High salt diets may delay puberty according to a study presented at the European Congress of Endocrinology in Dublin. As the salt content of Western diets continues to increase these findings could have significant consequences for the reproductive health of future generations.

Researchers from University of Wyoming, USA led by Ms Dori Pitynski are investigating the effect of varying levels of dietary salt on the onset of puberty in rats. They found that rats fed a high salt diet (equivalent to 3 or 4 times the recommended daily allowance for humans) had a significant delay in reaching puberty compared to those fed a normal (low) salt diet. Interestingly, rats that had salt completely excluded from their diet also had delayed puberty.

Ms Pitynski and colleagues concluded that salt intake is necessary for onset of puberty but that excesses can affect reproductive health. Late onset of puberty can lead to behavioural problems, stress and reduced fertility.

To date, while work has been done on the effect of varying levels of dietary fats on puberty, nobody has yet looked at the effect of dietary salts.

“Our work shows that high levels of fat and salt have opposite effects reproductive health” said Ms Pitynski. “High fat diet is thought to accelerate the onset of puberty but our work demonstrates that rats fed a high salt diet even with a high fat diet will still show a delay in puberty onset.”

According to Ms Pitynski, “our research highlights for the first time that the salt content of a diet has a more significant effect on reproductive health than the fat content.”

Recent guidelines from WHO state that populations around the world are consuming much more salt than is physiologically necessary, and certainly more that the WHO recommended daily allowance of 5 g of salt per day for adults.

Sodium is found naturally in a variety of foods, including milk, cream and eggs. It is also found, in much higher amounts, in processed foods, such as bread, processed meats like bacon, snack foods as well as in condiments such as soy sauce and stock cubes; which are becoming more prevalent in the Western diet.

“Current salt-loading in Western populations has the potential to drastically affect reproductive health, and warrants further attention” said Ms Pitynski.

The post High Salt Intake May Delay Puberty appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Anthony Borden*

Hope is a scarce commodity in Iraq. It was further diminished last week when Ammar Al Shahbander, one of the country’s few dreamers, fell victim to one more act of senseless violence.

Born in Iraq in 1973, Ammar left the country in 1977 with his father, an opposition politician in Saddam Hussein’s era. They fled first to Kuwait, then Iran, Syria and finally Sweden.

By 2002, Ammar was a sociology student at London’s Westminster University and fluent in four languages. He and his circle of friends shared a dream. With the United States invasion the following year, these young students foresaw a new Iraq, united by a common democratic vision and not splintered by religion, ethnicity or corruption. It was a vision they were determined to turn into reality.

Some months after the fall of Saddam, my colleague Duncan Furey and I met Ammar for the first time in the lobby of the Palestine Hotel in Baghdad on the banks of the Tigris. We were on a trip to establish a team for the London-based charity we work for, the Institute for War & Peace Reporting (IWPR), which strengthens local media and civil society groups in countries in crisis and transition.

There was clearly a lot to be done.

In a white T-shirt and jeans, Ammar looked very much a kid. We soon noticed his confident and inviting smile that seemed to embrace everyone he met.

As we sipped tea in the lobby and discussed how bewildered we were by Iraqi society, we marvelled at this young man’s ability to work a room. Ammar knew everyone, and everyone knew Ammar.

There was our man. We knew we should hire him immediately.

Having already established the Baghdad office of the Iraq Foundation, Ammar joined IWPR and set to work, steadily building up a team that peaked at 150 local staff, with himself as Chief of Mission. Over an extended period, the programming he developed was marked by great creativity – a ground-breaking television series on human rights, a weekly women’s radio show, an advertising agency run by women, numerous radio programmes and publications encouraging people to vote, a major initiative for media policy and legal reform, and countless training and mentoring activities for Iraqi reporters and civil society groups.

Ammar had an impact on an entire generation of journalists in the country. This would be a remarkable roll call of accomplishment in any country, let alone Iraq.

The initial calm after the war did not last long, and the country sank into a decade of terrible conflict that left hundreds of thousands of dead, immense physical destruction, industrial-scale corruption, and more displacement and flight. Recently there was a crisis of government legitimacy, and then the emergence of Islamic State, promising only more violence.

Few outside Iraq would think the outlook is positive.

Ammar endured through it all, constantly travelling across the country – one day in the Kurdish north, the next in western Iraq, then back in the capital.

As violence in Baghdad spiked, many international NGOs withdrew to the north. But Ammar – with a talented and dedicated team – persevered, managing complex projects, meeting officials, civic leaders, editors and others, writing endless reports and proposals, and always offering information and advice to anyone who came calling.

I have worked with many colleagues within war zones, and strains are inevitable. Ammar was not immune from them, but we often felt that only in this kind of environment could he steal the freedom he craved. Throughout, he retained his positive demeanour, warm manner and that winning, sometimes mischievous smile.

He was also developing a formidable expertise and intellect. Ministers and ambassadors, journalists and academics all had huge respect for Ammar, and his briefings were always informative and inspiring.

In one instance, acting US Ambassador Robert Ford spent several hours with Ammar and a number of trainees, hearing about IWPR’s work and discussing developments in Iraq. As they departed, Ambassador Ford remarked to his State Department colleague Vitessa Del Prete, “Best day in Iraq, ever.” Ammar had that effect on many people.

Without doubt, the initial dream faded. The vision of quick progress under Ahmed Chalabi never materialised. Bad leadership and poor decisions were rife, among Americans and Iraqis alike. The violence never abated and the deaths mounted.

Three reporters involved with IWPR lost their lives, including Sahar al-Haidari, assassinated in Mosul for writing about the risks of Islamic extremism.

We came to love our colleague and friend Ammar, but in truth there were times he also drove us nuts. Deadlines were just not his thing. He might disappear for days on end, only to re-emerge to say he had been caught out by a sandstorm or a worn-out telephone battery.

Yet his judgement of people, of politics, and of Iraq was always unerring, and he never let you down in the end.

At one point some years ago, he was tempted to run for political office. It would have been an obvious progression. But after much soul-searching, he declined. Jumping into formal politics would only have limited his ability to contribute, and it would definitely have constrained his free spirit.

Despite his growing family, he was determined to stay in Iraq. This was not easy, especially for his wife, Angela. They tried relocating to Baghdad, but it did not work. So he travelled back and forth from London regularly. Only last summer, Ammar and Angela celebrated the birth of their fourth child. He spent a very long time every day talking to them all via Skype.

In the end, Ammar stayed with IWPR and remained working on the ground because despite everything, he never did lose that dream.

Ammar believed passionately in working at grassroots level to make social and political change happen from the ground up. With his background in sociology, he was constantly thinking about how Iraq could be knitted together, how different groups could work across dividing lines, and above all how women and youth could be encouraged to participate.

He helped keep alive the flame of hope and possibility for countless Iraqis, especially young people.

Most recently, he was seized by the plight of the Yezidi minority suffering at the hands of Islamic State (including horrible stories of abuse against women), and he worked to mobilise Iraqi and international support to assist them.

We urged him to be careful, and he had a closetful of flak jackets and other safety equipment. His father – living back in Baghdad – and his wife also begged him to limit his movements. But Ammar was smart and incredibly well connected, and knew how to handle himself. He always had done.

Despite feeling under the weather, he could not refuse an invitation last Saturday afternoon to go to a concert by an Eagles cover band, of all things: “You can check out any time you like, but you can never leave.” In one of the last photographs ever taken of him, smiling in the audience, I know he is thinking about more than just the moment. For if Iraq cannot play music, it cannot move forward. And if he is not willing to turn up, who will?

It would be his last Tweet.

After a pleasant meal with friends at a nearby restaurant, he was walking down the street. The car bomb blast killed him instantly. A small piece of shrapnel embedded itself in his heart. Sixteen other people died in the attack, and another IWPR colleague was wounded but survived.

The reaction of all of his good friends – whether in Baghdad or Irbil, London or Malmo, Washington or New York and beyond – was the same: “No – not Ammar.”

The great survivor, the wise youngster, the rascal and the pro – Ammar was always there and always would be. No one could believe it. His tight group of Iraqi friends from London – the original young dreamers – are especially bereft. I still have difficulty accepting the fact, and will for some time.

“Ammar was very special,” Angela said in her agony. “But in Iraq, no one’s life is special.”

And yet, that may not be wholly true after all.

It is hard to really appreciate what you have until it is gone. This has never been more true than for Ammar. The day after his death, a Sunday, was World Press Freedom Day. For his many friends including me, May 3 can never again be a celebration, only a commemoration.

Ammar’s funeral on the Monday (delayed so that Angela, with her parents and all the children, could travel from London) and the official mourning in Baghdad, attracted enormous support from leading politicians and religious figures, journalists and activists. Hundreds of people attended, including former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. There has been broad coverage in the Iraq media which he did so much to help build. “Brother”, “hero” and “patriot”, his friends reminisced – “the pure soul of Iraq”.

“When I said I lost Ammar,” one of his close Iraqi colleagues wrote to me, “I mean I lost myself.”

A man of Iraq, Ammar was buried in Wadi al-Salaam, the vast cemetery in the holy city of Najaf. Friends who viewed the body said he was smiling.

In the worst of environments, Ammar gave hope. Will that hope be extinguished? Or is it just possible that his passing may inspire those he touched to recommit to that dream?

*Anthony Borden is Executive Director of the Institute for War & Peace Reporting. This article was published at IPWR

The post Ammar Al Shahbander: Iraq’s Pure Soul – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Against a backdrop of the violent redrawing of the map of the Middle East as minorities assert their rights, rebels challenge the existing order, and militant Islamists seek to carve up the post-colonial order, Iranian soccer pitches are signalling that the Islamic republic is not totally immune to the region’s upheaval.

To be sure, the territorial integrity of Iran which unlike countries like Syria and Iraq boasts a strong state, rooted institutions, an imperial history and a culture that dates back hundreds of years, is nowhere close to being called into question.

Yet, soccer fans in different parts of Iran populated by ethnic minorities as well as protesters in Kurdish regions of the country are demanding rights and in some cases hinting at a desire to break away from the Islamic republic.

In the latest incident, soccer fans took this week to the streets of Tabriz, the capital of East Azerbaijan province, and other cities in the province, according to opposition groups, in protest against what they see as political interference in the Iranian Premier League final between Tractor Sazi Tabriz FC, a symbol of Iranian Azeri identity, and Naft Tehran FC, owned by the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) to prevent the Azeri club from clinching this year’s trophy.

The protests centre on a decision by the referee in the last 20 minutes of the game to give a red card to Traktor Sazi midfielder Andranik Teymourian, which allowed Naft Tehran to turn defeat into a tie. ‘The atmosphere within the stadium quickly shifted from celebratory to anger after the referee’s call,” said Araz News operated by the National Resistance Organization of Azerbaijan (NROA). It said throughout the game fans had been chanting Azerbaijani nationalist slogans.

Southern Azerbaijan, another opposition website, said that clashes with security forces erupted in the Sahand Sport Stadium and the streets of Tabriz at the end of the match as protesters decried the alleged manipulation of the match. Fan shouted ‘Stop Persian Racism, ”Down with Islamic Republic,’ and ‘Long live Azerbaijan’ during the protests.

The website said Traktor Sazi had been playing defensive in the last 20 minutes of the match because the team’s coach Tony Oliviera had been informed by the Islamic Republic of Iran’s Football Federation (IRIFF) that the results of parallel matches meant that the Tabriz club would only need a draw to win the championship. “We were tricked,” Mr. Oliveira told the official IRNA news agency.

Southern Azerbaijan said that mobile communications in the stadium in the last minutes of the match had been disrupted. “We were following the other game on television in the changing room but at 87 minutes in, suddenly the TV, radio and cell phone networks blacked out and we had no means of communication,” Agence France Presse quoted Naft Tehran CEO Mansour Ghanbarzadeh as saying.

East Azerbaijan governor Esmaeil Jabbarzadeh reportedly conceded on television that the outcome of the match was questionable as he called for calm.

Stadia in Tabriz have in recent years been the scene of a number of environmental and nationalist protests and clashes with security forces in which fans chanted secessionist slogans. “The main (Iranian concern) is that the idea of Turkism is strengthening in South Azerbaijan,” News.Az, a pro-Azeri news website, quoted Saftar Rahimli, a member of the board of the World Azerbaijani Congress, as saying. Mr. Rahimli was referring to Eastern Azerbaijan by its nationalist Azeri name.

Similarly, a soccer pitch in the Iranian city of Ahvaz, the capital of the oil-rich southern province of Khuzestan and home to Iran’s Arab minority, emerged last month as a flashpoint of anti-government protest at a time of rising Arab-Iranian tensions over the status of Shiite Muslim minorities in the Arab world, the crisis in Yemen, and the outlines of a multilateral agreement that would curb Iran’s nuclear program and return the Islamic republic to the fold of the international community. Teachers in Ahwaz have since held anti-government protests.

Soccer fans clashed with security forces twice in recent months in Ahwaz, the second time in April after a match between state-owned Foolad FC and Teheran’s Esteghlal FC, according to the National Council of Resistance in Iran, a coalition of opposition groups dominated by the Mujahedeen-e-Khalq, a group that was tainted when it moved its operations in 1986 to Iraq at a time that Iraq was at war with Iran after being expelled from France.

Ethnic Arabs have long complained that the government has failed to reinvest oil profits to raise the region’s standards of living. The World Health Organization (WHO) identified Ahwaz in 2013 as Iran’s most polluted city.

Authorities distributed in February tens of thousands of surgical masks and more than 26,000 gallons of milk in Ahvaz, a city of more than 1 million, when it was hit by a severe sand storm that forced the closure of schools and offices, the cancellation of flights, and prompted scattered protests. Some Arab commentators have called against the backdrop of Saudi Arabia and Iran fighting proxy wars in Syria, Iraq and Yemen for Iranian Arabs to secede from the Islamic republic.

If soccer fans in East Azerbaijan and Khuzestan were not a big enough headache for the government, police in the majority Kurdish city of Mahabad sought earlier this month to quell riots after a 25 year-old hotel maid died jumping from a fourth floor balcony as she tried to escape from an intelligence official who was allegedly trying to rape her. Crowds mobilized by women’s rights activists demanded answers refusing to be sent home with an announcement that a civilian suspect had been taken into custody. Amateur video showed the hotel allegedly being put on fire. One person was killed and 50 reportedly injured in clashes with police.

Iranian Kurds concede that hopes that this month’s demonstrations will ignite a wider spread protest are likely to prove wishful thinking with Kurdish groups hopelessly divided even as Kurds in Iraq and Syria have carved out entities of their own and the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) negotiates greater rights for Kurds in Turkey with the government in Ankara.

“All of these parties are frozen in the past and completely dependent on the Iraqi Kurds. They made no effort to create a clandestine movement inside Iran, believing that the regime would implode. Their calculation proved to be wrong,” Al-Monitor quoted Abbas Vali, a prominent Istanbul-based Iranian Kurdish academic, as saying.

The post Ethnic Tensions Spill Onto Iranian Soccer Pitches – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

US Defense Secretary Ash Carter said in statement Saturday that US special operations forces yesterday conducted an operation in Syria to capture Abu Sayyaf, a senior leader of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant terrorist organization.

“Last night, at the direction of the Commander in Chief, I ordered U.S. special operations forces to conduct an operation in al-Amr in eastern Syria to capture an ISIL senior leader known as Abu Sayyaf and his wife Umm Sayyaf,” Carter said.

Abu Sayyaf was involved in ISIL’s military operations and also helped direct the terrorist organization’s illicit oil, gas and financial operations, the defense secretary said.

“Abu Sayyaf was killed during the course of the operation when he engaged US. forces” Carter said, adding that the operation “is a reminder that the United States will never waver in denying safe haven to terrorists who threaten our citizens, and those of our friends and allies.”

Relatedly, the White House confirmed in a statement that the operation was conducted at US President Barack Obama’s direction, with US personnel based out of Iraq conducting an operation in al-Amr in eastern Syria to capture Abu Sayyaf and his wife Umm Sayyaf, adding that during the course of the operation, Abu Sayyaf was killed when he engaged US forces.

According to a statement by NSC Spokesperson Bernadette, Umm Sayyaf was captured and is currently in US military detention in Iraq.

“The operation also led to the freeing of a young Yezidi woman who appears to have been held as a slave by the couple,” Bernadette said, adding, “We intend to reunite her with her family as soon as feasible.”

No US personnel were killed or injured during this operation.

According to the White House statement, “Abu Sayyaf was a senior ISIL leader who, among other things, had a senior role in overseeing ISIL’s illicit oil and gas operations – a key source of revenue that enables the terrorist organization to carry out their brutal tactics and oppress thousands of innocent civilians. He was also involved with the group’s military operations. We suspect that Umm Sayyaf is a member of ISIL, played an important role in ISIL’s terrorist activities, and may have been complicit in the enslavement of the young woman rescued last night.”

According to the White House, President Obama authorized this operation upon the unanimous recommendation of his national security team and “as soon as we had developed sufficient intelligence and were confident the mission could be carried out successfully and consistent with the requirements for undertaking such operations.”

“This operation was conducted with the full consent of Iraqi authorities and, like our existing airstrikes against ISIL in Syria, consistent with domestic and international law,” the statement added.

“We are working to determine an ultimate disposition for the detainee that best supports the national security of the United States and of our allies and partners, consistent with domestic and international law. We will follow our usual practice with respect to giving the ICRC notification and access to the detainee.”

The post US Confirms Islamic State Leader Abu Sayyaf Killed In Raid appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Rowan Popplewell*

Violent protests have gripped the streets of Bujumbura since the 26 April when the Burundian President, Pierre Nkurunziza, declared his intention to run for a third term. On 13 May, protestors celebrated the announcement that the President had been dismissed and a coup d’état was underway. Yet the outcome of the coup remains unclear as army factions fight for control of key government institutions in the capital.

It was always a possibility, yet few genuinely believed the army would move against the President, especially under the leadership of his former ally, Major General Godefroid Niyombare. Throughout the unrest, the army had largely remained neutral, often acting as a barrier between protestors and police. Yet it had already fired a warning shot. On 2 May, the Minister of Defence, Pontien Gaciyubwenge, issued a statement demanding that political actors respect the Constitution and the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement. General Niyombare, while declaring the coup announced that the army had moved “to remedy the unconstitutional environment into which Burundi has been plunged”.

While the coup itself was not widely predicted, the protests that led to it were easily foreseeable. Nkurunziza never concealed his desire to run and those opposed to his candidacy never hid their intention to contest it.

Since narrowly failing to change the constitution last year, the President and his supporters consistently made the case for why he could stand for a third term. Nkurunziza argued that the term limits contained in the Arusha Agreement and the Constitution did not apply to him because he was not elected by popular vote in 2005 – a position that was controversially endorsed by the Constitutional Court last week.

The President also crushed opposition within his own party that emerged in the weeks leading up to his candidacy. Nkurunziza dismissed his spokesperson, Leonidas Hatungimana, and sought to oust the President of the National Assembly, Pie Ntavyohanyuma, both of whom warned him against standing again. In February, the leader of the coup, General Niyombare, was removed as the head of the intelligence services for his opposition to the third term. His wife narrowly escaped an assassination attempt later that month.

In a further show of strength and intent, the ruling Conseil National Pour la Défense de la Démocratie – Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie (CNDD-FDD) organised a huge pro-regime rally on the 11 April. According to the party, over 50,000 people congregated in central Bujumbura in support of Nkurunziza’s third term, with supporters being bussed in from around the country.

Public opposition increased dramatically over recent months as civil society, political parties, the international community, and even the Catholic Church issued statements against the third term. Opposition demonstrations became larger and more frequent. In January, protests followed the arrest of Bob Rugarika, the head of the largest independent radio station, Radio Publique Africaine. Upon his release, thousands took to the street in a huge, spontaneous protest.

Although these events help to explain why the protests were widely predicted, they do not explain what drove them. To really understand why people took to the streets, it’s important to recognise that the protests occurred against a backdrop of sustained political and economic marginalisation and widespread fear. While the reasons that motivated each demonstrator to take to the streets will have differed greatly, it appears protest leaders successfully tapped into individual discontent and anxieties generated by exclusion and repression.

Democratisation has done little to support broad-based participation in political institutions and processes. At the national level few formal spaces for civil society engagement exist. Opportunities for the inclusion of ordinary citizens in decision-making at the local level are also few and far between, meaning decisions are often made behind closed doors. Civil society groups have sought to increase levels of participation through supporting initiatives that promote local accountability, such as participatory governance committees. Yet the spaces for participation they create are often informal and limited.

Feelings of political exclusion have been reinforced by restrictions placed on protest and dissent. Over the past two years the Government has introduced laws designed to increase control over independent media and public gatherings, such as the Law on Demonstrations and Public Meetings, which allows the authorities to prevent public assemblies and ban spontaneous protests. Those who openly criticise the Government have been intimidated and harassed. High profile civil society activists reported receiving phone calls in the middle of the night and seeing strange people hanging around outside their homes in recent months. Others received serious threats to themselves and their families [1].

Restrictions on speech and assembly forced Burundians to find increasingly creative ways to express discontent. Civil society actors encouraged people to wear green every Tuesday in solidarity with imprisoned activists and the causes they championed. The Mardi Vert movement, as it became known, successfully enabled ordinary Burundians to engage in protest without violating the law. In April, the civil society coalition opposing Nkurunziza’s candidacy, Halte au Troisième Mandat!, called on Bujumbura motorists to sound their horns in unison against the third term. Burundians responded en masse, creating a noise that could be heard from the hills surrounding the city.

Economic hardship has also contributed to rising tensions in Burundi. Increasing cost of living and a crippling petrol crisis have made life more and more difficult for ordinary people. In March, the civil society coalition, Le Campagne Contre La Vie Cher, brought the capital to a standstill, encouraging Burundians to stay at home in protest at the Government’s failure to respond to rising living costs. While the leaders of the protests are themselves often from relatively affluent or middle class backgrounds, they tapped into the concerns of ordinary Burundians who feel that the Government is doing little to make life better for them and their families.

But it’s not only civil society and protest leaders that have exploited the frustrations and discontent generated by political and economic marginalisation. Many Burundians I have talked to in recent months have real concerns about the manipulation of young people by political actors, including the ruling party and political opposition.

The rise of the Imbonerakure, the armed youth wing of the ruling CNDD-FDD, has reinforced these concerns. Over the past year, reports of small-scale attacks on civilians and opposition members by the youth militia have increased. Those who have crossed the border into neighbouring Rwanda in recent weeks have told how the Imbonerakure are patrolling neighbourhoods with clubs spiked with nails and painting red marks on the houses of those they intend to target[2] .

Although the current unrest appears to be political at the moment, many fear that people could become mobilised along ethnic lines, should ethnicity become salient once again. This is because Burundi has been here before. During the civil war, youth militia such as the Tutsi Front Jeunesse Patriotique and the Hutu youth paramilitary group known as the abajeunes or the Gardiens de la Paix, patrolled and terrorised communities throughout the country. Although the number of young men who actually joined militias during the war stood at less than 3%, they succeeded in creating a climate of fear and disorder that supported the spread of ethnic violence[3] .

Burundians are afraid that history is about to repeat itself. Scenes of celebration witnessed on the streets of Bujumbura upon announcement of the coup, were accompanied by those of fear and panic. Immediately following the announcement, reporters witnessed people running to safety and locking themselves indoors. Ordinary people took to the streets because they wanted a more peaceful, prosperous and democratic Burundi. Yet this outcome is by no means guaranteed by the coup attempt. The situation remains fragile and uncertain, and we have yet to see how actors such as the Imbonerakure will respond. Like many Burundians I am watching and waiting, afraid for the future of a country and people that I care about deeply.

