By Prashant Dikshit*

The Indian government’s decision to purchase 36 Rafale MMRCA aircraft from France outright, as against the original 18, with a direct government to government deal with France could be the best option. This is because the issues were no longer merely commercial in nature; there were strategic reasons to be considered.

The most apparent and crucial matter of the rapidly decreasing combat punch of the Indian Air Force (IAF) was not the only issue at hand. The decision to select the Rafale at the outset was already made with the conscious view that it was the best buy. It not only satisfied the operational framework of the IAF, but also ensured that with its acquisition India will put the eggs in the correct basket.

India has invested more than adequate material resources in the burgeoning strategic equation with the US and has acquired maritime and heavy-lift transport aircraft, among other weapon systems. Deeply emboldened by the mutual India-US wooing syndrome, the US administration is leaving no stone unturned to participate in the India’s aircraft carrier industry. On the MMRCA front however, there were disappointments in the US industry circles that India had found the F-16 aircraft somewhat outmoded and the F-18, too heavy and alien for its systemic construct.

Related: India’s Rafale Deal: Much Needed Infusion For IAF – Analysis

But it had obviated Indian policy planners’ deeply embedded fears that the complex structure of the US regime – that consists its presidency, the senate and the congress – could place embargoes on technical and material support in the future for such a crucial combat ingredient; just because some law-wielding segment US did not see, eye to eye, with Indian policies elsewhere. There was precedence on this score in the past and the Indian establishment has institutional memory of having encountered such impediments; and the development of India’s Light Combat Aircraft is one of the many examples.

As for Russia, India is already acquiring over 250 Su-30 MKI air superiority fighters and most importantly, is developing Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft plus a Medium Transport Aircraft along with other weapon platforms such as the BrahMos in collaboration with Russian majors.

Although, the all-weather relationship with the erstwhile USSR and now Russia has stood the test of time and India availed of Russian support on not only the Arihant nuclear submarine but also substantially for the operation of nuclear power plants, uncertainties and irritants faced by India’s defence establishment for provision of spares for military hardware after the breakup of the USSR and again, before the eventual induction of the aircraft carrier, INS Vikramaditya, could not be ignored. Additionally, there is an emerging perception that with the rising clamour for enhanced price structures by Russian companies, the mutuality of equations is tilting towards greater commercial gains and the tenor of the relationship may have come to a saturation point. The Indian endeavour would rather be to sustain than to increase.

Related: India: Why The Rafale Deal Must Be Welcomed – Analysis

India had already procured adequate materials from UK during its post-independence relationship. The British-made Jaguar joined the IAF fleet with over 150 aircraft to fulfil the IAF’s requirement for Deep Penetration Strike Aircraft; over 120 of the British Aerospace built Advanced Jet Trainer, the Hawk, have been inducted in the IAF and the India Navy with an Indian government investment of nearly $ 2 billion. These purchases had set up a pipeline for infusion of spares periodically from aviation majors in UK. The British industry had nothing more to offer.

With France the story is different and the developments had to be placed on an even keel. First, the uncertainties in nurturing the contract with the French aviation major Dassault, the producer of the Rafale, had emerged because the manufacturer had declined to accept responsibilities for the 108 machines that were to be assembled by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited. There is a strong view that some in the South Block had persuaded Dassault to accept this clause against the manufacturer’s judgment and these doubts could not be kept under wraps beyond a point.

Related: India’s Rafale Conundrum: Lessons To Be Learned – Analysis

Eventually, the whole deal was falling through due to procedural impositions of the treatment of “Request for proposals.” There was an emerging perception that at risk was the equation with France – whose support in operating their Mirage 2000 with the IAF was pivotal in countering the aggression during the Kargil war. France is going to be a supplier of nuclear materials to India, and with whom India is pursuing several space ventures through its Department of Space. However, the most crucial of all reasons why this is strategically important is due to France’s unstinted support for India’s membership in the UN Security Council.

* Prashant Dikshit
Former Deputy Director, IPCS

The post India’s Rafale Deal: Why The Outright Purchase Was A Balancing Step – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Israel’s Equal Employment Opportunities Commission (EEOC) has demanded that notoriously racist club Beitar Jerusalem, the bad boy of Israeli soccer, retract recent statements that it would maintain its policy of not hiring Palestinian players because of opposition by the team’s militant, racist fan base.

The demand comes as Israel is fighting an attempt by the Palestine Football Association (PFA) to get the Jewish state suspended from FIFA at next month’s congress of the world soccer body. The PFA charges that Israel hinders the development of Palestinian soccer by obstructing travel of Palestinian players between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as well as abroad.

Related: Contours Of Future Israeli-Palestinian Battles Emerge On Soccer Pitch – Analysis

Senior Israeli soccer officials are in Europe this week for talks with FIFA president Sepp Blatter, and Michel Platini, the head of the European soccer body UEFA, in a bid to block the PFA effort. They counter the Palestinian assertion by insisting that the Israel Football Association (IFA) has no say in Israeli security policy.

The PFA effort is part of a broader campaign by President Mahmoud Abbas’ Palestine Authority to pressure and isolate Israel following the failure of peace talks and last year’s Gaza war by joining multiple UN organizations, particularly the International Criminal Court (ICC). FIFA was the first international group to recognize Palestine as far back as 1998.

An Israeli law firm joined the Israeli-Palestinian battle in international organizations with a petition to the ICC to investigate PFA president General Jibril Rajoub on suspicion of war crimes during last year’s Gaza war.

It is hard to assume that the demand by the EEOC is at least not in part related to the battle over Israel’s status in FIFA given that the commission has not acted in the past against Beitar Jerusalem, the only top flight Israeli club to have not hired Palestinian players even though Palestinians rank among the country’s top performers. Beitar’s nationalist ideology is embedded in its name, a reference to the Jews’ last standing fortress in the second century Bar Kochba revolt against the Romans.

Related: Mounting Israeli-Palestinians Tensions Reverberate On Soccer Pitch – Analysis

Similarly, the Israel Football Association, even though it is the only Middle Eastern soccer body to have an anti-racism program, has repeatedly slapped Beitar Jerusalem on the knuckles but has always stopped short of significantly raising the cost of the club’s persistent racism. Beitar, which has long enjoyed the support of Israeli leaders, including Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu and other prominent right-wing personalities, has the worst disciplinary record in Israel’s Premier League.

Beitar’s rabidly anti-Palestinian, anti-Muslim La Familia support group sparked rare national outrage in 2013 when it unfurled a banner asserting that “Beitar will always remain pure” in protest against the club’s brief hiring of two Muslim players from Chechnya. It was the group’s use of language associated with German National Socialism that sparked the outrage against its consistent racism.

Nonetheless, La Familia operates in an environment in which racism, racial superiority, bigotry, double standards and little sincere effort to address a key issue that undermines Israel’ s projection of itself as a democratic state founded on the ashes of discrimination , prejudice and genocide is one predominant story that emerges from the country’s soccer pitches.

Writing in Soccer & Society, Israeli football scholar Amir Ben-Porat warned that “the football stadium has become an arena for protest: political, ethnic, nationalism, etc… ‘Death to the Arabs’ has thus become common chant in football stadiums… Many Israelis consider the Israeli Arabs (Palestinians) to be ‘Conditional Strangers,’ that is temporary citizens… Contrary to conventional expectations, these fans are not unsophisticated rowdies, but middle-class political-ideological right-wingers, whose rejection of Arab football players on their team is based on a definite conception of Israel as a Jewish (Zionist) state,” Mr. Ben-Porat wrote.

Related: Israeli Raid On Palestinian Soccer Association Signals Dangerous Hardening Of Israeli-Palestinian Battle Lines – Analysis

Responding to Mr. Levi, IFA president Ofer Eini said “Levy’s words are not appropriate and their racist scent certainly doesn’t contribute to Israeli soccer and Israeli society. As a coach and an educator it would have been better had he avoided comments which can serve those who want to divide Israeli society.” Mr. Eini did not include any potential punitive action against Beitar in his statement.

The EEOC and the IFA took issue with a statement in a radio interview by Beitar coach Guy Levi that “it doesn’t matter that this is the right time; it would create tension and cause much greater damage. I won’t find any player from the Arab sector who would want to. Even if there was a player who suited me professionally, I wouldn’t bring him, because it would create unnecessary tension.”

Mr. Levi said that opposition by La Familia, whom he praised, meant that he would not sign Israel international Bibras Natcho, a Circassian Muslim, as it would stir unrest among the club’s supporters. “My job is to coach the team, not to educate anyone,” Mr. Levy said. Mr. Natcho, a CSKA Moscow midfielder asked Mr. Levy on Twitter: “What would happen if a European coach would have announced that he doesn’t want a Jewish player on his team?”

EEOC commissioner Tziona Koenig-Yair asserted that Mr. Levi’s comments constituted “suspicion of racism in contravention of the law prohibiting discrimination based on nationality, among other things in acceptance to employment.”

Mr. Levi’s assertion that Palestinian players would not want to play for Beitar, presumably because the explicit racist provocation of, chants against, and attacks on Palestinians and Muslims by La Familia, was belied by Mohammed Ghadir, a Palestinian striker, who in 2011 said he wanted to play for Beitar but was rejected. “I am well suited to Beitar, and that team would fit me like a glove. I have no qualms about moving to play for them,” Mr. Ghadir said at the time. The EEOC and the IFA failed to step in.

In a commentary on Mr. Ghadir’s case, Ha’aretz columnist Yoav Borowitz noted that “an extraordinarily courageous Arab player has stood up, and fearlessly indicated that he is not afraid to play for Beitar. The Jerusalem squad did not assent to his request – not because he lacks sufficient talent, but because he is an Arab. This is a mark of Cain for Beitar Jerusalem and its fans, and also for the city of Jerusalem, the state of Israel and its legal system, the IFA and also for the media, which continues to cover this soccer team. Day by day, we reinforce and popularize this loathsome form of racism.”

Beitar was founded in 1936 by members of the Beitar movement established in 1923 in Latvia as part of the revanchist Zionist trend. Beitar’s founder, former Ukrainian war reporter Ze’ev Jabotinsky, hoped to imbue its members with a military spirit.

The club initially drew many of its players and fans from Irgun, an extreme nationalist, para-military Jewish underground that waged a violent campaign against the pre-state British mandate authorities. As a result, many of them were exiled to Eritrea in the 1940s. Many of La Familia’s members are supporters of Kach, the outlawed violent and racist party that was headed by assassinated Rabbi Meir Kahane. La Familia frequently displays Kach’s symbols.

