“I predict that we will see a whole new wave of UAVs emerging with payloads more unusual than tasers, dart guns and paintball guns.” — Guy Martin, editor of Defence Web, BBC News, Jun 18, 2014

Innovation, Edmund Burke reminds us in “A Letter to a Noble Lord,” does not necessarily imply reform. While the peaceful uses of drones are often treated as the benign effects of the security industrial complex, the spill over into more violent deployments has proven unavoidable. What is done in Waziristan against Taliban militants will eventually be done to US citizens on a smaller yet significant scale – the civilian cloaking there becomes as irrelevant in tribal foothills as it does on the streets of Chicago.

The drone monitors have gotten excited by an announcement that Indian police forces will be making use of drones to deploy pepper spray against protesters. Trials were conducted on Tuesday in Lucknow, with the city’s police force anticipating using five such vehicles later this month. “The results,” claimed the jubilant police chief Yashasvi Yadav, “were brilliant. We have managed to work out how to use it to precisely target the mob in winds and congested areas.”[1]

The language used by Yadav serves an important purpose. Drones are weapons of use against that dark, primordial “mob”, difficult to control, unruly of purpose. From the perspective of many state authorities, any protesting group constitutes an unruly “mob”. The idea of a peaceful protest is nowhere to be seen, the greatest of unnatural phenomena. But Yadav insists that, “Pepper is non-lethal but very effective in mob control. We can spray from different heights to have maximum results.”

Controlling protests via the use of drones is at the forefront of new policing technologies, be they used by private entities or more conventional police forces. It is certainly interesting weapons manufacturers, who are lining up their customers. South Africa-based Desert Wolf is one example, telling the BBC in June last year that it had secured the sale of 25 “riot control copters” that would deal with crowds “without endangering the lives of security staff.”[2]

As is the habit of those in the business of providing such weapons, benevolence accompanies the authoritarian, somewhat murderous streak. Using such weapons against dissenting citizens will save, rather than inflict, the loss of life. According to Desert Wolf’s managing director Hennie Kieser, “We cannot afford another Lonmin Marikana [where striking miners were killed] and by removing the police on foot, using non-lethal technology, I believe that everyone will be much safer.” All this, despite the obvious point that using pepper spray, or firing projectiles from the air, can constitute lethal forms of action.

Such octacopter drones brandish the necessary menace that policing authorities will find attractive. They can carry up to 4,000 bullets at a time, as well as sporting the added feature of “blinding lasers” and onboard speakers. The Skunk variety has four high-capacity paintball barrels, each with a firing capacity of 20 bullets per second. The culprit purchasers in this instance came from the mining industry, a sector always keen to iron out protesting strife.

The International Trade Union Confederation immediately saw misty red. Spokesman Tim Noonan deemed the purchases a “deeply disturbing and repugnant development and we are convinced that any reasonable government will move quickly to stop the deployment of advanced battlefield technology on workers or indeed the public involved in legitimate protests and demonstrations” (BBC, Jun 18, 2014).

The police have traditionally felt left out when it comes to the assortment of weapons the military deploy against designated enemies. But the increasing militarisation of the police forces makes waiting for such weapons less of a problem. Military grade weapons are used against petty criminals. They are used in a hopelessly categorised “war on drugs”.

In the apocalyptic language of an ACLU report, War Comes Home: The Excessive Militarization of American Policing (Jun 23, 2014), it is noted how, “Our neighbourhoods are not warzones, and police officers should not be treating us like wartime enemies. An[d] yet, every year, billions of dollars’ worth of military equipment flows from the federal government to state and local police departments.”[3]

Alli McCracken, national coordinator of Code Pink, a body opposed to the deployment of drones, fears the innovations advanced by the Lucknow police force. “We can’t as a world rush into utilising this tech. The police are already so militarised. It’s a matter of privacy and safety.”[4]

The increasing use of drones to carry out policing functions is deemed by such officials as Yadav to be the logical and natural consequence of police work. For him, there is little difference in using such vehicles in monitoring crowds at religious festivals, to then deploying pepper spray when the gathering crowds misbehave.

This cognitive blindness is to be expected from those supporting the machine imperative. Irony proves inescapable, though it is lost on those behind this security push: to humanise policing, machines must be used. To improve public safety, the human element must be removed from the security agent monitoring the ground. Effectively, decisions on life and order are to be made at a location separate and even distant from the protest. This is the gruesome logic of targeting from vast distances.

Where police departments treat protesters as sinister enemies, seeing themselves as protective warriors, problems proliferate. Drone technology desensitises the task of policing, focusing less on public safety than police security. The machine imperative in this regard neuters human judgment. Added to this the attractions offered by weaponized drones, and a world of urban mayhem filled with strafing vehicles and poor decision-making is not so much around the corner as very much pressing against us.

Notes. 

[1] http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/india/11521639/Indian-police-to-use-pepper-spray-drones-on-protesters.html

[2] http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-27902634

[3] https://www.aclu.org/war-comes-home-excessive-militarization-american-policing

[4] https://news.vice.com/article/police-in-india-now-have-drones-that-can-shower-unruly-crowds-with-pepper-spray

The post Using Drones Against Protesters – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Sarah May Stern*

Remember April Glaspie? In 1990, she was President George H. W. Bush’s ambassador to Iraq. During her first meeting with Saddam Hussein, rather than using blunt language to tell the Iraqi dictator that the U.S. was opposed to any act of military aggression by his nation against Kuwait, she opted instead to employ far more opaque phrasing, saying, “we have no opinion on your Arab-Arab conflicts.” In doing so, Glaspie may well have inadvertently led Saddam Hussein to believe that he would receive little more than a verbal condemnation for invading Kuwait, thereby setting the stage for two American wars and thousands of casualties. War was not Glaspie’s intention on that July day, but Iraq’s strongman misinterpreted her words.

In 1950, a similar lack of diplomatic clarity by then Secretary of State Dean Acheson, who implied that South Korea lay outside of the U.S.’s “defense perimeter,” helped incite North Korea to invade the South. The North mistakenly believed that the U.S. government would not intervene to defend South Korea. Today the Obama Administration may be inadvertently leading us toward a similar tragedy. Only this time, the dictator in question is Iran’s Ayatollah Khamenei and the likely casualties will be the Israelis.

Last week while the terms of the Iranian nuclear deal were being written in Lausanne, Iran issued a statement saying that the destruction of Israel was non-negotiable. The Obama Administration chose not to address this comment. By ignoring Iran’s statement, our diplomats may have been unwittingly sending a signal that the annihilation of the Jewish state is permissible. Of course, the Obama Administration does not want Iran to attack Israel. But Ambassador Glaspie did not intend for Saddam to attack Kuwait either, nor did Secretary Acheson wish for North Korea to cross the 38th parallel and strike at the South.

In an interview with New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman on Saturday, President Barack Obama stressed the “deep affinities I feel for the Israeli people and for the Jewish people,” and his frustration with critics who claim that his “administration has not done everything it could to look out for Israel’s interest.” No doubt the Iranian leadership is reading this interview very carefully for further insight into the United States’ stance as the negotiations move forward, which is why President Obama’s words are critical, both for what he did say and particularly for what he did not say. The most important words in the interview may be these: “What I am willing to do is to make the kind of commitments that would give everybody in the neighborhood, including Iran, a clarity that if Israel were to be attacked by any state, that we would stand by them.”

The glaring omission in this sentence and in the interview as a whole is that Mr. Obama did not tell Iran not to attack Israel. The President did not explicitly say that Iran must stop calling for the destruction of Israel. Nor did he say that such threats against Israel are “unacceptable” and “non-negotiable” for the United States. While our media may be willing to overlook Mr. Obama’s choice of words, we can be certain that the Iranians who are parsing this interview will notice this glaring presidential omission. And given Mr. Obama’s general reluctance to use force anywhere, particularly his decision to walk back of his own red line statement on the Syrian regime’s use of chemical weapons, the Iranians may well suspect that an attack on Israel will not provoke any serious military response from the United States while Barack Obama is President.

Moreover, throughout last year’s nuclear negotiations, Iran has repeatedly called for the annihilation of Israel. And each time, these words have been met by silence on the part of the United States. For example, in a meeting last July with Iranian college students, the Iranian news service, Fars News Agency, reported that Ayatollah Khamenei said, “The only solution is its (Israel’s) destruction . . . Israel must be destroyed.” In November, Khamenei further tweeted that “This barbaric, wolflike & infanticidal regime of #Israel which spares no crime has no cure but to be annihilated.”

These are strong, incendiary words. They deserve a reply, if not from the President himself then at least from the Administration. Yet last Friday during the State Department’s daily press briefing, when Acting Spokesperson Marie Harf was asked point blank if the issue of Iran’s statements on the destruction of Israel should be included in any agreement, she replied: ”No, this is an agreement that doesn’t deal with any other issues, nor should it.” The President reiterated this stand on Monday in an interview with NPR’s Morning Edition when he called making the nuclear deal contingent on Iran recognizing Israel “a fundamental misjudgment.” Once again at a crucial moment, the Obama Administration missed an opportunity to state that Israel has a right to exist, as well as to reaffirm that Israel is both an essential American ally and that the U.S. categorically rejects any statements calling for Israel’s destruction.

Indeed, even if Israel’s right to exist is not part of any nuclear agreement, the U.S. State Department could still have taken that moment to reiterate America’s commitment to Israel and to warn against any attack on the state. Not doing so could be interpreted as a green light for Iran to attack, just as nearly a quarter-century ago, Saddam Hussein heard April Glaspie say that it was permissible for Iraq to invade Kuwait, or 65 years ago, North Korea believed it could lay claim to South Korea. In none of these cases would the interpretation be correct, but thus far, the outcome has been the same: tragic.

About the author:
*Sarah May Stern, Chairman of the Board of Trustees, Board Member of Hudson Institute.

Source:
This article was published by the Hudson Institute.

The post Iran Nuclear Deal: The Danger Of What Hasn’t Been Said – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Dr. S. Chandrasekharan

Two major issues continued to dominate the political scene in Nepal. First of course is the elusive consensus in drafting the new constitution and the second was the annulling of discretionary powers of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and the Commission on Inquiry into enforced Disappearance Act (CIED) by the Supreme Court.

When the Maoists joined the Madhesi and the Janajathi groups for the massive protests, it was not clear whether they were genuinely concerned about the configuration of the provinces on ethnic lines or on the Supreme Court judgement that ruled out general amnesty for serious rights violations. My suspicion is that they were more concerned about the judgement than on the consensus. They are going along with the Madhesis and the Janajathi groups because politically it suits them and not that they genuinely believe that the hitherto marginalised groups should be empowered under the new set up.

First on the Supreme Court Judgement on Amnesty

It appears that altogether 234 victims of the armed conflict between the Maoists and the government had filed writ petitions on June 3 last year challenging the discretionary powers given to the TRC and the government.

The Special Bench of the Supreme court, annulled two controversial provisions of the TRC and the CIED Acts that gave discretionary powers to the transitional justice mechanisms for amnesty and prosecution of human rights violators. More important, the Special Bench also directed that the victim’s consent should be made mandatory for reconciliation. It also declared that cases that are sub judice at various courts cannot be transferred to the Commissions.

The discretionary powers given to the commission on the provision that it cannot recommend amnesty for perpetrators involved in cases of serious human rights violation that are found to lack sufficient reasons and grounds for amnesty were also taken away in this judgement. In the court’s view it is the duty of the commission to look for reasons and grounds to bring such perpetrators under legal review.

The Special bench had also directed that the transitional mechanisms and the government not to act against the previous verdicts of the apex courts in the related cases.

This judgement has enraged all the six Maoists parties, particularly the two major ones led by Dahal and Mohan Baidya. The present government has been placed in a very tight and embarrassing position as the peace process cannot be considered complete without the pending cases before the TRC and the CIED being cleared.

The Elusive Consensus

Ever since January 25 when the Speaker announced that he would form a Questionnaire Committee and go ahead with the voting on the contentious issues of the new constitution, the opposition parties have been boycotting the Constituent Assembly.

On a request from a group of leaders of the civil society, the CA plenary was deferred on Feb 12 to enable them to help the parties to reach a consensus on the disputed issues of statute writing. After many meetings with the leaders of all the parties failed to produce the desired consensus, the civil society leaders formally met the Speaker and told him that their efforts to help the parties to reach a consensus failed.

Thereupon the Speaker wanted to convene the assembly on April 6. The opposition 30 Party Alliance led by the Maoists and the two major Madhesi Groups declared a three-day strike and closure throughout the country starting from 6th.

The agitation on the first day left 19 vehicles vandalised in Kathmandu valley and there were damages to public vehicles in other places too. In the city 11 people including the security personnel sustained injuries. Four persons were critically injured in Bhojpur. Full reports on the destruction of public property and injuries to the people are yet to be received.

