Sri Lanka President Maithripala Sirisena said the relevant clauses of 19th Amendment to the Constitution will be amended and it will presented to Parliament on April 20. He said Parliament will be dissolved after the passage of the 19th Amendment.

Speaking in Polonnaruwa, Sirisena said that this would help to bring clarity to what is seen as a confused political situation that prevails in the country today.

Speaker Chamal Rajapaksa has informed Parliament, that the Supreme Court had determined that the 19th Amendment is consistent with the Constitution, but certain sections require a referendum.

Prime Minister Ranil Wickramasinghe stated that the sections which require a referendum will be omitted from the 19th Amendment.

The Supreme Court took up 19 petitions filed against the proposed 19th Amendment to the Constitution, which was presented to Parliament on March 24. The Supreme Court also heard seven intervening petitions.

The petitions were taken up before a three member Supreme Court Bench comprising Chief Justice K Sripavan and Justices Chandra Ekanayake and Priyasath Dep.

On Monday, the Supreme Court concluded the hearings on the 19th Amendment to the Constitution, which principally seeks the reduction of executive powers of the Presidency and restoration of independent commissions.

The post Sri Lanka: Amended 19 Amendment To Be Presented In Parliament On April 20 appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Sajjad Ashraf*

Pakistan’s National Assembly, the Lower House of Parliament, has given post-facto approval for a major project that has come to be known as China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). The addition of CPEC to the China-Pakistan agenda blends with Beijing’s Silk Road initiative that is designed to connect China, through a series of infrastructure projects, with Central and South Asia and even the eastern edges of the Persian Gulf region.

The project, planned to connect Kashgar in China’s western region with Gwadar Port on the Baluchistan coast in Pakistan – through rail, road, and oil and gas pipeline – is expected to spur investments along the way and boost trade flows. The CPEC is also likely to result in the setting up of economic zones along the way, with emphasis on energy production that will help ease Pakistan’s chronic energy shortages.

The CPEC, an idea speculated for decades, gained traction when, in February 2013, Pakistan transferred the contract to upgrade and operate its deep-water Gwadar port, at the mouth of Straits of Hormuz, from Port of Singapore Authority to China Overseas Port Holdings. Much of the world’s oil traffic flows through this Strait, and a good bulk of it goes to China. With the idea firmly on the table now, the Chinese banks and companies pledged over US$ 45.6 billion2 for energy- and infrastructure-projects along the corridor, during Pakistan’s Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s visit to China in November 2014. The agreements demonstrate a deepening strategic linkage between the two countries.

CPEC is a collection of projects and has thus embraced several existing projects. In Baluchistan it includes expansion of Gwadar Port, the east-west expressway and the international airport at Gwadar. The Chinese investments are expected to add 16,000 MW3 of electricity by 2021, easing Pakistan’s energy shortages to a considerable extent.

Beginning from the early-1960s, with China’s assistance in building the Karakoram Highway, China-Pakistan cooperation has had a security dimension. The Chinese-built Gwadar Port has been back with them for operations since 2013. Strategic thinkers, especially in India, suspect that Gwadar will eventually serve as a Chinese naval facility, in addition to being a terminal for the CPEC. The Chinese, main suppliers of Pakistan’s military hardware, have built two nuclear power plants for Pakistan, and two more are under construction.

China-Pakistan relations are also exemplified through the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) the two countries had signed in 2006. By 2009 China became the largest supplier of goods to Pakistan. While China-Pakistan trade increased eight-fold during the last decade Pakistan’s trade only tripled during this time.

China-Pakistan relations are mutually advantageous. While Pakistan looks at China as perhaps the only reliable friend, providing security, Pakistan provides connectivity for China to the Arabian Sea. The expanding Chinese investments in its western region necessitate provision of matching facilities down the line to the Pakistani coast. China also understands that Pakistan’s importance in the Muslim world provides Beijing with a ready opening into the Islamic bloc. As relations between China and Pakistan continue to develop in diverse fields, Pakistan’s roller-coaster political-security-and-economic ride means that Islamabad is a bigger beneficiary of the two. The trust level for China in Pakistan is, therefore, high.

Controversy

However, like most projects in Pakistan, the CPEC is caught in conspiracy-theories from its very early stages. Reports have emerged that the government has changed the CPEC’s road and rail network route to favour Punjab and Sindh, the two relatively better-off provinces. Such connectivity has implications for the location of other economic units. In typical flip- flop, the ministerial responses have ranged from denial to a virtual admission of such a route- change. This amounts to the government accepting that it has for now picked up the most beneficial route from amongst various options. The Chinese, Pakistan claims, are in agreement on route-selection. If the original route-plan is followed, it is said, there is a likelihood of a delay in operationalising the CPEC, as building new rail- and road- connections is time-consuming. Securing the Chinese investments early, as long as the basic contours of the plan remain in place, will quickly help inject much-needed capital into Pakistan’s investment-shy market.

Pakistan continues to face many challenges to its security, especially in areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan, where militants target power pylons, gas pipelines and other points, causing economic consequences. The new route almost entirely bypasses Baluch and Pashtun areas, and runs through Sindh and Punjab. The smaller provinces, KPK and Baluchistan, are calling foul. Asfandyar Wali Khan, head of KPK-based Awami National Party, accuses the Punjabi-dominated federal government of discrimination against the smaller and less-privileged parts of Pakistan. “We want a brotherly federation, one that treats all equally”,4 he adds. The change of route means that the less-privileged areas get deprived of a chance of getting their populations involved in economic activity. With fewer chances for economic engagement, the chances of the youth turning extremists go higher. Baluchistan evidently has the most to lose by this change of route.

External Factors

India, on its part, has reservations over the project, as some of its sections run through Azad (Independent) Jammu and Kashmir (AJK), the areas of the state that Pakistan claims it liberated from India after a short war in 1947. Conversely, Pakistan questions the development of hydroelectric projects in Jammu and Kashmir region, currently administered by India. India is also wary of the military potential of Karakoram Highway, built by the Chinese and passing thorough AJK. Indian sensitivities were ruffled when Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif performed the ground-breaking ceremony for a US$ 297-million, 4-lane highway, parts of which pass through AJK. The Indian fears were aroused further when the Chinese Prime Minister labelled the CPEC as a flagship project to strengthen connectivity with neighbouring countries and as a strategic framework for pragmatic cooperation between China and Pakistan.

Regardless of political and military implications of this major project, it has several benefits for the people of the region. Pakistan, suffering from chronic energy shortages and limited trade with its immediate neighbours, will be better-connected and will hopefully become energy-sufficient. A Pakistan-centred road network will facilitate contacts between Pakistan’s neighbours on east and west. India and Iran need this corridor for closer integration with each other’s economy. While the CPEC facilitates movement of goods and services in the area, China’s involvement in the region’s economy turns adversaries into stakeholders in maintaining peace and stability in the South and Central Asian regions.

The proximity of the Gwadar Port to the energy-rich Persian Gulf region, while benefitting Pakistan, will give China a direct land link to energy- and trade-sources. This will reduce China’s dependence on the longer Indian Ocean routes through Malacca Straits and the South China Sea. The Chinese understand that, for the CPEC to succeed, peace in the region is essential, for which both Afghanistan and Pakistan must cooperate. China hosted an Afghan Taliban delegation in December 2014. There is speculation that China is playing a role in getting various stakeholders in Afghanistan together. For China, this will translate into expanded power and influence in the region. The challenge is for Pakistan and Afghanistan to establish peace and order within. India’s concerns will only be addressed if other regional players join together to improve connectivity for economic development. A troubled region will thwart the intended benefits of the CPEC. If countries, both regional and extra-regional, can get power politics out, the CPEC has the potential to uplift the region and beyond.

About the author:
1 *Mr Sajjad Ashraf is a Consultant at the Institute of South Asian Studies, an autonomous research institute at the National University of Singapore (NUS), and an Adjunct Professor at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at NUS. He was Pakistan’s High Commissioner to Singapore from 2004 to 2008. He can be contacted at sashraf1947@gmail.com. Opinions expressed in this paper, based on research by the author, do not necessarily reflect the views of ISAS.

Source:
This article was published by ISAS as ISAS Brief Number 364 (PDF).

Notes:
2. http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/11/21/us-pakistan-china-idUSKCN0J51C120141121
3. Ibid
4. China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, Centre for Research and Security Studies, Islamabad. March 16, 2015

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While the United Nations takes stock of how far women have come in getting women’s rights acknowledged as human rights, Indonesia wants to stop sending women out of the country as foreign domestic workers (FDWs).This will throw a wrench in their financial empowerment.

By Tamara Nair*

During a recent visit to Malaysia, Indonesian president Joko Widodo expressed shame when discussing the issue of Indonesian women working overseas as foreign domestic workers (FDWs). In an effort to preserve the dignity of the nation, the President announced plans to stop sending women to work as domestic helpers overseas. In doing so, he failed to realise the greater consequences of legitimate employment opportunities for women being cut.

The growing gender challenges of development and economic growth aside, women also face numerous cultural hurdles in establishing economic security. There is a need for more income generating opportunities provided for women in order for them to live stable, secure and indeed, dignified lives. Instead of ‘band-aid’ solutions, policies should be aimed at greater regulation and protection of FDWs. It is in fact by empowering its women that Indonesia will find greater dignity.

Creating jobs equals creating dignified lives

There is ample evidence from cases in Asia and elsewhere that higher female incomes most often go towards the betterment of the family. This includes increased household food security, and greater spending on education and healthcare. For these women, financial independence puts food on the table, sends their children to school and takes care of their families’ health and welfare. Higher incomes for women can also help to narrow the gaps in resource distribution between genders, which in fact can have positive impacts on the community as well. However, given prevalent gender inequity, income disparities between men and women remain high. This creates a culture of dependence for women.

Women who are economically insecure often encounter many obstacles. Many women tolerate years of physical and psychological abuse because they do not have the financial means to make a life for themselves. Increasing levels of economic security for women should be a key concern for the government given the various setbacks that arise as a result of their financial dependence.

Beyond issues of shame or dignity

Being engaged in gainful employment sets poor and dependent women in a higher playing field, allowing them to negotiate for the lives they wish to lead. It gives them a legitimate ‘space’ to freely leave the home and return without compromising their roles as daughters, sisters, wives and mothers. In the eyes of many conservative families, looking after children or a home or the elderly is a ‘decent’ job through which their womenfolk are permitted to enter the workforce. Many women, with their limited education and skills, find the skill set for domestic work within their capabilities.

Indonesia does not want to be seen as a net exporter of its people. However, it is high time that leaders realise that FDWs provide a valuable service in receiving countries. Politically speaking, such a move to curb FDWs may assuage the middle and upper classes who do not want the country to be seen as ‘lowly’ but it does little to alleviate the plight of women who see being FDWs as a chance to get out of the cycle of poverty.

Despite Indonesia being one of the top three countries in the world supplying domestic workers, it is unlikely to be a matter of dignity for the poor and disenfranchised Indonesian women. For them, it is a job that empowers them financially. In spite of having to face uncertainties in receiving countries, being away from all that is familiar, and facing possibilities of ill treatment women still leave to work overseas. The industry is thriving and until other employment opportunities for these women open up, it will continue to flourish.

Better regulating, not banning

Indonesia has a large population of FDWs in the ASEAN region and beyond. These women contribute significantly through their remittances to their country’s economy with almost all their pay sent home to families. Stopping this will just push them into more fraught ways of earning an income. It also makes them more vulnerable to being trafficked.

