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Spain: Atlantic Corridor Railway Opens Connecting Ferrol With Portugal Border

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The Atlantic Corridor – the high-speed railway corridor running north-south for 241 kilometres along the Atlantic coast between Ferrol and the border with Portugal – will begin operating this week, with tickets going on sale from Tuesday, according to the Spanish Minister for Public Works, Ana Pastor.

Pastor, who made the announcement at a conference organised by Diario de Pontevedra, stressed that almost 840 million euros have been allocated to this infrastructure during the course of this legislature. She explained that this investment has enabled the conclusion of works on the Ulla Viaduct; redevelopment and adaptation to high-speed services at Pontevedra railway station; the opening of a depot adapted to high-speed resources at Arousa railway station; construction of the Vigo-Urzáiz railway station; the start-up of works between Portela and Pontevedra; and completion of the Padrón-Vilagarcía and Arcade-Vigo Urzáiz sections.

Furthermore, the Spanish minister underlined the improved journey times that the Atlantic Corridor will offer passengers. For example, it will be possible to travel from Pontevedra to Vigo in 15 minutes (currently 36 minutes); to Vilagarcía in 16 minutes (7 minutes faster); to Santiago in 39 minutes (it currently takes 56 minutes); and to Coruña in 1 hour 8 minutes (26 minutes faster).
Express services

The Minister for Public Works said that, to offer more competitive services better suited to the real needs of the public, new express services will be launched between the main urban centres, with 10 services in each direction per day.

These services will stop in A Coruña, Santiago de Compostela, Vilagarcía de Arousa, Pontevedra and Vigo, with some of them also stopping at the new stations in Padrón-Barbanza, Redondela AV and Arcade. These services will represent an average journey time reduction of 40%.

Furthermore, the number of seats will be increased by 50% from the 185 currently available to 282.

Furthermore, Pastor said that a number of stopping services will also be launched to connect the various towns located along the corridor with the main urban centers.

By operating these services, the current number of services stopping at each station is either maintained or improved, with the number of seats being increased by approximately 40%.

The Spanish minister stressed that the service improvement will not lead to an increase in ticket prices. Prices will remain as they are, with the current T4 Intercity price being used for Express Services and the T2 Intercity price for Stopping Services.

The post Spain: Atlantic Corridor Railway Opens Connecting Ferrol With Portugal Border appeared first on Eurasia Review.


Kerry’s Mystery Russia Statement And The American ‘Semi-Fact Sheet’– OpEd

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“The facts on which the parameters are based are facts. And yesterday, the Russians issued the statement saying that the fact sheet or the facts as expressed by the United States are reliable and accurate information.” U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry made this statement on television on Sunday, April 12th and was thus able to convey the impression that Iran’s criticisms of the U.S. “fact sheet” are invalid.

Yet, the problem with Kerry’s claim of Russian endorsement of the “fact sheet” disputed by Iran is that there is no evidence of any such statement by any Russian official, including the foreign minister Sergei Lavrov, or other officials directly involved in the nuclear negotiations.

On the contrary, Mr. Sergei Rybakov the deputy foreign minister who leads the Russian delegation at the talks has explicitly challenged the American interpretation of the Lausanne statement, which insists on gradual “sanctions relief” instead of their immediate removal. Rybakov has stated:

“We reiterate our position that the lifting of the sanctions set forth in the UN Security Council resolution, should take place simultaneously with the signing of the agreement. But this does not mean that the entire volume of sanctions will be immediately canceled. In what order and what sanctions may be suspended or canceled completely, this remains a subject of negotiations. And the inconsistency of these questions largely determines and explains why after the Lausanne Round divergent signals we heard from Washington and Tehran.”

Hence, this raises the question of why Secretary Kerry made that wild, unsupportable claim about Russia, when the opposite is true?

Perhaps Kerry expects the international community to behave like the docile American population and its mainstream media, by simply adopting his claims as facts? But, given the fact that the world has a belly full of American deception and duplicity, Kerry’s latest statement on Iran requires serious scrutiny. A foreign journalist conducting that interview with Kerry might have bothered to ask about the statement, but not the American journalist intent on giving legitimacy — to a rather embarrassing situation where the U.S. is caught with its distortion of facts, as indicated by Iran’s Supreme Leader and Iran’s resourceful foreign minister, Javad Zarif.

In fact, even the Europeans have pretty much landed on Iran’s side by explicitly stating that only the Lausanne statement matters, in other words showing their distrust of the American “fact sheet” which is better called “semi-fact sheet.”

One reason why Rybakov’s statement on sanctions mentioned above is important is that he is also on record after Lausanne meetings, stating the following:

“We are pleased with how this ended a marathon. It ended by finding the key parameters of the future agreement,”

It is therefore logical to deduce from the Russian statements that the parameter on sanctions reflects Iran’s position, not the current U.S. position. This is an important conclusion that bears on the next round of talks that focus on drafting the final agreement. The U.S. will obviously try to shape the final agreement according to its own arbitrary interpretation, which is in open divergence from Iran’s view on important key issues not limited to sanctions, such as the length of agreement on limitations on Iran’s nuclear activities, or the scope of inspections.

Obviously, these important differences need to be resolved before a deal can be reached, meanwhile a little bit of American honesty, and self-criticism, can go a long way.

This article was published at Iranian Diplomacy and reprinted with permission.

The post Kerry’s Mystery Russia Statement And The American ‘Semi-Fact Sheet’ – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Can Diplomacy Solve The Chaos In Middle East? – OpEd

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When it comes to the Middle East, everything happens at a pace that is too fast to comprehend. Proxy wars, manipulations and unjustifiable violence — unfortunately, a region so blessed and so beautiful is nowadays mostly known for all the wrong things.

As of now, Iran-Arab relations are turning from bad to worse with sectarian rhetoric and regional rivalries resulting in a weird form of power struggle that will have many losers, and probably zero winners. Both Iran and Saudi Arabia have entered into a stare-down in Yemen, and with nearly all the major states of the region taking sides, the flames of these tensions are reaching as far as Turkey and Pakistan. Add to it the fact that the recent nuclear deal between P5+1 and Iran can affect regional strife even further, and the chances of a zero sum game look even bleak.

At this point, one needs to wonder: what can be the possible solution for Middle East?

The Nuclear Deal

Question is: how will the US-Iran nuclear deal affect regional balance of power? Now, there are many faces to this question, and it can be broken down as under:

  • How will Iran’s nuclear deal affect Saudi Arabia’s terms with USA?
  • Will this lead to a possible cooperation between USA and Iran? It must be noted that Iran did help USA against the Taliban back in 2001.
  • Both Israel and Saudi Arabia are not too pleased with this nuclear deal. Will it mean that they resolve their differences and take a principled stand against Iran?
  • Even more so, how the hardening power triangle in the region, Israel, Saudi Arabia and Iran, react? Will it lead to an even greater three-sided sectarian conflict?
  • On paper, Saudi Arabia is fine with the US-Iran nuclear deal. Does it mean USA will help Saudi Arabia in its regional endeavors as a return of favor? If so, will USA openly oppose Iran’s stand in Yemen?

A big factor here is the rise of The Islamic State (or ISIS, or ISIL, or Da’esh, whichever name you like to use). Virtually every player in the region is not fond of IS (accusations and conspiracy theories aside, IS surely does not have any open supporters per se). In fact, the recent nuclear deal might just have happened as an outcome of the fact that USA needs Iran to fight against IS in Iraq and possibly in Syria.

Can Diplomacy Work?

Recently, at the Turkish-Iranian summit, Iran gave a warm reception to Turkish President Erdogan. Even though both Turkey and Iran do not see eye to eye on various issues, they still managed to agree to double their trade from $14bn to $30bn.

The same model should be implemented in case of Saudi Arabia and Iran as well. Diplomacy is the way forward, war is not.

Of course, such a summit seems unlikely as of now, especially because the Islamic Middle East has multiple players in the picture: Turkey on one hand, the Saudi Arabian party on the second, and Iran and its friends on the third. More importantly, the volatile borders in the Middle East are surely not sensible, and a good number of them were drawn not by legitimate methods but as a by-product of imperialism. The divisions in the Middle East — be it the case of Iraq, or Syria or Palestine or even Saudi Arabia and Iran themselves — are more artificial and less logical.

But this is precisely why diplomacy can be helpful. As a matter of fact, the best way forward for the Arab World would be complete unification, in sync with the aspirations of the Arab people and against the wishes of both Israel and oil-hungry West. Sadly, that seems unlikely as of now, and whether you like it or not, Saudi Arabia is the de facto face of the Gulf. As such, any solution will have to acknowledge the reality and focus on arriving at a conclusion thereafter. Similarly, Iranian borders and desires may be questionable, but it does stand tall as a powerful Islamic entity, and can serve as a legitimate check against Zionist aggression (something that the Arabian powers have failed to do so far).

Conclusion

Right now, the most plausible solution to the crisis in Yemen as well as Syria would be a diplomatic arrangement between all the parties involved, sans the foreign detractors. Probably Turkey and Qatar can mediate, whereas Saudi Arabia, Iran and other relevant parties can sit together and discuss the details. Day dreaming? Might be, but it is still better than engaging in dumb sectarian strife and offering additional leverage to NATO and Israel.

Both Saudi Arabia and Iran are currently involved in a race to the bottom, with each party declaring itself to be the sole voice of sanity. In such a tug of war, there are no winners, and if the current trend continues, all of Middle East will fight its way back to Stone Age.

For Middle East, unification is the cure, but since that is not happening anytime soon, unity is what we should strive for.

The post Can Diplomacy Solve The Chaos In Middle East? – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

The Ukraine Conflict, Economic-Military Power Balances And Economic Sanctions: Lessons From Past For Future EU Policies – Analysis

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How generously should the EU support the reform and recovery of the Ukraine economy? Should the EU de-couple its policies concerning anti-Russia economic sanctions from those of the US? Should the EU countries discourage NATO from providing military assistance to the armed forces of Ukraine?

By Christopher Davis*

This analysis begins by identifying lessons for the understanding of the conflict in Ukraine and contemporary economic sanctions from the histories of the dynamics of economic and military power balances in Europe leading up to 2013 and of Western economic warfare directed against the USSR. It evaluates a number of empirical issues, such as the impacts of sanctions on the economy of Russia, and then provides brief answers to three key questions related to EU policymaking in 2015: (1) How generously should the EU support the reform and recovery of the Ukraine economy?; (2) Should the EU de-couple its policies concerning anti-Russia economic sanctions from those of the US?; and (3) Should the EU countries discourage NATO from providing military assistance to the armed forces of Ukraine?

Analysis:

The Rise and Fall of the USSR as a Great Power, Western Economic Warfare, and Conventional Deterrence in Europe During the Cold War

Although Russia declined as a European economic and military power following the Bolshevik Revolution and Civil War, its revolutionary program was perceived as a threat by leading capitalist nations. These concerns were intensified when Stalin’s policies generated rapid economic growth and substantial increases in military power in the 1930s, which provided the foundation for the successes of the USSR in World War II.

From 1917 until 1991 foreign powers waged economic warfare against and imposed sanctions on the USSR in order to constrain the development of its economic and military power. However, there often were divisions between countries over anti-Soviet policies. Germany provided important covert assistance to Soviet Russia throughout the 1920s. The rapid Soviet industrialization in the 1930s benefited from large-scale exports to Stalin’s USSR of machinery and equipment by Western firms, notably American ones. Germany assisted the Soviet Union economically during 1939-41, whereas the US and Britain provided it with help over 1941-45. Due to forcible inclusion from 1940 of the Baltic and East European countries in the Soviet-led socialist system, the newly formed (1949) NATO alliance adopted containment policies that involved formalized economic warfare against the USSR under the supervision of CoCom. All important industrialized countries participated in these restrictions on trade and finance that remained in effect until the end of the Cold War.

The Soviet Union developed economic warfare counter-measures against the capitalist countries that involved embargoes, trade diversion, and technological espionage. By the 1960s the USSR had a well-organized and effective Spetsinformatsiya (special information) system that obtained restricted Western technologies on a large scale using covert means.

In the post-war period the Soviet economy grew rapidly. Despite Western technology controls, the Soviet Union was successful in developing nuclear weapons, ICBMs, strategic bombers, nuclear submarines, and sophisticated conventional weapons. The USSR became the dominant economic power in Eurasia and the second “superpower” in military terms.

Two cases of Cold War anti-Soviet economic sanctions have parallels with the current Ukraine situation. In response to the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 by the USSR and the imposition of martial law in Poland in 1981, the US imposed draconian controls on the export to the communist bloc of energy-related technologies and asked its NATO partners to participate. However, West Europe decided to ignore the US sanctions and instead to cooperate with the USSR in building the 4,500 km natural gas pipeline from Urengoi to Uzhgorod (Ukraine) during 1982-84. The second case relates to the 1983 shooting down by a Soviet fighter of the Korean Airlines (007) civilian passenger plane that had strayed into Soviet airspace. The world community was appalled by this action and additional sanctions were imposed in response. These remained in place for less than two years because of the decision by Western powers in 1985 to work constructively with the new reformist Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev.

During the late Cold War period NATO substantially built up its conventional and strategic nuclear forces and achieved deterrence in Europe. This required substantial commitments of resources to defense: US 6 % of GDP, UK 5 %, France 4 %, Germany 3 %. The US and USSR engaged in numerous proxy conflicts in the Third World. The US had mixed success in supplying weapons to weak regimes threatened by revolutionary forces. Cases of defeat with the loss of all US weapons included Vietnam 1973, Ethiopia 1974, and Nicaragua and Iran in 1979.

Although there were military tensions in Europe during 1945-1989 there were no armed conflicts or European border changes. The US did not recognize the 1940 annexations of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, but it treated this as a side-issue in order to manage its relations with the USSR for the sake of global stability.

The communist regimes in Eastern Europe collapsed in 1989 and in the USSR in 1991 due to economic problems, excessively heavy defense burdens, and population dissatisfaction. Economic warfare and sanctions played only minor roles in altering economic and military power balances and in bringing about regime change.

