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India-Sri Lanka: Deepening Crisis In Palk Bay – Analysis

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By Prof. V. Suryanarayan*

Storm clouds are gathering over Palk Bay region, which divides Tamil Nadu from the northern parts of Sri Lanka, threatening the livelihood of thousands of Tamil fishermen on both sides.

It is unfortunate because the Sirisena-Ranil administration is very keen to develop and foster friendly relations with New Delhi. Unlike Mahinda Rajapaksa who was getting closer to Beijing and Islamabad to “cut India to size” the present government is committed to remove the distortions in foreign policy, come out of international isolation and bring about ethnic reconciliation.

The latest phase in the long standing dispute began when Prime Minister Ranil Wikramasinghe, in the course of an interview with Tamil TV channel, Thanti TV, declared that he had ordered the Sri Lankan Navy to resort to firing if Tamil Nadu fishermen continued to poach into Sri Lankan side of the Palk Bay. Ranil’s statement was justified by DM Swaminathan, Minister for Resettlement. In an informal chat with journalists in Chennai, Swaminathan remarked that “any country can fire at infiltrators”. Compounding the complex situation is the bill introduced recently in Parliament by Sumanthiran, the leader of the Tamil National Alliance (TNA), asking the government to confiscate all trawlers poaching into Sri Lankan waters. The reaction on the Indian side was equally unfortunate. Political parties in Tamil Nadu naturally opposed the Sri Lankan statements. What is more, before proceeding to New Delhi to meet Smt. Sushma Swaraj, Minister for External Affairs, sections of Indian fishermen demanded that the Government of India should ensure their “unrestricted entry” into Sri Lankan waters.

Due to unrestricted and extensive trawling there is no fish on the Indian side of the Palk Bay. Therefore the Indian fishermen go deep into Sri Lankan waters, which is relatively rich in marine endowments. The long years of ethnic conflict, when fishing was banned by the Sri Lankan government, was God send for Indian fishermen. During this period, there was indiscriminate firing by the Sri Lankan Navy, who could not distinguish between a fisherman and a Tiger guerrilla leading to loss of lives, serious injuries, destruction of fishing boats and loss of fish worth crores of rupees. When the war ended and the Sri Lankan Tamil fishermen wanted to resume fishing they found the presence of Indian trawlers to be a major impediment to their livelihood. But nobody cared for them, including the leaders of the Tamil National Alliance (TNA). The statements of Ranil and Swaminathan are an illustration of Sri Lankan “brinkmanship” to compel New Delhi to arrive at an amicable solution to the problem.

New Delhi’s policy on the issue so far can be characterized as a “fire fighting exercise”. When there is a fire, extinguish the fire. Thus the Ministry of External Affairs became very active when Indian fishermen were detained by the Sri Lankan Navy and their boats confiscated. New Delhi used its good offices and the fishermen and the boats were released. The very next day Indian fishermen once again entered into Sri Lankan waters. What is required is not a fire fighting exercise, but a determination to remove the causes of fire once and for all. This can be done only when the two governments address the problems relating to livelihood of thousands of not only Indian fishermen, but also Sri Lankan Tamil fishermen

The one sided approach of Indian fishermen was evident in the meeting they had with the BJP leadership in New Delhi last week. The meeting was arranged by Honourable Minister Pon Radhakrishnan where the fishermen expressed their problems freely and frankly. I had the opportunity to attend the meeting. The fishermen stated that the sea and the sea coast belong to them and their interests should be safeguarded by the Government of India. Unfortunately not even one of them referred to the livelihood issues of the Sri Lankan Tamil fishermen. In my intervention I submitted that the Palk Bay belongs to both Indian Tamil fishermen and Sri Lankan Tamil fishermen and an amicable solution can be found only when we focus on the livelihood issues of Sri Lankan Tamil fishermen also.

Fishermen throughout the world are no respecters of maritime boundaries. Just as Tamil Nadu fishermen enter into Sri Lankan waters, Sri Lankan fishermen every day enter into Maldivian and Indian waters. According to YS Yadava, a leading specialist on fisheries, Sri Lankan fishermen are more adept and active than Indian fishermen. The deep sea fishing vessels of Sri Lanka regularly poach into Maldives, India and Bangladesh.

The statements made by Ranil and Swaminathan, it must be pointed out, are violations of the UN Law of the Sea. Crossing the international maritime boundary and fishing in another country’s waters is a civilian economic offence. Article 145 of the UN Law of the Sea stipulates, “Measures will be taken to ensure effective protection of the human life”. Article 73 mentions that a coastal state can take measures “including boarding, inspection, arrest and judicial proceedings to ensure compliance with the laws and regulations”. Shooting and killing of fishermen violate all canons of natural justice. In this connection it must be pointed out that the Indian Coast Guard regularly detains foreign fishermen who enter into Indian waters, but there had been no occasion when fishermen have been shot. They are tried according to the law of the land.

The Sri Lankan Tamil Fishermen are the worst victims of prolonged ethnic conflict. In the pre-1983 period, the Northern Province accounted for 38 per cent of the total fish production of Sri Lanka. When the conflict began their personal security and livelihood were adversely affected. They had to come to India as refugees not once, but three times. The National Fisheries Solidarity in a report stated that 1, 50,000 fishermen of the north and the east lost their principal source of income. Fishing harbours were converted into high security zones. 90 per cent of their fishing nets, gears and engines were rendered unusable. Equally important, while in recent years the southern part of the island has made rapid strides in deep sea fishing, the Tamil fishermen still remain backward.

A solution can be found only when Indian fishermen accept the reality that the Palk Bay belongs to both Indian Tamil and Sri Lankan Tamil fishermen. Depriving the livelihood of Sri Lankan Tamil fishermen is an unpardonable crime. Where is Tamil solidarity, which the Tamil politicians shout from house tops every day?

The ball is in New Delhi’s court. In the meeting with fishermen last week Smt. Sushma Swaraj asked the Indian fishermen not to cross the international maritime boundary line. In order to dissuade Indian fishermen from getting into Sri Lankan waters, New Delhi should announce immediately that the trawlers will be withdrawn from the Palk Bay region within six months. Fortunately the number of trawlers has been coming down, because the trawler owners are realizing that it no longer profitable to use trawlers. In my conversation with fishermen they told me that they are not opposed to withdrawal of trawlers. What is more, these trawlers, with certain modifications, can be used in the deep sea as subsidiary boats attached to a big mother ship. And as a stop gap arrangement, livelihood allowance could be paid to the fishermen until they get trained in deep sea fishing.

Fishermen and the sea are inseparable. But at the same time the fishermen do not have such an attachment to the land. Majority of fishermen in Rameshwaram have come from villages in the Gulf of Mannar. Since the Palk Bay is self-enclosed, the fishing harbours for deep sea fishing have to be located in the Gulf of Mannar, Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean. With incentives and persuasion on the part of Central and State Governments fishermen can relocate themselves to new fishing harbours. It should be pointed out that deep sea fishing is also one of the main objectives of central and state government.

The success of diplomacy consists in converting a crisis into an opportunity. With trawlers out of the scene the Palk Bay region will become a tranquil area. A Palk Bay authority should be constituted, consisting of representatives of both countries, to manage, modernize and enrich fishing. The Palk Bay authority can determine what is the ideal sustainable catch, what type of fishing equipments can be used, how many days can Indian and Sri Lankan fishermen fish and how to enrich the sea. From being a contested territory the Palk Bay will become common heritage, which it was for several centuries. Such an imaginative step will also give a fillip to bilateral and regional co-operation in South Asia.

*Dr. V. Suryanarayan is Nelson Mandela Professor for Afro-Asian Studies in Mahatma Gandhi University, Kottayam. His e mail id: suryageeth@gmail.com

The post India-Sri Lanka: Deepening Crisis In Palk Bay – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.


ETA Member Hilario Urbizu San Román Arrested In Mexico

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In collaboration with the Spanish Guardia Civil, officers from the Federal Police Force of Mexico arrested ETA member Hilario Urbizu San Román in Aguascalientes (Mexico) on Thursday under an International Arrest Warrant (IAW) issued by Central Criminal Investigation Court Nº1 of the Spanish National High Court through diplomatic channels.

According to the Spanish government, the arrest of Urbizu San Román stems from the excellent cooperation that exists between the Mexican and Spanish authorities during an operation carried out by the Spanish Guardia Civil, the Federal Police Force of Mexico and the Mexican Attorney General’s Office (Spanish acronym: PGR) as part of the joint strategy in the fight against terrorism.

The Spanish government didn’t provide any further details.

The post ETA Member Hilario Urbizu San Román Arrested In Mexico appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Spain And Senegal Step Up Fight Against Illegal Immigration

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Spain’s Minister for Home Affairs, Jorge Fernández Díaz, met on Wednesday in Madrid with the Home Affairs Minister of Senegal, Abdoulaye Daouda Diallo, whom he thanked for Senegal’s “ongoing commitment” to Spain.

Fernández Díaz said that the collaboration between the two countries on security issues “can be described as exemplary”, and is “particularly intense and fruitful in relation to cooperation in the fight against illegal immigration”. This can be seen in the fact that no vessel embarking from Senegal has reached the Canary Islands in the last five years, the Spanish Ministry for Home Affairs said.

According to Spanish Ministry for Home Affairs, Fernández Díaz reminded his Senegalese counterpart that Spain firmly believes that the best formula for tackling illegal immigration and the mafias that profit from this activity is to step up the comprehensive approach to cooperation on security issues focused on prevention at origin and on working with countries which, like Senegal, have become “our priority and strategic partners”.

In this regard, Fernández Díaz pointed out that this “comprehensive response” must result in strengthening diplomatic relations with countries of origin and transit, and this must translate into an increase in logistics, human and economic resources in terms of development cooperation. This requires stepping up intelligence and personnel resources from law enforcement and security agencies and reaching agreement on joint patrols by sending own resources and personnel, together with ensuring the involvement of the European Union and FRONTEX.

“Spain and Senegal are aware that this integrated raft of responses constitutes a model that works”, underlined the Spanish Home Affairs Minister.

Fernández Díaz also highlighted that this is the message that Spain is constantly reiterating to the Member States of the European Union, citing the model of collaboration that currently exists between Senegal and Spain, “which is admired by the rest of the EU countries”. He also recalled the Spanish and Senegalese participation in various important European Union projects such as Operation HERA launched by FRONTEX, the Seahorse Project on the exchange of information and the West Sahel Project.

According to the Spanish Ministry for Home Affairs, Fernández Díaz pointed out that “all these major initiatives will enjoy continuity through the proposal made by Spain at the latest meeting of the Rabat Process – the so-called Blue Sahel Project”, which seeks not only to combat illegal immigration but also to fight “other latent threats in the region, such as terrorism and drug trafficking”.

On this issue, Fernández Díaz conveyed the need to “make further progress in terms of collaboration and commitment” to his Senegalese counterpart, through boosting and stepping up other areas of bilateral cooperation, specifically in such areas as fighting terrorism, drug trafficking, cyber-crime and laundering profits from criminal activities.

At the end of the meeting, held at the headquarters for the Ministry of Home Affairs, the Ministers for Home Affairs of Spain and Senegal traveled to the Directorate General of the Guardia Civil, where Jorge Fernández Díaz bestowed the Great Cross for Civil Merit on his Senegalese counterpart. “The strength of our valuable cooperation ties can be seen through this public recognition in appreciation of your committed and loyal collaboration”, said the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs to Abdoulaye Daouda Diallo.

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Sri Lanka: Sirisena Meets With Former President Rajapaksa

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Sri Lanka’s President Maithripala Sirisena met on Wednesday with former President Mahinda Rajapaksa at the President’s Office in the parliamentary complex.

During the discussion, President Maithripala Sirisena told former President Mahinda Rajapaksa in no uncertain terms that the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) would not nominate a Prime Ministerial candidate before the next Parliamentary Election.

At the discussion held between the two warring factions within the SLFP, President Sirisena explained the “disadvantages” of naming a Prime Ministerial candidate before the election. The President made his position clear when former President Rajapaksa’s group said the SLFP should name its Prime Ministerial candidate in the party’s run-up to the election. “When the name of the Prime Ministerial candidate is announced, it can be counter-productive to the party’s election campaign”, the President said.

Sri Lanka's Mahinda Rajapaksa

Sri Lanka’s Mahinda Rajapaksa, File photo.

On the other hand, it is important to draw the support of minority voters into the party at the next election. Minority votes drifted away from the SLFP at the last presidential election and we should restore their faith in the party. So, it is disadvantageous for the Sri Lanka Freedom Party to name its Prime Ministerial candidate before the election,” President Sirisena explained.

The discussion between the two factions of the SLFP focused on five major issues including the party’s stance on the PM candidate. In addition to that, the dissolution of local government bodies, the future of the United People’s Freedom Alliance, ongoing investigations into bribery and corruption allegations and giving nominations to MPs supporting former President Rajapaksa were raised by the pro-Rajapaksa group during the meeting.

Commenting on the dissolution of local government bodies, President Sirisena said their term had already come to an end. “The term of the local government bodies was extended in March by one and a half months following a request made by members of the UPFA. The extended term will also come to an end on May 15 and it is not a personal decision made by anyone,” the delegation supporting President Maithripala Sirisena explained.

When the pro-Rajapaksa group asked about the future of the United People Freedom Alliance (UPFA), President Sirisena’s delegation raised their concerns about the conduct of some political parties who claim to be partners of the UPFA.

“The UPFA is comprised of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party, the Mahajana Eksath Peramuna and a few other leftist parties. Wimal Weerawansa’s National Freedom Front and Udaya Gammanpila’s ‘Pivithuru Hela Urumaya’ are not even members of the UPFA. They only contest elections under the UPFA ticket and that does not make them partners of the UPFA. So we have concerns about certain statements they have made over the decisions of the UPFA,” President Sirisena’s delegation stated.

At this point, President Sirisena said the SLFP should remain as one unit and there cannot be various factions operating on their own. “If there is a public meeting, it should be an SLFP meeting. If there is a media statement, it should be a SLFP media statement,” President Sirisena asserted.

Former President Rajapaksa then raised his concerns over the investigations carried out by the Bribery Commission and the Police Financial Crimes Investigations Divisions (FCID). In response, President Sirisena said any person can seek refuge in the country’s judiciary in the face of injustices.