Beitar’s initial anthem reflected the club’s politics, glorifying a “guerrilla army racist and tough, an army that calls itself the supporters of Beitar.” That spirit still comes to life when fans of Beitar meets their team’s Palestinian rivals. Their support reaches a feverish pitch as they chant racist, anti-Arab songs and denounce the Prophet Mohammed.

Beitar’s matches often resemble a Middle Eastern battlefield. The club’s hard core fans — Sephardi males of Middle Eastern and North African origin who defined their support as subversive and against the country’s Ashkenazi establishment — revel in their status as bad boys. Their dislike of Ashkenazi Jews of East European extraction, rooted in resentment against social and economic discrimination, rivals their disdain for Palestinians.

The failure to seriously confront La Familia has entrenched Palestinian perceptions of an Israeli society that is inherently racist. Israeli Palestinian Member of Parliament Ahmed Tibi has laid the blame for La Familia’s excess at the doorstep of Israeli political and sports leaders. “For years, no one really tried to stop them, not the police, not the club, not the attorney-general and not the Israeli Football Association,” he said.

The post Israel Chides Club For Racism In Bid To Fend Off FIFA Suspension – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Neil Thompson believes that Mongolia, which is resource-rich and relatively democratic, is set to become the bellwether state for 21st century Eurasian politics. That’s because the way Ulan Bator is balancing its ties with Russia and China could provide a model for other Central Asian states to follow.

By Neil Thompson*

Many  Westerners continue to view  Mongolia through the lens of its distant past, when this vast country served as an incubator for the conquering waves of nomadic horsemen that periodically appear throughout history. However, the origins of today’s modern Mongolian republic and its foreign policies reflect its troubled birth as a state on a historic fault line between many competing empires and tribes. Yet that might be about to change, with this landlocked and impoverished but resource rich and democratic Asian country becoming the bellwether state for 21st century Eurasian politics.

Life on a Fault-line

In the 18th and 19th centuries, the region that is now the modern state of Mongolia was, like the rest of Central Asia, first squeezed between and then divided by the expanding Russia and Chinese empires – both cultures which had long suffered from Mongol depredations themselves. The popularity of this political arrangement locally can be measured in the length of time it outlasted the Qing and Romanov dynasties. In 1913, less than two years after the fall of the Qing, Tibet and Mongolia signed a treaty declaring their independence from China. Independence, in turn, inspired nationalist sentiment for an enlarged Mongolian territory that embraced Mongols in both China and Russia.

Related: Mongolia: The Future Of Eurasia? – Analysis

The Russian reaction however was an ominous sign of things to come. Despite signing a treaty with the new Mongolian government, Russia and China’s disintegrating central government issued a joint declaration stating that Mongolia was still under Chinese suzerainty. This was reinforced by a joint Russian-Chinese-Mongolian treaty in 1915 placing an autonomous Mongolia back under formal Chinese oversight. Russia’s striking respect for the official boundaries of the now-vanished Qing dynasty is easily explained. The Japanese defeat of first China in 1895 and then Russia in 1905 added a third predatory power to north-east Asia. Secret treaties at the end of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05 initially forced tsarist Russia to accept Mongolia lay within Japan’s sphere of influence.

Despite a decade of unsavory horse-trading between imperial Japan, tsarist Russia and China’s warlords, it would be Russia into whose orbit the new ‘autonomous’ state of Mongolia would ultimately be drawn. ‘Outer Mongolia’, as Mongolia was then called, was tragically caught up in the drama of the Russian Revolution. It was alternatively occupied and fought over by local nationalists, China’s warlord-dominated Beiyang government, White Russian troops and their semi-official Japanese allies, and the Red Army together with a nascent Mongolian communist movement. The Bolshevik intervention was the decisive one and in 1925 the People’s Republic of Mongolia was proclaimed. Mongolia became a Soviet satellite state of the in the same mold as the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. It would remain isolated from the outside world for seven decades, integrated only with its Soviet mentor and economic prop.

Whither Ulan Bator?

Nowadays, this country of just three million is still encased between her old occupiers, Russia to the north and China to the south, east and west. However the threat from Japan ended after the Second World War, and in 1986 Mongolia restored friendly diplomatic relations with China that had long suffered during the Sino-Soviet split. The 1990 withdrawal of the Soviet military and Moscow’s political and economic support ended decades of communist government. And while Mongolia was plunged into food shortages and economic collapse, a new and vibrant democratic system was kept alive and functioning.

Related: China, Russia Mull Mongolia Gas Route Amid Ukraine Crisis – Analysis

Probably thanks to this Mongolia has not succumbed to the ‘resource curse’ yet, despite sitting on vast quantities of untapped mineral wealth. Minerals already make up over 80% of Mongolia’s annual exports, and that is expected to rise to 95% after a number of massive mining projects come on-stream. Despite squabbles between foreign companies and the at-times erratic Mongolian government, foreign direct investment (FDI) from a number of different foreign states has been transforming its post-communist economy. Mongolia was one of the world’s fastest growing economies until recent times, with high growth rates reported in 2012 and 2013.

A genuinely free Mongolia presents a curious picture today. Twenty-five years after independence Mongolia is still a lone democracy in a region of autocracies (albeit with Kyrgyzstan as a credible contender to join it). Certainly it is a lot freer and less corrupt than its two giant neighbors though there have been plenty of bumps along the way in recent years, including a state of emergency being declared in 2008 after a disputed election led to a drunken riot in which five people were killed. Accusations of corruption and electoral malpractice have also been found to have some substance. In 2012, Enkhbayar Nambar – the former Russian-friendly president – was jailed on corruption charges before being pardoned by his successor (and long-time rival) the following year. The antics of the landlocked and impoverished state’s rapidly expanding merchant navy also continue to raise eyebrows, even as it diversifies revenue streams in an economy heavily dependent upon commodity prices.

Three’s a Crowd

Geopolitically, Mongolia continues to face the tough choices of its location between a reenergized authoritarian Russia and a booming communist China. To its north it has a revanchist neighbor that is currently spearheading a comparatively protectionist customs union as an economic means to a political end. Russia’s own creaking economy is once again bearing the cost of subsidizing the underdeveloped neighbors it has persuaded or bullied back into the fold. As Moscow has revived itself under Putin, it has also sought to breathe new life into bilateral economic and political ties with Mongolia. Russia remains the only alternative choice to China for Mongolian export routes, something that Ulan Bator’s politicians think about when they remember past Kremlin arm-twisting over their Soviet-era debts to Russia.

Related: China And Mongolia: Realising A ‘Comprehensive Strategic Partnership’ – Analysis

To the south, China remains the booming source of Mongolia’s new found prosperity, should the legal wrangling over various mining projects ever end. Beijing shares Mongolia’s flexible attitude to the rule of law, desire for efficient economic growth, and lately even a showy crackdown on corruption. Yet many Mongolians remain disturbed by their southern neighbor. While Russia is vast but under populated, China surrounds them on three sides and already rules a Mongolian population that’s twice as large as Mongolia’s. Worries also abound that the mining boom will turn Mongolia into an economic satellite of China in much the same way that the country was a political satellite of Russia in the twentieth century. Having tasted the fruits of full sovereignty Ulan Bator does not want to lose it as wealth literally starts to spring from the ground under its feet.

At present, China is the overwhelming export market for Mongolia, buying 89% of the coal, metals, oil and even livestock that Mongolians send abroad each year. However the figures for China are somewhat deceptive as the impact of large scale FDI by Western mining companies has yet to be fully felt. For instance, British-Australian mining giant Rio Tinto spent $6 billion preparing its copper mine at Oyu Tolgoi and believes it will extract $8 billion in revenue per year for the next several decades. Ulan Bator has also tried to diversify away from overreliance on China, most notably by signing a free trade agreement with Japan earlier this year. With this in mind, analysts predict that Mongolia’s ever-closer connection to the Chinese market will not necessarily translate into Beijing’s increasing political influence there.

Towards an Ever Distant Union

Indeed, the most interesting aspect of the Sino-Russian-Mongolian relationship is the growing importance of Mongolia’s agency relative Beijing and Moscow, a reversal of the situation in 1915. In this sense, Mongolia is a microcosm for the states of the wider Central Asian region which have also been trapped between the two giants since the 17^th century. Although Russia and China have been careful not to step on each other’s toes, their economic interests in Mongolia are basically at odds. China has simply tried to pull Mongolia ever closer into the structural embrace of its giant economy, whereas Russia has had to trade on its diminishing assets in the country – such as writing off Ulan Bator’s debts in 2003 and once again in 2009.

Despite Moscow’s scrambling to secure access in a share of Mongolia’s natural resources, its long term success can perhaps be measured by the news that the Mongolian parliament voted in October 2014 to adopt a rail gauge compatible with China’s in order to develop a special 240-kilometer track from the Tavan Tolgoi coal basin to the Chinese border. Coal is Mongolia’s second biggest export, and China is its largest customer. The new gauge will reduce the cost of transporting coal to China by a third, from $6 a ton to $4 a ton, once the line is completed in late 2016.

In addition, the Oyu Tolgoi mining project was once envisaged by Moscow as a means to leverage its split ownership of the trans-Mongolian railway line into economic influence. Russia offered to build a railway link to the main line, and run the copper extracted to far eastern ports via Russia. Instead the contract was given to a Canadian firm which is now part of Rio Tinto and the precious metal is simply trucked to the Chinese border eighty kilometers away. So, despite the maneuvering of successive Mongolian governments to ensure they balance trade with China against trade with other countries, Ulan Bator has also ensured that it remains free from participating in Putin’s pet Eurasian Economic Union project.

No More Backyards

There is a cross-party understanding within political circles that Mongolia has no permanent friends or enemies today, only trading partners. Ulan Bator today ruthlessly seeks out opportunities to cooperate with foreign parties for its own economic development and discards them quickly if a better offer is made. China has found it a tough partner to bargain with economically. Meanwhile, Russia may find that the rest of Central Asia prefers to follow the lead of Ulan Bator as the fruits of Mongolia’s socio-economic experiments bear fruit compared to their own stagnant kleptocracies. The era of Eurasian states having to choose between geopolitical ‘clubs’ is over and Ulan Bator knows it.

*Neil Thompson is Content Editor at News4Media and freelance contributor at the Diplomat, Informed Comment, Geopolitical Monitor and similar publications. He holds an MA in International Relations of East Asia from the University of Durham.

The post Mongolia’s Choices Matter – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

A car-bomb exploded outside a restaurant Tuesday in Mogadishu killing at least 11 people, reports Radio Shabelle, attributing the attack to the Islamist al Shabab insurgent group.

The blast ripped through the Banoda Restaurant in front of Mogadishu’s Central Hotel. According to police and rescuers, at least six injured were rushed to the city hospital.

