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Burundi: Supporters Of President Take To The Streets

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“The President’s supporters have taken the streets in celebration, attending his return to the capital, while after the appeal of opposition leaders barricades have begun re-emerging in other areas in an attempt to relaunch the demonstrations”, local sources told MISNA from Bujumbura where President Pierre Nkurunziza announced his return after a failed coup attempt.

The local media reports that Nkurunziza has already reached the presidential palace. He reportedly departed this morning from his birth city of Ngozi, 140km from the capital. The President is now expected to address the nation over the national Radio-TV.

The President’s supporters have gathered around the city center, explained the MISNA sources, while the opposition activities are more concentrated in the Musaga area. “They are probably attempting to isolate the area before resuming the actual protests”, said a MISNA source, adding that “there is even more uncertainty now” in respect to the past hours, “because no one knows what reaction the authorities will have”. At least three of the coup leaders have been placed under arrest, including the second in command General Cyrille Ndayirukiye. The coup leader Gen. Godefroid Nyombare instead announced his surrender.

The developments of the past days and uncertain future of the nation have pushed thousands of Burundians to flee the country. Based on UN estimates, 105,000 have fled, including 70,000 to Tanzania, 26,300 Rwanda and 9,000 to the Democratic Republic of Congo, more specifically South Kivu.

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Ron Paul Says US Drone Program ‘Should’ve Never Started’

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The US government is undermining Americans’ rights at home through surveillance, and its drone program “should’ve been shut down a long time ago,” former Texas Congressman Ron Paul told RT. He also criticized the prospect of another Clinton-Bush election.

Speaking on RT’s ‘Watching the Hawks’ program, Paul was asked if it’s time to close down the drone program considering that two hostages were recently killed in an airstrike.

“It should’ve been shut down a long time ago – it should have never been started, as far as I’m concerned,” Paul said. “It gives us nothing but grief. They’ve been used for [the] assassination of American citizens.”

“It should be closed down as quickly as possible. If it’s ever to be used in wartime it should be very strictly controlled.”

Paul dismissed the idea that drone strikes prevent American casualties by keeping the US from sending in ground troops, arguing that usually the deployment of drones, special forces and sanctions leads to more problems and continued escalation.

Regarding the National Security Agency’s mass surveillance programs, Paul also said those who claim bulk collection helps “close the gap” between the government’s failure to stop the September 11 attacks, like Sen. Tom Cotton (R-Arkansas), are “blowing smoke.”

Paul said the sole purpose of the government and military is to protect our liberties, yet the federal government is doing the opposite. He added that interfering in other countries overseas draws the US further into conflicts to the point that it feels the need to undermine Americans’ rights.

“We lose our liberties here at home, at the same time it’s costing us a bundle, driving us into bankruptcy, and our freedoms are being undermined,” he said. “We’re told that we’re [overseas] to protect our liberties and enforce the Constitution by fighting unconstitutional wars overseas and unconstitutionally undermining our Fourth Amendment here at home.”

“It makes no sense. I just wish the American people would wake up,” he said.

On the topic of the 2016 presidential election, the former lawmaker was asked about a potential matchup between former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and former Florida Gov. Jeb Bush, a race that would pit another Clinton against another Bush.

“If that comes up, the American people are gluttons and they’re going to have to suffer,” Paul said. He noted that “there’s a lot of big money” behind the fact that the Clinton and Bush families are mainstays in the political system, but said a disapproving population could change things if it wanted to.

“When the people reject, totally, confidence in the government and they know the promises aren’t going to bear out, they change the program. Some of these systems fail because they’re not workable,” he said, adding that he believes the current US system of intervention and high spending will fail.

“The American people have a responsibility,” he said, “but I hope they’re not gluttons for more of this suffering.”

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US Assures Gulf States That Iran Won’t Be Allowed To Have Nukes

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President Barack Obama has pledged America’s “ironclad commitment” to Gulf nations to help protect their security, pointedly mentioning the potential use of military force and offering assurances that a potential nuclear agreement with Iran would not leave them more vulnerable.

At the summit-closing news conference, Obama said Gulf leaders hadn’t been asked to “sign on the bottom line” to approve work in process. They agreed, he said, “that a comprehensive, verifiable solution that fully addresses the regional and international concerns about Iran’s nuclear program is in the security interests of the international community, including our GCC partners.”

Foreign Minister Adel Al-Jubeir said Arab leaders were “assured that the objective is to deny Iran the ability to obtain a nuclear weapon” and that all pathways to such a weapon would be cut off.

He added that it was too early to know if a final nuclear agreement would be acceptable, saying, “We don’t know if the Iranians will accept the terms they need to accept.”

Addressing reporters after a Camp David summit with six Gulf leaders, Obama said: “As we’ve declared in our joint statement, the United States is prepared to work jointly with GCC member states to deter and confront an external threat to any GCC state’s territorial integrity that is inconsistent with the UN charter.”

He added: “Let me underscore, the United States keeps our commitments.”

The president said the US believes Iran’s focus would be on shoring up an economy that has struggled under the sanctions pressure.

Obama promised a “concrete series of steps” from the one-day summit.

Following Obama’s remarks, the Emir of Qatar, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani, said that his country and other GCC states hope that the Iran agreement would be a stabilizing factor in the region. He added that the talks were fruitful and candid in all regional issues.

“In the event of such aggression or the threat of such aggression, the United States stands ready to work with our GCC partners to determine urgently what action may be appropriate, using the means at our collective disposal, including the potential use of military force, for the defense of our GCC partners,” the joint statement added.

On the sidelines of the summit, a White House spokesperson said that the White House was open to the idea of granting its Gulf Cooperation Council partners major non-NATO ally status.

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Taking ‘Make In India’ To The West – Analysis

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By Preety Bhogal*

The Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi recently concluded a nine-day long trip to France, Germany and Canada in pursuit of establishing technology and energy linkages. This trip followed the release of India’s latest Foreign Trade Policy (2015-2020) that regards technology transfer and energy efficiency as key policy agendas. India’s international relations and policies have taken a leap over the last one year. Starting with the bumper ‘Make in India’ campaign with focus on manufacturing, energy efficiency and job creation, the rechristened ‘Link West, Act East’ policies, growing emphasis on the neighbours and prominence of technology transfer are vital ingredients to India’s renewed policy recipe. In pursuit of these, the Indian leadership has been carefully coordinating the foreign visits.

The latest Foreign Trade Policy and overall policy agenda focuses on establishing India as a manufacturing hub with export capacity. It also involves deepening India’s regional trade engagements with nations that are potential markets for Indian goods and are major suppliers of some strategic inputs. India has largely been relying on the West for state-of-the-art technology to ensure global competitiveness. India has been entering into collaboration with different countries on various science and technology projects for building technology capabilities within India.

As per the Indian government’s Department of Science and Technology, in 2013-14, collaborative projects worth Rs.220 million (approximately) were approved by the Indian government, of which around Rs.7 million were from Germany. Additionally, while energy production has increased in India (nearly 13,400.15 Peta Joules in 2013-2014), there is a more than proportionate rise in the consumption (about 47,264 Peta Joules in 2013-2014), leading to a widening demand-supply gap as regards the energy sector. This has paved way for foreign collaboration and cooperation in producing clean energy efficiently using renewable resources. These agendas have been addressed in the prime minister’s diplomatic efforts during his visits to France, Germany and Canada.

On the global front, Germany and France are strategic partners of India for trade and investments. The two together contribute close to five percent of the total cumulative foreign direct investment (FDI) in India, amounting to US$12 billion, positioning them among the top ten investors in the Indian market. Germany is also the second largest country in the world in terms of technology transfer into India, after the United States. Finally, Canada, with a large Indian diaspora has immense potential particularly in context of skill development and human capital.

In this context, the prime minister’s visit to France focused on energy and defence cooperation. Several collaborative efforts and initiatives were undertaken at both the government and private sector level. Around 17 agreements were signed relating to defence, space, nuclear and renewable energy. French multinational group AREVA, one of the world’s largest nuclear energy companies, signed agreements with the state-owned Nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd (NPCIL) and Larsen and Toubro (L&T) for the development of the sector in India, reducing cost of energy generation and instilling overall efficiency in the system. According to the Economic Survey 2014-2015, the renewable energy industry in India is expected to generate commercial opportunities worth US$160 billion. The untapped potential of the renewable energy sector calls for establishing greater international cooperation frameworks, focusing on sharing the expertise and technology to manufacture efficient renewable energy systems and devices in India.

As an initiative to foster business-to-business interactions and knowledge sharing, India partnered with Germany at Hannover Messe business fair this year, thereby fuelling the national targets of ‘Make in India’ campaign. With the Make in India lion sitting in Hall no. 6 of the fair, the participation is expected to regain the eroding faith in Indian business and operating environment. India’s deteriorating position on the World Bank’s ease of doing business ranking from 133rd in 2010 to 142nd in 2015 has affected investors’ confidence. The Indian prime minister addressed this issue at the Hannover industrial trade fair by firming up his resolution to set up a mechanism to improve economic linkages between India and Germany and regain investor confidence through a pro-investment attitude.

To establish people-to-people linkages through improving cross-border employability and training was the ultimate objective of Prime Minister Modi’s visit to Canada. Thirteen agreements were inked on skill development between the two countries along with the uranium supply deal. With due recognition to the need of skilled workforce for boosting manufacturing growth in India, Modi partnered with Canadian educational institutions and colleges to create job opportunities for the youth. The two sides also agreed to enhance cooperation in the areas of defence, nuclear energy and security, strengthening their bilateral relations further.

India has altered its vision for growth and expansion by focusing on production and trade of higher value added products in technology intensive areas and by linking itself to the global value chain. In response to the government’s renewed policy agendas, the diplomatic initiatives like the ‘SAARC Yatra’ undertaken by Foreign Secretary S. Jaishankar in March and the prime minister’s visits in April, send positive signals to global partners. India’s collaboration with the leaders of developed countries in key priority areas like technology transfer, energy efficiency and skill development provide an opportunity to support its process of development. While diplomatic initiatives strengthen collaborations on paper and improve inter-governmental and business-to-business relations, it is essential to ensure a stable operating environment and ease of doing business for foreign investors in the country.

The stringent laws, regulations and legal processes require an overhaul and more efficient and effective practices must be adopted for an easy conduct of business in India. Additionally, it is essential to create a common platform for industrial associations, companies and investors, market leaders, stakeholders, fund raisers and financiers and key policy makers to highlight India’s investment potential, thus promoting the ‘Make in India’ campaign. The participation of foreign countries is likely to expedite India’s development process and make it easy to achieve the growth targets efficiently and effectively.

*Preety Bhogal is Researcher, Centre for Policy Research (CPR), India. The author can be contacted at preety273@gmail.com

The post Taking ‘Make In India’ To The West – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Nigeria: Boko Haram Kills Dozens In Attack On Maiduguri

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Over 60 people were killed in an offensive launched this week by Boko Haram Islamists against Maiduguri, main city of Borno State, reports the national media. After repelling the militants, the military imposed a curfew in the city.

According to the Vanguard, the heaviest fighting took place 20km south of Maiduguri, near the villages of Kayamula and Alau Dam. The victims include 35 Islamists and 27 civilians, while no information has been disclosed on eventual government troop losses.

Sources indicate that the Islamists fled in direction of the Sambisa Forest, a Boko Haram stronghold that extends to the border with Cameroon.

The post Nigeria: Boko Haram Kills Dozens In Attack On Maiduguri appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Fox Ruins The Simpsons?

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Are Mr. Burns, Principal Skinner, and Ned Flanders leaving Springfield for good? Longtime Simpsons actor Harry Shearer, who has voiced those roles along with Dr. Hibbert, Otto, Reverend Lovejoy, Scratchy, and many others since joining the show as a founding cast member in 1989, indicated in a very public way Wednesday night that his tenure with the long-running Fox animated series has come to an end.

Shearer, one of the show’s most vocal cast members, quoted a message from a lawyer for executive producer James L. Brooks that said: “show will go on. Harry will not be part of it, wish him the best.”

The Emmy-winning actor and comedian also said a desire to have the freedom to work on other projects was the source of the dispute, and later thanked The Simpsons fans for their support.

Earlier this month 20th Century Fox green-lit two more 22-episode seasons for The Simpsons, which has already run for a record-breaking 26 seasons—an eternity in television years. Shearer was reportedly the core cast’s lone contractual holdout as the studio and his fellow cast members geared up to start production on the 27th season.

Back in 2011, Shearer led a group of Simpsons cast members in a lengthy and public salary negotiation. The actors ended up taking pay cuts, and won none of the backend merchandising and licensing profits that Shearer lobbied passionately for in a guest article for The Daily Beast.

“As a member of the Simpsons cast for 23 years, I think it’s fair to say that we’ve had a great run and no one should feel sorry for any of us,” Shearer wrote. “But given how much joy the show has given so many people over the years—and given how many billions of dollars in profits News Corp. has earned and will earn from it—I find it hard to believe that this is Fox’s final word on the subject.”

“At least I certainly hope it isn’t, because the alternative is to cancel the show or fire me for having the gall to try to save the show by helping Fox with its new business model. Neither would be a fair result—either to those of us who have committed so many years to the show or to its loyal fans who make our effort worthwhile.”

The terms of Shearer’s departure from The Simpsons remain unclear for now, as does the fate of the many fan favorite characters he voiced. Representatives for Fox and Shearer could not be reached for comment. Stay tuned for more from Springfield as the animated dust clears.

The post Fox Ruins The Simpsons? appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Modi’s China Visit: Practical Approach Is Best – Analysis

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By Namrata Hasija*

Since Prime Minister Narendra Modi came to power with a historic majority last year, his government has been looking to re-adjust India’s China policy. A paradigm shift was signalled right from the start with an invitation to Tibetan ‘prime minister-in-exile’ Lobsang Sangay to attend Modi’s swearing-in on May 26 and the inclusion of Kiren Rijiju, a Member of Parliament (MP) from Arunachal Pradesh, which China claims as its territory, as junior home minister in the government.

Along with three state-level bilateral visits between China and India, and New Delhi’s moves to strengthen infrastructure along its borders, these have been the first steps to ramping up India’s China policy. Small wonder then that expectations are high from Modi’s upcoming visit to China from May 14-16.

With China already committing $20 billion worth of investments during President Xi Jinping’s visit to India in September last year, there are expectations that another $20 billion will be committed during Modi’s visit as indicated by China’s Ambassador to India, Le Yucheng. It is also anticipated that the two leaders are likely to announce a special package for places like Sarnath, Lumbini and Nalanda, attracting the large Buddhist population in China.

Inevitably, the most important issue on the agenda is the bilateral border dispute. India and China have signed a number of agreements in accordance with the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (Panchsheel). These include: Agreement between India and China on Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility Along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas (1993), Agreement on Confidence Building Measures in the Military Field Along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas (1996) and Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the India-China Boundary Question (2005). The most important being the 1993 agreement which states that “The two sides agree that references to the line of actual control in this Agreement do not prejudice their respective positions on the boundary question”. This clearly indicates that the two agree that the LAC is not the border. Thus, there is no need for incursions from either side to demarcate territory.

Nevertheless, intrusions such as the one in September 2014 have been a glitch in the border talks. Indian External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj, , during her visit to Beijing indicated that ‘out of box’ thinking was required to solve the border dispute. Yet recent reports from Beijing indicate that a solution to the border dispute is not possible during this visit.

For India, it will be important to discuss the growing trade imbalance, especially after Prime Minister Modi’s much-hyped ‘Make in India’ campaign. The Chinese envoy in a recent interview said that India should ease restrictions on exporting competitive products such as iron ore to China. He also appreciated Modi’s ‘Make in India’ initiative, hoping it would bring new opportunities for expanding India-China trade relations. These are all high expectations, but a more pertinent question here is will these expectations be fulfilled? China is hoping to sign trade agreements and looking for multiple leverages for Chinese companies and businessmen in India.

Currently, both China and India are trying their best to break the shell of formal protocol. Modi’s debut on Weibo, China’s main micro blogging service, gained him thousands of followers. But while most Chinese netizens welcomed him, there were many comments on Arunachal Pradesh, clearly stating that Arunachal Pradesh is ‘Southern Tibet’ and belongs to China.

The Chinese are also going out of their way to make a friendly gesture towards the Indian prime minister, including ‘Hometown diplomacy’ wherein Modi will visit Xian, Xi Jinping’s hometown. Huang Xilian, Deputy Director-General of the Department of Asian Affairs in the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that special care is being taken to maintain “peace and tranquility” at the border during Modi’s Beijing visit. .

Both sides have realised that for different reasons a practical approach to India-China relations is best. For China it is important to wean India away from its growing proximity to the United States and Japan, especially after the signing of multiple agreements with the U.S. including one that requires Indian support for the principle of freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, issues of maritime security, and interests in maintaining regional stability in the Asia-Pacific.

On the other hand China’s ‘One Belt, One Road’ policy is a major challenge for the Modi government with many South Asian countries committing to help China see this initiative through. Modi has no choice but to push for a practical approach towards China to ensure that the kernel of sea-based commerce is preserved and expanded, without the militarisation of the Indian Ocean. .

The visit might not give an immediate solution to many of complications in India-China relations but indications are that Swaraj’s suggestion for ‘out of box’ thinking is necessary.

*Namrata Hasija is Research Associate, Centre for China Analysis and Strategy. She can be contacted at hasija.namrata@gmail.com

The post Modi’s China Visit: Practical Approach Is Best – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

The Conflicted Role Of The AIIB In Southeast Asia – Analysis

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By Stuart Larkin*

There are 35 Prospective Founding Members (PFMs) of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, (AIIB), and a further 23 countries applying for this status.1 As many as 28 of the PFMs are from Asia, including all the ASEAN countries – Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam,2 – the large economies of China and India and the oil rich states of Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Kazakhstan among others. The non-regional members are France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, New Zealand,3 Switzerland and the United Kingdom. Applicant countries include other OECD4 countries such as Australia, South Korea, Spain, Portugal, Netherlands, Austria, Poland, Hungary, Turkey and the four Scandinavian countries. Brazil and Russia are large-economy applicants and the Hong Kong territory has also applied. Belgium, Canada and Ukraine are considering joining; Colombia, Japan and USA have no immediate intention to participate; and North Korea and Taiwan’s applications to join have been rejected by China.

Thus, the AIIB is set to commence operations by the end of the year with a long list of founding members. A reliable assessment of the AIIB’s role in Southeast Asia is only feasible once the bank is operational and its public statements and research outputs, as well as the details of the actual projects and financing structures it expedites, can be scrutinized. However, the membership is diverse with each PFM having its own reasons for wanting to get on board.

For the purpose of analysing the range of interests and objectives of PFMs I group them into three: (i) loan recipients within Southeast Asia, (ii) China, and (iii) OECD members and the oil rich states. The differing interests and objectives of these three groups will be advanced by members during the course of the bank’s operations, (and during the set-up period when governance procedures are established), and the playing out of these tensions will determine the nature of AIIB’s evolving role in Southeast Asia. For example, the AIIB is China-led and yet multilateral – how will decision-making power be distributed, both according to the bank’s founding covenants and in practice? The core themes of AIIB as an instrument of soft power in China’s rise and the region’s need to get infrastructure projects off the ground will coalesce around common interests.

LOAN RECIPIENTS WITHIN SOUTHEAST ASIA

ASEAN members as developing countries have inadequate infrastructure and therefore welcome the new source of infrastructure financing that AIIB presents. (Singapore and Brunei have good infrastructure and much higher per capita incomes and although sharing security concerns with their neighbours, have more in common with the OECD and oil rich states).5 Southeast Asian nations have three principal hopes and concerns regarding AIIB’s role in the region. First, they hope that AIIB will view Southeast Asia as a compelling market opportunity in infrastructure finance, supplying “public goods” in an essential sector where private sector financial intermediation has fallen short. Second, they hope AIIB will act as a knowledge bank providing much needed advice and assistance, helping countries to build capacity in establishing “shovel ready” infrastructure project pipelines. Third, they hope China will not seek to use AIIB to gain undue political influence in the region.

The Southeast Asian Infrastructure Market

The market has been well defined by governments and international organizations such as ASEAN, APEC, ADB and World Bank with their programmes for development of national and cross border infrastructure (CBI), as well as regional frameworks. Such plans are well formulated and have been long in the making; for example, APEC Leaders’ 2013 Declaration of shared aspiration for seamlessly and comprehensively connected and integrated Asia Pacific through the pillars of Physical Connectivity, Institutional Connectivity and People-to- People Connectivity.6 But implementation has been slow. There is deemed to be a massive “funding gap”, regionally as well as globally. Asian nations need infrastructure investments of US$ 750 billion per year through 2020 (ADB), whereas ADB and World Bank combined are making infrastructure investments of just US$ 20 billion a year worldwide.7 The infrastructure deficit for developing countries overall is particularly acute: they spend about US$ 1 trillion a year on infrastructure and need at least an additional US$ 1 trillion per year to meet demand and maintain growth rates.8 A United Nations report in July 2014 notes an additional 2.5 billion people will live in cities by 2050, with nearly 90 per cent of that increase concentrated in Asia and Africa.9 The UN estimates Asia’s urban population to increase by 630 million people by 2030 led mainly by China, India and Indonesia.10

Table 1: Total National Infrastructure Investment Needs in Asia 2010-2020

Table 1: Total National Infrastructure Investment Needs in Asia 2010-2020

Asia is the world’s largest and most populous region, covering 26 million square kilometres and, with 3.77 billion inhabitants, it accounts for about 60 per cent of the world’s population and 30 per cent of the world’s total land area.11 Such statistics might suggest that South and Central Asia will be AIIB’s near term focus for infrastructure finance, but this would be misleading. Central Asia certainly has energy and mineral deposits that China is developing. However, vast distances (and some of the world’s remotest geography), sparse population, and Russian geostrategic interest, to link up to the European market all challenge the economic feasibility of Eurasian connectivity investments. India, which dominates South Asia, has high population and production and market potential. But its chaotic form of government presents huge challenges in infrastructure planning.

Table 2: Asia’s Infrastructure Requirement, 2010–2020 (2008 $ billion)

Table 2: Asia’s Infrastructure Requirement, 2010–2020 (2008 $ billion)

The largest infrastructure market within Asia is East and Southeast Asia, (see Table 2 above). ASEAN countries will require infrastructure investments amounting to US$ 1.08 trillion during 2010-20, with an average investment of US$ 98.5 billion per year (see Table 3 below). Of this projected amount, around US$ 731.6 billion (68 per cent) will be needed for investment in new projects while US$ 351.6 billion (32 per cent) will be required for maintenance.

Table 3: Projected infrastructure Requirements in Developing ASEAN* Economies 2010–2020 by Sector (US$ million)

Table 3: Projected infrastructure Requirements in Developing ASEAN* Economies 2010–2020 by Sector (US$ million)

There are a number of reasons why infrastructure investment in Southeast Asia may be particularly attractive to the China-led AIIB. ASEAN is currently China’s third biggest trade partner with US$ 443.6 billion of annual bilateral trade.12 Production networks and supply chains are already China-centric and the region also supplies many natural resources to China. ASEAN has a population of 600 million which offers low cost labour as well as a good sized middle class of sophisticated consumers; ASEAN has high and middle income countries as well as low income ones. Most importantly, the potential returns to infrastructure investment are greatest because the region already has an advanced economic integration agenda based on a combination of infrastructure and connectivity development and trade and investment liberalization.

ASEAN’s major projects in transport are the ASEAN Highway Network and Singapore- Kunming Rail Link projects but a large portion of national infrastructure such as airports, ports, roads and railways can be considered as cross border infrastructure (CBI) and building blocks for regional connectivity. The ASEAN Secretariat, APEC, ADB and World Bank have all contributed to the regional economic strategy strongly encouraged by outside powers such as USA and Japan, and of course China. Buy-in by national politicians in ASEAN countries has been lacklustre and the ASEAN Secretariat is inadequately resourced and lacks enforcement power. There is a leadership role for AIIB to play in financing connectivity investments that encourage national politicians to implement their agreements on ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) and ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) 2015.

Developing Capacity in Southeast Asian Countries to Establish Project Pipelines

ASEAN countries can look to the AIIB to help with their financing needs – for example, Philippines needs US$ 20 billion annually to finance its infrastructure needs until 2020 (ADB)13 – but many ASEAN countries are weak in infrastructure planning. They could benefit from the AIIB providing a pool of experience and expertise, drawing from China’s own experience. Consider progress with Jakarta’s monorail project with China’s record of building urban transit systems in recent years.14

Bankers often maintain that the financing deficit for infrastructure is not due to an unwillingness to contribute capital. The problem is mostly caused by a lack of well- structured, bankable projects; regulatory and political stability that decrease investor confidence; and the lack of capacity on behalf of governments, city leaders and project sponsors. The investments needed are typically for public goods which are large-scale, long term and illiquid, and present challenging cost recovery problems. Constraints, particularly in attracting private sector investment, include problems of project selection and preparation, implementation risks, the need to translate sound economic rates of return into financial returns, and intermediation challenges. AIIB will need to build up considerable expertise if it is to help Southeast Asian countries acquire the capacity to address these challenges. Without a pipeline of “bankable” projects the AIIB has no deal flow.

Fear of AIIB as Instrument to Advance China’s Political, Economic and Security Interests

Although AIIB is a multilateral institution, prospective loan recipients in Southeast Asia worry that China may use it as instrument with which to pursue purely national goals. Fear of China domination is hard-wired in Asia. This is due to the geography, that is, the size asymmetry, and the history – from the ancient tributary system, through the cold war (when ASEAN was formed under the “communist threat”) and up to contemporary territorial disputes in the South China Sea. Furthermore, ASEAN countries are particularly sensitive to the issue of external interference in their internal affairs, perhaps because of their experiences in the struggle for independence from colonial powers. They are in no mood to see unwanted western influence replaced by China domination.

There are two fundamental principles of China’s engagement with ASEAN: mutual security and economic cooperation.15 However, in practice the latter is far more developed than the former. Southeast Asian production networks and supply chains are quite well integrated with China, and energy and other natural resources also flow from the region. But mutual security understanding has been shaken by China’s perceived belligerence in the South China Sea. Also, while President Xi Jinping’s “Belt and Road” speeches (see below) have outwardly been well received by Asian countries eager to attract foreign investment and infrastructure financing, there is disquiet about the China-centric vision of regional integration they articulate. The core-periphery structure of connectivity envisaged differs from the multilateralism that ASEAN has entertained. It is also a challenge to the principle of ASEAN Centrality which implies that ASEAN, instead of the bigger economies like those of China, Japan, the US or India, should be the hub of developing a wider Asia-Pacific regional architecture.16 Also, the difference in economic scale between China and its neighbours creates asymmetric interdependence that favours China and makes ASEAN countries wary.

ASEAN countries wish to take advantage of AIIB’s project loans and other “public goods” to advance their development but fear doing so might leave them vulnerable to unwanted political influence. The main safeguard against this is to balance these loans with financing from elsewhere. The more financing ASEAN countries can secure from the China-led AIIB, the more they can hope to secure from countries fearful of China’s growing influence in the region, spurring an “investment race”. For example, shortly after China talks with Indonesia over the refurbishment of 24 ports, the US Chamber of Commerce in Jakarta, Amcham, staged a US-Indonesia Investment Summit on the prospect of US$ 61 billion of US FDI over the next five years.17 Jokowi’s concept of Indonesia as a “global maritime axis” can play in with Xi’s Maritime Silk Road. ADB’s plan to provide US$ 1.5 billion in loans to Indonesia in 2015 (nearly triple the amount in 2014, US$ 550 million)18 is not a coincidence. Conversely for China, there is the risk they will disburse funds for infrastructure development without markedly increasing their political influence and security cooperation with countries in the region.

