increasingly uncertain age defined by a rich body of threats. The US’ responses should not only measure up to those threats – its capabilities should exceed them.

Strategy and Policy

In April 2009, President Barack Obama delivered a speech in which he outlined his vision for a world free of nuclear weapons. He called for the formation of a global summit regarding nuclear security and ways in which the U.S., with the help of its allies and friends, could prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and prevent them from falling in the hands of the wrong people. A goal that might not be realized in his lifetime was set in motion in 2010 with the Obama Administration concluding the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). The NPR presents ways to reduce the dangers of nuclear weapons while “advancing the broader security interest of the United States and its allies.” The policy was set in motion with other states but does not apply in the context of terrorists and terrorism. The broader aim of the US nuclear policy to ensure the strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regimes by beginning with the reduction of nuclear arsenals in the U.S. and in Russia, and expanding this to other nuclear weapons states.

The aim of this US nuclear weapons policy works in concert with its national security strategy (NSS) and the role that nuclear weapons play in the strategic vision outlined in the document. The US has stated that it is not pursuing the development of new nuclear weapons nor is it looking to engage in new nuclear missions. Deputy Secretary Frank A. Rose remarked during a speech delivered at The Pryzbyla Center, Catholic University of America in Washington, DC that, “we have committed not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their nonproliferation obligations; and we have clearly stated that it is in the US interest and that of all other nations that the nearly 68-year record of non-use of nuclear weapons be extended forever.”

In 2012, President Obama remarked in Seoul that, “[w]e can already say with confidence that we have more nuclear weapons than we need. I firmly believe that we can ensure the security of the United States and our allies, maintain a strong deterrent against any threat, and still pursue further reductions in our nuclear arsenal.” The administration has repeatedly emphasized that the way forward in its nuclear weapons strategy is to bilaterally reduce its nuclear arms. The new START treaty, soon to enter its fifth year, seeks to reduce the ODSNW of both the US and Russia to levels not seen since the Eisenhower Administration. The US and Russia are working together to apply reductions to all categories of nuclear weapons: strategic, non-strategic, deployed, and non-deployed.

Analysis

The US Department of Defense (DoD) recently redacted one of its classified papers and made it public. The document outlines the some of the major changes that have taken place in the international security environment in the past few decades and the sort of impact that it has and might have on US national security interests. The majority of the document “sizes” the current political and military force of the US and presents recommendations for the management of risk by the US and how it should manage its nuclear “posture” in the coming years.

The US has simultaneously addressed the need to reduce its strategic nuclear arsenal and meet its obligations under Article VI of the Nonproliferation Treaty. It is estimated that the US requires approximately 1,700 to 2,200 ODSNWs to meet its current security needs and ensure the security of its allies and friends. The sizing methodology differs from that which was used during the Cold War. In the words of the document: “The size of the US nuclear force is now based on the ability of the operationally deployed force, the force structure, and the supporting nuclear infrastructure to meet a spectrum of political and military goals.”

Precisely what that spectrum is comprised of is not clarified. While the U.S. was engaged in a wide range of political and military goals during the Cold War, those goals have changed radically with the international security landscape and the political order associated with it. The goals alluded to in the document have no doubt changed a number of times. Thus, the DoD needs to make clear what it expects the future of its political and military goals to look like and take into consideration how the composition of its strategic and non-strategic nuclear arsenals will look in accordance with them. It is difficult to surmise exactly how these goals might fluctuate in the near and distant future. Indeed, this is no small challenge to assess; however, if Washington is to make certain that its nuclear forces can relate to its objectives as established through its national policies and strategies, it needs to first establish the degree to which its forces can change with its political and military goals. As the New START treaty attests, the expected outcomes of the treaty cannot be realized overnight. Roughly how such a treaty and those that may follow are to keep pace with a radically changing security environment requires further attention and in-depth consideration by those formulating them.

Notwithstanding US plans to reduce the number of US nuclear warheads further and commit to its obligations in Article VI of the NPT, as well as maintain its bilateral commitment with Russia, the extent to which the U.S. is actually limited in its ability to reduce these numbers requires further in-depth analysis. Nuclear weapons have played a key role in the preservation of peace since the beginning of the Cold War, largely through deterrence and the framework of mutual assured destruction (MAD), and continue to play just as critical a role. The changing security order since the Cold War has not invalidated the role of nuclear strategic or non-strategic nuclear weapons.