The former President asked whether the MPs supporting him would get nomination to contest the next election under the SLFP or UPFA ticket. However, no assurance was given by the President’s group with regard to the matter. “We did not have time to discuss that matter at length. Probably we will discuss that on another day,” a member of President Sirisena’s delegation told the Daily News last evening. He also added that the SLFP Central Committee will be briefed on progress of the discussions.

The post Sri Lanka: Sirisena Meets With Former President Rajapaksa appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Papua Region Under Jokowi: New President, New Strategies – Analysis

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President Joko Widodo has proclaimed his commitment to bolster Indonesia’s regional policy in Papua (formerly known as Irian Jaya). The policy will combine the welfare approach with an intensified security apparatus in the ‘black pearl’.

By Emirza Adi Syailendra*

President Joko Widodo (Jokowi) has affirmed that special attention would be given to the Papua region comprising the two provinces of Papua and West Papua. The region has endured a low-level guerrilla insurgency from a militant Papuan independence movement since 1969. Under the nationalist doctrine of Trisakti, the new policy will focus on bolstering capacities to bring about greater security to the conflict-prone and outermost areas such as Papua.

The two provinces had significantly contributed to Jokowi’s victory in the 2014 presidential election.Owing to the trust that Papuans have for him, Jokowi has scheduled three visits a year to that region. His visits are seen as symbolic to win the hearts of the Papuans. The scheduled visit on 1 May 2015 coincided with the day of Papua’s integration with Indonesia; which some Papuans view derisively as annexation day. The trip was postponed reportedly due to strong resistance from one of the armed criminal groups which had threatened to spread chaos if the president proceeded with the visit to Papua.

Strategic value of Papua

Jokowi is aware that Papua is of strategic importance to Indonesia and it cannot afford to lose Papua like it did Timor-Leste in 1999. Papua is one of the richest regions in natural resources. Its forests are the largest in Indonesia accounting for more than 32 million hectares, while as much as 45 percent of national copper reserves are located in Papua. It has also huge strategic value for Indonesia’s defence, being perceived as a buffer against foreign intrusion by countries such as Australia and the United States that have raised their presence in the Southwest Pacific, and potential intrusion from the north such as illegal fishing boats coming from the Philippines.

Security-wise, threats posed by armed criminals referred to by the authorities as Armed Criminal Groups (KKB) are growing. According to data from the regional police of Papua, from 2009 to 2014, there have been 166 cases of violence involving the criminal groups. One of the common threats toward the economy are the fundraising activities by the KKB to extort special autonomy funds that are distributed to the local government, especially in the mountain areas such as Puncak Jaya, Paniai, and Ilaga.

The threat from separatists referred to as Political Criminal Groups (KKP) is equally, if not more, worrying. The authorities have forbidden the use of the separatists’ insignia, but in the democratic setting of Indonesia it is increasingly difficult to curb the political movement. Press releases and religiously-related activities are the common methods of domestic activists with the main goal to converge perceptions toward independence. Such efforts have been done along with international lobbies to internationalise the conflict.

Sticks and carrots

The Jokowi administration has sought to combine two strategies: building welfare and building a military presence. In terms of improving welfare, Jokowi has plans to establish three Ocean Toll Roads in Sorong, Jayapura, and Marauke. Sorong has been selected as the first location for a deep sea port facility as the gateway to Papua and is expected to reduce the cost of developing infrastructure in the region. Jokowi’s other project is to build Special Economic Zones (SEZ) in Indonesia including in Papua. Two SEZs will be initiated in Merauke and Sorong, as well as the industrial region at Teluk Bintuni and a tourism region at Raja Ampat.

The economic measures will be accompanied by the expansion of the territorial military structure to the region. The Indonesian Army has confirmed that the establishment of military district command (Kodam) in Manokwari, West Papua will be accelerated in 2015. The Eastern Region Fleet command base is being shifted to Sorong. TNI has also been planning to set up a 3rd Division of the Army Strategic Command as well as the 3rd Division of Air Force Operational Command in Sorong. Although the territorial structure has been criticised as potentially bringing back New Order-style military intervention, it is expected to help maintain Indonesia’s sovereignty over the restive region.

Potential fault lines

The rules of engagement are not balanced: the KKBs have the ability to sporadically attack the security apparatus whenever they want, but the security apparatus must play by democratic rules. In this asymmetric setting, the Jokowi administration is aware that winning the hearts of the locals and building domestic resilience is the most important approach. To achieve this, a new programme called serbuan teritorial or ‘territorial invasion’ is to be intensified. Although it is sounds like a hostile measure, the core of the programme is to increase military social functions and to improve its image among locals.

Thirteen memoranda of understanding have been secured with various ministries such as for agriculture and transportation. Various community projects to empower the locals are set to be implemented, led by the Kodam in collaboration with local government, related state agencies and leaders of various ethnic groups. Some activities have been implemented such as the planting of paddy early this year.

A potential peril of the project is that it could easily turn into patronising state projects that would further aggravate the feeling of angst toward the national government. Upholding democratic principles, therefore, is very important. One of the potential fault lines that require special attention is cultural misunderstanding towards the complexities of Papuan culture. It could be manifested in the form of resistance toward transmigrants and foreign immigrants; or feuds and attacks on the local inhabitants.

Thus, exposure to Papuan culture is needed to promote better understanding and hinder ethnocentrism and stereotyping of Papuans. The Jokowi government should give them the attention they desperately need – by properly developing the region for the greater good of the Papuan people in particular, and a united Indonesian nation-state in general.

*Emirza Adi Syailendra is a Research Analyst at the Indonesia Programme of the S. Rajaratnam of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore.

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Miniature India In Far Away Suriname – OpEd

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By Prof. V. Suryanarayan*

The Antar Rashtriya Sahayog Parishad (Indian Council for International Co-operation) in furtherance of its objective of promoting connectivity with the Indian Diaspora, organized a Baithak Gaana (musical evening) by artists from Suriname on April 27, 2015 in New Delhi. The function was organized in collaboration with the Embassy of the Republic of Suriname.

Four folk artists from Suriname, Drewindersingh, Manager of the Saranga Super Stars; Jagdiepkoemar Chedi; Taranpersad Panchoe and Jagpersad Andre Sital constituted the team of artists who enthralled the assembled audience with their rendering of folk songs. Andre Sital, the veteran artist of the dholak, played the instrument with gusto. The music was so captivating that the audience spontaneously joined the artists in the rendering of songs. They also danced with gay abandon.

The musical evening brought home to me how in far away Suriname the people of Indian origin are retaining Indian culture against difficult odds. Retention of Indian culture on the one hand while adapting to distant locales on the other are twin facets of people of Indian origin. They use musical instruments which are no longer used in India. The artists were referring to musical notes in a scribbling pad; I asked Her Excellency Aashna Kanhai, Ambassador of Suriname to India and Sri Lanka, whether the notes were written in Devanagari script. She replied: “No, they are written in Creole language”. Their names have undergone transformation, Kumar has become Koemar, Prasad has become Persad, but their hearts still remain Indian. Amb. Ashna, herself a consummate artist, rendered a melodious song and also joined the folk dance.

The function began with Saraswati Sumiran in Sarnami Dhrupad style. For me it was a happy experience because in Suriname also they start the function by paying homage to Saraswati, the Goddess of knowledge. The artists then rendered an immigration song in baaithak gaana style. The early migrants, hailing from Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, took sail from Kolkata. They were told by the contractors that they are going on a pilgrimage to a place called Sri Ram and after six weeks of trial and tribulations, reached a country which turned out to be Suriname. To commemorate the early migrants to Suriname twin statues are being installed in Kolkata named appropriately as Baba and Mai.

The next song was Mundan Song rendered in Sohar style. The Hindus in Suriname perform the mundansanskar either on the third or eleventh month. The song conveys the blessings to the child for a happy and prosperous life. The Bhatwaaan song, which followed, is sung before the marriage ceremony. It is sung by artists who assemble before the bridegroom. Portions of the song ridicule the parental aunts. The next was the Londwa song, where a boy dressed as a girl, sing and dance before the bridegroom. The sixth song was holi song, a group song, which is sung during the harvest season. It was followed by uma nanga mang (women and men), sung in a mixture of Creole and Sarnami, asking men and women to unite in times of adversity. In the final section the artists rendered popular Hindi film songs sung by Mohammad Rafi and Mukesh.

To those assembled the musical evening was an exhilarating experience. The songs gave glimpses into how the people of Indian origin retain Indian culture in faraway lands. It was a proof that wherever they go the Indians carried a little bit of India with them.

Suriname is a beautiful country. Nature has endowed it with rich flora and fauna. VS Naipaul once described Suriname as Holland without tulips. The people of Indian origin, though originally went as plantation workers have transformed themselves into skilled professionals doctors, engineers, scientists, artists and politicians. Among those who have made a mark in the political field mention should be made of J Lachuman, Speaker of the National Assembly and Rattankoemar Ajodia, who became the Vice President of the country.

The people of Indian origin in Suriname number about 1, 50,000 out of a total population of 5, 31,000. The long distance which separated India from Suriname brought about welcome changes in the Hindu society. The caste system broke down and the Hindus have emerged as a homogenous society. Among young people there is a great desire to know more about India and trace their roots. The Antar Rashtriya Sahayog Parishad can act as a catalyst in this direction by encouraging two way traffic – visit by Indian artists and educationists to Suriname and also visit by Surinamese to various parts of India. The Government of India should award more scholarships to Surinamese students to have their higher education in Indian universities. Diasporic studies should be encouraged in Indian Universities, similarly Indian Studies in the University of Suriname. As Senator Fulbright once remarked, “Educational exchange is not merely one of those nice but marginal activities in which we engage in international affairs, but rather, from the point of view of future world peace and order, the most important and potentially the most rewarding of our foreign policy activities”.

*Dr. V. Suryanarayan is Nelson Mandela Professor for Afro-Asian Studies, Mahatma Gandhi University, Kottayam. His e mail id: suryageeth@gmail.com

The post Miniature India In Far Away Suriname – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

US Drone Strike Kills Top Al-Qaeda Official In Yemen

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Nasr Ibn Ali al-Ansi, the Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula militant who claimed responsibility for the Charlie Hebdo attack in Paris, has been killed, the terror group said.

A video statement from an AQAP spokesman said al-Ansi was killed in a U.S. drone strike, SITE Intelligence Group, a terrorist monitoring organization, said. The video said al-Ansi was killed in April in the port city of Mukalla, Yemen.

A U.S. official confirmed al-Ansi was dead but didn’t say whether it was from a drone strike or when his death took place, CNN reported.

Al-Ansi appeared in a video claiming responsibility for the attack on the Paris offices of satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo. That attack, perpetrated by brothers Said and Cherif Kouachi, left 12 people dead and led to a massive manhunt that ended with both gunmen dying in a police standoff.

Al-Ansi encouraged would-be jihadists to plan attacks in their home countries if possible.

“If he is capable to wage individual jihad in the Western countries that fight Islam — such as America, Britain, France, Canada and others of the countries that represent the head of disbelief in waging war against Islam … If he is capable of that, then that is better and more harmful,” al-Ansi said.

Original article

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The European Union: A Past, A Present And What Future? – Analysis

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By Sandra Fernandes

Exiting his function as President of the European Commission, José Manuel Durão Barroso launched the “new narrative for Europe” initiative. In late October 2014, he stressed that the European Union (EU) has to defend its values and to fight its past demons of nationalism and populism.1 This initiative resumes an appeal to involve European citizens in the debate about the evolution of the integration process, departing from a manifesto entitled “The Body and the Mind of Europe”, proposed by intellectuals.2 The text and the various activities organized under the “new narrative” flagship reflect the existence of a deep crisis experienced by the Union, not only for financial and economic reasons, but also as related to identity and legitimacy deficiencies. As common citizens would express, “citizens feel less and less European” or “Europe is not a culture, but a junction of cultures”.3 In this article, we aim at tackling the challenge of thinking about the EU’s uncertain future taking into consideration what is the Union. We shall explore the fact that the EU has a past and a present and what does this mean for its possible future path. We raise the assumption that the EU’s history has reached a point of non-return: unless citizens are given a core locus in the integration process, the Union is deemed to stagnate and transform itself in a less satisfactory way with respect to European cooperation.

The European Union’s past has been featured by the parallel dynamics of enlargement and deepening. While the club of member states has been growing—providing the EU with a greater geographic scope on the continent—the levels of integration have also deepened to encompass more policy areas and more transference of national prerogatives to Brussels. Beginning with a common policy in the areas of trade and agriculture with the 1957 Rome Treaty, the Union has developed its actions much further, tackling for instance internal security or macroeconomic policies.

The evolution of the integration process is also deeply rooted in an historic novelty. In fact, the Union is committed to the idea of creating peace among its member states that include powers such as Germany, France and Great Britain which have fought wars for hegemony on the continent. Additionally, the kind of peace that is aimed at is also novel as compared to the traditional and realist perspectives on peace. The Union project is based on the idea of “positive peace” that includes human rights and needs. That commitment towards a positive peace contributes to explain the level of exigency of the citizens within the EU area towards what the Union delivers. This expectation and delusion about its materialization are at the core of today’s EU political legitimacy crisis.

In fact, peace is not anymore just about the absence of war (negative peace), but it now also includes human rights in the sense that security is “human security”. along this line, besides rights such as, for instance, access to food and education, EU citizens perceive that the EU has a role in assuring their political, economic and social rights.4 This is particularly sensitive in the aftermath of the financial crisis that began in 2008 and which brought bailouts in Ireland, Portugal and Greece and social unrest in several EU countries due to the degradation of living conditions. In particular, growing unemployment has impacted directly on the notion of human dignity. In late 2014 the average unemployment rate of the EU was 9.8%. Germany had an unemployment rate of 4.8% as compared to Greece with 26%.5 Portugal presented a rate of 14.1%. The impact of these data on the perceptions of EU citizens is to a certain extent reflected in the 2014 Special Eurobarometer. “Only 22% of respondents regard the employment situation in their country as generally good, though this is up from 20% in autumn 2013. Germany (62%) has the most people who rate it as good, while Greece, Portugal and Spain (all 2%) have the fewest”. Correspondingly, the survey indicates that “trust in the EU remains low (32%) but has increased slightly (+1)”.6

The issue of trust towards the role of the EU—and the recurring, and perhaps, growing gap between the citizens and EU policies and institutions7—poses a paradox to the European integration process. If positive peace places the individual at the core of the project, its evolution has produced distance between citizens and the EU’s actions, both internally and
externally. This is visible in the poor knowledge that the citizens have about the Union’s external role. Who in Europe has heard, for instance, about the Union is fighting piracy in the Horn of Africa with its mission EUNAVFOR? Although not affecting directly the daily life of its citizens, the operation has been instrumental in assuring the fluxes of trade and, thus, the functioning of EU economy.