Realising the consequences of the “bandas” and on the specific appeals from the public, the 30 party alliance decided to withdraw the strike scheduled for the 7th and 8th of April. It appears that the Maoists were playing up the two groups of the Madhesis with the Upendra Yadav’s groups wishing to continue and the Gachhadar group opting to withdraw the agitation.

Meanwhile the Speaker as well as the Ruling parties have given themselves a deadline of May 29 to get the draft of the new constitution ready.

If one is to go by past experience there is very little chance of the contending parties coming to any consensus before the deadline. The present “unsettled situation” is likely to continue with the Maoists making the most out of the political impasse that is seen today.

There have been two “out of the box suggestions” that have recently come out and both are worth considering.

In the configuration of the provinces the disputed districts are only Jhapa, Biratnagar, Sunsari in the east and Kalilali and Kanchanpur in the west. Whey not then go for a referendum in these five districts and let the people from the five districts decide where they want to be? This would help the Federal system to be retained and at the same time the peoples’ wishes from the five districts would also have been taken into account.

The second suggestion is- Why not delete the word “interim” from the Constitution and continue with the present constitution along with provisions that have been agreed to among the parties? This suggestion made in an editorial of Nepal Times is said to be “least disruptive and most forward looking way” to end this “debilitating deadlock.”

While the former provision may be acceptable to the Terains, the latter one will be opposed tooth and nail by them as this will perpetuate the present discrimination against the Terai indefinitely.

Indian Foreign Secretary’s visit

In the course of SAARC Yatra, the Indian Foreign secretary made a two day visit to Nepal and met almost all the stake holders both in the government and outside. He urged the political leaders to come up with a constitution at the earliest and help end the current protracted transition.

He also added that it is in the larger interest of Nepal to bring a new constitution and through the broadest possible compromise. In the same breath, he also reiterated that “India does not want to interfere in Nepal’s internal affairs.”

There are suggestions in the Press that India should intervene. It is best left to the Nepalese to decide on the type of constitution and the mechanism through which it is done. Nepal is quite capable of deciding on such issues.

The post Nepal: Elusive Consensus And Supreme Court Ruling On Amnesty – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Samir Saran*

There is quite an air of anticipation around the Indian Prime Minister’s visit to France. The government’s foreign policy pace has been enviable, and Narendra Modi has demonstrated a remarkable aptitude in gauging the mood and the space to manoeuvre with various partners. He has revitalised old relationships and lent them his energy. He has also achieved some real strategic gains,such as the one in Seychelles. The visit to France is pregnant with possibilities that are rooted in a historic context and which now need to be leveraged on a broader plane.

France has always been a critical partner to India in high technology areas. Its bid to aid India in the diversification of its defence sector began as early as 1953, when the Dassault-Ouragan fighters were supplied to the India Air Force and played a leading role in the 1961 liberation of Goa. Significantly, when India-U.K. defence relations soured in the 1970s, France emerged as the only western power willing to supply India with state-of-the-art weaponry and support its space programme and nuclear development. The importance of France as a key partner was accentuated in 1998 when, following India’s nuclear tests, France actively thwarted United Nations Security Council sanctions and forced a toning down of the final language even as the Russians dithered. During that period, India’s agreement to launch satellites from French Guinea stayed intact despite the sanctions imposed by other European Union countries across a range of technological sectors, especially space. In 1999, during the Kargil war, the French maintained a supply of spares to the IAF, which allowed it to operate without worrying about expending smart weapon reserves.

France was arguably the first western country to de-hyphenate its relations with Pakistan from those with India, deciding that the artificial “balance of power” equation between the two was passé. Today, France is at the forefront of India’s ambitions of modernising its sub-surface fleet. Scorpène class submarines are being built at Mazagaon docks and Dassault’s Rafale has won the Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) tender. India’s only dedicated military satellite, the GSAT-7, was launched from Ariane 5, from Kourou.

Despite all this, it seems as if the tenor of the Indo-French engagement is being determined only by the progress on the Rafale deal. Much like the U.S. and India relationship, which had to find a way past the Civil Nuclear Agreement that hung heavy like the proverbial albatross, the India-France partnership must move beyond the circular meanderings that the negotiations look like to outsiders. One way or another, we must strive for an early conclusion, as this is not just about one set of aircraft but about investment in a host of current and future possibilities presented by India’s growing economic and geo-strategic strength. The Rafale deal must be placed in a broader framework of association. This framework could include three key elements, among others.

Nuclear cooperation

The first is for France to translate into action its previously expressed acceptance of India’s stance of nuclear exceptionalism and for the two countries to enter into full-spectrum collaboration. Such a partnership should be aimed at reducing the incubation time of Indian nuclear technologies and would cover the full nuclear cycle, including reactors, enrichment and reprocessing. This nuclear cooperation would logically extend into the sphere of military nuclear propulsion. The upcoming French Barracuda class SSN, for example, is optimally suited to the Indian Navy’s needs. If India buying the Rafale is the truest sign of India’s commitment to the relationship, then the nuclear submarine may well be the litmus test of French reciprocity.

But, again, it is important not to get fixated only on the big-ticket items but to use the other opportunities that signature government initiatives like “Skilling” and “Make in India” offer alongside these big deals. The French could, for example, help develop the defence sector eco-system in India, especially in the small and medium segments, investing in skills and capacity building here. This is where the real value addition takes place in the defence business and this could be the differentiator between France and other countries.

The second element must be regional cooperation. Increasingly, the interests of the two countries have intersected and their views tend to be similar even if their positions are not. Much of this is because Indian and French foreign policies share the same fundamental view of strategic autonomy and refuse to cede security primacy to one or two actors. It was because of this that India had, in 2013, co-sponsored a UN resolution that paved the way for French intervention in Mali. This is why it needs to cooperate in the Indian Ocean, West Asia and North Africa. India and France have significant interests here and it is perhaps time to build a robust platform for dialogue that will allow the two nations to cooperate meaningfully.

West Asia and North Africa are in the midst of a turbulent period of dramatic change. India’s chief task is to secure its energy source, the safety of its diaspora, and the stability of its extended neighbourhood. France will continue to play a significant role in the region.

As for the Indian Ocean area, France is a major power here and has demonstrated some degree of interest in cooperating with India. A focussed engagement would also be a natural extension of the collaboration envisaged here between the U.S. and India earlier this year. Co-investing with France in a ‘research’ facility located in Mauritius may serve as the point of convergence for such a regional play. This could form the basis for intensified cooperation on maritime domain awareness, building capacity in Indian Ocean Rim countries, and in honing synergistic strategies to deal with humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

Accord on climate

Finally, France is set to host the most important of climate conventions at the end of this year, one that will determine the successor to the Kyoto Protocol. This makes for an important area where the two countries can cooperate. The climate agreement can impact energy access and energy options for most countries, including India. The French are familiar with the Indian effort to eliminate poverty and the principal role that low-cost energy could play in meeting this goal.

The Paris climate meet will be an optimal moment for India to stop being defensive about the issue. It must unhesitatingly showcase all that it has already undertaken and achieved in responding to the challenge of climate change. It must clearly signal what it seeks from the outcome to protect its development space. And France, with its agenda-setting capacity and consensus-building role, must strive to ensure a climate deal that is fair and equitable and allows India critical room to manoeuvre.

*Samir Saran is Vice-President and Senior Fellow at Observer Research Foundation, Delhi

Courtesy: The Hindu, April 9, 2015

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Sri Lanka President Maithripala Sirisena and the visiting Bhutanese Prime Minister Tshering Tobgay pledged to enhance bilateral cooperation and establish air links between Paro and Colombo by Druk Air, the Bhutanese national Carrier.

The two leaders agreed that Sri Lanka and Bhutan have a special relationship as the two countries are bound by common spiritual link of Buddhism.

Prime Minister Tobgay said that his country is extremely grateful to Sri Lanka for the gift of a sapling of Sri Maha Bodhi to Bhutan and it will be highly venerated and respected in his country. He said that the Bodhi sapling will be a sacred symbol of the extraordinary spiritual bonds between Bhutan and Sri Lanka.

During the bilateral discussions, Mr Tobgay thanked Sri Lanka for providing placements to Bhutanese students in Sri Lankan medical colleges and it is a great help to the improvement of the health service in his country. President Sirisena said he would provide more seats to Bhutanese students at the Medical faculty of the Kotalawala Defence Academy and examine the possibility of increasing the number of scholarships given to Bhutan.

President Sirisena said steps would be taken to increase cooperation in areas such as health, agriculture and tourism between the two countries.

The post Bhutan And Sri Lanka Friendship Based On Common Spiritual Link Of Buddhism appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Like you and every other person, I have no just right to prescribe for another person where he may come and go, with whom he may contract as employer or employee, and with whom he may buy, sell, and otherwise associate, so long as he does not violate anyone’s justly acquired private property rights or otherwise infringe on anyone’s natural rights. I don’t own other people; nor do you; nor does anyone else.

As everyone from John Locke to the Founders of the United States to the general run of political philosophers has recognized, the people are, in justice, the political sovereigns, and the government possesses no rights of its own, but only powers delegated to it by the sovereign people, who make this delegation solely to defend their natural rights more effectively.

In light of the foregoing considerations, the government may not justly carry out what is now called immigration policy. This policy violates migrants’ and would-be migrants’ natural right to move about peacefully so long as they do not trespass on anyone’s private property or trench on anyone’s other natural rights, and it violates the rights of residents to harbor, aid, do business, and associate freely with migrants and would-be migrants. If migrants wish to enter this country to visit or do business with me or to pursue any other peaceful purpose, no one may justly interfere with their doing so; and because none of us has a just right to interfere, neither may the government interfere, because no one may delegate to the government the defense of a right he does not possess and, to repeat, the government as such has no just rights of its own.

As for so-called public property, which the government purports to own, the situation is different: the ownership of such property justly resides in no particular person(s); it is therefore common property, and any person whatsoever, including a migrant, has as much right as any other person to gain access to and use it. No government functionary can justly claim to represent anyone else in controlling the use of and exclusion of others from such property, because such functionaries have not entered into legitimate explicit, individual, voluntary contracts with the individuals on whose behalf they purport to act. They can defend the “public property” only in the same way that a common thief might defend his stolen loot—effectively perhaps, but certainly not legitimately in the service of justice.

The government’s immigration policies of threatening, restricting, kidnapping, confining, punishing, and deporting peaceful migrants are unjust. For what it is worth, these actions also happen to be unconstitutional by virtue of never having been enumerated as government powers in the Constitution—not that they would be any more just if they had been enumerated. The whole apparatus serves only the ends of usurpation, violence, and disorder, contravenes the just rights (including the private property rights) of all private parties (both residents and migrants), and compounds the government’s intrinsic injustice.

The claim that in the service of “national security” a government must “secure the borders” not only against invaders or others clearly intent on causing harm in this country, but against would-be migrants in general is without merit. The claim also flies in the face of historical evidence. The U.S. government managed to survive and grow, and the people to prosper abundantly, during the century in which the government had no immigration policy except forbidding the entry of people with certain contagious diseases and those likely to become a public charge (the latter restriction being honored mainly in the breach).

If government officials were to prevent the entry of persons they have good reasons to believe intend to commit terroristic or other criminal acts, their exclusion of such persons might be justified on other grounds, as protection of the current resident’s natural rights to life and private property, but such exclusions, unlike general immigration controls, would affect only a tiny group of specific persons, not all would-be migrants whatsoever, regardless of their transparent peacefulness. It is unjust to violate preemptively the natural rights of entire groups of people on the grounds that a member of such a group might later commit a crime.

On this basis, the government could with equal justice violate everyone’s natural rights and throw all of us in prison—after all, it is certain that some members of all large groups, including native-born residents, will commit crimes at some point in the indefinite future. The governments of genuinely free countries, however, do not punish people or otherwise violate their natural rights on the basis of vague suspicions and prevailing prejudices; nor do they administer justice on the basis of group membership, but only on the basis of individual actions. Only by so acting do they guarantee “equality under the law.” Far from meeting this standard, however, the U.S. government’s current immigration policies represent only an arbitrary and capricious mass of unjust coercion.

The post US Immigration Policy Is Unjust – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Spain’s Minister for Foreign Affairs and Co-operation, José Manuel García-Margallo, received the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Committee at Santa Cruz Palace on Wednesday, made up of the heads of the diplomatic missions in the Philippines, Ambassador Carlos Salinas; Thailand, Ambassador Bussaya Mathelin; Vietnam, Ambassador Nguyen Ngoc Bihin; Indonesia, Chargé d’affaires Erie Noer Bawono; Malaysia, Chargé d’affaires Ahmad Amiri Abu Bakar, on the occasion of its formal constitution.