CHINA: THE AIIB AS BEIJING’S BABY

There are a number of reasons why China may have taken the initiative to launch AIIB. It may partly be out of frustration with its inability to expand its influence within the IMF and World Bank19 commensurate with its rising economic status. Also, China may see enormous potential in the obvious need across Asia to improve its infrastructure. With a domestic slowdown underway leaving many infrastructure-related industries operating with spare capacity – such as in construction, cement and iron and steel – the timing may be auspicious. Also related to the domestic economy, there is a need for China to step up the export of capital. However, the official reasons are encapsulated in the “Belt and Road” vision articulated by China’s top leadership, of which AIIB is seen as a leading execution agency. Since its leadership of AIIB is indisputable, how China perceives AIIB’s role is of utmost importance.

“Belt and Road” and AIIB as Instrument of “Soft Power”

“The basic purpose of [AIIB] is to support infrastructure in Asian countries and investment of other productive areas, promote economic development in the Asian region and regional economic cooperation”,20 and it is Beijing’s brainchild to steer development along the proposed “Belt and Road”. The Silk Road Economic Belt is a programme to build land transportation corridors that connect China to Europe and all other major Eurasian sub- regions, including Indochina, South Asia and Southwest Asia. The 21st Century Maritime Silk Road is a port development initiative to broaden Chinese trade channels targeting the maritime regions of Southeast Asia, South Asia, the Middle East, East Africa and the Mediterranean.21

Connectivity has a compelling economic and commercial logic to it but it easily takes on geostrategic and security connotations. China’s interest in extending its maritime capability is consistent with it becoming the world’s largest goods trader, overtaking the USA in 2013 with total imports and exports of over US$ 4 trillion.22 Over 80 per cent of global traded goods are carried by maritime transport (WTO 2013). Expanding blue water naval capability is thus a legitimate goal for China and it provides greater visibility, deterrence, reassurance and can earn prestige and permit becoming “a neighbor of every other country.” Developing roads, railways, ports, and energy corridors is part of a strategy based on the politics of routes, which create access and may increase neighbour’s reliance on Chinese markets and capital. The idea is to draw in the countries of Eurasia and of the maritime Asia Pacific into China’s economic orbit to form what Xi Jinping calls a “community of shared destiny”. Xi Jinping is clearly thinking in terms of “grand strategy”.23

But “Belt and Road” creates unease in the region with its considerable ambition and scope and its China-centric conception of regional connectivity and economic integration. Southeast Asian leaders fear having to kowtow to Beijing for their project loans. Unperturbed and possibly insensitive to this, perhaps Xi Jinping’s “Belt and Road” speeches were primarily directed at the domestic audience. A patriotic vision of how China regains its rightful place in the world is a welcome morale booster for China’s nationalistic people experiencing hardship amidst a serious domestic economic slowdown that has not yet found bottom. Also, China’s business leaders, bureaucrats and bankers are being primed for the new opportunities that they will have to go out and nail down in the region.

The execution of the “Belt and Road” requires China to assume a leadership role within the region which cannot be based solely on coercion and economic and military might. China must be seen as providing benefits to the countries of Southeast Asia. Within the politically more acceptable multilateral approach, AIIB is being framed as an instrument of China’s “soft power” .24 As a provider of regional public goods, AIIB dispatch of infrastructure loans and related services to countries in the region is to help convince them that China’s rise will be peaceful. This will be quite a challenge for AIIB while perceptions of ongoing China belligerence in the South China Sea persist.

AIIB as Conduit for Capital Exports

With strict capital controls restricting most of China’s huge savings to deployment in the domestic economy, China has become oversupplied in infrastructure and real estate (and heavy industry) and the returns on investment have fallen to very low levels; and resource allocation in the economy has become highly inefficient. The marginal productivity of domestic investment has fallen so low that in the macro-economy it now takes RMB 5 of investment to produce RMB 1 of GDP growth.25 China has to drain off surplus savings from its domestic economy to improve resource allocation and returns on investment. Regional infrastructure finance markets have the advantage of scale, the prospect of work for Chinese companies, e.g. in construction and steel, and economic benefits from enhanced connectivity.

AIIB can sell renminbi-denominated bonds to China’s huge commercial banks and lend the proceeds to infrastructure projects in Southeast Asia (and the wider region). In global financial markets, capital is allocated through trillions of individual investment decisions, but because China’s domestic savings are held captive by the state they can be exported in a highly concentrated and strategic way. AIIB will play a leading role in the intermediation of domestic savings into regional infrastructure investment. But China’s other outbound investment institutions will also play an important role. The China Development Bank had outstanding foreign exchange loans in 2010 of US$ 141.3 billion (Peoples’ Daily Online, February 14, 2011). The Export-Import Bank of China (Eximbank of China) is another important policy bank.26 China’s will also seek to redeploy some of its foreign exchange reserves, which stood at US$ 3.84 trillion in December 2014,27 away from low yielding US Treasury Bonds, drawing further on the services of Chinese Investment Corporation (CIC) and China International and Trust Investment Corporation (CITIC). There is also the New Development Bank, (NDB), with a capital endowment of US$ 100 billion to consider, and the US$ 40 billion Silk Road Fund announced in November 2014.

OECD MEMBERS AND THE OIL RICH STATES

The British decision to join the AIIB on 12th March has triggered a widespread reaction to the US effort to deter its allies from being a part of the China-led bank. The City of London trumped the City of Westminster in a clear demonstration of global capital owing no loyalty to nation state allegiances, and opened the floodgates for many OECD countries, including France, Germany and Italy to join AIIB. As non-regional members, along with the oil rich states, these countries will not be seeking infrastructure loans from AIIB: they are joining for other reasons. For all practical purposes, Singapore and Brunei can also be considered within this category; they account for much of the ASEAN-5 countries considerable savings worth US$ 457 billion and foreign exchange reserves amounting to US$ 409 billion.28

OECD members and oil rich states are PFMs in AIIB as providers of long term capital. OECD members in particular have high standards of governance and their participation will boost AIIB’s credit rating and allow them to borrow at a lower rate of interest. However, they will want to see high governance standards for two reasons. First, they will not want to see their reputations tarnished by scandals concerning corruption and inappropriate project selection and execution regarding labour, social and environmental standards. Second, they will want to see high standards of due diligence conducted so that non-performing loans (NPL) are minimal. OECD countries will want to participate as creditors and investors alongside AIIB and the oil rich nations, on project loan syndicates, for example.

Apart from the sovereign wealth funds as a source of infrastructure finance, this grouping also includes various sources of private sector financing that may be interested in participating in infrastructure projects alongside AIIB. There are approximately 8,000 institutional investors worldwide but only about 300 are dedicated to infrastructure. As at 4th November 2014 there are 148 private infrastructure funds currently in the market.29 However, capital does not appear to be the main problem. Despite very low interest rates, huge gaps in infrastructure coexist with comparably massive accumulation of savings and underused global capacity. The world’s capital is concentrated in vast pools of value with US$ 80 trillion plus in global bond markets, US$ 60 trillion held in worldwide bank deposits, upward of US$ 50 trillion captured in equity markets and US$ 47 trillion plus controlled by 10 million high net worth individuals.30 So it is not the case that there is inadequate savings to finance the world’s infrastructure requirement but rather that there is a massive failure in the intermediation of savings into investment. It is for AIIB to meet that intermediation challenge within the region.

The problem is that there is a scarcity of “bankable” infrastructure projects within Southeast Asia. Singapore will be hoping that AIIB will open its first branch in the lion state so that it can add infrastructure finance as another pillar to its financial services sector. International professional services firms, specialized engineering companies and fully fledged construction and infrastructure companies can then all set up their regional offices in order to help facilitate infrastructure development within the region, hoping to pick up contracts in the design, construction and operation phases. In short, OECD countries want to join AIIB so their companies can benefit from this new source of financial intermediation and funding. In this endeavour they will be expecting to both compete and collaborate with Chinese firms.

CONCLUSION

China has its China-centric conception of regional connectivity and economic integration in its “Belt and Road” vision to serve its interests and guide its rise as a regional, and later global, power. But what is the political buy-in for this from Southeast Asian governments? It clashes with the principle of ASEAN centrality which keeps the initiative for connectivity and economic integration with Southeast Asian countries and away from outside powers. Southeast Asian governments want infrastructure loans but they don’t want to kowtow to China for them. In any event they have access to other sources of finance. The US and Japan, and even India, perceive a need to limit China’s influence in Southeast Asia and appreciate that that involves spending money. In fact the world is glutted with capital and the main problem appears to be the dearth of “bankable” projects within Southeast Asia. Is AIIB able to acquire the necessary knowledge culture for a politically diverse Southeast Asia under the leadership of an authoritarian monoculture?

China wants to use the AIIB to intermediate domestic savings into Southeast Asian infrastructure investment. But OECD members and oil rich states want their own institutions to finance some proportion of Asian infrastructure given the region’s growth prospects in both production and consumption. Both of these groups also want their own companies to win contracts in infrastructure project design, construction and operations. As a multilateral institution, how are the tasty morsels of business going to be divvied up among members? Not only will AIIB have to acquire the financial, economic and legal knowledge to expedite the financing of large and complex infrastructure projects but also the in-house diplomatic skills to reconcile all of the conflicting interests and objectives of its diverse membership.

About the author:
*This is the first in a three-part series on the AIIB by Stuart Larkin. Stuart Larkin was Visiting Fellow at ISEAS from 26 May 2014 to 25 September 2014, and 20 October 2014 to 19 April 2015.

Source:
This article was published by ISEAS as ISEAS Perspective Number 23, May 2015 (PDF)

Notes:
1. All membership data is sourced from Wikipedia accessed on 9th April 2015 and held to be the situation as at 7th April 2015. http://en.wikipedia.or /wiki/Asian_Infrastructure_Investment_Bank#Countries_with_no_intention_or _refused
2. This is all of Southeast Asia except Papua New Guinea and East Timor, which are neither regional members nor applicant countries.
3. Wikipedia lists New Zealand as one of seven non-regional members as at 9th April 2015 even though its geographical position would suggest its classification as a regional member.
4. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, (OECD), has 34 members and can serve more or less as a proxy for the developed world.
5. See later section entitled ‘OECD Members and the Oil Rich States’.
6. Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation, (APEC), Leaders Declaration, 2014, Annex D – APEC Connectivity Blueprint for 2015-2025, http://www.apec.org/Meeting-Papers/Leaders- Declarations/2014/2014_aelm/2014_aelm_annexd.aspx
7. Gallagher, Paul, U.S. Suicidal War on New Chinese Infrastructure Bank, Executive Intelligence Review, July 7th 2014; http://www.larouchepub.com/other/2014/4127us_v_china_bnk.html
8. World Bank, Public Private Partnerships: Global Infrastructure Facility (GIF), 17th November 2014, http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/publicprivatepartnerships/brief/global-infrastructure-facility-gif
9. Yahya, Yasmine, Singapore Eyes Slice of Pie Worth About $4 trillion, Straits Times, 6th September 2014.
10. Wilson, Karl, Funding the Future, China Daily Asia, March 28th 2014; http:www.chinadailyasia.com/asiaweekly/2014-03/28/content_15127714.html
11. Bhattacharyay, Biswa, Institutions for Asian Connectivity, ADBI Working Paper No. 220, 2010.
12. China Daily, ASEAN Welcomes China’s New Maritime Silk Road Initiatives, 15th August 2015, http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2014-08/15/content_18322921.htm
13. Ong Junio, Don Rodney, The Diplomat, Asian Infrastructure Bank: An Idea Whose Time Has Come? 4th December 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/12/asian-infrastructure-investment-bank-an- idea-whose-time-has-come/
14. More issues halt monorail’s progress, Jakarta Post, April 30th 2014, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/04/30/more-issues-halt-monorail-s-progress.html
15. David Arase, China’s Two Silk Roads: Implications for Southeast Asia, ISEAS Perspective, 22nd January 2015
16. Sanchita Basu Das, The ASEAN Economic Community: An Economic and Strategic Project, ISEAS Perspective, 29th January 2015.
17. Jakarta Globe, Indonesian Ministries Step Up for US Firms’ $61b Investments, 12th November 2014, http://thejakartaglobe.beritasatu.com/news/indonesian-ministries-step-us-firms-61b- investments/
18. Nikkei Asian Review, ADB Lends US$ 1.5 Billion Ahead of AIIB Establishment, January 14th 2015, http://asia.nikkei.com/Politics-Economy/Economy/ADB-lends-1.5-billion-ahead-of-AIIB- establishment
19. China currently commands only 5.17 per cent of the vote in the World Bank and 3.81 per cent in the IMF. Forbes, China Challenges Dollar Hegemony with New Infrastructure Bank, 6th April 2015. http://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2015/04/06/chinas-infrastructure-bank-challenges- dollars-world-hegemony/
20. Lou Jiwei answered reporters on the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, Ministry of Finance, PRC, March 7th 2014.
21. David Arase, China’s Two Silk Roads Initiative: What It Means For Southeast Asia, unpublished draft, February 2015
22. Jamil Anderlini and Lucy Hornby, China Overtakes US as World’s Largest Goods Trader, Financial Times, 10th January 2014, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/7c2dbd70-79a6-11e3-b381- 00144feabdc0.html#axzz3RVdkoAQF
23. Grand strategy denotes ”a country’s broadest approach to the pursuit of its national objectives in the international system”.Robert H. Dorff, A Primer in Strategy Development, in Joseph R. Cerami and James F. Holcomb, Jr. (eds.), U.S. Army War College Guide to Strategy, Strategic Studies institute, 2001, p. 12.
24. “Soft power” can be usefully defined as “the ability to cause others to admire, respect and emulate”. David Arase, Unpublished draft, Op Cit.
25. David Arase, China’s Two Silk Roads: Implications for Southeast Asia, Op Cit.
26. Although it shares CDB’s mandate to help ease China’s energy and natural resource bottlenecks and to help Chinese firms expand overseas, Eximbank is a much smaller institution with assets of RMB 792million in 2009 against CDB’s RMB 4.5 billion, (Downs, 2011).
27. Trading Economics, China’s Foreign Exchange Reserves, accessed 17th February 2015, http://www.tradingeconomics.com/china/foreign-exchange-reserves
28. Bhattacharyay, Biswa Nath, Infrastructure for ASEAN Connectivity and Integration, ASEAN Economic Bulletin, Volume 27, Number 2, August 2010.
29. GIB Summit Report 2014, Op Cit.
30. Global Energy Basel, infrastructure for a Changing World, 2012.

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OBOR And India’s Security Concerns – Analysis

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While China will seek India’s cooperation on its ambitious ‘One Belt, One Road’ project during Prime Minister Modi’s visit this week, Indian policy makers must soon articulate a definite stand on this transnational corridor by bridging the country’s security concerns and the benefits of such an engagement with China.

By Sameer Patil*

Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to China, starting on May 14, is the first time Chinese President Xi Jinping will receive a foreign leader at a location outside Beijing—the two will meet in Xi’an, the capital of Shaanxi province, often referred to as “the cradle of Chinese civilisation”.

Xi’an was also the starting point of the ancient Silk Road, now being revived through the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB). The SREB, along with the proposed Maritime Silk Road connecting ports of various countries in China’s extended neighbourhood, constitutes China’s ‘One Belt, One Road’ (OBOR) initiative.

These ambitious plans, launched by Xi in 2014 to connect China with its neighbours in Asia and beyond, involve more than 60 countries. China plans to finance OBOR projects through the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the $40 billion Silk Road Fund.[i]

Both OBOR and AIIB are the biggest and newest such ventures promoted by China, and Beijing wants India to participate. However, India’s response is guided by a complex set of factors.

India’s persistent security concerns—including an unresolved border dispute with China; the psychological baggage of the 1962 war; the repeated incursions by Chinese troops into Indian territory; China’s close ties with Pakistan; and the perceived power rivalry between India and China—have created a lingering trust deficit between the two countries. India is therefore bound to be cautious about any project proposed by Beijing that involves Pakistan or India’s other neighbours.

Specifically, India’s hesitation in embracing the China-led OBOR is the projection of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) as its flagship project.[ii] The CPEC is expected to connect Kashgar in China’s restive province of Xinjiang with the Gwadar port in the volatile Baluchistan province of Pakistan. It will pass through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) and Gilgit-Baltistan—both Indian territories occupied by Pakistan. This is at the core of India’s doubts about China’s sincerity in seeking its collaboration.

India’s security establishment and strategic community have consistently flagged the issue of the growing Chinese presence and involvement—such as infrastructure projects, including dams and roads—over the last decade in these regions.

Moreover, India has steadfastly opposed any international presence in PoK and Gilgit-Baltistan. For example, India’s opposition to the Asian Development Bank’s financing of the high-profile Diamer Bhasha dam project in Gilgit-Baltistan in 2011-13 forced Pakistan to look for other sources of funding for the project.[iii]

India’s concerns about the CPEC and China-Pakistan ties are combined with Beijing’s growing presence and influence in South Asia and the Indian Ocean Region. In the last decade, China has systematically engaged with countries in India’s neighbourhood—such as Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and the Maldives—through economic and military aid. Although India’s poorly-executed neighbourhood policy may be partially responsible, India sees China’s growing profile in the region as an “encirclement”. OBOR, with its network of China-sponsored infrastructure projects in and around India’s neighbourhood, amplifies India’s anxiety about China’s real intentions.

India has repeatedly drawn China’s attention to these issues. But China remains seemingly indifferent to India’s apprehensions, perhaps because its perspective, unlike India’s, is not coloured by the war of 1962. Many Chinese scholars find India’s suspicion puzzling and self-defeating. However, they also acknowledge that China has similar sensitivities towards Japan, even though the history of the confrontation between these two countries dates further back—to the first Sino-Japanese War of 1895.

China’s disregard of India’s concerns also stems from how China’s perceives India—as a regional power, a country that still has to overcome its socio-economic problems and build the material strength required to become a great power.

For China, socio-economic development is the key to resolving regional security problems. In fact, the consensus in China seems to be that the root cause of terrorism in Pakistan is poverty and unemployment, and that infrastructure development can do for Pakistan what it did for China. This belief persists despite the growing instability in China’s own Xinjiang province. In fact, Chinese investment-based projects and labourers in Gilgit-Baltistan and PoK have historically faced multiple violent attacks by Xinjiang-origin militants.

Despite these threats, even China’s vision document of March 2015 for OBOR implicitly assumes that the economic development and prosperity that OBOR promises will eventually root out terrorism and religious extremism in Pakistan—the document barely mentions the numerous security challenges of such an endeavour.[iv]

This may also explain why China has emphasised that its involvement in PoK and Gilgit-Baltistan is merely for economic reasons, and should not be seen as supportive of Pakistan’s position on the Kashmir issue.

India will soon have to articulate a definite stand on OBOR by assessing its security concerns along with the benefits of greater engagement with China. If OBOR does generate substantial socio-economic benefits of infrastructure and connectivity, India will gain from a stable neighbourhood and a prosperous Asia.

India too wants better connectivity with Afghanistan and the rest of Central Asia to its west, and with Myanmar and rest of South East Asia to the east. Both regions suffer from intermittent connectivity due to insurgency, and terrorism has stalled several infrastructure projects undertaken by India in these regions. Any financial and engineering inputs arising out of OBOR will take this regional connectivity forward.

Gateway House has already argued that India must press China to co-design OBOR so that it can be truly collaborative, and India can fully benefit from the integration.[v] Given India’s goodwill in South Asia, West Asia and South East Asia, a partnership with India will also benefit China—and China knows that.

Without this goodwill, the economic development that OBOR promises can be compromised by the unrest in the countries through which the SREB will traverse, threatening China’s investments and ultimate vision. The onus is on both leaders to bridge the trust deficit and Modi’s trip to China will be one such opportunity to demonstrate progress.

*Sameer Patil is Associate Fellow, National Security, Ethnic Conflict and Terrorism, at Gateway House. This feature was written for Gateway House

Notes:
[i] Chen Jia, ‘Silk Road Fund makes first investment’, China Daily, 22 April 2015, <http://europe.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2015-04/22/content_20501261.htm>

[ii]Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, Li Keqiang: Building the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor Flagship Project, 8 November 2014, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/ytjhzzdrsrcldrfzshyjxghd/t1209089.shtml>

[iii] Hussain, Shaiq, ‘Pakistan asks India to stop opposing Diamer dam’, Pakistan Today, 24 September 2012, <http://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2012/09/24/national/pakistan-asks-india-to-stop-opposing-diamer-dam/>

[iv] Tian Shaohui, ‘Full Text: Vision and actions on jointly building Belt and Road’, Xinhua, 28 March 2015, <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2015-03/28/c_134105858.htm>

[v] Bakshi, Rajni, ‘Co-designing the new Silk Road’, Gateway House, 6 May 2015, <http://www.gatewayhouse.in/new-silk-road-for-a-just-world-order/>

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Co-Designing The New Silk Road – Analysis

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China’s Silk Road Economic Belt initiative will feature prominently on the agenda when Prime Minister Modi visits Beijing and Shanghai on 14 May. India can make a strong move to co-design the framework and details of this initiative – making it truly collaborative and win-win for all of Asia

By Rajni Bakshi*

The very mention of a “Silk Road” evokes images of teeming bazaars filled with not just the most beautiful silks but also metal objects, oils, spices, and innumerable manufactured goods that made the lives of our ancestors colourful and comfortable.

It was along this route that the many technological advances of ancient China travelled west and to India—paper, the wheelbarrow, gun powder, and critical innovations in tools which revolutionised agriculture.

China’s plan for a Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB), also known as One Road One Belt, seeks to celebrate not just this material legacy but also the ‘Silk Road Spirit’ which, as the Chinese government’s vision document states, is about “peace and cooperation, openness and inclusiveness, mutual learning and mutual benefit.” [1]

If these values are actually to be put into practice, two key issues urgently need attention.

Firstly, in what ways can the SREB foster a 21st century version of the socially-embedded bazaar, which was the nurturer of invention, innovation, and commerce in China and India for over two millennia till the mid-18th century?

Secondly, can the SREB become an extensive laboratory for finally breaking the false dichotomy between economic growth and ecological sustainability as well as social equity?

Commerce in Asia, as in most pre-capitalist societies, was governed by several layers of ethical and cultural norms which recognised greed as a human trait but did not celebrate or encourage it. Even in societies with rigid social hierarchies there were spaces for the inventive and enterprising energy of millions of small producers who would today be dismissed as cottage industries. [2]

If the SREB is to be a win-win proposition for all the countries it touches, then its projects and funding mechanisms must focus on creating the kind of infrastructure and economic spaces that will enable communities to strengthen their local economies.

In this context, it is important to note that the Chinese government’s vision document presents the SREB as a response to the lingering global slump triggered by the financial crisis of 2008 and implies that the world order, as defined by the West since World War II, is past its expiry date.

As recent discussions among various think tanks in Beijing and Shanghai indicated, Chinese scholars are uniformly confident that the new model emerging from Asia can foster win-win global relations. The western model, one senior scholar said, fostered win-lose relations.

The SREB is also projected as a mechanism by which the Chinese government aims to raise the governance standards of Chinese companies to make them less dependent on personal relationships. This approach will presumably inform the operations of the Silk Road Infrastructure Fund, which already has $40 billion.[3]

It is not clear if and how the SREB will foster equity and fairness, rather than relying on profit maximisation as the only reliable driver of economic dynamism. But there are faint glimmers of hope on the environmental front.

In June 2014 the Institute of Geographic Sciences and Natural Resources Research, a part of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, brought together experts from 17 countries for a conference on ‘Ecology, Environment and Sustainable Development of Silk Road Economic Belt’. This is partly because many of the regions included in the SREB are already ecologically stressed.

Through the report of this conference Chinese scholars have called for the setting up of multi-lateral platforms for “scientific policy-making system of ecological environment and sustainable development in the SREB.” [4]

Even more significantly the official report on the conference states that “human society is marching towards Ecological civilization which advocates harmonious coexistence between human and nature.” In practical terms, it goes on to say, this will mean protecting important ecological spaces in natural reserves and building ecological economic zones based on “circular economics”—presumably a reference to closed loop production systems which place a minimal burden on the natural resource base.

However, discussions with various Chinese scholars in the last week of April indicated that many still hold the view that environmental concerns cannot be allowed to stand in the way of economic growth. And since SREB is the key to China’s “new normal”, at lower rates of growth, nothing must jeopardise this plan.

There was also a distinct unhappiness about why the Indian government has not as yet fully endorsed the SREB. As some of the visiting Indian scholars pointed out, there is a contradiction in a vision that aims to be collaborative being unilaterally designed and declared.

Since the SREB will be a top item on the Chinese agenda when Prime Minister Modi visits Beijing and Shanghai from 14-16 May, this is a crucial moment for India to take a stand.

It is necessary, but not sufficient, for India to negotiate on both potential benefits from the SREB—to fund our own infrastructure, as well as strategic geo-political threats posed by the SREB, such as the China-Pakistan economic corridor.

It is equally, if not more, important that India co-design the SREB along with China with a view to ensuring two broad goals. The SREB must foster mechanisms that create not just economic opportunities for people on the ground but also dispersed accumulation of assets. And above all, the SREB can become the harbinger of a 21st century model of infrastructure and growth, which dissolves the out-dated dichotomy between environmental protection and material plenitude.

Modi could highlight these potentialities and make them the centre-piece of his visit to China. For example, Indian scholars and technical experts, many of them in private not-for-profit organisations, have crucial experience in the restoration of watersheds, community management of forest resources, revival of bio-diversity, and construction of buildings that have a lower eco-footprint. These are strengths that can lend heft to the pitch for co-designing a scheme that could potentially shape the future of this continent.

Note: The Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) initiative of the Chinese government was the recurring theme when three scholars from Gateway House, along with a team from the Observer Research Foundation, recently visited Beijing and Shanghai at the invitation of the prestigious Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS). The SREB involves massive infrastructure projects that will link eastern China via sea and land with southeast Asia, south Asia, and central Asia, up to Europe and Africa—covering a region inhabited by 4.4 billion people or 63% of the world’s population. On 23 April, at a seminar hosted by CASS in Beijing, Rajni Bakshi chaired a session on how, if China and India cooperate to build the SREB, it could establish a more just and reasonable international order.

Source: This article was published by Gateway House

References
[1] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of China, Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road, 28 March, 2015, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1249618.shtml>

[2] Bakshi, Rajni. Bazaars Conversations and Freedom: For a market culture beyond greed and fear (New Delhi: Penguin, 2009)

[3]Xinhua, China Pledges 40 Bln USD for Silk Road Fund, 8 November 2014, <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-11/08/c_133774993.html>

[4] Dong, Suocheng, and others, ‘Resources, Environment and Economic Patterns and Sustainable Development Modes of the Silk Road Economic Belt’, Journal of Resources and Ecology, Vol. 6 No. 2, 2015 <http://www.jorae.cn/EN/abstract/abstract8614.shtml>

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Inclusive Growth: Vital For Asia-Pacific Sustainable Development – OpEd

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By Dr. Shamshad Akhtar*

The level of global debate about sustainable development is reaching new heights as the United Nations gears up for Member States to negotiate the post-2015 development agenda at a landmark summit to be convened by the General Assembly in September.

Amid these debates, it is vital that we keep in view the prerequisites for sustainable development. Maintaining quality, robust, sustained and inclusive economic growth is critical as we adopt the new sustainable development agenda.

Deliberations about the specific sustainable development goals to be adopted, must be reinforced by sound global economic governance and focused domestic policy frameworks, improving the inclusiveness of growth to advance the economic, environmental and social welfare of our people and the planet.

Official Photo of Dr. Shamshad Akhtar, Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations & Executive Secretary of the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UN ESCAP Photo/Suwat Chancharoensuk)

Official Photo of Dr. Shamshad Akhtar, Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations & Executive Secretary of the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UN ESCAP Photo/Suwat Chancharoensuk)

The benefits of growth have to be more widely distributed, because inclusive growth is the cornerstone of sustainable development. Mainstreaming sustainability considerations in policymaking will, in turn, support inclusivity.