* Rowan Popplewell is a PhD candidate at the University of Oxford. Her research focuses on civil society and peacebuilding in Burundi.

END NOTES
[1] EurAc (01 December 2014) “Burundi: The European network for Central Africa (EurAc) is concerned by threats to the Forum pour la Conscience et le Développement (FOCODE) and to its President, Pacifique Nininahazwe.”
[2] UNHCR (8 May 2015) “More than 50,000 flee Burundi to escape spiralling violence”. Available online at: http://www.unhcr.org/554c83d46.html
[3] Uvin, Peter (2009) Life After Violence: A People’s History of Burundi (London: Zed Books)

The post Why Burundians Took To The Streets – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

With Daish (ISIS) advancing (5/15/2015) toward the gates of Syria’s ancient city of Palmyra (Tadmur), an irreplaceable treasure for the Syrian people and for the world, where this observer has been honored to spend many inspiring awe-filled hours these past few years observing and contemplating its unique blend of Greco-Roman and Persian influences, another global archeological tragedy may be unfolding. Fears are raised today in Syria that this UNESCO World Heritage Site could face destruction of the kind the jihadis have already wreaked in Iraq and other areas of this country.

The Director-General of Antiquates and Museums (DGAM), Syrian patriot Dr. Maamoun Abdel-Karim, who has devoted life to preserving our global heritage in Syria, and whose office this observer had just left when the news broke, declared that “If ISIS enters Palmyra, it will be destroyed and it will be an international catastrophe.”

Against this horrific backdrop, discussing other aspects of Syria’s cultural heritage could appear to dear reader as relatively less significant at this moment. Yet, Syria’s historic Al Hijaz railway system, as is the case with much of this country’s cultural heritage, has also been damaged, looted and in some cases maliciously destroyed. Trains being considered by some jihadist salafis and deranged miscreants as somehow religiously subversive. One barely teenage Da’ish (ISIS) tryout, deselected when he lied to recruiters about his real age which was 13, explained to this observer recently that in the for sure to be established Caliphate, camels, donkeys and horses, and other 7th century modes of transportation should be required via fatwa in order to render us all more religious and nearer to what he imagines Allah would really want us to be.

Virtually all Syrians scoff at this and related notions and countless numbers today are volunteering at archeological sites, wherever and whenever security conditions allow, preserving and protecting their and our, cultural heritage. This work includes many heritage projects around the Damascus area, including Syria’s historic train system which formerly was also a major national and international tourist attraction.

Admittedly, Syria’s rail system, old in terms of much of western history including North America is very recent in the context of this country’s ten millennia cultural history. Yet Syria’s trains have been an important cultural aspect in the history of the Levantine region from the eastern coast of the Mediterranean, to the sea north of the Arabian Peninsula and to the south of Turkey, and on down to Jordan and including still occupied Palestine.

Government workers and volunteers here are protecting and restoring the train system with the support and appreciation of this war-battered public.

An earlier railway for this area had been suggested in 1864 by the Ottomans in order “to relieve the suffering of the hajis on their 40-day journey to Mecca” through the wilderness of Midian, the Nafud, and the Hejaz Mountains. But not until 1900 was the railway started by order of the Ottoman Sultan Abdul Hamid II and was built largely by the Ottomans, with German advice and support, again, ostensibly to facilitate religious pilgrimages to Muslim holy places, including Mecca. But as is often the case, particularly these days, religion was used as a mask to facilitate political objectives and in fact the main reason for the train system, according to some scholars, was to strengthen Ottoman control over the most distant provinces of its empire. Before the construction, German military adviser in Istanbul Auler Pasha advised the Sultan that the transportation of soldiers from Istanbul to Mecca would be reduced to only 120 hours. Another advantage to be gained was that the line would protect Hejaz and other Arab provinces from British invasion.

German engineers oversaw construction and German trains were imported for the 820 miles of track that traversed 820 miles (1,320 km) of difficult terrain and was completed in only eight years. It ran from Damascus southward to Darʿā (Deraa) and thence over Transjordan via Az-Zarqāʾ, Al-Qaṭrānah, and Maʿān into northwestern Arabia, and inland via Dhāt al-Ḥajj and Al-ʿUlā to Medina. The major branch line, 100 miles (160 km) long, from Darʿā to Haifa on the Mediterranean coast of Palestine was added.

World War I devastated much of Syria’s railroad system but even before the war started, trains were sometimes attacked by Bedouins from adjacent desert areas because they threatened the tribes control and profits over pilgrim routes to holy places. When the Arabs of the Hejaz revolted against Turkish rule in 1916, the track that ran to Medina was put out of operation by Arab raids, largely planned by the British archeologist and military strategist, Thomas Edward Lawrence. Lawrence was dispatched from London to Arabia to assure the Arabs that England had their best interests at heart and would deliver on their pledges which Lawrence communicated. After the war Messrs.’ Sykes and Picot arrived and the operative sections of track were taken over by the Syrian, Palestinian, and Transjordanian governments.

The very popular Rabweh to Dumar line of Syria’s railway system, which begins in central Damascus, is protected by the government and after nearly four years closure due to rebel threats has this month re-opened. The public is demonstrably elated. Most of whom, like this observer, seem to be steam engine train lovers as they explain that they are also filled with memories of childhood family train trips as well as inhaling breadths of joy and optimism over even a partial return to pre-conflict life these warm spring days. Today, nostalgia is widespread in Syria for days past.

Not long after this country convulsed in conflict, Syria’s railway system stopped functioning and rebels destroyed $250 million worth of new train cars, not yet even put into service that had recently arrived from China. Also destroyed were many vehicles and parts of buildings when rebels occupied the largest railway museum in the world, at Qadam, a Damascus suburb. Serious damage was done to the “museum of the rolling stock of Al-Hidjaz Railway” with fires destroying antique steam engines, wrecked and burned out train cars, buses, heavy equipment and assorted vehicles. Damage also resulted from shelling of the outer walls and ceiling of a large maintenance and storage facility at Qadam. The jihadists also looted computers and large LCD TV’s but in some cases passed on many irreplaceable objects—such as old Morse code machines, historic documents and other heritage items apparently not appreciating their historic significance or cultural value which they were bent on destroying.

In February 2014, the central Damascus Hejaz railway station was bombed by a rebel mortar killing 12 people while shrapnel damaged the exterior of the station but missed its large historic red, yellow, blue and green stain glass window and Ottoman period ceilings. The elegant building, which was designed by the Spanish architect Fernando de Aranda, currently houses a museum and is a popular meeting place for the public. Other damage to Syria’s heritage railway includes the derailment, in 2012, of a passenger train to Aleppo, which Mr. Younes Al-Nassar reported insurgents perpetrated with a kitchen pot stuffed with explosives, killing the engineer and his assistant. The 500 passengers miraculously escaping serious injury.

Mr. Al-Nassar, a Transportation Department employee who works as the Director of National and International Affairs for the governments Al Hijaz Railway spent an afternoon last week giving this observer a detailed history and current affairs overview. He insisted that “The Syrian Hejaz railway is part of the Arab memory and its heritage and it should stay alive.” Explaining that railways are the most sociable form of travel, he recalled his own train trips to Turkey on to Romania, Bulgaria and Iran. It has long been said that the people of Syria are deeply connected historically and culturally to their train system which until the crisis began in March of 2011, scores of thousands of Syrians and international tourists enjoyed. Countless families would use train travel en route to family picnics often starting from Damascus beneath the Quasioun Mountains toward Lebanon along the Barada River which flows easterly from Ein Al-Feijeh.

Mr. Al Nasser described how his grandfather used to ride to work in Palestine on trains that linked Damascus to Haifa and other villages now cut off by the Zionist regime. An official with the Al Hijaz railway system, the gentleman kindly made arrangements for this observer to travel from Rabweh near central Damascus to Dumar on the historic line. One purpose of the trip was that the engineer, Atef and his crew were inspecting the rails and stations en route in preparation for crews to make repairs for hopefully soon arriving tourists coming this way but more immediately for students and their families traveling to rest areas and parks in a couple of weeks after exams are finished and summer holidays begin.

The train’s Engineer, Atef, could not have been a more gracious host. He invited this observer to ride with him in the nearly hundred year old German coal fueled engine-now running on diesel—as we chugged and train whistled our way west. Brushing the side of our three passenger-car train, manufactured in Bremen, were maple, olive, sycamore, pine and large mulberry trees, the latter with branches bent over heavily loaded with still green mulberries. And to my pleasant surprise, within few yards of our passing train along some of the route, were many Akedenia trees with their delicious sweet yellow fruit, maybe my favorite spring fruit in the region.

As we started to pull out of the central Damascus station, with the blasts of whistles and warning horns, engineer Atef shouted at me, “Do you know how to operate a train’? I replied “Not really, but for many years I operated my Lionel American Flyer model train in the USA.” Well, with all the noise and challenged English-Arabic language interpretation, Atef obviously misunderstood my weak joke and shouted back,

“Kweiss! (Good!) Then the engineer pointed to the large control lever on the left of the engine compartment and gestured at three variously sized whistle buttons with different functions. Atef lite a cigarette and sat down on a chair next to me and sipped a cup of tea while encouraging me to reach over to the right and operate the whistles whenever I saw someone walking along the tracks or as we approached stations. Actually if was terrific fun operating the whistles and pretty easy to operate the power/speed lever, but I was never quite sure which horn or whistle was to be sounded for what purpose. But they sounded great. Only after we arrived in Dumar did my son Alistair come to me from one of the passenger cars and informed me that one lady complained that the engineer must have gone crazy because he was blowing the horn and whistles much more than normal or necessary!

The memory this observer will retain of Syria’s train system is the excitement and the friendly waves and smiles of citizens all along the railway line and the sheer joy expressed by citizens that their train system is back, even if to date limited to secured areas. And that her historic railways are deeply valued as part of Syria’s cultural heritage and warrants protection and preservation.

The post Syria: Islamic State At The Gates Of Palmyra – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Nearly a third of college marching band members surveyed in a national study observed hazing in their programs but few of the students reported the activities, often because of fears of retribution or loss of social standing, according to researchers.

Public verbal humiliation and public degradation were the most common forms of hazing reported by the band members, said Jason Silveira, an assistant professor of music education in the College of Liberal Arts at Oregon State University and lead author of the study, published recently in the Journal of Research in Music Education. Co-author of the study is Michael Hudson of the University of Kentucky.

The findings indicate there may still be confusion about what constitutes hazing and band members may need more education to understand what hazing is and why it shouldn’t be tolerated, Silveira said.

“Despite all of our efforts, the message about hazing is still not getting out there,” he said. “Band participants might say it’s no big deal, it’s what we do. It may not be a big deal to that person, but to someone else it may be.”

Silveira and Hudson began investigating marching band hazing after several high-profile hazing incidents at colleges across the country, including the death of Robert Champion, a member of the Florida A&M

CORVALLIS, Ore. — Nearly a third of college marching band members surveyed in a national study observed hazing in their programs but few of the students reported the activities, often because of fears of retribution or loss of social standing, according to researchers.

Public verbal humiliation and public degradation were the most common forms of hazing reported by the band members, said Jason Silveira, an assistant professor of music education in the College of Liberal Arts at Oregon State University and lead author of the study, published recently in the Journal of Research in Music Education. Co-author of the study is Michael Hudson of the University of Kentucky.

The findings indicate there may still be confusion about what constitutes hazing and band members may need more education to understand what hazing is and why it shouldn’t be tolerated, Silveira said.

“Despite all of our efforts, the message about hazing is still not getting out there,” he said. “Band participants might say it’s no big deal, it’s what we do. It may not be a big deal to that person, but to someone else it may be.”

Silveira and Hudson began investigating marching band hazing after several high-profile hazing incidents at colleges across the country, including the death of Robert Champion, a member of the Florida A&M University marching band who died during a hazing incident in 2011. Silveira had recently finished graduate school at another Florida institution at the time of Champion’s death.

They found that few researchers had examined hazing in the performing arts; the little research that did exist tended to be part of larger hazing studies involving athletics or Greek organizations as well, Silveira said. So Silveira and Hudson set out to learn more about students’ attitudes toward, understanding of and exposure to hazing in their marching bands.

“We wanted to pull back the veil of secrecy and see if there was anything we could do to help prevent hazing incidents in the future,” Silveira said.

With permission from band directors, the researchers queried more than 1,200 undergraduate and graduate students who participate in NCAA Division I marching band programs in 30 states across the U.S. Student participation in the online survey was voluntary.

Overall, band members reported that they had never been forced to participate in most of the 18 types of hazing incidents listed in the survey. Only four types of hazing had been experienced by at least 10 percent of the respondents.

Nearly 20 percent of band members indicated they had been required to sing or chant by themselves or with selected others while in public and nearly 20 percent reported being yelled at, cursed at or sworn at. Nearly 15 percent of the band members reported that they had been asked not to associate with certain specific people but not others. And nearly 12 percent of the students reported depriving themselves of sleep.

The numbers were even lower when students were asked if they had participated in hazing others. About 3 percent of the survey respondents reported forcing others to participate in a drinking game, for example. Nearly 8 percent reported forcing others to sing or chant in public and 5 percent reported yelling, cursing or swearing at other members.

The vast majority of the students indicated they were aware of their university’s hazing policies and expressed negative views toward hazing activities, Silveira said.

“That’s a promising finding, that hazing is not being supported,” he said.

However, nearly a third of the band members also reported observing some type of hazing. That indicates a possible disconnect in band members’ understanding of what hazing is, Silveira said.

Silveira suggested band directors or other band leaders may need to step up education and reporting efforts to root out hazing in their programs. That might include establishing a system for anonymous reporting of hazing; comprehensive reviews of hazing policies with members; or using role-playing to help members better understand what hazing is.

“There was a sense that band members didn’t see some behaviors as hazing,” Silveira said. “Giving students concrete examples that help delineate what hazing is might help.”

The post Hazing Remains Concern In College Marching Bands appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Much of what President Obama said this week at Georgetown University about poverty was insightful and accurate, but he made some statements that deserve a rejoinder.

President Obama clearly understands, intellectually, the need for character formation and the role that values play in accounting for social mobility. Why, then, hasn’t he promoted policies that address these issues? Because his real interest is not fighting poverty, or growing the economy, it’s fighting inequality.

Inequality can be resolved either by providing programs that allow those at the bottom to rise or developing tax schemes that punish those at the top. Obama has chosen the latter route, which explains, in part, why the poverty rate has increased during his tenure. Ironically, inequality has also increased under his watch: low interest rates, which is a signature of his administration, bolsters the equities market, making the rich richer.

Obama took the occasion to criticize Catholics and Protestants who are more concerned about abortion than poverty. Yes, Mr. President, the most fundamental civil right is the right to be born—it is not the right to eat. Just as important, the research overwhelmingly shows that conservatives (those associated with the pro-life wing of Christianity) are more generous to the poor than liberals (the social justice wing). So his side is neither compassionate to the unborn nor charitable to the needy.

It was remarkable to hear Obama say that we should not “buy the idea that the poor will always be with us and there’s nothing we can do.” Who is the “we”? What has he done about it? He spoke throughout the conference as if he was just another one of the academics on the panel. He has been president for six-and-a-half years and there are more poor people today—they are disproportionately African American—than when he took office. Obama desperately needs a reality check.

The post Obama Needs A Reality Check – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Victoria Arnold

Russian people and religious organisations charged with distributing banned “extremist” texts face sharply increased fines after President Vladimir Putin on 2 May signed into law amendments to Article 20.29 of the Code of Administrative Offences. This punishes “the mass distribution of extremist materials included in the published Federal List of Extremist Materials, as well as their production or storage for mass distribution”. Confiscations of religious texts from both Muslims and Jehovah’s Witnesses, mostly during raids or detentions, frequently result in prosecutions under Article 20.29, Forum 18 News Service notes.

If an item is on the Federal List, possession of it carries the risk of a fine or imprisonment for up to 15 days, and confiscation of the banned literature. The Federal List now runs to over 2,500 items, often does not include full bibliographical details, and is irregularly updated, making it difficult for anyone to keep abreast of recent bans..

Courts continue to rule texts “extremist”, opening the way for more prosecutions for their possession or “mass distribution”. These include the Google Translate Russian version of a collection of sayings of the Islamic prophet Mohammed, a video commenting on the attempted seizure by bailiffs of saints’ relics from the Russian Orthodox Autonomous Church, and Jehovah’s Witness texts.

Despite Article 20.29 using the term “mass distribution”, prosecutors have often brought charges even if only one copy of a text is discovered. Court decisions usually order “extremist” materials to be confiscated and often destroyed.

Convictions of individuals under Article 20.29 have led to liquidation or threats of liquidation against Jehovah’s Witness or Muslim communities they belong to. If members of “liquidated” communities continue to meet they can be prosecuted (see below).

Other freedom of religion or belief obstacles

The possession of allegedly “extremist” texts is not the only obstacle to exercising freedom of religion or belief. Communities face barriers to holding public events. Baptist pastor Pavel Pilipchuk was imprisoned for five days in Orel in mid-April for refusing to pay a fine for allegedly organising an open-air meeting for worship without informing the city administration beforehand.

In February 2014 lengthened terms of imprisonment under Criminal Code Article 282.2, Part 1 were brought in. In March 2015 a Muslim from Ulyanovsk, Bagir Kazikhanov, was sentenced to three and a half years’ imprisonment for “organisation of extremist activity”. He is the first known person to be sentenced under the new Article.

Massive fine increases

The amendments to the Administrative Code, which President Putin signed into law on 2 May, came into force on their official publication on 6 May.

The minimum fine under Article 20.29 for “juridical persons” (which include commercial, publishing, media and registered religious organisations) has been doubled to 100,000 Roubles (about 15,000 Norwegian Kroner, 1,780 Euros, or 2,050 US Dollars). The maximum fine has been raised by 10 times the previous amount to 1 million Roubles (about 150,000 Norwegian Kroner, 17,800 Euros, or 20,500 US Dollars).

The increases are part of a number of legal changes proposed by the Communications Ministry in December 2014, which introduce specific charges for media outlets accused of inciting “extremism” and harshen existing punishments for related offences.

The May changes have not increased fines for individuals or officials. If convicted, individuals continue to face a fine of between 1,000 and 3,000 Roubles (about 150 to 450 Norwegian Kroner, 18 to 55 Euros, or 21 to 61 US Dollars), or up to 15 day’s imprisonment. Fines for people acting in an official capacity (including individuals such as bookshop owners) range from 2,000 to 5,000 Roubles (about 300 to 750 Norwegian Kroner, 36 to 90 Euros, or 41 to 102 US Dollars).

19 prosecutions so far in 2015

Between the beginning of January and the end of April 2015 there were 19 known prosecutions under Article 20.29 for belief-related materials which do not appear to incite hatred or violence, deriving from 13 separate police cases or investigations. All but one resulted in fines, with no acquittals and no known appeals so far. All 19 cases were concluded before the new penalties came into force. Organisations may also be prohibited from operating for a period of up to 90 days.

In 10 of the 19 known prosecutions (six related to Muslim literature, four to Jehovah’s Witness literature), judges ordered the destruction of the confiscated religious materials, Forum 18 notes.

A growing number of Article 20.29 prosecutions relate to online texts or videos. Law enforcement monitoring is increasingly being carried out online, targeting the sharing of videos and electronic documents on social media, principally the popular Russian VKontakte site. Four known cases in the first four months of 2015 related to religious materials.

One Article 20.29 jailing so far in 2015

One of the 19 known prosecutions resulted in a resident of Perm Region being sentenced to five days imprisonment. This is the first known instance in 2015 of a jailing under Article 20.29 for distribution of allegedly “extremist” religious material. No such jailings took place in 2014.

On 26 March Judge Yekaterina Malysheva of Kungur City Court sentenced Yevgeny Menshenin to five days imprisonment for posting a video on his profile page on the VKontakte social network. The film “The Wonders of the Koran” was banned by Nefteyugansk City Court in Tyumen Region on 7 April 2011.

On 24 April 2014 Rail Ganiyev in the Mari El Republic was fined 3,000 Roubles for posting the video to his VKontakte page, one of 65 individuals and religious communities known to have been prosecuted under Article 20.29 in 2014. The video does not appear to contain any incitement to violence or hatred.

According to the March 2015 Kungur City Court verdict, seen by Forum 18, Menshenin argued that he had not known that the video was deemed “extremist” and had not watched it himself. The judge, however, considered that “placement on one’s page of extremist materials banned by the law, if other persons have access to it, should be considered actual distribution by the user of information of an extremist nature”.

The judge imposed a sentence of five day’s imprisonment “given the nature and degree of public danger of the administrative offence, the circumstances of the offence, and the personality of the perpetrator”, and obliged Menshenin to delete the video from his profile.

So far in 2015 two other residents of Perm Region have been convicted of distributing “The Wonders of the Koran”, on 2 March and 27 March respectively. One was fined 1,500 Roubles, the other an unknown amount. One was also sentenced by Judge Malysheva at Kungur City Court, the day after Menshenin.

Judge Malysheva said she could not discuss the case when Forum 18 reached her on 13 May. Prosecutor Yuliya Lobanova, who was present in court, similarly would not answer the question of why Menshenin was imprisoned when others convicted of the same offence were not. She directed Forum 18 to the press office of the Regional Prosecutor. This number went unanswered whenever Forum 18 called on 13 and 14 May.

Fined although materials no longer deemed “extremist”

Two of the 19 prosecutions in January-April 2015 involved materials which were at the same time not deemed “extremist” under Russian law. An imam from Penza Region and a librarian in Tatarstan were convicted in March of mass distribution of texts unbanned by an Orenburg Regional Court ruling on 27 February, which came into force on the day of its adoption.

After repeated delays since June 2012, repeated “expert analysis”, and the destruction of their own evidence by law enforcement agencies, Orenburg Regional Court overturned a widely condemned “extremism” ban on 50 texts from a total of 65 Islamic books, one issue of the Muslim journal “Novie Grani” (New Boundaries), and two short articles. Eighteen Islamic books from the 68 texts nevertheless continued to be deemed “extremist” and prohibited from distribution. On the day of the verdict (27 February) lawyers in the case thought the entire process of removing the 50 texts from the Federal List could take up to two months.

The 50 unbanned titles have still not (as of 15 May) been removed from the Federal List of Extremist Materials on the Justice Ministry’s website, despite the court ruling entering force immediately.

On 5 March Anna Vilchinskaya, director of Rybnaya Sloboda village library, was fined an unknown amount for the presence in her library’s religion section of a single copy of “Pillars of Islam and Faith”, by Muhammad bin Jamil Zeno (banned by Pervomaysky District Court, Vladivostok on 6 March 2012), and two copies of “Stories from the Life of the Prophet of Allah”, Book 2 of the “Religious Narrative” series compiled by Abdel Hamid Dzhuda Al-Sahhar. The latter text was unbanned by Orenburg Regional Court on 27 February, the same day Vilchinskaya’s case was brought to court. Judge Nurtdin Zamaliyev fined her and the fine would have been between 2,000 and 5,000 Roubles as she is an official. The books were ordered confiscated.

Vilchinskaya admitted negligence in monitoring the library’s stock and did not appeal. The verdict entered legal force on 17 March.

