If your top salespeople exceed their sales targets, do you raise those targets for the next year? What happens if a positive bump was only temporary and your best talent is left discouraged by performance goals that are ever harder to reach?

In other words, what is the best way to set targets that motivate, help with planning, but don’t fall prey to the “ratchet effect”?

Carmen Aranda and Javier Arellano of the University of Navarra and Tony Dávila of IESE study ratcheting and target setting over five years at a large travel company. They conclude that setting relative targets, based on comparable peer performances and benchmarks, is better than looking at individuals’ past performances alone. In other words, relative target setting enhances contracting to help supervisors avoid the ratchet effect, where employees deliberately reduce their efforts to lower future expectations.

The Ratchet Effect at Work

Too often, work targets are routine adjustments based simply on historical performance. This is known as ratcheting. Once employees recognize the predictable pattern, negative consequences may set in.

Over the long run, employees avoid exceeding targets if they know it will inflate future expectations. They may deliberately limit their efforts in a bid to temper future goals. This is known as the “ratchet effect” and it gets in the way of optimal firm performance.

For supervisors, it is key to know if great results come from temporary or permanent improvements. Increased efforts are considered temporary because there are limits to how much individual effort can be increased over time. If targets are ratcheted up, extraordinary (distorted) efforts cannot possibly be sustained over the long run.

In contrast, when productivity gains stem from greater efficiency, such as the introduction of new technology, they are more likely to persist.

A Study of Branches

The co-authors study 376 branches of a large retail travel company. The branches, located in 18 distinct regions, all sell the same products, have a similar size and complexity, and have similar marketing and operations practices. In other words, comparing the branches’ performances and target setting practices over five years allows the researchers to glean some very practical insights.

Taking into account the performance metrics of other, similar units allows managers to observe if positive (or negative) trends are likely to be temporary or permanent and adjust targets accordingly to the new objectives.

The co-authors note that ratcheting targets upwards goes better with permanent efficiency gains, when a rising tide is lifting all ships. In this scenario, individual employees tend to recognize that limiting their own efforts will have a limited impact. In contrast, the savvy managers look to the firm averages to limit ratcheting if their employees’ gains came from extraordinary individual efforts.

Meanwhile, shrewd managers set new targets based on general performance results seen throughout the company, and not on positive results that are due to extraordinary individual efforts and are, therefore, unsustainable.

Better Information, Better Targets

Relative target setting can incorporate information from other branches, divisions and even industry competitors. Relative target setting improves the quality of supervisors’ targets for better results.

Overall, by having more information to work with — information that looks sideways and not just at the past to set goals — companies can reduce negative effects of ratcheting, while motivating employees more effectively to maximize efforts for everyone’s benefit.

The post The Tao Of Target Setting appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Shastri Ramachandaran*

The Royal Danish Embassy in New Delhi is a reminder that Denmark has fallen off the map of India’s Ministry of External Affairs (MEA). Neither the change at the helm – from Manmohan Singh as prime minister to Narendra Modi – nor foreign secretary Sujatha Singh being replaced by S Jaishankar has altered Denmark’s situation.

The Government of India (GoI) barely acknowledges the Danish embassy as a diplomatic entity, which is kept out of official programmes. However, the embassy does not deny a visa to any Indian, including journalists, who want to visit the land of Hans Christian Andersen, known for famous fairy tales, including The Little Mermaid and The Emperor’s New Clothes.

Therefore, not many know that India-Denmark relations are at their lowest. Only in Denmark, on meeting Danes who didn’t get a visa, it becomes apparent that India does not issue visas to Danish media people and even those in government, politics and culture. So few are favoured with visas to India, that it is hard to say who would not be turned away.

Four years ago, a Danish TV crew came on a tourist visa and made a dubious film. Despite GoI’s warning that the film was shot in violation of visa conditions, the state broadcaster aired it. This seemed a provocation at a time when ties were already strained by Copenhagen’s refusal to appeal the court order, in 2011, against extraditing Kim Davey – wanted by India’s Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) in the Purulia arms drop case. Besides, there were other issues – including Danish media’s cartoons of the Prophet, which Indians and New Delhi found objectionable – vitiating bilateral relations.

The government of the day made matters worse by citing India’s atrocious human rights record and abominable prison system to justify its refusal to extradite the terrorist Kim Davey. In spite of such righteous posturing, a year later – in 2012 –Denmark made diplomatic overtures to Prime Minister Narendra Modi to show its displeasure at the previous government consigning it to the diplomatic doghouse.

Long before the British High Commissioner re-opened, in October 2012, the so-called international community’s line to Modi, the Danish ambassador was already talking to him. MEA officials concluded that the ambassador was unlikely to have acted on his own in this matter. The same country, as part of the same “international community”, had isolated Modi for the 2002 massacre of Muslims in Gujarat under his watch. Now it was cosying up to Modi.

Change of governments in Denmark had not changed the Danish stand. Yet Copenhagen believed that after the elections, when Modi replaced Manmohan Singh, Denmark would be back in favour. Months after Modi became Prime Minister, Denmark remained isolated.

In a desperate bid, the Danish prime minister (PM) sought to attend the Vibrant Gujarat summit, but in vain. When Jaishankar became foreign secretary, not granting a visa to the Danish PM for the summit was listed among the “sins” of Sujatha Singh, which earned her Modi’s wrath. Jaishankar is very much in command of the MEA. Yet there is no sign of the visa regime being relaxed for Danes.

In diplomatic and media circles in New Delhi and Copenhagen, the talk is about how such exercise of visa power reflects on India and its democracy. No one argues against Denmark as State and government being isolated for its transgressions. But why punish the Danish people alone when India does not deny visas to visitors from even “enemy countries” like Pakistan, is the oft-asked question in places where it matters. It is time Delhi came up with an answer.

*This article first appeared in DNA and is being reproduced by arrangement with the writer, an independent political commentator.

The post India-Denmark Relations At Their Lowest – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Dr. Serafettin Yilmaz*

First announced by Chinese President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang in October 2014, the AIIB (The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank) has attracted a great deal of attention over the past few months. Proposed as an institution to exclusively focus on infrastructure development in Asia, the Bank is to have a $50 billion startup capital, which later will be raised to $100 billion.

The fact that Washington publicly attempted to dissuade its allies and partners from joining the AIIB, the growing list of membership which was snowballed after the United Kingdom declared its interest to join has been viewed by many as yet another sign of China’s growing economic and geopolitical clout. Indeed, of the notable US allies, only Japan, the de facto leader of the Asian Development Bank (ADP) and Washington’s most trusted strategic partner in the Asia-Pacific, declined to make a formal application.

Beijing set March 31 as the final day to enlist in the Bank as a prospective founding member. By the time the deadline approached, a total of 57 nations were approved with only North Korea and Taiwan’s applications being rejected. The rejection of the former has been due to its non-transparent economy. The rejection of the latter, on the other hand, has been due to the two sides’ disagreement over the title under which Taipei would be represented in the AIIB. So far, however, only scant interest has been shown to the failed applications.

Taiwan submitted its letter of intent to join the AIIB on March 31st to Taiwan’s Affairs Office of the State Council (TAO), the agency which handles the relations with Taipei, pledging to invest $200 million. By its skeptics, the decision to apply via TAO, rather than Ministry of Foreign Affairs as was the case with other applicants, could give the impression that Taipei conceded to the One China framework. The criticism leveled at the Ma Ying-jeou administration also included the oft-repeated argument that the decision had been made behind the closed doors and the society and the opposition had been left uninformed on the issue.

As a matter of fact, Beijing made it clear from the beginning that Taiwan’s application would have to comply with the “requirement that the island not be identified as a separate country.” Initially there was considerable optimism with respect to a consensus on the appropriate title for Taiwan within the AIIB. The approaching high-level meeting between officials from the two sides at the 11th round of cross-Straits talks was slated as an important platform to overcome the deadlock.

However, the sides failed to reach an agreement. Taipei missed the opportunity to become a founding member as Taiwan’s proposal to be admitted under the name of Chinese Taipei as a bottom line has been thwarted by Beijing. As it stands today, the rejection is a major loss for Taipei’s drive to be more closely integrated into the regional and global development network, given that Taipei is already largely isolated from most of the integration schemes, be they bilateral or multilateral.

It follows that the concern of those who argued for Taiwan’s participation in the AIIB and warned against the negative implications of a missed founding member status is justified. Those who urged Taiwan not to take part in the proposed institution and downplayed its importance and prospects seem to have failed to fully grasp the importance for Taiwan to secure a seat in the grouping.

Although, provided that a consensus is reached on the title, Taiwan can still find a place as a regular member as long as a political will toward this direction exists, a founding member status would definitely have been more valuable since it would give Taiwan the right to have a say in the writing of the Bank’s charter as well as a greater weight in the body’s decision-making process.