The Asia-Pacific region, with its strong growth performance and economic dynamism, has achieved a remarkable reduction in extreme poverty, along with broader development – however much work remains. The Economic and Social Survey of Asia and the Pacific 2015, launched this week by the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), forecasts for 2015 and again for 2016 only a single percentage point rise in levels of economic growth in the region’s developing countries.

The changing dynamics in regional growth trends are driven by many factors, prominent among these is the economic rebalancing of China, which is expected to register a lower growth rate of 7 percent in 2015 – a stark contrast to investment and export-led growth averaging 9.7 percent over the last decade. Authorities are managing the transition well however, and are counting on domestic consumption-led growth.

While the unprecedented decline in the international oil price of almost 40 percent between the end of June 2014 and the start of May 2015 offered the region a window of opportunity and some relief to the large community of oil importers, it also created economic tremors in Russia and its neighbors.

In terms of regional impact, the slowdown in some of the larger economies is being partially offset by India’s growth, which we expect will accelerate to 8.1 in 2015 from 7.4 percent last year, as the new Government of India translates its reform commitments into action. Work has also intensified in ASEAN, with members set to establish the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) by the end of this year, which should boost growth prospects for the subregion and the wider Asia and the Pacific. Within ASEAN, Indonesia is set to see its growth increase to 5.6 percent in 2015 from 5 percent in 2014.

The good news is that there is still much scope to catalyze higher growth, with much of the region’s output below its potential, and in some cases even below pre-crisis levels. Better growth is contingent however on strong and sustained domestic reforms. Structural weaknesses, such as infrastructure shortages; excessive commodity-dependence; low productivity and social deficits also keep some developing economies in the region from realizing their full growth potential.

The irrefutable lesson of recent decades is that although economic growth is vital and necessary, it is not sufficient to create shared and sustainable prosperity. This requires shifting the focus of development policies to address not only ‘inequalities of income’ but also ‘inequalities of opportunity.’

This distinction is important, because different kinds of deprivation reinforce each other. Reduced access to adequate healthcare, basic nutrition, clean drinking water, better sanitation and quality education, for example, impacts employment prospects, widening the gap even further between haves and have-nots, and creating a vicious spiral of inequality.

For sustainable development to succeed, growth must be made more inclusive, by addressing social and environmental deficits. ESCAP has introduced an innovative new multidimensional inclusiveness index – a composite measure of 15 core indicators that track the economic, social and environmental dimensions of development in 16 countries, which together account for 92 percent of the region’s population and 88 per cent of its GDP.

Inclusiveness measurements confirm that while the region as a whole has made progress over time, within several countries economic and social transformation is still lagging. Despite significant progress in improving access to universal primary education, for example, there are still several countries where more than half of all children of secondary school age are not even enrolled. In India’s lowest income quintile, girls receive on average, only half as many years of education as boys. In Pakistan, the gap is even more glaring.

A similar picture emerges in health services. Only about 59 percent of the region’s population are able to access basic sanitation, and close to 800 million people lack access to these facilities in South and South-West Asia alone. Of particular concern are large and widening income inequalities in many countries, as well as disparities in access to critical public goods, such as education and health services across the region. Deteriorating environmental conditions and frequent natural disasters are also making it more difficult for socioeconomic progress to be sustained.

As the region prepares for the post-Millennium Development Goals future, inclusiveness must be integrated and mainstreamed in policymaking to meet these outstanding development commitments and to implement the new sustainable development agenda.

It is essential for governments to launch integrated and well-designed packages of inclusive policies to boost opportunities for decent employment and job security, equitable access to finance, and to provide adequate access to basic services such as education, health, energy and water. Addressing the shortcomings of inclusive growth, together with prudent and consistent management of risks to growth, has to be a key part of our transformation for the sustainable future we want.

*The author is an Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations and Executive Secretary of the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP). She is also the UN’s Sherpa for the G20 and previously served as Governor of the Central Bank of Pakistan and Vice President of the MENA Region of the World Bank.

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Modi’s China Visit: Optics With Diplomacy – Analysis

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By Vivek Mishra*

Even as Prime Minister Narendra Modi looks to visit China from May 14-16, he would be taking a next step in the direction of improving relations with great powers. Given the hard reality of a border dispute, the Indo-China relations stand in stark contrast to India’s relations with other major and middle powers: US, UK, France, Germany and Canada. Yet the upcoming visit by Modi to China has put a lot at stake from either side, marking it as distinct from that of his predecessors.

Setting the stage for Modi’s Visit

A significant groundwork for the visit had been done by India’s External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj when she led a delegation to Beijing in February this year. She held talks on various bilateral and multilateral issues like opening the second route of the Kailash-Manasarovar Yatra in Tibet, attending the Russia-China-India (RIC) meeting and launching the “Visit India Year” aimed at attracting more Chinese tourists to India. The minister was accompanied by Foreign Secretary S. Jaishankar. There certainly seemed to be a plan behind appointing a new foreign secretary and rushing him to Beijing within two days of his appointment. In Jaishankar, India found somebody who had in the recent past served in China and hence was more suited for setting the platform before the prime minister’s visit.

Agendas

The pre-announcement that an ‘out of the box’ solution for the border problem has been planned ahead of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit, augurs well for the longstanding border issue. India’s desire for an ‘early settlement’ of the border issue has shown the right intent in this regard.

India is likely take up the issue of a widening trade deficit and greater market access for domestic products during the visit. India’s trade deficit with China climbed to a whopping $37.8 billion last year whereas bilateral trade stood at $65.85 billion in 2013-14. So, the question facing India is how to narrow this deficit.

During the prime minister’s visit, India would also discuss ways to increase presence of domestic products, including automobiles and pharmaceuticals, in the Chinese market. To help Indian industry move up the value chain, the government is following a three-pronged strategy which includes addressing specific market access issues in sectors such as drugs and pharmaceuticals, IT/ITeS, agriculture and food processing, and encouraging Chinese manufacturers of finished goods to set up production base in India.

Both sides are trying to put up plans for signing of investment proposals worth US$10 billion. Among other things, India is seeking a larger role in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), within which China commands tremendous influence. On the other hand, China wants India to agree to its plans for Silk Road and Maritime Silk Road. China is also keen to have a free trade agreement with India, which the latter had been reluctant to talk about fearing an onslaught on India’s industry. There is also the possibility that both sides may link their ambitious connective projects, China’s Silk Road and India’s Mausam, to create tangible benefits for both sides.

Demarches

Both sides have taken steps to create an atmosphere of bonhomie for the bilateral visit to turn it into a success. In an important step, ahead of the China visit, the home ministry is set to relax investment rules for companies based there, dismantling longstanding barriers but putting safeguards in place to address security concerns raised by India’s intelligence agencies.

China’s agreement to host the Indian Northern Army Commander ahead of the prime minister’s visit is also a landmark departure from its erstwhile stand on such an issue. First in 2010 and subsequently in 2012, China had denied visa to the Indian Army’s General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Northern Area Command, because he was responsible for Jammu & Kashmir, a state that China maintains is disputed. The new understanding was reached at the recently concluded defence dialogue between both the countries. With steps like these China could well be hinting that it is equally taking steps to prepare the ground for the prime minister’s visit.

Optics: Modi’s new diplomacy

The Indian prime minister has involved optics as part of his new kind of diplomacy. From his much touted “Chai Pe Charcha” and “Mann ki Baat” with US President Barack Obama during his visit to India to Prime Minister Modi’s boat ride with French President Francois Hollande on river Seine in France, optics has been an integral part of India’s new kind of diplomacy.

After addresses by Modi at New York’s iconic Madison Square Garden and Allphones Arena in Sydney, he will do a repeat of his Madison Square Garden act during his visit to China that will make him the first Indian leader to address the communist nation’s burgeoning Indian community, whose numbers have swelled to 45,000.

The ‘Hometown Diplomacy’ is also likely to take centre stage. Prime Minister Modi is likely to return Xi Jinpng’s visit to Ahmedabad by travelling to the Chinese president’s home province of Shaanxi.

Beijing is likely to involve optics as a means of engaging with India’s prime minister. Pillars of India’s soft power such as Buddhism and yoga will take centrestage during the visit as President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang will join Prime Minister Modi at some high-profile events tracing the roots of cultural links between the two countries. While Xi is expected to take Modi to the Wild Goose Pagoda, a spiritual structure in the ancient city of Xian, built to highlight famous Chinese Buddhist monk Xuan Zang’s journey to India in 645 AD, Li will join Modi at the iconic Temple of Heaven in Beijing for a public demonstration of Yoga and the Chinese martial art of Tai Chi.

*Vivek Mishra is a Doctoral Candidate, US Studies Program, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU). He can be contacted at viveksans@gmail.com

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Religious Rehabilitation Group: Female Volunteers Ten Years On – Analysis

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This year marks a decade of the Religious Rehabilitation Group’s work in religious counselling for women. Over the years, the number of female Muslim religious counsellors volunteering with the RRG has grown, and so have their challenges.

By Nur Irfani Binte Saripi*

When the Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG) was officially formed in April 2003, it had only 11 members. All of its volunteers were male asatizah (religious teachers, advisers and counsellors) as the rehabilitation work at that nascent stage was concentrated on understanding and countering the radical ideology of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) detainees.

As religious counselling for the detainees and those under Restriction Order (RO) progressed, there was a realisation that their wives should be offered religious counselling as well. Acknowledging the religious and cultural sensitivities — as counselling is usually conducted one-to-one in a private setting — female religious advisers were invited to join the RRG in 2005.

Emergence of the ustazaat

Despite the lack of religious counselling for the wives in the early years, the welfare of the detainees’ families was not neglected. Understanding that these families might experience emotional trauma and financial difficulties, the Aftercare Group (ACG) was swiftly formed in February 2002, shortly after the first wave of the JI members’ arrest. The ACG comprised voluntary Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) which provided a range of services including counselling, financial assistance, looking for employment for detainees’ spouses and educational assistance for school-going children.

The assistance began from the period of detention and, if necessary, would continue even after the detainees are released. While the ACG provides material welfare support, the RRG focuses on the religious aspect of the rehabilitation programme.

In February 2005, five ustazaat (ustazaat is the Arabic plural term for female religious advisers, teachers and counsellors; the singular noun is ustazah) joined the RRG. Their role is to provide emotional support and religious counselling to the wives of both JI detainees and former JI detainees under RO. Four more ustazaat have since joined the RRG, which currently has a total of 36 religious clerics among its members.

Importance of religious counselling and aftercare for wives

Although the JI members’ wives were not detained, they should be equipped with a rightful understanding of the religion as they might have been influenced ideologically by their husbands. With religious guidance, they will then impart the right teachings to their children and help to minimise the latter’s resentment.

Engaging the families by effectively challenging the radical ideology and replacing it with the true understanding of Islam that teaches peace and moderation will also undermine their sympathy towards and support for extremism. The counselling process has yielded positive results over the years. Some of the wives have themselves requested for religious counselling from the RRG.

The religious rehabilitation and aftercare programmes offered are evidence that the community embraces the families as part of their own, neither discriminating against them nor stigmatising them. Most importantly, it is an effort to prevent a regeneration of extremists.

The role of the ustazaat of the RRG is not only confined to giving counselling. As part and parcel of the RRG’s effort in countering radicalisation, they are also involved in giving talks at seminars, forums and various other platforms on the work of the RRG and the threat of radical ideology. The RRG ustazaat play a crucial role in fostering social cohesion in Singapore’s multi-racial and multi-religious society.

Challenges facing RRG

There are three key challenges confronting the RRG. Firstly, the group needs to keep abreast of the changing terrorism landscape. After the two waves of arrests in 2001 and 2002, the JI network in Singapore had been dismantled. Out of the 66 that have been detained since 2001, more than four-fifths have been released. As years go by, the threat of terrorism has changed from being al-Qaeda/JI-centric to one focused on the self-styled Islamic State in Iraq and Greater Syria (ISIS).

In Singapore, two families had travelled to Syria to join the conflict. Several Singaporeans had also intended to travel to Syria or expressed interest to join the fight. The RRG has been observing the ISIS phenomenon and studying its ideology so as to be able to counter it effectively.

The RRG has in fact produced two public education pamphlets, The Syrian Conflict and The Fallacies of ISIS Islamic Caliphate to raise awareness of the ISIS threat and to debunk the ISIS’ self-proclaimed caliphate. The second pamphlet comes in English, Malay, Chinese and Tamil versions and these have been distributed to the mosques. Several educational institutions have also requested them. In addition the RRG has produced short video clips and posted them online to counter the ISIS narratives.

Secondly, it is important to recruit young ustazaat as the RRG prepares for the next generation of clerics to continue counselling people radicalised by narratives such as that of ISIS. Thirdly, a small segment of the community remains sceptical of the RRG. To address this, it tirelessly conducts community outreach programmes to raise awareness of its work.

RRG’s motivations

In spite of the challenges, the RRG has not allowed the spirit of altruism of the group to wane. On the contrary, members have been even more motivated to carry on the voluntary work. The ustazaat find the counselling sessions rewarding, especially when they witness a positive change in the behaviour and thinking of the ladies they have counselled.

They perceive their work with the RRG fulfilling on both the spiritual and patriotic levels. Spiritually, it is a form of da’wah (missionary work) and ibadah (act of worship). They are also aware that the RRG’s voluntary service contributes to preserving Singapore’s national harmony, stability and security. The inclusion of the ustazaat has strengthened the role and contribution of the RRG.

Today, as the world faces the threat from ISIS, the RRG feels that it must continue its efforts to help counter its extremist narrative and inoculate Singaporean society just as the RRG has done in the wake of JI.

*Nur Irfani Saripi is an Associate Research Fellow of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore and also a volunteer of the Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG).

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Russian Foreign Policy Under Dimitry Medvedev’s Presidency (2008-2012) – Analysis

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Summary

Putin’s Russia (2000-2008) not only established internal stability, following the difficult and painful transition of the 1990’s onwards, but recovered economically, bolstered by a rapid increase in revenues from oil exports. Vladimir Putin knew how to take advantage of Russia’s position as the main supplier of energy to Europe. He also used it as a bargaining chip in achieving political ends. Russia is now trying to regain its former position as a major power, grounded on a strong and independent foreign policy. However, regardless of how well-intentioned this policy initially was, it ultimately created tensions with the West – especially with the United States (U.S.) and the European Union (EU).

The inherent limitations of this policy were brought to the forefront during the economic crisis of 2008-2009, which demonstrated that Russia was still plagued with serious economic, social and institutional deficiencies. President Dmitry Medvedev, Putin’s successor in the Kremlin in May 2008, quickly realized that a new course of structural reform was needed, not only to provide immediate solutions but to allow Russia to continue to be counted among the ranks of the world’s major powers. After setting these reforms, referred to as “modernization,” into motion Medvedev did not hesitate to approach the West for the required investment and technology transfer so desperately needed in many spheres of the Russian economy. These initiatives coincided with the election of Barack Obama as president of the United States. Obama first came across as less inclined towards unilateralism than his predecessor, George W. Bush, and responded positively to the Russian shift in attitude. This was demonstrated when former U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov symbolically pressed the “reset button,” a highly-publicized event designed to turn a new page in the ledger of relations between Washington and Moscow.

Medvedev’s Russia also recognized that the EU should be another major partner in its drive towards modernization, as reflected by the Modernization Partnership launched at the Stockholm Summit in November 2009. But the limits of the new approach to the relations between Russia and the West were palpable in a series of crucial issues: The lack of progress in negotiating a new Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the EU and Russia (as a replacement of the the 1997 agreement)1; Russia’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO), achieved only at the end of 2011; Russia’s continued pursuance of establishing a new European security architecture focused only on military issues (or hard power), which reflects Russia’s desire to maintain an exclusive sphere of influence in the post-Soviet space

The war between Russia and Georgia in August 2008 over the breakaway Georgian regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and the stated intentions of the Georgian and Ukrainian governments to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), raised the bar in the already heightened tensions between Russia and Western countries to its highest point since the Cold War.

Russia under Medvedev actively sought to establish a special relationship with China, its historical Asian rival. Russia is aware of the substantial benefits that could be derived from closer economic cooperation with this rapidly developing neighbour. At the same time, Russia is also confronted by the strategic challenge of dealing with a country that has become a major world power. Relations – both political and economic – between Moscow and Beijing during Medvedev’s presidential term can be best described as good and business-like. However, Medvedev was unsuccessful in establishing a public dialogue with China on major global issues.

Relations between Moscow and Tokyo were tense due to Russia’s ongoing claim to the disputed Sakhalin Islands, captured from Japan at the end of World War II. Nevertheless, Japan remains a major investor in Russia.

Between 2008 and 2012, Russia paid more attention to other emerging powers like Brazil and India (and BRICS members),2 seeking better ways to coordinate shared policies on global economic governance. Russian-Indian relations have historically been robust, and India is today a major consumer of one of Russia’s chief exports – cheap, yet competitively priced arms and weapons systems. Moscow also began to refocus on Latin America, both for geopolitical (as it is located in the “U.S.’s backyard”) and economic reasons, especially those connected with energy. Although only modest results have been achieved in respect to Russia’s relations with Brazil and India, two regional and economic powerhouses, it is possible that these countries may effectively coordinate their positions at some point, especially in dealing with some of most important and pressing aspects of international economic relations.

INTRODUCTION

Following the inauguration of Russian President Dmitry Medvedev in May 2008, the Russian political scene was characterized by a new structure: the country was governed by a bicephalous system (which reflected the two-headed eagle of the national flag).Medvedev became President and Vladimir Putin assumed the position of Prime Minister. In this ostensibly tandem structure, the Chief Executive was subordinated to the President as was the case even before Russia first emerged as an independent country in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Such a dual power sharing worked quite well during Medvedev’s term and with no serious fissures that could bring about competing circles of power around each of the heads of state. This was true even though the personalities of the two leaders were very different. Their priorities, however, seemed different, at least formally.

During his presidency (2000-2008), Putin made every effort to recover Russia’s super power status and international respect. He did not hesitate to use the privileged position of Russia – main energy supplier to Europe, a permanent member of the Security Council of the United Nations, a continuing influence over the post-Soviet space – to achieve his ambitious goal. For his part, Medvedev preferred to use foreign policy as an instrument to advance the process of economic modernization, while keeping Russian national interests in mind. When compared to Russia’s main partners and competitors, Medvedev was very much aware of the systemic disadvantages his country faced. These disadvantages, according to him, were factors that considerably weakened Russia as a major world power and economic player.

The foundation of Putin’s domestic and foreign policy was the concept of “sovereign democracy,” which argues that Russia must follow its own democratization process. There was no need to emulate and copy Western models. In this view, if Russia’s political system had serious flaws, the same could be said of the political systems of Western countries. The West was no longer seen as being in a position to give lessons to Russia. Consequently, Russian foreign policy at the time gradually abandoned or even opposed some of the positions taken by Western countries. Such a tendency began with Putin’s speech at the annual Wehrkunde conference held in Munich in January 2007.

Within a year serious tensions arose between Russia and their Western allies, for instance with the August 2008 armed conflict between Georgia and Russia. The origin of this conflict was the longstanding secession attempts by South Ossetia and Abkhazia, two territories recognized as being part of Georgia.

Especially glaring were Russia’s disagreements and confrontations with the U.S. over such issues as NATO expansion, European-based missile defense systems and U.S. attempts to expand its influence into what Russia considers its “near abroad”, the post-Soviet space. Under Putin, Russia once again seemed to be a rival of the West, not merely on an ideological basis as during the Cold War, but because of its own strong nationalistic tendencies.

Medvedev, however, decided to take a different track. The great economic crisis of 2008-2009 somberly exposed Russia’s serious limitations, especially in the economic sphere. The young President, although trying to maintain an independent foreign policy, recognized that for Russia to become a great power again matching not only the “big” U.S. and Western powers but also major emerging economies such as China, Brazil and India, it has to “modernize” in broader terms. Not only does it have to upgrade its infrastructure, diversify the economy and expand its base of technology, but it needs to make progress at the institutional level. This means that Russia needs to make greater efforts at democratization and reduce endemic problems such as corruption and excessive bureaucracy.3

This new approach is graphically reflected in the doctrine of the “four I’s”: Institutions, Infrastructure, Innovation and Investment. Medvedev sought to rouse Russian society from its slumber, bring the country into the 21st century more definitely and use its enormous capabilities with far more efficiency. Medvedev believed that to overcome its technological backwardness Russia needed to collaborate politically with other nations and to open the country up to foreign capital and technology transfer, thus bringing about a clear improvement in relations with Western partners was an essential step.

The underlying purpose of the Russian President’s visit to Silicon Valley in June 2010 and the “Partnership for Modernization” launched at the EU summit in Stockholm in November 2009 was in keeping with this approach. Medvedev was not afraid to admit that the U.S. and the EU can be key partners in Russia’s modernization project, which he was bent on pursuing.

While Putin and Medvedev maintained excellent personal relations, there were some differences in their approach. These led to some confusing and somewhat embarrassing situations. In June 2009, Medvedev, for instance, wanted to consolidate his efforts, proverbially, “putting all his eggs in one basket,” by concluding negotiations on Russia’s accession into the World Trade Organization (WTO). Accession talks had been dragging on for over 17 years.4 At the St. Petersburg Economic Forum in June 2008 a series of fruitful meetings were held between the Russian Minister of Economic Development, Elvira Nabiulina, her American counterpart, Ron Kirk, and Catherine Ashton, then European Commissioner responsible for trade relations. Two hours after this meeting Prime Minister Putin announced that before joining the WTO, Russia would first focus on forming a Customs Union with Belarus and Kazakhstan. Putin’s announcement appeared at first impression to imply (though not openly stated) that these three countries would, through establishing a common trade organization, join WTO simultaneously. Such a surprising revelation at the time only resulted in Russia’s efforts to join WTO being delayed even more. It was even described as a step backwards.

Unlike his predecessor, Medvedev managed to reduce tensions with the U.S., the EU and even NATO. He supported the adoption of new sanctions on Iran by the UN Security Council and halted the expected delivery of Russian S-300 surface-to-air missiles to Iran, effectively cancelling past agreements signed during Putin’s reign.

It could be argued that Medvedev’s apparent outreach towards moderation amounted to anything more than participating in cordial summits and meetings. Certainly the results of his policy were modest. The wider Russian public remained skeptical about any possibility for effecting real change. On the other hand, the mistrust of the West loomed large – remembering the failure of the policy of concessions followed by Mikhail Gorbachev – despite the positive momentum of Russia’s new relations with the U.S. and EU.

Russia’s Great Power Status

Although Russia had ceased to be a major global ideological force and had lost much of its former empire, between 2008 and 2012 both Putin and Medvedev believed that it still remained a major global power. Objectively, there is no doubt about this reality in light of its world standing:

(1) Occupying an area of over 17 million square kilometers, Russia is the largest country in the world, covering more than half – 170 – of the 360 degrees of longitude of the earth.

(2) Russia is the second largest exporter of oil after Saudi Arabia and the largest producer and exporter of natural gas in the world. It owns 20% of the world’s known coal reserves and 14% of its uranium. It is a leading producer of titanium, copper, zinc, aluminium, gold and diamonds. Russia has the largest temperate rain forests in the world and is a major producer of wood products. It also has the largest freshwater reserves on the planet.

(3) After suffering an approximately 50% drop in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the 1990s, the Russian economy recovered dramatically between 2000 and 2008, with an average growth rate exceeding 6% per annum. In 2007, in terms of Purchasing Power Parity (PPP), it was ranked sixth in the world (in terms of absolute purchasing power, it is currently ranked No. 12). In the 2010s, Russia accumulated the third largest foreign currency reserves in the world (more than 450 billion),5 after those of China and Japan. The Russian state paid off its foreign debt inherited from the Soviet Union almost entirely. Understanding the “ups and downs” of the global economy, Russia proceeded to create a Stabilization Fund which absorbed much of the shock when achieved growth reversed, as a result of the 2007-2008 international economic crisis.

(4) Russia continues to be a key actor on the international scene with the largest arsenal of nuclear weapons after that of the United States. It maintains a powerful standing army, although it is undergoing a difficult process of reduction in terms of manpower, restructuring (from 4 million to 1 million soldiers) and modernization. It is a permanent member of UN Security Council and belongs to the G-8, the G-20 and BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa). It is also a member of the Quartet on the Middle East Peace Process (the United Nations, the United States, the European Union and Russia), the P5+1 (the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany) on Iran’s nuclear program and the Six-Party Talks on North Korea’s nuclear program. In addition to its enormous capacity as a producer of oil (it is not a member of the OPEC cartel but is a member of the Forum of Gas Exporting Countries), it controls much of the network of pipelines connecting the energy producing fields of Russia itself, the littoral states of the Caspian Sea and Central Asia with Europe.

(5) Russia continues to have great advantages in the sphere of science, but still fails to connect much of its basic research and development with applied technology for industrial uses, which further hinders technology transfer and commercial development.

(6) Russia’s enormous potential continues to be restrained by a series of internal structural problems which are holding back its development as a major economic and political power. Russia is also suffering a serious demographic problem, due to its low birth rate (10.4/1,000) and high mortality rate (16/1.000), which translates into low population densities, (8.6 inhabitants/km² throughout the country). This is especially noteworthy in the case in the far eastern part of the country. Social problems are acute, with a high rate of alcohol and drug use, economic inequality and the deterioration of education and health services. Corruption and the shadow economy hinder the development of SMEs (small and medium-sized enterprises) and the fledgling middle class is very slow to integrate new cohorts into its ranks. The economy is overly dependent on export revenues from oil and other mineral products, making it vulnerable to the fluctuation of prices in international markets. The vast majority of public infrastructures have not been renovated since the Soviet era and have badly deteriorated. This is not only a hindrance to development but also a threatening strategic risk, as these facilities form the backbone of the country. Finally, after two devastating wars in Chechnya in 1994 and 1999, Russia is again facing increasing instability the North Caucasus region. Terrorist attacks began again in Moscow, with a bombing at its international airport on January 24, 2011.

From the military standpoint, restructuring efforts and downsizing have aroused serious discontent amongst the officer corp. Despite claims of modernization, only a small part of the plan to turn the army into a professional one has been actually carried out. Problems affecting the supply of military components and parts for conventional warfare and nuclear arms (including Iskander tactical missiles and the strategic-ICBMs) continue. Recent tests of new types of weapons, such as the Bulava missile, have proved unsatisfactory. The shipbuilding industry has become nearly obsolete, to the point that, for the first time, the Russian Navy has decided to purchase foreign-made vessels, for instance, the French Mistral.6 After two years of negotiations, Russia and France signed a treaty of military cooperation on June 17, 2011, under which Russia agreed to buy two French Mistral-class amphibious assault ships, together with a full technological complement package as part of the total deal. This transaction marked the largest transfer of sensitive military equipment from one country to another in history. Russia plans to renew its outdated military and technological base in order to restore the effectiveness of its military deterrence at the regional level. Meanwhile, France will take advantage of this commercial windfall to expand exports into evolving new arms markets and to further boost its foreign policy initiatives.7

From a broader perspective, Russia continues to suffer from an identity crisis: although, since the fall of Constantinople to the Ottomans in 1453, Russia has considered itself the just heir of the Byzantine Empire and “the Third Rome,” – Russians and their European neighbors both have been doubtful and an identity crisis as to whether this country is really part of Europe and has the proclaimed Western values it claims to. There are several reasons for this isolation, and much is historically based. Russia has been isolated for many centuries (attributed to invasions of the Tatars/Mongols, the Orthodox Church, the Communist regime, etc). The ideas of the Renaissance of the 14th and 15th centuries and of the Enlightenment in the 18th century did not penetrate the country as much as it did in Europe and authoritarian regimes have prevailed, from the autocracy of the Tsars to the totalitarianism of the Soviet Union, such regimes have preventing the principles of liberal democracy from taking deep root among the masses.