Absolute and Relative Declines in the Economic, Technological and Military Power of Russia and Ukraine in the 1990s

Russia and Ukraine emerged as independent states in 1991 with similar Soviet inheritances and close economic linkages. Economic transition in the 1990s proved difficult for both countries with GDP collapses of about 40%, high inflation, corrupt privatization processes, limited industrial restructuring, and little FDI. In contrast, OECD economies experienced healthy growth and technological progress accelerated. So the gap in economic power between Russia and the West widened. The East Europe and Baltic countries engaged successfully with necessary reforms and their economies recovered quickly.

In Russia and Ukraine the priority of the military-industrial complex was downgraded. Defense expenditures were drastically reduced, military capabilities deteriorated, and negligible progress was achieved in reforms of the armed forces or defense industry.

The effectiveness of NATO armies remained high and new military technologies were introduced (stealth design, smart bombs, drones). However, European countries obtained an economic “peace dividend” by reducing defense expenditures, military personnel and weapon systems. For example, the number of UK Main Battle (MB) tanks dropped from 1,330 in 1990 to 636 in 2000. Substantial withdrawals were made of the military forces deployed in Germany of the US, UK and France. In 1999 the membership of NATO was expanded to include Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland.

In the post-Cold War period there has been significant instability of the borders of countries in Europe with a total of 30 alterations. There were peaceful changes in 22 cases: reunification of Germany; fragmentation of the USSR into 15 successor states; division of Czechoslovakia; independence of Slovenia and FRY Macedonia; and Serbia and Montenegro splitting. Three states achieved independence following wars: Serbia-Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzogovina, and Croatia. In five other cases regions of a state achieved autonomy through armed conflict, usually involving a foreign power, and thereafter entered the category of “frozen conflict”: Transnistria (1992), South Ossetia (1992), Abkhazia (1993), Nagorno-Karabakh (1994), and Kosovo (1999).

Recovery in Russia, Stagnation in Ukraine, Expansion of the EU and NATO, and Power Balances in Europe in the 2000s

The main economies in the world (now including China) grew at healthy rates during 2000-2008. The Baltic and Central East European countries benefited from inflows of FDI and completed their accessions to the EU in 2004 and 2007. However, the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) provided a severe negative shock to European economies. Despite resulting economic problems and austerity policies, the EU continued to expand, granting membership to Croatia in 2012, and made efforts to involve Former Soviet Union (FSU) states through the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP).

In Russia Vladimir Putin was elected President in 2000 and has remained the dominant leader since then. Market-oriented reforms were only partially successful in the 2000s, but the Russian economy benefited substantially from the rise in the world market price of oil to a peak of $145 in 2008. Russia deepened its integration into the global economy and prudently built up a stabilization fund using taxes on energy exports. In 2012 Russia joined the WTO and published plans calling for closer economic links with the EU.

From 2000 Russia raised the priority of the defense sector, adopted an ambitious weapons procurement program, and intensified military reforms. According to SIPRI, real ($2011) defense spending increased from $31 billion in 2000 to $85 billion in 2013. The defense share of GDP rose from 3.6 % of GDP to 4.2 % (World Bank). The size of the armed forces was reduced from 1,004,100 to 845,000 and the number of MB tanks from 12,920 to 2,550 as part of modernization. The Russian military engaged in counter-insurgency operations in the Caucasus and fought a successful war against Georgia over South Ossetia in 2008.

Ukraine has had a democratic but unstable political system. The peaceful Orange revolution in 2005 held out the promise of democratic reforms and reduction in pervasive corruption, but the pro-West government was ineffectual and was replaced following the 2010 election by the more pro-Russian President Yanukovich. The Ukraine economy made limited progress with economic reforms and performed poorly with respect to growth, inflation, unemployment, and foreign debt (78 % of GDP in 2013). Ukraine remained economically dependent on Russia.

Due to economic difficulties and the low priority accorded to defense in Ukraine, military expenditure fell as a share of GDP from 3.6 % in 2000 to 2.9 % in 2013, although it increased in real ($2011) terms from $2 billion to $5 billion. The number of troops was reduced from 303,800 to 130,000 and MB tanks from 3,895 to 1,110. The Ukraine armed forces had low pay and poor conditions for officers, obsolete weapons, and inadequate training.

During 2000-2013 NATO continued to withdraw conventional forces from forward-operating bases. By 2013 the US had only 53 MB tanks and 48 helicopters in Europe (CFE zone). National armies were reduced. Germany cut the size of its armed forces from 321,000 to 186,450 and the number of MB tanks from 2,815 to 322. NATO defense spending rose after 9/11 2001, but most the increment was devoted to War on Terror operations. Defense expenditure was reduced significantly in most European countries after the GFC and by 2013 their average defense share of GDP was 1.6 %.

Despite the military and expenditure cutbacks, NATO expanded its membership by including the Baltic and East Europe countries in 2004 (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia) and 2009 (Croatia) and developed closer relations with states in the FSU (Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova). NATO Europe per capita defense expenditure in real terms ($2005) dropped from $715 in 1990 to $515 in 2000 to $401 in 2013.

Over this period NATO countries also significantly scaled back intelligence (CIA/MI6 and defense specialists) efforts focussed on Russia, and the best analysts were redeployed to counter-terror activities. In 2011-12 the US announced that it would be making a major shift in its strategic focus away from peaceful Europe to the Asia-Pacific region to deal with new threats.

The US continued its poor record of supplying weapons to weak armed forces that were then defeated and lost their supplies to US opponents: Afghanistan army 2001 ongoing (to the Taleban); Georgia army 2008 (to Russia); Iraq army 2014 (to ISIS); Syria democratic forces 2015 (US anti-tank weapons to al-Nusra Front); Yemen army 2015 (to al-Houthi and al-Qaeda rebels).

Conflict in Ukraine, Anti-Russia Economic Sanctions, Exogenous Economic Shocks, and Russian Counter-Measures

The progression of the Ukraine conflict from the start of the Maidan protests in autumn 2013 to the revolutionary overthrow of President Yanukovich in February 2014 to the war in the eastern regions to the Minsk II accords of February 2015 is well known and cannot be reviewed in this article. In response to the annexation of Crimea, the armed conflict, and the shooting down of Malaysia Airlines 17, economic sanctions were imposed on Russia by the EU, US, Canada, Japan, and several other countries. The measures included restrictions on individuals (bans on travel, freezing of assets), trade (no transactions related to Crimea or exports to Russia of weapons and military equipment, dual-use technologies, and energy exploration technologies), and finance (exclusion of specified banks and businesses from credit markets, reduction in the period of loans).

Two features of anti-Russia sanctions have undermined their effectiveness, especially with respect to trade restrictions. The first is the non-participation of important industrial countries: Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, South Korea and Turkey. In the Cold War era all major economic powers observed CoCom restrictions. The second is that NATO countries have outsourced much of their electronic and high-technology production to the lower wage non-participating countries. This will facilitate Russian trade diversion and covert technology acquisition.

A beneficial development for anti-Russia sanctions was the coincidental exogenous shock of the drop in the world market price of oil (Brent Crude) from $115 per barrel in June 2015 to $50 in January 2015. This lowered Russia’s dollar earnings from energy exports, which weakened the financial positions of its banks, businesses and government. It constrained Russia’s ability to replenish the stabilization funds based on energy taxes that are being used to offset the adverse impacts of sanctions.

As in the Soviet period, the Russian government has adopted multi-dimensional and asymmetric counter-measures in response to sanctions. With respect to Ukraine, it imposed restrictions on exports to Russia, cut energy subsidies, and refused to sell gas without pre-payment. Another measure was the ban of imports of food from the sanctions countries and subsequent efforts to find alternative suppliers in non-participating nations. However, Russia also has provided positive incentives to EU member states that have been critical of anti-Russia sanctions. A new sanction introduced in March 2015 is the ban on Western IT firms based in Russia from bidding for state contracts (about 70 % their revenue) if they are observing Western restrictions on doing business in Crimea. Several policies have been adopted to promote import-substitution and have been supported by major state budget allocations.

Russia has decided to move back toward self-sufficiency in defense and it has revived the priority protection system in economy. It is likely that Russia has re-energized its Spetsinformatsiya system and that relevant specialists and institutions are engaged in trade diversion through non-participating countries and in the covert acquisition of banned technologies and finance. Experience in recent years has revealed the difficulties in regulating the complicated global financial system, so it will be challenging for the small and hastily organized EU/US compliance teams to ensure that sanctions are observed. In connection with security-related developments, President Putin became Head of the Military-Industrial Commission in September 2014.

Impacts of Sanctions on Russia, Ukraine and EU in 2014-2015

The performances of the economies of Russia and Ukraine deteriorated 2014 and are projected to be poor in 2015. Some studies claim that the worsening economic situation in Russia is proof that the sanctions have been achieving their objectives.

Russia - Ukraine Economy 2012-2015

Russia – Ukraine Economy 2012-2015

However, it is almost impossible to measure the specific impacts of sanctions on the Russian economy because of the coincidental disruption caused by the drop in oil prices and lack of information of the effectiveness of Russian counter-measures. The World Bank (April 2015) has made a careful professional analysis of this topic, but almost every tentative conclusion has several qualifications following it.

With respect to the technical implementation of sanctions, it is clear that banned individuals have had their assets in the West frozen and can no longer obtain visas for travel to many countries. Both foreign and Russian companies have been inhibited from investing and trading in Crimea. Russian banks and businesses, whether specifically sanctioned or not, have experienced difficulties in obtaining new loans in Western capital markets and rolling over existing ones. In the case of restrictions on the trade in technology, decrees have been issued by the EU and US. Firms based in the US or the UK no longer sell military-equipment or energy exploration technology directly to Russian firms. However, it probably is the case that some now banned critical technologies were stock-piled in advance of the crisis by Russia and other technologies are flowing though indirect and complicated routes to end users in Russia.

In assessing the macroeconomic impacts of sanctions on Russia it is helpful to consider the counter-factual of Saudi Arabia not driving down the oil price. If Russia had continued to receive payment of $100 per barrel from June 2014 to the present, then it is likely that many of the negative phenomena in the Russian economy (large capital outflows, depreciation of the exchange rate, unstable equity market, reductions in imports, higher inflation, negative GDP growth) would not have developed, even with geopolitical tensions and sanctions. Furthermore, the Russian government would have been able to augment its stabilization funds and to provide more assistance to Russian banks and firms that became vulnerable in foreign capital markets.

However, in reality the oil price did drop so sanctions must be assessed in conjunction with the decline in Russia’s hard-currency energy earnings. Anti-Russia sanctions as an independent force exerted significant adverse influences at the microeconomic level on the availability of new loans for Russian banks and firms in foreign capital markets and indirectly contributed to capital outflows and reductions in FDI. But the macroeconomic effects of sanctions probably have been small, in part because they are being offset by Russian counter-measures. Overall, sanctions are having negligible effects on important economic and military power balances or on the decision-making of the Russian elite concerning national security matters, such as the status of Crimea.

Similar conclusions can be drawn about the impacts of Russian sanctions on Ukraine and the EU. The faltering macroeconomic performance of Ukraine has been caused primarily by accumulating problems (high external debt), the direct economic effects of the crisis (disruption of industrial production and tax collection in the East), and normal reactions of foreign investors to geopolitical risk (depreciation of the currency). The loss of Russian subsidies has been offset by increases in IMF/EU/US support and Russia has permitted many economic exchanges (including those concerning energy) to continue. Russian counter-sanctions have had negligible macroeconomic effects on EU countries because the affected commodities (food products) comprise only small shares of exports, but there have been some important negative microeconomic impacts (e.g. the bans on the exports of fruit from Greece, apples from Poland and cheese from Lithuania).

Conclusions: Implications of Findings for EU Policy

The analysis above has produced answers to important questions, such as: Has the economy of Russia been adversely affected by economic sanctions? Due to space constraints these cannot be summarized here. Instead attention is focussed on relating findings to three questions of concern to EU policy-making in 2015.

(1) How generously should the EU support the reform and recovery of the Ukraine economy in light of budget constraints and the austerity policies of several EU member states?

The European Commission (EC) did not anticipate that its attempts in 2013 and earlier to develop closer relations with Ukraine through the ENP without taking into account Russian interests would help to initiate the current complex political, economic and military conflict. The EU, US and IMF have taken over responsibility for supporting the flawed and failing Ukraine economy from Russia. The IMF already is providing Ukraine with a financial aid package of $17 billion, but much more (perhaps $30 billion) will be needed. The EC has not provided EU citizens with a full explanation of events and their unintended financial implications for taxpayers. Given the current tensions within the EU between Greece and the Troika over the austerity policies and bailout loans, as well as the difficult economic circumstances of other countries (e.g. high youth unemployment in Spain), it is not certain that a democratic consultation of the population by the EC would reveal significant support for a major allocation of EU funds to help Ukraine. However, in order to avoid governance difficulties in the future, it would be best for the EC to be consult EU citizens before it makes firm financial commitments to Ukraine. The EU also should be careful to ensure that any financial assistance provided to Ukraine cannot be used as defense expenditure to finance a military build-up. Given the high debt level of Ukraine and the inadequacy of budget revenue to cover constitutionally-guaranteed basic social needs (medical care, pensions, education, social care), any funding to support the improvement of the long-neglected armed forces has to come from foreign sources.

(2) Should the EU de-couple its economic sanctions policies from those of the US if the Minsk II accords are largely honoured by both sides in the conflict?