Nonetheless, a prospective AIIB membership is crucial for Taiwan in normative, political and economic respects and hence should be encouraged. Normatively, AIIB offers Taipei a chance to break away from the existing perception crisis which has been further aggravated by the concentrated protests in Taiwan which crippled the efforts to launch the Cross-Strait Services Trade Agreement (CSSTA) that aimed to bring greater economic synergy and benefit to both sides. Admittedly, the existing status quo will not be altered entirely with Taiwan’s participation, but nonetheless, it would count as major step toward bridging the normative gap across the Straits.

Politically, further interaction between China and Taiwan would certainly help improve Taiwan’s interconnectedness and importance as new linkages are cast in the Asia-Pacific. Taipei’s isolation from major decision-making structures would be compensated to some degree, which, in the final analysis, would count as an improvement over the present status quo. Realistically speaking, political differences are here to stay across the Straits, but, given the size and potential extent of the newly-launched institution, a meaningful membership will certainly offer Taipei a larger room for maneuver. The fact that countries such as Vietnam and the Philippines have joined the Bank despite the existing territorial disputes demonstrates that differences can be shelved for larger benefits. In this particular case, then, the onus of seeking a workable solution with Beijing has been on Taipei.

Obviously, a real, tangible contribution of the AIIB is the anticipated economic benefits. The Bank’s primary objective is clearly stated in its title. It is likely that, other than the geopolitical interests, what has driven over 50 states to join the Bank is the anticipated economic gains that come from taking part in the infrastructure development of the world’s most dynamic region that hosts a number of nations in need of large scale investment.

No doubt, infrastructure is the key word with a wide range of applications that extends from physical structures to information and communication technologies (ICT) and other information-related industries that help operate and connect all these tangible assets. Taiwan, with its well-developed ICT base, could be a major contributor and beneficiary of China’s new drive for regional interconnectedness given that it already occupies a significant space in the supply chain of ICT industrial cluster networks.

Thus, a regular membership would still offer Taiwan numerous advantages. A certain level of participation should be preferable over no participation. In short, apart from an improvement in cross-Straits relationship, joining the AIIB could provide Taipei further regional and global economic linkages, reinforce its global standing within its existing political capacity and promise considerable benefits in terms of taking part in intra and inter-regional development projects.

Those who object Taiwan’s efforts to find a seat within the AIIB should be reminded of the unfavorable status quo which, realistically, does not allow much room to Taiwan and becomes a greater burden each passing day as has been reflected in the fatalism observed in Taipei’s internal politics. The existing deadlock is obvious, but it hardly makes sense to force Taipei to further isolate itself even when it has an opportunity to participate in a development-oriented institution under an appropriate name.

It is becoming clear that, with it ever increasing aggregate national power, China is now an indispensable country for the regional and global development. Therefore, the cost of missing out on China-led development schemes has grown significantly just as the rewards are multiplied for every actor, something that the overall interest in the AIIB proves. Especially when the existing international structures are far from satisfying in the right way the development-related needs of the rising East Asia, the price of an exclusion from a major institution can hardly be stressed enough. What appear to be at stake for Taipei are not only direct economic benefits but also intangibles that include prestige and influence.

Apparently, the risk of inciting fierce opposition and crippling protests (however one might argue that these do not necessarily represent the entirety of the Taiwanese society) have deterred the administration from taking a bold move regardless of the fact that Taiwan is a member of the ADB under the name of “Taipei, China,” and therefore a similar arrangement would not make much difference in the status quo. Nevertheless, shying away from the AIIB will mostly remain a one-directional move, in the same line with the forced freeze on the implementation of the next steps proposed under the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA). Economic vitality and relevance is as important as political viability. Taiwan would do better if it capitalized on its strengths rather than sacrificed strengths for weaknesses.

*Dr. Serafettin Yilmaz (姚仕帆) is a researcher and former recipient of Academia Sinica’s Doctoral Student Fellowship. His research interests include critical IR theory, China and major power relations, and energy security. His most recent publications have appeared on Issues and Studies and Chinese Journal of Political Science. He can be reached at syilmaz1864@yandex.com.

The post The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank And Taiwan – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Ali Ahmed*

From separate media reports on ‘massive’ exercises in India’s western deserts, we learn that India’s premier ‘strike’ corps, two Corps (Kharga Corps), and a ‘pivot’ corps, 10 Corps (Chetak Corps), are being exercised. Interestingly, media reports that carry mention of the two Corps exercise, ‘Exercise Brahmashira’, make no mention of the other exercise, Exercise Akraman II of 10 Corps, and vice versa.

It would seem that the two are not interconnected. However, this is improbable since the exercises are taking place in the same geographic area, Suratgarh sector. Therefore, it can be plausibly be inferred that a pivot corps and a strike crops are exercising together. What are the implications?

Pivot corps are erstwhile ‘holding’ corps in a defensive role. India’s doctrine, now a decade old, converted these into ‘pivot’ corps, equipping each with an offensive element, termed ‘integrated battle group’. From the name of the pivot corps exercise, Akraman (attack) II, it is likely that the Chetak corps exercise is to practice its integrated battle groups (IBG).

Each of India’s three strike corps is orbited to one of the three geographic commands facing Pakistan. Kharga Corps, under Western Command, is reasonably understood to operate in the developed plains sector in Punjab which Western Command faces. However, strike corps, owing to their inherent mobility, are able to achieve surprise. Therefore, they can be launched across the entire front at any point. In this case, it appears that the Kharga Corps is being put through its paces in the semi-developed terrain opposite South Western Command.

In the doctrine, while the initial offensives are launched by division-sized IBGs of pivot corps and of strike corps formations located closer to the border, the remainder of the strike corps mobilizes in their wake. It can use the areas already captured by IBGs for jump off for battles within enemy territory.

Clearly, in light of possible Pakistani nuclear thresholds, one salient exit point from conflict for both sides is therefore prior to launch of strike corps. Pakistan may be able to countenance shallow thrusts by IBGs along the front with greater equanimity than deeper thrusts that could potentially threaten its vital areas and communication networks in greater depth by strike corps in deep battle.

In this case in the semi-developed sector there is arguably greater space for strike corps operations without flirting inordinately with the proverbial nuclear threshold as would be the case in developed terrain, say, opposite Lahore.

Therefore, if in the current exercise the strike corps is advertised as rehearsing maneuvers that ‘will allow the Army formations to break through multiple obstacles within a restricted time frame’, then the army expects sufficient space for territorial gains and attrition of Pakistani reserves without the nuclear factor intervening. Presumably, this is so in the desert sector further south too, where another strike corps, 21 Corps, is slated to operate under Southern Command.

Pakistan has in its testing of a tactical nuclear weapon hinted at a lower nuclear threshold precisely to stay such operations by India’s strike corps in their tracks. India, for its part, is exhibiting nonchalance by going about an exercise that takes the strike corps across multiple obstacle systems to indicate that it is not self-deterred from using its conventional advantage.

The two states are playing a ‘game of chicken’.

The questionable part is in the doctrine being practiced envisages strike corps operations in depth areas. This does not lend confidence to whether India’s 2004 ‘Cold Start’ doctrine that was revised in 2010 is sufficiently cognizant of the criticism that had greeted its release in 2004. The critique primarily had two points: one is the short time window for crisis response since IBGs were to be launched in short order, and second, that deep operations could trigger nuclear thresholds.

Unlike the 2004 doctrine, the 2010 revised version is not in the open domain. Last heard, a leak at the turn of the decade in late 2009 had it that the 2004 doctrine was under revision in the form of the ‘two front’ doctrine. That it has been thereafter adopted has not been made known in a press release as is the form in India. Can it be that the confidentiality owes to the military neglecting the critique in its revision of doctrine?

If this is the case with revision of the conventional doctrine, it is possible that such doctrinal reticence can also attend India’s nuclear doctrine. Nuclear doctrine revision had found controversial mention last year in the run up to elections. India’s reaching out under Mr. Modi to Japan had resulted in the revision being shelved. However, given the manner the new edition of the conventional doctrine has been kept internal to the military, a shift from declaratory nuclear doctrine of 2003 cannot be ruled out.

Currently, India envisages ‘massive’ nuclear retaliation to any form of nuclear first use by Pakistan. However, if its army formations are practicing maneuvers that could trigger tactical nuclear first use by Pakistan, it is possible that India is prepared with the more appropriate nuclear retaliatory response: proportional retaliation. Deterrence may be tending towards nuclear war-fighting, something India’s nuclear trajectory of delivery vehicles and nuclear ordnance enables.

Had the doctrinal space been less opaque, it would have been easier to substantiate this argument and raise a timely warning. India would do well to revert to doctrinal transparency in order that it benefit from the doctrinal debate that follows. In the nuclear age, how the state intends to defend the nation is a legitimate public query. A reading of the exercises underway does not inspire confidence India is sufficiently mindful of the nuclear overhang.