The Ambassador of the Philippines, in his capacity as Rotating President of the ASEAN Committee in Madrid outlined how, pursuant to the ASEAN Charter, the diplomatic missions of the member nations in third countries must set up a committee to promote the interests of the organisation in the host nation. That is what the five countries with embassies in Madrid have done out of the ten that form part of ASEAN.

The committee in Madrid has set the target of promoting economic and cultural exchanges between the Member States and Spain, to which end they will endeavour to present the business opportunities in their respective countries to Spanish business leaders at various forums. At a cultural level, he highlighted the Cervantes Institute and Asia House and thanked them for their work.

The Ambassador of Thailand outlined the regional integration process that the ASEAN project represents, which seeks to set up an ASEAN Community as from 31 December 2015, comprising three main pillars: the Political and Security Community, the Economic Community and the Socio-Cultural Community.

Minister García-Margallo congratulated the heads of mission on having constituted the ASEAN Committee and underlined the importance given by Spain to maintaining dialogue with the various regional groups, particularly in its role as a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. Finally, the minister invited the representatives to continue to maintain fluid dialogue with the government and to use the public diplomatic channels of the Network of Houses to make known the integration process of the countries in Southeast Asia.

The post Spanish Minister Meets With ASEAN Committee In Madrid appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Ziauddin Wahaj*

It is more than six months since President Ashraf Ghani and CEO Abdullah Abdullah were tied together in a forced-marriage-type arrangement by  US Secretary of State, John Kerry in a bid to put an end to the 2014 presidential election dispute.

So far, the National Unity Government has failed to meet the expectations of the Afghan public. The government has been characterized by rifts between the two leaders on key issues such as formation of the cabinet, appointment of key government officials, peace talks with Taliban and Afghanistan’s position on Yemen crisis.

Braving out the Taliban threats and proving the pessimistic analysis of political commentators wrong, the Afghan people took part in an unprecedented number in both rounds of last year’s presidential election with the hope that the new government would bring peace, improve the delivery of justice and create new jobs. However, these hopes received a body blow when Secretary Kerry brokered a deal between the two leaders – according to which Ghani shared the power with the runner-up Abdullah.

Though, Secretary Kerry was appreciated for saving Afghanistan from entering into chaos, the deal seemed faulty from day one, since the involved parties had just returned from a bitter election campaign. Six months later, the deal is proving to be the fundamental reason for the failure of the government to deliver quality public services, as both Ghani and Abdullah continue to disagree on key national policies.

To win the support of Saudi Arabia to pressure Pakistan into playing a constructive role in the Afghan peace process, the Afghan president backed the Saudi’s stance on Yemen and even vowed to defend it if the two holy mosques were at risk. Though Abdullah seemed to be on the same page with the president on the Yemen issue, however, his second deputy, Mohammad Mohaqiq – a pro-Iranian political figure and a warlord – in an interview with Tolonews opposed the government’s decision to endorse the involvement of Saudi Arabia in Yemen. An example of difference of opinion and interests between the two camps.

In addition, the appointment of Shukria Barikzai – a member of the Afghan parliament and a strong supporter of the president – as head of the Election Reform Commission has turned into a point of contention between President Ghani and CEO Abdullah. The CEO denied accepting her to lead the commissionm which is mandated to introduce electoral reforms prior to the parliamentary election, and has reportedly been postponed for a year with the aim to let the commission do its work.

However, the major disagreement that has widened the differences between the president and CEO is on the appointment of the Chief of Army Staff, a powerful position at the Afghan National Army (ANA). Dr. Abdullah has named Atiqullah Baryali, a former deputy Afghan defense minister and a close aide to CEO, however, president Ghani has reportedly disagreed with the nomination. As a result, the President’s nominated Defense Minister, General Afzal Ludin, a Dr. Najibullah’s time commander who defeated and demoralized Pakistani-backed Mujahidden in the famous Jalalabad battle in early 1990s, withdrew his nomination to ease tension between the two sides, a major loss for the government for having failed to secure the services of an experienced Army General.

The CEO Abdullah also does not seem pleased with the recent remarks of Secretary Kerry in an official dinner hosted for both the President and CEO in their last month trip to USA. “He (Ashraf Ghani) was not required by any law, by any rule, by any precedent to share power and create the unity government” said so Secretary Kerry bluntly while referring to the deal that he brokered last year. Abdullah while speaking in a conference in Kabul said, “The CEO post is not a gift, and is not representing a group of people. But, this position came as a result of elections and as a result of a national unity government”.

The Afghan public is frustrated with the performance of the national unity government, which has turned into a two-headed government, thus making the decision making process slower and more ambiguous. The common Afghan feels embarrassed when each time Secretary Kerry has to either call or visit Kabul to address the differences between the two leaders.

The Afghan People expect both leaders to focus on critical issues ranging from the threats posed by Taliban to fighting corruption and creating jobs. If they cannot overcome their rifts, then one of the two leaders should show statesmanship and resign for the sake of broader national interests.

Taking into account the current power struggle between the President and CEO, the likelihood that the two-headed Afghan government will survive is bleak, especially when a Loya Jirga is expected to take place in one and a half year time to legally define the role of CEO Abdullah – A major test for the government to survive. In addition, given the current differences between the two leaders, it would be difficult for the members of the Loya Jirga to justify upgrading the powers of CEO to the level of a Prime Minister.

*Ziauddin Wahaj has a postgraduate degree from University of Adelaide. He tweets at @wahajzia and can be reached at zia.wahaj@gmail.com

The post Is Kerry’s National Unity Government Recipe Failing In Afghanistan? – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Anouar Boukhars*

There has been a marked intensification of conflict across the Sahara and the Sahel. This has created a new normal, where ethnic tensions are reinforced, religious divisions are more pronounced and crises are less local. The current conflicts in Mali, Libya, and Nigeria – for example – show this, having been deeply shaped by a cross-section of Saharan radicalised militants that mix with transnational smuggling networks and independence movements.

To be sure, the old normal was also marred by terrorism and other forms of political violence, border disputes, and occasional acts of banditry. But the nature of conflicts in the Sahel and the Sahara has changed, and the patterns of violence have become more complex. The sources of crises have also become more mobile, acquiring a cross-border dimension that requires regional solutions. So far, bilateral, regional, and international responses have been numerous, but largely contradictory and short-sighted.

The good news is that regional and international actors are increasingly aware that any effective response framework needs to be well- coordinated, and adapted to the geographic and organisational interdependence of networks and populations across the Sahel-Sahara zones. The bad news, however, is that it has been very difficult to design and implement a coordinated security and development strategy that transcends the narrow confines of counter-terrorism, international institutional rivalries, and regional inter-state rivalries.

FOUR PHASES OF CONFLICT

The Saharan-Sahelian space has witnessed four phases of conflict escalation and violence. Each stage has its own distinct characteristics regarding intensity of conflict, alongside the tactics employed and strategies pursued by various actors. The post- colonial phase (1960-75) was the period of least intense conflict.

The main disturbances came from the three-week ‘war of sands’ between Morocco and Algeria (1963), the aborted Tuareg rebellion (1963- 64) in Mali and the successful military coups in Libya (1969), Mali (1968), and Niger (1974). The long drought (1969-73) that struck the countries on the southern border of the Sahara (Mauritania, Senegal, Mali, Niger, and Chad) also had severe dis- locating effects on both nomadic groups and agro-pastoralists, especially the Moors, Arabs, Toubous, Tuaregs and Peuls. Some of these populations, especially Tuareg, fled to Algeria while others sought exile in Libya. But none of these internal disturbances seriously undermined the stability of the post-colonial system, though their side effects would be felt in subsequent phases of conflict.

The second conflict phase (1975-90) was more intense and destabilising. The Western Sahara dispute exploded into a full blown zero-sum regional confrontation between Morocco, Algeria, the Polisario Front (a Sahrawi independence movement founded in 1973 and based in Algeria), and Mauritania. The first casualty of the conflict was Mauritania, which saw its heavy war losses lead to a military coup in 1978 and the withdrawal of all Mauritanian claims to Western Sahara. Mauritania’s exit left Morocco battling the Algerian-backed guerrilla Polisario Front until the ceasefire of 1991.

Since its inception, the conflict has never managed to break loose from geopolitical rivalry between Morocco and Algeria. The second phase also saw some other low-intensity border disputes between Burkina Faso and Mali (1985-86), Nigeria and Chad (1987), and Libya and Chad (1973-87).

The third phase (1990-2003) began with the entry into hibernation of the Western Sahara dispute, and the settlement of the Libyan and
Chadian conflict by the International Court of Justice in 1994. But it is the intensely violent conflicts that erupted in Algeria, Mali, and Niger that mark this period. The bloody Algerian civil war (1991-98) was provoked by the army, which aborted the Islamists’ then emerging dominance of the electoral process on 11 January 1992 (prior to that the Islamists had won municipal elections and the first round of parliamentary elections). The second Tuareg rebellion, which started in Niger before spilling over into Mali (1990-95), coincided with turbulent political developments and the military overthrow of Mali’s Traore government in 1991. These rebellions were contained through a series of tenuous agreements, brokered by Algeria.

The last and most turbulent phase (2003-present) marked the official debut of terror groups and criminal organisations in the Saharan desert. The spectacular 2003 kidnapping of thirty-two European tourists travelling across the Algerian desert and their transfer to Mali where they were ransomed for €5 million by an Algerian terror group, later renamed al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), became the trade mark activity for violent extremists and jihadist gangsters to finance their operations. This period was also characterised by volatile politics and military coups in Mauritania (2005 and 2008), Niger (2010), Mali (2012), and Burkina Faso (2014). The Arab revolts of 2011 also had dreadful destabilising consequences on some parts of the Sahel-Sahara region. The popular protests and armed uprising in Libya quickly decayed into fratricidal chaos, destabilising its fragile southern neighbours and contributing directly to the 2012 collapse of order in Mali (For a detailed description of the phases of conflict, see SWAC/OECD 2014, An Atlas of the Sahara-Sahel – Geography, Economics and Security, Chapter 8).

RECURRENT TURNOVERS OF POWER

Most countries across the Sahel and the Sahara strode into the new millennium burdened with the baggage of semi-democratic politics, ethnic divisions, and ingrained socio-economic inequalities. The mechanics of this legacy still hangs over the region. Democratic transitions have been messy, often punctuated by coups, protests, and rebel- lions. In Niger (2009) and Burkina Faso (2014), elected leaders were ousted after trying to bulldoze constitutional amendments through parliaments that would eliminate their term limits. Mauritania saw its brief democratic experiment upended by a coup in 2008, only one year after the military was pressured to relinquish control to civilian rule. Only Senegal has never experienced a coup – a feat rarely equalled in a region prone to military interventions – and managed to have a peaceful transition of power. The 2011 mobilisation of the opposition in Senegal forced the then 85-year-old president, Abdoulaye Wade, to back off plans for a constitutional change to pro- long his tenure for another (third) term.

There are many factors that explain the recurrent turnover of power across the Sahel. Prior to the 1990s, political transformations were usually triggered by conflict, stagnating socio-economic development, and foreign interference. In the 1990s, other variables gained in importance. Popular mobilisation against rigid austerity measures imposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) sparked a wave of protests between the mid-1980s and early 1990s that hustled in a new era of political transformations in Mali, Niger, and Senegal. But the failure of this round of political transformation to temper mass demands for less corruption and more economic and social justice paved the way for another wave of rebellions, popular protests and militancy in the new millennium.

The outbreak of Tuareg insurrections in the 1990s and 2000s across the Sahel-Sahara was precipitated by both endogenous and exogenous factors. The underlying factors for the eruption of violence were group-based discrimination and region specific neglect. The post-independence Saharan states promoted agriculture and sedentism at the expense of Tuareg pastoral nomadism. This feeling of identity-based discrimination was exacerbated by the states’ neglect of their Saharan hinterlands. The short-term drivers of the rebellions, however, were regional in nature. Libya’s war losses in Chad, the contraction of oil prices in the 1980s, and international economic sanctions led Gaddafi to order the decommissioning of thousands of Tuareg from the armed forces.

Thousands of Tuareg were also expelled from Algeria, which suffered a serious economic downturn in the 1980s. The return of legions of well-trained Tuaregs was one the main catalysts for the 1990s rebellions in Niger and Mali (See SWAC/OECD 2014, An Atlas of the Sahara- Sahel, pp: 182-192).

A couple of decades later, exogenous shocks from Libya brought terrible consequences to Mali. History does not repeat itself, but, as Mark Twain noted, it sometimes rhymes. The 2011 fall of Gaddafi in Libya triggered a disorderly chain of events combining societal imbalances and shifting ethnic fault lines in northern Mali. Deprived of their historical patron, thousands of Nigerien and Malian Tuareg tribesmen returned home with vehicles, weapons and military expertise, unsettling the prevailing status quo and upsetting the power relations among and within ethnic and tribal groups.