With both continuity and discontinuity in the international security environment since the 1990s, a number of key issues related to the nuclear “posture” of the US can be noted. During the Cold War, the US maintained a nuclear arsenal that was deemed sufficient in deterring an attack by the Soviet Union, which was then the primary adversary of the United States. Maintaining nuclear arsenals rests in the idea that, “nuclear and conventional capabilities [were] sufficient to convince any potential aggressor that the costs of aggression would exceed any potential gains that he might achieve.” What needs to be called into question now is the ability of other states to fill the same or a similar role to the one occupied by the Soviet Union for decades. It should be no surprise that a number of states in the contemporary world meet a short list of criteria necessary to move into the position of the former-Soviet Union.

Russia is not the only state that assumes this position. The primary security objective of the US for decades was to contain the expansion of Soviet Communism while concurrently preventing nuclear aggression and outright war. While the former is no longer a threat, the latter is. Whether states retaining nuclear weapons capabilities are currently hostile or seen as threats to the US and international security should bring little weight to the issue. Instead, whether or not a state has nuclear weapons capabilities is the requisite factor in the decision on the part of the US to maintain its nuclear arsenals and delivery methods.

As noted during the Clinton Administration, emerging adversaries presented new threats to the U.S. The NSS Report of 1998 noted that, “a number of states still have the capabilities and the desire to threaten our vital interests […] in many cases, these states are also actively improving their offensive capabilities, including efforts to obtain or retain nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons, and, in some cases, long-range delivery systems.” It was further noted that, “[w]eapons of mass destruction pose the greatest potential threat to global stability and security. Proliferation of advanced weapons and technologies threatens to provide rogue states, terrorists, and international crime organizations the means to inflict terrible damage on the United States, its allies and US citizens and troops abroad. We must continue to deter and be prepared to counter the use or threatened use of WMD[s], reduce the threat posed by existing arsenals of such weaponry and halt the smuggling of nuclear materials.”

During the 1990s, China was not seen as the sort of threat that it has been characterized as under the Obama Administration. Having noted that the US cannot be sure that it will not require nuclear weapons to deter China or other states with nuclear weapons aspiration in the future mirrors the same uncertainty that the US currently faces.

Conclusion

In just a few decades, the U.S. has committed to the reduction of nuclear warheads to a level not seen since the 1950s. This period of reduction is therefore quite a historic one for the US and figures positively as a model for the reduction of arsenals by other states. Anti-proliferation of nuclear warheads, however, has been strained by the need to have such programs operate within and therefore harmonize with the bilateral covenant that exists between the U.S. and Russia. The aims of reduction, still, to many necessitates recasting amid a backdrop of nuclear flexibility, including strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons capabilities backed by an ability to deliver these weapons through diverse means. The most consistent aspect of the current international security environment is change and uncertainty. Both of these elements are primary expedients of threat and challenges for which the U.S. should be constantly prepared and not caught off-guard as a result of overt and idealistic hopes of reducing nuclear arms to the point that US national and international security are jeopardized.

This article was published by Geopolitical Monitor.com

The post Is America’s Finger Back On The Nuclear Button? – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By David Inserra and Peter Brookes*

Last Wednesday, two cousins were arrested in Chicago on charges of conspiring to knowingly provide material support and resources to a foreign terrorist organization. According to the criminal complaint brought against them by the FBI, Army National Guard Specialist Hasan Edmonds planned to travel to Syria to fight with the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), while his cousin Jonas Edmonds planned to attack the U.S. military installation at which Hasan had trained. Both men were U.S. citizens, and both were radicalized in the U.S.

This attempt by two homegrown terrorists represents the 64th Islamist terrorist plot or attack against the U.S. since 9/11 and should remind policymakers that critical law enforcement and intelligence tools are essential to stopping terrorists before they strike. This event is also the second terrorist plot in the U.S. in which the attacker was primarily inspired by and supportive of ISIS, which demonstrates that what happens in Syria and Iraq does not necessarily stay in Syria and Iraq. Preventing additional terrorist plots requires going beyond U.S. borders to deal with the root of the problem.