With any economic sanctions it is important that the terminal conditions be clearly specified and be achievable. With respect to Ukraine, there are important differences between the EU and the US on the endgame. It appears that a majority of EU member states (and probably of EU citizens) would be satisfied with a peace settlement that would ensure that there would be no more war in Ukraine, that appropriate powers be devolved to regions, and that the central government regains control of Ukraine’s borders, not including those of Crimea. The Crimea issue could then be treated in a manner similar to the Baltic states in the Cold War. In contrast, the US has set the return of Crimea to Ukraine as a non-negotiable condition for ending sanctions. But Russia has made it clear that it never will do that. So the US is locked into economic warfare of indefinite duration with Russia, especially given the current political composition of the US Congress. In light of the facts that the US has insignificant economic interests in Russia, whereas the EU countries have substantial stakes (imports of energy, exports of consumer and industrial commodities), it would be sensible for the EC to make contingency plans for a decoupling. On the basis of the experience from the 1980s when West Europe ignored US sanctions related to the gas pipeline and of the mutual dependence of the US and EU, it can be anticipated that there would be only short-term strains in the relationship following a decoupling.

(3) Should the EU discourage the NATO from providing military assistance to the Ukraine armed forces?

The poor performances of the Ukraine armed forces in the two active phases of the war reflected the neglect of them by successive governments over two decades. The military power balance in Ukraine now is firmly in favour of the insurgents in the eastern regions and their supporters in Russia. These circumstances cannot be changed in the short-term, especially not by foreign powers providing more sophisticated weapons and military equipment to Ukraine. Over the decades the US has had little success in supplying weapons to weak governments with poorly performing armies, which describes the situation in Ukraine. US weapons are only effective if they are used by properly trained and motivated soldiers and are well maintained in a technical sense. They are appropriate for NATO armies and a small sub-set of other allies, notably Israel. The armed forces of Ukraine would require intensive and extended training before they could handle some of the systems (e.g. the AN/TPQ-53 mobile anti-artillery radar system) being proposed by supporters of arms supplies. A further complication has been highlighted by President Poroshenko: Ukraine government, intelligence and military organizations have been comprehensively penetrated by Russian intelligence. So the insurgents and the Russians would know the numbers and locations of any NATO-supplied military systems. A final problem is that Russia has escalation dominance in conventional weapons, which means that that the US cannot alter the military balance in favour of Ukraine, even in the medium term. In sum, European countries would be acting sensibly to discourage the US from getting involved militarily in the Ukraine conflict.

About the author:
*Christopher Davis, Reader in Command and Transition Economies, Department of Economics and School of Area Studies, University of Oxford, academic specialist on the economy of the USSR/Russia, especially industry, defense and health.

Source:
This article was published by Elcano Royal Institute.

The post The Ukraine Conflict, Economic-Military Power Balances And Economic Sanctions: Lessons From Past For Future EU Policies – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Repercussions Of Turkish Stream For Southern Gas Corridor: Russia’s New Gas Strategy – Analysis

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By Ilgar Gurbanov*

On December 1 2014, during his official visit to Turkey, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced the suspension of South Stream, blaming the EU for its “unconstructive” position. In fact, the realization of pipeline had become untenable as a result of various legal, political and financial issues, such as the EU’s Third Energy Package, the Ukraine crisis and the ensuing sanctions over companies involved in South Stream (Stroytransgaz and Gazprombank). That day, Turkish BOTAŞ and Russian Gazprom signed a Memorandum of Understanding for construction of a new offshore gas pipeline with 63 bcm/a capacity, to run under the Black Sea to the Turkey-Greece border. Some 16 bcm of this amount will be supplied to Turkey in the first phase in December 2016. In the second phase, the remaining 47 bcm will be delivered to the planned gas hub near the Turkish-Greek border – on the Turkish side – to transport Russian gas to Europe.

The key question is whether the Turkish Stream will be a competitor for the Trans-Anatolian or Trans-Adriatic Pipelines, which envisage the delivery of 16 bcm of Azerbaijani gas to Turkey and Europe by 2018 and 2020 respectively. There had been similar tensions between the South Stream and Nabucco projects; while previously Nabucco offered an alternative to South Stream, now Turkish Stream presents an alternative to TANAP/TAP.

However, Nabucco failed due to political and financial uncertainties, and was subsequently redesigned as Nabucco-West, after Azerbaijan and Turkey initiated TANAP in 2012. When Azerbaijan opted for TAP over Nabucco-West in June 2013, Baku’s choice was interpreted a positive development for Russia’s South Stream; Azerbaijan refrained from angering Russia as a pipeline competitor.

Analysis

One of the main factors in Moscow’s shift from South Stream to Turkish Stream was the EU’s Third Energy Package (TEP). Under these rules, a single company cannot own the pipeline through which it also supplies gas. Neither Russia nor Turkey is an EU member, and so neither are bound by the TEP, which makes the construction of Turkish Stream much easier. However, the construction of Turkish Stream is not the only issue at stake. The pipeline will have to stop at the Turkey- Greece border because of the TEP rules, given that Greece is an EU member state.

Thus Russia will need its customers to buy its gas right at the border from the planned natural gas hub in Turkish territories. Meanwhile, the new government in Athens has expressed interest in the extension of the Turkish Stream into Greece. In order to transport its gas to Greece and onwards, Gazprom needs to use existing interconnectors – either TAP or Interconnector-Turkey-Greece-Italy, including the DESFA-operated Greek National Gas Transmission System (NGTS).

Turkish Stream is intended to end in the Ipsala district of Turkey (near the Greek border), where TANAP is also planned to end and connect with TAP. This raises another question, namely whether the termination of both pipelines at the same location will create competition in terms of market share, given the possible expansion capacity of both TAP (from 10 to 20 bcm/a) and TANAP (from 16 bcm/a to 23/31 bcm/a).

In fact, Russia has the opportunity to export its gas via TAP from the Turkish Stream toward Europe, without Gazprom’s presence in the TAP Consortium and without breaching the TEP rules.

First of all, Russia has no stake in TAP. Second, in the first stage, TAP is supposed to use 50% of its total capacity for 10 bcm/a. It can expand its capacity up to 20 bcm/a (100% of total capacity) in the second stage. Third, the EU Commission’s regulation left 50% of TAP’s total capacity open for Third Party Access (TPA) for the Expansion Capacity (second stage). Fourth, the EU regulation also states that upon request of a third party, TAP is obligated to construct additional entry/exit points in Greece to receive gas from non-Shah Deniz sources.

In this context, Russia may reserve space in the TAP by requesting TPA to transport its gas (as a supplier, not an owner) at the second stage of gas delivery, or request the construction of additional entry/exit point for additional compressors at the expansion capacity of TAP. If Russia does not own the infrastructure, but simply sells its gas from the Turkey-Greece border, its actions are not in contravention of the TEP rules. However, the Shah Deniz Consortium has already secured 10 bcm of Azerbaijani gas with a 25-year-contract for the first stage of gas delivery via TAP. Under this contract, the Consortium has already secured 100% of its initial capacity (50% of final capacity). Meanwhile, the Consortium has been already granted a TPA exemption by the EU Commission for 100% of initial capacity (for 10 bcm) of the pipeline for 25 years. This means that Russian gas cannot be transported via TAP for at least the next 25 years, unless there are either significant market or geopolitical changes, or sufficient gas demand to drive expansion. The long-term contracts of Shah Deniz Consortium together with the relevant provisions of EU law make this option unlikely, as Gazprom plans to pump its gas as earlier as possible.

Allowing Russian gas to enter TAP could put both Russian and Azerbaijani gas in competition in terms of price and volume. Beyond the 10 bcm, Azerbaijan is expected to increase its gas flow from the Azeri-Chirag-Guneshli, Umid, Absheron fields and possibly Shah Deniz Phase III. It can deliv- er this via the Interconnector-Greece-Bulgaria to Bulgaria, and the Ionian-Adriatic Pipeline (from Albania) to Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia in the second stage of gas delivery. More- over, the amount that Turkey is supposed to receive via Turkish Stream is close to the volume currently transported by the Trans-Balkan pipeline (TBP) to Turkey via Ukraine, Moldova, Romania and Bulgaria. However, the expiration of a transit agreement on Russian gas supply through Ukraine in 2019 along with the completion of Turkish Stream mean that TBP will likely be suspended. Thus, Turkish Stream will enable Russia to change the route of its current gas export to Turkey, without affecting the current volumes, and without competing with TANAP in terms of capacity.

Furthermore, Greece also wants to see Russian gas transported via the Interconnector-Turkey-Greece-Italy (ITGI) as an extension of the Turkish Stream from Greece to Europe. This could pave the way for Russian gas through the Interconnector-Greece-Bulgaria (which also considers transportation of Azerbaijani gas) as an additional branch from ITGI. Back in June 2007, President Putin suggested to Athens that Greece join South Stream, because Russia was planning to construct an alternative route for South Stream towards Greece in case the northwestern route to Bulgaria did not come to fruition. However, both the Turkey-Greece (ITG) part of ITGI and the Greek part of IGB will be operated by DESFA as part of the NGTS. Given that SOCAR hopes to purchase 66% of DEFSA, it is possible that SOCAR can control Russian gas delivery if Gazprom decides to transport its gas through ITGI (or ITG).

Surprisingly, on March 4 ,2015, following his meeting with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, Bulgarian PM Boyko Borisov called for the revival of Nabucco pipeline as a part of the Southern Gas Corridor (SGC). After the failure of both Nabucco and South Stream, Borisov’s stance is understandable, as Bulgaria has been sidelined twice. President Ilham Aliyev states that, “Bulgaria has already become a part of the Southern Gas Corridor via IGB pipeline, [but] we can merge TAP and Nabucco by virtue of the huge gas reserves of Shah Deniz, Absheron and Umid fields.” The issue is not the revival of Nabucco; the intent is to transport Azeri gas through existing interconnectors to Nabucco-West countries – namely Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary, which Russia is also targeting. Russia plans either to revive South Stream’s onshore section as an extension of Turkish Stream from Bulgaria to Serbia, Hungary and Austria, or to set a reverse flow via Trans-Balkan pipeline to Bulgaria, Romania through to Greece. Russia also supports the construction of a new pipeline from Greece through FYROM, Serbia and to Hungary, once gas volumes have entered Greece through the Turkish Stream. However, it is not yet clear from where in Greece this new pipeline will pump Russian gas toward Hungary, nor which pipeline with which it will be merged – TAP or ITGI.

Conclusion

Ultimately, the move from South Stream to Turkish Stream will not change Russia’s energy market, as the latter might be extended into Greece or Bulgaria via different pipelines. Thus, Russia is seeking either to target potential markets (Central and Eastern Europe) for Azerbaijani gas, or to use the additional capacity of Azerbaijan’s gas export routes. At first glance, it might seem that the timeline and capacity of Turkish Stream will hamper Azerbaijan’s gas strategy in Southeast Europe, given that Azerbaijani gas will reach Turkey in 2018 and Europe by 2020. However, the 16 bcm of gas from Shah Deniz’s Phase II that TANAP/TAP will carry to Europe has already been sold based on 25-year contract with European companies, and the initial capacity of TAP has been secured via a TPA exemption under EU Regulations. These long-term agreements protect SOCAR from the risk of competition from other gas suppliers. Consequently, Russia is seeking additional routes for gas exports, such as onshore sections of South Stream and reverse flow via Trans-Balkan Pipeline. Meanwhile, the transportation of Russian gas via ITGI is matter of time and financing, while a new pipeline via FYROM, Serbia to Hungary might encounter new problems with TEP rules.

About the author:
* Ilgar Gurbanov is an analyst on Russian Foreign Policy and Energy Security of Strategic Outlook from Azerbaijan.

Source:
This article was published by the Caspian Center for Energy and Environment as CCEE Policy Brief 15, April 2015 (PDF).

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Iran Viewpoint: Saudi Arabia Is Big Loser Of Yemen War – OpEd

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By Abbas Parvardeh*

From a historical viewpoint, the ongoing aggression against Yemen by Saudi Arabia and Egypt is nothing new. The two countries have frequently attacked this impoverished Arabian Peninsula country during past decades under the pretext of supporting proxy governments. However, the point that differentiates Saudi Arabia’s recent aggression against Yemen is the hurry shown by Riyadh, as a result of a number of domestic and foreign reasons, in launching the military action.

On the domestic front, the Al Saud family, more than any time before, is facing problems as a result of the ageing of its leaders, a crisis of legitimacy, and the possibility of uncontrollable unrests, especially among Shia population living in the eastern part of the country. On a regional level, Saudi Arabia is witness to collapse of security barriers it had erected around it; a change which started in Bahrain and bore fruit in Yemen to disturb the fabricated calm of the Saudi royal family.

On international level, Al Saud has been an unbelieving witness to gradual termination of four decades of hostility between Iran and the United States through one year of nuclear negotiations. If these negotiations end in an agreement, which is greatly possible in view of the existing evidence, many equations that had been of concern to conservative Arab states of the region during the past four decades will undergo fundamental changes.

In the meantime, the most important question is “will Saudi Arabia succeed in restoring to Yemen past conditions that are favorable to Riyadh?” Before answering this question, a few points should be mentioned to shed more light on this issue. From a military viewpoint, the next step to be taken by Saudi Arabia to complete its military supremacy and return Yemen’s fugitive president, Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi, to power, is to send army forces into its southern neighbor. Although the ongoing aerial attacks are necessary in order to cause damage and reduce military and logistic capabilities of Ansarullah fighters and the Yemeni army, the operation can only reach its final goal through an invasion on land. At the same time, conditions on the ground are not suitable for the entry of the Saudi ground forces into Yemen and are totally to the detriment of Riyadh. The only geographical place, where Saudi Arabia can send in its ground forces, is the border with northwestern regions of Yemen, which are a place where Shias and Ansarullah forces are concentrated, and are also among mountainous parts of the country. Yemen’s eastern borders, which are neighboring Hadhramaut and Ma’rib provinces are easy to enter for Saudi Arabia, but they lack military value and though they are not controlled by Ansarullah fighters, are among barren and sparsely-populated parts of the country most of whose inhabitants are Sunnis. On the other hand, Saudi army is a trained force special to classic warfare and is not capable of fighting against the Ansarullah fighters in northern parts of Yemen and is certainly not fit for engagement in an asymmetrical warfare in mountainous parts of Yemen’s Saada Province. Also, as airstrikes and the subsequent massacre of the civilian population and destruction of Yemen’s infrastructure go on, opposition will continue to soar against Saudi military aggression among the public opinion in the region, especially the people of Yemen, and this will push Saudi Arabia into defensive. Such disadvantage will come in spite of the fact that Saudi Arabia has not achieved any of its main goals through the war so far and has also lost a number of its expensive modern planes.