What the EU is today, and the challenges it faces, needs to be put in the perspective of its above-mentioned past. The Union presents itself as the carrier of values of its own that are simultaneously European and universal. This peculiarity has brought perspectives on the EU as a “normative” actor.8 Externally, it means that Brussels acts neither as a military nor as a civilian power. Assuming itself as a change promoter, the EU seeks to alter norms in the international system according to its own values and principles. The later are particularly visible in its relations with neighboring countries and in its enlargement policy, which are: the rule of law, good governance, respect for human rights, including minority rights, the promotion of good neighborly relations, the principles of market economy and sustainable development.9 Internally, this set of normative standards is particularly sensitive for the security perceptions of citizens when it comes to social and economic rights, as above-mentioned.

Currently the EU is also marked by the adoption of several strategies to cope with financial, economic and social challenges. The gap between discourse and practice has led to disenchantment, and improvement is needed, but the agendas to cope with issues nevertheless exist. Regarding the euro debt crisis, the austerity method and the bailouts for Ireland, Greece and Portugal have not yet delivered enough harmonization at the EU level, but particularly in the aftermath of Greece’s failure to implement the external rescue program (known as “troika” program), the management of the eurozone is under serious revision. The fact that the EU is an “unidentified political object”—referring to its complex and unique political system—doesn’t mean that it has no legitimacy. The Lisbon Treaty that entered into force in 2009 has been able to reinforce the role of theEuropean Parliament and to rebalance the weight of member states.10

Taking into consideration that the EU has a past and a present, thinking about what it ought to achieve in the future may require a creative act as compared to its foundation. The founding fathers of the Union made a political creation that resulted in the “Schumann Plan”, published on 9 May 1950. One can read that, “Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity”.11

Solidarity and compromise constitute the two bedrocks of the integration process where member states have been agreeing progressively on common interests and have been compromising to achieve decisions. That is the reason why one might consider that the EU has attained an historic point of non-return: the citizens must be placed at the core of the integration process. In fact, austerity policies and the difficulties to manage the euro zone crisis have shown a growing distance from the solidarity dynamics and from the search for compromise. When EU citizens feel threatened internally, as by unemployment for instance, the EU itself is threatened because solidarity and compromising fail to be put in practice.

In October 2013, the Union received the Nobel Peace Prize. The supporters of the integration process—the so-called “euro-optimists”—received the news with great applause. It meant that the EU has a past, a present and a future, i.e. the Union has brought historical peace in Europe and it has created political, economic and social convergence. The process is still ongoing and the tools to continue this path need both serious refreshing and to include a better involvement of its citizens. All Europeans are protagonists of the ongoing EU crisis and are part of the challenge of retrieving the founding spirit of solidarity that is hampered by the resurgence of national egoism. If Europeans fail to agree that the problems ahead are common, the prospects to find converging and long-lasting solutions will be narrow. The perception of belonging to a same public European sphere is what the “new narrative for Europe” is trying to bring back in the EU dynamics. The future of European integration depends on the creative capacity to move from words to deeds.

About the author:
Research Unit in Political Science and International relations (NICPRI), University of Minho

Source:
This article was published by IPRIS as IPRIS Viewpoints 173 (PDF)

Notes:
1. Rui Pedro Antunes, “Durão diz que europa passou “teste de stress” e rejeita Belém” (Diário de Notícias, 29 October 2014).
2. Website with information on the project: http://ec.europa.eu/culture/policy/ new-narrative/index_en.htm
3. Retrieved from a debate organized with Ba students of the University of Minho on 24 March 2014.
4. On the impact of austerity measures on economic and social rights in the eU, see Cláudia Viana Barbosa, “(In)Segurança Humana económica na União europeia: o Impacto da austeridade nos direitos económicos e Sociais” (repositorium Universidade do Minho, 2014).
5.“Unemployment rates, seasonally adjusted” (Eurostat, February 2015).
6. “Europeans in 2014” (European Commission, Special Eurobarometer no. 415, July 2014).
7. In this article, we do not tackle the issue of national citizenship versus EU citizenship and the issues of political legitimacy posed at the national level.
8. Ian Manners, “Normative Power Europe: The International role of the EU” (European Community Studies Association Biennial Conference, 31 May 2002).
9. “Communication from the Commission – European neighborhood Policy – Strategy Paper” (European Commission, 12 May 2004).
10. On the Lisbon Treaty, see Sebastian Kurpas et al., “The Treaty of Lisbon: Implementing the Institutional Innovations” (CePS, Special reports, 15 November 2007); Juan Mayoral, “Democratic improvements in the European Union under the Lisbon Treaty Institutional changes regarding democratic government in the EU” (robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, 2011).
11. “The Schuman Declaration”, 9 May 1950.

The post The European Union: A Past, A Present And What Future? – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.


‘Iron Brothers': Sino-Pakistani Relations And The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor – Analysis

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In his first state visit to Pakistan on April 20, 2015, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced a massive package of investments in Pakistan’s infrastructure.1 The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) consists of a package of Chinese infrastructure investments in Pakistan worth 46 billion USD, and is the flagship project of China’s “Belt and Road” development framework.2 Chinese Premier Li Keqiang had unveiled the CPEC concept two years earlier during his May 2013 visit to Pakistan, and its key importance for the “Belt and Road” initiative is that CPEC connects the Silk Road Economic Belt with the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road.3 Some observers have noted that several previous Chinese mega-investments in Pakistan were unsuccessful because of problems with corruption and political violence. However, CPEC is different given the commitment by China’s leadership to the success of the “Belt and Road” initiative.4

CPEC, which consists of a 2,000 mile transportation corridor of roads, railways and pipelines, will connect the Chinese-operated Pakistani port of Gwadar on the Arabian Sea with the Chinese province of Xinjiang. CPEC, which is expected to be ready in 15 years, will eventually extend to other countries, possibly stimulating an economic boom in the region.5 Experts believe that the planned Gwadar-Kashgar railway will spur further rail development in Central Asia, including, for example, a possible railway from Kashgar through Kyrgyzstan to Andijan in Uzbekistan.6 When completed, CPEC will also offer an economic stimulus to China’s underdeveloped western provinces, including Xinjiang, by opening their markets to global competition, thereby reducing their income gap with China’s developed coastal cities and provinces. The broader infrastructural development of the Silk Road Economic Belt will likewise stimulate the economies of Central Asia by opening greater access to regional markets, including those of the Caspian and Caucasus regions.7

When complete, CPEC’s pipelines from Gwadar to Xinjiang will offer the shortest route for China to import oil and gas from Africa and the Middle East.8 The railways and highways to be constructed under the CPEC plan will also offer Chinese traders an important overland shortcut between China and Europe, and could cut travelling time and costs by half, compared to the current shipping routes utilizing the crowded and increasingly risky Straits of Malacca.9 CPEC also provides for infrastructure for the digital economy, as it will include a 44 million USD fiber optic cable connecting Xinjiang with Rawalpindi.10

China also plans over 10 billion USD in infrastructure investments in Pakistan outside of the CPEC framework.11 These include a six-lane 1,240 km expressway between Karachi and Lahore which is scheduled for completion in 2017, the modernization of the 1,300 km Karakoram Highway between China and Pakistan across the Himalayas, and upgrades to public transportation in Lahore, Karachi, Rawalpindi, and three other Pakistani cities.12

Strengthening Energy Capacity

With daily electrical shortages impeding its economic development, Pakistan needs foreign assistance to increase its energy-generation capacity.13 Apart from investments in Pakistan’s transportation infrastructure, CPEC also includes investments in energy projects including the construction of coal-fired power plants. The first group of power plants, which will cost 15.5 billion USD, will contribute 10,400 megawatts of electricity to Pakistan’s grid by 2018. A second group of power plants, costing 18.3 billion USD, will be built after 2018, and will add an additional 6,600 megawatts to the grid. These in total will double Pakistan’s current electricity supply and alleviate the country’s daily electrical shortages. These new power plants will dwarf US aid in the energy sector, whose projects have contributed just an additional 1,500 megawatts to Pakistan’s electrical grid.14

Clean energy infrastructure will also be constructed under CPEC, including hydropower, solar, and wind power plants.15 For example, the Karot hydropower plant on the Jhelum river, which will cost 1.65 billion USD, will contribute 720 megawatts to the grid when it commences operations in 2020.16 Outside of the CPEC framework, China has helped build 6 nuclear reactors in Pakistan, supplying 3,400 megawatts. This is part of Pakistan’s plan to use nuclear energy to generate 8,800 megawatts by 2030.17 A nuclear power plant in Karachi could involve the installation of China’s new third-generation Hualong-1 nuclear reactor.18 These expansions to Pakistan’s electrical grid are important not just for development, but also for security, as the country’s chronic electrical shortages are a key cause of social unrest.19

“Iron Brothers”

China and Pakistan have historically considered their relationship to be that of “iron brothers.” In an op-ed in Pakistan’s Daily Times, Xi Jinping highlighted the long history of friendship between China and Pakistan, and described China’s massive plans for economic engagement as an act of friendship.20 As Mushahid Hussain Sayed, chairman of the Pakistani parliament’s defense committee, observed:

“China treats us as a friend, an ally, a partner and above all an equal – not how the Americans and others do.”21

In 1950, Pakistan was one of the first countries to recognize the People’s Republic of China, and both countries established diplomatic relations in 1951. Pakistan remained an ally during the 1960s and early 1970s, when China suffered international isolation. In return, Pakistan has gained economic and military assistance from China, especially in the form of transfers of sensitive technology.22 Between 1956 and 1979, Pakistan was China’s principal recipient of economic aid, receiving almost a third of China’s total aid to Asia and the Middle East. While this allowed Pakistan to reduce its dependence on American aid, China’s generosity to Pakistan served as a useful showcase to the non-communist Third World of the benefits of Chinese friendship.23 The “all-weather” friendship between Pakistan and China has also been made manifest in large-scale infrastructural projects, not just in the upcoming CPEC projects, but also in older megaprojects like Karakoram Highway across the Himalayas.24

Historically, the Sino-Pakistani relationship has been useful for both countries as a foil against India. Pakistan’s relations with India have been hostile since the Partition of 1947, and hostilities have erupted in wars and lower-level conflict, in particular over the disputed territories of Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistan hence values China not just as a key source for upgrading its economic and military strength, but also as a source of security against the Indian threat. China, which has its own territorial disputes with India—including a 1962 border war—values Pakistan as a deterrent to India. In turn, India has strategic concerns over China’s long-term nurturing of Pakistan’s military strength, and perceives China as engaging in a policy of encirclement of India’s regional influence.25

“Belt and Road”

Pakistan seeks to be a key part of China’s “Belt and Road” as this would attach Pakistan’s economy to the growth regions of East, Central and South Asia, a combined economic zone consisting of 3 billion people.26 Even before the conceptualization of the “Belt and Road,” the economies of Central Asia and its peripheries had already begun a process of economic integration following the collapse of the Soviet Union. The infrastructural modernization promised by the Silk Road Economic Belt will accelerate this process of economic integration—or more accurately reintegration—as the polities of Eurasia had previously been economically integrated during the periods of the ancient empires and the original Silk Road.27

CPEC and the “Belt and Road” promise to accelerate the growing trade between China and Pakistan. China became Pakistan’s largest trading partner in 2010, overtaking the US, and Sino-Pakistani trade expanded from 4 billion USD in 2007 to 10 billion USD in 2014.28 Pakistani traders have increased their presence in China since 2002, with the establishment of trading companies in major cities including Beijing, Guangzhou, Shanghai, Shenzhen, and Yiwu. They have also increased their participation in trade fairs in Kashgar and Guangzhou. While they are currently focused on the trade in small commodities like home appliances and textiles, this is expected to change when CPEC takes off.29

Gwadar and the Baloch

As noted earlier, the deep sea port of Gwadar is the Arabian Sea terminus of CPEC. As such, Gwadar, which is expected to commence full operations at the end of 2015, will receive further development under CPEC. China, which has received the right to operate Gwadar port for 40 years, is expected to invest a further 1.62 billion USD in Gwadar, including an international airport and a new expressway connecting the harbor with the coast.30 Gwadar’s development began in May 2001, when China’s then-Premier Zhu Rongji announced China’s investment in Gwadar during his state visit to commemorate the 50th anniversary of Sino-Pakistani relations. Not only would the development of Gwadar double Pakistan’s capacity for oceanic trade, it would also be the terminus of pipelines transporting oil and gas from Central Asian producers to the world’s energy markets. Gwadar will also serve as a key node on the long-delayed Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline.31 The development of Gwadar, coupled with China’s parallel modernization of Pakistan’s rail networks, will transform Pakistan into an overland corridor for trade between the Arabian Sea and western China as well as Central Asia.32

However, the security threat posed by the Balochistan separatist movement could derail these plans for Gwadar and CPEC. In early April 2015 an attack by the Balochistan Liberation Front killed twenty Pakistani construction workers.33 Later that month, on April 21, 2015, the same day Xi Jinping addressed the Pakistani parliament, Baloch rebels attacked a coastal radar station near Gwadar. This highlights the security situation that will be faced by the construction of CPEC. Chinese projects in the region have previously been impacted by insecurity. In 2004, three Chinese engineers were killed by Baloch rebels at the Gwadar construction zone. Two other Chinese engineers were subsequently kidnapped by the Taliban at a dam project in South Waziristan, and one was killed in a failed rescue attempt. To protect the CPEC construction sites, the Pakistani military will create a special security division, consisting of an army battalion with air support.34

The roots of Balochistan’s separatist movement lie in the region’s economic deprivation and exploitation by outsiders. While the province is the poorest in Pakistan, it is actually the richest in its natural bounty of key resources like natural gas, uranium, gold, and silver. A typical case of the exploitation and exclusion of Balochistan is the Saindak copper mine, whose profit-sharing arrangement has its Chinese owners receiving 50% of the profits, the Pakistani government 48%, and Balochistan the remaining 2%. The Baloch separatists hence have been demanding provincial autonomy and control over their land’s natural resources.35

The Pakistani government’s announcement of the development of Gwadar in 2001 was the primary cause of the current wave of separatist militancy, as the project involved no local participation, and local residents perceived the project as a front for internal colonization by the Pakistani government. Baloch nationalists noted, for example, that the majority of the estimated one million workers who would be hired to work on the construction projects would be outsiders brought in from elsewhere in Pakistan, and that the poorly-educated Baloch locals would be assigned lowly paid menial jobs.36

However, the economic opportunities represented by Gwadar could ameliorate these separatist tensions by generating well-paid employment for the local population. Gwadar is intended to be a free trade zone and a major destination for Chinese investment on the scale of Hong Kong or Singapore.37 China is currently constructing 70 cooperative economic zones, including industrial parks, with the “Belt and Road” nations, and already over 8 billion USD has been invested in them. These zones are expected to generate over 20 billion USD per year, and create jobs for 200,000 people. In Thailand, for example, Chinese investment in the Rayong Industrial Zone has created 3,000 jobs, while over 10,000 textile and garment jobs have been created by Chinese investment in Cambodia.38 If Chinese investment similarly takes off in Gwadar, the impact on the local economy could be equally significant. This in turn could have a positive impact on the security situation.

