According to some media outlets, minutes before Elton Simpson started shooting at the anti-Islam cartoon event in Garland, Texas that left two gunmen dead and one security guard wounded, he tweeted, “If there is no check on the freedom of your speech, then let your hearts be open to the freedom of our actions.” He was shot dead quickly thereafter, never realizing that his plainly irresponsible position—no limits on speech means no limits on conduct—was the proximate cause of his death. Absolutism also explains his attraction to Islamism.

There is no role for absolutism in a free society. Yet there are those who, like many members of the PEN American Center, embrace it, at least when it comes to speech. Tonight they honored Charlie Hebdo in New York City, the French magazine that was tied to the Paris murders. Officials from the publication received an award for “freedom of expression courage.” But other PEN members are objecting, saying that freedom of expression has limits: by depicting Muslims as savages, Charlie Hebdo is promoting bigotry.

Both factions of PEN are phonies. In October 1998, I led 2,000 demonstrators in the street outside the theater that featured “Corpus Christi,” a play that depicted Christ having sex with the apostles. “From the beginning,” I wrote in the November 1998 issue of Catalyst (our monthly journal), “the league has argued that the play should not be censored by the government but that the producers of the play should have cancelled it in the name of common decency.” On that same rainy night there were 300 counter-demonstrators: they came to protest our constitutional right to freedom of speech. Among them was a contingent from the PEN American Center.

The other phonies are the ones who don’t want to honor Charlie Hebdo. They have no problem offending Christians, but when it comes to bashing Muslims, they are horrified. The entire organization is corrupt.

Here’s my take: It is wrong to honor Charlie Hebdo, and it is equally wrong to intentionally bash people of faith.

The post Anti-Islam Cartoons And Free Speech – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Osama Al Sharif

Recent setbacks for the regime in Syria could give an unexpected push to the UN-sponsored Geneva talks, which began Monday and are slated to last for a month or more. UN Syria Envoy Staffan de Mistura will hold separate in-depth consultations with representatives of the regime, the Syrian National Coalition and local opposition members in addition to ambassadors of key international and regional states, including Iran.

The consultations will focus on ways to implement the Geneva I outcomes; paving the way for a political transition. Iran was not invited to the Geneva II meeting last year, which failed to reach an agreement. Hopes for this week’s talks remain low but their final outcome will depend on a number of factors including the course that ongoing military confrontations in northern and southern Syria will take.

Late last month a coalition of mostly Islamist rebel group, fighting under the banner of the Conquest Army, was able to drive government forces from the city of Idlib. Few days later the same coalition was able to take the strategic city of Jisr Al-Shugour in the same governorate. Since then repeated attempts by regime forces to halt the advance of Islamist insurgents, led by Al-Nusrah Front, were met with failure. The Conquest Army is now advancing toward the mountains overlooking Latakia governorate and the Syrian coast, and has cut regime supply lines to Aleppo. At one point the rebels were about 40 km north of Latakia, a key city with symbolic and strategic value for the regime of Bashar Assad.

Recent victories in the north came in the wake of bitter defeats by Iranian Revolutionary Guard (IRG) and Hezbollah fighters in the south. A major Iran-led operation to retake Darra, Qunaitra and parts of Damascus countryside was repulsed by the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and Al-Nusrah Front. Not only that the rebels were able to capture Busra Al-Sham and the Nasib border crossing with Jordan. On Monday, Al-Nusrah launched a fresh assault against Hezbollah strongholds in Al Qalamoun Mountains on the border with Lebanon.

Regime’s recent losses have put unprecedented pressure on the Damascus-Tehran alliance. News reports say that no IRG and Hezbollah fighters participated in the battles in Idlib and that government forces were left to fight on their own. Furthermore, it was reported that Islamist rebels had used sophisticated weapons, such as armor piercing rockets, as they made their advance.

These defeats have undermined morale both within government forces and inside the political and military structure of the Damascus regime. Unconfirmed reports speak of internal conflicts within Assad’s top leadership, especially after the death, in suspicious circumstances, of a top aide and former Syrian political security chief; Rustom Ghazaleh two weeks ago.

There are signs that Iran may be rethinking its strategy in Syria and in particular its long-term support of President Assad.

There are a number of factors that are behind this potential change in strategy and objectives. Most of Iran’s military resources, including Shiite fighters who were in Syria, have been diverted to Iraq to face the Islamic State (IS). The Popular Mobilization militias in Iraq are made up of Shiite recruits and are said to be under the command of Iranian generals. Iran’s stakes in Iraq are much more higher and it makes sense that it shifts its attention to the Iraqi battlefields at this juncture.

Furthermore, the Saudi-led air campaign in Yemen has foiled Iran’s scheme to extend its influence to that country. The military operation has cut off supply routes between Iran and the Houthi-Saleh alliance, which is waging war to take over the country. The new front in Yemen has shifted Tehran’s attention from Syria, as Saudi Arabia was able to build an Arab coalition to confront Iranian regional ambitions.

In addition to this Iran is keen on concluding its deal with the international community over its nuclear program; a deal that promises to lift biting sanctions that have crippled the Iranian economy and readmit Tehran into the international community of nations. There are those within the Iranian leadership who would like to normalize their country’s relationship with its neighbors and limit the influence of the “revolutionary” flank that has wasted Iran’s resources on outside adventures.
The possible change in Iran’s position on Syria is worrying the Assad regime as noted by the fact that pro-Iran columnists in both Damascus and Beirut have openly criticized Tehran for failing to come to the aid of government forces in Idlib. The fact that Iran is now participating in the Geneva talks may shed some light on the evolving Iranian position.

Such change in position might not be good news for Assad, but it doesn’t mean that the Syrian conflict could witness a breakthrough in the coming days. The regime will fight until the end, compounding the humanitarian crisis.

The post Iran Between A Rock And A Hard Place – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Once again, the nation watches as prosecutors deal with the killing of an unarmed black man.

“[The officers] failed to establish probable cause for Mr. Gray’s arrest as no crime had been committed by Mr. Gray . . . Accordingly, [he was] illegally arrested,” Baltimore state’s attorney Marilyn Mosby declared, as she announced the filing of criminal charges against the six officers implicated in Freddie Gray’s death.

Gray made “eye contact” with Officer Brian Rice. Gray then ran from Rice, and Rice began chasing Gray. It was after Gray surrendered to Officers Garrett Miller and Edward Nero that Gray was taken on his fatal “rough ride.”

A “rough ride” is an unsanctioned technique that some officers use to injure arrestees without physically touching them with their hands or weapons. The driver typically takes intentionally rough or rapid turnsß around corners or makes sudden stops. Since the suspect is handcuffed, he is unable to brace himself so he falls forward, often bashing his head against the inside of the van.

Like so many African American men before him in this country, Gray was guilty of nothing other than “walking while black.” In his case, Baltimore’s sordid history of racial and class oppression, combined with the war on drugs, made for a deadly combination.

“Probable cause was distorted by the drug war,” David Simon, creator of The Wire, said in an interview with Bill Keller. Set in Baltimore, the award-winning HBO series portrayed the conflict between the police and African Americans in the streets, in a compelling work of historical fiction. “[T]he drug war was as much a function of class and social control as it was of racism,” Simon added. “The drug war gives everybody permission to do anything. It gives cops permission to stop anybody, to go in anyone’s pockets, to manufacture any lie when they get to district court.” In short, under the guise of the war on drugs, Baltimore police have been harassing people for years. Simon added, “My own crew members [on The Wire] used to get picked up trying to come from the set at night . . . Driving while black . . . Charges were non-existent, or were dismissed en masse.”

Scholar Richard Rothstein, a research associate at the Economic Policy Institute, documented more than 100 years of “federal, state, and local policies to quarantine Baltimore’s black population in isolated slums.” Rothstein does not think the answer lies in improving the quality of the police. He recognizes the frustration of those who engage in violent protest, as they have been denied the opportunity to become part of mainstream society. “When disadvantaged children are concentrated in separate schools, as they are in Baltimore, their disadvantages are exacerbated.” Rothstein found, “Baltimore, not at all uniquely, has experienced a century of public policy designed, consciously so, to segregate and impoverish its black population.”

The Supreme Court held in Illinois v. Wardlow that flight in a high-crime area may constitute reasonable suspicion for an officer to briefly detain an individual and determine whether there is evidence of criminal activity. After Miller and Nero handcuffed Gray, they put him in a prone position with his arms handcuffed behind his back. Gray said he couldn’t breathe and requested an inhaler, “to no avail,” according to Mosby. The officers found a legal pocketknife in Gray’s pocket. But instead of releasing Gray, they put him back on his stomach and restrained him with a “leg lace” while waiting for the police wagon to transport him.

Miller and Nero loaded Gray into the wagon, which Officer Caesar Goodson drove. At no time was Gray secured by a seatbelt, in violation of Baltimore Police Department (BPD) policy. At Baker Street, Rice, Nero and Miller placed handcuffs and leg shackles on Gray. They then placed Gray on his stomach in the wagon, head first.

“Following transport from Baker Street,” Mosby said, “Mr. Gray suffered a severe and critical neck injury as a result of being handcuffed, shackled by his feet and unrestrained inside of the BPD wagon.”

Goodson stopped to check on Gray but “at no point did he seek nor did he render any medical assistance for Mr. Gray.” At another stop, Goodson and Officer William Porter went to the back of the wagon to check on Gray, who requested help, said he couldn’t breathe, and twice requested a medic. “At no point did either [Goodson or Porter] restrain Mr. Gray per BPD general order nor did they render or request medical assistance.”

“Despite Mr. Gray’s obvious and recognized need for medical assistance, Officer Goodson in a grossly negligent manner chose to respond to the 1600 block of West North Avenue with Mr. Gray still unsecured by a seatbelt in the wagon without rendering to or summoning medical assistance for Mr. Gray.”

During still another stop, Officer Alicia White, Porter and Goodson “observed Mr. Gray unresponsive on the floor of the wagon.” White, who was “responsible for investigating two citizen complaints pertaining to Mr. Gray’s illegal arrest spoke to the back of Mr. Gray’s head. When he did not respond, she did nothing further despite the fact that she was advised that he needed a medic. She made no effort to look or assess
or determine his condition.”

“Despite Mr. Gray’s seriously deteriorating medical condition, no medical assistance was rendered or summoned for Mr. Gray at that time by any officer,” Mosby added.

Goodson failed to restrain Gray with a seatbelt at least five different times.

“By the time [officers] attempted to remove Mr. Gray from the wagon, Mr. Gray was no longer breathing at all.” A medic, who “was finally called to the scene,” determined that Gray “was now in cardiac arrest and was critically and severely injured,” Mosby stated.

Gray was finally “rushed” to the hospital where he underwent surgery and died seven days later.

The Maryland Medical Examiner concluded Gray’s death was a homicide, “believed to be the result of a fatal injury that occurred when Mr. Gray was unrestrained by a seatbelt in the custody of the Baltimore Police Department wagon.”

Mosby described multiple stops during which Gray was never secured by a seatbelt or provided with medical care. Almost one hour passed before he received any medical attention.

The state’s attorney charged six Baltimore police officers as follows:

Goodson: second-degree depraved heart murder, involuntary manslaughter, second-degree negligent assault, manslaughter by vehicle by means of gross negligence, manslaughter by vehicle by means of criminal negligence, misconduct in office by failure to secure prisoner, failure to render aid.

Porter: involuntary manslaughter, second-degree assault, misconduct in office.

Rice: involuntary manslaughter, second-degree assault, misconduct in office, false imprisonment.

Nero: second-degree intentional assault, second-degree negligent assault, misconduct in office, false imprisonment.

Miller: second-degree intentional assault, second-degree negligent assault, misconduct in office, false imprisonment.

White: involuntary manslaughter, second-degree assault, misconduct in office.

