While world media highlights the White House announcement of an imminent meeting between US President Barack Obama and Cuba’s Raul Castro in Panama, a warning arrives from Havana on the ‘thaw’ in relations between the two.

Ahead of the VII Summit of the Americas (10-11 April), Cuban Trade and Foreign Investment Minister Rodrigo Malmierca criticized Washington’s limited steps to ease the crippling embargo imposed on Cuba since 1960 as “insufficient”.

“This policy of the White House imposed over half a century ago remains unchanged. The measures Obama ordered are incomplete and insufficient, and do not change the essence of this unilateral measure taken by the US government against Cuba”, Malmierca told state newspaper Granma.

The minister recognized that the process to fully lift the ‘bloqueo’, as it is called by the Cubans, will be long and complex – because opposed by Republicans who control the US congress – however stressing the importance of a true “normalization” of bilateral ties. The Cuban government takes a positive view of a future when US companies can trade and invest on the island, but also warned they will receive no preferential treatment. “It’s true we take a positive view, when US laws permit, of their being able trade and invest, but that does not imply preferential treatment”, warned the minister.

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The first flight of the International Committee of the Red Cross carrying medical personnel has landed at the Sanaa airport, said Dominik Stillhart, ICRC director of operations, according to a post on his Twitter account.

Stillhart added that there are more to come by air and sea when clearance is received to bring urgently needed medical supplies.

ICRC spokeswoman in Yemen Marie Claire Feghali specified that they are seeking authorization for the docking of a ship carrying aid at the port of Aden, while another cargo plane transporting medical supplies necessary to treat some 1,500 injured is due to take off tomorrow from Amman, in Jordan.

This news arrives on the backdrop  of the United Nations Child’s Fund (UNICEF) warning that over 10,000 people have been forced from their homes since March 26. UNICEF calls for “special respect and protection by all parties to the conflict” for children, after 74 were killed in fighting and airstrikes.

The post Yemen: First Red Cross Plane With Medical Aid Lands In Sanaa appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Coordinated patrols by littoral states are credited with containing piracy and armed robbery in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. What are the prospects for their enhancement?

By Euan Graham*

Attention from various quarters is currently focused on the possible expansion of counter-piracy sea patrols in Southeast Asia. There are several strands and potential modalities to this, not all of which have been reported accurately.

Three basic options have been suggested: an ASEAN-led maritime force for counter-piracy and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR); observer status for Myanmar in the Malacca Strait Patrols (MSP); and counter-piracy patrols east of Singapore.

An ASEAN-led Maritime Force?

In March, Vice Admiral Robert Thomas, Commander of the US Seventh Fleet, was reported by media to have mooted the establishment of an “ASEAN-led maritime force” in the South China Sea. His remarks at the Langkawi International Maritime and Aerospace exhibition were made during a panel discussion on how to address the spread of piracy to the south-western reaches of the South China Sea.

However, international media reports conflated this with earlier comments suggesting that Japan could in future expand its naval and air presence into the South China Sea, and appeared to infer US support for a more expansive patrol concept for Southeast Asian navies in the context of maritime territorial disputes with China.

The ease with which such statements can be taken out of context highlights the difficulty in differentiating issues of maritime security from strategic factors in the South China Sea. This “ambiguity problem” has also reinforced Southeast Asian countries’ caution about embracing maritime security initiatives at a collective level in the South China Sea for fear of “offending” China, or raising mutual sensitivities around sovereignty.

As a result, like-minded ASEAN states have tended to pursue maritime capacity building and cooperation bilaterally or mini-laterally, while others travel at a slower pace, reflecting their less acute threat perceptions.

US efforts to boost maritime security and domain awareness in Southeast Asia are broadly tailored to reflect this patchwork reality, with HADR providing a common denominator template for defence-led engagement across ASEAN’s various multilateral security forums. There is no indication that the US Navy is promoting a new maritime patrol initiative in the region, though “ASEAN-led” efforts towards a more concerted region-wide approach are generally welcomed and encouraged.

Myanmar MSP observership?

In a separate development, Malaysian Defence Minister Hishammuddin Hussein has invited Myanmar as an observer to the Malacca Strait Patrols (MSP) counter-piracy initiative. Established in 2004, the MSP – Southeast Asia’s best-known maritime security mini-lateral – has three components: i) the Malacca Strait Sea Patrol (MSSP); ii) Eyes in the Sky; and iii) the MSP Intelligence Exchange Group. Participation until now has been limited to the three littoral states: Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia, plus Thailand which takes part in the aerial patrols.

Although the coordinated patrols are often credited with containing piracy and armed robbery in the Strait, the paucity of public data on MSP activities makes an empirical judgement about their effectiveness impossible. Their major operational limitation is that the patrols are coordinated rather than joint, in deference to sovereignty concerns. The two other options for enhancing the MSP are: i) an expansion of their geographical remit, or ii) extending membership to the near-littorals and the ‘user’ community at large.

Given Myanmar’s capabilities, observer status or full membership would be unlikely to contribute much to the MSP’s operational effectiveness. The invitation, extended under Malaysia’s ASEAN chairmanship, is nonetheless noteworthy as a nod towards the Indian Ocean, a traditional blind spot for ASEAN and the source of multiple maritime security challenges.

Securing Myanmar’s cooperation in the outer approaches to the Malacca Strait could be aimed beyond counter-piracy, to include stemming the seaborne outflux of Rohingya Muslims from Myanmar – a particular concern for Kuala Lumpur. However, Singapore and Indonesia have yet to signal their approval. Singapore’s maritime security focus lies currently to the east.

Piracy patrols east of Singapore?

Less in the public eye, Singapore has been exploring the possibility of introducing coordinated patrols east of the Singapore Strait including the nearby reaches of the South China Sea. This is in response to a rise in attacks on shipping including a spate of fuel syphoning incidents in the waters north of Indonesia’s Bintan island which lies near Singapore.

A major shortcoming of the MSP’s geographical limitation is that the deterrent value of the sea patrols does not extend much beyond the Straits themselves. Since piracy is inherently mobile the threat may be displaced to the South China Sea. Singapore has received support from Malaysia and Vietnam, both of which have broader reasons for cross-bracing maritime security relations with their ASEAN partners in the South China Sea – underlining the blurring of non-state and inter-state factors there.

However, Indonesia is unlikely to agree to an expansion of the MSP for two reasons. First, piracy continues to occupy a lower niche in Jakarta’s threat perceptions. Diverting resources to chase pirates in the near reaches of the South China Sea would be viewed as a distraction from the priority tasks associated with President Joko Widodo’s ‘Maritime Fulcrum’ aspirations, especially thwarting illegal foreign fishing in the archipelago.

Second, the MSP remain coordinated rather than joint largely in deference to Jakarta’s unbowing reluctance to allow Singaporean or Malaysian vessels to patrol within the portions of the Straits that are Indonesia’s territorial waters. Rather than expanding the MSP to cover the south-western South China Sea, a free-standing coordinated patrol arrangement is more likely to fly, though Indonesian participation remains uncertain.

HADR naval protocol?

Unrelated to sea patrols but still relevant for “ASEAN-led” maritime cooperation is the ongoing development of an intra-ASEAN set of naval protocols for HADR. This initiative was proposed by the Philippine Navy at the ASEAN Chiefs of Navy Meeting (ACNM), in Manila in September 2013.

It has since garnered support from Indonesia among others and a working group has delivered preliminary recommendations for the protocols, which may be formally adopted at the next ACNM in Myanmar this autumn. This could set an important inter-naval operational benchmark on a shared maritime interest in spite of the gulfs in capability and threat perceptions across ASEAN’s diverse membership.

ASEAN-led naval and maritime security cooperation continues to move forward, though not yet to the level that would support a Southeast Asia-wide joint or coordinated patrol force, or even an expansion of the Malacca Strait Patrols. However, an ad hoc counter-piracy arrangement to cover the south-western South China Sea is within reach for ASEAN’s like-minded.

*Euan Graham is a Senior Fellow with the Maritime Security Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University in Singapore.

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A pentalateral ministerial meeting initiated by the Hungarian Foreign Ministry was held in Budapest, on the issue of the future energy supply of the Central and South-East European region. The Foreign Affairs Ministers of Serbia, Greece and Macedonia and the Minister for EU Affairs of Turkey were welcomed by Hungarian PM Viktor Orbán on Tuesday morning in the Parliament.

After the ministerial talks the sides have signed a joint declaration on strengthening the energy cooperation in the region. The representatives of the participating states – Volkan Bozkır, Ivica Dačić, Nikos Kotzias, Nikola Poposki and Péter Szijjártó – have agreed that cooperation in ensuring energy supply security contributes to the good neighbourly relations between their countries and to the welfare of the citizens.

“Taking into consideration the role of European funds to develop infrastructure projects in Central and South Eastern Europe in reaching a Western European level of diversification, which would in turn make a significant contribution to the overall energy security of Europe and must therefore be a common responsibility of the European Union”, the declaration claims.

The sides have declared their political intention to increase the interconnections between the natural gas systems of their countries. The five ministers also expressed their support “to create a commercially viable option of route and source diversification for delivering natural gas from the Republic of Turkey through the territories of their countries to the countries of Central and South Eastern Europe as well as other countries.”

Furthermore, the representatives of the participating states have agreed (1) to support the energy markets of Turkey, the European Union and the Contracting Parties of the Energy Community through the Southern Gas Corridor; (2) to work on new possibilities for creating regional economic development via interconnecting the natural gas infrastructures of our countries with European Union financial assistance; (3) to welcome in cooperative spirit other willing countries of the region to participate in these efforts; and (4) to complement the operation of gas storage facilities with the aim of facilitating trading, providing seasonal balancing and increasing the security of supply in case of disruption of gas supplies.