Indeed, the US has encouraged China’s increased investment in Pakistan, as it recognizes that this will improve the stability of not just Pakistan but also the region.39 The US has so far failed to bring economic growth to the region with its development projects. Some believe this is due to the comparatively small scale of the US-funded projects. The US has supplied Pakistan with 31 billion USD in aid since 2002, with 2 billion USD spent on infrastructure projects between 2010 and 2014.40 This investment has recently slowed with the depletion of Congressional counterterrorism funding for the Afghan surge.41 China hopes to do better with CPEC, as its infrastructure projects are on a far larger scale. Unlike the US projects which are funded through development aid, the Chinese projects will funded through commercial loans and investments, thereby allowing for the increased scale of these projects.42

The Uighur Question

China recognizes that economic development will be necessary for the stabilization of Pakistan, and that this will have positive spill-over effects for Xinjiang. China’s economic engagement hence has implications for security.43 In particular, China is concerned about Uighur militants from Xinjiang who are receiving aid and training in Pakistan’s northwest tribal regions. In his speech to Pakistan’s parliament on April 21, 2015, Xi Jinping praised the Pakistani military for targeting Uighur militants in North Waziristan in 2014.44 In a separate meeting with Pakistan’s armed forces chiefs, President Xi committed China to aiding Pakistani military efforts against militants on the Afghan border.45 The Eastern Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), a Xinjiang separatist militant group based in Pakistan’s North Waziristan province, will be a key target for Chinese and Pakistani security forces.46

ETIM, which is also known as the Turkistan Islamic Party, is estimated to have 300-500 fighters based in Pakistan, with cells in Turkey and elsewhere in Central Asia. ETIM seeks independence for Xinjiang and its transformation into the Islamic state of East Turkestan. Experts believe ETIM’s campaign of terrorism entered a dangerous new stage on October 28, 2013, when ETIM terrorists staged a suicide car bombing in a crowd at Tiananmen Square. This attack marked the start of a campaign of terror outside of Xinjiang where ETIM’s attacks were previously concentrated. ETIM’s campaign after the 2013 Tiananmen attack focused on China’s key transportation nodes, particularly its railway stations. For example, on March 1, 2014, ETIM terrorists staged a knife attack at Kunming Railway Station, slashing and stabbing 31 people to death and injuring 141 others. This attack underscored ETIM’s understanding of the critical importance of China’s rail network to its economy, as well as the strategic position of Yunnan as one of China’s international gateways. Despite the killing of ETIM leader Abdul Haq al-Turkistani in North Waziristan in a drone strike in February 2010, as well as the killings of other ETIM leaders, ETIM remains a credible threat to China.47

ETIM represents the violent radical edge of the broader Uighur separatist movement, which is rooted in the ethnoreligious difference between the Turkic and Muslim Uighurs and the officially atheist Han Chinese majority of the People’s Republic of China. This ethnoreligious difference triggered separatist tensions when the Uighurs perceived socioeconomic discrimination from the Han Chinese. Not only were the Uighurs unhappy that Han Chinese settlers were displacing the Uighur people from their traditional lands, they were also unhappy that these settlers were monopolizing the best jobs and economic opportunities.48 After all, even though Xinjiang contains China’s largest deposits of key resources like oil and natural gas, it remains one of the most underdeveloped regions of China.49

While China feared the Uighurs would be inspired by the examples of the neighbouring Kazakhs, Tajiks, Turkmens, and Uzbeks who formed their own independent nations after the collapse of the Soviet Union, a generation of Uighur jihadis was receiving a militant education in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Uighur jihadis who had been educated in Pakistani madrassas in the 1980s subsequently gained combat experience in Afghanistan’s wars against the Soviets and then the US. After returning to Xinjiang, some of these jihadis persuaded their fellow separatists to adopt terrorist tactics in their fight against the Chinese state. The violent Chinese repression against Uighur “splittism” has provoked further radicalization within the separatist movement.50

The Pakistani state has long recognized the problem. Pakistan’s Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif stated during Xi Jinping’s state visit that “Pakistan considers China’s security as its own security.”51 For many years, Pakistani intelligence agents have helped to prevent jihadi groups from targeting China. Pakistan has also helped to broker talks between China and the Taliban which resulted in Taliban assurances, in exchange for aid and limited diplomatic recognition from Beijing, that their territory would not be used for terrorist strikes on China, and that they would not support the Uighur separatist movement.52

Strategic Defence Cooperation

Apart from the infrastructural investment agenda, China and Pakistan also formalized their “all-weather” strategic defense partnership during Xi Jinping’s visit.53 Pakistan has agreed to a 6 billion USD purchase of eight submarines from China.54 When finalized, this deal will be one of China’s largest arms sales, and will help Pakistan expand and modernize its submarine fleet, making its submarine capability competitive with India’s.55 Other recent defence deals between China and Pakistan include Pakistan’s purchase of 110 Chinese FC-1 Xiaolong jet fighters. Redesignated as the JF-17 Thunder in Pakistan, 60 of these fighter jets have been received from China since 2007, and the remaining 50 will be sent to Pakistan over the next 3 years.56

Historically, China began its military support of Pakistan in the 1960s. Not only did China supply weapons systems, it boosted Pakistan’s defence capability by constructing weapons factories so that Pakistan could produce its own weapons. Apart from China’s contributions to Pakistan’s air force, China has also helped Pakistan develop its missile program, including ballistic missiles, as well as its nuclear weapons program. Experts suspect Pakistan’s development of the nuclear bomb was based on Chinese technology transfers.57 Such technology transfers remain a key—if secretive—part of Sino-Pakistani strategic relations.58

The Future

Analysts following Sino-Pakistani relations will be tracking the political, economic and security impacts of the construction of CPEC and the ongoing development of Gwadar. China’s enormous financial commitments to Pakistan have already had an impact on Pakistan’s foreign policy, with Pakistan choosing to remain neutral in Saudi Arabia’s Operation Decisive Storm against Yeman’s Houthi rebellion. The threatened loss of investment from the Arab world due to this decision has been mitigated by China’s planned investments. China would be supportive of Pakistan’s decision given the potential for blowback in Xinjiang. In addition, Operation Decisive Storm is widely recognized as a Saudi proxy war against Iran, and China and Pakistan both have a vested interest in the completion of the Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline.59

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Tiezzi, Shannon. “China’s Coming Nuclear Power Boom.” The Diplomat, April 24, 2015. Accessed April 27, 2015. http://thediplomat.com/2015/04/chinas-coming-nuclear-power-boom/.

Tweed, David. “Xi’s Submarine Sale Raises Indian Ocean Nuclear Clash Risk.” Bloomberg, April 17, 2015. Accessed April 27, 2015. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-04-16/xi-s-submarine-sale-raises-risk-of-nuclear-clash-in-indian-ocean.

Vertzberger, Yaacov. “The Political Economy of Sino-Pakistani Relations: Trade and Aid 1963-82.” Asian Survey 23 (1983): 637-652.

Wang Ting. “China gets 40-year rights at Pakistani port.” China Daily, April 14, 2015. Accessed April 27, 2015. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2015-04/14/content_20433493.htm.

Xi Jinping. “Pak-China Dosti Zindabad.” Daily Times, April 19, 2015. Accessed April 27, 2015. http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/national/19-Apr-2015/pak-china-dosti-zindabad.

Notes:
1. Salman Masood and Declan Walsh, “Xi Jinping Plans to Fund Pakistan,” New York Times, April 21, 2015, accessed April 27, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/22/world/asia/xi-jinping-plans-to-fund-pakistan.html. Wajahat S. Khan and F. Brinley Bruton, “China-Pakistan Pacts Worth Billions Reveal Beijing’s Ambitions,” NBC News, April 26, 2015, accessed April 27, 2015, http://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/china-pakistan-pacts-worth-billions-reveal-deeper-ambitions-n347646.
2. Saeed Shah and Jeremy Page, “China Readies $46 Billion for Pakistan Trade Route,” Wall Street Journal, April 16, 2015, accessed April 17, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/china-to-unveil-billions-of-dollars-in-pakistan-investment-1429214705.
3. “Belt and Road to boost already strong China-Pakistan trade,” Want China Times, April 29, 2015, accessed April 30, 2015, http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?id=20150429000114&cid=1102&MainCatID=0.
4. Philip Reeves, “China-Pakistan Deal Highlights Waning U.S. Influence In Region,” NPR, April 21, 2015, accessed April 27, 2015, http://www.npr.org/2015/04/21/401318956/china-pakistan-deal-highlights-waning-u-s-influence-in-region. Alvin Cheng-Hin Lim, “China’s Transition to the ‘New Normal’: Challenges and Opportunities,” Eurasia Review, April 2, 2015, accessed May 2, 2015, http://www.eurasiareview.com/02042015-chinas-transition-to-the-new-normal-challenges-and-opportunities-analysis/
5. Shah and Page, “China Readies $46 Billion.”
6. “Pakistan-China railway to extend Beijing’s influence, says scholar,” Want China Times, April 26, 2015, accessed April 27, 2015, http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?cid=1101&MainCatID=11&id=20150426000082.
7. Nicklas Norling and Niklas Swanström, “The Virtues and Potential Gains of Continental Trade in Eurasia,” Asian Survey 47 (2007): 365.
8. “Economic corridor, Gwadar Port on agenda as Xi visits Pakistan,” Xinhua, April 20, 2015, accessed April 27, 2015, http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?id=20150420000094&cid=1101&MainCatID=0. Rebecca Cockayne, “Prospects improve for China-Pakistan economic corridor,” Global Risk Insights, March 1, 2014, accessed April 27, 2015, http://globalriskinsights.com/2014/03/prospects-improve-for-china-pakistan-economic-corridor/.
9. Shah and Page, “China Readies $46 Billion.”
10. Jack Detsch, “China’s Grand Plan for Pakistan’s Infrastructure,” The Diplomat, April 21, 2015, accessed April 27, 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/04/chinas-grand-plan-for-pakistans-infrastructure/.
11. Shah and Page, “China Readies $46 Billion.”
12. Detsch, “China’s Grand Plan.”
13. Ankit Panda, “Pakistan’s Neutrality in the Yemen Crisis: Brought to You by China,” The Diplomat, April 28, 2015, accessed April 30, 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/04/pakistans-neutrality-in-the-yemen-crisis-brought-to-you-by-china/.
14. Shah and Page, “China Readies $46 Billion.”
15. Kamran Haider, “China’s Xi Pours Money Into Pakistan, His ‘All-Weather’ Friend,” Bloomberg, April 20, 2015, accessed April 27, 2015, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-04-19/china-pakistan-to-sign-28-billion-in-projects-during-xi-visit-i8orbgig.
16. Josh Chin, Liyan Qi, Saeed Shah and Qasim Nauman, “China Makes Multibillion-Dollar Down-Payment on Silk Road Plans,” Wall Street Journal, April 21, 2015, accessed April 27, 2015, http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2015/04/21/china-makes-multibillion-dollar-down-payment-on-silk-road-plans/.
17. Prashanth Parameswaran, “China Confirms Pakistan Nuclear Projects,” The Diplomat, February 10, 2015, accessed April 17, 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/02/china-confirms-pakistan-nuclear-projects/.
18. Shannon Tiezzi, “China’s Coming Nuclear Power Boom,” The Diplomat, April 24, 2015, accessed April 27, 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/04/chinas-coming-nuclear-power-boom/.
19. Shannon Tiezzi, “Can China’s Investments Bring Peace to Pakistan?” The Diplomat, April 21, 2015, accessed April 27, 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/04/can-chinas-investments-bring-peace-to-pakistan/.
20. Xi Jinping, “Pak-China Dosti Zindabad,” Daily Times, April 19, 2015, accessed April 27, 2015, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/national/19-Apr-2015/pak-china-dosti-zindabad.
21. Katharine Houreld and Mehreen Zahra-Malik, “The China-Pakistan relationship is about to get $46 billion stronger,” Reuters, April 16, 2015, accessed April 17, 2015, http://www.businessinsider.com/the-china-pakistan-relationship-is-about-to-get-46-billion-stronger-2015-4.
22. Jamal Afridi, and Jayshree Bajoria, “China-Pakistan Relations,” Council on Foreign Relations, July 6, 2010, accessed April 28, 2015, http://www.cfr.org/china/china-pakistan-relations/p10070.
23. Yaacov Vertzberger, “The Political Economy of Sino-Pakistani Relations: Trade and Aid 1963-82,” Asian Survey 23 (1983): 644-645.
24. Ziad Haider, “Baluchis, Beijing, and Pakistan’s Gwadar Port,” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs 6 (2005): 96-97.
25. Afridi and Bajoria, “China-Pakistan Relations.”
26. Shah and Page, “China Readies $46 Billion.”
27. Norling and Swanström, “The Virtues and,” 351-352.
28. Haider, “China’s Xi Pours.” Houreld and Zahra-Malik, “The China-Pakistan relationship.”
29. “Belt and Road to.”
30. Wang Ting, “China gets 40-year rights at Pakistani port,” China Daily, April 14, 2015, accessed April 27, 2015, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2015-04/14/content_20433493.htm.
31. Saeed Shah, “China to Build Pipeline From Iran to Pakistan,” Wall Street Journal, April 9, 2015, accessed May 2, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/china-to-build-pipeline-from-iran-to-pakistan-1428515277.
32. John W. Garver, “Development of China’s Overland Transportation Links with Central, South-West and South Asia,” The China Quarterly 185 (2006): 7-10.
33. “Baloch ire prompts security fears for China-Pakistan Economic Corridor,” AFP, April 21, 2015, accessed April 27, 2015, http://tribune.com.pk/story/873432/baloch-ire-prompts-security-fears-for-china-pakistan-economic-corridor/.
34. Masood and Walsh, “Xi Jinping Plans.”
35. Adeel Khan, “Ethnonationalist Insurgency in Balochistan, Pakistan: The Militarized State and Continuing Economic Deprivation,” Asian Survey 49 (2009): 1075.
36. Khan, “Ethnonationalist Insurgency,” 1078-1080.
37. Detsch, “China’s Grand Plan.”
38. “Belt and Road nations account for 26% of China’s trade,” Xinhua, April 29, 2015, accessed April 29, 2015, http://www.china.org.cn/business/2015-04/29/content_35446742.htm.
39. Reeves, “China-Pakistan Deal.”
40. Haider, “China’s Xi Pours.” Shah and Page, “China Readies $46 Billion.”
41. Detsch, “China’s Grand Plan.”
42. Shah and Page, “China Readies $46 Billion.”
43. Khan and Bruton, “China-Pakistan Pacts.” Shah and Page, “China Readies $46 Billion.”
44. Masood and Walsh, “Xi Jinping Plans.”
45. Haider, “China’s Xi Pours.”
46. Tiezzi, “Can China’s Investments.” Andrew Small and Jane Perlez, “Q. and A.: Andrew Small on the China-Pakistan Relationship,” New York Times, February 6, 2015, accessed April 27, 2015, http://sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/02/06/q-and-a-andrew-small-on-the-china-pakistan-relationship/.
47. Sajjan M. Gohel, “The ‘Seventh Stage’ of Terrorism in China,” CTC Sentinel, December 10, 2014, accessed April 29, 2015, https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-seventh-stage-of-terrorism-in-china. Ziad Haider, “Sino-Pakistan Relations and Xinjiang’s Uighurs: Politics, Trade, and Islam along the Karakoram Highway,” Asian Survey 45 (2005): 523.
48. Haider, “Sino-Pakistan Relations,” 524-526.
49. Andrew Small, The China-Pakistan Axis: Asia’s New Geopolitics (London: Hurst, 2015), 69.
50. Haider, “Sino-Pakistan Relations,” 523-524. Small, China-Pakistan Axis, 71-72.
51. Masood and Walsh, “Xi Jinping Plans.”
52. Andrew Small and Gabriel Domínguez, “The Sino-Pakistani axis: Asia’s ‘little understood’ relationship,” Deutsche Welle, January 15, 2015, http://www.dw.de/the-sino-pakistani-axis-asias-little-understood-relationship/a-18194448.
53. Haider, “China’s Xi Pours.”
54. Houreld and Zahra-Malik, “The China-Pakistan relationship.” Jane Perlez, “Xi Jinping Heads to Pakistan, Bearing Billions in Infrastructure Aid,” New York Times, April 19, 2015, accessed April 27, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/20/world/asia/chinas-president-heads-to-pakistan-with-billions-in-infrastructure-aid.html.
55. Qasim Nauman and Jeremy Page, “Pakistan to Buy Eight Chinese Submarines,” Wall Street Journal, April 2, 2015, accessed April 27, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/pakistan-to-buy-eight-chinese-submarines-1427969061. David Tweed, “Xi’s Submarine Sale Raises Indian Ocean Nuclear Clash Risk,” Bloomberg, April 17, 2015, accessed April 27, 2015, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-04-16/xi-s-submarine-sale-raises-risk-of-nuclear-clash-in-indian-ocean.
56. “China to deliver 50 Thunder fighters to Pakistan over 3 years,” Want China Times, April 24, 2015, accessed April 27, 2015, http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?id=20150424000019&cid=1101&MainCatID=0.
57. Afridi and Bajoria, “China-Pakistan Relations.”
58. Andrew Small, “China-Pakistan: A Strategic Relationship in the Shadows,” YaleGlobal, April 7, 2015, accessed April 27, 2015, http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/china-pakistan-strategic-relations-shadows.

