Researchers at the University of Houston have determined that climate change – in the form of a stronger sea breeze, the result of warmer soil temperatures – contributed to the drop in high-ozone days in the Houston area.

Robert Talbot, professor of atmospheric chemistry, said that also should be true for coastal regions globally.

The researchers describe their findings in a paper published this week in the journal Atmosphere. In addition to Talbot, they include first author Lei Liu, a doctoral student, and post-doctoral fellow Xin Lan.

The study relied upon ground-level ozone data collected over the past 23 years by the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality. The meteorological data was collected by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.

The researchers said they did not set out to find a connection between climate change and lower ozone levels – the number of days in which ozone levels exceeded federal standards varied from year to year but overall, dropped dramatically between 1990 and 2013. For example, in Aldine, one of four sites studied, the number of days during which ozone levels exceeded federal standards over an eight-hour period dropped to an average of 11 days per year during 2001-2013, down from 35 days per year during 1990-2000.

Talbot said the steep decline made him suspect something was happening beyond a city-led effort to reduce nitrogen oxide emissions, one of the components of ozone.

Liu said they first ruled out other meteorological factors, including temperature, humidity and solar radiation. After they discovered the lower ozone readings coincided with days the southerly flow was strongest, they realized that climate change – in the form of warmer soil temperatures – had increased the southerly flow, she said.

“The frequency of southerly (air) flow has increased by a factor of ~2.5 over the period 1990-2013, likely suppressing O3 (ozone) photochemistry and leading to a ‘cleaner’ Houston environment,” they wrote. “The sea breeze was enhanced greatly from 1990 to 2013 due to increasing land surface temperatures, increased pressure gradients, and slightly stronger on-shore winds. These patterns driven by climate change produce a strengthening of the sea breeze, which should be a general result at locations worldwide.”

Industrial plants and vehicle exhaust mix with heat and sunlight to produce ground-level ozone, which can worsen asthma and other conditions. The city’s rapid population growth – more people means more cars – and the refineries and petrochemical plants along the Houston Ship Channel are key factors in Houston’s ground-level ozone.

The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency in 1997 classified Houston as a “severe” nonattainment area due to ozone levels measured over an eight-hour period. By 2008, the city was classified as a “moderate” nonattainment area.

For the study, researchers focused on data from four locations: Galveston, Clinton Drive near the Houston Ship Channel, Aldine and a site in Northwest Harris County. They also used data on background ozone levels collected from the roof of Moody Tower, a high-rise residence hall on the UH campus.

Background ozone levels have remained constant over the past seven years, they report, dropping just one part per billion. The average background level over that period was 30 parts per billion.

But the number of days in which ground-level ozone exceeded federal standards in one-hour and eight-hour measures dropped sharply at all four sites between 1990 and 2013. (Data for the Galveston site is available only back to 1997.)

In contrast, “the length of time per year Houston is under the influence of southerly flow has more than doubled from 1990 to 2013,” the researchers wrote. ” … We propose that the increased flow of ‘cleaner’ air is diluting the dirty Houston air, lowering the mixing ratios of NOX, O3 and precursor hydrocarbons. It also would advect the polluted air away from Houston,” leading to lower potential to produce ozone.

They compared land and sea temperatures over the 23-year period to determine how temperature differences impact southerly flow. Land temperatures increase faster than water temperatures on a daily time scale, Liu said. As the heated air over land rises, cooler air from the sea rushes in, dispersing both ozone and the chemical elements that contribute to ozone.

“We weren’t looking at it from a climate change perspective at first,” Talbot said. “Then once we saw it was the sea breeze, we knew it had to be climate.”

The post Climate Change Helped To Reduce Ozone Levels appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Pope Francis on Sunday called for prayers for the people of Burundi, where violent clashes have broken out following a failed coup last week.

“I also wish to invite you to pray for the dear people of Burundi, who are living in a delicate moment,” the pontiff said in his May 17 address ahead of the Regina Caeli prayers.

“May the Lord help everyone flee the violence and act responsibly for the good of the country.”

The Pope was speaking at the conclusion of Mass for the canonization of four saints in Saint Peter’s Square.

Violence broke out last week after a failed coup against Burundi’s President Pierre Nkurunziza.

Around 20 people have been killed in the unrest, and tens of thousands have fled the country.

Eighteen suspected perpetrators of the coup were in court on Saturday, while the alleged ringleader, Major General Godefroid Niyombare, is still at large, according to BBC News.

Unrest began with protests starting April 26, one day after Nkurunziza announced he would be running to be reelected for a third term in office. Opponents said a third presidential term was unconstitutional. Some 600 protesters have been arrested.

A coup was announced on May 13, but it appears to have failed as of the following day.

Burundi is in southeast Africa and borders the Central African Republic, Tanzania, and Rwanda.

The country is the second poorest in the world. According to the World Bank, around 60 percent of its 10.4 million people do not have enough food.

The post Pope Francis Appeals For Peace In Burundi appeared first on Eurasia Review.

A coalition of Asian-American groups filed a federal complaint against Harvard University on Friday alleging the school engaged in “systemic and continuous discrimination” against Asian Americans during its admissions process.

More than 60 Chinese, Indian, Korean and Pakistani groups came together for the complaint, which was filed with the civil rights offices at the justice and education departments. They are calling for an investigation into Harvard and other Ivy League institutions that they say should stop using racial quotas or racial balancing in admission.

“We want to eliminate discrimination of Asian Americans, and we want procedural justice for all racial groups,” Yukong Zhao, one of the chief organizers and a guest columnist with the Orlando Sentinel, told NBC News. “All racial groups should be treated equal.”
The coalition includes the Chinese-American Association of Orange County, in California; the Global Organization of People of Indian Origin, in New York; and the Pakistani Policy Institute, also in New York, Zhao told the network.

Robert Iuliano, Harvard University General Counsel, said in a statement that the university uses a “holistic admissions process” that is “fully compliant with federal law” to build a diverse class. He added that over the past decade the percentage of Asian American students admitted to Harvard College has increased from 17.6% to 21%.

“We will vigorously defend the right of Harvard, and other universities, to continue to seek the educational benefits that come from a class that is diverse on multiple dimensions,” Iuliano said.

Iuliano also pointed to the Supreme Court’s landmark 1978 decision in Regents of University of California v. Bakke, which upheld affirmative action and specifically cited Harvard’s admissions plan as a “legally sound approach” to admissions.

Yet, Yukong Zhao, a 52-year-old Chinese-American author who helped organize the coalition, told The Wall Street Journal that there are longtime stereotypes of Asian applicants’ being “not creative enough or risk-taking enough, but that’s not true.”

“There is a lot of discrimination, and it hurts not just Asian Americans, it hurts the whole country,” he told the paper.

Meanwhile, other Asian-American groups and officials have released statements supporting affirmative action, including two members of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights.

“Neither of us believes that any racial or ethnic group should be subjected to quotas,” commissioners Michael Yaki and Karen Narasaki said. “Nor do we believe that test scores alone entitle anyone to admission at Harvard. Students are more than their test scores and grades.”

The post Asian Americans Sue Harvard Over Discrimination appeared first on Eurasia Review.

In recent weeks, Rohingyas stranded in rickety boats in the seas of Southeast Asia has caused international alarm. There are several thousand of these migrants in boats off the coasts of Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia with dwindling supplies of food and water. Nicholas Kristof of the New York Times calls it ‘a scene of a mass atrocity.’ If the seas will not kill them, starvation will.

According to Tom Andrews, a former member of Congress who is president of United to End Genocide, “The Andaman Sea is about to become a floating mass grave, and it’s because of the failure of governments, including our own, to do what is necessary.”

In spite of their sad plight, these fleeing refugees are denied temporary shelter in any of these ASEAN countries.  “Not only is there not a search-and-rescue operation going on right now — with thousands out to sea — but governments are towing these people out from their shores back to open sea, which is tantamount to mass murder,” says Tom Andrews.

It is estimated that some 130,000 of them have fled by boat their ancestral home in the Rakhine state of Myanmar (also known as Burma) since mid-2012, and many – probably thousands – have succumbed to death just trying to do so. Many Rohingyas were smuggled or trafficked to Thailand and held in camps until they paid hefty sums of money to reach the Malaysian border, which has been a favorite destination for these migrants that has already housed some 45,000 of them; but now the Malaysian government has ordered its navy to repel them from its borders.

The Rohingyas have been fleeing Buddhist Burma for quite sometime. Soon after Burma’s independence many Rohingyas were “compelled to leave their ancestral homes as a result of a deliberate Burmese policy to remove them.” Massacres by armed forces occurred on 10 and 11 November 1948, and the military told surviving Rohingyas that unless they vacated Maungdaw and Buthidaung (northern Rakhine towns close to Bangladesh, then East Pakistan) they would be tortured and butchered like animals and that they were appointed to wipe out the Rohingyas from Maungdaw and Buthidaung. [Reference:  Confidential Records Branch CRiV-10/51 in the National Archives of Bangladesh.]

Soon after the military came to power in 1962, largely since the 1970s the condition of the Rohingyas worsened as a result of a plethora of state policies that are brutal, savage and an anathema to everything we consider moral, noble, right, fair and decent in our time. Not a single of the Articles enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is honored by the Buddhist government in its treatment of the Rohingya people. Most of them who had hitherto enjoyed full citizenship under 1948 legislation did not receive new IDs. Through its 1982 Citizenship Law, the Burmese government had effectively made them stateless in their own country with no rights and made them the most persecuted people on earth. As a result of such unfathomable violations of human rights, a majority of the Rohingya have ended up living as refugees or unwanted people in many parts of our world, especially, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Bangladesh and the Gulf States.

The repression of the Rohingyas has gradually intensified since the relaxation of international embargo on President Thein Sein’s government in 2011. In June and October 2012 there were large scale ethnic cleansing drives on Rohingyas in the Rakhine State to exterminate or drive them out of the country. Hundreds of thousands lost their homes, which were destroyed by the marauding and genocidal Buddhists with support from the local and central government and the racist politicians and monks. Some 140,000 of them are now forced to live in concentration camps. To make things worse for the persecuted Rohingya, the government in March revoked white cards – or “temporary registration certificates” – that had been issued to hundreds of thousands of Rohingyas. This meant that they no longer have the right to vote in upcoming elections in November.

In the last few days alone, dozens of Rohingya homes and boats were burned down by racist Buddhists and government security forces in northern Muslim majority areas of the Rakhine state further escalating the crisis and pushing them to the brink of despair. It is not difficult to understand why some 3500 of them are now in the seas of the Southeast Asia.