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By Farzana Marie

The lynching of a young woman named Farkhunda in bustling downtown Kabul on March 19^th just before nowruz (the Persian/Afghan New Year), has wracked Afghanistan and the Afghan community worldwide. Social media has been saturated with the bloodied pictures and videos of her, and thousands of demonstrators seeking justice for her killing and protesting lawlessness have turned out in the streets of Kabul and other major cities since her death, including both a candlelight vigil and a rally in Washington DC coinciding with President Ghani’s visit to the U.S.

The false accusation that Farkhunda had burnt a Qur’an led to her brutal beating and killing by a huge crowd, without intervention from the police. Farkhunda was in fact a religious devotee and was teaching other women about the Qur’an, including warding them off from superstitious practices like the taweez or talismans that can often be a form of exploitation.

Something unusual happened at Farkhunda’s funeral: women carried her coffin, also a form of protest against the mob of men who killed her. Many have written poems and songs in support of Farkhunda, honoring her memory and calling for justice for her murderers. Here is one more response:

The Charlatan’s Game

Women wait in line to charm their problems
like snakes.
The long-beard lures them with ritual services,
offers to alter their fates:

a taweez to cure the sick or childless
taweez to boost your business
a taweez to locate that lost necklace
taweez for a visa to the West
a taweez to marry the one you’re attracted to
taweez to get him to stop beating you.

But God cannot be cajoled or tricked
with tiny box-trinkets stuffed with scribbled verses
worn around the neck,
paper runes ingested with water.
God is not reading them.

God is aghast.

She who loved the holy book,
who warned women
not to buy the con-man’s charms,
not to weigh his pockets down with trust,
she who wore her scarf pulled low across her brow,
she who was sane enough to endanger
the charlatan’s game, lucrative
on the eve of the new year:

she is the one
accused of burning sacred pages,
whose knowledge threatened their supremacy

the one they seized
the one they beat with sticks
whose wisdom their ignorance sought to silence

the one whose bloody face they unveiled,
they videotaped
whose blood, whose power to bring forth life terrified them

she is the one they trampled
the one they crushed under wheels of a truck
whose image will haunt them in their sleep

she is the one whose cries have spilled from mouths
in streets of Kabul, Herat, Washington, Toronto,

she is the one whose battered body they burned,
they threw into the riverbed of refuse and human waste.

Her name was Farkhunda,
but this spring equinox was not Farkhunda—not auspicious, not blessed,
as birds scattered from the sidewalk outside a downtown Kabul mosque
escaping the rabid mob as Farkhunda could not.

All we can do now is paint our faces red
carry her coffin over and over,
over our heads through the streets of our dreams
and scream our skin burning
with the fire they set to her,
cry for consequences that will speak
the language of no,
the language of never again
the language of this is not us,
this is not human
this will not stand
let this end
let this end.

The post For Farkhunda – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Darryl E. Brock*

Taiwan just announced that the Caribbean nation of Saint Lucia will open an embassy in Taipei by the end of June. This seems to put an end to a tumultuous courtship of the tiny West Indian nation—population 182,000.

At times Taiwan’s rival, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), stood in ascendancy over securing the coveted prize. Saint Lucia originally established relations with the Republic of China (Taiwan) in 1984, but with election of the outspoken Kenny Anthony as prime minister in 1997, the island nation quickly shifted recognition to Mainland China. The return of Saint Lucia from the Labour Party to the United Workers Party, in 2007, brought a re-recognition of Taiwan. The issue thus seemed settled, with the wedding dance in planning, when the irrepressible Anthony resurfaced. He voiced allegations of improper diplomatic procedure against the then Taiwan ambassador.

The controversy may have in fact helped him regain leadership as prime minister at the end of 2011. Observers predicted yet another pendulum swing across the strait, back to Mainland China, promise rings and vows yet un-exchanged. Yet, this did not happen. Why? Partly in that China discovered reasons to reorient its thinking, but also because imperial history and local party politics surfaced, in perhaps unexpected ways.

European Imperial Legacy

The Saint Lucian people, easy-going and friendly, find it only natural that the world’s great powers would vie to win the hand of the Caribbean’s Fair Helen. Just as earlier Helen once impelled nations to launch a thousand ships, this latter Caribbean incarnation launched a 150 year struggle between the sixteenth and seventeenth century’s great powers—France and Great Britain.

Saint Lucia changed hands fourteen times before the British finally secured the island in 1814 after defeating Napoleon. So, to native Saint Lucians, it only seems natural that the two Chinas would vie for the heart, affections—and international recognition—of their enchanting paradise. Indeed, vie they did. The diplomatic war between the PRC and ROC raged for decades after the United Nations transferred the China seat from the ROC to the PRC in 1971. The courting of allies occurred not only in Saint Lucia, but in theaters across the Pacific, Africa, and elsewhere in Latin America. The 2008 election of Ma Ying-jeou as president of Taiwan, when the ROC could then count only 23 allies remaining, finally catalyzed an informal diplomatic truce. The cousins on both sides of the strait would accept the status quo, with no more poaching of diplomatic allies.

China’s Diplomatic Truce with Taiwan

Republic of China (Taiwan) flag flying over Statue of Sun Yat-sen, Hero of the Two Chinas. Photo by Darryl E. Brock.

Just three years later, in November 2011, the newly re-elected PM Anthony pondered his situation. Could he abandon Taiwan, yet once again, and re-align his nation with the PRC? What would the people of Saint Lucia say? After all, the previous ambassador, Tom Chou, had delivered millions of dollars of local aid, including orchid farms, aquaculture production, and renovation of the fire-gutted St. Jude Hospital. The people also treasured his smaller projects like foot paths down mountainsides so teenage girls could safely make it down to school with no further need for two pairs of shoes: one for mud, and one for class.

There was also the matter of this diplomatic truce. Would it be honored by Mainland China, eliciting a “no thank you” to a Saint Lucian overture? After all, the PRC cited the importance of good cross-strait relations when it gently turned away El Salvador’s bid to switch from Taiwan in mid-2009. The prime minister faced a conundrum: How could he reify his party’s past complaints without provoking the patient Saint Lucian citizenry—that is, by fecklessly abandoning their Taiwanese benefactor—even while chasing the mirage of a PRC relationship? The nation waited with bated breath until the prime minister finally addressed the nation ten months later, on September 11, 2012.

A Prime Minister’s Decision

Anthony restated his past unhappiness with the local Taiwanese embassy and broadened his assault to Taipei itself, lamenting the loose money from Taiwan orchestrated by former Taiwanese President Chen Sui-bian. At that time Chen yet remained in prison, serving a sentence for corruption. But then Anthony abruptly announced that Saint Lucia would nevertheless maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan. The public reacted swiftly. The Saint Lucia Star referred to accusations with “no evidence,” and the inappropriate pouring of “disdain and scorn” on an allied benefactor nation.

Chastised, a new Anthony soon emerged. Just one month later, at the 101st National Day Celebration for Taiwan, he expressed a shared common identity between the two island nations. That is, Saint Lucians were originally exiled from Africa and placed into slavery under European Empires, not unlike the exodus of so many Chinese to Taiwan, a former sugar colony of the Japanese Empire.

The following year, 2013, Taiwan’s President Ma jump-started his Caribbean tour in Saint Lucia. On that occasion, Prime Minister Anthony again waxed eloquent, thanking the Taiwanese government for its generosity. He also expressed a hope for more: Fair Helen is a wonderful “investment destination,” with niche opportunities in yachting, hotels, ICT and agri-business.

Saint Lucia, at long last, has chosen a suitor. In fact, the island nation proved conspicuously absent from the China Forum for Latin American nations, held in Beijing this past January, a meeting attended by eight of the ROC’s twelve regional allies. This represents astonishing loyalty from a nation that once chose to recognize Mainland China—and at that time under the very same Caribbean prime minister who now establishes an embassy in Taipei. During a recent trip to Taiwan, in search of that embassy site, Anthony’s trade minister explained the Taiwan model is a good one for development. A first-time embassy in Taiwan may stoke Saint Lucia’s hope for greater business investment by savvy Taiwanese firms. At long last, the wedding is on.

*Dr. Darryl E. Brock, currently a Research Fellow sponsored by the Taiwan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, teaches Asian and Latin American studies at the University of Bridgeport in Connecticut, where he is an adjunct assistant professor of history. He has published on Chinese socialist science and Latin American Dollar Diplomacy in such journals as the Southeast Review of Asian Studies and the Journal of Global Development and Peace, as well as co-editing Mr. Science and Chairman Mao’s Cultural Revolution (Lexington, 2013).

The post China’s Diplomatic Truce Examined: Understanding Taiwan’s Newest Embassy Partner – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

China wants to avoid criticism over its close security ties with troublesome Pakistan.

By Andrew Small*

The China-Pakistan relationship has inspired plenty of florid language, invoking “iron brothers” whose “all-weather friendship” is “higher than the Himalayas and deeper than the oceans.” Yet the public demonstrations of this closeness have often fallen short of the rhetoric.

The latest manifestation is the on-again, off-again visit by China’s President Xi Jinping. After being forced to cancel his trip last year due to anti-government protests in Islamabad, speculation has grown over why it has proved difficult to reschedule. This reached its peak during Pakistan’s National Day celebration in March, after Pakistani officials had initially suggested that Xi might be the guest of honor, a counterpoint to President Barack Obama’s glittering visit to India in January. Xi’s no-show elicited claims of a Chinese “snub.” This is a relationship where the public theatrics have generally been a poor indicator of the underlying substance. Not only have the most important facets of the relationship been difficult to capture in photo ops, they have often been those about which the two sides can say the least.