Secondly, assuming that Saudi Arabia would be able at last to reinstate Mansur Hadi at the presidential palace in Sana’a through iron fist and brute military action, it would be some sort of going back to ground zero. That is, even in this case, the situation in the country will revert to the situation that existed following the fall of Yemen’s former president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, in 2012. His fall was ensued by the implementation of the (Persian) Gulf Cooperation Council’s initiative with the United States’ support, which was the main reason prompting the Yemeni people to repeat their revolution. Now, the question is “what other trump card do Saudi Arabia and its Arab allies have in Yemen apart from Al-Qaeda, in order to support their proxy government?” Finally, the people in Yemen, including Sunnis, are not positive toward Hadi and regional governments that are considered his allies. They rightfully argue that why Saudi Arabia had not shown such a powerful opposition to Houthis despite the fact that Ansarullah revolutionaries entered the capital city of Sana’a more than six months ago on September 21, 2014?

On the other hand, although the United States has so far supported Saudi airstrikes against Yemen, such support will not serve to solve regional problems under the existing circumstances. Of course, it is not difficult to guess that the United States’ main motive is to prevent the increasing influence of Iran in Yemen. The United States is running Al Anad Air Base in southern Yemen and also attaches great significance to Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, and this is why Washington is opposed to empowerment of those political groups in Yemen that are close to Iran. At the same time, the United States had mostly remained silent toward developments in Yemen during the past months due to successful campaign that Ansarullah had launched against Al-Qaeda in the country.

Ansarullah, as the political arm of the Zaidi Houthi group, are not representative of all the people in Yemen, but they stand for real demands of the Yemeni people, including balanced distribution of political power, justice in distribution of economic resources, and the establishment of security across the country. Meanwhile, despite what has been reflected in those media that are opposed to Iran, Ansarullah and other revolutionaries that have joined them from other tribes and even Sunnis that have joined their ranks, seek to realize the historical and civil rights of the Yemeni people. Of course, bitter memories produced by years of foreign intervention by the United States and Saudi Arabia in Yemen have fostered a special xenophobic spirit among the country’s people, which may give birth to powerful reactions to Saudi attacks. Therefore, although it is still too early for speculation about the outcome of Saudi Arabia’s military intervention in Yemen, the sure point is that Saudi Arabia and its allied governments lacked suitable solutions for the reinstatement of Hadi in the first place. On the contrary, it seems that Saudi Arabia is treading a path, which can take the Saudi government into a situation in which Riyadh will find itself caught in a regional mire with the subsequent deepening of internal rifts among Saudi officials. Meanwhile, in case of a military triumph for Ansarullah, they will need to interact with other political and ethnic groups in Yemen in order to form a broad-based government, which would enjoy support of all political groups in the country and be less vulnerable to further interventions by conservative Arab countries and the United States.

* Abbas Parvardeh
Expert on Middle Eastern Affairs

Source: Iranian Diplomacy (IRD)
http://www.irdiplomacy.ir/
Translated By: Iran Review.Org

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Genocide In Rwanda: A Commemoration – OpEd

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As Rwandans and their friends commemorate the genocide, it is important to maintain our efforts to resist hatred, to cultivate a culture of nonviolence, and to strive for a just world, that works for all human beings, in order to prevent the repetition of such atrocities.

By Jean de Dieu Basabose*

Each year, on the 7 April, ceremonies are held across Rwanda to commemorate the genocide of 1994. Called Kwibuka – meaning ‘remember’, the commemorations are held to remember the atrocities commited, honour the dead, and prevent them happening again.

This year, the Kwibuka activities have been organised around the theme of countering genocide denial and revisionism. Rwandans and their friends are called on to engage the international community on these issues, and emphasis is placed on genocide as a crime which should not be allowed to continue unabated. Denying the genocide is understood as an insult to Rwandans and the souls of those who died during the conflict, and recognising and remembering it perceived as a crucial measure to prevent future atrocities.

In preparation for the 21st commemoration ceremony, different organisations have begun various activities with a view to remember the victims, stand alongside survivors and renew hope amongst Rwandans for a brighter future. The commemoration also creates opportunities for acknowledging and honoring those who rescued people during the genocide, and reaffirms the necessity to work for a reconciled and united Rwandan society.

The AERG is an association of students who survived the genocide, and is one of the organisations involved in the Kwibuka activities. Last month, the AERG launched the Kwibuka 21 campaign, involving various activities which took place in Ngoma District, in the Eastern province of Rwanda. Through the campaign, the young survivors recognise and present their gratitude to those who stood up to it. Other activities include cleaning up and maintaining memorials and recording the names of families that perished. Members of the AERG plan to plant trees at these sites, to preserve the history and memory of victims, as well as supporting and advocating for survivors who need social and medical assistance.

Commemoration activities – bringing people together

The commemoration activities also involve flame lightings, church memorial services, remembrance walks, the proper burial of newly found victims, and radio shows, which envision a common future with a firm commitment to the slogan ‘never again’. As Jean de Dieu Mirindi, the coordinator of AERG explained during the event, the campaign will show “how grateful we are to those who rescued Tutsi during the genocide.”

“We want to bring genocide survivors together, share the history of the genocide and teach young Rwandans about the genocide, how to build themselves and their country, as we well as about genocide prevention,” he added.

Never Again Rwanda is another organisation that is coordinating remarkable activities. A national conference is being held to encourage young people to discuss and reflect on the events of 1994, aiming to provide a space to voice concerns and encourage hope for a better future.

This year, a conference on Policy and Practice of Commemoration of the 1994 Genocide Against Tutsis is acting as an opportunity for public dialogue, whilst simultaneously providing input into commemoration policy and practice. Everyone, regardless of their ethnic belonging, age and historical background, is called on to play an active role in Kwibuka activities. Even the perpetrators are engaged in remembering the innocent men, women, and children who were killed. The conference is expected to enlighten ways towards a shared and inclusive understanding on various issues.

As Rwandans and their friends commemorate the genocide, it is important to maintain our efforts to resist hatred, to cultivate a culture of nonviolence, and to strive for a just world, that works for all human beings, in order to prevent the repetition of such atrocities.

*Jean de Dieu Basabose is Insight on Conflict’s Local Correspondent in Rwanda. He has more than 10 years’ experience in peacebuilding and has facilitated numerous training sessions and workshops on mediation, networking, community organising, organisational governance, peace monitoring and communication. Through Shalom Educating for Peace, a peace education organisation he co-founded in 2007 and co-directs, Basabose is making efforts to build and sustain peace through education. Jean holds a Master’s degree in Conflict Resolution and Peace Studies.

This article was originally published by Insight on Conflict and is available by clicking here

Never Again Rwanda is a member of the Global Coalition for Conflict Transformation.

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Science Shows More To A Rembrandt Than Meets The Eye

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Art historians and scientists use imaging methods to virtually “dig” under or scan various layers of paint and pencil. This is how they decipher how a painter went about producing a masterpiece – without harming the original.

A comparative study with a Rembrandt van Rijn painting as its subject found that the combined use of three imaging techniques provides valuable complementary information about what lies behind this artwork’s complex step-by-step creation. The study, led by Matthias Alfeld of the University of Antwerp in Belgium, is published in Springer’s journal Applied Physics A: Materials Science and Processing.

Rembrandt’s oil painting Susanna and the Elders is dated and signed 1647. It hangs in the art museum Gemäldegalerie in Berlin, Germany. The painting contains a considerable amount of the artist’s changes or so-called pentimenti (from the Italian verb pentire: ”to repent”) underneath the current composition. This was revealed in the 1930s when the first X-ray radiography (XRR) was done on it. More hidden details about changes made with pigments other than lead white were discovered when the painting was investigated in 1994 using neutron activation autoradiography (NAAR).

Alfeld’s team chose to investigate Susana and the Elders not only because of its clearly visible pentimenti, but also because of its smaller size. Macro-X-ray fluorescence (MA-XRF) scans could thus be done in a single day using an in-house scanner at the museum in Berlin. These were then compared to existing radiographic images of the painting.

All three techniques (the early X-ray radiography, and the later neutron activation autoradiography and the recently developed macro-X-ray fluorescence scans) reveal considerable changes were made to the painting. Alfeld’s team found that the images of the elements used which were acquired by X-ray fluorescence scans are the easiest to interpret. This is because most of the individual elements are clearly separated. A broader range of elements can also be studied, compared to using autoradiography. However, X-ray fluorescence scans can only be used to detect bone black on the surface of a painting and not in sub-surface layers, such as is found in hidden sketches.

Autoradiography is a very suitable tool to study pigments such as bone black, umber, copper-based greens and blues, smalt and vermilion, but not for calcium, iron and lead. It is also the only method capable of visualizing phosphorous, present in bone black, in lower paint layers. With X-ray radiography and autoradiography, single brush strokes can be discerned, which helps with the study of the painting technique employed.

“Given the relatively short time and less effort required for investigations using X-ray fluorescence scans, this technique is expected to be applied more frequently in the future than autoradiography,” said Alfeld. “However, due to the capability of the latter method to visualize the distribution of certain elements through strongly absorbing covering layers, both methods ultimately provide complementary information. This is especially true for phosphorous, which was found present in the sketching of the painting investigated.”

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Household Saving Rate Up To 13% In Euro Area

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The seasonally adjusted household saving rate in the euro area (EA18) was 13.0% in the fourth quarter of 2014, compared with 12.8% in the third quarter of 2014.

The seasonally adjusted household investment rate in the euro area was 8.2% in the fourth quarter of 2014, stable compared with the previous quarter.

These data come from a first release of quarterly European sector accounts released by Eurostat, the statistical office of the European Union and the European Central Bank (ECB).

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European Parliament Members Confirm Support For Yemen’s Hadi

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Members of the European Parliament’s Foreign Affairs and Security Committee stressed Tuesday in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia their support for the efforts exerted by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Determination Storm Coalition to stabilize Yemen and assist the Yemeni people, reports Saudi state news agency SPA.

According to SPA, the EU officials also reiterated support for the legitimacy in Yemen represented by President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi.

During a hearing on the situation in Yemen, organized by the European Parliament’s Foreign Affairs and Security Committee, EU Ambassador in Sanaa Bettina Muscheidt stressed that the European Union understands the stance of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia towards Iran’s involvement in the Yemeni crisis, pointing out that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is facing a real threat as a result of Iranian interference in Yemen, according to SPA.

SPA reported that Muscheidt said that two Iranian warships are currently off the coast of Yemen, but have not entered the Yemeni territorial waters, stressing that Yemeni President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi represents that nation’s ‘legitimacy,’ adding that the Houthis are ultimately responsible for the deteriorated situation in Yemen.

Michele Alliot-Marie, Chair of the European Parliament Delegation for relations with the Gulf countries and Yemen, stressed the seriousness of Houthi militias practices and their threats to the security of Yemen, the Arab Gulf and the region, according to SPA. Alliot-Marie said that Saudi Arabia is leading a legitimate coalition in Yemen supported by the international community, adding that the entire Arab Gulf states are in danger of losing their balance due to the Iranian role.

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Pakistan: Persistent Mischief – Analysis

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By Tushar Ranjan Mohanty*

Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi, the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) ‘commander’ and alleged mastermind of the November 26, 2008, Mumbai (Maharashtra, India) terror attacks (also known as 26/11), was released from Adiyala Jail in Rawalpindi, in the Punjab Province of Pakistan, in the night of April 9, 2015. He furnished a PKR two million in surety bonds. According to Jail authorities, following his release, he was picked up by members of Jama’at-ud-Dawa (JuD), the LeT front organization amid ‘tight security’. His current location is not known. Earlier in the day, the Lahore High Court had dismissed the order of detention issued against him by the Okara District Coordination Officer (DCO) on March 14, 2014.

Lakhvi was arrested on December 7, 2008, along with six others allegedly involved in the Mumbai attack, and challenged his indictment in the Lahore High Court on December 5, 2009. A bail plea filed by him was dismissed in August 2010, and he continued in Jail – albeit, according to reports, in extraordinary comfort and with a range of perks and privileges that provided him unprecedented access to cadres of his ostensibly banned terrorist group, the LeT. He was granted bail by the Islamabad Anti-Terrorism Court, citing ‘lack of evidence’ on December 18, 2014. Ironically, this was just two days after the December 16, 2014, Army Public School (APS) attack, in which 148 persons, including 135 children were killed, and in the wake of numerous declarations by the country’s political and military leadership that all forms of terrorism would be suppressed in Pakistan. A succession of maneuvers, thereafter, under intense pressure from India and the international community, has kept Lakhvi behind bars since then.

Meanwhile, the LeT founder and JuD ‘chief’ Hafiz Muhammad Saeed, also a close relative of Lakhvi, has roamed free across the country all these years under direct state patronage. Saeed, who has a USD 10 million US Government bounty on his head, is, according to Pakistani authorities, a “philanthropist”. Pakistan’s Minister for Defence Production, Rana Tanveer Hussain, on January 16, 2015, declared that Pakistan could not ban the JuD led by Hafiz Muhammad Saeed because it is a charitable and not a terrorist organisation.