In utter desperation, the Rohingya have become the stranded boat people of our time. Aptly put, they are forced to brave death at sea to escape ‘open-air concentration camps’ inside Myanmar. Like the Jews on-board the SS St. Louis, fleeing Hitler’s Germany in 1939, who were denied landing in Cuba and the USA, the Rohingyas are denied landfall today.

Obviously, we have learned nothing from the experiences of those returning Jews of the SS St. Louis, many of them dying in the Jewish Holocaust!

In the midst of this rapidly worsening condition of the Rohingyas, a high level 3-day conference to end Myanmar’s persecution of the Rohingya people is scheduled to open on May 26 in Oslo, Norway. State Secretary Morten Høglund from Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ola Elvestuen, Deputy Leader of the Liberal Party (Venstre) will contribute to the discussion of the plight of the Rohingyas. At the conference, iconic leaders from diverse backgrounds including George Soros, Nobel Peace laureates Mairead Maguire, Desmond Tutu, and José Ramos-Horta, and the former prime ministers of Malaysia and Norway – namely Tun Dr Mahathir Mohammad and Kjell Magne Bondevik – will join hands with the representatives of the two generations of Rohingya refugees and activists as well as international human rights researchers and scholars of genocides and mass atrocities. Tomas Ojea Quinta and Yanghee Lee, former and present UN Special Rapporteurs on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, respectively, will also share their expertise with the audiences and other participants. Dr. Maung Zarni, a human rights activist and co-author of the journal article, “The Slow Burning Genocide of Myanmar’s Rohingya” will also share his views. [While I was invited, I declined because of a conflict of schedule, which won’t permit me to make the trip to Oslo.]

What can we do to stop the plight of the Rohingya people, esp. their desperate maritime movements? Finding the solution must start with Myanmar. Lately, the U.N. human rights chief Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein has stated, “Until the Myanmar government addresses the institutional discrimination against the Rohingya population, including equal access to citizenship, this precarious migration will continue.”

And yet, Myanmar government is in the denial of the very existence of ‘Rohingya.’ It considers the Rohingyas as the ‘Bengalis’ who had intruded from Bangladesh and refuses to attend a May 29 regional meeting with officials from 15 countries to solve the crisis. Zaw Htay who heads the office of Myanmar President Thein Sein said on Friday that Myanmar’s government “will not attend a regional meeting hosted by Thailand if ‘Rohingya’ is mentioned on the invitation”. What arrogance! And the sad reality is many of the states, including the USA, are caving in to such arm-twisting tactics of the rogue regime.

It is important that the world community press Myanmar to stop her persecution of the Rohingya people. As I noted before, ASEAN is partly responsible for ignoring the problem too long, which has now become a wider humanitarian crisis. It can’t afford closing its eyes like an ostrich to the crisis any more. It has a moral imperative – if not a legal requirement – to allow migrants to take shelter. It is understandable that some countries may be unwilling to act because by doing so they are more likely to be exposed to the principle of non-refoulement, whereby refugees cannot be forcibly returned to places where their lives or freedoms may be threatened. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon in May 2015 urged governments in the region to remember their obligations to keep their borders and ports open to abandoned people at sea and to ensure that “the prohibition on refoulement is maintained”.

“I am appalled at reports that Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia have been pushing boats full of vulnerable migrants back out to sea, which will inevitably lead to many avoidable deaths. The focus should be on saving lives, not further endangering them,” U.N. human rights chief Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein said.

He said the latest report of the Thai navy forcing a boat carrying several hundred people back out to sea after supplying it with provisions was “incomprehensible and inhumane”.

I hope the Oslo Conference succeeds in mobilizing the world community to stop the persecution of the Rohingya people of Myanmar, including finding temporary homes for those stranded migrants in the seas. They need all our help before it is too late and we are forced to hear the same old tired statement of past generations of genocide apologists — “we didn’t know.”

The post Can We Allow Fate Of Those In The SS St. Louis To Repeat? appeared first on Eurasia Review.

On Friday the House passed a massive National Defense Authorization for 2016 that will guarantee US involvement in more wars and overseas interventions for years to come. The Republican majority resorted to trickery to evade the meager spending limitations imposed by the 2011 budget control act – limitations that did not, as often reported, cut military spending but only slowed its growth.

But not even slower growth is enough when you have an empire to maintain worldwide, so the House majority slipped into the military spending bill an extra $89 billion for an emergency war fund. Such “emergency” spending is not addressed in the growth caps placed on the military under the 2011 budget control act. It is a loophole filled by Congress with Fed-printed money.

Ironically, a good deal of this “emergency” money will go to President Obama’s war on ISIS even though neither the House nor the Senate has debated – let alone authorized – that war! Although House leadership allowed 135 amendments to the defense bill – with many on minor issues like regulations on fire hoses – an effort by a small group of Representatives to introduce an amendment to debate the current US war in Iraq and Syria was rejected.

While squashing debate on ongoing but unauthorized wars, the bill also pushed the administration toward new conflicts. Despite the president’s unwise decision to send hundreds of US military trainers to Ukraine, a move that threatens the current shaky ceasefire, Congress wants even more US involvement in Ukraine’s internal affairs. The military spending bill included $300 million to directly arm the Ukrainian government even as Ukrainian leaders threaten to again attack the breakaway regions in the east. Does Congress really think US-supplied weapons killing ethnic Russians in eastern Ukraine is a good idea?

The defense authorization bill also seeks to send yet more weapons into Iraq. This time the House wants to send weapons directly to the Kurds in northern Iraq without the approval of the Iraqi government. Although these weapons are supposed to be used to fight ISIS, we know from too many prior examples that they often find their way into the hands of the very people we are fighting. Also, arming an ethnic group seeking to break away from Baghdad and form a new state is an unwise infringement of the sovereignty of Iraq. It is one thing to endorse the idea of secession as a way to reduce the possibility of violence, but it is quite something else to arm one side and implicitly back its demands.

While the neocons keep pushing the lie that the military budget is shrinking under the Obama Administration, the opposite is true. As the CATO Institute pointed out recently, President George W. Bush’s average defense budget was $601 billion, while during the Obama administration the average has been $687 billion. This bill is just another example of this unhealthy trend.

Next year’s military spending plan keeps the US on track toward destruction of its economy at home while provoking new resentment over US interventionism overseas. It is a recipe for disaster. Let’s hope for either a presidential veto, or that on final passage Congress rejects this bad bill.

This article was published by the RonPaul Institute.

The post Ron Paul: New Military Spending Bill Expands Empire But Forbids Debate On War – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

After four years of engagement with its critics in a so far failed bid to turn its hosting of the World Cup into a successful soft power tool, Qatar appears to have decided that the region’s tendency to intimidate those who don’t fall into line may be a more effective strategy.

In doing so, Qatar appears to be backtracking on its record of being the one Gulf state that instead of barring critics entry or incarcerating them – standard practice in most countries in the region – worked with human rights and trade union activists to address concerns about the working and living conditions of migrant workers who constitute a majority of the population.

The cooperation resulted in key Qatari institutions adopting forward looking standards that would improve conditions and modernize but not abolish Qatar’s controversial kafala or sponsorship system that puts workers at the mercy of their employers.

Qatar’s engagement sparked understanding among major segments of the international human rights community, including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, of the existential issues involved in labour reform in a country in which the citizenry accounts for only 12 percent of the population. Many Qatar’s fear that tinkering with the labour system would be opening a Pandora’s Box that could lead to them losing control of their society and culture.

Labour has emerged as the major distraction from Qatar’s success in winning the right to host the 2022 World Cup against the backdrop of a relatively high workers death rate and criticism of the conditions in which primarily Asian workers live and work. Qatar has conceded that it needs to reform its labour system in a bid to fend off calls that it be deprived of its World Cup hosting rights but has been slow in implementing reform.

Theo Zwanziger, the outgoing member of the executive committee of world soccer governing body FIFA in charge of monitoring Qatari progress on labour reform and a long standing Qatar critic, has warned that the Gulf state’s snail pace approach could result in a resolution being tabled at the group’s congress later this month demanding that the World Cup be moved away from Qatar.

Mr. Zwanziger’s warning rings hollow against the backdrop of guarantees given to FIFA by Russia, the host of the 2018 World Cup, that it would suspend labour laws with regard to World Cup-related projects. FIFA has said the German television report had taken the agreement with Russia out of context.

Qatar’s backtracking in the form of the detention of foreign journalists, including ones invited by the government, who investigate worker’s living and working conditions, and warnings to those in Qatar who have worked with Qatari institutions, human rights groups and trade unions comes as Gulf states adopt more assertive regional and foreign policies. In doing so, Qatar joins the conservative Gulf mainstream.

The United Arab Emirates has in recent weeks barred entry to a New York University professor who was scheduled to attend a conference at the university’s Abu Dhabi campus and two prominent artists, including one associated with the Guggenheim Museum, that is building a satellite in the emirate, because of their criticism of the UAE’s labour regime.

Gulf states distrust US policy in the Middle East, particularly the Obama administration’s handling of nuclear negotiations with Iran that could return the Islamic republic to the international fold. They also feel that Iran is projecting its power in the region through proxies that are encircling the Gulf. In response, Gulf states led by Saudi Arabia have become militarily and politically more assertive as in Yemen where they have waged a destructive bombing campaign and in Syria with stepped-up support for rebels fighting the regime of President Bashar al-Assad.

Gulf assertiveness began with Saudi troops helping in brutally suppressing a popular revolt in Bahrain in 2011 and the kingdom together with the UAE and Kuwait backing a military coup in Egypt in 2013. Qatar, with its close ties to the Muslim Brotherhood, appeared at the time of the coup to be the one Gulf state charting an independent course.

With Qatar’s falling more in line with the more hard line mainstream Gulf approach, Oman is replacing Qatar as the odd man out in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the regional group that brings together Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Oman, Bahrain, the UAE and Kuwait. Oman has refused to join the bombing campaign in Yemen, mediated US contacts with Iran that put the nuclear negotiations into high gear, and has rejected militarization of the GCC.

In the latest evidence of a reversal in Qatar’s approach, security forces detained a BBC television team that had been invited by the government to report on the labour issue. “We were invited to Qatar by the prime minister’s office to see new flagship accommodation for low-paid migrant workers – but while gathering additional material for our report, we ended up being thrown into prison for doing our jobs,” wrote Mark Lobel on the BBC’s website.

The 13-hour detention of the BBC journalists followed the arrest earlier this year of a German television team. Both teams had their equipment confiscated, which in the case of the Germans was returned only after all data had been wiped out. In a meek defense, the Qatar Supreme Committee for Delivery & Legacy that is responsible for the 2022 World Cup said the German crew had failed to obtain proper permissions to film. It is an argument that doesn’t hold in the case of the BBC.