Xi’s maiden trip to Pakistan has proved unusually tricky to arrange. Originally scheduled for September, during his tour of South Asia, it was embarrassingly called off at the last minute after Chinese security officials decided that protests made it too difficult for the president to move safely around Islamabad. The visit now appears set for later in April, which may calm the rumor-mongering. But the intervening months have been rife with questions about why Xi, who has been everywhere from Cuba to the Maldives, has yet to visit China’s “all-weather friend.”

There were some genuine challenges. Officials in Beijing were clearly not keen on the heavy-handed symbolism of China’s president attending the National Day military parade, replete with Chinese kit. In addition, infighting in Pakistan over the route of the proposed $45.6 billion China-Pakistan economic corridor risked shrouding the trip in political controversy, while reaching agreement on the details for many of the initiatives that the Chinese leader’s visit is supposed to launch proved difficult. Yet the speculation went beyond this – was it a reflection of Xi’s desire to focus more seriously on upgrading ties with India ahead of Modi’s May visit? A manifestation of Chinese frustration with the Pakistanis over prospects for their joint projects? Is Pakistan being de-prioritized, or was it never a priority in the first place?

Given that China takes the symbolism and deal-making attached to visits by its heads of state seriously, the questions are natural enough. But in the China-Pakistan relationship, bilateral trips have rarely been a good barometer. If one were to judge the relationship by these set-piece occasions, one might wonder whether the two sides are really friends at all.

An earlier semi-snub came from Chinese Premier Li Keqiang whose trip in May 2013 took place during the transition period after the Pakistani elections, ensuring that it was virtually impossible to make preparations on the scale that accompany a prime ministerial visit. There was little attempt to conceal the fact that Li’s principal destination was India. Xi’s predecessor, Hu Jintao, was supposed to arrive in 2007 with assurances that China would give nod to a controversial set of nuclear reactors that Pakistan had sought as a response to the US-India nuclear deal. The nod was not forthcoming. Far worse was Jiang Zemin’s visit in 1996, whose speech to the national assembly urged Pakistan to put Kashmir on the back burner, a message received in silence by parliamentarians in attendance. In some respects, that was the relationship’s low point.

Visits to China from Pakistani leaders have a more checkered history. The last army chief, Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, saw his farewell visit in 2013 overshadowed by a suicide attack in Tiananmen Square, which Chinese officials blamed on a militant group headquartered in Pakistan’s tribal areas. Asif Ali Zardari’s inaugural trip was dogged by a Chinese hostage crisis in Swat Valley and his decision not to make China the destination for his first overseas visit. He was firmly rebuffed in his efforts to secure a large bilateral loan. Pakistani leaders’ trips during times of conflict have been more disappointing – over the decades, army chiefs and politicians have flown to Beijing to solicit support and come home empty-handed.

For those who judge the relationship by these optics, the story is one of Pakistani delusion and China’s failure to come through in Pakistan’s hour of need. Throw in consistently low trade and investment numbers, and periodic tensions over counter-terrorism issues, and it can be argued that there is less to the “all-weather friendship” than meets the eye. Yet in practice, the fact that China eschews showy, geopolitically antagonistic demonstrations of support for Pakistan does not mean that its discreet, consistent backing has been any less strategically significant. Both sides have had good reason to keep their cooperation away from the spotlight.

China’s military support has long focused on building up Pakistan’s own capabilities rather than intervention during conflicts or other formal alliance commitments. For decades, Beijing has been Pakistan’s only wholly reliable weapons supplier, and SIPRI’s most recent report shows that China has sold Pakistan over half the arms it imported in the last five years. The apogee of this relationship is the two sides’ cooperation on Pakistan’s nuclear and missile programs, where Chinese knowhow, technology and materials have played a vital role – but not one conducive to celebratory toasts in public. Similar sensitivities have applied to major civilian projects too, such as investments in the nuclear power plants at Chashma. Even the construction of the Karokaram Highway between 1966 and 1979 was kept secret for many years. Pakistani transfers of Western technology to the Chinese – such as stray ballistic missiles, centrifuges, or material from US stealth helicopters – are also tricky subjects for a public speech.

Discretion has been of the essence when it comes to Pakistan’s diplomatic brokering on China’s behalf too. Henry Kissinger’s covert side trip to Beijing in 1971, while ostensibly recovering at a Pakistani hill station, paved the way for the re-opening of US-China relations, while Bandar Bin Sultan’s secret meeting at the Chinese embassy in Islamabad saw the green light given for China’s ballistic missile sales to Saudi Arabia in the 1980s. More recently, Chinese officials met with the Taliban on multiple occasions in Pakistan without attracting attention.

For so many sensitive initiatives between China and Pakistan, Beijing has sought to minimize the risk that external pressure or criticism, particularly from the United States, will derail the two sides’ efforts. But its commitment to defend them has been strong. When faced with resistance, as was the case, for instance, with US sanctions in the 1990s following Chinese missile transfers to Pakistan, China pressed ahead regardless.

The coming years will see similarly delicate plans move ahead: The large-scale expansion of Sino-Pakistani civil nuclear cooperation, without the agreement of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. An array of new infrastructure projects in Kashmir. A takeoff in the two sides’ naval cooperation during a period where China is seeking to build up reliable overseas facilities for the PLA Navy and Pakistan is looking to develop sea-based nuclear capability. The intensification of China’s contacts with the Taliban and a growing Chinese role in Afghanistan’s peace process add to the list.

Beijing has been willing to be more open about some of these initiatives than it was a few years ago. But showcasing them during Xi’s visit would be a step too far. However resilient China-Pakistan ties have proved to be, much of the relationship still must be conducted in the shadows.

*Andrew Small is a transatlantic fellow with the German Marshall Fund’s Asia program, which he has helped lead since 2006. His research focuses on US-China relations, EU-China relations, Chinese policy in South and South-West Asia, and China’s role in “problem” and fragile states. He is author of The China-Pakistan Axis: Asia’s New Geopolitics.

The post China-Pakistan: A Strategic Relationship In The Shadows – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Jemimah Joanne C. Villaruel*

In his first State Visit to the US in September 2014, Prime Minister Narendra Modi of India and President Barack Obama issued a joint statement reaffirming “the importance of safeguarding maritime security and ensuring freedom of navigation and over flight throughout the region, especially in the South China Sea” as well as calling “on all parties to avoid the threat or use of force” in maritime disputes. In addition, the two leaders also expressed their reproach of China’s provocations with its neighbors over the maritime tensions in the South China Sea.

These strong statements not only express the convergence of US and Indian interests in the South China Sea but also convey the growing unease of non-littoral states such as India and the US over Chinese actions in the region.

Indian interests in the South China Sea

India, poised to become the fastest growing economy by 2016 as predicted by IMF, recognizes the greater role that it must play if it is to be a significant actor in world affairs. India has long known the value of the ASEAN region with its Look East strategy. But now with Prime Minister Modi at the helm, the shift to an Act East policy of India signifies a greater strategic interest in forming stronger linkages with ASEAN and its member states, many of which are entangled in maritime disputes with China over the South China Sea.

India, in the past, has shown reticence in expressing its views about territorial issues in the region, preferring to be a passive observer. But in the ASEAN Regional Forum Summit in Phnom Penh in 2012, India emphasized its strong support for freedom of navi- gation and access to resources such as fisheries and gas in accordance with principles of international law. This was followed by a joint communiqué from India and Vietnam in 2014 calling for all concerned parties in the South China Sea to exercise restraint, avoid threat or use of force and resolve disputes through peaceful means.

But India’s interest in the South China Sea region runs deeper than a desire for stronger cooperation with ASEAN countries. The South China Sea is a major and fundamental sea corridor used for commercial and naval shipping. According to the US Energy Information Administration (EIA), the South China Sea is one of the most important energy trade routes in the world with almost a third of crude oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG) supplies passing through it annually. Aside from being a rich source of fish and marine life, it is also purported to hold significant quantities of oil and gas at around 11 billion barrels of oil and 190 trillion cubic feet (tcf) of natural gas as estimated by EIA, making it a potential huge energy resource for energy-scarce growing economies such as China and India.

India is the fourth largest energy consumer in the world and its energy import-dependence is enormous, with oil, coal and gas imports projected to significantly increase within the next two decades according to former Indian Foreign Affairs Minister Salman Khurshid. This crucial need compels India to explore sources of energy through various means, including oil and gas exploration.

And so, India accepted Vietnam’s invitation to explore oil and gas in contested waters in the South China Sea in 2011. This made India, by consequence, a player in the maritime wrangling in the South China Sea. While this agreement illustrated India’s desire for deeper ties with Vietnam, it also simultaneously earned the ire of China as it was perceived as a direct contravention of China’s appeal to the international community that non-littoral countries should not involve themselves in the South China Sea dispute.

India is apprehensive of China’s provocations in the South China Sea, as it is almost entirely dependent on sea trade and any disruptions in the sea lanes of communications (SLOC) will be detrimental to its economic and strategic interests in the region. Its strategic maritime interest extends to the maritime choke points in the Indian Ocean and Strait of Malacca as 95 percent of India’s total external trade, along with its oil imports, transit through these waters. The security of passage and freedom of navigation in these vast waters and unimpeded access to the region’s maritime commons are therefore imperative to India’s industrial and commercial growth.

This concern is in fact enshrined in India’s Maritime Doctrine which outlines the importance of protecting the nation’s economic interests. According to Indian Navy chief Admiral D.K. Joshi, India is also investing in hydrocarbon assets worldwide and these assets are maintained by sea and use sea lanes for repatriation to India. Securing energy, given that it has a maritime component, is thus a paramount concern for India.

Maritime activities In addition to its economic and strategic interests in the South China Sea, India also has well-embedded maritime interests in the region. The Indian Navy has been active in its maritime operations such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, as well as joint naval exercises and port calls since 1990, but has since been expanded to other naval activities. In fact, ensuring the safety of India’s strategic interest in the region precipitated the creation of the Andaman and Nicobar Command in the Bay of Bengal which is India’s first and only tri-service command that serves as a focal point for Indian naval engagement with Southeast Asian navies such as Thailand and Indonesia.