In order to secure a conviction of second-degree depraved heart murder, which carries a maximum sentence of 30 years in prison, the prosecutor must prove that Goodson killed Gray by acting with a conscious and extreme disregard of a very high risk to Gray’s life. Taking Gray on a “rough ride” while he his arms and legs were immobilized caused his death.

Two other men from Baltimore, Jeffrey Alston and Dondi Johnson, became paralyzed after riding in police vans in two separate cases. Alston settled his lawsuit for $6 million in 2004. Goodson should thus have been on notice of the very high risk to Gray’s life from his “rough ride.”

Professor Alan Dershowitz doubts that prosecutors could secure a conviction of Goodson for second-degree depraved heart murder because “Nobody wanted this guy to die, nobody set out to kill him, and nobody intentionally murdered him.” If Dershowitz were to read the Maryland statute, he would learn that second-degree depraved heart murder does not require the intent to kill.

To be convicted of involuntary manslaughter, which carries a maximum of 10 years, Goodson, Porter, Rice and White must have unintentionally caused the death of Gray while doing a negligent act or negligently failing to perform a legal duty. Failing to secure Gray with a seatbelt and get medical assistance for him constituted negligent acts, which caused Gray’s death. The officers had a legal duty to protect a prisoner in their custody.

Second-degree assault, which also carries a maximum sentence of 10 years, requires that the officers caused physical harm to Gray as the result of an intentional or reckless act. Failing to secure Gray with a seatbelt and get him medical assistance constituted acts intended to hurt him, causing physical harm (death) to Gray.

Preliminary hearings are scheduled for May 27, but prosecutors have 30 days from the date of the filing of charges to seek a grand jury indictment. There is ample evidence to support the charges against these officers. But whether they are indicted by a grand jury, and if so, ultimately convicted, remains to be seen.

Gray’s family certainly has a good section 1983 civil rights lawsuit for violation of Gray’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure, and his Fifth Amendment right not to be deprived of his life or liberty without due process of law.

Sonja Sohn, who portrayed Detective Kima Greggs on The Wire, wrote in the New York Times, “there was a hopelessness on the streets of Baltimore that ran so deep that it seemed to have killed the spirit of the people.” She attributes the recent “violence” to a “public betrayal of trust” as well as “the culture of police brutality that was so pervasive that underserved Baltimoreans accepted it as a fact of life.” When Mosby announced the charges against the officers who were complicit in Gray’s death, Sohn “sensed something lift. It is a break from the defeat I felt when I had to take a breather from my nonprofit [“ReWired for Change,” that served formerly incarcerated youth in Baltimore]. It’s a reprieve from the despair that I felt all those years ago, struggling to act in the reality of the Baltimore poor.”

The elation felt by hundreds of demonstrators in Baltimore was understandable. If the officers are indicted, they will be tried in a community in which the police have long enjoyed a culture of impunity. But Gray’s death took place in the context of killings of several unarmed black men, including Michael Brown and Eric Garner, by police in high-profile cases around the country. This may give jurors pause when they consider whether the officers in Gray’s case could have committed these crimes.

The post The Chickens Come Home To Roost In Baltimore – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

The EU and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) signed on Wednesday a short-stay visa waiver agreement at a ceremony that took place in Brussels. On behalf of the EU, the agreement was signed by representatives of the Latvian Presidency of the Council and the European Commission. For the UAE, Ambassador Sulaiman Hamid Almazroui, signed the agreement.

The new visa regime provides for visa-free travel for EU citizens when traveling to the territory of the UAE and for citizens of this country when travelling to the EU, for a period of stay of 90 days in any 180-day period.

In order to benefit from visa-free travel, citizens from the EU and the UAE must be in possession of valid ordinary, diplomatic, service/official or special passport. Visa-free travel applies to all categories of persons and for any kind of purposes of travel (for instance tourism, cultural visits, scientific activities, family visits, business etc.), except to persons traveling for the purpose of carrying out a paid activity.

The agreement will now be sent to the European Parliament with a view to obtaining its consent before it can be concluded. However, it will apply on a provisional basis as from 6 May 2015.

Ireland and the United Kingdom will not be subject to the application of the agreement, in accordance with the protocols annexed to the EU treaties. The visa regime to these Member States remains subject to their national legislation.

The post EU Signs Visa Waiver Agreement With United Arab Emirates appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Bahraini authorities should order an independent investigation into allegations that security forces used excessive force to quell unrest in Jaw Prison on March 10, 2015, and mistreated prisoners in the aftermath, Human Rights Watch said today. Security force members or other officials found to have used unlawful or disproportionate force should be held to account, Human Rights Watch said.

Human Rights Watch spoke separately in mid-April by phone to three recently released Jaw Prison inmates who said they saw security forces fire teargas into prison buildings and systematically beat inmates as they cleared cells when quelling the unrest on March 10. The three alleged that following the unrest, security officials subjected prisoners, including some held on political grounds, to physical and psychological abuse and did not allow them medical treatment for their injuries, including head and leg wounds.

“The more we learn about Bahrain’s response to the Jaw Prison unrest, the more troubling the picture becomes,” said Joe Stork, deputy Middle East and North Africa director. “The authorities need to allow independent medical access to the prison at once and ensure their access to building 10, where the most serious abuses are alleged to have taken place.”

The March 10 unrest began following an altercation in the visiting room that morning between prison staff and family members visiting an inmate. One family member told Human Rights Watch that at least 10 inmates witnessed the incident.

One of the three prisoners Human Rights Watch interviewed, who was there, said that other inmates forcibly ejected the four or five prison officers then on duty there, in building 4 of the prison, after they learned of the altercation, while other inmates forcibly ejected prison staff from buildings 1 and 6. He said that at the time, no prison officers had been in another of the prison’s 10 buildings, building 3, for two months, following an earlier altercation between staff and inmates.

The prisoners described the use of teargas, birdshot, and beatings as riot police retook the four buildings, and said that prisoners had been moved outside for weeks, repeatedly beaten, doused with cold water, and forced to shout pro-government slogans. Some were taken to rooms where there were no closed-circuit TV cameras and beaten there, they said.

Article 54 of the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners states that “[o]fficers of the institutions shall not, in their relations with the prisoners, use force except in self-defence or in cases of attempted escape, or active or passive physical resistance to an order based on law or regulations. Officers who have recourse to force must use no more than is strictly necessary.…”

Teargas can cause serious medical problems, even when it is used with restraint. As a riot control method, teargas should only be used where necessary as a proportionate response to quell violence.

Bahrain has ratified and is bound by the UN Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. In April 2013, however, the authorities effectively cancelled the visit of the UN special rapporteur on torture, Juan Mendez. In the same year a royal decree provided for creating a Bahrain Prisoners and Detainees Rights Commission, which has yet to report on conditions in Jaw Prison.

“These allegations make it all the more necessary for the UN special rapporteur on torture to be promptly allowed into Bahrain to report on the treatment of detainees, some of whom have done nothing more than criticize the Bahraini authorities,” Stork said.

The post Bahrain: Allegations Of Severe Prisoner Abuse, Says HRW appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Samir Saran*

‘India First’. This phrase, used liberally by the then Indian prime ministerial candidate from Gujarat, Narendra Modi, captured the imagination of many Indians because it responded to the Indian moment.

In 2013-14, Candidate Modi and his Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) were determined to restore a semblance of pride in a population scarred by corruption scandals and government bloopers. The national shame resulting from the ghastly rape of December 2013 destroyed brand India and darkened the national mood. And the economy, India’s invincible proposition to the world for over a decade, began to head south. The nation was restless and impatient. There was a growing clamour for strong leadership. This was the India of just over two years ago, when #NaMo began to trend on social media. This was when Candidate Modi would have sensed that he had a fair chance of winning. This was also when the ‘man of action’, the new loh purush (‘man of steel’), made his promises to an expectant nation and laid out his vision of a re-energised India.

Nearly a year later, it is a good moment to reflect on that promise.

It would be fair to say that there seem to be two Modis. The first is Prime Minster Modi on the world stage, a rock star when he’s abroad and when he receives foreign dignitaries. He is flamboyant in resetting the India narrative in Western capitals and closing in on lucrative partnerships in Asia. He has injected new dynamism in how India engages with its neighbourhood. He deploys slick messaging and leverages the Indian diaspora to create a sense of optimism. The US President waxes eloquent about him in TIME and even the Germans acknowledge the masterful conduct of the ‘Make in India’ outreach at their prestigious industrial fair.

Then there is the Prime Minister at home, with a different look and feel about him.

He is determined at one level, as he stakes his political capital on reforming the land acquisition law, and while pushing forth a slew of new initiatives like replacing the economic planning body (the Planning Commission) with a contemporary organisation. On the other hand, you sense there are some wrinkles that are yet to be ironed out. There are times when you can see him pensively watching parliamentary proceedings as the lack of majority in the upper house impedes him. There is reluctance while communicating his vision and policies, and an inability to deploy the same communication means to reach out to citizens that got him the top job in the first place.

Clearly then, as we clock in year one, there is much to be done at home for the Indian Prime Minister, if the disconnect between the external messaging and the politics at home is to be reconciled.

India’s most powerful proposition to the world remains an India that offers opportunity to Indians and to others who want to engage with it. It was on this promise of hope, domestic reform and growth that Modi was elected. His election slogans held a two-fold promise: Acche din aane wale hain (‘good days are about to come’), and na khaoonga, na khaane doonga (‘neither will I take bribes nor will I allow others to’). These slogans alluded first to a government that delivers on its promises and is sensitive to the aspirations of youth, and second to a commitment to systemic reform, with corruption a metaphor for bad governance.

Once the scale of his victory became clear, the Prime Minister’s first tweet was acche din aa gaye (‘good days have come’). Implicit in this declaration was that his election was a mandate for change and that change would be rapid, not incremental. If expectations of the new government were high, it was because Modi himself led India to expect a tectonic shift.

The Modi campaign was clever in seizing upon a rare confluence of the needs of big businesses and the bottom of the pyramid. Both needed financial-sector reforms and innovation. While at one end investable capital was needed through creative instruments, at the other end basic financial inclusion, distress loans and lifeline banking were crucial.

Big businesses sought employable human capital to scale up operations, to climb global value chains and to optimise labour productivity (a fifth of China’s). The bottom of the pyramid needed skilling initiatives, basic education, digital literacy and technical education that would allow them to participate in the modern economy and make their ‘mom and pop’ operations more profitable.

Both big business and small operations needed market access, roads, ports, energy and digital highways that would allow them to compete in the global marketplace. To deliver on these was essentially the ‘Modi Promise’.

So it was not surprising that in his early days he rolled out the ‘universal banking scheme’ (Jan Dhan Yojana), the Digital India Initiative and the ‘skilling’ initiatives alongside the ‘Make in India’ thrust. Earlier this year, in its first full budget, the Modi Government announced schemes to support micro-enterprises, innovation start-ups and a pro-industry economic orientation that was appreciated by many. The Finance Commission recommendations on federalising tax receipts and giving more to state governments was accepted. Several social sector and welfare schemes were left to the autonomous design of state governments. India was seen to be moving towards a more decentralised system that resonated with the campaign promise of ‘More Governance, Less Government.’

While the schemes and initiatives announced were on the ball, some of the tactics and processes that their success may depend upon need to be rethought and reorganised. Four in particular need attention.

First, the PM may have to oversee a more sophisticated management of parliament. BJP has to reach out to a variety of political actors in the upper house of parliament (and their own coalition partners) effectively. They are unlikely to have the numbers for a few years and the country may run out of patience before then.

The second would be to be mindful of the contradiction between seeking to expand one’s political base across the country while at the same time striving to deliver economic restructuring that responds to promises and expectations. As the political expansion takes place, policy compromises may seem tempting and could dilute the ‘Modi mandate’. Already the talk in some circles is that the real opposition the Prime Minister faces is within his party. The nationalist and insular component of the Rashtriya Swayamsewak Sangh (the parent organisation of the ruling party) is vocal in its opposition to a number of forward-looking measures the Government may opt for, be it issue foreign investment in certain sectors, labour reform or the reorganisation of the food and agriculture sectors.