*Ali Ahmed, PhD, is author of India’s Doctrine Puzzle: Limiting War in South Asia (Routledge 2014), On War in South Asia and On Peace in South Asia (CinnamonTeal 2015). He blogs at www.ali-writings.blogspot.in.

The post This Year’s Maneuver Season In India – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Nurzhanat Ametbek*

During the commemorations of the 100th anniversary of the Armenian deportation, many experts looked to China with increasing attention noting China’s own painful experience during WWII under a violent Japanese occupation. Armenians expected China to condemn the mass deportations of ethnic Armenians during the Ottoman era as ‘genocide’. Some influential Armenian activists in Russia have even called on China to become more involved in Caucasian affairs, as they believe the country could act as a balancing power in the region. The commemorations are also occurring at a time during which Turkey and China are trying to deepen their relations, but if the special relationship between Turkey and Azerbaijan is taken into consideration, China’s attitude becomes all the more salient.

The Armenian Community is active in China

Last week, China’s Armenian community organized a landmark series of cultural and artistic events in China’s big cities like Beijing, Nanjing and Shanghai. On April 24, an Armenian cultural evening was held in Shanghai. That same night, the Embassy of the Republic of Armenia in Beijing arranged a showing of a documentary entitled “Andin: Armenian Journey Chronicles” directed by renowned documentary filmmaker Ruben Giney. The film recounts the long history of Armenians in China and the historical links between the two civilizations.

Yet the main highlight of the weekend was the public gathering in Nanjing, where Japanese troops massacred hundreds of thousands of Chinese during World War II. In the minds of many Chinese, as with the ‘Armenian Genocide’, the Nanjing Massacre is an event that still goes unrecognized by its perpetrators. These commemorations presented Armenian history, art, and culture to the Chinese people, and were dedicated to the remembrance of the 1915 Events.

Armenians have strong financial support for overseas activities

Chinese media reports that Armenia is able to engage in a greater amount of activity due to its strong financial support. To make more countries recognize the deportations as genocide is an important part of Armenian public diplomacy and also the main goal of the lobbying activities of the Armenian diaspora community scattered throughout the world.

This year is the 100th anniversary of the Armenian deportations, and it has thus coincided with a greater scope and scale of commemorations across the globe. Among the large number of Armenian people currently living abroad, most of them are ancestors of the Armenians who had escaped from the deportation and settled abroad 100 years ago. Similar with the Jewish people, Armenians are also seen as shrewd and successful businessmen; therefore, the overseas activities of Armenians usually have strong financial support.

Armenians expected China to condemn the deportations

In commemoration of the 100th anniversary of the Armenian deportations, groups across the globe upped their efforts to influence various countries’ position on the matter. According to influential Russian-Armenian Union leader Arbor Lamy Yang, Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan, in a meeting with Chinese leaders during his visit to Beijing about a month ago, asked China to recognize the Armenian deportation as genocide and expressed that he looked forward to China’s condemnation of the so-called 1915 Events.

Between 1915 and 1917, the Ottoman government forced Armenians living in modern day Turkey to emigrate en masse, killing as many as 1.5 million ethnic Armenians in the process. As reported by Baihua, Arbor Lamy Yang said that although the responses of the Chinese leaders to the genocide allegations as well as the results of their meeting with Sargsyan were not publicized, Armenians are still looking forward to hearing China’s opinion on the issue as a growing influential power.

Arbor Lamy Yang also said that it would be very important for Armenians were China to speak out on the issue. If the Chinese government and the Chinese people condemn the 1915 Events as genocide, this would be of great emblematic support for Armenians and Armenia would in turn be forever grateful to China. Armenia is one of Russia’s closest allies, and also an important pillar of support for Russia in the Caucasus region. Here, while Russia supports Armenia on the one hand, it conscientiously tries to avoid offending its traditional rival Turkey on the other.

Over the past few years, China has also been strengthening its relations with Turkey as expected. At the same time, China’s influence is growing in the former Soviet Union countries. Here, another Russian-Armenian activist said that while the Caucasus region has many nationalities, the relations between which are very complicated, Armenia expects to introduce China into the Caucasus region as a balancing power.

Baihua also referred to the opinion of some Armenian activists that it would be very beneficial for China to emerge as a stabilizing force in the southern Caucasus, where Armenia is located, as the region is host to a number of potential and frozen conflicts. They have expressed hope that China will become more involved in the affairs of the South Caucasus and the Caucasus in general. They contend that a triangular relationship can be formed between Armenia, China, and Russia, especially considering that Russian-Chinese relations are experiencing a deepening phase and that Armenia is also developing its relations with China.

The Chinese media’s various reactions towards the Armenian issue

The Chinese media does not exhibit a common attitude on the Armenian issue. Some Chinese media outlets attempt to reflect both sides of the issue. For example, one source reports that “The so-called Armenian ‘genocide’ refers to a large number of Armenian deaths that occurred between 1915 and 1917 during the reign of Turkish Ottoman Empire. While Armenia considers the events as ‘genocide’, successive Turkish governments have denied that the event constitute ‘genocide’ and claimed that the number of deaths is exaggerated. Armenia has set April 24 as the day on which annual commemorations of the ‘genocide’ take place. This year marked the centenary of the events.”

Additionally, some sources attempt to refer back to history and to analyze the events from a historical perspective. Nonetheless, such sources primarily take their references from the Western media, which is often pro-Armenian in nature. There have also been some attempts in the Chinese media to draw a link between the Chinese and Armenian experiences. In this vein, some media outlets emphasize that the Armenian community is quite active in China, and that they are trying to draw sympathy from China by directing the public’s attention to the Nanjing Massacre committed by the Japanese Army during World War II.

Other sources emphasize more current geopolitical configurations, noting that Turkey supports Azerbaijan in its territorial disputes with Armenia, an alliance that caused Turkey to close its borders with Armenia in 1993. Here, these sources also refer to the fact that on October 10, 2009, in Switzerland, Turkey and Armenia signed an agreement to end hostilities and to achieve long-term normalization of bilateral relations.

Misunderstandings may be rooted in Chinese language and history

The Chinese language itself may also convolute the international understanding of China’s stance on the issue. For instance, “massacre” and “genocide” can both be translated as “da tu sha”, or “大屠杀”. For example, in “zhongzu miejue de da tu sha”, or “种族灭绝的大屠杀”, “zhongzu miejue de” indicates the degree of the “massacre” as “genocide”. Therefore, “Armenian da tu sha” can be understood as either the “Armenian Massacre” or the “Armenian Genocide”. Because the term used in the Chinese language does not convey the meaning of “deportation” most of the general Chinese population understands the literal reflection of the events as the “Armenian massacre”, despite the fact that various academic sources emphasize the “deportation” aspect of the 1915 Events, as discussed above.

Additionally, a combination of Chinese linguistic and historical factors may also influence the Chinese understanding of the 1915 Events as a result of China’s experience during World War II. During this time China experienced a violent invasion and occupation at the hands of the Japanese Army that left hundreds of thousands of Chinese dead. Therefore, when Armenians mention the “Armenian Massacre”, they are easily able to find sympathy from those Chinese that recall the “Nanjing Massacre”.

To sum up, the Armenian community is quite active in China, as is also the case in the Western world, especially compared with the relative inactivity of the Turkish community abroad. This is also supplemented by the fact that Chinese scholars and journalists often cite Western media sources in their reading of the Armenia issue. However, cognizant of the potential effects of the Armenian issue on the fragile state of Sino-Turkish relations, Chinese officials have been very cautious in their approach to the topic, often referring to Turkey’s offer to open up its archives, including military archives, for scholars and researchers to study the issue in an academic environment free from political intervention.

The post Reflections Of Armenian Issue In Chinese Media – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

The prospect of robopets and virtual pets is not as far-fetched as we may think, according to University of Melbourne animal welfare researcher Dr Jean-Loup Rault.

His paper in the latest edition of Frontiers in Veterinary Science argues pets will soon become a luxury in an overpopulated world and the future may lie in chips and circuits that mimic the real thing.

“It might sound surreal for us to have robotic or virtual pets, but it could be totally normal for the next generation,” Dr Rault said.

“It’s not a question of centuries from now. If 10 billion human beings live on the planet in 2050 as predicted, it’s likely to occur sooner than we think. If you’d described Facebook to someone 20 years ago, they’d think you were crazy. But we are already seeing people form strong emotional bonds with robot dogs in Japan.

“Pet robotics has come a long way from the Tamagotchi craze of the mid-90s. In Japan, people are becoming so attached to their robot dogs that they hold funerals for them when the circuits die.”

Dr Rault embarked on research for the paper after discovering a huge lack of information about how technology may influence our relationships with animals in the future.

“You won’t find a lot of research on pet robotics out there, but if you Google robot dogs, there are countless patents. Everyone wants to get ahead of this thing because there is a market and it will take off in the next 10 to 15 years.”