Efforts to integrate Russia into the West in the last decade of the 20th century failed due to a lack of vision and willingness from the Western countries. The problem was compounded because the Russian elite preferred to follow a nineteenth-century capitalist model of development, one mixed with corporatism and state-orientated policy it was this model that forced it away from the West. The model forced it away from the West. Following a short flirt with Western capitalism and political values during the first presidential term of Vladimir Putin (2000-2004), Russia moved away from the West (2004-2008) and proceeded to redefine its own objectives. Russian foreign policy since then has focused on maintaining a dominant position within the “near abroad”, achieving equality with the main centers of global power (mainly the U.S., the EU and China) and promoting the formation of a multipolar world order.8

THE POST-SOVIET SPACE

The post-Soviet space is made up of countries linked historically to the Tsarist and Soviet Empires, and where tens of millions of ethnic Russians or Russian speakers live, serves as a crossroad between Europe, Asia and the Middle East. For Russia, it is an area of vital importance, not least because of its vast energy resources. Russia’s efforts since the dissolution of the Soviet Union have been designed to recover the dominant role it once played in such an expansive area. He wanted to ensure forth all efforts to prevent or to reverse attempts by other powers (the U.S. and China, Turkey, Iran and the EU) to increase their degree of presence and influence.

At the end of the last decade, Dmitri Trenin, a Russian analyst, launched what has been called the “CIS Project,” i.e., the conversion of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) into a pivotal point of Russian power. However, never sought seek to formally put back together the Soviet Union. It wanted to ensure the loyalty of the new member states to Russia and in turn for Russian to gain a privileged position in terms of economic and cultural interests. President Medvedev himself called the post-Soviet space a “zone of privileged interests” for Russia. Moscow has used different instruments, such as political and economic integration, intervention in internal or regional conflicts and the restoration of close relations with its largest Western neighbor, Ukraine to develop this strategy.

Integration

Russia is the driving force behind regional integration structures, such as the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Eurasian Economic Community (EAEC), the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). However, none of these structures has yielded the expected results.

  • The CIS was created in December 1991; it comprises all the republics of the former USSR, with the exception of the Baltic States, Ukraine and Georgia. It is an institutional structure that serves as the mechanism of political integration of former Soviet republics. However, it cannot be compared with the EU or a formal federation or confederation. The CIS’s relatively low standing is mainly because it does not present an integration model, and one which is attractive to member countries. For instance, unlike the EU, it has no collective funds which can be redistributed and targeted for the development of the weakest member states). Its activities are further confounded by fears that Moscow’s leadership has become too powerful, and other partners are not willing to be involved with the re-creation of a re-branded post-Soviet political structure.
  • The Eurasian Economic Community (EAEC or EurAsEc) was created on December 10, 2000 by Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, with Uzbekistan, Moldova, Armenia and Ukraine having observer status. Member states allowed Uzbekistan to join on October 7, 2005, and it became one of the most independent minded countries of the former Soviet Central Asian republics. The organization wants to bring about greater economic integration between its members.
  • In June 2009 Prime Minister Vladimir Putin announced that before entering the WTO, Russia would establish a Customs Union (CU) with Belarus and Kazakhstan, which would then be expanded to include other nations. On November 27, 2009, the agreement establishing a Common Economic Space was signed in Minsk; it entered into force on January 1, 2010. The Unified Customs Code (which is actually a copy of the Russian code) of this union came into being on July 1, 2010, along with the new Common External Tariff (CET). The creation of this Customs Union had been a serious obstacle to Russia’s accession to the WTO (it finally entered the WTO in December 2011).There is no guarantee that the project will succeed in the long term, when the limited development of the economies of its members is considered. On January 1, 2012 the leaders of Russia, Kazakhstan, and Belarusian approved documents establishing a “common economic space”– a single market for the provision of goods, investments and the flow of labor.
  • The Collective Security Treaty Organization (also known as the Tashkent Treaty) was signed on May 15, 1992 in Tashkent Uzbekistan. It established a regional security structure which assured for the collective defense needs of signatory states. Article 4 crucially states that “an aggression by a state or group of states against one signatory would be perceived as an aggression against all.”9 Initially only Russia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan signed the Treaty. Soon thereafter Azerbaijan followed in their footsteps, as of September 1993, and in December 1993, Belarus and Georgia also joined up. Military co-operation had continued without interruption since the USSR was dissolved; it was the single most effective area of co-operation amongst CIS countries, surpassing any other economic integration arrangements. Security had been a priority in Russia’s policy. For many who have signed the Treaty, especially Central Asian states and Armenia, Russia was seen as the sole security guarantor. This is why, from its inception, the CIS Treaty was one of the few structures established within the region which provided for practical co-operation; it actually took place in the form of regular joint military exercises and co-ordination and synchronization of security policies of the member states.

Uzbekistan, Georgia and Azerbaijan refused to extend their membership during the summit of the CSTO members in May 1999’ and this decision proved to be a major failure for Russia. Although the Treaty had fewer members, co-operation amongst the remaining ones intensified. In May 2001, the Rapid Reaction Force of the Central Asian Region was established,10 and during a meeting in Moscow on May 14, 2002, it was decided that the Treaty would be transformed into a political and military bloc, namely the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).

CSTO was finally institutionalized, as of April 27, 2003 in Dushanbe Tajikistan, and this occasion is considered by many as the beginning of a new stage in the organizations’ activities. All successes which originated from Moscow’s deliberate decision to make co-operation more dynamic and genuine resulted in a transformation of the CSTO into a more effective instrument of Russian foreign policy.

Some of the CSTO’s initiatives included a proposal to create an Anti-Terrorism Centre to respond to threats in member states, and in 2003, a Russian military base was established in Kant, Kyrgyzstan (which is officially a CSTO base, although only Russian troops are deployed there). After renewing its membership in June 2006, Uzbekistan withdrew from the alliance in late June 2012.

One of the informal objectives behind strengthening the CSTO is to counter American and NATO activities in the CIS area. They believe that only a strong and effective CSTO would be able to prevent NATO’s continued “expansion.” However, the organization is primarily an instrument allowing Russia to retain and further consolidate its position in various regions of the former USSR, especially in Central Asia. Its stated objectives are to combat terrorism and drug trafficking and to assist in civil emergencies. It seems, however, that of all the international organizations operating in the post-Soviet area – apart from the EurAsEC – the CSTO offers the best prospects for continuity. This is mainly because its members are genuinely interested in Russia’s military presence in the region, especially because of the security guarantees Moscow offers. Meanwhile Russia views its remaining influence and control in the territory that the CIS encompasses as being crucial for its own security. But still it has not fully achieved the purpose with this security organization; this is partly due to the lack of trust that governments of the Central Asian states have. Uzbekistan especially fears that Russia would abrogate the right to intervene in their sovereign territories.

  • The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) was established in 2001 by China, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Uzbekistan. The group also includes India, Pakistan, Iran and Mongolia as observers. It was created as a political and security alliance with a main focus on anti-terrorism. Even a regional centre on terrorism has been established in Bishkek; however, the organization as a whole does not appear to be able to effectively play the role of an integrating body. This is largely because of the greatly increased economic influence of China in recent years in the region. China does not want to make serious commitments on security and sees the SCO as more of a vehicle for achieving economic cooperation than military integration (although since the summer of 2007 some important manoeuvres have been held involving Chinese military units).

Intervention in Regional Conflicts

Rivalries between the countries of the former Soviet Union were revealed the day after its dissolution. Soon they were transformed into armed conflicts in Moldova and the Caucasus region, as well as in Central Asia mainly over issues pertaining to water rights and allocation. The dissolution of the Soviet Union provoked three conflicts which 20 years later still remain unresolved (hence the term “protracted conflicts”) .

Map 1: Transnistria Conflict

Map 1: Transnistria Conflict

The Transnistria conflict affects Moldova, a landlocked country culturally and politically linked to Romania. The eastern part (known in Romanian as “Transnistria”) rebelled against Moldova in March 1992, declaring it wanted to continue to remain in Russia’s orbit. The conflict has led to the de facto independence of the territory, whose population is 25% of Russian origin and 28% being of Ukrainian origin. Russia maintains a 1,200-strong military contingent on that territory, the remnant of the “Peacekeeping Force” deployed there by the CIS in 1992, although at the OSCE Summit in Istanbul in 1999 it pledged to withdraw. The Moldovan government has made repeated requests but Russia did not follow through on its promises. An international mechanism to facilitate a settlement of the conflict has been established: the Group of 5 (Russia, Moldova, Transnistria, Ukraine and the OSCE) + 2 (the EU and U.S. observers, since 2005). In an effort to exert influence on this body, Moscow prevents this mechanism from acting effectively and promotes, under its auspices, three way conversations: between itself; internally with the Moldovan government; and with the de facto authorities of Transnistria.11

Nagorno-Karabakh is an enclave with a mostly Armenian population located on the territory of Azerbaijan. This conflict erupted in 1992 when the Armenian population declared it independent as the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR) and Armenia intervened with Russian assistance. Armenia won the subsequent war and has since retained control of Nagorno-Karabakh and seven adjacent districts, which represent approximately 18% of the territory of Azerbaijan.

Map 2: The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict

Map 2: The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict

Negotiations over this conflict took place within the framework of the OSCE. They were held by the so-called Minsk Group, co-chaired since 1995 by Russia, the U.S. and France. Armenia and Azerbaijan also participated. The specific terms of negotiation were defined in the “Madrid Principles” (accepted by the parties during the OSCE ministerial meeting in Madrid, December 2007), which included the renunciation of the use of force to resolve the conflict, respect for territorial integrity and the right of self-determination.

President Medvedev has been actively involved in the mediation efforts. In November 2008 Presidents Heydar Aliyev of Azerbaijan and Serzh Sarkisian of Armenia signed in Moscow a joint statement asserting that there can be no solution to the conflict other than a negotiated agreement, and based on the principles of the Madrid document. The compromise reached was threefold: (a) postponing determination of the final status of Nagorno-Karabakh, (b) Armenia returning to Azerbaijan the seven Azerbaijani districts it controls (with the exception of the “Lachin Corridor” which links Armenia with Nagorno-Karabakh, and (c) wider autonomy granted to Nagorno-Karabakh (NK) by Azerbaijan for an undetermined period of time. However, a key point was the renunciation by both sides of force and finding a final solution to the problem of Nagorno-Karabakh. This objective was replaced by a commitment from both sides of the conflict to develop cooperation between Armenian and Azerbaijani proper, to resolve the ultimate status of the disputed NK territory. Talks between the parties continue but progress has yet to been realized. Quite the opposite, fatal cross-border shootings and violence were reported in June 2012; increased tensions remains high and; no progress has been made to bring a final resolution.

Map of Georgia highlighting Abkhazia (green) and South Ossetia (purple).

Map of Georgia highlighting Abkhazia (green) and South Ossetia (purple).

The conflict between Georgia proper and the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia has been ongoing since the early 1990s. These two Georgian regions are conflicts zones that Moscow has been more interested in and has taken a more proactive approach. It directly intervened in this conflict to a far greater degree than it did with others in the former Soviet Union. Regardless of motivations or a double standard, it is clear that Moscow was not pleased with Georgia becoming more “pro-Western” orientated following the 2003 Rose Revolution, and the events that brought the current President, Mikhail Saakashvili to power in January 2004.

Matters were more complicated by that fact that Georgia is at the crossroads of energy pipelines, most notably the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline project. This massive project was constructed by British Petroleum (BP), and links hydrocarbons of the Caspian Sea to Turkey, and seen as an invasion of Russia’s zone of influence (totally bypassing Russian territory).

The August 2008 the Georgia-Russia war created a serious crisis in relations between Russia and the West. There was fear among Russia’s neighbors that Moscow was willing to use force to compel them to respect its interests. The short but deadly war was brought to a halt through the intervention of then-EU President – and President of France – Nicolas Sarkozy. The ceasefire agreement was brokered with the help of French diplomacy. It stipulated the withdrawal of the Russian armed forces to where they were located at the outbreak of hostilities and for the deployment of an observation mission (the EU Monitoring Mission, EUMM) to monitor the brokered ceasefire agreement. The EUMM mission continues to function and it attributes to being the main instrument for the prevention of renewed armed hostilities.

It is clear why Russia found so few allies during and following the Five-Day War in August 2008. Not one of the countries of the former Soviet Union was willing to provide military or political support during the armed conflict. None went as far as recognizing the two breakaway territories as independent states, despite the enormous pressure Moscow exerted on them (especially in the cases of Belarus and Kazakhstan). Russia has so far been effective in persuading only five countries – Nicaragua, Venezuela, Vanuatu, Tuvalu and tiny Nauru – to officially recognize these breakaways. Moreover, the sustainability of such recognition among these island nations is a constant source of media speculation and political discourse.

Meanwhile the Russians required Georgia to sign an agreement on the non use of force with the governments of the two breakaway territories (which would, in fact, be a tacit recognition of their independence, and thus rejected by Tbilisi). It has also tried to give the same negotiation status to the representatives of the two entities, giving them the same standing as the Georgians in conflict negotiations held in Geneva (Geneva Talks). The outcomes from these negotiations have so far been modest at best.

The “Recovery” of Ukraine

Zbigniew Brzezinski, in his book The Grand Chessboard, pointed out that without Ukraine, Russia would cease to be an empire with one foot in Europe.12

On April 21, 2010 Medvedev made his first official visit to Ukraine (making a second on May 17 of the same year). Some important agreements were concluded in the city of Kharkiv (East Ukraine) with the new the “pro-Russian” Viktor Yanukovych, President of Ukraine. Russia had agreed to reduce the price of the gas it supplies to its neighbour with 30% and in return Ukraine would extend until 2042 the lease and authorization for the Russian Black Sea Fleet to use the Sevastopol naval base in the Crimea (the previous lease agreement was to expire in 2017).

These agreements are an example of how Russia effectively uses its energy resources as a weapon to gain political leverage. However, during the Viktor Yushchenko presidency, after the “Orange Revolution” of 2004, relations between Russia and Ukraine deteriorated. There were severe disagreements over the gas price and Moscow subsequently cut off supplies to that country twice, in January 2006 and January 2009, resulting in serious damage for European customers who use Ukraine as a transit point for obtaining Russian gas. In addition, Yushchenko’s commitment to taking Ukraine into NATO was a major cause of irritation in Moscow, although the official reason was arrears for previous supplied gas.

Relations between Russia and Ukraine are mutually beneficial as their joint trade turnover is valued at $30-35 billion a year, and covers many areas (industry, energy, agriculture). Eighty percent of Russian gas that transits to Europe (at least until the South Stream pipeline become operational), passes through Ukraine. Ukraine is almost totally dependent on Russian for the supply of oil and electricity; the two countries have largely similar aircraft, space and weapons industries. An estimated eight million Russians live in Ukraine and about three million Ukrainians in Russia. Millions of Russian and Ukrainian citizens travel between the two countries, and not only tourists. The two countries have a generally shared language, and with many ethnic Russian living in Ukraine. There are many cultural, religious and historical links. Kiev is considered as the cradle of the East Slavic civilization and there are strong and lasting bonds between Russians and Ukrainians.

The efforts of President Victor Yushchenko after the Orange Revolution to distance Ukraine from Russia flew in the face of the efforts to build dense networks of shared interests and ties between them, although his successor Yanukovich restored “normality” by regulating economic relations and removing various “irritants,” such as official attempts to investigate the Golodomor (famine-genocide in Ukrainian), an organized famine that starved between three and five million people in less than two years during the 1930s as a part of a forced collectivization of peasants. For contemporary Ukrainians, this is nothing less than a diabolically planned genocide carried out by Stalin and his subordinates to quell the nationalism of Ukrainian peasants and keep them from rebelling against Soviet rule.

However, the new Ukrainian President has also sought to keep a safe distance from Moscow. He declined an invitation from Putin to integrate Ukraine with the Belarus-Russia-Kazakhstan Customs Union. At the same time, he has continued negotiations in concluding a free trade agreement with the EU. Moreover, in line with manoeuvres, Yanukovych also failed to respond positively to the Russian Prime Minister’s offer in late April 2010 to merge Gazprom with the much smaller Naftogaz Ukrainy, a move that would have given Russia control of Ukraine’s entire gas transit and storage system.13

Problems with Belarus

Although on April 2, 1997 Belarus and Russia signed the Treaty on the Belarus-Russia Union – an attempt to establish a confederation between the two countries – that Union has not been translated into reality. Belarus is controlled by the authoritarian regime of President Alexander Lukashenko, whose reluctance to be subordinated to Russia has been a source of friction. Minsk has been reluctant to agree to the creation of a Presidency of this Union (whose incumbent was Vladimir Putin) and is resisting Russian economic domination (for example, giving Gazprom control of Beltransgaz, the company that owns the network of pipelines in Belarus). Disputes over the price of the gas Russia supplies to Belarus, the level of transit charges for transporting Russian oil to Europe and the Beltransgaz debt to Gazprom have caused a serious crisis in bilateral relations. In addition, the ban on the import of Belarus milk and dairy products to Russia, for health reasons, and Mink’s refusal to recognize the breakaway republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia have further soured relations. Some of the major Russian television channels launched a campaign against President Lukashenko a few months before he stood for a fourth presidential term in December 2010.

The Belarusian government’s position is weak because its economic dependence on Russia is almost complete [6] and its relations with the West are not good. Having initially excluded this country in its Eastern Partnership initiative due to violations of fundamental rights and freedoms by the Lukashenko regime, the EU decided to offer the partnership with a view to help put Belarus on the democratic path. For its part, the Russian armed forces consider Belarusian territory its “first line” of defense against NATO. It lies between Russia proper and the Russian region of Kaliningrad. Furthermore, armament cooperation between Russia and Belarus is important (there were 32 joint projects in progress under Medvedev’s presidency). Belarus’ withdrawal of the CSTO would be a blow to this organization and Russia. Nevertheless, the rift between Lukashenko and Moscow seems difficult to repair.

The End of the “Tulip Revolution” in Kyrgyzstan

The revolutionary events of April 7, 2010 ended five disastrous years for the citizens of Kyrgyzstan. They had suffered under the corrupt and authoritarian regime of Kurmanbek Bakiyev, victor of the 2005 “Tulip Revolution”. Bakiyev eventually fled the country on April 15, after a brief attempt to retain power by retreating to his stronghold in the south of the country.14 Russia was the first country to recognize the new government led by Roza Otunbayeva, a former foreign minister of Kyrgyzstan and Soviet diplomat who had undergone training in Russia. At the same time, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin announced that 50 million in urgent financial aid would be given to Kyrgyzstan. In another form of direct assistance, Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin conveyed Russia’s readiness to supply the necessary fuel to Kyrgyzstan so its farmers could sow the winter wheat crop.

Moscow’s dissatisfaction with Bakiyev’s regime had increased ever since it became apparent that he had reneged on a commitment to expel the U.S. military from the Manas Air Base (the main U.S. logistics hub in Central Asia for operations in Afghanistan) after receiving the promise of a loan of $2.1 billion from Moscow. [8] Kyrgyz became extremely irritated by the sharp rise in commodity prices and electricity – this was fuelled by harsh criticism of Bakiyev’s regime by Russian TV channels, which did not shy away from exposing just how bad things were for the average Kurgyz people. On April 2, Moscow decided to pre-empt the collapse of the regime by ceasing to to supply oil to Kyrgyzstan at “discounted prices.” Kyrgyzstan’s fragile economy could not withstand the impact of this punitive measure.

This action, combined with the growing public discontent, created further political instability and the situation soon reached crisis level. However, the Russians agreed to the request of the acting president, Otunbayeva, and sent troops to the southern city of Osh to quell increasing riots. The Russian government opposed constitutional changes which would have moved Kygyzstan away from a presidential system towards a parliamentary one. Moscow believed such a structure would create further instability. In the end the Russians opted to allow parliamentary elections which would clearly favor Roza Otunbayeva. She was considered the person most likely able to garner support from a variety of different political groups, thus ensuring stability.15

ENERGY POWER

The energy sector is an important one for all the various countries of the world, but especially for Russia as it is the very foundation on which rest the Kremlin’s power and leverages. The petroleum industry in Russia is among the three largest in the world. Up until the end of 2013, Russia was the world’s largest producer of oil and gas combined. It seems, however, that the U.S. is on track to pass Russia soon. This is made possible by a comeback fueled by shale-rock formations of oil and natural gas.16

The hydrocarbons sector is also essential for the Russian domestic economy, generating year in and year out more than 20% of its GDP, 40% of its export earnings and approximately 50% of the state’s total revenues. Consequently the Russian economy is pinned to the price of oil. It reached over $134 a barrel in July 2008 and dropped to less than $30 seven months later. Energy price fluctuations also impact economic indicators. For instance, Russia’s GDP contracted by 7.9% in 2009, whereas it had grown by 5.6% in 2008.17 These figures reveal the overly huge dependence of the Russian economy on the petroleum industry. During Boris Yeltsin’s presidency (1991-1999) the average price of a barrel of oil was $16.70. The recovery in oil prices in the second half of the 2000s has greatly contributed to destabilization in some OPEC countries; the low price of oil may have influenced the decision to go to war in Iraq. The Russian economy rebounded in tandem with a rise in oil prices, with a recorded growth of 4.3% in 2011,18 and this trend has positively impacted the value of the Russian ruble against other major currencies.

There is no monopoly on the production and export of oil in Russia, although six large companies, Rosneft, Lukoil, TNK-BP, Surgutneftegaz, Gazprom Neft and Tatneft, are clearly dominant in this market.19 By contrast, the energy transport system (pipelines) is operated as a monopoly by Transneft, a publically owned company. As for natural gas, Gazprom’s dominance of the production and export sectors is almost total (production equals 1.8/2.0 bcm/day). Its retention of these effective monopolies on the sale and transport of gas is the main reason why Russia has rejected the EU’s Energy Charter Treaty and the Energy Charter Protocol on energy efficiency.

Russia is the leading energy supplier to the EU. In 2007, it provided 36% of the gas, 33% of the oil and 25% of the coal consumed by EU member states.20 Such a dependency is mutually beneficial, as Europe is virtually the only large market for Russian gas.21 However, China is understood to be a potential alternative market for Russian gas exports (oil as well), but the Chinese are hesitant about paying such high prices as do European countries.22

There are three main facets to the gas export trade: (a) domestic production; (b) the marketing of gas produced by other CIS countries; and (c) transportation.

(A) Production.

Russia is faced with a problem of production capacity due to a lack of investment in new projects and ever-increasing domestic demand. In the period 1999-2007, it invested only 17% of its GDP in the development and maintenance of its energy sector, compared with 20-24% on average in other major energy producing countries. According to some experts, if it had not been for the economic crisis that started in September of 2008, Russia would have experienced a production deficit of 27 billion cubic meters of gas in 2010 and 46 billion in 2015, thus making it impossible to meet domestic demand or export commitments to foreign customers. The large gas deposits discovered during the Soviet era have already been heavily exploited and opening new ones, especially those on the Arctic Yamal Peninsula and the Shtokman field in the Barents Sea, involves considerable technical difficulties; transportation costs can also be very high.23

(B) Marketing of the gas produced by other CIS countries.

In order to compensate for this shortfall in production, Russia worked to monopolize the purchase and transport of gas from other CIS countries, particularly from Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. These exporting countries have no direct outputs to European markets. In May 12, 2007 Vladimir Putin signed an agreement with Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to build a new pipeline, called the Prikaspiiski natural gas pipeline to carry Turkmen and Kazakhstani gas to Russia, alongside the Eastern shore of the Caspian Sea. The pipeline would carry Turkmen and Kazakhstani gas to Russia, enabling the Kremlin to tap into Central Asia’s oil and gas reserves in the long term. The agreement was interpreted by analysts as being a major blow to U.S., and especially, EU hopes of becoming less dependent on Russian gas imports because U.S. and EU energy projects in the Caspian basins looked futile in light of this agreement. However, during a visit to Ashkhabad by Russian President Dmitry Medvedev on December 25, 2010, the two sides concurred to formally suspend the Prikaspiiski natural gas pipeline project. Turkmen President Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov indicated that he looked forward to a revival of Turkmen natural gas exports to Russia which had drastically fallen sharply after a mysterious pipeline explosion in April 2009. An agreement was also reached to increase existing pipeline capacity (through the Central Asian Gas Pipeline). Moreover, Gazprom signed an agreement with Turkmenistan to buy gas at similar prices to those found in European markets.24

(C) The transport of gas.

After the pro-Western government of Viktor Yushchenko was elected in December 2004, Moscow rapidly increased the price of the gas it sold to Ukraine. Failure to reach an agreement on prices and the consequent lack of payment by Ukraine led to Gazprom proceeding to cut the supply in both January 2006 and January 2009.

Almost all Russian natural gas is exported through pipelines. The key country is Ukraine, as most of the gas that is sold by Russia to Europe passes through Ukrainian pipelines. Russia has tried, albeit unsuccessfully, to gain control of this pipeline network. Moscow rapidly increased the price of the gas it sold to Ukraine following the election of the pro-Western government of Viktor Yushchenko in December 2004. The failure to reach an agreement on prices and the lack of payment by Ukraine compelled Gazprom to cut off the supply in both January 2006 and January 2009. Supplies to European customers were severely interrupted, and this seriously disrupted the economies of Eastern European countries highly dependent on Russian gas. Gazprom’s decision brought about a sharp decline in Russia’s image of a stable and trustworthy supplier.

In order to reduce its dependence on gas transit through Ukraine, Moscow decided to launch two major pipeline projects: Nord Stream and South Stream. Nord Stream is a joint venture between Gazprom and Germany’s E.on and Wintershall (a subsidiary of BASF).25 The pipeline is 1,224 km long and links the Russian port of Vyborg, near St. Petersburg, with the German port of Greifswald, crossing the Baltic Sea. It cost at least 12 billion euros to build both Line 1 and Line 2. Construction of Line 1 of the twin pipeline system began in April 2010, and was completed in June 2011. Transportation of gas through Line 1 began in mid-November 2011. Construction of Line 2, which runs parallel to Line 1, began in May 2011 and was completed in April 2012. Gas transport through the second line began in October 2012. Each line has a transport capacity of roughly 27.5 bcm of natural gas per annum. South Stream, a project launched in 2007, is being led by Gazprom and Italy’s ENI, which in December 2009 agreed to give France’s EDF a stake in it.26 It focuses on building a 900 km pipeline linking the Russian coast of the Black Sea (the port of Novorossiysk) with the European continent through Bulgaria. Its capacity will be 63 bcm/year and it is expected to start operating in 2015. On December 28, 2011, Turkey gave its approval for allowing the pipeline to pass through its territorial waters.27

South Stream is primarily a political project as reflected in its enormous cost of more than 24 billion euros. Such a sum of money cannot be justified from a purely economic perspective. Its purpose is twofold: first, to reduce dependence on transit through Ukraine (although the modernization of the Ukrainian gas transport system would be far less expensive); second, to counter Nabucco, the rival European project.