Migrant worker numbers in ASEAN countries are growing. As such, greater regulation and monitoring seems to be the order of the day. FDWs need to be made more aware of their rights and there should be help centres and agencies set up to make sure that there is easy access to assistance if needed, including easy communication with their families back home.

The provision of such assistance needs to be decentralised and located at village levels and in small townships across the country. Expanding the geography of receiving countries, for a job that is in demand, can also play a part in protecting these women. Countries with stronger labour laws that protect the rights of the worker and with good diplomatic ties with Indonesia should be seen as potential receiving countries.

Empowerment as development

The creation of jobs domestically to absorb additional numbers of unskilled females may seem a good idea but the total number of this group will increase if they are no longer allowed to travel out of the country to work. Moreover, the Indonesian Manpower Minister’s claim to only send ‘well-equipped and skilled workers abroad’ will already exclude a large number of women.

As part of the wider objective of building an ASEAN community that is centred on its people, a better option for Indonesia is to raise its game in empowering women through greater access to education and safeguarding their rights and interests. Skills training, increased literacy and political participation, as well as equal opportunities should be available for women and should be part of the plan to maintain Indonesia’s development trajectory and its dignity as an influential entity in the region.

*Tamara Nair is Research Fellow with the Centre for Non Traditional Security (NTS) Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University in Singapore.

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As we enter the post-Lee Kuan Yew era, some “Alternate” historians and activists will seek to revise history in line with ideological and political concerns.

By Kumar Ramakrishna*

The 50th anniversary of Singapore’s independence from Malaysia, coupled with the passing of its first Prime Minister Mr Lee Kuan Yew, appears to have ushered in a period of national reflection. This introspection is apparent on two related fronts. First, some netizens, academics, civil society activists, former detainees as well as foreign observers have intensified scrutiny of the “Singapore Story”, the master narrative purporting to chronicle the country’s historical trajectory down the decades.

Second, some of these voices have questioned yet again if Singapore’s political system should be brought more in line with the Western liberal democratic model. On the one hand, what I have called “Alternate” historians and their sympathisers allege that the incumbent PAP government’s consolidation of power in the early 1960s was done through unethical means.

Alternates’ weak case

In particular, they argue that Operation Coldstore, the internal security dragnet mounted by the Internal Security Council comprising Singaporean, British and Malayan senior government representatives on 2 February 1963, and which the Singapore Story portrays as having decimated the Communist United Front (CUF) in Singapore at the time, was unjustified.

This is because the action allegedly destroyed not an underground Communist movement that had infiltrated leftwing political parties such as the Barisan Sosialis Singapura (BSS), affiliated unions and other civil association, but a legitimate progressive leftist movement that could have challenged the PAP in general elections later that year.

The Alternates hint therefore that Singaporeans unjustly suffered a “path not taken”: a BSS-led Singapore under the potential premiership of the Barisan leader Mr Lim Chin Siong.

As I have argued however in my new book Original Sin? the Alternates have a very weak case. They display among other faults a generally poor grasp of the Communist mindset and tactics, and more egregiously, basically ignore the published admissions by leading Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) figures themselves of the existence of the CUF and how Coldstore decimated it.

In addition, some elements within the Alternate constituency employ what I term four tactics of “mass distraction” in order to conceal their argument’s weaknesses.

The online debates

First, as the ongoing online debate clearly evinces, they employ disparaging comments against those mainstream historians who attempt to engage with their arguments. So blatantly obvious have been the personal attacks that fair-minded netizens have criticized this ploy, as I show in my book. Second, some Alternate historians distract readers from the substance of the mainstream historians’ counter-arguments by focusing attention instead on the latter’s institutional position.

This is really a postmodernist tactic in which the idea is to suggest that the mainstream historians, deliberately portrayed as “government stooges” or “bureaucratic scholars”, possess an inescapably pro-establishment ideological or political agenda. As I show in my book however, this is a simplistic view. Despite protestations to the contrary, moreover, some Alternate historians possess an unarticulated but deeply ideological and political agenda of their own.

A third tactic of some Alternates to distract attention from the weakness of their position is very serious actually: they appear to ignore facts that directly contradict their arguments. For example, on 18 July 1961, when Lord Selkirk, the UK Commissioner in Singapore, pointedly challenged Lim Chin Siong and his colleague Fong Swee Suan to say if they were Communists, the record of the meeting indicates that both men appeared embarrassed and failed to give a clear reply.

The reason is obvious: if they had said yes, they would have been arrested, as being a CPM member was illegal. The point is, some Alternate historians in writing about this famous meeting, completely ignore this extraordinary exchange. Readers should ask: is the omission because including it may have undercut the stock Alternate narrative that Lim and Fong were actually progressive leftists rather than Communists?

A final tactic of mass distraction of some activists associated with the Alternate historians is: when the argument is lost, shift the goalposts. It was reported in the media in January 2015, for instance, that one leading activist, perhaps facing up to the reality that Lim Chin Siong in particular was indeed a Communist – now declared that it did not matter whether he was one or not!

Mainstream historians’ arguments

My book delves into this specific issue, drawing upon both declassified and still-classified sources. It reveals that by the 1980s Lim freely if privately admitted to his CPM affiliation. Some within the Alternate constituency contend that security statements by Lim may have been coerced.

However the book counters this, showing that the Singapore Special Branch and the successor Internal Security Department had to carry out their work based in part on such information, and could not take risks with the false testimony likely to have been induced by clumsy, coercive interrogation of Lim. The book even shows that Lim himself had apparently developed a cordial relationship with the authorities by the 1980s and even sought their help on occasion.

Hence what really drives some Alternate historians and their supporters is what is called presentism – an orientation to the past coloured by current ideological and political biases and concerns. Some Alternate historians appear to sift through the historical record purposefully to find facts that mesh with what they want to say. This, lest it be forgotten, is not history but propaganda.

Moreover, is it a surprise that some Alternate historians – despite assurances that they do not allow their “political intent” to overwhelm their “scholarship” – do precisely that, by so publicly championing the causes of former detainees and working closely with them on projects like the one that produced the Alternate history of Operation Coldstore in November 2013?

It is obvious that in the hands of some Alternate historians, as Foucault once suggested, history has become irredeemably partisan. Readers should thus be aware of this whenever they encounter the works of such Alternate historians in print or online.

Finally, mainstream historians like myself openly declare their “inherent subjectivity”. While “mainstreamers” are a loose coalition of scholars without a precisely formulated agenda, some would agree that the successful governance model that the late Mr Lee Kuan Yew and his first generation colleagues bequeathed us remains relevant. Tweaks are clearly necessary as a different, more cosmopolitan generation of Singaporeans mature politically and gradually wield influence in government, business and civil society.

Blind, uncritical imitation of the Western model however – as some Alternate historians and activists appear to crave – would be unwise. Evolutionary change, with one eye fixed firmly on Singapore’s unique geopolitical, demographic and sociocultural realities, remains the way forward in the post-Lee Kuan Yew era.

*Kumar Ramakrishna is an Associate Professor and Head of Policy Studies in the Office of the Executive Deputy Chairman, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. His book, Original Sin? Revising the Revisionist Critique of the 1963 Operation Coldstore, has just been published by the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.

The post ‘Alternate’ Historians Post-Lee Kuan Yew: The ‘Four Tactics Of Mass Distraction’ – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Amit Cowshish

The ‘Make-in-India’ drive of the government has created a conceptual parallax in so far as the defence manufacturing sector is concerned. Foreign companies, and even governments, seem to view it differently from the way it is being seen by the Indian industry. The lack of clarity about the policy underpinnings of this amphibolous trope lies at the root of this dichotomy.

The Ministry of Defence (MoD) has had its own make-in-India policy in the form of the ‘Make’ procedure since 2006. Notwithstanding the fact that not a single project has taken off till date under this procedure, its aim is “to ensure Indigenous Research, Design, Development and Production of capabilities sought by the Armed Forces in prescribed timeframe while optimally utilizing the potential of the Indian Industry” as “it would also achieve self reliance in Defence Equipment” (sic).1.

The emphasis of the Defence Production Policy of January 2011 is also on the Indian industry as the primary vehicle for achieving self-reliance in defence production. This is evident from its objectives, which are:

to achieve substantive self reliance in the design, development and production of equipment/ weapon systems/ platforms required for defence in as early a time frame as possible; to create conditions conductive for the private industry to take an active role in this endeavour; to enhance potential of SMEs in indigenization and to broaden the defence R&D base of the country.”2.

In keeping with this policy drift, a new paragraph was added to the Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) 2013, which states that:

Preference will be given to indigenous design, development and manufacture of defence equipment. Therefore, whenever the required arms, ammunition & equipment are possible to be made by Indian Industry within the time lines required by the Services, the procurement will be made from indigenous sources.”3

DPP 2013 also laid down a hierarchy of procurement categories: Buy (Indian), Buy and Make (Indian), Make (Indian), Buy and Make, and Buy (Global). These categories are arranged in a decreasing order of preference.4 As is quite obvious, only Indianentities can compete in the procurement programmes classified under any of the first three categories. Indian companies can also participate in the Buy (Global) tenders. And under the Buy and Make category, foreign companies are required to transfer technology to an Indianentity for manufacturing the equipment under the ‘make’ portion of the Buy and Make cases.

While seeking approval-in-principal – or Acceptance of Necessity (AoN), to use the official jargon – for placing a procurement programme in a particular category that figures lower down in the hierarchy, it is now necessary to provide justification for not choosing any of the categories that precede the proposed category.

The reference to the ‘Indian industry’ in the DPP and ‘private industry’, as well as ‘SMEs’ (small and medium enterprises), in the Defence Production Policy implies Indian companies ‘owned and controlled’ by Indian citizens and other Indian entities.

All this policy baggage goes to show that the effort so far has been to energize the Indian domestic industry to reduce dependence on imports. The purpose of the ‘Make-in-India’ initiative, on the other hand, seems to be to invite foreign manufacturers to set up manufacturing bases in India. This was the unmistakable message of the prime minister’s maiden Independence Day speech on 15 August 2014.

The official ‘Make-in-India’ website does not throw much light on the policy underpinning of the campaign. But the general tenor of its content shows that the aim is to attract global companies to undertake the manufacture of their products in India.

The problem, however, is that the exhortation to global firms does not seem to be in tune with the objectives of the defence production policy and the procurement procedure that the MoD has been following for the past several years.

That being the case, the ‘Make-in-India’ initiative is clearly in conflict with MoD’s policy of indigenization of defence production by promoting Indian industry. The question that arises is: how do global companies fit into the scheme of things? What do they make in India and how do they sell what they make?

Global companies and other investors are unlikely to bring in foreign direct investment (FDI) and chip in with transfer of technology only to end up becoming minority stakeholders in some joint venture. It is not clear if this is how the government expects ‘Make-in-India’ to play out in the defence production sector, but surely this is not how global companies and foreign governments would like it to play out.

Conceptual clarity about ‘Make-in-India’ is, therefore, the sine qua non for the success of the ‘Make-in-India’ initiative, the core conceptual issue being: what is new that it offers to the Indian industry, global companies and foreign governments? Within the category of the Indian industry, clarity is required as regards the role expected to be played by the big players, the SMEs and the public sector, apart from the Defence Research & Development Organization (DRDO) and how these roles would be synergized.