But the emergence of robotic pets is a double-edged sword, he warns. They can benefit people who are allergic to pets, short on space, in hospital, or scared of real animals, but the ethics of depending on a robot for companionship begs many big ethical questions.

“Robots can, without a doubt, trigger human emotions,” Dr Rault added. “If artificial pets can produce the same benefits we get from live pets, does that mean that our emotional bond with animals is really just an image that we project on to our pets?”

As an animal welfare researcher, Dr Rault is particularly interested in whether a surge in popularity of disposable fake pets could lead to a shift in how humanity treats animals.

“Of course we care about live animals, but if we become used to a robotic companion that doesn’t need food, water or exercise, perhaps it will change how humans care about other living beings.”

Dr Rault says it’s not too far-fetched to imagine that robot pets of the future could feature bonafide Artificial Intelligence and could learn to think and respond on their own.

“When engineers work on robotic dogs, they work on social intelligence, they address what people need from their dogs: companionship, love, obedience, dependence,” he said.

“They want to know everything about animal behaviour so they can replicate it as close as possible to a real pet.”

And what about robotic cats? “Well, that’s a little harder because you have to make them unpredictable,” he concluded.

The post Rise Of Robot Pets Seen In An Overpopulated World appeared first on Eurasia Review.

(RFE/RL) — China has agreed to lend about $7 billion to Belarus through credit lines set to open this month.

Belarusian Economy Minister Uladzimer Zinouski said on May 11 that about $3 billion provided by Beijing will come in the form of low-interest loans, and some $4 billion to Belarusian banks to finance commercial projects.

According to Zinouski, about $130 million is earmarked primarily for humanitarian projects, such as housing.

Zinouski did not elaborate on a time frame for paying back the loans.

Chinese President Xi Jinping arrived in Minsk on May 10 for a three-day visit as part of a diplomatic tour that is also taking him to Russia and Kazakhstan to boost economic ties across Eurasia.

This is the first time that a Chinese head of state has visited Belarus in more than a decade.

On May 10, Lukashenka and Xi held talks after which nearly 20 bilateral agreements and memoranda were signed.

After meeting, Lukashenka said that the signed agreements would help boost bilateral ties in a variety of areas, including trade, technology exchanges, and the share of scientific-technical innovations.

On May 11, Lukashenka and Xi attended the opening of Belarusian-Chinese business forum in Minsk.

Lukashenka said at the ceremony that his country would help China “push forward its interests” in the EU and the Eurasian Economic Union, which includes Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia, and soon, Kyrgyzstan.

Earlier on May 11, Xi awarded 15 Belarusian World War II veterans with the Chinese Medal of Peace.

Xi said at the award ceremony held in the Belarusian State Museum of the Great Patriotic War in Minsk that the Belarusian veterans, who fought against Japanese forces on Chinese territory, had “largely contributed to the defeat of fascism in the world.”

The post China Lends Billions To Belarus appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Pope Francis met Monday morning in the Paul VI Hall with around 7,000 children and teens of Italy’s schools, who participated in the ‘Peace Industry’ initiative.

During the audience, the Pope answered to a series of questions. An Egyptian boy asked him: “Dear Pope, we come from nations that are torn by poverty and war. Our school loves us, why don’t powerful people help the schools?”

Pope Francis responded: “Why don’t powerful people help schools? I think we can even ask a bigger question: why do many powerful people not want peace? Because they live off war!”

“The arms industry is the terrible answer! Powers, some powers, make a fortune with the arms industry, selling weapons to one country that is against another, and that one against another… It is the death industry! This is how they make money. You know, greed is bad for us: to always want more and more money – the economic system rotates around money and not the person, men, women, but money. All are sacrificed, waging wars to defend money”.

“This is the reason why many people don’t want peace. More money is made with war! They earn money, but lose lives, culture, education, many things are lost. This is why they don’t want it. An elderly priest I once knew would say: the devil enters from the wallet out of greed, and this is why they don’t want peace!”

The post Pope Francis Says ‘Wars Are Waged To Defend Money’ appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Forces loyal to Libya’s internationally recognized government headed by General Khalifa Haftar shelled a Turkish cargo ship off the Libyan coast town of Tobruk, killing one crew member. Libyan military spokesman Mohamed Hejazi specified that the cargo ship was targeted after it failed to heed a warning not to approach the eastern city of Derna, in part controlled by Islamists affiliated to the so-called Islamic State (IS).

The Cook Islands-chartered Tuna-1 vessel, which was carrying plasterboard from Spain, set on fire after the shelling but is en route back to Turkey and expected to arrive within 24 hours at the eastern port of Fethiye, an anonymous source told the Hurriyet newspaper.

The Turkish government announced legal and judiciary actions against Libyan authorities through the Ankara Embassy and Consulate in Istanbul, as also the UN and IMO (International Maritime Organization).

Turkey has been repeatedly accused by the internationally-recognized Libyan government of providing weapons and supplies to the Tripoli Islamist militias.

The post Libya: Turkish Cargo Ship Shelled, One Dead appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Turkey must do more to fight corruption and enforce respect for media freedom, free expression and judicial independence, said EU Foreign Affairs Committee MEPs on Monday. In a resolution on the progress of reform in Turkey in 2014, MEPs also urged the EU to back Turkey’s efforts to build solid, democratic institutions and ensure respect for fundamental freedoms, human rights and the rule of law. Finally, it advocated stepping up EU/Turkey foreign policy cooperation.

The Turkish government must commit itself “unequivocally” to respect democratic rules and principles, which are at the heart of the EU, MEPs said, inviting it to put the reform process at the center of domestic policy choices. A new constitution, based on provisions promoting a pluralistic, inclusive and tolerant society, would underpin such a process, they added.

MEPs encouraged the Turkish government’s efforts to conclude, in a sustainable way, the peace process with the Kurdish community but regret the Turkish decision to build the Ilisu dam, which in a region mostly inhabited by Kurds, is expected to have “devastating” social, environmental and political effects on the Kurdish population.

Step up foreign policy cooperation and people-to-people contacts

EU-Turkey foreign policy cooperation and counter-terrorism dialogue must be stepped up, and Turkey must use all its resources, to fight terrorist groups such as ISIL, said MEPs. Turkey should also do more to prevent foreign fighters, money or equipment reaching ISIL and other extremist groups through its territory, they add.

To bring about a progressive alignment of foreign policies, Turkey’s foreign minister should be invited to EU foreign affairs Council meetings whenever relevant, MEPs suggested. They also think that opening of the currently frozen EU accession talks chapter on security and defense would be useful to that end.

They also said more needs to be done to boost people-to-people contacts, not least through visa liberalisation. Turkish business people must have easier access to visas and student exchanges should meanwhile be actively promoted, MEPs underline.

Fight corruption, respect freedoms

Greater political will is needed to create a proper legal framework for the fight against corruption, MEPs say. They deeply regret failures to complete very serious corruption investigations in Turkey in December 2014. They also voice concern about the criminal proceedings brought against investigative journalists following these corruption cases and stress that the government must guarantee media freedom “as a matter of priority”.

They also regreted that Turkey’s “Law 6532”, passed in 2014, renders Turkish National intelligence Agency staff immune to legal proceedings and hence further undermines the freedom of the media and freedom of expression.

Turkish action against freedom of press and plurality of opinion is “incompatible with the fundamental rights of the EU” and “conflicts with a resumption of the negotiations process”, they said.

The committee condemns the Turkish government’s attempts to ban access to social media and websites, the intimidation of journalists and other pressures put on them, and the police raids and detention of journalists on 14 December 2014.

MEPs are also concerned about persistently high levels of violence against women in Turkey and failures to enforce legal measures to prevent it. They call for comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation, including the prohibition of discrimination and hate speech on the grounds of ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation, gender or gender identity.

Cyprus

MEPs called on Turkey and all parties concerned to actively support the resumption of talks on reunification of Cyprus, on the basis of the UN parameters for reunification. Turkey must take steps to normalise its relation with Cyprus, begin to withdraw its troops and transfer the Famagusta area to the UN, MEPs say.

At the same time, the Republic of Cyprus should open the port of Famagusta under EU customs supervision and allow Turkish Cypriots to trade with the EU in a legal manner, they add.

The post EU MEPs Stress Turkey Must Put Democracy And Fundamental Rights First appeared first on Eurasia Review.

May 19, 2015 will mark the 5th anniversary of the Bangkok Massacre when almost 100 unarmed Thai civilians were murdered on the streets of the Thai capital at the hands of the Thai Army during April-May 2010. May 19th also specifically marks the deaths of 6 innocent civilians who were shot and killed in 2010 at the Wat Pathum temple, a site which had been designated as a “safe-haven” by the same Abhisit Vejjajiva-led “Democrat” Party government which had given the Thai Army the very orders that led to the killings. Amongst the dead at Wat Pathum were medical workers and pro-democracy protesters with their deaths being ruled by a Thai court in August 2013 to have “resulted from bullets fired from the direction of the Thai Army”, none of whom have yet faced trial.