The Nabucco project, promoted by the EU as an alternative to Russian supplies, is a venture project involving Botas (Turkey), Bulgargaz (Bulgaria), Transgaz (Romania), MOL (Hungary) and OMV (Austria). On July 13, 2009 the five countries (Austria, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey) through which the pipeline will pass signed an intergovernmental agreement about the project in Ankara. Before being put on hold by the EU in 2013, the project’s cost was estimated at 15 billion Euros (the final price tag is underestimated and continues to rise). Once completed, it was expected to have a flow capacity of 31 bcm.28 The European Commission-backed project was originally set to come online in 2015, but this date has been delayed until 2017 with no certainty that the project will actually be put back on track again at that year. Construction was expected to start in 2013, or “as soon as there are firm indications that gas-supply commitments are in place,” according to Reinhard Mitschek, managing director of Nabucco Gas Pipeline International. However, many aspects are still in question, as the price adjustment threatens to dampen some energy companies’ interest in continued cooperation with the project consortium, and this delay could provide conditions where competing gas lines would beat it out, both in terms of gas supplies and access to customers.29

RUSSIAN-U.S. RELATIONS

Undoubtedly, Russia’s relationship with the United States remained a top priority under Medvedev’s presidency. Reminiscent of its former superpower status, the Kremlin wants Washington to fully recognize Russia as an equal player on the international scene. The Moscow-Washington relationship deteriorated significantly during the second term (2004-2008) of President George W. Bush, but with Barack Obama taking over the White House considerable improvements have been realized. Soon Washington decided to adopt a policy more sensitive to Russia’s interests, and perhaps more pragmatic, aiming to gain Russia’s cooperation on major issues such as Iran’s uranium enrichment, Afghanistan and nuclear proliferation. Russia saw the hand extended by the Obama administration as an opportunity to promote its interests in several ways: security in Europe, economic modernization and, finally, its entry into the WTO. The term “reset” (or “reconfiguration”) used by Vice-President Joseph Biden in his speech in Munich in February 2009 best characterized this new approach. This speech made a big impression and it appeared that under Medvedev’s presidency a willingness on both sides to open a new chapter in their relations came into being.

In July 6, 2009 President Obama made an important visit to Moscow, during which he signed several key documents, including an agreement on providing air traffic equipment and military material as part of the operation in Afghanistan. The establishment of a the Obama-Medvedev Commission, officially known as the U.S.-Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission, was also set up in order to improve communication and cooperation between the two countries. The two Presidents announced that the work of the Commission would be coordinated by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov. The work of this Committee developed with great intensity and produced some useful results.

The most important achievement was the signing in Prague on April 8, 2010 of a the New START Treaty (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, to replace the 1991 START treaty (whose terms expired on December 5, 2009) and the Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty (SORT) of 2002. The New START had great political importance as it was a symbol of the new era in relations between the two former superpowers, though it is relatively modest in scope, as it reduces by only 30% the number of strategic nuclear weapons deployed by each party and does not resolve the problem of the linkage between offensive and defensive weapons, such as missile defense systems. The Russians, who fear that these systems may hinder their strategic offensive capability, wished to see this linkage incorporated in the provisions of the treaty and legally binding. However, the Obama administration refused, arguing that the Senate would not ratify the treaty if such a provision was included. Some reference is made in the Preamble to New START Treaty, but no more.30

Following the signing of the Treaty, Obama and Medvedev discussed efforts to synchronize the respective parliamentary approvals of the bilateral agreement. The Americans needed to obtain 67 favorable votes in the Senate, but it proved difficult to gain Congressional approval for the Treaty before the elections of November 2010. The Republican opposition accused Obama of having made too many concessions to the Russians (including the cancellation of the proposed deployment of missile defense systems in Poland and the Czech Republic) without obtaining enough in return. In fact, the Republican obsession with depriving Obama of this success proved the main threat to the ratification of this important treaty.

The climate of relations between Washington and Moscow improved markedly between 2009 and 2011. This is exemplified by how both parties behaved when Washington expelled a network of 10 people allegedly involved in intelligence work for Russia in July 2010. However, there still was a real partnership on issues like Iran and Afghanistan. On September 22, 2010 President Medvedev signed a decree vetoing the delivery of S-300 missiles to Iran. Washington and Moscow even held talks about collaborating on such a sensitive topic as missile defense.31 For her part, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton declared on September 22, 2010, during a meeting in New York between Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov and his counterparts in NATO, that “in the longer term, NATO and Russia should work together to develop models for a combined NATO-Russia missile defense architecture”.32 It was also leaked that Secretary of Defense Robert Gates suggested to his Russian counterpart Anatoly Serdyukov, during the latter’s visit to Washington on September 17, 2010, that Russia cooperate militarily in the fight against the Taliban in Afghanistan and provide the U.S. armed forces strategic transport aircraft such as the An-124 and Mi-17 helicopters.33

There was “good chemistry” between Presidents Medvedev and Obama. Medvedev did not only visit the Silicon Valley to study the development of high-tech industries, but also praised the American model of technology partnerships between the government and the private sector through The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), which reports to the Pentagon. Russia wanted to tap American experience of modernizing and organizing the armed forces and police.

The case of Russia’s position during the March 2011 vote on resolution 1973, on the situation in Libya, is particularly interesting. President Medvedev’s decision not to exercise Russia’s veto to block the resolution took everyone by surprise and the motives behind it were not apparent to most observers. This episode suggested a shift in Russia’s foreign policy under Medvedev, and provided a glimpse of the future relations between Russia, the U.S. and the West more generally.

From the Korean War to Iraq, Russia had always opposed military intervention in foreign countries because of its strict observance of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states. This cautious policy persisted even after the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s.

Russia could not prevent nor NATO from bombing Serbia in 1999 nor could it impede the invasion of Iraq by a U.S.-led coalition of states in 2003. The use of its veto in both cases cast a clear message to the West, namely that it is opposed to military aggression against sovereign states without the authorization of international organizations. As a result, in 1999 and 2003, relations between Russia, NATO and the United States reached their lowest point in the post-Cold War period. During the crisis in Libya, Russia, for the first time, did not attempt to obstruct the way chosen by the West. What had changed since 2003? Was there a link between Russia’s new foreign policy of Russia under Medvedev and his abstention in the UN vote on resolution 1973? We must answer yes to the last question. By endorsing military intervention in Libya, Moscow avoided compromising its ties with the United States and Western Europe. Two underlying crucial factors contributed to Russia’s courageous stance: the urgent need for Russia to accelerate its economic “modernization” with the support of the West and the relative success of the “reset” of relations with the United States.

Medvedev redefined his country’s foreign policy by focusing mainly on economic modernization. Russia cannot aspire to become a major player on the international stage without more investment in technological development and the upgrading of its infrastructure. Therefore, it sought to forge closer relations with countries able to assist in its modernization project. The United States were on top of the list because of its technological prowess and the quality of its most prestigious universities. Medvedev and Russian “modernists?” thought that the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) could become a strong ally in this quest.

In July 2009, during the Moscow summit, Obama and Medvedev signed an agreement to create establishment the Obama-Medvedev Commission (officially known as the Russian-American Presidential Bilateral Commission). The Commission significantly contributed to improve relations between Russia, the U.S. It aimed to strengthen cooperation between the two countries on a wide range of issues. After reaching a low point in the wake of the armed conflict between Russia and Georgia in August 2008, the U.S.-Russian cooperation was again on the rise thanks to the Commission, which was coordinated by Hilary Clinton, U.S. Secretary of State and Sergey Lavrov, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

The Obama-Medvedev Commission produced significant results: Agreement on arms control and nuclear non-proliferation (New START), joint efforts to fight the terrorist threat and drug trafficking, Russia’s contribution to NATO’s mission in Afghanistan, to name a few. The Kremlin’s abandonment of its former policy of systematically exercising its veto in the United Nations Security Council could also be interpreted as a success of the “reset” in U.S.-Russian relations.

Although the decision to abstain on Resolution 1973 was extremely controversial within the Russian political elite, President Medvedev, with this option, clearly indicated the new direction he intended to give to his country.34

But all this should not obscure the fact that discrepancies still remain between Washington and Moscow on a range of topics, especially in regard to the post-Soviet space35 and European security. As Dmitri Trenin wrote, the idea of a “grand bargain” in which Washington will allow Moscow to dominate the countries of the former Soviet Union and recognize a Russian “exclusive interest” in its “near abroad” in exchange for support on issues such as Afghanistan or the Middle East is a chimera. The notion of a new European security treaty which would block the further enlargement of NATO does not seem acceptable to Western allies, even if such enlargement is, for the moment, frozen.

In the economic sphere, relations are not what one might expect from fellow members of the G8. In 2008, the year in which mutual trade was at its peak, the U.S. accounted for only 4% of Russia’s foreign trade and was only its eighth largest trading partner. The relationship is even less significant for the U.S. because Russia accounted for less than 1% of its foreign trade in 2008. In addition, Russia had been trying to enter the WTO, without success, since 1993, and Moscow accused Washington of being responsible for the delay in its accession to that international organization.36 Following a telephone conversation between Obama and Medvedev, both sides declared that bilateral negotiations between the two countries on Russia’s entry into the WTO had concluded.37

NATO AND EUROPEAN SECURITY

Relations between Russia and NATO continued to be strained. The Russians believe that the West took advantage of its good faith and temporary weakness after the break-up of the Soviet Union. The West took decisions that were against Russia’s interests. Moscow believes that NATO has sought to become the key security organization in Europe, eviscerating the work of other relevant organizations in the field, such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). This organization has in fact been transformed, in the Russian perception, into an organization whose central purpose is to monitor respect for human rights and democratic freedoms in the countries of the former USSR (“East of Vienna”), albeit neglecting other key security roles.

NATO has also acted “aggressively” in the eyes of Moscow by conducting a military intervention, without the authorization of the UN Security Council, against the former Yugoslavia in 1999 under the guise of the Kosovo crisis. Furthermore, in 1997 NATO began expanding to the very borders of Russia, raising the possibility that it could continue and enter such countries as Ukraine and Georgia, despite their historical links to Russia.

Although it signed the Founding Act between Russia and NATO in May 1997 and the NATO-Russia Council (NRC), a body for consultation, cooperation and decision-making on the basis of equality, Russia claimed it was not consulted about the NATO’S eastward expansion and its opinion was not taken into account. Furthermore, the Alliance failed to fulfill very important political commitments implicit in the ratification of the Adapted Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (Adapted CFE treaty) signed at the OSCE summit in Istanbul in 1999.

Russia’s intervention in Georgia in August 2008 was an action clearly aimed, among other goals, at “freezing” the gradual incorporation of that country (and indirectly Ukraine) into NATO.38 As a result of that conflict, cooperation between Russia and NATO was suspended for almost a year.39 In December 2007, Russia also suspended the CFE Treaty, citing the Western breach of the commitment to ratify the Adapted CFE Treaty signed in 1999 and NATO’s incorporation of new members from the Baltic region. For its part, NATO explicitly stated that the new Russian military doctrine, published in February 2010, was a possible threat to international security.

NATO insisted that its extension is not a threat to Russia and that it has global ambitions but seeks to address “unconventional” threats (terrorism, Illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive material, etc.) which concern Russia as well. In this context, it offered to work with Moscow in developing a missile defense system as a symbol of the new spirit of cooperation in the Euro-Atlantic space. But the Russians insisted that the U.S. should first give up its missile defense program, as it could affect strategic stability (i.e., reduce the credibility of Russia’s strategic deterrent), or at least sign an agreement with Russia to limit the program. They also wanted to promote the non-weaponization of outer space. Moscow followed with great interest the work undertaken within NATO on the new Strategic Concept adopted at the Summit in Lisbon on November 19 and 20, 2010.

Given the unsatisfactory security situation in Europe (Medvedev gave as an example of this the failure of OSCE institutions to perform adequately during the August 2008 war in Georgia, it was logical that Moscow should try to change the situation. In speeches delivered in Berlin and Evian in June and September 2008 President Medvedev raised the idea of establishing a new security architecture in Europe, putting forward the ideas of negotiating a new treaty for all countries and existing security organizations in the Euro-Atlantic area (“from Vancouver to Vladivostok”). Medvedev proposed to convene a European summit (of the 56 states belonging to the OSCE) to start the process of drafting this treaty.

The aim of this project was to establish a new collective security system in Europe, which would eliminate what were from the Russian perspective new dividing lines created on the continent as a result of NATO enlargement and the advancement of enemies’ infrastructure to Russia’s borders. The new treaty proposed to incorporate the “legally binding” principles and political commitments enshrined in the Founding Act of 1997 and the Rome document of 2002.

On November 29, 2009 Russia made public a draft treaty on European Security which proposed the establishment of consultation mechanisms that every state would be entitled to use when they consider their security interests might be affected. The signatories would pledge not to use force without consulting the other states and organizations party to it.

The Western allies agreed to discuss the development of a new security structure for Europe. However, they saw no need to translate the existing commitments into a new treaty or to create new institutions or mechanisms for this purpose. They sought to focus the debate purely within the framework of the OSCE and to include the military aspects of security (‘hard security’), as preferred by Russia, but also to extend the debate to economic (e.g. energy supply security) and human (respect for individual rights and fundamental freedoms) aspects.40 The OSCE Ministerial Council held in Corfu, Greece in June 2009 launched the so-called Corfu Process, which debated these three aspects of security. The provisional results of these debates were presented at an OSCE summit held in Astana (Kazakhstan) on December 1-2, 2010.

Moscow was quite realistic and knew that its proposals on European security had no chance of being accepted. Regardless, it considered that it achieved partial success by being able to stimulate a wider debate on security in Europe. It realized that the recognition of the situation is far more complex than being merely a question of whether Russia should belong to NATO or the EU, or not. The major Western countries wanted to strengthen relations with Russia in the field of security and, for that matter, they invited President Medvedev to participate in the NATO Summit in Lisbon (November 19-20, 2010). In July 2010, prior to the summit, German Chancellor Angela Merkel told Medvedev that the EU would support some of the Russian proposals in exchange for Moscow clearly committing to furthering the solution of the ex-Soviet space’s “protracted conflicts,” starting with the withdrawal of Russian forces from Transnistria. For his part, French President Nicholas Sarkozy invited Medvedev to hold a joint session with him and German Chancellor Angela Merkel in Deauville on October 18-19, 2010 to discuss these issues. The U.S. Ambassador to NATO, Ivo Daalder, recalled during the meeting that Russia, as a European state, is entitled to join the Atlantic Alliance, in accordance with Article 10 of the Washington Treaty. The Institute for Modern Development (INSOR) in Moscow also launched a debate on this issue, although such incorporation, realistically, was unthinkable in the foreseeable future.

RUSSIA-CHINA RELATIONS

Russia’s relations with China gained ground under Medvedev, especially in the economic and energy sectors. However, this has not always been the case.

Since the Sino-Soviet split (1960–1989) that saw the worsening of political and ideological relations between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, China poses the most important strategic challenge to Russian security. The influx of Chinese in Russia’s unpopulated and underdeveloped East Siberia region, adjacent to China’s northern border, may be an unstoppable flow. Also, ever-increasing numbers of Chinese citizens can be even found in Moscow. Russia is trying to accommodate China’s rapid emergence as a world power. It has enjoyed a position of prominence in relation to China for over 300 years. In 1990, the GDP of both countries was approximately equal in absolute terms, but by 2011 China’s GDP was four times larger than Russia’s. This great imbalance emerged in just over a decade. It is evident that the enormous strength of China will continue to have a very deep impact on Russia itself.

After its foundation in 1949, the People’s Republic of China (PRP) partly followed the Stalinist model of party rule, but a divide emerged between the two ruling communist parties in the 1960s. In 1968 and 1969 territorial disputes led to armed clashes between the two countries, in the Xinjiang region, located in the north east of China, and on the Damanski island (Zhenbao Island in Chinese). A significant example of the recent degree of rapprochement between the two countries was the signing on July 21, 2008 of a border demarcation agreement under which Russia restored to China two islands in the Amur River near Khabarovsk. These were first occupied by the Soviets in 1929. Undoubtedly, this agreement was another indication of the rise of China’s ascent in that region and on the world stage.

Russia worked to bring about an improved approach towards China, particularly after Putin rebuilt the ‘power’ of the Russian state in the aftermath of the failure of Gorbachev’s perestroika and the subsequent chaotic dismantling of the communist economy under President Yeltsin.

Trade between the two countries has grown dramatically in recent years, and China is now Russia’s second largest trading partner after Germany (this trade turnover is valued at between $54 and $56 million annually). Russia has been the largest supplier of weapons to China in the post-Soviet era, although Chinese technological advancement will make it less dependent on Russian arms imports in the future.41

In the energy sector opportunities for cooperation between the two countries are immense. In February 2009, the China Development Bank (CDB) and the Russian energy companies Rosneft and Transneft agreed to grant the first tranche of a loan of $25 million to develop new oil fields in Siberia and build a “branch” of the East Siberian oil pipeline to the Pacific Ocean linking the two countries.42 From 2011 to 2030 Russia agreed to supply China 20 million tons of crude through this pipeline.43

The importance Moscow attaches to relations with China is shown by the fact that the first foreign trip of Dmitry Medvedev as Russian head of state (except for one to Kazakhstan) was to Beijing in May 2008. Prime Minister Putin visited the Chinese capital several times between 2009 and 2011. In October 2009, the Russian PM signed cooperation agreements with his Chinese counterpart amounting to $3.5 billion. Moreover, Presidents Hu Jintao and Medvedev met five times in 2010.

From September 26 to 29, 2010 Medvedev made an important visit to Beijing, during which he signed 15 bilateral agreements, including 12 on energy cooperation. In addition to opening the aforementioned pipeline between eastern Siberia and China, the following important agreements were signed:

1. Gazprom and China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) signed an agreement establishing the basic principles for future cooperation in the field of natural gas. Although a final agreement between Gazprom and CNPC was stalled over Russian price demands, which Beijing viewed as unaffordable for domestic consumers, the parties still decided to continue a dialogue for elaborating mutually beneficial decisions on different routes of supply, gas supply volumes and the setting of prices.44

2. The Russian Energy Minister signed a memorandum with his Chinese counterpart on cooperation in the field of coal mining. Beijing granted Moscow loans amounting to $6 billion in exchange for supplies of coal from Eastern Siberia. During the next 25 years China is expected to import at least 15 million tons of coal from Russia.45

3. In the field of nuclear energy, the State Atomic Energy Corporation (Rosatom) and its Chinese counterpart signed a deal to build two new reactors (Unit 3 and Unit 4, anticipated capacity – 1,060 MWe) at China’s Tianwan nuclear power plant, located in Lianyungang City, Jiangsu Province, about 250 km north of Shanghai. Construction began in late 2012.46

4. In the electricity sector, the Chinese corporation Huadin signed with the Russian TGK-2 a contract worth $5 billion for the construction of a high-power electric steam generator with a capacity of 490 MW in the Russian city of Yaroslavl.

5. In the aluminium sector, the Russian company Rusal and China’s Norinco signed an agreement under which the former undertook to export about 2 million tons of aluminum worth about $4 billion, while the second will invest in production plants in Russia.

6. In the automotive sector, the Russian Avtomobilny Zavod (VAZ) and Chinese FAW Group Corporation, a state-owned automotive manufacturing company, agreed to establish a joint venture (JV) in Russia’s Ural region for the production and distribution of trucks.

These agreements have, without a doubt, a strategic dimension. Russia is taking important steps to diversify its export markets for energy products, reducing its dependence on Europe, while China is strengthening its energy security by ensuring supplies from Russia rather than relying on sea transport routes, where risks are increasing. Both have pledged to work on ensuring that mutual trade reaches $70 billion annually. In the political sphere China has underlined its support for territorial integrity in the North Caucasus and Russia has recognized Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. For the first time China expressed clear support for the Russian initiative to establish a new security architecture in the Euro-Atlantic area and agreed to begin work to develop a “Security Architecture for the Asia-Pacific,” a matter of great interest for Beijing. This security architecture would prevent participants from taking actions towards the build-up of “offensive military infrastructure.”

Sino-Russian cooperation projects are not only undertaken on issues relevant to the two states but also with regard to major issues on the international agenda: Iran, Afghanistan, North Korea and the international financial system. Both powers are trying to decide their positions within the UN Security Council, the G20, the BRICS and regional organizations, such as the SCO. But Beijing has so far prevented the latter organization from acquiring the military dimension desired by Russia. It mainly focuses on economic rather than military issues. China uses it as a tool to increase its influence in Central Asia, as it is emerging as a competitor for Russia in that region (it has offered loans worth $10 billion to countries in the region during Medvedev’s presidency), both from a geostrategic point of view and as a supplier of energy resources. Beijing has also refused to recognize the Georgian breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states, taking a line which has been followed by the other Central Asian members of the SCO.

RUSSIA-EU RELATIONS

Since the enlargement of the EU to 25 members on May 1, 2004 (part of the same wave of enlargement included the accession of Bulgaria and Romania on January 1, 2007 and the accession of Croatia on July 1, 2013), Russia shares a long common border with the EU space, running from the Barents Sea to the Black Sea.47 Three EU Member states share a land border with Russia, which the leading supplier of energy to the EU. In 2010 it provided 34% of the gas, 33% of the oil and 30% of the coal consumed by the EU. Approximately two-thirds of Russia’s gas and oil exports go to Europe. Over 50% of Russia’s foreign trade is conducted with the Union and Russia is now the third largest trading partner of the EU, after the U.S. and China. The total Russia-EU trade volume exceeded $390 billion in 2011. It is estimated that up to 75% of Foreign Direct Investment stocks in Russia come from EU member states.48

Relations between the EU and Russia are governed by the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), a10-year agreement signed in 1994 and entered into force in 1997 with the possibility of being extended. Since December 2007 it has been extended on an annual basis. As a result of the delay in Russia’s accession to the WTO, at the St. Petersburg Summit in May 2003 both sides agreed to boost cooperation in four areas known as “The Four Common Spaces”: (1) economic, (2) freedom, security and justice, (3) external security, and (4) research, education and culture. In May 2005, “road maps” to spur action on the four Common Spaces were approved.

The objective of the Space of Economic is the creation of an open market between the EU and Russia and the closer integration of their economies. At the Stockholm Summit in November 2009 the “Partnership for Modernization” program was launched to help Russia modernize its production structure and diversify its economy. The program’s aim was to reduce Russia’s dependency on the production and export of hydrocarbons and minerals. The Europeans places special emphasis on “institution building” as they considered that the modernization of the Russian economy should be based on foreign investment and technology transfer. However, such a direction would require the strengthening of legal guarantees for investors and the elimination of protectionist barriers. The latter prevent the creation of internationally competitive industries. Even before Russia entered into the WTO in 2012, the EU believed that it was highly desirable for Russia to adopt internationally recognized standards (preferably incorporating much of the “acquis communautaire”). Although this initiative is now in deadlock as a result of the armed conflict in Eastern Ukraine, the Medvedev administration thought in 2009 that be of great importance in the relationship between Russia and the EU, particularly if approached as a broad partnership in reforming and modernizing production and institutional structures rather than being limited by Russia to being a mere attempt to promote technology transfer.

In January 2006 and January 2009, as a result of disputes over gas price levels between Russia and Ukraine, Gazprom supplies to European countries were temporarily halted causing severe economic damage to the industrial sector and human suffering to many European consumers. Russia’s reputation as a supplier suffered and European countries sought to diversify their supplies away from Russia in order to assure continuity. Moreover, much uncertainty over potential investment followed Russia’s refusal to implement the proposed Energy Charter.

In the Space of Freedom, Security and Justice, perhaps the most important and sensitive issue concerned the movement of people. Russia considered it humiliating that its citizens have to obtain a visa to travel to EU member countries (the Schengen Area) and it urgently sought the elimination of this barrier, without avail. Various EU Member states stand divided on this issue. Even some of the friendliest countries to Russia, like Germany and France, which host a large number of Russian tourists each year, favored signing a simple and comprehensive agreement on visa-free short-term trips that would cover citizens of Russia and the Schengen Area. The EU’s top priority was an agreement on the repatriation of Russian illegal immigrants in Europe and the eventual elimination of administrative obstacles for the EU citizens to live and work in Russia (registration requirements, difficulties in obtaining work permits and residence documents, etc.).49

In terms of human rights, there was an uneasy dialogue between Russia and the EU during Medvedev’s four-year term as president. Russia is a member of the Council of Europe (COE) and by the same token a member of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) which was established by the European Convention on Human Rights. The ECHR hears applications alleging that a contracting state has breached one or more of the human rights provisions concerning civil and political rights set out in the Convention and its protocols. Interestingly, Russia has more human rights pending cases than any other member. The vast bulk of these cases deals with the behaviour of law enforcement bodies in the North Caucasus. On June 1, 2010, six years after it was opened for ratifications, Protocol 14 was added to the ECHR and entered into force. Basically, this protocol streamlines the procedures of the court. However, while it quickly ratified Protocol 14, Russia was the only European Commission (EC) member state which refused to ratified Protocol 6 to the on the abolition of the death penalty. In fact, fifteen years ago it imposed a moratorium on its application.

At the Saint Petersburg Summit in 2003, the EU and Russia established the Common Space on Freedom, Security and Justice, a new non-legally binding institution which reinforced their cooperation on justice, liberty and security ever since. In the Common Space of Security, a wider dialogue was held on key international issues, although their positions did not always coincide with one another.

However, more problematic in Russia-EU relations was what is described as the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), which was first developed in 2004 as a way to integrate the EU’s 6 closest neighbors on its eastern border. Later, on May 7, 2009, in Prague, the EU inaugurated the Eastern Partnership (EaP), regarded with high suspicion by Moscow. Comprising Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Republic of Moldova and Ukraine, the EaP “enables partner countries interested in moving towards the EU and increasing political, economic and cultural links to do so. It is underpinned by a shared commitment to international law and fundamental values – democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms – and to the market economy, sustainable development and good governance.”50 With this “partnership”, the Russians believe that the EU is interfering in its own “backyard” and is trying to prevent Russia from exercising its influence on these ex-Soviet republics (the EU is now negotiating free trade agreements with some of these countries).51 Another area of cooperation covers the field of crisis management. The EU-Russia collaboration in that field so far has been positive, but Russia wants to participate in crisis management operations on a basis of equality and co-decision with its European partners. Hence, Medvedev proposed the conclusion of a framework agreement that would outline a set of cooperation principles during crises.52 The EU was not keen on such a proposition as it wants to preserve its autonomy in the conduct of crisis management operations.

Russia and the EU have an intense cooperation in the Space Research and Education. Even though it was not an official member, Russia very actively participated in the 6th (2002-2006) and 7th (2007-2013) Framework Programmes for Research and Technological Development (abbreviated FP1 through FP6), which are coordinated by the Joint S&T Cooperation Committee. Created by European Union/European Commission, FPs aim to support and foster research in the European Research Area (ERA). In the field of education, the EU’s objectives in its cooperation with Russia are to facilitate academic mobility through the support of academics, the modernization of educational programs and the progressive alignment of Russia with the Bologna Process.

Negotiations on a New EU-Russia Agreement

In July of 2008, negotiations began to conclude a new agreement to replace the 1997 PCA. The EU wanted to reach a global agreement covering all areas of cooperation under the four Common Spaces. In the economic field, the goal was to establish an expanded free trade area covering almost all forms of trade (goods, services and capital) and important components of regulatory convergence and economic cooperation. The EU sought to improve the regulatory environment by building upon WTO rules and strengthening bilateral trade relations. Included in these talks was a further cooperation in the energy sector in line with the principles of the Energy Charter and Transit Protocol.

For its part, Russia adopted a much less ambitious approach. It advocated the negotiation of a framework agreement supplemented by sectorial arrangements in areas which were considered priorities for the Kremlin: the movement of people, combating crime, technological collaboration within the Partnership for Modernization, and cooperation in the field of security and crisis management.

Ten rounds of negotiations were held and, although progress was achieved in some areas, negotiations on economic issues did not advance as quickly as expected. This apparent lack of headway stemmed from the uncertainty at the time surrounding Russia’s accession to the WTO and the establishment of the Customs Union between Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan.