The second issue concerns the procedure for tapping the defence market. As of now, the only procedure in place is the Defence Procurement Procedure, which is built around five procurement categories, including the ‘Make’ procedure. This document pre-dates the current ‘Make-in-India’ initiative and may, therefore, not provide the answer to many new issues that have arisen as regards the role of the Indian industry and foreign companies/governments.

For example, it does not answer the question whether manufacturers, including Indian companies, can take the initiative to make something on their own volition or should they wait till the MoD comes out with a Request for Proposal (RFP)? Manufacturing a product suo moto is fraught with the risk of being unable to sell it.

These new issues have arisen even as the old ones are yet to be resolved. The Indian industry has been having problems with the procurement procedure laid down in the DPP, including the ‘Make’ procedure. Foreign and Indian companies have been having problem with the offset guidelines.

All these procedures have been under review for more than two years now. While it is absolutely necessary to complete the review immediately, it is equally important to evolve appropriate procedures to be followed by global companies and foreign governments desirous of entering the defence manufacturing sector in India under the emerging circumstances.

The third issue concerns the creation of an industry-friendly eco-system. This is important for the Indian industry as much as it is for foreign companies. India fares poorly on all parameters that constitute the global index of ease-of-doing business, in which it figures at the 142nd position. Everyone understands that improving the eco-system is a difficult and time-consuming inter-ministerial task, but what is difficult to understand is the absence of a conspicuous roadmap for completing this task.

Lastly, a loosely articulated idea of making India a defence manufacturing hub cannot work unless it is backed by a comprehensive blueprint, efficient procedures, meticulous implementation, trained and responsive manpower, continuous monitoring and quick decision-making. MoD will have to do something about all this, especially its decision-making structures and processes and put in place a system of free and frank dialogue with the industry without whose active support it cannot realize the objectives of ‘Make-in-India’ in defence.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India

Notes:
1. Defence Procurement Procedure 2013, Ministry of Defence, Chapter III, Paragraph 5.
2. Defence Production Policy 2011, Ministry of Defence, Paragraph 2
3. Defence Procurement Procedure 2013, Ministry of Defence, Chapter 1 Paragraph 20a
4. Ibid.

Originally published by Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (www.idsa.in) at http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/MakingMakeinIndiaMoveinDefenceProduction_acowshish_080415.html

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By Gustavo Plåcido Dos Santos*

Since the end of Mozambique’s civil war the political landscape in that nation has never been so uncertain and unstable. Renamo, the rebel group turned opposition party, made an assertive comeback in the October 2014 elections and is increasingly motivated to press the government towards satisfying its demands. In this context, the ruling party, Frelimo, faces a dilemma: Should they cede more ground to Renamo’s leader, Afonso Dhlakama, to accommodate him, or refuse and risk new armed clashes? Things get gloomier when considering Dhlakama’s demand for the introduction of autonomous management over those provinces where he obtained more votes than his adversaries in the last elections.1 Additionally, suspicions abound that the ruling party was involved in the assassination of Gilles Cistac, a constitutionalist who upheld the legality of provincial autonomy2 and called for President Filipe Nyusi to free himself from Frelimo’s tight grip on power.3

While there is a growing perception that the ruling party often abuses power, Renamo is increasingly recognized as a valid political alternative. Hence Armando Guebuza’s resignation as head of Frelimo, on March 29,4 which appears to have been motivated by the need to change the course of events. However, that may not be enough to stop Renamo’s momentum.

Is the government going to concede to Dhlakama’s demand for provincial autonomy? Whereas Renamo is surely motivated— due to prior concessions—Frelimo is highly unlikely to abdicate from the strategic provinces.5 Given this conjuncture, tensions will surely be on the rise.

Renamo has the game in its favor

It is often argued that Renamo does not meet the necessary conditions to launch a large-scale offensive against Maputo. However, one should not underestimate its ability to destabilize the country and inflict considerable damage to government forces. In the summer of 2013, Renamo’s forces managed to face up to Mozambique’s Armed Forces, virtually divided North from South by blocking the main EN-1 road, and threatened to suspend traffic along the Sena railway—vital to the coal industry.

Recent government concessions and the expected natural resources boom6 are strong motivational drivers. In fact, Dhlakama’s return took place shortly after the discovery of large natural gas reserves. Furthermore, the poorest sectors of the population want to benefit from the natural resource wealth. To a large extent, it is from the mobilization of those sectors of the population that are hoping for change that Renamo has managed to come out rejuvenated.
Furthermore, the party’s leadership enjoys vast experience in guerrilla operations and is familiar with the country’s geography. In addition, Dhalakama’s return and the establishment of a military base was accompanied by the provision of military training to war veterans.7 Moreover, Renamo has other factors in its favor: a Mozambican army comprised of 13,000 soldiers and deliberately weak;8 and the abundance of small arms across the country.

It is estimated that 3 million to 4 million arms were in circulation by the end of the civil war. In fact, there is still a high number of small arms available in Mozambican territory. Also relevant is the ignorance on the part of government authorities over the exact amount of weapons possessed and stocked by national security forces, something which raises questions regarding the ability of authorities to address the proliferation and illegal use of small arms in the country.9

Coupled with the proliferation of small arms, the sacking of weapons from governmental forces has boosted the group’s offensive capabilities. In January 2014, Renamo’s political advisor to Mozambique’s southern region claimed that the party did not dispose of an inventory for the totality of the weapons from the civil war, adding that there are weapons spread across the country.10

Some reports have given indications that the illegal ivory trade is potentially one of the group’s sources of financing. In fact, the majority of foreigners detained in South Africa under charges of poaching are Mozambican nationals. Adding to this, former military officials have been providing political protection to criminal groups involved in that illegal activity, while weapons and uniforms used by the Mozambican armed and security forces were found in poaching areas.11

Although these allegations are mostly targeted at individuals associated with Frelimo, could that also apply to Renamo? Part of the ivory passing through Mozambique is extracted and exported in and via the northern region, namely through the Pemba airport.12 It is also known that Renamo used poaching as a finance source during the civil war. Moreover, Dhlakama’s return coincided with a substantial increase in poaching.13

Foreign influence: a game-changer

The success of Renamo’s 2013 insurgency showed that Mozambique’s security forces do not have effective control over the country’s northern and central regions. That strengthens Renamo’s position and increases the risk associated with ceding to provincial autonomy.

However, it does not serve the interest of both parties to provoke an escalation in tensions and initiate armed clashes, since the immediate outcome would be an interruption in the inflow of investment, in particular in the highly profitable extractive industries, as well as in international and regional isolation and condemnation.

Roughly half of SADC member-states are landlocked—such as Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe—making them dependent on other countries to export their produce. Also worth noting are South Africa’s interests in Mozambique, which risk being seriously affected in a setting of instability. Additionally, these countries’ border regions with Mozambique are also likely to be destabilized.

Considering these threats, regional countries and SADC have expressed their concern. Thus, given that a stable Mozambique is of strategic interest to the region, it is highly likely that further insecurity in the country may mobilize SADC towards an intervention.

Furthermore, in recent years Mozambique has positioned itself at the centre of international attention largely due to the natural gas reserves. However, despite the unstable environment in the country, natural gas discoveries appear to be so promising that international investors and buyers are willing to sign long-term deals.14 It remains to be seen up to what point these entities are willing to tolerate a spiral of instability.

The resource-hungry Asian countries have shown particular interest in Mozambique’s resources. China, in particular, “is fast emerging as the most important economic and diplomatic player in Mozambique, bringing billions of dollars in investments and asking no questions”.15 In this setting, the instability generated by Renamo is an obstacle to Beijing’s goals.

Given the obvious strategic shift in Beijing’s policy towards Africa16—aimed at protecting its interests and boosting cooperation with regional organizations—17 one should not exclude the possibility that Chinese authorities begin demanding more conditions from Maputo so as to safeguard investments. Additionally, one should also consider that Beijing may exert greater diplomatic pressure—in coordination with the AU and/or SADC—to push for a bipartisan understanding. It is highly unlikely that Beijing will stand idly by as Mozambique’s power games threaten its interests in the largest natural gas reserves in sub-Saharan Africa.

Conclusion

The next few months promise to be exciting for fans of political thrillers. The investigation into the murder of Gilles Cistac is currently underway and the outcome may benefit Renamo’s popularity. Meanwhile, the issue pertaining to the establishment of autonomous provinces is still uncertain. One can clearly note that the two historical rivals have entered a collision course. Only time will tell which side will eventually give in. In the unlikely case that no party concedes ground, the resulting collision will have repercussions reminiscent of the civil war.

Both clearly know that a spiral of armed conflict will most probably halt the wave of investments planned for the coming years, ultimately benefiting other countries in the region with natural gas reserves. To witness international markets shifting attentions to Mozambique’s neighbors would be a harsh defeat for Frelimo and Renamo, as well for the general population. Conflict is not an inevitability. The dynamics between Beijing’s strategic shift in Africa and the need to protect its interests may represent a key factor in guaranteeing stability. Moreover, regional countries have every interest in avoiding a new civil war. Awareness of the consequences deriving from a regional intervention should suffice to deter both parties.

In sum, Renamo does represent a real threat to Frelimo. However, the cards on the table show there is more at stake than their private ambitions. Pressure by international actors with immediate interests in Mozambique will certainly dictate up to what point the two sides can continue on a collision course. Until then both are likely to stand their ground and small-scale clashes are likely to occur. But in the end, someone has got to give.

About the author:
*Gustavo Plåcido Dos Santos, Portuguese Institute of International Relations and Security (IPRIS).

Source:
This article was published by IPRIS as IPRIS Viewpoints Number 171, April (PDF)

Notes:
1. “Afonso Dhlakama quer ser Presidente do centro e norte de Moçambique” (Deutsche Welle, 11 January 2015).
2. “Indignação e acusações em Maputo devido à morte de Gilles Cistac” (Voice of America, 5 March 2015).
3. “Gilles Cistac sugere que Filipe Nyusi se “desvincule” da Frelimo para ser soberano” (Verdade, 4 February 2015).
4. As head of Frelimo, Armando Guebuza held substantial powers over the country’s presidency. “Nyusi Named Mozambique Ruling Party Leader as Guebuza Steps Down” (Bloomberg, 29 March 2015)
5. Strategic both to domestic finances and the interests of the party’s elite. Namely Tete, due to the large coal reserves, and Nampula, for its precious stones and access to the resource-rich maritime territory.
6. “Mozambique to become one of biggest coal & gas producers” (Mozambique Political Process Bulletin, 15 Feburary 2013).
7. Estimates point to a 1000-strong Renamo armed wing. “Armed Forces for the Defence of Mozambique” (Defence Web, 23 August 2013).
8. The 2014 national budget allocated a mere 2.2% of the GDP to the Armed Forces. This can be justified by the tight public finances and also by the potential threat to the regime.
9. “Avaliação do crime e violência em Moçambique” (Open Society Foundation, 2012).
10. “Assessor da Renamo garante que homens do partido têm armas em todo o país” (Lusa, 10 January 2014) e “Polícia descobre 39 armas de fogo enterradas em Cabo Delgado” (Verdade, 13 November 2014).
11. “Obama Urged to Sanction Mozambique over Elephant, Rhino Poaching” (Inter Press Service, 2 July 2014).
12. “Home-grown corruption is killing Africa’s rhinos and elephants” (Daily Maverick, 28 November 2014).
13. “Poaching Peace and Security” (Atlantic Council, 28 October 2013).
14. In 2014, U.S. oil giant Anadarko announced the conclusion of long-term natural gas supply agreements with Asian buyers. See “Anadarko Signs Supply Contracts With Asian Buyers, Defining Clearer Investment Plans For
Mozambique LNG” (Forbes, 31 March 2014).
15. “East Africa eyes the race for LNG exports” (Office of the Federal Coordinator for Alaska Natural Gas Transportation Projects, 27 May 2014).
16. The mediation efforts undertaken by China in South Sudan and the contribution to the UN peacekeeping mission in Mali indicate a more active commitment in supporting peace and security in the continent.
17. One example is the African Union’s admission as a full member in the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation and the launching of the AU-China Strategic Dialogue for Peace and Security in Africa.

