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Russia’s Revised Military Doctrine: Putin’s Posturing And Swaggering – Analysis

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On February 5th 2010, just a day after Romania gave the go-ahead for an overhaul of the US plan to deploy medium-range ballistic missile interceptors, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev affixed his signature to a new “military strategy” intended to serve as the basis of defence policy for the next ten years. On December 26th 2014, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed an updated version of this military doctrine, which details new threats to national security.

As expected, the “new” policy is an update of the three previous strategic blueprints signed in 1993, 2000 and 2010. It explicitly identifies threats to Russia and spells out who Russia’s allies and enemies are, and in what contexts. The main point it makes, as in previous doctrines, is that “the expansion of NATO’s military potential on the Russian border” is the greatest threat to Russia.

The document has much to say about the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) enhanced capabilities and global reach, and the increased role the military will play in shaping the foreign policy of most countries. It states that “actions aimed at violent change of the Russian constitutional order, destabilisation of the political and social environment and disruption of the functioning of governmental bodies, crucial civilian and military facilities and informational infrastructure of Russia” are a major threat deriving from these sources.

Other threats to Russia’s security and the global security system listed are actions aimed at undermining global and regional stability, not least by hampering the work of Russian systems of state and military rule, and those aimed at disrupting the functioning of strategic nuclear forces, missile attack early warning, antimissile defence and space monitoring systems and their combat stability, nuclear munition storage facilities, nuclear power generation, nuclear and chemical industries and “other potentially dangerous installations.” The document also takes into account the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and missile technologies, global terrorism (which potentially involves using radioactive and toxic materials), arms and drug trafficking, armed domestic conflicts along ethnic and confessional lines, and the activities of armed radicals and private military companies. It also says that Russia should be prepared to fight future wars in space.

For years now, former President Medvedev, incumbent President Putin and their senior aides have been attacking NATO for plans to deploy weapons systems and bases in the new states of the former Soviet bloc. They have also lambasted US plans to install parts of a missile defence shield in Eastern Europe. The Obama administration, having renounced the Bush Administration’s antimissile shield project expected to be installed in Poland and the Czech Republic in 2009, has nevertheless revised it and embarked on a new missile defence project. It has convinced Bucharest (Romania) to host U.S. missile interceptors as part of Washington’s “phased adaptive approach.”

The Kremlin’s worries have not subsided because the current and future deployment of interceptor missiles and other various anti-missile facilities close to the Russian borders and in waters adjacent to Russia. Russian commanders regularly attack the US missile defence plans, whilst claiming that Russian long-range bombers could easily destroy radar stations and other facilities which are part of the US defence shield in Eastern Europe. Since the missile defence facilities are weakly protected, any number of Russian aircrafts is indeed capable of electronically jamming or simply destroying them. The recent incursion of Russian military airplanes over East European territory was perhaps aimed at gathering information on the US anti-missile systems or even partly undermining them.

US officials have repeatedly sought to assure Moscow that the planned medium-range ballistic missile interceptors are targeting intercontinental ballistic missiles launched by rogue states, mainly Iran and North Korea, and are not intended to weaken the Russian nuclear deterrent, but Russian officials remain skeptical. Many Russian military experts believe that components of the US system in Eastern Europe would be capable of destroying Russian missiles. The Kremlin’s proposal to make the US assurances to the contrary legally binding has been rejected out of hand.

A final key feature of the document is that it reiterates that Russia has the right to use nuclear weapons if the existence of the country or its allies is threatened by WMDs or even conventional weapons attack. It also states that Russia has every reason to be confident in the deterrence capabilities of its strategic nuclear arsenal.

Most governments treat the formal unveiling of a military strategy as a PR exercise conducted to have an effect on neighboring states and declared or potential faraway enemies. “A state or statesman swaggers in order to look and feel more powerful and important, to be taken seriously by others in the councils of international decision, to enhance the nation’s image in the eyes of others,” according to Robert J. Art, an American Foreign Policy and International Relations scholar at Brandeis University.

In international security parlance Russia’s new military doctrine can be considered a component of a “swaggering” strategy towards NATO and the European Union (EU). Swaggering in international relations is usually expressed in displaying a country’s military power at military exercises and parades and buying from foreign states the most prestigious weapons available (although currently on hold, the purchase of France’s Mistral warship comes immediately to mind here).

But in August 2008 Russia did not content itself with merely holding the Kavkaz-2008 military exercise. As we know, this extended into a war against Georgia. That became possible because Russian leaders had no doubt that Georgia would be an easy prey. Furthermore, at the end of February 2014 Russia did not hesitate to support the separatist movement in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea through military intervention and de facto occupation of the region, illegally incorporating it into the Russian Federation a few months later. At the same time it carried out subversive activities in eastern and southern Ukraine and massed troops along the Ukrainian border.

However, when it comes to NATO and US conventional and nuclear “war machine” Russians are far less confident, and swaggering is not on the agenda. For instance, in the last few months Russian strategic bombers have been flying to the shores of the United Kingdom, Sweden and even the United States, provoking the State Department to warn Moscow to abide by international law. But an important detail, mostly overlooked by the media, is that these aircraft were Tu-95 bombers, first commissioned in 1952. They entered into service in 1956 and will serve the Russian Air Force until at least… 2040. The least one can say is that they are far from cutting edge military equipment.

In February 2009 a report from Russian Technologies, a state-owned corporation which runs the arms exporter Rosoboronexport and is a major stakeholder of the carmaker AvtoVAZ and VSMPO-Avisma, the world’s largest titanium producer, appeared in the weekly Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye. It stated that about half of Russia’s weapons makers were almost bankrupt, despite this sector being Russia’s largest exporter of manufactured goods. At that point only 36 per cent of the strategic organisations in the military-industrial complex enjoyed stable financial and economic conditions, and since the beginning of the world financial crisis in 2007-2008 the situation has worsened. According to the Federal Statistics Service, industrial production has plummeted. The Russian economy contracted by 7.9 per cent in 2009 (the first contraction since 1998), making it one of the hardest hit by the world economic slowdown. The World Bank released data according to which, between 2010 and 2014, the Russian economy grew by only 2.8 per cent on average, with a peak of 4.5 per cent in 2010 and a mere 0.6 per cent growth in 2014.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union the number of weapons designers and manufacturers which have gone bankrupt or shifted their production to more lucrative civilian sectors can be counted by the hundred. New military procurement has been suspended for more than a decade. The world economic crisis has underlined Russia’s excessive reliance on the export of raw materials such as oil and gas. Demand has tumbled by as much as 50 to 70 percent in some industrial sectors.

The Russian arms trade enjoyed record sales levels of $15.2 billion in 2012 and $13.2 billion in 2013. However, industry officials have long warned that the primary goals of increasing investment levels in research and production capacity have not been met for many years, and that the industry remains beset by a myriad of labor, technology and manufacturing problems. Russia’s major clients, and China in particular, have complained about late deliveries of major orders. India, another major purchaser of Russian weapons, has lately turned to the US defence systems.

In 2008, Algeria returned 15 MIG fighters, saying that they contained some old and substandard parts. Russia’s shipyards are also in need of modernisation, as they cannot currently produce carriers of the size or sophistication as those found in the US, French or British fleets. The loss of Russia’s shipyard in Ukraine, and Kyiv’s March 2014 decision to cease all defense-industrial cooperation with its eastern neighbor, are compounding the Kremlin’s efforts to modernise the Army.

The most important aspect of Russia’s naval modernisation plan, however, is the purchase of two French Mistral-class warships, which were expected to be delivered from the Saint-Nazaire-based STX shipyard in northwest France in 2014 and 2015. The purchase of French hardware was designed to increase Russia’s capacity to intervene in short and medium range theatres of conflict. However, as part of the recent Western sanctions against Russia, the French government has decided to put the delivery of the ships until Russia changes it policy towards the conflict in eastern Ukraine and complies with the Minsk Protocol signed in September 2014 by Ukraine, the Russian Federation, the self-proclaimed the Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) and the self-proclaimed Lugansk People’s Republic (LPR).

In 2010, the Kremlin enacted the State Armaments Program (SAP) for the period 2010-2020. The scope of the program includes the purchase of high-tech Western military equipment and technologies. However, due to the depreciation of the ruble, the SAP’s budget has shrunk from $600 billion (20.7 trillion rubles) to $340 billion. A ramping up of military spending is much needed, but the recent drop in energy export earnings, the collapse in the value of the ruble and the ever more biting Western sanctions in response to Moscow’s alleged involvement in the war in Ukraine war are presenting an unprecedented budget challenge to the Russian leadership. While the Kremlin insists that it will maintain the military’s rearmament program at current levels, EU and US sanctions forbid Russian corporations to have commercial transactions with Western companies.Russian Army insiders are also already alluding to the fact that the Ministry of Defence is behind schedule with SAP. They claim that insufficient funds have been allocated from the budget to carry out the proposed changes. Finally, one has to keep in mind that more than 20 per cent of Russia’s military budget always vanishes due to corruption. With the global economic crisis potentially gaining momentum, such problems and recriminations are not likely to disappear any time soon.

With bank interest rates now close to 20 per cent, the Russian military-complex has a hard time finding domestic credit at a reasonable cost. In the past it could approach Western banks for loans, as credit was several times cheaper than in Russia, but Western sanctions have eliminated this alternative. Credit is the most painful topic for Russian arms makers. Enterprise managers grumble that with such high interest rates they are simply unable to modernize the industry and make profitable investments.

Russia, unable, as yet, to fully reintegrate ex-Soviet satellites into its orbit, particularly Georgia and Ukraine, whose positions towards Europe are irreversible, sees NATO enlargement to the east as a political defeat and a military humiliation. However, Russia’s greatest humiliation is actually its incapability of rebuilding its armed forces, despite what some interpret as its military “swaggering.”

This article appeared at New Eastern Europe and is reprinted with permission.

The post Russia’s Revised Military Doctrine: Putin’s Posturing And Swaggering – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.


What China Thinks Of Hillary Clinton – OpEd

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By Lin Baohua*

Former U.S. Secretary of State and First Lady Hillary Clinton announced on April 12 that she would run as Democratic Party candidate in next year’s presidential elections.

Public opinion polls suggest that she could win support within her party for selection, and so far, the Democrats have yet to come up with anyone to compete with her [for the candidacy].

After the news broke, the official Chinese news agency Xinhua ran an article on April 13 titled “How will Hillary play the China card?” This tells us that Beijing is paying close attention to her China policy.

As a woman, Hillary will inevitably draw the female vote. The Xinhua article notes: “Hillary Clinton will be attaching great importance to women’s issues, including gender equality in the U.S. and internationally, projecting an image of charm and responsibility.

And as a recent grandmother, she will want to show people that she is far from elderly.

Of course there is a connection between Hillary’s concern for women’s rights and China, which could hardly escape her attention, as the world’s most populous nation where there is little gender equality.

So she didn’t address the fact that that there has never been a female member of China’s [all-powerful] Politburo standing committee. But she cares in a universal way about the human rights of Chinese women.

Criticisms of China

As First Lady, she attended the United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing, in September 1995, along with the U.S. permanent representative at the U.N. Madeleine Albright.

During her speech to the conference, she made some sharp criticisms of human rights violations against women in China and in all developing countries.

The text of this speech was deleted from the Chinese translation of Hillary’s memoirs, published in Nanjing in 2003, a piece of censorship about which she has already expressed anger.

On the eve of International Women’s Day this year, five Chinese feminists—Li Tingting, Wang Man, Wei Tingting, Zheng Churan, and Wu Rongron—were detained by police in Guangzhou, Hangzhou, and Beijing on charges of “gathering a crowd to disrupt public order.”

This didn’t escape Hillary Clinton’s attention, and she made a personal statement on April 7 on Twitter calling on the Chinese authorities to release them.

So we can see that she won’t let China lightly off the hook on human rights issues.

Xinhua commented on the matter: “Generally speaking, presidential candidates make strong, even acrimonious comments, about China to win votes, and yet, once they get into the White House and are confronted with the reality of the situation, they take steps to avoid messing up Sino-U.S. relations.”

“This is a common tactic in U.S. politics. It seems that Hillary Clinton is an exception. She is taking a hard line before the election, but she’ll take an even tougher one afterwards,” Xinhua said.

A tough line

While this might previously have made it hard for Hillary to win the primaries, as Secretary of State under the Obama administration, she has taken an extremely tough line on China—for example, when she came up with the “pivot to Asia” policy, which has continued since she left office.

In the past, the U.S. military always took a tougher line on China, while the State Department took a more conciliatory approach. Clinton’s successor Kerry has continued with this.

But Hillary Clinton is different. At the July 2010 ASEAN regional forum in Hanoi, Vietnam, which brought together representatives of 27 nations in the region’s biggest-ever security convention, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton issued an open challenge to China on the issue of the South China Sea, saying that the maintenance of freedom of navigation through the region was in the U.S. national interest.

She even alluded to Chinese “coercion” and threats of force against other countries over disputes in the South China Sea. In response, Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi immediately came out and expressed Beijing’s fierce opposition to the “internationalization of the South China Sea issue.”

However, the South China Sea has always been an international waterway. China, Vietnam, Taiwan, Malaysia, the Philippines, Brunei, Indonesia, and other countries have claimed sovereignty over the South China Sea. It was internationalized a long time ago.

The U.S. stance found support from many countries in ASEAN. At the 5th ASEAN defense ministers’ conference in Jakarta, Indonesia on May 5, 2011, the issue of the South China Sea was raised for discussion for the first time at this meeting, resulting in the declaration of a set of management rules governing South China Sea territorial disputes.

The meeting also agreed to strengthen defense and security cooperation among ASEAN member nations, in order to ensure and promote regional peace and stability. Singapore’s leader Lee Kuan Yew, who has long enjoyed a good relationship with China, later publicly expressed the hope that the U.S. military should stay in Asia as a counterbalance to China.

It seems as if, under President Clinton, the conflict between the United States and China could intensify.

Rumored concerns

This is why Xinhua … recently started badmouthing her, in an article titled “Can Hillary Get Into The White House?” Xinhua wrote, “Hillary Clinton is 67 this year, and there have been rumored concerns over her health in the past.”

It even went on to quote experts as saying that: “From the point of view of the American voter, an even bigger issue is that Hillary presents a face that looks too old. She has already spent too long in the White House, and from the point of view of the electorate, she looks like a veteran politician, the sort of politician that people are tired of.”

“The voters would actually prefer some fresh energy from the grassroots. This was one of the factors that led to Hillary’s defeat by Obama. In addition, her strong character won’t help her when it comes to attracting middle-of-the-road voters.”

“Her personality is too distinct,” Xinhua wrote. “Those who like her, like her a lot, but those who don’t really hate her.”

Of course, whether or not Hillary Clinton is elected president will depend on the U.S. electorate.

But China has already taken some measures. On March 16, CBS News reported that the Clinton Foundation run by the Clintons and their daughter received a donation of around U.S.$2 million from a company with close ties to Beijing, the Liaoning-based Rilin Construction Group.

Company chairman Wang Wenliang is a delegate to the National People’s Congress (NPC), and his company has won bids to build a number of Chinese government projects and consular and diplomatic properties overseas, including the Chinese Embassy in Washington, D.C.

The same company also spent around U.S.$1.4 million in 2012 on lobbying the U.S. Congress and State Department. So it’s not hard to imagine the intention behind that donation.

So money can keep the demons at bay, can it? Such actions only expose the dark and dirty psychology of the [ruling] Chinese Communist Party.

Translated by Luisetta Mudie.

*Lin Baohua is an exiled pro-democracy activist turned political commentator.