Aside from its naval activities, trade is another facet that India has been vigorously pursuing with Northeast Asia and with ASEAN member states. India’s trade with Japan and South Korea has been steadily growing along with ASEAN-India trade which has also been increasing remarkably passing the USD70 billion mark in 2011 as reported by ASEAN and is expected to grow even more with robust investments coming from both sides. The surge in trade between India and countries in Asia thus make the freedom of navigation in the SLOCs of South China Sea even more essential.

Conclusion

India’s desire for a deeper economic and security cooperation with ASEAN countries demonstrates its renewed and stronger interest in the region. Deep concern for the state of ASEAN regional security stems from its cognizance of the fact that escalation of maritime and territorial disputes in the region will have larger implications in international world order.

In view of this, the Philippines must reexamine its relations with India given India’s desire to play a greater regional role and how this could lead to deeper bilateral ties. One aspect is naval cooperation and the possibility of engaging in more extensive maritime exercises such as anti-piracy and anti-terrorism, sharing best practices and enhancing military exchanges.

As an ASEAN Strategic Partner, how India positions itself in the complex maritime dispute and China’s unpredictable actions in the South China Sea could either lead to de-escalation of tensions and preservation of regional peace and security or further alienate China on this issue. However, there is hope that the increasing economic considerations of India and China in the region may reinforce restraint in aggressively tackling tensions in the region.

About the author:
*Jemimah Joanne C. Villaruel is a Foreign Affairs Research Specialist with the Center for International Relations and Strategic Studies of the Foreign Service Institute. Ms. Villaruel can be reached at jcvillaruel@fsi.gov.ph.

Source:
This article was published by FSI as CIRSS Commentaries – Vol. II, No. 8 (March 2015)

The post India’s Interests In The South China Sea – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Two Iranian vessels have arrived in the Gulf of Aden, off the coast of Yemen, where Saudi Arabia is on a bombing campaign against anti-government Houthi rebels.

The Alborz destroyer and Bushehr logistics vessel are on a patrol mission in the Gulf of Aden, south of Yemen, and the Red Sea, according to Navy Commander Rear Admiral Habibollah Sayyari. He says the ships will “provide [safety for] Iran’s shipping lines and protect the Islamic Republic of Iran’s interests in the high seas,” Press TV reports.

According to Tehran officials, the warships will be protecting a crucial trade route against pirates. The Iranian Navy has been conducting such patrols since 2008.

Iran’s fleet is headed into troubled waters, as at the moment Yemen is blockaded off by a Saudi Arabia-led military coalition. They are on a bombing campaign against anti-government Houthi Shia rebels, whose uprising forced Yemen’s President Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi to flee the country. He is currently in Saudi Arabia.

Iran has been vocal in calling for an end to the airstrikes against Houthis, which often end up hitting civilians. Saudi and Western officials believe Iran is directly supporting the Houthis with money and weapons, aiming to take control of Yemen’s Red Sea coast – something Tehran denies.

The fierce bombing campaign has led to over 560 deaths in just two weeks, according to the latest World Health Organization estimates. It describes the situation in Yemen as a rapidly-unfolding humanitarian catastrophe, with over 1,700 people wounded and 100,000 displaced.

An international evacuation effort is under way, with India alone rescuing some 4,000 of its citizens from the war zone. Russia is also taking part. So far, it has sent five airplanes to Yemen, rescuing its nationals, as well citizens of 11 other countries.

With the chaos triggered by the Houthi uprising and the airstrikes, militant and terrorist groups are finding it increasingly easy to operate in Yemen. Last week, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) captured the port city of Al Mukalla, seizing an army base and freeing 300 prisoners from a local jail.

On Tuesday, Al-Qaeda militants reportedly attacked an outpost on Yemen’s border with Saudi Arabia, killing several officers and taking over the checkpoint.

The post Iran Sends Warships To Monitor Yemen’s Coast appeared first on Eurasia Review.

A Florida Senate subcommittee voted on April 8, 2015 to approve a bill that would allow judges rather than prosecutors to determine when a child should be charged as an adult. Senate Bill (SB) 1082, which would greatly reduce the number of youth under 18 sent into the adult criminal justice system, deserves a vote before Florida’s full Senate and House.

SB 1082’s companion bill, House Bill 783, has to be considered by two more committees before it can proceed to a full vote. The House committees should swiftly schedule hearings on the bill before April 21, after which they can no longer meet in this legislative session.

“Prosecuting a young person as an adult has far-reaching consequences for society as well as for the person involved,” said Natalie Kato, southern US state policy advocate at Human Rights Watch. “The Senate appropriations subcommittee has taken a smart and humane step by voting to place these decisions with a judge, not a prosecutor. The full Florida Senate and House should follow suit.”

Under Florida’s current “direct file” statute, prosecutors have almost complete discretion to charge children 14 and older as adults. More than 98 percent of youth in Florida’s adult court are transferred there by a prosecutor without judicial oversight. Florida’s direct file law is one of the most expansive such laws in the United States, as Human Rights Watch documented in 2014.

Most children tried in adult court in Florida are accused of nonviolent crimes. In 2012 and 2013, 60 percent were there for nonviolent offenses, according to data Human Rights Watch analyzed.

SB 1082 would revise Florida’s current direct file law by limiting the offenses that qualify for transfer under that statute. In addition, a judge would have the opportunity to review transferred cases and determine whether a particular case should go back to the juvenile court.

Charging children as adults not only has serious – often lifelong – consequences for the children involved, but is also counterproductive to reducing recidivism, Human Rights Watch said. Multiple studies have shown that children who are prosecuted in the adult system reoffend more quickly and go on to commit more serious crimes than those who are kept in the juvenile justice system for the same offenses.

Children who commit crimes can and should be held accountable, but the appropriate place to do so is the juvenile justice system, Human Rights Watch said. The Convention on the Rights of the Child, to which the US is a signatory, states that treatment of child offenders must take into account the child’s age and the desirability of promoting the child’s reintegration and the child’s assuming a constructive role in society.

The US Supreme Court, in a series of four recent cases, has underscored that children are developmentally less mature than adults, and more capable of rehabilitation. Their punishment should take into account their diminished culpability and their capacity to change. Judgments about punishment are best made by the juvenile system, which takes these factors into account.

“Florida’s legislature should grab this opportunity to place limits on prosecutorial discretion to charge youth as adults,” Kato said. “This bill is a big step forward for public safety and justice, and deserves a ‘yes’ vote from every Florida legislator.”

The post Florida: Hope For Children Charged As Adults, Says HRW appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By N Sathiya Moorthy*

Making a further point over the ‘division of powers’, or bowing to ‘international pressure’ or otherwise, Maldives President Abdulla Yameen has returned to Parliament the prisoner-membership Bill denying political party membership to prisoners. Almost simultaneously, the Government has also cleared another jailed politician, Col Mohamed Nazim, for travelling overseas for medical care for a life-threatening ailment.

One more of the fast-tracked pieces of legislation over the past months, the Bill, if cleared, would have denied former President and Opposition Maldivian Democratic Party (MDP) leader Mohammed ‘Anni’ Nasheed any political role, after his 13-year imprisonment had disqualified him from contesting future elections for a long time to come. Nasheed having taken future possibilities to his party cadres even before his arrest by asking them publicly to retain him as their party leader and presidential candidate, barring him from political activity could have also weakened – and at times even fractured – what is essentially a self-styled, democracy-centric ‘umbrella organisation’.

Parliament passed the Bill, moved by a member of the ruling combine, led by President Yameen’s Progressive Party of Maldives (PPM), amidst continuing Opposition boycott of official business and non-stop shrill protests by MDP members inside the House and outside. While it may be inconceivable in the Third World democratic context that the Bill was moved and passed without the President’s knowledge and consent, Yameen, a week later, has reportedly cited Attorney-General Mohamed Anil to hold that the legislative measure did not meet with democratic standards the world over. The AG is also reported to have written to the People’s Majlis, saying the Bill put constraints on basic rights more than should be allowed within a democratic society.

Lawyers’ team for lobbying

In between, President Nasheed has put together a team of international lawyers to present his case to the global community. The team is meant mainly to lobby Nasheed’s case in UN fora and elsewhere, and not meant for arguing and/or building his defence before appellate courts in Maldives. In a statement, Nasheed has profusely thanked the team members, and said that they would work towards taking up his case – and also what MDP calls as President Yameen’s authoritarian regime – to the international community and fora.

In the past, Nasheed and the MDP had used international legal teams for the twin purposes, but not this time round, it would seem. In context, Nasheed’s defence team nearer home had originally complained against lack of time for preparing the appeal papers. After the High Court clarified they could take more time beyond the Supreme Court-amended 10-day upper-limit in January, they have now gone back to contesting the credibility of the nation’s judiciary at all levels. It’s anybody’s guess why the Nasheed’s legal defence is keen on keeping the issue political and international, without wanting to argue the appeal in the local courts.

By returning an ‘anti-Nasheed’ Bill to Parliament now, President Yameen might have proved his detractors wrong, though only up to a very limited extent. Ever since Nasheed was arrested under an anti-terror law of 1989 vintage, Yameen and his Government have been maintaining that as a respecter of ‘separation of powers’, the President could not be expected to interfere with the judicial process.

The MDP continued to maintain that it was all a political issue and not a ‘legal case’, hence presidential clemency/pardon was the only way out for Nasheed (and by extension, the nation as a whole). Though nothing seemed to have moved after Nasheed’s defence decided to forego the appeals option, President Yameen’s returning the prisoner-membership Bill to Parliament augurs well for political reconciliation efforts of whatever kind is possible yet.