Terrorist Plot Details

According to the FBI, in January 2015, Hasan Edmonds communicated online with an undercover FBI agent about getting his and his cousin’s affairs in order and their plans to travel to the Middle East. Hasan wrote that it was his “duty” to support ISIS and stated that he and Jonas had taken an oath to support ISIS.[1]

While Hasan wanted to travel to Syria and use his military training to help ISIS there, he also expressed an eagerness to attack targets in the U.S. in the event he was prevented from traveling to Syria or if ISIS commanded him to remain in the U.S. His stated rationale for such acts was that “the best way to be[a]t them is to break their will. With the U.S. no matter how many you kill they will keep coming unless the soldiers and the American public no longer have the will to fight…. If we can break their spirits we will win.”[2]

The FBI began to communicate with Jonas in February 2015, and the goals he expressed to them were similar to Hasan’s. Law enforcement officials met several times with the cousins during February and March. During these meetings, it became clear what the cousins sought to do. Hasan purchased tickets to fly to Egypt, from where he would make his trip to Syria, while Jonas would purchase assault rifles and grenades for use against a U.S. military base.[3] Hasan provided Jonas with his knowledge of the base and recommended specific targets and tactics.

On March 25, Hasan went to Chicago’s Midway Airport to fly to Cairo. Hasan was arrested at Midway airport, and Jonas was arrested at his home shortly thereafter.[4]

Counterterrorism at Home and Abroad

Out of the 64 plots and attacks against the U.S. homeland since 9/11, the plot by the Edmonds is the 53rd by a homegrown Islamist terrorist. This trend of homegrown terrorists is likely to continue as ISIS makes use of aggressive messaging and social media efforts to attract followers to itself or other Islamist terrorist groups. This plot also represents the 17th Islamist attack or plot aimed at military targets, the most frequent targets of such attacks since 9/11.

In order to combat these threats at home, U.S. counterterrorism efforts must maintain and build the intelligence tools necessary to prevent terrorists from attacking. The U.S. should also empower state, local, and civil society partners to help prevent individuals from radicalizing in the first place.

Such actions are, however, essentially treating the symptoms of violent Islamism as opposed to the disease itself. With “successful” terrorist groups such as ISIS and al-Qaeda affiliates (e.g., al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula) maintaining their bases of operations across the Middle East and Africa and in some places growing in influence and power, the core of the problem festers even as Western law enforcement and intelligence agencies perpetually combat terrorist acts at home.

For example, ISIS controls one-third of Iraq and one-third of Syria. It has drawn some 20,000 foreign fighters from as many as 90 countries.[5] Despite six months of a U.S.-led coalition air campaign, it continues to maintain territory to develop a caliphate. ISIS is also credited with coordinating and supporting a number of recent, high-visibility domestic terrorist attacks in European capitals such as the shooting at the offices of Charlie Hebdo. One of the Paris attackers also claimed affiliation with al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.

It might even be argued that perceptions of ISIS or al-Qaeda affiliates as “winners” or as having notable successes, despite their acts of brutality and terrorism, will serve as a powerful motivator for further radicalization and violence. Unless this perception is altered by any number of possible means, these groups will continue to attract followers at home and abroad, ensuring a continuation of their brand of violent Islamist extremism.

Counterterrorism Policy

To combat terrorism in the U.S., Congress should:

• Maintain essential counterterrorism tools. Support for important investigative tools is essential to maintaining the security of the U.S. and combating terrorist threats. Legitimate government surveillance programs are also a vital component of U.S. national security and should be allowed to continue. The need for effective counterterrorism operations, however, does not relieve the government of its obligation to follow the law and respect individual privacy and liberty. In the American system, the government must do both equally well.
• Emphasize community outreach. Federal grant funds should be used to create robust community outreach capabilities in higher-risk urban areas. Importantly, these funds must not be used for political pork or so broadly used that they are no longer targeted at those communities at greatest risk. Such capabilities are key to building trust in local communities, and if the United States is to be successful in thwarting lone-wolf terrorist attacks, it must put effective community outreach operations at the tip of the spear.
• Develop a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy. Since the inspirational source of domestic radicalization and terrorism often lies overseas, battling violent Islamist extremism abroad must be addressed in concert with the challenges presented by the terrorism at home. To this end, Congress should ensure that the Administration has a comprehensive strategy for addressing violent Islamist extremism both at home and abroad.

Security Requires Vigilance

Until it is able to combat and destroy ISIS, al-Qaeda, and other Islamist extremist groups effectively, the U.S. will remain the target of terrorists inspired by this extreme ideology. The U.S. cannot afford complacency but instead must use intelligence, community outreach, and efforts to defeat ISIS and other terrorists abroad to stop them before they strike.