The post What China Thinks Of Hillary Clinton – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

The US, China And The AIIB: From Zero-Sum Competition To Win-Win Cooperation? – Analysis

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On March 12, 2015, the White House issued a surprising public rebuke of the UK for agreeing to join China’s Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) as a founding member. This breach of the US-UK “special relationship” signaled the US’ unease with China’s growing influence as a rising power, as well as the US’ belief that “constant accommodation” was the wrong way to relate to China.1

This suggests that the US sees its relationship with China over the AIIB through the lens of zero-sum logic, such that the gains in global influence China earns through the AIIB automatically translate into losses in global influence for the US. As we shall see, this is not the first time the US has seen a non-Western global initiative as a threat to its influence. In the case of the AIIB, the UK’s decision to join opened the way for other US allies to follow suit. Among the G-7 group of the world’s most industrialized economies, the UK was quickly joined by France, Germany and Italy as founding members of the AIIB, leaving out the US, Canada and Japan.2 By April 15, 2015, when the list of the AIIB’s founding members was finalized, 57 countries had joined the AIIB as founding members. While most were located in Asia, particularly in the regions along China’s “Belt and Road” development zones, the potential for synergistic economic growth attracted countries from outside these regions to join the AIIB as founding members, including Western Europe and South America.3 The sudden wave of last-minute applications to join the AIIB as founding members reportedly surprised China, especially given the hostility of the US to the AIIB.4 This unexpected support shows that many countries don’t share the US’ understanding of the AIIB as representing a zero-sum competition for global influence, but that instead they share China’s view of the AIIB as representing a significant opportunity for win-win cooperation, with economic development for all participants as the primary goal.

Zero-Sum Logic

In a zero-sum game, a gain for one participant means a loss for another participant, and there is no net gain or loss for the game’s participants.5 In the case of the US and its relations with the Asia-Pacific, its actions indicate that it sees certain situations in terms of zero-sum logic. In the late 1990s the US was opposed to an Asian-led initiative to create an Asian Monetary Fund, and succeeded in terminating the initiative. In that case and in the case of the AIIB, the US feared the loss of influence that it believed would result from multilateralism.6 Zero-sum logic can also be seen in the US’ exclusion of China from its proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership with Asia-Pacific economies.7 In addition, proposed reforms to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to grant a greater share of votes to China and other emerging economies have been blocked by the US Congress for the past 5 years.8 Zero-sum logic can also be perceived in policy analyses which view Beijing as establishing a parallel international structure, of which the AIIB is one component, to “challenge and constrain US and European predominance.”9 As we shall see, Beijing’s actions with regard to the AIIB indicate it does not intend to use the AIIB to subvert the established international system of infrastructure financing, but instead seeks to use the AIIB to complement this existing system.

Ironically, by killing the Asian Monetary Fund, and by attempting to kill the AIIB, the US, whose rhetoric positions itself as the champion of global capitalism, is effectively maintaining a monopoly on the global market for infrastructure financing, whereas China is trying to open up this market and introduce competition with the introduction of the AIIB. As Joseph Stiglitz, Nobel laureate in economics and former World Bank Chief Economist, points out, US opposition to the AIIB reflects the common phenomenon of firms wanting “competition everywhere except in their own industry.”10 South Korean economist Ha-Joon Chang offers another perspective on this issue in his observation that, after having ascended the ladder of economic development, the US has effectively kicked away this ladder, and is forcing developing countries to achieve development through a method which it did not itself go through.11

In contrast, China seeks to share its actual development experience with other developing countries.12 The AIIB is one of the mechanisms it has set up to achieve this. This reflects China’s understanding of the AIIB as a mechanism for win-win cooperation, which, unlike zero-sum logic, allows all the participants in the situation to achieve gains without penalty for anyone. In the case of the AIIB, the infrastructural development it finances can potentially stimulate economic growth throughout the region.13 Before we consider how the different founding members of the AIIB understand how they can partake in this possible growth, we will first consider how the AIIB fits in with the existing group of international financial institutions (IFIs).

The Global Infrastructure Financing Gap

Contrary to the paranoid suspicions that the AIIB seeks to replace existing IFIs like the Asian Development Bank (ADB), IMF, and the World Bank, Chinese officials like Jin Liqun, the secretary general of the AIIB’s interim secretariat, have repeatedly stated that the AIIB is intended to complement the service of these IFIs.14 This can be seen in their different niches: while existing IFIs focus on poverty reduction, the AIIB is focused on infrastructure development.15

Indonesian Finance Minister Bambang Brodjonegoro has elaborated on this point, noting that the AIIB will focus on large-scale infrastructure projects like airports, seaports, and power plants. This distinguishes the AIIB from the existing IFIs as the latter primarily focus on the financing of smaller-scale poverty reduction projects like irrigation systems and rural roads. This difference in focus means the AIIB is not in competition with these other IFIs, and instead complements their work.16 Indeed, in terms of their capitalization, it is clear that the AIIB was never intended to supplant the ADB, much less the IMF or World Bank. The AIIB will begin its operations with an initial sum of 50 billion USD in authorized capital. This will eventually increase to 100 billion USD.17 This is significantly less than the ADB which had 153 billion USD in capital at the end of 2014.18

The other important way the AIIB complements the existing IFIs is by helping meet the global gap in infrastructure financing. The World Bank has calculated that the world will need to invest at least 57-67 trillion USD in infrastructure, with the needs of developing countries accounting for 37% of this. In addition, developing countries will need to spend 1 trillion USD in annual infrastructure investments to meet the needs of their economic growth and urbanization.19 Focusing on Asia, the ADB calculates that existing IFIs lack the capital to meet the infrastructural financing needs of developing countries in the region. While Asian countries need to spend 800 billion USD each year to maintain their economic growth, the existing IFIs can only supply 20 billion USD in financing. The AIIB is intended to help fill this financing gap.20

International organizations have recognized the complementary role of the AIIB to their work. Jan Eliasson, the deputy secretary-general of the United Nations, has praised the China’s ambitious “Belt and Road” regional development strategy and the AIIB for their role in helping developing countries achieve the UN’s development goals through infrastructure investment.21 World Bank president Jim Yong Kim has welcomed the AIIB’s role in reducing the global infrastructure financing shortfall, and confirmed that the World Bank is ready to cooperate with the AIIB, for example by sharing knowledge and experience. Kim also hopes that the AIIB will participate in the World Bank’s Global Infrastructure Facility, an instrument that facilitates the creation of public-private partnerships for infrastructure projects.22 IMF Managing Director Christine Lagarde and ADB President Takehiko Nakao have likewise welcomed the AIIB and stated the willingness of their respective IFIs to cooperate with the AIIB on infrastructure financing, especially given the global infrastructure financing shortfall.23

Win-Win Cooperation

Rather than zero-sum competition, China views the AIIB as a key instrument for achieving win-win cooperation in Asia. By drawing on its foreign reserves and pooling together the resources of the other 56 founding members, the AIIB, and the “Belt and Road” projects that it will finance, represent for China important mechanisms to fulfill its responsibility as a global leader, and to assist its Asian neighbours on their paths to economic development.24 Indeed, having enjoyed three decades of rapid economic growth, China seeks to help developing economies in Asia partake in economic growth, and in the process transform Asia into a “community of common destiny.”25

The IMF has calculated that investment in infrastructure in developing countries has a significantly high multiplier effect on their economies, such that each dollar spent on infrastructure will stimulate an expansion of 1.6 dollars in the economy.26 This can be observed in the economic growth stimulated in northern Vietnam by the construction of the Noi Bai-Lao Cai expressway. Developed as part of the ADB’s Kunming-Hai Phong Transport Corridor project, the expressway has increased trade between Vietnam and China, and generated an economic boost for northern Vietnam.27 The unexpected international support for the AIIB can hence be interpreted as a widespread desire among developing and developed economies to partake in the economic benefits of the “Belt and Road” infrastructure projects.28 The “Belt and Road” promises synergistic economic growth by connecting the high growth regions of Western Europe and East Asia with the hinterland of Central Asia. The latest roadmap of the “Belt and Road” now shows the inclusion of the South Pacific in the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road. In addition, the roadmap elaborates the Silk Road Economic Belt as having three lines of development: from China to Europe via Central Asia and Russia; from China to the Persian Gulf and Mediterranean Sea via Central and Western Asia; and from China to the Indian Ocean via Southeast and South Asia.

Indeed, the “Belt and Road” extends from East Asia to Western Europe via the Balkans, Hungary, and the Greek port of Piraeus, which is partly managed by the Chinese firm COSCO. The full geographic reach of the “Belt and Road” encompasses 75% of the world’s economy, a market of 4.4 billion people, and a combined economy of 21 trillion USD. According to economists, the countries along the “Belt and Road” will require infrastructure investment worth 8 trillion USD.29 While the improved infrastructure offers economic gains for the receiving countries, the infrastructure construction projects represent significant business opportunities for economies in need of further stimulus. Let us now consider how some of the AIIB’s 57 founding members hope to benefit from their participation in the AIIB, and more broadly, in the “Belt and Road”:

Australia: Like the UK and the advanced economies of Western Europe, Australia broke with the US to join the AIIB as a founding member. The economic benefits from participation arise from the expected boost to Australia’s minerals sector, in particular the supply of iron and ore for the global infrastructure projects financed by the AIIB.30

India: Back in July 2014, India expressed its interest to be a founding member of the AIIB, as it saw the AIIB as a key source of financing for not just its planned infrastructure projects but also the development of its manufacturing sector. India has also sought to increase foreign direct investment (FDI) in its economy. After Xi Jinping’s visit to India in 2014, Chinese FDI in India soared, and Sino-Indian trade reached 70 billion USD in 2014, 70 times what it was in 2004. The Indian government hopes this trade will increase to 100 billion USD in 2015, and especially seeks Chinese investment in Indian factories, thereby developing the Indian manufacturing sector.31

Indonesia: The Indonesian government estimates that the synergistic alignment of China’s 21st Century Maritime Silk Road with Indonesian President Joko Widodo’s Global Maritime Axis initiative could add 0.3-0.5% growth to Indonesia’s GDP. The economic development of Indonesia’s less developed regions could also receive a boost from the construction of new seaports across the Indonesian archipelago.32 The AIIB, of which Indonesia is a founding member, is expected to be a key source of financing for this large investment in maritime infrastructure.

Israel: Due to rising anti-Semitism in Europe, the Israeli government has encouraged its business community to diversify their export markets, and many have turned to Asia. Israel’s position as a founding member of the AIIB is expected to create business opportunities for Israeli companies with the AIIB’s infrastructure projects.33

Kazakhstan: Kazakhstan is the world’s largest landlocked country, and seeks the development of its transportation infrastructure, in particular railways, roads, and airports, as well as the development of its energy infrastructure, to facilitate its economic growth. A key part of the Silk Road Economic Belt, Kazakhstan has launched its own program of infrastructure development. The AIIB, of which Kazakhstan is a founding member, is expected to provide much needed financing for these projects.34

Myanmar: Myanmar is one of the AIIB’s 32 Asian founding members, and like India was among the first to join. With poor infrastructure severely impeding economic growth, the Myanmar government urgently needs financing for the country’s infrastructure development.35

Singapore: Singapore’s participation in the AIIB as a founding member will allow it to share its expertise in economic development. Singapore’s corporations will also have opportunities to participate in the AIIB’s infrastructure projects.36

South Korea: South Korea’s participation in the AIIB as a founding member has benefitted the country’s manufacturers like Histeel and Hanil Iron & Steel, with their stock prices increasing on investor anticipation that they will receive large orders from the AIIB’s infrastructure projects. The South Korean government also expects the AIIB’s projects to benefit companies in other economic sectors including communications, energy, and transportation.37

UAE: The UAE, one of the founding members of the AIIB, is positioning itself to be a key gateway on China’s “Belt and Road,” by highlighting its industrial free zones, like the Khalifa industrial zone in Abu Dhabi, and its maritime and air transportation hubs to construction and logistics corporations involved with “Belt and Road” projects. Chinese firms involved with Africa and West Asia are long familiar with UAE. With the upcoming “Belt and Road” projects, the UAE is positioning Dubai International Airport, the world’s busiest airport, and Dubai’s Jebel Ali seaport, the Middle East’s largest container port, as key logistics and transportation hubs between Africa, the Middle East, Europe and Asia. The “Belt and Road” also represents a key opportunity for the UAE to diversify from its oil economy.38

New Normal

Like the other 56 founding members of the AIIB, China too expects to enjoy an economic boost from its participation. In 2013 China launched the “Belt and Road” development framework, of which the AIIB is a key financing instrument, as one of the new engines of growth for what the government has described as the country’s “new normal” of slower economic growth.39 China’s past three decades of rapid growth was unprecedented and was the result of the government’s open attitude to “trial and error” experimentation with reforms. As Deng Xiaoping said, China had to “cross the river by feeling the stones.” The “Belt and Road” and its associated institutions like the AIIB can be seen as innovations implemented by Xi Jinping’s administration to lead China through the changed economic circumstances of the “new normal.”40

This economic slowdown has affected manufacturers across the country in regions like the Pearl River Delta. At present Guangdong’s imports and exports with the countries on the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road amount to less than 20% of total imports and exports. This suggests that Chinese manufacturers will have to adjust their businesses to serve the countries located along the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road in order to take advantage of the new opportunities afforded by the “Belt and Road.”41 These opportunities are not insignificant. Chinese investment firm Minsheng Securities estimates that the “Belt and Road” will generate 1 trillion RMB in investment spending, with at least 30% of this spent in China, thereby adding 0.3-0.4% growth to China’s GDP.42 However, Chinese companies will not have a free ride, as it is the AIIB’s Board of Directors that will decide on investment projects, not the management. This means Chinese companies will have to compete against their global competitors for the opportunity to work on AIIB-funded infrastructure projects.43

The “Belt and Road” is anticipated to create business opportunities in numerous sectors of the economy. China’s slumping construction machinery industry is one of these, and the “Belt and Road” is expected to boost exports of heavy machinery from the present volume of 19 billion USD to 54 billion USD in 2020.44 The energy sector is another. Jinko Solar, a Chinese solar power company, is one of the Chinese companies which have aligned their businesses with the opportunities provided by the “Belt and Road.” Jinko is investing in the energy sectors of “Belt and Road” countries like Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in Central Asia, Jordan in the Middle East, and Thailand in Southeast Asia.45 Transportation is also a key sector.

CRRC Corporation, the Chinese rail construction giant that will be formed by the merger of China’s two biggest rail construction companies, is expected to be competitive against the world’s leading corporations in the rail construction sector, including Alstom, Bombardier, General Electric, Kawasaki, and Siemens. These top corporations are expected to bid for rail construction projects in the “Belt and Road,” including rail connections between China and Southeast Asian countries like Laos and Thailand. The rail sector in particular has become a bright light in China’s “new normal,” with Chinese manufacturers exporting rolling stock, railway equipment, and trains to meet transportation demand around the world, including from overseas “Belt and Road” rail projects.46 The “Belt and Road” has already shown early signs of the fulfillment of its economic promise in the form of increased trade, with bilateral trade between China and the “Belt and Road” countries reaching 1.45 trillion RMB, or one quarter of China’s total trade, in the first quarter of 2015. China’s exports to the “Belt and Road” countries rose by 10%, compared with the 4.9% increase in China’s total exports during this period.47

Preparations for Launch

The AIIB is scheduled to commence operations at the end of 2015. A lot of work will have to be done in the meantime. Apart from recruiting its managerial team and staff, China and the other founding members will also have to establish the charter and work out the AIIB’s rules.48 The rule-making function will be guided by the distribution of voting shares among the founding members.