The third is the fundamental tension between the centralisation and concentration of power within the Prime Minister’s Office, and the ambition to federalise and devolve governance horizontally and vertically. The Prime Minister’s Office is already under some flak for empire building, delays and inefficiency. What worked in Gujarat may not work for India.

And finally, the PM’s core instinct to operate through the bureaucracy (or a select few among them) may preclude the possibility of lateral hiring of talent that many of his key initiatives do need. While the Chief Minister-civil servant duopoly served Modi well in Gujarat, the decision-making high table may well have to be enlarged if real change is to be effected in New Delhi.

The Government’s honeymoon is perhaps already over and realistically it has another 6 to 12 months to start putting flesh on the bare-bone schemes and ideas announced this past year. If these do not eventuate, one may well witness emptier stadiums abroad and hear shriller voices at home. Ultimately, for PM Modi to sell the Incredible India story, he will need to make India credible.

*Samir Saran is Vice President at Observer Research Foundation, Delhi

Courtesy: www.lowyinterpreter.org

The post India’s Modi Shines On World Stage, Labours At Home – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Neerja Gurnani

The Alien Tort Statute is a legislation that grants U.S. courts “original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort”[1]. As it governs the relationship between United States’ domestic and international law, it has been subject to waves of judgments and discussions, regarding both corporate liability as well as international human rights laws.[2]

Causes of action arising in foreign territory have comprised both the vast majority and the most contentious ATS claims over the past three decades.[3] In September 2010, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that corporations cannot be liable for violations of customary international law under ATS. In Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum[4], the Court dismissed a lawsuit filed against Royal Dutch Shell for aiding & abetting the Nigerian government in state-sponsored torture and murder. It was held that the liability of a corporation for violating international law is governed by international law itself, and the Court, applying a presumption against extraterritoriality[5], held that the claims brought by foreigners against foreigners for conduct abroad were not actionable.

Under the ATS, courts can only apply “specific, uniform and obligatory” norms of international law[6], and the corporate liability did not fit the bill.

This decision was criticised to be wrong in the face of law as it was opined that U.S. Supreme Court cases had already recognised that corporations can have duties & rights under international law.[7] It also went against the principle of international law that states, for the “universal jurisdiction” violations of the law of nations, remedies should come from the domestic law of the forum, or the lex fori.[8]

In April 2014, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York revived the question In Re South Africa Apartheid Litigation,[9] which accused Ford Motor and IBM Corp of human rights abuses in South Africa. The court was bound to follow the Kiobel principle, which unequivocally stated that corporations cannot be sued under the ATS. However, since Kiobel had been dismissed on other grounds such as extraterritoriality, the Court sub silentio reversed the original decision ruling on corporate liability. This seems quite far out, and it appears that Judge Scheindlin went well out of her way to re-address the question. She did not dismiss all defendants, and is also willing to explore the requirement that claims must “touch and concern” US territory in order to overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality.[10]

Later, however, Judge Scheindlin had to reluctantly conclude that the case did not belong in American courts, as the plaintiffs could not show “relevant conduct” of the corporations within USA. She regretted that plaintiffs were left without relief, and ultimately felt herself to be bound by legal precedent despite personal views to the contrary. This ruling disappointed human rights lawyers, as it was seen to give corporations a free ticket to violate human rights abroad.[11]
Lower courts, too, have struggled with application of the Kiobel principle in cases involving American corporations and conduct in the United States.[12] However, no other court has held that the international law violation itself must occur in the US.[13]

In April 2015, a petition went up for review in the case Cardona v. Chiquita Brands International, Inc[14], with both defendant corporations being U.S. companies, alleged of aiding and abetting extrajudicial killings and funding terrorist organisations (to Chiquita Brands pleaded guilty). In a stunning move, the Supreme Court denied certiorari[15] as “all relevant conduct occurred abroad” and United States did not have jurisdiction.[16]

In a world witnessing an expansion in jurisprudence to accommodate human rights, this comes a blow, especially as United States has always proclaimed itself to be a forerunner in condemning global human rights violations. These rulings imply that in US courts, innocent people have no recourse against American corporations that engage in human rights violations abroad.

While it has been justified by stating that it merely shifts the locus of human rights actions to a different jurisdiction, and has been done to avoid unwarranted judicial interference in matters of foreign policy,[17] the fact remains that a gap has been created between corporate responsibility for human rights and the capacity to punish them for the same. Corporations no longer face reparation in US Courts, even for “specific, universal, and obligatory” crimes like genocide. If accountability for genocide is a problem, accountability for something like contribution to climate change seems like a distant dream.

The ball has ultimately been knocked into Congress’ court, as Chief Justice Roberts said, “Corporations are often present in many countries, and it would reach too far to say that mere corporate presence suffices. If Congress were to determine otherwise, a statute more specific than the ATS would be required.” It now remains to be seen how Congress responds, and whether it deems respecting human rights to be a part of the price that corporations pay for doing business in other countries.

[1] 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
[2] Goodbye to the Alien Tort Statute? Second Circuit Rejects Corporate Liability for Violations of Customary International Law, Julian Ku, http://opiniojuris.org/2010/09/17/goodbye-to-ats-litigation-second-circuit-rejects-corporate-liability-for-violations-of-customary-international-law/#sthash.hbxAMCW3.dpuf
[3] See, e.g., Doe v. Exxon Mobil, 654 F.3d 11 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013 (7th Cir. 2011); Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
[4] Full judgment here http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/12pdf/10-1491_l6gn.pdf
[5] See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877 (2010) (“When a statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none.”).
[6] Filartiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 887–88 (2d Cir. 1980).
[7] http://ssrn.com/abstract=2173474 and http://ssrn.com/abstract=1701992
[8] For instance, universal jurisdiction is conferred upon acts of piracy, as recognized and defined by laws of nations. See United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 161 (1820)
[9] In Re: South African Apartheid Litigation, U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York, No. 02-md-01499, http://opiniojuris.org/wp-content/uploads/17-Apr-SDNY-Opinion.pdf, See also http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/17/apartheid-lawsuit-idUSL2N0N91J120140417
[10] The Case That Won’t Die: U.S. Court Revives South Africa Apartheid Alien Tort Statute Lawsuit, Julian Ku, See more at: http://opiniojuris.org/2014/04/18/case-wont-die-u-s-court-revives-south-africa-apartheid-ats-lawsuit/#sthash.hiAUYlv8.dpuf
[11] http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/08/28/us-apartheid-lawsuit-idUSKBN0GS2P120140828
[12] See Mastafa v. Chevron Corp., 770 F.3d 170, 187-89 (2d Cir. 2014); See Chowdury v. World Bangladesh Holding Ltd, 746 F.3d 42, 49 n.6 (2d Cir. 2013).
[13] See Doe v. Nestle USA, Inc., 766 F.3d 1013, 1022 (9th Cir. 2014); see also Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 40-57 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (recognizing corporate liability); Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1017-21 (7th Cir. 2011) (same).
[14] Is the Alien Tort Statute Headed Back to the Supreme Court?, William S. Dodge, http://opiniojuris.org/2015/04/13/guest-post-is-the-alien-tort-statute-headed-back-to-the-supreme-court/
[15]http://www.asil.org/blogs/us-supreme-court-declines-hear-appeal-alien-tort-statute-case-april-20-2015#sthash.AxALhwWm.dpuf
[16] http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/24/chiquita-colombia-decision-idUSL2N0PZ28P20140724
[17] International Human Rights Litigation After Kiobel, Gregory H. Fox and Yunjoo Goze, Michigan Bar Journal November 2013, p. 44

The post The Alien Tort Statute: Why Does US Refuse To Hold Corporations Liable For Human Rights Violations? – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Dilek Kütük*

The Balkan economic structure may be the most unpredictable in the world due to the region’s political circumstances. This issue was discussed at the Turkey-Balkan Economy Summit at Bahcesehir University in Istanbul that was organized by the International Relations Studies Association (TUIC) and host to 14 expert speakers from the Balkans and Europe including Kujtim Dobruna (Senior Economy Advisor to the President of the Republic of Kosovo), Will Bartlett (Senior Researcher to the London School of Economics) and Helene Lavoix (Director of Red Team Analysis, Paris).

While there are still optimists, pessimists have gained ground recently when pointing to the high youth unemployment, political ignorance and general hopelessness permeating the countries of the Balkans. The global economic crisis seriously affected the Balkan economies: their development was first halted and then resumed progress at only a snail’s pace. After the collapse of Yugoslavia, many important economic reforms have been implemented to promote free market economies in the region. Kujtim Dobruna mentioned that economic institutions are a prime driving factor of the transition to a free market economy. These transitioning countries need to further develop their political and economic institutions to instil inclusiveness in both their policies and their actions. These institutions must ensure the establishment of a level playing field, on which people can interact and conduct business, by securing private property, fostering an unbiased system of law and providing public and administrative services. Building state legitimacy, ensuring economic stability and including the private sector in the decision-making process are some of the approaches that need to be considered when formulating development strategies in these countries.

Sanel Halilbegovic from the American University in Sarajevo emphasized the importance of cooperation between the Sarajevo Stock Exchange and Borsa Istanbul. In his speech at the conference, he stated that Turkey can be regarded as one of the largest economies in the region, therefore cooperation through exchange should be seen as a very positive step. It is important to note that real economies and the financial economies are interrelated. The benefits of such cooperation for investors and companies would be: a wider variety of investment opportunities, the improvement of the quality of information (e.g. auditing), an increase in fresh capital through the issuance of new securities, an increased reputation for both parties, increased liquidity, increased company value, and more efficient protection of investors on all levels. Such cooperation can combat the various obstacles that hinder Turkish-Balkan economic relations, and economic development of the Balkans in general, by spurring each other’s mutual interest in one another, disseminating accurate knowledge and reducing the sense of insecurity that is bound to arise when dealing with the unknown. This partnership can also serve as a breeding ground for future partnerships and deepen Turkish-Bosnian economic and political ties in particular.

Turkey’s investment potential is steadily increasing, especially after 2004 with the commencement of Turkey’s EU accession negotiations. Turkey is one of the most important trading partners for European countries. According to Senada Šelo Šabić from the Institute for Development and International Relations in Zagreb, Turkey is the EU’s 7th largest import and 5th largest export partner, and it has also started to invest abroad; between 2004 and 2013 Turkey’s direct investment abroad grew from 7 to 33 billion dollars. Greece is Turkey’s 14th largest import partner, and Romania is its 17th. Also, Romania, Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina are Turkey’s most important export countries. 4.7% of Turkish FDI abroad was directed at the Balkans between 2002 and 2012.

Turkey encourages trade and investment, and has activated its tools of production in the region. Turkey, due to its historical and cultural ties, seeks to increase its trade volume with the Balkans. In light of these aims, as Ms Sabic pointed out in her speech, Turkey has set out to undertake ambitious projects in the region. For instance, in Albania Turkey’s Enka construction conglomerate joined forces with the US’s Bechtel to build a 1 billion dollar highway (2010) and Turkey’s Calık Holding purchased Albania’s 2nd largest bank (2006-2009). In Bosnia and Herzegovina, Turkey acquired 49% of BH Airlines, opened several branches of the its state-owned Ziraat Bank in the country, therewith providing local financial empowerment, and Natron Hayat invested 90 million dollars in the country’s paper industry. In Croatia, Turkey’s investments include the construction of a motorway, a bank, various chain stores, hotels and involvement in marina management.