But unlike previous episodes, these events did not have the same destabilising effect on Niger as on Mali. Niger largely escaped the devastating opportunist assaults by Tuaregs and associated radical Islamists that chased the Malian army and sank its massive northern territory into chaos. The different impact is partly due to the Nigerien government’s pro-active and aggressive approach to monitoring its borders with Libya, disarming ex-combatants and reintegrating the 90,000 Nigerien migrants forced to return home.

The Nigerien armed forces also never left the country’s northern territory, unlike the Malians who were bound by the 2006 Algiers agreement with Tuareg rebels to withdraw the bulk of government forces from the north.

Other factors are attributable to the relative success of the government in Niger in managing the Tuareg question, such as integrating an appreciable number into the civil service, government and armed forces. Decentralisation, for example, has allowed a good number of former rebel leaders and dissident voices to head local and regional councils. The north-south divide that is a central feature of the Malian crisis is also less pronounced in Niger, where the Tuaregs are more dispersed nationally than in Mali. This does not mean that the chaos in Libya and persistent instability in Mali and northern Nigeria is not affecting Niger. The 2013 twin terrorist attacks on Agadez and Arlit are believed to have been hatched in southern Libya. Southwest Niger is especially vulnerable to penetration by jihadist groups operating in Mali. The Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), present in the Gao region that borders Niger, draws part of its recruits from black Songhais and Peuls in the Niger valley, some of whom are Nigeriens.

Similar danger stems from the Nigerian violent extremist group, Boko Haram, which uses the countries on the edge of northeastern Nigeria as both recruitment grounds and fall-back bases. In February 2015, Boko Haram – which is currently battling Nigerian security forces – widened the fight to strike across the border into Niger and Chad. Earlier, it retaliated against Cameroon for entering the war against it. As the group expands its operations, its exact nature and composition is becoming harder to discern. Some Boko Haram fighters are known to have received training from regional militant groups, including AQIM, but the group remains very localised and focused on domestic issues. Grievance and resentment politics against government corruption, poor governance and the brutality of security services resonates in Nigeria’s restive northeastern Borno state, and are the driving force behind Boko Haram’s endurance. But like other insurgent groups in the
Sahel, Boko Haram has become a magnet not only for angry and disillusioned young men in the marginalised Muslim northeast, but also for criminals, gangsters, and opportunists.

THE SPREAD OF CROSS-BORDER CONFLICT

The links between violent political insurgencies and crime are not new. For example, during the 1990s Algerian civil war, the Islamist insurgency ended up dabbling in transnational trafficking and Mafia-style organised crime. Another troublesome characteristic of that insurgency was its expansion beyond its borders. The settlement of Algerian terrorists in northern Mali helped embroil the region into a tangled web of militancy, extremism and criminality. Similar worries exist today about the increasing reach of Boko Haram across northern Nigeria and into neighbouring countries. Unchecked militancy runs the risk of not only fuelling Muslim-Christian discord in Nigeria, but also in Chad, where all its recent civil wars have been exacerbated by religious tensions. It also raises the spectre of growing links between different conflicts across the vast Sahara and Sahel regions.

The prospect of cross-fertilisation between Boko Haram, AQIM and other regional militant organisations is a nightmare scenario. AQIM and MUJAO already draw their membership from a cross-section of Saharan countries. Cross-border mobility is a fixture of conflicts in the Sahara and Sahel and looks set to increase (See Judith Scheele, Trafic ou commerce? Des échanges économiques au Sahara contemporain, SciencesPo, July 2013). When Boko Haram lost its leader in 2009 and was under siege from Nigerian security forces, its leaderships regrouped in Niger, Chad, and Cameroon. Ethnic and tribal affiliations often transcend national frontiers, for example along the Algerian-Malian borders. The leading actors in the terrorist group MUJAO, for instance, hail from the Lamhar tribe, an influential Arab group based in Gao but that also has tribal and business ties in southern Algeria. The same applies to the so-called Arab Mauritanians who operate within MUJAO or AQIM. Many are connected to tribes that are scattered throughout Mauritania, Algeria, and Mali (See Baz Lecocq, Serval in the Sahara, Cultural Anthropology, March 2012).

Whether forced out – like the Algerian militants in the late 1990s – or drawn by new opportunities, the militants who roam the Sahara desert are faced with few hurdles. Political inter-connections and illicit interactions are unconstrained by the jurisdictional barriers instituted by the individual sovereign states (based on territorial locations crafted by colonial powers). The routes used by militants and traffickers have been traversed by nomads for centuries. The only major change concerns the leap from the camel to the pickup truck.

Containing the geographical scope of instability across the Sahara and the Sahel is difficult, since the growing links between conflicts and the fluidity of alliances between non-state actors in those conflicts make the regional space both cluttered and permeable. For example, both the aggrieved nomadic Toubu tribes of the Sahara (in southern Libya, northern Chad and north-eastern Niger) and the Tuareg irredentists in Mali (and their sustained social networks in southern Algeria and other countries of North-west Africa) bring a regional dimension to local problems. Countries of the region and the international community recognise this interconnected nature of the threat and have responded with a plethora of regional strategies.

The African Union (AU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the United Nations (UN), and the European Union (EU) have all adopted Sahel-specific strategies designed to tackle the causes of insecurity in the region. The World Bank and the African Development Bank (AfDB) have also joined the fray. Unfortunately, the lack of harmonisation of these multiple initiatives leads to a duplication of efforts and resource dispersal. The coordination mechanisms that exist have only a limited degree of interaction and possess weak monitoring systems (See SWAC/OECD 2014, An Atlas of the Sahara-Sahel, pp: 240-249).

Another major reason why these initiatives have so far met with only limited success is attributed to their narrow counter-terrorism focus. The efficacy of counter-terrorism programmes in building the capacity of Sahelian states to ‘find, fix and finish’ terrorist groups, and protect their borders against illicit smuggling of arms and drugs, is undermined by the lack of focus on non- military solutions that prop up democratic governance, fight public corruption, and tackle social inequality.

Mali is a textbook case study of the failure of Western governments and international donors to correctly diagnose the sources of Sahelian state fragility. Before the 2012 crisis, international actors were all too eager to dispense economic and military aid to Mali, while ignoring how state corruption and nepotism were eroding state authority and exacerbating socio-political tensions in the north. Focusing on building the security capacity of such a government only compounds state fragility (See also FRIDE working paper number 126 – Fragile States: an urgent challenge for EU foreign policy).

CONCLUSION

The major challenge for international actors is to connect their plethora of initiatives designed to address security and development challenges across the Sahara and the Sahel. There is growing recognition of the multidimensional nature of threats, and regional interdependence of political networks and ethnic populations. But the efforts of different actors (local, regional and international) show little coherence and almost no consensus on regional approaches to intervention – which should also be tailored to the different local contexts. Each regional strategy fits its sponsor’s political priorities and strategic purposes. Algeria, for example, supports initiatives that it can dominate and that especially marginalise its arch-rival Morocco. This undermines the effectiveness of multilateral initiatives like the AU’s Nouakchott Process – a regional platform established in 2013 to promote security cooperation – because it forces Morocco to seek and promote other alternatives (Morocco is not a member of the AU).
In turn, Morocco has shown its determination to protect its geopolitical interests by resurrecting the Tripoli Process in 2013, a border cooperation initiative, and revitalising the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), which covers over half of Africa’s countries – except Algeria. The Sahel G5, launched in 2014 by Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger seeks to circumvent these limitations by not formally including Algeria and Morocco. The problem, however, with this increasingly cluttered inter-governmental setting is that it risks undermining other multilateral processes and institutions like ECOWAS.

Even so, the EU and its international partners should encourage local and regional ownership by propping up these fragile home-grown initiatives, whose implementation relies on external funds and technical support. Already, a number of EU and UN strategies are implemented in concert with the AU and ECOWAS.

Another example of synergies that deserve support is the recent proposal by the AfDB to establish and manage ‘action funds for the Sahel’ that would pool donor contributions together. A coordinated international approach that skilfully uses the comparative advantage of each regional institution would greatly help tackle rising insecurity across the Sahara and the Sahel.

About the author:
*Anouar Boukhars is associate fellow at FRIDE and non-resident scholar in the Middle East Programme of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He is also associate professor of International Relations at McDaniel College in Westminster, Maryland.

Source:
This article was published by FRIDE as Policy Brief No 199 – APRIL 2015 (PDF).

This Policy Brief belongs to the FRIDE project ‘The Fragile Sahel: A challenge for Europe’, carried out in cooperation with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. We acknowledge the generous support of DIMES. For further information on this project, please contact Clare Castillejo (ccastillejo@fride.org).

The post Rethinking Security Across The Sahara And The Sahel – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Greece is interested in expanding its energy cooperation with Moscow and the construction of an extension pipeline to the Turkish Stream project, said the Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras during his meeting with the President of Russia Vladimir Putin on Wednesday, April 8.

According to Mr. Tsipras, the project will attract new investments in the Greek economy, stabilize the region and set up the path towards improving relations with Ankara.

The plans include the construction of a 50 bcm gas transport hub on the Turkish-Greek border. From that point, an extension pipeline may be built through Greece and further towards the European countries such as Macedonia, Serbia, Hungary, and Austria.

A day before, on April 7, the foreign ministers of Turkey and four Balkan states – Greece, Serbia, Macedonia and Hungary –spoke in support of the ways to diversify natural gas supply and said they are ready to join the Turkish Stream after a joint meeting in Budapest. The high-ranking officials also signed a declaration on energy cooperation.

In March, the President of Turkey Recey Tayyip Erdogan called the Turkish Stream an important project after his meeting with the Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko, stressing he found the Russian gas pipeline offer acceptable after the cancellation of the South Stream. The project, Mr. Erdogan added, would allow diversifying the gas supply sources.

The Turkish Stream plans quickly got in the spotlight of the Turkish media: according to them, Mr. Erdogan’s decision would allow to transform Turkey from a transit country into the top European gas supplier, greatly improving Ankara’s position and providing additional profits.

In addition, Taner Yildiz, Turkish Minister of Energy and Natural Resources, said he sees no competition or rivalry between the Turkish Stream and the TANAP projects, since the supply routes will work at the same time. However, he admitted that the Azeri natural gas would end up being more costly, but the overall gas mix would make energy cheaper for the Turkish people.

Meanwhile, several international experts warned that the joint Russian-Turkish project might cause opposition of the Western politicians who earlier had brought the demise of the South Stream project. In particular, the visit of Alexis Tsipras to Moscow brought forward the outrage from the EU politicians, disappointed with Greece’s attempts to conduct independent policy and become closer to Russia in order to resolve internal economy issues.

Some media sources also noted that the EU and the US might choose to incite political unrest in the countries that would be involved in the Turkish Stream project, citing the prevented coup d’etat in Macedonia in January as an example.

A possible alternative to such influence, some media sources say, would be the attempts to bring out the internal tensions in Turkey, and the Crimean Tatars may be potentially used as a pawn to pull the 75-million population of the country into unrest. Officially, the population of the Crimean Tatars is set at approximately 100,000 people. However, over 5 million persons come from families of Crimean emigrants, and the outside players allegedly see them as the main force in putting a stop to the project, waiting only for a massive news and media campaign on the Tatar minority rights abuse in Crimea to happen.

According to a Turkish observer Mehmet Kubat, a dangerous tendency has taken place in the social networks recently, with messages urging the Crimean Tatars in Turkey to organize and become more socially active, and some even openly calling for blocking the access to the Turkish Stream-related construction sites.

At the same time, the journalist notes, the public opinion manipulation strategy using Twitter and Facebook has already been field-tested, and successfully used by the US State Department in Egypt, Libya, Syria and Ukraine to create civil unrest.

Meanwhile, Kamal Sido, head of Middle East Department of the Society for Threatened Peoples (STP), highlighted a list of issues that may arise in Turkey and possibly hinder the project.

“We know the Kurdish issue has not been resolved yet. There are talks between the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, [the party’s leader] Abdullah Ocalan, and the Turkish government, but currently there is no final decision. Of course this will negatively affect the gas pipeline issue until the problems have a solution,” he explained.

Moreover, the expert added, there have been other issues with other national minorities in Turkey that need to be resolved.

In addition, according to him, some Crimean Tatars that have been in Ukraine at the time when Crimea joined Russia are now banned from returning, and the human rights organizations are actively working with this issue.

The construction of the Turkish Stream is unlikely to cause any large-scale civil unrest, suggested Harun Ozturkler, economy researcher, associate professor of Economic and Administrative Sciences at the Kirikkale University.