When Forum 18 telephoned Rybnaya Sloboda District Prosecutor’s Office on 12 May and mentioned the case to a spokeswoman, she immediately ended the call.

A full month – on 27 March – after “Constellation of the Righteous Caliphs” by contemporary Istanbul Naqshbandi Sufi teacher Osman Nuri Topbas was unbanned by Orenburg Regional Court, Imam Shamil Neverov was brought to Spassk District Court in Penza Region. The case was brought after a police inspection found one copy of the book in the library of his mosque in Nizhny Lomov. At the hearing on 30 March, Judge Yury Kamynin also ordered the destruction of the book and Imam Neverov was fined 2,000 Roubles.

Neverov also did not appeal against his conviction, and the ruling came into force on 17 April. Forum 18 called Spassk District Court on 12 May but the phone was immediately put down.

Orenburg unbanning possibly taking effect

The 27 February Orenburg ruling may be having an effect on whether cases under Article 20.29 are brought. The first four months of 2015 saw nine prosecutions concerning these texts out of a total of 19. Only the two Penza and Tatarstan cases (see above) took place after the Orenburg ruling came into force. Five of these prosecutions were based on the same investigation in Kunashak in Chelyabinsk Region, involving a group of men who shared the same set of books among themselves.

In the previous four months (September to December 2014), there were 11 separate cases involving materials banned in Orenburg out of a total of 18. For 2014 as a whole, this figure was 35 cases out of 65. Shopkeepers and stallholders have suffered particularly from the ban on the Orenburg texts, as several titles are popular prayer books such as al-Qahtani’s Fortress of a Muslim. There were no known cases against shopkeepers brought under Article 20.29 in the first four months of 2015.

One community prosecuted, another threatened

Out of the 19 prosecutions in January-April 2015, five involved Jehovah’s Witness literature, the rest Islamic texts or videos. Penza, Orenburg, Novgorod, and Sverdlovsk Regions and the Republics of Tatarstan and Yakutia have seen one prosecution each in the first four months of 2015. Two prosecutions took place in Krasnodar Region and three in Perm Region. There were also three prosecutions in Karachay-Cherkessiya and five in Chelyabinsk Region, although these were based on single investigations.

Only one organisation was charged – the Jehovah’s Witness community of Cherkessk in the North Caucasian republic of Karachay-Cherkessiya. It received a fine of 50,000 Roubles at Cherkessk City Court on 17 March after Prosecutors and “Anti-extremism” Police, informed by a local resident, confiscated a large quantity of texts from its premises and from members’ homes. Judge Oskar Kochkarov also fined two members of the organisation 1,000 Roubles each. In both these cases the confiscated religious texts were ordered to be destroyed.

Prosecutors may use convictions under Article 20.29 as evidence of “extremist” activity and seek to have a religious community dissolved on that basis. If entire communities are banned as “extremist” their former members can then face prosecution if they continue to meet, with the risk of imprisonment. This has been the experience of Jehovah’s Witnesses in Samara, Taganrog, and Abinsk, and a Muslim community in Borovsky village in Tyumen Region.

On 24 February 2015, Jehovah’s Witness Vasily Platon was fined 1,500 Roubles for handing out texts in the street in Tikhoretsk (Krasnodar Region), including “How To Achieve Happiness In Life”. The confiscated tests were ordered to be destroyed.

“How To Achieve Happiness In Life” has been banned twice – on 23 December 2013 by Kurgan City Court and again on 10 July 2014 by Central District Court, Barnaul.

Tikhoretsk Inter-District Prosecutor’s Office later issued Platon’s Jehovah’s Witness congregation in Tikhoretsk with an official written warning of the “inadmissibility of extremist activity”. In a press release of 8 April, the Prosecutor’s Office described this as a “preventative measure”, and stated that if it is not heeded “the question of liquidating the above organisation may be considered”.

The post Russia: Increased Fines For ‘Extremist’ Texts appeared first on Eurasia Review.

China is the world’s most populous country with a fast-growing economy that has led it to be the largest energy consumer and producer in the world. Rapidly increasing energy demand, especially for petroleum and other liquids, has made China influential in world energy markets.

China has quickly risen to the top ranks in global energy demand over the past few years. China became the largest global energy consumer in 2011 and is the world’s second-largest oil consumer behind the United States. The country was a net oil exporter until the early 1990s and became the world’s second-largest net importer of crude oil and petroleum products in 2009. The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) reports that China surpassed the United States at the end of 2013 as the world’s largest net importer of petroleum and other liquids, in part because of China’s rising oil consumption. China’s oil consumption growth accounted for about 43% of the world’s oil consumption growth in 2014. Despite China’s slower oil consumption growth in the past few years, EIA projects China will account for more than one-fourth of the global oil consumption growth in 2015.

Map of China: Source: Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook.

Natural gas use in China has also increased rapidly over the past decade, and China has sought to raise natural gas imports via pipeline and as liquefied natural gas (LNG). China is the world’s top coal producer, consumer, and importer and accounts for almost half of global coal consumption, an important factor in world energy-related carbon dioxide emissions. China’s rising coal production is the key driver behind the country becoming the world’s largest energy producer in 2009. China’s sizeable industrialization and swiftly modernizing economy helped the country became the world’s largest power generator in 2011.

China is the world’s most populous country (1.36 billion people in 2013) and has a rapidly growing economy, which has driven the country’s high overall energy demand and the quest for securing energy resources.¹ According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), China’s annual real gross domestic product (GDP) growth slowed to a reported 7.4% in 2014, which was the lowest since 1990, after registering an average growth rate of 10% per year between 2000 and 2011.² China’s leadership announced a target GDP growth rate of 7% for 2015. Chinese GDP, measured using purchase power parity (PPP) exchange rates, surpassed U.S. GDP in 2014, as estimated by IMF data.³ (PPP exchange rates make adjustments for the differing costs of goods and services across countries, attempting to show what exchange rates would have to be to buy the same basket of goods in different places. As costs are much higher in the industrialized world, comparisons of GDP by PPP exchange rates tend to boost the relative size of economies in less developed nations.)

China mitigated the 2008 global financial crisis with a massive stimulus package spread over two years that helped bolster China’s investments and industrial demand. Economic growth has slowed since 2012 as industrial production and exports decreased and as the government attempted to curb high debt levels and excessive investment in certain markets. In response to the rapidly slowing economy and deflationary trend in 2014, the government eased its monetary policy through interest rate cuts, providing medium-term loans to Chinese banks, and reducing the reserve requirements by banks. These measures have been followed by the government’s announcement of a smaller, more strategic fiscal stimulus targeting infrastructure projects in 2015.⁴

New leadership emerged in China in March 2013 when Xi Jinping became President and Li Keqiang assumed premiership. The new administration is keen to initiate economic and financial reform in China in the interest of greater long-term and sustainable growth. In November 2013, at the Third Plenum, a major policy meeting held every five years, the Chinese government outlined broad principles for economic reform in China. The government is pursuing incremental policy and economic reforms to create more balanced economic growth and to shift away from an economy driven primarily by excessive investments and exports to an economy characterized by greater domestic consumption. In the energy sector, the government is moving toward more market-based pricing schemes, energy efficiency and pollution-controlling measures, and competition among energy firms, as well as making greater investments in more technically challenging upstream hydrocarbon areas and renewable energy projects. China has been seeking ways to attract more private investment in the energy sector by streamlining the project approval processes, implementing policies to foster more energy transmission infrastructure to link supply and demand centers, and relaxing some price controls.

Total primary energy consumption

Top primary energy consumption in China by fuel type, 2012

Coal supplied the majority (nearly 66%) of China’s total energy consumption in 2012. The second-largest source was petroleum and other liquids, accounting for nearly 20% of the country’s total energy consumption. Although China has made an effort to diversify its energy supplies, hydroelectric sources (8%), natural gas (5%), nuclear power (nearly 1%), and other renewables (more than 1%) accounted for relatively small shares of China’s energy consumption. The Chinese government plans to cap coal use to 62% of total primary energy consumption by 2020 in an effort to reduce heavy air pollution that has afflicted certain areas of the country in recent years. China’s National Energy Agency claims that coal use dropped to 64.2% of energy consumption in 2014.⁵ The Chinese government set a target to raise non-fossil fuel energy consumption to 15% of the energy mix by 2020 and to 20% by 2030 in an effort to ease the country’s dependence on coal. In addition, China is currently increasing its use of natural gas to replace some coal and oil as a cleaner burning fossil fuel and plans to use natural gas for 10% of its energy consumption by 2020.⁶ Even though absolute coal consumption is expected to increase over the long term as total energy consumption rises, higher energy efficiency and China’s goal to increase environmental sustainability are likely to lead to a decrease in coal’s share.

As a result of high coal consumption, China is also the world’s leading energy-related CO2 emitter, releasing 8,106 million metric tons of CO2 in 2012. China’s government plans to reduce carbon intensity (carbon emissions per unit of GDP) by 17% between 2010 and 2015 and energy intensity (energy use per unit of GDP) by 16% during the same period, according to the country’s 12th Five-Year Plan (2011-15). China also intends to reduce its overall CO2 emissions by at least 40% between 2005 and 2020. The current climate change plan released at the end of 2014 reinforced China’s commitment to reduce carbon emissions mainly in the energy-intensive industries and in construction by 2020.⁷ Recently, China projected that its carbon emissions would rise by more than one-third from current levels and peak in 2030.⁸ These goals assume that China can reduce its reliance on coal and become a more energy-efficient economy in the long run.

Petroleum and other liquids

China is the world’s second-largest consumer of oil and moved from second-largest net importer of oil to the largest in 2014.

Top ten annual net oil importers, 2014

According to the Oil & Gas Journal (OGJ), released in January 2015, China holds 24.6 billion barrels of proved oil reserves, up almost 0.3 billion barrels from the 2014 level and the highest in the Asia-Pacific region (excluding Russia). China’s total petroleum and other production, the fourth-largest in the world, has risen about 50% over the past two decades and serves only its domestic market. However, the production growth has not kept pace with demand growth during this period. In 2014, China produced nearly 4.6 million barrels per day (bbl/d) of petroleum and other liquids, of which 92% was crude oil and the remainder was non-refining liquids and refining gain. EIA forecasts China’s oil production will increase slightly to higher than 4.6 million bbl/d by the end of 2016. In the medium and long term, EIA predicts China’s oil production will grow incrementally to 5.1 million bbl/d by 2020, 5.5 million bbl/d by 2030, and 5.7 million bbl/d by 2040, based on the International Energy Outlook 2014 (IEO2014). Long-term growth will require continued success of enhancing recovery at mature crude oil fields, greater investment to access more technically challenging plays such as shale oil, tight oil, and deepwater fields, and growth in non-petroleum liquids such as gas-to-liquids, coal-to-liquids, and biofuels.

China’s annual growth in oil consumption has eased after a recent high of 11% in 2010, reflecting the effects of the most recent global financial and economic downturn as well as China’s policies to reduce excessive investment and capacity overbuilding. Despite the slower growth, the country still accounted for more than one-third of global oil demand growth in 2014, according to EIA estimates. China consumed an estimated 10.7 million bbl/d of oil in 2014, up 370,000 bbl/d, or almost 4%, from 2013. Notably, China became the largest global net importer of oil in the first quarter of 2014, surpassing the United States, and the country’s average net total oil imports reached 6.1 million bbl/d in 2014. Significant U.S. oil production from shale oil plays and rapid Chinese oil demand growth occurring simultaneously over the past few years pushed China ahead of the United States as the largest importer. China’s oil demand growth depends on several factors, such as domestic economic growth and trade, transportation sector shifts, refining capabilities, and inventory builds. EIA forecasts that China’s oil consumption will continue growing through 2016 at a moderate pace to approximately 11.3 million bbl/d. China’s oil consumption growth is forecast in IEO2014 to rise by about 2.6% annually through 2040, reaching 13.1 million bbl/d in 2020, 16.9 million bbl/d in 2030, and 20.0 million bbl/d in 2040. EIA forecasts that China’s oil consumption will exceed that of the United States by 2034.

China’s demand growth for oil products has decelerated following a growth spike in 2010. Diesel (gasoil) is a key driver of China’s oil products demand and accounted for an estimated 34% of total oil products demand in 2014. Diesel demand declined on an absolute level in 2014 for the first time in two decades, as a result of several factors—slower economic growth, decreased production from the coal and mining sectors that transport products via rail and trucks, greater efficiency in heavy-duty vehicles, and increased use of natural gas-fired vehicles in recent years. Gasoline, the second-largest consumed petroleum fuel in China with an estimated 23% share in 2014, is still experiencing robust demand growth as a result of high light-duty car sales.⁹ China’s middle class has expanded in the past decade, giving rise to high car sales. Future gasoline consumption will depend on the pace of economic development and income growth, fuel efficiency rates, and government regulations on passenger vehicle use in certain congested urban areas. Liquefied petroleum gas continues to experience some growth from the petrochemical industry, while fuel oil demand has weakened considerably.

Sector organization

China’s national oil companies dominate the oil and natural gas upstream and downstream sectors, although the government has granted international oil companies more access to technically challenging onshore and deepwater offshore fields. China revised its oil price reform legislation in 2013 to further reflect international oil prices in the country’s domestic demand.

The Chinese government’s energy policies are dominated by the country’s growing demand for oil and its reliance on oil imports. The National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), a department of China’s State Council, is the primary policymaking, planning, and regulatory authority of the energy sector, while other ministries such as the Ministry of Commerce, the Ministry of Land and Resources, the Ministry of Environmental Protection, and the State Oceanic Administration oversee various components of the country’s oil policy. The government launched the National Energy Administration (NEA) in 2008 to act as the key energy regulator. The NEA, linked with the NDRC, is charged with approving new energy projects in China, setting domestic wholesale energy prices, and implementing the central government’s energy policies, among other duties.¹⁰ In January 2010, the government formed a National Energy Commission with the purpose of consolidating energy policies among the various agencies under the State Council and assessing major energy issues. Reforms under the new government leadership include consolidating and streamlining ministries and expanding the NEA’s purview.¹¹

National oil companies and others

China’s national oil companies (NOCs) wield a significant amount of influence in China’s oil sector. In the 1980s, China established three major NOCs—China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), the China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation (Sinopec), and China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC)—to serve in various areas of the oil sector. CNPC was put in charge of most of the country’s onshore upstream assets, and Sinopec was given responsibility for the downstream activities such as refining, distribution, and petrochemicals. China gave CNOOC responsibility to explore and develop oil and gas assets in the offshore areas of China. In the late 1990s, the Chinese government reorganized most state-owned oil and gas assets and created separate operating companies or publicly-listed arms of each of the NOCs. These separate companies are majority-owned by each of the NOC holding companies. Additionally, in 1998, the government restructured CNPC and Sinopec into two vertically integrated firms that own both upstream and downstream assets, with CNPC taking some downstream assets and Sinopec acquiring some fields for exploration and production (E&P). CNPC is the leading upstream player in China and, along with its publicly listed arm, PetroChina, accounts for an estimated 54% and 77% of China’s crude oil and natural gas output, respectively, according to FACTS Global Energy (FGE).¹² CNPC’s current strategy is to integrate its business sectors and capture more downstream market share. Sinopec seeks to acquire more upstream assets to capture more value from oil and gas production and diversify its revenue sources.

CNOOC, which is responsible for offshore oil and gas E&P, has seen its role expand as a result of growing attention to offshore zones and overseas assets. Also, the company has proven to be a growing competitor to CNPC and Sinopec by not only increasing its E&P expenditures in the South China Sea, but also by extending its reach into the downstream sector, particularly in the southern Guangdong Province.

Additional state-owned oil firms and private companies have emerged over the past several years. Sinochem Corporation, CITIC Group, and Yanchang Petroleum are state-owned firms that have expanded their presence in China’s oil sector over the past decade, but these companies are still relatively small. Several independent and private companies own downstream oil infrastructure such as refineries, but their scope has remained limited by policies that have favored NOCs.

Onshore oil production in China is mostly limited to China’s NOCs, but international oil companies (IOCs) have been granted greater access to offshore oil prospects and technically challenging onshore gas fields, mainly through production-sharing contracts (PSCs) and joint ventures (JVs). IOCs involved in offshore E&P working in China include: ConocoPhillips, Shell, Chevron, BP, BG, Husky, Anadarko, and Eni, among others. China’s NOCs must hold the majority participating interest in a PSC and can become the operator once development costs have been recovered. IOCs offer their technical expertise in order to partner with a Chinese NOC and to gain entry into the Chinese markets.

Pricing reform

The Chinese government launched a fuel tax and reform of the domestic product pricing mechanism in 2009 in an effort to tie retail oil product prices more closely to international crude oil markets. This reform was designed to ensure better profit margins for refiners who must sell fuel at regulated prices and to reduce energy intensity that resulted from lower consumer prices and higher demand. The oil product pricing system adopted in 2009 allowed the NDRC to adjust retail prices when the moving average of imported crude prices fluctuated outside a 4% range around the established price within 22 consecutive working days for diesel and gasoline.

Despite the price reform, international crude oil prices increased at a faster rate than revisions made by the NDRC to retail fuel prices, causing refiners to incur losses on their downstream businesses and increase their fuel product exports. To promote greater market transparency and global changes, the NDRC revised the pricing regime in March 2013 by shortening the retail fuel price adjustment period to every 10 working days when prices automatically adjust to international crude price fluctuations greater than 50 yuan per metric ton (about $1.10/barrel). However, the NDRC did not identify the slate of crude oil types that it uses for price determination. When international oil prices began falling in the middle of 2014, the NDRC approved 12 downward price changes. When benchmark crude oil prices recovered slightly at the beginning of 2015, the NDRC reversed course by raising the retail prices twice.¹³

In 2011, China installed an ad valorem resource tax of 5% on all oil and gas production, including unconventional resources output, in an attempt to increase revenues for local and regional governments and to encourage more-efficient hydrocarbon production. The resource tax was raised to 6% in late 2014, although the tax rate was lower for projects using certain enhanced oil recovery (EOR) techniques or containing high sulfur or heavy oil.¹⁴ China raised the threshold of its windfall resource tax from $55/bbl to $65/bbl to not deter investment in oil and gas investment after international oil prices fell to half of their previous level in late 2014.

Exploration and production

China’s largest oil fields are mature, and production has peaked, leading companies to invest in techniques to sustain oil flows at the mature fields, while also focusing on developing largely untapped reserves in the western interior provinces and offshore fields.

China’s oil productions and consumption, 1993-2016

After bolstering domestic oil output in 2010, China experienced more moderate oil production growth. China boosted its domestic oil output by more than 7% in 2010, after incremental growth in the previous two decades. Petroleum and total liquids production in 2014 reached nearly 4.6 million bbl/d, 50% higher than the level two decades ago. Most of this production is from crude oil (about 92%), and the remaining output is from coal-to-liquids, biofuels, and refinery processing gains. Approximately 80% of Chinese current crude oil production capacity is located onshore, and 20% of crude oil production is from shallow offshore reserves as of 2014.¹⁵ New offshore production, use of EOR in older onshore fields, and small discoveries in existing basins are the main contributors to incremental production increases. China’s NOCs are investing a great deal in EOR techniques such as water injection, polymer flooding, and steam flooding, among others, to offset oil production declines from these mature, onshore fields. Recent E&P activity has focused on the offshore areas of Bohai Bay and the South China Sea (SCS), as well as onshore oil and natural gas fields in western and central interior provinces such as Xinjiang, Sichuan, Gansu, and Inner Mongolia.

China’s recent energy policy aims to improve domestic production by developing new oil fields. Meeting this goal will likely require significant investment in deepwater and tight oil extraction, and the lower oil prices since the second half of 2014 could affect long-term expenditures of the NOCs. The recent low-price oil environment, after international crude oil prices plunged by about 50% since June 2014, when price levels had averaged more than $100/bbl for three years, has caused some uncertainty about the future levels of NOC investment in domestic production. Even though oil prices have rebounded slightly since January 2015, EIA does not expect them to return to levels of early 2014 in the next one to two years. CNOOC announced recently that it plans to lower its overall capital expenditure on domestic and overseas upstream developments by 26% to 35% of its 2014 spending.¹⁶ Also, CNPC and Sinopec plan to reduce their capital spending by 10% and 12%, respectively, in 2015 as the companies’ revenues have declined following the oil price fall. Sustained lower oil prices place a significant downward risk to China’s oil production growth in the near term. However, China has a vested interest in developing its domestic oil and gas reserves using cost-effective practices to strengthen its energy security.

Source: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Deborah Gordon, Yevgen Sautin, and Wang Tao), “China’s Oil Future”, May 6, 2014.

Most of China’s largest oil fields are located in the northeast and north central regions of the country and represents the backbone of the country’s domestic production. However, these fields are mature and prone to declining production. CNPC’s Daqing field, located in the northeastern region, is one of China’s oldest and most prolific fields, constituting 19% of China’s overall crude oil production. In 2014, Daqing produced about 800,000 bbl/d of crude oil, according to FGE, and has maintained this level for the past decade after declining from a level of about 1 million bbl/d.¹⁸ Sinopec’s Shengli oil field near the Bohai Bay produced about 557,000 bbl/d of crude oil during 2014, making it China’s second-largest oil-producing field. The use of EOR in these fields has been able to slow decline rates. However, Daqing, Shengli, and other mature fields have been heavily exploited since the 1960s, and their output is expected to decline within the next decade. CNPC, the operator of Daqing, reports that they will reduce the field’s output to 640,000 bbl/d by 2020 as a result of limited reserves, high production costs, and lower international oil prices.¹⁹

CNPC’s use of various EOR techniques on the Liaohe and Jilin fields in the Northeast, some of China’s oldest onshore oil fields, has helped stem production declines in recent years. Liaohe, one of China’s largest heavy oil fields, produced around 200,000 bbl/d in 2014. Because CNPC began using more advanced EOR methods such as steam flooding and polymer flooding on a large scale at Liaohe in 2009, the NOC has successfully sustained production at the field during the past few years. CNPC has used hydraulic fracturing and CO2 injection at the Jilin field to mitigate further declines in hydrocarbon output.

China’s interior provinces, such as the Northwest’s Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region (including the Junggar and Tarim basins) and central Ordos basin (particularly the Changqing field), have attained strong production growth in recent years through the use of improved drilling and advanced oil extraction techniques to unlock complex geological oil reserves. As China constructs more storage and processing infrastructure in this region, it is heavily investing in developing the surrounding oil and gas fields. Total 2014 production from the Junggar, Tarim, and other key basins in the Xinjiang area was estimated at about 400,000 bbl/d.²⁰ CNPC applied a new EOR technology to the ultra-heavy Fengcheng field in the Junggar basin and has been sustaining its production over the past few years.²¹

Output at Changqing, China’s third-largest producing oil field, which is located in the north central Ordos basin, grew robustly over the past several years, averaging more than 12% annual growth between 2006 and 2013. However, the field’s pace of production growth slowed substantially to just 3% in 2014 when output reached 500,000 bbl/d. CNPC uses water injection, steam flooding, and hydraulic fracturing to boost Changqing’s production.

Offshore E&P activities, mostly driven by CNOOC, have focused on the Bohai Bay region in the Yellow Sea, the South China Sea (particularly the Pearl River Mouth Basin), and, to a lesser extent, the East China Sea. Most of these fields are small and mature faster than China’s onshore fields, prompting CNOOC to explore deepwater plays and to use EOR techniques for its more mature fields.