OTHER ISSUES IN RUSSIA’S FOREIGN POLICY

The Iranian Nuclear Dossier

Russia’s position regarding the Iranian government’s efforts to control the complete fuel cycle, which could lead to nuclear weapons production, is a crucial aspect of the development of relations between Moscow and Washington, especially following President Obama’s arrival in the White House and the “reset” of the two countries’ relations. In support of this reset, President Medvedev seemed willing to sacrifice some of Russia’s economic interests in Iran (focused primarily on arms supplies and the construction of nuclear power plants) and political relations with Tehran.53

However, Iran’s seemingly continuous attempts to deceive the international community and international nuclear energy watchdogs did not cause Moscow to change its policy of opposition to excessive UN Security Council sanctions against Iran. Since 2006, when the debate on Iran’s nuclear program first appeared on the agenda of the UN Security Council, Moscow has tried to position itself as a key intermediary in the process of resolving the crisis. Admittedly, on three occasions Russia did vote in favor of sanctions against Iran in the period from 2006 to 2008, but each time it managed to delay and water them down. The sanctions imposed a limitation of export of technology which Iran could use for the development of its nuclear programme, the freezing of the Iranian financial assets, whether those of the government, banks or key individuals, and a ban on selected Iranians from international travel. At the same time, in view of a lack of progress in resolving crisis, Moscow has repeatedly expressed its presumption in favor of imposing further sanctions. Many speeches by President Medvedev in the second half of 2009 demonstrated Russia’s concern on the Iranian issue. In practice, however, every pretext was exploited by the Russian government to postpone sanctions.

Russia’s ambivalence in the Iranian nuclear crisis stemmed from the fact that for the development of its nuclear program Iran benefited from the supply of dual-use technologies by Russian and Chinese companies. With this support Iran created the technical infrastructure necessary for the enrichment of uranium and plutonium. The main factories of the Iranian nuclear infrastructure are: the complex of Saghand (activities related to extracting uranium), Ardekan (for the mineral’s treatment and the production of uranium oxide), Isfahan (where uranium oxide is converted into uranium hexafluoride) and the Natane plant. Depending on the level of enrichment, refined uranium can fuel power plants or nuclear bombs. In the Arak complex – built with the assistance of the Chinese Government which supplied technology and trained Iranian scientists – Iranians conduct activities related to the treatment of enriched uranium and the separation of plutonium. The last element is the Bushehr 1,000 MW capacity power plant. The Russian-Iranian cooperation under Medvedev was part of a wider program of reorganizing the nuclear sector promoted by Moscow’s leaders in order to build a sort of “nuclear super-holding.”

The construction of Iran’s Bushehr nuclear power station by Russia, which dates back to 1992, was another reason for Moscow to play for time. In 1995, Russia and Iran signed another agreement to continue the construction. The plant should have entered into service in 2007 but, because of a series of delays, was only officially opened in September 12, 2011. Russian Energy Minister Sergei Shmatko and head of the Rosatom Sergei Kiriyenko attended the opening ceremony.54

The Russians were upset with Tehran over its rejection of the offer, submitted in Geneva in October 2009 by the EU 3+3 (an abbreviation for the EU 3 [France, Germany, United Kingdom] and China, Russia, and the United States), according to which Iran would have sent its uranium to Russia and France for enrichment.55 This refusal was contemporaneous with the order by Iran’s President Mahmud Ahmadinejad to produce uranium enriched to 20% for the Bushehr reactor and the Natanz plant, located between Isfahan and Kashan in central Iran.

Consequently, on June 9, 2010, Russia supported the adoption by the UN Security Council of a resolution imposing a fourth round of sanctions against Iran’s nuclear program. On September 23, 2010 President Medvedev signed a decree which put in place the sanctions adopted by the United Nations (the main thrust of the sanctions was against “military purchases, trade and financial transactions carried out by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps”56). In tandem with this new round of sanctions, Moscow also suspended the delivery of S-300 surface-to-air missiles, other air defense systems, combat aircraft, armored vehicles, helicopters and warships to Iran. Medvedev’s action contradicted statements made by his own Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, and senior military commanders who claimed that the S-300 system, due to its purely defensive character, was not subject to the sanctions adopted by the Security Council. Hence the act appeared to show that the Russian President was willing to go beyond what was required by the Security Council resolution.57

The Iranian government did not take Moscow’s decision lightly. Tehran accused the Russians of breaching their contract and even threatened to take the case to an arbitration tribunal. Moscow feared that the vacuum left by its refusal to supply arms to Iran would be filled by China, though the same S-300 systems that China purchased from Russia did not have the same level of sophistication. In these circumstances, Iran vowed to create a more advanced domestic anti-aircraft defensive system – something it claims it has since accomplished. On the other hand, the Russians expressed deep unease at the fact that the U.S. and the EU decided to take actions against Iran without the approval of the Security Council.

The Peace Process in the Middle East

Medvedev was very active in that region, eager to move the Israeli-Palestinian negotiation process forward and regain lost influence in the region as a whole. On March 19, 2010, at Russia’s initiative, a meeting of the Quartet on the Middle East (United Nations, the United States, the European Union, and Russia) was held in Moscow in which Russia urged the parties to resume negotiations as soon as possible in order to address all the issues affecting the process. In the months following this meeting, the Russians made very strong statements against Israeli settlement expansion in the occupied territories. Moscow also attempted to maintain contacts with all parties to the conflict and was the only member of the Quartet to actually meet with representatives of Hamas, as the Kremlin considered it necessary to involve all parties in the negotiation process.

Medvedev kept open its offer to hold an international conference on the Middle East in Moscow, with the participation of all parties involved, but he did make it clear that that the timing was not appropriate yet for such a conference. The Russians were pessimistic about whether a meeting could be organized in the medium term, at least until direct talks had been held significant progress achieved. But it did not appear likely after the Israeli government refused to extend the moratorium on settlement construction in November 2010, which resulted in the indefinite interruption of the negotiations.58

Afghanistan

Russia paid much heed to the situation in Afghanistan, a country which it considers to be within its sphere of interest. It is above all concerned about the spread of Islamic extremism, terrorism, drug trafficking and the proximity of the country to oil-producing regions such as Iran, the Persian Gulf, Central Asia and the Caspian Sea.

Moscow’s position regarding NATO operation (International Security Assistance Force or ISAF) in Afghanistan and the U.S.-led coalition was ambivalent: on the one hand, it supported the mission and wished it success in controlling the Taliban, but on the other, it was distrustful of the U.S. hegemon intervening outside the European stage and remained wary of the possibility that the U.S. would keep long-term bases in the country after its planned pull out in 2014. It was also hostile to the presence of large U.S. military bases in Central Asia that are used to support the war effort, as it considers that this U.S. policy leads to an increased penetration by the West into a region it has always considered its exclusive sphere of influence. They rented two military bases in Central Asia: the Manas air base in Kyrgyzstan between December 2001 and June 2014 and the Karshi-Khanabad air base between 2001 and 2005 in Uzbekistan).

Moscow also believed that the Western military operation would have a negative impact on regional stability, especially in Pakistan, and was sceptical about the survivability of the regime headed by the Afghan Hamid Karzai.

Moscow expected that the U.S. and NATO would fail in Afghanistan (as Great Britain and the Soviet Union had previously) and that this failure would lead to the discrediting of the Western security organization and divisions among the allies, something that would greatly benefit Russia’s geopolitical position in the region and in the world more broadly. Russia knew that NATO was suffering increasing losses in Afghanistan and that a number of its troops were experiencing combat fatigue. As a result, pressure kept mounting on the Obama administration to withdraw the American troops before the already announced departure date of 2014.

Consequently, Russia sought to cash in and offered its support to the alliance by allowing transit of military equipment and personnel and non-lethal equipment to some allied countries: Germany, France, Spain and the U.S. Such an act of cooperation severed Moscow’s interests in other strategic areas of negotiation, such as missile defense in Eastern Europe. Meanwhile, the logistical support was in line with Russia’s strategic prerogatives of stabilizing Afghanistan so as to prevent a spill-over of violence into Central Asia.

The Kremlin was particularly concerned about the growing traffic of heroin from Afghanistan and was dismayed by what it considers to be NATO’s lack of attention and willingness to address this problem more effectively. Moscow argued that Russia is the main market for such traffic, which caused over 3,000 deaths per year during Medvedev’s presidency. Moscow tried to involve regional organizations (SCO, CSTO) in this issue and promote international cooperation against drug trafficking. The Kremlin also repeatedly advocated NATO-CSTO cooperation on the issue, though unsuccessfully.

Latin America

During the period of the Cold War, Latin America was a strategic region for Soviet foreign policy, as the USSR sought to counterbalance the U.S. sphere of influence in the South American hemisphere by supporting countries which promoted, or adhered to, the communist ideology. The Soviets also encouraged freedom of movements and backed pro-socialist political parties on the continent. After the collapse of the Soviet system, the Russian presence in the region was reduced very significantly due to political and economic problems in the new Russian Federation. Russia’s financial support to countries like Cuba, Guatemala and Nicaragua all but ended, resulting in a significant deterioration of bilateral relations with these countries and a near collapse of their economies.

The re-emergence of Russia as a great power with global aspirations, already observable during Putin’s second term (2004-2008) was mainly due to its huge revenues derived from hydrocarbon exports. It rekindled Moscow’s interests in Latin America. This led to intensified exchange visits at the highest level. For instance, President Medvedev, Prime Minister Putin, Foreign Minister Lavrov and Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin visited most countries of the region, while the Presidents of Venezuela (Hugo Chavez, nine times), Cuba, Argentina, Nicaragua, Bolivia, Brazil, Guatemala and Ecuador paid official visits to Russia between 2006 and 2011. In 2006, Russia sold Venezuela weapons worth U.S. $4.4 billionl59 and provided a loan of $2.2 billion to be used for the purchases of new Russian military equipment.60 Chavez became a major customer for the Russian arms industry, as well as some other countries in the region in dire need of military weapons.

In July 27, 2009, Igor Sechin, Russian Deputy Prime Minister, arrived in Venezuela’s capital to discuss plans to boost economic relations between the two countries and expand the exploration and production of oil and gas. Caracas announced an agreement with a consortium of five Russian companies (Rosneft, Lukoil, TNK-BP, Gazprom and Surgutneftegaz), which pledged to make a $20 billion investment in Venezuela over the next three years and gained the right to prospect in the Orinoco Delta.

In April 2010, Russia sold $4.4 billion worth of weapons to Venezuela when Prime Minister Putin met Chavez in Caracas to discuss oil, defense and nuclear energy cooperation. The agreement included $2.2 billion in credit lines for Russian arms received by Chavez during his eighth visit to Moscow in September 2009. It stipulated also the delivery of T-72 tanks and the S-300 advanced anti-aircraft missile system. Chavez said that this new arsenal is aimed at countering a planned increase of the U.S. military forces in neighboring Colombia, Washington’s closest ally in Latin America.

Chavez recognized the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the two pro-Russian breakaway Georgian regions, during his Moscow visit in September 2009. President Medvedev said at the time that that Russia would supply Venezuela with all the arms it had requested. The U. S. has frequently expressed concern about Russian weapons sales to Venezuela, one of its most noted foes in the region.61

In addition, during Sechin’s trip to South America Gazprom signed an agreement for gas exploration with Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos (YPFB), the state-owned petrol company of Bolivia. The Bolivian government acquired five military transport helicopters from Russia, along with a $150 million loan. Trade between Russia and Latin America has increased fivefold in the last 15 years, from $3 billion in 1995 to $15 billion in 2008, although the region represented only 3% of Russia’s foreign trade. Within the Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF), an intergovernmental organization made up of 11 of the world’s leading natural gas producers (Algeria, Bolivia, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Iran, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Russia, Trinidad and Tobago, Venezuela), Russia tried to find support from the countries of the region (particularly Bolivia and Venezuela) in its efforts to form a “Gas OPEC,” but to no avail. As the heir to the Soviet Union, and thus rival to the U.S., Russia aimed to exploit the sympathy found in some countries of the region, especially members (Antigua and Barbuda, Bolivia, Cuba, Dominica, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Venezuela) of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA).

With these manoeuvres Moscow is sending the message that Washington’s own actions in the Russian “zone of influence” (Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus and Central Asia) should not go beyond certain limits.

The BRICS

As a member of BRICS, which brings together five major emerging economies of the world, Russia plays an increasingly important role in the international arena. In 2011, BRICS’s member countries accounted for “26% of the world’s land area, 42% of the world’s population, and 14.6% of the world’s GDP”62, on course to reach 40% in 2050. By all accounts, BRICS is trying to establish itself as an alternative to the G-8.

The importance of this group, as noted by Zhang Youwen, Director of the Institute of World Economy under the Academy of Social Sciences of Shanghai, is evident when one takes into account the average growth of the BRICs countries’ economies between 1999 and 2011: Brazil grew by 3.3%, Russia by 6.99%, India by 7.22%, China by 9.75% and South Africa by 4%. Compared with the 2.8% average growth of the U.S. and the 3% of the World economy for the same period, these figures are quite impressive.63

This group of countries is primarily concerned with seeing that reforms are carried out in the Breton Woods institutions (IMF and World Bank), particularly the vote allocation system, which gives to the BRICS countries about the same number of votes as to low-developed countries. They are also calling for more influence in these institutions and for the appointment of the managing director of the IMF and the president of the World Bank Group (WB) on the basis of professional competence rather than nationality (traditionally, the IMF director has been a European and the WB president an American).

Although it was only partly able to move forward with this demand, the BRICS group continued to promote a new international payment mechanism and the diminution of the role of the dollar in international financial transactions. This group of countries was also unsuccessful in creating a payment mechanism in local currencies to facilitate trade between the five countries. That mechanism would of course enable them to avoid using the dollar in their bilateral and multilateral trade. In commercial terms, the BRICS, theoretically, promote liberalism, defend the multilateral trade system and condemn protectionism. However, words are not matched by deeds, as all five countries pursue protectionist policies in a significant number of trade sectors. Moreover, they share few similarities in the political arena. They take clearly divergent positions on various issues, such as, among others, the reform of the UNSC, sanctions against Iran or global warming.

It appears likely that the BRICS will become increasingly more important in global economic forums and institutions in the coming years. It could also display an increased role within the global political arena. For its part, Russia has played an important role in the establishment and promotion of this new “club.”

India

Russian-Indian relations have an historical dimension. They date back to the close cooperation developed between the two countries following India’s independence in 1947 and the interest of Jawaharlal Nehru’s interest in the Soviet planning system. During the Cold War, New Delhi relied on the Soviet veto in the UN Security Council in its territorial disputes with neighboring Pakistan. Russia has also traditionally been the main supplier of arms and nuclear technology to India, whose geostrategic importance for Russia stems from its rivalry with Pakistan and China.

In March 2010, Prime Minister Putin paid a visit to New Delhi and signed a series of far-reaching agreements. One of these specified that the Rosatom will build two new nuclear power plants of 1,000 Mega Watts, each in central Kudankulam in the Tirunelveli district of the southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu, with an option for another two blocks, and possibly up to 12 plant reactors and nuclear fuel production facilities.64 Moscow and New Delhi also resumed arms trade agreements, according to which Russia will modernize the aircraft carrier Admiral Gorshakov, deliver 29 MiG-29 (naval version) fighter jets and possibly sell its then new Mig-35 fighter to India. These agreements also promoted technological cooperation: The Russian Federal Space Agency (Roskosmos) promised to build and deliver in 2013 two spacecraft and a Global Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS).

Japan

Russian-Japanese relations are stormy at times. A geopolitical rivalry in East Asia, combined with both countries claiming sovereignty over the Kuril Islands (or “Northern Territories,” as the Japanese call them), a territorial dispute that dates back to the First World War and that Russia considers resolved, and frequent friction over fishing, have marked the last one hundred years in Russia-Japan affairs.65 These disagreements, and the absence of a peace treaty between the two countries, prevent substantial Japanese economic and technological investment in Russia.

The disputes came back into focus following President Medvedev’s visit to Beijing on September 28, 2010. Three weeks after the Russian President’s visit, a a Chinese fishing trawler collided with two Japanese Coast Guard patrol boats in the waters around the Senkaku islands (called the Diaoyu by the Chinese) in the South China Sea. Russia’s apparent backing of China’s position on this incident and the Russian President’s commemoration of the 65th anniversary of the end of World War II upset the Japanese government greatly, as did the proposal (which was eventually rejected) that President Medvedev visit the Kuril Islands on his return from Beijing.

Despite all these contentious issues, the level of economic trade between the two countries remains high. In 2008, the Sakhalin II project, on the island of the same name, began exporting liquefied natural gas to Japan and South Korea. The project involves two Japanese companies: Mitsubishi and Mitsui Sakhalin Holdings B.V. (a subsidiary of Mitsui and Co., Ltd. and Diamond Gas Sakhalin B.V. (a subsidiary of Mitsubishi Corporation). They initially held a combined 45% stake in the project’s operating company, but were later pressured by the Kremlin to halve their share to 12.5% and 10% respectively.66

Japanese carmakers, Toyota and Mazda, two brands that overtook the lower-end Ladas in the 1990s, have established assembly plants in Russia in 2005 and 2012 respectively. But in October 2009 Prime Minister Putin ordered a sharp increase in the tariffs on imported used cars, causing serious damage to Japanese exporters who sell many vehicles in the eastern part of Siberia.67

Multilateral policy

The scope of this paper has limitations in providing a broader overview of Russia’s position on various multilateral issues. As already noted, Moscow seeks – with varying degrees of success – to achieve greater political and economic integration in the post-Soviet space. On the basis of Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations and to avoid duplication of efforts, Moscow believes that the full potential of regional organizations should be utilized in solving inter-state and intra-state conflicts. The United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia (UNRCCA) is a case in point. Based in Ashgabat, it was eestablished in 2007 at the initiative of the governments of the five Central Asian countries and it seeks to promote dialogue between the region’s governments in finding solutions for emerging problems and eliminating potential threats.68 In this sense, Medvedev was willing to strengthen cooperation between the UN, CSTO and SCO and he stated on a few occasions that one of the main aims of the reform of the United Nations should be to strengthen the regional dimension of global governance.

He also favored revitalizing and enhancing the capacities of the Military Staff Committee (MSC) of the United Nations Security Council, a subsidiary body whose role is to plan UN military operations and assist in the regulation of armaments, and combining peacekeeping with peace building operations.69 Between 2008 and 2012 Russia contributed forces to peace operations in the Middle East and various parts of Africa, Kosovo, East Timor and Haiti.

Russia moderately backed UN Security Council reform in order to enable it to meet new regional and global challenges, increase its representativeness and strengthen its central role. While not rejecting the possibility of expanding the membership of the Security Council, Russia opposes any change which would diminish the Council’s primary authority in international peace and security matters and the role of the permanent members of the Council, an aspect that Moscow considers as untouchable.

As stated by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov at the 65th Session of the UN General Assembly in September 2010, Russia’s priorities at the multilateral level focused on the following points: (a) to address threats to international peace and security in the areas of disarmament and non-proliferation, (b) to combat terrorism, drug trafficking and organized crime, (c) to resolve regional conflicts, and (d) to overcome the effects of the international 2007-2008 economic and financial crisis, ensure sustainable growth, and fight climate change.

With regards to Iran, Moscow insisted that the imposed sanctions were punitive in nature but not affecting the Iranian population as a whole. Sanctions should instead be aimed at convincing the Iranian government of the need to return to the negotiating table and cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Concerning the struggle against piracy in the Indian Ocean, Russia was party to establishing an ad hoc international tribunal to prosecute such crimes.

Russia also supported the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) which “which range from halving extreme poverty rates to halting the spread of HIV/AIDS and providing universal primary education, all by the target date of 2015”.70 Medvedev noted that in recent years Russia has increased its development assistance, which is partly true. The country’s aid spending, according to a report by the Russian Ministry of Finance released in advance of the May 2011 G8 summit in Deauville, France, dropped from $785 million in 2009 to $472.32 million in 2010 – a decrease of 40%. However, Russia had only temporarily increased its aid budget in 2009 to soften the blow of the global financial and economic crises, particularly in the neighboring former Soviet republics, the report says. A government strategy paper, released in 2007, about foreign aid policy set an annual spending target of $400-500 million and talked about setting up a specialized government aid agency. It also supported actions relating to humanitarian aid, food security and natural disasters.71

In the field of disarmament, Russia actively participated in the Review Conference for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), held at United Nations Headquarters in New York in May 2010, which adopted an Action Plan detailing 64 specific actions to be taken on the three pillars of the NPT (disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy).72

Moscow wanted to strengthen cooperation in the field of nuclear energy, an area in which it has good technological capabilities and competitive advantage, and sought to become one of the main exporters of nuclear technology. Russia promoted the creation of an international centre for uranium enrichment, under IAEA supervision, located on Russian territory. In July 2006 it was one of the initiators of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), an international partnership of 83 nations and 4 official observers working to improve capacity on a national and international level for prevention, detection, and response to a nuclear terrorist attack. In 2009, it also has strongly supported the commencement of negotiations for the conclusion of a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT), which aimed to prohibit the further production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices. The treaty has not yet been seriously negotiated and its terms remain to be defined.73

In July 2010 Moscow supported the creation of the new gender entity called United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN Women), headed by Chilean President Michelle Bachelet (2006-2010), which reinforces the mandates of the various existing entities within the organization.74 Finally, Russia is one of the most vigorous members of the so-called Dialogue among Civilizations and the United Nations Alliance of Civilizations (UNAOC).75

On October 5, 2010 Russia participated in its first Asia–Europe Meeting (ASEM), officially established in 1996 at the first summit in Bangkok, Thailand. Seeking to deepen the relations between Asia and Europe at all levels, ASEM is an interregional forum which consists of the European Commission, the 28 members of the European Union (EU), the 10 members of ASEAN, plus China, Japan, South Korea, India, Mongolia, Pakistan, Australia, Russia, New Zealand, Bangladesh, Norway, and Switzerland. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated during the 2010 summit the importance of establishing new rules on energy cooperation and proposed the creation of a new “environmental risk insurance fund”.76 He also proposed once again the creation of an international tribunal to deal with piracy.

CONCLUSION

This paper has outlined the main elements of Russian foreign policy, particularly during Dmitry Medvedev’s presidential term. Russia wants to be among the top actors in world politics, which it undoubtedly should be for historical, geographic, economic, military and cultural reasons. However, the severe crisis of 2008-2009 highlighted, at the internal level, Russia’s social, economic and institutional shortcomings, even after more than eight years of strong economic growth. Certainly, the burden of achieving such a status would create social deprivation and economic and institutional problems at home.

President Medvedev sought to mobilize Russian citizens and social forces in an effort to modernize the country in economic, technological and institutional terms. Being fully cognizant of the need for collaboration with other countries to achieve modernization, he made what appeared to be a concerted effort, if not in substance then at least in intention, to make Russian foreign policy friendlier and less confrontational, especially in its relations with the West. This new orientation in foreign policy contrasted with that of Putin, who maintained an arms-length relationship with the West in his second term (2004-2008).

The most remarkable aspect of this policy shift was the redefinition and resetting of relations with the United States, the USSR/Russia’s Cold War adversary. Medvedev openly admitted that the West must be the privileged partner in any effort to modernize the Russian economy as it can provide start-up capital, make productivity-enhancing investments, and participate in technology transfer. The U.S. has the models and value system considered most appropriate for tomorrow’s Russia, Medvedev thought. This so-called new approach coincided with the arrival in the White House of a new President, Barack Obama, who agreed with Medvedev on the need for deeper internal reforms and far-reaching solutions to global problems in cooperation with other countries and international organizations. The two leaders were also able to effectively establish excellent personal relations, a factor which is undoubtedly of great importance in bilateral relations.

Medvedev achieved with this new policy what his predecessor had been unable or unwilling to do: ensuring that Washington took into account Russia’s concerns and interests on issues such as NATO expansion, the postponement of the missile defense shield in Eastern Europe, Russia’s accession to the WTO, and the role Russia wants to play in the post-Soviet space. For its part, Moscow was willing to proactively engage in dialogue and collaboration with the West in all key areas: Afghanistan, the Middle East and Iran’s nuclear program.

Russia still considered the post-Soviet space its own backyard. The Georgian-Russian war of August 2008 sent a clear message to all countries of the Caucasus and Central Asia that Russia would not tolerate them leaving its orbit and that other “colour revolutions” were out of the question. Russia also sought to maintain its nearly complete monopoly over the energy resources of the Caspian Sea and Central Asia. It did whatever was necessary to oppose competitive projects which might break this monopoly, such as the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum pipeline projects. Consequently, Russia managed to delay – if not to wreck – the EU-sponsored Nabucco project.

Russia is in no particular hurry to resolve the “frozen conflicts” in Transnistria (Moldova), Nagorno-Karabakh (Azerbaijan) and Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Georgia). Maintaining the status quo enables Moscow in turn to maintain its sphere of influence and apply pressure on regional flashpoints at will.
Viktor Yanukovych’s election as President of Ukraine in 2010 and the persistently difficult economic situation in that country proved a windfall for Moscow, giving it ample opportunity to regain ground lost after the “orange revolution” of 2004. Not only is the relationship with Ukraine of strategic importance for Russia but it has great sentimental value.

Outside the post-Soviet space, Europe was Russia’s primary area of geopolitical interest. Viewed from this perspective, Russia remains a fully “European power”. Moscow tries to take advantage of the lower priority Washington is giving Europe and the moments of weakness and introspection in its Western neighbor. Such opportunities allow Russia to improve its positions in economic and political spheres. Its proposal for the revision of the security architecture in Europe was a prime example Moscow’s opportunism.

Russia, like many other states, does not consider that the EU is yet mature enough to become an indispensable partner because it is still considered “weak” and of limited utility. It prefers to engage directly with major European countries rather than Europe as a bloc. Consequently, relations with Germany, and to a lesser extent France and Italy, are held to be of particular importance.

There were some attempts at “reconciliation” with Poland following the dramatic events on the 70th anniversary of the Katyn massacre in April 2010, when a plane crashed near the city of Smolensk, Russia, killing the Polish President and many senior government and military leaders. Rapprochement between Moscow and Warsaw could have brought about positive outcomes in broader Russian-EU relations, as Poland has been an EU member since 2004.77

But the reality is that for Russia good relations with the EU are essential, and Medvedev should have therefore paid closer attention to the conclusion of a new agreement with the EU to regulate these mutual relations. This agreement envisaged, in the medium term, a larger free trade zone between the EU and the Russian Federation. Moreover, now that Russia has joined the WTO, and could become a member of the OECD in the future, cooperation in the technological and energy areas should be pushed forward once the dust settles in Ukraine crisis. It should be accompanied by the intensification of academic exchanges and the waiving of the visa requirements for temporary stays, as this would greatly facilitate the contacts between Europeans and Russians. Building a truly strategic relationship with Russia should also be a top priority for the EU, even though experience shows that this is easier said than done.

With China, an emerging global power, Medvedev tried to build a truly strategic relationship and sought to diversify economic and energy relations and neutralize the latent security risk presented by its powerful Asian neighbor. This policy achieved important results in the economic field. China has become a major source of investment capital for Russia, especially in the field of energy development. But in the political field gains were unimpressive. China would rather maintain an independent position and discuss major issues bilaterally with the other superpower, the U.S., than act in concert with Russia, a declining state. Moreover, the rapid rise of China as an economic and political powerhouse in its own right poses a primary strategic challenge for Russia. As Dmitri Trenin, director of the Carnegie Endowment’s Moscow Center wrote in 2009, “a key challenge for Russia’s foreign policy will be to learn to live alongside a China that is strong, dynamic, assertive, and increasingly advanced.”78

Hence, his effort to build a special relationship (both within the BRICS group and in multilateral forums) with the other major economic powers like China, India and Brazil and its renewed focus on Latin America.

For Russia, trying to reconcile improved relations with the West with accelerating the creation of a multi-polar world order in response to what appears to be the present or impending decline of the American power on the world stage was like trying to put a square peg in a round hole.