The post Mozambique: How Big A Threat Is Renamo To Frelimo-Led Government? – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Sovereign bonds are the latest and biggest quantitative easing (QE) policy conducted by the Eurozone. This column argues that instead of sovereign bonds, the Eurozone should focus on assets that are the closest to job-creating, growth-enhancing, and innovation-promoting activities. In particular, instruments issued by agencies and European institutions should be given a prominent role. But they should also be selected to promote the financing of long-term growth and jobs, not of unsustainable government expenditure.

By Urszula Szczerbowicz and Natacha Valla*

Sovereign bonds are a natural target for the ECB’s Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP), the latest – and by far the biggest – of the Quantitative Easing (QE) policy conducted in the Eurozone. The pool of outstanding sovereign debt instruments is indeed the deepest and the most liquid, especially for highly rated bonds. Sovereign purchases are also expected to compress bond yields across the board (Carpenter et al. 2013), reduce interest rate risk along the yield curve (Greenwood and Vayanos 2015), and generate spillovers to other markets at similar maturities (Szczerbowicz 2014).

But shortcomings of sovereign purchases by the Eurozone have been subject to criticism even before their implementation. First, some have said ‘too little, too late’. Second, the geographic allocation of purchases, set to follow the share of each European Monetary Union member state in the ECB’s capital (the ‘capital key’), mechanically allocates almost half of all purchases to German and French bonds. Those markets already benefit from exceptionally low interest rates, and net secondary market supply is expected to fall short of planned purchases (both because current bond holders might stick to their portfolios, and because primary market issuance, in particular in Germany, will be small over the foreseen horizon of the Purchase Programme). Third, their market impact (flattening of yield curves) and macroeconomic effects (hiking inflation, spurring credit growth) are expected to be limited. Fourth, the Public Sector Programme might exacerbate tensions in the interbank market by extending the pool of outstanding sovereign debt trading at negative rates. That could in turn accessorily drain the already scarce collateral.

Twisting the programme to diversify the funding structure of the Eurozone economy

What if the Eurozone flipped its QE strategy around and selected assets based on their final economic use rather than on their issuer or on the asset class they belong to? In fact, a reasonable operational target for the ECB’s QE could be to facilitate the financing of growth-enhancing private sector activities, to stimulate investment, and to underpin European investment projects or joint initiatives, such as – but not only – the Juncker Plan.

The first way to implement a non-sovereign QE is to focus on private assets. These can be either issued by the financial sector or by non-financial corporations themselves. In fact, purchases of financial sector securities have been the ECB’s first asset purchase programmes. Way back in 2009, they started going quantitative by conducting outright purchases of covered bonds. They then followed suit in November 2014 with an ABS programme.

But this exclusive focus on securities issued by banks turned problematic. By doing so, the ECB did put all its eggs in the same basket, fully conditioning the transmission of its monetary policy on bank balance sheets. Looking forward, at a time when banks are engaged in a decade long process of balance sheet consolidation, the scope to kick start bank credit supply will remain constrained for a while (Bologna et al. 2014). But also, evidence suggests that there are many benefits in diversifying the sources of financing for firms so that they can find funding in all cyclical circumstances, in particular in early stages of upturns. Grjebine et al. (2014) show that economies with high share of bonds in corporate debt and high degree of substitutability of bonds for bank loans tend to perform better after economic downturns, i.e. they recover faster and more steeply (see Figure 1). Supporting the diversification of financing sources seems like a reasonable objective for the ECB as it provides the ECB with alternative channels for monetary policy transmission (Coeuré 2015, Mersch 2015).

Figure 1. Economies with high share of bonds in corporate debt perform better in recoveries
Source: CEPII, Grjebine et al. (2014).

Financial instruments issued directly by the corporate sector would therefore be a premium candidate for QE. By purchasing them, the ECB would foster the development of those markets and most surely improve and speed-up the nascent recovery of the Eurozone economy. En passant, that would also be a plus to move the Eurozone towards a Capital Markets Union (CMU), as foreseen by the European Commission (EC 2015).

What size of corporate bond purchases could the ECB aim for? Corporate bonds are already accepted as collateral in the ECB open market operations (OMOs). In fact, according to the most recent published numbers, the ECB identifies an outstanding amount of €1 393 billion of such assets eligible to its OMOs, of which only a mere €74 billion have actually been pledged! This leaves a substantial outstanding stock that could be bought outright by the ECB without running the risk of creating a collateral squeeze. In the recent past, corporate bonds were bought by the Bank of England and the Bank of Japan to facilitate corporate refinancing and investment. The Fed also purchased unsecured corporate commercial paper and asset-backed commercial paper. So, that would not be such an exotic endeavour after all.

But we should keep in mind that by buying corporate bonds, the ECB would directly interfere in the development of bond markets in Europe – again a matter to be looked at, and perhaps levered within the Capital Markets initiative. This can be constructive if done carefully. First, the development of European bond markets must go along with appropriate regulation. Second, the impact of ECB massive interventions on market liquidity should also be anticipated and fine-tuned. The BIS and others have recently pointed to bond market liquidity as a cause of concern (Fender and Lewrick 2015). This issue should be considered seriously, bearing in mind that the ECB purchases might also stimulate bond issuance by firms that would otherwise not be active in those markets.

Purchases of agencies and international European institutions: Be massive, but parsimonious

A more direct financing of the real economy could take yet another form. In fact, the ECB’s QE programme already explicitly includes securities of European institutions that finance European investment projects, such as the European Investment Bank (EIB). Not only would these purchases support the Eurozone deficient demand in a way that is geared towards long-term growth objectives, but they would also deepen European integration. At the current juncture, this is no luxury as low investment and weak growth is a source of concern in Europe (Giovannini et al. 2015). The total available euro-denominated pool of bonds issued by the EIB is of around €200 billion. As the ECB programme currently stands, the purchases of such securities are subject to loss sharing and limited to 12% of the programme. It seems that substantially increasing this limit beyond 12% would make QE more efficient (see Figure 2).

Figure 2. The universe of purchasable agencies and European Institutions should not be underestimated
Source: RBS, ECB.

Purchases of ‘agencies’ and ‘European institutions’

In its Public Sector Purchase Programme, the ECB distinguishes between ‘agencies’ and ‘European institutions’. This has gone unnoticed, but might in fact be key. While the ECB purchases of European institutions securities are constrained by 12% ceiling, the purchases from agencies are not subject to the same limit. When publishing the nitty-gritties of its programme, the ECB even indicated that national central banks could choose between sovereign or agencies, and that if they were not in a position to execute the planned monthly purchases of sovereign or agencies debt instruments (for example, because there would be none to sell in the market), they would have the possibility to buy European institutions instead. This means that the ECB would be in a position to massively support public investment simply by buying bonds from national promotional banks such as the German Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KFW) or Spain’s Instituto de Credito Oficial (ICO), or from the EIB, or even instruments issued under the heading of the Juncker Plan, instead of their sovereign counterparts.

Yet, while we fully support ECB’s purchases of agencies (and in fact we believe that they should be the backbone of QE), parsimony in the choice of agencies will be critical. Indeed, the list of eligible agencies as published by the ECB covers a range of very different animals. For instance, the list includes CADES (a body created to bear the debt of the French social security system) and UNEDIC (body in charge of France’s unemployment insurance, which is largely in deficit). These bodies have little to do with investment and long-term growth, and it is not clear that European public opinions will be that pleased when they find that out. When selecting its eligible agencies, the ECB might be well advised to select them not only on the credit worthiness grounds but also according to their economic purpose.

*About the authors:
Urszula Szczerbowicz
Economist, CEPII

Natacha Valla
Deputy Director, CEPII

References:
Bologna, P, M Caccavaio, A Miglietta (2014) “EU bank deleveraging”, VoxEU.org, 14 October

Carpenter, S, S Demiralp, J Ihrig and E Klee (2013), “Analyzing Federal Reserve Asset Purchases: From whom does the Fed buy?”, Federal Reserve Board Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2013-32.

Cœuré B (2015), “What is the goal of the Capital Markets Union?”, Speech at a conference “The European Capital Markets Union, a viable concept and a real goal?”, 18 March 2015.

European Commission (2015), “Building a Capital Markets Union”, Green Paper, 18 February 2015.

Fender, I and U Lewrick (2015), “Shifting tides – market liquidity and market-making in fixed income instruments”, BIS Quarterly Review, March 2015.

Giovannini, A, C Mayer, S Micossi, C Di Noia, M Onado, M Pagano, and A Polo (2015), Restarting European Long-Term Investment Finance: A Green Paper Discussion Document, 30 January.

Greenwood, R and D Vayanos (2015), “Bond supply and excess bond returns”, Review of Financial Studies, forthcoming.

Grjebine, T, U Szczerbowicz and F Tripier (2014), “Corporate Debt Structure and Economic Recoveries”, CEPII Working Paper, Nr 2014-19 November.

Mersch, Y (2014), “Capital markets union – the ‘Why’ and the ‘How’”, speech at Joint EIB-IMF High Level Workshop, Brussels, 22 October.

Szczerbowicz, U, (2014), “The ECB’s Unconventional Monetary Policies: Have they lowered market borrowing costs for banks and governments?“, RIETI Discussion paper 14008.

The post QE, ‘European Style': Be Bold But Parsimonious – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

An operation targeting the smuggling of dangerous chemicals conducted across Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines resulted in the recovery of a hijacked ship and a number of arrests, according to INTERPOL.

INTERPOL said that the Indonesian-flagged vessel, which was used to ship chemicals, was recovered by Philippine authorities on 23 February.

The seizure was part of a five-day operation (23 ­- 27 February) at Davao International Seaport in the Philippines, Tunon Taka International Seaport in Indonesia and Bukit Kayu Hitam at the Malaysian border with Thailand, as part of INTERPOL’s Chemical Anti-smuggling Enforcement (Chase) programme.

Around 500 law enforcement officers including police, customs, maritime security, immigration, border and government chemical agencies took part in the operation and carried out more than 45,000 checks of individuals, documents, vessels and cars against INTERPOL’s databases.

Preceded by training provided by INTERPOL’s Chemical and Explosives Terrorism Prevention unit, a key objective of the operation was to improve cooperation and communication between the various agencies across all three countries.

The post Operation Targeting Chemical Smuggling In Asia Nets Hijacked Ship appeared first on Eurasia Review.

The United States supports bringing to justice those who committed atrocities in the 1971 Bangladesh war of independence, said US State Department spokesperson Marie Harf in a statement on Saturday, adding that “In doing so, the International Crimes Tribunal (ICT) trials must be fair and transparent, and in accordance with international obligations that Bangladesh has agreed to uphold through its ratification of international agreements, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.”

According to Harf, countries that impose a death penalty must do so with great care, in accordance with a very high standard of due process and respect for fair trial guarantees.