According to Jin Liqun, the secretary general of the AIIB’s interim secretariat, voting shares will be allocated based on geography as well as GDP. Asian countries will receive 75% of the shares, and non-Asian countries the remaining 25%. The share allocation will then be based on each country’s GDP. China hence will be the AIIB’s largest shareholder. The geographical division reflects the AIIB’s desire for the advanced economies of the West to share not their capital but rather their technical experience with managing complex corporate entities like the AIIB, thereby ensuring the AIIB adheres to world-class standards of governance.49 The Asian-centric distribution of voting shares will also help the AIIB avoid a recurrence of the situation in the ADB where, despite its Asian focus, the US and Europe have predominant influence.50

While the opportunity for countries to join the AIIB as founding members has closed, the bank is still open to receiving ordinary members. Unlike the founding members who enjoy the right to create the AIIB’s governance and operational rules, the ordinary members have voting rights but are excluded from the rule-making process.51 Of the G-7, the US, Canada and Japan missed out on the opportunity to participate in the AIIB as founding members. Japan reportedly has interest in joining the AIIB as an ordinary member, with a possible contribution of 1.5 billion USD.52 Likewise, Canada is actively considering joining the AIIB.53 Following the unexpected surge in international support for the AIIB, including support from the ADB, IMF, and World Bank, the US has softened its initial hostility to the AIIB. US Treasury Secretary Jack Lew has stated that the US is now open to welcoming the AIIB if it, as China has repeatedly confirmed, complements the work of the existing IFIs and follows world-class standards of governance.54 China, in turn, continues to offer the US the opportunity to join the AIIB. Jin Liqun and Chinese Finance Minister Lou Jiwei have stated that the US is welcome to join the AIIB anytime.55

About the author:
Alvin Cheng-Hin Lim is a research fellow with the Longus Institute for Development and Strategy, and is the author of Cambodia and the Politics of Aesthetics (Routledge 2013). He received his Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Hawaii at Manoa, and has taught at Pannasastra University of Cambodia and the American University of Nigeria.

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Notes:
1. Nicholas Watt, Paul Lewis and Tania Branigan, “US anger at Britain joining Chinese-led investment bank AIIB,” The Guardian, March 13, 2015, accessed April 19, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/mar/13/white-house-pointedly-asks-uk-to-use-its-voice-as-part-of-chinese-led-bank.
2. “Japanese govt criticised over AIIB handling,” The Yomiuri Shimbun, April 8, 2015, accessed April 14, 2015, http://www.asianewsnet.net/Japanese-govt-criticised-over-AIIB-handling-73859.html.
3. Dai Tian, “AIIB founding members rise to 57,” China Daily, April 15, 2015, accessed April 15, 2015, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2015-04/15/content_20440449.htm. Te-Ping Chen and Yang Jie, “China’s Infrastructure Bank Attracts 57 Founding Members – Prospectively,” Wall Street Journal, April 15, 2015, accessed April 15, 2015, http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2015/04/15/chinas-infrastructure-bank-attracts-57-founding-members-prospectively/.
4. Jane Perlez, “Stampede to Join China’s Development Bank Stuns Even Its Founder,” The New York Times, April 2, 2015, accessed April 9, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/03/world/asia/china-asian-infrastructure-investment-bank.html.
5. Andrew M. Colman, Game Theory and Its Applications in the Social and Biological Sciences (Oxford: Psychology Press, 1995), 53.
6. Mohamed A. El-Erian, “U.S. Opposition to Asian Bank Is Self-Destructive,” Bloomberg, March 31, 2015, accessed April 7, 2015, http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-03-31/el-erian-u-s-opposition-to-asia-bank-is-self-destructive.
7. Nick Derewlany, “Australia Caught in Middle of US-China Power Tussle,” The Diplomat, April 14, 2015, accessed April 15, 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/04/australia-caught-in-middle-of-us-china-power-tussle/.
8. “IMF members frustrated at quota reform delay: PBOC governor,” Want China Times, April 19, 2015, accessed April 19, 2015, http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?id=20150419000112&cid=1102&MainCatID=0. Lawrence Summers, “Time US leadership woke up to new economic era,” Financial Times, April 5, 2015, accessed April 7, 2015, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/a0a01306-d887-11e4-ba53-00144feab7de.html. Jonathan Weisman, “At Global Economic Gathering, U.S. Primacy Is Seen as Ebbing,” New York Times, April 17, 2015, accessed April 18, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/18/business/international/at-global-economic-gathering-concerns-that-us-is-ceding-its-leadership-role.html.
9. Sebastian Heilmann, Moritz Rudolf, Mikko Huotari and Johannes Buckow, “China’s Shadow Foreign Policy: Parallel Structures Challenge the Established International Order,” MERICS China Monitor 18, October 28, 2014, accessed April 19, 2015, http://www.merics.org/fileadmin/templates/download/china-monitor/China_Monitor_No_18_en.pdf.
10. Joseph E. Stiglitz, “Asia’s Multilateralism,” Project Syndicate, April 13, 2015, accessed April 18, 2015, http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/china-aiib-us-opposition-by-joseph-e–stiglitz-2015-04.
11. Ha-Joon Chang, “Kicking Away the Ladder: The ‘Real’ History of Free Trade,” Foreign Policy in Focus, December 30, 2003, accessed April 18, 2015, http://fpif.org/kicking_away_the_ladder_the_real_history_of_free_trade/.
12. Alvin Cheng-Hin Lim, “Africa and China’s 21st Century Maritime Silk Road,” The Asia-Pacific Journal 13, March 16, 2015, accessed April 18, 2015, http://japanfocus.org/-Alvin_Cheng_Hin-Lim/4296.
13. Isabel Reynolds and Enda Curran, “In Development Bank Battle, Surge to China Rattles Japan,” Bloomberg, March 18, 2015, accessed April 14, 2015, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-03-18/in-development-bank-battle-surge-to-china-rattles-japan.
14. “AIIB, a paradigm power shift,” Xinhua, March 31, 2015, accessed April 14, 2015, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-03/31/c_134114065.htm.
15. Sharon Chen, “China-Led Infrastructure Bank to Welcome U.S. ‘Anytime,’” Bloomberg, April 11, 2015, accessed April 15, 2015, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-04-11/china-led-infrastructure-bank-to-welcome-u-s-anytime-.
16. Ben Otto, “China-Led Bank to Focus on Big-Ticket Projects, Indonesia Says,” Wall Street Journal, April 10, 2015, accessed April 14, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/china-led-aiib-to-focus-on-big-ticket-projects-indonesia-says-1428647276.
17. Huang Hsin, “AIIB to hold first working meeting at end of month,” Want China Times, April 4, 2015, accessed April 14, 2015, http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?id=20150404000097&cid=1101.
18. Reynolds and Curran, “In Development Bank.”
19. Miriam L. Campanella, “The AIIB Will Help Bridge Infrastructure Finance Gap,” Caixin, April 14, 2015, accessed April 15, 2015, http://english.caixin.com/2015-04-14/100800152.html.
20. “AIIB, a paradigm.” “AIIB to bring competition for infrastructure in developing world,” Want China Times, April 9, 2015, accessed April 9, 2015, http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?id=20150409000150&cid=1102&MainCatID=0. “The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank: The infrastructure gap,” The Economist, March 21, 2015, accessed April 9, 2015, http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21646740-development-finance-helps-china-win-friends-and-influence-american-allies-infrastructure-gap. “Transcript of Premier Li Keqiang’s Interview with Financial Times Editor Lionel Barber,” English.gov.cn, April 16, 2015, accessed April 17, 2015, http://english.gov.cn/premier/news/2015/04/16/content_281475089949531.htm.
21. “China’s Belt and Road initiative ‘fits into UN goals’: UN deputy secretary-general,” Xinhua, April 10, 2015, accessed April 14, 2015, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/916201.shtml.
22. Tim Fernholz and Jim Yong Kim, “World Bank president Jim Kim on Asian infrastructure investment, Africa rising, and his bromance with Jack Ma,” Quartz, April 11, 2015, accessed April 14, 2015, http://qz.com/381115/world-bank-president-jim-kim-on-asian-infrastructure-investment-africa-rising-and-his-bromance-with-jack-ma/. “World Bank president ‘welcomes new development banks,’” Xinhua, April 8, 2015, accessed April 9, 2015, http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?id=20150408000103&cid=1102&MainCatID=0.
23. “IMF chief Christine Lagarde hails AIIB as US mellows down criticism,” Economic Times, March 23, 2015, accessed April 7, 2015, http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2015-03-23/news/60404300_1_aiib-infrastructure-investment-bank-asian-development-bank. Michael Ivanovitch, “Asia infrastructure: investment opportunities abound,” CNBC, April 6, 2015, accessed April 7, 2015, https://au.finance.yahoo.com/news/asia-infrastructure-investment-opportunities-abound-235425014.html. Matthew Miller and Brenda Goh, “IMF, ADB add to supporters for China-led development bank,” Reuters, March 22, 2015, accessed April 17, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/03/22/us-china-finance-ministry-adb-idUSKBN0MI03I20150322.
24. “Xinhua: Bias against AIIB betrays entrenched prejudice against China,” Xinhua, March 31, 2015, accessed April 7, 2015, http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?id=20150331000092&cid=1102&MainCatID=0.
25. “AIIB, a paradigm.” “Full text of Chinese President’s speech at Boao Forum for Asia,” Xinhua, March 29, 2015, accessed April 19, 2015, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-03/29/c_134106145.htm.
26. Campanella, “The AIIB will.”
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28. Perlez, “Stampede to Join.”
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The post The US, China And The AIIB: From Zero-Sum Competition To Win-Win Cooperation? – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Egypt: Death Sentence For Soccer Fans Puts President’s Iron Grip To The Test – Analysis

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Egyptian-general-turned-president Abdel Fattah al Sisi’s iron grip on dissident is likely to be put to the test with the sentencing to death of 11 soccer fans for involvement in a politically loaded football brawl three years ago that left 74 militant supporters of storied Cairo club Al Ahli SC dead.

The brawl and the subsequent sentencing to death in an initial trial two years ago of 21 supporters of the Suez Canal city of Port Said’s Al Masri SC sparked mass protests by Al Ahli fans demanding justice in the walk up to the court hearings and a popular revolt in Port Said and other Suez Canal cities once the verdict was issued that forced then President Mohammed Morsi to declare an emergency and deploy military troops to the region.

Although the judge in the retrial ordered by an appeals court lowered the number of al Masri supporters facing a death penalty, the verdict is certain to spark renewed anger in Port Said where many see the fans as scapegoats in what was likely an effort that got out of hand by the military and security forces to punish the Al Ahli supporters for their key role in the 2011 popular revolt that toppled President Hosni Mubarak and subsequent mass protests against military rule.

The 11 fans are part of a group of 73 defendants that includes nine polices officers and three Al Masri executives charged with responsibility for the incident in which police and security forces stood by as the Al Ahli fans died in a stampede after their team’s match against Al Masri in a Port Said stadium whose gates had been locked from the outside. The court is expected to issue its final verdict on May 30.

Suspicion of some association of police and the military in the incident, the worst in Egyptian sporting history, was further fuelled by circumstantial evidence, including lax security in advance of the match, the signalling of a group of men armed with identical batons in the stadium, and threats exchanged on Twitter between Al Masri and Al Ahli fans in advance of the game.

Mr. Al Sisi’s brutal suppression of dissent since he toppled Mr. Morsi in a military coup in 2013 that has led to more than 1,400 deaths and the incarceration of thousands raises the stakes for protesters and could lead many in Port Said to think twice before taking to the streets. Supporters may also wait until Egypt’s grand mufti rules on the death sentences.

All death sentences in Egypt are referred to the mufti for his non-binding ratification. A decision by the mufti to reject the death sentences could lower temperatures in Port Said but spark anger among Al Ahli fans who celebrated when the initial court sentenced the 21 to death.

The initial indictment of the 73 served to effectively put the blame for the incident on Al Masri fans and evade a thorough investigation of potential involvement of security or military personnel despite the presence of nine local police officials among the defendants. The framing of the case in this fashion made it however impossible to achieve a verdict that would be perceived as equitable by all. The sentencing of the Al Masri fans was always going to leave Port Said unhappy while acquittal or the imposition of light sentences would have infuriated the thousands of supporters of Al Ahli.

The court verdict comes at a sensitive moment in Egyptian soccer politics. The death sentences came days after Egypt moved closer to banning as terrorist organizations militant soccer groups that form the backbone of opposition to Mr. Al Sisi’s autocratic rule with the arrest and pre-trial detention of five alleged members of the Ultras White Knights (UWK), the highly-politicized, street battle-hardened support group of Al Ahli arch rival Al Zamalek SC. The five men were arrested on charges of joining a “terrorist entity” and attempting to topple the regime of general-turned-president Abdel Fattah Al Sisi.

The verdict also followed the start of a trial against 16 people, including UWK members, charged with violent acts, arson and rioting that led on February 8 to a stampede outside Cairo’s Air Defence Stadium in which 20 people were killed. The deaths are widely believed to have been the result not of UWK provocation but of violence by a police and security force that has no experience in crowd control and is notorious for its brutality.

Finally, the court issued the death sentences at a time that soccer fans are at the core of anti-government protests in universities that are controlled by security forces and popular neighbourhoods of Egyptian cities. Leaders of fan and student groups warn that the post-2011 generation is on the one hand more apathetic and on the other more hopeless and nihilistic than the one that participated four years ago in the popular revolt.

The crackdown on soccer fans at a time that league matches are played behind closed doors to pre-empt violence and prevent stadia from re-emerging as venues for the expression of dissent is certain to deepen a sense of frustration. “When the opportunity arises they (the new generation) will do something bigger than we ever did,” said a founder of the UWK who has since distanced himself from the group.

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Saudi Arabia Seeks To Uplift Regional Prestige Through Yemen Aggression – OpEd

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By Ali Akbar Asadi*

The ongoing military intervention in Yemen by Saudi Arabia and its Arab allies has only served to intensify crisis in Yemen, make it more complicated, and usher it into a totally different new phase. While the Saudi government was known for its cautious approach and discretion in foreign policy during past decades, the country’s military onslaught against Yemen following the ascension to power of such young leaders as Mohammed bin Salman, the current Saudi defense minister and the son of King Salman, has given rise to many questions and analyses in this regard.

Regardless of the form, process and possible outcomes of Saudi Arabia’s military intervention in Yemen, positing questions about the motivations behind this intervention in view of existing understanding of the country’s foreign policy behavior can be very important. Most leaders and analysts close to the Saudi government have been trying during past weeks to show that Saudi Arabia’s military aggression against Yemen has been in reaction to urgent and immediate security threats posed to Riyadh by its southern neighbor. In doing so, they have been trying to provide necessary grounds to justify this act of aggression at regional and international levels.

However, a review of domestic conditions as well as the military power of the Saudi government in comparison with capabilities and behavior of Yemen’s internal players can lead us to a different conclusion. This article aims to discuss the argument that Saudi military aggression against Yemen, more than being motivated by urgent security concerns, has been an effort by that country’s leaders to boost their country’s national prestige both at regional and international levels. This effort, which stands in stark contrast to traditionally conservative and cautious approach of Saudis, emanates from the mentality of such young leaders as Muhammad bin Nayef, who is simultaneously Saudi Arabia’s deputy crown prince, second deputy prime minister and the minister of interior. The hallmark of that mentality has been relative disregard for complicated conditions in Yemen as well as regional conditions and balance of powers.

The most important argument used by Saudis to justify their military aggression against Yemen is domination of Shia Houthis on the country in collaboration with Iran and subsequent security threats that arise from this situation both for the Saudi government and the entire region, especially the strategic strait of Bab-el-Mandeb. There are a few points that should be mentioned with regard to this allegation.

Firstly, more than being merely a result of the measures taken by Houthis, the situation in Yemen is the outcome of the failure of policies that have been adopted during the past decades, which have pushed the country toward economic collapse, social and political dissent, and exacerbation of domestic differences and conflicts.

