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Greece Says Germany Owes €279 Billion In Nazi Reparations

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(EurActiv) — Greece’s deputy finance minister said Monday that Germany owes Greece nearly €279 billion in reparations for the Nazi occupation of the country.

Greek governments and also private citizens have pushed for war damages from Germany for decades, but the Greek government has never officially quantified its reparation claims.

A parliamentary panel set up by Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras’s government started work last week, seeking to claim German debts, including war reparations, as well as the repayment of a so-called occupation loan that Nazi Germany forced the Bank of Greece to make and the return of stolen archaeological treasures.

Speaking at parliamentary committee, Deputy Finance Minister Dimitris Mardas said Berlin owed Athens €278.7 billion, according to calculations by the country’s General Accounting Office. The occupation loan amounts to €10.3 billion.

The campaign for compensation has gained momentum in the past few years as Greeks have suffered hardship under austerity measures imposed by the European Union and International Monetary Fund in exchange for bailouts totaling €240 billion to save Greece from bankruptcy.

Tsipras has frequently blamed Germany for the hardship stemming from the imposition of austerity. He has angered Berlin by threatening to push for reparations in the middle of talks to unlock aid for Greece.

Germany has repeatedly rejected Greece’s claims and says it has honored its obligations, including a 115 million deutschmark payment to Greece in 1960.

Preliminary deal with lenders?

In the meantime, Greek Finance Minister Yanis Varoufakis told Greek daily Naftemporiki on Monday that he wants the negotiations with the country’s official lenders to reach a preliminary deal at a 24 April meeting of euro zone finance ministers.

“At the Eurogroup [meeting] of 24 April there must be a preliminary conclusion (of the talks), as per the Eurogroup accord on 20 February,” Varoufakis told the paper.

Greece offered a new package of reforms last week in the hope of unlocking remaining bailout funds, but has yet to win agreement on the proposals with its EU and IMF lenders.

“We are not going to condemn the country, as previous governments did, to a long-term asphyxiation,” Varoufakis told the paper, suggesting the EU/IMF lenders had treated the previous conservative-led government more leniently.

“The negotiations will end when we reach an honorable agreement, which will give the Greek economy the prospect of real stabilization and substantive growth,” Varoufakis said.

Asked whether he had thought of quitting the job, said: “Not for one minute.”

On Sunday Varoufakis said that Greece “intends to meet all obligations to all its creditors, ad infinitum“.

The post Greece Says Germany Owes €279 Billion In Nazi Reparations appeared first on Eurasia Review.


EU Increases Emergency Aid To Yarmouk, Syria

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The European Union said Tuesday it is providing emergency funding of €2.5 million to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees (UNRWA), to deliver life-saving assistance to Palestinian refugees in Syria through cash and emergency relief items.

With intense fighting in the Yarmouk refugee camp, near Damascus, the humanitarian situation is dramatically deteriorating for 18,000 Palestinian refugees and Syrians in the camp. Thousands remain trapped receiving little to no humanitarian assistance.

“The suffering of civilians in Yarmouk camp is reaching intolerable levels. Once again, I strongly urge all parties to the conflict to allow immediate and unconditional humanitarian access, and to afford all necessary protection to Palestinian refugees and all affected civilian populations in Syria,” said Christos Stylianides, Commissioner for Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Management.

As part of the EU’s 2015 humanitarian funding for Syria, support will facilitate a rapid humanitarian response to meet the needs of vulnerable families. This funding extends to all parts of Syria affected by the conflict, with specific focus on the recent violence in Yarmouk, Idlib, Dara’a and Aleppo.

The post EU Increases Emergency Aid To Yarmouk, Syria appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Industrial Producer Prices Up By 0.5% In Euro Area

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In February 2015, compared with January 2015, industrial producer prices rose by 0.5% in the euro area (EA19) and by 0.6% in the EU28, according to estimates from Eurostat, the statistical office of the European Union.

In January 2015 prices fell by 1.1% in in the euro area and by 1.3% in the EU28.

In February 2015, compared with February 2014, industrial producer prices decreased by 2.8% in the euro area and by 3.4% in the EU28.

Monthly comparison by main industrial grouping and by Member State

The 0.5% increase in industrial producer prices in total industry in the euro area in February 2015, compared with January 2015, is due to rises of 2.0% in the energy sector and of 0.1% for both durable and non-durable consumer goods. Prices remained stable for capital goods, while they fell by 0.2% for intermediate goods. Prices in total industry excluding energy decreased by 0.1%.

In the EU28, the 0.6% increase is due to rises of 2.5% in the energy sector and of 0.1% for both durable and non- durable consumer goods. Prices remained stable for capital goods, while they fell by 0.2% for intermediate goods. Prices in total industry excluding energy decreased by 0.1%.

The highest increases in industrial producer prices were observed in Greece (+3.5%), the Netherlands (+2.3%) and Denmark (+1.7%), and the largest decreases in Slovakia (-2.2%), Estonia (-1.8%) and Ireland (-0.8%).

Annual comparison by main industrial grouping and by Member State

The 2.8% decrease in industrial producer prices in total industry in the euro area in February 2015, compared with February 2014, is due to falls of 8.1% in the energy sector, of 1.8% for intermediate goods and of 0.9% for non- durable consumer goods, while prices rose by 0.7% for capital goods and by 1.0% for durable consumer goods. Prices in total industry excluding energy fell by 0.8%.

In the EU28, the 3.4% decrease is due to falls of 11.5% in the energy sector, of 1.6% for intermediate goods and of 1.1% for non-durable consumer goods, while prices rose by 0.8% for both capital goods and durable consumer goods. Prices in total industry excluding energy fell by 0.7%.

Industrial producer prices fell in all Member States, except in Luxembourg (+0.7%) and in Latvia where prices remained stable. The largest decreases were observed in Lithuania (-9.2%), the Netherlands (-8.3%), the United Kingdom (-8.2%), Belgium (-6.8%), Ireland (-6.0%) and Denmark (-5.8%).

The post Industrial Producer Prices Up By 0.5% In Euro Area appeared first on Eurasia Review.

The Iran Nuclear Deal: Advantage India – Analysis

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By Dr. S. Chandrasekharan

It is a sad reflection of our foreign policy that one has to give the title as “advantage India” after the recent framework that was signed on April 2 between P5+1 and Iran on a nuclear deal. This in due course is supposed to be translated into a final agreement by June 30.

This advantage was there for years. India not only chose not to use it, but go against it in voting against Iran three times in the last few years.

India’s purchase of Iranian oil was considerably reduced out of pressure and in the month of March it is said that it was almost nil. Now with great alacrity India was sending its Commerce Secretary Rajeev Kher to Tehran to “boost bilateral commercial ties” after the deal!

Repeated gestures and initiatives from Iran were ignored. One has only to see the map to realise the geo strategic importance of Iran and its significance to Indian strategic interests. Yet the development of Charbahar and the opening to northern Afghanistan and to Central Asian Republics which would have been a game changer for Indian strategic interests were being done at snail’s pace. It looked as if some anti-Iranian forces in the South Block were at work to delay the development!

It is known that India’s policy was fashioned specifically due to pressure from USA and to a lesser extent Saudi Arabia.

India must have been aware that US was carrying on an informal dialogue for many years at multilateral levels with the Iranian diaspora to come to a settlement.

As for Saudi Arabia, with all oil prices falling its “oil clout will be considerably reduced. Its recent involvement in Yemen is going to affect many other countries and create more complications in places where sectarian conflict is already in the critical stage. It is said that Saudi Arabia has spent around 100 billion in recent decades to spread an extremist ideology, a hybrid of wahabism ad salafism, two versions of Islam supposedly to purify it from foreign influences. (See new age Islam.com – article “Time to left Veil on Saudi Arabia’s Hijacking of Islam . . .)

No one would admit it- but one sees that the Islamic State is only following the laws followed in Saudi Arabia.

Before we go into some of the details of the agreement- some points need attention:

  • It was generally agreed by intelligence sources that since 2007 Iran had not only mastered the nuclear fuel cycle but had the scientific, technical and industrial capacity to produce nuclear weapons if it chose to.
  • Iran would have gained nothing by exploding a device, once its objective of getting the “know how” to make the bomb was reached. It was prudent to go for negotiating an agreement rather than incurring the wrath of the whole world. The surprise was that it took Iran such a long time to come to an agreement!
  • It is also made out that the sanctions on Iran had worked and that but for sanctions Iran would not have come to the negotiating table. This was not the position and if Iran wanted it, nothing could have prevented the Irnians from making the bomb.

The agreement briefly involves the following:

1. Iran will be restricted to use only 6000 centrifuges- 5000 in Natanz and 1000 in Fordow- Iran is said to have at present 20,000 centrifuges.

2. Iran is allowed to enrich uranium up to the strength of 3.67 percent only.

3. Iran is permitted to have a stockpile of only 300 kilograms of enriched Uranium from the present stock of 10,000 kilo grams. (There are differences on how to dispose off the surplus and this will have to be discussed again.)

4. Sanctions will be incremental. (There is a problem here as the understanding in Iran is that sanctions will be lifted once the agreement is signed on June 30. No time has been specified by the negotiating team of P5 + 1, but US State Secretary indicated a time of two years from the date of signing the agreement.)

5. Iran can use its facility at Fordow as a nuclear research laboratory, but no fissile material will be allowed. It is said that US is objecting to Iran developing faster and more sophisticated centrifuges. This goes against the principle already accepted by Iran of restricting itself to 3.67 percent enrichment. It is like the traffic rules where the speed limit is restricted to say 10 KM an hour. Does it matter whether one uses a small car like the Indian Maruthi Alto or the powerful BMW to keep this speed?

6. The Plutonium plant at Arak is barred from producing weapon grade Plutonium but can make energy grade plutonium.

7. The IAEA will have powers for an intrusive inspection that will cover nuclear sites, Uranium mines and mills, centrifuge plants, nuclear supply chain as also monitor dual use technologies. IAEA can inspect suspicious sites. Here again the IAEA Inspectors could be nasty as had been the experience in India. Analysts in India are also amused by the presence of China under the P5 as those in India who have dealt with nuclear proliferation know that China was the world’s greatest proliferator!

To me it looks that it is the best that the West could have got from Iran and the opportunity to go ahead with the June 30 deadline for final agreement should not be lost. It is a win- win situation both for the West and Iran.

The Director of Non Proliferation policy for the Arms Control Association said that if the agreement is implemented, it would take for Iran to amass enough bomb grade uranium for weapons for about 12 months and for all practical purposes it will effectively block Iran’s potential to produce plutonium for weapons. Unless Iran has bomb grade plutonium hidden, it will take more than one year to produce a bomb and one has to have at least two bombs to test one!

A group of 30 leading nuclear non-proliferation specialists, primarily from the United States, issued a joint statement just two days ago assessing the framework deal announced by the P5+1 and Iran on April 2 as a “vitally important step forward” for non-proliferation and international security.

“When implemented, it will put in place an effective, verifiable, enforceable, long-term plan to guard against the possibility of a new nuclear-armed state in the Middle East,” the statement read.

The “Parameters for the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran’s Nuclear Program” announced April 2 would establish long-term, verifiable restrictions on Iran’s sensitive nuclear fuel cycle activities, many of which will last for 10 years, some for 15 years, some for 25 years, with enhanced International Atomic Energy Agency inspections under the Additional Protocol and modified code 3.1 safeguards provisions lasting indefinitely.

Nothing more need be said on the nuclear agreement.

The post The Iran Nuclear Deal: Advantage India – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Israel And The Iran Nuclear Deal – Analysis

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By Anthony Rusonik

Despite Israel’s vocal opposition, genuine fear, and preemptive threats, the truth is that Jerusalem understands Iranian nuclear weapons are an eventual fait accompli.

Atomic weapons technology is now 60 years old – just shy of Israel’s own age and a historical “classmate” of the Holocaust. It is almost inevitable that technology as old as rotary telephones is now within the grasp of backwards but determined fundamentalists.

For all his foreign policy debacles and earned “feckless” reputation, consider also that President Obama displayed a rare Realist insight into state behaviour as he approached Tehran with an aim to manage the Ayatollahs’ ambitions.

The fact that there is no trust between Obama and Israel’s Netanyahu just underscores and sensationalizes the fact that the “genie is long out of the bottle.”

The Iranian drive to nuclear weapons is no doubt wrapped in visions of the Mahdi and Zion in flames. Still, the even more “fundamental” and conservative vision of the regime is self-preservation.