Respect SC: Speaker

Coinciding with the presidential decision or otherwise, the MDP too has decided to stop their shouting-campaign until Parliament Speaker Abdulla Maseeh had decided on their request for an appointment to discuss their demands, centred on President Nasheed’s imprisonment. Following this, Parliament functioned properly for the first time since the year’s sessions commenced with the customary presidential address in early March.

At a breakfast meeting with media persons earlier, the Speaker pointed to every stake-holder in older and larger democracies across the world respecting the Supreme Court in their countries. He also made the point that even larger and older democracies had their flaws, and were working on rectification processes all the time. He seemed to imply that Maldives too was doing so, and should not be singled out for global criticism, based on individual/individualist episode and specific issues.

Before the current moves, and ahead of the party-inspired street-protests ‘in defence of democracy’ since December/January, the party had formed a negotiations team with fellow-Opposition Jumhooree Party (JP) of tycoon- philanthropist Gasim Ibrahim. Home Minister Umar Naseer was the only one to meet them after the ‘Judge Abdulla abduction case’ against President Nasheed went to trial, and pleaded helplessness in the matter.

On the ‘defence of democracy’ demands of the combined Opposition, President Yameen declared that they should either go to the Legislature or the Judiciary, as their issues, in his view, had little to do with the Executive authority of the President. On Nasheed’s arrest, trial and fast-tracked conviction and sentencing later, he said that there was little that the President could (and should) do when the matter was in the hands of the Judiciary.

Agitating legal issues?

Judge Abdulla’s detention and President Nasheed’s knowledge of it being facts, it’s still anybody’s guess why Nasheed’s defence does not want to agitate the legal issues in domestic courts, where alone the matter now rests. The overnight conversion of a criminal offence into an ‘act of terrorism’ without clear definition or explanation would require judicious reasons for the higher judiciary to uphold in a ‘democracy’, which President Yameen and his Government says, Maldives under him still is.

Should the PPM-controlled People’s Majlis, or Parliament, ‘defy’ President Yameen and re-enact the law, with or without amendments, he would then have no choice but to give his assent, and notify it as law. It would then again be left to the higher judiciary to test the constitutional validity of the measure, and for the nation to test the genuineness of President Yameen’s democratic Executive prerogative to ‘return’ the Bill to Parliament in the first place.

Pending domestic developments, about which not much is known outside, the international community’s (read: West) reaction to Nasheed’s arrest has been muted, periodic and customary. Three weeks into his imprisonment, there does not seem to be any coordinated strategy, whether aimed at ensuring his freedom and/or restoring his electoral rights (which would be unavailable to him if let out under a presidential pardon).

It may be because of a variety of factors. Prima facie, President Nasheed and the MDP seemed to have been in too much of a hurry to effect a ‘regime change’ by fast-tracking ‘democratic transition’ in Maldives, when no elections were due – and through street-protests. Two, unlike his predecessors, including half-brother and former President Maumoon Gayoom, the incumbent seems to have proved to be a match for Nasheed’s tactical ingenuity – at least up to now.

Sovereignty issues

As if to put his external detractors, particularly State players, on the defensive, President Yameen and his niece and Foreign Minister Dunya Mumoon have been repeatedly raising ‘sovereignty’ issues viz the international community. Ever since the Nasheed case came up, they have been telling third nations, neither to get involved with Maldivian affairs or comment on them, in what they say was a partisan way without knowing ground rules and realities.

It is also not unlikely that nations and governments might have become touchy and cautious over Nasheed’s unpredictability over the past years, learning as might have from the ‘Indian experience’. Defying court summons in 2013 in the very same ‘Judge Abdulla abduction case’ – then only a criminal offence, and not a ‘terror act’ – Nasheed, as a former Head of State, staged an unexpected stay-in in the Indian High Commission, Male. Anticipating arrest this time round, he publicly and repeatedly called upon India to ‘protect him’.

If all these were enough for any host government to become suspicious — and other nations to become cautious, the Maldivian Judiciary might have since made others sit up and take notice. The three-Judge trial court that sentenced Nasheed to 13 years in prison also ordered 11 year-jail term for President Yameen’s ex-Defence Minister and one-time political colleague, Col Mohamed Nazim (retd), for ‘possessing illegal weapons’ while in power. Nazim’s defence has claimed that the case was ‘foisted’ and is likely to appeal.

But in a rumoured turn of events since President Yameen returning Nasheed-related Bill to Parliament, the Government has authorised Col Nazim to travel overseas for medical treatment for a potentially life-threatening condition. “He will be allowed to leave the country for a set period of time,” Minivan News reported, quoting a media official from the Maldives Correctional Service. The jailed politician’s family said they had not yet been told about his permission to leave, Minivan News reported at the time of going to press.

‘Silencing dissent’

In between, the Supreme Court seemed to have redeemed some of the prestige, if at all, for the nation’s Judiciary after the conviction and sentencing of Ahmed Nazim, an incumbent PPM parliamentarian and one-time aide of President Yameen, to 25 years in prison in a ‘corruption case’. Without commenting specifically on this case, detractors of President Yameen however see in all these an effort to ‘silence dissent’ of every kind.

The ‘Independent’ constitutionally-mandated Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) has near-simultaneously asked the AG’s office to include ‘illicit enrichment’ a criminal offence under the new penal code. These come at a time when the international community is concerned about political and administrative corruption — if not as much about democracy. Whether anyone outside the country – or, inside – is going to switch one issue for another, or substitute progress on one front with reported regression on the other is anybody’s guess.

There is otherwise no knowing how far would the MDP be able to sustain the pressure on the Yameen leadership, from within and outside, on the Nasheed issue. Be it in 2012, when the ‘Abdulla abduction case’ was first flagged, nor now, there are enough aspirants for the party leadership – and by extension the national leadership – and President Nasheed may not be unaware of them and their machinations.

President Yameen’s present initiative of returning the Bill has the potential to keep the nation’s leadership fight still between the two of them, with supporters of Nasheed hoping that international intervention would still help him get back his freedom and electoral rights, thus helping him to contest the 2018 presidential polls. That may not be asking for more, from their perspective – but it would still be asking for time, to begin with.

*The writer is a Senior Fellow at Observer Research Foundation, Chennai Chapter

The post Maldives: Yameen ‘Returns’ Bill Barring Politics For Nasheed – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Iran’s Leader of the Islamic Revolution Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei says a halt to the military aggression against Yemen and foreign meddling in the country is the only solution to the crisis plaguing the Arabian Peninsula state.

The Leader said the crisis in Yemen is one of the problems in the Muslim world and stressed, “The stance of the Islamic Republic with regard to all countries including Yemen is opposition to foreign intervention. Therefore, from our point of view, the solution to the crisis in Yemen is also the halt of foreign intervention and attacks against the people of this country.”

The Leader made the remarks in a meeting with Turkish President Turkish Recep Tayyip Erdogan in the Iranian capital, Tehran.

Ayatollah Khamenei further stressed that the “Yemenis should decide the future of their country,” adding, “Today, the United States and the Zionists are happy with differences among Muslim countries and the solution to these problems is cooperation between the Islamic countries and taking practical and constructive measures.”

The Leader also stressed that regional countries will not benefit from trusting the West and the US, adding that everyone can clearly see the outcome of the measures taken by the West in the region which is to the detriment of the region and Islam.

Ayatollah Khamenei further referred to developments in Iraq and Syria and violent acts of terrorist groups in these countries, adding that those who fail to see the role of the enemy in the crises in these countries have deceived themselves.

The Leader said the US and the Israeli regime are most satisfied with the developments in the region and do not want an end to the scourge of the ISIL Takfiri group.

“Who supports these currents financially and logistically?” the Leader asked, pointing to the brutalities by the ISIL Takfiri group and other terrorist groups in the region.

The Leader further stressed the need for the expansion of relations between Iran and Turkey, adding, “The strength of every Muslim country is, indeed, the strength of the Islamic world and the policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran is that the Islamic countries should strengthen each other.”

Ayatollah Khamenei then pointed to the phenomenon of the “Islamic awakening” and the insatiable thirst of the nations for Islam as main reasons for the rising sensitivity of the enemies, saying “For a while now, the enemies of Islam have launched their counterattack against this awakening and the unfortunate reality is that some Muslim governments are betraying the others and putting their money and facilities at the service of the enemy.”

Ayatollah Khamenei further touched upon the current situation in Iraq and highlighted Iran’s assistance to the Iraqi government in its battle against the terrorists, saying, “Iran has no military presence in Iraq, but the two nations of Iran and Iraq have historic, deep-rooted, and very close relations.”

Iran’s President Hassan Rouhani and his Turkish counterpart Recep Tayyip Erdogan have called for the expansion of joint efforts aimed at fighting terrorism and extremism in the Middle East, saying that the two countries share a common view on the issue.

“The two sides agree on the view that instability, insecurity and war should stop in the entire region,” President Rouhani said in a joint press conference with the Turkish president in the Iranian capital, Tehran.

The Iranian president also stated that Tehran and Ankara should boost bilateral efforts to tackle terrorism in the region, saying, “Together, we should fight terrorism and extremism in order to achieve brotherhood between Muslims and people in the region.”

Rouhani said he and Erdogan have held “detailed discussions” on the ongoing conflict in Yemen, adding that the two sides emphasized the need for an immediate ceasefire in the Arab country.

Rouhani said the establishment of such a ceasefire could pave the way for sending humanitarian aid to Yemen, adding that Iran and Turkey and other countries should help peace and stability be restored to the Arab country. The president expressed hope that in Yemen “an inclusive government is established through dialogue.”

The Iranian president said the two sides have also agreed to broaden their cultural and academic cooperation. Iran and Turkey will also work for tougher security along the border.