The Bohai Bay Basin, located in northeastern China east of Beijing, is the oldest oil-producing offshore zone and holds the bulk of proved offshore reserves in China. However, production from shallow waters in the Bohai Bay has been flat over the past few years. CNPC initiated the first phase of the Jidong Nanpu field development in 2007, and hoped to bring 200,000 bbl/d of crude oil production on stream by 2012. However, since then, the company claimed the reserves and production levels were overstated, and further exploration and reserve additions in the field would be necessary to meet its goals.

CNOOC’s production in the Bohai Bay was 404,000 bbl/d in 2014, or nearly two-thirds of the NOC’s domestic oil production. Following an oil leak at China’s largest offshore crude oil field (Penglai 19-3) in July 2011 and a disruption to the field’s total output for more than a year, CNOOC and its partner, ConocoPhillips, resumed production of about 120,000 bbl/d when they received government approval in early 2013. Production from the Penglai project is processed at China’s largest floating production, storage, and offloading (FPSO) vessel with an offloading capacity of 190,000 bbl/d. Further development phases of Penglai are underway. CNOOC made five oil and gas discoveries and brought online one field in Bohai Bay with a peak production of 35,000 bbl/d in 2014. The NOC added another 84,000 bbl/d from small fields in the first few months of 2015 and expects to add another 6,000 bbl/d in the second half of the year.²²

Although the South China Sea (SCS) is known to be gas-rich, CNOOC has also discovered several small oil fields and is focusing on deepwater discoveries. In 2014, CNOOC’s total oil production in the SCS was 222,000 bbl/d, a majority coming from the Pearl River Mouth Basin in the eastern SCS. CNOOC’s significant discoveries in the Enping, Panyu, and Liuhua areas opened up further opportunities for exploration in the eastern SCS. In 2014, CNOOC commenced production from oil fields in the Panyu 10, Enping 24, and Lufeng 7 blocks of the eastern SCS and added 115,000 bbl/d of peak production in the next few years. The NOC anticipates two more oil projects from the western SCS to begin operation in 2015, augmenting offshore production by another 24,000 bbl/d.²³

CNOOC has held annual licensing rounds since 2011, inviting foreign companies to jointly explore and develop offshore blocks in the Bohai Bay, SCS, and ECS. The latest tender was issued in 2014 and included 33 blocks, 12 of which are being carried over from the last bidding round in 2013.²⁴

Territorial disputes

Territorial disputes in the East China Sea to date have limited large-scale development of oil and gas fields in the region, where China and Japan compete for territorial claims. The two countries have held negotiations to resolve the disputes. In June 2008, the two countries reached an agreement to develop jointly the Chunxiao/Shirakaba and Longjing/Asurao gas fields. However, in early 2009, the agreement unraveled when China asserted sovereignty over the fields. Since the agreement was signed, the countries have continued unilateral actions in attempts to develop the gas fields. Tensions escalated with territorial claims by Japan in 2012 over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, China’s installation of a production platform, CNOOC’s proposal to develop several gas fields in the contested area in 2013, and China’s claim to the air space above the islands in 2013. The two sides held talks at the end of 2014 to defuse some of the tension and improve relations over the territorial claims.²⁵

Continued territorial disagreements by countries bordering the South China Sea, including ownership of the Spratly and Paracel Islands, have hindered efforts for joint exploration of hydrocarbon resources in the area. ASEAN members signed the Declaration of Conduct in 2002 that encourages countries to use restraint and cooperate in the South China Sea, but no regulations were established. China stakes claims to the SCS using a “nine-dash line” to determine each country’s maritime borders and resources. Increasing appetites for oil and natural gas have exacerbated tensions, particularly between China and Vietnam and between China and the Philippines, as hydrocarbon development has attracted interest in deepwater areas. China has increased its naval activity in the contested areas, and CNOOC’s June 2012 tender for nine offshore blocks in the disputed area overlaps several fields located within Vietnam’s 200-nautical mile exclusive economic zone. China placed an oil rig in disputed waters near the Paracel islands for two months in 2014 and claimed the purpose was to explore for oil and gas in the area.²⁶ This move caused serious clashes with Vietnamese vessels and has increased tensions within the region. China’s current policy is to forge JV partnerships with the other SCS countries to explore and develop untapped hydrocarbon resources in the sea.

Overseas acquisitions

China’s national oil companies have rapidly expanded their purchases of international oil and natural gas assets since 2008 through direct acquisitions of equity and financial loans in exchange for oil supplies in order to secure more oil and gas supplies, make long-term commercial investments, and gain technical expertise in more challenging oil and natural gas plays.

China’s increasing dependence on oil imports, the need for Chinese companies to develop technical expertise for their more challenging resources, and attempts to capture value upstream are key factors driving Chinese NOCs to invest in international projects and form strategic commercial partnerships with IOCs. Since 2008, the NOCs have purchased assets in the Middle East, North America, Latin America, Africa, and Asia and invested an estimated $73 billion in overseas oil and gas assets between 2011 and 2013, according to the International Energy Agency (IEA). Most of China’s recent direct acquisitions were channeled to deepwater oil plays off the coast of West Africa and Brazil, natural gas and coalbed methane opportunities in Australia, and oil sands and shale gas projects in North America.

China’s oil production from its overseas equity shares and acquisitions grew significantly over the past several years, from 1.36 million bbl/d in 2010 to an estimated 2.1 million bbl/d in 2013, according to the IEA. CNPC holds the most equity production and investment overseas of all the NOCs, although Sinopec, CNOOC, and other smaller NOCs and private companies have rapidly expanded their overseas investment profiles over the past five years. Chinese companies are participating in upstream activities in 42 countries, and half of the overseas oil production stems from the Middle East and Africa. Iraq is a key country where all three of the NOCs have invested in several large fields where they expect production to increase. About 26% of China’s overseas oil production in 2013 was in Iraq.²⁷ Kazakhstan, Sudan, and South Sudan are other countries that have contributed to sizeable portions of China’s overseas production.

In the past few years, China has diversified its overseas upstream acquisitions to include new oil formations in Brazil and North America. Not only do these assets provide commercial opportunities, they allow the NOCs to gain technical expertise in challenging and unconventional plays. Although CNOOC contributed just small amounts to China’s overseas hydrocarbon production for several years, the NOC has swiftly increased oil and gas purchases since 2010 in an attempt to gain technical expertise and acreage in shale oil, shale gas, and coalbed methane and deepwater hydrocarbon resources. Following approval from Canada, CNOOC purchased the Canadian oil company Nexen for $15.1 billion (plus $2.8 billion in Nexen’s net debt) in 2013. This deal became China’s largest overseas acquisition. CNPC, Sinopec, and Sinochem have purchased stakes in producing fields in Canada, the United States, and Brazil as well.

Chinese NOCs have also invested in overseas shale gas and tight gas formations to improve their technical capacities for developing these resources domestically and to secure gas supplies. As China rapidly expands its imports of liquefied natural gas (LNG), the NOCs are seeking supply contracts by purchasing stakes in the upstream developments and liquefaction terminals in the Asia-Pacific region, Canada, and the United States.

By the end of 2013, Chinese NOCs had secured bilateral oil-for-loan deals with several countries, amounting to almost $150 billion.²⁸ China provided loans to countries that need capital to extract energy reserves and build energy infrastructure in exchange for oil and gas imports at established prices. China extended oil-for-loan deals with Russia, Kazakhstan, Venezuela, Brazil, Ecuador, Bolivia, Angola, and Ghana and has had a gas-for-loan agreement with Turkmenistan over the past decade. Venezuela and China signed several deals for more than $45 billion in exchange for 600,000 bbl/d of crude oil and products. Based on China’s trade data, Venezuela falls short of this amount, but the country’s crude oil exports to China have ramped up markedly from four years ago and were 276,000 bbl/d in 2014. The recent low oil price environment is affecting Venezuela’s upstream development and export capacity in the near term, and China provided another $5 million in 2015 for oil investment.²⁹ Several oil and gas deals have been signed with Russia in the past few years, including two loan-for-oil deals amounting to $50 million, signaling China’s move to diversify its energy supply. Each of the deals includes 300,000 bbl/d of oil transported through the ESPO pipeline from Russia to China. CNPC and Russia’s Rosneft formed a JV, where CNPC holds a 49% stake, to develop Russia’s East Siberian oil fields, which are expected to help meet the export requirements of the deals.³⁰ These agreements signal the growing energy ties between the neighboring countries and China’s interest in gaining more access to Russian oil.

Crude oil imports

Substantial oil demand growth and geopolitical uncertainties have led China to import greater volumes of crude oil from a wide range of sources.

China’s crude oil imports by source, 2014

As China’s oil demand continues to outstrip production at home and the country continues building its strategic petroleum reserves, oil imports have increased dramatically over the past decade, reaching record highs set in 2014. To ensure adequate oil supply and mitigate geopolitical uncertainties, China has diversified its sources of crude oil imports in recent years. China imported nearly 6.2 million bbl/d of crude oil on average in 2014, rising 9% from 5.6 million bbl/d in 2013, according to China’s customs data and FGE.³¹ China’s crude oil imports continued to remain high in the first few months of 2015 and climbed to a record-high level of 7.4 million bbl/d in April 2015.

Total net oil imports, driven primarily by crude oil imports, now outweigh domestic supply, and oil import dependency has risen from 30% in 2000 to about 57% in 2014 by EIA estimates. The government’s current Five-Year Plan targets oil imports reaching no more than 61% of its demand by the end of 2015.³² China’s dependence on crude oil imports in the longer term will be determined by the sustainability and growth of domestic oil production, the rate of oil consumption growth as the government aims to create more sustainable economic growth, the speed of strategic and commercial stock fill, the fuel efficiency gains in transportation, and any substitution of fuels such as natural gas for oil.

The Middle East remains the largest source of China’s crude oil imports, although African countries, particularly Angola, began contributing more to China’s imports in the past decade. As part of China’s energy supply security policy, the country’s NOCs are attempting to diversify supply sources in various regions through overseas investments in upstream oil projects and long-term contracts. In 2014, the Middle East supplied China with 3.2 million bbl/d (52%). Other regions that export oil to China include Africa with 1.4 million bbl/d (22%), the Americas with 667,000 bbl/d (11%), Russia and the former Soviet Union with 778,000 bbl/d (13%), the Asia-Pacific region with 127,000 bbl/d (2%), and 27,300 bbl/d (<1%) from other countries. Saudi Arabia and Angola remain China’s two largest sources of oil imports, and together they account for 29% of China’s total crude oil imports.³³

Global oil supply disruptions in recent years have shifted China’s crude oil supply portfolio and forced the country to diversify its sources. Sudan and South Sudan became significant oil exporters to China until production was shut in at the beginning of 2012, following political conflicts between the two African nations over their oil resources. Exports from Sudan and South Sudan to China dropped from 260,000 bbl/d in 2011 to zero by April 2012. As production in the two African countries returned, China resumed a reduced level of imports, reaching 164,000 bbl/d in 2014. The ensuing shut-in of some of Libya’s oil production since political uprisings began in 2011 has also affected oil exports to China. Despite some Libyan exports that were brought back online in 2012, the political situation has deteriorated overall, and oil exports to China fell to just 19,000 bbl/d in 2014.

Historically, Iran was China’s third-largest source of crude imports until 2012, when Russia surpassed it. Following U.S. and European sanctions on Iranian crude oil sales resulting from disagreements on Iran’s nuclear program, China reduced its average annual oil import levels from Iran to maintain diplomatic ties with the United States and Europe. In 2012, China imported 439,000 bbl/d from Iran, or 20% less crude oil, from a high of 555,000 bbl/d in 2011. Iran constituted 8% of China’s crude oil imports in 2012 and 2013 compared to 11% in 2011. Negotiations between Iran and six countries, including the United States and China, at the end of 2013 allowed Chinese buyers to raise Iranian imports back to levels before the sanctions took effect. Future crude import levels from Iran hinge on the final outcome of the nuclear agreement that was forged in April 2015 and how quickly oil-related sanctions can be lifted. Even if production resumes to pre-disruption levels from these countries, most analysts expect that China will continue to diversify import sources to reduce geopolitical risks and oil supply uncertainties.

China replaced the share of oil lost from Iran, Sudan and South Sudan, and Libya with imports from other Middle Eastern countries (United Arab Emirates, Oman, and Iraq), Angola, Venezuela, and Russia. China and Russia have signed deals for Russia to send China up to 800,000 bbl/d of crude oil by 2018, mostly by pipeline. Currently, Russia sends oil to China via pipeline, ship, and rail, primarily from Russia’s fields in East Siberia.³⁴ To help meet its contract obligations to China, Russia holds a swap deal with Kazakhstan in 2013 and exports oil from its western Siberian fields through links to the currently underutilized Kazakhstan-to-China pipeline.³⁵ China has significantly increased imports from Iraq, although future import growth is likely to depend on the pace of infrastructure development and the political situation in Iraq.

Pipeline connections

China is improving its domestic oil pipeline network to integrate its oil supply and demand centers and to diversify its oil import sources through pipeline links with Kazakhstan, Russia, and Myanmar.

China has actively sought to improve the integration of the country’s domestic oil pipeline network, as well as to establish international oil pipeline connections with neighboring countries to diversify oil import routes. According to CNPC, China had about 15,657 miles of total crude oil pipelines (70% managed by CNPC and the remaining 30% by other NOCs) and 12,605 miles of oil products pipelines in its domestic network at the end of 2013.³⁶ The bulk of China’s oil pipeline infrastructure serves the more-industrialized coastal markets and the northeastern region. However, several long-distance pipeline links have been built or are under construction to deliver oil supplies from the northwestern region or from downstream refining centers to more-remote markets in the central and southwestern regions.

China inaugurated its first transnational oil pipeline in 2006, when it began receiving Kazakh and Russian oil from a pipeline originating in Kazakhstan. The pipeline, developed by a joint venture between CNPC and Kazakhstan’s KazMunayGas (KMG) and financed by Chinese loans, transports oil from the oilfields in western and central Kazakhstan to China. The pipeline, which has been developed in stages, connects Atyrau in western Kazakhstan on the Caspian Sea with Alashankou on the Chinese border in Xinjiang. The pipeline’s initial capacity was 200,000 bbl/d, and an expansion in 2013 along the route from central Kazakhstan to China doubled the capacity to 400,000 bbl/d on the Atasu-to-Alashankou section. Further infrastructure expansion and export capabilities are contingent on the development of Kazakhstan’s Kashagan field as well as domestic requirements on the Kazakh side.³⁷

Russia’s new East Siberian oil fields have become another source for Chinese crude oil imports. Russian state-owned oil giant Transneft constructed the Eastern Siberia-Pacific Ocean (ESPO) Pipeline, extending 3,000 miles from the Russian city of Taishet to the Pacific Coast in two stages. The first stage of the project included the construction of a 740,000-bbl/d pipeline from Taishet to Skovorodino in Russia. CNPC also built a 597-mile pipeline linking the spur with the Daqing oil field in the Northeast. The pipeline spur to China became operational in January 2011, and delivers up to 300,000 bbl/d of Russian oil to the Chinese border under an original 20-year supply contract between the two countries. The second stage of ESPO came online at the end of 2012 and delivers oil to the Russian Pacific port of Kozmino. This port provides Russia the option to send more crude oil to China via a sea route. Russia anticipates expanding the ESPO transmission capacity to Skovorodino to 1.6 million bbl/d by 2020 and augmenting contracted supply to China through this route.³⁸

China launched an oil import pipeline with a capacity of 440,000 bbl/d from Myanmar in January 2015.³⁹ Myanmar is not a significant oil producer, so the pipeline is envisioned as an alternative transport route for crude oil from the Middle East that would bypass the potential choke point of the Strait of Malacca, which approximately 80% of China’s oil imports traverse based on crude oil import sources and routes. CNPC plans to send crude oil from the pipeline to serve the Yunnan/Anning refinery that is slated to start operations in 2016 and to the Chongqing refinery that could begin operations in 2017. In the meantime, China plans to store any oil imports from the pipeline in excess of local demand.

Refining

As part of its goal to diversify crude oil import sources and meet oil product demand, China has steadily augmented its refining capacity, which exceeded 14 million bbl/d by 2015. However, weaker Chinese oil demand growth in recent years created excess refining capacity, and many refinery projects are experiencing delays in construction.

China has steadily expanded its oil refining capacity to meet its strong demand growth and to process a wider range of crude oil types. The country now ranks behind only the United States and the European Union in the amount of refining capacity. China’s installed crude refining capacity reached nearly 14.2 million bbl/d by 2015, about 680,000 bbl/d higher than in 2013, according to FGE.⁴⁰ Two new greenfield terminals started operations in the first half of 2014—CNPC’s Pengzhou and Sinochem’s Quanzhou, which contributed to most of the capacity additions that year. However, no new terminals are expected to come online until the latter half of 2016, and only a few expansion projects are expected to add incremental capacity of less than 200,000 bbl/d in 2015. Some of the new refineries are designed to accept all grades of crude oil, making Chinese refineries a strong regional competitor. The country intends to meet its domestic demand, which has grown rapidly in the past several years, but also to export petroleum products within the region.

Refinery utilization rates have declined to less than 75% in the past year as Chinese companies continued to build refining capacity against a backdrop of slower oil demand growth in China and around the world.⁴¹ The government expanded refining companies’ product export quotas in 2014 and 2015 because domestic demand growth had slackened since 2012. The NDRC claims that incremental refining capacity is expected to be 3.4 million bbl/d between 2016 and 2020. However, industry analysts anticipate China would add only 1.5 million bbl/d of net capacity between 2015 and 2020, as a result of several project delays and overcapacity during the past two years. Projects such as CNOOC’s Huizhou expansion, CNPC’s Huabei, Anning, and Jieyang, and Sinopec’s Zhangjiang have all been pushed back by one to two years from their originally planned start dates.⁴²

Recent heavy pollution in certain areas of China prompted the NDRC to adopt stricter petroleum product specifications that are intended to lower sulfur emissions from gasoline and diesel use. The agency requires refineries to implement the equivalent of Euro IV standards for transportation fuels nationwide in 2015 and Euro V standards by January 2017, a year ahead of the prior schedule.⁴³ Shanghai and Beijing are already supplying only fuels that meet Euro V standards. Sinopec and CNPC are investing in refinery upgrades to meet these emissions standards, but the small independent refineries are facing economic challenges of additional cost.

China’s notable refinery projects and expansions

Company owner	Location	Capacity	Start date	Notes
Sinopec	Caofeidian/Tianjin	240,000	2020+	Construction; Received NDRC approval January 2015; Plans to process crude oil from Saudi Arabia
Sinopec	Guangdong/Zhanjiang	300,000	2017	Construction; Developing with Kuwait Petroleum (30%) and Total (20%)
Sinopec	Hainan	100,000	2020+	Environmental approval received February 2013
Sinopec	Luoyang	160,000	2020	Expansion project
CNPC/PetroChina	Huabei	100,000	2017	Upgrading; Construction
CNPC/PetroChina	Anning/Yunnan	200,000	2016	Construction; Plans to process oil from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait via the crude oil pipeline from Myanmar; JV with Saudi Aramco (39%) and Yuntianhua Group (10%)
CNPC/PetroChina	Guangdong/Jieyang	400,000	2018	Construction; JV with PDVSA (40%)
CNPC/PetroChina	Tianjin	320,000	2020	Construction agreement signed between partners; JV with Rosneft (49%)
CNOOC	Ningbo Daxie/Zhejiang	140,000	2015	Construction; Expansion to 300,000 bbl/d
CNOOC	Huizhou Phase 2	200,000	2016	Construction; Expansion
Sources: U.S. Energy Information Administration based on FACTS Global Energy,44 International Energy Agency,45 Reuters, company information.

The oil refining sector has undergone modernization and consolidation in recent years, shutting down dozens of smaller, independent refineries (commonly known as teapots). These smaller, independent refineries account for more than 20% of China’s total refinery capacity.⁴⁶ The NDRC issued guidelines in 2011 to eliminate refineries smaller than 40,000 bbl/d by the end of 2013 in an effort to encourage economies of scale and efficiency measures. Several of these local refineries, mostly located in the northeastern Shandong province, expanded their capacity or consolidated with larger firms to avoid closing, and some continued to operate. Recent refining capacity overruns, unfavorable economics, higher oil product consumption taxes on fuel oil at the end of 2014, and restrictions to crude oil imports imposed on independent refiners have pressed the local government in Shandong to streamline capacity of these small facilities. In addition to placing a moratorium on new projects as of 2014, the Shandong government added other reforms including a refining capacity ceiling of 90,000 bbl/d by 2017.⁴⁷ The NDRC announced a policy in early 2015 allowing local refiners to gain greater access to imported crude oil if they reduce excess capacity and remove facilities with less than 40,000 bbl/d in capacity, modernize or remove antiquated facilities, and build oil storage facilities.⁴⁸

Domestic price regulations for petroleum products resulted in revenue losses for Chinese refiners, particularly small ones, in the past few years when international oil prices were high. This price differential squeezed refineries’ profit margins, leading to reduced processing rates at some independent refineries. The oil price reforms recently implemented by the NDRC have reduced some of these revenue losses and allowed refiners to be more responsive to domestic demand and global markets.

Although China remains an overall net oil product importer, the country became a net diesel fuel exporter in mid-2012, mostly to other Asian countries, as growth in domestic oil product demand slowed. The NDRC issues export quotas on oil products to NOCs to ensure that domestic demand for major oil products is met, with the possibility to extend the quotas if supply exceeds demand. The government set export quotas at 73 million barrels of oil products in 2015, up from 60 million barrels in 2014.⁴⁹ In 2014, China imported approximately 600,000 bbl/d and exported about 586,000 bbl/d of petroleum products.⁵⁰ As refining capacity expands, albeit at a much slower pace during the next two years, exports of products, particularly gasoline, jet fuel, and diesel, are likely to grow. Meanwhile, imports of liquefied petroleum gas and naphtha have increased over the past few years.

NOC participation

Sinopec and CNPC/PetroChina are the two dominant players in China’s oil refining sector, respectively accounting for 41% and 31% of the country’s capacity in 2014, according to FGE.⁵¹ Sinopec, which operated 5.6 million bbl/d of total oil processing capacity in China in 2014 and holds a significant refining presence in the coastal and southern areas of China, is the largest oil refiner in the world. Sinopec relies heavily on imported crude oil for its refineries, and most of the NOC’s refineries are configured to handle crude oil higher in sulfur and acidity.

The other NOCs are now building refineries and pipelines to compete with Sinopec’s strong presence in China’s downstream markets. CNPC expanded its downstream presence in southern China, and it started commercial operations of its 200,000-bbl/d Pengzhou refinery in Sichuan Province at the beginning of 2014. CNOOC entered the downstream sector by commissioning the company’s first refinery, the 240,000 bbl/d Huizhou plant in 2009. The NOC anticipates expanding this refinery by 200,000 bbl/d in 2015. Sinochem commissioned its first major refinery, Quanzhou, at the end of 2013.

National oil companies from Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Russia, Qatar, and Venezuela have also entered into joint ventures with Chinese companies to build integrated refinery and petrochemical projects and to gain a foothold in China’s downstream oil sector.

Chinese companies have ventured into overseas refining opportunities. In addition to its strong domestic presence, Sinopec is gradually investing in refining assets overseas, and the company purchased a 37.5% stake in Saudi Arabia’s 400,000 bbl/d Yanbu refinery and began processing heavy crude oils in 2015. Sinopec has entered into joint venture partnerships to develop refinery projects in Africa and Latin America and invested in oil storage projects abroad. CNPC branched out to acquire refinery stakes in other countries to move downstream and secure more global trading and arbitrage opportunities. The company’s purchases of refinery shares in Singapore and Japan a few years ago are cases where CNPC was looking for a share in the region’s refining opportunities. Also, CNPC has invested in refineries and pipelines in African countries in exchange for exploration and production rights.