About the authors:
*David Inserra is a Research Associate for Homeland Security and Cyber Security in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign and National Security Policy, of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy, at The Heritage Foundation. Peter Brookes is Senior Fellow for National Security Affairs in the Davis Institute.

Source:
This article was published by The Heritage Foundation.

Notes:
[1] Kim Janssen, “Edmonds Complaint Affidavit,” Scribd, March 26, 2015, http://www.scribd.com/doc/260041011/EDMONDS-Complaint-Affidavit (accessed March 30, 2015).

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid.

[4] U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs, “U.S. Army National Guard Soldier and His Cousin Arrested for Conspiring to Support Terrorism,” March 26, 2015, http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/us-army-national-guard-soldier-and-his-cousin-arrested-conspiring-support-terrorism-isil (accessed March 30, 2015). The FBI complaint indicates that Jonas had not yet purchased any of the weapons for his attack but had only figured out his plan and identified a supplier.

[5] CBS News, “20,000 Foreign Fighters Flock to Syria, Iraq to Join Terrorists,” February 10, 2015, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/ap-20000-foreign-fighters-flock-to-syria-iraq-to-join-terrorists/ (accessed March 30, 2015).

The post 64th Islamist Terrorist Plot Since 9/11 Shows US Must Combat Radical Islamist Threat – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

As difficult on a human level as it may be to stand back and not intervene, the best approach to the conflicts in the Mideast may be to do nothing, take no sides.  Perhaps better to work within the international community and the UN Security Council to encourage peace through diplomatic means while standing ready to undertake peacekeeping should there eventually be a peace to help keep.

By Gerard Gallucci*

If one takes a somewhat broad view of what counts as civil war, the phenomenon seems to be spreading.  Defining civil war as a conflict between people who once lived together in a common state but have come to see themselves as an us vs them unable any longer to co-habit, civil war now characterizes an arc across the Mideast from Libya to Syria, Iraq and now Yemen.  Other states in the region face internal pressures that might easily push them over the boundary as the wars next door engender further instability.

Civil wars may occur due to the breakdown of an existing state that contained groups that potentially or already come to see themselves as threatened by the other.  Such state collapse may arise from internal dynamics or as the result of outside intervention.  Groups may come to see themselves as split along some ethnic, religious, language or other divide because of long simmering differences over some tangible or intangible, real or perceived inequality.  Or they might be encouraged along that path by conflict “entrepreneurs” seeking to excite and ride group conflict as an avenue to power or riches.  Facing a weak central government – one unable to maintain order either by repression or compromise – internal conflict may transform into civil war on its own.  With Yemen, this may have been the case.  But in Libya, Iraq and Syria (and also non-Arab Afghanistan), civil war broke out after foreign powers broke the repressive regimes holding the centrifugal forces in check.

Now the civil war in Yemen appears to be kicking the whole region into a new level of conflict between  people ostensibly united by Islam but in reality long divided by a potent mixture of ethnicity, history and religion.  On one side are the Arab Sunnis and on the other the Persian Shiites and their followers.  This is not a clean divide (and that is part of the problem).  But Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states are now arranged against Iran and its proxies in Yemen (as they have been – if never in neat ways – in Syria and Iraq).

Hard decisions face the leaders of the Western democracies, and especially the United States.  President Obama is under pressure to decide whether to come to the aid of traditional Arab allies or stay out of involvement in yet another conflict it is essentially powerless to resolve.  Already he has taken a step in the direction of intervention by reportedly supplying the Saudis with intelligence.  But Obama knows too well that US interests themselves are in conflict.  In Iraq, the US seems to be fighting alongside Iran and the Shiite militias and against the Sunni Islamic State.  In Syria, Washington appears to be working against both the enemies and supporters of the Iranian-backed Assad regime.  Now in Yemen, the question is whether to support Saudi Arabia – an ally but also the patron of Wahhabism and Al Qaeda – or stay out of its conflict with Iran especially while trying to negotiate a deal on the latter’s nuclear program.