The post Khamenei: Ending Military Aggression Against Yemen, Sole Solution To Crisis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Andrea Kristine G. Molina*

On January 21, United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon confirmed that Palestine will join the International Criminal Court (ICC) on April 1. This would allow the Palestinians to pursue Israel on possible war crimes committed during the Israel-Gaza war last June 2014. The UN has already launched an inquiry into the possible human rights violations by Israel in June 2014 offensive to be presented on March 23. The move came after the UN Security Council rejected the draft resolution proposed by the Palestinian Authority (PA) calling for the Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state on pre-1967 borders by 2017.

The ongoing conflict started after the June kidnapping and murder of three Israeli teenagers hitchhiking in the West Bank, which was purportedly ordered by the Gaza-based Hamas. This set off the chain of events that led to the 50-day war in Gaza, in which 2,200 people were killed, 66% of which are Palestinian civilians. As Gaza struggles to rebuild, the Palestinians have been successful thus far in launching high-stakes diplomatic offensive in the international arena. Israel, on the other hand, rallied for support in the US Congress and expanded its relations with friendly governments. At any rate, Israel’s next move remains to be seen until after their March 2015 legislative elections.

With the absence of light in the political horizon and the vulnerability of relations between people, the Israelis and the Palestinians are yet again stuck in a cycle of conflict and peace seems less possible more than ever. Home to more or less 36,400 Filipinos and the “Holy Land” to the predominantly Christian Philippines, Israel and Palestine are also crucial for the Philippines.

Intractable conflict

The ongoing conflict is one of the longest-running geopolitical conflicts in modern times. Since the creation of the State of Israel in 1948, the region has witnessed a series of wars and uprisings, failed peace processes, false promises, and more human suffering. As the conflict drags on, however, it seems that the situation becomes more complex and more difficult, if not impossible, to disentangle.

In simpler terms, the conflict is over who gets what land and how much control over these lands. But this passes through several high-stakes issues such as the control over Jerusalem, the borders that needs to be drawn, and the status of the Palestinian refugees and their descendants who still long to return to their former homes, among other things.

Since the breakthrough and the subsequent failure of the 1993 and 1995 Oslo Accords, the United States grappled with its attempts to salvage the peace deal between the two parties. It predictably collapsed as none of the parties were willing to compromise.

Further complicating the issue is the internal power struggle among different Palestinian factions, particularly between Fatah and Hamas, which administers the West Bank and Gaza Strip, respectively. While there was an effort to reconcile the seven-year rivalry between the two factions through the creation of the now-expired unity government in 2014, it suffered several setbacks including the unification of institutions, the holding of elections, as well as the considerable task ahead in managing the reconstruction of post-war Gaza. Should elections happen, there is a huge chance that Hamas would win both the parliamentary and presidential elections, following its increased popularity in the immediate aftermath of the Gaza war.

Israel is vehemently opposed to the Palestinian unity government, let alone a potentially Hamas-controlled one. For Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, this would mean “a Palestinian step against peace and in favor of terrorism.” Israel, along with several Western countries, officially designate Hamas and its military wing Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades as a terrorist organization, intent on the destruction of the Jewish state. For this reason, Israel refuses to lift the blockade in Gaza and will continue doing so until its security is no longer threatened by Hamas and other Gaza-based militant groups. Hamas, for its part, would not lay down its arms unless Israel lifts its blockade in Gaza and end its occupation of Palestine.

The futile attempts to resolve high-stakes issues unresolved to this day has created another layer of conflict that each party has to address: the management of the very antagonistic Israeli-Palestinian coexistence. For decades, Israel has put the Palestinians under military occupation, creating more resentment and distrust among people. Palestinian militant groups and radicalized individuals, on the other hand, continue to launch sporadic attacks of violence against civilians in Israel. Furthermore, Israelis and Palestinians have completely divergent historical narratives such that recognizing the other’s grievance is unlikely. This makes it easier for extremists on both sides to derail the peace process by pursuing strategies capitalizing on force and on violence.

Prospects and perils of the two-state solution

One-state solution, in which Israelis and Palestinians coexist into a pluralistic state, is already off the table as there are no viable arrangements and outcomes that both sides would accept. Likewise, complete destruction of the other side, while preferred by extremists, is not a pragmatic solution and would definitely be more catastrophic.

In theory, the only feasible solution for the conflict is the two-state solution, which is for Israelis and Palestinians to have their own independent states. However, it poses difficult questions and requires working out thorny details on Jerusalem, refugees, and borders. Furthermore, by becoming a full-fledged state, Palestinian leaders should have to choose between nation-building and the destruction of Israel. By choosing nation-building, it goes without saying that they would have to be accountable for the welfare and security of their own people.

Moreover, the expanding Israeli settlements jeopardize the viability of a Palestinian state. Israel would also need to concede some land to physically unite the non-contiguous areas of West Bank and Gaza Strip. But it should be clear, once and for all, what constitute “Palestine” and what exactly freeing Palestine means. As Fatah focuses on building a state in 1967 borders (i.e. West Bank and Gaza Strip), Hamas insists on the 1948 borders of the entire historic Palestine, which includes the lands where Israel currently sits. Hamas was opposed to the PA’s UN draft resolution for this very reason. This ideological difference between Hamas and Fatah demonstrate, in part, why this conflict is difficult to solve. To be able to achieve a two-state solution, all sides have to agree that no one is going anywhere unless everyone is willing to make uncomfortable compromises.

It is becoming clear that short-sighted solutions would not work as long as there is glorification of revenge and martyrdom, perpetual sense of victimhood, and pervasive desentization to violence from all sides. Nothing can be expected but years of repeated cycles of violence, ceasefires, and more violence, endangering the lives of people and jeopardizing a chance for peace in the region. Political and military solutions should go hand-in-hand with cultural solution in managing and resolving the conflict, since at the core of every misunderstanding are preconceived notions that blindly warp the perception of one towards the other.

While the centricity of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the Middle East universe has been challenged recently by the political turmoil across the region, the success and failure of the peace process would nonetheless be significant to the rest of the world, including the Philippines. Thus far, the Philippines’ recognition of a de facto state of Palestine since 1989 has not jeopardized its friendly relations with Israel. But while Filipinos benefit from Israel’s safety protocols and Iron Dome rocket interception system, they are nevertheless vulnerable to premeditated and indiscriminate attacks on civilians. Filipinos in Gaza Strip and West Bank are even more at risk of becoming collateral damages of war and unrests. The volatility of the situation requires the Philippines the necessary preparations to assist its nationals in the event of heightened tensions. While conflicts in the Middle East are beyond the Philippines’ control, the country could only strengthen its commitment to peace and stability in the region through active diplomacy.

Source:
This article was published by FSI as CIRSS Commentaries – Vol. II, No. 5 (March 2015)

About the author:
*Andrea Kristine G. Molina is a Foreign Affairs Research Specialist with the Center for International Relations and Strategic Studies of the Foreign Service Institute. Ms. Molina can be reached at akgmolina@fsi.gov.ph.

The post Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: The Long Road To Peace – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Although some important issues still need to be clarified in the final agreement, President Obama should be congratulated for getting a better-than-expected framework agreement restricting Iran’s nuclear program. Obama is right that negotiation is the only game in town. Even the Israelis and hawkish Republicans have quit pushing non-viable military options as much, but they offer no credible alternative to what Obama has been doing. Startling are the concessions that Iran has already made. Even Republican analysts like Richard Haass, Chairman of the Council on Foreign Relations, have been pleasantly surprised.

Of course, Israel and hardline Republicans complain that no Iranian nuclear facilities have been shut down and remain ever suspicious that the unfriendly Iran still wants to get a nuclear weapon. This strident view neglects the fact that Iran has a right, under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, to a nuclear program used for peaceful purposes and that the United States began the long downhill slide in U.S.-Iranian relations with the CIA’s overthrow in 1953 of an elected Iranian government to reinstate the brutal Shah as dictator. Iran has not always behaved well either, but it does live in a rough neighborhood, with the already nuclear Israel (likely possessing 200 to 400 nuclear weapons) and hostile Sunni Arab states in close proximity. Also, U.S. intelligence believed that Iran had not yet made a decision to produce a nuclear weapon. Iran, a theocratic state based on Shi’ite Islam, might even have some religious qualms about getting such a weapon.

If inspections under any new agreement failed to stop Iran from getting a nuclear bomb, even in that worse case, Iran would have only a few warheads compared to the vast Israeli stockpile. And even if an Iran nuclear bomb triggered a drive by Egypt, Turkey, or Saudi Arabia to get the same, nuclear weapons have contributed to the reduction of conventional cross-border conflicts in the post-World War II world. Furthermore, Iran does not have missiles that can hit the United States, even if it could shrink a nuclear warhead to fit such projectiles. So in essence, Iran is a threat to the Middle East region and perhaps Europe, not to the United States. Similarly, the small, comparatively weak groups that Iran sponsors, Hamas and Hezbollah, focus their efforts against Israel, not the United States. Furthermore, the now-wealthy Israel has had its major enemies neutralized—Syria by civil war and Egypt through the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty of 1979—yet still receives more than $3 billion in U.S. aid each year, most of it military assistance. Thus, even the threat of a nuclear Iran should be put in perspective.

In sum, praise for Obama in reaching a good framework deal with Iran should be unqualified. However, Obama has erred in two ways. He has grudgingly endorsed only a non-binding vote in Congress on any final deal, so that it wouldn’t impair his ability to implement it. But why have a meaningless vote in Congress? Under the Constitution, the only agreements with foreign countries that are allowed are treaties that are approved by a two-thirds vote in the Senate. Obama said: “My hope is that we can find something that allows Congress to express itself but does not encroach on traditional presidential prerogatives…” His use of the word “prerogatives” is telling because it harkens back to the “king’s prerogatives” that helped drive the American Revolution. That’s why the U.S. Constitution doesn’t mention executive agreements that can skirt a legitimate, binding vote in Congress. Hopefully, the Republicans controlling Congress will not once again abdicate their constitutional power and let a president get away with this un-American rule by fiat. A nuclear Iran would be better than the continued flagrant violation of the Constitution.