Unsurprisingly, despite several reports and claims of a ban on the ‘charitable’ JuD and the Haqqani Network (which operates under Pakistani state support against the Kabul regime in Afghanistan) in the aftermath of the Peshawar APS attack, it was subsequently confirmed that these outfits remained ‘legal’. Federal Minister of Interior Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan, while clarifying that the Government had not outlawed any group after the APS attack, declared, on February 11, 2015, “Yes we are a signatory to the United Nations (UN) Charter and we will devise a policy on this topic [but] so far, we have only added 10 organisations – proscribed by the UN – to our watch list.” Interestingly, the Supreme Court on January 22, 2015, had directed the Federal Government to upload on its websites, details pertaining to terrorist outfits banned by the Government. The Court observed that no such record was available and friendly countries should also be informed in this regard. The Government had earlier claimed that it had banned 63 terrorist outfits, but no record or notification of such a list is in the public domain. It is, however, a fact that similar lists consisting of varying numbers of ‘banned’ terror groups had been released by the National Assembly in the past. It now emerges that all but 10 of these organizations are not banned but merely on a ‘watch list’ which places them under no legal restraint.

Amidst these developments, Islamabad continues with its deceptive posturing. Between December 17, 2014, a day after the APS attack, when the moratorium on execution of death penalties in terrorism-related cases was lifted, and March 10, 2015, when the Government decided to implement the death penalty in all cases, a total of 24 persons were executed. Of these, however, only eight have been involved in terror cases. Between March 10 and till April 10, 2015, another 46 prisoners were executed, of which none were terrorists. The eight terrorists who have been hanged include:

  • Niaz Mohammad, who was executed on December 31, 2014, in Peshawar Central Prison for his involvement in the assassination attempt on the life of then President General (Retd) Pervez Musharraf, on December 25, 2003. Niaz was a close aide of Adnan Rasheed, the chief ‘operational commander’ of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)-linked Ansarul Aseer (Helpers of the Prisoners) – a unit which was founded to secure freedom for the imprisoned jihadis by conducting jail-break operations.
  • Ahmed Ali, who belonged to the banned Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), was hanged at the New Central Jail of Multan in Punjab in the early morning of January 7, 2015. A resident of Shorkot, Jhang District, he was handed capital punishment for killing three men in an act of sectarian killing on January 7, 1998.
  • Ghulam Shabbir, also of SSP, was hanged at the New Central Jail of Multan in Punjab in the early morning of January 7, 2015. A resident of the Talamba area of Khanewal District, he had killed Deputy Superintendent of Police (DSP) Anwar Khan and his driver Ghulam Murtaza on the Bohar Gate Road in Multan on August 4, 2000. Charges of sectarian violence were also proved against him.
  • Zulfikar Ali, who was convicted of killing two Policemen near the US Consulate General in Karachi, the provincial capital of Sindh, was hanged at Adiala jail in Rawalpindi on January 13, 2015. Ali, a resident of Naval Colony, Hub Road, in Karachi, was associated with al Qaeda.
  • Mohammad Saeed alias Maulvi was hanged at Karachi Central Jail in the morning of January 14, 2015. Saeed who was associated with Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) was awarded the death sentence by Karachi ATC in April 2001 for the killing of DSP (Retd) Syed Sabir Hussain Shah and his son Syed Abid Hussain Shah on sectarian ground in an ambush near the Malir City Railway crossing in 2000.
  • Ikramul Haq of SSP was hanged at Kot Lakhpat Central Jail, Lahore, in the morning of January 17, 2015. In 2004 an anti-terrorism court in Faisalabad had given him the death sentence in connection with the killing of a man, Nayyar Abbas, at Shorkot area of Jhang District on July 9, 2001. Abbas was a guard of Altaf Shah of the banned Sipah-i-Muhammad at an Imambargah (Shia place of worship) in Shorkot.
  • Mohammad Azam alias Sharif and Attaullah alias Qasim, who belonged to the LeJ, were hanged at the Karachi central prison in the early hours of February 3, 2015. Both Attaullah and Azam were sentenced to death by an ATC in July 2004 for their involvement in the killing of Dr. Ali Raza Peerani on sectarian grounds on June 26, 2001 in the Soldier Bazaar area of Karachi.

None of the terrorists hanged were from leadership ranks.

According to officials of the Ministries of Interior and Law and Justice and Human Rights there were around 8,261 prisoners on death row in more than five dozen jails of the country as of on December 17, 2014. Around 30 per cent of them were believed to be convicted under the Anti-terrorism Act by Special Courts after 2003-04.

Meanwhile, in response to hangings and executions of terrorists in Pakistan, domestically oriented terrorist groups, primarily the TTP and its splinters, such as Jamaat-ul-Ahrar, have intensified their operations. According to partial data compile by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), since the hanging of Aqeel alias Dr. Usman, the first terrorist to be hanged (on December 19, 2014) after the APS attack, at least 1,485 persons, including 354 civilians, 115 SF personnel and 1016 terrorists, have been killed in just 114 days (data till April 12, 2015). Overall fatalities in Pakistan in terrorism-related violence in the current year (2015) have already crossed at least 1,263 – 339 civilians, 103 SF personnel and 821 terrorists.

Pakistan continues with a two faced strategy of arbitrary and sporadic ruthlessness against domestic terrorists, on the one hand, and sustained support to externally directed terrorism, particularly in Afghanistan and India, on the other. In this, it has occasionally succeeded in deceiving elements within the international community into believing that it is acting against ‘terrorism’, and in turn securing the release of fairly regular doses of economic and military aid. In the process, it has created a domestic environment of extremism and endemic violence, within which all forms of terrorism continue to flourish. Pakistan has done grievous harm to its neighbourhood, and to the world, by long and continued support to Islamist extremism and terrorism, but it appears to have inflicted the greatest injury on itself.

*Tushar Ranjan Mohanty
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management

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US State Department Issues ‘Myths And Facts Regarding Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty And Regime’

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The US State Department released Tuesday a Fact Sheet related to what is describes as “Myths and Facts Regarding the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and Regime” in response to criticism from some sectors that the US has a double standard with regard to the NPT Treaty.

Following is the complete State Department Fact Sheet:

(1) Myth: The NPT has failed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has enjoyed tremendous successes over the 45 years since its entry into force. The NPT is the most widely adhered to nuclear treaty in history. It has established an international legal framework against the proliferation of nuclear weapons to which 190 countries have subscribed. Among them are states that abandoned nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons programs with the NPT serving as an impetus. The vast majority of NPT parties meet their obligations and benefit every day from the security the Treaty provides. For the few that do not, the NPT provides a common international basis for resolving noncompliance where the actions of a country contravene the treaty’s principles.

(2) Myth: Not enough is being done to pursue nuclear disarmament.

When the NPT entered into force in 1970, the United States had a nuclear stockpile of over 26,000 nuclear weapons. By 2013 that number had been reduced by about 82 percent to 4,804 operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads. From October 1993 through September 2013, the United States dismantled almost 10,000 nuclear warheads. Several thousand additional nuclear weapons are currently retired and awaiting dismantlement. Nuclear weapons reductions continue as we fulfill our obligations under the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START). When the New START Treaty limits are reached in 2018, the United States and Russia will have reduced our respective operationally deployed strategic forces to 1,550 deployed strategic warheads, their lowest level since the 1950s. The United States has reaffirmed our commitment to additional arms control measures, and has proposed negotiations with Russia to achieve another one-third reduction in our strategic nuclear arsenals. We also remain committed to bringing into force the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and we seek the immediate start to negotiations on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty.

Beyond nuclear arms control negotiations, we seek to broaden our cooperation with non-nuclear weapons states on disarmament verification issues through a new initiative, the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification. This program aims to develop technical solutions to challenges involved in verifying future nuclear agreements.

(3) Myth: Modernization of nuclear weapons and related infrastructure is a step backwards on disarmament and inconsistent with NPT disarmament obligations.

The United States is committed not to pursue new nuclear warheads, and life extension programs will not provide for new military capabilities. U.S. stockpile stewardship and life extension programs are designed to service the existing nuclear arsenal in order to ensure it remains safe, secure, and effective so long as nuclear weapons exist. The United States is pursuing life extension for a number of warhead types that will enable us to eliminate many of the weapons we maintain in our stockpile as a hedge against technical contingencies.

Modernization of nuclear infrastructure has nothing to do with developing new nuclear weapons. These investments are needed to replace aging infrastructure that will allow us to safely, securely, and more rapidly reduce the total stockpile. Simply put, infrastructure modernization, stockpile stewardship, and life extension programs for U.S. warheads will contribute to and do not detract from progress on our NPT nuclear disarmament obligations.

(4) Myth: There is insufficient cooperation among the nuclear weapons states on promoting nuclear disarmament, nonproliferation and peaceful uses.

The NPT Nuclear Weapon States (P5) are working to strengthen implementation of all three pillars of the NPT. Since 2009, the P5 have met annually to jointly pursue an agenda of strengthening the global nuclear nonproliferation regime and have institutionalized regular dialogue on nuclear weapons-related issues. One notable result of these meetings has been development of a common reporting framework on implementation of the 2010 NPT Review Conference Action Plan. We are also pursuing technical work on nuclear terms and definitions that can help lay the foundation for future cooperation or agreements. P5 engagement is a long-term investment to strengthen and advance the NPT, build trust and create a stronger foundation to achieve the Treaty’s disarmament, nonproliferation and peaceful uses goals.

(5) Myth: Nuclear Weapons States are insensitive to the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons.

This is simply not true. Underpinning all of our nonproliferation and disarmament efforts, stretching back decades, has been our clear understanding and recognition of the humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons. The United States remains firmly committed to the view that it is in the interest of all states that the 70-year record of non-use of nuclear weapons be extended indefinitely. The United States participated in the Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons in Vienna, Austria, last December to reinforce the message that it is precisely because of the destructive power of nuclear weapons that we give the highest priority to ensuring these weapons remain safe and secure for as long as they exist. While we share some of the frustration with the slow pace of nuclear disarmament, we also recognize that the realization of a world without nuclear weapons will require significant changes in the international system. For this reason, the practical path of step-by-step, verifiable nuclear reductions remains the only realistic route to our shared goal of a nuclear weapons- free world.

(6) Myth: “Hair-trigger” alert status and failures to take proper care of nuclear weapons are accidents waiting to happen, and demonstrate the urgent need to eliminate all nuclear weapons.

U.S. nuclear forces are not on “hair-trigger” alert and the U.S. employs multiple, rigorous and redundant technical and procedural safeguards to protect against accidental or unauthorized launch. Only the President can authorize the employment of U.S. nuclear weapons and we are taking further steps to maximize decision time for the President in a crisis. These steps enhance stability before and during a crisis and avoid the instability and compressed decision times that are inherent to changes in alert status.

The United States is also actively working to reduce the numbers and role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy. These steps include taking all of our non-strategic nuclear bombers and nuclear-capable heavy bombers off day-to-day alert, engaging in the practice of open-ocean targeting for ICBMs and SLBMs, and reducing the number of warheads each ICBM carries to a single warhead. Converting ICBMs to a single warhead makes these weapons less attractive targets and therefore more stabilizing. Continuing at-sea patrols for submarines carrying nuclear weapons have a similar effect.

(7) Myth: Export controls and discriminatory policies are impeding nuclear cooperation and preventing developing countries from exercising their inalienable right to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

The United States fully supports the right of all Parties to the NPT to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, in conformity with their nonproliferation obligations. An effective, transparent export control regime helps build confidence among states that assistance provided for peaceful nuclear development will not be diverted to illegal weapons purposes. The United States and other major supplier nations do not apply export controls in order to impede legitimate nuclear commerce. Rather, U.S. export controls are designed to maximize legitimate trade while raising barriers to high risk transfers that could result in the diversion or retransfer of U.S. technology, equipment and material to weapons purposes.

The United States actively lends support to NPT Parties that are in compliance with their NPT obligations to help them develop the infrastructure needed for peaceful nuclear applications and safe, secure, and safeguarded nuclear power programs. The United States is by far the largest contributor to IAEA peaceful use programs, including about $142 million in voluntary contributions to the Technical Cooperation program since 2010 and another $50 million toward the IAEA Peaceful Uses Initiative (PUI) that we helped launch. PUI programs have addressed the sustainable development needs of more than 120 Member States in areas such as human health, water resource management, food security, environmental protection, and nuclear power infrastructure development.

(8) Myth: The United States has a double standard with respect to opposing nuclear proliferation.

The United States remains committed to universality of the NPT and has consistently urged the few countries that have never signed the Treaty to accede as non-nuclear weapon states and in the interim to take actions that are supportive of NPT principles and provisions. We have also been consistent in advancing international efforts to hold NPT Parties to account for noncompliance with the Treaty – as President Obama said in his 2009 Prague Speech, rules must be binding, violations must be punished and words must mean something. We are very encouraged with process underway to address Iran’s noncompliance and we remain steadfast in our insistence that North Korea return to the NPT and IAEA safeguards and comply fully with its UN Security Council and nonproliferation obligations.

(9) Myth: The United States is not doing its part to promote a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction.

The United States remains firmly committed to the goal of a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. We continue to work with Russia, the UK, the UN and the Conference Facilitator, Ambassador Laajava, to convene the proposed conference to discuss a regional zone. We have supported five rounds of consultations between Israel and Arab states and encourage these talks to continue. Regional states bear the responsibility to reach consensus on arrangements for the conference. Efforts to turn the NPT process into a referendum on this issue should be rejected.

(10) Myth: Nuclear cooperation with India is inconsistent with the NPT.

Nothing in the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement or in the 2008 policy decision of the Nuclear Suppliers Group to enable civil nuclear cooperation with India violates the NPT. Such cooperation is permitted provided the supply of material or equipment is under safeguards. Under the parameters of the initiative, India committed to separate its civilian and military nuclear facilities and has placed all civilian-designated nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. All U.S. civil nuclear cooperation with India is subject to such safeguards, and cooperation on sensitive nuclear technologies is ruled out. India has also worked to bring its export controls into line with internationally-recognized standards and committed to continue its voluntary moratorium on nuclear testing and support negotiation of a fissile material cutoff treaty. These commitments constitute significant gains for global nonproliferation efforts.

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Motives Behind China’s Oil Industry Crackdown Remain A Mystery – Analysis

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By Michael Lelyveld

After two years and dozens of corruption cases, China’s motives for targeting its state-owned oil monopoly remain largely a mystery.