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Reclaiming India’s Air Space – Analysis

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New Delhi needs to worry with Chinese satellites taking over the air space in South Asia using a predatory pricing mechanism. The official policy striving towards a Digital India must take note of the past performance of ISRO and the DoS and reassess the future of India’s Open Sky policy, which might have allowed itself to be exploited by foreign powers.

By Bibhu Prasad Routray*

Can there be a scenario when a number of Indian states suddenly find themselves without access to real time television coverage, just because the satellite on which their popular channels are hosted has suddenly been switched off? However unreal this may sound, the Direct to Home (DTH) scene in India and the related scamper by the private operators in the country to find transponders could indeed be heading in that direction, especially when Chinese satellites, through a predatory pricing mechanism have started playing hosts to Indian television channels. Does that constitute a national security threat? This is a question the country’s security establishment must find an answer to.

In December 2014, GSAT-16 was launched into orbit carrying 24 C-band, 12 Ku and 12 extended C band transponders. The launch had been advanced by about six months to meet user needs, but came 11 months after the launch of GSAT-14 in January 2014. The launch of GSAT-15 will not happen till October 2015. The Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) predicts that a policy of launching these satellites, packed with more transponders than before and leasing of foreign transponders has taken care of the needs of the Indian DTH operators.

The reality, however, is different.

Since 2000, the year DTH services were launched in India, the government has been implementing an open sky policy which allow both Indian and foreign satellites to be used in DTH services with the condition that Indian Satellite would get preferential treatment. While there can be little disagreement with the broad ‘Open Sky’-policy, the history of implementation is replete with glaring shortcomings. The 2014 Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) report, ‘Management of satellite capacity for DTH service by Department of Space’ for instance, details the missteps of the Department of State (DoS) over the past decade that has not only incurred heavy financial losses to the organisation, but the recurrent delays in satellite launches, power problems in the existing satellites, allocation of capacity for other purposes, which have made Indian DTH operators overtly dependant on foreign satellites.

Statement of Jitendra Singh, Minister of state for in the Prime Minister’s Office and Ministry of Personnel, in the Lok sabha in March 2015 is a reiteration of what the CAG report draws one’s attention to. Indian DTH operators currently use a total of 77.89 (36 MHz equivalent) Ku band. Since “sufficient capacity of Ku Band transponders is not available in INSAT/GSAT satellites”, out of the total 77.89 transponders, only 19 transponders, amounting to 24 percent are in INSAT/GSAT satellites and the rest leased from foreign satellites. The government is in the process of allocating 46 transponders (in C, Extended-C and Ku Bands), which are vacant at present.

While it is a fact that no single satellite operator will be able to fulfil immediate or future demand for satellite capacity in the country, the glaring loopholes on DoS’ inability to come up with Ku band (Kurtz-under band, used predominantly for satellite telecast) satellite capacity for DTH services commensurate with the demand in the sector and requirement for national and strategic applications is glaring.

TV penetration in India is at 60 percent, much lower than in developed countries where it is greater than 90 percent. According to a study by the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII), a gradual acceleration in pay TV penetration will drive major growth for the television sector in five years, aided by the digitisation of cable TV in India. The demand for the Ku-band capacity used by Indian DTH operators, thus, is projected to remain high, as the operators strive to accommodate more HD channels in the time to come. A large number of requests for TV license to the tune of over 300 are pending with the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. By 2017, India has the potential to accommodate more than 1,500 licensed channels. Demand for more number of high definition (HD) channels make the search for transponders even more intense and can to an extent lead to a national security issue.

In December 2014, the Raj Television Group, with a bouquet of 13 channels predominantly catering to audience in South India, moved from Asiasat-5 satellite, operated by the Hong Kong based Asia Satellite Telecommunications Company to Chinese government owned Chinasat-12, citing its vision for “betterment in quality and need for additional bandwidth for its future expansion plans.” A representative of the network confirmed that Chinasat-12, with 28 Ku band and another 28 C-band transponders, is a much better platform for the Group’s expansion plans. The main reason for such shift, however, is the dumping prices Chinasat-12 has offered to Television channels switching to its platform.

Today Chinasat-12 carries several Afghan TV channels belonging to the Tolo group, Negaah TV, Noorin TV and Khurshid TV. Chinasat-12, also called Zhongxing-12, has also leased payload to Sri Lanka and co-brands itself as SupremeSat-I, hyped as the island nation’s first ever satellite. Similarly, several channels from Bangladesh, Nepal and Pakistan today have been offered transponders on Chinese satellites, all with predatory dumping prices.

Is this a mere business strategy by the Chinese or should it ring any national security alarm bells in New Delhi? In December 2012, the ISRO initiated a Request for Proposal (RFP), the second one after a similarly worded RFP in 2011, to obtain responses from interested foreign satellite operators for leasing satellites with transponders working in Ku and C-band frequencies. All three satellite providers from China have participated in the bidding process. One of these satellites actually shows Arunachal Pradesh as a part of China and the same is not a part of the India beam. Incidentally, the Chinese policy is not to allow landing rights to any foreign satellites.

New Delhi worries about the Chinese strategy of ‘string of pearls’ – Beijing seeking to set up listening posts all across the Indian ocean encircling India. Doesn’t New Delhi need to worry with Chinese satellites taking over the air space in South Asia using a predatory pricing mechanism? The solution is obviously not putting in a prohibitive mechanism, but streamlining the process in which ISRO and its marketing arm make the process of leasing transponders easy, fast and safe. The official policy striving towards a Digital India must take note of the past performance of ISRO and the DoS and reasses the future of India’s Open Sky policy, which might have allowed itself to be exploited by foreign powers.

*Bibhu Prasad Routray is Director of Mantraya

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Cuba Says It’s Open To Investment From The US

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Senior Cuban officials told participants at the 10th World Economic Forum on Latin America that the government is eager to receive foreign investment, and has taken measures to make Cuba an attractive investment destination. The meeting was a historic one for the country, which has recently initiated diplomatic relations with the US after half a century.

Lina Pedraza Rodríguez, Minister of Finance and Prices of Cuba, said that the country urgently needs to modernize its economy so as to protect the achievements of the Cuban Revolution. For that it requires foreign investment, including from the United States. “Cuba is open to investment from the United States. It has never been closed.” She said that her government has achieved a stabilization of macroeconomic indicators, is engaged in productive negotiations with its foreign creditors, and is moving to eliminate its dual currency system. The state will maintain its leading role in the economy, but private and foreign companies can operate with their property rights secure.

Deborah Rivas, General Director, Foreign Investment, Ministry of Foreign Trade and Foreign Investment, Cuba, emphasized that laws are in place to protect foreign investment. “We want to make policy transparent and provide legal certainty to foreign investors,” she said. Cuban law now permits foreigners to fully own businesses and all of those businesses’ assets. Investors are free to sell property and repatriate profits. Cuba has also created a special industrial zone, Mariel, with particularly investor-friendly regulations.

“The actions taken by the Cuban government with its new trade zone open up the potential of strategic investments from Mexico. Mexican companies are very excited,” Ildefonso Guajardo Villarreal, Secretary of Economy of Mexico, said.

Cuba is especially interested in attracting investment in agriculture, since the country currently spends heavily on food imports. Even though all land belongs to the state, private investors can acquire 99-year leases and own everything built on and produced by the land. In other sectors, such as biotechnology, healthcare and tourism, Cuba has competitive advantages that should attract investment, Rivas said.

“Mexico is a strong supporter of the modernization efforts under way in Cuba,” José Antonio Meade Kuribreña, Secretary of Foreign Affairs of Mexico, said. Mexican businesses, building on the long-standing friendship between the two countries, are leading the way in investing in Cuba. A trip last year of 68 Mexican business leaders to Cuba has already resulted in 50 investment projects.

Marisol Argueta de Barillas, Senior Director, Head of Latin America, World Economic Forum USA, said that the World Economic Forum is “happy to offer its global forum to help Cuba’s government in its process of modernization”.

More than 750 participants are taking part in the 10th World Economic Forum on Latin America in Riviera Maya, Mexico from 6 to 8 May 2015. The theme of the meeting is “Advancing through a Renovation Agenda”.

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South Africa: Chaos In Parliament, Violence In Communities – OpEd

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South Africa is at a critical stage in its history. In order to avert violent conflict, all political parties must endeavour to settle their differences, avoid using hate speech and handle its democracy with respect for the sake of peace and human security.

By Tendaishe Tlou*

2014 and 2015 are the years in which the South African National Assembly plunged into chaos, with the opposition being forced out not once but twice. Since then, the opposition has been vying for a vote of no confidence in the Speaker of Parliament and President, Jacob Zuma. The ruling party is now at its most difficult position; poised between political regression and decomposition, on the one hand, and a loss of confidence from citizens on the other. The ruling party-opposition vendetta has implications for South African communities, against a background of spiraling corruption, poor service delivery, power outages and escalating poverty. According to the theory of hegemony, shifts in power politics have an accompanying effect on the attitude and behaviour of the citizenry.

Hegemony refers to an interrelated set of ruling ideas filtering into a society (Hitchock, 1982), making the established order of power and values (ideologies) appear normal or rational (McQuail, 1994). The underlying assumption of the theory of hegemony’s view of society is that there are fundamental inequalities between social groups. Dominance is not simply a result of the imposition of the will of the dominant class and ideology alone, but results from a presentation of the group as being best able to fulfill the interests and aspirations of the other classes and, by implication, the whole society (Ibid). The group sells its ideas through various ways that can convince the other social group. Gramsci, however, emphasizes that hegemony is in a constant struggle. Hegemony as such is a constant contradiction between ideology and the social experience of the subordinate, which makes this interface into an inevitable site of ideological struggle (Fiske, 1990).

The ruling party-opposition confrontation in South Africa is therefore not confined to parliament, but has the ability to spill-over into society and, in the long run, poses an inevitable threat to the ANC’s hegemony, peace and human security. Since the formation of the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) Party in 2013, the political landscape has changed in South Africa. Led by Julius Malema, the opposition coalition including the Democratic Alliance (DA) have constantly criticized the ruling party’s conduct and disrupted National Assembly proceedings both at the provincial and national levels. In the past two decades, the ANC has never been challenged in this way and it is certain that its hegemony is under threat.