But the deeper issue is what, if anything, outsiders can do about civil war.  Logically, there would seem to be two alternatives:  stay out or take sides.  What should be clear – though policy makers often try to dodge the issue – is that any involvement means taking sides.  What must be made clear is that there is usually nothing outsiders can do about the zero-sum conflict at the heart of civil war except making it worse by trying to help one side defeat the other.  A civil war – a conflict over basic identity – is existential to the participants.  They see only their side and anyone not with them is against them.  Outsiders helping one side to defeat the other means either assisting genocide or leaving behind a festering wound and continuing source of instability with the added result of making the losers hate you as well.  In the emerging jihad between Shiites and Sunnis, US intervention in Yemen and continued involvement in Syria and Iraq – no matter which side chosen – only adds fuel to the Islamic outrage against America because of its longstanding support for Israel against the Palestinians.  (This outrage may be the only thing that unites Sunnis and Shiites.)

Civil wars rarely have happy endings.  (One look at the electoral map of the US – divided into Red states and Blue – suggests it has not yet fully recovered after 150 years.)  Americans have a knee-jerk tendency to “get involved,” spread “human rights and democracy” and take political stands.  It almost never works out well.  As difficult on a human level as it may be to stand back and not intervene, the best approach to the conflicts in the Mideast may be to do nothing, take no sides.  Perhaps better to work within the international community and the UN Security Council to encourage peace through diplomatic means while standing ready to undertake peacekeeping should there eventually be a peace to help keep.

*Gerard M. Gallucci is a retired US diplomat and UN peacekeeper. He worked as part of US efforts to resolve the conflicts in Angola, South Africa and Sudan and as Director for Inter-American Affairs at the National Security Council. He served as UN Regional Representative in Mitrovica, Kosovo from July 2005 until October 2008 and as Chief of Staff for the UN mission in East Timor from November 2008 until June 2010. He was Diplomat-in-Residence at Drake University for the 2013-14 school year and now works as an independent consultant.

The post What To Do About Civil War? – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Here in Lexington federal prison’s Atwood Hall, squinting through the front doorway, I spotted a rust-red horse swiftly cantering across a nearby field. The setting sun cast a glow across the grasses and trees as the horse sped past. “Reminds me of the Pope,” I murmured to no one in particular. “What’s that?” Tiza asked. I tried to explain that once, when I asked a close friend his opinion of the Pope, shortly after Catholic bishops had elected Pope Francis, my friend had said, “The horse is out of the stable! And galloping.”

I love the image. Here is a Pope who, upon learning that a chaplain in a Chinese prison couldn’t afford to buy the traditional “moon pies” for every prisoner to celebrate the harvest moon, cut a check to cover the remaining cost.  This Pope loves the tango dance. On his birthday, tango dancers filled St. Peter’s Square at the time when ringing bells call on believers to kneel and recite the Angelus.

In September, 2015, Pope Francis will visit New York City, Washington, D.C. and Philadelphia. Tiza and I wondered if he would visit a prison. “If he does, he should come here,” Tiza insisted, “and not go to some showcase place!” I don’t think he’ll be able to put Kentucky on his agenda, but it’s not outlandish to imagine the Pope visiting a U.S. prison. He consistently emphasizes our chance to choose the works of mercy rather than the works of war: to visit those who are sick, those who are in prison; to feed the hungry, clothe the naked, bury the dead. Never to turn our heads, say “it was their own damn fault”; never to choose wars and weapons, the burning of fields, destruction of homes, slaughter of the living.

Women here pray for the Pope every week, their prayers guided by a Jesuit priest, a tall, balding man with a long, white beard and a kindly manner. “He’s the one who looks like a mountain man,” Tiza once told me.

At the beginning of a 40-day season of atonement called Lent, the priest’s message was stark and simple: “Our world is very sick.” He asked the women before him to recall how each might feel, as a mother, if her child is sick. “Nothing else matters,” said the priest. “You’re focused on your child.” He urged us to focus on healing an ailing world with just as much fervor. Following his words, we joined in prayer for the Pope, a symbol of unity, collecting our desires for a world at peace, where people’s basic needs are met and all children can thrive.

A few evenings later, while walking up the stairs toward my 3rd floor room, I heard a woman wailing. “Not my baby!” she cried, in pure anguish. “Not my baby!” She had collapsed to the floor in the middle of a phone call telling her that her four year old child had been rushed to the hospital, unconscious. Her closest friends were soon at her side, holding her, soothing her. Word spread through the prison. After the 9:00 PM “count,” women did what they could. Dozens of women filled the first floor chapel, praying for hours for the prisoner, for her child, for the child’s caregivers, for the hospital personnel.  Word arrived, the next day, that the child had regained consciousness.