Since four top officials were ousted at China National Petroleum Corp. (CNPC) for “serious violations of discipline” in 2013, at least 45 middle and high-ranking executives have been investigated for corruption, state media reported last month.

The cases account for a fraction of the 71,748 officials that the Communist Party’s Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) says it punished for breaking anti- corruption rules in 2014.

The shock waves have swept through the ranks of both high and low party officials, in keeping with President Xi Jinping’s pledge to pursue both “tigers” and “flies.”

But the CNPC probes are believed to represent the highest concentration among the 26 state-owned enterprises (SOEs) under investigation by the CCDI in 2015 and the 14 SOEs inspected in the prior two years.

Most recently, the agency announced an investigation of CNPC General Manager Liao Yongyuan last month for “suspected serious violations of law and party discipline.”

One week later, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate (SPP) said former Vice General Manager Wang Yongchun had been prosecuted on charges of bribery, holding “unidentified property” and abuse of power, the official Xinhua news agency said.

Many executives prosecuted

With the latest corruption cases, five out of the nine members of CNPC’s executive board have been placed under investigation, according to Xinhua.

Other top ex-officials of CNPC have also been prosecuted and expelled from the party, including Jiang Jiemin, who served as director of the State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC), as well as CNPC chairman.

Jiang’s trial on corruption charges began today before a local court in central Hubei province.

He stands accused of “taking bribes, possessing a large number of assets from unidentified sources and abusing power while performing duty for a state-owned enterprise,” according to Xinhua.

Zhou Yongkang, the powerful former domestic security chief and a previous general manager of CNPC, has also been charged with “bribery, abuse of power and intentional leaking of state secrets,” the SPP announced on April 3.

The sequence could be a sign that prosecutors have been targeting one top CNPC official after another, removing them almost as quickly as their disgraced predecessors can be replaced.

In the case of Liao, for example, he was named general manager in May 2013, just three months before Jiang was detained and the first four senior CNPC executives were suspended on suspicion of corruption.

Liao, a company veteran who had overseen construction of China’s West-East gas pipeline project, held onto his new post for less than 20 months.

Caixin magazine cited sources as saying that Liao was accused of getting jobs for relatives at exploration subsidiaries and allowing bidding irregularities in pipeline contracts.

Analysts puzzled

While the progression of big names has played out in public, it has left analysts to puzzle over the government’s motives and goals for CNPC.

A report by the official English-language China Daily offered a series of theories last month, concluding that the anti-corruption campaign “has combined with plunging crude prices to darken the outlook for China’s petroleum industry.”

Among the possible explanations cited is the notion that the government is clearing the decks for restructuring or reform, particularly in the more profitable and monopolized “upstream” exploration and production segments, where graft opportunities abound.

That interpretation suggests that targeted officials were removed for resisting the government’s plans, a theory that might be supported by the probes aimed at a majority of CNPC’s board.

But in a seeming contradiction, China Daily also cited unnamed “foreign observers” as saying that the sackings “might disrupt development strategies.”

Caixin has favored the “clique” theory, arguing that prosecutors are pulling at a thread that links the imprisoned former Chongqing party secretary Bo Xilai with Zhou Yongkang and Jiang Jiemin in what the Financial Times has called the “petroleum faction.”

Another interpretation is that China’s oil sector has simply been so riddled with corruption that investigators are finding it wherever they look, leaving analysts to perceive patterns in retrospect.

Edward Chow, senior fellow for energy and national security at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, said that analysts are unable to explain the government’s goal for CNPC because the crackdown has taken on a life of its own.

“It seems to me that the anti-corruption campaign is just out of control now,” Chow said.

“Whatever the initial impulse was, they’re now at the point where they want to correct the system altogether,” said Chow. “But I don’t hear of any reforms that would alter the underpinnings of why corruption was as pervasive as it was.”

So far, the government has offered mostly tentative and conflicting ideas for reforming the petroleum monopoly, suggesting it may be opened to more competitive forces on the one hand and expanded under state auspices on the other.

Last May, CNPC’s listed PetroChina subsidiary announced plans to spin off the West-East pipeline business into a new company that would be open to private investment under the government’s “mixed ownership” policy.

Critics have been doubtful about the mixed ownership initiative, which falls short of privatization and leaves the state in control.

“I don’t see how that changes corruption,” Chow said.

In another move last August, the Ministry of Commerce cleared Xinjiang Guanghui Energy Petroleum Co. Ltd. to become the first private enterprise licensed to import crude oil for sale to refineries, Xinhua reported.

The move was seen as a small step toward promoting competition, nibbling away at the state’s monopoly control.

But in February, government planners appeared to be moving in the opposite direction after The Wall Street Journal reported that advisers were studying a merger of CNPC with state-owned refining giant Sinopec to create a “new national champion” that would compete with international oil majors.

The idea met with a frosty reception.

In a blog posting for the American Enterprise Institute, Asia economist and resident scholar Derek Scissors cited the plan as evidence that President Xi “is not a market reformer.”

“A market reformer acts to increase competition in a crucial sector, not reduce it,” Scissors said.

Chow said a merger would also be counter-productive for fighting corruption.

“That would go in exactly the wrong direction,” he said.

Days later, a Sinopec official denied knowledge of any such plan and refused further comment, Xinhua reported.

Merger gambit

The news agency quoted an “industry insider,” saying the government was working on a structural reform plan for the energy sector to be released “as early as the first half of this year.”

Chow believes the merger story was a trial balloon, but it may also demonstrate the lack of set goals for CNPC, the energy sector and the anti-corruption drive.

The merger gambit suggests that reforms at CNPC may be more of an afterthought of the corruption crackdown rather than part of a coordinated plan.

An alternate explanation is that the entire campaign has been used to justify a purge of officials who opposed Xi’s rise to party leadership.

“They did not believe that Xi Jinping was qualified to be general secretary,” said Willy Wo-Lap Lam, a senior fellow of the Washington-based Jamestown Foundation, as quoted by The Washington Post.

Philip Andrews-Speed, a China energy expert and a principal fellow at National University of Singapore’s Energy Studies Institute, said that Xi had twin objectives when he came to power — dealing with the Bo Xilai/Zhou Yongkang clique and dealing with corruption.

Those factors have combined with the ample opportunities for corruption at CNPC, thanks to its huge levels of investment and procurement, making the company a focus of investigations, said Andrews-Speed.

The connections to reform are less clear, he said in an email message.

“Some very modest reforms are being implemented, but most commentators do not see these actions as precursors of a major structural reform. I doubt that the government will break up CNPC and Sinopec into smaller companies as it wants to have large internationally competitive national oil companies,” Andrews-Speed said.

In the meantime, the wave of prosecutions is stifling innovation as industry officials keep their heads down instead of pushing new reform or restructuring ideas, said Chow.

“The system is freezing because the anti-corruption campaign has gone on too long and no one knows where it’s heading,” he said.

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India: Twist In Nagaland Tale – Analysis

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By Giriraj Bhattacharjee*

In an early morning ambush, suspected National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) militants killed three troopers of the 4th Battalion of the Rajput Regiment and injured another four at Tukpi village of Tirap District in Arunachal Pradesh on April 2, 2015. The identity of the faction responsible is yet to be ascertained.

A similar ambush was reported from the neighboring Changlang District (Arunachal Pradesh) on February 6, 2015, when two civilian porters were killed and nine Assam Rifles (AR) personnel were injured in an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) blast at Monmao village. One of the wounded AR troopers succumbed to his injuries a day later. An unnamed source from NSCN’s Khaplang faction (NSCN-K) claimed that the attack was a joint operation by the NSCN-K and the Independent faction of the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA-I) against the Indian Army.

The February 6, 2015, attack was the first in Arunachal since October 25, 2007, in which a Security Force (SF) trooper was killed. Three AR personnel and a civilian were killed and eight persons were injured in a powerful IED explosion engineered by NSCN’s Isak-Muivah faction (NSCN-IM) in a remote jungle in the Tirap District on October 25, 2007.

Perturbed by the developments, Arunachal Pradesh Chief Minister Nabam Tuki, on April 4, 2015, made a fervent appeal to the Centre to resolve the insurgency in the region once and for all: “Unless the core issue of insurgency is resolved permanently, such incidents may recur. At the receiving end will always be the common people, security personnel, the administration and the State Government. The central Government needs to act fast.” The ‘core issue of insurgency’ in Arunachal Pradesh is linked to Naga militant outfits, a fact that the Union Ministry of Home Affairs [UMHA] had underscored while extending the Armed Forces Special Power Act (AFSPA) through a formal notification on September 20, 2014. Out of 21 Districts in the State12, are currently under the purview of AFSPA.

Arunachal’s Tirap, Changlang and Longding Districts, of which Longding shares borders with Nagaland, have long been strongholds of Naga outfits. These Districts share borders with Myanmar, where Naga militant formations have a strong presence. They are part of the imagined ‘Greater Nagaland’ for which Naga militants claim to be fighting.

Within Nagaland, one violent incident targeting SFs has already been reported since January 1, 2015. On March 26, 2015, four AR troopers were injured when gunmen opened fire at the personnel, who were waiting for a convoy near Indira Gandhi stadium in Kohima. Though the last SF fatality in Nagaland took place on May 11, 2008, when Police recovered the dead body of an Indian Reserve Battalion (IRB) trooper between the Keyive and Heningkunglwa areas under Peren District; the last attack targeting SFs took place on September 19, 2011, when militants opened fire targeting SF personnel on National Highway 2, near old Modern College in Upper AG colony in Kohima District on September 19, 2011. One civilian was killed and three others, including two AR personnel, were injured during the firing.

The incidents suggest that Naga militants, principally the NSCN-IM, NSCN-K and NSCN-Khole-Kitovi [NSCN-KK], amidst their continuing internecine battle, both within and outside the territory of Nagaland, are resuming their fight against the Indian State, believing that their respective ceasefire agreements have failed to ‘deliver’.

Indeed, on March 31, 2015, NSCN-K asserted that it was no use extending the ceasefire without discussing the issue of Naga “sovereignty”. In a press note issued by the organization’s ‘military supervisor ‘, ‘lieutenant-general’ Niki Sumi, the group claimed that the Government of India had failed to discuss the “Naga sovereignty issue”, which was the only basis of the Nagas struggle, and it was therefore futile to continue the extension of ceasefire: “Clamouring for peace without even an inclination to discuss sovereignty issue or resolution of sovereignty is only farce and any settlement or solution short of sovereignty would only be a betrayal of Nagas historical and political legacy.”

Earlier, on March 27, 2015, NSCN-K ‘chairman’, S.S. Khaplang, had expelled two senior kilonsers (ministers), Wangtin Konyak, also known as Y. Wangtin Naga, and T. Tikhak, for their alleged “anti-Naga nationalism”. The ‘expelled’ duo had reportedly, on the same day, attended the ceasefire supervisory board (CFSB) meeting at Chumukedima (Dimapur) and had expressed their desire to extend the ceasefire with the Centre. NSCN-K had signed the ceasefire agreement with the Central Government on April 28, 2001, and this has since been extended annually. The last extension agreed upon between the two sides was in April 2014, which will expire on April 28, 2015. Except for the ritual of meeting to decide the yearly extension of ceasefire, not a single round of talks was held between the Government and NSCN-K during this entire period.

Further, prior to the signing of the ceasefire with the NSCN-IM in July 31, 1997, the Centre had assured the outfit that it would not engage in dialogue with any other Naga group, and had stated that the NSCN-IM was the only ‘legitimate’ Naga group. The assurance has proven costly in the long run.

Meanwhile, the ‘expelled’ duo of Y. Wangtin Naga and T. Tikhak formed an new faction, NSCN-Reformation (NSCN-R) on April 6, 2015. The Press Release announcing its formation stated that its primary agenda would be to “develop a sense of brotherhood among the Naga family and also to rebuild the trust and faith among the Naga society. We would also like to give opportunity to all the Naga people, NGO’s, social organization, intellectuals and leaders of various tribal councils to share their ideas in building a renewed Naga society. It will also be our humble effort to run the party without becoming a liability to the people.”

This is the second split within NSCN-K since 2011. Earlier, on June 7, 2011, Khole Konyak and N. Kitovi Zhimomi left NSCN-K to form the NSCN-KK. The split was followed by a sharp increase in fratricidal killings. The incidents of fratricidal killing, however, declined through 2014, primarily due to the signing of the ‘Lenten Agreement’ on March 28, 2014, during a two-day reconciliation meeting of three Naga militant groups – NSCN-IM, NSCN-KK and Naga National Council/ Federal Government of Nagaland (NNC/FGN) – at Dimapur, under the banner of the Forum for Naga Reconciliation (FNR). NSCN-KK is presently observing a ceasefire with the Government.

The Centre, however, is continuing the unilateral ceasefire with NSCN-K, according to a statement by an unnamed senior intelligence officer on April 3, 2015, when asked why the Centre was not retaliating to the April 2 attack.

In the meantime, there has been no positive development with regard to talks with the NSCN-IM. The Union Government’s Interlocutor for Naga Peace Talks and Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), R. N. Ravi, ruling out any time bound strategy to deal with the NSCN-IM, on April 6, 2015 observed, “The Government has not given any timeline to end the talks. I have no knowledge of it but we are trying to come to a logical conclusion as early as possible.” Interestingly, National Security Adviser (NSA) Ajit Doval, on October 18, 2014, had asserted, “There should never be any feeling that it (talks) is protracted… The (peace) process is the means to an end and if there is an end, which is a desired end, it must be found in real time. There should be rule of law in the Naga insurgency-affected areas for which peace process must be completed as early as possible.”

The Government is clearly pinned on the horns of a dilemma. More than 70 rounds of talks have taken place between NSCN-IM and the Central Government since 1997, without any tangible gains on issues such as ‘Naga sovereignty’ and ‘integration’. On the other hand, NSCN-IM ‘general secretary’ Thuingaleng Muivah, on April 4, 2015, clarified that in the course of political negotiations with the Union Government, the Nagas have not given up on any issues, including the “sovereign rights and integration of all the Naga areas that were divided by the colonial powers without the free and informed consent of the Nagas.”