Foremost, the deal gives Tehran relief from sanctions and domestic unrest in exchange for Western verification, a reduction in centrifuges, and limits on plutonium enrichment. True, a “bomb in the basement” also allows Iran to poke Israel further via Hezbollah and Syrian adventures and to challenge Saudi Arabia in the endless Shia-Sunni stalemate (a conflict that pre-dated ISIL and will survive it).

However, the Iranians are not victims of their own rhetoric. Their logical “use” of nuclear capabilities is limited to a deterrent against those who would thwart their regional ambitions. It is improbable, albeit not impossible, that Iran thinks it can destroy Israel and survive.

Far more important, the Ayatollahs’ pledge to lose half of their own country to destroy Israel underscores ambition more than observed behaviour. A suicidal Iranian regime does not need nuclear weapons to achieve national martyrdom. Chemical arsenals attached to Iran’s formidable ballistic missile force would trigger the same Armageddon and create innumerable Shaheed. There are softer targets for Iran of greater strategic value. Yemen and Iraq beckon, the latter with tacit Western encouragement. Jihad against the Zionists is a low-intensity conflict Iran controls via Hezbollah with little danger to itself (a fact not lost on the average Lebanese).

Israel, of course, understands this. Jerusalem, too, is a conservative power. Israel has no further territorial ambitions and seeks to retain the status quo. Control of the West Bank is both a security and ideological driver, undercut by the demographic math.

One of the greatest miscalculations strategists make in analysis of Israel’s behavior and intent is the assumption that the Palestinian question dominates Israeli considerations. It doesn’t. Israel wants quiet. Whether that is achieved by “occupation” or via “territorial concession” is just a tactical consideration.

For quiet to prevail, Israel is much more alert to Iran, Lebanon and Syria than Palestine. The Arab Spring served to further degrade the capabilities of conventional threats from border states. Iran, which emerged as a regional power after its war with Iraq in 1988, now lurks ominous in 2015.

For a time, Israel pondered in vain the logistics of how even its vaunted air force could overfly hostile neighbors then penetrate Iranian nuclear facilities constructed at levels far beyond those the IAF destroyed at Osiraq in 1981, or Syria in 2007.

At some point, Israeli planners concluded that it was just as hard for Iran to issue a direct threat to Israel as it was for Israel to reach Iran. In a slow but deliberate manner, Israel’s doctrine of preemption transformed to a more conservative and confident “active deterrent” posture. This is not to say that Israel and Iran are the new US and USSR in a “MAD” Middle East. Israel’s fight is existential so it doesn’t have that luxury. But is does mean that Jerusalem has refocused on a doctrine to absorb the first blow, thereby attain diplomatic maneuver, then establish “escalation dominance.”

The wars with Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon proved to Israel that its conventional superiority was difficult to invoke in a decisive manner unless Jerusalem attained a green light from the US and Europe through absorption of the first blows. Cries of “disproportionate response” plagued Israel on the diplomatic front as missiles rained down on Israeli towns, even as Israeli troop casualties mounted in Gaza and Lebanon.

Iron Dome emerged as the tactical answer. The technology was a game-changer. The shield against rockets allowed Israel to respond with more clinical precision to Hamas and Hezbollah attacks, rather than with rage as was the imperative before Israel’s civilian populated was protected.

In turn, Israel applied the same logical transformation to its strategic doctrine. Determination to retain air and ground superiority with F-35 strike aircraft and Merkava tanks is now a qualitative objective for decisive surgical strikes. It is no longer a quantitative objective as in 1967 and 1973. Israel invests less in numbers here as the threat transforms. Instead, assured second-strike capabilities are now paramount.

Israel’s biggest investment is a joint effort with Germany (times do change) in a small fleet of nuclear-capable submarines. These are deployed in international waters off the Iranian coast.

Iron Dome’s success against tactical threats has spurred successful investments in the Arrow anti-ballistic system and a counter to theater threats in David’s Sling. These sophisticated shields are supported by pinpoint satellite intelligence from Israel’s Ofek satellites, as well as eyes and ears from Mossad on the ground.

It is doubtful the Iranians are foolish. If they are, Israel retains the Sampson Option. Buried deep in underground silos at Zekharyah, and further protected by the Tel-Nof air force base, Israel retains a fleet of Jericho ballistic missiles that can deliver up to 300 thermonuclear weapons across Iran within 20 minutes of launch order.

Israel has demonstrated considerable restraint in self-management of its nuclear force, with “deliberate ambiguity” still the official policy. The silos were opened just once, in 1973. Surprised by Syria on the Golan and with the Galilee at the apparent mercy of an order from Hafez Assad , a panicked Israel armed the missiles in clear view of American and Russian satellites.

Iran, meantime, has also demonstrated clever diplomatic skills as it maneuvers for junior nuclear club status in exchange for great power management and a degree of economic integration.

Israel and Iran will no doubt fight via proxy, and they may even clash head to head in Syria. It is doubtful, however, a nuclear confrontation will ensue.

This article was published at Geopolitical Monitor.com

The post Israel And The Iran Nuclear Deal – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

LUKOIL President Held Talks In Baghdad With Iraq PM Al-Abadi

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LUKOIL President Vagit Alekperov took part in a meeting last week between the Iraqi Prime Minister, Haider al-Abadi, and Mikhail Bogdanov, the Russian President’s Special Representative for the Middle East and Africa, Russia’s Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs.

The latter conveyed an invitation on the part of Russian President Vladimir Putin to the Iraqi leader to pay an official visit to Moscow.

The letter of invitation says, specifically, “I would like to express my gratitude for your personal concern about the activities of the Russian oil business. I am convinced that the profound experience of our oilmen and the cutting-edge technologies they use will further contribute to the development of your country’s energy potential”.

Last week’s meeting focused on issues related to the activities of Russian companies operating in Iraq and on the implementation of the West Qurna-2 field-development project – as well issues related to various new initiatives.

Bogdanov and Alekperov also assured the Iraqi prime minister that the Russian business was interested in still better cooperation with Iraq and in broader investments in the country’s economy.

The post LUKOIL President Held Talks In Baghdad With Iraq PM Al-Abadi appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Indonesia: Blocking ‘Radical’ Websites Threatens Free Expression, Say Rights Groups

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By Ryan Dagur

Rights activists representing several NGOs slammed the government’s recent move to block dozens of Islamic websites allegedly containing radical content, saying that such a move would threaten freedom of expression.

Last week, on the request of the National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT), the ministry of communications and informatics blocked at least 19 Islamic websites considered to be spreading radical ideologies. Hidayatullah.com is among these blocked websites.

“We support the Indonesian government’s effort in banning hate speech in the name of religion or belief…. [But] the web blocking has the potential to threaten the freedom of expression, which has long been the character of Indonesia as a democratic state,” rights monitors said in a joint statement issued during a press conference held on Monday afternoon in Jakarta.

According to the activists from, among others, Wahid Institute and the Institute for Policy Research and Advocacy (ELSAM), any such ban should have strong checks and balances.

“The government should file a report to the police if they find any violation committed by the websites, such as publishing hate speech against a certain religion. This should be taken to the court, and the web blocking should be based on the verdict,” Wahyudi Djafar, a human rights lawyer and researcher at ELSAM, said.

Similarly, chief of the Alliance of Independent Journalists Suwarjono questioned the mechanism of the web blocking.

“It should be done through the court. We see that only a verdict can justify the web blocking. If not, it will likely create a conflict of interest,” he told ucanews.com.

Suwarjono added that the government blocked the websites based on the minister’s 2014 regulation on controlling sites containing negative content.

“We know that the regulation mentions content which can be blocked, such as pornography and something regarded as illegal. The word illegal has multiple interpretations. It could be something which is against the government’s interest. It remains unclear,” he said.

Alamsyah M Djafar, a program officer at Wahid Institute, said the ban is shortsighted and fails to address the inherent problem with such content.

“Instead, the government should construct a counterview of radicalism promoted by the websites. The government hasn’t yet paid attention to this issue so far,” he told ucanews.com after the press conference.

Mahladi, the editor in chief of Hidayatullah.com responded to the ban by saying that he didn’t understand why his website was blocked by the government.

“There’s no evidence which can show us that our website contains radicalism. After we checked with BNPT, they used two articles as evidence. I, however, think that the articles are journalistic writings as they have sources,” he told ucanews.com.

Also, he said, “if the problem lay only in the two articles, why was our website blocked, instead of just the two articles?”

On Tuesday, Mahladi met with officials from the ministry. “We were invited yesterday. They said that they want to talk about the web blocking. We’ll wait for the result before taking the next move.”

Meanwhile, BNPT spokesman Irfan Idris maintained that the government’s effort had been discussed by the ministry as well as the the ministries of religious affairs and political, legal and security affairs.

“We have reviewed it since 2012. The websites could create violence done in the name of religion,” he told ucanews.com.

“Certainly, we see threats behind the websites,” he said.

The post Indonesia: Blocking ‘Radical’ Websites Threatens Free Expression, Say Rights Groups appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Rand Paul Announces Presidential Bid

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It’s official: “Libertarian Conservative” Senator Rand Paul (R-Kentucky) says he’ll be running for president of the United States in 2016.

Paul, 52, announced Tuesday morning that he’ll indeed be pursuing the Republican Party’s nomination for president ahead of next year’s election.

“I am running for president to return our country to the principles of liberty and limited government,” Paul announced on his website.

Tuesday’s announcement makes Paul the second big-name Republican to formalize their bid for the White House in recent weeks. Last month, Sen. Ted Cruz (R-Texas) said he’d also be pursuing the GOP’s nod ahead of the 2016 race.

On Monday, Paul’s office revealed that the senator will be running for office under the slogan, “Defeat the Washington machine — Unleash the American dream.”

“We have come to take our country back,” Sen. Paul told a crowd during a planned address in Louisville, Kentucky later on Tuesday when he formally announced his plans to run, promising to abolish “the Washington machine that gobbles up our freedoms and invades every nook and cranny of our lives.”

The conservative lawmaker and onetime ophthalmologist has advocated during his tenure in Congress for decreased military spending abroad and audits of the Federal Reserve and Internal Revenue Service — issues championed previously by his father, retired congressman Ron Paul, and all but certain to be central points of the senator’s Oval Office campaign.

While Paul is the second leading Republican to announce his White House run, so far he’s the only contender to say supporters can donate to his campaign via Bitcoin. In addition to credit card donations and contributions processed over PayPal, Paul’s campaign website gives donors the options to pledge their support with the digital cryptocurrency.

As RT reported previously this week, Sen. Paul’s campaign agenda will likely include calls for reform of the National Security Agency, US drug laws and the military’s use of armed unmanned aerial vehicles, or drones: in 2013, Paul famously led a filibuster on the floor of the Senate to discuss America’s drone program during the confirmation hearing for John Brennan, the Obama administration’s pick for CIA director.

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Saving Passengers Of The Good Ship ‘Titan… Earth’– OpEd

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On 15 April 1912, the ‘Titanic’, the largest ship afloat at the time it entered service, sank in the North Atlantic Ocean after hitting an iceberg on its maiden voyage. The large and unnecessary death toll – more than 1,500 passengers and crew – was the result of many factors.

Understanding the psychology that underpins these factors teaches us why so many people died in the ‘Titanic’ disaster. This, in turn, gives us insight into how we might be able to improve our chances of averting the sinking of the Good Ship ‘Earth’ and losing most of its passengers in the years now immediately ahead.

Two key factors in the sinking of the ‘Titanic’ were the ship’s design, including the limited number of watertight compartments in the hull, and the ship’s speed at the time of the incident despite the risk of hitting an iceberg (which could only be detected visually, rather than technologically, in 1912).

Separately from this, other factors in the huge death toll were the inadequate number of lifeboats and the failures in telegraph communications – see ‘The ITU and the Internet’s “Titanic” Moment‘ – which meant that the ‘Californian’, just five to ten miles away, did not respond to the distress signals, although the ‘Carpathia’ travelled considerably further to arrive less than two hours after the ‘Titanic’ foundered, thus saving over 700 lives.

Moreover, the decisions to prioritise the access of wealthy passengers to the lifeboats (by locking many ‘lower deck’ passengers below), the decisions to launch many lifeboats before they were full, and the decisions by virtually all lifeboat occupants to not row the lifeboats the short distance back to rescue passengers stranded in the water after the ship had sunk also significantly contributed to the unnecessarily high death toll.

So what can we learn from the sinking of the ‘Titanic’ and its huge death toll that can help us to avert sinking the Good Ship ‘Earth’ and killing off most, if not all, humans and many other species besides? Let me consider each item above in turn.