Instead of blaming countries like Iran for the existence of these conditions, Riyadh should know that they are the aftermath of the approach taken to Yemen by certain Arab countries, especially Saudi Arabia. This is true as popular protests and uprising in Yemen in 2011 failed to lead to objective changes in the life of Yemeni people. On the other hand, the initiative offered by the (Persian) Gulf Cooperation Council [(P)GCC] to resolve the country’s problems, actually sought to put a leash on the demands of the Yemeni people.

Secondly, although Houthis and their Ansarullah fighters have good relations with Iran, they also represent a vast social and political current with a popular, national and revolutionary approach in Yemen. They managed to gain considerable power in Yemen’s political equation only after the failure of the past political and security trends, especially as a result of the alliance of a large part of Yemeni army with them.

Thirdly, given the true course through which Yemen’s Houthi Ansarullah fighters have gained power in the country, Arab states should have tried to recognize this reality and come to a political understanding with this important political actor. On the contrary, they have made serious weakening of Ansarullah through any kind of possible political or military process and this issue is the most important factor that has led to the current escalation of the crisis in the Arab country. The important point is the false propaganda that Arab states have launched about security consequences of the empowerment of Ansarullah in Yemen. At present, Houthis and the Yemeni army have preferred to show self-restraint in the face of the Saudi military aggression in order not to help the war spread to other places. Therefore, it would not be optimistic to assume that this group could really pose a serious security threat to a country like Saudi Arabia, whose military power is much higher than Houthis.

Also, propaganda about the ability of Houthis to threaten Bab-el-Mandeb Strait is devoid of any truth. At a time that major marine powers are present in that region and safety of international shipping is also intertwined with global economic trends, it would not be logical to assume that Ansarullah has the will or even the ability to pose any threat to this international waterway.

In view of the above factors, it seems that the decision made by Saudis for military intervention in Yemen is a measure aimed at rebuilding the Saudi government’s prestige at regional and international levels rather than being motivated by the country’s security concerns and interests. Of course, governments usually pursue revival and promotion of their international prestige as a foreign policy goal in addition to seeking such goals as protecting their country’s territorial integrity, national security, and national welfare. However, efforts made to boost a country’s national prestige can be better pulled off through due attention to a variety of factors such as economic development, religious and cultural factors, or boosting the military might of a country.

Up to this time, the Saudi government has mostly tried to relay on its religious status as the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, as well as on its economic might that stems from oil exports to uplift its national prestige. However, it now appears that the country is making an endeavor to take advantage of its military power in an objective and active way to realize this goal. In other words, the new leadership in Saudi Arabia maintains that simple recourse to traditional tools and approaches has weakened the country’s national prestige and reduced its role in regional developments.

Therefore, Riyadh feels compelled to take advantage of the military hardware, on which it has spent billions of dollars, to boost its regional prestige through a brutal display of military power. The case of Yemen has been chosen for the application of the military power because Saudis believed that their attack on Yemen will be followed by less regional and international opposition as well as lower resistance and military cost than other similar cases.

Nonetheless, the consequences of Saudi Arabia’s recourse to military hardware in Yemen in order to boost its regional prestige cannot be fully fathomed yet. While more than 20 days have passed since the beginning of the military aggression against Yemen by Saudi Arabia and its allies, the possibility for changing security and political balance in Yemen through air strikes is decreasing day by day. Sending troops into Yemen is also bugged with many difficulties because it can produce a totally opposite result.

At the same time, political pressures as well as pressures from human rights bodies are mounting on Saudi officials. Therefore, as the possibility of Saudi’s achieving their goals in Yemen is actually fading out, the possibility that the aggression against Yemen is having a negative effect on the regional prestige of Saudi Arabia is increasing. Meanwhile, another important point to be considered here is that escalation of the crisis in Yemen through a possible ground military action can be followed by real security threats for Saudi Arabia in the long term and even pose objective and extensive security threats to the leaders of Saudi Arabia.

* Ali Akbar Asadi
Ph.D. in International Relations & Middle East Analyst

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Next Phase Of US Pivot To Asia: Responses From China – Analysis

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By Prof. B. R. Deepak*

Just before setting off to his visit to Japan, South Korea and the US Pacific Command in Honolulu between April 8 and 11, the US Secretary of Defence, Ashton Carter while delivering a speech at Arizona State University’s McCain Institute on April 6, 2015 said that he was ‘personally committed to overseeing the next phase of the rebalance, which will deepen and diversify the US engagement in the region.’

Carter was perhaps reassuring the US allies in Asia-Pacific that even though the US was bogged down in conflicts in the Middle East and Af-Pak region, it was serious about its pivot to Asia. Secondly, if the first phase of the pivot was overshadowed by China’s grandiose initiatives such as Asia Infrastructural Development Bank (AIDB), ‘Belt and Road initiative, Silk Road Fund, and the Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific (FTAAP), the second phase will see the US taking its leadership role in the Asia Pacific region. Thirdly, the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and its companion agreement Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) floated by the US, that has remained non starter may be realised sooner than the later. It was in this context that Carter compared the TPP as a ‘new aircraft carrier’ and one of the most important parts of Obama administration’s effort to shift more attention to Asia-Pacific. He urged the Congress to give President Barack Obama authority to complete the agreement that holds ‘enormous promise’ for economic development and job creation. Carter declared Asia-Pacific as ‘defining region’ for the future of the US.

According to Carter there are three cornerstones of the next phase of the US pivot to Asia: advanced high-tech weapons; trilateral alliance between the US, Japan and South Korea; and the TPP. He said that most advanced weapons would be deployed in the Asia-Pacific, and 60% of the US naval fleet (six aircraft careers) would be deployed in the region. China finds it interesting that when the idea of pivot to Asia was floated in 2011, the US has pointed out that 60% of its fleet would be stationed in the Pacific, however, after 2013 the US have included the Indian Ocean as a part of the concept.

It is in this context that analysts in China are apprehensive about India becoming a ‘pawn’ on the ‘pivot to Asia’ chessboard, for India has been issuing joint statements since last year on Asia-Pacific with the US. However, many including Prof. Wang Wei of Central Nationality University believe that India may not be willing to play the second fiddle to the US. On the contrary, Chinese experts are of the view that India’s ‘Act East Policy’ may be on the path of ‘collision and friction’ as India expands its influence from South Asia to Southeast Asia.

As far as the triangular alliance between the US, Japan and South Korea is concerned, China sees an increased level of defence cooperation between the three, and finds it in sync with Shinzo Abe’s efforts to expand the role of the Self-Defence Forces (SDFs) by loosening constitutional constraints, especially the right to collective self-defence. Japanese SDFs are likely to provide their logistic support for the US forces in a case where Japan’s national security is threatened, and will cooperate under various circumstances including in a case of collective self-defence. The alliance is also considering ballistic missile defence, to this end the US is trying to convince South Korea to deploy ‘Sade System’.

The third cornerstone, the TPP, a symbol of economic and trade cooperation in the region, has been pronounced as one of the most important parts of the Asia-Pacific rebalancing strategy, ‘as important as an aircraft carrier.’ It is interesting to note that Japan and South Korea subsequently has been added to TPP negotiations while China has been kept out, albeit China has signalled that it may not be averse to join the agreement. However, it also believes that the TPP while serving the US pivot to Asia is also aimed to establish a new international economic order in Asia-Pacific under the auspices of the United States and contain China’s growing influence in the regional and global economy. China also believes that the negotiations may be stalled further as the US-Japan differences on trade and tariffs are serious.

The Ashton pronouncements have been regarded by China as ‘old wine in new bottle’; the wordings ranging from Hilary Clinton’s 2009 rhetoric of ‘Pivot to Asia-Pacific’ to Carter’s ‘new stage of the pivot’ according to China is a pointer to the fact the US has never been out of the ‘Cold War mentality’ and that it simply wants to consolidate its dominance in the Asia-Pacific, and maintain its hegemony in the region while containing China.

China believes that the reasons behind ‘the new stage’ of the pivot arise from ‘a sense of urgency’ from Obama administration, as it remains one of the flagships of US’s foreign policy but not taking a definite shape. It also reveals that there is ‘a sense of frustration’ as the ‘pivot’ has failed to contain China’s rise and influence in the region. Not only this, the US has also failed to reassure its allies in the region. Its old ally the Philippines has even announced its withdrawal from the TPP negotiations. The declining leadership role of the US is not only felt by its allies but by the US itself. The third reason the Chinese analysts provide is ‘a sense of powerlessness’ in the minds of the US authorities, and that is why it is strengthening its security alliance with Japan, South Korea and other allies, as well as trying to coax other powers in the regions to be part of its strategy.

Analysts in China are of the view that contrary to be able to bring security and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific, the ‘rebalancing’ will bring disaster to the region. They are questioning whether the TPP which has been compared to an aircraft career is open to various countries on equal footing like the ‘Belt and Road’ initiative or not? Is it inclusive or is there any hidden agenda? If it is not inclusive and not a win-win proposition, how can it bring peace and prosperity and provide security to the region? If it is exclusive, and the players have to play by the US rules, isn’t that the thinking of a hegemon?

It is in this context that China believes that Asian affairs should be left to the Asian countries to be resolved. These could be only resolved on the basis of mutual respect, consensus and a win-win scenario. Asia does not require ‘foreign monks’ to recite the ‘scriptures’! China’s strategy according to Prof. Wang Wei should be win-win cooperation with the US on one hand and consolidating and strengthening of China’s relations with Asia-Pacific countries on the other. She believes that Asia-Pacific is big enough to accommodate both China and the US, however, China need to be cautious as the US harbour evil intention towards China.

*B R Deepak is Professor of Chinese and China Studies at the Centre of Chinese and Southeast Asian Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University New Delhi. The views are solely his own.

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Nakhchivan, Azerbaijan: The Undiscovered Destination, Land Of Prophet Noah – OpEd

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By Basrad Pashayev*

Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic is an exclave of the Azerbaijan Republic. This wonderfully atmospheric region borders Turkey to the northwest, Armenia to the north and east, and Iran to the south. The isolation of Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic from the rest of the country is dating only from 1924, when Stalin transferred the province of Zangazur to Armenian control. In result of the Daglig/Nagorno Garabagh/Karabagh (the Azeri province occupied by Armenia) conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, the Armenian forces bombed Nakhchivan, but never were able to invade, taking only the village of Karki. The capital of the Autonomous Republic is Nakhchivan city and the enclave has an area of 5,500 sq. km with a population around 500.000. Nearly 75% of the territory is located at a height of 1,000m and above – Nakhchivan is known for its majestic mountains.

The city of Nakhchivan was mentioned firstly in Ptolemaios’s “Geography” as Naksuana and said to be established in 4400 A.D. Being involved in empires, sultanate, and khanate the name of Nakhchivan was altered many times. Some of these names are: Nakshi jahan (“The Beauty of the World”), Nuh chikhan (the place where Prophet Noah landed), and etc. The word Nakhchivan was differently presented in early sources: Naksuana in Greek, Nakhch in Pehlevi, Nakhchuan in Arabic. Despite of so many ideas were put forward by different researchers about the name of Nakhchivan the name of area is closely associated with Prophet Noah and Legend of World Flooding. The existence of the legend of Noah in holy Koran and Bible the epics Gilgamush and Gamigaya rock writings at the nearby of worship places which is located on the highest peak of the Lesser Caucasus mountains, Gapijig peak, 3907 meter from the sea level (located in the area of Ordubad of Nakhchivan) is quiet relevant to reality. Prophet Noah’s grave is also found in Nakhchivan city and a Complex is restored to this honor.

The Nakhchivan city is located on the crossroads of ancient trade routes. In The Early Middle Ages, the links between Nakhchivan and the countries of Asia Minor, Middle East and Transcaucasia became especially close. The city’s wealth and geopolitical position became the reason for frequent raids from neighboring countries. In the middle of the 1st century AD the city was sacked and destroyed by the Byzantine Emperor Iraclion the 2nd; it was frequently sacked during the Mongol raids; it became a permanent conflict of interest between Byzantine and Arab Caliphate. In all times Nakhchivan was one of the key cities of different states – the ruling dynasties of Sadjids, Salarids, the capital of the Azerbaijan State of Atabey Eldegiz. It eventually became an independent Khanate in the 18th century and was integrated to Russia in the 19th century. In 1991, as the USSR started to collapse, Nakhchivan declared independence for Azerbaijan, second only to Lithuania. Today as an Autonomous Republic within Azerbaijan, Nakhchivan has its own parliament (supreme assembly) and Cabinet of Ministers and Chairman of Supreme Assembly is the highest position.

The city also enjoyed high level of trade and was famous for artists and craftsmen: weavers, jewelers and glass blowers. However, the city was particularly famous for its architects of the famous school of Nakhchivani architecture. French travelers Pierre Chardine and Dubois de Monpierre and British traveler Porter noted that this was a splendid city with well-preserved architectural monuments of the antiquity. Turkish traveler Evliya Chelebi was enchanted by the city’s baths with the water pools daily scattered with rose petals.

In present Nakhchivan, close attention is paid to the development science and education. There are 2 Universities, a branch of the Azerbaijan National Academy of Sciences, branch of Teacher’s Institute. Schools are not set aside, too – old schools are being restored along with building of new ones – e.g. large, finely equipped schools. The city houses the Palace of Culture, Drama Theatre, Puppet Theater, Carpets Museum, and Historical Museum etc. The finely equipped Olympic Sport Complex has been built. Economy is developing rapidly, new plants, factories and enterprises are set up and many jobs are created.

The Tourism Potential of Nakhchivan is very high offering cultural heritage, historical, botanical, bird watching, ecological, health, and resort etc opportunities to many local and International travelers throughout the year. The most common way to reach Nakhchivan for International travelers is via air from Istanbul. Turkish Airlines have weekly 5-6 flights to and from Nakhchivan. Azerbaijan Airlines (AZAL) also operates at least 4 scheduled flights daily from Baku. You can also fly to Nakhchivan from Moscow, Russia and land pass from Julfa, (near Tabriz) Iran and Igdir, Eastern Turkey.

Nakhchivan offers rich architectural heritage to the world as the Mausoleum of Momine Khatun (12th century), the tomb of Yusuf Kuseyir (13th century), Garabaglar mausoleum with 2 minarets (13th century), Alinja Khanegah (12-13th centuries), Asabu Kahf (as stated in Holy Koran), Aza Bridge (16th century), Gulustan Tomb (13th century), Imamzade Complex (16th century), Alinja castle, the ruins of the city of Gilan etc.

Nakhchivan has also an ancient health history. Owing to the widespread natural medicine plants different illnesses could have been treated and this experience has been alive through the generations. Duzdag Physiotherapy center located at salt caves is an important medical center specialized in treatment of asthma and bronchial system illnesses. The Daridagh Balneological (arsenic water) Hospital is situated in the arsenic water bed area at 8 km distance from the city of Julfa. It was established on the basis of the mineral water bed in 1978. With the help of the Daridagh arsenic mineral water different heart diseases, support-action organs peripheric nerve system, venereal diseases, women’s diseases, anemia and other diseases are treated in this hospital. The people from different corners of the world visiting these treatment objects are healed very soon.

The Nakhchivan is promoting these sites as a potential source of historical/cultural and ecological tourism.

To conclude, Nakhchivan is the homeland of many famous political and military leaders, scientists, statesmen, writers, philologists and etc. The national leader of Azerbaijan, Heydar Aliyev was born in Nakhchivan too. Nakhchivan is a shockingly well-to-do, progressive, and proud corner of the nation obsessed with local, organic produce, alternative medicines, health and spirituality tourism, all things ecological, and universal internet access.

About the Author
*Basrad Pashayev was born and grown up in Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic of Azerbaijan and studied at the Nakhchivan Private University, Purdue University Calumet-USA, Andrews University-USA and is an Independent Economics/Energy Advisor and Travel Consultant.