The blast comes a day after al Shabab claimed an attack in Garowe, capital of the semi-autonomous Puntland region, against a UNICEF (United Nations Child’s Fund) vehicle, killing four staff members.

The post Somalia: Car Bomb Explodes In Mogadishu Killing 11 People appeared first on Eurasia Review.

A seismology team led by Southern Methodist University (SMU), Dallas, finds that high volumes of wastewater injection combined with saltwater (brine) extraction from natural gas wells is the most likely cause of earthquakes occurring near Azle, Texas, from late 2013 through spring 2014.

In an area where the seismology team identified two intersecting faults, they developed a sophisticated 3D model to assess the changing fluid pressure within a rock formation in the affected area. They used the model to estimate stress changes induced in the area by two wastewater injection wells and the more than 70 production wells that remove both natural gas and significant volumes of salty water known as brine.

Conclusions from the modeling study integrate a broad-range of estimates for uncertain subsurface conditions. Ultimately, better information on fluid volumes, flow parameters, and subsurface pressures in the region will provide more accurate estimates of the fluid pressure along this fault.

“The model shows that a pressure differential develops along one of the faults as a combined result of high fluid injection rates to the west and high water removal rates to the east,” said Matthew Hornbach, SMU associate professor of geophysics. “When we ran the model over a 10-year period through a wide range of parameters, it predicted pressure changes significant enough to trigger earthquakes on faults that are already stressed.”

Model-predicted stress changes on the fault were typically tens to thousands of times larger than stress changes associated with water level fluctuations caused by the recent Texas drought.

“What we refer to as induced seismicity – earthquakes caused by something other than strictly natural forces – is often associated with subsurface pressure changes,” said Heather DeShon, SMU associate professor of geophysics. “We can rule out stress changes induced by local water table changes. While some uncertainties remain, it is unlikely that natural increases to tectonic stresses led to these events.”

DeShon explained that some ancient faults in the region are more susceptible to movement – “near critically stressed” – due to their orientation and direction. “In other words, surprisingly small changes in stress can reactivate certain faults in the region and cause earthquakes,” DeShon said.

The study, “Causal Factors for Seismicity near Azle, Texas,” has been published online in the journal Nature Communications at http://nature.com/articles/doi:10.1038/ncomms7728.

The study was produced by a team of scientists from SMU’s Department of Earth Sciences in Dedman College of Humanities and Sciences, the U.S. Geological Survey, the University of Texas Institute for Geophysics and the University of Texas Department of Petroleum and Geosystems Engineering. SMU scientists Hornbach and DeShon are the lead authors.

SMU seismologists have been studying earthquakes in North Texas since 2008, when the first series of felt tremors hit near DFW International Airport between Oct. 30, 2008, and May 16, 2009. Next came a series of quakes in Cleburne between June 2009 and June 2010, and this third series in the Azle-Reno area northwest of Fort Worth occurred between November 2013 and January 2014. The SMU team also is studying an ongoing series of earthquakes in the Irving-Dallas area that began in April 2014.

In both the DFW sequence and the Cleburne sequence, the operation of injection wells used in the disposal of natural gas production fluids was listed as a possible cause of the seismicity. The introduction of fluid pressure modeling of both industry activity and water table fluctuations in the Azle study represents the first of its kind, and has allowed the SMU team to move beyond assessment of possible causes to the most likely cause identified in this report.

Prior to the DFW Airport earthquakes in 2008, an earthquake large enough to be felt had not been reported in the North Texas area since 1950. The North Texas earthquakes of the last seven years have all occurred in areas developed for natural gas extraction from a geologic formation known as the Barnett Shale. The Texas Railroad Commission reports that production in the Barnett Shale grew exponentially from 216 million cubic feet a day in 2000, to 4.4 billion cubic feet a day in 2008, to a peak of 5.74 billion cubic feet of gas a day in 2012.

The post Texas Earthquakes Likely Caused By Combination Of Gas Field Fluid Injection And Removal appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Sinisa Jakov Marusic

Macedonian police on Tuesday said a group of 40 armed and masked gunmen wearing the markings of an Albanian paramilitary unit, the National Liberation Army, NLA, stormed a police outpost near Kosovo at 2.30 am Tuesday.

Police Spokesperson Ivo Kotevski told a press conference in Skopje that a “terrorist attack” had taken place.

The spokesman said the attackers, who appeared to be from Kosovo, spoke Albanian and took four policemen who were manning the border post hostage.

They then tied three of them up and beat them while filming the whole thing on camera.

“The leader of the group, speaking in Albanian… told the captured police officers the following: ‘We are from the NLA and tell everyone that nobody can save you, neither [Prime Minister] Nikola Gruevski, nor [head of the junior ruling Albanian DUI party] Ali Ahmeti. We want our own state”.

According to Kotevski, the police officers were told that they risked being executed.

After the hostage takers left, the spokesperson said that the fourth officer, who was not tied up, helped the four captives to escape on foot. While departing the scene, the officers heard shots from automatic weapon.

Police said they were taking measure to clear up the attack but no more information was available owing to the complexity of the situation.

The scene of the reported attack, the village of Goshince, part of the ethnic Albanian rural municipality of Lipkovo, is some 25 kilometres northeast from the capital of Skopje towards the border with Kosovo.

The region was on the frontline of armed hostilities during a short armed conflict in Macedonia in 2001.

The secretary general of Lipkovo municipality, Nexhadi Osmani, told BIRN that they had not noticed any increased police presence or the presence of unidentified gunmen.

“All we know is what we hear from the police and many people here are still not informed about what is happening. But I can vouch that the people here do not hold any ethnic grudge against anyone,” he said. “We have lived through war and we know best what it’s like. We do not want to go through it again,” he added.

Back in 2001 conflict erupted between Albanian insurgents and the security forces. It ended with the Ohrid peace accord, which offered more rights to the Albanians who make one quarter of the population of 2.1 million. In return for the deal, the insurgents from the NLA disbanded and formed the ethnic Albanian Democratic Union for Integration, which now sits in government.

The incidents comes amid a political crisis in Macedonia revolving around opposition claims that the Prime Minister has orchestrated the illegal surveillance of some 20,000 people.

Critics of the government have accused it of plotting a spike in ethnic tension to distract attention from the affair.

On Tuesday, the DUI, representing ethnic Albanians, called the whole affair a provocation.

“The DUI calls on all the citizens not to worry and not to fall for provocations,” the junior party in government said, adding that such incidents only served to distract the country from the goal of interethnic integration and reconciliation.

Meanwhile, the former commandant of the now disbanded NLA in the region of Lipkovo was quoted by a news agency Zhurnal as claiming that the incident in Goshince had been staged by the Macedonian secret service in order to mobilize Macedonians against Albanians and rally them to the embattled government.

“These cases have been fabricated by the government in a professional manner… The aim is to unite Macedonians against Albanians. The government has paid some people to create a problem up there to manipulate public opinion,” Abedin Zymberi was quoted as saying.

“The longer we wait [for a resolution of the crisis] the higher the risk that someone might hire small criminal groups of Albanians to try to stage a conflict. Albanian criminals might be used to attack Macedonian villages or vice versa,” a former legislator and political analyst, Mersel Biljali, recently told BIRN.

The post Macedonia Claims Kosovo Albanians Attacked Border Post appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Apparently, Dick Cheney is not the only one who thinks the president has ceded too much of his power since the 1970s and has become too week vis-à-vis the other two branches of American government. Now, on the other end of the political spectrum, Steven Rattner, a Wall Street executive and former Obama Treasury Department official who helped engineer the president’s bailout of huge, irresponsibly managed American auto companies, has echoed Cheney in a recent New York Times opinion piece: “The assault on presidential authority dates from at least the early 1970s, when a mix of the Vietnam War, Watergate and a mushrooming executive branch raised fears of an “Imperial Presidency….” Since some on the left and some on the right agree with this premise, it must be true, right? Wrong. Compared with the Europeans, Americans are not good at remembering their history, and Cheney and Rattner, though better than most, only remember back to the 1970s, and even then, their memory is cloudy.

During that decade, Congress did push back some on the huge executive aggrandizement of power throughout American history, vis-à-vis the other branches, in major areas: the war power, the budget, and international agreements. Yet all of these congressional clawbacks were temporary or have been almost inconsequential.

Rattner mentions the War Powers Resolution of 1973, which was designed to limit the ability of the president to sustain wars on his own without congressional approval. From the Constitution and the debates at the Constitutional Convention, however, it is clear that the nation’s founders gave the Congress sole war-making power unless the country was under direct attack. Beginning with Harry Truman’s abuse of the Constitution when he did not seek a congressional declaration of war for the Korean “conflict,” such declarations have become so yesterday. As we have seen from post-1970s U.S. military action—for example, Reagan’s invasion of Grenada and premeditated provocations of Libya, George H. W. Bush’s invasion of Panama, Bill Clinton’s escapades in the Balkans, and Obama’s more recent attack on Libya—the War Powers Resolution has been largely ignored and has been a failure in restoring congressional war-making power.

In the 1970s, Congress also set up its own budgetary process to counter executive encroachment on one of its other primary functions under the Constitution, which had eroded since President Warren Harding introduced a unified executive budget in the early 1920s. Yet the executive branch has gotten so mammoth—98 percent of all federal employees work for the president—that Congress usually changes the budget the president submits only at the margins. Congress has also allowed its constitutional powers to be abrogated by passing vague laws and allowing the executive to take the political heat in implementing them. Avoiding such responsibility helps when members of Congress try to get reelected, which they almost always do, but it is lousy for the republic, because they are eroding valuable legislative checks on executive power.

The third area in which Rattner sees congressional resurgence is that since 1970s, Congress has insisted that the text of any new executive agreement signed by the president with another country or countries be sent to the legislature forthwith. Nevertheless, Rattner argues that the authority for the president to enter such agreements has remained in place and notes the thousands signed by Bill Clinton and George W. Bush and the hundreds inked by Obama. Yet the Constitution does not mention executive agreements at all—instead requiring formal treaties, which must be ratified by a two-thirds majority in Congress. Yet 94 percent of all U.S. arrangements with foreign nations are executive agreements, not treaties.

The recent congressional action demanding that Congress examine and vote on any U.S.-Iranian nuclear agreement seems to have triggered Rattner’s piece. He says Congress’s bludgeoning of Obama into ceding his “prerogative” to enter into an executive agreement with Iran casts a pall over the legality of his recent executive orders on immigration, climate change and other issues. Yes it does, because guess what: Executive orders are not mentioned in the Constitution either! One can make an argument that the Constitution does allow the president to implement and execute the laws passed by Congress, and therefore he needs the narrowly defined power to issue executive orders to do so. However, Obama and other recent presidents have gone far beyond that. Obama’s justification for issuing an executive order that somewhat liberalized immigration was that he had to act because Congress wouldn’t. Under the Constitution, presidents are not allowed to legislate using executive orders just because Congress, the only body allowed to legislate, chooses not to act (even on laudable issues like immigration reform, which I support).