“We greatly respect the decisions of the International Crimes Tribunal and the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh in Chief Prosecutor vs. Mohammed Kamaruzzaman, and note in particular the judicial rigor applied to this ruling,” Harf said in a statement.

“We believe that broad and enduring support for this process both nationally and internationally can be best achieved by exercising great care and caution before imposing and implementing a sentence of death,” Harf added.

According to Harf, while there has been progress, the US still believes that further improvements to the ICT process could ensure these proceedings meet domestic and international obligations.

“Until these obligations can be consistently met, it is best not to proceed with executions given the irreversibility of a sentence of death,” Harf said.

The post US Cautious On Bangladesh’s Death Sentence Of Kamaruzzaman appeared first on Eurasia Review.

The U.S. government is deeply disappointed in the Egyptian court’s decision in the case of U.S. citizen Mohamed Soltan, said US State Department spokesperson Marie Harf on Saturday, adding “We understand from reports that Mr. Soltan has been sentenced to life in prison.”

Harf said the US remains deeply concerned about Soltan’s health and detention.

“The United States reiterates our call for the release of Mr. Soltan on humanitarian grounds, and we urge the Government of Egypt to redress this verdict,” Harf said in a statement.

According to Harf, the Department of State takes its assistance to U.S. citizens abroad very seriously, adding that “Embassy officials remain in contact with Mr. Soltan and will continue to provide all possible consular assistance.”

The post US State Dept. ‘Disappointed’ In Egypt’s Conviction Of US Citizen Soltan appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Ann Schneible

This month the Vatican will gather a wide range experts in the field of exorcism with the aim of shedding light on demonic possession from both theological and scientific perspectives.

The annual course, “Exorcism and Prayer of Liberation,” is designed for priests and lay persons interested in learning how to recognize a case of demonic possession when they see one – and what to do about it.

This year’s session will run from April 13-18 at Rome’s Regina Apostolorum University, and will feature interventions by a wide range of experts in the field of exorcism from priests – including practicing exorcists – medical professionals, psychologists lawyers, and theologians. It’s sponsored by the Vatican Congregation for the Clergy and organized by the Sacerdos Institute.

According to Breitbart News Network, one of the primary objectives of the course will be to help priests and lay people distinguish demonic possession from psychological or medical conditions.

The sessions will also examine a series of other related issues, including occult practices, Satanism, and nihilism among young people.

Pope Francis has frequently warned against thinking of the devil as merely “a myth, a figure, an idea, the idea of evil.”

“The devil exists and we must fight against him,” the Pope said in an Oct. 30 homily, adding that the battle against temptation is not with small, trivial things, but with the principalities and ruling forces of this world, rooted in the devil and his followers.

In a separate homily, the pontiff stressed the importance of knowing how to discern the presence of evil in our lives.

Catholic experts have noted that occult activity and the resulting need for exorcisms has reached a critical level.

The International Association of Exorcists (AIE) met for their 12th annual conference in Rome last October. According to AIE spokesperson Dr. Valter Cascioli, an increasing number of bishops and cardinals asked to participate in the conference due to an increase in demonic activity.

“It’s becoming a pastoral emergency,” Cascioli told CNA. “At the moment the number of disturbances of extraordinary demonic activity is on the rise.”

The rise in demonic activity can be attributed to a decreasing faith among individuals, coupled with an increase in curiosity and participation in occult activity such as Ouija boards and seances, Cascioli said.

The post Vatican’s New Exorcism Course To Shed Light On Demonic Possession appeared first on Eurasia Review.

I wrote the following article for the “Close Guantánamo” website, which I established in January 2012 with US attorney Tom Wilner.Please join us — just an email address is required to be counted amongst those opposed to the ongoing existence of Guantánamo, and to receive updates of our activities by email.

On March 30, lawyers for five Afghan prisoners still held at Guantánamo wrote a letter to President Obama and other senior officials in the Obama administration asking for their clients to be released.

The five men in question are: Haji Hamdullah (aka Haji Hamidullah), ISN 1119; Mohammed Kamin, ISN 1045; Bostan Karim, ISN 975; Obaidullah, ISN 762; and Abdul Zahir, ISN 753.

The lawyers wrote, “Their continued detention is illegal because the hostilities in Afghanistan, the only possible justification for detention, have ended. Therefore, these individuals should be released and repatriated or resettled immediately.” They referred to President Obama’s State of the Union Address, on January 20 this year, at which the president said, “Tonight, for the first time since 9/11, our combat mission in Afghanistan is over.”

Under the heading, “The War in Afghanistan Is Over and Therefore Afghan Citizens Must Be Released,” the lawyers wrote, “The government’s authority to detain our clients is based on the Authorization for the Use of Military Force (‘AUMF’), passed by Congress and signed into law in the week following the attacks of September 11, 2001 … The government’s authority to detain is not indefinite. Indeed, it lasts only as long as the war in Afghanistan exists.”

The lawyers then quoted Judge Sandra Day O’Connor’s opinion in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the 2004 Supreme Court ruling establishing that the AUMF authorized the imprisonment of the men held at Guantánamo. “It is a clearly established principle of the law of war that detention may last no longer than active hostilities,” Judge O’Connor wrote.

The lawyers added, “Over the last decade, the federal judiciary has acknowledged that the government’s authority to detain individuals at Guantánamo Bay will end eventually,” and quoted from a variety of US cases, in the D.C. Circuit Court, relating to the Guantánamo prisoners — including Adham Ali Awad, a Yemeni prisoner, in 2010, when the appeals court judges stated, “[T]he United States’ authority to detain an enemy combatant is not dependent on whether an individual would pose a threat to the United States or its allies if released but rather upon the continuation of hostilities.”

As well as citing President Obama’s State of the Union Address, the lawyers also noted that, “on December 28, 2014, President Obama marked the end of Operation Enduring Freedom and combat operations in Afghanistan at a flag ceremony in Kabul, noting that ‘thanks to the extraordinary sacrifices of our men and women in uniform, our combat mission in Afghanistan is ending, and the longest war in American history is coming to a responsible conclusion.’ At that same ceremony, former Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel further acknowledged the end of combat operations by American forces and the transfer of security authority to the government of Afghanistan: ‘At the end of this year, as our Afghan partners assume responsibility for the security of their country, the United States officially concludes Operation Enduring Freedom. Our combat mission in Afghanistan, which began in the aftermath of the September 11, 2011 attacks, will come to an end.’”

The lawyers also noted that the statements by President Obama and Chuck Hagel “are supported by concrete steps taken by American military forces, including the significant reduction of troops stationed in Afghanistan, the transfer of control over detention facilities housing Afghan detainees at Bagram Airfield to the Afghan government, and the transfer of security control of 95 Afghan districts to the Afghan government.”

They added, “Moreover, the Afghan government has requested on multiple occasions that its citizens detained in Guantánamo Bay be released. On December 22, 2014, the United States released four Afghan detainees from Guantánamo Bay and returned them to Afghanistan. Additionally, the United States has released hundreds of Afghan detainees being held at Bagram Airbase [and] the Afghan government has successfully overseen their return to civilian life. Accordingly, any concern that the release of our clients will result in their recruitment to an engagement in belligerent and militant actions against American forces is wholly unfounded. Our clients are not charged with any crime. Their detention is not penal in nature. Instead, they are being held captive subject to a military action that has concluded.”

They then — again — cited Justice O’Connor in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, drawing on a 1946 ruling: “Captivity is neither a punishment nor an act of vengeance … A prisoner of war is no convict … He is disarmed and from then on must be removed as completely as practicable from the front, treated humanely and in time exchanged, repatriated or otherwise released.”

In conclusion, the lawyers wrote, “In sum, we request that you take immediate action to release these five Afghan detainees. They have been detained without charge for over thirteen years. They have lived the last several years in isolation without any real hope that their detention will come to an end. The moral and legal deadline for their release passed long ago.”

The five men are amongst the 56 prisoners — out of the remaining 122 prisoners — who have not either been approved for release (56 others) or put forward for trials (the other ten). One of the five, Abdul Zahir, had been charged in the very first incarnation of the military commissions under President Bush, which the Supreme Court shut down in 2006. He has not been charged again in the years since although, as the Miami Herald noted, his name was “included in a list of war crimes trial candidates drawn up by the Department of Defense late last year that surfaced recently in legal documents.”

Two others — Mohammed Kamin and Obaidullah — were charged in subsequent versions of the military commissions, but the cases were ridiculously weak, and the cases are no longer active. In addition, Obaidullah and another of the five, Bostan Karim, had their habeas corpus petitions turned down after ideologically-motivated interference by the D.C. Circuit Court.

The other four men — none of whom are expected to face trials — are eligible for Periodic Review Boards, a process established in 2013 to review the cases of the men not cleared for release or facing trials. Unfortunately, the review process is disturbingly slow-moving. Just 13 reviews have taken place to date, and although eight men have been approved for release and two of the eight have been freed, there is no way of  knowing how many years it might take for any of the other men — including the Afghans — to have their cases reviewed.

A Yemeni prisoner asks a court to order his release

The lawyers’ letter about the Afghans followed a federal court filing submitted on behalf of a Yemeni prisoner, Mukhtar al-Warafi, at the end of February. Unlike the Afghans, al-Warafi, a medic in Afghanistan whose habeas corpus petition was turned down in March 2010, was approved for release — if security concerns could be satisfied — by President Obama’s high-level Guantánamo Review Task Force in January 2010, but, as the Miami Herald put it, he “is from violence-plagued Yemen, where the Obama administration won’t send cleared captives.”

Al-Warafi’s lawyers presented many of the same arguments the Afghans’ lawyers put forward in their letter last week. As Shane Harris described it in an article for the Daily Beast, al-Warafi is “saying that since President Obama has declared the war in Afghanistan is over, there are no longer any legal grounds to hold him.”

Harris stated that al-Warafi’s court submission was “believed to be the first time a Guantánamo detainee has argued that the government’s authority to detain him evaporated with end of military operations against the Taliban.” However, as he added, “when US attorneys respond, they could argue that, in fact, hostilities haven’t come to a conclusion, and there are still grounds to hold the man. That could put them the strange position of undercutting the president, and arguing that just because the commander-in-chief says the war is over doesn’t necessarily make it so.”

One of al-Warafi’s lawyers is Brian Foster, who, with colleagues at the law firm Covington & Burling, represents prisoners accused of being involved with the Taliban as well as others accused of having some involvement with al-Qaeda. Foster said they “chose al-Warafi’s case as a first test because he was only ever named as a member of the Taliban, offering a clearer argument for why he should be set free now,” as opposed to men accused of having al-Qaeda connections.

Arguments will no doubt be put forward that the conflict with al-Qaeda is ongoing, although as we at “Close Guantánamo” have always maintained, it should never be taken for granted that the US authorities’ supposed evidence against the prisoners — including claims of their supposed involvement with al-Qaeda — is at all reliable, and in any case, as Brian Foster explained, although the legal argument for freeing men allegedly associated with al-Qaeda “is more complicated than for al-Warafi, which is why the team started with a client that had no al-Qaeda connections,” assumptions about al-Qaeda must also be challenged.

As Foster pointed out, the al-Qaeda to which low-level prisoners belonged “is not the same organization” as it was back in 2001. “It has nothing to do with the people who’ve been in Guantánamo for 13 years,” he said.