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India: Spike In Maoist Violence In Chhattisgarh – Analysis

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By Deepak Kumar Nayak*

…our subjective forces seriously lag behind the objective situation. Thus we see the contradiction, the glaring gap between the potential of the objective situation and the subjective capacities of the Maoist forces. The history of the world revolution teaches us that the principal way to overcome this is by waging revolution and advancing to victory. —  Muppalla Lakshmana Rao alias Ganapathy in a supplement to Central Committee message issued on 10th anniversary of the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist)

There has been an abrupt spike in Maoist violence in the Bastar Division of Chhattisgarh, with 14 Security Force (SF) personnel killed, and 17 vehicles set on fire, by cadres of the Communist Party of India – Maoist (CPI-Maoist) between April 11 and 15, 2015.

On April 11, seven personnel of the Special Task Force (STF) of Chhattisgarh Police, including Platoon Commander Shankar Rao, were killed and 11 others were injured when Maoists ambushed an STF team of 49 personnel in the forests near Pidmal village under the Polampalli Police Station in Sukma District.

Barely, 24 hours had passed, when the Maoists set afire at least 17 vehicles engaged in mining work at the Barbaspur iron ore mining site under the limits of the Korar Police Station in Kanker District on April 12.

Striking on the same day, the Maoists attacked a Border Security Force (BSF) contingent that was patrolling the Chhote Baithiya BSF Camp under the Bande Police Station area, in Kanker District, late in the night of April 12, killing a trooper. Later, the body of one Maoist, killed in the return of fire, was recovered.

On April 13, five Chhattisgarh Armed Force (CAF) personnel were killed and another seven were injured, when Maoists blew up a mine protected vehicle (MPV) near Khudiyapara village on Kirandul-Cholnar Road in Dantewada District.

On April 15, the body of Bira Basant, a District Force (DF) trooper who was abducted by Maoists on April 7, was found on the Gangaloor-Bijapur Road with Maoist pamphlets strewn around.

On April 10, in an incident that did not received much attention, armed Maoists numbering around 30 to 40, set ablaze an under-construction Police Station in the Mudhia Mohara village in the Dongargarh area of Rajnandgaon District.

The spate of violence has again brought the focus on the Maoists and their surviving strengths and capabilities. According to the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) database, in all theatres of Left Wing Extremist (LWE) violence across States, there were 314 fatalities, including 128 civilians, 87 Security Forces (SFs) personnel and 99 CPI-Maoist cadres, in LWE-related incidents in 2014. This was less than a third of such fatalities in the peak year, 2010, when at 1,180 fatalities were recorded. Maoist violence has come down to zero fatalities in West Bengal, from a peak of 425 killed in 2010; and has declined sharply in other States, including Andhra Pradesh, Telangana, Odisha, Maharashtra and Bihar. The situation in Jharkhand has also seen major reverses for the Maoists.

Significantly, the Bastar Division of Chhattisgarh alone accounted for 55 out of 87 SF fatalities across the States in 2014; as against 45 out of 111 in 2013. The deteriorating trend seems to be continuing, with the Bastar Division accounts for 24 of 30 SF fatalities across all States, in 2015, as of April 19. That Bastar Division has, consequently, emerged as the nucleus of the Maoist Tactical Counter-offensive (TCO). In the current year, as of April 19, Chhattisgarh has recorded 37 fatalities in LWE-related violence – including nine civilians, 24 SF personnel and four Maoists. All these fatalities have occurred in Bastar Division.

Beyond the crude data, among the latest incidents, two are significant because they buck the trend and in view of their potential ramifications. Firstly, unlike most of the past major incidents where the Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs) were principally targeted, it was the Chhattisgarh Police that has now suffered major casualties.

In the Pidmal ambush, an STF team of 49 personnel led by platoon commander Shankar Rao had gone for a swift operation, based on intelligence received by Rao. The probably planted intelligence appears to have been extremely tempting, seducing Rao into launching the operation without due clearances and sufficient backup. The unit made a journey of 18 kilometres through the jungles in the dark of night, but was ambushed in the morning. The eventual encounter was spread over three kilometres and involved three gun battles. Shankar Rao was killed in the first round of fire. Two subsequent engagements killed three troopers each. However, the STF managed to withdraw, managing to keep the total casualties low and losing just two weapons.

The pattern reflected the February 2, 2015, Kanker ambush, in which Bande Station House Officer (SHO) Avinash Sharma and Gopniya Sainik (secret agent) Sonu Ram Gawde were killed and another six SF personnel — three each from the Police and BSF – were injured, the team was led by Sharma, who received the apparently planted intelligence. Sharma was killed in the first hail of bullets from Maoists.

The Khudiyapara village MPV blast incident (April 13) was a clearly avoidable tragedy. The last incident of MPV blast before this in Chhattisgarh was on August 6, 2012 and Movements in MPVs have been banned by the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) since June 30, 2013. In the latest MPV blast incident at Khudiyapara, the Maoists used about 80-100 kilograms of explosives that tossed the 50-tonne vehicle up in the air and created an 18-foot deep crater. After the blast, the Maoists resorted to indiscriminate firing, including Under Barrel Grenade Launcher (UBGL) fire, to inflict more casualties. Dantewada Superintendent of Police (SP) Kamalochan Kashyap observed, “The Maoists were agitated ever since the Police post (at) Cholnar was set up in February. This barred them from entering 100 villages, which they ruled earlier. They coaxed the locals to take out rallies in protest of the Police camp. But in vain.”

Official reactions to incidents have been as usual. Condemning the Pidmal attack [April 11], Chhattisgarh Chief Minister Raman Singh, termed it “cowardly” and “shameful”; while Union Home Minister Rajnath Singh declared, “The Centre will take stringent action against the Naxalites (LWEs) who killed seven Policemen in Sukma District in Chhattisgarh.” And when asked about the central government’s stand against Naxalites, Rajnath Singh responded tersely, “The Centre as well as the State Governments have initiated action against the Naxalites operating in the region to keep up the morale of the forces… Appropriate directions have been given to the state Chief Minister but I am not going to disclose the strategy just now before media.” Union Minister of State for Home Affairs, Kiren Rijiju added that, as the strategy followed so far had resulted in SF casualties, it would be reviewed in consultation with the States, especially in relation to the situation in Chhattisgarh.

Among the critical elements of any such review would need to be the deployment and use of the various Forces available for counter-insurgency operations in Maoist affected areas. The issue of coordination between CAPFs and State Police Forces has been a recurrent obstacle to effective action, and the CRPF had repeatedly complained that it was suffering heavy casualties because it received inadequate support from the State Police in Chhattisgarh. An overwhelming majority of SF fatalities in Chhattisgarh have been among the CAPFs, suggesting that State Forces were relatively inactive – or extraordinarily and inexplicably successful in avoiding casualties. Worse, after the December 1, 2014, debacle in which 14 CRPF personnel were killed in an ambush near Kasalpara village in Sukma District, the CRPF has given orders that all major operations must be cleared by headquarters. Media reports suggest that CPRF personnel have since virtually kept themselves confined to barracks. The onus of anti-Naxalite operations in Chhattisgarh had, before this, largely been borne by the 31 battalions of CAPFs deployed in the State. STF, the dedicated anti-Maoist force of the State Police, has only two battalions, which is extraordinary, since at least 22,000 Chhattisgarh Police personnel have been trained at the Counter Insurgency and Jungle Warfare College (CIJWC) at Kanker. There is no publicly available figure of how many of the CIJWC-trained personnel have actually been deployed in anti-Maoist operations, but unconfirmed reports suggest that an overwhelming proportion has been assigned to other duties.

Interestingly, the draft counter-Naxal strategy prepared by the Union Home Ministry in October 2014 is yet to be cleared by the Cabinet. The Union Government, in its 2015-16 Budget, has reduced the Central allocation to the States for Police Modernisation by INR eight billion, arguing that the States have been allocated an additional 10 per cent share from Central taxes, according to the recommendations of the 14th Finance Commission, and are expected draw on the increased allocation for Police modernization. Allocations for the Integrated Action Plan (IAP) [which was renamed as “Additional Central Assistance to LWE affected Districts” by the new NDA government at Centre] were also stopped on the same logic. However, allocations for the Special Infrastructure Scheme (SIS), which were also stopped, were subsequently restored.

The problem with the revised process is that States have seldom coughed up funds for Policing, beyond the minimum necessary for maintenance, and are likely to continue to neglect pressing aspects of Police modernization. Indeed, if even some of the affected States falter in this regard, all of them are likely to suffer the consequences.

Both at a policy and operational level, consequently, there appears to be a measure of persistent disarray in the state’s responses to the Maoist challenge. This is particularly unfortunate at the present juncture, when the Maoists have suffered enormous losses, particularly at leadership level, and are hemorrhaging cadres, with increasing numbers of surrenders and desertions. Indeed, the current Maoist TCO is a transient (the rains will soon bring it to an end) and desperate measure to restore a degree of morale among the rank and file in a situation of sustained reverses that the rebels have suffered. In a supplement to People’s March (Vol. 13, September 2014) CPI-Maoist General Secretary, Muppala Lakshmana Rao aka Ganapathy acknowledges:

Our party lost considerable number of comrades belonging to all levels, right from CC to the village level, in the offensives of the enemy. Though leadership losses began since 2005 May itself, they increased gradually after Unity Congress and the situation took a serious turn by 2011 end. The leadership failed to a large extent in defending itself and the ranks. These losses weakened the three magic weapons of NDR – the party, PLGA (People’s Liberation Guerilla Army) and the UF (United Front) – quite a lot. This failure is a very severe one.

There is an unprecedented opportunity for state consolidation at this juncture. This, however, will require the crystallization of a coherent strategy and enormous tactical coordination between available Forces of the States and the Centre, and across State boundaries. This, however, has been the gaping lacuna in the past, and there is much to suggest that this is yet to be filled.

* Deepak Kumar Nayak
Research Assistant, Institute for Conflict Management

The post India: Spike In Maoist Violence In Chhattisgarh – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.


Pakistan: Enduring Tragedy In Balochistan – Analysis

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By Ambreen Agha*

On April 10, 2015, Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF) militants shot dead at least 20 Punjabi and Sindhi construction labourers at point blank range at their camp in the Gagdan area of Turbat District. Out of the 20 deceased labourers, 16 were Punjabis, and four were Sindhis from the Hyderabad District in Sindh. A senior administration official Akbar Hussain Durrani disclosed that the militants had lined the labourers up and shot them at point blank range after confirming their identity.

BLF ‘spokesman’ Goran Baloch claimed responsibility for the attack, asserting, “We will continue our fight against Pakistani occupation until (the) liberation of Balochistan.”

Retaliating to the killing, the Frontier Corps killed at least 13 BLF militants in a raid on April 13, 2015, including one key militant ‘commander’ Hayat Bewas in the same area. Leveling charges of extrajudicial killing on the SFs, leader of the Voice for Baloch Missing Persons (VBMP) Abdul Qadeer Baloch, also known as Mama Qadeer, at a Press Conference at the Karachi Press Club in Karachi, on April 16, 2015, claimed that five of the 13 suspects killed had been missing for some time. The claim leaves the incident shrouded in controversy. As SAIR has noted in the past, extrajudicial killings by state agencies have become a recurring problem in the Province.

The April 10 killing was the first incident of ethnic violence in Balochistan in 2015. There are, however, other precedents in the Province, such as the October 19, 2014, incident in which at least nine Punjabi poultry farm labourers were found dead in the Sakran area of Hub tehsil (revenue unit) in Lasbela District. Unidentified militants had abducted the 11 workers from a poultry farm in Sakran on October 18, 2015, and had killed nine of them after checking their identity cards. The remaining two were set free because they were from the Lasbela District of Balochistan. The United Baloch Front (UBF) had claimed responsibility for the October 2014 killings.

In another such incident, at least two persons were killed and a child was injured when unidentified militants opened fire at a barber shop on Sariab Road in the provincial capital Quetta, on April 15, 2014. Superintendent of Police (SP) Imran Qureshi had disclosed that the victims belonged to Punjab and had been working on Sariab Road for a long time.

Some other major attacks (each resulting in three or more fatalities) inside Balochistan targeting settlers from outside Balochistan include:

August 6, 2013: At least 14 Punjabis, including three security personnel, were killed in an attack by Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) militants on five passenger buses in the Machh area of Bolan District. The buses were on their way from Quetta to Punjab when 200 militants intercepted them in Machh and abducted the passengers. The militants killed Punjabi passengers after inspecting their national identity cards (NICs).

July 6, 2012: At least 18 Punjabi-speaking persons, who were travelling to Iran, were shot dead and another two were injured, when Balochistan Liberation Tigers (BLT) militants attacked their vehicles in the Basoli area of Turbat District.

July 23, 2011: Five labourers of Punjabi ethnicity were shot dead by unidentified assailants in the Kisankuri area of Nushki town in Nushki District.

August 14, 2010: Unidentified assailants singled out Punjabi passengers travelling on a bus, killing 10 and injuring five near Ahd-e-Gham in Mach town, Bolan District.

According to partial data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), a total of 159 settlers have been killed in Balochistan since the killing of Nawab Akbar Bugti, leader of the Bugti tribe and President of the Jamhoori Watan Party (JWP), on August 26, 2006, in a military operation in the Chalgri area of the Bhamboor Hills in Dera Bugti District. The killings of settlers started only after the Bugti killing, when Baloch militant organizations such as the BLA, BLF and Baloch Republican Army (BRA), among others, began to voice anti-Punjabi sentiments in their slogans. The killing of Akbar Bugti led to a series of attacks on Punjabi and other non-Baloch settlers in Balochistan, as well as the destruction of national infrastructure.

Out of the 159 ‘outsiders’ killed, at least 146 were Punjabis. 33 Punjabi settlers have already been killed in the current year (data till April 19, 2015). In 2014, the number of such fatalities stood at a total of 17; in 2013, at 29; 2012, at 26; 2011, at 13; 2010, at 21; 2009, at 18; and one in 2008. No such fatality was recorded in 2007 and 2006. While Punjabis have been the main targets, other ethnic groups, like Urdu-speaking people from Karachi and Hindko-speaking settlers from Haripur District in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), have also been singled out in acts of ethnic violence. A media report published on June 28, 2011, noted, “Almost all non-Baloch are on their hit-list.” Muhammad Khalid of Balochistan Punjabi Ittehad stated, “The militants began to target the Punjabi settlers after Nawab Bugti was taken out by the military (in August, 2006). Before that there were occasional incidents in which Punjabis were targeted.”

Most of the Punjabi settler killings are recorded in South Balochistan (principally in Bolan, Turbat, Gwadar, Panjgur, Khuzdar, Sibi and Lasbela Districts) which accounts for 122 killings; followed by 24 in North Balochistan (mostly in Nushki, Quetta and Mustang District). The overwhelming concentration of such killings in the South is because of the presence and dominance of Baloch insurgent groups, while the North is dominated by Islamist extremist formations such as the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), who are primarily engaged in sectarian killings. The latter groups of Islamist terrorist formations enjoy the tacit support of Islamabad, which has, for long, used Islamist extremist violence as an instrument of domestic political management, engaged in a selective campaign against the Baloch people, and sought to aggressively alter the region’s demography

Targeted killings have now created an atmosphere of fear and terror among settlers across the Province. According to the a report by the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) dated October 15, 2014, more than 300,000 people have fled the Province over the past 10 years due to the growing unrest. Tahir Hussain Khan, President of the Balochistan Chapter of the independent HRCP asserted that 90,000 people who had fled were from Punjabi and Urdu-speaking communities, and had left to avoid violence by Baloch nationalists.

An unnamed Punjabi-speaking member of the Barbershop Owners’ Association in Quetta, way back on August 23, 2007, demanded that the Government provide them security as they were facing threats due to their ethnic background, and had claimed, “Since Nawab Akbar Bugti’s killing last year, more than 12 attacks have been made on barbershops. The number of attacks in interior Balochistan is higher.”