FIFA’s rejection of the findings of the German documentary and particularly the fact that it expressed surprise that one of its media partners would report independently and critically about the group raises questions about the sincerity of its pledge to investigate the detention of the BBC journalists. “Any instance relating to an apparent restriction of press freedom is of concern to FIFA and will be looked into with the seriousness it deserves,” the group said in a statement on the BBC case. It did not issue a similar statement when the German team was detained.

It is unclear whether the hardening attitude of Qatar that is also reflected in sources in Qatar being hesitant to speak out after having been reportedly advised to lie low is simply security forces taking a tougher position as they forge closer security and intelligence ties to other Gulf states or whether it reflects an overall change in Qatar’s approach.

Qatar’s changed approach could well signal a partial shift away from seeing soft power as the main pillar of its security and defense architecture in the absence of the manpower or strategic depth to project hard power to adherence to a Saudi-led projection of military force. Qatar last year stepped up its arms purchases with an $11 billion deal to acquire US Patriot missiles.

Yet, Qatar, given that it is sandwiched between Iran across the Gulf and Saudi Arabia, sees the kingdom as both an ally and a threat, Qatar is likely to walk a fine line even if it adopts some of its big brother’s more repressive tactics.

In the end, it doesn’t really matter in an autocratic state in which decision making is highly centralized. At risk is Qatar’s potential of become a rare example of a mega-sporting event leaving a legacy of social if not political change rather than white elephants and financial loss. The World Cup offers Qatar an opportunity to put its best foot forward and emerge as a forward-looking 21st century regional model. The question is whether Qatari backtracking will squander the Gulf state’s unique opportunity.

The post Qatar Backtracks On Engagement With Critics – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

North Korea is back in news yet again, as usual all for the wrong reasons. It has conducted nuclear tests in defiance of the UN resolutions, faced sanctions from the international community, committed indescribable atrocities on its own people, committed aggression against its immediate neighbour South Korea, abducted citizens from Japan, eliminated potential political rivals and the list of North Korea’s horror politics is endless.

In the latest unacceptable acts of consolidation of political power, the regime’s young leader Kim Jong-un is believed to have purged the country’s defence minister, Hyon Yong Chol, on treason charges after he allegedly fell asleep at an event presided by Kim. This was confirmed by South Korea spy agency, National Intelligence Service (NIS). This marked the most high-profile demise of a top Pyongyang official since the purge and execution of Kim’s powerful uncle, Jang Song-thaek, in December 2013. Jang was once considered the second most powerful man in Pyongyang’s leadership circle and the charge against him was corruption such as stealing the state funds and that he was committing crime that was damaging the economy, besides plotting to overthrow Kim. Therefore, he, along with a group of officials close to him was executed. By dozing off at a military event presided by Kim, Four-star General Hyon was charged to have shown disrespect and disloyalty and was therefore executed with an anti-aircraft gun in front of hundreds of senior military officials. Unauthorised napping could be an excuse and the real reason seems to be outright subordination.

Though the NIS confirmed the news to Seoul’s lawmakers, China said that it had “no information” about the reported execution of Hyon. Analysts, including the present author, are of the view that Kim’s latest act underscores his drive to consolidate power, which too can be read as sign of instability in Pyongyang, which if true could be the precursor of a huge political earthquake in the peninsula with serious consequences in the region and beyond as the scenario of the regime’s collapse could seem imminent.

According to the NIS, Hyon, the People’s Armed Forces Minister, was machine-gunned at a shooting range on the Kang Kon Military Academy around 30 April. Though the NIS information could be accurate, North Korea’s activities ought to be treated with a degree of scepticism because of the secretive and closed-off nature of the regime. But going by the recent report from the Michael Kirby-led US-based Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, information for which was collected from defectors and satellite imagery of the area just outside Pyongyang where human rights violations have been rampant, it becomes difficult to disbelieve the information the NIS has obtained.

Ever since Kim Jong-un assumed power in 2011 after the death of his father Kim Jong-il, the military leadership has been in a flux. Hyon was the fourth person to hold the defence portfolio in two and half years, though the military chief was changed only three times during the two-decade tenure of Kim Jong-il. There could be several reasons why Kim has become so ruthless. One reason for the frequent reshuffle could be that Kim’s demands on officials are too high than the officials’ capacity to meet as resources are always in short supply, constraining their capacity to meet Kim’s demands. The other could be the execution shall encourage loyalty from others. Kim does not realise that such acts could lead to political instability, which again shall encourage more ruthlessness until probably it reaches the tipping point.

Military chiefs are not the only ones who have faced Kim’s wrath; or high-profile executions limited to Hyon. The Director of Military Operations, a position that controls conventional military forces, was changed six times since Kim assumed power. Besides executing his uncle Jang in 2013, according to NIS report, Kim executed 15 senior North Korean officials in April 2015 accused of challenging his authority. It is possible that Kim’s strategy of purging is to check the military old guard, from whom he perceives a plausible threat to his rule and therefore pushing a reign of terror to solidify his leadership. But these impulsive decisions could be symptomatic of an insecure leader and Kim’s efforts are unlikely to succeed if he fails to improve the country’s shattered economy. This shows that Pyongyang’s military leadership has been in a state of perpetual reshuffle since Kim took power to establish his monolithic authority in the state.

Among the 15 high-ranking officials killed this year was a North Korean vice minister, who was executed in January after he complained about Kim’s policy on forestation. In February, another vice minister in charge of economic planning was killed for objecting to Kim’s decision to change the roof design of a building under construction in Pyongyang. In March, four members of the Unhasu Orchestra, where Kim’s wife, Ri Sol-ju, once performed as a singer, were executed by firing squad on espionage charges. These executions are meant to be setting an example for the rest. So, his “reign of terror” continues.

His other methods of consolidating power have been frequent shifting of jobs among his close aides, demotion and promotion of top generals. In October 2014, Kim ordered the country’s borders to be closed to foreign tourists for fear of the Ebola virus. His instructions were strictly followed and top government officials returning from overseas were required to go through 21-day quarantine. North Korean diplomats abroad were banned from home visits and all these restrictions were in place till early March 2015 when the Ebola ban was lifted.

The US reacted to the alleged execution of the top military official as showing “another extremely brutal act” by the communist regime. I use the word ‘alleged’ because there are conflicting information about the said execution as information from the reclusive regime is difficult to prove. For example, a Tokyo-based organisation that monitors the reclusive country as reported in Asahi Shimbun on 15 May 2015 observed that Hyon may still be alive. According to the Asahi report, Radiopress Inc. said on May 14 that Hyon appeared in a documentary about Kim that was broadcasted the same afternoon, suggesting that Hyon was very much alive. Pyongyang has made no official statement regarding Hyon. Even the NIS subsequently seemed to have retracted from its earlier statement about the execution, saying that it was unable to verify if Hyon was put to death.

It is possible that the confusion was partly because the way the NIS briefings to Parliamentary committee meetings are carried out behind closed-doors, after which selected lawmakers leak the information to the media. For example, lawmaker Shin Kyoung-min who attended the briefing said that Hyon was killed by anti-aircraft gunfire with hundreds watching at a shooting range at Kang Kon Military Academy in late April. Another lawmaker, Lee Cheol-woo, released similar information.

According to the NIS, Hyon could have been charged with treason but it was unlikely that he was executed as he showed some sign of disrespect to Kim rather than plotting a rebellion. Hyon was believed to have expressed dissatisfaction with Kim’s governing style and Hyon’s dozing off at a military event held on 24-25 April in Pyongyang might have sealed his fate. Given the nature of Kim’s past conduct, it is difficult to disbelieve NIS’s initial findings. Kim is believed to be sensitive about subordinates falling asleep in his meetings and given repeated warnings against it. Lesser rank officials, when caught dozing off, have been either demoted or purged. Hyon had no such chance. North Korea refrained from commenting on the reports released by the NIS.

Does his execution reaffirm to the theory that Kim is maintaining a firm grip over the elite in Pyongyang through purges and killings? It is possible to believe such a theory because there were no legal proceedings before he was proved to be disloyal and showed disrespect and executed thereafter. This seemed a bit unusual because in Jang’s case, even though he was once-powerful uncle of Kim, he was found guilty of numerous charges, including a plot to revolt against the state, four days after his dismissal from all of his powerful positions and was executed right after a military trial on 12 December 2013. Even there were conflicting reports when Jang was executed in December 2013. Though Jang’s death was confirmed by North Korea’s state press, reports circulated at the time that Jang had been fed alive to a pack of starved dogs. It transpired subsequently, however, that this version of event originated with a satirist.

It was indeed a dramatic fall for the 66-year-old Hyon, a graduate of the elite Kim il-Sung Military University. He had visited Moscow in April 2015 as Kim’s emissary to meet with his Russian counterpart and speak at a security conference before he was executed. Hyon enjoyed a towering stature and accompanied Kim to public events 14 times in 2015 alone, the maximum by any military official. Only three other people were seen more often with Kim.

Since he took power in December 2011, Kim has engineered a series of executions, purges and frequent reshuffles in the governing clique he inherited. Since then he has been resorting to a mix of terror and rewards to thwart any challenge to his inexperienced leadership. Hyon was the second most powerful military man in North Korea after Hwang Pyong-so, director of the General Bureau of the North Korean Army. Since taking power, Kim Jong-un is believed to have executed around 70 senior party and military officials. This compares with around 10 who were executed during the first four years of reign of his father and thus a dramatic increase in number. He started executing three officials in 2012 and the figure dramatically jumped to 30 each in 2013 and 2014. In 2015, Kim has executed already eight officials up to mid-May. The figure could be much more as all information is difficult to be confirmed.

According to the NIS, Byon In-Son, director of operations at the military’s General Staff, Ma Won Chun, the head of the National Defense Commission’s planning committee, and Kwang Sang, director of the Chosun Workers’ Party Finance and Accounting Department, were also allegedly purged. According to the NIS report, Hwang Pyong So, a standing member of the Political Bureau Standing Committee of the Workers’ Party (WPK) and director of the General Political Bureau of the Chosun People’s Army (KPA), also fell victim to the purges. Hwang is alleged to be “alive and has not been purged.”

Kim Jong-un could be “trigger happy” when it comes to executing top officials but executing people with anti-aircraft guns could be false as was the story earlier that Kim had fed his uncle – Jang – to 120 hungry dogs. The regime’s actions have been so brutal that such salacious reports do the rounds quickly after an incident occurs, before it is proved false. But satellite photos available in October 2014 showed that a large number of VIPs buses moved into a military area, where they watched as several Soviet-made anti-aircraft guns fired down a range at small targets about 100 feet away.