“I am not a political expert, but I think that there is no possibility for this scenario to be staged. Even in the heat of the events, there had not been severe and continues protests,” he explained.

Discussing the value of the Turkish Stream, the expert called it a new step for strategic relations between Europe, Russia and Turkey, and expressed his hope that it would change the geography of the European energy market in the future.

“From a perspective of political economic and international relations, at this stage of the Ukrainian crisis, the importance of the project is that it will lessen the role of Ukraine for EU, and provide Russia with a new advantage in its international political moves against the west and USA,” the economy researcher stressed, adding that Europe is yet to find a full alternative to the Russian natural gas supply.

In his opinion, Greece will gain the most out of the Turkish Stream.

“This project [Turkish Stream] will help Greece’s struggling economy though its investment and employment effects,” Harun Ozturkler explained.

At the same time, he pointed out that Turkey may greatly profit from the joint project with Russia, especially along with the TANAP gas pipeline project that officially went into the construction phase in March 2015.

“I do not think these two projects are alternative to each other; rather, they complete each other in increasing EU energy supply security. From the Turkey’s perspective, this new project together with TANAP, Turkey will have the chance to upgrade its position from being an energy bridge to an energy market,” the economy researcher said.

Talking about the opponents of the Turkish Stream, he suggested that the start of the project may interfere with the plans of the United States and several Middle Eastern countries.

“This project is against the economic and political interests of Iran, the Kurdistan Regional Government and the USA. This move will make alternative natural gas projects involving Iran, and Northern Iraqi natural gas less competitive,” the expert explained, noting that Tehran may potentially influence the situation in the future.

Moreover, from his point of view, the influence of Tel Aviv or a possible instability in Greek-Turkish relations may affect the talks.

“Israel may use its energy deal with South Cyprus to influence Greece’s position towards the project. Furthermore, there might be problems between Turkey and Greece as well. The potential problem between Turkey and Greece is that both parties will struggle to have the marketing hub of the project rather than just be a transfer country,” the economy researcher pointed out.

The Turkish Stream talks, he reminded, are taking place in the midst of a large-scale confrontation of the world powers.

“Russia and China are the two most important competitors for the west, and Ukraine is a new battlefield in this completion. Therefore, it is natural that both sides are after new moves against each other. But I think, in the long run, the EU is more dependent on Russia for both its energy needs and as market for its products than Russia needs Europe. Russia’s latest energy agreement with China and Shanghai are the two proofs for my claim,” Harun Ozturkler stressed.

On the same subject, Chi Kong Chyong, research associated of the Energy Research Group at the University of Cambridge, Director of Energy Policy Forum, noted that once fully constructed, the Russian-Turkish pipeline will present a great threat to the political and economic position of Ukraine.

“Politicians and public perception about the project is such that if Turkish Stream is built in full (with four lines) then it could jeopardize Ukraine’s position in Europe, as one of the largest transporter of Russian gas to Europe, hence leaving Ukraine with little economic option to influence Russia,” the expert explained in an interview to “PenzaNews” agency.

However, according to him, the European Union will only benefit from simultaneous gas supplies from Russia and Azerbaijan.

“Co-existence between the two is not an issue, at least for Europe as the clients of Russian and Azeri gas – the more competition between the suppliers, the better for the consumers,” the analyst said.

At the same time, Chi Kong Chyong added, the transit countries will also profit from the project, gaining direct access to an energy supply line, an additional source of income, and more political weight and importance vis-à-vis Brussels and Moscow.

If the legal and technical issues are resolved, the European Union will not interfere with the project, the energy researcher said.

“If Gazprom could prove that it could build Turkish Stream pipelines at least cost and benchmark these costs against best practices of building offshore pipelines and abide by laws and regulation, particularly on competition, procurement and transparency issues then only Turkey could potentially stop the project,” he clarified.

Moreover, Chi Kong Chyong expressed his belief that the new project far surpasses the South Stream from a commercial and rational standpoint.

“Turkey is one of the fastest growing gas markets in the region, and hence for Gazprom, having already invested a substantial amount of money, it makes sense to build at least the first two lines of the Turkish Stream. The first line will replace the existing flows from Russia through Ukraine to Turkey, and the second line should serve as an option for Gazprom to meet any additional demand from Turkey. In a nutshell, the first two lines can be easily built since money has already been spent, and they should also serve as an option for Gazprom to expand the project and build the third and fourth lines to serve Europe, should the political environment in Europe allows Gazprom to do so,” said the speaker.

However, Necdet Pamir, renowned energy policy expert, Chairman of the Energy Commission of the oppositional Republican People’s Party of Turkey, reminded that the United States and the European Union have begun a full-fledged campaign to exert pressure on Russia, and stressed that Moscow’s opponents are using both sanctions and Saudi-supported oil market speculations.

“With one stone, the Americans and the Saudis are trying to kill many birds. [America is] trying to limit the oil and gas revenues of Russia, Iran and even Venezuela, while decreasing the US oil import bill. Saudis are also trying to increase their influence in the region against the Russians and Iranians while trying to capture the market share of Russia in the oil market,” Necdet Pamir explained.

In his opinion, the current state of the economy may make the project prohibitively expensive, especially if one notes that laying a pipeline through Turkey and Greece into Europe is a difficult task.

The success of the Turkish Stream, Necdet Pamir added, will greatly depend on the relations between Russia and the EU and the prospects of Brussels buying Russian natural gas from a different supplier.

“Whether through Bulgaria or through Turkey – it doesn’t matter. If you come to Turkey, then you have to go to Europe. If the European countries are not going to buy your gas, such an economically ambitious project would go nowhere,” he stated, also saying that the South Stream project might be reborn if the relations between Moscow and Brussels recover.

At the same time, he expressed his doubt that Turkey would be able to gain any profit from the project under the currently known conditions. In particular, according to the expert, the parties need to resolve the issues of gas price, re-export rights, and construction of gas storage facilities required for the task.

Turkey already imports as much as 59% of gas, 32% of coal and 8% of oil from Russia, he pointed out.

Discussing the issue of co-existence of the Turkish Stream with the Azeri TANAP, Necdet Pamir stressed that both projects may end up in a situation when one of the supply routs would be made redundant.

“The EU is trying to diversify, but also trying to reduce its consumption and increase the percentage of the renewables in its energy mix. Therefore, there seems to be not enough room for both projects,” he explained.

However, the member of the Republican People’s Party of Turkey struggled to compare the Turkish Stream to TANAP. The Moscow project, he clarified, wins in terms of supply volume but goes against the EU energy policy, while the Azeri gas suits the political needs but is made less attractive by high shipping expenses and small volume of supply.

According to Necdet Pamir, TANAP will supply only 10 bcm a year to Europe during the first step, while Russia has already been supplying the EU and Turkey with over 160 bcm per year in 2013.

In his turn, Jonathan Stern, chairman of the Natural Gas Research Program at the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, thought the Turkish Stream and TANAP will have no trouble working side by side, and in a best-case scenario may even be connected to the projected Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) on the Turkish-Greek border.

However, the expert stressed that the project is still largely obscure, since very little information had been made public.

“I would expect this to progress much faster. We know nothing about Turkish Stream yet, except what Gazprom would like to do. We don’t know whether the Turkish government has indeed agreed, we don’t know if the seabed [exploitation] has started, we don’t know when the pipe will start to be laid,” he clarified.

At the same time, Jonathan Stern expressed his belief that neither Kiev nor Brussels would be able to prevent Russia and Turkey from working on the project.

“It has nothing to do with either the European Union or Ukraine. All the European Union can say is when the gas enters into EU countries, then it will be subject to EU law and regulations. That is all it can say,” the analyst stated.

Currently, it would be difficult to make any guesses on the development of the Turkish Stream extension through the Balkan countries, he added.

“It very much depends on the extension of Russian Gazprom’s transportation contracts with those countries,” the expert said, adding that some states may potentially decline to take part in the “Balkan Stream” extension in favor of gas supply through Ukraine.

Meanwhile, Salihe Kaya, research assistant at the Economic and Social Studies Department of the SETA Foundation in Turkey, said she strongly believes that the Turkish Stream will become a great opportunity for the Balkan states to improve their economy and industry.

“The relationship between Greece and Turkey will go on the road. Apart from Greece, this project will be a good opportunity for Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Albania and Montenegro,” the expert explained.

In her opinion, Ankara had everything it needed for a large-scale joint energy project with Moscow.

“Turkey is blessed with its geographical excellence on the crossroads of Balkans, Middle East and Caucasus. In addition, Russia and Turkey have succeeded in developing a very constructive relationship across a variety of policy areas. Their economic cooperation goes beyond energy and holding the keys to the Black Sea,” the researcher said, adding that both the Turkish Stream and TANAP are relevant to the country’s multipolar geopolitical and economic interests.

Moreover, the project is likely not to attract any public outrage, she suggested.

“In my opinion, there is no negative situation in the progress because this project has been supported by both the Turkish government and the society,” Salihe Kaya pointed out.

In conclusion, the SETA Foundation representative added that Ankara’s growing energy cooperation with Moscow would allow Turkey to cash in its strategic advantage in the region and make the country more attractive for investors.

This project advantages and disadvantages. In spite of the disadvantages of this project, it will help Turkey to be the energy terminal in the long term. Turkey will be a country that sets the prices and the trade of natural gas. It will be very important for Turkey’s future,” Salihe Kaya summed up.

This article was published by Penza News.

The post Turkish Stream Project Success Promises Benefits, Profits To Many South-Eastern EU States – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

The change of government in January 2015 in Sri Lanka turned the attention of the nation, at least partially, to constitutional reform. President Sirisena won the presidential election promising to make changes to the system of governance. Without wasting too much time, the present government, first released a draft proposal, then published the draft bill called the 19th Amendment to the Constitution, and finally announced amendments to the 19th Amendment. The proposals entail several elements. This article, however, deals with the central aspect, i.e, powers of the president and the politics played around this issue.

First Proposal

The first proposal published by the government in February 2015 to reform the constitution entailed some radical rudiments as it proposed to transform the existing executive presidential system into a parliamentary form of government. According to the original proposal the president was required to act “always…on the advice of the Prime Minister” except of course “in the case of the appointment of the Prime Minister.” The prime minister was also to be the head of the government.

This was in a way intriguing because President Sirisena did not promise to abolish the executive presidential system in his election manifesto. He only promised to remove what he called the “autocratic” powers of the president. Nevertheless, the abolitionists who provided impetus to Sirisena’s election campaign were elated.

However, some of the nationalist Sinhala groups that consisted of political parties and ideological factions were up in arms, especially the Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU). The group declared that it would not support the proposed changes. Why? These groups believed that a diluted political leadership is detrimental to the national security of the country. This notion probably was based on two assumptions.

One, a strong political leadership (preferably the president) is a precondition to prevent a possible reemergence of the LTTE. The threat perception within this group still remains very strong. They believe that the LTTE will make a comeback with the assistance of the Tamil diaspora and friendly governments in the West.

Two, a parliamentary form of government would potentially magnify the power and influence of Tamil parties, especially the Tamil National Alliance (TNA), forcing future governments to make unnecessary concessions. The possibility of an executive prime minister conceding to the Tamils on the more important question of devolution of power is not acceptable to these groups. Hence, the assault on the first proposal.

19th Amendment

The resistance forced the UNP government to renegotiate the constitutional amendment with concerned parties and alter its original ideas of constitutional reform. Consequently, the government officially published the draft bill of the Nineteenth Amendment to the Constitution. The 19th Amendment may be seen as a victory for JHU and other nationalist Sinhala factions because the idea to transform the system into a parliamentary form of government was dropped. According to the proposed 19th amendment the president is not required to act on the advice of the prime minister.

The draft bill of the 19th Amendment tried to achieve two goals. One, it retained the executive presidency while curtailing some of the powers which abetted authoritarianism. For example, according to the bill, the president shall be “the Head of the State, the Head of the Executive and of the Government and the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces.” The bill meanwhile proposed to reintroduce the two term limit for the president and restrict the term in office to five years instead of the original six years.

Two, it proposed to elevate powers of the prime minister. According to this draft the prime minister, for example, will be the head of the cabinet of ministers, determine the number of ministers and have the powers to assign and change subjects of the ministers.

Therefore, the proposed 19th Amendment could be depicted as a compromised formula as it tried to strike a balance between agendas that seek to abolish and those that seek to retain the executive presidential system. As the pressure mounted against the draft bill, the government recently published what it called the “Amendments proposed to the 19th Amendment to the Constitution Bill,” which stated that “There shall be a President of the Republic of Sri Lanka, who is the Head of the State, the Head of the Executive and the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces.”

Regardless of these changes, the JHU’s resistance continued, which indicated that the party was not in favor of constitutional reform at this point in time. It is imperative to note that the party, despite its meager electoral base, has exercised considerable power and influence under the present system. Perhaps there is a nexus between the power the party enjoys under the present system and the constant resistance to any form of constitutional change.