South Africa is a nation whose population is constantly under threat from chronic poverty, 24% youth unemployment, crippling corruption, crime and other crises. The opposition is now using the counter-hegemonic tactic whereby “consent must be constantly won and re-won since the people are frequently reminded of the disadvantages of subordination by other discourses in society” (Fiske, 1990).The opposition are using the challenges facing the ANC government as a vintage point for political expediency. Malema has became active in politics, taking an opposition stance against the ANC to redeem himself for the humiliation caused by the ruling party demoting him as ANC Youth League president.

Dubbing themselves as the ‘mouthpiece’ of the people, the opposition insists that the president and speaker of parliament resign as there is an acute contradiction between their ideology and reality on the ground. In this context, whilst the opposition parties wage war in parliament against the ruling party, the portents for violent confrontation are brewing. When two hegemonies are struggling to take and maintain power, the immediate ripple effects are that the supporters of the contending parties also personalize the struggle. For example, government infrastructure development projects in Mpumalanga are apparently being disrupted by EFF supporters because they equate the ANC with the government. Most recently, the EFF has vowed to demolish all the statues of apartheid icons in Pretoria, such as that of Paul Kruger in the Church Square, because to them they “symbolise white supremacy” in South Africa and violate the people’s rights. After this they vowed to surrender themselves to the police (Metro FM News, 2015) because they know what they are doing is illegal, but also because it increases their popularity and enables them to erode the dominant hegemony.

Cases of constant power struggles in South Africa are endless but what the proponents of these actions do not bear in mind is that their repercussions is violence. The opposition is setting an agenda which the masses will act upon. The increasing aggression of the EFF and DA – in line with their anti-ANC stance, especially among the 3.2 million unemployed youth and 21.5 % living in poverty – means that the environment is conducive for a bloody confrontation. Following the February 2015 State of the Nation Address (SONA) by the president, the violent pandemonium and ensuing apology to Malema by the speaker of parliament after she publicly compared him to “cockroaches”, EFF supporters staged a celebration in Pretoria on 21 February 2015 so as to express their victory by their ‘unwavering’ leader. They feel that their hegemony is being consolidated and gathering momentum at the expense of the ruling party.

Given the vitriolic attacks on the president, MPs are planting the seeds of mass demonstrations against the executive, especially after the president answered questions on 11th March 2015.Opposition strongholds are anticipating this day as the day their representatives exposed the ruling party, whilst the opposition’s hegemony gathers momentum in preparation for the 2018 elections. On 21st February 2015, Malema called on all South African contract workers to provide their employment details so that the EFF lobbies private companies to increase their salaries and give them permanent jobs (Pretoria News, 2015). In this way, when the ruling party seems to try to stall the process it will automatically trigger violent confrontation.In rural areas where land is increasingly becoming a source of mobilization and a bone of contention, the opposition will not hesitate to in some cases redistribute it. For example, Malema condemned the removal of homeless people from unoccupied land in Mamelodi East, Nelmephius and Sasolburg-Zamdela by the police under the directive of the government during the SONA debate. It is natural that when the counter-hegemony clashes with the pre-dominant hegemony, both the contending parties retaliate.

During the SONA debate, Malema did not conceal the EFF’s objective to take over “power by any means necessary,” coupled with the “bring back the money” mantra in relation to the expenses incurred during the erection of the Nkandla homestead; whilst several years back president Zuma reiterated to the nation that “the ANC will rule until Jesus comes”. These are statements that should be taken seriously as they illuminate that two hegemonies that are contesting to take and to stay in power. The opposition is apparently enjoying it marriage of convenience with the media who took the state to court over jamming of signals, claiming that the ruling party is increasingly becoming a threat to free access to information and freedom of expression. This collaboration presents the opposition with an opportunity to weaken the ruling party. To many, the opposition are saviours who will lead poverty-stricken South Africans to the promised land.

However, notwithstanding that people of South Africa have various parliamentarians posing as their mouthpieces, if these delicate issues are not handled with caution it might well plunge the nation into violent conflict. In the pre-1994 era, vicious misunderstandings between De Klerk’s government, the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) and the ANC in parliament erupted into violent confrontations all over the country, resulting in unnecessary and pervasive losses of life (Jeffrey, 2009). Each party accused the other of assassinations, inconsistency, reluctance to reform and inciting violence, among other things, and the masses responded and intensified the struggle by staging mass demonstrations, strikes, violent assaults and assassinations.

Appealing to the masses to stage a revolution against either a real or perceived oppressive hegemony comes with its consequences, and the failure to negotiate a peaceful transition always ignites bloodshed, as witnessed in Zimbabwe and Mozambique. However, when tantrums spread through the country, the state is obliged to intervene so as to maintain public peace and order, and the opposition can take this opportunity to consolidate its agenda by accusing the state of stifling public freedoms and liberties. South Africa is at a critical stage in its history. In order to avert violent conflict, all political parties must endeavour to settle their differences, avoid using hate speech and handle its democracy with respect for the sake of peace and human security. Parliamentarians calling other delegates ‘coakroaches’,‘hooligans’ and a ‘broken man’ in and outside parliament in a struggling country and economy is an ingredient that could spark a vicious civil war. All political parties must desist from trying to employ violence in order to solve problems and gain power. South Africa’s history was very violent and it cannot be destined for a violent future.

*Tendaishe Tlou is a freelance researcher and writer specialising in human rights, environmental security, peace and governance issues. He holds a BSc (Honours) Degree in Peace and Governance with Bindura University of Science Education and a Post-graduate Certificate in Applied Conflict Transformation. He works with various NGOs and Government Ministries in Zimbabwe and South Africa. However, these are his personal views; no authors, NGOs, Universities or any other Institution must be held accountable for the arguments in this article.

References

  • Fiske, J (1990), Introduction to Communication Studies, 2nd ed., Routledge, London.
  • Hitchock, J (1982), The Mass Media, Available at: http://www.catholiceducation.org, date accessed: 20/08/14.
  • Jeffery, A (2009), People’s War, Jonathan Ball Publishers, South Africa.
  • McQuail, D (1994), Mass Communication Theory. SAGE, London.
  • Pretoria News (2015), ‘Malema calls on Contract Workers to Bring their Details,’ Pretoria News, 21/02/15, Pretoria.

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US Senate Passes Bill Giving Congress Right To Review Iran Nuclear Deal

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By a 98-1 vote, the US Senate passed a bipartisan bill that would give Congress review rights over the White House’s Iran nuclear deal. The bill is expected to pass in the House, and has President Obama’s support.

The White House originally opposed the bill, proposed by Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairman Bob Corker (R-TN), until some of its provisions were revised in a compromise deal with the committee’s ranking democrat, Ben Cardin (D-MD) last month.

The compromise won over enough Democrats that President Obama withdrew his veto threat. The draft bill was approved by the committee unanimously.

However, a faction led by Tom Cotton (R-AR) and Marco Rubio (R-FL) attempted to insert a number of amendments into the bill during the floor debate, including a provision requiring Iran to recognize Israel as a Jewish state.

Several other amendments had already been defeated. One would’ve classified any nuclear deal as an international treaty requiring the support of two-thirds of the Senate, while another would have denied Iran sanctions relief until it stopped supporting terrorism.

Corker defended the compromise, warning that altering the compromise would cause the entire bill to fail, and Congress to lose any right to review the treaty. “Without this bill, there is no review,” he warned.

In the end, Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-KY) called for cloture, cutting off debate on all further amendments. The chamber voted 96-3 in favor, clearing the way for the final vote, in which Cotton was the lone voice of dissent.

“Many wish the bill was stronger. I don’t disagree with them, but this is a piece of legislation worthy of our support,” McConnell said during the floor debate. “It offers the best chance we have to provide the American people and the Congress they elect with power to weigh in on a vital issue.”

“As currently drafted, it is a virtual certainty that no matter how terrible this deal is, it will go into effect and this legislation is unlikely to stop it,” Ted Cruz (R-TX), one of the Republican presidential contenders, said during the debate.

“I applaud the Senate for passing this bill, and thank Senator Corker and others for their hard work,” said House Speaker John Boehner (R-Ohio) Thursday. “I look forward to House passage of this bill to hold President Obama’s administration accountable.”

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Japan: Is Shinzo Abe Changing His Stance? – Analysis

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By Sandip Kumar Mishra*

In the latter half of April 2015, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe met with both Chinese President Xi Jinping and US President Barak Obama. There were some speculations that he may change his course of being unapologetic on the Japanese colonial past but nothing of that sort happened. On 22 April 2015, Abe met the Chinese President Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the Asia African Summit in Jakarta, Indonesia. It was expected that it would be a better exchange between the two leaders than November 2014 when they encountered in Beijing in a very awkward way.

Optimists believed that in the wake of the 70th anniversary of the end of WW2, Abe might make a statement in August 2015 in which he would change his course of being unapologetic on history issues and his address in Jakarta would be a precursor to that. However, optimists should not have neglected the fact that just a week before his Jakarta visit, Abe sent an offering to the Yasukuni shrine, knowing quite well how it would be received in neighbouring countries. In Jakarta too, Abe stopped by just expressing ‘deep remorse’ for Japan’s role in WW2 and did not make a formal apology – that was made during the same meeting in 2005 by the then Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi.

During his week-long visit to the US from 26 April, Abe addressed the Joint Session of the US Congress – the first by any Japanese prime minister. It was again expected that he might say something that would be soothing to the countries that have gone through Japanese colonial exploitations and humiliation. But Abe emphasised the supreme importance of the Japanese alliance with the US and also underlined the strategic significance of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). In his speech in the US, he again assiduously avoided language related to Japan’s colonial past – which has been convention.

Abe probably feels that his consistent ‘aggressive’ approach and unapologetic behaviour would gradually become more acceptable in regional politics and even if it does happen, his stance is very successful for the Japanese domestic politics. He is quite convinced that a declining US would like to have a partner in Asia Pacific, one that fully supports their policy of Asian ‘re-balancing’ or ‘pivot to Asia’ and takes a lead in regional politics. In the process, if Tokyo takes lead and becomes ‘assertive’ vis-à-vis Beijing, it would reduce Washington’s burden and provide them with negotiating space in dealing with China. In the process, Abe feels that an apologetic stance does not go well with an ‘assertive’ Japan.

Abe is also quite consistent in being unapologetic on history issues, uncompromising on territorial issues, and aggressive in dealing with neighbouring countries. Abe feels that if the US support continues, he could carry forward his approach without much problems. From his speech at the US Congress, it also appears that he is interested in invoking democracy as common meeting point to connect Japan with India and Australia. Abe also assumes that even though it is dangerous to have a military confrontation in the region, it is useful to keep the situation ‘warm’ and utilise it for his political purposes.

However, he is mistaken and even if his policies may buy him popularity in Japan’s domestic politics, they would not succeed in producing desired results in its external relations. First, his approach may strengthen the US-Japan bilateral but it has led to the emergence of serious mistrust in the US-South Korea-Japan trilateral. It is not surprising that South Korean President Park Geun-hye is ready to meet North Korean leader Kim Jong-un unconditionally, but prefers to get Abe’s apology on the ‘comfort women’ issue before any bilateral talks with him. Second, Shinzo Abe’s policies have been pushing South Korea closre to China over the past few years. Incidentally, a conservative party government is in power in South Korea, one that has strong bonds with the old and reliable ally – the US; but if there would have been a progressive government in South Korea, the entire equation would have been markedly different.

Third, the Japanese behaviour provides breathing space to North Korea, which was feeling pinch of economic sanctions, especially after its third nuclear test in February 2013. Any problem in the Japan-US-South Korea trilateral gives North Korea manoeuvring chance. Fourth, Japan’s expectations that India and Australia as democratic countries would necessarily go along with Japan may not be correct. Democratic values include tolerance, peace, stability and common prosperity. If Tokyo’s unapologetic behaviour does not appear to move in this direction, New Delhi’s and Canberra’s supports cannot be unconditional and as a given.

Lastly, there is no fool proof mechanism to keep political and strategic relations in the regional politics ‘warm’. There is always a serious chance of miscalculation and such strategies must be avoided.

Thus, it would be right to disagree with optimists who keep imagining a changed Shinzo Abe in near future, especially if the US does not change its foreign policy course or regains its huge relative prominence. Since both the options appear either remote or impossible, with all the changes, Abe’s approach will remain the same.

*Sandip Kumar Mishra
Assistant Professor, Department of East Asian Studies, University of Delhi, and Visiting Fellow, IPCS

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The Security Implications Of New Mapping Technologies – Analysis

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Will digital mapping technologies such as GPS and Google Maps transform international politics? Jordan Branch thinks it’s possible. Just as the first map and atlas printers helped establish the territorial state as a dominant political unit, today’s mapping technologies may redistribute power in new ways.

By Jordan Branch*

Ten years ago, Google entered the online maps business and revolutionized our ability to navigate daily life. Thanks to the ubiquity of digital mapping, we may never get lost again. Google and its competitors have become the primary source for spatial information in everyday life, providing online maps, directions, and even turn-by-turn navigation on smartphones. Yet the effects of these tools go far beyond simply making travel easier: online mapping is reshaping everything from disaster relief to international boundary disputes. With the possibility for nearly anyone to create a map for almost any purpose, international political interactions are being transformed. Just as mapping helped to establish the territorial state as the dominant political unit in the modern world, new mapping tools and practices could be redistributing power in significant ways.

The cartographic state

Digital mapping tools have been applied to resolving political conflicts for at least two decades. At the 1995 Dayton negotiations, for example, computer mapping systems proved essential to drawing new boundaries and ending the Bosnian war, according to U.S. negotiators. The ability to show detailed, three-dimensional terrain and satellite imagery allowed U.S. general Wesley Clarke to convince Milosevic of the need for a defensible corridor to the Muslim enclave town of Gorazde. Since 2005, far more advanced tools have been available to the public, for free — yet this has not always encouraged peace. In 2010, as part of an ongoing border dispute between Nicaragua and Costa Rica, a Nicaraguan official referred to the depiction of the boundary on Google Maps to support his country’s claim and justify the movement of troops across the border. Google conferred with their source for boundary data — in this case, the U.S. State Department — and quickly adjusted their map to match the widely recognized Costa Rican claim. But the damage in this case had already been done, and conflicts over territory will only get more complex as the perceived authority of sources like Google continues to increase.