Obama’s second error is to redouble his support for Israeli security and to “formalize” aid to Arab states threatened by Iran. If the Iran nuclear deal is what Obama says it is, a way to effectively limit Iran’s nuclear program, which it does seem to be, these other nations should be safer. Here, Obama is really preparing the American people for the possibility that he may buy off these countries to win their support for the deal by using taxpayer dollars to increase aid to them. President Jimmy Carter did the same thing with Israel and Egypt to get the peace treaty of 1979.

In the end, however, Israel and the Arab allies are as scared of a power realignment in the Middle East as they are of an Iranian nuclear weapon. They have benefited over the years from U.S. hostility toward Iran, a potentially powerful country in the region. Obama’s statement that he is “hoping that we can conclude this diplomatic arrangement and that it ushers in a new era in U.S.-Iranian relations” strikes fear in their hearts that their relations with the United States will be diminished. If that is the case, so be it. The United States shares some interests with Iran—for example, revulsion at the Sunni ISIS group’s brutal antics in Syria and Iraq. The United States needs to do what is in its best interest, and having better relations with a powerful and previously hostile Iran is now included. The best analogy might be the anti-communist Richard Nixon’s much praised opening to Communist China in 1971.

However, Obama must make this diplomatic opening in a constitutional way by going over the heads of hawks in Congress and directly winning overwhelming public support for a surprisingly good nuclear deal— thus, compelling reluctant members of Congress to vote for it or suffer politically.

This article was published at Huffington Post and reprinted with permission.

The post Obama’s Nuclear Agreement With Iran Is A Good One, But Issues Remain – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Royal Dutch Shell said Wednesday that the Boards of Shell and BG have reached an agreement on the terms of a recommended cash and share offer to be made by Shell in deal valued at around $69 billion.

Shell said that as part of the agreement, BG shareholders will receive for each BG Share 383 pence in cash and
0.4454 Shell B shares.

Shell said that based on the 90 trading day volume weighted average price of 2,170.3 pence per Shell B Share on 7 April 2015 (being the last Business Day before the date of this announcement), the terms of the Combination represent: a value of approximately 1,350 pence per BG Share; and a premium of approximately 52% to the 90 trading day volume weighted average price of 890.4 pence per BG Share on 7 April 2015.

The deal will result in BG Shareholders owning approximately 19% of the Combined Group.

Shell said it expects the Combination to accelerate its growth strategy in global LNG and deep water, and will add some 25% to Shell’s proved oil and gas reserves and 20% to production, each on a 2014 basis, and provide Shell with enhanced positions in competitive new oil and gas projects, particularly in Australia LNG and Brazil deep water.

According to Shell, the Combination has the potential to unlock further value for both sets of shareholders from the combined portfolio. “An enhanced set of upstream positions will be a springboard to high-grade the Combined Group’s longer term portfolio, increase asset sales and reduce capital investment, thereby enhancing the Combined Group’s capacity to pay dividends and undertake share buybacks,” Shell said.

Shell said it expects the Combination to generate pre-tax synergies of approximately $2.5 billion per annum (which have been reported on) and has also identified further significant opportunities.

“In the near term, BG Shareholders will benefit from the dividends enjoyed by Shell Shareholders,” Shell said, adding,”Shell today confirms its intention to pay dividends of $1.88 per ordinary share in 2015 and at least that amount in 2016.”

According to Shell, “in the medium term, all shareholders will benefit from the potential for enhanced cash flow and a continued drive to grow returns and enhance capital efficiency from the combined portfolio.”

The post Royal Dutch Shell To Buy BG For $69 Billion appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Rashid Hassan

Fighting for the restoration of peace and the legitimate government in Yemen, coalition forces have reason to believe that the Houthis were trained by Hezbollah and Iran to harm people in order to dismantle the legitimate government of President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi.

Addressing the daily briefing on Operation Decisive Storm at Riyadh Air Base on Tuesday, Brig. Gen. Ahmad Al-Assiri, a consultant at the defense minister’s office, said: “The asymmetric warfare of the Houthis and Iranian-trained fighter jets being used by the militia only prove that Hezbollah and Iran trained the Houthis.”

Moreover, the history of their alliance in the past further confirms their vested goals of grabbing power, he said.

The coalition spokesman pointed out that the Houthis targeted hospitals and civilians, and attempted to cut water and power supplies, but coalition forces, the Popular Committees, tribesmen and resistance fighters prevented them from causing chaos.

Al-Assiri noted that the UN was briefed on these attempts to cause chaos. Moreover, the Red Cross revealed ground reports exposing Houthi involvement in the targeting of civilians, he said.

The militants areresorting to these tactics against civilians to provoke coalition troops for any reactions that may cause collateral damage, he said.

However, undeterred by the facts, the allied forces continued their strikes based on precise intelligence to destroy Houthi firepower, artillery stocks and other arms and ammunition to force them to surrender, paving the way for the restoration of the legitimate government.

Al-Assiri said the coalition command is proactive to provide logistical and humanitarian support whereas the airstrikes are also continuing at the same pace to achieve the defined goals.

Coalition forces have targeted a number Houthi camps in different areas of the country to bring them to their knees, he added.

Despite their hostile attempts to disturb peace and continue their reign of terror, the coalition will restore peace in Yemen, he said.

“Operation Decisive Storm was started to protect the people of Yemen and their legitimate government, and we are sure we will protect them by the grace of Almighty Allah,” said Al-Assiri.

In a reply to a questions about the use of forces for ground operations, he said: “It will be announced at an appropriate time, if and when required.”

So far as the land forces are concerned, Border Guard and field artillery on southern border are vigilant and committed to their assigned mission in preventing the terrorists from forming any base to head toward the border, he said.

The post Saudi Arabia Says Terrorists ‘Targeting Hospitals, Civilians In Yemen’ appeared first on Eurasia Review.

It’s time to prioritize Ijtihad rather than Jihad

By Ibrahim A. Khalil*

I’ve always been curious about Ibn-Taymiyyah (1263-1328) one of the most prolific writers of medieval Islam. His writings are numerous, alike in exegetical, dogmatic and political theology. I have read almost all of Ibn-Taymiyyah’s books. In my teenage years and even now, I am still in awe of this man. Six hundred eighty six years after his disappearance, he is still a living force for articulating the literature of the Qur’anic commentary by jumping from exegeses to judgment and has strongly influenced the entire trajectory of Islamic sociopolitical spectrum. Indeed his name was brought up by the 9/11 Commission that al Qaeda was influenced profoundly by his teaching.

Ibn–Taymiyyah has inspired both jihadist groups and traditional academic institutions, those who study his gigantic works, using the petrodollar to broaden their reading, rather than filtering and comprehending the contents of his work. I can’t stop thinking about this man — like have we ever satisfied adoring his past, staggering in the medieval age theology, transforming the Arab Spring into Fall, or returning the Muslim population to the deterioration of the fourteenth century, and mobilizing all the past with its bloodthirstiness and revenges.

No other Arabic writer can challenge the appeal for Jihad that Ibn-Taymiyyah has approached, and no one else in any juristic effort has established a religious influence as intellectual or as ample.

Ibn-Taymiyyah put his own spin on Jihad and its theoretical framework by expounding a provocative rhetoric in the elucidation of the Islamic jurisprudence. He saw the Muslims as being flexible to put his experience into practice. At the same time, he pulled back Ijtihad as an intellectual deriving methodology preserving Sharia to adopt with the changing issues at hand. For example, Ibn-Taymiyyah praised Muslim jurists who divided the world into the Domain of Islam (Dar al-Islam) and the Domain of War (Dar al-Harb). Instead of lucubrating his reasoning to formulate a new opinion especially when that division in total doubt, Ibn-Taymiyyah interpreted that division in a conflicting manner. Ibn-Taymiyyah’s word of Jihad has an intransigent meaning in his thought, different than it completely has in the real world. There are those now who are ignoring the core of the problem, believing that by changing their godfather’s perspective of Jihad would mean admitting their faith was wrong, when it’s not logically possible to continue the course of Jihad — even after discovering it’s not working.

Ibn-Taymiyyah was constantly in dispute with Islamic sects of deviant thought, drawing his red line on Taqlid (imitation) the Salaf (pious ancestor’s) asserted that any product of thought that doesn’t match the (Salaf ) is an innovation. In other words, accepting a religious ruling without proof — Blind imitation of this is still playing out perpetually to this day! His views on Ijtihad based on excommunicatory methodology (takfiri) and paradoxical innovation was itself innovative.

Major Muslim scientists have been labeled by Ibn Taymiyyah as disbelievers despite their contribution in turn to our current age, such as Ibn Sina, Al-Khwarizmi, and Al-Biruni, al-Kindi, al-Razi, Abu-l-Qasim and Jabir Ibn Haiyan.

Ibn-Taymiyyah and his students spent massive energy questioning the political chaos and brutal wars in their time. They confused Taqlid with Ijtihad, which led to narrow the scholar’s room to seek knowledge and learning and had the chilling effect of moving them further away from the practicing of Ijtihad. As a result, Ijtihad has deteriorated, surrendering its place to Taqlid which occupied the Islamic jurisprudence in the fourth century AH.