The Government’s directionless approach could also impact on the neighbouring Manipur State. The Coordination Committee (CorCom), an umbrella of Imphal valley based militant groups in Manipur, stated on March 29, 2014, “The decision taken by the NSCN-K under the leadership of S.S. Khaplang to abrogate the 14-year ceasefire with the Centre is a right step.” According to reports some cadres of NSCN-K are stationed in Manipur’s Tamenglong District. On March 21, 2015, four Army personnel, including a Junior Commissioned Officer (JCO) of the 2nd Battalion of the 5th Gorkha Rifles on December 17, 2014, were injured in an ambush by NSCN-K militants at Luklang Khunou in Tamenglong District.

As the violent incidents of last few months suggests, NSCN-K decision to unilaterally call off the ceasefire, the split within its ranks, and the Union Government’s failure to make any progress with regard to talks with NSCN-IM, could lead to greater violence in Nagaland and neighboring northeastern states. SFs, who had enjoyed clear respite from terror, will, in particular, face the brunt of escalating violence, if these developments continue. Intelligence inputs predict a spike in hit-and-run attacks on SFs over the coming days, particularly by NSCN-K militants operating from across the Indo-Myanmar border.

While better management of the Indo-Myanmar border will be critical to contain the current trend, the unending ramble of the ‘Naga talks’ will have to be brought to a rational conclusion if a permanent solution to the repeated cycles of violence is to be found.

*Giriraj Bhattacharjee
Research Assistant, Institute for Conflict Management

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Russia’s Turbulence Could Drive Sustainable Development – Analysis

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Hard times combined with falling oil prices could encourage Russia to lead in sustainability.

By Anastasia Okorochkova*

The economic crisis confronting Russia paradoxically offers the country a chance to reform and try a sustainable path. External shocks such as economic sanctions and a drop in oil prices are pushing the Russian government to focus on domestic affairs pressing economic, social and ecological problems accumulated since the breakup of the Soviet Union. Difficult times could help Russians transform their society.

To do so, Russia must mobilize its strengths – including a well-educated public, sustainable development of rich natural resources, and economic reform.

Oil and gas represent about 50 percent of the Russian government’s budget. Sacrifices would be required in reducing dependence on these resources, striving for sustainability and shifting toward a service economy.

Russia has a great opportunity to switch to services and away from energy by developing, for example, the agricultural sector, mechanical engineering, software production. According to the decision of the Ministry of Economic Development of Russian Federation, there are several priority sectors for import substitution and further development of equipment for the food, heavy engineering, power engineering, electrochemical and cable, oil and gas engineering, machine-tool, shipbuilding, electronic industry, chemical and petrochemical, pharmaceutical and medical, conventional weapons, civil aircraft, engine and transport engineering industries.

The government issued “The Economic Sustainable Development and Social Stability Plan for 2015” in January, to encourage structural economic changes and stabilizing functioning of institutions, particularly for key sectors. The goal: to promote growth and achieve macroeconomic stability by balancing the labor market and reducing inflation. The plan is vague, urging enhanced economic growth, support of economic sectors and social stability – easy to put on paper, but more challenging to achieve.

People are the priority, said First Deputy Prime Minister Igor Shuvalov, before the State Duma, the lower house of Russian Parliament, while presenting the plan: “We are not going to reduce budget expenditures at the expense of citizens.” The words sound beautiful, however words are not actions. Observers generally doubt that the government intends to convert a resources-based economy into a service-based system, socially and ecologically oriented. For the short term, large oil and gas reserves can easily be converted into money, and there is little will to risk changing priorities to invest in science, technology, education or health care.

Officials mention social risks and consequences of the lack of sustainability. But little thought or resources are devoted to promoting inclusive social development and environmental sustainability. Russia ranks 58 among 61 leading nations on the 2015 Climate Change Performance Index. The US and China, rank 44 and 45, respectively.

Generally the Ministry of Natural Recourses and Ecology devotes attention to environmental protection, to clean air, water, soil preservation, ecosystem and biodiversity protection. Green technologies and eco-efficiency are matters of a concern nowadays in Russia. Most of oil and gas companies develop environmental strategies and management systems, competing to become leaders on environmental safety. For example, Russia’s biggest natural gas and oil producer, Gazprom, has developed an online site on environmental protection and focused particular attention to environmental safety. There was scant mention of environmental protection in the “Economic Sustainable Development and Social Stability Plan for 2015.”

Sustainable development must meet present needs without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their needs, suggests the 1987 Brundtland Report from the UN World Commission on Environment and Development. Sustainable development requires strategic economic planning, flexible to changing needs, as well as reliance on state-of-the-art IT technologies, private-public partnerships that emphasize corporate social responsibility. Instruments of monetary policy – taxation, redistribution of income and inconsistent changes of interest rates by the central bank – are not enough to overcome challenges. The government must also strengthen social-welfare and environmental-protection systems.

It is necessary to develop a sustainable model of strategic economic planning, based on dynamic input-output model developed by economist and Nobel laureate Wassily Leontief, which examines the evolution of an economy toward equilibrium via industrial interrelationships and inter-independencies of the economic system. Attention to the model with government investments could ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns. Russia needs such structural economic changes to shift from oil and gas extraction and export to petrochemical, agricultural, pharmaceutical and other goods production and export.

Moreover, public-private partnerships and corporate social responsibility – the inclusion of businesses and NGOs into the process of sustainable development – could help Russia achieve economic growth and full and productive employment. When business and government work as partners, opportunities abound to prevent deforestation, biodiversity loss, environmental degradation while fostering innovation and access to affordable, reliable and modern energy.

Such strategic economic planning could revive Russian confidence.

People of all ages and income brackets worry about their future with many in a hurry to buy consumer products before the prices rise. “Sales” and “value for money” are priorities for customers in Russia today.

Consumer demand is falling rapidly and with government financing shrinking – in part because of sanctions but in large part because of falling oil prices – there are worries over education, health and culture. Corporations have cut thousands of jobs and investors withdraw assets from Russia.

Some are relieved by the downturn, hoping that Russia will be forced to confront its problems, that the country could fix everything at the last moment when the system seems most cracked. Many anticipate a turnaround, a new political agenda and new values among the young.

The government’s economic plan faces political challenges. Representatives of several political parties that normally support the government do not agree on the proposals. The deputy chairman of the Fair Russia faction, Mikhail Emelyanov, said to the Kommersant newspaper, “This is a set of measures to help private individual industries and categories of the population that strategically change nothing.” The deputy chairman of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, Sergei Reshulsky, said that support of the plan showed a lack of self-respect. The Liberal Democratic Party is more amenable: “It is impossible not to support the government in such an acute situation, but we do not absolve the government of responsibility for the crisis,” said Igor Lebedev, vice-speaker of the State Duma.

Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev is trying to consolidate the many political forces. He proposed renewing the mechanism of interaction between the president, the government and the State Duma, which would allow consolidating of political positions, as was done during the financial crisis of 2008.

Some people say that the 2015 plan is workable, reviving measures taken during the 2008 crisis, but not creative or bold enough. Former Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin suggests the plan “only partially ‘relieves pain,’ it doesn’t heal.”

Russia must wean its economy away from energy, its single source of revenue, and the country must consider ways to conserve natural resources while developing new methods of production, consumption and distribution. For example, during the 1973 oil crisis, when oil hit new records, the developed economies that depended on imported oil stepped up research on alternative energy sources and focused on efficiency through regulations. Research and development of solar, wind and biomass energy sources have gained momentum, along with new technologies for exploiting shale oil.

The current crisis offers Russian President Vladimir Putin a chance to reevaluate his priorities, understand the goals of sustainable development and change the political agenda according to the principles of inclusiveness, efficiency and effectiveness.

Macroeconomic indexes and statistics do not reveal the real state of affairs inside Russia, the lack of confidence and anxiety. Russians wait for reforms and an improved quality of life.

*Anastasia Okorochkova is a Fox International Fellow (2013-2014) at Yale University and she is a PhD candidate in economics at Lomonosov Moscow State University. Her research focuses on public policy in the field of corporate social responsibility and economic development.

The post Russia’s Turbulence Could Drive Sustainable Development – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.


New Horizons Spacecraft Nears Historic July 14 Encounter With Pluto

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NASA’s New Horizons spacecraft is three months from returning to humanity the first-ever close up images and scientific observations of distant Pluto and its system of large and small moons.

“Scientific literature is filled with papers on the characteristics of Pluto and its moons from ground based and Earth orbiting space observations, but we’ve never studied Pluto up close and personal,” said John Grunsfeld, astronaut, and associate administrator of the NASA Science Mission Directorate at the agency’s Headquarters in Washington. “In an unprecedented flyby this July, our knowledge of what the Pluto systems is really like will expand exponentially and I have no doubt there will be exciting discoveries.”

The fastest spacecraft ever launched, New Horizons has traveled a longer time and farther away – more than nine years and three billion miles – than any space mission in history to reach its primary target. Its flyby of Pluto and its system of at least five moons on July 14 will complete the initial reconnaissance of the classical solar system. This mission also opens the door to an entirely new “third” zone of mysterious small planets and planetary building blocks in the Kuiper Belt, a large area with numerous objects beyond Neptune’s orbit.

The flyby caps a five-decade-long era of reconnaissance that began with Venus and Mars in the early 1960s, and continued through first looks at Mercury, Jupiter and Saturn in the 1970s and Uranus and Neptune in the 1980s.

Reaching this third zone of our solar system – beyond the inner, rocky planets and outer gas giants – has been a space science priority for years. In the early 2000s the National Academy of Sciences ranked the exploration of the Kuiper Belt – and particularly Pluto and its largest moon, Charon – as its top priority planetary mission for the coming decade.

New Horizons – a compact, lightweight, powerfully equipped probe packing the most advanced suite of cameras and spectrometers ever sent on a first reconnaissance mission – is NASA’s answer to that call.

“This is pure exploration; we’re going to turn points of light into a planet and a system of moons before your eyes!” said Alan Stern, New Horizons principal investigator from Southwest Research Institute (SwRI) in Boulder, Colorado. “New Horizons is flying to Pluto – the biggest, brightest and most complex of the dwarf planets in the Kuiper Belt. This 21st century encounter is going to be an exploration bonanza unparalleled in anticipation since the storied missions of Voyager in the 1980s.”

Pluto, the largest known body in the Kuiper Belt, offers a nitrogen atmosphere, complex seasons, distinct surface markings, an ice-rock interior that may harbor an ocean, and at least five moons. Among these moons, the largest – Charon – may itself sport an atmosphere or an interior ocean, and possibly even evidence of recent surface activity.

“There’s no doubt, Charon is a rising star in terms of scientific interest, and we can’t wait to reveal it in detail in July,” said Leslie Young, deputy project scientist at SwRI.

Pluto’s smaller moons also are likely to present scientific opportunities. When New Horizons was started in 2001, it was a mission to just Pluto and Charon, before the four smaller moons were discovered.

The spacecraft’s suite of seven science instruments – which includes cameras, spectrometers, and plasma and dust detectors – will map the geology of Pluto and Charon and map their surface compositions and temperatures; examine Pluto’s atmosphere, and search for an atmosphere around Charon; study Pluto’s smaller satellites; and look for rings and additional satellites around Pluto.

Currently, even with New Horizons closer to Pluto than the Earth is to the Sun, the Pluto system resembles little more than bright dots in the distance. But teams operating the spacecraft are using these views to refine their knowledge of Pluto’s location, and skillfully navigate New Horizons toward a precise target point 7,750 miles (12,500 kilometers) from Pluto’s surface. That targeting is critical, since the computer commands that will orient the spacecraft and point its science instruments are based on knowing the exact time and location that New Horizons passes Pluto.

“Our team has worked hard to get to this point, and we know we have just one shot to make this work,” said Alice Bowman, New Horizons mission operations manager at the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory (APL) in Laurel, Maryland, which built and operates the spacecraft. “We’ve plotted out each step of the Pluto encounter, practiced it over and over, and we’re excited the ‘real deal’ is finally here.”

The spacecraft’s work doesn’t end with the July flyby. Because it gets one shot at its target, New Horizons is designed to gather as much data as it can, as quickly as it can, taking about 100 times as much data on close approach as it can send home before flying away. And although the spacecraft will send select, high-priority datasets home in the days just before and after close approach, the mission will continue returning the data stored in onboard memory for a full 16 months.

“New Horizons is one of the great explorations of our time,” said New Horizons Project Scientist Hal Weaver at APL. “There’s so much we don’t know, not just about Pluto, but other worlds like it. We’re not rewriting textbooks with this historic mission – we’ll be writing them from scratch.”

The post New Horizons Spacecraft Nears Historic July 14 Encounter With Pluto appeared first on Eurasia Review.

North Korea Should Be Held Accountable For Persecuting Christians – OpEd

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By Olivia Enos*

In February 2014, the United Nations Commission of Inquiry (COI) on Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of North Korea (DPRK) confirmed the world’s worst fears: North Korea is guilty of crimes against humanity.[1] In addition to the atrocities committed by the Kim regime, the report found that “there is no effective freedom of religious belief in the DPRK.”[2]

Justice Michael Kirby, the lead U.N. investigator for the COI, said that the persecution of religious minorities, in particular Christians, is one of the least discussed findings of the report.[3] As a global leader on international religious freedom, the U.S. can do more to hold North Korea accountable for its egregious violations of religious liberty.

The Findings of the Commission of Inquiry

The COI provided verifiable proof that North Koreans are denied religious freedom. The report details historical and current acts of persecution committed by the regime toward religious minorities and specifically highlights the extreme persecution faced by Christians.