Of the 3,367 civilian fatalities recorded in Balochistan since 2004 [data till April 19, 2015], at least 837 civilian killings are attributable to one or other militant outfit. Of these, 325 civilian killings (202 in the South and 123 in the North) have been claimed by Baloch separatist formations while the Islamist and sectarian extremist formations, primarily LeJ, TTP and Ahrar-ul-Hind (Liberators of India), claimed responsibility for another 512 civilian killings, 506 in the North (mostly in and around Quetta) and six in the South. The 325 civilian killings attributed to Baloch formations include at least 146 Punjabi settlers since 2006. The remaining 2,530 civilian fatalities – 1,535 in the South and 995 in the North – remain ‘unattributed’. A large proportion of the ‘unattributed’ fatalities, particularly in the Southern region, are believed to be the result of enforced disappearances carried out by state agencies, or by their proxies, prominently including the Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Aman Balochistan (TNAB, Movement for the Restoration of Peace, Balochistan). The large number of unattributed civilian fatalities strengthens the widespread conviction that the Security Agencies are busy with “kill and dump” operations against local Baloch dissidents, a reality that Pakistan’s Supreme Court has clearly recognized.

In a demonstration of Islamabad’s belligerent strategy on the Baloch crisis, unnamed official sources revealed that Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, during his meeting with Army Chief General Raheel Sharif on April 15, 2015, decided to expand the ongoing Operation Zarb-e-Azb to Balochistan, to target the Baloch insurgents. The Army launched Operation Zarb-e-Azb against terrorists of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and associated Islamist terrorist formations in the North Waziristan Agency of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) on June 15, 2014, in the aftermath of the attack on the Jinnah International Airport, Karachi, on June 8-9, 2014. The Army, thus far, has claimed to have killed 2,000 ‘terrorists’ (no independent confirmation of this categorization is available, as media and outside access to the areas of conflict is severely restricted) in the ongoing Operation.

Baloch separatists allege that the Federal Government is systematically suppressing development in Balochistan to keep the Baloch people weak. The attacks on Punjabi settlers are claimed as retaliation by the Baloch people against the Pakistani establishment’s efforts to alter the region’s demography, and for continuously ignoring the genuine grievances of the Baloch people. One of these grievances, as evident from the recent killings of workers, is the outsourcing of labour from other Provinces, deliberately keeping the local Baloch away from development work in the Province and depriving them of their own resources.

Further compounding ethnically targeted violence is Islamabad’s strategy of supporting armed Islamist extremist formations and other violent proxies that have enormously worsened the situation in Balochistan. Turning a blind eye to the ground realities of the Province, the Federal and Provincial Governments have remained complicit in the State-backed repression of Baloch groups articulating the genuine demands of the community. The most basic issues, including the urgent crisis of extra judicial killings, have been studiously ignored by authorities, and judicial proceedings have been actively thwarted to prevent effective prosecution of the guilty. Under the circumstances, the possibility of relief to the people of Balochistan – both locals and ‘outsiders’ – remains slim.

* Ambreen Agha
Research Assistant, Institute for Conflict Management

The post Pakistan: Enduring Tragedy In Balochistan – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

ASEAN Economic Community Poised To Surpass EU In Next Decade

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In a planned economic community that will link 10 nations across South-East Asia and account for the seventh-largest economy in the world, regional leaders told participants at the 24th World Economic Forum on East Asia that the ASEAN economic community (AEC) will rival the European Union (EU) in the years to come.

“To the extent that ASEAN grows at 5% per annum and Europe by less than 2%, of course we will catch up with Europe; one day we will be there,” said Mustapa Mohamed, Minister of International Trade and Industry of Malaysia. “What we need to do in ASEAN is to grow much faster so we get there much faster, we overtake faster, and probably that will happen in the next 10-15 years.”

He said ASEAN’s largely youthful population, in comparison to an ageing population in Europe, gave the planned AEC a significant edge. The unified economic bloc will form a single market and production base, and facilitate the free flow of goods and services around one of the world’s most dynamic and fastest-growing regions.

Anthony F. Fernandes, Group Chief Executive Officer, AirAsia, Malaysia, agreed. “We have the numbers; 600 million people and a lot of good work. Definitely the AEC can rival the EU,” he said. He added that while the AEC won’t be perfect by the end of 2015, it offers an important platform to build on and, “if it is a true economic community, it will benefit everyone”.

In the critical and exciting months before the AEC comes into effect, non-tariffs barriers and standardization of procedures represent the last mile. “A lot of improvements have been made in tariffs,” said Teresita Sy-Coson, Vice-Chairperson, SM Investments Corporation, Philippines. “Maybe the next step will be the opening up of borders.”

In the sector of tourism, discussion is already under way about the creation of a single ASEAN visa and, in the future, the mobility of ASEAN citizens across borders will be a priority, especially for skilled labour. “Both companies and countries will benefit,” Mohamed said.

Describing widespread migration as inevitable – whether as a result of more open borders, conflict or natural disasters or increasing digitization – William Lacy Swing, Director-General, International Organization for Migration (IOM), Geneva, said: “Migration is not so much a problem to be solved but a reality to be managed.” He added that migration is necessary for skills to be available, “for jobs to be filled, for our economies to flourish”. He said: “It is highly desirable if we have the right policies.”

The leaders also acknowledged the multitude of challenges facing the region. Evelyn Balais-Serrano, Executive Director, Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development, Thailand, suggested that as ASEAN approaches deeper integration, it should ensure that greater protections are first implemented at the national level. “Before we can consider the full AEC, each country should have policies on better protection for migrants, especially for women,” she said. “Without this respect for human rights, there will be this vicious cycle of abuse.”

Looking at lessons to be learned from the EU, the speakers agreed that the ASEAN Secretariat should adopt best practices such as common standards, rules and regulations, and strengthen its centralized body.

The post ASEAN Economic Community Poised To Surpass EU In Next Decade appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Oil-Rich Delta Poses First Big Test For Nigeria’s New Leader – Analysis

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By Obinna Anyadike*

An early test for Nigerian president-elect Muhammadu Buhari is how his incoming administration will handle the volatile oil revenue-generating Delta, where former militia commanders pledged their support to Goodluck Jonathan, their clansman, who was emphatically beaten in the 28 March presidential election.

The former Ijaw militants, all now wealthy businessmen after a government amnesty in 2009, had vowed a return to war should Buhari win. But following Jonathan’s acceptance of electoral defeat, they have rapidly reversed that position – including Mujahid Dokubo-Asari, who had been especially menacing.

Most have now publicly promised to work with Nigeria’s no-nonsense, straight-talking new leader when he is sworn-in on 29 May, but the suspicion remains that all may not be well in a region awash with weapons and a history of violence.

Gabriel Asabuja, previously second-in-command in the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta, one of the largest militant groups, told IRIN he accepted the poll result – despite the fact he had been at a meeting called by Jonathan’s party to plan for this weekend’s tense state governorship elections.

“Buhari’s victory is the way God wants it. As a Niger Delta youth leader I can say we can work with Buhari and it’s our duty to move forward,” he insisted.

Too rich to fight?

Asabuja, who still has a retinue of young men who refer to him as “General”, dismissed the idea of Asari or other former leaders going back to war.

“He’s made so much money – nobody is ready to go back to the creeks”. But, he added: “We want to work with the government – unless the government doesn’t want to work with us, to carry Niger Delta people along, to empower the Niger Delta youth and create jobs for us.”

There are several hurdles that could test the peace. Among them is the fate of pipeline protection and maritime surveillance contracts, reportedly worth between US$20 to US$45 million, aimed at curbing oil theft currently running at 100,000 b/d, according to the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC).

These were recently awarded to mainly Delta youth leaders like Asari, Ebikabowei “Boyloaf” Victor Ben, Ateke Tom and Government “Tompolo” Ekpmupolo – despite the NNPC finding that a similar $39.5 million deal made in 2011 had not been value for money.

The agreements were widely interpreted as a cynical use of the public purse by Jonathan to buy electoral support.

The bombing of a gas pipeline in the Ighrenene area of the Delta on 3 April, claimed by a group known as Urhobo Gbagbako, highlights the difficult position Buhari now finds himself in.

The militants said the blast was in response to the exclusion of the Urhoba ethnic group from the lucrative pipeline deals.

“We have now resumed attacks on the … pipeline facilities on a massive scale, [the] scale of bombings shall be unprecedented,” the emailed statement warned.

Other minority communities could follow suit if the situation is not handled carefully.

The cupboard is bare

Buhari is inheriting a much-depleted treasury, the result of the halving of global oil prices on which the Nigerian economy depends.

Buying peace to protect oil production – the policy of previous governments – may no longer be an option. It would also be out of character for Buhari, seen as an austere anti-corruption crusader who, as a military ruler for 20-months from 1983, was not averse to using military power.

“An area of confrontation is when Buhari refuses to negotiate the oil pipeline contracts,” said Michael Karikpo, project officer with the NGO Environmental Rights Action.

“The militants might be calculating they have the [new] government over a barrel. ‘If the government doesn’t have money and we start blowing up pipelines, perhaps they’ll start doing business with us’. But that would be a miscalculation.”

The environmental destruction and humanitarian impact of more than 50 years of unpoliced oil production has been catastrophic for the Delta – far worse than was realized by the international community, according to a 2011 report by the UN’s Environmental Programme.

But the amounts of money squandered since the amnesty by a raft of government initiatives and agencies, or paid directly to those who had a hand in the violence, chaos and criminality, has drained away public sympathy.

“We can’t complain to the rest of Nigeria that we are underdeveloped after all the money spent – it has been an opportunity lost,” said Karikpo.

The Presidential Amnesty Programme has officially enrolled 30,000 ex-militants in disarmament, demobilisation and rehabilitation (DDR) since 2009.

It pays a monthly stipend of US$400 to each participant and has provided vocational training in Nigeria and abroad to over 14,000 ex-fighters.

The 2014 DDR budget was US$386 million, but programme management has been opaque and top-down, with funds disbursed through the accounts of militia leaders – a system tailor-made for embezzlement. It has also woefully failed in its goal of disarmament.

The cynical policy of pay-offs employed by both the government and international oil companies has kept the Delta armed and dangerous, eroded traditional systems of authority, and deepened the neglect of the communities.

“It has been an absolute disaster – money was thrown at the problem without any strategic thought,” said Karikpo.

In essence, the authorities and “oil companies pay the strongest youth groups in each community to keep the peace, so every youth group [keeps their guns and] competes [for their share],” Karikpo said.

The multinationals “prefer making those payments than providing development [to the communities], as it’s cheaper,” he added.

Guns for hire

Soifiri Peterside was part of the technical committee that recommended the amnesty and a series of interventions to address the economic injustice at the root of Delta agitation. He disowns what has since emerged – an entrenched culture of guns-for-hire in each community, where money rather than ideology generates recruits.

Despite the public avowal of peace by Asari and other militant leaders, Peterside said meetings were under way with a string of advisers and elder statesmen to reinforce a message that the new government’s response to any return to violence “won’t be like it was in the past,” and “very brutal” by comparison.

A complication Peterside foresees is that “the new battle may not be led by these [older] guys” who have much to lose. It could be driven instead by the hungrier footsoldiers or the urban “cult” gangs traditionally hired by feuding politicians.

Asabuja told IRIN he wanted Buhari to bring “real development, not just money but real jobs” to the Niger Delta. “If we don’t get it, the youth will revolt, and I won’t be able to step them. The tension is high.”

There is an emerging post-election narrative that accuses Buhari – a northern Muslim – of being the harbinger of “a northern agenda” to take control of the Delta’s oil. It alleges Jonathan’s defeat was part of a conspiracy supported by the international community, and his quick concession was not an act of statesmanship but of cowardice.

According to this logic, self-determination for the oil-producing overwhelmingly Christian states that voted solidly for Jonathan and his People’s Democratic Party becomes an attractive option to wage war for.

But Karikpo is certain that any return to war in the creeks, the network of waterways that carve through the region’s mangrove swamps, will not win support from the communities that bore the brunt of the militancy of the past.

He says people have woken up to the fact that the original goals of the Delta struggle were hijacked by people “who made billions”. That ambivalence will work in favour of the new government should Buhari’s resolve be tested.

*Obinna Anyadike is Editor-at-Large at IRIN.

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Ron Paul: Political Murders In Kiev, US Troops To Ukraine – OpEd

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Last week two prominent Ukrainian opposition figures were gunned down in broad daylight. They join as many as ten others who have been killed or committed suicide under suspicious circumstances just this year. These individuals have one important thing in common: they were either part of or friendly with the Yanukovych government, which a US-backed coup overthrew last year. They include members of the Ukrainian parliament and former chief editors of major opposition newspapers.

While some journalists here in the US have started to notice the strange series of opposition killings in Ukraine, the US government has yet to say a word.

Compare this to the US reaction when a single opposition figure was killed in Russia earlier this year. Boris Nemtsov was a member of a minor political party that was not even represented in the Russian parliament. Nevertheless the US government immediately demanded that Russia conduct a thorough investigation of his murder, suggesting the killers had a political motive.

As news of the Russian killing broke, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee Ed Royce (R-CA) did not wait for evidence to blame the killing on Russian president Vladimir Putin. On the very day of Nemtsov’s murder, Royce told the US media that, “this shocking murder is the latest assault on those who dare to oppose the Putin regime.”

Neither Royce, nor Secretary of State John Kerry, nor President Obama, nor any US government figure has said a word about the series of apparently political murders in Ukraine.

On the contrary, instead of questioning the state of democracy in what looks like a lawless Ukraine, the Administration is sending in the US military to help train Ukrainian troops!

Last week, just as the two political murders were taking place, the US 173rd Airborne Brigade landed in Ukraine to begin training Ukrainian national guard forces – and to leave behind some useful military equipment. Though the civil unrest continues in Ukraine, the US military is assisting one side in the conflict – even as the US slaps sanctions on Russia over accusations it is helping out the other side!

As the ceasefire continues to hold, though shakily, what kind of message does it send to the US-backed government in Kiev to have US troops arrive with training and equipment and an authorization to gift Kiev with some $350 million in weapons? Might they not take this as a green light to begin new hostilities against the breakaway regions in the east?

The Obama administration is so inconsistent in its foreign policy. In some places, particularly Cuba and Iran, the administration is pursuing a policy that looks to diplomacy and compromise to help improve decades of bad relations. In these two cases the administration realizes that the path of confrontation has led nowhere. When the president announced his desire to see the end of Cuba sanctions, he stated very correctly that, “…we are ending a policy that was long past its expiration date. When what you’re doing doesn’t work for fifty years, it’s time to try something new.”

So while Obama is correctly talking about sanctions relief for Iran and Cuba, he is adding more sanctions on Russia, backing Saudi Arabia’s brutal attack on Yemen, and pushing ever harder for regime change in Syria. Does he really believe the rest of the world does not see these double standards? A wise consistency of non-interventionism in all foreign affairs would be the correct course for this and future US administrations. Let us hope they will eventually follow Obama’s observation that, “it’s time to try something new.”

This article was published by the RonPaul Institute.

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Sri Lanka: Rajapaksa And Brother Summoned In Bribe Probe

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Sri Lanka’s former President Mahinda Rajapaksa and former Defense Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa have been asked to report this week to the nation’s Bribery Commission (BC) to record statements over various allegations against them.

After the announcement, supporters of the former president called on the parliament speaker, Chamal Rajapaksa, the eldest brother of Rajapaksa, to intervene and stop the investigation.

According to official sources, the former president allegedly paid bribes to an elderly opposition member to drop out in the run-up to the January presidential race, in which Rajapaksa was defeated by President Maithripala Sirisena.

Since taking office, Sirisena has ordered investigations against Rajapaksa’s closest collaborators. This will mark the first time that the former president and his brother Gotobhaya face questioning over allegations of financial fraud during their decade-long tenure in office. Gotabhaya served as Defence Secretary in the previous administration and was believed to be behind Rajapaksa’s political successes.