The good priest had chosen a metaphor that women here could readily understand.

Gypsi, one of my roommates, saves her funds for phone calls, twice a week, with her small daughters, age 3 and 5. Prisoners can make 15 minute calls, at 21 cents per minute.

One night, Gypsi came back from her call, red-eyed but smiling. Meekah, her younger daughter, can trade song verses with Gypsi. “Momma, let’s sing one more!” Meekah had cried. “Please sing another song!” But, instead, a loud beep signaled that the call was over.

I just finished reading an exquisite book, Yashar Kemal’s Memed My Hawk (2005, NYRB Classics 50th Anniversary Edition), with a subplot about two women wrongfully imprisoned. Iraz thinks longingly of her son Riza, while Hatche remembers Memed, the young love of her life.

“As the days passed, Iraz and Hatche… shared everything, including their troubles.  Hatche knew Riza’s height, his black eyes, his slim fingers, his dancing, his childhood, what he had done as a child, with what trouble Iraz had brought him up, the whole story… down to the last detail, as if she had lived through and seen it all herself.  It was the same with Iraz.  She too knew everything about Memed, from the day he and Hatche had first played together as children.”

Yes, it’s like that among women in prison. Tremendous focus. And yet, as Kemal adds, “Anyone going to prison for the first time is confused on entering so different a world. One feels lost in an endless forest, far away, as if all ties with the earth, with home and family, friends and loved ones, with everything, have been broken. It is also like sinking into a deep and desolate emptiness.”

Broken. On empty.

Worldwide, impoverishment shackles women to unspeakably harsh conditions and makes them vulnerable to predators. Lacking protection, they are sold into human trafficking rings, subjected to forced labor, forced prostitution and forced removal. Widows and orphans find themselves penniless and defenseless. More than 115 million widows live in extreme poverty around the world, with a half billion children dependent on their care and support: Gary Haugen, in The Locust Effect (2014, Oxford University Press), presents in careful and disheartening detail a discussion of the sea change needed to uphold the rights of impoverished women and children. Sadly, in many places, traditions and customs regard women as being less valuable, subordinating them and treating them as property.

Sometimes, we have to interrupt ourselves in our relative comfort and estimate how we can bring to bear our best resources in the name of changing criminal, wrongful patterns.

Pope Francis faces an extraordinary possibility. He could rely on Catholic teaching which proclaims that humans are all part of “one bread, one body,” emphasizing that women and men are equal to each other; and he could promote an exemplary practical consequence of this teaching by embracing “the priesthood of all believers,” welcoming women as well as men to follow a vocation into ordained ministry. It would be a dramatic change, an arrow pointing toward new expectations and possibilities regarding the status of women.

Coretta Scott King says that in the moments after John F. Kennedy was assassinated, her husband, Dr. Martin Luther King, turned to her and said, “This is what is going to happen to me also. I keep telling you, this is a sick society.” She could only agree that he was right; and he was. Yet his service to equality and his fierce courage to reject violence couldn’t be killed. He took us with him to that mountaintop, entrusting to us a new vision and a way forward.

Pope Francis must indeed feel the challenge of the past century’s social justice visionaries, many of them cruelly vilified and rejected – many sent by violence from the world. Assassination is on the rise: the “kill list” is now an openly acknowledged part of U.S. policy. I know that women here will continue to pray for a sick society, and for the Pope, long after I leave.

I will continue to feel deeply moved by our “mountain man”‘s humble, direct plea, asking us to focus for forty days on our very sick world. Lent ends today, “Good Friday” is tomorrow.  Saturday is the anniversary of our loss of Dr. King, who, on an April 4th exactly one year before his death, told us that “we are called to play the Good Samaritan on life’s roadside, but that will be only an initial act. One day we must come to see that the whole Jericho Road must be transformed so that men and women will not be constantly beaten and robbed as they make their journey on life’s highway.”

In just a few more weeks, I’ll be moving on from here. The other members of our congregation will remain, and, along with so many of the world’s most expendable people, will remain nearly invisible to corporate forces driving humanity to nightmarish war, horrifying inequalities in wealth and education, and the irreversible destruction of natural resources nearly as precious as the squandered hopes of these women.