From a design perspective, the Earth is without peer in the known Universe if life support is the primary consideration. The Earth took more than four billion years to evolve into the state it had reached by 1790. It was perfectly functional as a life-support system for billions of species interacting in a phenomenal web of life that nurtured not only species but each individual as well.

But then the industrial revolution, fuelled by coal, oil and gas, starting adversely impacting on that life-support system, although it wasn’t until the twentieth century that scientists worked this out. Fortunately, we know now – see ‘Game Over for the Climate‘ – and there is still a little time left to take the profound action necessary to halt and, in some key ways, reverse the design alterations to the Earth that we have been making for the past 200 years. But will we act?

Many people won’t act, particularly those people whose fear works in the same way as most of those involved in the ‘Titanic’ disaster. ‘Fear?’ you say. Yes, fear. Or, more accurately, unconscious terror.

Why weren’t there more watertight compartments in the hull of the ‘Titanic’? Fear (of the cost). Why weren’t there more lifeboats? Fear (again, of the cost). Many business decisions are based on fear although businesspeople have developed a substantial language to obscure this fact (mainly from themselves): emphasising the importance of ‘maximising short-term shareholder profits’ (at the expense of socially or environmentally desirable outcomes) is an obvious example.

Why was the ‘Titanic’ travelling at high speed? Fear. In the conditions, the speed was clearly foolish but the owner couldn’t feel this because it was overshadowed by his focus on ‘showing off’ the ship’s speed and the ship’s captain was too frightened to refuse the owner’s request for greater speed even though he was well aware of the danger of hitting an iceberg.

What caused the failure in telegraph communications? Fear (of losing their jobs). The Telefunken-employed radio operators on the ‘Californian’, which was just a few miles away, were not allowed to communicate with the Marconi-employed radio operators on the ‘Titanic’.

Why did officers prioritise the access of wealthy passengers to the lifeboats (by locking many ‘lower deck’ passengers below deck)? Fear (of disobeying orders and overloading lifeboats).

Why were many lifeboats launched before they were full? Fear (on the part of passengers already in lifeboats who wanted to get away from the sinking ship quickly).

Why did virtually all lifeboat occupants not row back the short distance necessary to rescue passengers stranded in the water after the ship had sunk? Fear (of being swamped and ending in the water themselves, although this could be easily avoided).

Of course, most of the time when people seek to explain dysfunctional human behaviour, they come up with an explanation that is more palatable. But when I observe dysfunctional human behaviour, I always see the fear, irrespective of other superficial justifications that are offered.

And that is what I see when I observe elite and most other responses to our current epidemic of violence whether in the form of war, exploitation of countries in the global ‘South’, environmental destruction, domestic violence or otherwise. I see their (unconscious) fear lead them away from insightful analyses and visionary solutions because they are compelled by their fear to live in delusion (which requires no action). See ‘Why Violence?‘ and ‘Fearless Psychology and Fearful Psychology: Principles and Practice‘.

So if you are like those people on the one lifeboat on the ‘Titanic’ who returned to rescue passengers after the ship had submerged and you reckon your fear hasn’t gotten the better of you, then I invite you to consider participating in the fifteen-year strategy outlined in ‘The Flame Tree Project to Save Life on Earth‘ and to consider joining those people in 81 countries who have signed the online pledge of ‘The People’s Charter to Create a Nonviolent World‘.

There is still just enough time to save most of the passengers on the Good Ship ‘Earth’ but we must be courageous and resolute. If we let the cowardice and delusion of elites and their agents guide us, we will join the dead passengers of the ‘Titanic’.

The post Saving Passengers Of The Good Ship ‘Titan… Earth’ – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Lee Kuan Yew: A Towering Inspiration For China – Analysis

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Lee Kuan Yew has been a towering inspiration for China’s modernisation. His emphasis on stability in governance resonated well in China.

By Zha Daojiong*

A legendary tale has it that Deng Xiaoping was so astonished by the changes he witnessed on his visit to Singapore in November 1978 that he made up his mind about opening and reforming China by learning from Singapore. In his youth Deng had once made a stopover in Singapore on his sea journey to France. The visual contrast could not have been stronger.

Lee Kuan Yew was the founding father who made possible his country’s transformation. Two years earlier, in 1976, Lee had travelled to China, in spite of the absence of formal diplomatic ties between the two countries. In his life time, Lee made 33 trips to China, each personalising his own commitment to make a positive contribution to China’s pursuit of modernisation.

Source of inspiration

Lee Kuan Yew built a country – small in geographical size and with virtually no natural resources beyond sustaining basic human survival – into one to be respected not only throughout Southeast Asia but also worldwide. If anything, the country Lee Kuan Yew led, governed and then advised even after retirement from the prime ministership, has proved its resilience throughout the decades of profound challenges in its neighbourhood and beyond.

Singapore’s record of rising from the ashes serves as a source of inspiration, partly owing to the fact that ethnic Chinese are the majority in the Singaporean society, many of whom – Lee’s own family included – had migrated to that part of the Malay peninsula when China was the ‘sick man of Asia’: as a people the Chinese can prevail out of adverse circumstances, just like other peoples of the world. It is up to the Chinese in China to prove that they too can match their achievements with those of their Singaporean cousins by kinship and cultural ties.

Today, the catch phrase for that inspiration is ‘soft power’. Singapore is beyond dispute one of the tiny number of countries that truly attracted China, its government and populace. It was only natural for the Chinese government to choose Singapore to be one of the first destinations for Chinese citizens to go on private foreign travel in the early 1990s. Singapore was not just a place with Chinese-speaking communities, but visibly a successful country. The more the average Chinese could learn from Singapore, the better they could contribute to improving China.

Teacher of Governance

Lee Kuan Yew gave priority to maintenance of social and political stability in governing his country. Among other points of wisdom in him as a national leader, the necessity of stability in governance resonated more closely in China.

As a matter of fact, compatibility in governance approaches led China to seek Singapore’s assistance in training Chinese civil servants. Such training programmes cover wide-ranging topics, from economic policy to project management, from community management to fighting corruption; virtually every aspect of governance was covered in these programmes. Transfer of ideational/technical expertise from Singapore to China has become systematic.

For China, learning from Singapore comes with a unique cultural environment. Under Lee Kuan Yew’s leadership and personal example, civil servants of Singapore dealing with China are required to be fluent in Chinese as one of the four official languages which include English, Malay and Tamil, while Malay is the national language. This facility in Chinese greatly helped the participants from China in their interactions outside the formal classroom, an attribute unavailable in many other advanced economies.

In the wider world, the match in governance between Singapore and China has received mixed commentaries, including some critical ones. But Lee Kuan Yew and his successors stood their ground and, arguably, have prevailed. China is solely responsible for shortcomings still existent in its own society. The appeal of building a clean government, with Mr. Lee as a leader and his country as a model, continues to be strong.

Singapore in China

In April 1994, Lee Kuan Yew, as Senior Minister, inaugurated the China-Suzhou Industrial Park, in China’s Jiangsu province. For China, this ‘Singapore in China’ project was conceived as a tangible demonstration of modernisation. Chinese planners envisioned 2012 to be the year for the collaborative Suzhou project to reach comparable Human Development Index levels of Singapore in 2011.

The initial years of the Suzhou project did not live up to Singaporean expectations. It was the fundamentals in bilateral relationship Lee Kuan Yew had built up that helped it to continue. The emphasis on pragmatism, another hallmark of Lee Kuan Yew’s leadership, helped to navigate both sides of the partnership.

Today, ‘Singapore in China’ projects have spread to other cities including Tianjin, Guangzhou, and Shenyang. In numerous other Chinese industrial zones and beyond, the Singaporean presence is strong. The value of these projects goes beyond statistical records of trade and investment. Throughout the times of uncertainty that the outside world had perceived China as a global economic partner, Lee Kuan Yew and his government cast a vote of confidence.

The one thing Lee Kuan Yew had for sure shown China and the Chinese society is that countries do not have to be large and strong in the conventional sense of the term to be valuable. Mr. Lee is going to be remembered as a towering source of inspiration.

*Zha Daojiong is Professor of International Political Economy, School of International Studies, Peking University. He was a Visiting Senior Fellow at RSIS in 2009 and 2011. He contributed this specially to RSIS Commentary.

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Jamaica Suffering From ‘Most Austere Budget In World’ Imposed By IMF – Study

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Ahead of President Barack Obama’s trip to Jamaica this week, a new paper from the Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR) finds that Jamaica is running the most austere budget in the world, with a primary surplus of 7.5 percent, due to its IMF agreement, and that the government’s interest payments on the debt and austerity have brought public investment to a low.

The paper, “Partners in Austerity: Jamaica, the United States and the International Monetary Fund” (PDF) by Jake Johnston, notes that Jamaica has a debt-to-GDP ratio of nearly 140 percent and its public interest burden is one of the very highest in the world, at over 8 percent of GDP last year. Coupled with the IMF-backed austerity, high interest payments have all but displaced needed capital spending, reducing government capital expenditure to a low of 1.6 percent of GDP in FY 2014/15.

The paper notes that after three consecutive quarters of economic growth, GDP fell by 1.4 percent in the third quarter of 2014, and the Jamaican economy is smaller today than it was in 2008. With anemic growth and continued austerity, social indicators have drastically worsened, with the poverty rate doubling since 2007. Unemployment, at 14.2 percent, remains higher today than during the height of the global recession.

“When President Obama travels to Jamaica this week, he will be going as someone partly responsible for the high unemployment and poverty that the country is suffering through,” Jake Johnston said. “This paper shows that through its leadership role in the IMF, the U.S. is imposing unnecessary pain on Jamaica through harsh austerity and a debt trap.”

Jamaica has suffered declining average living standards over the past 20 years, with GDP per capital actually falling by 0.3 percent annually over the past two decades.

Jamaica’s 7.5 percent primary budget surplus dwarfs even the budget surpluses being demanded of crisis-hit countries such as Greece, which was expected to run a primary surplus of 3.0 percent of GDP this year and 4.5 percent for years thereafter – and even this is widely considered politically unsustainable.

The paper finds that Jamaica’s high debt-to-GDP ratio comes even after two debt restructurings, both as preconditions to receiving IMF support. After multilateral loans were cut off in 2012 following the breakdown of Jamaica’s previous IMF agreement, net flows from the multilateral banks turned negative for two consecutive years. Even after the signing of the new IMF agreement, Jamaica paid $138 million more to the IMF than it received last year, and Jamaica still owes the World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank over $650 million through 2018.

This paper concludes that multilateral debt relief for Jamaica would likely free up more resources than new loans. Finally, the paper finds that without hundreds of millions in financial support from Venezuela and investment from China, the impact of IMF-led austerity would likely be far worse, making the ongoing program politically untenable.

“Alternatives to IMF-imposed austerity are key if Jamaica is going to emerge from its debt trap and begin economic recovery,” Johnston said. “Perhaps most important would be debt cancellation.”

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How Can Obama Claim Alternative To Nuclear Deal With Iran Is War? – OpEd

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A kudo to President Obama. But just one.

If he manages to pull off an agreement with Iran on limiting that country’s nuclear fuel enrichment program in the fact of determined resistance from Republicans, Neocons, the Israel Lobby and the warmongers in both the GOP and his own Democratic Party, he will have finally earned at least some small portion of the gold in his Nobel Peace medallion.

We could reasonably ask why he thinks it’s cool to negotiate with the “Axis of Evil” nation of Iran over the nuclear issue, but not with Russia over Ukraine. After all, Iran doesn’t even have a nuclear weapon, and on the evidence, isn’t trying to build one, so these negotiations aren’t really even preventing a nuclear war; they’re just calming the nerves of some trigger happy paranoids in Israel and Washington. But Russia does have nuclear weapons, and has made it clear that if the US pushes too hard at putting NATO weapons and forces near the Russian border, or if it tries to undo the annexation of Crimea, it will use them. Shouldn’t that kind of thing call for cool-headed negotiation, instead of aggressive moves like sending offensive armaments to Kiev?

But then we have some other issues too.

If Obama really wants an agreement with Iran on limiting its nuclear fuel enrichment program, why is he being so hard-assed about ending the grinding sanctions that have been imposed on the country? I mean a deal’s a deal. If one side gives you want you want, you have to give something in return. You can’t say, okay you stop enriching uranium, dilute the stuff that you already enriched to 20%, back down to 3.5%, and shut down most of your centrifuges so you can’t make much anymore. But we’re not going to end sanctions until you have done this for a while so we know you mean it.