A court has already banned Gotabhaya from leaving the nation, while an arrest warrant was issued for another brother, who served as Economic Development Minister and fled the island after the election defeat.

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Spain PM Rajoy Sends Telegram Condemning Murder Of 30 Ethiopian Christians In Libya

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Spain’s Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy has sent a telegram to the Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Ethiopia Hailemariam Desalegn condemning the murder of 30 Ethiopian Christians in Libya.

“I wish to express my strong and outright condemnation of the cruel murder of 30 Ethiopian Christians at the hands of terrorists in Libya,” said Rajoy, adding that, “Acts such as these are an affront to human dignity and constitute an unacceptable breach of the values which we share, particularly the respect for life.”

Rajoy said, “the Government of Spain and all its people are deeply dismayed and united with the people and Government of Ethiopia.”

According to Rajoy, Spain will always be on the side of friendly nations and allies in the fight against “terrorism, senselessness and barbarities.”

“Our unity and our determination to fight this blight on humanity must ensure that those responsible for this type of action are brought to justice to answer for their actions,” Rajoy said.

Rajoy ended the telegram expressing his condolences and affection to the families and friends of the victims.

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South China Sea: Time For US-ASEAN Maritime Cooperation – Analysis

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China’s accelerated construction activities in the South China Sea reveal the paucity of existing measures to manage the ongoing maritime disputes. It is high time to consider novel, decisive options, namely the proposal for the establishment of a multilateral peacekeeping force, composed of ASEAN members, with American backing.

By Richard Javad Heydarian and Truong-Minh Vu*

China’s accelerated construction activities in the South China Sea have further intensified the ongoing maritime disputes between Beijing and its Southeast Asian neighbours, particularly the Philippines and Vietnam. More than just complicating the nature of the ongoing disputes at the expense of other claimant states, China’s land reclamation activities signal its growing military assertiveness, as the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) moves towards “peripheral defence” and consolidation of its strategic depth in the area.

China’s man-made islands fortify its already expansive presence in the contested areas, fulfilling Beijing’s broader grand strategy of dominating adjacent waters, particularly vital Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) such as the South China Sea. The ongoing construction activities could very well pave the way for the establishment of a Chinese Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the area, as Beijing completes a network of airstrips and military garrisons across the Paracel and Spratly chain of islands. There are real implications for freedom of navigation and flight in the area.

Multilateral naval force

There are growing fears — especially in Manila and Hanoi — that China would increasingly interfere with activities of other littoral countries when it comes to marine surveillance and research, fishing activities, as well as hydrocarbon exploration and development in the South China Sea. Most fundamentally, China’s actions represent a direct challenge to the sovereignty claims of neighbouring states, undermining their ability to lawfully exercise jurisdiction, in accordance with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), within their Exclusive Economic Zone and continental shelf.

What is at stake is no less than the vital interests of a number of ASEAN countries as well as the US’ naval primacy in the Pacific. The situation demands no less than a more robust American counter-strategy, given the limited capabilities of Southeast Asian claimant states to rein in China’s territorial assertiveness on their own.

But America need not act unilaterally, nor should its response be primarily military. The best way forward is a cooperative approach, with Washington utilising its unique ‘convening power’ to assemble a coalition of forces to ensure maritime stability in the region.

In a recent meeting with ASEAN naval leaders, Vice Admiral Robert Thomas, commander of the US Pacific Fleet, called for Southeast Asian nations to form a multilateral naval force in order to carry out cooperative patrols in the South Sea. This proposal resembles existing practices in the area such as the joint anti-piracy patrols in the Malacca Strait, carried out by Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and Thailand.

South China Sea operations centre

Apart from a joint patrol force, the US has also proposed the establishment of a South China Sea International Operations Centre in Indonesia. The proposal was forwarded by Commander Harry B. Harris of the US Pacific Command (PACOM) in a Congressional hearing at the end of 2014.

The Centre was proposed to be established in Jakarta, the capital of ASEAN’s informal leader, which has no direct claim in the South China Sea but has repeatedly expressed its willingness to mediate the disputes between Beijing and ASEAN countries. The proposed Centre would represent a vital element of broader international efforts to ensure maritime security and freedom of navigation in the Indian and Pacific Oceans.

The above proposals reflect Washington’s preference for a cooperative strategy to manage emerging threats to regional security. American emphasis on cooperative security and multilateral approaches to maritime security has been reflected in a number of policy papers since 2007, namely the American Sea Services, which includes the Navy, the Marine Corps and the Coast Guard.

Such a cooperative strategy rests on two principles: Firstly, the necessity for comprehensive collaboration among all concerned nations to manage a specific threat. The ongoing construction activities in the South China Sea represent a threat to regional security. Secondly, a growing emphasis on burden-sharing and multilateralism in light of America’s fiscal woes and defence budget constraints.

Protecting the relevance of ASEAN

It is time for ASEAN to consider the US’ proposals in order to manage the brewing conflicts in the South China Sea, lest the very relevance of the regional body will come under question. After all, ASEAN and China have barely moved beyond their largely symbolic but inconsequential non-binding Declaration of Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) in 2002.

Obviously China prefers to settle the disputes through purely bilateral channels, where it has the upper hand. But China has also shown its willingness to maintain stable ties with the ASEAN and avoid complete estrangement of its Southeast Asian neighbours, as evident in its decision to sign the 2002 DOC; emphasise the importance of “peripheral diplomacy” with neighbours on its fringe; and advocate the “2+7 cooperation framework”, which calls for, among other things, a two-point political consensus on a Treaty of Good Neighbourliness, Friendship and Cooperation between ASEAN and China and seven proposals for cooperation.

In short, China will have to engage ASEAN on important issues that affect their two-way relations. ASEAN as a whole and/or key regional states such as Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam, which share similar concerns vis-à-vis threats to freedom of navigation and the increased militarisation of the South China Sea disputes, can push ahead with joint patrols. At the very least, they could collectively leverage the prospect of joint patrols to convince China to revisit its current policy and consider necessary de-escalation mechanisms such as a freeze on ongoing construction activities and the negotiation of a CoC.

What is important is for ASEAN members to explore all possible multilateral options, which can contribute to the management, if not resolution, of the disputes. With sustained and unequivocal international support, including from the US, ASEAN may achieve greater collective resolve to address worrying trends in the South China Sea and re-assert its relevance.

For almost seven decades, Washington has stood as the anchor of stability in the region. But as we move towards a more multipolar order in the region, the US will no longer be in a position to unilaterally dictate events on the ground. This is precisely why the best way forward is to adopt a multilateral, cooperative security approach, which will involve and empower ASEAN as the engine of integration and dispute-management in the region. The South China Sea is the best place to start.

*Richard Javad Heydarian is an Assistant Professor in political science at De La Salle University, Manila, and author of “Asia’s New Battlefield: US, China and the Struggle for the Western Pacific”. Truong-Minh Vu (PhD) is Director of the Centre for International Studies, University of Social Sciences and Humanities, Ho Chi Minh City. They contributed this specially to RSIS Commentary.

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Spain And UN Security Council: Global Governance, Human Rights And Democratic Values – Analysis

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By Jessica Almqvist*

In January 2015 Spain assumed its position as a non-permanent member in the UN Security Council (the ‘Council’). Its mandate will run for two years. During this period, Spain will work alongside the five permanent members –China, France, the Russian Federation, the UK and the US (‘P-5’)–, four non-permanent members –Angola, Malaysia, New Zealand and Venezuela– whose mandates, like Spain’s, run until the end of 2016, and a further for –Chad, Chile, Jordan, Lithuania and Nigeria– whose mandates finish at the end of December of 2015. Besides having a general role and functions, Spain currently chairs the Iran Sanctions Committee, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Sanctions Committee and the Committee on the Non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, in which it also acts as penholder. It is furthermore penholder in the Taliban Sanctions Committee, which is chaired by New Zeeland.

Council membership means special rights and privileges. It generates rights of access to and participation in, including voting on, all decisions of this organ. These decisions may amount to recommendations on how international disputes are to be resolved (Chapter VI UN Charter). More importantly, the Council has competences to determine international security threats, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression. In response, it may adopt measures, including coercive ones, including mandatory arms embargoes, economic sanctions, ICC referrals and the authorisation to use armed force (Chapter VII UN Charter). The Council may also impose obligations on all UN members to cooperate in the enforcement of its decisions. To this should be added that the admission of new UN member states, the election of UN secretary-generals and the appointment of judges to the International Court of Justice require a prior recommendation of the Council.

However, council membership implies not only rights, but generates, above all, great responsibilities. Spain assumes Council membership at a time when the expectations of what this organ is meant to accomplish are on a constant rise. Governments and regional organisations around the world, as well as civil society, are looking to this organ for leadership and direction in the process of meeting current threats and global challenges. In this light, the questions that deserve attention are how the Council and its members have sought to meet the challenges of rising expectations on its role in world affairs, what the main difficulties are and the role of Spain and other members in the process of overcoming them.

The ending of the Cold War created unprecedented opportunities for the Security Council to meet its primary responsibility to act as a guardian of international peace and security. As an illustration, in 1990 it condemned the Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait and authorised the use of armed force. In 1992 it approved the creation of a unified task force to enable the provision of humanitarian assistance to civilian populations in the Somali conflict. In 1993 it established an ad hoc international criminal tribunal in response to the Yugoslav conflict. A year later it decided to create a second such tribunal in response to the Rwandan genocide. Moreover, following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, it took on a leading role in the Global Fight against Terrorism. Resolution 1373 of 28 September 2001 determines that international terrorism constitutes a security threat and imposes obligations on all UN members to cooperate in the enforcement of concrete measures, including the criminalisation and prosecution of the financing of terrorism as well as the freezing of assets of persons who plan, support and commit these acts. In addition, it created the Counter-terrorism Committee (CTC) to monitor the Resolution’s implementation. These actions have been followed by several others, such as the establishment of the CTC Executive Directorate in 2004, which aims to strengthen Council capacities to provide governance and support in this fight.

The UN reform process (2001-05) offered a moment of reflection on the responsibilities of the Security Council in a changing security environment. The discussions that took place resulted in a general agreement that the international community faces several new threats and global challenges that require collective action through the Security Council. According to the 2005 World Summit Outcome, these threats are not limited to interstate conflicts but extend to international terrorism, domestic conflicts (civil wars), grave crime on a massive scale (genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes), weapons of mass destruction, epidemics and climate change. The growing number of internal conflicts involving grave crime, also perpetrated by non-state actors, was recognised as an especially grave concern. It was understood that the rise in these types of conflicts warranted an affirmation that the responsibility to protect (‘R2P’) is not an exclusive responsibility of states. In situations in which states are unable or unwilling to protect their civilian populations, the R2P is transferred to the international community. It was further agreed that the Security Council has the mandate to adopt coercive measures, including the use of force, to bring such situations to an end.

The Council has responded positively to demands about the need to expand its area of responsibility to cover new threats in a changing security environment, such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, such as nuclear weapons, climate change and epidemics.[1] It has determined several domestic conflicts and post-conflict situations, involving atrocities, as amounting security threats, among them the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Central African Republic, the Sudan and South Sudan, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia and Libya. Additionally, it has responded to several situations of on-going atrocities through the adoption of coercive measures. Whereas the authorisation of the use of force is not ruled out, as manifested by the intervention in Libya in 2011, a more common response to conflicts involving atrocities as well as other threats, such as international terrorism, is the creation of mandatory sanctions regimes. Since the end of the Cold War, the Council has established a total of 27 sanctions committees. It currently administrates 16 such committees. The most recently created regime is the 2606 South Sudan sanctions committee, established on 3 March 2015.

What is novel about sanctions regimes is that they are ‘targeted’ in the sense of ‘using one or more measures to signal, constrain or coerce states, entities or individuals to change behaviour’. The different measures include arms embargoes, asset freezes and travel bans, which are often used in tandem.[2] Most sanctions committees focus on internal conflict and post-conflict situations. However, two sanctions committees established in 2006 focus on how to tackle threats posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and also nuclear weapons: North Korea and Iran. The most well-known committee centre deals with the threat posed by al-Qaeda and associated individuals and entities. Its mandate has been modified several times so that its sanctions now apply to designated individuals and entities wherever located.[3] Last year, its mandate was further extended to cover potential threats of individuals and entities belonging to ISIL and ANF. As of 26 February 2015, a total of 618 persons and 421 entities and other groups are being targeted by UN sanctions regimes.[4]

Furthermore, the Council has demonstrated a growing interest in the promotion of criminal tribunals to investigate, prosecute and sanction grave crimes committed on a massive scale. Since the creation of the two ad hoc international criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, it has requested that the UN Secretary-General negotiate an agreement with the Sierra Leone government about the establishment of a special court. It also gave broad mandates to the UN transitional administrations in East Timor and Kosovo, allowing them to constitute panels consisting of international judges within existing national judiciaries. In 2005 it referred the situation in Darfur to the ICC. A year later it concluded an agreement with Lebanon on the creation of a special tribunal in response to the terrorist attack on 14 February 2005 that killed former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and 22 others, an agreement that entered into force as a result of a Council resolution. In 2011 it referred the situation in Libya to the ICC.

Another significant advance is how the Security Council is seeking to go beyond the reactive realm when responding to the threat posed by conflicts involving atrocities. This development reflects how the meaning and implications of the R2P agreed on in 2005 has evolved and is now thought of as not only referring to reactive responses but also to measures aimed at preventing such conflicts from breaking out in the first place and designed to reconstruct societies having suffered from them. In this spirit, the Council has established ad hoc working groups on peacekeeping operations (in operation since 2001) and conflict prevention and resolution in Africa (in operation since 2002). Moreover, it contributes to the advancement of themes such as the protection of civilians in armed conflict, women, peace and security, and justice, the rule of law and impunity in these societies. In 2005, the Security Council, together with the General Assembly, created the Peacebuilding Commission to focus attention on ‘the reconstruction and institution-building efforts necessary for recovery from conflict’ and to support the development of integrated strategies for sustainable development.

Notwithstanding the advances towards a more proactive approach to major threats and global challenges, the Council continues to be criticised for failing to live up to rising expectations. The efforts to improve respect for human rights in the enforcement of Council decisions still falls short of meeting basic demands. The way in which targeted sanctions in the form of asset freezes are imposed has provoked a series of human rights complaints. At the outset, the enforcement of these sanctions paid no attention to fair-trial rights, including the right to be presumed innocent and the right to be informed promptly and in detail of the nature and cause of the charges. There was no consideration of humanitarian needs of targeted individuals. Over the last decade, several improvements have been made, such as the introduction of a humanitarian exception to cover basic needs and a delisting procedure as well as a focal point for delisting requests. Those individuals and entities seeking to be removed from the al-Qaeda List can now submit their petitions to an Ombudsman appointed by the Secretary-General. Even so, there is a general concern that the Council fails to respect human rights in this sphere of action, such as due process norms and the right to an effective remedy.

A second line of criticism stems from rising expectations on the need for the UN organ to focus attention on how to improve its conduct in the light of democratic values. The 2005 World Summit Outcome expressed support for early reform of the Security Council ‘in order to make it more broadly representative, efficient and transparent and to further enhance its effectiveness and the legitimacy and implementation of its decisions’. In particular, it stressed the importance of continuing to adapt the Council’s working methods so as to increase the involvement of UN members without seats in the Council, to enhance its accountability to membership and to seek more transparency.[5] The Council has sought to respond to the call for more transparency through increased interactivity, public meetings, consultations and informal dialogue.[6] For example, in different notes, the Council President has stressed the importance of dialogue with non-Council members and bodies, as well as consultations between the Council, the Secretariat and troop- and police-contributing countries.[7] The President has also emphasised wider participation of Council members in the drafting of Council products, and the relevance of intra-Council dialogue.[8] Meanwhile, it has not shown any interest whatsoever in changing its composition in order to make it more representative or how to tackle the need for accountability.