Where you stand determines what you see. Transformation of the Jericho Road must begin with actually stopping there. In Atwood Hall, our “mountain man” earnestly spoke to us as the people with whom the transformation starts, as people both vital and central to the healing he yearns for. If it comes, it will have started in a million places like this one.

Recognizing our need to support one another, to overcome the scourges of our time, to pick up a pace commensurate to the needs of those surrounding us, focused on our sick society with the same determination to heal that we would bring to a very sick child, we all have the task of going beyond our places of comfort, of escaping the stable and trotting if we can’t manage to gallop, of building new affinities in which to imagine and then co-create a better world. I hope the Pope will pick up the scent of spring renewal, maybe even imagine a Kentucky Derby, as he prepares to speak a clarion and expansive wake-up call, calling us to sing another song, a new song: just as we’ve called to him.

Kathy Kelly, co-coordinator of Voices for Creative Nonviolence www.vcnv.org) is in federal prison for participation in an anti-drone protest. She can receive mail at: KATHY KELLY 04971-045; FMC LEXINGTON; FEDERAL MEDICAL CENTER; SATELLITE CAMP; P.O. BOX 14525; LEXINGTON, KY 40512.

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British companies Premier Oil Plc and Falkland Oil and Gas Ltd have found oil and gas at a well off the disputed Falkland Islands. The discovery could aggravate further tensions between Buenos Aires and London over the sovereignty of the archipelago.

Two British companies, Premier Oil Plc and Falkland Oil and Gas Ltd, announced they discovered 24.6 meters of net-oil bearing reservoir and 16.7 meters of net-gas bearing reservoir at the Zebedee well in the Falkland Islands, after a nine-month drilling campaign.

The Zebedee well will be now plugged, while the British companies continue exploration at the Isobel fan complex in the North Falkland Basin.

The sovereignty over the Falkland Islands has long been disputed between Argentina and the United Kingdom. The discovery is likely to aggravate further tensions between London and Buenos Aires.

On April 2 Buenos Aires commemorates the 33rd anniversary of the start of the Falklands War between the UK and Argentina. The conflict ended on June 14, 1982, resulting in the deaths of 255 British troops and 649 Argentine military personnel. The archipelago in the South Atlantic Ocean has had Argentine, British and Spanish settlements in different periods of its history. However, Britons took control over the islands in 1833, and in 1983 declared Falkland Islanders as British citizens.

Although Argentina continues to claim the Falkland Islands its territory, London refers to a referendum, held in 2013, which showed 99.8 percent of Falkland Islanders voted in favor of remaining a UK Overseas Territory.

Remarkably, at the end of March 2015, London increased its military spending on the islands’ defense and heightened its military presence on the archipelago.

Earlier, when UK Foreign Secretary Philip Hammond denounced Crimea’s democratic reunification as an “illegal annexation,” Russian lawmaker Alexei Pushkov emphasized that Russia has more legitimacy over Crimea than the United Kingdom has over the Falklands.

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Gunmen from the Islamist militant group al Shabaab stormed a university in Kenya and killed at least 147 people on Thursday, in the worst attack on Kenyan soil since the U.S. embassy was bombed in 1998, Reuters reported.

The siege ended nearly 15 hours after the Somali group’s gunmen shot their way into the Garissa University College campus in a pre-dawn attack, sparing Muslim students and taking many Christians hostage.

Interior Minister Joseph Nkaissery said four gunmen strapped with explosives were behind the attack, the same number that killed 67 people during the 2013 bloodbath at a shopping mall in Nairobi.

“The operation has ended successfully. Four terrorists have been killed,” Nkaissery told Kenyan media.

Kenyan police chief Joseph Boinet said the attackers had “shot indiscriminately” when they entered the university compound.

Police and soldiers surrounded the campus and exchanged gunfire with the attackers throughout the day but were repeatedly repelled. At least 79 people were injured and many airlifted to Nairobi, Kenya’s national disaster body said.

Al Shabaab, who carried out the deadly attack on the Westgate shopping mall in Nairobi in 2013, claimed responsibility for the raid on the campus in Garissa, a town 200 km (120 miles) from the Somali border.

The group has links to al Qaeda and a record of raids on Kenyan soil in retaliation for Nairobi sending troops to fight it in its home state of Somalia.

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Over the next four decades, Christians will remain the largest religious group, but Islam will grow faster than any other major religion, according to a Pew Research Center report.