Since May 7, 2012, which saw the return of Vladimir Putin as Russian president on May 7, 2012 the “bear” pays more attention to East Asia and the Pacific, two regions experiencing a strong period of economic growth. It would also be wise for Putin to achieve a more equitable balance between European Russia and Asiatic Russia, especially in the districts overlooking the Pacific where far-reaching geostrategic rethinking is required.

In the final analysis, Russia should make all efforts to resolve its internal problems, economic, social and institutional. These continue to be the proverbial Achilles’ heel of modern Russia and will adversely affect its efforts to remain a key player on the international scene.

This article appeared at Cesran.org and is reprinted with permission

Notes:
1. See Countries and Regions: Russia. Trade, European Commission, at http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/countries/russia
2. BRICS is an acronym that refers to the countries of Brazil, Russia, India and China and South Africa.
3. “White nights, Some hopeful signs from the St Petersburg economic forum”, The Economist, June 12, 2008, at http://www.economist.com/node/11541277?zid=307&ah=5e80419d1bc9821ebe173f4f0f060a07
4. Up until May 2012, Russia was the only major world economy outside the WTO, putting it outside the regulatory framework of international trade. It also prevented it from entering other economic organizations like the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).
5. “Russian Foreign Currency Reserves Continue to Grow”, Top Forex News, November 29, 2007, at http://www.topforexnews.com/2007/11/29/russian-foreign-currency-reserves-continue-to-grow
6. Russia was also interested in acquiring unmanned drones or aircraft from Israel.
7. Irina Titova, Russia buys 2 Mistral-Class Warships from France, Associated Press, June 17, 2011; Edward Cody, Russia to Buy Two Warships in Deal with France, The Washington Post, December 25, 2010; Russia to Buy 4 Mistral Class Warships from France – Sarkozy, Interfax, Military News Agency, March 2, 2010; Russia Hopes to Build Mistral-Class Warships on Its Own – Gen. Staff, Interfax. Russia & FSU General News, February 24, 2010; Medvedev Confirms Russian Plan to Buy Mistral Class Warships from France, Interfax. Russia & CIS Business & Financial Newswire, March 1, 2010; Sarkozy: Russia, France Starting Talks on Russian Purchase of 4 Mistral-Class Warships, Interfax. Russia & CIS Business & Financial Newswire, March 1, 2010.
8. See Dmitri Trenin (2009), Russia Reborn. Reimaging Moscow’s Foreign Policy, Foreign Affairs, November-December.
9. “Организация Договора о Коллективной Безопасности” (The Collective Security Treaty Organization), at http://www.odkb-csto.org
10. This includes ten battalions: three from Russia, three from Tajikistan, two from Kazakhstan and two from Kyrgyzstan. It has been proposed within the organization that the mandate of the Rapid Reaction Force should be extended beyond Central Asia.
11. The Western countries are insisting that the negotiating framework for resolving this conflict should be the Group of 5 +2. They also insist that Russian forces must withdraw from the territory and be replaced by an international force in which the Russians would be present along with other nations. The EU believes that resolving this conflict would be clear proof that Russian proposals to establish new security architecture in Europe have a practical embodiment.
12. Zbigniew Brzezinski (1998),The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy And Its Geostrategic Imperatives, Basic Books.
13. Anatoly Medetsk, “Gazprom Sweetens Naftogaz Merger Offer,” The Moscow Times, 28 June, 2010, at http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/gazprom-sweetens-naftogaz-merger-offer/409170.html
14. Following his departure from Kyrgyzstan, Bakiyev found refuge in Belarus. From there he attempted to continue to influence the internal politics of his country, promoting unrest and ethnic conflicts, as in June 2010 in the city of Osh, in southern Kyrgyzstan, with attacks on ethnic Uzbeks, which resulted in dozens of casualties and thousands of displaced people. Given the gravity of the situation, the Permanent Council of the OSCE adopted PC Decision No. 947, on July 22, which authorized “the deployment, without delay, of an OSCE Police Advisory Group [PAG] to assist Kyrgyzstan to reduce inter-ethnic tensions, restore public order and strengthen the capacities of the territorial units of the Ministry of the Interior of the Kyrgyz Republic.” See http://www.delegfrance-osce.org/IMG/pdf/sec_gal_150_cpc_director_report_PAG_Kyrgyzstan.pdf
15. In the Kyrgyz parliamentary elections of October 10, 2010, voter turnout was surprisingly low (55.7%), except in the southern part of the country where the majority of the populace opted for the party Ata-Jurt, which is identified with the supporters of ousted President Bakiyev and has the most nationalistic discourse. However, the party only won 0.7% of the vote in the capital, Bishkek, which revealed that the country is characterized by a deep north-south divide.
16. Russell Gold and Daniel Gilbert, U.S. Is Overtaking Russia as Largest Oil-and-Gas Producer, The Wall Street Journal (October 2, 2013). http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303492504579111360245276476
17. “Russia’s GDP falls 7.9%, hit by falling oil prices,” Market Watch, The Wall Street Journal (February 2, 2010) http://www.marketwatch.com/story/russias-economy-contracts-79-in-2009-2010-02-01
18. Moderating Risks, Bolstering Growth, The World Bank in Russia, Russian Economic Report, nº 27, 2012, p. 2. www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/rer-27-march2012-eng.pdf
19. Marshall Goldman (2008), Petrostate: Putin, Power and the New Russia, Oxford University Press.
20. Some EU member states (Finland, Slovakia, the Baltic States and Bulgaria, but also Austria, Poland or Germany) are almost totally dependent on very large supplies of Russian gas.
21. Eighty percent (80%) of Russian oil exports and seventy percent (70%) of its gas exports is destined for Europe, with Germany, Netherlands and Poland receiving the bulk of oil volumes, and Germany, Turkey, and Italy receiving the bulk of gas volumes. In 2011, revenues from exports of oil and natural gas accounted for 50% of the Russian budget. However, Russia is gradually increasing its export of oil and gas to East Asia. In December 2009 Moscow and Beijing launched the first section of the 4,740 km-long East Siberia-Pacific Ocean (ESPO) oil pipeline, which has a capacity of 600,000 barrels of oil per day and a total of 30 million tons of oil per year. It is set to raise its output to 50 million tons per year. A 930 km-long branch that connects the first section of the East Siberia-Pacific Ocean pipeline to refineries located in the northeast Chinese city of Daqing has been operational since early 2011.On December 25, 2012 Russia brought into service the second section of the $25 billion ESPO pipeline, which runs between the Siberian city of Skovorodino and the Kozmino oil-loading port in the Bay of Kozmino, about 100 km east of Vladivostok. See http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=RS
22. In 2010 Moscow was demanding prices similar to those Gazprom charges its European customers, but Beijing wanted a discount. The two sides were about $100 per 1,000 cubic meters apart, according to Chinese officials. See http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-11/24/content_11599087.htm
23. Moscow has delayed some of its major projects not only due to the global economic crisis, which has reduced demand in Europe, but also because of changes in gas market conditions. There were two new factors at play: the use in the U.S. in 2009 of new technologies to produce shale gas as a natural gas substitute – which means that Russia may lose a potential market (the U.S.) for the LNG produced at Shtokman and Yamal – and the entry into service of new LNG production facilities in Qatar and other important producing countries. These changes have brought about a sharp decline in gas prices on international markets. Due to the high investments in production and construction of transport infrastructure, the Russian gas sold in Europe in mid-2010 was priced at $280/1000 cubic meters. For its part, shale gas could be purchased for approximately $99/1000 cubic meters and LNG from Qatar for $170/1000 cubic meters. The result was a reduction in purchases of Russian gas in most countries in 2009 and 2010, despite the fact that the contracts contained the take-or-pay clause. The Shtokman field (which will be operated by Gazprom and France’s Total with 25% after Norway’s Statoil Hydro wrote off its investment into the project; see http://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/08/07/statoil-shtokman-idUSL6E8J76LB20120807 ) was initially expected to have entered into service in 2011, but due to the new economic circumstances was rescheduled for 2016 at the earliest. As for the Yamal gas field in Western Siberia, Moscow is trying to attract major international oil companies in it.
24. “The China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, New Digest” (2010), China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, October. http://www.chinaeurasia.org/news-digest.html?start=360
25. More recently, Gasunie and Gas de France Suez have joined the joint-stock company.
26. http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052748704107104574573612378528416
27. Turkish approval of South Stream gave huge boost to Russia, http://www.todayszaman.com/business_turkish-approval-of-south-stream-gives-huge-boost-to-russia_266990.html
28. The problem with Nabucco is that its viability is questionable because it has not yet guaranteed sufficient gas supply to be profitable. The situation would change if additional gas was supplied from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, but this would require a trans-Caspian gas pipeline built on the seabed of the Caspian Sea between Türkmenbaşy in Turkmenistan, and Baku in Azerbaijan. However, Russia has taken the legal position that the Trans-Caspian Gas pipeline project would require the consent of all five Caspian littoral states in order to proceed. Iran has also taken a legal position by pointed out that treaties signed by Iran and the Soviet Union in 1921 and 1940 are still in force and that such an undertaking without the consent of all the littoral states would be illegal. Other potential suppliers would be Iraq, Iran and Egypt but these countries pose problems of capacity, as well as technical and political risks.
29. “Nabucco Pipeline Delayed Again,” The Prague Post, May 18, 2011, at http://www.praguepost.com/business/8738-nabucco-pipeline-delayed-again.html
30. Russia on several occasions said that it reserves the right to withdraw from the Treaty in the future if it considers that the U.S. missile defense system adversely affects the security of Russia and weakens its nuclear deterrent capability.
31. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said that Russia and the U.S. are close to reaching an agreement on conducting a joint analysis of threats, which would be a first step in addressing the risks of proliferation of missiles and weapons of mass destruction. On the basis of that document, the U.S. and Russia, according to Moscow, considered what the next steps should be and action to take to deal with these threats. The measures would have ranged from diplomatic pressure and the adoption of political and economic sanctions to the use of military force in case of serious and immediate threats.
32. “Russia, U.S. Still Disagree on Missile Shield – Russian Defense Ministry”, RIA Novosti, September 17, 2010, at http://en.rian.ru/trend/pentagon_meets_russian_def_min
33. According to sources in the Russian General Staff, during this meeting in Washington, the use of the 45th Independent Special Task Force Regiment, which is an elite unit and has officers who fought in Afghanistan during the Soviet era, was suggested. But the main Russian contribution was the supply of helicopters to the Afghan security forces and the train of pilots.
34. See Richard Rousseau, L’attitude de la Russie face à l’intervention de L’OTAN en Libye, Global Brief, April 21, 2011, at http://globalbrief.ca/richardrousseau/2011/04/21/l%E2%80%99attitude-de-la-russie-face-a-l%E2%80%99intervention-de-l%E2%80%99otan-en-libye/
35. However, the U.S. has assured Moscow that it has no intention of establishing permanent military bases in Central Asia. In the case of the Manas Base in Kyrgyzstan, Washington will only use this base to support its stabilization operation in Afghanistan.
36. The so-called Jackson-Vanik Amendment (incorporated in the Trade Act of 1974) remained in force in the U.S. until December 20, 2012, when, finally, U.S. President Barack Obama formally granted “permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) to Russia, following congressional action that cleared the way for him to remove a Cold War-era vestige. This legislation was necessary to ensure that American companies share the full benefits of Russia’s recent entry in the WTO. See www.reuters.com/article/2012/12/20/us-usa-russia-trade-idUSBRE8BJ0XB20121220
37. On the U.S. side, trading in agricultural products, protection of intellectual property rights and financial services were the most sensitive issues in these negotiations. At the bilateral level, only Georgia refused to agree to Russia’s membership and this continued to be a hindrance until it was finally resolved with outside pressure (Switzerland) in the second half of 2012. In terms of multilateral negotiations a major problem arose on how to incorporate the Customs Union between Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan in to a WTO membership agreement.
38. Moscow wanted also to warn NATO allies of the risks they would face if the organization’s commitment to defend a member country was upheld. Georgia, according to the Russians, did not hesitate to use force against a breakaway region, its own citizens and attack Russian peacekeepers. Could NATO realistically get involved in a war with Russia because of Georgia’s objective of re-establishing its territorial integrity, asked Russia?
39. In May 2009, in retaliation for the expulsion by the Belgian government, at NATO’s request, of two Russian diplomats for alleged espionage, Moscow expelled the the director of the NATO Information Office in Moscow, Isabelle Francois. In 2008 Russia and NATO signed an agreement on the use of Russian territory to deliver non-lethal supplies to alliance troops in Afghanistan, but not troops or air transit arrangements as initially sought by NATO. However, the agreement was barely implemented due to the high prices charged by the Russian side for the use of its infrastructure transport corridor. See http://en.rian.ru/russia/20080404/103017125.html
40. The EU identified four priority areas which were forwarded to the OSCE Chairman-in-Office, Kazakhstan: conflict resolution, arms control and confidence-building measures, human dimension and transnational threats. For its part, Russia, just before the Summit, tried to lower expectations concerning Transnistria (it claimed that nothing can be done until the elections in Moldova in late November 2010) and Georgia (it refused to allow the OSCE mission to return to the breakaway region of South Ossetia).
41. “China Becomes Russia’s Top Trade Partner,” China Daily, September 26, 2012, at www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2012-09/26/content_15784444.htm
42. This 930 km-long branch that connects the first section of the East Siberia-Pacific Ocean pipeline to refineries located in the northeast Chinese city of Daqing has been operational since early 2011. On December 25, 2012 Russia brought into service the second section of the Eastern Siberia–Pacific Ocean (ESPO) oil pipeline, which runs between the Siberian city of Skovorodino and the Kozmino oil-loading port in the bay of Kozmino, about 100 km east of Russia’s city of Vladivostok.
43. Beijing has asked Moscow to increase supplies to 30 million tons a year, but Russia is not presently able to meet this demand from its East Siberian oilfields. For Beijing, this agreement is strategic in nature, as it ensures a supply of oil which is not dependent on insecure sea routes in which U.S. naval superiority is decisive. With this agreement, Moscow gave itself an alternative to traditional energy sales to Europe.
44. “Gazprom and CNPC Continue Dialogue on Natural Gas Supplies to China,” Gazprom, December 5, 2012, at http://www.gazprom.com/press/news/2012/december/article150629
45. The Chinese loan will be used to finance exploration projects, construction of road networks and railways in Russia’s eastern regions to transport Siberian coal to China. In return, China commits to supplying Russia with mining machinery and other equipment, as well as providing labor.
46. “Contractual Details Finalized for Tianwan Phase II,” World Nuclear News, June 27, 2011; “China-CNNC – Tianwan Nuclear Power Plant (Phase II),” Energy World, September 2, 2010. www.world-nuclear-news.org
47. See http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_russia_europe_and_the_new_international_order245#sthash.TcP8H2DG.dpuf
48. See http://ec.europa.eu/energy/international/russia/russia_en.htm; http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42405.pdf; http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-906_en.htm; http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/countries/russia
49. The European Commission-Russia Visa Facilitation Agreement was agreed at the EU-Russia Summit in Sochi in May 2006 and entered into force on June 1, 2007. See http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/russia/eu_russia/fields_cooperation/visas_readmission/index_en.htm
50. See http://eeas.europa.eu/eastern/index_en.htm
51. For example, Moscow’s behavior prompted the European Commission to convene a conference in March 2009 (excluding Russia), at which Ukraine and three international financial institutions (European Investment Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development) signed a joint declaration on reform of Ukraine’s gas sector.
52. In September 2007 the UN Security Council established in Chad and the Central African Republic “a multidimensional presence intended to help create the security conditions conducive to a voluntary, secure and sustainable return of refugees and displaced persons.” Russia participated (November 2008-February 2009) in this military operation alongside the EU, contributing a total of 118 peacekeepers and four Mi-8MT helicopters to the UN mission. On that occasion, it signed with the EU an ad hoc participation agreement which it wanted to be regulated on an ongoing basis. On November 15, 2010 Russia started withdrawing personnel and equipment from its aviation group in Chad. It is currently working closely with the European Union Naval Force Somalia (EU-NAVFOR-ATALANTA), which is part of a global action by the EU to prevent and combat acts of piracy off the coast of Somalia. See http://en.rian.ru/russia/20101115/161344385.html http://www.eunavfor.eu
53. However, in 2006-2007, Russia delivery of 29 TOR-M1 “ground-to-air” missiles to Iran under a contract signed in December 2005. At a total cost of $1.4 billion, the missiles were destined for the defense of military targets and the most important nuclear sites located in Isfahan, Busher, and Tehran. The TOR – M1 is a tactical “fifth generation” anti-aircraft artillery system able to guarantee effective defense from ground-to-air missiles, aircraft and distance controlled strike equipment.
54. “Iran Launches Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant,” Ria Novosti, September 12, 2011, at http://en.rian.ru/world/20110912/166785925.htm
55. The tri-partite “Joint Declaration” signed by Iran, Brazil and Turkey on May 17, 2010, which outlined a plan to part with 1.2 tonnes of its low-enriched uranium in exchange for special nuclear fuel to run Iran’s medical research reactor, was met with reservations in Moscow. The Russian authorities asked for more information about the deal, although also stating that it could be a useful confidence-building effort. Many Western governments concluded from Moscow’s reaction that it was a ploy to win Iran time and divide the international community, and that the Iranian government was continuing its enrichment activities in Natanz, building a heavy water reactor in Arak, and trying to hide the Qom’s plant enrichment program. See http://in.reuters.com/article/2010/05/24/idINIndia-48751920100524
56. Neil MaFarquhar, “U.N. Approves New Sanctions to Deter Iran,” New York Times, June 9, 2010, at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/10/world/middleeast/10sanctions.html?_r=0
57. The Russians have ‘offset’ the suspension of the S-300 anti-aircraft missile defense system delivery to Iran by selling to Syria a Yakhont, which is a supersonic anti-ship cruise missile developed by NPO Mashinostroyeniya. The non-delivery of the S-300 caused the Russian economy a revenue shortfall of as much as $1 billion. See http://defense-update.com/20100920_yakhont_in_syria.html
58. “Netanyahu’s Refusal to Extend Settlement Freeze Is Hurting Israel,” Haaretz, November 5, 2010, at http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/netanyahu-s-refusal-to-extend-settlement-freeze-is-hurting-israel-1.323159
59. Sukhoi fighter jets, Mi-17 helicopters and AK-103 assault rifles.
60. For the sale of air defense S-300 transport helicopters, T-72 tanks and SU-35 aircraft.
61. “Russia Eyes $5 Billion in Arms Sales to Venezuela: Putin,” Reuters, April 5, 2010, at http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/04/05/us-russia-venezuela-arms-idUSTRE63420S20100405?feedType=RSS&feedName=worldNews
62. See http://rt.com/politics/bric-goals-medvedev-article/
63. At the 2010 “Spring Meetings” Meetings of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank Group
Washington, D.C., the leaders of Brazil, Russia, India and China called for the hastening of the redistribution of voter rights and power in the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. “Reforming these institutions’ governance structures requires first and foremost a substantial shift in voting power in favor of emerging market economies and developing countries to bring their participation in decision making in line with their relative weight in the world economy,” a BRIC communiqué said. As of November 2014, the allocation of shares or voting rights in the IMF is as follows: United States 16.75%, Japan 6.23% Germany 5.81% France 4.29% United Kingdom 4.29%, China 3, 81%, Italy 3.16% Canada 2.56%, Russia 2.39%, India 2.34%, Netherlands 2.08% Belgium 1.86%, Brazil 1.72%, Spain 1.63%, Mexico 1.47%. See http://IMF.org/external/np/sec/memdir/members/htm
http://edition.cnn.com/2010/BUSINESS/04/15/bric.summit.brazil/index.html
64. See Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited (NPCIL), at http://www.npcil.nic.in/main/ConstructionDetail.aspx?ReactorID=77
65. Moscow thought the new Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama (16 September 2009 – 2 June 2010) and his successor in office, Naoto Kan (8 June 2010 – 2 September 2011, who belonged to a party (the Democratic Party of Japan) other than that which had been almost continuously in power since 1945 (the Liberal Democratic Party), would adopt a more flexible position on the issue, but this has not been the case.
66. “Japan Firms Eye Mega LNG Project / Mitsubishi, Mitsui Investment in Huge Russian Gas Fields could Ce Risky,” The Daily Yomiuri, January 8, 2011, at http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/business/T110107003341.htm
67. “New Car Deals Underline Russian Manufacturing”, Russia Today, June 23, 2011, at http://rt.com/business/news/mazda-fiat-car-production
68. See the United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy in Central Asia (UNRCCA), at http://unrcca.unmissions.org
69. See Charter of the United Nations, Chapter VII, at http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter7.shtml
70. See http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/
71. During the severe fires suffered by Russia in July-August 2010, the Russians were aided by 14 countries in the form of air water tankers, firefighting equipment and specialized personnel in the field, as well as humanitarian aid to affected populations. See Claire Provost, “The Rebirth of Russian Foreign Aid,” The Guardian, May 25, 2012. See also http://www.minfin.ru/en
72. The 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), at http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2010
73. See Proposed Fissile Material (Cut-off) Treaty (FMCT), at http://www.nti.org/treaties-and-regimes/proposed-fissile-material-cut-off-reaty
74. See UN Women, the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women, at http://www.unwomen.org/about-us/about-un-women
75. See United Nations Alliance for Civilization, Many Cultures – One humanity, at http://www.unaoc.org/about/group-of-friends
76. See http://www.un.org/en/mdg/summit2010/debate/RU_en.pdf
77. Also noteworthy is the agreement reached between Moscow and Oslo on the delimitation of the respective zones in the Barents Sea.
78. Dmitri Trenin, “Russia Reborn: Reimagining Moscow’s Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs 88, no. 6 (November–December 2009), 77.

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Yemen Crisis: Pakistan The Reluctant Coalitionist? – Analysis

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Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and Saudi King Salman Bin Abdul Aziz held a luncheon meeting at the Royal Palace in Riyadh on 23 April, where Nawaz Sharif reportedly expressed “solidarity” with Saudi Arabia, specifically with regards to Saudi military intervention in Yemen. The meeting was followed by delegation-level talks where Pakistan emphasised the measures it had taken to support the United Nations Security Council resolution on Yemen. The Pakistani delegation included the army chief General Raheel Sharif and Defence Minister Khawaja Asif.

It was felt that the visit would clear the air on the Pakistani support for Saudi intervention in Yemen (Operation Decisive Storm) and unambiguously convey to the regional actors that Pakistan stands by Saudi Arabia. The outcome of the visit according to some Pakistani officials would shape the contours of Pak-Saudi relations for the next few years. This article looks at the possible reasons Pakistan is “agonising” over Yemen and the implications they may hold for India.

The Request

In early April, Riyadh reportedly asked Pakistan for combat aircrafts, warships and troops as it launched its Operation Decisive Storm. But on 07 April, the Pakistani lawmakers voted to remain “neutral” in the conflict, albeit Sharif later clarified in a televised speech that in case of an aggression against Saudi Arabia, Pakistan would be at Riyadh’s side. A Pakistani delegation led by the Defence Minister did visit Saudi Arabia to assess the Saudi requirement.

While Saudi Arabia expressed its disappointment on the Pakistani decision on Yemen, Anwar Gargash, the United Arab Emirate (UAE) minister of state for foreign affairs, lashed out at Pakistan accusing it of siding with Iran, and that the decision would come at a “high cost” to Pakistan. Subsequently, a high-level “damage control” delegation led by Punjab Chief Minister Shahbaz Sharif along with Sartaj Aziz reached Jeddah on 15 April to meet Saudi leadership and give reassurance of Pakistan support.

The Response

It well known that Pakistan has military personnel in training and advisory capacity in Saudi Arabia and that they remained present even after Operation Decisive Storm was launched. Pakistan claims its troops were holding a pre-scheduled joint military drill with Saudi Arabia. Pakistan Army spokesman said that the joint military exercise “Samsam-5″ was being conducted since 19 March in the Saudi Arabian city of Taif and that 292 Pakistani military personnel were participating in the drill. It appeared that the usual excuse of safeguarding the holy sites in Saudi Arabia was no longer good enough in a surcharged sectarian situation, both internally as well as for the international environment.

The initial Pakistani explanations attributed its “neutral” stand to the sectarian Shiite-Sunni fault-line and strife in the country and how much of its military was committed in internal security and counter-insurgency operations. Pakistani reasserted its commitment to safeguard Saudi territorial sovereignty after reports indicated that Saudis wanted Pakistani troops on their border with Yemen. It offered naval assets, already in the area for evacuation of its citizens from Yemen, to enforce an arms blockade. Saudis obviously were not appeased.

There was also this Pakistani assessment that Saudi Arabia might have over-reached itself in Yemen and that it would be a protracted military affair. Saudi Arabia, after calling off the bombing campaign of 30 days and 2,415 sorties, resumed airstrikes and there appears no end in sight to the campaign.

Pakistan also coordinated closely with the Turkish government and tried to encourage the OIC and the UN to play a more proactive diplomatic role. Pakistan supported the United Nations Security Council resolution on Yemen which called for an arms embargo on the Houthi rebels.

Why Pakistan?

There is no denying the soundness of traditional Pakistan-Saudi relations and economic ties which overlay a strong security understanding. Then with Pakistani troops already in Saudi Arabia in an assisting role, why the Saudi request to scale up? According to some analysts, it is a propaganda issue. The Saudis were particularly perturbed over not physically seeing Pakistanis by their side as they would like the Pakistanis to be more visible in their military campaign. Another reason is that the Saudis think that military support from Pakistan and Turkey is imperative for ground operations.

Assessment

On the issue of Iran, Pakistan may have felt that its ties with Saudi Arabia cannot and should not come at the expense of a neighbour with which it shares a significant border. Also the, the Syrian conflict has made Iran more aggressive in its approach to proxy conflicts and it could respond to existing sectarian Shiite-Sunni strife in Pakistan more significantly than it had done in the past. Pakistan is aware that Iran has been recruiting among the country’s refugees and immigrants, thousands of Afghans and Pakistanis to fight in Syria, offering them financial rewards and residency. Of these the Fatemiyoun Brigade is made up of Afghan volunteers who fight in Syria to protect holy Shi’ite shrines while the Zeynabiyoun Brigade has been established by Pakistanis fighting in Syria.

Pakistani leadership also reportedly discussed the issue with the Chinese leadership and were given the indication that the Saudi threat should be ignored. Iranian support for Chinese initiatives in Pakistan and Afghanistan would have trumped any considerations for backing the Saudis.

Pakistan’s interests may also lie in broadening ties with Iran, especially in terms of energy cooperation, and to position itself to take advantage of the rollback of sanctions that the US-Iran nuclear deal may allow. Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif, during a two-day visit to Pakistan agreed with Sartaj Aziz that dialogue was the way to resolve the Yemen conflict. The Iranian FM also called on Gen Sharif at the GHQ in Rawalpindi.

The security of Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities could have been a factor. Recently the New York Times recommended that attention be turned to constraining them. Particularly since the Pakistan Taliban has claimed that they have developed and successfully test-fired a missile christened ‘Omar-1’. The narrative coming out of Pakistan in response has been that with Iran neutralised, Pakistan remains the only nuclear-capable Islamic nation and it is US aim to denuclearise all Islamic countries.

This Pakistani discomfort with the focus on its nukes could have contributed to its dithering over the support to Saudi Arabia in its intervention in Yemen. Pakistan’s affirmation of its faith in the UN Security Council and the desire to remain “neutral” in a “distant war” could be more to project itself as a responsible nuclear state.

Yet some experts believe the contrary. They feel that Pakistan’s complicated international relations and regional position and the likelihood of scenarios such as a US-Iranian convergence, the ongoing China-Russia rapprochement, an increased India-Iran cooperation and the situation in Afghanistan might drive Islamabad to forge even closer ties with Saudi Arabia.