National Government

Meanwhile, in an interesting turn of events, the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), which hitherto performed tasks of the main opposition party in parliament, accepted ministerial portfolios in the new government and became part of what is termed the national government. For the first time in the history of Sri Lanka, the two major parties, the SLFP and the United National Party (UNP) are in the government at the same time.

The SLFP’s entry into the government should have raised the likelihood of getting the amended version of the bill ratified in the national legislature. The UNP does not have the required two-thirds majority in parliament. With the SLFP support, a two-thirds majority could be achieved. Since both are in the government, theoretically, it should be easy to adopt the amendments now.

The SLFP however is not budging. Party leaders declared that the SLFP would not support the proposed amendment sans provisions to reform the electoral system and want the next general election conducted under the new system. The fact that even if the electoral system is reformed immediately, adequate time needed to provide for implementation does not seem to be resonating.

These demands imparted the impression that the present electoral system is detrimental to its chances of winning the next general election. It is true that J. R. Jayewardene, the architect of the present constitution, thought that the proportional representation system would bestow an added advantage to the UNP. But the SLFP has won enough elections under the present system. The party can give the UNP a run for its money if an election is conducted under the present system even today. It is amusing to see the party choosing a yet to be determined system to the present one.

Therefore, one can argue that concern about the electoral system cannot be the real cause of the SLFP resistance to the proposed bill. Some believe that the SLFP is covertly working for President Sirisena. The president understands that weakening the office of the executive president at this point in time could be dangerous. It could pave the way for former president Mahinda Rajapaksa to return to active politics and even enter parliament as the prime minister. Such a scenario could be suicidal for Sirisena and his partners such as Democratic Party leader Sarath Fonseka and former president Chadrika Kumaratunge. Naturally, he cannot prefer a strengthened office of the prime minister.

If he is not keen to reform the constitution as proposed, one of the best ways to delay or scuttle the process is to get the SLFP to make unrealistic demands. After all, he is the leader of the SLFP. The Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) has already accused the president of conspiring against the proposed constitutional change.

Supreme Court

Obviously, the bill was challenged in the Supreme Court. It was determined that some clauses of the bill were inconsistent with the constitution. In order to be approved, they need the approval of the people in a referendum, in addition to a two-thirds majority in parliament. Importantly, the clauses that bestow powers on the prime minister require approval of the people. The government however, is not keen to go for a referendum immediately. According to news reports coming from Colombo, these clauses will be dropped. This will eliminate any possibility of making fundamental changes to the system. If approved, the proposals, in the present form, will take away only a few powers of the president and the prime minister will remain a rubber stamp.

Even then, there is no guarantee that the modified bill will be approved. The draft bill contains provisions, for example, the constitutional council, that are potentially controversial and perhaps not preferable to some segment of the polity. Therefore, one could expect more resistance from within and outside of the SLFP to the proposed changes. It will not be surprising if the whole idea to reform the constitution is eventually abandoned. If the process is derailed, the SLFP has to take the blame, which on the other hand may boost the popularity of the UNP, especially among citizens who are concerned about the state of democracy in the country.

The post Sri Lanka: Politics Of Constitutional Reform – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

In this week’s address, the US Vice President Joe Biden laid out his and the President’s plan to make two years of community college free for responsible students. Access to higher education has a tangible impact on a student’s success: Those with an associate’s degree earn 25% more than folks who graduated high school, and those with a four-year degree make 70% more. Not only that, but a better educated citizenry is necessary to ensure that the United States continues to out-compete the rest of the world. Making two years of community college free is good for workers, good for companies, and good for our economy. And this proposal is part of the President’s broader vision for middle-class economics: that everybody who works hard deserves their fair shot and the chance to get ahead.

Remarks of Vice President Joe Biden
Weekly Address
The White House
April 11, 2015

Ladies and Gentlemen, this is Joe Biden and I’m here filling in for President Obama, who is traveling abroad.

And I’m here with a simple message: middle-class economics works.

Our economy has gone from crisis to recovery to now to resurgence—with the longest streak of consecutive job growth ever recorded in the history of this country and more than all other advanced countries combined.

But to make sure everyone is part of this resurgence, we need to build on what we know widens the path to the middle class—and you all know what it is, access to education.

Folks, the source of our economic power and middle class strength in the 20th Century was the fact that we were among the first major nations in the world to provide twelve years of free education for our citizens.

But in the 21st Century, other countries have already caught up and twelve years is simply no longer enough—a minimum of fourteen years is necessary for families to have a surer path to the middle class and for the United States to be able to out-compete the rest of the world.

Consider that by the end of the decade, two out of three of all jobs will require an education beyond high school, from an 18-week certificate to a two-year associate’s degree to a four-year bachelor’s, or a PhD.

And consider that folks with an associate’s degree earn 25% more than someone who graduated just from high school. And folks who graduate with a four-year degree make 70% more.

But today, the cost of higher education is too high for too many Americans. Too many folks are priced out of a piece of the middle-class dream.

And that’s why the President and I have a straightforward plan to remove that barrier and expand the pathway to the middle class—by bringing the cost of community colleges down—down to zero.

Zero—for anyone willing to work for it and for the institutions that meet certain basic requirements.

Our plan is no give-away. Students must keep up their grades and stay on track to graduate. States must contribute funding and hold community colleges accountable for the results. And community colleges must maintain high graduation and job placement rates.

And here’s a key point—community colleges will have to offer courses that are directly transferrable to a four-year degree.

If two years of community college are free—and credits can transfer to a four-year university—that means the cost of a four-year degree will be cut in half for a lot of working families struggling to send their children to college, qualified children.

And under our plan, students from low-income families will be able to keep the benefits that flow from other financial aid, like Pell grants, to cover childcare, housing, transportation—costs that often keep them from attending class and completing a degree in the first place.

But here’s another key point. Not every good-paying job will require a two-year or four-year degree. Some of these jobs will require just a training certificate that can be earned in just a few months.

For example, you can go to an 18-week coding bootcamp—with no previous experience in computers—and become a computer programmer making up to $70,000 a year.

There are other jobs in fields like advanced manufacturing and energy that pay $40,000, $50,000, $60,000 a year—jobs you can raise a family on.

It’s a simple fact that community colleges are the most flexible educational institutions we have. I’ve traveled all over this country, from New York to Iowa to California, to see how community colleges create partnerships with Fortune 500 companies and local businesses to generate jobs; support apprenticeships with organized labor, and prepare hardworking students for good-paying jobs in the areas in which they live.

Making community colleges free is good for workers, it’s good for companies, and it’s good for our economy.

Here’s what we propose: Close loopholes for the wealthiest investors and levy a .07% fee on the biggest banks to discourage the kind of risky behavior that crashed our economy just a few years ago.

Doing just that would pay for free community college—and provide a leg up for working families through tax credits to cover necessities like childcare.

That’s what middle-class economics is all about—giving folks a fair chance to get ahead. A fair tax code. No guarantees. Just a fair chance.

It’s simple folks, two years of community college should become as free and as universal as high school is today if we’re to make this economic resurgence permanent and well into the 21st Century.

So I want to thank you all for listening. I hope you have a great weekend and God bless you all and may God protect our troops.

The post Biden: Tuition-Free Community College – Transcript appeared first on Eurasia Review.

The US Capitol was placed on lockdown after shots were fired on the lower west terrace. A police spokesperson said that the alleged gunman had been “neutralized” and confirmed the shooting was a suicide attempt.

“Confirmed: self-inflicted gunshot by neutralized subject,” police spokeswoman Sargent Kimberly Schneider said shortly after the incident. AP says it is not clear if the person, who has not been identified, is dead. No one else appears to be hurt.

The lock down, which lasted for less than two hours, has been characterized as precautionary measure. Authorities are investigating a suspicious package, which was found at the scene. Local media reported that it was a suitcase left by the person.

Police are also reportedly preparing to search the man’s car.

An unnamed official has told NBC Washington that there are no indications that the incident was terror related.

According to ABC news, the person was wearing a blue backpack and had a sign taped to his hand. Twitter users are saying that the placard read, “Tax the 1 percent.” These reports have not been confirmed.

The incident occurred on Saturday during Washington’s annual Cherry Blossom Festival. Congress has been out of session for the last two weeks for spring break; lawmakers are set to return to work on Monday.

The DC landmark has served as the site of several shootings through the years. In 2013, police officers fatally shot a dental hygienist after she struck a secret service agent with her car and led officers on a chase from the White House to the Capitol.

In 1998 a gunman entered the building and opened fire on the deputies manning a security station, killing two officers.

Earlier this year, the FBI arrested an Ohio man for plotting a terrorist attack on the Capitol, where he had planned to set off a series of bombs.

The post Capitol Hill Was On Lockdown After Suicide Attempt On Building’s Steps appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Saudi Arabia’s King Salman has been sacked the country’s Health Minister, AFP has reported.

Ahmed al-Khatib was relieved of his duties and Minister of State Mohammed al-Sheikh has been appointed as acting health minister, the Saudi Press Agency said in a statement.

The SPA did not state why the health minister had been sacked, although Saudi news website Sabq said that al-Khatib was replaced due to his “shortcomings” in dealing with hospitals in the south of Saudi Arabia, where troops are situated on the Saudi-Yemeni border.

The post Saudi Arabia: King Salman Sacks Health Minister appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Manoj Joshi*

Foreign policy is easily the most successful area of Narendra Modi’s government, something in which the Prime Minister has himself played a significant role. Whether it is with big powers like the US and Japan, neighbours like Nepal and Sri Lanka, or Indian Ocean islands like Mauritius and Seychelles, Modi has reset Indian policy and deepened the strategic content of our relations with them.

Beginning April 9, he begins another foreign tour, but this time the goals are slightly different and they relate to the main item of his agenda- the economic transformation of the country. As he tweeted on March 26 “My France, Germany & Canada visit is centred around supporting India’s economic agenda & creating jobs for our youth.” Actually the agenda would be much more varied and complex involving not just trade and investment, but smart cities, climate change, energy security, education, skill development and so on.

But of course, in all three cases, there will be a substantial strategic content– France is a permanent member of the UN Security Council and which has been an important player in India’s nuclear and aerospace efforts and Germany is Europe’s de facto leader. As for Canada, not only is it an important source of uranium, it is the original home of India’s PWHR reactors. Equally, it has an important Indian diaspora which, in turn, yields substantial strategic content.

France, of course, is a major defence partner of the country and significantly, it was only on Monday that India launched the first of the six modern Scorpene class submarines that are being assembled by DCNS of France at the public sector Mazagaon Dockyards in Mumbai.

Currently, India and France are discussing a number of high profile defence purchases-2 Airbus 330s to serve as a platform for India’s indigenous AWACS project, 2 Airbus 330s which will serve as aerial tankers. The Indian Air Force will later get four more of each type. But the biggest deal that the two sides are involved in is for 126 Rafale fighters which is reported to be in the final stage of the negotiations. According to sources, all the issues relating to the technology transfer to HAL have been resolved and the real sticking point is the price escalation since the deal was finalised three years ago.

Decisions and actions on such purchases are not really part of the PM’s tour, but it would be surprising if they do not figure in the talks between the two countries, especially since the Indian goal now is to utilise all foreign purchases to kick-start its domestic industry. As part of the Rafale deal, for example, there would be an unprecedented level of technology transfer to manufacture 108 of the 126 fighters in India which would involve not just Dassault, the manufacturer, but over 700 smaller companies which supply components and sub-assemblies.

Another important component of the relationship relates to nuclear energy. France is one of the world’s leaders in nuclear reactor technology. The French company Areva is hoping to set up a 9,900 MW nuclear power plant for the Indian Nuclear Power Corporation Ltd at Jaitapur in Maharashtra. This will be one of the biggest projects of its kind in the world, involving 6 reactors and the government hopes that it will not only generate power, but significant civil works that will provide local jobs, along with giving a boost to the country’s medium and small scale industries which will provide smaller components for the project.

The economic component of Modi’s visit will be strongest in the case of Germany which remains Europe’s powerhouse. Modi will inaugurate the Hannover Trade Fair in which India is the partner country under the theme “Make in India.” Over 100 Indian CEOs will be attending the fair in which some 450 Indian companies are participating The Germans are keen to engage India in traditional areas of industry as well as areas like green energy, infrastructure, affordable housing, and the Clean Ganga project. The Make in India project is attracting a great deal of attention in Germany which is considered one of the leading manufacturing powers of the world.