After Turkey’s then-Prime Minister (now President) Recep Tayyip Erdogan held a speech asserting that “Kosovo is Turkey, Turkey is Kosovo”, Turkey’s cooperation and relationship with Kosovo has become an issue of increased sensitivity. Although there has been little change in the two countries’ relations, investment projects are continuing and show no sign of stopping: the Turkish-US consortium of ENKA-Bechtel is building a motorway in the country valued at 700 million euro, Calik Holding is in the process of purchasing Kosovo Electricity Distribution and Supply, and Turkish Economy Bank now operates 24 branches within Kosovo. As for Macedonia, Turkey’s Tosyali Holding is involved in a project that aims to modernize and to improve the management of Skopje and Ohrid airports, and it is also seeking to acquire the AD Nikšić steel-mill in Montenegro. Turkey also enjoys diverse relations with Serbia and Slovenia. The trade volume between Turkey and Slovenia was 860 million dollars in 2013 and between 2002 and 2012 Turkey’s FDI stock in the country was valued at 5 million dollars. Turkey’s trade volume with Serbia, on the other hand, was valued at 586 million dollars in 2012, and from 2002-2012 its FDI stock in the country was estimated at 49 million dollars.

Another point worth considering is cooperation between small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Independent Economic Consultant at Macropolis Jens Bastian perceives of SMEs as an important instrument for development of the Balkan countries. The European Investment Bank (EIB) is the largest international financier, and it has financed projects totalling 28 billion euros. The European Commission’s Programme for the Competitiveness of Enterprises and SMEs, or the COSME Programme for short (2004-2020), provides venture capital and mezzanine finance in the Balkans. Another EU funded initiative, namely the WB EDIF (the Western Balkans Enterprise Development and Innovation Facility), aims at increasing the financial resources made available to SMEs based in the Western Balkans, while also offering technical assistance for strategic investments in the region to support socio-economic development and the respective countries’ EU accession processes. According to Jens Bastian, Balkan countries seek to boost their economic ties, find new areas of cooperation, whether in the fields of transport infrastructure, power plants, housing, tourism, or other niche areas, and rearrange legislation to open their markets to foreign investors.

Nonetheless, the work that has been done to transform the Balkan countries into functioning free market economies after the collapse of Yugoslavia has taken a serious blow due to the effects of the global economic crisis. Senior Economy Researcher at LSE Will Bartlett said that the Western Balkans have suffered from the spill-over effects of the Eurozone crisis and cannot devalue their way out of the recession due to “euroisation”. Therefore, the only option is internal devaluation and structural reform. In his conclusion he mentioned that while the Balkan countries have high growth potential, this potential has been seriously dented by two recent factors: the impact of the Eurozone crisis, and fiscal consolidation and austerity programmes. Here he proposed that the Western Balkan countries consider a coordinated fiscal expansion based on investment in infrastructure, education and health that could be financed by EIB loans and the diversification of exports to countries such as Turkey and other emerging economies throughout the region.

Turkey has pursued a proactive foreign policy in the Western Balkans and assesses its successes and shortcomings by way of its various diplomatic and economic initiatives in the region. In light of its history, culture and geography, Turkey has come to employ its soft power instruments in the region, including economic investment, film, diplomacy, cultural centres, tourism, etc. Turkey’s use of soft power in the Balkans was a point of focus for Prof Birgul Demirtas from TOBB University of Economics and Technology. After the end of the Cold War, the Balkans were granted with greater room to manoeuver between the international powers. During his time at as Turkey’s Foreign Minister, (current Prime Minister) Prof Ahmet Davutoglu emphasized his “forward looking” vision for the Balkans ensconced in the promotion of regional self-dominion and inclusiveness, regional and European integration, and a common stance on regional and international organizations. In addition to these visions, Prof Demirtas emphasised that the concept of a “trading state” could also be applied here, as Turkey’s trade volume with the Balkans increased by six from 2.9 billion dollars in 2000 to 17.5 billion dollars in 2012. Furthermore, Turkey’s effective use of cultural diplomacy in the region can be exemplified by fact that Turkey operates 12 Yunus Emre Cultural Centre offices in 6 different Balkan countries. Thus, the number of Turkish-speakers throughout the region is increasing every day. Another tool of Turkey’s soft power are the “Turkey Scholarships”, which are applied for by thousands of student each year but only granted to 700. Briefly, other institutions that work to exert Turkish influence in the Balkans can be seen in the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TİKA), 18.5% of whose aid is directed at the Balkans, the regional offices of the Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (TRT), and lastly, the Anadolu Agency. Finally, Prof Demirtas also mentioned the role of the increasing ties between local municipalities and the circulation of Turkish soap operas as forms of cultural interaction between Turkey and the Balkans.

Conclusion

Although the Balkans house risks to investment because of their instable political environments, the proliferation of security threats and their problems related to inadequate infrastructure and legal arrangements, today it is a region with high investment potential. Turkey’s EU accession process affected its foreign policy toward the Balkans as it succeeded in transforming its system. It sought to export this experience to neighbouring countries while also working towards regional integration. The above-mentioned speakers at the Turkey-Balkan Economy Summit presented powerful reasons for and examples of Turkey’s contributions to the region. Turkey may in fact come to function as the spokesman for the Balkans as it host the next G20 Summit in Istanbul, during which time it could engage in formidable efforts to promote regional sustainability and inclusiveness, all the while working to attract investment to the region during the meetings with these senior officials of the top 20 economies of the globe. Also, it deserves mention that the Honorary Consulate of Bosnia and Herzegovina to Bursa, Turkey, General Manager of the furniture company Çilek, and Founder and President of the BİGMEV Foundation, Muzaffer Çilek, has been appointed as a senior advisor to the Bosniak Member of the Presidential Council of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bakir Izetbegovic. Seeing that Turkey already enjoys good relations with Bosnia and Herzegovina, and particularly with its constituent Bosniak community, it can be expected that the economic relations between these two countries will develop in the future as their long-term, mutually beneficial friendship grows. For this to become a reality, however, Turkey now needs to set its weight behind establishing new opportunities for the people of the Balkans, specifically its youth, by supporting local NGOs with its economic, cultural and human capital, thus working to ensure stability, prosperity and interdependence in the Balkans.

*Dilek Kütük is an Assistant Specialist at the Istanbul based think-tank the Turkish Asian Center for Strategic Studies – TASAM.

The post Deepening Relations Between Balkans And Turkey: Economic Growth And Patterns Of Development – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Emily Schwartz Greco*

Kicking humanity’s addiction to oil, gas, and coal before those industries render the planet uninhabitable may take a miracle. So it’s a good thing that the climate movement found a patron saint.

I’m talking about Pope Francis, of course. Before an upcoming encyclical makes the Vatican’s stance official, he’s already spreading the gospel of a fossil-free future.

In case, like me, you’re not Catholic: An encyclical is a basically a memo the church sends its 1.2 billion believers — one out of six people alive in a community that includes 30 percent of Congress. Here’s looking at you, John Boehner, Marco Rubio, Jeb Bush, and Ted Cruz.

Two years into what he says will be a brief tenure, the pope’s putting climate skeptics on the defensive.

Fretting about the fate of the Earth is part of his broader condemnation of the global status quo, which Francis considers to be a “throwaway culture.” And it explains why he and some of his top aides came to call for a transition to greener energy.

“The ever-accelerating burning of fossil fuels that powers our economic engine is disrupting the Earth’s delicate ecological balance on an almost unfathomable scale,” warned Cardinal Peter Turkson, the Ghanaian cardinal who is taking a leading role in drafting the climate encyclical. “Corporations and financial investors must learn to put long-term sustainability over short-term profit.”

Turkson spoke at a recent Vatican climate summit of religious and secular leaders.

The group, which included Francis, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, the presidents of Italy and Ecuador, Nobel laureates, and leading scientists, released a statement urging a quick “transformation to a world powered by renewable and other low-carbon energy.”

Some Catholics believe that modern life requires the burning of every drop of oil and every last hunk of coal. Increasingly, this fossil-fuel fundamentalism leaves them at odds with their church.

Once the Holy See officially condemns worship at the altar of dirty energy, those fundamentalists may need to choose between what their church demands and what the oil, gas, and coal industries dictate. Boehner and other conservative Catholic lawmakers will surely squirm in their seats when Francis addresses Congress in September.

And who could be a stronger spokesman for bringing the power of religion to fuel this change?

Even Ban, who refuses to divulge whether he adheres to a specific faith tradition, can now connect with the pious. “Science and religion are not at odds on climate change. Indeed, they are fully aligned,” he declared at the Vatican’s climate summit. “It is a moral issue. It is an issue of social justice, human rights, and fundamental ethics.”

Vatican City has already shrunk its carbon footprint. Pope Benedict XVI installed solar panels on the roof of a big building next door to St. Peter’s Cathedral and ordered a hybrid popemobile.

Francis, however, will take things much further if his encyclical drives all Catholic-run outfits — including schools, hospitals, churches, and retirement homes — to take action.

Plus, he could divest from fossil fuels. Francis is the sole shareholder in the Vatican Bank, a financial institution with $8 billion in assets that previously lacked adequate oversight. He’s already shaken things up there by shutting down accounts belonging to money launderers, mobsters, drug-runners, and corrupt politicians. Barring its investments in oil, gas, and coal could be next.

With the recent news about Antarctica thawing out, there’s no time to lose. So it’s reassuring that Turkson, widely seen as a papal contender himself, speaks so eloquently about the urgency of climate action.

“God has given all of us this planet as a gift, to provide for our needs,” he declared. “And the correct response to receiving such a magnificent gift is surely one of gratitude, love, and respect.”

The post Converting The Fossil-Fuel Fundamentalists – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Mark N. Katz*

In Ukraine in particular and Europe more generally, Russian President Vladimir Putin has been pursuing an activist foreign policy agenda that Europe and the United States (US) are having difficulty responding to. For example, Brussels and Washington have been unsuccessful in persuading or coercing Moscow to withdraw from eastern Ukraine, much less Crimea. Putin’s success (so far) in Europe, though, has not been matched by success in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Like the US and Europe, Russia often finds itself thwarted in its efforts to protect, much less advance, its interests in the MENA. This is due to four factors: 1) the interests Russia pursues in the MENA region are often in conflict with one another; 2) the MENA environment has become more difficult for Russia (among others) since the outbreak of the Arab spring; 3) the means available to Moscow for pursuing Russian interests in the MENA are limited; and 4) the actions of other actors in the region – even those allied to Moscow – often serve to hinder rather than advance the achievement of Russian aims in the region.

CONFLICTING INTERESTS

Moscow has several geopolitical interests in the MENA. One of these is, as in other regions (most notably Europe), to prevent what it sees as American and European efforts to deprive Moscow of its allies. In turn, Moscow seeks to take advantage of MENA governments’ unhappiness with American and European policy in the region. Competition with the West, though, is not Moscow’s only geopolitical interest in the MENA. Another is to prevent the rise of radical Sunni forces which Moscow fears will, if they grow strong enough, not only engulf the MENA and reduce Russian influence, but also spread into the Muslim regions of Russia.

A third Russian geopolitical interest in the MENA derives from Moscow’s strong dependence on oil and gas export revenue – not only to fund the government’s budget but also to pay off key interest groups on whom Putin’s rule depends and to support the Russian economy more generally. Since the Middle East is a key supplier of petroleum resources to the rest of the world, Moscow has a strong interest in seeking to prevent or reverse developments there that result in lower worldwide petroleum prices or European countries switching their reliance on Russia to MENA countries for gas supplies (see Figure 1).

A fourth Russian geopolitical interest in the MENA relates to Moscow’s efforts to expand its exports of arms, nuclear reactors, and other goods produced by enterprises closely linked to the Kremlin, and exports to wealthy MENA countries help bolster these industries. But what makes this an important geopolitical (and not just commercial) interest for Russia is that these industries support key elites and interest groups that back Putin (see Figure 2).

These four Russian geopolitical interests in the MENA, it must be noted, are not always mutually compatible. Specifically, the goal of limiting the further expansion of Western influence in the region can be at odds with the aim of preventing the spread of radical Sunni forces. America and Europe, after all, share this latter goal with Russia, and a strong Western presence in the MENA can serve this aim – provided that the US and Europe focus on this goal. Similarly, while Moscow seeks to sell arms, nuclear reactors and other products to the petroleum rich MENA countries, Russia is often in competition with these same countries to export oil and gas to Western and other countries.