Traditional paper maps have shaped territorial conflicts and their resolutions for centuries. In the peace negotiations after World War I, for example, extensively researched maps of ethnic and linguistic groups were applied to Wilson’s aspiration of allowing self-determination for the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe. Yet this was not an easy or straightforward task: particularly in the Balkans, ethnic and racial divisions were difficult to map, and the history of conflict in the region has continued to testify to those challenges. During the same period in the Middle East, negotiators with very different goals used maps of oil resources and strategic interests to draw political boundaries, including divisions like the Sykes-Picot line recently “erased” by ISIS.

If we look at an earlier revolution in cartographic technology, however, an even more dramatic effect of mapping appears. Until five hundred years ago, maps were extraordinarily rare, and the few that existed served particular purposes, representing property ownership, cosmology, religious beliefs, or simplified geography. Then, in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Europe, maps as we currently know them emerged as a new and rapidly popularized medium. For the first time, mapping techniques incorporated surveying, mathematical projection methods, and the coordinate grid of latitude and longitude (previously used to map the position of the stars). Combined with the growth of printing, the result was a dramatic increase in the production and use of maps of all types. Maps went from being extraordinary rare artifacts to playing a part of innumerable everyday activities — from a few thousand maps circulating in all of Europe before 1500 A.D. to millions by 1600.

Rulers and their officials in particular came to see mapping as a useful tool, not only for governing their own territories but also for fighting and negotiating over the divisions between kingdoms. Over the course of several centuries — and many wars, negotiations, and peace settlements later — political organization took on the form that we know today : countries are defined by their mapped and demarcated boundaries and are expected to control all that takes place within those lines. Previously, rulers had laid claim over particular places, narrow jurisdictions, or groups of persons — without the use of linear boundaries separating sovereign territories. Medieval France’s frontiers, for example, were unclear, overlapping zones. The modern state of France is not simply larger than its predecessor; its clearly demarcated boundaries make it a fundamentally different type of political unit. In other words, the effects of mapping went well beyond disseminating information or enabling navigation; maps and their use cemented territorial states as the dominant political unit in the modern world.

The power of mapping

Today, empowered by Google Maps and other tools, ordinary people take part in mapmaking to an unprecedented degree. New online platforms (such as Ushahidi) enable immediate mapping of humanitarian crises and natural disasters, giving aid providers essential information in the aftermath of disasters like the 2010 Haiti earthquake . Crowd-sourced mapping projects (like OpenStreetMap) are constructing a user-created map of the entire world, with participation that would have been impossible before digital technologies. Poor and informal neighborhoods — marginalized in terms of public services because they do not appear on official records — have been mapped by the residents themselves, giving them a new way to find services, navigate safe routes, and for the first time put their homes, literally, on the map. Participating in these mapmaking projects may require a laptop or a smartphone, but no longer is mapmaking limited to those governments or institutions with the resources for labor-intensive surveying and map printing.

Digital mapping goes beyond making tasks easier. It enables new projects and encourages the pursuit of goals that were not even on the table before. Remarkably, some features of today’s technological revolution closely parallel the earlier period in which mapping had such a major impact. Today, as in early modern Europe, we see new techniques for mapmaking, rapidly increased map distribution and use, and control of mapping beyond the hands of governments. Politically, the ability to generate, organize, and disseminate knowledge has always been part of the power of mapping. That power is now being redistributed in revolutionary ways — both to users in crowd-sourced mapping projects and also to increasingly dominant web companies such as Google.

We simply do not know where this radical opening up of mapping may lead, just as the first map and atlas printers in the late sixteenth century did not foresee that their creations would instigate a fundamental political transformation. Taking a long-term view of technological change may be more difficult than focusing, as we typically do, on immediate “disruptions.” Yet it is the only way we can shape these outcomes and encourage such beneficial effects asincreased participation by disadvantaged groups or the creation of new forms of expression. It is already clear that the ubiquity of GPS and digital mapping tools can prevent us from getting lost as we navigate the world around us, but we are still in the dark concerning where, exactly, these new technological tools will take international politics.

*Jordan Branch, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Brown University, is author of The Cartographic State: Maps, Territory, and the Origins of Sovereignty (2014, Cambridge University Press).

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Europe Wants Gas From Turkmenistan By 2019

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The European Union wants to take gas deliveries from Turkmenistan from 2019, part of a determined drive to use Central Asia to weaken Russia’s grip over its energy supplies.

On a trip to Ashgabat, Maros Sefcovic, a European Commission vice-president and its top energy official, said gas could be sent to Europe from Turkmenistan either through a proposed pipeline that runs along the Caspian Sea floor or via Iran and then through neighbouring Turkey.

“Europe expects supplies of Turkmen gas to begin by 2019,” he said after meeting Turkmen president Kurbanguly Berdymukhamedov.

For years Europe and Turkmenistan have discussed the tantalising potential of Turkmen gas reaching European households, but Mr Sefcovic’s trip to Ashgabat and subsequent statement is the strongest indication yet that what once appeared rather fanciful could actually materialise.

And it would be a game-changer for Europe and Turkmenistan.

Europe is desperate to reduce Russia’s grip over its gas supplies, especially since the eruption of war in east Ukraine and the souring of relations with the Kremlin.

Turkmenistan, which holds the world’s fourth largest gas reserves and has been maturing its production process, is eager for more clients.

Currently China buys most of Turkmenistan’s gas. Europe, though, would be another large, stable client and it would propel Turkmenistan into the top division of global gas suppliers.

On his trip to Ashgabat, Mr Sefcovic also met with energy ministers from Azerbaijan and Turkey. The EU needs their support to pump Turkmen gas.

The stakes are high for both Europe and Turkmenistan.

This story was first published in Issue 230 of the weekly Conway Bulletin newspaper on May 6, 2015.

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General Election Result Signals A Move To The UK’s Euroscepticism

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The 2015 General Election was a “victory for Euroscepticism”, according to a politics expert at the University of Huddersfield who is the author of a freshly updated book on the rise of anti-EU sentiment in Britain.

UKIP did not make major inroads in terms of Parliamentary seats, but gained more than 12 percent of the popular vote. And a Conservative victory means that an in/out referendum is a certainty for 2017.

“Also, the fact that David Cameron has a very small majority means his Eurosceptic backbenchers, many of whom want complete withdrawal from the EU, are going to have a strong voice in the Parliamentary party and have an influence on Government,” said Dr Chris Gifford.

Gifford is Head of the Department of Behavioural and Social Sciences at the University of Huddersfield, and his book The Making of Eurosceptic Britain, first published in 2008, has now been revised to take in developments such as Eurozone crisis.

The Prime Minister’s Eurosceptic backbenchers will closely monitor and influence his attempts to negotiate with the EU, said Dr Gifford.

“They will keep a careful eye on what he is achieving in the European Union so that they get the kinds of reforms that they want, which includes some kind of repatriation of powers and restriction on the free movement of people.

“We have had an election that further embeds Euroscepticism in the political system,” concluded Dr Gifford.

Euroscepticism growing amongst the electorate

Gifford’s newly-revised book examines issues such as the political impact in the UK of the Eurozone debt crisis and asks if bank collapses and bailouts reinforced Britain’s Eurosceptic trajectory.

The Making of Eurosceptic Britain examines the extent to which Euroscepticism has become dominant within both the Conservative leadership and the bulk of its parliamentary party and how this affected the relationship of the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government with the European Union.

Gifford argues in the book that British Euroscepticism is structural in nature and a persistent and institutionalised feature of UK Politics.

Now the 2015 Election has added extra impetus to his analysis. UKIP took votes from both Tory and Labour supporters, he says, and the issue of immigration, especially from Central and Eastern Europe, has meant that Euroscepticism has become increasingly salient to large numbers of the electorate.

“UKIP has built a narrative that appeals to a certain section of the population,” said Gifford. “This is the idea is that Britain is a country in decline, symbolised by giving power to Europe, and letting too many immigrants. People’s values and sense of belonging are increasingly being threatened and UKIP is capitalising on those feelings.”

At the same time, an “elite consensus” over Europe has been weakened, according to Gifford.

“In certain sections of Whitehall and among the leadership of the main parties, there was a core who continued to believe that Britain’s place in the EU was something that this was essential and inevitable for a post-imperial power.

“But this has been increasingly challenged as Europe has become more of a populist issue, so we have seen Tories like Nigel Lawson and Boris Johnson saying that Britain could go it alone. You were once seen to be extremist if you believed that Britain should come out of the EU, but this has changed.”

Gifford believes that when an EU referendum is held, there will be a majority for staying in the EU, especially as younger voters tend to be more pro-European. But it could be a close call.

“My feeling is that it will be a narrow victory in favour, but it will depend on the campaign and on David Cameron’s ability to get the kind of reforms he is talking about.”

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Splitting Up Iraq – OpEd

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Iraq’s fate was sealed from the moment we invaded: it has no future as a unitary state … Iraq is fated to split apart into at least three separate states…This was the War Party’s real if unexpressed goal from the very beginning: the atomization of Iraq, and indeed the entire Middle East. Their goal, in short, was chaos – and that is precisely what we are seeing today.” — Justin Raimondo, editor Antiwar.com

A bill that could divide Iraq into three separate entities has passed the US House Armed Services Committee by a vote of  60 to 2.  The controversial draft bill will now be debated in the US House of Representatives where it will be voted on sometime in late May. If approved, President Barack Obama will be free to sidestep Iraq’s central government in Baghdad and provide arms and assistance directly to Sunnis and the Kurds that are fighting ISIS. This, in turn, will lead to the de facto partitioning of the battered country into three parts; Kurdistan, Shiastan, and Sunnistan.

The plan to break up Iraq has a long history dating back to Oded Yinon’s darkly prophetic 1982 article titled  “A Strategy for Israel in the Nineteen Eighties”. Yinon believed that Israel’s survival required that the Jewish state become a imperial regional power that “must effect the division of the whole area into small states by the dissolution of all existing Arab states … The Zionist hope is that sectarian-based states become Israel’s satellites and, ironically, its source of moral legitimation.” (The Zionist Plan for the Middle East, Israel Shahak)

The  GOP-led House Armed Services Committee’s bill embraces Yinon’s vision of a fragmented Iraq. (Note: Under the current bill, which is part of the 2016 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA),  as much as 60% of the proposed funds, or $429m, would flow directly to the “Kurdish Peshmerga, the Sunni tribal security forces with a national security mission, and the Iraqi Sunni National Guard”.) Providing weapons to Sunni militias and the Kurdish Peshmerga will inevitably lead to the disintegration of the country,  the ramping up of sectarian hostilities,  and the strengthening of extremist groups operating in the region.  It’s a prescription for disaster.  Here’s a brief excerpt from Yinon’s piece on Iraq:

“Iraq, rich in oil on the one hand and internally torn on the other, is guaranteed as a candidate for Israel’s targets. Its dissolution is even more important for us than that of Syria. Iraq is stronger than Syria. In the short run it is Iraqi power which constitutes the greatest threat to Israel … Every kind of inter-Arab confrontation will assist us in the short run and will shorten the way to the more important aim of breaking up Iraq into denominations as in Syria and in Lebanon. In Iraq, a division into provinces along ethnic/religious lines as in Syria during Ottoman times is possible. So, three (or more) states will exist around the three major cities: Basra, Baghdad and Mosul, and Shi’ite areas in the south will separate from the Sunni and Kurdish north.”  ( “A Strategy for Israel in the Nineteen Eighties”, Oded Yinon)

The fact that US and Israeli strategic objectives match up so closely calls into question the ISIS invasion of Iraq in 2014 when a two mile-long column of white land rovers loaded with 15,000 jihadis barreled across the open desert from Syria spewing clouds of dust into the atmosphere without being detected by US AWACs or state-of-the-art spy satellites. The logical explanation for this so called “intelligence failure” is that it was not a failure at all, but that Washington wanted the operation to go forward as it coincided with US-Israeli strategic aims. As it happens, the areas now controlled by the Kurds, the Sunnis and the Shia are very close to those projected by Yinon suggesting that the ISIS invasion was part of a broader plan from the very beginning.  That’s not to say that ISIS leaders take orders directly from Langley or the Pentagon. No. It merely implies that Washington uses the marauding horde for their own purposes.  In this case, ISIS provides the pretext for arming the Sunnis and Kurds, imposing new borders within the existing state,  creating easier access to vital resources, and eliminating a potential rival to US-Israel regional hegemony. The US needs an enemy to justify its constant meddling. ISIS provides that justification. Check this out from the Daily Star:

“The present ISIS lightning war in Iraq is the creation of an illusion to initiate the fulfillment of a pre-planned agenda of the West in close alliance with Israel to redraw the map of the entire region as the “New Middle East…..The chaos, destruction and devastation caused by the ISIS in its process of establishing the Sunni Islamic Caliphate in Iraqi and Syrian territories is the realisation of the intended policy of the US and the West to change public perception that the “War on Terror” was never a war waged by the West against Islam but a “war within Islam” along religious, ethnic and sectarian lines in the Islamic world…

The division of Iraq into three separate entities had also been strongly advocated by US Vice-President Joe Biden. Biden’s heritage and an analysis of his electoral constituents will help understand better his support for the fragmentation of Iraq under the Yinon Plan.” (The Yinon Plan and the role of ISIS, The Daily Star)

The Biden-Gelb plan, which was proposed in an op-ed in the New York Times in May 2006, called for the establishment of  “three largely autonomous regions” with Baghdad becoming a “federal zone.”  In other words, the powers of the Iraqi central government would be greatly reduced. The authors tried to soft-peddle their radical scheme as “decentralization” which is a milder term than the more accurate “partition”.  The authors, both of who are members of the powerful Council on Foreign Relations, obscure the real aims of the plan which is to weaken the country through dismemberment and to leave it in “a permanent state of colonial dependency.” (Chomsky)

Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi has denounced the proposed bill as an attempt to undermine his authority and rip the country apart.   In a recent phone conversation with Vice President Biden, Abadi expressed his opposition to the bill insisting that “only the Iraqi people can decide  the future of their country.”

Also, according to Press TV, Iraqi cleric, Muqtada al-Sadr,  warned that if congress passed the bill, he would order his Mahdi Army to resume hostilities against the US targets in Iraq.

“We are obliged to lift the freeze on our military wing … and begin hitting US interests in Iraq and outside it,” said Sadr, who once led the powerful Mahdi Army and still enjoys huge influence among the Shia population.