The visit to Germany and France will give the Prime Minister an opportunity to discuss key political issues relating to Ukraine and the Middle-East. India is feeling the indirect impact of the Russian estrangement from Europe as this has led to closer strategic ties between Moscow and Beijing. India wants to keep a keen watch on the developments relating to the Islamic State because it could have implications in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Modi’s visit to Canada will be the first bilateral visit by an Indian prime minister since 1973. This is yet another instance of the unique trail being blazed by Modi in the area of foreign policy. No doubt trade and commerce are important elements in the visit. But perhaps the more important factor that he wishes to exploit is the Indian diaspora in that country. That seems to be the message from his visits to the historic Khalsa Diwan gurudwara and the Laxmi Narayan temple in the Vancouver area.

On the economic side, hopes are centred on an early signing of the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) which would facilitate Indian pharma and textile exports to Canada, as well as aid the freer movement of professionals. For its part, Canada is keen to push its financial services and telecom sector in India. It also has huge strengths in agricultural processing equipment and technology. Given the low levels of trade and investment at present, there is a huge area of potential growth in India-Canada relations.

Visits abroad are no longer a one-way street given the growing Indian investment in foreign destinations. For example, in France, there are as many as 110 Indian owned companies dealing with a range of products like pharmaceuticals, Software, Steel, Plastics, Railway Wagons, and Aerospace products. Canada’s investment in India in the last 15 years is just $ 550 million, compared to the $3.5 billion Indian investment there.

More than the nuts and bolts of investment, trade and commerce, what the three countries are keen to get a measure of is Modi himself who is considered the most interesting Indian leader of his generation. The rockstar quality of his foreign tours will be fully visible in the public event at the Ricoh Coliseum in Toronto whose 8,000 tickets have already been sold out.

*The writer is a Distinguished Fellow at Observer Research Foundation, Delhi

The post Modi: A Foreign Tour With Slightly Different Goals – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Programmers, manufacturers, and military personnel could all escape liability for unlawful deaths and injuries caused by fully autonomous weapons, or “killer robots,” Human Rights Watch said in a recent report that was issued in advance of a multilateral meeting on the weapons at the United Nations in Geneva.

The 38-page report, “Mind the Gap: The Lack of Accountability for Killer Robots,” details significant hurdles to assigning personal accountability for the actions of fully autonomous weapons under both criminal and civil law. It also elaborates on the consequences of failing to assign legal responsibility. The report is jointly published by Human Rights Watch and Harvard Law School’s International Human Rights Clinic.

“No accountability means no deterrence of future crimes, no retribution for victims, no social condemnation of the responsible party,” said Bonnie Docherty, senior Arms Division researcher at Human Rights Watch and the report’s lead author. “The many obstacles to justice for potential victims show why we urgently need to ban fully autonomous weapons.”

Fully autonomous weapons would go a step beyond existing remote-controlled drones as they would be able to select and engage targets without meaningful human control. Although they do not exist yet, the rapid movement of technology in that direction has attracted international attention and concern.

Human Rights Watch is a co-founder of the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots and serves as its coordinator. The international coalition of more than 50 nongovernmental organizations calls for a preemptive ban on the development, production, and use of fully autonomous weapons.

The report will be distributed at a major international meeting on “lethal autonomous weapons systems” at the UN in Geneva from April 13 to 17, 2015. Many of the 120 countries that have joined the Convention on Conventional Weapons are expected to attend the meeting of experts on the subject, which will continue deliberations that started at an initial experts meeting in May 2014.

Human Rights Watch believes the agreement to work on these weapons in the Convention on Conventional Weapons forum could eventually lead to new international law prohibiting fully autonomous weapons. The Convention on Conventional Weapons preemptively banned blinding lasers in 1995.

A key concern with fully autonomous weapons is that they would be prone to cause civilian casualties in violation of international humanitarian law and international human rights law. The lack of meaningful human control that characterizes the weapons would make it difficult to hold anyone criminally liable for such unlawful actions.

Military commanders or operators could be found guilty if they intentionally deployed a fully autonomous weapon to commit a crime, Human Rights Watch said. But they would be likely to elude justice in the more common situation in which they could not foresee an autonomous robot’s unlawful attack and/or were unable to stop it.

“A fully autonomous weapon could commit acts that would rise to the level of war crimes if a person carried them out, but victims would see no one punished for these crimes,” said Docherty, who is also a lecturer at the Harvard Law School clinic. “Calling such acts an ‘accident’ or ‘glitch’ would trivialize the deadly harm they could cause.”

The obstacles to accountability would be equally high under civil law, Human Rights Watch said. Civil liability would be virtually impossible, at least in the United States, due to the immunity granted by law to the military and its contractors and the evidentiary hurdles in product liability suits. Many other countries have similar systems of sovereign immunity.

Even if successful, a civil suit would have limited effectiveness as a tool for accountability. The primary focus of civil penalties is compensating victims, not punishment. While monetary damages can assist victims, they are no substitute for criminal accountability in terms of deterrence, retributive justice, and moral stigma.

A system in which victims could receive compensation without proving legal fault also would not achieve meaningful accountability, and most governments would be hesitant to adopt such a system, Human Rights Watch said.

The accountability gap is just one of a host of concerns raised by fully autonomous weapons. In other publications, Human Rights Watch has elaborated on the challenges the weapons would face in complying with international humanitarian law and international human rights law. It has also noted concerns about the potential for an arms race, the prospect of proliferation, and questions about whether it is ethical for machines to make life-and-death decisions on the battlefield.

“The lack of accountability adds to the legal, moral, and technological case against fully autonomous weapons and bolsters the call for a preemptive ban,” Docherty said.

The post The ‘Killer Robots’ Accountability Gap appeared first on Eurasia Review.

There is so much killing committed by so many nations, groups, and individuals that it is hard to know where to begin in condemning it all. Of course the biggest mass killers are and always have been governments. As time passes, states around the world have ever more horrifying capabilities of taking human life. In the process they create resentments, hatred, and ultimately the desire for revenge. The Somali group Al-Shabaab is an example of this predictable and horrifying phenomenon.

On April 2, 2015, Al-Shabaab fighters stormed a university located in Garissa, Kenya, and killed 147 people. Survivors report that Muslims were separated from non-Muslims, and non-Muslim students and staff were summarily executed. In 2013 Al-Shabaab attacked a shopping mall in Nairobi under the same circumstances and killed 67 people. In 2015 as in 2013, the group immediately claimed responsibility and made their rationale clear. In an online statement Al-Shabaab repeated that it seeks revenge for the destruction of Somalia by the United States and its allies.

“In Somalia, the Kenyan military has committed a countless number of atrocities against the Muslim population. With their government’s approval, the Kenyan military embarked on a series of mass killings, torture and systematic rape of the Muslim women in Somalia. Tens of thousands of Muslims were displaced from their homes, hundreds more were killed and thousands injured as a direct result of the Kenyan invasion. Kenyan jets shelled refugee camps and hospitals, killing dozens. They strafed entire villages from the air, killed livestock and bombarded Madrassas and educational institutions, crushing, with such malice, the dreams and hopes of an entire generation.”

Somalia is a nation long torn apart by civil war aided and abetted by neighboring states Ethiopia and Kenya who work in league with the United States. When Somalia began to emerge as a stable nation the United States and Ethiopia acted quickly to make sure that it remained weak and vulnerable. Ethiopia invaded Somalia at America’s urging and was later joined in the aggressions by Kenya and other African puppet governments who remain in that country.

No one wants to live in an occupied country with foreign armies, starvation, and death, and Somalis are no exception. The United States continues drone strikes which claim to kill a particular “Al-Shabaab leader” and in so doing keep Somalia in a state of failure. No stone is left unturned in the effort to keep Somalia from becoming a thriving nation with its sovereignty intact.

In February of this year the United States government ended the ability of any American bank to transfer funds to Somalia. Remittances from Somalis living abroad account for some 50% of that country’s gross national income and total over $1 billion. The rationale for this latest destruction was keeping funds out of the hands of Al-Shabaab. Of course ordinary citizens will suffer far more. In the past the United States even withheld food aid for the same stated reasons and suffering still falls largely on a vulnerable population.

Al-Shabaab fighters can’t reach the United States, but they can reach Kenya, with which it shares a border. Kenyans shopping in a mall or attending university run the risk of being victimized too. That is the point which Al-Shabaab makes implicitly and explicitly with each attack. If their people can be killed, then the citizens of an occupying nation can be killed too.

Once again we see painful and heart rending images of victims and grieving families. The corporate media tells Americans little if anything about Somalia’s road to ruin which the United States directed. They don’t reveal the American violence directed at Somalis or present images of starving people or bodies left by war and drone strikes.

In the American mind Al-Shabaab is just another group of crazed foreigners who have bizarre grievances. In fact their grievances are justly held and if there were true justice in this world the United States and its puppets would not only have to leave that country but make restitution as well.

When Barack Obama makes his official visit to Kenya later this year he will no doubt make mention of Garissa. He will say that Al-Shabaab is made up of evil cowards who have no regard for human life but he won’t mention how the United States helped to kill up to 1 million people in neighboring Somalia through war and starvation. Every president since George H.W. Bush has either sent United States troops to conduct “humanity missions” or killer drones to “fight terrorism.” Somalia suffers from an unfortunate geography. It is too close to the Persian Gulf and access to oil. It also suffers because America has reached the apex of imperialism and looks for new places to bring under its influence, even when that means a great loss of human life.

Al-Shabaab may well have the last word. In their statement they warned that Garissa would not be the end of their violence perpetrated against Kenyans. “For as long as your government persists in its path of oppression, implements repressive policies and continues with the systematic persecution against innocent Muslims, our attacks will also continue. No amount of precaution or safety measures will be able to guarantee your safety, thwart another attack or prevent another bloodbath from occurring in your cities.”

Those words could have been written by the United States. In Somalia, Libya, Iraq, Yemen, and Syria there is no escape from American aggression either. Al-Shabaab has learned a lot about how to kill.

The post Why Al-Shabaab Kills – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Adam Dick

Massachusetts does not have a death penalty. It has not had one for over thirty years — since the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ruled in 1984 that the state’s death penalty violated the state constitution. Yet, we have the spectacle of Charlie Baker, the state’s Republican governor, proclaiming on Wednesday that Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, who a United States district court trial jury had that day found guilty of counts related to the Boston Marathon bombing, should be executed in contravention of Massachusetts law.

Executing Tsarnaev is an option only because the United States Department of Justice decided to prosecute him in the US court system. Had that decision to intervene not been made, prosecution would have surely been pursued in the Massachusetts state court system where Tsarnaev would face incarceration upon a guilty verdict, but not execution.

It is bad enough that US government politicians and bureaucrats routinely stomp on state and local decisions to restrict the exercise of government power via criminal law, as seen in the ongoing conflict between the US government enforcing US drug laws and state and local governments rolling back various aspects of the drug war. Must we also endure governors like Baker cheering the US government crushing their own states’ limits on government power, including the power to terminate a person’s life?

Boston attorney and Three Felonies a Day author Harvey Silverglate sums up the problem with the US government seeking the death penalty in the Tsarnaev case. Silverglate wrote in a Wednesday Boston Globe editorial, “Regardless of the jury’s sentencing decision, this trial has starkly illustrated a decline in Massachusetts’ state sovereignty in deciding — literally — life-or-death matters.”

The US government’s circumvention of the Massachusetts death penalty prohibition is a disturbing contravention of American states’ historic dominion over criminal law matters, including murder trials. Years back people used to say, “Don’t make a federal case out of it!” You do not hear that phrase much anymore. The expansion in recent decades of both the US criminal code and prosecutions in the US court system has made the phrase become virtually meaningless. The US government can make a federal case out of just about anything now and thus uproot state and local governments from their historic role in administering criminal cases and defining procedures and punishments. This abrogation often happens, as it has in the Tsarnaev case, with state politicians failing to defend their states’ limits on government power. Sometimes, as with Baker, state politicians even applaud the US government’s toppling of those limits.

This article was published by the RonPaul Institute.

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By Clint Watts*

A year ago, the Islamic State (IS or ISIS) was on the rise but few expected them to travel such a rapid trajectory to the top of the global jihadi community.  The fighting (fitna) to kick off 2014 between Jabhat al-Nusra, al-Qaeda’s arm in Syria, and ISIS seemed, at first, to be undermining the greatest jihadi foreign fighter mobilization in history.  But in June 2014, ISIS swept into northern Iraq simultaneously seizing Mosul and the minds of jihadi supporters worldwide by doing what al-Qaeda always discussed but never delivered–an Islamic State.  Through audacity, violence against Assad, Shia, the West, and slick social media packaging, ISIS now dominates the global jihadi scene.  Foreign fighters have flocked to ISIS ranks and when unable to travel, have sworn allegiance to ISIS (bayat) in groups across North Africa to Southeast Asia.