The report’s key findings include:[4]

  • The right to religious liberty is technically enshrined in article 68 of the North Korean constitution, but in practice North Koreans are granted no such right.
  • The true religion in North Korea is the worship of the Kim family. The cult of personality surrounding the Kim regime encompasses the deification of the Kim family, absolute worship of the Kim family, and strict adherence to the Kim philosophy of Juche. The Kim regime considers religious activity subversive to the government, as it detracts from the worship of the Kim family.
  • North Koreans are tortured, sent to labor camps, and even killed for their faith.[5] North Koreans cannot erect a religious building without first receiving permission from the government, are only able to study religion if they are a member of the elite, and can only attend the limited number of state-sanctioned religious institutions.
  • Christians face unique persecution. Possession of the Bible is illegal, and non-approved Christian religious activities are considered political crimes. Christians and North Koreans who have contact with Christians often face the harshest punishments for practicing their faith.

Christianity in North Korea

The Kim regime is particularly hostile toward Christianity, in part because of the role that Christianity played in the collapse of other communist regimes, including the Soviet Union, Poland, and Romania.[6] As a result, the North Korean regime has systematically persecuted the estimated 200,000 to 400,000 Christians in North Korea.

According to Open Doors’s World Watch List, North Korea was the worst persecutor of Christians in the world in 2015.[7] Christians are often sent to prison camps for possession of Bibles and are sometimes even executed for their faith. The State Department estimates that 80,000 to 120,000 North Koreans are imprisoned in labor camps, many because of their religious beliefs.[8]

Documented instances of persecution of Christians are not uncommon. In November 2013, 80 North Koreans were reportedly executed for possession of Bibles and South Korean films.[9] Until he was released in late 2014, Kenneth Bae, a Korean American pastor, was detained, imprisoned, and sentenced to 15 years of hard labor in North Korea for sharing his faith and allegedly undermining the Kim regime.[10]

Despite continued persecution, Christians have nonetheless played an important role in North Korean society. Underground churches in North Korea and church groups from the U.S. and South Korea are intimately involved in rescuing North Korean defectors.[11] Other Christian groups have been responsible for getting outside information into North Korea through radio broadcasts and information dissemination.[12]

What the U.S. Should Do

The U.S. has an interest in promoting religious freedom abroad. Historically, religious groups have often been the catalyst for political reform—especially in communist and post-communist countries. In partnering with religious groups to promote religious liberty in North Korea, the U.S. may be able to encourage incremental reform.

  • The State Department should continue to designate North Korea as a country of particular concern in the International Religious Freedom report. Since 2001, North Korea has been designated as a “country of particular concern” (CPC) in the State Department’s International Religious Freedom report and was re-designated as a CPC in 2011.[13] CPCs are guilty of severe forms of persecution including torture, discrimination, and denial of religious freedom. Despite North Korea’s designation as a CPC, sanctions under the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA) have been waived and subsumed under sanctions that have been imposed pursuant to the Jackson–Vanik Amendment. This strategy has failed to garner compliance. Due to North Korea’s ongoing violations of religious freedom, it should remain a country of particular concern and face sanctions under IRFA specifically for its violations of religious freedom.
  • The U.S. should increase funding for broadcasts into North Korea. Most defectors say that access to outside information was an integral reason behind their decision to defect.[14] Interestingly, high-level defections from the elite class are not uncommon. This is unsurprising since members of the elite class have the most access to outside information.The U.S. should deepen its partnership with the Broadcasting Board of Governors, Voice of America, and Radio Free Asia to disseminate timely outside information into North Korea. The BBG and its affiliates reach over 215 million people worldwide weekly and conduct programs in some of the world’s most repressive regimes, including North Korea, Iran, and Cuba.[15] Such programming could influence political change in North Korea that leads to respect for basic rights, including, but not limited to religious freedom.
  • The State Department Office of International Religious Freedom should support religious nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) seeking to disseminate information into North Korea. Part of the mission of the Office of the International Religious Freedom is to “assist religious and human rights NGOs in promoting religious freedom.”[16] The U.S. government should support religious NGOs that are broadcasting information on religious matters into North Korea. Many of these operations are often underfunded, but with the support of the U.S. government, they would have the ability to continue broadcasting into North Korea.

Conclusion

The U.S. and the international community cannot afford to be silent about violations of the essential right of North Koreans to practice their faith. The U.S. should be more vocal in its criticism of North Korea and should do more to hold the Kim regime accountable, not just for its human rights atrocities, but for its egregious violations of religious liberty.

*About the author:
Olivia Enos is a Research Associate in the Asian Studies Center, of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy, at The Heritage Foundation.

Source:
This article was published by The Heritage Foundation.

References:
[1] U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” A/HRC/25/63, February 17, 2014, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/CoIDPRK/Pages/ReportoftheCommissionofInquiryDPRK.aspx (accessed April 7, 2015).

[2] Ibid., p. 73.

[3] Center for Strategic and International Relations, “North Korean Human Rights: The Road Ahead, Commemorating the One Year Anniversary of the UN Commission of Inquiry Report,” February 17, 2015, http://csis.org/event/north-korean-human-rights-road-ahead (accessed April 7, 2015).

[4] U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.”

[5] U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, Annual Report 2014: North Korea, 2014, http://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/North%20Korea%202014.pdf (accessed April 7, 2015).

[6] U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.”

[7] Open Doors, “World Watch List: North Korea,” 2015, http://www.opendoorsuk.org/persecution/worldwatch/north_korea.php (accessed April 7, 2015).

[8] U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, International Religious Freedom Report for 2013: Korea, Democratic People’s Republic, 2014, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/religiousfreedom/index.htm?year=2013&dlid=222139 (accessed April 7, 2015).

[9] Jessica Chasmar, “80 People Publicly Executed Across North Korea for Films, Bibles,” The Washington Times, November 12, 2013, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/nov/12/80-people-publicly-executed-across-n-korea-films-b/ (accessed April 7, 2015).

[10] Olivia Enos, “American Pastor Languishing in North Korea Labor Camp,” The Daily Signal, July 10, 2013, http://dailysignal.com/2013/07/10/american-pastor-languishing-in-north-korea-labor-camp/ (accessed April 7, 2015).

[11] Durihana, “About Durihana,” http://www.durihana.net/about_durihana.aspx (accessed April 7, 2015).

[12] North Korea Freedom Coalition, “Ways You Can Get Involved,” http://www.nkfreedom.org/Get-Involved/Ways-You-Can-Get-Involved.aspx (accessed April 7, 2015).

[13] Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, International Religious Freedom Report for 2013: Korea, Democratic People’s Republic.

[14] Robert R. King, “U.S. Special Envoy King on Human Rights in North Korea,” remarks at European Parliament Subcommittee on Human Rights, Brussels, Belgium, January 21, 2015, http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2015/01/20150126313190.html#axzz3WdePcOmO (accessed April 7, 2015).

[15] Broadcasting Board of Governors, “Our Broadcasters,” http://www.bbg.gov/broadcasters/ (accessed April 7, 2015).

[16] U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, “Religious Freedom,” http://www.state.gov/j/drl/irf/ (accessed April 7, 2015).

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South Africa’s Electricity Crisis: Clearer Prioritization And Coherence Needed – Analysis

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By Ola Bello and Busisipho Siyobi*

Is there clarity and coherence in current measures being taken by South Africa’s government to address the country’s critical energy challenges?

Last month’s suspension of four top executives of Eskom, the state-owned energy utility, and the subsequent resignation of its chair, have partly overshadowed the five-point plan adopted by the Cabinet on 10 December 2014 to address South Africa’s electricity supply constraints.

The plan made provision for a technical implementation ‘war room’ under the supervision of a ministerial cluster including the Departments of Energy; Corporate Governance and Traditional Affairs; Public Enterprises; National Treasury; Economic Development; and Water and Sanitation with the task to address five intervention areas. These included emergency measures to be undertaken by Eskom during an initial 30 day period; harnessing cogeneration opportunities in partnership with the private sector; and accelerating the substitution of diesel with gas. Other measures include the launching of a coal independent power programme, exploring the nuclear option alongside renewable energy sources, and managing demand through energy efficient technologies.

Apart from the government departments tasked with the plan, technicians from Eskom, joined by experts from elsewhere in government, were charged with providing support to the war room.  Crucially, the plan was conceived not only to ensure additional electricity supply, but also to make sure that due contract management and oversight functions are efficiently exercised. While it is unclear how an independent inquiry initiated on 12 March to look into Eskom’s challenges such as poor generation capacity, delays in its infrastructure build and its primary energy and cash flow problems are linked to the five-point intervention plan, it is useful to explore whether the plan goes far enough in addressing South Africa’s energy challenge.

The severity of the power problem for industry is underlined by the decision of some private sector actors, such as Sibanye Gold Limited, to become energy-independent. Sibanye aims to invest in solar power and build its own coal-fired plants with the capacity to generate 200-600 MW of electricity. Whether such a move portends an impending mass defection of the corporate sector from the national grid remains to be seen. What is beyond doubt is waning private sector confidence in the government’s ability to address the country’s electricity constraints. South Africa’s short to medium term energy plans involve a mix of renewable and non-renewable sources. However, it is not often clear how the government ranks or prioritises each of those sources in terms of their fit, commercial viability and implications for national finance. Clear prioritisation by government is needed, particularly in light of the fiscal constraints unveiled in the 2015 budget.

On renewables for example, independent power producers (IPPs) offer market-driven options for government to rapidly address supplies constraints. It has long been clear that IPP-sourced electricity hold some advantages, including private sector finance and a renewables focus. Both factors could inject healthy competition into the national energy sector. Why the government is not doing more to encourage IPPs has confounded many analysts. To Eskom’s credit, some of its recent improvement plans have been proceeding well. The long-delayed Medupi unit 6 is now partly operational, though generating only a fraction of its planned capacity. Eskom is also better managing demand, including through retrofitting energy efficient technologies in residential dwellings. There might also be an argument for extending rebate programmes aimed at encouraging use of more energy efficient appliances such as geysers. However, whilst the government announced that it will provide Eskom with 23 billion rand in the next fiscal year, it is not yet clear how this injection will be distributed across the 5 areas in the government’s five-point plan.

Regarding nuclear procurement, the government in 2014 signed Inter-Governmental Agreements with vendors from supplier nations, including the United States, South Korea, Russia, France and China. The government promised to engage all the vendors in a transparent and competitive procurement process. Given the financial burden of a nuclear energy option, the affordability of this procurement plan sits uneasily with the government’s Integrated Resource Plan (IRP) 2010-2030. The government also recently announced steps to add another 800MW of electricity to the grid through co-generation agreements with private investors. Negotiations for other co-generation projects will similarly be concluded by mid-2015. These announcements are commendable as they clearly outline a path towards reaching the second objective in the five-point plan, namely to harness cogeneration opportunities with the private sector to assist energy diversification. Yet, in the extant debates on South Africa’s energy mix, there is lack of clarity on the government’s rationale for prioritising key elements in its energy mix.

Notably, elements in the government’s nuclear procurement plans and new investments in coal-fired plants have been criticised, respectively for their huge cost, long lead time and incongruity with the country’s aspiration for a cleaner energy future. As noted earlier, a clearer assessment of the suitability, efficiency and financial performance of different energy sources is essential. Also, government must outline a comprehensive energy vision to restore public confidence in its ability to lead responsibly on managing these challenges.

A good first step in this direction will be the publication of a Cabinet-endorsed update to the IRP 2010-2030, informed by comprehensive consultation with all important stakeholders. This must be at the core of government efforts to align energy planning and implementation with South Africa’s broader economic and financial reality.

It is also to be hoped that the ongoing enquiry into Eskom’s operational challenges will succeed in revealing the underlying causes of its problems. That will go a long way towards enabling the government to proffer comprehensive, informed solutions that can help to loosen the stranglehold of Eskom’s inefficiencies on the economy.

*Dr Oladiran (Ola) Bello is head of SAIIA’s Governance of Africa’s Resources Programme (GARP) and Busisipho Siyobi is a KAS Scholar with the same programme. This article was originally published on AllAfrica.com.

Source: SAIIA

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Another Baseless Attack On Pius XII – OpEd

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Rabbi Shmuley Boteach posted yesterday an article online at observer.com attacking Pope Pius XII.

Rabbi Boteach’s piece trotted out the discredited thesis that Pope Pius XII was “silent” during the Holocaust. In actual fact, the pope did more to save Jews from the Nazis than any other religious leader in the world. This explains why Jewish notables at the time praised him so effusively.

On Christmas Day, 1941, the New York Times singled the pope out in an editorial, saying he was “a lonely voice in the silence and darkness enveloping Europe this Christmas.” [My italic.] The next year it said, “This Christmas more than ever he [the pope] is a lonely voice crying out of the silence of a continent.” [My italic.] So much for the rap that the pope was “silent.”

To be sure, the pope chose his words carefully. So did Jewish leaders in the United States: they did not want to inflame Hitler even further. Were they Hitler’s rabbis?

One of the world’s experts on the Holocaust, who wrote monumental volumes on the subject, Sir Martin Gilbert, died in February. He said that the test case for Pius XII “was when the Gestapo came to Rome in 1943 to round up the Jews.” What happened? “And the Catholic Church,” he said, “on his [the pope’s] direct authority, immediately dispersed as many Jews as they could.” Which is why Gilbert thanked the pope for his yeoman efforts in Never Again: A History of the Holocaust.

Rabbi Shmuley’s ideologically driven screed is not supported by the kind of careful scholarship of Sir Martin Gilbert. If anything, Pope Pius XII deserves to be hailed as a “Righteous Gentile,” as Gilbert and other Jewish scholars have recommended.

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Yemen: Drone Strike Kills Al-Qaeda Leader

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A prominent leader for al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, based in Yemen, was killed in a drone strike allegedly conducted by the US, AFP reported Tuesday.

In a statement al-Qaeda said idealogical leader Ibrahim al-Rubaish and other militants were killed in a raid Monday, seeming to refer to a drone strike that killed six people in southeast Yemen.

The US is the only country currently conducting drone strikes in Yemen, according to the AFP.

Al-Rubaish in January had accused France of becoming the top enemy of Islam above the US.

Original article

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