Strategic petroleum reserves and crude oil storage

China’s plan to construct crude oil storage through both state-owned strategic petroleum reserves and commercial crude oil reserves reflects its need to secure energy in light of its growing reliance on oil imports. The government intends to build strategic crude oil storage capacity of at least 500 million barrels by 2020.

In response to China’s need for energy security and its growing reliance on oil imports, the country is in the process of developing significant storage capacity to buffer geopolitical issues involving global oil supply. In China’s 10th Five-Year Plan (2001-2005), Chinese officials decided to establish a government-administered strategic petroleum reserve program (SPR) to help shield the country from potential oil supply disruptions. The plan involves three phases and calls for China to construct facilities that can hold 500 million barrels of crude oil by 2020. Currently, China has built between 141 and 180 million barrels of total storage capacity for the SPR, and several sites are under construction. SPR sites are operated almost exclusively by the major Chinese NOCs, although the Chinese government recently encouraged private investment in crude oil storage. Phase 1, completed in 2009, has a total storage capacity of 103 million barrels at four sites. China reported that this first phase held 91 million barrels at the end of 2014. Phase 2 is expected to add about 170 million barrels to the SPR capacity by 2020, and another 232 million barrels are proposed for phase three.⁵² Industry sources report that at least two Phase 2 sites, which add 39 million barrels to the capacity, were completed in 2011, and possibly two more came online in 2014.⁵³ Some of the Phase 2 sites are located inland in western and central China, while the others are scattered along the eastern and southern coasts, allowing China to fill the facilities from various sources. Once these sites are commissioned, there is an incentive for China to continue building crude oil inventories to enhance the country’s oil supplies. High levels of crude oil imports in 2014 could indicate that China was filling some of its SPR.

In addition to the strategic reserves of crude oil, China held around 350 million barrels of commercial crude oil storage capacity at the beginning of 2014.⁵⁴ The distinction between future strategic and commercial storage reserve capacity is not clearly defined, and there could be crossover between some of the facilities.

Stockpiling rates for strategic and commercial storage in China depend on factors such as supply security, crude oil prices, domestic demand, domestic policy goals, and the storage capacity build. The Chinese government reported the average Brent crude price was $58/barrel for purchasing oil in Phase 1.⁵⁵ However, prices in the past few years until mid-2014 have averaged more than $100/barrel, making purchases for storage more expensive. While China’s official stocks are not disclosed on a regular or complete basis, commercial stocks have fluctuated over the past four years based on swings in crude oil imports and refining runs each month. One driving factor for additional stock build in the next several years is China’s goal to hold at least 90 days’ worth of net oil imports by 2020.

Natural gas

China’s natural gas production and consumption, 2000-2013

Although natural gas production and use is rapidly increasing in China, the fuel comprised only 5% of the country’s total primary energy consumption in 2012. Heavy investments in upstream development and greater import opportunities are likely to underpin significant growth in China’s natural gas sector.China held 164 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of proved natural gas reserves in January 2015, according to data released by OGJ, 9 Tcf higher than reserves estimated in 2014 and the largest in the Asia-Pacific region. China’s natural gas production and demand have risen substantially in the past decade. China more than tripled natural gas production to 4.1 Tcf between 2003 and 2013. FGE estimates that natural gas output continued rising in 2014 to more than 4.4 Tcf. The government targets 6.5 Tcf of natural gas production by 2020 in line with its desire to use more natural gas to replace other hydrocarbons in the country’s energy portfolio.⁵⁶

The Chinese government anticipates boosting the share of natural gas as part of total energy consumption to at least 10% by 2020 to alleviate high levels of pollution resulting from the country’s heavy coal use.⁵⁷ Consumption in 2013 rose to 5.7 Tcf, 12% greater than 2012, and the country imported about 1.8 Tcf of liquefied natural gas (LNG) and pipeline gas to fill the gap. Although the majority of gas consumption stems from industrial users (32% in 2013), the shares of gas consumption in the power and transportation sectors have been rising over the past decade.⁵⁸ To meet projected long-term demand increases, China is expected to continue importing natural gas in the form of LNG and from a number of new and proposed import pipelines from neighboring countries. It will also have to tap into its expanding domestic reserves and establish a wider domestic natural gas network and storage capacity.

China was traditionally a net gas exporter until 2007, when it became a net natural gas importer for the first time. Since then, gas imports have increased dramatically in tandem with rapidly developing pipeline and natural gas processing infrastructure. Natural gas imports, which met 32% of demand in 2013, have become an increasingly significant part of China’s gas supply portfolio.

Sector organization

The NOCs lead the natural gas development of China. Similar to oil exploration and production, these companies partner with international companies to develop natural gas projects requiring more technical expertise. The shifting landscape of China’s natural gas supply sources towards greater imports and the need to bolster investment were the factors leading the government to implement the recent price reforms and align domestic natural gas prices more closely to market-based rates.

As with oil, the natural gas sector is dominated by the three principal state-owned oil and gas companies: CNPC, Sinopec, and CNOOC. CNPC is the country’s largest natural gas company in both the upstream and downstream sectors. CNPC accounts for roughly 77% of China’s total natural gas production, according to FGE.⁵⁹ Sinopec operates the Puguang natural gas field in Sichuan Province, one of China’s most promising upstream assets. CNOOC led the development of China’s first three LNG import terminals at Guangdong, Fujian, and Shanghai and manages much of the country’s offshore production. CNOOC typically uses PSC agreements with foreign companies wanting to jointly develop upstream offshore projects and has the right to acquire up to a 51% working interest in all offshore discoveries once the IOC recovers its development costs.⁶⁰

China’s rapidly growing natural gas demand over the past few years has opened up opportunities for independent Chinese energy companies to operate in the LNG space and in unconventional gas production. China’s three NOCs own majority stakes in most of the existing and proposed terminals, although the swiftly changing LNG landscape is opening up opportunities for smaller local and private firms. Several local state-owned municipalities, gas distributors, and power developers own minority stakes in several existing LNG terminals, and two non-NOCs (Shenergy Group and JOVO Group) hold majority ownership in facilities. In 2013, JOVO Group became the first private Chinese company to own a majority stake in a regasification terminal, and the company signed a long-term contract with Malaysia’s Petronas, marking the first private company to hold a long term LNG purchase agreement. The government initiated a new policy in early 2014 to allow access rights to third party companies for supplying natural gas to LNG terminals, providing more supply opportunities from firms involved along the entire LNG value chain, from the upstream gas procurement to the downstream distribution. Development of unconventional gas supply, primarily from coal-bed methane or shale gas, has attracted greater interest from private investment, and local and private Chinese companies are involved in owning and exploring these resources.

Natural gas pricing and reforms

China’s natural gas prices, similar to retail oil prices, are regulated by the NDRC and have been kept below international market rates. China’s nascent natural gas market has flourished in the past few years and has become more complex as relatively expensive gas imports began to compete with domestic production. In order to bolster investment in the natural gas sector, to create more transparency in the pricing system and responsiveness to market fluctuations, and to make domestic natural gas competitive with other fuels and imported gas, the NDRC implemented a new system linking gas prices more closely to higher international oil prices.

China launched a pilot program for natural gas price reform in the southern provinces of Guangdong and Guangxi at the end of 2011. Following this pilot phase, China rolled out the reforms on a nationwide basis for all customers, apart from the residential and fertilizer sectors, in July 2013 as a three-phase reform process. The new system links the natural gas prices at the citygate (delivery point from a gas transmission pipeline to a local distribution utility) to the price of imported fuel oil and liquefied petroleum gas. The linked natural gas price is discounted to some degree to encourage use of natural gas rather than coal. The pricing scheme covers natural gas from imported pipeline gas, most domestic onshore sources, and LNG imports sent through pipelines. Prices for shale gas, coalbed methane, and coal-to-gas, and LNG imports sold at the terminal for local distribution can be negotiated between the producer and the wholesale buyer and are not subject to regulation. The reform created two categories of prices, one for existing demand based on 2012 consumption (Tier 1) and incremental natural gas demand above 2012 levels (Tier 2). The NDRC raised the average price for all Tier 1 customers by about 15% for non residential consumers. Average citygate ceiling prices for the second tier were set about $3.7/MMBtu higher than the first-tier volumes.⁶¹

In September 2014, China ushered in the second phase of the reforms by increasing the prices for existing demand (Tier 1) by around 20%, while keeping the price caps for the incremental demand (Tier 2) the same.⁶² At this time, China created market-based prices for all imported LNG, shale gas, coalbed methane, and coal-to-gas even for volumes transported through the long-distance pipeline network. This policy allows sellers to market the gas directly to buyers through independent sales agreements.

In the third phase, which took effect April 1, 2015, the government combined the prices of the two tiers into one price by lowering the price for incremental demand and raising the price for the existing customer base. This last phase effectively lowered the price of Tier 2 customers by about $1.90/MMBtu and slightly raised the price for Tier 1 customers by $0.17/MMBtu, resulting in a weighted average price of 2.51 yuan/cubic meter ($10.62/MMBtu). Overall, average regulated citygate prices increased by more than 36% between the time prior to the reforms in 2013 and the third phase in 2015, according to IHS Energy.⁶³ The NDRC plans to adjust this price ceiling every six months in line with the LPG and fuel oil prices. China also intends to create more market-based rates for residential customers by the end of 2015, but this directive has not been clearly defined yet.⁶⁴

Exploration and production

China’s shale oil and gas basins
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, Technically Recoverable Shale Oil and Shale Gas Resources: An Assessment of 137 Shale Formations in 41 Countries Outside the United States, 2013.

China contains several natural gas-producing regions, including the western and central parts of the country as well as offshore basins. While eager to develop older natural gas fields, China’s oil companies are exploring and developing frontier plays such as deepwater, shale gas, and gas derived from coal seams. The country’s first deepwater field came online in 2014, and similar developments are under development.China’s primary onshore natural gas-producing regions are Sichuan Province in the Southwest (Sichuan Basin); the Xinjiang and Qinghai Provinces in the Northwest (Tarim, Junggar, and Qaidam Basins); and Shanxi Province in the North (Ordos Basin). China has delved into several offshore natural gas fields located in the Bohai Basin and the Panyu complex of the Pearl River Mouth Basin (South China Sea) and also is exploring more technically challenging areas such as deepwater, coalbed methane, and shale gas reserves with foreign companies.

SouthwestThe Sichuan Basin is China’s key natural gas-producing area in the southwestern region. The largest recent discoveries in this region are Sinopec’s high-sulfur natural gas finds at the Yuanba and Puguang fields. Sinopec started commercial production at Puguang in 2010 and ramped up to its peak capacity of 350 Bcf in 2012. Sinopec anticipates the field will produce at this level for about two decades. The NOC anticipates the Yuanba field, which began operation in 2014, will produce 120 Bcf/y by 2016.⁶⁵

Sichuan Province also holds five high-sulfur content (sour) gas fields in the Chuandongbei basin. In 2007, CNPC awarded a 30-year PSC to Chevron to bring the technically challenging fields online by 2010. Field development has encountered several delays, and initial production has been pushed back to 2015 at the earliest.⁶⁶ Chevron is building two sour natural gas processing plants with a combined production capacity of 204 Bcf/y.⁶⁷ CNPC also announced a major new discovery in 2014 and claims that the Anyue gas field holds nearly 11 Tcf of technically recoverable reserves.⁶⁸

Northwest

Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region historically has been home to one of China’s largest and most prolific gas-producing regions, with output of 980 Bcf in 2014. The Tarim Basin in Xinjiang was the second-largest gas-producing basin in China in 2014, supplying 832 Bcf/y, or 19% of China’s total production.⁶⁹ The basin’s complex geological features make development costs relatively high. CNPC’s two cross-country West-East Gas Pipelines, connecting Xinjiang to Shanghai, Beijing, and Guangdong, have greatly expanded the upstream potential for the Tarim Basin to supply markets in eastern China. The Tarim Basin’s major fields—Kela-2, Dina-2, Yaha, and Yingmaili—are still undergoing exploration and development and are key sources supplying the West-East Pipelines.⁷⁰ Other new discoveries in the Northwest that have high gas supply potential are the Junggar Basin in Xinjiang Province and the Qaidam Basin in Qinghai Province.

Northeast

The Changqing oil and gas area in the Ordos basin is China’s largest gas-producing area and houses the Sulige gas field. Development of this region is both geologically and technically challenging, and most of the reserves are tight gas (characterized by low permeability and low pressure and usually requiring hydraulic fracturing for commercial production). Partnering with IOCs Total and Shell Oil, CNPC is effectively using advanced drilling techniques and recovery methods to retrieve natural gas from projects in the South Sulige and Changbei fields. Changqing’s production rose steadily over the past decade to 1,347 Bcf in 2014, and constituted 31% of China’s total gas output.⁷¹

The Songliao basin holds the Daqing oil and gas field, which produced 124 Bcf in 2014.⁷² Also, China began the process of reinjecting carbon dioxide to enhance recovery rates for the mature fields in this area. The Jilin oil field recently began using CO2 injection produced from the associated Changling gas field for enhanced recovery.

Offshore

Offshore zones have also received increasing attention for upstream natural gas developments in China, and CNOOC is the primary stakeholder of exploration rights. The NOC produced about 175 Bcf in 2014 in the South China Sea (SCS). The western South China Sea accounted for about 53% of CNOOC’s domestic gas production, although the NOC sees great potential for development in the eastern South China Sea.⁷³ The western South China Sea is home to the Yacheng 13-1 field, China’s largest offshore natural gas field and a primary source of energy for Hong Kong’s power stations. However, production levels from the Yacheng 13-1 field and a few others are in decline, forcing CNOOC to explore and develop other nearby blocks and explore more deepwater areas to replace diminishing reserves. Other fields have entered operations since 2005 and offset some declines from Yacheng, and CNOOC’s long-term development plans include exploration of deepwater fields in the Pearl River Mouth and Qiongdongnan Basins.

The eastern SCS is under intense exploration for natural gas. The NOC partnered with Husky Energy to develop China’s first large-scale deepwater gas project at Liwan 3-1, which started production at its first field in early 2014. The project’s second field came online at the end of 2014. CNOOC expects the Liwan gas project, which includes three fields and 4 to 6 Tcf of reserves, to ramp up production to 180 Bcf/y by 2018 and to be one of the company’s largest new sources of incremental gas production in the next few years.⁷⁴ As development continues, other deepwater fields such as Panyu 34-1 will feed into the main processing platform at Liwan. CNOOC made two significant gas discoveries in the Qiongdongnan Basin, Lingshui 17-2 and Lingshui 25-1, and the company claims Lingshui 17-2 is one of China’s largest offshore discoveries with proved reserves estimated to be 3.5 Tcf.⁷⁵ Other IOCs, namely Chevron, BG, BP, Anadarko, and Eni, signed PSCs for more deepwater hydrocarbon blocks in the SCS.

Coalbed methane, coal-to-gas, and shale gas

The coalbed methane (CBM), coal-to-gas (CTG) or synthetic natural gas (SNG), and shale gas industries in China are in early stages of development because of technical and water resource challenges, regulatory hurdles, transportation constraints, and competition with other fuels and conventional natural gas. However, China’s potential wealth of these resources has spurred the government to seek foreign investors with technical expertise to exploit them.

Most of China’s CBM volumes are from basins in the North and Northeast, the Sichuan basin in the Southwest, and the Junggar and Tarim basins in the West. FGE reported that CBM production in 2014 was an estimated 584 Bcf, up from about 475 Bcf in 2013, from both surface wells and coal mines. China’s NEA set the most recent 2020 target for production at 1.4 Tcf of CBM, half from extraction of coal, and half from surface mining. Most of the CBM production is from coal mine extraction, which hinders higher utilization rates because some of the methane gas that seeps from the underground mines is vented. Current utilization rates are about 45%, and China intends to reduce the production waste and increase consumption of coalbed methane. Although CBM production is increasing, company developers face regulatory hurdles, technical challenges, lack of pipeline infrastructure from linking coal-mining areas to gas markets, high development costs, and competition with other forms of natural gas supply. At times, there are conflicting interests between governing bodies when dealing with mineral and land rights. The local governments hold rights to coal mines, whereas the central government has rights to natural gas and CBM. China’s State Council issued a policy guideline in September 2013 encouraging investment in CBM exploration and development and more pipeline infrastructure through financial incentives and tax breaks to producers and reform of local price controls.⁷⁶

China’s first commercial CBM pipeline became operational in late 2009, linking the Qinshui Basin with the West-to-East pipeline. Several other pipelines, mostly in the Shanxi Province of north central China, have become operational, and several more are under construction. China also uses many small liquefaction plants and trucks to transport CBM to demand centers.

After 2012, China was rapidly approving CTG projects so that it could use its vast resources of coal to satisfy growing natural gas demand along the eastern and southern coastal areas. As a result of looser government regulations and more favorable economics for natural gas projects, Local power and coal companies and NOCs entered the market to develop several CTG projects. Although China’s original CTG production target was 530 Bcf by 2015, the industry has experienced very slow progress. China produced only 75 Bcf in 2014 from its two operational CTG plants—Datang Group’s plant located in the northern province of Inner Mongolia and Kingho Energy Group’s plant in the northwestern Xinjiang province—that have a combined capacity of less than 100 Bcf/y.⁷⁷ However, these plants are running at low utilization rates as a result of technical problems and design issues. Three other projects are under construction, including Sinopec’s Zhundong project, China’s largest CTG project located in Xinjiang province. The plant is scheduled to come online in 2017 and connect with pipelines carrying the natural gas towards eastern China. So far, the NDRC has approved 15 large-scale CTG projects with a total capacity of more than 2,800 Bcf/y.⁷⁸

Several more facilities are in the planning phase, but CTG projects face high capital costs required to develop the attendant infrastructure, require scarce water resources, and produce high levels of emissions. These factors could affect the potential construction of many of these projects. China’s NEA is concerned that the industry does not overbuild with several small facilities, so they imposed a regulation that requires CTG plants to have a capacity of at least 70 Bcf/y to operate.⁷⁹

Even though China’s shale gas industry has vast potential for growth, it is currently in nascent stages, and developers and regulators are working through many challenges. Most of China’s proved shale gas resources are in the Sichuan and Tarim basins in the southern and western regions and in the northern and northeastern basins. EIA estimates from its most recent report on shale oil and gas resources that China’s technically recoverable shale gas reserves are 1,115 Tcf, the largest shale gas reserves in the world.⁸⁰ Shale gas production, mostly from Sinopec’s Fuling block and CNPC’s Changning-Weiyuan block in the Sichuan basin, grew by more than five times between 2013 and 2014 and reached 46 Bcf/y. Sinopec’s recent success in developing its Fuling gas field is significantly boosting production levels, and the NOC reported that Fuling could ramp up output to 353 Bcf by 2017.⁸¹ Despite this significant discovery, current shale gas production is falling short of the Ministry of Land Resources’ original goal to produce 230 Bcf of shale gas by the end of 2015. As part of China’s new energy targets, the government halved the original 2020 shale gas production target to about 1,060 Bcf, a more realistic goal based on the geological risks, lack of water needed for shale resource development, and lower-than-expected production rates. Even though there is great potential for shale gas development in China, greater investment in these technically challenging plays and attendant infrastructure is necessary as drilling costs remain high. Also, shale gas is competing against several other sources of natural gas, which may take precedence in the near term. Several industry analysts anticipate China’s shale gas production will play a significant role in the natural gas supply slate after 2020.⁸²

Although several small, local Chinese companies have entered China’s shale gas industry, state-owned companies, primarily CNPC and Sinopec, own the vast majority of China’s shale gas resources. These NOCs are partnering with several IOCs to gain necessary technical skills and investment for developing these geologically challenging resources. CNPC and Shell signed the first PSC for the Fushun-Yonghchuan block of shale gas in the Sichuan Basin in March 2012. Shell also has partnered with Sinopec and CNOOC on two other shale gas plays. Sinopec is working with Chevron and ConocoPhillips to explore shale gas resources in the Qiannan and Sichuan basins, respectively. Although the IOCs have drilled several wells so far, these projects are still in assessment stages. Chinese NOCs have also actively invested in shale oil and gas plays in North America to gain technical expertise in this arena.

China held its first shale gas licensing round in 2011 for four blocks in the Sichuan Basin and awarded the tenders to two Chinese companies: Sinopec and Henan Coal. Tendering is available not only to NOCs but also to private and local companies, and foreign investors may participate indirectly if they hold a PSC contract with a participating Chinese firm. The State Council released shale gas from the jurisdiction of the NOCs, allowing the MLR to open a larger second bidding round in mid-2012. The MLR awarded 19 blocks to 16 domestic companies, mostly to coal producers, power companies, and local energy firms. Since these companies have limited shale gas experience and the capital required for such projects, they may partner with China’s larger state-owned companies or with foreign companies. China’s third shale gas round was expected to launch in 2013 but continues to experience delays. The MLR is in the process of selecting blocks based on high quality and greater potential to attract investors.⁸³

Pipeline connections

China continues to invest in natural gas pipeline infrastructure to link production areas in the western and northern regions of the country with demand centers along the coast and to accommodate greater imports from Central Asia and Southeast Asia.

Key oil and natural gas pipelines in China
Source: PetroChina

China had nearly 35,498 miles of main natural gas pipelines at the end of 2013.⁸⁴ China’s natural gas pipeline network is fragmented, although NOCs are rapidly investing in the expansion of the transmission system to connect more supplies to demand centers along the coast and in the southern regions as well as integrating local gas distribution networks. While the major NOCs operate the trunk pipelines, local transmission networks are operated by various local distribution companies throughout China. China intends to increase its natural gas pipeline network to 74,564 miles by 2020.⁸⁵

CNPC is the key operator of the main gas pipelines, including the West-East Pipelines, and holds nearly 80% of the gas transmission in China.⁸⁶ CNPC moved into the downstream gas sector recently through investments in gas retail projects as well as investments in several pipeline projects to facilitate transportation for its growing gas supply. CNPC developed three parallel pipelines, called the Shan-Jing pipelines, linking the major Ordos basin in the North with Beijing and surrounding areas. The third Shan-Jing pipeline began operations in 2011. The NOC completed in 2013 its Zhongwei to Guiyang Gas pipeline, which delivers gas from the West-East pipeline network in the north-central part of the country to the gas markets in southwestern China. Sinopec is also a major player in the downstream transmission sector, operating long-haul pipelines from the Sichuan province to Shanghai and the north central region to Shandong along the northeastern coast.⁸⁷ CNOOC operates pipelines mainly along the coastal areas of China.⁸⁸

West-to-East Gas Pipelines

The Chinese government promoted the construction of the West-East Gas Pipeline in 2002 to meet natural gas demand in the eastern and southern regions of the country with production from the western provinces and Central Asian countries. CNPC’s/PetroChina’s first West-East Gas Pipeline, commissioned in 2004, is China’s longest natural gas pipeline at 2,722 miles, with one trunkline and three branch lines. The pipeline links major natural gas supply areas in western China (Tarim, Qaidam, and Ordos Basins) with markets in the eastern part of the country and ends in Shanghai. The initial West-East Pipeline has an annual capacity of 600 Bcf/y and contains many regional spurs along the main route, which has improved the interconnectivity of China’s natural gas transport network.