In recent weeks there has been a concerted attempt by the present Thai military dictatorship to deny the details of the Wat Pathum deaths and to re-write the entire history of the Bangkok Massacre, an event that tens of thousands of ordinary Thais personally witnessed.

The London-based law firm, Amsterdam & Partners – in an attempt to forestall this cover-up being perpetrated by the Thai military junta and their allies in Thai Democrat Party – will be releasing a number of key, legal documents in the next few days that will reveal that not only are those conducting the cover-up lying but that the Thai military junta is almost certainly hiding murderers in its own ranks.

In a statement, Mr Robert Amsterdam, lead counsel at Amsterdam & Partners LLP said:

“We are placing these documents in the public domain so that the Thai people can easily equip themselves with the tools necessary to debunk the dictatorship’s lies. It is essential that anyone interested in seeing justice in Thailand reads them and then draws their own conclusions not only regarding the murders at Wat Pathum but in regard to all the killings that occurred during the Bangkok Massacre of May 2010.

“Furthermore the Thai army and the Democrat Party should be under no illusions that the Thai people will hold them both to account for their actions and will expect justice to be served.”

The post Amsterdam & Partners To Release Key Documents Relating To 2010 Bangkok Massacre – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Michael Lelyveld

Some of China’s giant state-owned enterprises may get even bigger as the government considers a merger and acquisition plan to reorganize its vast holdings.

But whether the state-held conglomerates known as SOEs will become more efficient or profitable remains to be seen.

Reports suggest that the government will reshuffle its many industrial interests, which vary from oil companies to arms manufacturers and makers of products ranging from salt to silk.

On April 27, share prices of some listed SOE subsidiaries soared after the official Xinhua news agency cited a “massive” plan to consolidate holdings under control of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC).

An internal SASAC document called for slashing the number of centrally administered SOEs from 112 to 40, Xinhua said in an exclusive report.

But six hours later, the news agency cast doubt on its own story following a SASAC disclaimer of the report by Xinhua’s Economic Information Daily.

“Investigations have found that the news story was written without interviewing or verifying with us,” SASAC said.

Conflicting reports

Listed shares of the monopoly China National Petroleum Corp. (CNPC) and state-owned refiner Sinopec jumped by the maximum allowed 10 percent on the earlier reporting, but closed 6 percent off their highs the next day after the apparent denial.

Both CNPC PetroChina and Sinopec said they had no information about a planned merger.

The flap marked at least the fourth time that the merger story has surfaced, only to be knocked down.

On Feb. 17, The Wall Street Journal first reported that officials were studying a possible CNPC-Sinopec merger, aimed at creating a “national champion” to compete with international oil companies.

Nine days later, a Sinopec spokesperson doused that report, saying the company had “never heard” of such a plan.

On March 11, The Wall Street Journal broadened the story, citing a plan “to radically consolidate” the entire state sector, restructuring over 100,000 enterprises and merging assets in fields including energy, resources, and telecommunications.

On May 4, analysts rekindled speculation as CNPC, Sinopec, and China National Offshore Oil Corp. (CNOOC) all announced replacements of their company chairmen, marking the petroleum industry’s biggest executive reshuffle in years.

Growing expectations

With the latest emergence of the merger story, expectations are growing that a reorganization plan for the sprawling but heavily indebted sector is in the works, sparking debates about the merits.

The rationale for mergers is at the heart of the controversy.

According to Xinhua, “… many SOEs compete with each other, causing overlapping business, fierce infighting and even malicious competition, especially when two companies eye the same international target.”

“The government wants to avoid senseless competition as it strives to make companies more competitive in the global market,” the news agency said.

Such reasoning strikes critics as anti-competitive.

Foreign press reactions have been largely negative with regard to a CNPC-Sinopec combination, arguing it would preserve all the drawbacks of state ownership while gaining none of the advantages of privatization.

“Critics say a merged oil group would be a more bloated and less efficient version of the current duopoly,” the Financial Times said.

But by airing overhaul plans for the entire state sector, the government seems to be seeking new remedies for stagnation as economic growth slows.

Bid to boost growth

On Sunday, the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) voiced concern for “relatively high downward pressure” on the economy as it announced its third cut in benchmark interest rates since November.

The monetary easing is the latest sign that the government is accelerating steps to halt the growth slide, raising prospects for plans to reinvigorate the laggard SOEs.

Last year, the government pushed a “mixed ownership” plan to encourage private investment in SOEs, hoping to pump life into the sector with new capital and management practices, but response has been cool.

In this year’s first quarter, SOE profits fell 8 percent to 499.7 billion yuan (U.S. $80.5 billion) after showing a 3.3 gain in the year-earlier period, the Ministry of Finance said.

The sector’s total assets stood at 105.5 trillion yuan (U.S. $17 trillion) with liabilities of 68.6 trillion yuan (U.S. $11 trillion), both up by about 12 percent from a year before.

The government has claimed success for the merger formula after approving a union between the top bullet train manufacturers, China CNR Corp. and China CSR Corp., in early March.

Officials argued that the firms were competing against each other for foreign contracts, undermining China’s national interests.

The State Council, or cabinet, has also considered consolidating the two major nuclear development firms, China Power Investment Corp. and State Nuclear Power Technology Corp., for the past year. But the companies are resisting a merger for the domestic market, the Financial Times said.

Concerns unclear

A fundamental question is whether a grand merger plan for the entire sector represents a step forward for China or a step back that will restrain competition among inefficient industries and neglect more productive private enterprises.

Economists are divided on the implications of the reported plans.

“If you put two giant companies together, you’re probably going to reduce competition in the domestic market,” said Gary Hufbauer, senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics in Washington.

The push for larger national companies may raise doubts about whether profitability is the main priority.

“You would think that if they’re anxious for better performance that privatization would be higher on the list than mergers,” said Hufbauer.

He also noted that the merger plans appear to disregard China’s anti-monopoly law, which has been enforced with heavy fines on foreign firms since last year.

The proposals for strengthening SOEs through mergers also seem to ignore calls for greater access to the Chinese market for foreign companies that could act as a check on monopoly practices.

“It doesn’t sound like any of those concerns are getting much play,” Hufbauer said.

‘The right direction’

But Harvard University economics professor Dale Jorgenson argued that China is moving in “the right direction,” given that state-controlled industries are far from prepared for privatization.

“This idea of consolidating these enterprises, I think, is the right step for them to take at the moment,” said Jorgenson. “Having a smaller number of these firms is a good idea.”

Many of the SOEs are already uncompetitive and unable to withstand further pressures.

“The basic point is that they’re not making a lot of money. Some of them are losing a lot of money,” Jorgenson said. “These are basically weak businesses.”

“We’re not talking about people that are world-class, trying to take down Apple or something like that,” he said.

The implication is that the merger plan is more defensive than offensive as China struggles with industrial overcapacity.

The series of reports and denials on the merger issue may be a measure of the political resistance to change in the state sector.

Although he sees the merger proposals as positive, Jorgenson discounted the idea that consolidation of SOEs would represent a government step toward radical reform.

“They have a lot on their plates, but economic reform doesn’t seem to be at the top of the list,” he said.

The post China Mulls Major Industry Mergers – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Hungary’s prime minister says that each member country of the European Union should be allowed to decide for itself about the use of the death penalty.

Prime Minister Viktor Orban, whose statement last week that the issue of capital punishment should be “kept on the agenda” was strongly rejected by EU officials, said Friday that the EU should follow the example of the United States, where states decide individually about the issue.

Orban said “there is no reason” for countries in Europe with different crimes rates and threat levels to think the same about the death penalty.

Orban said on state radio that he was “on the side of life,” but that the death penalty was needed if it was the only way to protect “law-abiding, innocent people.”

If one European country that needs to seriously consider the death penalty, it’s Macedonia after a score of terrorists killed 8 policemen and planned mass murder of hundreds of civilians.

The post Hungary Considers Introducing Death Penalty appeared first on Eurasia Review.

The US National Football League (NFL) said Monday that is has fined the New England Patriots $1 million dollars and suspended Quarterback Tom Brady without pay for the first four games of the 2015 in relation to the use of under-inflated footballs in the AFC Championship Game of this past season.

It is widely expected that Brady will appeal the NFL’s decision.

In addition to the $1 million fine, the NFL announced that the the New England Patriots will forfeit the club’s first-round selection in the 2016 NFL Draft and the club’s fourth-round selection in the 2017 NFL Draft. If the Patriots have more than one selection in either of these rounds, the earlier selection shall be forfeited. The club may not trade or otherwise encumber these selections.

NFL Commissioner Goodell authorized the discipline that was imposed by NFL Executive President Troy Vincent, pursuant to the commissioner’s disciplinary authority under the NFL Constitution and Bylaws and the Collective Bargaining Agreement with the NFL Players Association.