Also, instead of “bludgeoning” Obama over the Iran nuclear deal, Congress is whipping him with a feather. Congress is artful at pretending to do something when it’s not doing anything of consequence. Senator Ron Johnson (R-Nort Dakota) impressively introduced a measure to make any nuclear agreement with Iran a treaty, which would require a two-thirds vote in the Senate for approval. He shouldn’t have had to do this, because under the Constitution, any arrangement with a foreign nation, no matter how minor, should already be a treaty. (The measure, even if offered, will not pass, which may be why Johnson introduced it.) Instead, inverting the Constitution on its head, Congress has arranged it so that it will need a two-thirds vote to override Obama’s veto of congressional disapproval of any such nuclear agreement. Thus, Obama would need to get only 34 senators to sustain his veto and preserve any agreement—an easy task. Congress would get to vote on the lifting of economic sanctions on Iran, but if it didn’t vote to do so, U.S. business would be at a tremendous disadvantage after any agreement, because the Europeans and the United Nations Security Council could lift their sanctions.

Congress is thus asserting its role, but only with smoke and mirrors. I predict that any final agreement with Iran will raise a lot of fuss among Republicans and even some Democrats but will eventually go through. Just as I support immigration reform, I support a verifiable nuclear agreement with Iran, but I do not support the unconstitutional way Congress is passing judgment on it. Obama’s acquiescence to Congress’ charade of relevancy reminds me of the Roman Empire, where emperors continued to pay due respect to the Senate, long emasculated from its glory days during the Roman Republic, but where everyone knew who was really running things.

This article was published at Huffington Post and reprinted with permission.

The post US Congress’ Charade With Iran Nuclear Agreement – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

The Saudi-led international coalition on Tuesday declared the end of its military campaign four weeks after launching air strikes against the Houthi militia in Yemen, saying their threat to Saudi Arabia and its neighbors had been removed.

The coalition has “ended Operation Decisive Storm based on a request by the Yemeni government and President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi,” its spokesman, Brigadier General Ahmad Al-Assiri, told a press briefing in the Saudi capital.

However, he said the coalition would continue to impose a naval blockade on Yemen and target any movements by the Houthi forces.

The coalition have named this new phase of the conflict operation ‘Restore Hope.’

The post Saudi Arabia Declares Successful End Of Decisive Storm In Yemen appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Canadians are caught in a new subprime-style property crisis and collapsing crude oil prices.

By Vikram Mansharamani*

For years, the global community praised Canadian financial conservatism and the country’s success in skirting the global financial crisis. Canadian banks were seen as among the world’s finest, appropriately capitalized, and well-run. They still are. Globalization and interdependency, however, are perniciously eating away at the fortress of stability that Canada once was.

The country is today one of the world’s most vulnerable large economies, and there are three key reasons for this precarious position: First, Canadian household debt levels are extremely high by almost any measure. Second, housing prices are elevated and continue to rise, driven by both confident Canadians and foreigners. More debt accompanies these higher prices, further escalating the vulnerability. Lastly, the proverbial straw that may break the Canadian camel’s back is the recent collapse of crude oil prices. Lower crude oil prices are rippling through the energy-exporting economy and will adversely affect employment, the federal budget, consumer confidence and ultimately real estate. The virtuous cycle appears poised to turn vicious.

Let’s begin by looking at Canadian household debt. According to the McKinsey Global Institute’s February 2015 report “Debt and (Not Much) Deleveraging,” Canada’s household debt-to-income ratio grew by a staggering 22 percentage points between 2007 and mid-2014, matching household credit growth in China and lagging that of Greece (30 percent). Meanwhile, US household credit actually shrank by 26 percent as risk aversion led to rapid deleveraging.

Total household debt, C$1.82 trillion, now exceeds GDP, C$1.6 trillion, approximately C$1.3 trillion of which was for residential mortgages. Further, household debt is now more than 160 percent of disposable income – meaning it would take about 20 months for a family to pay off its debt if interest rates were 0 percent and they spent their entire disposable income to do so. The Bank of Canada highlighted “elevated levels” of household indebtedness as one of the key vulnerabilities of the Canadian economy.

Subprime redux? As Canadian housing prices rise, uninsured mortgages outpace those that are insured (International Monetary Fund)

And then there’s the Canadian shadow-banking sector that is booming. As a result of regulatory efforts to contain the housing froth, mortgages insured by the Canadian government are no longer growing. Uninsured private mortgages are filling the void. This includes creditworthy, gainfully-employed and seemingly responsible homeowners tapping home-equity lines. Such loans cost the banks about 3.5 percent, which then lend the money to a homebuyer who doesn’t qualify for an insured loan at 12 percent. This private uninsured mortgage market is a booming subprime industry, similar to the one that brought down US financial system in 2006-7. The graph from a recent International Monetary Fund report shows the continued growth of this lending as traditional insured lending slows.

It’s only a matter of time before this shadow mortgage banking market implodes, The impact of such a development will go beyond Canada. As incremental credit evaporates, housing prices are likely to fall and drag the Canadian dollar and Canada’s debt rating with them. Might this result in a greater flight of capital to US treasuries, forcing yields lower in the United States and an incrementally stronger US dollar? Might this stronger dollar further weaken crude prices, thereby hurting crude exporters such as Venezuela, Iran and Russia while helping crude-importers like India and China?

Given that 70 percent of household debt is associated with residential real estate, there is a tight connection between mortgage debt and real estate prices. Unlike the US real estate markets, which corrected during the financial crisis, Canadian prices continue an uninterrupted rise that began in the mid-late 1990s. Detached single-family homes in Toronto now average more than C$1 million, and Vancouver is now deemed the second least affordable city in the world – thanks in large part to Chinese buyers who are also facing a slower economy. The Economist magazine recently noted that Canada’s housing markets might be overvalued by as much as 35 percent.

One of the main reasons that Canada weathered the last financial storm was due to a strong oil price and the corresponding jobs created for Canadian workers. Collapsing oil prices have dramatically altered the situation. Consider the chart prepared by University of Calgary Professor Ron Kneebone that evaluates Canada’s unemployment rate as cited and then removing the impact of Alberta’s boom.

Oil and Jobs: Western Canada Select oil prices went from near $80 per barrel in February 2014 to below $30 in March; the graph shows the impact of jobs in the Alberta oilfields on Canada’s unemployment rate (Ron Kneebone, University of Calgary)

A Statistics Canada report issued in March highlighted that Alberta was responsible for almost 90 percent of all new jobs created in Canada in 2014. That trend is now in reverse. According to construction industry association BuildForce, Alberta is likely to see sustained job losses for the next three years at a minimum. Further, because Alberta drew workers from all over the country, any slowdown will have national impact on unemployment. Not surprisingly, Calgary and Edmonton real estate markets have been rapidly weakening.

Sadly, Canadian leaders have very little in their control at this point. The global credit and crude markets defy local control. Even housing in Canada is more global than traditionally assumed – just ask any Vancouver real estate agent. Dan Scarrow of Macdonald Realty last month bluntly described the impact of Chinese buyers: “Our analysis last year indicated that roughly one-third of buyers in Vancouver had some connection to mainland China.”

Excessive household debt, an overvalued housing market, lower oil prices and a weak employment outlook have Canada teetering on the verge of an economic bust. In fact, it may not take a home price drop for chaos to ensue. Individual debt levels now need growth in prices to keep the system working. Prices plateauing may be sufficient for the house of cards to collapse.

China’s economic slowdown and the strong US dollar have affected crude oil and other commodity prices negatively. Bank of Canada Governor Stephen Poloz reduced interest rates this January, clinging to a global trend of government stimulus spending, in a quest to mitigate the negative economic impact of plummeting oil prices. Lower interest rates fuel uninsured lending, but higher rates would crush the consumer and make debt unmanageable.

Housing prices, too, are largely out of Canada’s control. Vancouver and Toronto are highly international cities, proving popular with emerging market investors looking to park money. How much of Chinese buying pressure is because of a desire to get money out of China? One suspects that Chinese President Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption effort is spurring more Chinese money into Canadian housing. More than 20 percent of those in Canada are foreign born. The insidious effect of rising housing prices with incessant foreign-buying pressure is that it generates local fears of being priced out of the market. Canadians scramble to participate, and that drives additional credit.

And lastly, the immediate catalyst of forthcoming economic pain with lower crude oil prices is being driven by dynamics outside of Canada. Whether it’s Saudi Arabia pumping more oil in the face of overcapacity for political reasons or technological developments in the United States allowing the shale boom to continue, Canada has little control over the oil market. And yet crude prices directly impact the federal budget. The best Canada can do is to hope for higher oil prices.

The Canadian consumer reminds one of the cartoon character Wile E. Coyote who has run off the cliff, his feet still moving. Suspended in air, he has yet to look down, and it’s only a matter of time until gravity exerts its force.

*Vikram Mansharamani, PhD, is a lecturer in the Program on Ethics, Politics, & Economics at Yale University and a senior fellow at the Mossavar-Rahmani Center for Business and Government at the Harvard Kennedy School. Follow him on twitter @mansharamani.

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The number of foreign citizens registered with the Spanish Social Security system stood at 1,563,343 in March, an increase of 2.29% – or 34,974 National Insurance contributors – on the previous month.

When compared with 2014, the number of foreign workers has increased by 1.79% – the equivalent of 27,455 more NI contributors. This is the first March since 2008 in which the number of foreign workers has increased year-on-year. Previous years saw declines of up to -9.85% (2009).

The highest figures for foreign workers correspond to Romania (279,128), Morocco (194,762), China (90,296) and Ecuador (69,466). These countries are followed by Italy (66,404), Bolivia (56,975), the United Kingdom (53,014) and Colombia (51,349).

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The new Silk Road is the most ambitious international initiative yet to be launched by the Chinese President, Xi Jinping. This policy has many strands, one of the most prominent being the creation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. We examine its possible implications for Europe, including Spain.