CNPC/PetroChina designed the second West-East trunk pipeline to connect with the Central Asian Gas Pipeline at the border with Kazakhstan and completed construction of this line in 2011. The second West-East Pipeline has a capacity of 1.1 Tcf/y and spans over 5,480 miles, including the trunkline and eight main branch lines. This pipeline transports natural gas from Central Asia and western China’s Xinjiang Province to the key demand centers in the southeastern provinces. The western section of the line runs parallel to the first West-East Pipeline to Zhongwei in north-central China, and the eastern section transports natural gas from Zhongwei to southern Guangdong province and Shanghai in the East.

To accommodate greater gas flows from Central Asia, CNPC/PetroChina began constructing the third West-East Pipeline, and the western section of the pipeline was launched in 2014. The eastern section is set to become operational by the end of 2015. This 1.1-Tcf/y pipeline will run parallel to the second West-East Pipeline for most of its length and end in the southeastern provinces of Fujian. Proposals for the fourth and fifth West-East Pipelines are still in the planning stages.⁸⁹

International pipelines

Over the past four years, China has ramped up imports of natural gas via pipelines as production from Central Asia and Myanmar increased and as gas infrastructure in the region improved. China’s total imports by pipeline were 1,133 Bcf/y in 2014, up 20% from 2013 imports. Pipeline imports swiftly exceeded LNG imports beginning in 2012.⁹⁰ China’s first international natural gas pipeline connection, the Central Asian Gas Pipeline (CAGP), transports natural gas through three parallel pipelines from Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan to the border in western China. The CAGP’s current capacity is 1.9 Tcf/y (pending the launch of the eastern portion of the third West-East pipeline in 2015) and spans 1,143 miles. The pipeline’s first and second phases (Lines A and B) began operations in 2010 with 1.1 Bcf/y of capacity and link to the second West-East Pipeline at the Sino-Kazak border.

CNPC has invested in upstream stakes in Turkmenistan to facilitate gas supply development. The NOC operates the Bagtyyarlyk PSC that currently feeds the CAGP. In 2009, CNPC was awarded a production supply agreement to develop natural gas resources at Turkmenistan’s massive Galkynysh gas field and signed a deal with Turkmengaz, the state-owned gas company. China imported more than 2.8 Bcf/d (1,040 Bcf/y) from Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan in 2014 and expects to increase imports as the pipeline capacities on both sides of the border expand. Turkmenistan and China signed another gas supply agreement in 2013 to extend supplies from 1.4 Tcf/y to 2.3 Tcf/y by 2020 as the new Galkynysh field ramps up production following its start of operations in September 2013.⁹¹

The CAGP is undergoing rapid expansion as more supply agreements are signed and as gas production capacity becomes available from Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan. In 2010, CNPC signed an agreement with Uzbekistan to deliver 350 Bcf/y (1 Bcf/d) through a transmission line that connects with the CAGP. Uzbekistan began exporting natural gas to China in mid-2012 and quickly ramped up to about 400 MMcf/d by mid-2013. The third phase of the CAGP, known as Line C, added another 880 Bcf/y of capacity from the three Central Asian countries to the CAGP system and became partially operational in May 2014. This line corresponds with the commencement of the third West-East Pipeline on the Chinese side, slated for 2015. Kazakhstan and China formed a joint venture in 2010 to construct a pipeline (the Beyneu-Bozoi-Shymkent pipeline spur) starting in western Kazakhstan and connecting with the other CAGP lines. The second phase of this pipeline from Kazakhstan links this country’s western fields to Line C of the CAGP and is scheduled to come online in 2015.⁹² CNPC signed agreements with the NOCs of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan in September 2013 to build a fourth line of the CAGP (Line D) that would supply natural gas from the second stage of the Galkynysh field development and traverse Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan. Construction began on Line D in September 2014, and the pipeline is scheduled to increase the system’s capacity by another 880 Bcf/y by 2016.⁹³

The China-Myanmar natural gas pipeline is likely to boost gas imports to China and diversify its supply in the future. CNPC signed a deal with Myanmar in 2008 to finance the construction of a 420 Bcf/y pipeline from two of Myanmar’s offshore blocks to China’s Yunnan and Guangxi provinces in the southwestern region. China began importing gas from Myanmar when the pipeline became operational in mid-2013, and by 2014, CNPC imported 116 Bcf.⁹⁴ The pipeline is projected to ramp up to full capacity as adjacent gas fields in Myanmar are developed and as the gas price reforms take effect in China, allowing imported gas to be more economically competitive with domestically produced gas.

Russia and China signed a momentous gas deal in May 2014 after a decade of negotiations over the import price and the supply route. China agreed to purchase 1.3 Tcf/y of gas from Gazprom’s East Siberian fields for $400 billion over a 30-year period. The proposed Power of Siberia pipeline will connect Russia’s eastern Siberian gas fields and Sakhalin Island to northeastern China. The NDRC approved construction of the pipeline on the Chinese side in late 2014 and anticipates the pipeline coming online in 2018. In November 2014, Gazprom and CNPC also signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) for China to import 1.1 Bcf/y from Russia’s western Siberian gas fields.⁹⁵ However, no price has been determined, and the deal would require infrastructure expansion. China is currently weighing its projected natural gas demand against the costs of the various supply sources, and the gas-on-gas competition within the country is growing.

Liquefied natural gas imports

Robust growth in natural gas demand in recent years, particularly in the urban coastal areas, has led China to become the world’s third-largest LNG importer and to accelerate development of its LNG and pipeline infrastructure.

China LNG import sources, 2014

Since the country built its first regasification terminal, Dapeng LNG, in 2006, natural gas imports have risen dramatically, making China one of the largest LNG consumers in the world. China quickly became the world’s third-highest LNG importer, behind Japan and South Korea, in 2012. In 2014, China imported 957 Bcf, a 7% increase from 895 Bcf in 2013 and consumed about 8% of the global LNG trade. Less than half of China’s total natural gas imports were in the form of LNG in 2014, because pipeline imports have surpassed LNG purchases.⁹⁶ Slower economic growth and the implementation of gas price reforms on the non residential sectors put downward pressure on the pace of LNG import growth in the last half of 2014, although China is set to continue raising LNG imports over the next several years.

Import regasification capacity was 1.9 Tcf/y (5.2 Bcf/d) by the end of 2014, and another 4.4 Bcf/d is expected to be constructed by 2017.⁹⁷ As of the beginning of 2015, LNG enters the country through 12 major terminals and a small peaking facility, with another 8 under construction and several other facilities in various stages of planning. China’s LNG imports are expected to increase as more terminal capacity comes online. Also, international Asian LNG prices, which are linked to global oil prices, are expected to decline as a result of the lower oil prices and increasing LNG supply following liquefaction capacity build in Australia and North America during the next few years. However, higher market-based LNG prices compared to lower prices from domestic gas sources and the increasing pipeline gas supplied by Central Asia could lead to more competition for LNG imports.

CNOOC is the pioneer developer of LNG regasification terminals and remains a key LNG player in China. The NOC operates seven existing plants, including the Hainan terminal, which came online in 2014. CNOOC completed construction of China’s first floating storage and regasification unit (FSRU) in Tianjin at the end of 2013. Generally, floating terminals are more expensive to build, but they can be developed more quickly than land-based terminals. China’s rapidly growing demand and need for seasonal flexibility makes the floating terminals attractive. CNOOC is constructing three regasification terminals in the southern region—Shenzhen/Diefu and Yuedong/Jieyang—and intends to expand three of the company’s existing terminals.

Although CNOOC has held a competitive advantage thus far in China’s LNG market, the other NOCs and private companies have made inroads into the LNG industry. CNPC entered the LNG market and commissioned its first two regasification terminals in 2011. The NOC operates three existing terminals and is constructing one near Shenzhen in southern Guangdong province. Sinopec entered China’s LNG market by commissioning its Qingdao terminal in Shandong province at the end of 2014. Apart from JOVO Group’s existing Dongguan terminal in southern China, two other terminals are under construction by private gas distributors and are targeted for completion in 2017.

Chinese NOCs must secure supply prior to gaining government approval to build a regasification terminal, and these firms are faced with competition from other regional buyers, mainly those in Korea and Japan. Chinese companies have signed long-term agreements to deliver at least 6.6 Bcf/d through 2030.⁹⁸ Most of these contracts are with Asian firms sourcing LNG from Indonesia, Malaysia, Australia, and Papua New Guinea (PNG). Some contracts are tied to new liquefaction projects located in Australia, PNG, and Russia and are slated to come online between 2014 and 2020. In addition to purchasing supply, Chinese companies are investing in significant equity stakes in Australia’s liquefaction projects, particularly ones involving coalbed methane. CNOOC owns a 50% stake in the Queensland Curtis LNG project, and Sinopec owns 25% of Australia Pacific LNG. CNPC also owns 20% of Russia’s Yamal LNG and holds a 20-year contract for supplies starting in 2017. Chinese companies signed gas purchase agreements based on their equity stakes in Canadian liquefaction projects that are expected to begin supplying LNG from shale gas operations around 2020. China started actively seeking potential LNG opportunities from North American shale gas plays by investing in upstream developments and LNG projects (LNG Canada and Pacific Northwest LNG) in Canada. Also, some long-term contracts involve gas supply from global LNG portfolios of major international oil companies.

Even though China’s key sources for the majority of its LNG are in Southeast Asia, Australia, and Qatar, China is diversifying LNG import sources to meet its rapidly growing natural gas demand. Qatar, which ships gas to China under long-term contracts and spot cargoes, was the largest LNG supplier to China in 2014.

China’s higher gas demand and a tighter LNG global supply market over the past few years led to an increase in LNG import prices, reaching a high of nearly $14/MMBtu at the beginning of 2014. CNOOC’s first LNG contracts with the traditional Asian suppliers and Qatar were priced at lower rates, and the overall LNG price to China was lower than the average paid by other Asian buyers. As China purchased more short-term and spot cargoes and diversified its long-term contracts, the average LNG purchase price rose to an average of around $11/MMBtu in 2014, according to IHS Energy.⁹⁹

China’s major LNG import terminals – current and proposed

Terminal name	Status/online date	Developer	Current / expansion capacity (MMcf/d)
Dapeng/Guangdong	Operational; Second Expansion under construction / 2015	CNOOC (33%); BP, Guangdong Province Consortium	885 / 305
Mengtougou Peaking Facility	Operational	Shanghai Gas Group (Shenergy)	15
Fujian	Operational	CNOOC (60%); Fujian Investment and Development Co. (40%)	665
Shanghai/Yangshan	Operational; Expansion proposed / 2018	CNOOC (45%); Shenergy (55%)	395 / 395
Dalian	Operational; Expansion proposed / 2017	CNPC (75%); Dalian Port Authority; Dalian Construction Investment	395 / 395
Rudong/Jiangsu	Operational; Expansion under construction / 2017	CNPC/Kunlun Energy (55%); Jiangsu Guoxin Investment Group, Pacific Oil & Gas	460 / 395
Zhejiang/Ningbo	Operational; Expansion under construction / 2017	CNOOC (51%); Zhejiang Energy Group, Ningbo Power Development	395 / 395
Zhuhai	Operational; Expansion proposed / 2016	CNOOC (30%); Guangdong Yuedian Group; local gas companies	460 / 460
Tianjin FSRU	Operational; Onshore terminal expansion under construction / 2017	CNOOC (46%); Tianjin Port; local gas companies	290 / 500
Caofeidian/Tangshan	Operational / Expansion proposed	CNPC (51%); Beijing municipal government; Hebei Construction Investment	460 / 395
Dongguan	Operational	JOVO Group	135
Qingdao/ Shandong	Operational / Expansion proposed / 2020	Sinopec	395 / 265
Hainan	Operational; Expansion proposed/ 2017	CNOOC (65%); Hainan Development (35%)	260 / 130
Beihai/Guangxi	Construction / 2015	Sinopec	395
Shenzhen/Diefu	Construction / 2015	CNOOC (70%); Shenzhen Energy (30%)	530
Tianjin Binhai	Construction / 2016	Sinopec	395
Shenzhen	Construction / 2016	CNPC (51%); CLP; Shenzen Gas	395
Yuedong/Jieyang	Construction / 2016	CNOOC	260
Fujian Zhangzhou	Construction / 2017	CNOOC (60%); Fujian Investment Development	395
Zhoushan LNG	Construction / 2017	ENN Group	395
Jiangsu Qidong	Construction / 2016	Guanghui Energy (51%); Shell (49%)	80
Sources: FACTS Global Energy100, IHS Energy, Reuters, company websites.

Coal

China is the largest producer and consumer of coal in the world and accounts for about half of the world’s coal consumption.

China’s coal supply and demand, 2000-2013

China’s vast coal resources enable the fuel to remain the mainstay of the country’s energy industry and have supported the country’s massive economic growth over the past decade. China has been the world’s leading coal producer and consumer since the early 1980s and accounted for close to half of the global coal consumption, an important factor in world energy-related CO2 emissions. According to the World Energy Council, China held an estimated 126 billion short tons of proved recoverable coal reserves in 2011, the third-largest in the world behind the United States and Russia, and equivalent to about 13% of the world’s total coal reserves.¹⁰¹

Coal production rose 9% in 2013 from 2012 to nearly 4.4 billion short tons. Chinese government data indicate that Chinese production and consumption declined by nearly 3% in 2014, the first decline in the coal industry in 14 years. These trends reflect the economic downturn particularly in coal-consuming sectors such as steel and cement, slower electricity demand growth, greater hydroelectricity generation, and China’s stricter environmental regulations recently imposed on high-polluting industries, including coal.¹⁰² Although there are 28 provinces in China that produce coal, Shanxi, Inner Mongolia, Shaanxi, and Xinjiang contain most of China’s coal resources and virtually all of the large state-owned mines. China currently has about 12,000 coal mines producing primarily bituminous coal and a fair amount of anthracite, lignite, and metallurgical coke.¹⁰³ These coal types are used primarily to generate electricity and heat as steam coal and to smelt iron ore and produce steel as metallurgical coal. Much of China’s steam coal resources (used for electricity and heating) are located in the north central and northwestern regions, whereas higher-valued coking coal and anthracite reserves are found mostly in the central and coastal parts of China.¹⁰⁴

Coal comprised nearly 66% of China’s total energy consumption in 2012. In 2013, China consumed an estimated 4.0 billion short tons of coal, representing about half of the world total. Coal consumption in 2013 was almost three times higher than it was in 2000, when China’s coal demand began swiftly increasing. In 2012, China’s coal consumption growth decelerated as a result of the country’s industrial slowdown and stricter regulations in major urban areas, particularly in the highly urbanized northeastern region and the Pearl River Basin area in the southeastern region, to reduce environmental pollution. China plans to cap coal consumption at 4.6 billion short tons by 2020.¹⁰⁵ Overall, China plans to close 2,000 small coal mines between 2013 and 2016 to enhance overall efficiency and safety in the sector.¹⁰⁶ About half of China’s coal was used for power generation in 2012. The industrial sector, including steel, pig iron, cement, and coke, accounted for 41% of coal use, and the remaining share was consumed by the residential, service, and other sectors.¹⁰⁷ Coal consumption generally tracks economic growth, electricity demand, and industrial sector output.

Prior to 2009, China’s domestic coal production generally met all of its consumption requirements, and the country was a net exporter. However, in recent years, the country has significantly increased its import volumes because of higher demand. Historically a net coal exporter, China became a net coal importer in 2009 for the first time in more than two decades. Total imports rose to 360 million short tons in 2013, about 14% higher than 2012 levels. Indonesia and Australia are the largest coal exporters to China, supplying 65% of China’s imports in 2013.¹⁰⁸ The government imposed restrictions on coal imports with high ash and sulfur content starting January 2015 and reinstated the import tariff at 3% to 6% to protect market share of domestic producers and pare back the recent excess supply.¹⁰⁹ Coal imports declined in 2014 as a result of slower economic and electricity consumption growth as well as excess domestic supply. China imported about 320 million short tons in 2014, an 11% drop from 2013 levels.¹¹⁰

Although coal consumption has remained lower than production over the past several years, imports have risen substantially since 2008, creating large stock builds. The rise in imports from 2008 to 2013 is primarily driven by steady demand growth and the high coal transportation costs resulting from bottlenecks in China’s railway system, which makes imported coal economically attractive, especially in southeastern China. Because the bulk of incremental coal produced moved to more remote areas in western and northern China, an increasing amount of coal needed to be transported over long distances from these supply regions to the demand centers along the coast and in the southern and eastern provinces via rail and truck. In recent years, the country has struggled with transportation bottlenecks in shipping coal to market, creating regional imbalances. Also, international coal prices, which have declined overall since 2011 and at times have fallen below China’s domestic prices, have made imports more commercially competitive with China’s own coal supply, particularly for electric utilities along the coastal regions.¹¹¹

As coal demand growth has eased since 2012, the country has witnessed an oversupply of coal and rising inventories. Despite this surplus, some of China’s major coal producers, particularly in key coal-producing provinces in north central and northwestern China that have larger and lower-cost mines, continued to increase production, albeit at a more moderate pace. Producers in these regions, primarily the state-owned enterprises, are able to reduce their unit costs through higher output and economies of scale. However, the majority of coal companies in China were unprofitable in 2014 as coal prices continued to be low. Some small mines in Inner Mongolia that produce lower-calorific coal and transport most of their coal outside of the region have suspended their output in response to weaker demand and revenue losses.¹¹² Also, Shanxi province responded to the oversupply in 2015 by ending the approval of all new coal mine projects until 2020.¹¹³ Mines that are able to keep their costs low in the current low coal price environment will be able to maintain higher production levels.

China reformed the coal tax structure at the end of 2014. The resource tax imposed on coal mining companies shifted from being a volume-based system to being a value-based system, allowing local governments to collect between 2% to 10% of the value of domestic coal sold. As part of the reform, China’s State Council removed all surcharges and fees for coal production. This reform allows coal producers to reduce some of the production costs from high taxes paid to the local governments, especially in a low-price environment.¹¹⁴

In 2013, China began addressing the regional imbalance of coal supply and demand through investments in greater railway capacity, storage and coal processing facilities, and higher electricity transmission capacity to enable electricity generated from coal to travel long distances to demand centers. China commenced operation of its third and longest coal-dedicated rail line running from the north central Shanxi province to the northeastern Shandong province at the end of 2014.¹¹⁵

China’s coal industry has traditionally been fragmented among large state-owned coal mines, local state-owned coal mines, and thousands of town and village coal mines. The top state-owned coal companies, including Shenhua Group and China National Coal Group (China’s largest coal companies), produce about 50% of the country’s coal. Local state-owned companies produce about 20%, and small town mines produce 30% of the coal output each year.¹¹⁶ As the government regulations and economic factors from a low-price coal environment force more inefficient and small mines to close, the share of production from large state-owned companies is likely to rise. China has about 10,000 small local coal mines that have insufficient investment, outdated equipment, and poor safety practices.¹¹⁷ These mines are typically inefficient and are a source of pollution. The goal of industry consolidation is to attract greater investment in new coal technologies and to improve the safety and environmental record of coal mines.

In contrast to the past, China is becoming increasingly open to foreign investment in the coal sector in an effort to modernize existing large-scale mines and to introduce new technologies in the coal industry. State-owned enterprises partner with foreign investors in the coal sector. Areas of interest in foreign investment include coal-to-liquids, CBM production, coal-to-gas, and slurry pipeline transportation projects.

Electricity

China’s installed electricity capacity by fuel, end 2013

China became the world’s largest power generator in 2011. Coal and hydroelectricity continue to be the leading sources of the country’s electricity generation and installed capacity. China is moving to generate more power from nuclear, renewable sources, and natural gas in efforts to address environmental concerns and diversify its electricity generation fuel slate.China is the world’s largest power generator, surpassing the United States in 2011. Net power generation was an estimated 5,126 Terawatthours (TWh) in 2013, up 7.5% from 2012, according to EIA estimates. Electricity generation has more than doubled since 2005, although power generation, which is mostly driven by economic and industrial demand, decelerated after the global financial recession in 2008 and 2009 and, again, starting in 2012. The industrial sector currently accounts for almost three-quarters of China’s electricity consumption.¹¹⁸ Annual growth in electricity generation was a decade-low 4% in 2014, according to preliminary data from NBS. This deceleration was mainly a result of significant slowdown of activity in heavy industries, especially the steel industry, as well as weather.¹¹⁹

China plans to rely on more electric generation from nuclear, renewable sources, and natural gas to replace some coal, with the goal of reducing carbon emissions and the heavy air pollution in urban areas. China’s installed electricity generating capacity was an estimated 1,260 gigawatts (GW) at the beginning of 2014. China’s capacity rose by almost 90 GW from a year earlier and doubled from 630 GW in 2006. As China’s generating capacity expanded over the past several years in response to its economic development, the country’s capacity grew to be the highest in the world. Installed capacity is expected to grow over the next decade to meet rising demand, particularly in large urban areas in the eastern and southern regions of the country. EIA projects installed capacity will double to 2,265 GW by 2040, propelled by a combination of capacity from coal, nuclear, and renewable sources.¹²⁰ Fossil fuel-fired power capacity has historically made up about three-fourths of installed capacity, and coal continued to dominate the electricity mix with 63% of total capacity in 2013. However, non-fossil fuels have been increasing their portion of installed capacity over the past few years.

Sector organization

China’s electric generation is controlled by state-owned holding companies, although limited reforms have opened up the electricity sector to some private and foreign investments. China is seeking to improve system efficiency and facilitate investment in the power grids.

In 2002, the Chinese government dismantled the monopoly State Power Corporation (SPC) into separate generation, transmission, and services units. Since the reform, China’s electricity generation sector has been controlled by five state-owned generation companies—China Huaneng Group, China Datang Corporation, China Huadian Corporation, China Guodian Corporation, and China Power Investment Corporation. These five companies generate nearly half of China’s electricity. Much of the remainder is generated by local-owned enterprises or by independent power producers (IPPs), often in partnership with privately listed arms of the state-owned companies. Deregulation and other reforms have opened the electricity sector to foreign investment, although investments have been limited so far.¹²¹

During the 2002 reforms, the SPC divided all of its electricity transmission and distribution assets into two new companies, the China Southern Power Grid Company and the State Grid Corporation of China, which operate the nation’s seven power grids. The State Grid Corporation operates power transmission grids in the north and central regions, while China Southern Power Grid Company handles those in the south.¹²² China also established the State Electricity Regulatory Commission (SERC), responsible for the regulation enforcement of the electricity sector and facilitation of investment and competition to alleviate power shortages. As part of the current Chinese leadership’s efforts to streamline government agencies, the government eliminated SERC in March 2013 and transferred the agency’s duties to the NEA.¹²³ China is seeking to improve system efficiency and the interconnections between the grids through ultra-high-voltage lines, as well as to implement a smart grid plan. The first phase was completed in 2012, and subsequent phases are slated for completion by 2020.¹²⁴

Electricity prices

On-grid (electricity sold by generators to the grid) and retail electricity prices are determined and capped by the NDRC. The NDRC also determines the price that coal companies should receive from power producers for a certain level of electricity. China attempted to reform electricity prices in 2004 by initiating a policy that will pass through fuel costs, although on-grid prices were modified infrequently. As a result, high coal prices in 2011 and lower government-controlled power tariffs contributed to financial losses for electric generators. Coal prices declined in 2012 and have remained relatively low for the past few years. These lower prices prompted the government to lower on-grid tariff rates for coal-fired power plants, giving power producers some financial reprieve.¹²⁵ As reforms in the natural gas pricing mechanism took place, electricity tariffs for gas-fired power plants were linked to higher natural gas prices.¹²⁶ Cost savings by power generators is designated for funding renewable energy subsidies. Additionally, the NDRC doubled the surcharge in 2013 on renewable energy use to all end-users excluding residential and agriculture sectors. These measures were designed to encourage more investment in renewable energy infrastructure and to facilitate a greater shift towards using alternative fuels.¹²⁷

Electricity generation

China’s net electricity generation by fuel type, 2000-2013.