According to Adam Taylor of the Washington Post, the targets were almost certainly people being executed. If true, on would shudder at the imagination of 24 heavy machine guns being fired at human beings and there can be no more gruesome public execution than this. By resorting to such methods, Kim wants to send a message to other officials of “both the strength of the regime and the price of any disloyalty”. Kim probably knows better than anyone else that the greatest danger to his regime would not be outside threats or even a popular uprising but rather “the circle of elites who surround him and keep him in power” and therefore Kim feels the need to constantly send the signal that he is in charge and the top officials must toe the line. If anti-aircraft guns are indeed being used for executing people with a purpose to send a message, it could be possible to believe that Jang too faced a similar fate than fed to starved dogs. An anti-aircraft gun is essentially a mobile platform of four machine guns large and powerful enough to shoot down an airplane. One would dread just at the thought of using such machine to kill a human being.

This “trigger-happy” chubby tyrant is aware that he is inexperienced and has to deal with many senior top military generals. To conceal from being the potential object of being ridiculed and contempt by older and more experienced officials, Kim has been resorting to continuous series of high-level and ultra-violent purges in a show of his strength. Even he did not spare his own uncle in 2013 and now the highly decorated military leader like Hyon. Ordering hundreds of his officials out to a firing range to make them quietly watch the brutal execution is to demonstrate how powerful he must be. Generally North Korea’s elites have been loyal because they know that remaining loyal can make their positions pretty safe but with increasing purges and executions, that could no longer be the case. Once a frustrated official knows that he is in the firing line, the option to resist rather than making a short trip to the execution grounds could be more attractive. Other options could be to flee the country with bags of state secrets or to stage a coup. Those could make sense. In the absence of real credible information, it is tempting to suspect in the light of the purges and the spate of executions that there is some dramatic change in the fundamental relationship between Kim and his coterie of senior-most officials. The potential ramifications of these developments are as difficult to understate as it is to predict.

There is a fear psychosis among officials that deter most to take important decisions for the fear that they could be executed for trivial reasons. Hyon’s case is typical example how Kim demands absolute loyalty from his officials. There are reports Hyon made an official complaint to Kim on behalf of senior military officials on promotion and demotion issues, which offended Kim and Hyon’s elimination became inevitable as Kim had to consolidate his firm grip on the military and therefore Hyon became the fall guy.

Can Kim Jong-un go on repeating such brutal acts for ever to protect his monolithic rule? The answer is, Yes, for some time at least, but certainly not forever. Certainly, Kim’s distrust of members of his core policy group has worsened, which is why his reign of terror has increased. If not execution, Kim has punished key officials with other means. For example, Ma Won-chun, director of the Designing Department at the powerful National Defense Commission was forced to work on a farm in Yanggang Province with his family after “Ma complained about the renovation of the Sunan International Airport last December, saying it lacked ‘Juche Ideology’, or North Korean identity”. Ma was known as North Korea’s chief architect of new infrastructure under Kim.

There are also reports that Kim poisoned his aunt Kim Kyong-hui to death in May 2014 after she complained against the execution of Jang. Kim Kyong-hui was the sister of Kim Jong-un’s father Kim Jong-il and wife of the executed Uncle Jang Song-taek. Jang was widely seen as a tutor and unofficial regent to the young leader was frog marched out of a formal assembly in December 2013 and killed along with some others who supported him.

However, conflicting reports have surfaced more recently about Kim Kyong-hui’s alleged poisoning. Way back in July 2014, after she disappeared from public life, rumour started circulating that Kim Kyong-hui was recuperating at a location in Sobaeksu Villa in Samjiyeon County, Yangkang Province. It seems after her husband’s execution, she became dependent on alcohol and prone to nervous breakdown and therefore was receiving treatment at Pyongyang’s Ponghwa Treatment Centre. She was not dead but still alive, was this version. However Japan’s NHK still claimed that Kim’s aunt was dead, though NIS confirmed in February 2015 that she was alive.

These incidents demonstrate that the internal politics is too volatile. There seems to be little respect for Kim within the core and middle levels of the military. Kim probably senses this trend and therefore becoming more belligerent as his sense of insecurity increases. Political dissent at any level is met with the harshest of punishments and this explains the purges of senior officials in such frequency. Being run by one of the most repressive regimes on Earth, Kim is apparently deeply fearful that his rule could be challenged and eliminating those seen as threats to his regime has been his preferred strategy.

Was it because of this reason why Kim Jong-un cancelled his planned trip to Russia for Russia’s celebration of the 70th anniversary of V-E Day and instead sent Hyon to represent him? Russia was candid in admitting that “internal Korean affairs” was behind the cancellation. Christian Whiton of the CNN makes some interesting observation that “Kim may be fitting comfortably into tyrant role”. According to him, “precariousness and insecurity are two different things”. He says that there are enough signs which suggest that the regime is “actually stable”. Whiton backs his argument that North Korea’s actual ties with China is not strained. He sees Chinese statements that it is fed up are merely double-speak because Beijing is unlikely to ever abandon North Korea and Kim is well aware of this reality. He further says that Pyongyang is in possession of “as many as 20 nuclear weapons and the ability to strike North America directly”.

Besides possessing nuclear weapons, the regime also launched test-fired submarine-launched ballistic missiles. Kim Jong-un is projected as the “beloved figure jovially dispensing military, industrial, and social guidance to a degree that equals or exceeds his father’s and grandfather’s cults of personality”. Thus, argues Whiton, “contrary to the image of a panicky, unsure, inexperienced boy dictator, Kim may be perfectly in his element as an effective tyrant. Furthermore, those who hope Kim’s purges will inspire North Korean officials who fear that they could be next on the chopping block to eliminate Kim, may be disappointed. One needs only to examine the reigns of Joseph Stalin and Mao Tse-tung to see that those most apt to murder their colleagues can also be the most durable and seldom challenged”. Even when the country’s economy continues to flounder amidst stricter international sanctions, Kim has been making frequent visits to catfish farms, textile factories and military barracks to build his image as a caring leader and legitimate successor in his family’s dynasty. But his tactics of “inspiring fear of purges” and stoking competition for his favour “have fostered strong resentment among North Korea’s elite”. The North Korean regime has become so repressive that one sees the regime no different from what Stalin, Hitler and Pol Pot did in their respective countries – Soviet Union, Germany and Cambodia – and to their peoples.

Is the argument made by Whiton sustainable in the light of Kim’s recent acts, which is why he has attracted so much of international opprobrium? The international community has no choice but to continue pursuing both carrot and stick policy towards the regime. The regime could be at fault in its policy but the people of the country deserve decent living and therefore need support of the international community. The real worry is that the regime “has grown in a decade from an exotic regional nuisance to a more direct and significant threat … led by a young dictator who looks less buffoonish and more diabolical by the month”. This calls for use of more stick and less of carrot or else the threat from the North shall continue to increase further, worsening the present security situation of the region and beyond.

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By Rene Wadlow*

May 18 has been designated by UNESCO as the International Day of Museums to highlight the role that museums play in preserving beauty, culture, and history. Museums come in all sizes and are often related to institutions of learning and libraries. Increasingly, churches and centers of worship have taken on the character of museums as people visit them for their artistic value even if they do not share the faith of those who built them.

Museums are important agents of intellectual growth and of cultural understanding. They are part of the common heritage of humanity, and thus require special protection in times of armed conflict. Many were horrified at the looting of the National Museum of Baghdad when some of the oldest objects of civilization were stolen or destroyed. Fortunately many items were later found and restored, but the American forces had provided inadequate protection at a time when wide-spread looting was predicted and, in fact, was going on. More recently, we have seen the deliberate destruction of cultural heritage in the museum of Mosul by ISIS factions. Today, there is deep concern for Palmyra as ISIS and government troops battle near Palmyra, a UNESCO World Heritage site.

Conserving a cultural heritage is always difficult. Weak institutional capabilities, lack of appropriate resources and isolation of many culturally essential sites are compounded by a lack of awareness of the value of cultural heritage conservation. On the other hand, the dynamism of local initiatives and community solidarity systems are impressive assets. These forces should be enlisted, enlarged, and empowered to preserve and protect a heritage. Involving people in cultural heritage conservation both increases the efficiency of cultural heritage conservation and raises awareness of the importance of the past for people facing rapid changes in their environment and values.

Knowledge and understanding of a people’s past can help current inhabitants to develop and sustain identity and to appreciate the value of their own culture and heritage. This knowledge and understanding enriches their lives and enables them to manage contemporary problems more successfully. It is important to retain the best of traditional self-reliance and skills of rural life and economics as people adapt to change.

Traditional systems of knowledge are rarely written down; they are implicit, continued by practice and example, rarely codified or even articulated by the spoken word. They continue to exist as long as they are useful, as long as they are not supplanted by new techniques. They are far too easily lost. Thus is is the objects that come into being through these systems of knowledge that ultimately become critically important.

Thus, museums must become key institutions at the local level . They should function as a place of learning. The objects that bear witness to systems of knowledge must be accessible to those who would visit and learn from them. Culture must be seen in its entirety: how women and men live in the world, how they use it, preserve and enjoy it for a better life. Museums allow objects to speak, to bear witness to past experiences and future possibilities and thus to reflect on how things are and how things might otherwise be.

Early efforts for the protection of educational and cultural institutions were undertaken by Nicholas Roerich (1874-1947) a Russian and world citizen. Nicholas Roerich had lived through the First World War and the Russian Revolution and saw how armed conflicts can destroy works of art and cultural and educational institutions. For Roerich, such institutions were irreplaceable and their destructions was a permanent loss for all humanity. Thus, he worked for the protection of works of art and institutions of culture in times of armed conflict. Thus he envisaged a universally-accepted symbol that could be placed on educational institutions in the way that a red cross had become a widely-recognized symbol to protect medical institutions and medical workers. Roerich proposed a “Banner of Peace” − three red circles representing the past, present and future − that could be placed upon institutions and sites of culture and education to protect them in times of conflict.

Roerich mobilized artists and intellectuals in the 1920s for the establishment of this Banner of Peace. Henry A. Wallace, then the US Secretary of Agriculture and later Vice-President was an admirer of Roerich and helped to have an official treaty introducing the Banner of Peace − the Roerich Peace Pact − signed at the White House on 15 April 1935 by 21 States in a Pan-American Union ceremony. At the signing, Henry Wallace on behalf of the USA said “At no time has such an ideal been more needed. It is high time for the idealists who make the reality of tomorrow, to rally around such a symbol of international cultural unity. It is time that we appeal to that appreciation of beauty, science, education which runs across all national boundaries to strengthen all that we hold dear in our particular governments and customs. Its acceptance signifies the approach of a time when those who truly love their own nation will appreciate in additions the unique contributions of other nations and also do reverence to that common spiritual enterprise which draws together in one fellowship all artists, scientists, educators and truly religious of whatever faith.”