By Mario Esteban and Miguel Otero-Iglesias*

China is using the new Silk Road as a means of positioning itself to play a decisive role in the integration process of Eurasia. The project promises to be an inclusive one, in which there will be space for all types of political regimes and actors, both public and private, based on a market logic that looks set to enable all participants to benefit. It is not therefore a case of an altruistic initiative, nor is it an exercise in development aid. The Chinese leadership believes that the implementation of this plan will help it secure a range of key objectives in domestic and foreign policy. The initiative is not free of risks for the EU, which could see its international influence eroded; meanwhile, corruption and indebtedness have the potential to destabilise such sensitive regions as the Balkans, Eastern Europe, the Middle East and Central Asia. The only means of avoiding this is if European governments and societies subscribe to the project in a critical and constructive spirit, helping to shape it and thereby ensure that it does not become a conduit solely for economic growth, but also for development.

Analysis: No state-backed project has garnered as much media attention this year, whether inside or outside China, as the new Silk Road, the most conspicuous aspect of which will be an extensive network of communication and transport infrastructure, both new and renovated, to improve connectivity between China, the rest of Eurasia and Africa. Launched towards the end of 2013, the programme encompasses two main initiatives: and a 21st-century Maritime Silk Road. The former aims to improve overland connections, while the latter focuses on maritime routes. Other plans mooted are directed at upgrading energy links and information super highways. In October 2014 the creation was also announced of the forthcoming Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, operating within the same framework; set to have an initial capital of up to US$100 billion, this signals the start of a new era in the international financial system, where the traditional powers no longer play the lead role when it comes to adapting to the structural changes taking place in the global economy.

Beijing hopes to use this plan to strengthen its economic, political and cultural ties with the rest of the States involved. In the commercial arena for example, estimates from the Chinese government envisage that the US$1.25 trillion worth of trade China conducted with Eurasian countries in 2013 will double by 2020. Furthermore, the initiative will not only reinforce China’s bilateral relations with a large number of States, with the ensuing boost to her international stature, it will also enable Beijing to drive various domestic priorities and significantly enhance its influence over the integration processes underway within the macro-region.

The project is still in its earliest phase and clearly exhibits many profound difficulties, but its potential for having an impact of historic proportions on the development of Eurasia means that it merits rigorous analysis. This task has been made easier by the significantly greater information about the new Silk Road that has emerged over the last few months, especially with the recent publication of an official action plan.

Road map of a project

Both the overland and maritime aspects of the new Silk Road include multiple routes, which in many cases complement each other. The main difference between the two is that the maritime routes are already much more developed and are used to transport a much larger volume of trade.

In the terrestrial sphere the emphasis is being placed on railways and various routes are being developed to strengthen links between China, Central Asia and the EU (either through Russia and Belarus or through Iran and Turkey), and between China and the Indochinese Peninsula. This great overland corridor, which would connect the two extremities of Eurasia from east to west, would be complemented by other routes, also overland, running north-south, such as China (Xinjiang)-Pakistan and China (Yunnan)-Myanmar-Bangladesh-India. These north-south corridors connect inland parts of China to the coast. Some of these lines are already in operation and the aim is to improve them (upgrading them in some cases to high-speed lines), while others need sections to be completed before they can enter into service.

In terms of the trade in goods between China and Europe, the only regular train connections currently terminate in Germany. In addition there are routes between Poland and China and the experimental Madrid-Yiwu route, the longest in the world. Although in theory the market for rail transport between China and Europe is expanding, it is still far from emerging in any substantial way, because the time saving that is being achieved at the moment in comparison to seaborne freight –nine days in the case of the Madrid-Yiwu route– does not make up for the appreciable difference in cost, around US$5,000 per container. The railways’ prospects for cutting delivery times and costs are however significant, increasing the competitiveness of this option, particularly for goods that are sensitive to humidity, are perishable or of high value and are not worth transporting by air because of their volume or weight. As far as high-speed lines are concerned, it has already been announced that a project with a budget in excess of €200 billion is being developed to link Beijing and Moscow, and certain Chinese journalists are even talking about the possibility of building a high-speed line connecting the Chinese capital with London via Turkey.

Figure 1. Map of the Silk Road Economic Belt and the Maritime Silk Road
Source: Xinhua News Agency.

In the maritime sphere, the current route connecting Chinese ports with Europe, passing through the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean before reaching the Mediterranean Sea, will be maintained; other routes, not yet opened, would avoid the Strait of Malacca by setting out from ports in the Indian Ocean. Although no details have been revealed, in all likelihood these ports belong to countries with which Beijing enjoys close diplomatic relations, such as the port of Gwadar in Pakistan, operated by a Chinese company, or Chittagong in Bangladesh. The map published by the official Xinhua news agency also shows a connection with Kenya, where Chinese companies are building various infrastructure projects to improve both internal transport links as well as those with neighbouring landlocked countries such as Ethiopia, South Sudan, Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi. In the case of Europe it is envisaged that the lead role will be played by the port of Piraeus, both because of its location and the involvement of the Chinese company COSCO Pacific, part of the Chinese state enterprise China Ocean Shipping Company. COSCO Pacific has been operating the freight terminal at Piraeus since 2008 and has announced an investment of €230 million to increase its capacity to 6.2 million containers, and is also one of the five finalists in the current privatisation of 67% of the Piraeus Port Authority. It is important to bear in mind that the development of ports often goes hand in hand with developing the railway infrastructure leading to the port, so as to avoid bottlenecks. As far as Spanish ports are concerned, China sends more goods through the ports of Barcelona and Valencia than any other country, and is ranked second at the port of Algeciras. The most significant development envisaged in the short term is the investment of €150 million by Hutchison Port Holdings to extend the Barcelona Europe South Terminal, opened in 2012.

The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank

There is a wide international consensus that pinpoints lack of infrastructure as one of the main obstacles to economic growth among the less-developed countries comprising the new Silk Road. This diagnosis is by no means new; nor is it novel to identify lack of capital as the main reason for this shortfall not having been remedied. It is hardly surprising therefore that the new Silk Road should come equipped with financial measures designed to tackle this situation. Some of these measures are directly linked to the project, such as the Silk Road Fund, set up with US$40 billions and jointly founded by the Chinese currency reserves, the China Investment Corporation (the largest Chinese sovereign wealth fund), the Export-Import Bank of China and the China Development Bank; other institutions, such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank itself, the China-ASEAN Investment Cooperation Fund and the China-Eurasia Economic Cooperation Fund, can finance projects that fall within the new Silk Road project, although their scope and frame of reference is wider.

Such mechanisms are clearly inadequate, however, if the project’s viability is to be ensured. Even the figure of almost US$4 trillion amassed by China in its currency reserves pales into insignificance in the context of the US$21 trillion some international experts reckon it would cost to make the new Silk Road a reality, or the US$8 trillion the Asian Development Bank thinks Asia will need to invest on infrastructure before 2020. Inevitably, in the light of the sums being mooted, the Chinese authorities have made it clear that the plan does not rely on donations, but rather investments made in accordance with market criteria. From this perspective it is envisaged that both States and participating companies as well as private international investors will be able to provide financing for the project via a number of different routes.

Herein lies one of the chief unknown quantities that will determine what impact the new Silk Road ultimately has. It hardly needs to be said that several of the States involved in the project do not exactly shine when it comes to good governance; on the contrary, they suffer from high levels of corruption and a political class that has a proprietorial attitude towards the State. How have projects that have not hitherto elicited the interest of private investors going to attract them now? How is it possible to finance these projects without it leading to a substantial increase in the international debt burden of the countries where the infrastructure is to be built? At the very least, how can it be guaranteed that the debt will contribute to the development of the countries in question, rather than lining the pockets of elites? In this context, the signing up of 18 member-countries of the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee, Spain being one of them, as founder members of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank is extremely good news. Furthermore, the Chinese government itself seems to have toned down its non-interventionist rhetoric and is referring to the desirability of creating supervisory mechanisms for the investments and coordinating economic policies to ensure the success of the project.

Unfortunate parallels

Although the Belt and Road initiatives were announced in September and October 2013 respectively, the fact is that they have suffered from a palpable lack of precision, at least until the latter part of March 2015 with the publication of the official action plan. The uncertainty surrounding the nature of the new Silk Road generated wide-ranging speculation about its content, and it was not unusual to read non-Chinese analysts comparing the new Road to the sinocentric vassal system of imperial China and to the Marshall Plan. Both comparisons should be treated with great caution, however, since they obscure as much as they enlighten. At various times at the height of imperial China, the empire was able to lead a hierarchical system of international relations, whereby various neighbouring nations paid tribute to the Chinese Emperor in recognition of his authority. While it is clear that Beijing exerts more and more influence over its neighbours, there is absolutely no possibility that this will lead to a relationship similar to the sinocentric system because, apart from anything else, China ceased to enjoy the self-sufficiency needed to drive its own socioeconomic development some time ago. The mutually dependent relationships that China has established with the outside world ensure that relations as hierarchical as those of the tribute States are simply not viable. As far as the Marshall Plan is concerned, there are two essential differences. The new Silk Road is not an aid plan; instead, it is governed by market criteria, and its character is inclusive, since no State will be prevented from participating on the grounds of its political regime. It has even been confirmed that Taiwan, which had already applied to join the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, will be welcome. In other words, the Chinese project neither submits to a bloc-based analysis nor is it a zero-sum game, although clearly this does not entail that it lacks objectives of a geopolitical nature.

Significance for China

The new Silk Road started to acquire increasing prominence in the latter part of 2014, with constant references being made to the project both at the main political events within China –witness the latest plenary sessions of the National People’s Congress and the People’s Political Consultative Conference– and at high-level meetings between Chinese leaders and their Eurasian counterparts. Moreover, the creation of a leadership group to direct and oversee the implantation of the Belt and Road policies has just been announced.

The way the new Silk Road has been promoted to the top of the agenda is a reflection of its priority for Xi Jinping as a means of achieving key goals in domestic and foreign policy. Maintaining China on the path of economic development is the priority both for China’s leadership and its citizens and this project can contribute to such development in at least four ways: driving the internationalisation of its construction industry, encouraging exports, reducing risks in the supply chain and attracting investments towards the interior of the country.

The construction industry has become one of the main drivers of economic growth and employment in China in recent years. This is due in part to the billions the Chinese authorities have invested in infrastructure projects as a way of kick-starting the economy amid the international slump in demand triggered by the global economic and financial crisis of 2007-09. The problem is that the fillip derived from construction is losing steam, owing to a slowdown in the property sector, problems of over-supply and the sharp increase in domestic debt, especially on the part of local governments, which shoulder much of the burden of the infrastructure projects. The solution lies in stepping up the already significant internationalisation of Chinese construction companies, and nothing is more likely to achieve this end than the myriad multi-million dollar infrastructure projects generated in the wake of the new Silk Road.