That’s double dealing, and hardly conducive to building a new relationship with a country that has good reason to doubt your own sincerity (after all, the US corporate media in reporting on this story never mention it, but Iranian antipathy towards the US didn’t begin with the overthrow of America’s puppet, the Shah of Iran. It began in the 1950s with a coup orchestrated by the CIA and British intelligence which overthrew Iran’s secular elected government — a catastrophe from which Iran has never recovered.

In fact, as part of the deal Iran probably should have insisted on an apology for that outrage, along with a promise to never again meddle in Iran’s internal politics.

Instead we have this rather bullying agreement in which a weakened Iran, faced with both tough US-led economic sanctions and a brutally low world price for oil (also allegedly orchestrated by the US and its puppet state Saudi Arabia), has agreed to severely reduce its nuclear refining capability, receiving little but promises of future lifting of sanctions in return.

The other thing, though, is this rhetoric from our Peace Laureate president threatening that if Iran doesn’t agree to the negotiated terms of this pact (and the ruling imams of the Guardian Council still have to give it their okay), it will mean war.

Where does he get off making that kind of threat? Iran, it should be made clear, is not doing anything illegal. It is a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and as such, allows inspections of its nuclear processing facilities as well as its nuclear power plant. This is in stark contrast to Israel, a country known to possess hundreds of nuclear weapons, though it won’t admit this, and which is not a signatory of the Non-Proliferation Pact. Indeed, Israel allows no inspections of its own nuclear facilities, including the Dimona Reactor where it makes plutonium for more bombs. Iran has no bombs, and isn’t making any, yet it is threatened with war if it won’t agree not to do something it already is not doing, and if it won’t stop doing something it has every legal right to do– namely to refine nuclear fuel, as many countries, from Japan and Taiwan to Brazil and Germany do all the time with nobody making a fuss about it.

Let’s be clear here. Making a threat to attack a country that does not pose an imminent threat — and since Iran a) has no nuclear bomb and b) is known not to have a bomb-making program (something even the CIA confirms) it is no imminent threat — is a war crime under the UN Charter, to which the US is a signatory. It is one of the so-called Crimes Against Peace, which since the Nuremberg Tribunal have been called the greatest of all war crimes, since all other war crimes like the murder of civilians or torture derive from.

That is to say that even as Obama finally makes one move in line with the hoped for promise of the Nobel Committee in awarding him a Peace Price before he had done anything at the start of his first term, he is grievously mocking them and the award they gave him by committing the worst kind of war crime.

This should not surprise us. President Obama has become one of the the great war-mongers of our history, presiding over an illegal war against Libya, another against Somalia, a third against Syria and now a fourth against Yemen. He is pressing towards war against Russia by moving US forces up close to the Russian Border in Estonia, Ukraine and elsewhere in Eastern Europe while imposing sanctions on Russia that are expressly aimed at “regime change” targeting President Vladimir Putin. He has more recently absurdly labeled Venezuela a “national security threat” to the US, earning the enmity of almost the entire Latin American region, save only the US puppet state of Panama. He has continued to have US forces occupy Afghanistan, where they maintain a pro-US puppet regime in power. And of course he persists in personally overseeing a drone war campaign against myriad nations — all of it illegal — and in terms the numbers of its civilian victim slaughter, an ongoing warcrime of immense proportions.

So for the sake of Iran and humanity, one small cheer for the tentative agreement reached with Iran to limit their nuclear program. Let’s all hope that the agreement survives death by a thousand cuts in both Tehran and Washington.

But let’s not go overboard in praising the president, who remains an insult to the Nobel Peace Price, a bloody killer of innocent men, women and children, and a blight on America’s reputation around the world.

The post How Can Obama Claim Alternative To Nuclear Deal With Iran Is War? – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Activity-Based Intelligence: Revolutionizing Military Intelligence Analysis

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By Chandler P. Atwood

Information-age technology is advancing at a stunning pace, yielding increasingly complex information architectures, data accessibility, and knowledge management—all of which have created the conditions for a leap in intelligence processes,” stated Lieutenant General Robert Otto, the Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR).1 The vast amount of information that the Intelligence Community (IC) collects demands a transformation in the way the Department of Defense (DOD) intelligence enterprise processes, organizes, and presents data. The enterprise must embrace the opportunities inherent to big data while also driving toward a unified strategy with the IC. The primary strategy thus far has been acquisition based, looking to industry and research and development organizations to provide the next best tool and software, rather than addressing the more existential requirement of advancing analytical tradecraft and transforming antiquated intelligence analysis and processing methods.

In our current diffuse and multipolar threat environment, the DOD intelligence enterprise faces the daunting task of discerning abnormal and/or significant activities from normal patterns of activities. To truly revolutionize and fundamentally change from an individual exploitation process to analysis-based tradecraft, the enterprise needs to harness the potential of big data, replacing the methodology of individually exploited pieces of data with an activity-based analysis approach, known as Activity-Based Intelligence (ABI). Use of the ABI methodology will enable our intelligence analysts to focus on hard problems with critical timelines as well as normal day-to-day production activities across the spectrum of conflict. This methodology will aid in the development and understanding of patterns of life, which in turn will enable analysts to differentiate abnormal from normal activities as well as potentially defining a “new normal.” Furthermore, the sharp incline in the amount of data, recent information technology (IT) advances, and the ABI methodology impel significant changes within the traditional DOD intelligence production model of PCPAD (planning and direction, collection, processing and exploitation, analysis and production, and dissemination).

Big Data: A Problem or Opportunity?

Today’s IC faces the data challenges of the “four Vs” with persistent sensors soaking the battlespace: variety, volume, velocity, and veracity. The DOD intelligence enterprise processing, exploitation, and dissemination (PED) systems and analysts cannot keep pace with the four Vs inherent in big data or continue to mitigate the tendency of each organizational entity to build stovepiped systems with poor interoperability overall.2 The IC has dealt with data volume and velocity issues for decades, but the challenge has more recently expanded to include the full complexity of big data with variety and veracity added to the equation as illustrated in figure 1.atwood-figure1

Even today in Afghanistan where ISR forces have been redundantly layered for years, the creation of a timely, coherent picture gained from integrated, multisource intelligence data is a rarity. For instance, U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces in Afghanistan have suffered losses when they were surprised by an unexpected larger insurgent force not detected and relayed in time even when there were ever-present ISR assets operating in a permissible environment.3 This assertion still stands true today and portends an enduring DOD intelligence enterprise challenge of integrating disparate datasets into a clear picture for warfighters and their commanders across all types of battlespaces. Whether we reflect over the last 13 years operating in a permissive environment or look to the future in a potentially highly contested battlespace, DOD intelligence organizations will operate in domains in which all four Vs of data combine to create the big data conundrum.

Most DOD intelligence enterprise analysts contend that “drowning in data” leaves our intelligence organizations afflicted with overstimulation and overwhelmed with man-hour intensive PED. Specifically, the DOD Joint Distributed Common Ground System (DCGS) enterprise fits this paradigm and has yet to reach its full potential of networking and integrating the entire spectrum of national and tactical intelligence due to a preoccupation with data exploitation. DCGS is a system with a laser focus on single-source, quick-look reporting. It does not provide larger discovery from the integration of multiple intelligence (multi-INT) disciplines and sources.

Since 2003, the Air Force DCGS and the greater DOD intelligence enterprise have seen a steep growth in the number of sensors with multiple exponential increases in the data each produces, as well as the multiple forms of data formats they must process and exploit. For instance, we started this era with a strong and growing dependence on a narrow field-of-view full-motion video (FMV) MQ-1 Predator observing a 0.1 x 0.1 kilometer (km) “soda straw” spot on the ground. Today our DCGS core sites focus on processing, exploiting, and disseminating intelligence from dozens of MQ-1 combat air patrols while also absorbing increased data from newer sensors with a much larger target area coverage. In the future, wide area airborne surveillance programs of record will have a sensor coverage area of an enormous 30 x 30 km. These advances in motion video coupled with the expansion of sensor coverage across the spectral bands, such as the data intensive hyperspectral sensors, and the burgeoning light detection and ranging sensors drive a significantly greater data problem concerning the four Vs. The list goes on, with increasing signals intelligence (SIGINT) sensors and moving target indicator (MTI) sensors as well as the growing integration of overhead persistent infrared (OPIR) data and nontraditional measurement and signatures (MASINT) sensors into the IC enterprise. This ever-expanding list of data generators leaves the ISR operators in a state of near paralysis and the training shops and leadership saying, “enough is enough.”4 Today’s focus on single-source exploitation in an environment of multisource data availability clearly hinders analysts from understanding and conveying the overall meaning of the integrated results.

In today’s dynamic and complex battlespace, the DOD intelligence enterprise requires near simultaneous access to and analysis of data from a multitude of sources and disciplines—thereby embracing big data. These integrated disciplines should include at a minimum SIGINT, human intelligence (HUMINT), geospatial intelligence (GEOINT), MASINT, and even open source intelligence (OSINT) to understand the problem and provide actionable intelligence to warfighters. Today’s analysts tend to develop an expertise in only one or two of these disciplines, resulting in their inability to understand and convey the overall meaning of the integrated results potentially obtainable from all data.

In spite of big data overwhelming our existing ISR exploitation capabilities, there are indications that change is starting to occur. The increase in sensors and resulting vast amounts of disparate data coupled with the increasing capabilities of IT systems to handle the deluge are transforming intelligence analysis. The traditional process of stitching together sparse data to derive conclusions is now evolving to a process of extracting conclusions from aggregation and distillation of big data.5 Although IT solutions will enable our analytical shift, the largest impact will come from replacing the methodology of individually exploited pieces of data with Activity-Based Intelligence. ABI is a high-quality methodology for maximizing the value we can derive from big data, making new discoveries about adversary patterns and networks, yielding context, and therefore also providing greater understanding.6 The information age now brings the potential for technological improvements to harness big data in such a way that true ABI methodology can indeed become a reality.

Activity-Based Intelligence

Activity-Based Intelligence has already been defined in many different ways, and after many months of debate, a codified and agreed-upon definition, based on Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence guidance, finally exists: “ABI is a multi-INT approach to activity and transactional data analysis to resolve unknowns, develop object and network knowledge, and drive collection.”7 The following paraphrasing may resonate more with DOD ISR professionals, enabling a better understanding of ABI, though not intending to replace or circumvent the established definition:

ABI is an analysis methodology which rapidly integrates data from multiple INTs and sources around the interactions of people, events and activities, in order to discover relevant patterns, determine and identify change, and characterize those patterns to drive collection and create decision advantage.8

ABI is an inherently multi-INT methodology that invokes a transformational approach to data processing and analysis. The methodology uses a large volume of data from a variety of intelligence sources to enable data correlations that, among other things, drive discovery of weak signatures and patterns in a noisy data environment. This methodology will fill critical gaps in single-source data PED processes. It will also help resolve unknowns through the process of correlating activity data with information about the attributes, relationships, and behaviors of known and unknown objects in ways that cannot be done today without proper automation. By accumulating the multi-INT data on individual activities, an ABI analyst can correlate activities, detect anomalies, and discover links between objects. The derived object and network knowledge will enable the discovery of new facilities, links and nodes, and patterns of activity. An ABI analyst correlating activities and resolving objects will enable real-time tipping and cueing of sensors, thereby driving collection, again, in ways that cannot be done today.9

Methodology in Action

The confluence of four Vs in big data requires a significantly different way of handling the task(s) that traditional intelligence methodologies cannot support. For instance, the Intelligence Community reportedly had pieces of information that provided indicators of the impending August 21, 2013, chemical weapons (CW) attack in Syria, but seemingly failed to process and integrate the information in time to portend such an attack. According to a White House Press Secretary official report, “In the three days prior to the attack, we collected streams of HUMINT, SIGINT and GEOINT that reveal regime activities that we assess were associated with preparations for a chemical weapons attack.”10 This reported shortfall raises troublesome questions for the analytical integration capabilities of the IC and provides a hypothetical backdrop from which to develop an ABI tradecraft workflow template applying its four pillars and main enablers.11

Perhaps the individual agencies had the data 3 days prior but failed to (or were unable to) integrate all the data from their respective data streams in order to first derive understanding and then to identify key indicators of abnormal activity in a way that would lead to a credible, defendable conclusion. Conceivably, the data associated with the individual intelligence components only made sense after the attack, when the events were manually retraced and integrated across the other data sources through a manpower extensive post-event reconstruction.