As Nicholas Roerich said in a presentation of his Pact “The world is striving toward peace in many ways, and everyone realizes in his heart that this constructive work is a true prophesy of the New Era. We deplore the loss of libraries of Lou vain and Overdo and the irreplaceable beauty of the Cathedral of Rheims. We remember the beautiful treasures of private collections which were lost during world calamities. But we do not want to inscribe on these deeps any worlds of hatred. Let us simply say : Destroyed by human ignorance − rebuilt by human hope.”

After the Second World War, UNESCO has continued the effort, and there have been additional conventions on the protection of cultural and educational bodies in times of armed conflicts. The most important is the 1954 Hague Connection for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict.

Museums help to build new bridges between nations, ethnic groups and communities through values such as beauty and harmony, that may serve a common references. Museums also build bridges between generations, between the past, the present and the future.

Therefore, on this International Museum Day, let us consider together how we may advance the impact of beauty upon the world.

*Rene Wadlow, President and a representative to the United Nations, Geneva, of the Association of World Citizens

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South Africa’s President Jacob Zuma on Monday will attend the Extraordinary Summit of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) in Luanda, the Republic of Angola.

“The Extraordinary Summit is expected to consider the prevailing security situation in the Great Lakes Region, in particular the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Central African Republic and the Republic of South Sudan,” the Presidency said on Sunday.

President Zuma was invited to the summit by his Angolan counterpart, Eduardo dos Santos, who serves as Chairperson of the ICGLR.

“President Zuma will be accompanied by the Minister of International Relations and Cooperation Ms Maite Nkoana-Mashabane,” the Presidency said.

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By David Danelo*

If Americans were asked to identify a city that most epitomizes Germany’s defining 21^st century dilemma, few would instinctively pick the town of Tröglitz. Before March 2015, the Saxony-Anhalt village south of Leipzig was best known, if at all, as a nice place for workers from the nearby Zeitz Chemical and Industrial Park to live. Farms and forests encircle the city center, and streets named after Friedrich Bergius and Max Planck remind visitors of the scientific forefathers whose discoveries in chemistry and physics paved the way for their employment. But roads honoring Karl Marx and Ernst Thälmann commemorate the immediate political past; twenty five years ago, Tröglitz was in East Germany, and the city’s 3,000 inhabitants have not forgotten the obstacles they faced on their path to reintegrate with the west.

It is a different type of chemistry that has made Tröglitz well known throughout Germany: the combustible mix that migration adds to a culture that, while overtly welcoming, fears threats to economic stability, physical security, and personal comfort. In December 2014, after announcing his city’s intention to house 40 Syrian amnesty seekers for shelter in a vacant city building, Tröglitz mayor Markus Nierth suddenly, and unexpectedly, became the epicenter of Germany’s immigration debate. In an ad hoc coalition, neo-Nazi and anti-immigration groups traveled from throughout Germany to oppose the shelter, claiming to speak for a silent majority. Three months later, Nierth, who was both praised and vilified in town hall meetings, resigned as mayor; he wanted to protect his wife and seven children from hate speech. Nierth became the first German politician to resign under neo-Nazi pressure since the Adolf Hitler era.

Since Nierth’s resignation, Tröglitz has become an ideological battleground. The city represents the front lines for a government committed to promoting integration, and a line in the sand for far-right activists. “It is a difficult topic,” says Katrin, an innkeeper and longtime Tröglitz resident in her mid-40s. “The social and economic policies should be better regulated.” Katrin sympathizes with the asylum seekers, but also fears how “the natives” will react to their arrival. She says most Tröglitz residents believe Germany’s economic policies will end up benefitting those granted asylum, and leave “good hard working Germans” disenfranchised.

Throughout Germany, Tröglitz has come to symbolize the national discussion about migration’s economic, political, and cultural impact. In 2014, Germany welcomed 200,000 asylum seekers—more than any country worldwide, and more than the next two European countries (Sweden and Italy) combined. Last year, Germany became home to one in every five asylum seekers in the world. German migration officials estimate they will have settled 300,000 in Deutschland when this year ends, the highest number since reunification.

What has made Germany the continent’s prime migrant destination? Liberal asylum laws? Lingering guilt for the continental refugee crisis following both world wars? A relative absence of a colonial legacy? Prospective economic opportunity? Or the evolving experience West and East Germans have with integrating a generation of Turkish migrant workers?

Over twenty-five years of slow, deliberate reunification, some combination of all these variables have shaped Germany’s migration policies. Second only to Sweden, Germany’s asylum and refugee laws are the most liberal in Europe. “If the asylum application is accepted, persons granted asylum status and those granted refugee status receive a temporary residence permit and are given the same status as Germans within the social insurance system,” reads text from Germany’s official Migration and Integration web page. “They are entitled to social welfare, child benefits, child-raising benefits, integration allowances and language courses as well as other forms of integration assistance.”

The Wilkommenskultur, or welcoming culture, was part of a path to excising both postwar guilt and post-Cold War memories. Excepting Sweden—a country with a long history of sheltering political refugees, including from World War II-era Germany—the commitment to asylum seekers, enshrined in Germany’s 1949 postwar constitution, contrasts with the rest of Europe. In 2014, the United Kingdom, France, and Italy combined to shelter about the same number of migrants as Germany alone. Most German families have grandparents who were war refugees themselves, and many former East Germans remember fleeing to the West. By entitling refugees to the same social benefits of citizens, Germans affirm solidarity with the migrant’s plight, and pay a type of psychological reparation to those who the Nazis displaced.

Germany also differs from Europe in its absence of any recent colonial history with most migrants or asylum seekers. In many European countries—consider the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Portugal, the Netherlands, and Spain—a colonial background may provide a shared language for migrants, but also brings stereotypes of racial inferiority, creating obstacles to social integration. Although Germany claimed territories in Africa (and portions of New Guinea), and hosted the infamous 1884 Berlin conference that divided ownership of the continent among European powers, few asylum seekers, refugees, or migrants seek Germany as a post-colonial destination. This impacts internal European attitudes as well; three of every four temporary workers in Germany, including asylum seekers, are European. “Italy is awful,” said Marta, an Italian who visited Berlin as a law student in 2011, and has kept a food service job for three years so she could stay in Germany. “The quality of life here is so much better.”

Unlike post-colonial migrants, refugees are not drawn to Germany because of a common language. They arrive believing, not without cause, that Germany offers the best chance for them to build a better, safer, more prosperous life. As commentators hyperventilate over Germany’s austere economic leadership—headlines like “Blame Germany if Europe Implodes”; “It’s Time to Kick Germany Out of the Eurozone”; and “Greece Should Not Give In to Germany’s Bullying” dominate U.S. foreign policy websites—migrants pour into the country seeking the Deutschland Dream. In 2013, according to UNHCR data, Germany processed more asylum applications than any other country. The United States—a country where 15 percent of the population claims German ancestry—was second.

Germany’s current economic strength was, in part, built by a generation of Turkish immigrants. In October 1961, Germany established conditions for welcoming 280,000 Turkish guest workers to support labor demand. The relationship grew over 50 years, and today 4 percent of Germany’s population—about the same percentage of Asian-Americans in the U.S.—are of Turkish heritage. Overall, Germany has the third largest immigrant population in the world (after the U.S. and Russia), and 12 percent of Germany’s population—about the same percentage of African-Americans in the U.S.—are immigrants.

Not everyone in Germany is pleased about this. Although official policy promotes immigration, Germans appear troubled by the increased presence of Halal supermarkets, döner kebab restaurants, and, especially, mosques. According to a 2012 study, 80 percent of Germans believe Islam deprives women of their rights, while only 29 percent say that “the Muslims who live here are part of Germany.” Sixty percent of Germans say immigration places too much pressure on public services. And two of every three Germans “fully disagree” with stating “Islam and Christianity are equally German”—even though just 13 percent of Germans attend church weekly.

Therein lies Chancellor Merkel’s dilemma. On the one hand, Germany’s economy has thrived because from immigration; on the other, many Germans see Islam itself as a national security threat. “German politics are inherently racist,” a Berlin-based think tank director tells me pessimistically. “We say we are welcoming, but then reject any exercise of religion. Eating pork and drinking alcohol are almost requirements in German culture, and abstaining from either is suspicious. Islam is not compatible with German identity.”

Which brings us back to the German heartland of Tröglitz. Katrin described her concerns about welcoming the asylum seekers as economic, not religious; she thought the state spent too much money on “war refugees,” threatening the social welfare of natural citizens. She also saw asylum seekers and Turkish guest workers as two different groups. “All of the problems come back to people not having enough money,” said Katrin, and she feared the refugees, if granted asylum, would take more from Tröglitz than they would give.

It is these fears that have made Tröglitz symbolic beyond its size. On April 4, a group of neo-Nazis infiltrated Tröglitz and lit on fire the abandoned building intended to house refugees. Tröglitz residents condemned the act, and even those opposed to welcoming the migrants expressed anger that their city had attracted interest from far right activists. Following the arson, former Mayor Markus Nierth received a message: “Hermann Göring has written to me and told me to shoot you.” Neirth now lives under 24-hour police protection.

Europe’s Muslim population will likely double by 2050, and if the laws and trends remain constant, many Muslim immigrants will find their way to German cities. In 2010, half of the players on Germany’s World Cup team had an immigrant background. Turkish supermarkets stock sausage and salami in halal varieties. The question is not whether Islam will become part of German identity, but how much social unrest Germany will endure as it does.

As increasing numbers of migrants drown while attempting Mediterranean Sea crossings, European policymakers claim they intend to “tighten border security” around the Schengen Area’s sea and land perimeter; heighten criminal penalties for human smuggling; and increase deportations of those whose asylum applications are rejected. Such measures might sound eerily familiar to U.S. border policies, none of which curbed Latin American migration. Only Mexico’s economic improvement slowed net migration to zero; Central Americans, who face more severe conditions, continue to come to the United States, both legally and illegally, in high numbers.

Throughout Germany, and most countries in northern Europe, traffic lights blink yellow whenever changing, not only before the red light (as in the U.S.), but also prior to the green signal. This is how Germany approaches policy, with caution and preparation as requirements for any change. With immigration, the public might eventually reject Merkel’s policies and demand restrictions to welcoming more refugees. But thus far Germany has been patient, resisting alterations to their asylum law and affirming their Willkommenskultur as part of a deeper existential struggle. “The Nazis must not be allowed to win,” Nierth said after his death threat, defending current asylum policy as a stand against fascism.