With regard to encouraging Chinese exports, the Silk Road project is not confined to constructing infrastructure. It is also committed to strengthening trading links between the participants by creating free trade areas and eliminating non-tariff barriers, and the speeding up and harmonisation of administrative processes such as customs procedures. All this is imbued with a logic aimed at extracting the maximum benefit from the comparative advantages of the various participating States, something that the Chinese government hopes will act as a catalyst for its exports.

The way China’s economy operates is highly dependent on imports (energy sources and raw materials) and long-haul exports that in many cases travel via routes that the Chinese neither control nor are capable of controlling. This generates strategic vulnerabilities for China in the event that certain key points, such as the Strait of Malacca, should ever be closed to Chinese commerce. With the prospect of the diversification of routes offered by the new Silk Road, there is a substantial reduction in these strategic risks vis-à-vis several of China’s main raw material and energy suppliers and its largest customer, the EU, as well as the Atlantic coast of the US. In many cases the new routes would also entail time savings.

It is also thought that the new Silk Road could help to attract investments in labour-intensive industries to China’s interior. Eastern China has been attracting investment in labour-intensive production processes for decades. This trend has stalled in recent years, however, due to the sharp upturn in salary costs. Rather than seeing these activities being transferred to other countries, such as Vietnam, the preferred scenario for Beijing is for them to go to the Chinese hinterland, where labour costs are appreciably lower than on the coast. The proposed Silk Road would significantly increase the connectivity of various inland regions, making it much more attractive for foreign businesses to invest in them.

This last point would not only contribute to China’s macroeconomic development but also give a boost to inter-territorial cohesion, a highly sensitive subject because of the yawning chasm that exists in the levels of development between different areas of the country and especially because of the existence of significant separatist movements in Tibet and Xinjiang. Indeed, as gateway to Central Asia and Pakistan, one of the regions that stands most to benefit from the Belt is precisely Xinjiang itself. This appears particularly promising to the Chinese authorities, who perceive modernisation in the region as the ideal antidote to separatism.

The reformist language used in the official plan of action, which proposes forms of economic liberalisation that go beyond the current Chinese reality, for example as regards the services sector or the role played by the market in the distribution of resources, suggests that Xi Jinping may be contemplating using the Belt and Road policies to push through internal reforms that generate friction within certain quarters of the regime. Moreover, this link between the new Silk Road and the need to drive through more internal reforms is explicitly made in the project’s official plan of action. It thus seems that President Xi may be following the same strategy as Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji, when China’s admission to the WTO served them as a means of introducing liberalising reforms in the teeth of internal opposition.

In addition to these domestic goals, there are others more closely tied to Beijing’s international strategy. If the project becomes reality, it will help to generate greater economic integration both within Eurasia and between Eurasia and Africa. The fact that China is leading the project ensures that it occupies an enviable position for increasing its international influence when the financial and trade flows between the countries in these regions and Beijing start to build up. In the financial field it would not only contribute to the internationalisation of the renminbi, with the prospect of various participants in the new Silk Road, both public and private, issuing bonds in the Chinese currency; interest in the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank among the international community, including some of Washington’s traditional allies, throws an even stronger spotlight on the US congressional veto of reform of the International Monetary Fund.

Particularly significant in terms of security is the strengthening of ties with Central and South East Asian countries, which are crucial for China in tackling such challenges as separatism, terrorism, drug trafficking and a range of territorial disputes. China is also aware that it will be much easier to become a regional leader if it manages to quell the alarm with which several neighbours view its re-emergence. Initiatives like the new Silk Road and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank seek to induce other players on the international stage, especially some of China’s neighbours and the traditional powers, to stop interpreting China’s ascent as a zero-sum game and start seeing it as an opportunity in which all stand to benefit. This would be the case for less wealthy countries because China would be playing the role of financial and technological facilitator, helping to overcome one of the main bottlenecks holding their development back: the lack of infrastructure. As for the traditional powers, these too would benefit from the prospect of business opportunities and a more stable international climate, courtesy of the socioeconomic progress that would be made by less-developed countries and a greater degree of interdependence between a range of international players (whether States or otherwise).

Implications for Europe

In the event that it becomes a reality, the new Silk Road will have multiple repercussions for Europe of an economic, geostrategic and geopolitical nature. The economic impact is likely to be the most obvious and will be fundamentally positive by dint of generating multiple opportunities for European businesses, both in China itself and in other countries on the route of the Belt and Road, and reducing costs for consumers. The primary beneficiaries of these opportunities will be construction, transport and logistics companies, which will have the chance to secure the building and operating contracts for the new infrastructure. The process is open not only to Chinese companies –as the German-Russian consortium, Trans-Eurasia Logistics, which operates container traffic between China and Germany via Russia, demonstrates– but also to European investors and companies.

The infrastructure projects will in their turn pave the way for European exports and investments in areas with high potential for economic growth, such as inland China, where GDP is growing faster than in coastal areas, and East Africa. The advent of such export and investment opportunities will be due not only to the greater degree of connectivity engendered by the new infrastructure but also to the liberalising measures of an administrative nature that the Road seeks to institute both within and beyond China’s borders, and which are in line with the approach adopted by European diplomacy. It is important not to lose sight of the fact that the development model on which the initiative relies, as is evident from the action plan published by the Chinese government, is based on liberalisation, internationalisation and economic diversification.

Furthermore, there are certain countries in Europe, particularly Greece and some of the members of the cooperation forum that Beijing runs with central and eastern European countries (CEE), known as the 16+1 group, which will be able to use greater Chinese investment to construct terrestrial and maritime infrastructure related to the new Silk Road. Notable in this respect is the successful extension of the freight terminal in the port of Piraeus, which has triggered the need to upgrade the rail connections between the port and Central Europe; this in turn has led to the announcement of a high-speed line between Belgrade and Budapest, scheduled to be finished in 2017 and subsequently extended to Athens. More speculatively, certain news outlets in China have reported possible plans by the Chinese authorities to develop a high-speed line that would connect Beijing with London, passing through Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Iran, Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Austria, Germany, Belgium and France. On the other hand, ports in the north of Europe could lose importance if the connections between China and other parts of Europe improve. By the same token, it is possible for the new infrastructure being mooted in the Middle East and Africa to create a situation in which many of the supply routes that start or terminate in these regions cease to pass through Europe.

The establishment of new routes looks set to reduce transport costs and lead times, but also risks. With the diversification of transport routes, the chances of a disruptive event significantly altering the flows of goods within this macro-region diminish. Meanwhile the geostrategic value of specific areas, such as the Strait of Malacca on the maritime route, and Russia on the overland route, is reduced. All this is clearly positive for Europe.

Also positive is the fact that the project is based on an inclusive approach, one that fosters interdependence and shared development, rather than competition between blocs, by dint of strengthening all manner of ties between participating countries. It is a matter of driving trade and investment, but also academic, scientific and cultural exchanges and building bridges between the societies on the paths of the Belt and the Road. This is how the great majority of China’s neighbours have read the situation, having signed up to the initiative despite the fact that several of them have running territorial disputes with Beijing. The only important players who have not signed up are the US and Japan, out of preference, and North Korea, because the Chinese government believes that Pyongyang does not provide the necessary information about its economic situation.

In addition, it embraces one of the founding principles of the EU: the positing of regional integration as a source of prosperity and stability. Brussels, with its consistent track record of supporting integration processes that are taking place in the region, ought to follow suit here, especially in light of the fact that it is a process that involves Europe itself and in which it is welcome to participate in an active way. Europe needs to have a presence in a project it can help to mould, so as to ensure it becomes a source of prosperity and stability not only for the Old Continent itself but also for its neighbours, with the ensuing dividends in terms of security and economic opportunities for European society.

Conclusions

The new Silk Road is a project of great potential that reveals a version of China that is prepared to lead major initiatives on the international stage without succumbing to an exclusionary approach. European governments and societies should sign up to this project in a critical and constructive spirit to help give it shape, avoiding getting sucked into a bloc-based rivalry that has been rendered obsolete by an international order characterised by globalisation and interdependence.

*About the authors:
Mario Esteban
Senior Analyst for Asia-Pacific, Elcano Royal Institute | @wizma9

Miguel Otero-Iglesias
Senior Analyst for the International Political Economy, Elcano Royal Institute | @miotei

Source:
This article was published at Elcano Royal Institute. Original version in Spanish: ¿Qué podemos esperar de la nueva Ruta de la Seda y del Banco Asiático de Inversión en Infraestructuras liderados por China?.

The post What Are Prospects For New Chinese-Led Silk Road And Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank? – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

These days it’s not unusual for someone on the way to work to receive a text message from her employer saying she’s not needed right then.

Although she’s already found someone to pick up her kid from school and arranged for childcare, the work is no longer available and she won’t be paid for it.

Just-in-time scheduling like this is the latest new thing, designed to make retail outlets, restaurants, hotels, and other customer-driven businesses more nimble and keep costs to a minimum.

Software can now predict up-to-the-minute staffing needs on the basis of  information such as traffic patterns, weather, and sales merely hours or possibly minutes before.

This way, employers don’t need to pay anyone to be at work unless they’re really needed. Companies can avoid paying wages to workers who’d otherwise just sit around.

Employers assign workers tentative shifts, and then notify them a half-hour or ten minutes before the shift is scheduled to begin whether they’re actually needed. Some even require workers to check in by phone, email, or text shortly before the shift starts.

Just-in-time scheduling is another part of America’s new “flexible” economy – along with the move to independent contractors and the growing reliance on “share economy” businesses, like Uber, that purport to do nothing more than connect customers with people willing to serve them.

New software is behind all of this – digital platforms enabling businesses to match their costs exactly with their needs.

The business media considers such flexibility an unalloyed virtue. Wall Street rewards it with higher share prices. America’s “flexible labor market” is the envy of business leaders and policy makers the world over.

There’s only one problem. The new flexibility doesn’t allow working people to live their lives.

Businesses used to consider employees fixed costs  – like the costs of factories, offices, and equipment. Payrolls might grow or shrink over time as businesses expanded or contracted, but from year to year they were fairly constant.

That meant steady jobs. And with steady jobs came steady paychecks along with regular and predictable work schedules.

But employees are now becoming variable costs of doing business – depending on ups and downs in demand that may change hour by hour, possibly minute by minute.
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Yet working people have to pay the rent or make mortgage payments, and have keep up with utility, food, and fuel bills. These bills don’t vary much from month to month. They’re the fixed costs of living.

American workers can’t simultaneously be variable costs for business yet live in their own fixed-cost worlds.

They’re also husbands and wives and partners, most are parents, and they often have to take care of elderly relatives. All this requires coordinating schedules in advance – who’s going to cover for whom, and when.

But such planning is impossible when you don’t know when you’ll be needed at work.