A third line of criticism centres on the Council’s inability to react in a timely and decisive manner to highly pressing situations, such as Ukraine, Syria and Palestine. During 2014 these situations were among the topics most discussed in the Council: Syria (29 times), Ukraine (15 times) and the situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question (13 times).[9] However, three draft resolutions that were presented were not passed as permanent members cast their vetoes. The Council’s passivity in the face of on-going atrocities perpetrated in Syria, especially by its authorities, has harmed the reputation of this organ. In a Security Council meeting held on 22 May 2014, the French draft resolution referring the Syrian situation to the ICC failed as the Russian Federation and China voted against it. The Council thereafter condemned the parties to this conflict and the Syrian authorities in particular for denying humanitarian access to civilian populations in the country. So far, however, none of these decisions have been accompanied with any forcible measure to ensure compliance on the ground.[10]

In conclusion, both advances and setbacks characterise the on-going efforts to shoulder the primary responsibility over the maintenance of peace and security. It is important to recall that significant progress has occurred. Even so, as has also been pointed out, several challenges taint the record of progress, among them the fact that the Council fails to act impartially in the determination of security threats and the failure to respect human rights and democratic values. No important change in the determination of security threats will occur as long as the P-5 understand their veto rights as implying a licence to block Council decisions whenever such decisions contradict their national self-interest. The longstanding disagreement between Council members about the primacy of human rights and democratic values when security is at stake makes any change unlikely. In this light, a piecemeal approach, while frustrating and riven with disappointments, is to be preferred. Permanent and non-permanent members committed to human rights and democratic governance can make use of their special rights and privileges so as to seek gradual progress on these matters. In this context, it is to be recalled that Spain has manifested a clear commitment to promoting human rights and to defend the protection of civilians and respect for international law, including international humanitarian law, during its term as Council member.

About the author:
*Jessica Almqvist
is Senior Research Fellow at the Elcano Royal Institute | @rielcano

Source:
This article was published by Elcano Royal Institute.

Notes:
[1] For example, UNSC res. 2177 of 18/IX/2014 addresses the Ebola outbreak.

[2] For an overview of these measures, see ‘Security Council Report, Active Security Council sanctions regimes: an abridged history (2014)’.

[3] According to the list that was last updated on 19 February 2015, the al-Qaeda committee targets 234 individuals and 70 entities.

[4] See Consolidated United Nations Security Council List.

[5] UNGA res. 60/1 of 24/X/2005, paras. 153 and 154.

[6] Security Council Report, Security Council Working Methods: A Tale of Two Councils (25/III/2014).

[7] S/2013/515 and S/2013/630.

[8] S/2014/268 and S/2014/56.

[9] Other topics most intensively discussed during 2014 were: Sudan/South Sudan (35 times), the Middle East (17 times) and the Central African Republic (13 times). See Security Council Report, In Hindsight: Council Statistics in 2014: New Energy and Activity, 30/I/2015).

[10] In 2014, UNSC res. 2139 of 22/II/2014, res. 2165 of 14/VII/2014, and res. 2191 of 17/XII/2014.

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The True ‘Arab Exception’– OpEd

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By Haizam Amirah-Fernández*

For decades, much has been talked and written about the ‘Arab exception’ due to the fact that the waves of democratisation that swept over southern and eastern Europe, Latin America, South-East Asia and Africa stopped short at the Maghreb and the Arab Middle East[1]. Many have sought to find an explanation to the phenomenon. The inability of Arab societies to make a transition from authoritarian political systems to democratic ones has been explained in two ways: (1) as a result of religious and cultural constraints that are difficult to change; and (2) due to economic and geopolitical factors that can change over time.

Those who favour the ‘religious or cultural exception’ adduce that Arab-Islamic culture is essentially patriarchal and authoritarian and that it promotes values such as obedience and submission to the community. According to this view, Islam and Arab culture necessarily run counter to the values of individualism that are the basis for principles such as human rights and civil and political rights. As a demonstration, it is noted that in Arab countries power is usually centralised, deeply hierarchical and dependant on a paternal figure to whom his subjects defer. It is also brought to mind that these features are present in both nationalist and Islamist ideological discourses.

Those who see an ‘economic and geopolitical exception’ in the Arab world focus on two realities: (1) the rentier character of most of their economies, either from oil rents or foreign aid; and (2) the international powers’ enormous interests in the region, which make it the scenario of fighting, interference and military intervention. According to this explanation, rentier economies do not depend on the taxes collected from their citizens but rather that the latter are dependent on the State due to its capacity to dispense resources, employment and privileges. It is also stressed that rentier countries devote large amounts of money to maintain powerful security and repression apparatuses that supress or buy out local reform movements.

The geopolitical considerations linked to oil, Israeli regional supremacy and the threats emanating from the region (currently Jihadism but previously the advance of Communism) are employed to explain the so-called ‘Arab exception’. From that perspective, the regimes in the region that ally themselves to the major powers obtain in exchange sufficient economic, military and diplomatic support to face up to local players demanding change and reform. To guarantee full control over their societies, some governments resort to restrictive and rigorous interpretations of religion. Additionally, foreign military intervention in countries such as Iraq, Syria and Libya have contributed to the militarisation of domestic conflicts and turned the struggle for greater rights into civil wars that make any prospect for democracy even more distant.

The antiauthoritarian revolts –known as the Arab Spring or Awakening– that broke out in late 2010 showed that there is a real demand for more rights and democracy in significant sectors of the population. Belonging to an Arab-Islamic culture was no impediment to millions of people demanding more freedom, a dignified way of life, social justice and good governance. The revolts –which were not initiated by Islamists–bore witness to a widespread rejection of the authoritarianism, corruption and political exclusion that are characteristic to Arab regimes. Social mobilisation was essentially the work of civil and youth groups that aspired to a better life and greater opportunities. To continue talking about the ‘Arab exception’ in cultural and religious terms following the wave of democratisation that began four years ago is, at best, mistaken.

Up against the social groups that demand democracy and the rule of law there are others that seek to strengthen authoritarian power and repressive structures. These include the old regimes, most of the Islamist sectors and sectarian forces. Similarly to any other society, Arabs have their own internal struggles and tensions between conflicting views on society and desirable political models. The disappearance of Arab authoritarian regimes is linked to the change in the balance of power between these opposing forces.

What has been confirmed by the four years of convulsive transitions in the Maghreb and the Middle East is that, for the time being, the ‘Arab economic and geopolitical exception’ remains in place. All the region’s monarchies and some republics –like Algeria– have sidestepped the wave of political transformations through public expenditure and more rentierism. Also through greater repression and ideological control. Military expenditure has surged, while spending on state services and employment has also risen with the object of keeping social unrest at bay. The funding of religious proselytism has also benefitted from high oil prices.

To date, the geopolitical dimension has decisively conditioned the evolution of the Arab Awakening. The resources devoted to funding and arming the parties involved in conflict have helped to militarise power struggles and to deepen the ethno-sectarian rifts throughout the region. The regional cold war between Saudi Arabia and Iran, foreign military intervention, the surge in extremist options such as Daesh (the self-proclaimed Islamic State), the muddled US policies in the region and the EU’s practical irrelevance are causing the collapse of several States and the blurring of some frontiers. Under these conditions, it is very likely for regional instability to increase and for the consequences to be felt throughout the neighbourhood.

About the author:
*Haizam Amirah-Fernández
is Senior Analyst for the Mediterranean and Arab World at the Elcano Royal Institute | @HaizamAmirah

Source:
This article was published by Elcano Royal Institute

Notes:
[1]Originally published in Cambio 16, 1/IV/2015. Original version in Spanish: La verdadera “excepción árabe”.

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Six Minnesota Men Charged With Conspiracy To Provide Material Support To ISIL

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A criminal complaint was filed Monday charging six Minnesota men with conspiracy and attempt to provide material support to a designated foreign terrorist organization, namely, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).

Zacharia Yusuf Abdurahman, 19, Adnan Farah, 19, Hanad Mustafe Musse, 19, and Guled Ali Omar, 20, were arrested in Minneapolis yesterday. Abdirahman Yasin Daud, 21, and Mohamed Abdihamid Farah, 21, were arrested Sunday in California after driving from Minneapolis to San Diego, according to the US Justice Department.

According to the criminal complaint and documents filed in court, the FBI has been conducting an investigation for the last 10 months into a group of individuals who have tried to join – and in some cases succeeded in joining – overseas designated foreign terrorist organizations. At least nine Minnesotans have now been charged as part of this conspiracy to provide material support to ISIL. The men are all alleged associates and friends of one another.

“The six defendants charged in the complaint allegedly planned to travel to Syria as part of their conspiracy to provide material support to ISIL,” said Assistant Attorney General John P. Carlin. “One of the National Security Division’s highest priorities is to identify, disrupt, and hold accountable those who provide or attempt to provide material support to designated foreign terrorist organizations. I would like to thank the many agents, analysts, and prosecutors who are responsible for this investigation and the charges in this case.”

“As described in the criminal complaint, these men worked over the course of the last 10 months to join ISIL,” said U.S. Attorney Andrew M. Luger. “Even when their co-conspirators were caught and charged, they continued to seek new and creative ways to leave Minnesota to fight for a terror group. I applaud the hard work and tireless efforts of the FBI Minneapolis Division and their colleagues around the country.”

“Preventing acts of terrorism is the FBI’s highest priority,” said Special Agent in Charge Richard T.  Thornton. “Disrupting individuals from traveling to join and fight for ISIL is an important part of our counter terrorism strategy. As a result of this investigation and arrests, these six Minnesota men who planned to travel and fight for ISIL will answer these charges in U.S. District Court instead of taking up arms in Syria. The FBI remains committed to ending both recruitment efforts and travel on the part of young people from Minnesota to fight overseas on behalf of terror groups. These arrests today signify this continued commitment.”

This case is the result of an investigation conducted by the FBI-led Joint Terrorism Task Force, U.S. Attorney’s Office of the District of Minnesota and the Counterterrorism Section of the Department of Justice National Security Division. Assistant Attorney General Carlin is also grateful to the U.S. Attorney’s Office of the Southern District of California and the FBI’s San Diego Division for their contributions to the investigation of this case.

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Cutting Through The Noisy TPP Debate – OpEd

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By Peter A. Petri and Michael G. Plummer*

The Trans-Pacific Partnership, or TPP, negotiations are in their final phase and the policy debate is in full swing. Unfortunately, it’s shaping up as a debate about trees, not forests; it ignores the central goal of the TPP: to renew the Asia-Pacific trading system and firm up America’s role in it.

World trade rules have not changed since 1994 — not since the rise of the internet, China and ubiquitous global production chains — and so trade has become very contentious and its growth has slowed. The TPP is controversial because it addresses varied obstacles to trade and investment — not just tariffs, but many conflicting regulations and standards (or lack of them, in the case of labor and the environment) in 12 countries at various stages of economic development.

It’s “Catch 22″: Because trade rules are so hard to change, the TPP has to take on many issues at once. This invites an onslaught of criticism, from corporations and unions to the activists of the right and left. In fact, the provisions of the TPP — results of long, painstaking negotiations — will simply not be as extreme or consequential as those opponents will claim.

What is really at stake? For the past four years, we have studied the TPP closely with a data-intensive, state-of-the-art economic model. We have published many detailed results, but three conclusions stand out:

1. The TPP will not have early, large effects in the United States. More than 90 percent of our economic activity involves markets and jobs minimally related to trade, and the TPP will apply best practices that are mostly already in place here. Changes will be gradual — some stretching to 10 years or more — giving companies, workers and countries time to adjust.

2. The agreement will generate significant, if not dramatic, increases in U.S. living standards over time. It will stimulate America’s most competitive sectors and help them gain a stronger foothold in production chains centered in Asia. For example, the TPP’s investment and intellectual property provisions will make sure that American computer technologies, robots, medical devices, medicines and music have access to and are safe from piracy in dynamic markets.

U.S. real incomes should increase by $77 billion per year by 2025. The benefits will extend across the economy through higher wages and lower prices. We do not calculate an increase in the number of people at work — our economy cannot add jobs permanently once it reaches full employment — but by 2025, around 650,000 more people should be working in export-related jobs that pay as much as 18 percent more than jobs in import-competing industries.

3. Ultimately, the TPP should stimulate further deals with Europe and other Asian and Latin American countries, establishing its updated rules as a global benchmark. In this case, benefits to the United States and the world would be multiplied by a factor of three.

The TPP will not cure all of our economic ills. With or without it, America’s prosperity depends on investments in innovation, infrastructure, workers and education for data-hungry services and manufacturing. These investments will make the gains from the TPP larger and address fundamental problems like wage growth and inequality. And we have to make sure that people who face difficult changes — due to technological advances, trade policy and other forces — are generously supported in making adjustments.

The TPP debate should be confident and forward-looking, befitting America’s enormous assets and recovering economic engine. The TPP offers significant economic benefits and an historic opportunity to deepen U.S. ties with the Asia-Pacific, the world’s most dynamic economic region.

*Peter A. Petri is the Carl J. Shapiro Professor of International Finance at Brandeis University, and a Nonresident Senior Fellow with the East-West Center. Michael G. Plummer is Director of Johns Hopkins SAIS Europe and also an East-West Center Senior Fellow.


This commentary first appeared in The Honolulu Star-Advertiser on April 12, 2015.

The post Cutting Through The Noisy TPP Debate – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

EU Commission Clears Altice’s Acquisition Of PT Portugal

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The European Commission on Monday authorized the proposed acquisition of the Portuguese telecommunications operator PT Portugal by the multinational cable and telecommunications company Altice.

The decision is conditional upon the divestment of Altice’s current Portuguese businesses ONI and Cabovisão. The Commission had concerns that the merged entity would have faced insufficient competitive constraint from the remaining players on the market for fixed telecommunications. This could have led to higher prices for clients. The divestments offered by Altice address these concerns. The Commission has also rejected a request to refer the examination of the transaction to the Portuguese competition authority.

EU Commissioner in charge of competition policy Margrethe Vestager said, “Telecoms play an essential role in our digital society. My wish is to ensure that the merger will not lead to higher prices and less competition for Portuguese consumers. The commitments offered by the parties address this concern”.

Altice operates via two subsidiaries in Portugal, Cabovisão and ONI. Cabovisão provides pay TV, fixed internet access and fixed telephony services essentially to residential customers. ONI provides services to business customers, including fixed telecommunication services, in particular voice, data and internet access services as well as IT services.

PT Portugal is a telecommunications and multimedia operator with activities extending across all telecommunications segments in Portugal. It offers fixed, mobile voice and data services; broadband internet access services and pay TV services to residential customers. PT Portugal’s offer for business customers includes fixed and mobile voice services data services and IT services, comprising data centre solutions, virtualisation services, cloud, business outsourcing process and other additional value-added services.

The Commission had concerns that the merger, as initially notified, would have reduced competition in a number of telecommunications markets in Portugal. These markets include the wholesale markets for leased lines and for call transit services, the provision of fixed voice services, fixed internet access services and pay TV services to residential customers and the provision of telecommunication services to business customers. The merger would have removed a strong competitor from these markets, with the risk of leading to higher prices and less competition in Portugal.

In order to remove these concerns, Altice offered to sell its Portuguese subsidiaries Cabovisão and ONI.

These clear-cut structural commitments completely remove the overlap between the activities of Altice and PT Portugal within Portugal and are therefore appropriate to address the initial competition concerns identified by the Commission. The Commission concluded that the transaction, as modified by the commitments, would raise no competition concerns. The decision is conditional upon full compliance with the commitments.

The post EU Commission Clears Altice’s Acquisition Of PT Portugal appeared first on Eurasia Review.

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