Seventy years ago, when the Allies ended the Nazi regime, few would have predicted that defending the rights of Syrian refugees would equate to a political statement against oppression. But Nierth’s moral defense of both German law and common humanity marks a constant thread in modern German history. Unlike the Netherlands, where a supposed culture of tolerance has clear political limits, Germany has backed its rhetoric with action. Whatever criticisms opponents may have of Germany’s asylum policy, they cannot accuse the Germans of inconsistence in ideals, or lacking a willingness to sacrifice.

The determined German capacity to tear down economic, social, cultural, and political walls that Nierth’s courage represents will define both the country and the continent’s future. At Berlin’s Checkpoint Charlie, tourists pose for pictures in front of two U.S. Army signs that mark where the American Sector started and ended. Although the placards illustrate Germany’s recent division, they also mark its path ahead. Germany is leaving the American Sector, confronting a resurgent Russia, uniting immediate neighbors, and shaping Europe’s demographic change. In 1945, the United States celebrated Deutschland’s defeat; twenty-five years ago, a seemingly permanent wall that symbolized the Iron Curtain was destroyed. It is the psychological obstacles of culture, religion, and ethnicity that will most acutely shape German leadership of 21^st century Europe, and the world will be watching—both in Tröglitz and throughout Germany—to see which barriers fall, and which ones endure.

About the author:
*David J. Danelo is director of field research at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. A U.S. Naval Academy graduate, he served seven years as a Marine Corps infantry officer, including a 2004 Iraq deployment as a convoy commander, intelligence officer and provisional executive officer. His initial freelance assignments came in 2005, when he reported on U.S. military strategy from Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti, from the Gulf Coast after Hurricane Katrina, and postwar observations from Vietnam. His first book, Blood Stripes: The Grunt’s View of the War in Iraq, was awarded a 2006 Silver Medal, and Gen. James Mattis listed the book among mandatory reading for Marines deploying to combat. His second book, The Border, earned a spot on the U.S. Customs and Border Protection commissioner’s reading list. His most recent book is The Return: A Field Manual for Life After Combat. In June 2011, Danelo was appointed to direct policy and planning within the Department of Homeland Security. While serving in government, he stabilized and led a policy and planning team, helped create the U.S. Border Patrol’s four year strategic plan, and developed U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s first-ever integrated planning guidance. He returned to the private sector in August 2012.

Source:
This article was published by FPRI.

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By Zachary Fillingham

Islamic State (ISIS) militants launched a major attack against the main government compound in Ramadi on Friday, sending government forces into retreat following a series of car bombs and firefights. Early reports put ISIS in near-total control of the city – the capital of the restive, Sunni-majority Anbar province.

As of early Sunday, ISIS has pulled back from some districts following a government counterattack, though it remains entrenched in others.

The attack on Ramadi is part of a broader offensive by Islamic State. There are reports of an ISIS presence in Karmah, a strategic town west of Fallujah, and Baghdadi northwest of Ramadi. This latest attack comes after a month of ISIS build-up and minor skirmishes in the surrounding districts.

Most police and military presence in the city have retreated towards Anbar Operations Command, a military outpost across the Euphrates River just north of Ramadi. Fighting has been reported in the area around the base, and it was targeted in the initial attack by no less than three suicide car bombs. ISIS militants are also said to have taken control of the only supply route to the base, complicating the possibility of government reinforcements.

Islamic State going by the guerrilla playbook

An offensive in Anbar province was a natural next move for Islamic State, faced as it was by a high concentration of government and militia forces along the Tikrit corridor on the road to Mosul. By shifting the fight back to Anbar province, it appears that Islamic State succeeded in catching the government by surprise, even though there was no shortage of warnings Baghdad failed to heed.

Islamic State’s guerrilla tactics pose a major challenge to the al-Abadi administration’s approach to liberating ISIS-held territory in Iraq. So far the favored strategy is a slow and meticulous rollback, relying on assistance from Popular Mobilization Front militias outside of urban areas and handing off sole responsibility to the Iraqi security forces (ISF) in major Sunni cities like Tikrit. Such delicacy is warranted by the high stakes in re-taking ISIS-held (mostly Sunni) territory, particularly with the help of Shi’ite militias. Al-Abadi is hoping to avoid any sectarian reprisal attacks that would play into the ISIS narrative of Sunni-Shi’ite conflict and damage Iraq’s national cohesion.

The attack on Ramadi, though a stunning tactical success for ISIS, does not necessarily mean that the city will remain under Islamist control. This could well be a ‘shock an awe’ campaign to spread terror and discord by executing Shi’ites and government collaborators, real or imagined. Though the attack was complex, well-executed, and ultimately successful in achieving its presumed goals, this doesn’t meant that ISIS has the available manpower to hold Ramadi against an ISF counterattack backed up by coalition air power, or that it even intends to do so. We may see ISIS militants pulling back in the days and weeks to come and simply waiting for the next vulnerability to form in ISF deployments.

It appears that this is already happening. Just one day after the black flag went up over Ramadi’s government complex, ISIS militants abandoned it and burned down the adjoining police station, retreating into Ramadi’s residential areas to avoid counterattacks from coalition air power.

Islamic State’s success in Ramadi goes beyond territory

Whether it holds on to Ramadi or not, Islamic State has scored a victory by underscoring its continued relevance despite a string of recent government victories. Months of airstrikes using the most advanced military technology on the planet was supposed to have declawed the militant group, paving the way for a decisive government counterattack. The fall of Ramadi shows that the group is still active and looking to expand its territory. This is a theme that will surely show up in the next wave of ISIS propaganda.

Looking at the big picture, the ISIS attack on Ramadi could influence the politics of the Iraq conflict in a way that is ultimately beneficial to the militant group. It will be seized on by some observers as evidence that the current approach to defeating ISIS is not working. There will be more calls for participation by the Popular Mobilization Front militias in liberating ISIS-held territory, a strategy that could well lead to a new spiral of sectarian killings.

There will also be calls in the United States to arm the pro-government Sunni tribes and the Kurdish Peshmerga directly, bypassing the Iraqi government. Though Baghdad’s stubborn resistance to arming the tribes is an enduring point of contention with Washington (indeed a local Sunni tribe predicted Friday’s attack and repeatedly requested arms and reinforcements from Baghdad to no avail), Washington arming the tribes at this point would almost certainly destroy US-Iraqi bilateral relations and quite possibly set the stage for a protracted civil war and the disintegration of Iraq into its Sunni-Shi’ite-Kurdish constituent parts.

The most sensible way forward would be to carry on with the careful rollback of ISIS’ territorial gains and introduce a new “Sons of Iraq” scheme with Baghdad, rather than Washington, at the helm. An inclusive, national approach is the only way to beat the sectarianism represented by Islamic State, and in this ‘slow and methodical’ is the only viable option.

Unfortunately, the fall of Ramadi makes it all the more likely that cooler heads will not prevail.

Update: As of Monday morning, a government official in Anbar province claims that Ramadi has completely fallen to Islamic State. There are reports of police and military units abandoning their posts and fleeing, leaving weapons and equipment behind, and members of ISIS say they have taken over the 8th Brigade army base.

Prime Minister al-Abadi has responded by ordering the Shi’ite militias to prepare to enter the city in a counterattack.

Source:
This article was published by Geopolitical Monitor.com

The post Iraq: What The Fall Of Ramadi Means – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Kenneth Katzman*

This report provides an overview of Iran’s foreign policy, which has been a subject of numerous congressional hearings and of sanctions and other legislation for many years. The report analyzes Iranian foreign policy as a whole and by region. The regional analysis discusses those countries where Iranian policy is of U.S. concern. The report contains some specific information on Iran’s relations with these countries, but refers to other CRS reports for more detail, particularly on the views of individual countries towards Iran. The report also makes reference to Iran’s efforts to utilize its ties to various countries to try to mitigate the effects of U.S. sanctions.

This report does not examine Iran’s broader policy toward the United States, but identifies Iran’s apparent perception of a threat from the United States as a constant theme that affects Iran’s policy in virtually all regions of the world. Iran’s perceptions of the United States are discussed in the “policy motivators” sections below. U.S.-Iran relations, including the potential for renewed diplomatic relations, are specifically addressed in CRS Report RL32048, Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses, by Kenneth Katzman. That report also discusses the issues surrounding negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear agreement between Iran and the “P5+1” countries (United States, Britain, France, Russia, China, and Germany), as well as the potential for relief from international sanctions as part of such an agreement. This report does not address how a potential Iranian nuclear weapon factors into Iran’s foreign policy.

Iran’s Policy Motivators

Iran’s foreign policy is a product of overlapping, and sometimes contradictory, motivations. In describing the tension between some of these motivations, one expert has said that Iran faces constant decisions about whether it is a “nation or a cause.”1 In other words, Iranian leaders weigh the relative imperatives of their government’s revolutionary and religious ideology and the demands of Iran’s interests as a country. Some of the factors that affect Iran’s foreign policy actions are discussed below.

Threat Perception

Iran’s leaders are apparently motivated, at least to some extent, by the perception of threat to their regime and their national interests posed by the United States and its allies.

• In spite of statements by U.S. officials that the United States does not seek regime change in Iran, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamene’i has repeatedly stated that the United States has never accepted the Islamic revolution and seeks to overturn it through various actions (such as support for domestic opposition to the regime), imposition of strict economic sanctions, or support for armed or other action by Iran’s regional adversaries.2
• Iran’s leaders assert that the U.S. maintenance of a large military presence in the Persian Gulf region and in other countries around Iran could reflect U.S. intention (and capability) to attack Iran if Iran pursues policies the United States finds inimical, or could cause military miscalculation that leads to conflict.3
• Some Iranian official media have asserted that the United States not only supports Sunni Arab regimes and movements that criticize or actively oppose Iran, but that the United States has created or empowered radical Sunni Islamist extremist factions such as the Islamic State organization.4

Ideology

The ideology of Iran’s 1979 Islamic revolution continues to shape Iran’s foreign policy to some extent. Iran’s revolution overthrew a secular authoritarian leader, the Shah of Iran, who the leaders of the revolution asserted had suppressed Islam and its clergy. The revolution established a clerical regime in which ultimate power was invested in a “Supreme Guide,” or Supreme Leader, who combined political and religious authority.