THE IMPACT OF THE ARAB SPRING

Before the outbreak of the Arab spring in 2011, Putin sought to protect and advance Russia’s geopolitical interests in the region by pursuing good relations with all governments and certain key political movements in the MENA. Putin not only rebuilt Russian relations with longstanding friends (including the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq, the Assad regime in Syria, the Gaddafi regime in Libya, the military regime in Algeria, and the Islamic regime in Iran), he also sought to improve relations with America’s friends there (including Turkey, Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf Cooperation Council states, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and even the post-Saddam government in Baghdad as well as the Kurdish Regional Government).

Especially noteworthy were Putin’s efforts to improve relations with Saudi Arabia, with which Moscow had tense relations not only during the Cold War when Riyadh was aiding the Afghan Mujahedeen, but also in the 1990s when Moscow believed the Saudis were assisting Chechen rebels.Putin also sought improved relations with Israel – a government that Moscow had long been at odds with. Russia – which, along with the US, the European Union (EU), and the United Nations (UN) is a member of the Quartet seeking an Israeli-Palestinian peace – has also had good relations with both Palestinian Fatah and rival Hamas and Hezbollah in Lebanon. Before the Arab spring, in short, Putin pursued good relations with all the major actors in the MENA (except al-Qaeda and its affiliates).

The 2011 Arab uprisings resulted in important changes to Moscow’s MENA strategy. Indifferent to the ouster of Tunisia’s Ben Ali, Moscow was uncomfortable with Mubarak’s downfall in Egypt but indicated its willingness to work with the forces seeking change in both countries. When, however, popular uprisings turned against Russia’s long-time allies in Libya and Syria – and especially when Western and Arab countries intervened militarily to overthrow the Gaddafi regime – Putin came to view the Arab spring in a more sinister light. Just as he did in response to the ‘colour revolutions’ in Georgia (2003) and Ukraine (2004), Putin regarded the Arab spring as an orchestrated effort to replace governments allied to Moscow with ones allied to the West instead.

Many in Moscow saw Western (and their MENA allies’) support for the Arab spring as the first step in a plan to stimulate the rise of similar forces in the Muslim regions – or all – of Russia. In February 2011, then President Medvedev suggested that ‘foreign elements’ were fomenting these uprisings, and that their ultimate intention was to bring political change to Russia. Then Prime Minister Putin warned that ‘external interference’ could lead to the rise of Islamists, and that their rise in North Africa could negatively affect other regions, including Russia’s North Caucasus. In addition, the collapse of world petroleum prices in late 2014, as a result of increasing American shale production as well as Saudi refusal to reign in its oil production, was seen in Moscow as a deliberate Saudi-American effort to weaken Russia economically.

Russian strategy for dealing with the MENA region since the outbreak of the Arab spring, especially since the downfall of Gaddafi, has involved several elements. First, blocking all Western/Arab-backed efforts against Syria’s Assad regime at the UN Security Council (Putin has indicated that then-President Medvedev’s decision to abstain on the 2011 UN Security Council resolution, calling for the imposition of a no-fly zone in Libya, was the lever which certain Western and Arab governments used to engineer Gaddafi’s downfall). Second, providing arms to the Assad regime to prevent its downfall.

Third, collaborating with MENA actors that oppose the downfall of the Assad regime or at least fear that what will replace it will be worse (Iran, the Shi’a-dominated government in Iraq, Egypt under Sisi, Algeria, and Israel). Fourth, Russia has been cooperating with American and European anti-Weapons-of-Mass-Destruction efforts (especially regarding chemical weapons in Syria and Iran’s nu- clear programme) so that they perceive Russia as a partner in the MENA despite their differences over Ukraine. Finally, Moscow’s MENA strategy has in- volved attempting to isolate Saudi Arabia and its Gulf Arab allies from the West in particular by trying to raise Western fears that they actually support Sunni jihadist forces such as Daesh (also called the Islamic State, IS).

LIMITED MEANS

While Russia has important geopolitical interests in the MENA, it has limited resources with which to pursue them. And Putin is unwilling to use some resources; for example, he has been unwilling to deploy the Russian military in support of MENA allies (Saddam Hussein in 2003, Gaddafi in 2011, or Assad since 2011). Nor does this seem likely to change even after the sharp deterioration of relations between Russia and the West over Ukraine. Indeed, Putin’s pursuit of forceful policies in Ukraine makes it less likely that he could engage Russian forces anywhere in the MENA simultaneously.

Like the Soviet Union, Putin’s Russia can (and does) provide arms to its allies in the MENA. Unlike the Soviet Union – which essentially gave weapons away – Putin has insisted that clients actually pay for them. It does not seem that Russian arms sales to states that also receive Western arms gives Moscow much influence in them, despite some contrary perceptions in the West. Indeed, it is not clear how much Moscow can influence even those governments (including Iran and even Syria) which the West does not sell arms to.

Similarly, Russian trade relations with most MENA states are not especially large and do not provide Moscow with much influence. Russia has a significant trade relationship with Turkey, but this has not served to narrow their differences over Syria or Armenia/Azerbaijan. The nature of Russian-Israeli trade may actually give Israel a degree of influence over Moscow. Israel is one of the few sources of Western military technology for Moscow, and Putin does not want to jeopardise this (see Figure 3).

There are, however, some resources Moscow can draw upon to advance its geopolitical interests in the MENA. Many MENA states and actors differ with the US and Europe, and with each other. Each of these differences potentially allows Moscow to side with dissatisfied parties. Just like in Soviet times, Moscow exploits MENA unhappiness with American support for Israel, portrays itself as a supporter of the Palestinians, and hence a more desirable partner for Arab states than the US. Although the post-Saddam government in Iraq was initially annoyed with Moscow for having previously supported Saddam, Washington-Baghdad differences over the pace of democratisation and other issues contributed to Baghdad granting oil concessions to Russian firms and buying Russian arms. Similarly, when the Obama administration cut back on US arms shipments to Egypt due to concerns about the Sisi government’s commitment to democratisation and human rights, Putin was quick to express Moscow’s willingness to sell (but not give) Russian arms to Cairo.

There is a limit, though, to how effectively Moscow is either willing or able to exploit differences between MENA actors, and between them and the West. Although Moscow has loudly proclaimed its support for the Palestinian cause, Arabs and Iranians know that Russia has close ties to Israel and is not willing to really upset Tel Aviv. While Moscow is willing to develop Iraq’s oil resources and provide it with arms for a price, Iraqis know that Moscow will not send Russian forces to protect Baghdad against Daesh. Similarly, while Moscow has expressed willingness to sell arms to Cairo, this has not yet happened because Egypt cannot pay for them and Saudi Arabia has not yet provided the necessary funds. Moscow also knows that Cairo is unwilling to rely primarily on Russia for weapon supplies, but uses Russian offers to convince Washington to resume arms supplies – which it now has done.

FEW REAL ALLIES, MANY ADVERSARIES

To counter Western influence in the MENA, Moscow’s main allies have been traditionally anti- American regimes: Iran, Syria and in the past, Saddam’s Iraq and Gaddafi’s Libya. Otherwise, most MENA governments willing to cooperate with Moscow (including Turkey) also seek to maintain cooperation with the US and Europe. And if there is sufficient progress on the Iranian nuclear issue, cooperation between Iran and the West may increase.

With regard to preventing the rise of Sunni violent extremism, Moscow sees Saudi Arabia and Qatar as its principal adversaries (with the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait playing a supporting role). Moscow perceives Syria, Hezbollah, Algeria, Sisi’s Egypt, Iran, and the Baghdad government in Iraq as allies in this endeavour, as are the US and Europe.

o maintain relatively high oil prices, all MENA petroleum producers should be Russia’s allies. But the fact that Saudi Arabia appears to be ‘flooding the market’ with cheap oil tells Moscow that not only is Riyadh not an ally, but that it is also determined to harm Russia even at great expense. For selling arms or other Russian goods, there is no MENA government that Moscow is unwilling to sell to. Unfortunately for Moscow, there are some wealthy MENA governments such as Saudi Arabia that could buy much from Russia, but have so far been unwilling to do so.

The problem for Moscow is that even when it is willing to compartmentalise its interests by cooperating with states in some areas even though it opposes them in others (i.e. Moscow still hopes to sell arms to Riyadh even though Russia and Saudi Arabia support opposing forces in Syria), not all MENA states are willing to do so. Saudi Arabia in particular seems to have linked whether or not it buys Russian arms to whether or not Moscow adjusts its Syria policy to Riyadh’s liking.

RUSSIA AND DEMOCRACY IN THE MENA

There is nothing in the way that Russia pursues its various geopolitical interests that promotes democracy or human rights in the MENA. In- stead, Putin seeks to uphold what he considers a stable authoritarian order. Moscow, therefore, has opposed any Western support, vocal or prac- tical, for democratisation efforts in the MENA.

There have been four strains of thought about the West and democratisation in the MENA among those supporting the Kremlin or tolerated by it. Those who want to preserve or rebuild Russian-Western cooperation believe that the West does not understand that only hostile Sunni Islamists will benefit from democratisation efforts in the MENA, not pro-Western liberals. Promoting democratisation in the region, then, can undercut reliable authoritarian rulers, but will not result in pro-Western democracies. Further, the rise of hostile Sunni Islamist forces will not only threaten Russian interests, but Western ones as well. Accordingly, just as Western support for the downfall of Gaddafi resulted in chaos (not democratisation) in Libya, the downfall of Assad in Syria would only lead to a far worse outcome that would threaten Western as well as Russian interests. Moscow’s support for Assad, therefore, so the argument runs, actually protects Western interests, even if the West does not understand this.

A more cynical Russian view, which was prevalent in the early days of the Arab spring, is that Western support for MENA democratisation was designed not to result in democracy but to topple pro-Russian governments and replace them with pro-Western ones. Some Russians contrast Western and Gulf states support to anti-Assad forces in Syria, while supporting (or acquiescing to) the suppression of opponents of the pro-Western authoritarian government in Bahrain.

There are also those in Russia who argue that the Arab spring, like the ‘colour revolutions’ in Georgia and Ukraine, were an effort to promote the outbreak of similar opposition movements in the Muslim regions of Russia, or throughout Russia, with the aim of weakening or even toppling Putin.

And there is a truly conspiratorial Russian view that Saudi Arabia is not the conservative state that the West thinks it is, but a revolutionary regime promoting Sunni jihadism elsewhere to advance its own great power agenda. By supporting the downfall of Gaddafi – that has resulted in the rise of jihadist forces in Libya – as well as the Sunni jihadist opposition to Assad, and through interventions in Bahrain and Yemen against Shi’a opposition forces, Riyadh has revealed its true aims. Policy-makers in Washington and European capitals might be duped by this, according to this viewpoint, but some in Moscow are not. If Western policy-makers would finally realise that Saudi behaviour threatens Russia and the West alike, then both could cooperate against this common threat.

CONCLUSION

Putin perceives Russia as having several import- ant geopolitical interests in the MENA: countering Western influence; containing Sunni jihadist forces; reversing the drop in petroleum prices; and expanding Russian exports to the region. Successfully pursuing these Russian interests in the Middle East, though, is difficult since they often conflict, Russia has limited means, and different MENA actors – including Moscow-friendly regimes – sometimes thwart Russian ambitions. So long as Putin – or someone like him – is Russia’s leader, it is doubtful that Moscow will see Russia’s geopolitical interests in the MENA differently than it does now. Certainly, Putin or some- one like him will never see the democratisation of the MENA to be a Russian interest, and will do nothing consciously to support it. Whether or not a more democratic Russia might have a more positive view of democratisation efforts in the MENA is questionable, given that Western democratic governments have long supported authoritarian regimes there, and hypothetical since a democratic Russian government seems highly unlikely to emerge anytime soon.