The Chinese government has prioritized the expansion of nuclear, natural gas-fired, and renewable power plants as well as the electricity transmission system to connect more remote power sources to densely populated areas along the coasts. Although coal remains the primary source of electricity generation, China is seeking ways to curb expansion of coal-fired generation.Rapid growth in electricity demand this past decade spurred significant investment in new power stations, particularly in fossil fuel-fired capacity. Although much of the new investment over the past several years was earmarked to alleviate power supply shortages, the economic crisis of 2008 and the deceleration of Chinese economic growth after 2012 resulted in a slower demand growth for electricity. Power demand typically follows economic cycles and rebounded in 2010 as the Chinese economy recovered from the recession. However, annual power demand growth slowed considerably to just 5% in 2012 and 7.5% in 2013 as a result of weaker industrial output and slower economic growth.¹²⁸ The government is investing in development of the transmission network, integration of regional networks, and construction of new generating capacity.

Fossil fuels

Fossil fuels, primarily coal, made up 77% of power generation sources and nearly 70% of installed capacity. Coal is expected to remain the dominant fuel in the power sector in the coming years, while natural gas is set to increase and replace some of the coal-fired capacity in the northeastern and southeastern coastal areas where power demand is higher. Oil-fired generation is expected to remain small in the next two decades. In 2013, China generated about 3,937 TWh from fossil fuel sources, up about 7% from 2012. Installed fossil fuel-fired capacity was 863 GW at the end of 2013.¹²⁹

Because of the large amount of domestic reserves, coal will continue to lead the fuel slate for power generation, even as China diversifies its fuel supply and uses cleaner fuels. Coal serves as the primary source of fuel for power, although plant utilization rates have declined slightly from 60% in 2011 to 56% in 2014.¹³⁰ As happened with coal mining, the Chinese government is closing small and inefficient plants to modernize the coal fleet in favor of larger, more efficient units as well as technologically advanced ultra-supercritical units, which operate at the highest levels of pressure and temperature for a coal plant. Also, China has prohibited companies from building new coal-fired power plants around three major cities—Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou—as air pollution rates have become a problem in recent years. China is building more coal-fired capacity closer to the inland coal-producing centers and expanding electricity transmission to alleviate air pollution from major urban areas along the coast.

Natural gas currently plays a minor role in overall power generation and accounted for only 43 GW of installed capacity at the end of 2013. However, the government plans to invest heavily in more power plants fueled by natural gas, a growing marginal fuel source. In 2014, companies added another 12 GW to the electric grid, and 18 GW of gas-fired power is under construction.¹³¹ China is able to obtain gas from increasing production of domestic sources as well as several import alternatives, but coal still remains the less expensive fuel except in the large southern coastal cities where natural gas is more available and competitive. Natural gas serves as a fuel source primarily during peak demand for power, and storage for natural gas is extremely low. These factors affect natural gas supply available for electricity. The utilization rate of gas-fired plants averaged 30% in 2013.¹³²

There are several examples of China’s effort to bring new efficient gas-fired units online, some in conjunction with new LNG terminals such as those in Guangdong and Shanghai. Also, Beijing authorities are replacing all of its coal-fired facilities, representing 2.7 GW of capacity, with more efficient gas-fired plants by 2016. By early 2015, Beijing had closed three of the four major coal-fired power plants in its campaign to significantly reduce coal consumption by 2017.¹³³ Overall, China’s effort to shift coal-fired generation to more gas-fired generation in the long term depends on the country’s ability to increase gas supply through domestic production and imported sources, to improve the infrastructure for gas transmission, and to regulate coal use.

Nuclear

Although nuclear generation is a small portion of the country’s total power generation portfolio, China is actively promoting nuclear power as a clean, efficient, and reliable source of electricity generation. China generated 106 TWh of nuclear power in 2013, making up only 2% of total net generation. However, the country rapidly expanded its nuclear capacity in the past few years, which will likely boost nuclear generation in the next few years. China’s net installed nuclear capacity was more than 23 GW as of April 2015 after the country added ten reactors with more than 10 GW since the beginning of 2013.¹³⁴ All of China’s nuclear plants are located along the east coast and southern parts of the country, but China plans to assess the construction of inland facilities, according to its latest energy strategy plan. By April 2015, Chinese companies were constructing an additional 23 GW of capacity, more than one-third of the global nuclear power capacity currently being built. These plants are slated to become operational by 2019 and roughly double China’s current capacity.¹³⁵ Several more facilities are in various stages of planning.

Following Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident in March 2011, China suspended government approvals for new nuclear plants until safety reviews of all facilities were completed and a safety framework was approved by the State Council. New plant approvals and construction resumed in October 2012, and the commissioning of new capacity has steadily increased. China’s government plans to boost operational nuclear capacity to 58 GW and to have 30 GW of capacity under construction by 2020.¹³⁶ As part of this effort, the government is encouraging private investment in nuclear project development and a more expeditious approval process for currently proposed facilities.¹³⁷

China also intends to build strategic and commercial uranium stockpiles through overseas purchases and continue to develop domestic production in Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang. Also, China is developing nuclear fuel reprocessing facilities expected to come online by 2017, according to the World Nuclear Association.¹³⁸

Hydroelectricity and other renewables

The Chinese government has a stated goal to produce at least 15% of overall energy consumption by 2020 from non-fossil fuel sources as the government addresses environmental issues.¹³⁹ Chinese companies invested a record-level $89 billion in renewable energy projects in 2014, 31% higher than 2013 investments. China, now the world’s leading investor in the renewable energy sector, will likely continue sizeable investments through the next five-year period to reach its renewable energy and carbon emission goals.¹⁴⁰ China is encouraging investment in renewable energy and accompanying transmission infrastructure through a variety of financial and economic incentives.

Because of its cost-effectiveness and sizeable resource potential, hydroelectricity has become China’s key source of renewable energy generation. China was the world’s largest producer of hydroelectric power in 2013. The country generated about 894 TWh of net electricity from hydroelectricity, representing 18% of the country’s total net electricity generation, according to EIA estimates. After a severe drought in the southwestern region that resulted in lower hydroelectric production in 2011, and the completion of the Three Gorges Dam in 2012, hydroelectric generation growth rebounded in 2012.

Installed hydroelectric generating capacity was 280 GW at the end of 2013, according to FGE, accounting for more than one-fifth of total installed generating capacity in China. The world’s largest hydropower project, the Three Gorges Dam along the Yangtze River, was completed in July 2012 and includes 32 generators with a total maximum capacity of 22.5 GW. The dam generated almost 99 TWh in 2014, the world’s highest level of hydropower generation in any year.¹⁴¹ Another massive hydropower dam and China’s third-largest, Xiangjiaba, entered operations in 2013 with four of its eight turbines. The 6.4-GW project, also along the Yangtze River, is slated for completion in 2015.¹⁴² The Chinese government plans to increase hydroelectric capacity to 350 GW by the end of 2020.¹⁴³ However, China has faced some delays on projects resulting from environmental concerns and complications of population displacement needed to build the dams.

In 2013, China was the world’s second-largest wind producer, generating about 132 TWh, a level about 38% higher than in 2012. China’s installed on-grid wind capacity was 76 GW at the end of 2013 and has grown exponentially since 2005. However, absolute wind power capacity stood at about 91 GW, representing a shortage of transmission infrastructure to connect wind farms to the electric grid.¹⁴⁴ The government has encouraged investment in grid development and measures to improve flexibility in the transmission system, especially during peak hours. The NEA reported that on-grid capacity rose to 96 GW in 2014, indicating infrastructure development is rapidly occurring.¹⁴⁵ As part of its renewable energy targets, the NDRC aims to increase wind capacity to 200 GW by the end of 2020.

China is also aggressively investing in solar power and hopes to increase capacity from 15 GW at the end of 2013 to 100 GW by the end of 2020. The NDRC began providing generous financial incentives for solar equipment manufacturers in 2012, which have led to a boom in large-scale solar projects.¹⁴⁶

Biomass use in China is relatively small, mostly for heating and cooking in rural areas, and for small-scale power projects.¹⁴⁷ The NDRC has created price and tax incentives for investments in biomass and waste incineration projects through feed-in tariffs. By 2014, the total installed biomass power capacity in China was 10 GW, with a targeted capacity of 30 GW by 2020.¹⁴⁸

Notes:

• Data presented in the text are the most recent available as of May 14, 2015.
• Data are EIA estimates unless otherwise noted.

Endnotes:

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¹¹⁷IHS Energy Coal Rush: The Future of China’s Coal Market, 2013, Chapter 3, page III-9.
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By Abdulrahman Al-Rashed

US President Barack Obama and delegations from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) were among 20 delegates gathered around a large rectangular table at the Camp David retreat on Thursday. If it were not for the strong objection of the Gulf countries on the West-Iran nuclear deal, this meeting would not have been held. The US would then have simply sent a letter through its diplomats to the Gulf explaining the details of the deal without taking into account the GCC’s opinion.

During the weeks that followed the declaration of the initial deal with Iran, the Gulf-American relationship was unsettled and several Gulf officials expressed their anger through direct and indirect messages protesting against the deal and the American standpoint. A diplomatic and media battle erupted between the two sides; President Obama tried to diminish the importance of the Gulf Arabs’ objections saying that the deal is rewarding for the Gulf countries and the whole world.

Obama tried to sarcastically respond to them at times, and at other times he speciously considered that Iran deserved more attention, and that the US would make up for the years of estrangement between the two countries, saying that the Iranian regime fits as a partner of the United States in the Middle East.

All this increased the anger of the Arab countries that expressed their rejection, sending signals of possible suspension of all further cooperation. The six Gulf nations were all united and they all stood together against the deal; this is what strengthened their objections. They were keen to have a precise stance and made sure not to get drifted behind wide-ranging and unrealistic demands.

The Gulf countries did not abruptly stand against the nuclear deal or against reconciliation with Iran, because it is actually in favor of the Gulf region and the world; however they objected on freeing the Iranian beast from its cage without providing security guarantees. Finally, Obama, the strategist of the deal, wanted to meet the Gulf representatives all together; they came to the Camp David compound with a joint memo. The summit that was preceded by several meetings was not limited to the discussion of the nuclear deal and Iran, as it also included all the issues that are threatening the region.

The demands of the Gulf countries were not entirely fulfilled but at the same time, President Obama did not ignore their objections. The US assured that it would protect the Gulf region from any external attacks, namely from Iran. They all agreed to peacefully resolve the issues; all this was under a new title: The Arab-US Strategic Partnership.

Three long meetings were the best way to conclude this political storm and fold away the worst chapter of relations between the Gulf and the Americans seen in 70 years. The GCC did not get a stamped and sealed pact from the president vowing to protect the Gulf, but the defense commitments were clear and similar to those vowed by former US presidents.

The most important point in my opinion was that Gulf diplomats were not content with a silent objection this time. On the contrary, they raised their voice, objected and insisted on their demands, thus saving the old vital and important strategic relationship. Meanwhile, Iranian leaders, who decided to fire on a Singaporean ship, did not succeed in sabotaging the negotiations. And their threats did not succeed in breaking the naval blockade on Yemen — a move that was intended to sow discord between the two sides.

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By Clint Watts*

This morning, reports confirmed that U.S. Special Operations Forces conducted a daring raid deep into Eastern Syria killing a key ISIS leader, Abu Sayyaf, along with several other ISIS members. The raid occurred near Der Ouzzer amidst the critical Syrian oil fields that provide the key lifeblood to ISIS. This daring U.S. raid and its great success likely signal a turning point in the fight against ISIS. Here are a few points worth considering.

Why risk so much to go after Abu Sayyaf?

For those outside of military and intelligence circles, Abu Sayyaf is an unknown, mid-level leader in ISIS. However, the best way to target the top leaders in a terrorist organization is to first go after those people in charge of finance and communications. These deputies hold the links between the foot soldiers and the leadership and provide essential coordination amongst the top commanders.

In well-run organizations, elimination of the top leaders may only result in a rapid succession of command with little resulting impact on the organization as a whole. Targeting those individuals in charge of finance and command and control will disrupt how an entire organization operates; sub-elements won’t receive needed funds, junior leaders will be unsure of what to do, military operations will slow and/or become disjointed, and throughout the entire terror group doubt will creep in as communication lessens. The effects of this strategy on terror groups can be observed retrospectively by looking at how al Qaeda was targeted through Abu Zubaydah, a key financial figure, not long after 9/11 and a targeted drone strike against Atiyah Abd al Rahman, al Qaeda’s key communications interlocutor.

ISIS has succeeded in pursuing an Islamic State where other al Qaeda affiliates have failed for one reason above all others: they have funded themselves. This self-funding has come in large part from oil. For the U.S. led coalition to make significant, sustained gains against ISIS, this revenue must be cut off and removing Abu Sayyaf from the network could definitely slow if not stop oil production and resulting revenues.

Why a raid rather than an air strike?

The U.S. mission more than anything suggests a perceived intelligence coup by targeting Abu Sayyaf. Early reports suggest they wanted to take Abu Sayaaf captive, suggesting his knowledge on ISIS could likely map out the entire organization. Taking Sayyaf alive would have allowed for interrogation and the yielding of unmatched intelligence from other sources. Even if a captive like Sayyaf doesn’t talk, his detention would instill fear amongst the rest of ISIS leaders who would be concerned about what their comrade has revealed.

A preference for raids as compared to airstrikes always signals the priority may be intelligence first and degrading ISIS operations second. Along with capturing Abu Sayyaf’s wife and freeing some prisoners, computers and communications between many nodes inside ISIS were gained and this intelligence will likely identify where key ISIS leaders may reside, their role in the organization, and illuminate previously unknown weaknesses inside the group.

What will be the effect of this raid on ISIS?

This highly successful raid will go much further to erode ISIS than the past many months of airstrikes and partner ground operations.

First, the raid will be a huge blow to the confidence of ISIS members. After taunting the U.S. to conduct ground operations, Special Forces have gone into the heart of ISIS’s caliphate, eliminated a key target and left without a scratch. ISIS growth has hinged for more than two years on their success in building an Islamic state through military victories. This raid represents an overwhelming defeat harming both ISIS ground operations as well as its online advertising which has up till now drawn an unprecedented number of foreign fighters.

Second, the raid will likely disrupt both financial and military operations. ISIS units will increase their security by communicating less. This will result in weakened command and control and a slow in military operations. This increased security posture may also impede ISIS’s ability to operate a state: a point of great pride for the group and an essential element of their attractiveness to their members.

Third, a successful raid of this caliber likely signals the start of a campaign rather than the conclusion. The raid and its resulting intelligence will ideally yield further elimination of key leaders in the coming weeks and months.

Fourth, we should look to see how this raid affects ISIS’s manpower: will foreign fighter flow slow after such a public ISIS loss? Will ISIS members who’ve begun retreating under coalition strikes and ground campaigns now see this raid as the time to abandon ship?

What does the raid signal for U.S. strategy against ISIS?

President Obama has stated and continues to imply the U.S. will not deploy ground troops on a large-scale to Iraq and Syria. Today’s mission suggests the U.S. is now entering a fourth phase after initiating airstrikes, deploying advisors and implementing the equip and train mission of selected militias. How much further will the U.S. go? Does the Special Operations raid approach represent a substitute plan for eroding ISIS over time as opposed to bloody campaigns to re-take cities like Mosul?

The raid also suggests a major increase in U.S. intelligence on Syria and Iraq. Last summer, news stories indicated the intelligence community was caught off guard by ISIS bold advance due to insufficient insight on ISIS movements. This raid likely took a while to prepare indicating significant intelligence collection and planning.. Finally, the raid demonstrates the lengths the U.S. is willing to take against ISIS. Airstrikes represent a safer strategy; few if any American lives are being put at risk. A failed raid deep into Syria resulting in significant U.S. casualties would truly test the resolve of the American public to sustain a campaign against ISIS.

Over the past year, no incident may represent a bigger game changer in the U.S. strategy to counter ISIS. The pace and type of American actions in the coming months will be key for understanding both the U.S. strategy and ISIS resiliency.

About the author:
*Clint Watts is an FPRI Senior Fellow with the Program on National Security and President of Miburo Solutions, Inc. His research focuses on analyzing transnational threat groups operating in local environments on a global scale. Before starting Miburo Solutions, he served as a U.S. Army infantry officer, a FBI Special Agent on a Joint Terrorism Task Force, and as the Executive Officer of the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point (CTC). Clint’s publications include: al Qaeda’s (Mis) Adventures in the Horn of Africa, Combating Terrorism Center, 2007 (Co-editor, Co-author); “Can the Anbar Strategy Work in Pakistan?” Small Wars Journal, 2007 ; “Beyond Iraq and Afghanistan: What Foreign Fighter Data Reveals About the Future of Terrorism?” Small Wars Journal, 2008; “Foreign Fighters: How are they being recruited?” Small Wars Journal, 2008; “Countering Terrorism from the Second Foreign Fighter Glut,” Small Wars Journal, 2009; and, “Capturing the Potential of Outlier Ideas in the Intelligence Community,” Studies in Intelligence – CIA, 2011.(Co-author). He is also the editor of the SelectedWisdom.com blog.

Source:
This article was published by FPRI

The post Why US Raid On Abu Sayyaf And ISIS In Eastern Syria May Be A Game Changer – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

(RFE/RL) — A court in Egypt has passed death sentences on ousted President Muhammad Morsi and more than 100 other members of the Muslim Brotherhood for allegedly orchestrating a mass jail break in 2011.

Morsi, sitting in a caged dock, raised his fists in defiance when the judge read his verdict in a Cairo courtroom on May 16.

The death sentence rulings will now be referred to Egypt’s top religious authority, the Grand Mufti, for an opinion before any executions can take place.

That opinion is non-binding, and the judge will issue a final decision on June 2.

Human rights groups have accused Egyptian authorities of widespread abuses in a crackdown on Brotherhood supporters as well as secular activists, allegations they deny.

Morsi was Egypt’s first freely elected president. He was ousted by the military in July 2013 after days of mass protests sparked by his divisive policies.

Morsi is now serving a 20-year jail sentence on charges linked to the killing of protesters outside a Cairo presidential palace in December 2012.

The post Egypt: Court Sentences Morsi To Death appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Neil Thompson

David Cameron unveiled the first all-Conservative cabinet in British politics for eighteen years on Monday after his Conservative Party won an unexpected majority in last week’s election. The 2015 election was an earthquake in British politics, and it ended Britain’s experiment with coalition government along with several political careers. The prime minister now leads just the second government to expand its majority in a subsequent election alongside the legendary Margaret Thatcher. But while David Cameron can now govern without the influence of a coalition partner, it will leave him more beholden to his own right-wing – an important consideration given the Conservative’s slender majority in the House of Commons of a dozen seats. The new cabinet reflects this by seeking to represent all factions of the Conservative Party in the new government.

In England and Wales, the Conservatives’ successes came at the expense of their centrist coalition partners the Liberal Democrats and the left-wing opposition Labour Party. But in Scotland the story was of the electoral triumph of the regional nationalist Scottish National Party (SNP) over Labour. Pundits have also claimed that Conservative scaremongering about the prospect of an SNP-Labour coalition was behind the governing party’s surprise victories in England and Wales and this is likely to estrange the Westminster government yet further from voters in Scotland. Ever since the Thatcher years, the Conservatives have been widely disliked north of the border and the arrival of the separatist SNP as the third-largest party in parliament looks certain to aggravate England-Scotland tensions that were meant to have been eased after Scottish voters rejected full independence in a referendum in 2014.

The contentious issue of Europe looks set to return to the headlines following the election, since the current terms of the UK’s membership in the European Union (EU) have been loathed by nationalist Conservatives for decades. The anti-EU United Kingdom Independence Party, which some see as increasingly embodying the voice of English nationalism, won about 13% of the national vote. David Cameron has promised his party a referendum on the question of continued UK membership by 2017. Further complicating the issue is that the newly-empowered SNP is ardently in favour of continued Scottish membership in the EU, and it is just waiting to exploit this latest point of difference between Edinburgh and London as the referendum approaches. An English vote to leave the EU could trigger demands by the SNP for a second referendum on Scottish independence and an application by Edinburgh to rejoin it. In an extreme scenario, the UK could slide towards disintegration with a Scottish state outside both unions until its standing to join the EU as a new member state is recognised.

The United Kingdom’s constitutional arrangements have seemed increasingly dated since the end of the Cold War and have only been slightly tinkered over the past few decades. However as London’s economic dominance has grown, there has been a noticeable drift towards the devolution of political power to the United Kingdom’s composite states and regions. Now, however, the UK is facing a weak Conservative government divided over Europe and with a slender majority. David Cameron has already pledged that he will not seek a third term in 2020, meaning that the race to succeed him as the leader of the Conservative Party, and potentially as prime minister, will gather pace as his second term continues. The stage seems set for the sort of factional infighting that destroyed the Conservatives as a serious political force in the 1990s, opening up opportunities for smaller parties in the lead-up to 2020.

Under normal circumstances analysts would assume such considerations to apply to the opposition Labour Party. After the Conservatives’ surprise victory in the 1992 general election, the resulting administration was judged by voters to have pushed them too far to the right and they responded by turning in droves to Tony Blair’s centrist New Labour. Now, after pushing what many senior Labour Party leaders saw as a populist left-wing manifesto, Labour’s recent crushing defeat has led many party strategists to urge a re-adoption of centrist ‘Blairite’ principles. These had been rejected before the election because Tony Blair is widely unpopular in the UK. But with Labour members anticipating the emergence of Conservative divisions over Europe down the line, many are hoping capitalise on the inter-Conservative race to succeed David Cameron which should be in full swing by 2017 and to repeat Blair’s trick of colonizing the center ground.

However, Labour’s attempts to return to political relevance are threatened by the growth of regional parties in areas that were once Labour strongholds. In Scotland, it has followed the Liberal Democrats and Conservatives into political oblivion. In its other traditional heartlands, the post-industrial regions of northern England, its blue-collar base voted for the insurgent UKIP party in droves.

The number of Liberal Democrat members of Parliament, the third party of British politics, was reduced to single figures. Labour has grown in strength in London, but the big lesson of the 2015 election is the decay of the national British parties outside of the capital. Any Conservatives who are still flush with their surprise election victory may wish to reflect on this unpleasant fact as they form the next government.

This article was published by Geopolitical Monitor.com

The post Is Cameron’s Big Win Just The Calm Before The Storm? – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

At least nine people have been killed in a shootout between rival biker gangs outside the Twin Peaks Restaurant in Waco, Texas. Police at the scene were reportedly trying secure the area when the fighting escalated from fists to knives, and then gunfire.

The number of those killed has not yet been officially confirmed, with Waco police reporting “multiple deaths and injuries,” according to Reuters. It was not immediately clear whether any of those killed or injured were bystanders, but no officers were injured in the incident, police said.