The Pew Research Center report notes that the religious profile of the world is rapidly changing, driven primarily by differences in fertility rates and the size of youth populations among the world’s major religions, as well as by people switching faiths.

According to the Pew Research Center report, if current trends continue, by 2050 the number of Muslims will nearly equal the number of Christians around the world, and in Europe, Muslims will make up 10% of the overall population.

India will retain a Hindu majority but also will have the largest Muslim population of any country in the world, surpassing Indonesia, according to the Pew Research Center report, while in the United States, Christians will decline from more than three-quarters of the population in 2010 to two-thirds in 2050, and Judaism will no longer be the largest non-Christian religion. Muslims will be more numerous in the U.S. than people who identify as Jewish on the basis of religion.

Four out of every 10 Christians in the world will live in sub-Saharan Africa.

For their part, atheists, agnostics and other people who do not affiliate with any religion – though increasing in countries such as the United States and France – will make up a declining share of the world’s total population.

Additionally, the report forecasts that the global Buddhist population will be about the same size it was in 2010, while the Hindu and Jewish populations will be larger than they are today.

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The Labor Department reported the economy added just 126,000 jobs in March, its weakest showing in two years. Downward revisions to the prior two month’s data brought the three month average to 197,000.

Clearly, weather played an important role in the weaker-than-expected report, as much of the Midwest and Northeast was hit by unusually severe weather in the second half of February and early March. As a result, construction lost 1,000 jobs after adding an average of 36,000 jobs in the prior four months. Manufacturing also lost 1,000 jobs after adding an average of 21,000 in the prior four months. Restaurants added 8,000 jobs in March, compared to an average of 43,000 a month from October to February. While all of this slowdown was not due to weather, it was an important factor.

Some other sectors, most notably mining, showed weakness that was not primarily weather-related. Mining lost 11,100 jobs in March — 1.3 percent of total employment — a decline which was undoubtedly due to the plunge in world oil prices. The government sector also shrank slightly, losing 3,000 jobs due to a decline of 4,000 in state-level employment.

Job growth in the health care sector slowed to 22,000 in March after averaging 49,000 the prior four months. Temp employment rose by 11,400, but most of this was just reversing a decline of 7,500 reported for February. In keeping with its recent pattern of strong growth, the professional and technical service sector added 23,700 jobs in March, only slightly below its 31,000 average for the prior four months.

There were some positive items in the report. Self-employment is up by 270,000, roughly 2.0 percent, from its year-ago level. This is a possible dividend of the end of health-care-related job lock due to the Affordable Care Act. Voluntary part-time employment fell slightly in March, but is still up by more than 900,000 (at 5.0 percent) from it level of two years ago. Involuntary part-time rose slightly in March, but is down by almost 1.0 million from its level of two years ago.

Also, there was a plunge of 5.0 percentage points in the unemployment rate of black teens to 25.0 percent. This is the lowest level since October of 2002. Most likely this is anomaly that will be reversed next month, but if part of the drop sticks, it does mean a serious gain. In this respect, it is worth noting that the employment-to-population ratio (EPOP) for black teens actually fell by 1.1 percentage points.

The share of unemployment due to people voluntarily quitting their jobs remained at 10.2 percent. This is the high for the recovery, but still well below pre-recession levels. All the long-term duration measures of unemployment fell in March, with the share of long-term unemployment dropping 1.3 percentage points to 29.8 percent.

In another likely anomaly, the number of discouraged workers was 40,000 higher than the year-ago level. This is the first year-over-year increase since January of 2014. All of the rise was among men.

There does finally appear to be evidence of accelerating wage growth. The average hourly wage over the three months from January to March rose at a 2.8 percent annual rate compared with the average for the prior three months. This compares to a 2.1 percent rate over the prior twelve months. This is consistent with the announcements of pay increases by several large employers of low-wage workers. In this respect, the pay of non-supervisory workers in retail rose at a 3.7 percent annual rate over this period, although the increase in the restaurant sector was just 2.1 percent. Hourly wages for all restaurant workers rose at a 3.0 percent rate over this period.

It is always difficult to read a report that was clearly skewed by weather. Clearly the underlying rate of job growth is faster than the 126,000 reported for March; however, it would not be surprising if employment growth did slow. An economy that is likely growing at close to a 2.5 percent rate would be expected to only generate around 120,000 jobs per month. The fast job growth of the last two years was associated with extraordinarily weak productivity growth.

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