About the author:
*Mark N. Katz is Professor of Government and Politics at George Mason University.

Source:
This article was published by FRIDE as Policy Brief No. 201 May 2015 (PDF)

This Policy Brief belongs to the project ‘Transitions and Geopolitics in the Arab World: links and implications for international actors’, led by FRIDE and HIVOS. We acknowledge the generous support of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway. For further information on this project, please contact: Kawa Hassan, Hivos (k.hassan@ hivos.nl) or Kristina Kausch, FRIDE (kkausch@ fride.org).

The post Conflicting Aims, Limited Means: Russia In The Middle East – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

For the first time, scientists have imaged thunder, visually capturing the sound waves created by artificially triggered lightning. Researchers from Southwest Research Institute (SwRI) presented the first images at a joint meeting of American and Canadian geophysical societies in Montreal, Canada, May 3-7.

“Lightning strikes the Earth more than 4 million times a day, yet the physics behind this violent process remain poorly understood,” said Dr. Maher A. Dayeh, a research scientist in the SwRI Space Science and Engineering Division. “While we understand the general mechanics of thunder generation, it’s not particularly clear which physical processes of the lightning discharge contribute to the thunder we hear. A listener perceives thunder largely based upon the distance from lightning. From nearby, thunder has a sharp, cracking sound. From farther away, it has a longer-lasting, rumbling nature.”

Although people see it as a flashing bolt, lightning begins as a complex process of electrostatic charges churning around in storm clouds. These charges initiate step leaders, branching veins of electricity propagating down, which subsequently lead to a main discharge channel. That channel opens a path to nearly instantaneous return strokes, which form the lightning flash as we see it. By studying the acoustic power radiated from different portions of the lightning channel, researchers can learn more about the origins of thunder as well as the energetic processes associated with lightning.

“Thunder and lightning are fascinating, wild, and unpredictable,” said Dayeh. “Because of their erratic nature, the phenomena are best studied using triggered events.” The technique involves launching a small rocket trailing a grounded copper wire into thunderclouds. The copper wire provides a conductive channel and creates a predictable path for lightning, allowing scientists to precisely focus their instruments and perform repeatable experiments close to the discharge channel. Using SwRI internal research funding, Dayeh led a proof-of-concept experiment to image the acoustic signature of thunder. SwRI conducted experiments at the International Center for Lightning Research and Testing at the University of Florida, Gainesville, taking advantage of the state’s claim to the most lightning strikes per year in the U.S.

Dayeh designed a large, sophisticated array of microphones to study the acoustic signature of thunder. Fifteen microphones, spaced one meter apart, were lined up 95 meters away from the rocket launch pad where the triggered lightning would strike. To image the vertical profile of the bolt, he used post-signal processing techniques and directional amplification of the data signals captured by the microphone array.

“At first I thought the experiment didn’t work,” said Dayeh. “The initial constructed images looked like a colorful piece of modern art that you could hang over your fireplace. But you couldn’t see the detailed sound signature of lightning in the acoustic data.”

However, when Dayeh looked at the different sound frequency bands, he saw that the images cleared up at higher frequencies. The technique revealed a distinct signature of thunder generated by the lightning strike. Future experiments could allow scientists to study the probable acoustic signatures of current pulses, step leader branches, and discharge channel zigzags independently.

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By Elise Harris

On Wednesday 32 new Swiss Guards swore an oath of allegiance to Pope Francis, who told them their role is one of courageously imitating Christ which ought to be rooted in prayer.

In an audience with the new guards and their families earlier in the week, Pope Francis said it was an occasion “to nurture a meaningful friendship, because you work so close to me.”

The friendship of the Pontifical Swiss Guard is special, he said, because it is based on “the love of Christ: that greatest love he referred to when he said: ‘There is no love greater than this: to lay down one’s life for one’s friends.’”

Pope Francis made his comments to the new guards in a Monday audience ahead of their May 6 swearing in ceremony, during which they took an oath of allegiance to Pope Francis, swearing to serve the Church by protecting him and all of his successors.

With a motto of “Courage and Loyalty,” the Pontifical Swiss Guard is the oldest standing army in the world.

The official swearing-in ceremony took place Wednesday in the San Damaso courtyard of the apostolic palace, where the new members of the Guard made their commitment like hundreds before them on the anniversary of the Sack of Rome.

May 6, 1527, is a date that marks the most significant and deadliest event in the history of the guard.

In the course of the battle, 147 members lost their lives while fighting the army of the Holy Roman Empire in defense of Pope Clement VII, who was able to escape through a secret passageway leading from the Vatican to Castel Sant’Angelo, which sits on the Tiber River.

In his comments to the new guards, Pope Francis noted how God has chosen to build his kingdom in collaboration with men, saying that he needs “willing and courageous people” to do it.

He also stressed the importance of frequenting the sacraments in the life of a Swiss Guard, saying that “Christ is the true king. He himself goes forward, and his friends follow him. A soldier of Christ participates in the life of his Lord.”

Swiss Guards are called to be companions of Christ and to learn how to “feel with Christ and the Church,” he said, and encouraged them to step-up their prayer life by reading scripture and praying the rosary.

“What I tell everyone, I’ll tell you too: always keep a small Gospel close at hand, read it as soon as you have a calm moment. It will help you in your personal prayer, especially the Rosary, during the honor guard,” he said.

Vatican Secretary of State Cardinal Pietro Parolin presided over a special Mass for the new guards in St. Peter’s Basilica just a few hours before their official May 6 swearing in.

In his homily, the cardinal reminded the guards that their task is not a mere job or profession, but a vocation they are called to live out in a time marked by “anxiety and lack of guidance” in which commitment and loyalty seem “to become secondary or particularly difficult to achieve.”

Cardinal Parolin recalled the death of the fallen guards during the Sack of Rome, noting that their heroic sacrifice constitutes the most “meaningful and emotional” moment of each guard, who on the battle’s anniversary vows to serve the Successor of Peter “with all of his strength.”

To have Mass before swearing their oaths serves as an act of thanksgiving and trust in the Lord, he said, “knowing that it’s God who enkindles in us the will and the work (because) in him every good work has it’s beginning and it’s end.”

During the swearing-in ceremony each, new guard approaches the flag off the Swiss Guard when his name is called out.

Firmly grasping the banner with his left hand, the new guard raises his right hand opens three fingers as a symbol of his faith in the Holy Trinity.

After making the gesture, the guard proclaims the oath, saying: “I, (name of the new guard), swear diligently and faithfully to abide by all that has just been read out to me, so grant me God and so help me his Saints.”

Patron saints of the Swiss Guard include St. Martin, St. Sebastian and St. Nicholas of Flue, known as the “Defensor Pacis et pater patriae.”

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By Fernando Reinares and Carola García-Calvo*

The latest arrests in Spain of individuals presumed to be involved in activities related to jihadist terrorism occurred in Catalonia on Wednesday 8 April. They were part of a cell of followers of the self-proclaimed Islamic State (IS) that aimed to perpetrate an attack in Catalonia. It was Catalonia also, or more specifically Barcelona, that saw in 1995 the first arrest in Spain of a member of one of the terrorist organisations linked to the jihadist phenomenon, the Algerian Islamic Armed Group (Groupe Islamique Armé, GIA), at that time closely linked to al-Qaeda.

Of the total number of individuals sentenced for jihadist-related terrorist criminal offences between 1996 and 2013, 33.3% were arrested in Catalonia –up to 28.6% in the province of Barcelona– and 30.6% were resident in that Autonomous Community –again, similarly, up to 23.5% in the province of Barcelona–. But these percentages are significantly higher when considering those sentenced who were arrested between 2004 and 2012, rising to respectively 37.5% and 35.7%. Thus, four out of every 10 individuals sentenced for jihadist terrorist activities in Spain during the period were located in Catalonia.

Catalonia was also where the Egyptian Mohamed Atta –the ringleader of the suicide terrorists responsible for the attacks of 11 September 2001 in New York and Washington– and the Yemenite Ramzi Binalshibh –who liaised between the September 11 cell and the al-Qaeda leadership– met two months before putting their plans into action in order to work out final details. Their meeting was held between the towns of Salou and Cambrils in the Catalonian province of Tarragona, very close to the home of another al-Qaeda member, an Algerian who was in touch with the most important members of the so-called Abu Dahdah cell that the terrorist organisation had established in Spain in 1994.

A jihadist cell linked to al-Qaeda was broken up as a result of the antiterrorist operation carried out in Catalonia in January 2003. Its members were in possession of mobile phones that were identical to those used a little more than a year later in the 11 March terrorist attacks in Madrid and had been altered in a similar way. Furthermore, those who had fled after 11-M to Iraq passed through Santa Coloma de Gramanet, a town in the province of Barcelona where members of the Moroccan Islamic Combattant Group (Groupe Islamique Combattant Marocain, GICM) were active. The latter were linked to facilitators of another jihadist organisation associated to al-Qaeda’s Iraqi branch, Ansar al-Islam (AI).

At the time, Catalonia had more than 100 Islamic places of worship, and that number has now doubled. In no less than a quarter of them the presence was detected of extremists related to jihadist organisations such as –in addition to those mentioned above– the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat(GSPC) as well as of numerous adepts of Hizb ut Tahir and of Tabligh Jamaat communities, which are non-violent fundamentalist entities but that, similarly to fundamentalist Salafism, promote beliefs that are incompatible with the democratic values of an open society. In Catalonia there are around 50 Salafist worship places, half of all those currently in existence in Spain.

Barcelona and not Madrid was the target for an 11-M-style repeat attack in January 2008. Ten Pakistani-born individuals, seven of them resident in Barcelona and one a naturalised Spanish citizen, in addition to an Indian national, were sentenced for being party to a planned, most likely suicide bomb attack, thwarted at an early stage of preparation, against the Barcelona metro. The plan had a direct link to Therik e Taliban Pakistan (TTP), one of the main associate organisations of al-Qaeda. Prominent senior members of the latter received funds from another jihadist cell broken up by the authorities in Catalonia in September 2004.

Since 2013, with the start in Spain of the antiterrorist operations aimed at dismantling networks connected to jihadist organisations based in Syria and Iraq, 35.3% of those suspected to be involved in them have been arrested in Catalonia, the Autonomous Community in which 39.5% of them were resident, and up to 31.8% and 36% of the total, respectively, in the province of Barcelona. These percentages are in line with the upward trend noted for the past decade that indicate that four out of every 10 individuals convicted for jihadist-related terrorist activities were linked to Catalonia, especially Barcelona and its metropolitan area.

Overall, Catalonia is over-represented in these figures, considering the number of immigrants from countries with Muslim majorities and their descendants in the Autonomous Community of Catalonia –mainly Moroccans and Pakistanis– since they account for no more than 26% of the total in Spain. The figures particularly over-represent the province of Barcelona that, although the home to the largest number of individuals of such an origin, accounts for only 16% of the Spanish total. Furthermore, in the Catalan case, radicalisation processes have begun to affect other segments of society, with a striking emergence of jihadist converts.

About the authors:
*Fernando Reinares is Senior Analyst for International Terrorism, Elcano Royal Institute | @F_Reinares

*Carola García-Calvo is analyst at the Global Terrorism Programme, Elcano Royal Institute | @carolagc13

Source:
This article was published by Elcano Royal Institute. Original version in Spanish: Cataluña y la evolución del terrorismo yihadista en España.

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Russia’s deals with Indonesia and Vietnam about railway construction reveal Moscow’s potential to meet the rising demand for land transportation in Southeast Asia. However, some technological factors put Russia in a less competitive position, especially at a time when Southeast Asia is going for high-speed trains.

By Wu Shang-Su*

Thanks to continued economic growth, most Southeast Asian states have to meet the increasing demand for land transportation, including railroad. Due to the door-to-door convenience, highway systems absorb most additional traffic generated by the economy. However, most ASEAN states’ railroad systems are struggling for modernisation and bear a relatively small portion of the load for land transportation. Electrification, central traffic control or other modern facilities for efficient railroad transportation are not popularly applied in Southeast Asian rail networks.