“We reached these decisions after extensive discussion with Troy Vincent and many others,” Commissioner Goodell said. “We relied on the critical importance of protecting the integrity of the game and the thoroughness and independence of the (Ted) Wells report.”

The NFL noted in a letter from Troy Vincent to Tom Brady, “With respect to your particular involvement, the report established that there is substantial and credible evidence to conclude you were at least generally aware of the actions of the Patriots’ employees involved in the deflation of the footballs and that it was unlikely that their actions were done without your knowledge.”

The letter continued: “Moreover, the report documents your failure to cooperate fully and candidly with the investigation, including by refusing to produce any relevant electronic evidence (emails, texts, etc.), despite being offered extraordinary safeguards by the investigators to protect unrelated personal information, and by providing testimony that the report concludes was not plausible and contradicted by other evidence.”

The post NFL Fines Patriots $1 Million, Suspends Brady Four Games appeared first on Eurasia Review.

(Civil.Ge) — Two-week long joint U.S-Georgian military exercises, Noble Partner, started at the Vaziani training area outside Tbilisi on May 11.

About 600 soldiers from the both countries are participating in the exercises, which aim at enhancing U.S. and Georgian NATO Response Force interoperability.

“I want to remind everyone that although Georgia is not a NATO member state, it is voluntarily taking part in NATO Response Forces,” Georgian PM Irakli Garibashvili said in his speech at the opening ceremony.

14 Bradley infantry fighting vehicles and several wheeled-support vehicles were shipped by the U.S. Army Europe from Bulgaria to Georgia across the Black Sea for participation in the Noble Partner exercises, which are held for the first time in Georgia.

Drills will include a combined parachute operation, classroom training, a field training exercise and a live-fire exercise.

“These exercises represent yet another confirmation of firm military cooperation between Georgia and the United States,” the Georgian PM said.

“I also want to emphasize that these exercises are not directed against any particular threat. These military drills aim at increasing compatibility with the NATO Response Force,” he said.

“I want to thank our main strategic partners and real friend – the United States, for sponsoring these exercises and for supporting Georgia,” the PM added.

A mechanized infantry company from 1st Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division, which is part of the U.S. contribution to NATO Response Force in 2015, as well as a rifle company of paratroopers from the 173rd Airborne Brigade are taking part in the drills from the U.S. side.

The Georgian participation includes a company from 1st infantry brigade’s 12th battalion; a mechanized company from 4th mechanized brigade’s 42nd battalion and a military police unit.

“Joint military exercises [with the U.S. troops] of such scale are taking part for the first time in Georgia,” Tina Khidasheli, Georgia’s new Defense Minister, told journalists after the opening ceremony.

“This is just the beginning. These exercises are important for number of reasons. It shows that Georgia has not just a partner, but a friend [referring to the U.S.], which is ready to help Georgia in every possible way to strengthen its statehood and its army. Second: it is unique opportunity for the Georgian solders to train alongside with the U.S. troops with the use of U.S. military equipment. And the third: there is a long-term plan of cooperation in frames of the Noble Partner. Several other large-scale exercises are also planned this year, including NATO-Georgian exercises, which are planned for this summer and which will feature troops from Georgia and several NATO [member states].”

“We do not plan to go into war with anyone; we prepare for peace and that’s precisely why we need strong army,” the Georgian Defense Minister added.

U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Russia, Ukraine and Eurasia Evelyn Farkas, who visited Tbilisi late last month, described the Noble Partner drills as “the most robust” that the U.S. has conducted with Georgia to date.

“It is a critical part of our [Georgia and the United States’] contributions to the NATO Response Force,” she said on April 24 in Tbilisi.

The post Georgian, US Troops Launch Joint Drills Outside Tbilisi appeared first on Eurasia Review.

The Department of Defense announced plans to station a special operations squadron of CV-22 Osprey aircraft at Yokota Air Base, Japan, according to a DoD news release issued Monday.

The first three aircraft will arrive in the second half of 2017 with an additional seven aircraft scheduled to arrive by 2021, the release said.

The deployment of tilt-rotor aircraft will provide increased capability for U.S. Special Operations forces to respond quickly to crises and contingencies in Japan and across the Asia-Pacific region, including humanitarian crises and natural disasters, according to the release.

The deployment will also increase interoperability, enhance operational cooperation, and promote stronger defense relations with the Japan Self-Defense Forces, according to the release.

The CV-22 Osprey is a highly advanced aircraft with unique capabilities and an excellent operational safety record, the release said.

The deployment reflects the United States’ steadfast commitment to defend Japan and to station its most advanced capabilities forward as part of the Asia-Pacific Rebalance, according to the release.

The post US Deploys CV-22 Osprey Aircraft To Japan appeared first on Eurasia Review.

When some dialogues in the wider cybersecurity debates are not progressing quickly enough, with sufficient political will, international collaborative efforts among law enforcement is one area that holds much promise.

By Caitríona Helena Heinl and Stephen Honiss*

Three major events in the international community’s cyber calendar occurred during the week of 13 April to address the demand for more robust global cooperation to combat cybercrime. The inauguration of the INTERPOL Global Complex for Innovation (IGCI) in Singapore; the Global Conference on Cyber Space (GCCS 2015) in The Hague; and the third session of the UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Developments in the field of Information and Telecommunications in the context of International Security in New York; each had a deep focus on international cooperation.

The list of challenges facing communities and governments globally from cybercrime is daunting. Traditional models are no longer adequate for the transnational nature of cyber, which now require stronger international collaboration. Whilst people may be wary of carrying large amounts of cash to avoid being robbed, the reality is that they are far more likely to fall victim to some form of cybercrime. The successful modern-day thief is a far cry from gun-toting Bonnie and Clyde and are increasingly difficult to catch.

Intricacy of cybercrime

Cybercrime, “419” letter scams, hacking – these terms all relate to offences with two things in common. Firstly, they are committed using an electronic device and the Internet; and secondly, they are likely to have been committed by a criminal overseas from the victim with the stolen money transited through a series of accounts in different countries again. The law in most countries was not written with this situation in mind, making it difficult, if not impossible, for law enforcement to track down the criminals.

Then there are highly-sophisticated, aggressive, often surgically precise, cyber attacks against industries that provide the lifeblood of economies, and against the agencies charged with defending those economies and countries.

In addition, there are few traditional crimes today that do not rely in some way on the use of the Internet. Such cyber-enabled offences are often cross-border crimes and they include, amongst many others, human trafficking, theft of intellectual property, blackmail and extortion, fraud, and drug trafficking. GCCS 2015 acknowledged that criminals are savvy in using countries where they know law enforcement is limited in legal recourse or technical capacity. GCCS 2015 follows three previous high-level dialogues that were first initiated in the United Kingdom in 2011, now known as the London Process. The last conference was held in Seoul in 2013 and it too continued to develop the theme of cybercrime.

Key developments

The inauguration of the IGCI was therefore a highly significant development for the global law enforcement community. It now provides a platform for collaboration both on operational matters and policy issues that have implications for the law enforcement community, as well as on the wider cybersecurity debate. It will also focus on emerging crime types and the impact of the Internet on traditional crimes.

This will be achieved by coordinating international law enforcement efforts on operations involving multiple jurisdictions and where needed; involving experts from industry, academia, research bodies, and the technical community, as well as other regional law enforcement bodies like Europol, ASEANAPOL, and AMERIPOL.

To further strengthen international cooperation, the 2014/2015 GGE is anticipated to build on the recommendations in the 2013 report. The report advised states to intensify cooperation against criminal or terrorist use of information and communication technologies (ICTs); to harmonise legal approaches as appropriate; and to strengthen practical collaboration between law enforcement and prosecutorial agencies. The Seoul Framework in 2013 later reiterated this recommendation in its guidelines.

The group also recommended enhanced mechanisms for law enforcement cooperation to reduce incidents that could otherwise be misinterpreted as hostile state actions in order to improve international security.

There is a growing recognition by law enforcement for the need to work more closely and in partnership with all stakeholders, such as the private sector, civil society, academia, research organisations, and the technical community. Hosting GCCS 2015, the Netherlands included government officials, international organisations, the private sector and civil society. This high-level conference specifically aimed to improve international cooperation with regard to the Internet and it focused on cybercrime as a part of the wider cybersecurity debate.

Important Issues at GCCS 2015

Strategies to fight cybercrime and resolving difficulties in determining jurisdiction were key questions posed during GCCS 2015. In particular, experts were present to analyse the role and responsibilities of stakeholders, such as law enforcement, in addressing challenges such as how to ensure people and organisations are protected; how to guard individual privacy; predictive policing; and how to ensure that the Internet remains both open and secure to support economic growth and innovation.

The Netherlands added the issue of the right to privacy to this year’s agenda to promote further international debate. The key challenge it identified was to ensure that security is safeguarded while also making sure that the digital domain remains open and innovative. Another new item was civil-military relations and international military cooperation in cyberspace – in other words where the responsibility of law enforcement ends and that of the military begins for cyber incidents.