Although Obama doesn’t approve of the new bill’s wording,  his opposition is far from convincing.  Here’s what State Department spokesperson Marie Harf said on the matter at a recent briefing: “The policy of this Administration is clear and consistent in support of a unified Iraq. We’ve always said a unified Iraq is stronger, and it’s important to the stability of the region as well.”

“Clear and consistent”?  When has US policy in the Middle East ever been clear and consistent?  Is it clear and consistent in Libya, Syria, or Yemen where jihadi militias are armed and supported either directly or indirectly by Washington or its allies?  Is US policy clear and consistent in Ukraine where far-right neo-Nazi extremists are trained and given logistical support by the US to fight a proxy war against Russia?

Sure, Obama wants to make it look like he opposes the bill, but how much of that is just public relations?  In truth, the administration is on the same page as the Congress, they just want to be more discreet about it.  Here’s  Harf again: “We look forward to working with Congress on language that we could support on this important issue.”

Indeed, the administration wants to tweak the wording for the sake of diplomacy, but that’s the extent of their opposition.  In fact,  the House Armed Services Committee has already complied with this request and removed the offending clause from the bill (asking for recognition of the Peshmerga and Sunni tribal militias as “countries”)  while, at the same time,  “maintaining that some of the military aid should go directly to the two forces fighting ISIS….”

So they deleted a couple words from the text but meaning remains the same. Also, according to Huffington Post:

“Rep. Michael McCaul (R-Texas) said Sunday he wants to identify “a way to streamline the process of getting the weapons to both the Sunni tribes and the [Kurds] … while at the same time not undermining the government of Iraq in Baghdad.”

There’s no way to “streamline the process” because the two things are mutually exclusive, Abadi has already said so. If Obama gives weapons to the Sunnis and the Kurds, the country is going to split up. It’s that simple.

So how has Obama responded to these latest developments?

Last week he met with Kurdish president Masoud Barzani in Washington. Here’s what happened:

“Asked by Kurdish outlet Rudaw whether he had secured any commitments on a change to the policy from President Barack Obama and Vice President Joe Biden when he met with them Tuesday, Barzani responded, “Both the vice president and the president want the peshmerga to get the right weapons and ammunition. … The important point here is that the peshmerga get weapons. How they will come, in which way, that’s not as important as the fact that peshmerga need weapons to be in their hands.”  (Kurdish Leader Aligns With White House Over Congress On ISIS Strategy, Huffington Post)

So Obama basically told Barzani he’d get the weapons he wanted. (wink, wink)

Can you see what a sham this is?   Iraq’s fate is sealed. As soon as Congress approves the new defense bill, Obama’s going to start rushing weapons off to his new buddies in the Kurdish north and the so called Sunni triangle.  That’s going to trigger another vicious wave of sectarian bloodletting that will rip the country to shreds.

And that’s the goal, isn’t it: To split the country into three parts, to improve access to vital resources,  and to eliminate a potential rival to US-Israel regional hegemony?

You know it is.

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Netanyahu And A Day And Night-Mare – OpEd

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BINYAMIN NETANYAHU seems to be detested now by everyone. Almost as much as his meddling wife, Sarah’le.

Six weeks ago, Netanyahu was the great victor. Contrary to all opinion polls, he achieved a surprise victory at the last moment, winning 30 seats in the 120-member Knesset, leaving the Labor Party (re-branded “The Zionist Camp”) well behind him.

The extra seats did not come from the Left. They came from his nearest competitors, the Rightist parties.

However, it was a great personal triumph. Netanyahu was on top of his world. Sarah’le was radiant. Netanyahu left no doubt that he was now the master, and that he was determined to order things according to his wishes.

This week he had his comeuppance. On the very last day of the period allotted to him by law to set up his new government, he was near desperation.

AN OLD Hebrew saying puts it succinctly: “Who is a hero? He who turns an enemy into a friend.”

In this sense, Netanyahu is an anti-hero. He has a peculiar talent for turning friends into enemies. Sarah’le is a great help in this.

Winston Churchill once advised that at the moment of victory, one should be magnanimous. Magnanimity is not one of Netanyahu’s outstanding virtues. He made it clear that he, and he alone, was now the master.

Right after the election Netanyahu decreed that the next government would be a narrow coalition of orthodox and rightist parties, which would be able at long last to do the things he really wants to do: put an end to this two-state nonsense, castrate the Supreme Court, muzzle the media and much more.

Everything went just fine. Netanyahu was invited by the President of the State to form the next government, coalition talks went smoothly, and the contours of the coalition were clear: Likud, the Ashkenazi orthodox Torah party, the Oriental orthodox Shas party, Moshe Kahlon’s new economic reform party, Naftali Bennett’s nationalist-religious party and Avigdor Lieberman’s ultra-rightist party. Altogether: a comfortable 67 of the 120 Knesset members.

Party chiefs don’t have lo love each other to set up a coalition. They don’t even have to like each other. But it is not really very comfortable to sit together in a government when they hate and despise each other.

THE FIRST to throw a bomb was Avigdor Lieberman.

Lieberman is not considered a “real” Israeli. He looks different, speaks with a very thick foreign accent, his mind seems to work in a different way. Although he came to Israel decades ago, he is still considered “a Russian”. Actually he came from Soviet Moldavia.

There is a saying that has been attributed to Stalin: Revenge is best served cold. This Tuesday, 48 hours before the end of the time allotted by law to the formation of the new government, Lieberman dropped his bomb.

In the election, Lieberman lost more than half of his strength to Likud, shrinking to six seats. In spite of this, Netanyahu assured him that he could retain his post as Foreign Minister. It was a cheap concession, since Netanyahu makes all important foreign policy decisions himself.

All of a sudden, without any provocation, Lieberman convened a press conference and made a momentous announcement: he was not joining the new government.

Why? All Lieberman’s personal demands had been satisfied. The pretexts were obviously contrived. For example, he wants “terrorists” to be executed, a demand resolutely resisted by all security services, who believe (quite rightly) that creating martyrs is a very bad idea. Lieberman also wants to send to prison orthodox youngsters who refuse to serve in the army, a ridiculous demand from a government in which the orthodox parties play a central role. And so on.

It was a clear and blatant act of revenge. Obviously Lieberman had taken the decision right from the beginning but kept it secret until the very last moment, when there was no time for Netanyahu to change the composition of the government by inviting, for example, the Labor Party.

It was indeed revenge served cold.

WITHOUT THE six members of Lieberman’s party, Netanyahu still has a majority of 61, just enough to present the government to the Knesset and get a vote of confidence. Just.

A 61-member government is a continuous nightmare. I would not wish it on my own worst enemy.

In such a situation, no member of the coalition parties can go abroad, for fear of a sudden opposition motion of no-confidence. For Israelis, that is a fate worse than death. The only way for a coalition MK to travel to Paris would be to make an agreement with a member of the opposition who wants to go, say, to Las Vegas. Hand Washes Hand, as the saying goes.

But there is a much worse day-and-night-mare for Netanyahu: in a 61-member coalition, “every bastard is a king”‘ as a Hebrew saying goes. Each and every member can obstruct any bill produced by the government, allow any opposition motion to win, absent himself from any crucial vote.

Every day would be a field day for blackmail of all kinds. Netanyahu would be compelled to accede to every whim of every member. Even in Greek mythology no such torture was ever invented.

THE FIRST example was given already on the very first day after the Lieberman bomb.

Bennett, who had not yet signed the coalition agreement, found himself in a position in which there would be no Netanyahu government without him. He racked his brains on how to exploit the situation and get something more than was already promised to him (and humiliate Netanyahu in the process). He came up with the demand that Ayelet Shaked become Minister of Justice.

Shaked is the beauty queen of the new Knesset. In spite of her 38 years, she has a girlish appearance. She has also a beautiful name: Ayelet means gazelle, Shaked means almonds.

Her mother was a leftist teacher, but her Iraqi-born father was a rightist Likud central committee member. She follows in his footsteps.

This almond-eyed gazelle excels in political activities based on hatred: an intense hatred of Arabs, leftists, homosexuals and foreign refugees. She has authored a steady stream of extreme rightist bills. Among them the atrocious bill that says that the “Jewish character” of Israel takes precedence over democracy and overrides basic laws. Her incitement against the helpless refugees from Sudan and Eritrea, who have somehow succeeded in reaching Israel, is just a part of her untiring efforts. Though the No. 2 of a rabid religious party, she is not religious at all.

The relationship between her and Bennett started when both were employees of Netanyahu’s political office, when he was leader of the opposition. Somehow, they both incurred the wrath of Sara’le, who never forgets or forgives. By the way, the same happened to Lieberman, also a former director of Netanyahu’s office.

So now is payment day. Netanyahu tortured Bennett during the negotiations, letting him sweat for days. Bennett used the opportunity after Lieberman’s desertion and put up a new condition for joining the coalition: Shaked must be Minister of Justice.

Netanyahu, bereft of any practical alternative, gave in to open blackmail. It was that or no government.

So now the gazelle is in charge of the Supreme Court, which she detests. She will choose the next Attorney General (known in Israel as the “judicial advisor”) and stuff the committee that appoints the judges. She will also be in charge of the ministers’ committee that decides which bills will be presented by the government to the Knesset – and which not.

Not a very promising situation for the Only Democracy in the Middle East.

NETANYAHU IS too experienced not to know that he cannot à la longue govern with such a shaky coalition. He needs at least one more partner in the near future. But where to find one?

The Arab party is obviously out. So is Meretz. So is Yair Lapid’s party, for the simple reason that the orthodox will not sit with him in the government. So only the Labor Party (aka Zionist Camp) is left.

Frankly, I believe that Yitzhak Herzog would jump at the opportunity. He must know by now that he is not the popular tribune needed to lead his party to power. He has neither the stature of an Apollo nor the tongue of a Netanyahu. He has never voiced an original idea nor led a successful protest.

Moreover, the Labor Party has never excelled in opposition. It was the party in power for 45 consecutive years before and after the founding of the state. As an opposition party it is pathetic, and so is “Buji” Herzog.

Joining Netanyahu’s government in a few months would be ideal for Herzog. There is never a lack of pretexts – we experience at least once a month a National Emergency that demands National Unity. A little war, trouble with the UN and such. (Though John Kerry this week gave an interview to Israeli TV that was a masterpiece of abject, belly-crawling self-humiliation.)

Getting Herzog won’t be easy. Labor is not a monolithic body. Many of its functionaries do not admire Herzog, consider Bennett a fascist and Netanyahu a habitual liar and cheat. But the allures of government are strong, ministerial chairs are so comfortable.

My bet: Netanyahu, the great survivor, will survive.

The post Netanyahu And A Day And Night-Mare – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Portugal, United States And Lajes Field: The Tail Wagging The Dog? – Analysis

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By Paulo Gorjåo*

On April 21, the Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs Rui Machete met in Washington with US Secretary of State John Kerry. As expected, the meeting’s content is unknown in detail. All we know is that among the themes covered may have been the state of events in Ukraine, terrorism, maritime security, the Middle East (notably the agreement reached with Iran) and, of course, the Lajes Field. Although some of the themes are un- likely to have been more than a mere formal chat, others cer- tainly had greater substance. I would even dare to say that Iraq, the Gulf of Guinea and the Lajes Airfield were, in an increasing order, the main courses.

Let us start with Iraq: In line with the Portuguese strategy of actively contributing to global security, the government not long ago declared its support for the international coalition against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). In this context, Machete formally announced in Washington that Portugal had decided to send 30 troops to help prepare and capacitate Iraqi armed forces. As the diplomatic protocol dictates, Kerry showed his appreciation for Portugal’s support in the campaign against ISIL and its commitment in the fight against terrorism. Naturally, it will not be 30 Portuguese troops that will make a difference in the fight against ISIL, but nonetheless, the Portuguese presence is worthy for the diplomatic and political signal that it sends.

Regarding maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea, the European Union (EU) and NATO intend to support, in a more active manner, regional countries in the fight against piracy and drug-trafficking. Portugal has every interest—and privileged conditions—to assume a major role in that context. Considering this, it is certain that Machete presented, in a detailed
manner, his arguments to Kerry, in favor of the establishment of a Maritime Security Center focused on the Gulf of Guinea, in Portugal.

However, the main theme discussed during the meeting was unquestionably the reduction of the US contingent at Lajes Field. As I have mentioned in a previous article, there is no doubt that it is in Portugal’s and United States’ best interests to reach a compromise as soon as possible. The Lajes issue is threatening to become a matter of domestic policy in Portugal and an arena for partisan politics, bringing with it potential negative repercussions for bilateral relations. In other words, the Lajes Field issue risks becoming an unwanted tail wagging the dog.

I abstain from pointing fingers to those who may be responsible for this situation. What matters is that the Lajes issue gets sorted out at the earliest possible moment and in line with both countries’ interests. After all, the relationship between Portugal and the United States—and, in a broader sense, the Trans-Atlantic relations—goes beyond Lajes Field.

Let us look at the recent economic data: in 2014, the United States was the tenth largest investor in Portugal (around 1.9% of total foreign direct investment). According to AICEP, for the last five years the trade balance has been “widely favorable” to Portugal—the United States was the sixth largest recipient for Portuguese exports and the second most important outside the EU. Adding to this, once negotiations between the EU and the United States for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership are completed, transatlantic relations—and the bilateral ones in particular—will certainly benefit from an additional boost.

Some observers may affirm that bilateral relations are more important to Portugal than to the United States. May be so. However, in a globalized international system, in which power relations are undergoing a transformation, the arithmetic will possibly be more complex than it may seem at first glance. The fact is that both sides have more to lose than to win with the deterioration in bilateral relations. This becomes even more serious when the reason for such a deterioration is a matter that, although important, is nevertheless of a second-ranking priority.

In any case, it will not take long to realize whether what prevailed was a particular short-sightedness or a concern over the wider political and diplomatic picture. The next US-Portugal Permanent Bilateral Commission meeting is scheduled for June 16, 2015 in Washington, where the reduction of the American contingent at Lajes Field will be discussed. Then, we will see whether Lajes Field is indeed the tail wagging the dog or the bilateral relationship returns to normalcy in due time.

About the author:
*Paulo Goråjo, Portuguese Institute of International Relations and Security (IPRIS)

Source:
This article was published by IPRIS as IPRIS Viewpoints No. 174, May (PDF)

The post Portugal, United States And Lajes Field: The Tail Wagging The Dog? – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

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