The ABI methodology will revolutionize the analytic processes applied to situations like this example in a way that will enable automated real-time correlation of data and information from current collections as well as through archived data sources. These data correlations can establish baseline understanding of the information, historic trends of activity, and provide identification of anomalies. When in action, the ABI methodology has four, not necessarily sequential, pillars: georeference to discover, integrate before exploitation, data (sensor) neutrality, and sequence neutrality.12

The absolute first step in the ABI methodology must be georeference to discover. All data sources should be spatially and temporally indexed at the time of collection rather than treated as an afterthought or last step in the analytic process as often accomplished today across the IC, if possible. ABI depends on a variety of multi-INT data that need to be integrated to fill holes in sparse single-source datasets. To mitigate gaps in single-source data, all of the collected data must be “georeferenced” to a specific point in space and time.13 Only then will an ABI analyst be able to correlate, integrate, and cluster the multi-INT data around a “spot of interest,” enabling the discovery of entities, activities, transactions, and begin to relate them.14 Having preconditioned data, with explicit spatial and temporal aspects, allows the ABI analysts to spend more time applying contextual knowledge to the problem set, focusing their analysis.

Using Syria’s use of chemical weapons as a backdrop, what if regime personnel were observed operating in an area used to prepare chemical weapons in the days leading up to the attack? Hypothetically, we could call this an analysis failure where the IC had the indications but did not integrate and make sense of the incoming multi-INT data fast enough. Imagine instead HUMINT and other data sources not fully used in the analysis had been georeferenced and temporally tagged at collection, enabling an ABI analyst to retrieve and integrate the sources through an interactive spatial application tool.15 The ABI product then becomes a relationship “map” of the objects and entities and their transactions, such as those activities surrounding preparatory CW attack efforts. Even in contested battlespaces, where data sources are sparse, it is only through georeferencing all the available multi-INT data that the ABI analysts can begin their workflow.

After georeferencing the collected data within the ABI context, it will be integrated before exploitation. Georeferenced data are associated at the earliest integration point, before an analyst conducts detailed exploitation and analysis, not at the end of the production process. The ABI methodology looks for relationships at the earliest point of consumption, applying context earlier than in the classic intelligence process. That process, codified in joint doctrine as a production model of PCPAD, integrates exploited and analyzed single-source information at the end of the process.16 When executed, the PCPAD model narrowly focuses on exploiting the stovepiped data first and then passing to a multi-INT or all-source analyst to integrate the different pieces of exploited data as depicted in figure 2.atwood-figure2

Still, much of the IC continues to be mired in a linear process that relies too heavily on a preset targeted collection strategy as well as an independent single-source PED and analysis process to address intelligence gaps. Yet by embracing the ABI methodology, the IC can overcome profound yet surmountable challenges of transforming this antiquated intelligence process and the related analytic tradecraft into one best suited for success in today’s data-congested enterprise.

During execution, the PCPAD model narrowly focuses on a linear approach to pushing data, typically single-sourced, to address an intelligence gap driven by causation, like Syria’s CW example. In this traditional method, some information may have been inadvertently discounted during the stovepiped exploitation process. In some cases, the relevancy of the information only develops significance when associated and integrated with another data source at the time of exploitation. The ABI methodology will provide the means of avoiding the trap of viewing data from a single source or multiple sources of the same discipline and making what may well prove to be inaccurate or incomplete value judgments before understanding the full picture.

In so doing, the ABI methodology enables analysts to sift through large volumes and varieties of data to see how the data overlap and intersect, identifying associations and enabling significant events to rise above the noise of data triage. For instance, in our previous CW example, let us now presume a HUMINT or SIGINT tip, not “finished intelligence” reporting, has been intercepted indicating that the use of CW had been ordered. This is information that could have been integrated earlier in the intelligence production process. A GEOINT analyst routinely observing imagery may have not seen abnormal activity days leading up to the attack. However, if the HUMINT or SIGINT tip had been known by the GEOINT analyst at the time of imagery exploitation, then what was potentially disregarded as insignificant activity may have been associated with preparatory CW operations and identified as such.atwood-figure3

As depicted in figure 3, this potential ABI-derived discovery would then drive additional analysis including the time-dominant exploitation requirement of the GEOINT, SIGINT, and any additional INT data pertaining to that area. In this case, the time-dominant exploitation of the HUMINT or SIGINT provides the GEOINT analyst with enough insight to focus his exploitation efforts on a specific area of the imagery, potentially reducing exploitation resources. Assuming limited information is available to corroborate potentially anomalous activity, a dynamic re-tasking of sensors could be conducted, driving real-time collection. After the ABI analyst commingles the various pieces of data and identifies key pieces, exploitation begins to occur within each INT, providing the results to the multi-INT analysts to conduct integration of the exploited information and address the intelligence questions as the process continues to add additional information. Finally, an all-source analyst may receive the multi-INT integrated information to provide additional context and subject matter expertise to this ABI methodology discovered intelligence of preparatory CW operations.

In addition to PCPAD’s inherent inflexibility to integrate single INT sources earlier in the process, it relies too heavily on an antiquated preset targeted collection strategy against known adversary targets. The PCPAD premise of targeted collection is highly reliant on known and distinguishable signatures supported with doctrinally aligned tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) to be effective against such threats. The post–Cold War’s diffuse and complex threat environment displays inherently nonstate threats, fleeting signatures, and minimally supporting doctrine from which to focus PCPAD’s target-based collection strategy. To transform the current paradigm from a deliberate fixed target focus requires a revised model.

The ABI methodology does not have a traditional target-centric approach to analysis, like observing specific CW stockpiles and production facilities on a daily basis. Using the integrate before exploit ABI pillar, the analyst is informed by the commingled data, allowing him to search for observables and to potentially discover a threat signature or indicator that was not discernable in the PCPAD paradigm. An ABI analyst integrating a variety of disparate datasets in this fashion may have provided the activity linkage leading up to Syria’s CW attack well before the intelligence process reached the all-source analyst.

Furthermore, the observed activity, potential discoveries, and identification of gaps surrounding a specific problem set will in turn drive current and subsequent collection requirements as depicted in figure 3, with the arrow from “discovery” to “planning and direction.” This correlated data discovery will potentially answer questions that were never asked or the analysts were unaware of the answers or how to answer the question in the past. Accordingly, the collection manager and end customer do not necessarily need to know beforehand how the analysts plan to use the data, unlike the traditional targeted collection model. Such a transformation will likely drive predetermined collection decks obsolete, while also enabling the analysts to improve their understanding and build specialized collection strategies with faster decision cycles and anticipatory analysis.

The first two ABI methodological approaches of georeference to discover and data integration before exploitation with their focus on multi-INT data clustering can enable the discovery of new intelligence in a noisy data environment. Moreover, these new methods can also fundamentally transform the PCPAD and traditional analytic processes to be more responsive to analyst and warfighter needs.

The next pillar to achieving the ABI methodological transformation occurs only when we take a data (sensor) neutrality approach. This pillar is predicated on accepting all data sources—that each can potentially be equally viable and that one data source or piece of data is not biased over the other.17 In this case, an ABI analyst does not favor any particular intelligence discipline (for example, SIGINT) reporting over any other data source (for example, GEOINT synthetic aperture radar [SAR] imagery). Likewise, an ABI analyst must accept a nonspatial or georeferenced data source because it may act as a tip for other sources. For instance, SIGINT or HUMINT data that may have an error of probability that geographically covers a large city and cannot be pinpointed to a specific suburb or facility must be treated as just as viable as a piece of information with exacting coordinates. Also, a fleeting piece of intelligence, like transitory CW preparations and the nonpersistent nature of poisonous gas when employed, must reside at an analyst’s fingertips to correlate with the other pattern developing multi-INT data. Additionally, the data must encompass a full range of sources, to include OSINT, especially social media (for example, YouTube).18 For instance, local Syrian social media reports of the CW attack numbered in the thousands, with hundreds of videos to confirm the attack and highly credible reporting from international humanitarian organizations and hospitals.19 Of course, an ABI analyst has to understand and account for the confidence, reliability, and potential errors in the data source as well as the interrelationships of what the data from the separate sources are providing and their integrated results.

Much of the collected data prior to an event or abnormal activity, such as the activity observed 3 days prior to the CW attack, would likely appear irrelevant at the time of initial exploitation. However, the observed CW activity can be quickly identified as significant when an ABI analyst applies the sequence neutrality approach, the fourth pillar of ABI. Essentially, ABI analysis of the data may happen immediately, or the data may not become relevant until the analyst acquires more data and is able to develop a pattern of activity.20 As such, previously collected and archived multi-INT data analyzed in a forensic manner can be as or more important than data obtained near real time.21 Additionally, an ABI analyst will not be biased toward an archived dataset that was specifically part of the targeted collection deck. In fact, incidentally collected data may be as or more significant than data collected in a targeted fashion. In some cases, data may need to be reexploited and analyzed based on additional information or may be repurposed for a different target within the same collection window.

Establishing the ABI Methodology

The described examples reveal how ABI methodology provides insight earlier in the intelligence process, enabling analysts to spend more time gaining context and analyzing the problem, while machine-to-machine processing interfaces and correlates the georeferenced data automatically. This new paradigm, as reflected in figure 3 (with flipped pyramid), reveals how the DOD intelligence enterprise could shift its model of exploiting approximately 80 percent of the collected data to one focused only on the pertinent 20 percent.22 By analyzing only the pertinent information and focusing the PED efforts, there will be a net manpower and cost savings to answer the key intelligence questions in an ABI-enabled and discovery focused environment.

The DOD intelligence enterprise must avoid the temptation to focus purely on acquiring the next widget or-specific toolset and focus first on developing the proper big data–enabled analytic environment. Although these developmental ABI toolsets will be invaluable to eventually executing the methodology, the first foundational step for DOD to derive maximum value from its data must be to ensure that the sensor collection-to-analysis timeline is quick enough to detect a pattern. This process must take place in a matter of minutes to be truly actionable by a warfighter, not days (as seen in today’s multi-INT analysis paradigm). To accomplish this, the architecture must be able to scale to the level required to retrieve and transmit the vast new and old data sources and store the datasets efficiently for extended periods of time for archival analysis.

Available technologies such as the Cloud and High Performance Computing with advanced algorithms have matured rapidly and may provide the proper solution space to handle the data storage dilemma and processing of complex datasets that enable ABI. However, the Cloud and High Performance Computing do not completely resolve the requisite architecture and bandwidth requirements to transmit and retrieve large disparate datasets from the sensor to the analyst in a timely fashion.

The time is right to move toward an integrated DOD and national intelligence enterprise architecture “with budget realities, current state of technologies and a sense of urgency in the IC leadership all combining to create an optimal climate for positive change,” according to the IC Chief Information Officers in an IC Information Technology Enterprise (ITE) white paper.23 In 2012, the Director of National Intelligence moved to transform a historically agency-centric IT approach to a new model of common architecture—labeled IC ITE, which will provide the IT shared services model for the national IC. The five leading national intelligence agencies—Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, and National Reconnaissance Office—have combined efforts to move the community to a “single, secure, coherent, mutually operated and integrated IC IT Enterprise.”24 With over 70 percent of the IC under DOD, the IC and DOD have ideally paired to share a common vision and have a similar timeline and path ahead to ensure a broader intelligence enterprise approach. The DOD and IC share the same vision but are working on parallel solutions that are not necessarily creating a completely integrated intelligence enterprise with analytical transparency—allowing a seamless collaborative environment.25

The Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) has been charged with the herculean task of consolidating and integrating multiple DOD networks into one common, shared network known as the Joint Information Environment (JIE). Ostensibly, the JIE currently faces the challenge of interacting and competing DOD program offices and being funded only by participants who desire increased IT efficiencies. Furthermore, the IC ITE task force recently stated that the JIE “is neither an enterprise (requiring common mission and leadership) nor an architecture (requiring tight management of implementation).”26 In fact, Admiral David Simpson, DISA Vice Director, pointed out that the JIE “is not a program of record or a joint program office.”27 This troubling state of affairs suggests that DOD should reexamine the JIE and the end-goal of creating a common, integrated network when it does not include complete DOD buy-in, and more important, is not in sync with the IC ITE construct. This two-pronged approach with both JIE and IC ITE will drive many DOD intelligence organizations to pick between the two or, even worse, to have to develop a hybrid system that interacts with both. In fact, the Air Force ISR 2023 strategy contends that to handle the challenges of data overflow and to transform to an ABI methodology, the Air Force ISR enterprise must be a “full partner of the IC-ITE and JIE.”28 This approach portends an enterprise with uncommon IT services, disparate architectures, and an untenable budget during a more constrained economic environment.