• In the early years after the revolution, Iran attempted to “export” its revolution to nearby Muslim states, but later muted those goals when Iran’s policies encountered resistance in the region.5
• Iran’s leaders continue to assert that the political and economic structures of the Middle East are heavily weighted against “oppressed” peoples and in favor of the United States and its allies, particularly Israel. Iranian leaders generally include in their definition of the oppressed the Palestinians, who do not have a state of their own, and Shiite Muslims, who are minorities in many countries of the region and are generally underrepresented politically and disadvantaged economically.
• Iran claims that the region’s politics and economics have been distorted by Western intervention and economic domination, and that this perceived domination must be brought to an end. Iranian officials typically cite the creation of Israel as a manifestation of Western intervention that, according to Iran, deprived the Palestinians of legitimate rights.

National Interests

Iran’s national interests also shape its foreign policy, sometimes intersecting with and complicating Iran’s ideology.

• Iran’s leaders claim a right to be recognized as a major power in the Persian Gulf and, to a lesser extent, in Central Asia. Iranian leaders stress Iran’s well- developed civilization and independence. This is often contrasted with the histories of the six Persian Gulf monarchy states (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, and Oman) that make up the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), several of which gained independence in the early 1970s. On this point, the leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran make many of the foreign policy assertions and undertake many of the same actions that were undertaken by the former Shah of Iran and Iranian dynasties prior to that.
• In some cases, Iran has appeared willing to temper its commitment to aid other Shiites to promote its geopolitical interests. For example, it has supported mostly Christian-inhabited Armenia, rather than Shiite-inhabited Azerbaijan, in part to thwart cross-border Azeri nationalism among Iran’s large Azeri minority. Iran also has generally refrained from backing Islamist movements in the Central Asian countries, reportedly in part to avoid offending Russia, its most important arms and technology supplier.
• Even though Iranian leaders accuse U.S. allies of contributing to U.S. efforts to structure the Middle East to the advantage of the United States and Israel, Iranian officials have sought to engage with and benefit from transactions with U.S. allies to try to thwart international sanctions.

Factional Interests

Iran’s foreign policy often appears to reflect differing approaches and outlooks among key players and interests groups.

• By all accounts, Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamene’i, has final say over all major foreign policy decisions. Khamene’i is widely considered an ideological hardliner who expresses deep-seated mistrust of U.S. intentions toward Iran. His consistent refrain, and the title of a book widely available in Iran, is “I am a revolutionary, not a diplomat.”6 Leaders of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), a military and internal security institution created after the Islamic revolution, consistently express support for Khamene’i and ideology-based foreign policy decisions.
• Nevertheless, more moderate Iranian leaders and factions, such as President Hassan Rouhani and the still influential former President Ali Akbar Hashemi- Rafsanjani, argue that Iran should not have any “permanent enemies” and that a pragmatic foreign policy could result in easing of international sanctions and increased support for Iran’s views on the Middle East. These views have drawn support from Iran’s youth and intellectuals who argue that Iran should adopt a foreign policy that avoids isolation and achieves greater integration with the international community.
• Some Iranian figures, including the elected president during 1997-2005 Mohammad Khatemi, are considered reformists.

They have argued for significant domestic reform, particularly a relaxation of restrictions on freedom of expression. Other reformist figures, such as former Prime Minister Mir Hosein Musavi, have remained in detention since the 2009 political uprising in Iran that protested alleged fraud in the 2009 reelection of president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. However, even during his presidency, Khatemi was unable to alter Iran’s foreign policy significantly because of the constraints on his authority imposed by the Supreme Leader.

Instruments of Iranian Foreign Policy Supporting Armed Groups

As an instrument of its foreign policy, Iran supports a number of armed factions, some of which are named as foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs) by the United States. Iran was placed on the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism (“terrorism list”) in January 1984. The State Department report on international terrorism for 2013,7 released April 30, 2014, stated that in 2013 Iran “continued its terrorist-related activity,” principally by supporting Lebanese Hezbollah and Palestinian groups such as Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Iran’s support for armed factions—which generally includes arms shipments, advice, training, and funding—is carried out by the Qods (Jerusalem) Force of the IRGC (IRGC-QF). The IRGC-QF is headed by IRGC Maj. Gen. Qasem Soleimani, who is said to report directly to Khamene’i.8

The range of armed factions that Iran supports are discussed in the regional sections below.

• Some Iranian-supported factions are opposition movements, while others are militia forces supporting governments that Iran is assisting, such as that of President Bashar Al Asad of Syria and the Iraqi government of Haydar Al Abbadi.
• Some armed factions that Iran supports have not been named as FTOs and have no record of committing acts of international terrorism. Such groups include the Houthi movement in Yemen (composed of Zaidi Shiite Muslims) and some Shiite opposition factions in Bahrain. The Houthis are currently conducting an armed offensive that has displaced the elected government of Abdu Rabbu Mansur Al Hadi.
• Iran opposes—or declines to actively support—some Islamist terrorist groups if the groups work against Iran’s core interests. For example, Al Qaeda and the Islamic State organization are orthodox Sunni Muslim organizations that Iran apparently perceives as significant threats.9 Over the past few years, Iran has expelled some Al Qaeda activists who sought refuge there after the September 11, 2001, attacks against the United States. As discussed below, Iran is actively working against the Islamic State organization, which opposes Asad of Syria and the Abbadi government in Iraq. One Sunni FTO, Hamas, has received Iranian support in part because it is an antagonist of Israel. Hamas is not actively fighting against any government that Iran supports, although Hamas leaders left Syria in 2012 because of Syrian President Asad’s use of armed force against mostly Sunni protesters.

Table 1. Major Iran or Iran-Related Terrorism Attacks or Plots

Other Political Action

• Iran’s support for opposition and other factions is not limited to IRGC-QF provision of arms and training. A wide range of observers report that Iran has provided funding to political candidates in neighboring Iraq and Afghanistan in an effort to build political allies in those countries.10
• Iran has reportedly provided direct payments to leaders of neighboring states in an effort to gain and maintain their support. For example, in 2010 then-President of Afghanistan Hamid Karzai publicly acknowledged that his office had accepted direct cash payments from Iran. 11
• Iran has established some training and education programs that bring young Muslims to study in Iran. One such program, headed by Iranian cleric Mohsen Rabbani, is focused on Latin America, even though the percentage of Muslims there is low.12

Diplomacy

At the same time that it funds and trains armed factions in the region, Iran also uses traditional diplomatic tools.

• Iran has an active Foreign Ministry and maintains embassies in almost all major countries with which it has formal diplomatic relations.
• Iran actively participates in or seeks to join many different international organizations, including those that are dominated by members opposed to Iran’s ideology and/or critical of its domestic human rights practices. For example Iran has sought to join the U.S. and Europe-dominated World Trade Organization (WTO). It has also sought to join such regional organizations as the South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) that groups Central Asian states with Russia and China.
• Iran participates actively in multilateral organizations that tend to support some aspects of Iranian ideology, such as its criticism of great power influence over developing states. From August 2012 until August 2015, Iran holds the presidency of the Non-Aligned Movement, which has about 120 member states and 17 observer countries. Iran hosted a summit of the movement in August 2012, when it took over the rotating leadership.

Near East Region

The overwhelming focus of Iranian foreign policy is on the Near East region, as demonstrated by Iran’s employment of all the various instruments of its foreign policy, including deployment of the IRGC-Qods Force. All the various motivations of Iran’s foreign policy appear to be at work in its actions in the region, including its efforts to empower Shiite communities that fuel sectarian responses. Iranian steps to aid Shiites in Sunni-dominated countries often fuel responses by those governments, thus aggravating sectarian tensions.13

The Arab States of the Persian Gulf

Middle East

Iran has a 1,100-mile coastline on the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman. The Persian Gulf monarchy states (Gulf Cooperation Council, GCC: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates) are a key focus of Iran’s foreign policy. These states, all controlled by Sunni-led governments, have cooperated extensively with U.S. policy toward Iran, including by hosting significant numbers of U.S. forces at their military facilities and procuring U.S. missile defense technology that the United States promotes as a coordinated defense against Iran’s missile forces. These facilities would be critical to any U.S. air operations against Iran in the event of a regional conflict. At the same time, the GCC states generally do not try to openly antagonize Iran and, although all the GCC states enforce international sanctions against Iran, they also all maintain relatively normal trading relations with Iran.

Virtually all of the GCC leaders have expressed concerns that a comprehensive nuclear deal could lead to a broader U.S.-Iran rapprochement and possibly weaken the U.S. commitment to Gulf security. After a round of nuclear talks with Iran in early March 2015, Secretary of State Kerry met with senior GCC officials to brief them on the talks and reportedly reassure them that the United States remains committed to GCC security. At the same time, the GCC states gave cautious support to an April 2, 2015, framework for a comprehensive accord as having the potential, if finalized, to lower tensions in the region.14 In announcing the framework, President Obama stated that he had invited the leaders of the GCC to Camp David to discuss regional security issues. At the summit, which is to be held May 13-14, 2015, the United States might make additional commitments to GCC security or offer sales of sophisticated new weaponry in part to calm the apparent concerns of the Gulf rulers.15

Saudi Arabia16

Iran – Saudi Arabia relations. Credit: Wikipedia Commons.

Iran and Saudi Arabia have long represented opposing interests in the region. Iranian leaders assert that Saudi Arabia seeks hegemony for its brand of Sunni Islam and that Saudi Arabia is working with the United States to deny Shiite Muslim governments and factions influence in the region. Saudi Arabia, for its part, has used the claim of an Iranian quest for regional hegemony to justify military intervention in Bahrain in 2011 and in Yemen in 2015. Some of the region’s conflicts, discussed below, are often described as “proxy wars” between Saudi Arabia and Iran because of each country’s tendency to back rival sides. The one exception might be Iraq, where both Iran and Saudi Arabia back the Shiite-dominated government, although Iran does so much more directly and substantially. At the same time, it can be argued that each country has tended to exaggerate the influence of the other, leading to actions that have fueled the apparently expanding Sunni-Shiite conflict in the region.

The Saudis also repeatedly cite past Iran-inspired actions as a reason for distrusting Iran; these actions include encouraging violent demonstrations at some Hajj pilgrimages in Mecca in the 1980s and 1990s, which caused a break in relations from 1987 to 1991. Some Saudis accuse Iran of supporting Shiite protesters and armed groups active in the Kingdom’s restive Shiite-populated Eastern Province. In the aftermath of the JPA, the Saudi government invited Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif to visit the Kingdom, and Zarif and Saudi Foreign Minister Saud bin Faysal Al Saud met in New York at the margins of the September 2014 U.N. General Assembly. Deterioration in Iranian-Saudi relations over Iraq and Yemen in the months since have precluded further rapprochement to date.

Although Saudi Arabia’s positions are often taken to represent those of all GCC states toward Iran, there are sometimes sharp differences within the GCC on policy toward Iran. Iran’s relations with all the other GCC states—and these differences in approach from Saudi Arabia—are discussed in sections below.