An increasingly critical subject open for discussion is that of the rising use of encryption built without back doors – what this would mean for the protection of individuals’ and companies’ data, and its impact on law enforcement investigating criminals who use this technology to avoid detection. Mutual legal assistance procedures are also not fit for purpose when it comes to this space and GCCS 2015 aimed to assist in finding a new way forward.

Such recent focus on the role of global law enforcement in combating new developments in cybercrime further highlights the significance of these efforts to wider international cybersecurity efforts.

Caitríona Heinl is a Research Fellow at the Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS) of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. Stephen Honiss is a Detective Superintendent from the New Zealand Police, on secondment to the Cyber Innovation and Outreach Directorate of the INTERPOL Global Complex for Innovation (IGCI) in Singapore.

The post Cybersecurity: Advancing Global Law Enforcement Cooperation – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By C. Uday Bhaskar*

As Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi prepares for his first visit to China next week, the unresolved territorial and border dispute will be a major issue on the summit agenda. The incursion by People’s Liberation Army (PLA) troops when President Xi Jinping was in India in September last will provide the context and both leaders will seek to avoid such exigencies.

India has to enhance its comprehensive national power to be able to better manage the uneasy bilateral relationship with China and the country’s composite national military capability is an integral part of this calculus. However, the stark reality is the steady increase in the military gap between India and China that is growing in favor of Beijing and Delhi’s inability to adequately redress the situation. India does not seek military equivalence with China but a degree of sufficiency and an operational profile that will enhance stability in the bilateral.

A useful reality check is provided in the Sixth Report of the Standing Committee on Defence that was submitted to parliament on April 24. It draws critical attention to the many immediate inadequacies and institutional infirmities that continue to plague India’s dysfunctional higher national security structures. The chairperson of the committee, Major General B.C. Khanduri (Rtd), an accomplished military veteran and former cabinet minister and chief minister, is to be commended for a comprehensive 118-page report that covers eight major subjects viz: the Defence Budget and Capital Outlays, the BRO (Border Roads Organization), Coast Guard, Defence Estates, MES (Military Engineer Services), Married Accommodation Project, Defence Public Sector Undertakings and the Welfare of Ex-Servicemen.

The observations and recommendations are unambiguous and the words “dismay” and “displeasure” that have been used in the report reflect the anguish of the Khanduri-led committee over the many ills that have tenaciously resisted any meaningful redress over the last two decades plus.

At a time when the three armed forces – the army, air force and navy – have been drawing attention to the many gaps in their inventory profile, it is both anomalous and inexplicable that over the last fiscal year, the defence ministry was able to expend only 87 percent of its allocated $35.94bn . The defence budget is broadly divided into two heads – the revenue and the capital – with the latter component catering for the induction of new inventory and modernization of existing platforms and equipment.

While the optimum ratio for military inventory is 30:40:30 (meaning 30 percent state-of-the-art equipment; 40 percent current technology; and 30 percent being inventory that is entering the cycle of obsolescence and phasing out), the Indian military receives just 38 percent of the total defence outlay for capital, and this has been grossly inadequate. Even in this head, the imbalance is glaring.

In the last fiscal, only $850mn were spent towards procuring new inventory while as much as $9.6b went towards payments for old contracts and in the current financial year – the corresponding figures are $950mn and $11.2bn. The principal reason why this pattern persists is the inability of the national exchequer to maintain the degree of fiscal fidelity that is called for in the defence sector and enforcing stringent and often counter-productive funding disbursals and a very tight control on the purse strings.

The Khanduri committee report again noted with dismay the state of the border roads near the territorial areas currently disputed with China and the contrast on the other side wherein Beijing has created the necessary infrastructure to enable their military in the event of an operational exigency.

Paradoxically, these glaring gaps in the overall Indian defence preparedness have been staring the political apex since the days of prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru and the 1962 war with China. Subsequently the 1999 Kargil War and the 2008 terror attack on Mumbai have only heightened the need to address the inadequacies in higher defence management and embark on the structural and systemic changes that are imperative.

A brave attempt was made in the aftermath of the Kargil War and the A.B. Vajpayee government set up a Group of Ministers to implement the institutional changes that were recommended. However, this remained inconclusive and currently India’s status apropos reviewing and redressing higher national security management may be compared to that of an intrepid person trying to cross a chasm in two leaps.

The net result of such complacence and insular tinkering with the larger gamut of national security (of which the military is a critical and visible but not the only component) is a series of cumulative delays and loss of comprehensive national capability. This is manifest in the poor material state of the Indian military across the board and the inability of the system to better integrate the paramilitary and police into the national security lattice. Furthermore, Defence R&D and domestic military production capabilities languish with episodic attention being paid to these sectors (for the record, the DRDO is still headless) and the management of the national intelligence agencies leaves a lot to be desired.

The last decade under the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) was a period of alarming stasis across the board – and both the material status of the Indian military and the human resource management led to a number of anomalous developments including allegations of a coup and the most unseemly controversy over the selection of the army chief. In addition, the status of the armed forces in relation to the rest of the edifice of government has been deliberately lowered leading to needless resentment in the ‘fauj’ – both in the serving fraternity and among ex-servicemen. The most shameful act has been that of the ‘benevolent’ Indian government and the Ministry of Defence challenging the legitimate compensation and benefits awarded to those injured in war or related operations.

The word dysfunctional to describe the current state of India’s higher defence management is a considered one. The most striking illustration of this malignancy and indifference is the reality that 68 years after attaining independence, India still does not design and produce a personal weapon that is comparable to the global median. Hence the Indian soldier is compelled to fight an adversary from a basic disadvantage – and yes, the country imports this piece of equipment with a two million plus uniformed constituency.

However, if the parliamentary standing committee is the only forum now available – considering that India rarely has a constructive and sustained debate in parliament on the subject – the present political matrix of the Modi-Parrikar-Khanduri combine may be the most favorable for Delhi to embark on the much needed review of what ails India’s national security management.

A number of useful task force reports on national security management are available with the government but have not been made public. These include the ones headed by the late K. Subrahmanyam as also the Vijay Kelkar, Rama Rao, Ravindra Gupta and Naresh Chandra committee reports. Releasing these documents to the public for an informed critique and providing them to the legislature would be a very useful first step. But will the Modi government pick up this gauntlet? Hopefully the prime minister’s China visit may yet prove to be the catalyst.

*C Uday Bhaskar is Director, Society for Policy Studies, New Delhi. He can be contacted at cudaybhaskar@spsindia.in

The post India’s National Security Management: Crying For An Overhaul – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

If governance and economic policies improved somehow in the post-earthquake period, we could see the emergence of a stronger and more scenic Nepal, but this is a very tall order.

By Pradumna Bickram Rana*

Two weeks after the devastating earthquake struck, Nepal is entering the second phase of its recovery. The first phase was rescue and relief. With the hope of finding anybody alive having faded, many rescue teams from abroad have now gone back. Relief in the form of clean water, food, medicines, tents and tarpaulins has reached most of the affected people except those in the most remote areas. Additional relief is, however, still very much required.

The second phase of rehabilitation and reconstruction has begun. The government has established a National Reconstruction Fund to which it has allocated US$200 million. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) has pledged another $300 million and other donors will surely follow suit. The ADB has also established an earthquake response team which will work with other partners to assess the losses and estimate the long-term investment needs. Japan has proposed to convene a donor group meeting. Despite the generous support of many “friends of Nepal”, the country’s recovery from the crisis will take many years. Dr. Ram Sharan Mahat, the finance minister, has remarked: “After decades of policy and political uncertainty, Nepal had just been gearing up for a higher trajectory of economic growth.”

Possible policies for phase two

Since losses are still being tallied, it is not possible to detail a complete list of the required long-term policies and strategies. Nonetheless, if the country’s governance were to improve and appropriate policies were to be adopted, a stronger and a more scenic Nepal could emerge from the crisis. This is a very tall order given the poor track-record of the government in delivery of services, mismanagement, and coordination, but there is no harm in hoping.

Policy actions are required in many different fronts, but there are four that can be immediately considered:

• Firstly, since the government lacks credibility, monitoring systems should be set-up to oversee the newly-established National Reconstruction Fund. Watchdog bodies and community–based organisations should be in place to ensure transparency and accountability in the use of resources.

After a decade of Maoist-led civil war which left 16,000 dead and ended in 2006, Nepal had entered a transitional stage. Seven years on, the constituent assembly has been unable to draft a constitution amidst fruitless debates and inter-party rivalry. Local government elections have not been held since 1999: instead, civil servants run the system. Corruption is pervasive at all levels. The Prime Minister’s speech to the nation a few days after the quake disappointed many, and several top political leaders were conspicuous by their absence in the early days of the crisis.