Conclusion

Using the four-pillared approach, ABI will provide solutions to assembling an answer by fitting small bits of linked yet disparate information from brief ISR windows into a complete picture. This will enable analysts to pull meaningful images from a sea of pictures, enabling discovery and greater context across the fabric of data for subsequent analysis. The success of ABI relies on the integration and correlation of truly large amounts of multi-INT data, as well as the tools to handle and appreciate what the ABI methodology is revealing. Many analysts coming out of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan presuppose that ABI is only enabled by persistently collected data, like ubiquitous full-motion video, on activity and transactions over a broad area. However, ABI truly harnesses big data by using a variety of integrated sources regardless of sensor platform. Even in contested battlespaces such as the hypothetical CW example, ABI does not necessarily depend on 24/7 sensor coverage—it builds on a variety of multi-INT data that can be integrated to fill holes in sparse single-source datasets.

The DOD intelligence enterprise must look over the horizon to an ABI analytic environment where such ISR sources as streaming FMV, MTI, OPIR, SIGINT, MASINT, SAR, spectral, and thermal imagery are integrated at the post-processed and georeferenced entry point and compared with archived collected data in an automated fashion. By harnessing a new IT environment enabled by ABI methodologies, analysts will be able to rely on readily available high-speed machine-to-machine processing and big data to make ABI possible on a large scale. These intuitive concepts will require significant effort and a unified IC strategy to overcome the technical and cultural challenges of developing such an information-sharing environment and paradigm-shifting approach to the traditional intelligence process.

During the Cold War, the IC had a laser focus on the adversary and became adept at distinguishing and even predicting Soviet strategic bomber activity and surface-to-air missile TTPs because they possessed discernable signatures, and those signatures were embedded in doctrine. Today, the IC faces more dynamic and multifaceted adversaries that possess fleeting signatures and minimally supporting doctrine. The DOD intelligence enterprise must collectively invest in the ABI tools, develop analyst tradecraft, and embrace a transformed intelligence process to repossess this level of understanding. Only then will we be able to address the near peer countries and asymmetric threats, exhibiting weak and nonpersistent signatures for tactical and strategic production needs.

Source:
This article was originally published in the Joint Force Quarterly 77, which is published by the National Defense University.

Notes

  1. Robert P. Otto, Air Force ISR 2023: Delivering Decision Advantage (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the U.S. Air Force, 2013).
  2. Lydia Ines Rivera, Debbie Salierno, and Allen Siwap, “Multi-Intelligence Distribution Architecture,” Capstone Team Project, University of California, San Diego, 2013.
  3. Michael W. Isherwood, Layering ISR Forces, Mitchell Paper 8, (Arlington, VA: Mitchell Institute Press, December 2011).
  4. John K. Langley, “Occupational Burnout and Retention of Air Force Distributed Common Ground System (DCGS) Intelligence Personnel,” RGSD-306 (Ph.D. diss., Pardee RAND Graduate School, 2012).
  5. Michael Farber et al., Massive Data Analytics and the Cloud: A Revolution in Intelligence Analysis (McLean, VA: Booz Allen Hamilton, 2011).
  6. Letitia A. Long, “Activity Based Intelligence: Understanding the Unknown,” The Intelligencer 20, no. 2 (Fall/Winter 2013), 7–15.
  7. David Gauthier, “Activity-Based Intelligence Definition for the Intelligence Community,” National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, 2013.
  8. Jon Kimminau, author interview, October 18, 2013.
  9. Gauthier.
  10. “Government Assessment of the Syrian Government’s Use of Chemical Weapons on August 21, 2013,” The White House, August 30, 2013.
  11. Shane Harris et al., “U.S. Had Intel on Chemical Strike Before It Was Launched,” Foreign Policy, August 30, 2013.
  12. Gauthier.
  13. Mark Phillips, “A Brief Overview of Activity Based Intelligence and Human Domain Analytics,” Trajectory, 2012.
  14. Gauthier.
  15. Ibid.
  16. Joint Publication 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, 2012).
  17. Gauthier.
  18. Kristin Quinn, “A Better Toolbox: Analytic Methodology Has Evolved Significantly Since the Cold War,” Trajectory (Winter 2012), 1–8.
  19. “Government Assessment.”
  20. Quinn.
  21. Gauthier.
  22. Robert Jimenez, presentation, Big Data for Intelligence Symposium, Defense Strategies Institute, November 2013.
  23. Accenture, “Driving High Performance in Government: Maximizing the Value of Public-Sector Shared Services,” The Government Executive Series, January 2005; Terry Roberts et al., White Paper, “Intelligence Community Information Technology Enterprise: Doing in Common What Is Commonly Done,” Intelligence and National Security Alliance, February 2013.
  24. Ibid.
  25. Ibid.
  26. Ibid.
  27. Amber Corrin, “JIE’s Murky Progress Raising Questions,” FCW [Federal Computer Week], August 27, 2013.
  28. Otto.

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World Bank President Outlines Strategy To End Poverty

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World Bank Group President Jim Yong Kim on Tuesday announced a broad strategy to end extreme poverty by 2030, and he welcomed emerging players such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the New Development Bank, established by the BRICS countries, as potentially strong allies in the economic development of poor countries and emerging markets.

“If the world’s multilateral banks, including the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the New Development Bank, can form alliances, work together, and support development that addresses these challenges, we all benefit – especially the poor and most vulnerable,” said Kim. “It is our hope – indeed, our expectation – that these new entries will join the world’s multilateral development banks and our private sector partners on a shared mission to promote economic growth that helps the poorest.”

“I will do everything in my power to find new and innovative ways to work with these new institutions,” Kim said.

Speaking today at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington in advance of the World Bank/IMF Spring Meetings, Kim noted that to achieve the World Bank’s twin goals — ending extreme poverty by 2030 and boosting shared prosperity among the poorest 40 percent in low- and middle-income countries — “there is more than enough work to go around.”

The new multilateral banks could help bridge financing gaps in areas such as infrastructure, energy, and water, said Kim. “We estimate that the world needs an additional US$1 to 1.5 trillion dollars every year to be invested in infrastructure – roads, bridges, railways, airports, and energy plants. By 2030, we will most likely also need 40 percent more energy and face a 40 percent shortfall of water – pressures that may well be further accelerated by climate change.”

Kim hailed the substantial development progress over the past 25 years. “In 1990, when the world population was 5.2 billion, 36 percent of the world lived in extreme poverty. Today – with 7.3 billion people — an estimated 12 percent live in poverty. Over the past 25 years, the world has gone from nearly 2 billion people living in extreme poverty to fewer than 1 billion.”

However, Kim noted that there are still nearly a billion people living on less than US$1.25 a day.

“Few of us can even imagine what this must be like. Let’s remember what poverty is. Poverty is 2.5 billion people not having access to financial accounts. Poverty is 1.4 billion people without access to electricity. Poverty is also putting your children to bed without food. And poverty is not going to school because everyone in the family needs to earn a few cents each day.”

To meet this challenge, Kim outlined a strategy to end extreme poverty, based on the best global knowledge now available, that he summed up in three words: Grow, Invest, and Insure.

  • “The world economy needs to grow faster, and grow more sustainably. It needs to grow in a way that makes sure some of our vast wealth goes to the poor.”
  • “The second part of the strategy is to invest – and by that, I mean especially to invest in people through education and health.”
  • “The final part of the strategy is to insure. This means governments providing social safety nets as well as building systems to protect against disasters and the rapid spread of disease.”

Kim said there was no single blueprint for countries on how they deploy the three-pronged strategy to end extreme poverty, but that it pointed to priorities for the future.

“First, agricultural productivity must increase. Second, we must build infrastructure that provides access to energy, irrigation, and markets. Third, we must promote greater and freer trade. Fourth, we must invest in the health and education of women and children. And fifth, we must implement social safety nets and provide social insurance, including initiatives that protect against the impact of natural disasters and pandemics.”

2015 is the most important year for global development in recent times, said Kim, and the decisions made this year will have an unprecedented impact on the lives of several billion people across the world for generations to come.

“In July, world leaders will gather in Addis Ababa to discuss how we will finance our development priorities in the years ahead. In September, world leaders come together at the United Nations to establish the Sustainable Development Goals – a group of targets and goals set for 2030 – just 15 years from now. And in December, leaders of countries again will gather in Paris to work out an agreement based on government commitments to lessen the severe short- and long-term risks of climate change.”

The end of extreme poverty is in reach, Kim stated, but to achieve this ambitious goal would require greater collaboration between governments, the private sector, and multilateral development bank partners, including the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the New Development Bank.

“The decisions we make this year, and the alliances we form with other institutions in the years ahead, will help determine whether we have a chance to reach our goal of ending extreme poverty in just 15 years.”

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US Defense Secretary Carter Stresses Commitment To Saudi Arabia

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US Defense Secretary Ash Carter spoke by telephone with Saudi Arabian Defense Minister Prince Mohammed bin Salman on Monday and praised the countries’ strategic relationship, Pentagon officials said in a written statement.

According to the statement, Carter underscored the U.S. commitment to the region and Saudi Arabia’s security, emphasizing the importance of limiting civilian casualties when conducting airstrikes.

“The two leaders agreed on the need to work toward a political solution in Yemen, and they discussed the importance of continuing to combat al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula,” the statement said. “They also promised to collaborate closely over the next several weeks to address security issues in the region.”

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Saudi Arabia Claims Iran Aiding Houthis In Yemen With Arms, Money

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Iran is supporting the Houthis with weapons and money in Yemen, including helping them on the ground to build arms factories, according to Saudi Ambassador in the United States Adel Al-Jubeir.

Speaking at a press conference with American and Arab journalists in Washington on Monday, Al-Jubeir said this is also the view of the American administration.

“Iran provides financial support for the Houthis, helps them build weapon factories, and gives them weapons. In addition, that there are Iranians working alongside the Houthis,” Al-Jubeir told journalists.

The envoy cited reports that the US has already intercepted an Iranian cargo ship loaded with weapons and missiles destined for the Houthis, saying: “When I talk with US officials, they know that this is what the Iranians are doing with the Houthis. There is no difference between us and the United States of America relating to Iran’s support for the Houthis.”

The Saudi diplomat reportedly warned foreign governments not to underplay the role of Iran and its Revolutionary Guards in backing the Houthis and other insurgent forces in the Middle East.

Al-Jubeir drew comparisons to the Lebanese militia, Hezbollah, and claims in the 1980s that it was largely an independent actor from Iran, even while it received money, weapons and training from the Revolutionary Guards. This analysis was wrong, Al-Jubeir said.

“We don’t want people to make the same mistake with the Houthis,” he said.

“Operation Decisive Storm is ongoing and we are in the process of destroying weapons that may pose a threat to the Kingdom, whether they are air weapons or ballistic missiles or heavy weapons, and we have destroyed Al-Houthi’s centers of command,” he said.

He said there continues to be support for the coalition from partners and allies around the world, including France, Britain and the US.

Al-Jubeir said there are efforts underway to find a political solution to the crisis and ensure a stable Yemen. Yemenis should reach an agreement based on the Gulf initiative and the results of the national dialogue, he said.

“We are sure that this process cannot be carried out without the presence of a legitimate government and adhering to a number of principles which prohibit any use of force or possession of heavy weapons by any group outside the legitimate security forces in the country,” he said.

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New Arab Order To Defend Middle East – OpEd

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By Osama Al Sharif

After more than two years of negotiations Iran has reached a framework agreement with the international community over its controversial nuclear program. It would take another three months to agree on technical details but both parties are already celebrating what has been described as an historic deal.

The long-term agreement would guarantee that Iran’s program will remain peaceful and that Tehran will never be able to build a nuclear weapon. From now on its activities will be subject to international verification and monitoring. In return related UN, US and European sanctions will be removed, allowing Iran’s economy to recover.

But what is probably more important than the agreement is the fact that Iran will be able to reverse its position as a pariah state and be welcomed back into the international community. Critics of the agreement, including Israel and a number of Arab states, believe that Iran will now feel free to press on with its regional agenda; one that threatens the stability and security of the entire region. Already Tehran is accused of interfering in the affairs of Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen. For Israel, Iran is seen as posing an existential threat that must be contained.

Much of these concerns are based on facts. Iran has become a major player in the region and is seen as being responsible for igniting sectarian confrontations in a number of Arab countries. The latest deal will boost its regional ambitions and deepen Arab suspicions, especially in the Gulf area. This is why President Obama has called on Gulf leaders to meet with him at Camp David in May to discuss regional security concerns.