Building from the estimates and scenarios created last March 2014 (ISIS Rise From al Qaeda’s House of Cards), I’ve generated a new estimate of the fractures between ISIS and al-Qaeda seen here in Figure 9.  I’ve also pasted below this post the estimate of these fractures one year ago for comparison (Figure 4).

A few notes on the ISIS versus as al-Qaeda chart in Figure 9. I generally don’t like organizational charts for describing jihadi terrorist groups because I’ve been to too many military briefings where these are misinterpreted as command and control diagrams. Al-Qaeda and its affiliates and now ISIS and its new pledges more represent swarming, informal relationships rather than a directed, top-down hierarchy.  Circle size represents an imperfect estimate of a group’s relative size compared to other groups.  Larger circles equal larger groups.  More overlap between circles represents my estimate of communication and coordination between the groups.  For emerging groups that have pledged bayat to ISIS, but ISIS has not officially recognized the pledge, I categorized them as “Lean ISIS.” For what I anticipate to be new ISIS affiliates that are emerging I’ve inserted dashed circles.  Thanks again this year to J.M Berger, Aaron Zelin and Will McCants for their feedback and insight on the graphics.  I’ve also included J.M. Berger’s latest link chart showing the same splits between ISIS and al Qaeda, which can be found in Figure 10 and downloaded at this link.

ISIS has clearly dominated al-Qaeda over the past year. Al-Qaeda couldn’t even release a confirmation video in a timely fashion when handed a success as the Kouachi brothers announced al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula was responsible for the Hebdo assassination.  Al-Qaeda is most certainly a distant number two in jihadi circles. A few observations of this year’s assessment (Figure 9) of the ISIS versus al Qaeda split as compared to last year’s evaluation (Figure 4).

• Proliferation, More circles, More groups: ISIS’s rise has created a break up of groups around the world into smaller clusters.  Some see this as a more dangerous world of terrorists, but more small groups can also lead to problems for both al-Qaeda and ISIS leading to a general jihadi burnout. A separate post will discuss this.
• Diffusion: A year ago, the overlap between al-Qaeda affiliates was significant, but communication has broken down even further.  We’ve learned just a couple of weeks ago that al-Shabaab in Somalia hasn’t heard from al-Qaeda in a long time.  When there have been communiqués, they have come more from AQAP who appears to be the critical link with remaining al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb members and the remaining core of al-Qaeda globally.
• Syria Shift: ISIS is the dominant player now in Syria, whereas last year, ISIS and Nusra were on a similar footing, and Ahrar al Sham was being courted by al-Qaeda.  This year, Ahrar al-Sham hardly exists.
• Reigniting the periphery: After 9/11, terrorism analysts went to great lengths to link all extremist groups from Southeast Asia to North Africa under al-Qaeda’s orbit.  Al-Qaeda’s connections to these peripheral groups faded with each passing year.  Today, ISIS receives pledges from groups of unknown guys around the world in all regions, and has ignited peripheral jihadi factions globally.

Will al-Qaeda even make it the end of 2015?

Those who assessed that bin Laden’s death would be of no consequence for al-Qaeda have been proven wrong.  Bin Laden, along with a select few of his top lieutenants and protégés who’ve been eliminated by drones, provided the last bits of glue that held a declining al-Qaeda network together. As discussed in the 2012 post “What if there is no al-Qaeda?”, al-Qaeda for many years has provided little incentive in money or personnel for its affiliates and little inspiration for its global fan base.  Things have gotten so bad that rumors suggest Ayman al-Zawahiri may dissolve al-Qaeda entirely, that’s right, al-Qaeda might QUIT! I’ll address these rumors in a separate post next week.  Until then, here is what I see as the good and bad for al-Qaeda and ISIS this year.

The Good News for al-Qaeda

• Jabhat al-Nusra is rebounding in Syria: Pressure on ISIS from the international coalition combined with the failings of Western backed militias to seize the initiative in Syria have allowed the still well-funded and cohesive al-Qaeda arm Jabhat al-Nusra to resurge in Syria taking Idlib in the last couple of weeks.  To survive, al Qaeda needs its place in the Syrian jihad – Nusra remains its greatest hope.
• Yemen’s Turmoil Creates Operational Space for AQAP: Just when an emerging younger ISIS affiliate may have started to challenge AQAP in Yemen, the Houthi coup and ensuing Saudi response has ignited a sectarian war where AQAP has already regained ground once lost to the Yemeni government.  AQAP, since bin Laden’s death, has become al-Qaeda Central and with time, space and maybe the death or resignation of Zawahiri in Pakistan, they may be able charge forward and challenge ISIS.

The Bad News for al-Qaeda

• Jihadis don’t care about al-Qaeda:  More than any other factor, global jihadi members and supporters don’t talk much about al-Qaeda.  ISIS has coopted al-Qaeda’s most notable characters showcasing bin Laden, Zarqawi and even Anwar al-Awlaki in their propaganda and rhetoric. Even the youngest ISIS supporters are openly challenging Zawahiri. Al-Qaeda needs their own success to rally the troops. They haven’t really had that in years and should even a big attack occur it’s doubtful it would eclipse ISIS’s success.
• Jabhat al-Nusra might want to quit al-Qaeda: Nusra’s connections with al-Qaeda and loyalty to Zawahiri have hurt the group more than helped it.  Al-Qaeda’s Khorasan Group embedded in Nusra has brought U.S. airstrikes.  Al-Qaeda’s global focus distracts from Nusra’s local focus and doesn’t offer a viable alternative to the ISIS state which provides the only form of governance in parts of Sunni Iraq and Syria.  Why would Nusra stick with al-Qaeda at this point?
• Al-Qaeda’s resources are limited: Compared to ISIS, al-Qaeda relies heavily on donations, which allowed it to survive while being hunted over the past decade.  Today, donor reliance is a liability for al-Qaeda.  ISIS coffers are full from oil money, licit and illicit schemes, and their successes have allowed them to push into al-Qaeda’s donor stream.  Al-Qaeda provides little incentive for donors to cough up their cash, and has no population to prey on for resources.
• Al-Qaeda has lost membership across all affiliates: Zawahiri’s creation of al-Qaeda in the Indian Sub-Continent signals his vulnerability to the Taliban’s shifting allegiance to ISIS.  He feels threatened and all al-Qaeda affiliates globally are either shifting their allegiance or are finding splinters that support ISIS form in their ranks.

The Good News for ISIS

• Everyone wants to be ISIS: The pace of pledges coming into ISIS is unprecedented and unexpected.  When Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi declared the Islamic State and named himself as the new caliph, one might have expected more backlash for his arrogance.  Instead, jihadis have seen ISIS’s success and generally gone with his pronouncements and fallen in line.  ISIS ranks have swollen in Iraq and Syria over the past year with the pace of foreign fighter recruitment likely peaking in the late summer and fall of 2014 before the push of the international coalition. ISIS, until the loss of Tikrit, is winning, and jihadis love them for it.
• Affiliates (Emirates) are popping up all over: Just as pressure mounts on ISIS in Iraq and Syria and they begin to lose ground, other new affiliates continue to pop up in safe havens of promise.  Libya and Yemen provide two new genuine opportunities for ISIS to anchor and homes for foreign fighters to nest in as they are pushed from the Levant.  ISIS affiliated attacks in Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, and Yemen show the potential of this new global jihadi network.
• Resources still in tact: Despite a sustained aerial campaign, ISIS remains able to sustain itself logistically.

The Bad News for ISIS

• Everyone wants to be ISIS:  A letter from Zawahiri to bin Laden, found amidst the Abbottabad documents, described al- Qaeda’s concerns about the growing number of inspired members claiming to be al-Qaeda that had no actual connection to the group.  ISIS’s rapid growth faces a similar challenge.  How might the misplaced violence of inspired supporters hurt the group’s global appeal?  Baghdadi has affirmed the pledge of some affiliates but also ignored the pledge of other upstart groups signaling he may not even know of these emerging groups, or he doesn’t trust that they are committed and in-line with ISIS goals.  ISIS’s rapid rise and growth while being under pressure from an international coalition suggests that there will be emerging command and control problems as young boys execute their violence with limited or no guidance.
• Taking losses in Iraq and Syria: As opposed to al-Qaeda, which has existed as a stateless, cellular network, ISIS’s unity of command and cohesiveness depends on the centralization provided in their pursuit of a state. They are now taking losses and fractures appear to be emerging as defections increase and ISIS has allegedly killed off doubters in their own ranks.  Pressure on ISIS continues to mount, on-the-ground, in-the-air and online, Baghdadi and his inner circle face a substantial challenge in 2015.
• Declining foreign fighter flow: Thousands of fighters have been killed in recent months and these losses will be difficult to regenerate as it becomes more difficult for fighters to get to the battlefields in Syria and Iraq.

The next year for both al-Qaeda and ISIS will likely be as dynamic as this past year.  Both groups remain under pressure. Arab countries have joined in the fight against ISIS in ways they never did against al-Qaeda and the growing sectarian conflict between Shia and Sunnis across the Middle East will likely grow and impact ISIS and al-Qaeda in unexpected ways. This growing sectarian battle has also, ironically, removed some pressure on the U.S.  ISIS and al-Qaeda have so much to pursue locally from North Africa to South Asia, the U.S. has really become a peripheral issue to both groups.  Both groups will likely take almost any opportunity to attack the West, but in reality, the opportunities and challenges in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Libya, Pakistan, and other places likely don’t allow either group to expend sufficient time to conduct an external operations attack on par with 9/11.  As for future scenarios for both groups, I’ll follow up in separate posts over the next couple of weeks.

Here is J.M. Berger’s link chart showing al Qaeda versus ISIS splits and for a better understanding of ISIS, check out his new book with Jessica Stern here: “ISIS: The State of Terror.”

About the author:
*Clint Watts is an FPRI Senior Fellow with the Program on National Security and President of Miburo Solutions, Inc. His research focuses on analyzing transnational threat groups operating in local environments on a global scale. Before starting Miburo Solutions, he served as a U.S. Army infantry officer, a FBI Special Agent on a Joint Terrorism Task Force, and as the Executive Officer of the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point (CTC). Clint’s publications include: al Qaeda’s (Mis) Adventures in the Horn of Africa, Combating Terrorism Center, 2007 (Co-editor, Co-author); “Can the Anbar Strategy Work in Pakistan?” Small Wars Journal, 2007 ; “Beyond Iraq and Afghanistan: What Foreign Fighter Data Reveals About the Future of Terrorism?” Small Wars Journal, 2008; “Foreign Fighters: How are they being recruited?” Small Wars Journal, 2008; “Countering Terrorism from the Second Foreign Fighter Glut,” Small Wars Journal, 2009; and, “Capturing the Potential of Outlier Ideas in the Intelligence Community,” Studies in Intelligence – CIA, 2011.(Co-author). He is also the editor of the SelectedWisdom.com blog.

Source:
This article was published by FPRI.

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(EurActiv) — Ukraine, locked in conflict with Russian-backed separatists in its east, announced a new security doctrine on Thursday (9 April), denouncing Russia’s “aggression” and setting its sights on joining the US-led NATO military alliance.

Oleksander Turchynov, head of the national security council, told a session of the body that Ukraine saw Russian aggression as a “long-standing factor” and viewed NATO membership as “the only reliable external guarantee” of its sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Turchynov’s comments, and the move to draft a new security strategy, were certain to raise hackles in Russia, which annexed the Crimean peninsula in March 2014 after a pro-Western leadership took power in Kyiv in the wake of an uprising that ousted a Moscow-backed president.

Russian officials have said that the radical change of leadership in Kyiv raises the strategic threat of US and NATO warships one day being based in the Black Sea, off Crimea.

Moscow has backed separatists fighting Kyiv government forces in eastern Ukraine, in a conflict in which more than 6,000 people have been killed.

Turchynov said the five-year strategy was based on the reality of military aggression unleashed by Russia.

“For the first time in history, a permanent member of the UN Security Council, which possesses the nuclear weapon, uses this factor to intimidate the international community and uses its military potential for annexation and seizing the territory of a European country,” he said.

Turchynov stated that European and Euro-Atlantic integration was now a priority for Ukraine’s policies, and that the country would aim to coordinate its armed forces and intelligence services with those of the Western alliance.

Ukraine, at the centre of a geopolitical tug-of-war between Russia and the West, has grown close to the NATO alliance during since independence from the Soviet Union in 1991.

The pro-Western leadership has prepared the way for a change in strategic direction by scrapping the “non-bloc” status introduced under ousted former president Viktor Yanukovich.

NATO has said that membership is one day possible for Ukraine, but has declined to arm the Kyiv government on the grounds that, as a non-member, it does not qualify for military help under NATO’s collective defence rules.

The new military doctrine drawn up by the National security and defence council will become policy once it has been endorsed by a decree from President Petro Poroshenko.

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