Nevertheless frequent traffic jams due to over-loaded highway systems and relatively low fuel efficiency of automobiles demonstrate the importance of railroad systems. With almost none or insignificant railroad industry extant in most ASEAN states, external sources of trains and railroad technology are crucial. So far, the major suppliers are China and Japan, while European countries, such as France and Germany, play a considerable role as well.

Enter Russia

Since the reorganisation of its railroad industry in 2003, Russia has become active in securing international contracts, not only in neighbouring countries, such as the Confederation of Independent States, but also in other states such as Libya. In Southeast Asia, Russian Railways (RZD), a state joint venture company, obtained a contract to build a 183 kilometre line mainly for transporting coal in Kalimantan in 2012 which was extended by another 60km in 2014. In April 2015, Moscow and Hanoi agreed to build a railway line in southern Vietnam as well as locally assembling Russian railcars and manufacturing rolling stocks.

Due to the economic sanctions imposed by Western countries and the falling price of oil, Moscow is searching for alternatives to the European market. Southeast Asia presents a great opportunity. Apart from energy, tourism and agriculture, the region’s increasing demand for infrastructure, including constructing or upgrading railroad systems, presents another potential-sector.

As a continental power, Moscow inherited a huge railroad industry which develops and produces a large variety of diesel and electric locomotives and trains as well as other rolling stocks. Such industrial capacity attracts investment from European companies such as French Alstom and German Siemens with eyes on the Russian domestic market and export as well. The recently weakened Russian rouble would be advantageous for export.

At a time when most Southeast Asian countries are looking to upgrade and extend their railroad systems while Russia with its rail industry wants to strengthen its trade, further deals may appear following Indonesia and Vietnam. Unlike Beijing and Tokyo, Moscow’s less geostrategic concerns in Southeast Asia may lower the political sensitivity for regional states, particularly those in Indochina which may be included into the Chinese “one belt, one road” framework. Moreover, relatively cheap prices of Russian locomotives and rolling stocks could be more attractive than their European and American rivals.

Actually, due to their low price, Chinese locomotives, electric trains and railcars have achieved a considerable portion of the rail market in Southeast Asia, and Russian rolling stock may follow the same approach. Although Russia chooses German and French trains rather than indigenous design for its high speed services in the 2000s, its development and practice of high-speed freight trains would be valuable for the regional states that concentrate on manufacture and trade.

Limitations and challenges

Moscow’s penetration of the Southeast Asian rail market will, however, be constrained by several factors. Firstly, most Russian trains are designed with a unique wide gauge track, 1.520 metre, which is much larger than the popular narrow gauge in ASEAN states, either 1 or 1.067 metre. Considering different sizes of train and axle weight, direct application of Russian railroad products would be unlikely and redevelopment for smaller versions would require additional costs with less certain quality. Although the Soviet Union supplied narrow gauged locomotives to Vietnam during the Cold War, to handle narrow gauge trains with new technology would be still a challenge.

Secondly, railroad projects are usually involved with large budgets so that financial support would be essential. Russia’s difficult financial conditions since the economic embargo and the falling price of oil would not leave much resources to support its railroad industry for export. The international funding facilities, either the US-led World Bank, Japan-led Asian Development Bank or China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, would be unlikely to cooperate with Russia due to the leading states’ political and economic concerns. Compared with Beijing’s loose conditions for funding, Moscow’s deal would be less attractive.

Finally, ASEAN states seem to still prefer passenger high-speed railroad systems. Although Russian indigenous passenger trains can reach 160km or even 200 km per hour, its lack of its own passenger high-speed railroad system or any achievement of reverse engineering may not perfectly match with the developmental goals of regional countries.

If Moscow is unable to overcome its problems of funding and lack of indigenous capability for high-speed passenger railroads, local lines similar to the deals in Vietnam and Indonesia would be the most they can do in the near future. Another marketing solution could be a large package deal including railroad and other major subjects, such as nuclear and arms sale.

In terms of the Southeast Asian rail market alone, Russia’s influence would be still limited in the near future, and the Sino-Japanese competition would remain the key play driven by the economic and political motives of China and Japan. However, railroads could still be as yet untapped policy and economic tool for Moscow.

*Wu Shang-su is a Research Fellow in the Military Studies Programme of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.

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Journalists from Germany’s biggest television networks were reportedly detained, questioned and not allowed to leave Qatar for days while working on a story about FIFA President Sepp Blatter and Doha’s vexed nomination for the 2022 football World Cup.

Reporter from ARD German TV Florian Bauer tweeted that all of his, as well as colleagues’, materials for ARD and WDR networks have been erased and equipment destroyed. He and his colleagues were interrogated by the police as well as secret service, Bauer claimed, and were forced to stay in the country for days.

Bauer, a long-time critic of the longtime FIFA president, has been working on a documentary titled ‘The Selling of Football: Sepp Blatter and the Power of FIFA,’ which was scheduled to air on Monday in Germany. Reporters employed by two German channels were shooting parts of the documentary when they were arrested.

“[We were] arrested during a shooting with workers in the Qatari capital, Doha, then interrogated by the State Security … and only released after 14 hours. The WDR employees were not allowed to leave Qatar for five days. The camera equipment, laptops and personal mobile phones were confiscated and … returned only with a four-week delay. All data has been deleted and damaged pieces of equipment,” WDR’s team wrote.

Based on the description of the documentary, the journalists managed to gain access to the bank of documents which incriminated key figures and could have potentially triggered their arrests. Both Qatar and FIFA have faced heavy criticism from human rights activists since the Gulf state was selected to host 2022 World Cup. Last year AFP reported that at least 237 Indian migrants lost their lives in Qatar in 2012 and another 218 in 2013.

Some 400 Nepalese workers are believed to have died at building sites since construction for the World Cup 2022 got underway in 2010, according to the Guardian.
These issues have raised serious eyebrows, with many rights campaigners speaking out against FIFA’s choice of Qatar as a host country. Activists have denounced the labor conditions in Qatar, labeling them a form of servitude and demanding immediate overhaul.

Qatar currently employs the Kafala system to oversee its domestic migrant workforce. This requires that foreign workers be sponsored by an employer who’s responsible for their visa and legal status. There have been several reports that the system is being manipulated by employers, who are denying migrants’ wages and refusing to grant them an exit visa.

On top of the labor criticism, Qatar has been accused of paying $5 million in bribes to win the World Cup bid. Senior football officials in Africa reportedly received the funds in return for making sure Qatar won the hosting position, according to Sunday Times revelations.

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Western governments must develop a long-term deradicalization strategy to stem the flow of Muslim volunteers with the objective of substantially reducing the threat they pose upon their return to their respective countries.

By Dr. Alon Ben-Meir*

One of the most troubling developments resulting from the escalation of violent extremism in the Middle East is the rise in the number of Muslims from the West who are joining the ranks of jihadist groups, notably ISIS. Western governments are struggling to find out what motivates young Muslims to leave their sheltered lives—many are well-to-do and educated—only to join radical organizations that offer an elusive goal and the prospect of violent death.

It appears that the determining factor behind this phenomenon is the absence of integration, by choice or design, of young Muslims into the mainstream of their respective Western countries. For this reason, integration must be the engine that propels deradicalization, and of necessity it takes a whole range of socio-economic, religious, and political measures to mitigate the vulnerabilities in these areas that young Muslims experience.

The rise of violent extremism is only at the early stages, and if the West wants to stem the flow of volunteers to these ruthless groups, Western countries should make a concerted effort to engage and understand the nuances of their Muslim communities, especially the families from which these volunteers are coming.

Unlike assimilation, where an individual stands to lose his identity by absorption into the mainstream culture, integration involves a mutual recognition and respect of the other—a harmonization that includes difference rather than denies it.

Lewis Mumford put it best when he stated that: “Integration proceeds by… a deliberate heightening of every organic function; a release of impulses from circumstances that irrationally thwarted them; richer and more complex patterns of activity; an esthetic heightening of anticipated realizations; a steady lengthening of the future; a faith in cosmic perspectives.”

The psychological dimension of violent extremism needs to be understood as there is no one single root cause or path that leads to the mental and emotional conditioning that transforms young Muslims from being ordinary peaceful individuals to violently radical.

The threat emanating today from ISIS, al-Qaeda, and other Islamist groups is inspired by religious teachings, distorted under the guise of defending purist Sunni Islam, which ultimately aim to infect susceptible Muslim youths to whom religion provides an escape and a sense of belonging.

Violent extremists wage a war on Western cultural and religious precepts and wish to see their acts fused into the identity of their own Muslim community so they can be recognized as being representative of the larger community, especially by the media.

Many of the young men and women who live in Western countries feel increasingly marginalized economically, socially, and politically, and are particularly vulnerable as they are often in transitional stages in their lives, whether as immigrants, students in search of friends, job seekers, etc.

On the whole, they are in need of an outlet to vent their frustration, and consequently, they become easy prey for extremists seeking new recruits in mosques and online.

There is, however, a common denominator behind most of the causes that radicalize Muslim youth, which is the lack of integration into their new social milieu, caused by:

Disinterest in being integrated, as many young Muslims are living in a bubble where they feel comfortable and secure and are not encouraged to step out beyond their immediate circle of peers and family. This is further compounded in situations where extremism runs deep in a particular family, or where they have certain gripes against the socio-political milieu in which they live;No deliberate effort by governments to integrate Muslim youth into general society, a condition further aggravated by entrenched prejudices in most West European societies, such as Britain and France. Citizens of foreign descent in these states are often identified and remain as ‘foreigners,’ regardless of how long they have been living in their adopted countries, even if they are second or third generation citizens;The growing pervasiveness of Islamophobia among Europeans, precipitated by the rise of violent extremists of all colorations and the seemingly endless bloodshed between Muslim communities and against Westerners, which has produced a conscious and unconscious repudiation of anything related to Muslims in general;A deeper, growing sense of alienation, which is the antithesis to inclusiveness, leading young Muslims in particular to find ways to resist and defy rather than seek new opportunities to integrate and become loyal nationals of their adopted countries.  Interestingly enough, the number of young American Muslims joining violent extremist groups remains proportionately considerably less than the number of British and French Muslims joining ISIS.

This perhaps can be explained by the fact that the US is essentially a country of immigrants, and having foreign roots is part of American culture. Therefore, the incorporation of foreigners into the main social stream, with some exception, is left up to the individual and is generally constrained only by the person’s qualifications and ambitions.

West European Muslims in particular seek to maintain their identity and can do so through integration, where their identity as a Muslim is not lost, rather than assimilation.

If West European countries are to subscribe to Mumford’s notion of integration, they must develop a comprehensive strategy that would prevent young disenfranchised Muslims from being lured to join the ranks of violent extremists.

Before they can develop such a strategy, they must avoid generalizations (for example, that Islam is inherently violent), understand why young Muslims and converts are joining, and why many of them come back. Only then should governments take specific steps to ensure that those who joined and return are deradicalized and become useful citizens who can dissuade others from following their path.

There are no quick fixes for this alarming development, and no amount of law enforcement and coercion will halt the flow of volunteers of West European Muslims to join the ranks of violent extremists other than inclusion.

To successfully counter violent extremism, West European countries, together with Muslim leaders and educators in their respective communities, must investigate who is embracing radical views through field studies, raise awareness, and analyze the real root causes in different Muslim communities, which was and still is missing.