Notwithstanding PM Sharif’s political gamesmanship and Gen Sharif’s “below the radar” parleys with the Saudis, Pakistani reactions are symptomatic of the changing geo-strategic equations in the Middle East. India, if it reads the situation well, can turn it into an opportunity to extract more responsible behaviour from Pakistan as it attempts to morph from a “frontline state” to a developing economy.

This article was published at CLAWS.

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Obama: Creating Opportunity for All – Transcript

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In this week’s address, US President Barack Obama highlighted the importance of expanding opportunity for all Americans — a principle that has guided his work throughout the past six years. This past week, the President attended a summit at Georgetown University where he discussed issues like poverty and inequality, and what we can do to ensure everyone gets a fair shot. We’ve seen real results in this area, but there is still more that can be done. And lack of opportunity is not the only barrier to success. That’s why, on Monday, the President will travel to Camden, New Jersey to visit with local law enforcement, meet with young people, and hear directly about efforts to build trust between the police and the community in a city that has faced one of the highest crime rates in America.

Remarks of President Barack Obama
Weekly Address
The White House
May 16, 2015

Hi, everybody. Everything we’ve done over the past six years has been in pursuit of one overarching goal: creating opportunity for all.

What we’ve long understood, though, is that some communities have consistently had the odds stacked against them. That’s true of rural communities with chronic poverty. That’s true of some manufacturing communities that suffered after the plants they depended on closed their doors. It’s true of some suburbs and inner cities, where jobs can be hard to find and harder to get to.

That sense of unfairness and powerlessness has helped to fuel the kind of unrest that we’ve seen in places like Baltimore, Ferguson, and New York. It has many causes — from a basic lack of opportunity to groups feeling unfairly targeted by police – which means there’s no single solution. But there are many that could make a different and could help. And we have to do everything in our power to make this country’s promise real for everyone willing to work for it.

That’s why last Tuesday, at a summit organized by Catholics and evangelicals, I sat down with a conservative scholar and a poverty expert for a discussion on what it takes to open more doors of opportunity. We know our efforts matter: since 1967, we’ve brought poverty down by about 40 percent, thanks in part to programs like Social Security and the Earned Income Tax Credit for working families. And we know that there are folks from all faiths, and across the ideological spectrum, who care deeply about “the least of these.” So I hope this conversation continues, not as a question of whether, but of how, we can work together to grow opportunity. Because it’s not words, but deeds, that make a difference. And from expanding tax cuts for working parents, to raising high school graduation rates, to helping millions of Americans secure health insurance when they didn’t have it just a few years ago — our actions are making a difference.

Of course, lack of opportunity is not the only barrier between too many of our young people and the kind of future they deserve. On Monday, I’ll travel to Camden, New Jersey, a city that has faced one of the highest violent crime rates in America. I’ll highlight some of the innovative things they’ve done to help police do their jobs more safely and reduce crime in the process. And I’ll highlight steps all cities can take to maintain trust between the brave law enforcement officers who put their lives on the line, and the communities they’re sworn to serve and protect.

Whether we are Democrats, Republicans, or independents; whether we live in one of our poorest communities, one of our wealthiest, or anywhere in between, we all want our country to be one where hard work pays off and responsibility is rewarded. We want a place where you can make it if you try. That’s the promise we make to our young people. That’s the promise that makes us exceptional. And it’s the promise I’ll never stop fighting to keep, for my children and for yours.

Thanks, and have a great weekend.

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Islamic State Seizes Northern Part Of Syria’s Palmyra

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Islamic State militants reportedly seized the northern part of Syria’s Palmyra Saturday, following intense clashes with government forces, AFP reports.

“Daesh advanced and took control of most of northern Palmyra and there are fierce clashes happening now,” Rami Abdel Rahman, director of London-based monitoring group the Syrian Observatory of Human Rights said.

Up to 13 militants are believed to have been killed during fighting, according to the monitoring group.

Daesh began an operation on Wednesday to seize the ancient UNESCO World Heritage city, killing dozens in the process.

Original article

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Egypt Bans Ultras In Bid To Break Anti-Government Protests – Analysis

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An Egyptian court has banned militant soccer fan groups or ultras as terrorist organizations in a bid to break the backbone of anti-government protests.

The ruling at the request of Mortada Mansour, the controversial, larger than life president of Cairo’s storied Al Zamalek SC who alleged that his club’s ultras, the Ultras White Knights (UWK), tried to assassinate him, pushes further underground groups that often offer despairing youth a rare opportunity to vent their pent-up anger and frustration peacefully.

Ultras have for the past eight years been at the core of anti-government protest in Egypt. They have been the drivers of student protests in the last two years against the regime of Abdel Fattah Al Sisi, the general-turned-president who in 2013 toppled Mohammed Morsi, Egypt’s first and only democratically elected president.

Mr. Morsi was sentenced to death on Saturday, the same day that the ultras were banned, on charges of conspiring with foreign militants to break out of prison during Egypt’s uprising four years ago.

Anti-Sisi protests in universities have largely been suppressed with security forces taking control of campuses, but ultras still play a key role in flash demonstrations on Friday’s in popular neighbourhoods of Egyptian cities.

Thousands of fans and students have been arrested and large numbers have been expelled from universities. Anas El-Mahdy, a 21-year old second year Cairo University physical therapy student, died on Saturday from injuries sustained in April during campus clashes between students and security forces.

Mr. Mortada prides himself on having asked security forces in February to intervene to prevent fans from entering a Cairo stadium without tickets. He charged that UWK had been paid to provoke a confrontation with security forces. Twenty fans were killed in the incident in which security forces used tear gas and birdshot against fans who had been cornered in a cul-de-sac.

In response to a journalist’s question about how the fans had died, Mr. Mortada responded: “Ask the Muslim Brotherhood,” the group of Mr. Morsi that has been banned as a terrorist organization and brutally repressed by Mr. Sisi. The court most probably accepted Mr. Mortada’s assertion that ultras are terrorists on the grounds that many of the protesters against the Sisi regime define themselves as Islamists, some of whom are members of the Brotherhood.

Sixteen ultras and alleged members of the Muslim Brotherhood were recently sentenced to prison terms in connection with the incident at Cairo’s Air Defence Stadium.

Security forces further arrested in March 52 students and UWK members who participated in a protest at Fayoum University. Twenty one of those arrested were handed over to the prosecution on charges of belonging to a terrorist organization and violating Egypt’s draconic anti-protest law. Police separately arrested UWK leader Said Moshagheb on charges of having been part of the UWK group that stormed Zamalek’s offices and tried to assassinate Mr. Mansour. The UWK has confirmed the storming but repeatedly denied having attempted to kill Mr. Mansour.

Linking the ultras with their tentacles in the student movement is rooted in the history of a movement that since the crackdown on the Brotherhood by Gamal Abdel Nasser, the visionary Egyptian leader who toppled the Egyptian monarchy in 1952 and became a symbol of Arab nationalism, was the Brotherhood’s catalyst for adaptation.

“The Muslim Brotherhood of the early 1970s was a shell of its former self. Many of the surviving activists, numbering barely one hundred members, were not even certain that they wanted to resurrect the organization’s mission upon their release from prison. The real story of this era revolves around a vibrant youth movement based in Egypt’s colleges and universities. Even as they rebelled against the tenets of Nasserism, the youth of this period were the products of its socioeconomic policies, from increased urbanization to greater access to education. They found in their Islamic identity a response to the post-1967 (Middle East war) crisis, even as they adopted the modes of popular contention that had emerged under Nasser. The student movement was notable for the fluidity it displayed on the ideological level and the dynamism it exhibited on the organizational front,” said historian Abdullah Al-Arian, author of a book on Islamic activism in Egypt in the 1970s, in an interview with Jadaliyya.

Ultras, who under ousted President Hosni Mubarak’s grew to be one of Egypt’s three largest social movements became in the last four years of the Mubarak regime highly politicized, well-organized, and street battle-hardened groups because they were the only ones to physically resist the president’s brutal security forces in regular clashes in stadia.

They were the shock troops of the popular revolt that toppled Mr. Mubarak in 2011 and played a key role in protests against the military government in the first 17 months after the president’s fall. Ultras were on both sides of the fence in their attitudes towards the Morsi government and the military coup that toppled the president.

The military government that initially succeeded Mr. Mubarak sought to cut the ultras down to size in a politically loaded brawl in 2012 in a Port Said stadium that got out of hand in which 74 militant supporters of UWK rival Ultras Ahlawy died.

The case against UWK leader Moshagheb – a mesmerizingly charismatic, under-educated and unemployed ultra – lifted the veil on a process of radicalisation at the fringe of the ultras reflective of attitudes among Egyptian youth disaffected by a lack of economic and social prospects that is fuelled by the restrictive and repressive policies of the Sisi government.

Sources close to the ultras said Mr. Moshagebh was suspected by authorities of having been involved in violent resistance to the Sisi government. They said the UWK leader had been under surveillance for some time during which he had been smuggling arms into Cairo from Sinai, the setting for an armed insurgency that is being fuelled by neglect of the region by successive governments and a brutal military crackdown. The sources said that AK-47s had been found in the homes of friends of Mr. Moshagebh some two weeks before his arrest.

Mr. Moshagebh was arrested after he and another ultra, Hassan Kazarlan, allegedly set fire to a Cairo convention fire. Sixteen people were injured in the incident. Mr. Kazarlan fled to Turkey after the arson attack but was persuaded to return to Egypt after security forces detained his father as a hostage and immediately detained upon his arrival. Sources close to Mr. Kazarlan’s family said he had told authorities that he had wanted to travel from Turkey to Syria.

If he had made it to Syria, Mr. Kazarlan would have followed in the footsteps of Rami Iskanderiya, a former leader of Ultras Ahlawy in the Mediterranean port city of Alexandria, who joined the Islamic State, the jihadist group that controls a swath of Syria and Iraq, and married a Syrian woman in the group’s Syrian stronghold of Raqqa.

Messrs, Moshagebh and Iskanderiya are examples of a development that leaders of Ultras Nahdawy, which has some 65,000 followers on Facebook, and Students against the Coup, the two groups driving the anti-Sisi student protests and flash demonstrations, want to prevent.

Ahmed, a leader of the Nahdawy and a member of an ultras group that played a key role in the popular revolt on Cairo’s Tahrir Square in 2011, has been expelled from university for organizing anti- Sisi protests and sentenced twice in absentia to long-‐term incarceration. Ahmed is a fugitive who moves around Cairo in a protective cocoon, speaks in a low voice to avoid being overheard, and regularly looks furtively over his shoulder.

“We don’t like violence but we are not weak. Hope keeps us going…. This regime is more brutal but there still are options. Success for us is our survival and ability to keep trying… Politics is about making deals; revolution is putting your life on the line. We are the generation that staged the revolution. The new generation no longer cares. Our role is to get the new generation to re-join the revolution. The government markets itself with promises and the power of the state. We can promise only one thing: we will stay on the street. To us football is politics, politics is in everything. That’s why we tackle politics,” Ahmed said.

Like during the 2011 revolt, Ahmed and his fellow ultras form the front-line defence against security forces in protests on campuses and in neighbourhoods. Their ultras-rooted tactics of chanting, jumping up and down and using flares and fireworks are evident in the protests. Some 17 members of Nahdawy that has branches in most Egyptian universities have been killed in clashes with security forces in the last two years.

“We are absolutely concerned that if we fail things will turn violent. Going violent would give the regime the perfect excuse. We would lose all public empathy. We hope that Egyptians realize that there are still voices out there that are not giving up and are keeping protests peaceful despite all that has happened,” added Yusuf Salheen, a 22-year old student of Islam at Cairo’s prestigious Al Azhar University and leader of Students against the Coup.

Messrs. Ahmed and Salheen are the first to admit that they are fighting multiple uphill battles in which the odds are stacked against them. Their space to manoeuvre has been further curtailed by the banning of the ultras, the latest move by the Sisi regime to stymie their effort to stem radicalization as the government tries to project itself an effective bulwark against jihadism.

“Youth have nothing to look forward to. They are hopeless and desperate. They join our protests but their conversation often focuses on admiration for the Islamic State. They are teetering on the edge. We are their only hope but it’s like grasping for a straw that ultimately is likely to break,” said an ultra and student activist.

The post Egypt Bans Ultras In Bid To Break Anti-Government Protests – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Land Boundary Agreement: New Catalyst In Bangladesh-India Ties – Analysis

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By Pinak Ranjan Chakravarty*

The Constitution Amendment Bill to implement the Land Boundary Agreement (LBA) Protocol has been passed by both houses of Parliament, paving the way for its implementation. Apart from being a significant milestone in bilateral ties, it is a feather in the cap for the Modi government which has clearly opted for a more pro-active neighbourhood policy. The passage of the LBA not only removes all hurdles for the final settlement of India’s longest border with any neighbour, but also paves the way for exchange of Enclaves and merger of Adverse Possessions by re-drawing the International Boundary (IB), also known as the Radcliffe Line. Exchange of enclaves and the re-drawing of the international boundary, to maintain status quo of adverse possessions, requires a constitutional amendment as per Article 368 of the Constitution. No constitutional amendment procedure is required for undemarcated sectors, as this falls within the competence of Executive action.

Named after its architect, Sir Cyril Radcliffe, a British civil servant who as Chairman of the Border Commissions presided over dividing 175,000 square miles (450,000 square Kms) of territory with 88 million people, the Radcliffe Line was published on August 17, 1947 as a boundary demarcation line between India and Pakistan upon the Partition of India. This line was drawn in much haste, as the date for India’s independence and Partition approached. Radcliffe had never travelled to India and consequently, had no experience of serving in India. Radcliffe accomplished his hasty hatchet job which left Enclaves, Adverse Possessions and undemarcated boundaries on the ground. The Radcliffe line passed through villages, dividing communities and villages and in some cases putting the kitchen area on different sides of the line from the rest of a village hut. Radcliffe drew the line based on maps, making no effort to relate it to ground realities. India has struggled with this legacy during the days of East Pakistan and thereafter, Bangladesh. It is this legacy of Partition that has been finally put to rest.

There is another aspect to the unanimous passage of the LBA Bill through both houses of Parliament. It underlines the growing maturity of the political discourse on foreign policy in India. Both the BJP and allies and the Congress party have shown that building consensus on India’s foreign policy, at least towards its neighbours, can increasingly be a bipartisan affair and parties can set aside politics as usual for the larger national interest. It is noteworthy that the BJP opposed the LBA while in opposition. It has now deftly moved away from its earlier position, after assuming the reins of government.

It is true that there has been considerable opposition from States which stand to lose territory. Thus the Chief Ministers of Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura and West Bengal had to be convinced about going forward with the LBA. The handling of the LBA’s passage required considerable back room work and political cajoling, particularly of the States affected by the potential land swap. In fact, till the last moment, it was touch and go whether Assam will be left out of the ambit of the LBA. When the LBA is implemented, India would have settled all outstanding boundary issues with Bangladesh, including the maritime boundary which was settled last year, with the award by an international tribunal. India had accepted international arbitration, in sharp contrast to China rejecting any form of international arbitration in its disputes with littoral states in the South China Sea. In fact China is now in the process of reclaiming land and building airports on some of the islands under its occupation. This seeks to expand China’s claim of its Exclusive Economic Zone in the South China Sea and is a source of potential conflict with other nations, claiming sovereignty over some of these islands. The contrast between China and India in dealing with such disputes is not going unnoticed by the international community.

Prime Minister Modi spoke to his Bangladeshi counterpart, Sheikh Hasina, soon after the bill was passed. Modi called the passage of the LBA as the collective will of the nation to build constructive relations with neighbours. Modi also thanked Chief Ministers of all bordering states and leaders of all Opposition parties in India, as well as the allies for their support and said a “historic milestone” has been reached in India-Bangladesh ties. External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj also waded in, by asserting that India will resolve the other main issue of water sharing with Bangladesh, including the Teesta Agreement that has been stalled by Chief Minister Mamata Banerji. Prime Minister Modi’s recent visit to West Bengal may lead to an understanding to implement the Teesta Agreement.

Prime Minister Hasina too expressed satisfaction and claimed that the passing of the Bill was a huge diplomatic success and thanked everyone involved in the process. The passing of the LBA Bill has also garnered bipartisan support in Bangladesh where the opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), currently locked in a bitter power struggle with the ruling Awami League (AL). There is a lurking belief in Bangladesh that the BJP, as a right-wing party, leans towards the BNP which is also regarded as right-wing in Bangladesh. There is clearly no substance to this belief. For instance, Prime Minister Vajpayee flagged off the first direct bus service between Dhaka and Kolkata in 1999 during his visit in July of that year, in the presence of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina. Later, during Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s tenure, the first ever “Maitri Express” train service was also flagged off in 2008.

Attempts to solve border issues have a long and complicated history. Numerous attempts have been made to reach a comprehensive settlement of the land boundary between India and Bangladesh (the erstwhile East Pakistan) since 1947. The Nehru-Noon Agreement of 1958 and the Agreement Concerning the Demarcation of the Land Boundary between India and Bangladesh and Related Matters of 1974, also called the Indira-Mujib Agreement, sought to find a solution to border related issues. The three outstanding issues were:

1. an un-demarcated land boundary of approximately 6.1 km

2. exchange of enclaves

3. unresolved adverse possession

The assassination of Mujibur Rahman left Bangladesh in political turmoil. Military strongmen who came to power eagerly embraced Islamism to perpetuate their hold on power. As a result, Bangladesh-India relations nosedived, as the military rulers jockeyed for leverage with India by adopting anti-Indian policies that Pakistan pursued when Bangladesh was East Pakistan. Consequently, any political appetite in India to implement the LBA quickly dissipated and the whole issue went into a deep freezer.

The current LBA Protocol breaks new ground by adopting the guiding principal of accepting ground realities, particularly the wishes and livelihood opportunities of the people living in these areas. The issue, therefore, was to tweak the original LBA to maintain status quo of adverse possessions and change the international border to accommodate the wishes of the settled population thus converting, a de facto situation into a de jure reality. The 2011 LBA Protocol will result in a fixed demarcated boundary in all the un-demarcated segments, exchange of 111 Indian enclaves in Bangladesh with 51 Bangladesh enclaves in India and a resolution of all adversely possessed areas. In the exchange of enclaves, India will transfer 111 enclaves with a total area of 17,160.63 acres to Bangladesh, while Bangladesh would transfer 51 enclaves with an area of 7,110.02 acres to India. While the exchange of enclaves between India and Bangladesh may seem like a loss of Indian land to Bangladesh, the fact is that these enclaves are islands inside the territory of both countries and neither side has any physical access to them from either country. Hence, the loss of land for India is notional. As for Adverse Possessions, India will receive 2777.038 acres of land and will transfer 2267.682 acres to Bangladesh. As in the case of enclaves, this too is recognition of a de facto situation into a de jure one, since such adverse possessions are already occupied by both sides.

The LBA Protocol’s implementation will set the stage for further cooperation with Bangladesh. The geo-strategic location of Bangladesh makes it an important player in the development of north-eastern states and India’s Act East policy. Bangladesh has a pivotal role in providing seamless connectivity in the eastern region of the sub-continent. Railway connectivity between Akhaura and Agartala will enable trains to move from Agartala to Kolkata via Dhaka, easing travel for millions of Bangladeshi and Indian travellers and provide a cost effective freight transportation route. Similar cross border railway connectivity in the north on the Bangladesh-West Bengal border will provide connectivity that will help Bhutan and Nepal also. There is strong case for sub-regional cooperation development involving Bangladesh, Bhutan, India and Nepal (BBIN). When Myanmar is brought into this equation, these five countries (BBIMN) can forge various sub-regional structures for cooperation that can include energy transmission corridors that will benefit all countries. The LBA, therefore, is an enabling step towards another giant leap for strategic integration of the eastern region of the sub-continent that will ultimately propel India’s “Act East” policy also.

*The writer is a Distinguished Fellow at Observer Research Foundation, Delhi

The post Land Boundary Agreement: New Catalyst In Bangladesh-India Ties – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Healing Or Harming? The Provision Of Health Care By Peacekeepers – Analysis

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How can the quality of health care provided by UN peacekeeping missions be improved? Sara Davies argues that not enough attention has been paid to the ‘game changing’ relationship between the health of peacekeepers and the assistance available to civilians in emergency settings.

By Sara E Davies*

The United Nations has sixteen missions deployed across four continents. 128 countries contribute personnel to those missions – a workforce of 112,696 in all, made up of troops, police, international and local civilian staff, and UN volunteers.[1] Keeping those personnel fit and healthy, particularly within the difficult and dangerous environments in which they are frequently deployed, is a significant medical undertaking.

Peacekeepers face a wide range of risks to their physical and mental health, and are more likely to die from accidents or infectious diseases than from combat. Civilians, meanwhile, face the risk of contagion when peacekeepers are deployed without pre-deployment medical checks, and when peacekeepers provide medical care that does not adhere to appropriate safeguards for infection control and treatment.

What actions and measures are available to address the quality of health care coverage and humanitarian health assistance available within peacekeeping missions? To date, there has been insufficient attention to the ‘game changing’ relationship that may exist between the health of peacekeepers and the availability of health care assistance to civilians in emergency settings.

Health of peacekeepers

Malicious acts of violence account for only a small proportion of the cases in which medical services have to be provided to peacekeepers. [2] The physical and mental health of peacekeepers themselves is only one aspect of what is a two-way interface between peacekeeping personnel and the civilian populations of the societies in which they serve. The health of peacekeepers can be affected by diseases present in the local environment (for example, malaria or dengue fever), but the reverse is also the case – as was seen in Haiti where cholera was allegedly spread from peacekeeping troops to the local population. Peacekeepers and local populations face, to some extent at least, “shared” health risks – often in environments where health resources and expertise are already severely strained.

However, there are also instances where serious public health events are perceived to threaten the safety of peacekeeping personnel, which can create tensions between the objectives of the Mission and the Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs). The Ebola epidemic in West Africa and fear of its potential impact on peacekeeping troops – especially those serving with UNMIL (United Nations Missions in Liberia) in Liberia – has attracted significant attention. A number of TCCs expressed concern for the safety of their troops. The Philippines actually withdrew its 115 troops from the mission, despite assurances from Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon about the limited threat posed to them:

All United Nations personnel in Liberia have been educated about the appropriate preventive measures that would minimize the risk of contracting Ebola, which is not airborne and requires direct contact with the bodily fluids of a symptomatic infected person or the deceased. I am therefore confident that United Nations personnel may continue their important work in Liberia.[3]

The Ebola outbreak in Liberia highlighted not just the unpredictable health risk that peacekeepers may be asked to face, but an underlying expectation that in such an emergency, battalions with medical units should assist outbreak-affected areas. Moreover, there is an embedded presumption that increasing capacity and resources would reduce both harm and infection to civilians. This presumption may not be a valid one at present. Inadequacies in the quality of medical care being provided to both troops and civilians in a number of peacekeeping missions raise questions about whether the risk of infection and contagion through inadequate care practices could be avoided if UNMEER (UN Mission for Ebola Emergency Response) in West Africa became a ‘template’ for future missions to arrest the spread of infectious disease outbreaks.

However, the Ebola outbreak highlighted another tension within peacekeeping missions – that of balancing their military and political mandate with the humanitarian mission of health care delivery. The decision to restrict UNMIL to their compounds during the initial stages of the Ebola outbreak had a significant negative impact on the local health programs that the mission’s medical units had been delivering. [4] This dependence on peacekeeping missions for primary health care highlights an important problem associated with chronically weak state capacity.

The precariousness of such arrangements highlights the broader complication that arises from civilians coming to rely upon peacekeepers for humanitarian aid.

Health of civilians

The UN has long articulated a necessary division of roles and responsibilities between its humanitarian and military actors. In practice this separation sometimes disappears – often for well-intentioned reasons. Understandably, in emergency settings, medical units within a peacekeeping contingent may be the only capacity available to displaced civilian communities. But there are also a number of UN missions’ where peacekeepers deliver medical care in peaceful, non-emergency environments. This sort of assistance may not contribute to building long-term of health care capacity within that country. What is more, serious ethical questions are raised by the practice of military units providing health care to win ‘hearts and minds’.

Prioritising the health of civilians and peacekeepers

Based on an assessment of the relationship between the mandates of 16 peacekeeping missions and their delivery of medical assistance, four specific courses of action would help to focus minds on reducing the negative health impacts of peacekeeping, while maximising the positive contributions:

  • Pre-deployment medical checks (which are carried out by Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) and verified by the mission’s Chief Medical Officer) should be strengthened, with the UN and TCCs cooperating to ensure that pre-deployment medical requirements have been properly fulfilled. With the adoption of a new reimbursement rate for TCCs (some of whom had cited the cost of pre-deployment medical care, among other things, to argue for an increased reimbursement rate), it seems legitimate for conditions regarding health assessments to be toughened in Memorandums of Understandings (MOUs) between the UN and TCCs.
  • Health Impact Assessment prior to deployment, and on an annual basis thereafter, should be conducted for all missions to systematically monitor the impact peacekeepers have on the health of the host population and to guide risk minimization strategies.
  • The UN’s principles and guidelines for peacekeepers should be revised to clarify the need for coordination with the Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the host state and other relevant agencies in the provision of humanitarian assistance (including health assistance). The environment of the mission, emergency versus non-emergency environments, should guide the roles and responsibilities of UN peacekeepers in the delivery of humanitarian assistance.
  • These guidelines should be tailored for each mission and reviewed as part of the mandate renewal (at 6 month and/or 12 month intervals) to ensure that prevailing coordination agreements reflect the changing circumstances on the ground and the findings of the latest Health Impact Assessments. [5]

One of the key challenges peacekeepers face is to stay healthy in conflict-affected environments. The environments in which peacekeepers are deployed are frequently beset by infectious diseases. They often have rudimentary, sometimes non-existent, health facilities. The civilian population that seeks medical assistance from these missions suffers not just trauma-related injuries but also additional poor health in general, with high levels of child and maternal mortality. UN peacekeepers are not in a position to solve these problems – their primary responsibility is to provide (or maintain) a stable situation in which other humanitarian actors and development agencies may work. Yet peacekeeping operations at the very least have a responsibility not to make health problems worse. They may also, if handled carefully, make some positive contribution to providing health services to the community in which they serve, in addition to providing appropriate and necessary services to peacekeeping personnel themselves. The key is to ensure that there is a basic level of good practice in medical care delivery across all missions.

*Sara E. Davies is an Australian Research Council (ARC) Future Fellow, based at the Health Law Research Centre, Queensland University of Technology, Australia.

[1] Data as of 31 October 2014. Source: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/about/ [Accessed 8 December 2014]

[2] James I. Rogers and Caroline Kennedy. 2014. ‘Dying for Peace? Fatality Trends for United Nations Peacekeeping Personnel’, International Peacekeeping 21 (5), pp. 658-672.

[3] Quoted in Colum Lynch (2014), ‘Ban Says U.N. Troops are Safe, Needed to Quash Ebola Unrest’, http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2014/09/02/ban_says_un_troops_are_safe_needed_to_quash_ebola_unrest

[4] Here it is important to distinguish between the UNMIL mission and UNMEER – the UN Mission for Ebola Emergency Response, the UN’s first ever emergency health mission. See http://www.un.org/ebolaresponse/mission.shtml

[5] UN General Assembly. 2011. Letter dated 25 February 2011 from the Chair of the 2011 Working Group on Contingent-Owned Equipment to the Chair of the Fifth Committee. Sixty-sixth session. Fifth Committee. Administrative and budgetary aspects of the financing of the United Nations peacekeeping operations, A/C.5/66/8, 27 October, p.37.

The post Healing Or Harming? The Provision Of Health Care By Peacekeepers – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

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