Modern Muslim dictators appealed to Ibn-Taymiah’s authority to play their favorite symbiotic created by him as evidence in their ruling that it was unlawful to rebel against the ruler, no matter how oppressive he might be. After being protected by this thought, dictators used savvy strategy to create proxy groups such as Hizb Allah , al-Qaeda and the “Islamic State” transferring the internal threat against their regimes to pursue Jihad abroad. This overlap has influenced them in igniting dogmatic historic battles based on definitions and categorizations.

On the other hand, those groups and their creators have read the misinterpretation of Ibn–Taymiyyah’s views of Jihad: that waging Jihad has to be under a certain state of authority with support from every sector of society. What seems to be conspicuous is that they are ignorant by lacking the Islamic jurisprudence credentials on waging Jihad with only limited support and without a legitimate state and legitimate leader.

Ibn-Taymiyyah Qur’anic analysis and political anticipation has impinged modern state scholars of Islamic code, as well as the students of legal ideologies.

For example Egyptian Imam of Al-Azhar, Ahmed Al-Tayeb mentioned: “IS established a colonial act in the service of the Zionists” a statement that restores the external conspiracy theory, and ignores the fact that his institution, with this jurisprudence, has resulted in widespread hatred.

Saudi Grand Mufti Abdel Al Sheikh, articulated that, “Muslims must fight ISIL if it fought Muslims”, which explicitly refers to permitting ISIL to fight non-Muslims. In this, the Mufti has turned a blind eye to the academic institutions in his country that are behind the rise of extremism. For example, the University of Muhammad Bin Saud, which is the largest in the Muslim world, with more than 20,000 students studying Islamic jurisprudence and Sharia. Some Masters and PhD theses produced by undergraduate students there include titles such as “The similarity between Shia rituals and Christian rituals”, “The similarities between Jews and rejecters (Rafedah)”, “The 12th Imam of the Shiites are the Jewish anti-Christ” and other similar titles. Is it any wonder that those forms of these extremists are the product of these intellectual institutions?

It’s time to deprecate between Jihad and convenience and Ijtihad by depleting every means based on reason to solve legal and social issues facing Muslim population. Muslim scholars should consider John Sowa’s technique using the advantageous methodology of Ibn Taymiyyah by incorporating his model of analogy of reasoning in his recent research. Sowa believes that Ibn- Taymiyyah’s analogy “becomes philosophical inspiration for the development of ontological structures in semantic networks for an artificial intelligence in computer science”!

*Ibrahim Khalil is a freelance journalist, based in Seattle, an expertise on Ibn-Taymiyyah and Ibn-Sina. You can reach him@ neptunebias@yahoo.com

The post 686 Years After His Death, Ibn-Taymiyyah Still Makes Waves – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

(Civil.Ge) — Russia’s deputy foreign minister, Grigory Karasin, hailed what he called Georgian government’s attempts to build ties with Russia on “pragmatic basis”, but expressed concern over Tbilisi’s NATO integration and said Moscow sees “dualism” in Georgia’s position.

Karasin, who is Russia’s chief negotiator in the Geneva talks, launched after the August 2008 war, and also is involved in direct dialogue with Tbilisi led from the Georgian side by PM’s special representatives for relations with Russia Zurab Abashidze, spoke about relations with Georgia in an interview with Russian newspaper, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, published on April 7.

“Despite of all the difficulties, which emerge at times, we intend to continue dialogue with Tbilisi,” Karasin said. “After the new leadership came into power in 2012, I mean Ivanishvili and his supporters, it was decided that this dialogue will possibly facilitate solving of practical issues and ease contacts between people. Almost one million ethnic Georgians live in Russia, who are part of our people. Nine meetings have been held with Georgian prime minister’s special representative for relations with Russia Zurab Abashidze; this is a measured and experienced person. At these meetings we do not address issues, which are unsolvable in the current situation – we instead focus on practical issues of bilateral relations such as transport, aviation, humanitarian contacts, visa practices, export of Georgian wine and mineral waters.”

He said that “in overall we are developing ties normally in the condition of absence of diplomatic relations between our countries”.

Karasin, however, said that “aggressive minded” opposition in Georgia tries to “artificially aggravate” situation in bilateral ties between Tbilisi and Moscow.

“Opposition forces, which mainly come from ‘Saakashvili’s nest’, are artificially aggravating situation today. These are aggressive minded people, who are exploiting economic difficulties, which Tbilisi faces, for their own interests,” Karasin said.

“However, for the future it is important for Tbilisi to shake off the burden of the previous unbridled, anti-Russian regime, which saw all kind of evil in its northern neighbor. Whatever negative was happening in the country or in the region, it was immediately linked to Russia,” Karasin said. “That’s an example of political idiotism.”

“When you live in a small country next to a major power, it would be more rational to match your geopolitical ambitions with real life. Otherwise you doom your people to a test. That’s what happened as a result of Georgian adventure in August, 2008. Saakashvili lost one-fifth of territories of the country,” Karasin said, adding that Georgia’s “attack on South Ossetia” was possibly dictated from outside.

“Georgia’s new leadership aspires to build its relations with Russia on more pragmatic basis,” he said.

“Of course we are concerned that mysterious NATO training centers are emerging on the territory of Georgia, promising statements are made about the need to speed up moving towards NATO structures,” Karasin said.

“We take into consideration and view it as dualism in [Georgia’s] position,” he added.

“At the same time we also make reference to the fact that Georgia’s new leadership is interested in solving concrete issues and in pragmatic relations with the Russian Federation. We are also interested to live in peace and agreement with Georgia,” the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister said.

Commenting of Russia’s recently signed “alliance” treaties with breakaway Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Karasin said that “hysteria caused by Tbilisi and the West” over these agreements “is an attempt to return the situation in the region back to August, 2008.”

“We cannot allow Tbilisi to constantly call under question their [Abkhazia’s and South Ossetia’s] ability to develop relations with us in a way they deem it necessary,” Karasin said.

The post Russian Deputy FM On Ties With Georgia, Concerned Over NATO Integration appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Adam Dick

When President George W. Bush announced the Global War on Terrorism in 2001 he did not have to start his war from scratch. Instead, the development of the United States government’s war on drugs that President Richard Nixon announced forty years earlier facilitated much of Bush’s new war. Two revelations this week provide new examples of the linkage between the two wars.

First, Brad Heath reported Wednesday at USA Today that from 1992 through 2013 the US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) collected calling records of “virtually all” phone calls from America to a long list of countries. At the list’s peak size, bulk collection was undertaken on calls between the US and over 100 countries. Countries that the article notes were on the list at “one time or another” include most countries in South America, Central America, and the Caribbean, as well as Canada, Mexico, Italy, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, and other countries in Europe, Asia, and Africa.

Heath describes the DEA program as “a model for the massive phone surveillance system the NSA launched to identify terrorists after the Sept. 11 attacks.”

Second, Jana Winter reported Monday at The Intercept that the Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques (SPOT) program of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) uses as a means for identifying possible terrorists a checklist that is, “in part, modeled after immigration, border and drug interdiction programs.” If one of the thousands of TSA Behavioral Detection Officers (BDOs) is watching a person and checks enough boxes on the checklist made up of ordinary human activities and attributes, the BDO can refer the observed individual to “selectee screening” (i.e., “enhanced” frisking and harassment) as well as request the involvement of local police who can interrogate the targeted individual and even bar him from traveling or arrest him.

Like the TSA overall, the SPOT program does not prevent terrorism. It is, though, one means among many the US government agency uses to routinely violate the rights of the people who encounter TSA checkpoints when they dare attempt exercising their right to travel.

These two examples are not the only ways the drug war has facilitated the Global War on Terrorism. Court decisions permitting invasive and abusive police tactics used in the drug war, for example, have created a drug war exception to the Fourth Amendment. This has led to courts being more accepting of the surveillance, entrapment, and other practices outside historic American legal limits that are used regularly in the name of fighting terrorism. Also, the practice of the US military deploying around the world to fight the drug war has made the similar “counterterrorism” deployments more easily undertaken by the government and more palatable to many Americans.

Last month at Foreign Policy, Harvard Professor Stephen M. Walt highlighted another commonality of the two wars — failure. Read here Walt’s persuasive presentation of why the Global War on Terrorism more and more reminds him of the “costly and counterproductive debacle” that is the US government’s war on drugs.

This article was published by the RonPaul Institute.

The post How The War On Drugs Facilitated Global War On Terrorism – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

France has declassified documents in the presidential archives relating to the 1994 Rwandan genocide. The declassification of the documents relating to Rwanda between 1990 and 1995 was decided to mark the anniversary of the massacres.

French President Francois Hollande announced a year ago that “France must provide proof of transparency and facilitate remembrance of this period”. The French presidency specified that the papers, which include documents from diplomatic and military advisers as well as minutes from ministerial and defence meetings, will be available to both researchers and victims’ associations.

Rwandan authorities unanimously welcomed France’s decision. Justice minister Johnston Busingye rold Radio France International that with the declassification of the documents “perhaps the goings on at the time will finally be opened up, and it will shed light on the many dark and gray questions still unaddressed”. He however added that “one only hopes that the declassification is total”, giving voice to a wide diffidence in the country. France and Rwanda have been engaged in a long-standing dispute as Rwandan President Paul Kagame’s government accuses Paris of complicity in the genocide, which left hundreds of thousands of dead among the Tutsis and moderate Hutu.

Marking the 21st anniversary of the atrocities, the Rwandan New Times daily published an open letter signed by various top political and social figures, including France’s former Foreign minister Bernard Kouchner, calling on Hollande to “put an end to this silence, and announce with clarity the truth about the genocide”.

The letter indicates the responsibility of “a handful of people, from the right as well as the left, responsible at the highest level of the state apparatus during the second term of François Mitterrand”. “Certain individuals, who led secret politics, continue to play a role on the political stage and are still present in our institutions”, says the letter.

The post France Declassifies 1994 Rwanda Genocide Documents appeared first on Eurasia Review.