This approach would enable them to present credible counter-arguments with candid, transparent, and open-ended dialogue that could change the socio-economic and political dynamics to create a new atmosphere that would single out young Muslims in a positive light. To that end, West European governments must:

Adopt a new public narrative by using a strategic way to communicate utilizing every conceivable media outlet to counter extremists with facts, avoid moral preaching, and address the perception of Western nations assailing Muslims, which leads the young to seek justice through violence;

Develop community service programs to introduce young Muslims to the larger community of their Western peers and begin a process of integration in which they develop personal interests to fill the social, economic, and political emptiness they feel;

Invite credible and respected voices from the Muslim world to discredit the messages of the extremists—that there is no path to glory in death, that joining such violent groups only reinforces the vicious cycle of death and destruction, and that there is no martyrdom in their senseless self-sacrifices;

Encourage young Muslims to join sport activities and provide opportunities to show off their talent and ability to excel, while supporting those who seek to establish their social identity and be recognized;

Prevent prisons from becoming incubators for new terrorists by rehabilitating prisoners through community programs, schooling, professional enhancements, and assigning of responsibility within the prison’s setting; nearly 80 percent of prisoners who went through such rigorous programs in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Yemen ended up being completely rehabilitated and became role models for other prisoners to emulate;

Foster the desire of young Muslims to participate in local political discussion groups, be involved in the decision-making process from the bottom up, and be part of any positive changes to advance the interests of their communities and enhance their self-esteem;

Develop international exchange programs to expose young Muslims to what is happening in other communities, areas of social and economic progress, and new innovations and ideas that can be duplicated to benefit their own families and communities;

Finally, all of these programs require a commitment for long-term funding. No country directly or indirectly affected by violent extremism can afford to be long on talking and short on funding. They must provide the financial and human resources to meet this unprecedented challenge, regardless of how costly and how long it might take.

Given that the violent turmoil sweeping the Middle East—especially the Sunni-Shia conflict and the civil wars in Syria, Yemen, and Libya—is unlikely to settle any time soon, a growing number of young Muslims will join the ranks of extremists posing an ever-greater national security menace for Western countries.

For this reason, we must distinguish between what’s possible and what’s impossible to achieve, and what might become more probable if circumstances change.

Western governments must develop a long-term deradicalization strategy to stem the flow of Muslim volunteers with the objective of substantially reducing the threat they pose upon their return to their respective countries. There is no shortcut and no other means by which to deradicalize young Muslims other than by taking the measures outlined above, and approaches tailored to specific communities.

Failure is not an option as the consequences will be extraordinarily dire. A state of constant alarm, emergencies, and terrorism will become a way of life, haunting Western democracies and violently destabilizing the Middle East for decades to come.

*Dr. Alon Ben-Meir is a professor of international relations at the Center for Global Affairs at NYU. He teaches courses on international negotiation and Middle Eastern studies.

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China has recently unveiled its intention to deploy floating islands in the South China Sea. If executed, this will be a new tool to assert its sovereignty claim in the disputed waters.

By Nguyen Hong Thao*

In response to regional concerns over the large scale and pace of its conversion of coral reefs into military outposts in the South China Sea, China is contemplating an even more audacious move – floating islands in the Spratly Islands.

A recent report in the award-winning US magazine Popular Science says the floating islands have been designed and constructed by two Chinese companies — Jidong Development Group (JDG) and Hainan Industrial Company, as announced by JDG at an April press conference. According to the magazine, the first floating island will be based as a deep sea support project in the South China Sea.
Civilian and military use

The floating islands can support both civilian and military missions, will have a full displacement of 400,000 to 1.5 million tonnes, and can move at a speed of 16 km/h or 9 nautical miles per hour. These floating islands are capable of carrying many marine battalions and a squadron of fighter aircrafts. China, no doubt, will have a new tool to pursue its nine-dash line territorial claim over almost the entire South China Sea. Significantly, at the press conference, guests included a PLA officer, suggesting the Chinese military’s interest in the dual use in JDG’s technology.

The idea of floating islands has been historically rooted in World War II. In fact, there are many artificial constructions in the sea, which are used for civilian purposes and specialised scientific research such as Shell Australia’s Prelude. But this is perhaps the first time that the new Chinese-designed mobile floating islands have amphibious functions and can also be used for large scale defence purposes.

The implications can be far-reaching in the context of the South China Sea which is grappling with competing maritime claims. What is the legal status of such floating islands? Are mobile man-made islands considered artificial islands? If they are artificial structures, under Article 60 of the United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), they shall be given a safety zone of 500 metres around them. If they are ships/vessels, they enjoy under UNCLOS the right of innocent passage through the territorial seas of 12 nautical miles of coastal states.

If those ships belong to the armed forces, they may be entitled to immunity when operating wherever at sea under another international maritime convention for the prevention of pollution known as MARPOL. Indeed “floating islands” may fall within the meaning of “ship” – a vessel of any type whatsoever operating in the marine environment and includes hydrofoil boats, air-cushion vehicles, submersibles, floating crafts and fixed or floating platforms.” International law has not yet had provisions appropriately adjusting for the development of new technologies.

Advantages of floating islands

In its claim for sovereignty over parts of the South China Sea, China has thus far deployed aircraft carriers and mobile oil rigs as well as artificial islands built up from coral reefs. Beijing should perhaps clarify its intentions behind the construction of the mobile islands, which possess at least five advantages:

Firstly, they have high mobility. With a speed of 9 nm/h, these islands could be considered as ships which travel at less average speed, but more flexible than drilling platforms. In theory, unlike aircraft carriers and drilling platforms, they also do not require strong escorts which are rather costly. They are superior to artificial islands which are fixed in one place. The floating islands could also change their positions; and therefore, could deploy deterrent systems from many different directions, expanding the ability to control the sea and the sky. They are well-placed to support the establishment of an Air Defence Identification Zones (ADIZ) should one be built in the area.

Secondly, they have high accessibility. Aircraft carriers and drilling platforms are symbols of threats to security and natural resources while floating islands enjoying the rights of civilian vessels. These could easily approach the coast of the countries bordering the South China Sea (East Sea) and enter the 12-nautical mile territorial seas, thus directly threatening the security of the coastal states yet these countries could not easily prohibit and prevent. It is no different from the activity to extend the cow’s tongue (China’s nine- dash line claim) to the coastlines of Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei.

Thirdly, they have an excellent safety profile. The design of floating islands is modular, which would also make them difficult to sink; in contrast the artificial islands cannot easily avoid being destroyed, for instance, by a ship-to-surface missile. The construction of a mobile island costs less than aircraft carriers and drilling platforms.

Fourthly, they have high adaptability. The floating islands could self-supply. They have the ability to transport and supply fuels, water, necessities and not depend on the sources of supply unlike artificial islands. This helps increase the operating time and space in the sea.

Fifthly, they have high versatility. They can serve both civilian and military purposes, and become construction equipment or vessels at sea. They clearly will be able to take advantage of whatever loopholes there are in the international law of the sea. Other countries will find it difficult to oppose or apply appropriate measures to prevent the operation of such islands or vessels.

Time for a special maritime law meeting

The international law of the sea is effective only when there is a strong international consensus. Land reclamation and the construction of floating islands in the South China Sea are contrary to Article 5 of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties (DOC) in the South China Sea signed between ASEAN and China in 2002. They cause serious concern for not only countries bordering the South China Sea but also threaten the peace, stability, freedom of navigation and overflight as well as the environment in the South China Sea.

It is high time for the leaders of the regional states to hold a joint meeting on the South China Sea issue, and a maritime law conference on the South China Sea. UNCLOS is an important document for sea management but there are still many points to be elucidated. Scientific and technical developments have rendered many things changed and different from the provisions made 33 years ago.

The problem now is no longer one of sovereignty dispute only between countries. The international community is facing a common concern: the marine environment and the freedoms of navigation and aviation in the South China Sea are under threat.

*Nguyen Hong Thao is an Assistant to Professor in Law at the National University of Hanoi, Vietnam and also serves at the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam. He contributed this specially to RSIS Commentary.

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(RFE/RL) — A senior European sports official has defended plans to hold the first-ever European Games in Baku next month amid what rights groups say is a growing crackdown on the media and civil society by Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev’s government.

Speaking at the European Parliament in Brussels on May 6, European Olympic Committees (EOC) Vice-President Janez Kocijancic indicated that the organization will not act on the basis of political concerns, saying the EOC “cannot accept political engagements.”

Rights defenders have questioned plans to hold the inaugural European Games on June 12-28 in Azerbaijan, where several journalists, activists, and government critics jailed in the past year are widely considered to be political prisoners targeted in a campaign to silence dissent.

The long-ruling Aliyev is “forging ahead with the most devastating clampdown on human rights in 24 years of post-Soviet independence,” said Minky Worden, director of global initiatives at the New York-based Human Rights Watch, at the same panel in the European Parliament.

“He has arrested many of the Azerbaijani human rights advocates and journalists who could have brought scrutiny and transparency to the conduct of these games if they were not in jail,” Worden said.

Rasul Cafarov, an activist who was arrested in August after announcing plans for a campaign to draw attention to the rights situation ahead of the European Games, was sentenced to six and a half years in prison last month after a trial on financial crimes charges he says were politically motivated.

Worden said that the EOC, which groups 49 national Olympic Committees in the region, “has the power and the leverage to tell Baku to release prisoners and to stop threatening journalists before the games begin.”

Kocijancic said that the organization expects that it will help “democratize every society where we will go” and use “whatever influence we have to make this society better and more open,” but that EOC cannot accept responsibility for changing political matters as this is not within the scope of its activity.

He noted that Azerbaijan chaired the Council of Europe for six months last year, and said that the oil-producing Caspian Sea coast nation has increased trade with the European Union “tremendously.”

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Debris from the US Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) F13 satellite, which recently exploded in orbit, could pose a threat to other spacecraft and missions according to new research from the University of Southampton.

On 3 February 2015, the DMSP F13 satellite exploded in orbit producing over an estimated 100 pieces of space debris that were detected using radar. In assessing how debris created by the explosion might affect their spacecraft, the European Space Agency and other satellite operators concluded that it would pose little risk to their missions.

However, scientists from the Astronautics Research Group at the University of Southampton investigated the risks to a wide range of space missions, coming from smaller pieces of debris created by the explosion that cannot be detected using radar based on the ground.

In the case of the explosion of DMSP-F13, they detected 100 new catalogued objects, which suggest that more than 50,000 small fragments larger than 1mm were created.

PhD student Francesca Letizia, who led the research under the supervision of Dr Camilla Colombo and Dr Hugh Lewis, said,  “The fragments from the explosion spread around the Earth forming a band, which can be crossed by spacecraft with orbits that are quite different from the one of DMSP-F13.”

The Southampton team developed a new technique called CiELO (debris Cloud Evolution in Low Orbits) to assess the collision risk to space missions from small-sized debris. They produced a collision probability map showing a peak in the risk at altitudes just below the location of the DMSP-F13 explosion. The map was created by treating the debris cloud produced by the explosion as a fluid, whose density changes under the effect of atmospheric drag.

Dr Colombo, who proposed this idea as a part of a Marie Curie project in the European 7th Framework Programme, said, “Treating the fragment band as a fluid allows us to analyse the motion of a large number of fragments very quickly, and much faster than conventional methods. In this way, the presence of small fragments can be easily taken into account to obtain a refined estimation of the collision probability due to an explosion or a collision in space.”

Francesca, who was awarded the 2013 Amelia Earhart Fellowship for this work, added, “This map can be used with a database of spacecraft or space debris objects to identify the targets that are most exposed. For example, in the map we show the top ten spacecraft at risk from the fragments generated by the explosion of DMSP-F13 according to our model. They are mainly US and Russian satellites in sun-synchronous or polar orbits.”

The aim of the team’s research is to gain a deeper insight into the dynamics of small debris fragments and their contribution to collision risk in the Earth orbital environment.

Dr Lewis, who represents the UK Space Agency on the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC), said that it is important to understand this contribution: “Even though many of these objects will be no bigger than the ball in a ballpoint pen, they can disable a spacecraft in a collision because of their enormous speed. In the case of the DMSP-F13 explosion, our work has shown that the introduction of a new cloud of small-sized debris into orbit will have increased the risks for other spacecraft in the vicinity, even if the risk from the larger fragments has been discounted.”

The research is published in the Journal of Guidance, Control, and Dynamics.

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