Whatever it’s called – just-in-time scheduling, on-call staffing, on-demand work, independent contracting, or the “share economy” – the result is the same: No predictability, no economic security.

This makes businesses more efficient, but it’s a nightmare for working families.

Last week, the National Employment Law Project reported that 42 percent of U.S. workers make less than $15 an hour.

But even $20 an hour isn’t enough if the work is unpredictable and insecure.

Not only is a higher minimum wage critical. So are more regular and predictable hours.

Some states require employers to pay any staff who report to work for a scheduled shift but who are then sent home, at least 4 hours pay at the minimum wage.

But these laws haven’t kept up with software that enables employers to do just-in-time scheduling – and inform workers minutes before their shift that they’re not needed.

In what may become a test case, New York Attorney General Eric Schneiderman last week warned 13 big retailers – including Target and The Gap – that their just-in-time scheduling may violate New York law, which requires payments to workers who arrive for a shift and then are sent home.

We need a federal law requiring employers to pay for scheduled work.

Alternatively, if American workers can’t get more regular and predictable hours, they at least need stronger safety nets.

These would include high-quality pre-school and after-school programs; unemployment insurance for people who can only get part-time work; and a minimum guaranteed basic income.

All the blather about “family-friendly workplaces” is meaningless if workers have no control over when they’re working.

The post How The New Flexible Economy Is Making Workers’ Lives Hell – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Osama Al Sharif

In his television interview with Fox News on April 13, King Abdallah of Jordan revealed that his country is now the only Arab member of the US-led international coalition that is bombing the Islamic State (IS) in Iraq and Syria. He said that the UAE and Bahrain withdrew their fighter jets from bases in Jordan to join the operation “Decisive Storm” in Yemen. This is a setback to the king’s effort to build an Arab-Muslim coalition to fight radicals who pose an existential threat to most countries in the region. That fight must remain a priority for the region.

IS and its affiliates are active in Sinai, Libya, the Horn of Africa, Pakistan, Afghanistan in addition to Iraq and Syria. Even in war-torn Yemen, Al-Qaeda has recaptured areas in the past few weeks especially in Hadramaut and there are concerns that tribes fearing Houthi expansion might ally themselves with the Jihadi Salafist group on sectarian basis.

One of the objectives of the proposed joint Arab force, which was approved in last month’s Arab summit in Sharm El-Sheikh, must be to consolidate efforts to fight IS. King Abdallah has reiterated time and again that standing up to those who have hijacked Islam must be the responsibility of Arabs and Muslims.

But defeating militants will require much more than airstrikes. In Iraq, the army, the militias, the Peshmerga and the local tribes have changed the balance of power on the ground. Assisted by the coalition air force, they have managed to recapture Tikrit and the strategic oil refinery in Beiji and are finally making headway in the long and difficult campaign to liberate Al-Anbar. Only with ground troops will the Iraqis be able to dislodge the IS from areas under its control. The biggest test will be in Mosul later on this year.

In Syria it is a different story. There is currently more than one battlefront in that beleaguered country; one is the war against the Assad regime and the other is the international coalition’s airstrikes against IS. But there is also fighting between rebel groups themselves over territory. Despite recent gains by the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and Al-Nusrah Front in the south and north of the country, IS is still in control of large swaths of territory. The regime has avoided confrontation with IS, which recently occupied most of Yarmouk refugee camp in the heart of Damascus.

Even if IS is eventually defeated in Iraq; it will be difficult to dislodge it from Syrian territory without ground troops. The Arab joint force will have to draw up a plan to face militants in Syria by recruiting and training Syrians to do the job. Unless the threat of IS in Syria is checked, it will continue to be a destabilizing force affecting Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon and Syria.

The war on extremists must become the center of Arab strategic approach. That war will take many shapes and forms and will be long and costly for all. But Arab and Muslim countries must take the lead in that war so as not to portray the campaign as a new crusade by the West against Islam.

It is imperative that more Arab countries join the coalition fighting IS, the campaign in Yemen notwithstanding. The Saudi-led airstrikes against the Houthis and rebel troops belonging to former President Saleh will eventually lead to a political solution in Yemen. This has become the conviction of all those involved in the conflict.

But the war against IS has no political horizon. It’s a war between moderation and extremism; an ideological clash with no middle ground. It is a war that will determine the future of the region and the fate of millions of people.

The military option is an essential and immediate part of a long-term solution to this existential challenge. But it must be accompanied by an intellectual campaign to protect younger generations of Muslims from falling to the tentacles of extremists with their skewed view of life. It will mean that Arab countries must work together to bring hope to their citizens. The reservoir from which IS and others get their volunteers must be drained. The social incubators for extremists in our societies must be dismantled.

The Arab-Muslim coalition fighting radicals must take form and must become a strategic priority. For now the military option takes precedence and must be demonstrated in Iraq and Syria. More battles will be fought in Libya and the rest of Africa. IS and its affiliates must be defeated on the ground and that requires an effective coalition.

The post Time To Crush Islamic State Together – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

In Sri Lanka’s Northern Province, 60% of the allegations of forced disappearances, abductions and arbitrary arrests were leveled against the LTTE, notes the interim report of the Presidential Commission to Investigate into Complaints Regarding Missing Persons.

The Commission further noted that “Allegations of forced disappearances, abductions and arbitrary arrests have been made against the LTTE, security forces, armed groups and unknown groups. Based on the inquiries conducted thus far, accountability and responsibility by these parties vary from district to district, and in the Northern Province, 60% of the allegations were levelled against the LTTE, 30% against the security forces, 5% against armed groups and 5% against unknown groups”.

Grave incidents requiring in-depth investigation have also been reported based on oral submissions made at public sittings. These include the Sathurukondan and Eastern University Massacres of 1990; Massacre of 600 Policemen in 1990 in Ampara; and Massacre of Muslim civilians in Kurukalmadam.

The Commission has recommended that these allegations be further investigated by a special investigating team to gather credible evidence against persons responsible in order to institute criminal proceedings according to domestic laws.

The Presidential Commission to inquire into and report on alleged abductions or disappearances that occurred during the period January 1, 1983 to May 19, 2009 submitted its Interim Report to President Maithripala Sirisena on April 10, 2015.

The three-member Commission comprising Mr Maxwell Paranagama as Chairman, Mrs Suranjana Vidyaratne and Mrs Mano Ramanathan makes its observations following its conduct of 11 Public Sittings in Kilinochchi, Jaffna, Mullaitivu, Batticaloa, Mannar, Trincomalee, Vavuniya and Ampara, and discussions with various stakeholder groups. By April 9, 2015, the Commission had received 16,153 complaints from residents in the Northern and Eastern Provinces and 5,200 complaints from the families of security forces personnel.

In its Interim Report, the Commission has specified by way of charts and graphs the nature of complaints received in terms of ethnicity, age and gender of the missing person, year and district, and the allegedly responsible party. The Report also contains allegations by parents of missing persons that their children continue to be kept in prisons, refugee camps, and detention centers without any information made available to their families.

The Commission has also reported cases of forced disappearances and abductions alleged to have been committed by officers of the security forces, according to oral submissions made by relatives of missing persons, which require to be referred to the Attorney General for judicial action.

The Commission’s procedure for inquiry also entailed an examination of medical registers from relevant hospitals that treated patients during the conflict and its aftermath in order to ascertain information and track the whereabouts of missing persons. The Commission, through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, had also requested information on names of persons who may have sought refuge in foreign countries, but such information had not been disclosed by foreign governments citing privacy laws.

The Commission had made written requests to the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Justice to release to the Commission names of persons who were in custody of prisons, detention camps, refugee camps, and rehabilitation centers. While noting with regret that such requests had not been complied with, the Commission decided to notice the respective officers to appear before the Commission in terms of the powers vested in the Commission by the Special Presidential Commission of Inquiry Act.

Where possible, the Commission has acted promptly to provide assistance to families of missing persons during public sittings with the assistance of Government Agents and Divisional Secretaries in aspects such as issuance of Death Certificates, payment of compensation in terms of Government Circular No. 06/1722/260/020 of 2006, rectifying delays in payment of compensation and pensions to injured persons, intervening on behalf of persons on employment matters and land issues, and identifying persons who have been deprived of livelihood assistance through the Samurdhi and Divineguma projects.

The Commission notes that problems of housing livelihood and other assistance have been provided by the Government, NGOs, INGOs, ICRC, USA, European Countries, Australia, India, Korea, Pakistan and Japan. However the Commission notes that the livelihood assistance provided is far from adequate for the purpose of rebuilding their lives.

Based on observations of the behavioral patterns of the complainants at public sittings, the Commission recommends to implement a well formulated programme to provide counseling by experienced counselors, and psycho-social support and related services for the benefit of the families of missing persons. In this respect, the Commission, in collaboration with the ICRC, relevant government agencies engaged in counseling, and other parties, has drawn up a comprehensive programme for counseling in the North and East.

On July 15, 2014, the scope of the Commission’s mandate was extended to inquire into and report on matters that have been referred to in paragraph 4.359 of the LLRC Report, which dealt in large part with the facts and circumstances relating to the internal armed conflict that ended on May 19, 2009, and in particular with the possible violation of International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law. An expert panel of eminent persons headed by The Right Honorable Sir Desmond De Silva, QC (Chairman) was appointed to assist the Commission in the capacity of an Advisory Council. A Report in respect of matters set out in the extended mandate is being drafted in consultation with the Advisory Council and would be submitted as a separate Report.

While executing its mandate, the Commission had held extensive discussions with the ICRC, UN agencies including the UNHCR, diplomatic representatives from the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, Australia and India, UN Special Rappoteur Mr Pablo Degreef, and Sri Lankan media organizations. During these discussions, the Commission had regularly conveyed information on the steps taken to implement its mandate in a transparent and independent manner.

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Spain’s Minister for Foreign Affairs and Co-operation, José Manuel García-Margallo, presided over the inauguration ceremony of the Spain-India Business Summit, organized by the Indian Chamber of Industry in collaboration with the CEOE Business Association and the Spanish Chambers of Commerce, with the participation of 77 Indian companies and 15 Spanish companies.

All the speakers at the event underlined the complementary nature of the Spanish and Indian economies, as well as the excellent business outlook as a result of the reform program and infrastructure projects that the government of Prime Minister Modi has introduced.

Minister García-Margallo highlighted in his speech the promising outlook for bilateral economic relations after overcoming the serious economic crisis in Spain. The minister outlined the threefold strategy for the recovery of the Spanish economy to Indian business leaders, comprising fiscal consolidation, the labour reform and the reorganization of the financial sector. These three rafts of measures, he pointed out, have once again returned the Gross Domestic Product of Spain back to the path of growth, achieved a reduction in unemployment and allowed the loss of competitiveness of the Spanish economy to be recovered. In fact, Spain has become an export leader, with this sector contributing 32% to our GDP and a surplus being posted in our foreign trade balance. He also referred to the expansive monetary policy of the European Central Bank, the depreciation of the Euro and the lower energy prices as external factors that have also positively contributed to this recovery.