According to witnesses, three rival biker gangs were having a brawl in and outside the Twin Peaks Restaurant when the gunfire erupted. Waco police officers were already at the scene when the action escalated, Waco Police Sgt. W. Patrick Swanton said, according to KWTX-TV.

“Gang members were shooting at each other and officers at the scene fired their weapons, as well,” Swanton said, confirming no policemen were injured.

Witnesses said the fighting began with punching and kicking but quickly escalated and knives, chains and bats could be seen before the shooting started.

“There was an incident but thankfully the awesome Waco Police have been on the premises and assisting with this situation,” a Twin Peaks employee wrote on Facebook

Police have warned that the entire Central Texas Marketplace is closed, urging people to leave now and avoid this area.

The post Texas: 9 Killed In Rival Biker Gang Shootout, Multiple Injuries appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Ghulam Wali Noori

Professor Kokri notes that making predictions often comes with a degree of risk. For our region, this risk is considerably high as we face a number of substantial societal issues, and, although our political leaders have a vested interest in “miracle work” they are not acting in a vacuum.

Afghanistan and the surrounding area remains one of the most insecure regions on earth, and what occurs in our region is largely distinct from other parts of the world. If one were to include the Middle East, most of the world’s failed states exist in our surrounding region, such as: Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Lebanon, Pakistan and our country, Afghanistan. Whatever the future holds for us, it will arguably be influenced by these six elements:

1. The silenced majority
2. State-sponsored terrorism
3. Political Islam Theory
4. Opposition to rationality
5. Superpower intervention
6. Economical potential

The silenced majority:

Many rulers in our region have risen to power as a result of external forces, monarchical bloodlines or military upheaval, and, once in power, have predominantly excluded the citizenry within their particular nations from playing important societal roles, whilst simultaneously exploiting public funds for personal gain. Most of these governments have lost legitimacy in the eyes of its people and international community.

The Mass Media has brought an opportunity for locals to be in contact with the outside world, being aware of their ideas and activities and that form the basis of the formation of civil society and social activism. To combat this, some authoritarian regimes have attempted to place restrictions on internet usage, media and tourism, in an effort to disconnect locals from the outside world, over fear that they may become more aware of the political rulers’ negligible activities.

Furthermore, some rulers have gone as far as to decree their book to be “God’s book,” and some have even claimed prophet-hood as a means of further asserting control over the populace. Despite this, locals, in many cases, have begun to recognize that their governments are disregarding their collective rights; thus, serving as the reason behind a growing lack of government legitimacy – a factor that may inevitably challenge the existence of government and may even bring the ruling regimes to the brink of collapse.

State sponsored terrorism:

There are a number of terrorists groups active in Afghanistan and in the wider region that are being equipped, financed and trained by other countries in the region for the sole purpose of waging a war in Afghanistan in order to preserve their long-term interests in our country. These groups have great financial and human resources in Afghanistan, Kashmir, Iraq, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Syria and Lebanon, and their formation and support, in most cases, can be traced to Pakistan and Iran, and, in some cases, the United Statesi.

The existences of these terrorist groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan have been the main reason for state failure. In some countries, the local citizens have welcomed the emergence of these terrorist cells, with the hope that they will remove the authoritarian regimes. But these groups quickly lose the trust in the hearts and minds of the local populations, as a result of fanatical ideology, harsh rules, or, in some cases, the rebranding of the cell’s identity in a manner that is several times more extreme than the predecessors or sometime these groups turn against its inventor.

Allegedly, the fall of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and Saddam’s regime in Iraq was in the interest of Iran; however, it has since shifted the broader international focus to Iran, which may ultimately play into Western interests. Pakistan, in the past, was viewed in the region to have the upper hand with respect to creating covert and overt militant groups, but it appears as though the emergence of ISIL in the region neighboring Afghanistan and Pakistan has since hindered its position.

In addition, as a result of blowback, Pakistan has been fighting militant groups within its community for the last 10 years – groups that were invented by Pakistani government for the sole purpose of controlling others. In my opinion, one of the main reasons why Pakistan is encouraging peace talks between the Taliban and Afghan government is due to fear of the appearance of ISIL in the region, and the mobilization of Pakistani extremist groups under the ISIL banner. As a result, I predict that these authoritarian governments will form more extremist groups in the region which will ultimately contribute to greater regional instability in the next 10 years.

Political Islam Theory:

Political Islam Theory has a long history with deep roots in the Arab World; however, while the theory is often linked prior to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, in actuality, it was rooted during the Taliban regime. During the Taliban regime, Political Islam Theory was spread to many countries in Central Asia in an attempt to overthrow several governments but, after the collapse of the Taliban regime, these movements have since been silenced by local governments. However, a new incident in the region might ultimately be able to reignite them. If reignited, they could create a serious problem for local governments, and some may even collapse. Despite this, it is doubtful that they would be able to grip control over an entire country like the Taliban had before 9/11, but they may be able to form their type of government in smaller provinces.

ISIL is a new conduit for the implementation of Political Islam Theory, and has already been active in Afghanistan. As a result of their emergence, it is possible that the Taliban will divide into several groups; one will join the Afghan government, another will join ISIL and other will take a third path. ISIL has already raised its flags on Afghan-Turkmenistan border, which is bad news for Central Asian Countries. ISIL in opposition to the Taliban has a Salafist universal ideology and has extended its structure and membership to Europe, North America, Australia, Africa, the Middle East and Asia.

According to some reports, ISIL has US$ 2.5 billion and is receiving US$ 3 million revenue from oil in Iraq per day. The birth of ISIL or other similar groups will pave the way for even more groups across the region that have been quelled by local governments, but may be motivated by Political Islam movements, as it may be viewed as the only way to get rid of authoritarian regimes. As a result, in the next 10 years, there will be a strong fight for political freedom, but control of this fight might ultimately be in the hands of Political Islam followers.

Opposition to Rationality:

As the people of this region continue to feel injustice, and given that they do not know of logical ways to explain their problems, or have ways of finding solutions to them, lots of people will look for increasingly illogical and desperate ways of remedying their grievances.

This means that in the next 10 years the number of people who are opposed to rationality will increase, and people who are following common sense will decrease. Instead of thinking about possible productive solutions to their problems, they will spend too much time blaming one another. They will expend more energy on complaining, and become more apathetic, rather than remaining active. They will continue to rely too heavily on the United States (US) for their future, for the belief is that if the US wanted this region to be prosperous in one night it could make it so, but if the United States does not want it, then it is not possible.

Most of the people in the region instead of searching for logical solutions to their problems will relieve themselves instead by turning to their history and the stories of their forefathers’ heroism. Searching for heroes in history and hiding in the past will weaken the drive for progress and future success in the scientific studies of history and anthropology as it has been already weakened. This weakness will continue to hinder efforts to solve the problems of our nations, but it should be noted that China and India are exceptions to this rule. The products of arts and literature of these nations in the next 10 years will be very few and if there is any, they will not be significant. In the next ten years, in the sense of opposition to rationality, the foundations of modernization such as; freedom, equality and dialogue will be seen as Western political and cultural impositions and the remains of colonial culture.

The study of science that has already been in a bad situation in the region will worsen; certainly some old and new regimes will invest lots of money in the weapons sector and hold some scientists in esteem, but in general scientific development will remain very weak, because if rationality and dialogue are not respected in a society, if scientific thought is weak, science will not be promoted in that society, and in turn it cannot help promote the society itself. In conclusion, over the next ten years I do not expect any success regionally in the scientific fields.

Superpowers Intervention:

Afghanistan and the wider region has remained at the frontline of super-power conflicts for the last few centuries and Afghanistan alone has been invaded several times in the 19th, 20th, and 21st centuries, sometimes by Western powers and sometimes by Eastern powers. It is possible that any dispute in Afghanistan and in the region can find a logical settlement if the super-powers stop intervention in the region. This region has become the most insecure after the NATO US lead invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq. The Taliban and its ideological allies remain a threat to the Central Asian countries that have ambitions to overthrow the Russian-aligned governments and the US would also to see these authoritarian and Russian-allied governments changed and the promotion of democratic governance. However Russia sees this move as a threat to its national security and in this context, the Taliban and the US pose similar threats to Russian interests in the region.

To counter this threat Russia has create several regional and international organizations in order to keep these countries firmly within its sphere of influence. China too is worrying about the ongoing US presence in Afghanistan and believes that the East Turkistan movement in Uyghur in the Xinjiang province of China, that wants to separate from China, is supported by the West and that the US wants to curb China’s political and economic development and influence in the region.

Iran sees the US presence in Afghanistan as a threat to its national Security and therefore reserves the right to fight the US in Afghanistan. Pakistan also is worried by the US and NATO presence in Afghanistan and think that the Pakistan Taliban Movement is supported by the West, while on the other hand, the US and its allies blame Pakistan and Iran for destabilizing Afghanistan. China and Russia, in order to curb American influence in the region and to respond properly to the dangers that are created by the US, have created the (Shanghai Cooperation Organization) and its full member-nations are: Russia, China, Kirghizstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, and further the list of observers, dialogue and attendees all have been increasing year by year. However, given the above considerations, the next ten years of our region will continue to be influenced heavily by interferences from regional and global super-powers.

Economic potential:

The Chinese economy is estimated worth US$ 22 trillion for 1.36 billion people, while the United States economy is worth US$ 22 trillion for 300 million people. According to an authenticated source the total minerals of Afghanistan are worth in excess of US$ 30 trillion. If this is true, then Afghanistan, with a population of 30 million, might potentially be able generate enough wealth to compete with the United States.

China has a desire to construct a 12,000 km railroad and 7,500 km highway that connects Iran, Afghanistan and Central Asia with Europe in order to greater facilitates trade and development. This would mean that an individual would be able to travel from Kandahar to Europe by train within the coming years. Meanwhile, over the next 25 years, China will be consuming 60% of its oil needs by way of pipelines that run through Central Asia, Russia, Afghanistan, Iran and the Middle East. Building the economic corridor between Afghanistan and China in Wakhan, connecting Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Iran and Pakistan by train, the implementation of the KASA 1000 power project between Afghanistan, Tajikistan and Pakistan, the railroad between Kabul and Iran’s Cha Bahar port, the implementation of the TAPI oil and gas project between Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India, Afghanistan, the construction of dam on Kunar River that will generate 1m500MW electricity, attracting foreign investments in Afghanistan mines and natural resources, the economic corridor between Pakistan and China and the implementation of thousands other economic projects could quickly turn this region into one of the richest regions in the world.

If the human resources, oil and minerals of this region were utilized for the public’s benefit, our region could become very prosperous in a relatively short-time like Western Europe. Every country has its own responsibility regarding not implementation of these projects, but Pakistan has often been the one to blame and, in some cases, the USii. In the next ten years, our future must be influenced by our oil, gas minerals and human resources, all of which a pertinent to the economic success of our region.

Notes:
i. Former US secretary of state Hillary Clinton blamed the US government for creating former Mujahidin who fought against the Russian invasion in Afghanistan.
ii. The US has threatened Islamabad with sanctions over Pakistan’s partnership with Iran to construct a gas pipeline between the two countries.

The post How Will Next Ten Years Look For Afghanistan And Wider Region? – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), food prices will surge by 40 percent in the next 10 years and will result in an acute food crisis worldwide. The report says the food expenditure per household is expected to rise by 30 percent.

The main factor contributing to this situation is the rapid urbanization of developed countries replacing arable lands with industrial zones. Developing countries appear to be oblivious of this fact and are destroying farmable lands. Such practices that lead to the devastation of world’s valuable natural resources at the hands of the former colonial powers are described as “agro-imperialism.”

Africa is once again in the headlines. Despite having been blessed with huge natural resources, the Dark Continent is struggling with hunger and poverty due to a lack of infrastructure, industries, rampant civil wars, continuous tug-of-war between establishments and the corporate sector. Ironically, 40 percent of the unused agricultural lands of the world are in Africa and the peoples of the continent, who cannot produce their own crops, are not able to benefit from their underground resources or their lands, which can be used for high-temperature resistant quality agriculture. This situation has opened the doors to a world of exploitation.

When the dangers of food crisis became apparent, countries looking for quick fixes began buying or renting agricultural lands in various African countries. It is estimated that some 47-56 million hectares of cultivable land have already changed owners through this method. Congo has reportedly rented 8.1 million hectares, corresponding to one-fourth of its entire lands. While the area of farmable lands rented by Great Britain in Africa is equal to the size of Denmark; US, China and Switzerland combined, purchased lands as big as Moldova.

This practice might at first look like a good idea for Africa, which needs new revenue sources. But in practice, things are different. Investor countries rent those areas not for a few years but for much longer duration like 90 years. They are being exempted from taxes for a long time and the produce is mostly exported. The portion they set aside for the domestic market causes a disadvantage in the competition for the African people who cannot carry out real agriculture and are having difficulty marketing their produce. In the domestic market, only the investor countries make money while the value of domestic products dips. For this reason, this practice does nothing but make the imperialist powers richer, as the Africans get poorer.

Some African countries have laws in place that protect exploitation of their respective agricultural sectors. For example in Ghana, the national parliament provides full support to those laws that restrict the farmers’ abilities to stock and swap seeds. This entails the farmers destroying seeds of their local products, and being forced to purchase the genetically-modified seeds provided by western suppliers. It is a known fact that countries that do not follow this path are pressured to accept it by western governments through various means. Actually, it is difficult to say that exploited Africa is the only victim in all of this. At the moment, this imperialist seed market has taken hold of the entire world. All developing countries, including Turkey, feel forced to accept this dangerous and exploitative system.

Mercia Andrews, of the Trust for Community Outreach and Education (TCOE) in South Africa, sees this as “another phase of colonialism” and adds “what we need is … People to people solidarity, not corporate takeover.”

Dr. Kanayo Nwanze, president of the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), stated that: “If we set our sights only on improving productivity, there is a very real danger that we will grow more food in Africa without feeding more people.”

The only reason why the world’s resources are not sufficient although there are enough to feed twice the world population today is selfishness. If the future policies are based on principles of selfishness and egoism, and if profit is favored over human life, global disasters will continue to strike mankind. The only way to avoid such disasters is to ensure that the spirit of love and solidarity prevails.

When that happens, the developed countries will work to ensure development both for themselves and for the countries they are using the lands of. They will choose to create opportunities to get prosperous together, instead of trying to further exploit an already impoverished country. They will teach industry, technology and agriculture to them, use the resources together and improve the existing conditions through cooperation. The spirit of love and solidarity that God wants can exist only through conscience. Such hearts with a strong conscience cannot bear the thought of getting rich at the expense of others. Such hearts cannot stand the thought of seeing themselves superior to others as the conscience always shows the right way.

In order for conscientious societies, governments and leaders to emerge, people with good hearts need to make their voices stronger. It is evident that selfish practices brought only poverty and hate to the world. The way to achieve wealth and happiness is conscientious and loving policies, which are things that governments probably never tried before. Let’s remind one more time something we have mentioned so many times before: Civilizations will get stronger not through fights, exploitation and oppression but through bonding, sharing, helping and loving each other. Those who find it hard to believe should put it to test once to see how true it is.

The post Africa: A Victim Of Agro-Imperialism – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Abdel Aziz Aluwaisheg

I write this week from Washington, where the first ever GCC-US summit was held on May 13-14. The first day was spent at the White House, where President Barack Obama hosted a working dinner for GCC visitors, focusing on the general issue of US commitment to Gulf security.

The next day — spent at the presidential retreat Camp David — focused in detail on particular issues, such as terrorism, regional conflicts and Iran’s destabilizing activities. The overarching theme, however, remained the same: How to bolster the region’s security through US-GCC collective efforts.

The meetings succeeded beyond expectations; it allayed concerns that had been voiced in the region about the nuclear deal with Iran, US commitment to the region’s security, and the overall GCC-US relationship. The summit then went a step further; the two sides agreed to elevate their relationship to a “strategic partnership,” the parameters of which were spelled out in some detail in the two documents adopted by the leaders.

Although media focus has been on Iran’s nuclear program, the meeting was more about the GCC-US relationship in light of the turbulence our region has witnessed for several years.

The idea for the summit started nearly a year ago. Over the past few months, several ministerial meetings took place between GCC foreign ministers and US Secretary of State John Kerry, as well as between other senior officials from both sides. Thorough preparations account for the depth and breadth of the documents adopted at the summit.

The US side was keen to explain the nuclear deal being negotiated between P5+1 and Iran. Because the technical details of the deal had been covered in meetings held between the GCC and US before the summit, the deal was discussed in more general terms at Camp David.

The US side acknowledges that there are still gaps in the framework agreement and reiterated their position that they are ready to walk away from the negotiations if those gaps were not settled to their satisfaction.

At the end, the GCC side gave a qualified endorsement. In the words of the joint statement, the two sides “emphasized that a comprehensive, verifiable deal that fully addresses the regional and international concerns about Iran’s nuclear program is in the security interests of GCC member states as well as the United States and the international community.”

On the fundamental issue of US commitment to the region’s security, the GCC side went into the summit with some misgivings, but came out reassured. President Obama went beyond what previous presidents committed, by spelling out the kinds of things he is prepared to do, by stating that the US shares with its GCC partners a deep interest in a region that is peaceful and prosperous, and a vital interest in supporting the political independence and territorial integrity, safe from external aggression, of Washington’s GCC partners. The US side added that its policy to use all elements of power to secure our core interests in the Gulf region, and to deter and confront external aggression against GCC states is unequivocal.

The United States made it clear that the nuclear deal, if it goes through, is not part of a “grand bargain” whereby the US would tolerate Iran’s attempts to destabilize the region and establish itself as a hegemon. The US said quite clearly that it opposed and will work together with the GCC to counter Iran’s destabilizing activities in the region. It stressed the need for Iran to take “concrete, practical steps” to build trust and resolve its differences with neighbors by peaceful means.

At Camp David, the leaders discussed how to intensify their cooperation to defeat terrorism, epitomized by the self-ascribed Islamic State (IS), and established a set of principles to address regional conflicts including Syria, Iraq, Yemen and Libya. Those principles include a shared recognition that there is no military solution to the regions’ armed civil conflicts, which can only be resolved through political and peaceful means; respect for all states’ sovereignty and non-interference in their internal affairs; and the need for inclusive governance as well as protection of all minorities and of human rights in conflict-ridden societies.

The annex to the joint statement is a more detailed description of what US commitment to the GCC security means in practice. To ensure continuity of those efforts, and speedy implementation of decisions expressed, the US and GCC directed their respective administrations to strengthen the framework of the US-GCC Strategic Cooperation Forum, to include more frequent ministerial and technical meetings for foreign affairs, defense, security, economic and other areas relevant to the forum’s activities. They also agreed to meet again at summit level in 2016, “in order to advance and build upon the US-GCC Strategic Partnership announced today.”

The post GCC-US Ties Rebooted – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Sri Lanka’s promotion of a senior officer whose division was implicated in serious human rights abuses casts doubt on government pledges to credibly investigate alleged war crimes, Human Rights Watch said Sunday.

Maj. Gen. Jagath Dias, who led the Army’s 57th Division during the last two years of the civil war with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), was appointed army chief of staff, one of the armed forces’ highest post. Although effective May 7, 2015, the appointment was only made public on May 15.

“Sri Lanka’s new government has promised genuine accountability for wartime abuses, but naming the general of an abusive unit the army chief of staff is a slap in the face for victims,” said Brad Adams, Asia director.

“Members of the UN Human Rights Council expecting genuine accountability in Sri Lanka need to closely scrutinize the government’s actions.”

The last months of Sri Lanka’s 26-year-long civil war, which ended on May 19, 2009, with the defeat of the LTTE, were marked by widespread violations of the laws of war by both sides. An independent report commissioned by the United Nations secretary-general found that up to 40,000 civilians, mostly ethnic Tamils, died during the war’s final months.

The 57th Division took part in the last battles of the war, including the extremely bloody and abusive fighting on a small stretch of beach in Mullaitivu district. Human Rights Watch documented the indiscriminate shelling of civilians and hospitals by government forces in the region where the 57th Division was deployed.

The previous government of President Mahinda Rajapaksa denied any laws-of-war violations by the military and placed all blame for civilian losses on the LTTE. He rewarded top commanders for their role in the war. Gen. Dias served as the deputy head of Sri Lanka’s mission to Germany from 2009 to 2011. In 2013, Gen. Dias was denied entry visas to Australia and the United States for his possible involvement in war crimes.

In light of the Sri Lankan government’s resistance to accountability, the UN Human Rights Council in March 2014 adopted a resolution calling on the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights to open an independent international investigation into allegations of abuses by both sides. The Rajapaksa government refused to cooperate with the investigation.

The present government of President Maithripala Sirisena, elected in January 2015, has stated publicly that it intends to reverse Rajapaksa’s policies and deliver justice and accountability for war crimes. While positive steps have been taken to end the Rajapaksa government’s repressive governance style, the new administration has yet to make meaningful moves toward addressing wartime abuses.

The government should put into place an effective accountability mechanism with a significant international component. Previous government accountability mechanisms have been impaired by harassment, threats, and violence against witnesses and commissioners. The best way to address this problem would be to create a combined international and domestic court similar to the successful hybrid courts in Sierra Leone and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

“The government’s appointment of General Dias is further proof that Sri Lanka needs an independent justice process with a strong international component that can undertake impartial investigations and prosecutions,” Adams said. “Six years since the end of the brutal conflict, the victims of the war still await justice.”

The post HRW Says New Sri Lanka Army Chief Is A Blow To Justice appeared first on Eurasia Review.

In recent years and months, peanut allergies in children have been in the news frequently, as scientists reveal new insights into why more and more children are developing them and what can be done to avoid them. However, until now, few have studied the connection between peanut allergy and childhood asthma.

A new study has shown that many children who have asthma have a sensitivity to peanuts, but did not know it. Conducted by researchers in the U.S., the study specifically looked at pediatric asthma patients at a pediatric pulmonary clinic.

The study will be presented at the ATS 2015 International Conference.

“Many of the respiratory symptoms of peanut allergy can mirror those of an asthma attack, and vice versa. Examples of those symptoms include shortness of breath, wheezing and coughing,” said study lead author Robert Cohn, MD, MBA. “This study aimed to evaluate the proportion of asthmatic children who also demonstrated a sensitivity to peanuts.”

For the study, the researchers looked at 1,517 children from the pediatric pulmonary clinic at Mercy Children’s Hospital in Toledo, Ohio. They determined if the children’s charts had a documented peanut allergy and if they had undergone a blood test for antibodies demonstrating a potential reaction to peanuts, known as IgE. Children were considered positive if they had a documented history of peanut allergy or a specific IgE blood test that showed a level higher than normal.

What they found was that of the 1,517 charts that were reviewed, 163, or about 11%, had a documented history of peanut allergy. Nearly 44% (665) had specific IgE testing at some point to test for peanut allergy. Out of that group, 148, or approximately 22%, had a positive test to peanut sensitivity. However, more than half of these children and their families did not suspect there was any sensitivity to peanuts. The prevalence of positive tests varied across age groups but the prevalence of known peanut allergy was strikingly similar across age groups.

“This study demonstrates children with asthma might benefit from a test for peanut sensitivity, especially when control of wheezing and coughing is difficult to achieve. If a physician is having this problem, or if a parent notices it in his or her asthmatic child, they should consider testing, even if they believe their child is not sensitive to peanuts,” said Dr. Cohn. “There should be continued investigation to learn more about the connection between asthmatic children and peanut sensitivity.”

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