At “Close Guantánamo” we agree, and we can see no reason for any case to be made to attempt to justify the ongoing imprisonment of anyone at Guantánamo except for those who are facing trials. We urge appropriate action from President Obama, the Justice Department and the Pentagon, and hope to see further releases from Guantánamo in the very near future.

The post Guantánamo Prisoners Ask To Be Freed Because Of End Of War In Afghanistan – OpE appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Robert Amsterdam and Claire Kerschensteiner

Stephan Templ’s conviction for serious fraud and his original sentence of three years imprisonment, now reduced to one, for damaging the Republic of Austria is an embarrassment for the country. To indict, convict and jail somebody for filling out an application form ‘incorrectly’ makes no sense. The restitution process, as designed, made it clear that nobody had a legal right to restitution – offered as an ‘act of mercy’ – and one’s only obligations to be considered for restitution was to apply in time. Stephan did, his aunt did not. The Settlement Law which provided for restitution is crystal clear and the matter should have gone no further.

It did go further, however, and for one reason alone. The Republic of Austria went to court to claim an entitlement to a property of which – by accepting it for Restitution – it had already declared that it had no rightful ownership. Thus, Stephan was accused of having damaged the State in the amount of €550,000 because the courts of Austria believes the Republic has a right to Nazi-looted property.

The extraordinary singularity with which this case has been pursued raises many legal questions for Austria, not least whether it is serious about complying with the Washington Agreement signed in 2001.

Has Austria complied with its Restitution Obligations? It bears repeating that at no point in the Templ case did the Austrian courts rely upon the restitution legislation in place or any other law to demonstrate that Austria could legally lay claim to property stolen by the Nazis. The Austrian courts’ decision that the Republic is the ‘victim’ of a fraud by Stephan presupposes that the State can even consider itself entitled to a share in a restituted property and is asserted with no evidential backing. For Stephan to be convicted of causing the State to suffer a loss of €550,000 is to wilfully ignore the spirit and the letter of restitution law and should not be allowed to stand.

Has Austria Addressed its History of Anti-Semitism? The transcript of the trial finding Stephan guilty is replete with commentary ascribing to Stephan qualities which are worryingly reminiscent of anti-Semitic stereotypes. The decision implies that Stephan’s multiple claims for restitution are indicative of a greedy character, wilfully or inadvertently ignoring the fact that restitution is about getting back that which was once ‘yours'; that, which in fact, had been stolen from Stephan’s ancestors for no other reason than because they were Jews in Austria in 1938.  Further, that the courts, Attorney General and Justice Minister all refused to even acknowledge that the context of this case is inextricable from Austria’s past complicity in crimes committed against Jews suggests that Austria does not feel a responsibility to be transparent about its past and present struggles with anti-Semitism.

Does the Justice System believe in Justice?Stephan requested the Attorney General to exercise his discretion to review or reopen the case in the interests of individual justice and in the interests of safeguarding the constitution following a misapplication of the law. The application advanced arguments that suggested serious doubt as to the legality of his conviction – which had been independently raised by many observers of the case – and was dismissed in three paragraphs with no reference to any case law, regulations, legislation or even legal principles. It is a legal maxim that justice must not only be done, but be seen to be done and this blind and summary refusal to engage with new facts presented or to explain the decision not to so engage, demonstrates a worrying apathy towards a citizen who had looked for a merciful decision or at the very least a reasoned explanation.

Despite the function of appellate courts being inherently to review decisions of lower courts, and keeping in mind that both the Attorney General and the Justice Minister have similar powers, Stephan’s appeals and entreaties were denied time and time again by reference to the fact that a court had already found him guilty. If these bodies are unwilling to take a fresh look at the facts or the law, they are fettering their discretion and closing their eyes to potential injustice. Why have appellate courts if they do not question what has gone before?

Are Austrian Courts Selective with regard to the Facts of a Case? The prosecutor originally launched the case because Stephan’s aunt made a claim that she had been cheated out of an inheritance by Stephan. The prosecutor either didn’t know or didn’t care that a long-running dispute in the family centred upon an alleged concealment of family bank accounts existed previously and this fact is conspicuously absent in the Indictment. This information would have provided an explanation for Stephan’s behaviour that should have given any prosecutor pause before getting involved in what was clearly a complicated domestic scenario. If they felt that the aunt had indeed been cheated, they should have brought a case naming her as victim. Instead they decided to criminally charge Stephan for damaging the Republic alone; Stephan’s aunt was referred to the civil courts.

Despite this, the courts and various representatives of the Republic appear to have since realised what shaky legal ground they were standing on and have post facto tried to allege that it really was the aunt all along who had been damaged. This is why representatives of the Republic erroneously name her as the victim in their statements to the public, and this is also why the State has since signed a secret agreement to assign to her their legal claim against Stephan.

Is the Separation of Powers Principle Upheld in Austria? While the Sentencing Court were deliberating upon Stephan’s sentence, numerous officials of the Republic publicly commented on this case, raising the question of whether their inserting themselves into the case influenced the court’s decision. Even more worryingly, the senior representatives of the Republic who did issue statements on the case deliberately mis-stated the facts of the case. By claiming to the world that Stephan had been found guilty of a crime wherein his aunt was the victim (and not the State), the representatives of Austria ensured that the public and potentially the Sentencing Court formed an erroneous and harmful view of Stephan and his actions – one which persists to this day. ​ This deliberate obfuscation constitutes a campaign of State Defamation conducted against Stephan and should concern all citizens of Austria.

A recent decision of the Austrian Higher Regional Court emphasised that the Settlement Law was designed to give the state a moral but not legal obligation to restitute assets. This decision repeats what previous Constitutional Court decisions have affirmed and is in line with the restitution law – the Settlement Law does not provide for any legal framework for restitution, it merely outlines a discretion of the state. Stephan owed no duties to the state in this process.

Stephan’s case is the legal anomaly, contradicting all that has gone before or come after. There remains a mere five months to rectify this situation before Stephan is imprisoned in September.

The post Questions For Austria Following The Stephan Templ Case – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Hillary Clinton’s aide John Podesta officially announced on Sunday that the former Secretary of State intends to seek the presidency of the United States for the second time.

Podesta said that Clinton is gearing up to “hit the road to Iowa to start talking directly with voters.”

Clinton’s campaign website went live Sunday afternoon. In a launch video featured on the site, Clinton promises to be a “champion” for “everyday Americans.”

The launch of her campaign will continue over the next week as the presidential hopeful visits Iowa and New Hampshire. In Clinton’s previous bid for the White House in 2008, the former secretary of state lost to incumbent Barack Obama in the heated democratic primary race.

Obama told reporters Saturday that Clinton would make “an excellent president.”

“She was a formidable candidate in 2008. She was a great supporter of mine in the general election. She was an outstanding secretary of state. She is my friend,” Obama said at a regional summit in Panama. “I think she would be an excellent president.”

Clinton, widely seen as the frontrunner for the Democrats’ nomination, is the party’s first member to declare candidacy for the 2016 election. The long-awaited announcement comes after two years of speculation about a possible second bid.

Meanwhile, past scandals are likely to surround Clinton’s campaign. Last month, the erstwhile senator and first lady was embroiled in a controversy surrounding her use of a private—rather than government-issued—email account during her time at the State Department.

Clinton’s time as Secretary of State was also marred by the Benghazi terrorist attacks in 2012 which left four Americans dead at the US compound. Clinton stands accused of not having done enough to protect US staff.

Following Clinton’s announcement, the Republican National Committee released a statement highlighting the recent scandals and questioning her reliability.

“Over decades as a Washington insider, Clinton has left a trail of secrecy, scandal, and failed policies that can’t be erased from voters’ minds. The Clintons believe they can play by a different set of rules and think they’re above transparency, accountability, and ethics,” the RNC statement said.

The post Hillary Clinton Launches 2016 Presidential Campaign appeared first on Eurasia Review.

The chief of Reuters’ Baghdad bureau has fleed Iraq after he was threatened on social media following a Reuters report on lynching and looting in the city of Tikrit, the news agency has reported.

Threats appreared on an Iraqi Facebook page run by a group that calls itself “The Hammer” against journalist Ned Parker. It is thought to be linked to armed Shiite groups, according to an Iraqi security source.

The original post was put up on April 5. The post and comments that followed demanded the journalist be expelled from Iraq, with one commenter saying that killing him would be “the best way to silence him, not kick him out.”

Three days later a television station owned by Iranian-backed armed group Asaib Ahl al-Haq broadcast part of a show accusing the journalist of unfairly criticizing Iraq and its government-backed forces, and called on viewers to demand Parker be expelled.

Parker reported on human rights abuses in Tikrit after government forces and Iranian-backed militias freed the city from Daesh (ISIS.)

Original article

The post Iraq: Reuters Baghdad Bureau Chief Flees After Death Threats appeared first on Eurasia Review.

The White House has released remarks made by US President Barack Obama and Cuba President Raul Castro before their meeting on Sunday at the ATLAPA Convention Center in Panama City, Panama. Following is the complete release:

*****

PRESIDENT OBAMA: This is obviously a historic meeting. The history between the United States and Cuba is obviously complicated, and over the years a lot of mistrust has developed. But during the course of the last several months, there have been contacts between the U.S. and the Cuban government. And in December, as a consequence of some of the groundwork that had been laid, both myself and President Castro announced a significant change in policy and the relationship between our two governments.

I think that after 50 years of policy that had not changed on the part of the United States, it was my belief that it was time to try something new, that it was important for us to engage more directly with the Cuban government and the Cuban people. And as a consequence, I think we are now in a position to move on a path towards the future, and leave behind some of the circumstances of the past that have made it so difficult, I think, for our countries to communicate.

Already we’ve seen majorities of the American people and the Cuban people respond positively to this change. And I truly believe that as more exchanges take place, more commerce and interactions resume between the United States and Cuba, that the deep connections between the Cuban people and the American people will reflect itself in a more positive and constructive relationship between our governments.

Now, obviously there are still going to be deep and significant differences between our two governments. We will continue to try to lift up concerns around democracy and human rights. And as you heard from President Castro’s passionate speech this morning, they will lift up concerns about U.S. policy as well.

But I think what we have both concluded is that we can disagree with the spirit of respect and civility, and that over time it is possible for us to turn the page and develop a new relationship in our two countries.

And some of our immediate tasks include normalizing diplomatic relations and ultimately opening an embassy in Havana, and Cuba being able to open an embassy in Washington, D.C. so that our diplomats are able to interact on a more regular basis.

So I want to thank President Castro for the spirit of openness and courtesy that he has shown during our interactions. And I think if we can build on this spirit of mutual respect and candidness, that over time we will see not just a transformation in the relationship between our two countries, but a positive impact throughout the hemisphere and the world.

And President Castro earlier today spoke about the significant hardships that the people of Cuba have undergone over many decades. I can say with all sincerity that the essence of my policy is to do whatever I can to make sure that the people of Cuba are able to prosper and live in freedom and security, and enjoy a connection with the world where their incredible talents and ingenuity and hard work can thrive.

PRESIDENT CASTRO: (As interpreted.) Well, Mr. President, friends from the press, we have been making long speeches and listening to many long speeches too, so I do not want to abuse the time of President Obama or your time.

I think that what President Obama has just said, it’s practically the same as we feel about the topics, including human rights, freedom of the press. We have said on previous occasions to some American friends that we are willing to discuss every issue between the United States and Cuba. We are willing to discuss about those issues that I have mentioned and about many others, as these — both in Cuba but also in the United States.