But dealing with perceived Iranian threats will require much more than building pacts and investing in military hardware. The Arab order has been stagnating for decades. Today it is being challenged in Syria, Libya, Yemen, Iraq and others. Religious extremism and sectarian conflicts have evolved to present this dilapidated order with fresh challenges. And so far Arab response to these challenges has been confused and contradictory. To protect the national security of one state, the entire order must be rebuild from scratch.

Only a strong Arab system that stretches from Morocco to Oman will be able to reinvent itself and be ready face regional competitors such as Iran, Turkey and Israel.

The conflict in Yemen presents the GCC with a tough challenge where military intervention will not be enough to end the Houthi rebellion and put the country back on the path of recovery. A land incursion will complicate matters further.

In light of Iran’s growing regional influence, Arab leaders must rethink their strategy. Fresh ideas are needed to build a regional coalition that is based on collective security and common sustainable development; two objectives that the Arab League has failed to achieve.

Only a strong Arab order can check Iran’s territorial and political ambitions. The challenges facing the Arab world today are complicated and diverse. They range from religious extremism to unemployment and poverty. A new approach to these challenges will have to be created; one that seeks to deal with the region as an entity and not with the plight of one country at the expense of the other.

This new Arab order will have to tackle security threats, regional crises as well as long-term social, economic and development issues. It will require a new definition of pan-Arab cooperation where the national security of one country becomes part and parcel of the security of all.

Today Arab national security is being tested in more than one country. What happens in Syria or Iraq will affect the stability of the rest of Arab countries. And the chaos in Libya and Yemen poses serious challenges to the entire Arab order and not only the GCC.

The fact is Iran would not dare meddle in the affairs of Syria, Iraq and Yemen if Arab countries adopted a united approach and a common strategy. And by the same token lack of such strategy will encourage Iran and others to interfere in Arab affairs.

What is needed now is to forge a plan to enhance inter-Arab cooperation along a comprehensive approach to the challenges facing this region. As a start the charter of the Arab League will have to be rewritten in a way that takes into consideration the realities of the region. The driving force will have to be economic cooperation that confronts the issues of unemployment and poverty; two main reasons for the growth of extremism in the region. It’s a tall order but leaders should act now in order to create momentum for a new regional bloc that will be able to defend the security and stability of the region.

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Portugal And The AIIB: What Implications For Relationship With US? – Analysis

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By Paulo Gorjåo

On March 31 the Portuguese government announced its intention to join the new China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) as a founding member. The details over the pros and cons that were weighed in the decision process are not yet known. The brief communiqué by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs solely stated that Portuguese participation—via the AIIB and within the field of economic diplomacy—aimed at creating better conditions for those Portuguese companies willing to partake in infrastructure investment projects in Asia.1

Portugal

Portugal

Although the communiqué is silent about the geopolitical, or politico-diplomatic, dimension, it is highly likely that the Portuguese government faced, up to the very last moment, the same dilemmas that other European partners had to deal with. From the beginning, the United States has not hidden its hostility towards the AIIB, in the sense that it represents a clear China-led challenge to American hegemony in the framework of global governance and, in particular, to the World Bank and IMF.

In retrospect, the American strategy failed dramatically. Oddly enough, the United Kingdom is largely to blame for that failure. In an unusual public rebuke, the White House criticized the United Kingdom for “constant accommodation” of China.2 As expected, from the moment the British government broke the embargo—the first G7 country to do so— other European states followed, as was the case with France, Germany, Italy and Portugal, among others.

There was a clash of two distinct approaches over the best way to deal with China’s growing assertiveness: containment and engagement.3 The United States regarded the Chinese challenge in a strict geopolitical perspective and devised a containment policy.

Facing the challenge represented by the rising power, the American government sought to contain and isolate the AIIB, namely regarding its projection in terms of the number of member-states. The United States is clearly aware of the challenge posed by China to its hegemony and to the rules of international order instituted in the aftermath of the Second World War.4 Naturally, the present—and previous—American administration seeks to face and eliminate (postpone in the worst case-scenario) the rise of China. In fact, the United States is resisting to its own detriment. In this context, the AIIB is just one challenge5 among many others—political, economic and military—posed by China and which the United States has been trying to respond to in recent years.

For their part, European governments have focused less on the geopolitical dimension and responded via a cooperation and engagement policy. Evidently, and to answer Teresa de Sousa’s question,6 Europe favors a world dominated by the United States, rather than by China. Having said this, for a number of reasons the American approach has always had an unsteady foundation. There is a generalized sense in the European Union that the United States is, to a large extent, politically responsible for the AIIB’s emergence.

Although the IMF’s model of governance, and respective quotas, was reviewed and approved by the White House in 2010, its approval by the American Congress is still pending.7 Given this deadlock, with no end in sight, the Chinese response has therefore not only a certain degree of political legitimacy, but has also been widely accepted and understood by Europe.

At the same time, the European states argued that their presence as founding members would allow, from inside and in a more efficient manner, to shape AIIB’s rules and working standards. The United States argued for the opposite stance, i.e. that it would be from the outside that greater influence would be attained in the definition of the organization’s workings. Although it is not guaranteed that the European states will manage to have a relevant say—with or without a joint negotiating position— the argument is in each case conceptually valid. At the very least, the European strategy appears to be more promising than the American one.8

Furthermore, Portuguese diplomacy always seeks to position itself at the front line of any multilateral initiative. Naturally, having weighed the pros and cons—of a process that may not have been consensual9—the AIIB should not be an exception to the rule.

However, coupled with the issue of legitimacy, or lack thereof, and the drafting of rules and working standards, there is the short-term interest. Within the framework of a zero-sum rationale, the European states, each accordingly to the scale of their interests, intended to guarantee a slice of the potential gains. For instance, as seen above, the Portuguese government sought to ensure that Portuguese companies are in good conditions— or at the very least not to be adversely affected—whenever they demonstrate a willingness to participate in projects in the Asian region.

None of this means that Portugal regards the transatlantic relationship, and the United States in particular, in a less important manner. An article in a daily newspaper stated that “majority sources” welcomed Portugal’s accession to the AIIB (as a founding member) as a normal development, taking into account the “little consideration” the United States has for Portuguese interests, for example regarding the Lajes Field.10 Such a reading of events is short-sighted and highlights the total lack of understanding over what is at stake. With or without the Lajes Field going through a renegotiation process, Portugal should join the AIIB. These are independent cases, hence, there is no reason for retaliation policies. In addition, Portuguese participation in the AIIB should not be seen as a blow directed at the United States nor to its detriment.

Notwithstanding Portugal’s recent tendency of deepening ties with China, something which in a way is redrawing its strategic geography,11 the relationship with the United States—in the political, diplomatic, economic and defense dimensions— is still a key and irreplaceable feature of Portuguese foreign policy.

About the author:
*Paulo Gorjåo, Portuguese Institute of International Relations and Security (IPRIS)

Source:
This article was published by IPRIS as IPRIS Viewpoints 179 April 2015 (PDF).

Notes:
1. “Portugal aderiu ao Banco Asiático de Investimento em Infraestruturas” (Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros: Governo de Portugal, 2 April 2015).
2. Geoff Dyer and George Parker, “US attacks UK over China stance” (Financial Times, 13 March 2015), p. 1.
3. See David Pilling, “‘Accommodating’ Beijing may be no bad thing” (Financial Times, 19 March 2015), p. 9; and, Philip Stephens, “China’s rise confounds a splintered west” (Financial Times, 27 March 2015), p. 9
4. See Lawrence Summers, “It is time the US leadership woke up to a new economic era” (Financial Times, 6 April 2015), p. 7.
5. Kenneth Rogoff, “Will China’s Infrastructure Bank Work?” (Project Syndicate, 6 April 2015).
6. Teresa de Sousa, “Sabemos a pergunta mesmo sem saber qual é a melhor resposta” (Público, 22 March 2015), p. 56.
7. See Anna Yukhananov, “U.S. Congress closes out year without passing IMF reforms” (Reuters, 10 December 2014).
8. See Fred Bergsten, “America should work from the inside with China’s new development bank” (Financial Times, 16 March 2015), p. 9.
9. Five days from the final deadline, the Portuguese government’s decision was not yet known, possibly highlighting intra and/or inter-ministerial divergences and deadlocks. See Paulo Zacarias Gomes, “Portugal adere ou não a banco de investimento chinês?” (Diário Económico, 27 March 2015).
10. Paula Sá, “Portugal também pediu a adesão ao Banco de Investimento Asiático” (Diário de Notícias, 2 April 2015).
11. See Paulo Gorjão, “Portugal and China: The rise of a new strategic geography?” (IPRIS Viewpoints, No. 81, January 2012).

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Obama Disparages Christians – OpEd

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“On Easter,” President Barack Obama at the White House Easter breakfast said, “I do reflect on the fact that as a Christian, I am supposed to love. And I have to say that sometimes when I listen to less than loving expressions by Christians, I get concerned.”

Well, Mr. President, I get more than concerned when I hear you denigrate Christians—no one can forget your swipe about them clinging to their guns or religion—I get nauseous.

The president had a grand opportunity to say something timely and urgent, such as the following: “I do reflect on the fact that as a Christian, I am supposed to love. This is not always easy, especially when Muslim barbarians single out Christians for execution in Kenya.”

Last week, Obama could not muster the courage to mention by name the religious affiliation of those who were chosen for execution—they are called Christians—but he has no problem letting the name Christian roll off his lips when it comes to disparaging them.

The reason why Obama did not mention Christians by name last week is because he does not want to offend Muslims. The reason he mentioned Christians by name today is because he does not mind offending Christians. It’s just that simple, and just that sick.

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Intervention In Libya: Lessons In Leading – Analysis

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By Dakota Wood, Charlotte Florance and James Phillips*

The Arab Spring undoubtedly changed the political, economic, and security landscape in the Middle East and North Africa. More than four years after the self-immolation of Tunisian street vendor Mohamed Bouazizi and the catalytic explosion of the event on social media among Arab youth populations, authoritarian regimes quickly came under fire, with protests and rebellions erupting in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Libya, Bahrain, Syria, Jordan, and Morocco. While the leadership in Jordan and Morocco responded quickly to popular demands to reform the political systems and hold constitutional referenda, authoritarian regimes in Syria and Libya fared very differently. Syria remains mired in a brutal civil war and has become an Islamist terrorist paradise spanning the Syrian–Iraqi border. Oil-rich Libya has disintegrated in a series of sub-state conflicts.

Libya's Muammar al-Gaddafi. Photo Credit: U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Jesse B. Awalt/Released

Libya’s Muammar al-Gaddafi. Photo Credit: U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Jesse B. Awalt/Released

The plundering of Muammar Qadhafi’s vast stocks of arms, and their proliferation throughout northern Africa after his death, destabilized the greater Sahel region, including the Islamist and Tuareg insurgencies in Mali. Libya has become not only a breeding ground for terrorism, but also the regional cockpit for a lethal proxy war in which Turkey, Qatar, and Sudan support Islamist extremist factions, and Egypt and the United Arab Emirates support a “moderate” eastern alliance of a mix of political groups.[1] Surely, this is not what the Obama Administration had in mind when it undertook to remove Qadhafi from power with a now-infamous “lead from behind” style of intervention in Libya.[2]

The “Liberation” of Libya

The Arab uprisings, beginning in late 2010 and spilling into 2011, presented serious challenges for the Obama Administration. While the “Arab Spring” was met with euphoric reactions in many Western capitals, including Washington, the conditions on the ground in many countries, particularly in Libya, did not favor the establishment of a stable democracy. In fact, it was highly questionable whether democracy could take root at all in a country ravaged for decades by a brutal dictator, and lacking any experience with democratic traditions or sustainable state institutions. As if to validate this concern, Qadhafi responded in true dictatorial fashion to the protests heating up in Libya—with brute force.

By late February 2011, members of the Qadhafi regime were renouncing the government and pressuring the United Nations to help depose Qadhafi. In response to this and growing reports of violence against civilians, the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 1970 (UNSCR 1970)[3] on February 26, condemning the Qadhafi regime’s use of force against protestors, imposing an arms embargo, and restricting travel rights and freezing financial assets of designated government officials. By mid-March, fears of the regime’s forces committing mass atrocities to suppress the rebel momentum was a turning point for the Obama Administration, although subsequent reporting from groups such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch indicated that the scale of violence on the ground was not as great as the scenario that the Administration used to build an intervention narrative.[4] On March 17, the U.N. Security Council passed UNSCR 1973,[5] which reaffirmed the concerns and provisions of UNSCR 1970, authorized U.N. member states to “take all necessary measures…to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack” by the government, but forbade foreign occupation of Libya.