Could this disaster lead to improved governance in Nepal? A long shot, but perhaps. Sometimes devastating disasters can shake up a society so much that seemingly intractable problems can be resolved. Examples are the war in Sri Lanka and the separatist movement in Aceh both of which finally came to a conclusion after the Indian Ocean tsunami that hit the countries ten years ago.

• Secondly, to re-build some 300,000 houses (and counting) that have been flattened and a similar number that have been partially damaged mainly in the villages, innovative technology such as the “Habitat Building System” developed by the Asian Institute of Technology and others could be considered, to construct cost effective yet sturdy houses. These houses should be designed to complement and blend with the village scenery in Nepal which attracts over 800,000 tourists every year.

Fix the economic development model

• Thirdly, a flaw in Nepal’s economic development model should be fixed. Available data suggest that Nepal has become one of the most remittance-dependent economies in the world. Before the earthquake almost 1500 able-bodied workers left the country on a daily basis for jobs abroad. This flow has now ebbed and some have, in fact, returned home to help out their families. Without jobs in the country to keep them in Nepal, they will surely leave again, perhaps in even larger droves.

It is therefore imperative that the country introduce innovative income-generating schemes like the “cash for works” programme run by, among others, Mercy Corps in Aceh in the wake of the tsunami and in the Philippines after the Super Typhoon Hainan. These programmes will provide jobs and income for the able-bodied in exchange for work completed in public works projects including school building and infrastructure development. Simply doling out money for rehabilitation is not a good idea as it will have adverse budgetary and monetary impacts.

• Finally, in a study prepared for the ADB last year, a co-author and I have argued that Nepal should strive to become a “land link” between the two “giant” countries of China and India, as it was in the bygone era, by improving connectivity both within the country as well as cross-border connectivity. Such a strategy would result in a more balanced development strategy for the country. Nepal’s founding member status in the China-initiated Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and its support of China’s Silk Road Economic Belt policy are steps in the right direction.

Lessons for other countries

Nepal experiences a major earthquake every 100 years or so. In 1934, it was ravaged by a quake which registered 8 on the Richter scale. Scientists had issued strong warnings about the likelihood of another one. The government had legislated a new building code in 1996 but the code was poorly implemented because of poverty and poor governance in the country.

An important lesson for other countries prone to natural disasters from Nepal’s experience is to be prepared. It is not good enough just to have laws and codes, they should be enforced. This is, however, easier said than done especially in a poor country.

*Pradumna B. Rana is Associate Professor and Coordinator of the International Political Economy Programme in the Centre for Multilateralism Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. He is a Nepali citizen who was previously a senior director at the Asian Development Bank (ADB).

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By Air Marshal M. Matheswaran (Retd)*

The success of the Mars mission of the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) has elicited singular praise from the prime minister and all quarters in the country. The mission is certainly a great achievement, considering the fact that it was done within limited budget and against enormous technological challenges. However, India’s space capability needs to be seen in the correct perspective in order to draw the right conclusions for addressing its related policy issues. Space capability has evolved over the last half a century to play a dominant role in the country’s security, economic, developmental and technological spheres. Great powers of this century will have to be dominant players in space.

Very often space capability of a nation is measured from a military perspective. But we forget that the real space security is achieved through strong economic and technological controls in the space domain. This is where ISRO’s performance in the last decade gives cause for concern, particularly when ISRO is generally perceived as an efficient organisation characterised by its methodical planning and development. However, a recent Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) report (2014) belies this image. The report clearly blames ISRO for its poor planning and inability to meet India’s telecommunication requirements that has forced Indian TV channels to become dependent on foreign satellites for transponder capacities.

The ‘Digital India’ dream of the current government can become a reality only if ISRO enables rapid growth of India’s TV industry through satellite-based telecommunications, in particular the Direct-to-Home (DTH) segment. For example, the Ku-band has vital importance in the field of data provisions, and satellite is the most economically viable and efficient means to reach the nook and corner of the country. Exploitation of the full spectrum of the Ku-band by utilising FSS (fixed-satellite service) and BSS (broadcasting satellite service) bands can easily make good the requirements of the DTH players, VSAT players, and the strategic users such as defence and other governmental agencies. Also, the dream of Edusat reaching every village can be fulfilled at a low cost in this manner.

Space technologies have evolved and matured significantly over the last two to three decades. Today, inputs from space or to put it more correctly, space services have become indispensable facets of our everyday life. The economic and commercial aspects of space power have become critical elements of national power. Space security of a nation, therefore, depends on the extent of dominance it exerts over space commerce. For example, television is an important social media that is critically dependent on space services. The rapidly expanding television services are dependent upon satellite-based transponders. From economic and security perspective India should have had majority of the TV channels beamed through its own satellites. To achieve this it should have created the requisite space capability to be a major player in the space services market. However, as the CAG report points out, India has failed to emerge as a significant player in the global satellite market.

The Indian television industry is a rapidly expanding one. From 300-odd channels in 2008, the television industry more than doubled to 821 licensed channels in 2012. This is expected to grow to 1,600 channels by 2017, of which 1,300 are expected to be operational. The channels operate, largely, on C band and also on extended-C and Ku bands. The DTH services operate on Ku band and this segment is likely to grow at a rapid rate. Before 1999, a “Closed Sky” policy was in vogue wherein the entire transponder requirements were met by ISRO satellites. Hiring of transponders from foreign satellites was not allowed. However, seeing the mismatch between a rapidly growing television industry and ISRO’s launch plans, the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting asked for an “Open Sky” policy for hiring of foreign transponders. In spite of Department of Space’s opposition, the government of India took a practical stand and declared an “Open Sky” policy in 2000 with a caveat that all hiring be done for short periods through ISRO. The objective was to shift to Indian satellites at the earliest, which has not materialised.

The CAG report has rightly blamed ISRO for poor planning and execution. It had planned for a target of 500 transponders on domestic satellites in the 11th plan period (2007-12) and further increasing it to 800 transponders in the 12th plan period (2012-17). In practice, it has been able to operationalise only 187 transponders during the 11th plan period. For example, in the fast growing and strategically important Ku-band segment ISRO has been able to provide only 48 Ku-band transponders in the 11th plan period as against the planned target of 218 transponders (just 22% of the target), thus forcing DTH operators to shift to foreign satellites. All this has translated into higher costs as well as a huge revenue loss for the country.

Today, majority of Indian commercial television channels are beamed through foreign satellite transponders. In C-band, only 160 channels out of 660 operational channels are carried by transponders on Indian satellites, which is barely 25%. Similarly, out of 76 Ku-band transmitters used by DTH (as of July 2013), only 19 (25%) are on Indian satellites. This shortfall is largely due to ISRO launching only three satellites as against the planned target of nine satellites in the 11th plan period. The failure to meet planned targets and the problem needs to be put in the correct perspective.

For long (in the early 1990s) India was seen as a strong contender to capture the growing satellite launch market by virtue of its low cost and better success rate. But this has failed to materialise so far. To this day India’s launch capability is limited to its workhorse PSLV (Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle), which can put only up to 1.5-ton satellites into orbit. The major launch market relates to the geostationary orbits, which will require ISRO to cross the 4-ton payload barrier in its GeoSynchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle (GSLV) launch capability. ISRO’s attempts to achieve this through cryogenic engine development, with Russian cooperation, in the early 1990s were scuttled by the Americans using the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) provisions to force Russian withdrawal. It was known that this would push ISRO behind by more than two decades and thus, put India out of the global satellite launch market as a strategic player.

ISRO’s GSLV is slated to be the main launch vehicle. Its successful launch in January this year is just the preliminary step of proving its cryogenic development. It will need few more developmental launches (over 2-3 years), before it can establish its payload launch capability of at least 3-tons. There is also the problem of poor reliability and longevity of INSAT (Indian National Satellite System) satellites, which reduces further the Indian transponder availability.

ISRO’s failure to effectively strategise its transponder availability has hurt Indian strategic interests and turned out to be a windfall for foreign satellite operators. Not only have they garnered more business but have also occupied five orbital slots in the Indian skies, and this would become difficult to get vacated in the future. That Antrix (marketing arm of ISRO) has negotiated these contracts for its revenue generation is no consolation. ISRO could have addressed this issue by launching more of its Geo satellites through EU or others so as to ensure higher transponder availability and keep strategic orbital slots in our control.

It will need to put more focus to accelerate India’s GSLV capability and satellite reliability. The issue is stark and clear – 75% of transponder capability on foreign satellites is not only a commercial loss but more importantly it is a huge strategic and security risk for India’s space capability and national interests.

*Air Marshal Matheswaran (Retd), was Deputy Chief at HQ Integrated Defence Staff dealing with Policy, Plans, and Force Development from 2012 until retirement in March 2014. He is currently an Advisor to Chairman HAL and Advisor to Aerospace Task Force of FICCI. He can be contacted at matheswaran2005@gmail.com

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