I think that everything can be on the table. I think that we can do it, as President Obama has just said, with respect for the ideas of the other. We could be persuaded of some things; of others, we might not be persuaded. But when I say that I agree with everything that the President has just said, I include that we have agreed to disagree. No one should entertain illusions. It is true that we have many differences. Our countries have a long and complicated history, but we are willing to make progress in the way the President has described.

We can develop a friendship between our two peoples. We shall continue advancing in the meetings which are taking place in order to reestablish relations between our countries. We shall open our embassies. We shall visit each other, having exchanges, people to people. And all that matters is what those neighbors can do; we are close neighbors, and there are many things that we can have.

So we are willing to discuss everything, but we need to be patient — very patient. Some things we will agree on; others we will disagree. The pace of life at the present moment in the world, it’s very fast. We might disagree on something today on which we could agree tomorrow. And we hope that our closest assistants — part of them are here with us today — we hope that they will follow the instructions of both Presidents.

Thank you so much.

The post Remarks By President Obama And President Raul Castro Of Cuba Before Meeting appeared first on Eurasia Review.

(RFE/RL) — Pope Francis has called the mass killing of Armenians by Ottoman soldiers during World War I “genocide” at a Sunday mass where he marked the 100th anniversary of the tragedy.

The pope said during the service at St. Peter’s Basilica, “In the past century our human family had lived through three massive and unprecedented tragedies. The first, which is widely considered ‘the first genocide of the 20th century,’ struck your own Armenian people.”

Francis was citing part of a statement from John Paul II and the Armenian patriarch in 2000.

The pope was joined by Armenian Patriarch Nerses Bedros XIX Tarmouni at the April 12 mass, which included elements of the Armenian Catholic rite.

Armenian President Serzh Sarkisian was reportedly also in attendance.

Pope Francis’s use of the term “genocide” is certain to anger Turkey, which has admitted Armenians were killed in large numbers but always added that hundreds of thousands of Turks were also killed during the bloodshed 100 years ago.

Turkey’s Foreign Ministry summoned the Vatican envoy to Ankara later on April 12 to request an explanation about Pope Francis’s use of the word “genocide.”

The ministry said Ankara had felt “great disappointment and sadness” over the pope’s remarks.

It accused the pope of engaging in a “one-sided narrative” that ignored the suffering of Muslims and other religious groups.

It also said the pope’s comments “contradicted his message of peace, reconciliation, and dialogue” made during his landmark visit to Turkey last November.

Divisive Issue

Armenia says some 1.5 million ethnic Armenians were slaughtered between 1915 and 1917 as the Ottoman Empire was falling apart.

Armenia has been campaigning for years to win international recognition of the mass killing as genocide.

Several European countries have officially recognized the massacre as genocide. The United States has not followed, although 44 individual states have recognized the events as genocide and Republican and Democratic lawmakers have introduced a resolution urging President Barack Obama to recognize the Armenian deaths as a genocide.

Armenia officially marks the anniversary of the killings on April 24.

The pope said the other two genocides of the last 100 years were “perpetrated by Nazism and Stalinism” but he also mentioned “more recently there have been other mass killings, like those in Cambodia, Rwanda, Burundi, and Bosnia.”

The pontiff added, “It seems that humanity is incapable of putting a halt to the shedding of innocent blood.”

During the special mass, Francis declared the revered Armenian mystic St. Gregory of Narek a doctor of the church.

Only 35 people have been given the title, which is reserved for those whose writings have greatly served the universal church.

Gregory, who lived around 950 to 1005, is considered one of the most important figures of medieval Armenian religious thought and literature.

The post Pope Uses ‘Genocide’ To Describe Armenian Killings appeared first on Eurasia Review.

It’s a paradox.

Almost all the economic gains are still going to the top, leaving America’s vast middle class with stagnant wages and little or no job security. Two-thirds of Americans are working paycheck to paycheck.

Meanwhile, big money is taking over our democracy.

If there were ever a time for a bold Democratic voice on behalf of hardworking Americans, it is now.

Yet I don’t recall a time when the Democratic Party’s most prominent office holders sounded as meek. With the exception of Elizabeth Warren, they’re pussycats. If Paul Wellstone, Teddy Kennedy, Robert Kennedy, or Ann Richards were still with us, they’d be hollering.

The fire now is on the right, stoked by the Koch brothers, Rupert Murdoch, and a pocketful of hedge-fund billionaires.

Today’s Republican firebrands, beginning with Ted Cruz, blame the poor, blacks, Latinos, and immigrants for what’s been happening. They avoid any mention of wealth and power.

Which brings me to Hillary Rodham Clinton.

Some wonder about the strength of her values and ideals. I don’t. I’ve known her since she was 19 years old, and have no doubt where her heart is. For her entire career she’s been deeply committed to equal opportunity and upward mobility.

Some worry she’s been too compromised by big money – that the circle of wealthy donors she and her husband have cultivated over the years has dulled her sensitivity to the struggling middle class and poor.

But it’s wrong to assume great wealth, or even a social circle of the wealthy, is incompatible with a deep commitment to reform – as Teddy Roosevelt and his fifth-cousin Franklin clearly demonstrated.

The more relevant concern is Hillary Clinton’s willingness to fight.

Politicians usually seek to appeal to as many voters as possible, eschewing controversy. After a devastating first midterm election, her husband famously “triangulated” between Democrats and Republicans, seeking to find a middle position above the fray.

But these times are different. Not in ninety years has America harbored a greater concentration of wealth at the very top. Not since the Gilded Age of the 1890s has American politics been as corrupted by big money as it is today.

If Hillary Clinton is to get the mandate she needs for America to get back on track, she will have to be clear with the American people about what is happening and why – and what must be done.

For example: Wall Street is still running the economy, and still out of control.

So we must resurrect the Glass-Steagall Act and bust up the biggest banks, so millions of Americans don’t ever again lose their homes, jobs, and savings because of Wall Street’s excesses.

Also: Increase taxes on the rich in order to finance the investments in schools and infrastructure the nation desperately needs.

Strengthen unions so working Americans have the bargaining power to get a fair share of the gains from economic growth.

Limit the deductibility of executive pay, and raise the minimum wage to $15 an hour.

Oppose trade agreements like the Trans Pacific Partnership designed to protect corporate property but not American jobs.

And nominate Supreme Court justices who will reverse “Citizens United.”

I’m not suggesting a long list. Democratic candidates too often offer mind-numbing policy proposals without explaining why they’re important.

She should use such policies to illustrate the problem, and make a vivid moral case for why such policies are necessary.

In recent decades Republicans have made a moral case for less government and lower taxes on the rich, based on their idea of “freedom.”

They talk endlessly about freedom but they never talk about power. But it’s power that’s askew in America –concentrated power that’s constraining the freedom of the vast majority.

Hillary Clinton should make the moral case about power: for taking it out of the hands of those with great wealth and putting it back into the hands of average working people.

In these times, such a voice and message make sense politically. The 2016 election will be decided by turnout, and turnout will depend on enthusiasm. The largest party in America isn’t the Republican or Democratic Parties; it is the Party of Non-Voters, who have become so cynical about politics they’ve ceased voting.

If she talks about what’s really going on and what must be done about it, she can arouse the Democratic base as well as millions of Independents and even Republicans who have concluded, with reason, that the game is rigged against them.

The question is not her values and ideals. It’s her willingness to be bold and to fight, at a time when average working people need a president who will fight for them more than they’ve needed such a president in living memory.

This is a defining moment for Democrats, and for America. It is also a defining moment for Hillary Clinton.

The post The Defining Moment, And Hillary Rodham Clinton – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Kazi Anwarul Masud*

The world is passing through a stage of conundrum.

With the passage of the world order that prevailed since the Second World War the American predominance in global affairs is on the wane. However much denied by the likes of Robert Kagan, Niall Ferguson and their fellow travelers who would like the US to be an imperialist power in disguise the fact remains that the US today has to share its influence with emerging economies like China, India, Brazil, a recalcitrant Russia and no less importantly ISIS, the Taliban, and host of other who are disturbing the global peace in the name of religion.

Obama administration is aiming at concluding a Trans-Atlantic Treaty that would, in the opinion of some, is a frontal assault on democracy (The Guardian-George Monibot- November 2013). The purpose of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership is to remove the regulatory differences between the US and European nations.

In particular the mechanism through Investor-State Dispute Settlement which provides for an arbitration court consisting of private individuals are entrusted with the power to review, without any restriction or appeal procedure, all actions of the government, all decisions of the courts, and all laws and regulations emanating from parliament. There are no corresponding rights for citizens. The people cannot use these tribunals to demand better protections from corporate greed. As the Democracy Center says, this is “a privatized justice system for global corporations”.

The other school including the European Commission believes that passage of the Transatlantic Trade Pact could boost trade by 50% for each bloc. The United States and European Union together represent 60% of global GDP, 33% of world trade in goods and 42% of world trade in services. A free trade area between the two would represent potentially the largest regional free-trade agreement in history, covering 46% of world GDP. The grueling negotiations are yet to end and a deal is yet to reach the US Congress and the European Parliament and those of EU members.

This distraction to Transatlantic Partnership and one desired by the US of a Transpacific Partnership is to emphasize the point that the world today gives more priority to the bread and butter issues than aberrant destructive acts of some sociopaths terrorizing parts of the world giving life to Samuel Huntington’s thesis of civilizational conflicts spreading their cancerous cells throughout the world. Some of these irreparably damaged minds are calling for jihad that, as analyzed by Benjamin Barber (Jihad vs. Mcworld) essentially puts forward the conflict of consumerist capitalism as opposed to religious and tribal fundamentalism. Some of the same class of people has wrought death and destruction to the people in the name of giving the people back their “lost” democratic rights.

In Bangladesh we are experiencing the latter kind of mindless violence resultant of adamant attitude of violence laced movement( general people are increasingly getting disinterested in the calls for strike and seize) faced with the government’s possible decision to treat the violence as terrorism and refusing to sit with the opposition political parties for any dialogue.

There appears to be sound logic in the government’s refusal to sit for a dialogue. Pakistan does not sit for dialogue with Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) nor does the coalition of the Middle Eastern countries assisted by US air strikes and other Western powers have any dialogue with ISIS or the Nigerians with Boko Haram terrorists.

So long the opposition political parties do not come out of the grip of terrorism it would be immoral and possibly illegal for the authorities to have any dialogue with them. The present situation in Bangladesh is similar to Joseph Heller’s famous book Catch-22 which refers to any illogical or paradoxical problem or situation or a “a vicious circle wherein an absurd, no-win choice, particularly in situations in which the desired outcome of the choice is an impossibility, and regardless of choice, a same negative outcome is a certainty” . World history does not provide examples of negotiation with violence till the perpetrators have abjured violence (we have the example of Shantu Larma giving up violence in favor of negotiations in Chittagong Hill Tracts).

Politics, if not satirically described as conduct of public affairs for private gains, is meant for the welfare of the people. So it is possible to have negotiations with former terrorists. In Afghanistan the authorities and the US are willing to talk with the former Taliban. It can be done here as well. But to arrive at this stage BNP-Jamaat combine have to cease killings of the innocent, destruction of property and causing loss to the economy. They have to stop terrorism in all its forms. Only then can an atmosphere for a dialogue can be formed.