José Manuel García-Margallo underlined that Spain is the fourth largest economy in the EU, the 11th largest investor globally, with privileged relations as a result of its membership of the EU and its close ties with Africa and Ibero-America and its powerful network of infrastructures, all of which mean it is a sound economic partner for India. Finally, the minister expressed his conviction that the 230 Spanish companies that are already established in India – many of them global leaders in their respective sectors – could contribute very positively to the development of the country and to the implementation of the ambitious plans of the government of the country.

Following this event, Minister García-Margallo held a meeting with the Indian Minister for Urban Development, Venkaiah Naidu. The two ministers discussed cooperation possibilities in detail, relating to areas such as the development of metro lines in Indian cities and “smart cities”. To this end, Minister García-Margallo handed over a draft Memorandum of Understanding on co-operation in relation to smart cities drawn up by the State Secretary for Trade.

The post Spain-India Hold Business Summit appeared first on Eurasia Review.

The second bill of the 19th amendment to Sri Lanka’s constitution was adopted by the country’s Parliament with an overwhelming majority on Tuesday.

Two hundred and fifteen (215) Members of Parliament (MPs) voted for the amendment while only one, MP Sarath Weerasekara voted against it.

MP Ajith Kumara abstained from voting, while seven Members of Parliament were absent.

The 19th Amendment to the Constitution will annul the 18th Amendment while replacing the now defunct 17th Amendment to establish the Independent Commissions.

It would also remove the Executive Presidential powers and limit the term of office of the President to five years.

The President will continue to function as the Head of State and Head of Security Forces.

19th Amendment to the Constitution

Curtailing the powers of the Executive Presidency and establishing independent commissions have been a strongly felt need by many parties including civil society, religious leaders, political activists, intellectual as well majority of people in Sri Lanka. Abolishing executive presidency has been an election slogan since 1994, although none of those previous attempts were successful. The main arguments against it were that it leads to authoritarian rule and corruption.

The proposed 19th Amendment was initiated by many politicians, activists and intellectuals including Ven. Maduluwawe Sobitha Thera and Ven. Athureliye Rathana Thera and many civil society representatives. The movement culminated in the last presidential election and became a key promise in the campaign of Hon. Maitripala Sirisena.

The main constitutional proposals of the 19th Amendment include the transformation of the Presidential form of government to a Presidential-Parliamentary system of government and the restoration of the 17th Amendment to the Constitution.

The transformation of these proposals into the 19th Amendment is the most important exercise faced by the new government.

The post Sri Lanka: Parliament Adopts Nineteenth Amendment appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Five crew members from a private Libyan TV network abducted in August were found dead. The crew was abducted while traveling to their hometown of Ajdabiya after covering the opening of the parliament in Tobruk.

According to government spokesman Hatem al Arib, the bodies of the 4 Libyans and an Egyptian cameraman, were found near Bayda, around 80km from the heart of the “caliphate” proclaimed by the Islamic State between Derna and Sirte.

A sixth crew member of Barqa TV (Cyrenaica in Arabic) managed to escape the attack in August along the road between Ajdabiya and Tobruk, in still unclear circumstances.

The post Libya: Abducted TV Crew Found Dead appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Fighting continues in Yemen’s southern port city Aden between Houthi rebels and forces loyal to President Abd al Rabbo Mansur Hadi, local sources report, indicating that also civilians were among the at least 20 dead in the clashes.

The Saudi-led coalition force has also continued airstrikes on the capital Sanaa, controlled since last September by the rebels, in the past hours also hitting a military base once used by the Republican guard of former president Ali Abdallah Saleh.

Combat jets also struck rebel posts in the provinces of Mareb, Hodeida and Taez, where fighting has also been reported.

Rebel forces spokesman Sharaf Luqman accused Saudi Arabia of “war crimes” and of beginning “a new phase of the offensive instead of ending it”, citing words used by Riyadh last week.

The humanitarian situation in Yemen is deteriorating, with over 150,000 people displaced by the fighting, based on UN estimates. “It’s so hard to move around with 6 kids, we keep moving from one family house to another, our flat was completely wrecked, imagine your home the only place you feel safe in, destroyed, every piece that you worked hard to buy, all gone”, a displaced man told the Yemen Times.

The post Yemen: Saudi-Lead Airstrikes Continue, Fighting In Aden appeared first on Eurasia Review.

U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry is scheduled to visit Sri Lanka from May 2-3.

Kerry is expected to meet government leaders, civil society members, and other representatives from the country’s diverse communities to hear and express US support for their vision for a more peaceful, stable, and prosperous future for its people.

Secretary Kerry will also join for the celebration of Vesak, according to the US State Department.

After the conclusion of his visit to Sri Lanka, Secretary Kerry will also visit Nairobi, Kenya and Djibouti.

This is the first time that a sitting US Secretary of State will visit Djibouti.

The post Kerry To Visit Sri Lanka May 2-3 appeared first on Eurasia Review.

The latest ASEAN summit has not thrown up any significant sign of an early resolution to the South China Sea disputes. As leaders pursue the necessary path of diplomacy, more decisive actions may be needed, including a change of name to the “Southeast Asia Sea”.

By Yang Razali Kassim*

ASEAN leaders held their 26th summit this week to sort out critical issues confronting the region. One urgent issue in their official talks in Kuala Lumpur and their retreat on Langkawi Island was the South China Sea where potential flashpoints for conflict over contending territorial claims showed little sign of abating. Indeed, it is hard to be optimistic about a resolution anytime soon – or at all – with Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong noting its growing seriousness in the past year.

China, as the most powerful claimant, is increasingly adversarial despite years of patient diplomacy by ASEAN. Several of Beijing’s recent moves to assert its claim have raised tensions further. Its relocation of an oil rig in waters claimed by Vietnam, sparking unusually harsh protests from Hanoi; the ramming of rival fishing vessels; and the ‘accidental’ cutting of cables of a seismic ship reflected the growing pattern of muscular response from China which was troubling the whole region particularly the Philippines and Vietnam.

From jaw-jaw to pour-pour

The latest and most provocative of China’s activities is the rapid land reclamation on submerged reefs in the Spratlys to create man-made islands – some big enough for airstrips for fighter jets. China is clearly preparing to project its hard power from the heart of the contested waters. This highly controversial build-up shown in satellite images goes against the spirit of the Declaration of Conduct (DOC) of Parties in the South China Sea which requires claimants not to engage in activities that would raise tensions. The DOC, signed in 2002, is to pave the way to a binding Code of Conduct (COC) but this key over-arching treaty seems elusive or glacial at best, as Beijing continues to drag its feet in negotiation.

With continuing landfill on some of the disputed outcrops, it appears that China is shifting its stance – to paraphrase Churchill – from “jaw-jaw” to “pour-pour”. ASEAN’s secretary-general Le Luong Minh described it this week as a move to change the status quo. This is a game-changer which will doubtless complicate the search for a resolution to the South China Sea disputes.

In the meantime, China will grow stronger economically and militarily while Southeast Asia could become increasingly fragile, and quarrelsome, as the pressures on their sovereignty create internal fissures. This had already happened in 2012: ASEAN for the first time in its history failed to issue a joint communique at its annual foreign ministers meeting in Cambodia. Since then, fears of a repeat of Cambodia 2012 has clouded ASEAN.

The South China Sea disputes have exposed ASEAN’s vulnerabilities. The once impressive image of ASEAN unity and cohesiveness has been punctured. As China plays to its strength, some ASEAN member-states will again be tempted to prioritise their national interest over ASEAN solidarity rather than pursue them in tandem.

This scenario should not be ruled out as China shifts towards cheque-book diplomacy – leveraging on its massive reserves to win friends and some say – buy influence. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) is a classic case of this turning point in China’s diplomatic game. Southeast Asian states, or ASEAN as a collective, are now facing this two-front push by China – a smiling dragon on the economic track dishing out AIIB-linked infrastructure funding, even as it whips a nasty tail on the South China Sea disputes. It will be tough for some member-states to face such a carrot-and-stick approach from China, especially the economically weaker ones.

What can be done: Three challenges

ASEAN has to think hard as it faces at least three critical challenges to Southeast Asia. The first is how to preserve ASEAN unity and solidarity over the South China Sea disputes such that these are resolved without undermining ASEAN cohesiveness.

To this end, a proposal by Carl Thayer, a long-time observer of the South China Sea issue, may be worth considering as a first step to the long-delayed COC with China. Thayer has proposed that ASEAN signs its own “Code of Conduct Treaty for Southeast Asia’s Maritime Commons”. Individual member-states should resolve their territorial and maritime disputes with other members, thus strengthening ASEAN solidarity.

The second challenge is how to deter future aggression by China in the seas while the region pursues deeper economic ties with Beijing. It would be timely to promote ASEAN’s maritime cooperation with trading partners that have stakes in the freedom of navigation and overflight in the South China Sea.

Such maritime cooperation can begin with the United States and possibly expanded later to include others, such as Japan and South Korea. A recent article in RSIS Commentary by Richard Javad Heydarian & Truong-Minh Vu proposed such maritime cooperation in the form of ASEAN joint patrols in the South China Sea.

From South China Sea to Southeast Asia Sea?

The third challenge is how to defuse, on a long-term basis the South China Sea disputes at the mindshare level. Perhaps the time has come for the South China Sea to be renamed. One appropriate alternative – is to call it the Southeast Asia Sea. The South China Sea was previously called the Champa Sea after the seventh century kingdom of Champa in today’s Vietnam. The point is, it was not always known as the South China Sea. Apparently, a petition to change the name to the Southeast Asia Sea has already been started.

The Philippines has also taken a similar step by calling it the West Philippine Sea. “When people keep referring to the South China Sea, there is a subliminal message that this sea belongs to a country whose name appears in the name,” says a Philippine Armed Forces spokesman. The online petition, by a Vietnamese foundation, kicked off in 2010 with at least 10,000 supporters from 76 countries, addressed to the presidents and prime ministers of 11 Southeast Asian states as well as the United Nations and several international organisations.

A people-driven initiative like this is in keeping with the region’s vision – emphasised by current Chairman, Malaysia – of a “people-oriented, people-centred ASEAN”. It would be most appropriate if this initiative grows to become a collective aspiration of the 600-million people of ASEAN and not just the ten governments.

*Yang Razali Kassim is a Senior Fellow of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.

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