Operation Odyssey Dawn,[6] led by France and the United Kingdom and supported by the U.S., was launched to implement UNSCR 1973. Control of the operation was passed to NATO on March 31, 2011, which continued implementation under Operation Unified Protector.[7] Again, the U.S. was in support, providing command-and-control capabilities, intelligence, cruise missile strikes, and supplying various precision-guided munitions (“smart bombs” and cruise missiles) to the international force.

After several months, Libyan opposition groups, with assistance from the international community, were able to push back government forces and gain control of eastern Libya, including the city of Benghazi, and methodically expand their control westward to eventually take control of Tripoli. Fighting between Qadhafi loyalists and the forces of the self-appointed National Transitional Council (NTC) raged from February to mid-November 2011, with NTC forces having captured all major cities by late October. Qadhafi was killed on October 20. By mid-November, the governments of all major foreign states had formally recognized the NTC as the official government of Libya. Operation Unified Protector formally ended on October 31 after the NTC declared Libya liberated,[8] at which time multinational involvement effectively ceased, including any meaningful involvement by the United States.

What unfolded in Libya after its liberation was predicted by many, but the situation in the country and its geographic proximity to the region’s other hotspots and the capitals of Europe should have been more cause for concern during the initial planning phases. One must look no further than former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates’s brief breakdown of Libya’s fragmented history prior to unification to understand what the country could devolve back into absent a significant unifying force, something the Obama Administration decided not to facilitate.[9]

Desired Outcomes Demand Committed Involvement

During the initial crisis period, when the population rose up against the regime, the various factions involved were relatively unified and focused by the common objective of regime overthrow. Once Qadhafi was gone, however, the institutions necessary to govern a country and maintain security—from national defense to local law enforcement—also ceased to exist in any coordinated or unified sense. Militias and tribal groups once allied in their quest to defeat Qadhafi were now faced with a very different reality in Libya: competition for political dominance. But as is the case with the majority of revolutions, power was set to pass on “to the best organized and most ruthless elements in the revolution.”[10] The new NTC, composed of a great many factions, became consumed with the immediate challenges of organizing a government that accounted for the diversity of interests and objectives. While the NTC focused on that task, the rest of the country descended into chaos, resulting in opportunistic exploitation by groups large and small in major cities and across the country, loss of control of borders (enabling the movement of groups from other countries into Libya), and loss of control of Qadhafi’s old weapons stores, which were looted and the arms distributed among a multitude of militias. The arms were proliferated across the loosely controlled borders to places such as northern Mali, destabilizing the region further.

Throughout the intervention, the U.S. played a supporting role—“leading from behind”[11]—while France and the U.K. led coalition airstrikes and related activities. The Obama Administration argued that this supporting role would prevent the U.S. from being dragged into yet another foreign morass while creating opportunities for other states to exercise leadership in their own regions. Critics argued that this approach was one more step in the diminution of U.S. influence that would result in lessened ability to shape the affairs and conditions of countries, regions, and issues of importance to U.S. interests.[12] What is clear is that without a policy that accounted for the removal of the Qadhafi regime, the coalition that worked for Qadhafi’s removal had no effective mechanism by which to implement a “comprehensive effort to build a workable governance or internal security apparatus.”[13]

By the time it became clear that the situation was spiraling into chaos, it was too late to do anything about it. Because the U.S. was not prepared to take effective action to stabilize Libya at the outset, the power vacuum created by Qadhafi’s removal, the inherent dysfunction of the indigenous militia coalition, and the unwillingness of the multinational coalition to be more involved combined to favor the growth of Islamist extremists and the resulting regional instability. Programs to secure armories or to disarm militias were not taken seriously by the coalition partners, and it was not until 2013, nearly two years later, that the Obama Administration seriously considered supporting the professionalization of the security forces.

Given the lessons that should have been learned from the consequences of some of the early decisions in the Iraq war, such as disbanding local law enforcement and other stabilizing authorities in the wake of Saddam Hussein’s removal, it is alarming that nearly the same mistakes were made in Libya. The failure of the Coalition, and of U.S. leadership in particular, to plan for potential post-Qadhafi developments and to take a more proactive role in shaping the outcome of events has resulted in Libya being well on its way to becoming a new Somalia.

Leading Means Leading

For a U.S. Administration that has so often addressed the supposed failings of the Bush Administration in Iraq and Afghanistan, the decision to support the rebels in Libya in March 2011 without a clear strategy for engagement with Libya after Qadhafi seems naive, if not tragically irresponsible. There was no clearly defined endgame or articulation of what victory would look like once Qadhafi was deposed. Consequently, the Administration appears not to have had any plan for dealing with Libya’s resulting condition. The events that have unfolded in Libya (including the death of four Americans, among them Ambassador Christopher Stevens in 2012) over the past four years highlight the dangers of not fully considering the consequences of a minimalist approach to something as significant as regime change. Putting aside the debate over whether it was appropriate for the U.S. to become involved in the multinational military intervention, once the Obama Administration chose to become involved, it also chose to allow others to determine outcomes.

Leading from behind ultimately led to fewer options and opportunities to correct course, because the U.S. was not at the helm to steer the effort as the situation changed. Today, Libya is a boiling cauldron in which an array of interests are mixed to include the security of neighboring Europe and regional powers in the Middle East, the hyper-violent efforts of extremist groups such as Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State to extend and consolidate their rule, and the competing efforts of a vast array of militias, ranging from moderate to radical, to dominate the local political landscape, with many now serving as proxies for external interests.

The effect of instability rippling out from Libya has been chilling. The Tuareg-based insurgency in northern Mali was overtaken by an Islamist insurgency; the situation grew with such intensity and reach in 2013 that the French were compelled to intervene militarily. Vast numbers of weapons looted from Libya have proliferated across the region, some of which are believed to now be in northern Nigeria, Gaza, and in the Sinai Peninsula in Egypt—a deeply troubling development for regional and international security.

Lessons for Leadership

Though the story of post-Qadhafi Libya is still unfolding in blood and mayhem, there are five key lessons that must be learned if policymakers and national leaders are to avoid yet another tragic repeat of missed opportunities and unnecessary loss:

  1. Determine national interests at stake. Determine what interests are at stake with the existing powers and actors in place, how important those interests are to the nation, and whether those interests are sufficiently in jeopardy to warrant not only the effort necessary to change conditions but to hazard unexpected outcomes.
  2. Envision what follows. Before deciding to change an existing order, decide what one would like to see in its place and determine whether the will, time, and resources exist to make that outcome happen. If one cannot envision and articulate what the day-after should look like, and has not determined to commit the resources necessary to see the effort through, it is generally unwise to trade the known for whatever fate might bring.
  3. Assess the risk to one’s own interests if others are determining the outcome. If deciding to cede leadership at the beginning to others, one cannot be surprised if they quit once their interests are satisfied, leaving one’s own interests unmet or the general situation in disarray.
  4. Develop an appropriate strategy. Starting a war is relatively easy. Winning one is never assured, but for the U.S., against most any country, it is much more likely than not. Winning the peace, however, takes skill, focus, statecraft, and a long-term commitment. Any U.S. strategy for intervention must always account not only for the actions necessary to defeat an opposing power militarily, but for establishing the basis for what is to follow, and for influencing and shaping the power structure meant to replace the one just removed. U.S. strategy should always include consideration of “what comes after.”
  5. Accept the burden of leadership, an essential element for success. Leading from behind, that is, depending on others to see to U.S. interests, is a prescription for leaving U.S. interests behind. Other powers will always place a higher priority on their own interests that will not necessarily align with those of the U.S. Leading from behind means that others will shape things along paths that serve their interests, which can include lack of any interest in remaining involved at all after the military objective has been accomplished. This is what happened in Libya with the consequence that when everyone else went home, the U.S. had no ability, no vantage point, by which to influence how conditions evolved post-Qadhafi. If the U.S. means to see an outcome acceptable to its interests, it must shoulder the burden of leading the effort, including the frustrating work of establishing a viable postwar order.

As amply illustrated in the multinational effort to support the liberation of Libya from the dictatorial rule of Muammar Qadhafi, breaking apart an existing order and then walking away assuming that the resulting shambles will somehow realign in a desirable outcome without further involvement was a recipe for disaster. U.S. policymakers should have foreseen that, in the chaotic aftermath of war, creating a functional government would not be an easy task and would be all the more difficult in the absence of any third party able to act as a mediator among competing factions. Further, the U.S. should have expected that competition for power and influence in the new Libya might not resolve in favor of U.S. interests, thus highlighting the importance of remaining involved in the rebuilding of Libya’s governing and security structures to shape their development along a preferred path. It is always in the United States’ interest to ensure that its interests are not critically dependent on the efforts of others.

Having been the single most important enabler of the multinational effort to overthrow Qadhafi, by providing the means to wage war, the reputation of the U.S. was inextricably linked to the outcome in Libya. Further, America’s security interests—both in the physical security of its friends and allies and the security of America itself and that of Americans abroad—were likewise tied to what would rise from the ashes. A stable Libya with a government that is friendly to the U.S. would preclude the rise of terrorist elements using the country as an operational sanctuary. But a Libya torn by war and mired in anarchy is everything the U.S. had “led from behind” to change. Worse still, a Libya riven by warring factions and lacking the involvement of any great power to help steer its path toward stability is the sort of sanctuary for terrorists that not even Qadhafi would have tolerated.

The Obama Administration’s decision not to lead in Libya, and its failure to implement a strategy that accounted for what should follow in the days after “liberation,” resulted in the worst of all outcomes: Libya as a haven for terrorists, U.S. influence diminished, and U.S. security interests placed at greater risk.

Final lesson: The United States must have a plan to win the peace—not just the war.

*About the authors:
Dakota L. Wood is Senior Research Fellow for Defense Programs in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign and National Security Policy, of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy, at The Heritage Foundation. Charlotte Florance is a Policy Analyst for Africa and the Middle East in the Allison Center. James Phillips is Senior Research Fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs in the Allison Center.

Source:
This article was published by The Heritage Foundation.

Notes:
[1] “Libya: The Next Failed State,” The Economist, January 10, 2015, http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21638122-another-font-global-mayhem-emergingnot-helped-regional-meddling-and-western (accessed March 17, 2015).

[2] Aamer Madhani, “Obama Says Libya’s Qaddafi Must Go,” National Journal, March 3, 2011, http://www.nationaljournal.com/obama-says-libya-s-qaddafi-must-go-20110303 (accessed March 17, 2015).

[3] United Nations Security Council, “Resolution 1970 (2011),” February 26, 2011, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1970%282011%29 (accessed March 17, 2015).

[4] Alan Kuperman, “Lessons from Libya: How Not to Intervene,” Harvard Kennedy School, Belfer Center Policy Brief, September 2013, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/23387/lessons_from_libya.html (accessed March 17, 2015).

[5] United Nations Security Council, “Resolution 1973 (2011),” March 17, 2011, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1973%282011%29 (accessed March 17, 2015).

[6] Jim Garamone, “Coalition Launches ‘Operation Odyssey Dawn,’” American Forces Press Service, March 19, 2011, http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=63225 (accessed March 17, 2015).

[7] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “NATO and Libya: Operation Unified Protector, February–October 2011,” March 27, 2012, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/71679.htm (accessed March 17, 2015).

[8] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “NATO Secretary General Statement on End of Libya Mission,” October 28, 2011, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_80052.htm (accessed March 17, 2015).

[9] Robert M. Gates, Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War (New York: Knopf, 2014), p. 522.

[10] Niall Ferguson, “Americans and Revolutions,” Newsweek, February 27, 2011, http://www.newsweek.com/niall-ferguson-americans-and-revolutions-68631 (accessed March 17, 2015).

[11] Ryan Lizza, “The Consequentialist: How the Arab Spring Remade Obama’s Foreign Policy,” The New Yorker, May 2, 2011, http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2011/05/02/the-consequentialist (accessed March 17, 2015).

[12] Charles Krauthammer, “The Obama Doctrine: Leading from Behind,” The Washington Post, April 28, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-obama-doctrine-leading-from-behind/2011/04/28/AFBCy18E_story.html (accessed March 17, 2015).

[13] John Hudson, “It’s Not Benghazi, It’s Everything,” Foreign Policy, May 20, 2014, http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/05/20/its-not-benghazi-its-everything/ (accessed March 17, 2015).

The post Intervention In Libya: Lessons In Leading – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

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