The decisions by BNP to support candidates for the city elections in Dhaka and Chittagong appear to be a positive indicator in an otherwise political conflict ridden country. Bangladesh government has decided to revise growth rate from 7.3% to 6.8%. ADB assessment is 6.1% from 6.4% while Bangladesh Bank revised down growth rate to 6.1%. This means that unless Bangladesh can come out of the 6% constraint and raise growth rate to at least 8% it would be difficult to achieve the target of medium income country in a decade or two. Despite having the advantage of democratic dividend( out of a population of 160 million 93 million are under the age of 28 years) this mass of people if better educated and trained, preferably abroad, can be an asset to the country’s development, more so, as we need 8% remittance growth.

Bangladesh is an investment friendly country yet both foreign and domestic investment have not been ideal for various reasons e.g. lack of infrastructure, difficulty in doing business, unpredictability of return on investment due to current political turmoil etc have added as a disincentive for lack of investment.

Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) in a recent survey reported that more than seventy percent Japan affiliated companies in China would like to shift their operation to Bangladesh as well as India, Vietnam and Thailand. The survey, however, stressed improving worker efficiency in the country by providing basic education and vocational training.

Among the countries surveyed, Bangladesh ranked the lowest in quality of employees. The average rate of workers’ productivity in Bangladesh is 31.6 percent, while it is more than double in Sri Lanka, in Pakistan, and slightly more in China and in India. While Bangladesh like any other developing country aims at improving its national wealth the authorities also have to be careful about distribution of wealth. GINI coefficient that measures inequality of income between different groups of people increased from 0.467 in 2005 to 0.458 in 2010. And the richest 5% households possess 24.61% while the poorest 5% have only to 0.46 in the 2000s of total income.

While it is debatable whether poverty is the principal reason for religious extremism there is no doubt that religious extremism has flourished in Muslim countries e.g. Pakistan( Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan), Nigeria( Boko Haram), Afghanistan( Taliban), Yemen( Taliban in Northern Africa), and currently the most brutal ISIS( Iraq and Syria).

Pew Research Center in January 2012( Religious Extremism and Development) measuring Social Hostility Index measured in terms of acts of religious hostility by private individuals, organizations or groups in society including religion-related armed conflict or terrorism, mob or sectarian violence, harassment over attire for religious reasons or other religion-related intimidation or abuse mentioned India’s Hindu Jagarana Vedike, enforcing a morality code, including an attack on young men and women for allegedly drinking and dancing at a birthday party in the state of Karnataka in July 2012 .Additionally the “ghar wapasi”(return to the fold) program has become controversial both in India and abroad.

The Pew report also included six countries with very high social hostilities in 2012– Syria, Lebanon, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Thailand and Burma (Myanmar). Among the world’s 25 most populous countries, Egypt, Indonesia, Russia, Pakistan and Burma (Myanmar) stand out as having most restrictions on religion when both government restrictions and social hostilities are taken into account. Despite Bangladesh government’s firm determination to disallow any form of militant Islam or terrorism in any form some recent events are causing worry both for Bangladesh and India.

Pew Research Center in a report( May 10 2013) on Pakistani views on religion, politics and democracy found that Pakistani Muslims were least likely to express support for democracy and instead majority of those surveyed felt that a leader with strong hand would be preferable to solve the problems facing the country. More than half of the Pakistanis wanted religious leaders to have some influence in political matters. Though Nawaz Sharif’s election as the Prime Minister after the latest general election in Pakistan is a reflection of peoples’ desire to return of democratic rule in the country yet the direct influence of the military establishment in the affairs of the state remains as before. It is felt that Pakistan’s security establishment has to make a permanent break with its decades-long romance with jihadi proxies. The distinction that some in the nation’s security apparatus draw between “good Taliban” — shorthand for groups who serve their regional interests — and “bad Taliban” — militants at war with the state — must end.

Pakistanis themselves are now introspecting their part of the blame in post-Peshawar carnage in which hundreds of school children were killed by the Taliban. Pakistan needs to move away from making religion its yardstick for measuring right and wrong in public life. This approach has its pitfalls because of the diversity in the interpretation of Islamic precepts with each school of thought claiming to be the correct one. A secular approach based on a social contract can alone resolve the contradictions that complicate life under a theocratic state while allowing the civilian government and the military to get away with so much casuistry (DAWN 24-12-2014 WE ARE TO BLAME ZUBEIDA MUSTAFA).

Given the continuing terrorism in Pakistan, the suspected linkage between ISI and Bangladeshi terrorists mainly drawn from Jamaat-e-Islami ( one official of the Pakistan diplomatic mission has been withdrawn from Dhaka) and Pakistan security establishments’ penchant to use Bangladesh territory as passage of terrorists to India we have to be on guard that such things do not occur any more. Pakistan is unhappy with the present Bangladesh’s strict policy of stopping transnational terrorism by stopping Pakistani terrorists going to India through Bangladesh which was much easier when BNP-Jamaat combine was in power.

Some Pakistani political leaders have publicly criticized Bangladesh for the trial of Jamaat leaders accused of war crimes. Pakistan is also not happy with improved Bangladesh-India relations despite some unresolved issues between the two countries. Most recently Indian ships have ferried back home hundreds of Bangladeshis trapped in war torn Yemen. On the other hand Pakistan remains obsessed with “threat” from India. A recent editorial in The New York Times( Nuclear fears in South Asia-April 6 2015) has written of Pakistani Army’s continuing obsession with India as the enemy, a rationale that allows the generals to maintain maximum power over the government and demand maximum national resources.

Pakistan now has an arsenal of as many as 120 nuclear weapons and is expected to triple that in a decade. An increase of that size makes no sense, especially since India’s nuclear arsenal, estimated at about 110 weapons, is growing more slowly. Even more troubling, the paper continues, the Pakistani Army has become increasingly dependent on the nuclear arsenal because Pakistan cannot match the size and sophistication of India’s conventional forces. Pakistan has left open the possibility that it could be the first to use nuclear weapons in a confrontation, even one that began with conventional arms.

In such a scenario in our immediate neighborhood Bangladesh cannot afford to have a disturbed political situation. Given the track record of Jamaat-e-Islami the best option for BNP to return to normal politics would be to sever connection with Jamaat which hopefully would be banned as a political party in the near future. BNP still remains the second largest political party in the country and should have no fear in contesting elections as the party is doing in the Mayoral elections in Dhaka and Chittagong. Since exercise of absolute sovereignty is circumscribed by the fallout from political disturbances in neighboring countries the international community has a duty to help curb terrorism in any country. Besides it is now proven that economic development among other factors, the raison d’etre of democracy, would be negatively affected because of terrorism we in Bangladesh need to eliminate the roots of terrorism through hard and soft powers by collaborating with the international community.

In short we need a peaceful Bangladesh to improve the socio-economic conditions of the people in conjunction with those of countries of South Asia.

*The writer is a retired Secretary of the Foreign Ministry of Bangladesh

The post Hoping For A Peaceful Bangladesh – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

The Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP) has begun its national congress until 12 April 2015. This could be a suitable platform for President Joko Widodo (Jokowi) to advance his political position and reconcile with PDIP, while altering Indonesia’s current political configuration.

By Adhi Priamarizki*

The influential Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP) has begun its national congress (9-12 April 2015) with little, if any, prospect of a change of its leadership. Despite the result of a survey conducted by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) that showed 31.5 per cent of 467 local chapter leaders would like a change, the current party leader Megawati Soekarnoputri is most likely to continue as PDIP chairman.

Prominent PDIP figures, such as Tjahjo Kumolo and Sidarto Danusubroto, believe there is no rivalry between Megawati and President Joko Widodo (Jokowi) in the congress which will discuss the party’s grand political plan for the next few years, including its chairmanship.

Re-instating Megawati as chairman

After reviewing the party’s accountability report for the 2010-2015 the next key item on the agenda is the inauguration of Megawati as the party’s chairman. Thirdly, PDIP will decide its upcoming programmes and political postures. The fourth is determining the composition of the party’s 2015-2020 structure. The last objective will be to discuss the current government’s programmes in four critical areas: politics, law and security; economy; maritime; and human development and culture.

As the winner of the 2014 legislative elections, PDIP holds substantial power to influence national politics. This congress is crucial for the party to reconcile internally and plan its political strategy for the next five years. President Jokowi is expected to attend the congress as a member of PDIP, not as President of Indonesia.

This fourth PDIP congress also poses an opportunity for President Jokowi. The recent Police Chief saga has exposed a precarious relationship between the president and his own party. His status as a party functionary (petugas partai) and PDIP’s status as winner of the 2014 legislative election provide the party a political asset as well as a burden for President Jokowi. Recently some senior PDIP members accused Jokowi’s inner circle of blocking their access to the president.

Jokowi himself is not likely to run for the PDIP Chairman’s position. In fact, in the PDIP National Leaders Meeting (Rapimnas) in Semarang last year, Jokowi assured that he did not have the ambition to become the party Chairman or seek other key positions. So what does the coming congress mean for Jokowi, his government and PDIP? Would it be possible for Jokowi to promote a better relationship with PDIP? What would be the probable impact of the congress on Indonesian politics?

Fourth PDIP Congress: Reconciling Jokowi and PDIP?

President Jokowi undoubtedly had limited political capital when he was inaugurated as the seventh President of the Republic of Indonesia. He faced a strong opposition group in the form of the Merah Putih (Red and White) coalition in the parliament. Over time, however, this opposition group has weakened due to internal frictions and leadership changes. One of the strongest Merah Putih coalition members, Golkar party, is divided into two camps – that of Agung Laksono and Aburizal Bakrie, with each claiming the mantle of legitimate leader.

The declining power of the opposition group does not automatically provide Jokowi vast political space for creating policies. His status as a ‘party officer’ carries a responsibility for him to follow PDIP’s platforms, though it also offers a political shield for Jokowi.

Preserving PDIP as one of his political guardians would be an advantage for him. Besides having limited political capital, Jokowi does not have an extensive political network. Being a newcomer to national politics restricts Widodo’s political reach, , especially in dealing with the members of parliament. Expanding his political network through various channels is necessary for Jokowi to ensure that his government runs smoothly. The President can benefit from the PDIP’s well-established political network in national politics.

Jokowi’s multi-party coalition, however, demands political compromises from PDIP, which makes it less likely for Jokowi to ignore the interests of the other coalition members. The 2015 PDIP Congress offers a chance for Jokowi and PDIP to improve their relations. It is the best time for both sides to settle their differences and forge a mutual understanding. Jokowi and PDIP may pledge political agreements to reconcile the party’s next five-year programme with Jokowi’s government agenda. The congress will also be an opportunity for Jokowi to gain trust from the PDIP leadership and other members. The congress may not be the only chance for Jokowi, but certainly it will provide a great momentum to close the gap between him and the party.

Hidden Conundrum for Indonesian politics

It is, however, not unthinkable for the rift between Jokowi and PDIP to widen. While he may benefit from attaching himself to PDIP, Jokowi must also prepare himself should he fail to firm up his tenuous affinity with the party. A prolonged disagreement may produce political consequences, such as clogged policy-making and the president’s weakened political influence.

Furthermore, a continued rift between Jokowi and PDIP could end up in a cabinet reshuffle, particularly if the political configuration changed dramatically. If PDIP and Jokowi manage to improve their relations, it is probable for Jokowi to accommodate his party’s interests, such as adding more PDIP cadres into the cabinet. On the other hand, a shaky relationship between PDIP and Jokowi may force him to find another power grouping that he could accommodate with cabinet positions or other concessions.

*Adhi Priamarizki is an Associate Research Fellow with the Indonesia Programme, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.

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