United Arab Emirates (UAE)17

United Arab Emirates

Like Saudi Arabia, the UAE tends to take hardline positions on Iran’s nuclear program and its influence in the region. However, UAE relations with Iran are also heavily influenced by the large population of Iranian expatriates in Dubai emirate, as well as the UAE’s close business ties to Iran, and territorial disputes over the Persian Gulf islands of Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunb islands in the Persian Gulf. The Tunbs were seized by the Shah of Iran in 1971, and the Islamic Republic took full control of Abu Musa in 1992, appearing to violate a 1971 UAE- Iran agreement to share control of that island. The UAE has sought to refer the dispute to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), but Iran has insisted on resolving the issue bilaterally. (ICJ referral requires concurrence from both parties to a dispute.) In the aftermath of the November 2013 interim nuclear agreement (Joint Plan of Action, JPA) and a visit to Iran by the UAE’s Foreign Minister, the two countries reportedly made progress toward resolving the islands dispute and Iran reportedly removed some military equipment from them.18

The UAE and Iran maintain relatively normal trade and diplomatic ties, and Iranian-origin residents of Dubai number about 300,000. In accordance with long-standing traditions, many Iranian-owned businesses are located in Dubai emirate (including branch offices of large trading companies based in Tehran and elsewhere in Iran). These relationships have often triggered U.S. concerns about the apparent reexportation of some U.S. technology to Iran,19 although the UAE has said it has taken extensive steps, in cooperation with the United States, to reduce such leakage.

Qatar20

Qatar

Within the GCC, Qatar appears to occupy a “middle ground” between the anti-Iran animosity of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain, and the consistent engagement with Iran exhibited by Oman. Qatar generally refrains from issuing publicly critical statements on Iran. Unlike the UAE, Qatar does not have any active territorial disputes with Iran. Yet, Qatari officials reportedly remain wary that Iran could try to encroach on the large natural gas field it shares with Iran, fueled by occasional Iranian statements such as one in April 2004 by Iran’s deputy oil minister that Qatar is probably producing more gas than “her right share” from the field. He added that Iran “will not allow” its wealth to be used by others.

Bahrain21

Bahrain

Bahrain is about 60% Shiite-inhabited, and many Bahraini Shiites are of Persian origin, but the government is dominated by the Sunni Muslim Al Khalifa family. In 1981 and again in 1996, Bahrain publicly accused Iran of supporting Bahraini Shiite dissidents in efforts to overthrow the ruling Al Khalifa family. Bahrain has consistently accused Iran of supporting radical Shiite factions that are part of a broader and mostly peaceful uprising begun in 2011 by mostly Shiite demonstrators.22 State Department reports on international terrorism in recent years have stated that Iran has attempted to provide arms and other aid to Shiite militants in Bahrain. However, some outside observers—including a government-appointed commission of international experts called the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry—have suggested that Iran’s support for the Shiite uprising has been minimal.23 On several earlier occasions, tensions had flared over Iranian attempts to question the legitimacy of a 1970 U.N.-run referendum in which Bahrainis opted for independence rather than for affiliation with Iran.

Kuwait24

Kuwait

Kuwait’s position on Iran is similar to that of Qatar; Kuwait cooperates with GCC efforts to contain Iranian power, but does not demonstrate enthusiasm for military or other forms of action against Iran’s regional interests. About 25% of Kuwaitis are Shiite Muslims, and Iran supported Shiite radical groups in Kuwait in the 1980s as a means to try to pressure Kuwait not to support the Iraqi war effort in the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988). After Saddam Hussein’s regime invaded Kuwait in August 1990, Kuwait pursued ties to Iran as a counterweight to Saddam. Kuwait’s concerns about Saddam were apparently so great that it hosted the U.S.-led force that invaded Iraq in 2003, even though the military ousting of Saddam was widely considered likely to bring pro-Iranian Shiite Muslim factions to power in Iraq. And Kuwait has continued to cooperate extensively with the Shiite-dominated government in Baghdad despite Saudi and other GCC criticism of the government’s marginalizing Sunni Iraqis. Kuwait’s Amir Sabah al-Ahmad Al Sabah visited Iran in June 2014.

Oman25

Oman

Of the GCC states, the Sultanate of Oman is closest politically to Iran. Oman officials assert that Oman remains grateful for the Shah’s sending of troops to help the Sultan suppress rebellion in the Dhofar region in the 1970s, and that the gratitude has transcended the change in regime in Iran.26 Sultan Qaboos made a state visit to Iran in August 2009, coinciding with protests against alleged fraud in the reelection of then-president Mahmud Ahmadinejad. The visit appeared to tacitly align Sultan Qaboos with Iran’s regime and against the protesters in Iran. Qaboos visited again in August 2013, reportedly to explore concepts for improved U.S.-Iran relations and to facilitate U.S.-Iran talks that led to the JPA. Oman subsequently hosted U.S.-Iran nuclear talks in November 2014; it was the only GCC state to do so, thus demonstrating Oman’s support for a comprehensive nuclear deal with Iran. In March 2014, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani visited Oman, the only GCC state he has visited since taking office.

Omani reluctance to damage relations with Iran has manifested itself in several ways. Unlike Saudi Arabia and some other GCC states, Oman reportedly has not materially supported any factions fighting against the Asad regime in Syria. Nor did Oman join the Saudi-led Arab intervention against the rebel Zaidi Shiite Houthi movement in Yemen that began in March 2014.

Iranian Policy in Iraq and Syria: Islamic State Crisis27

Iran’s policy has been to support the Shiite-led government in Iraq and the Alawite-led, pro- Iranian government in Syria. That policy has come under strong challenge from the Islamic State organization, which threatens the Iraqi government as well as that of Iran’s close ally President Bashar Al Asad. The United States and Iran have worked in parallel, although separately, to assist the Iraqi government against the Islamic State organization. However, the United States and Iran hold opposing positions on the regime of Asad in Syria.

Iraq28

Iran – Iraq relations. Credit: Wikipedia Commons.

In Iraq, the U.S. military ousting of Saddam Hussein in 2003 benefitted Iran strategically by removing a long-time antagonist and producing governments led by Shiite Islamists who have longstanding ties to Iran. Until the Islamic State organization’s capture of Mosul and other Iraqi cities in June 2014, Iran had strongly backed the government of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, a Shiite Islamist who Tehran viewed as loyal and pliable. Maliki supported most of Iran’s regional goals; for instance, Maliki allowed Iran to overfly Iraqi airspace to supply the Syrian military fighting rebels there.29 The June 2014 offensive led by the Islamic State organization threatened Iraq’s government and Iran responded quickly by supplying—to both the Baghdad government and the peshmerga force of the autonomous Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG)—IRGC- Qods Force advisers, intelligence drone surveillance, weapons shipments, and other direct military assistance.30 Iranian leaders also supported U.S. efforts to help a more inclusive government take office in 2014 by backing the appointment of Abbadi as Prime Minister and thus abandoning their longtime ally, Maliki. 31 U.S. officials, including Secretary of State John Kerry, have said that Iran’s targeting of the Islamic State, if effective, contributes positively to U.S. efforts to assist the Iraqi government.

Still, many aspects of Iranian policy in Iraq reportedly trouble U.S. policymakers. Iran helped establish many of the Shiite militias that fought the United States during 2003-2011. During 2011-2014, the Shiite militia factions had been evolving into political organizations, but more recently Iran has helped reactivate and empower some of them to support the Iraq Security Forces (ISF) against the Islamic State. The militias that Iran reportedly works most closely with in Iraq include As’aib Ahl Al Haq (League of the Righteous), Kata’ib Hezbollah (Hezbollah Brigades), and the Badr Organization. The Mahdi Army of Moqtada Al Sadr (renamed the Peace Brigades in 2014) was supported extensively by Iran during the 2003-2011 U.S. intervention in Iraq but has sought to distance itself from Iran in the more recent campaigns against the Islamic State.

Kata’ib Hezbollah has been named a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) by the United States. Iran also reportedly has moved some of its missiles and long-range rockets into Iraq to assist Iraqi and Shiite militia operations against the Islamic State.32 The participation of some Shiite militias has increased tensions with Iraq’s Sunnis because some Shiite militia fighters have carried out reprisals against Sunnis after recapturing Sunni-inhabited territory from the Islamic State.

Syria33

Syria

On Syria, there apparently has been no U.S.-Iran cooperation against the Islamic State at all. The United States has stated that President Bashar Al Asad should leave office as part of a negotiated political solution to the conflict. Iran’s policy is to try to keep Asad in power because he has been Iran’s closest Arab ally and because Syria is the main transit point for Iranian weapons shipments to Hezbollah; both Iran and Syria have used Hezbollah as leverage against Israel to try to achieve regional and territorial aims. U.S. officials and reports assert that, to try to prevent Asad’s downfall, Iran is providing substantial amounts of material support to the Syrian regime, including funds, weapons, IRGC-QF advisors, and recruitment of Hezbollah and other non-Syrian Shiite militia fighters.34 Some experts say the Iranian direct intervention has, at least at times, gone beyond QF personnel to include an unknown number of IRGC ground forces as well.35

At the same time, some experts assess that Iran might be willing to abandon Asad, as it abandoned Maliki in Iraq, if a relatively pro-Iranian figure can be identified to replace Asad.36 In December 2012, Iran announced a six-point plan for a peaceful transition in Syria that would culminate in free, multiparty elections; the plan was rejected by Syrian rebels because it provided for Asad to compete in 2014 elections, which he ultimately won under conditions that the international community called neither free nor fair.

Israel: Iran’s Support for Hamas and Hezbollah37

Iran and Israel. Credit: Wikipedia Commons.

The Islamic revolutionary regime in Iran opposes Israel as what it asserts is an illegitimate creation of the West and an oppressor of the Palestinian people and other Arab Muslims. The position of Iran’s current regime differs dramatically from that of the pre-1979 regime of the Shah of Iran. Israel and the Shah’s regime had relatively normal relations, including embassies in each other’s capitals and an extensive network of economic ties.

Supreme Leader Khamene’i has repeatedly called Israel a “cancerous tumor” that should be removed from the region. Iran’s open hostility to Israel—manifested in part by its support for groups that undertake armed action against Israel—fuels assertions by Israeli leaders that a nuclear armed Iran would constitute an “existential threat” to the State of Israel. Iran’s support for armed factions on Israel’s borders could represent an Iranian attempt to acquire leverage over Israel. More broadly, Iran might be attempting to disrupt prosperity, morale, and perceptions of security among Israel’s population in a way that undermines the country’s appeal to those who have options to live elsewhere. The formal position of the Iranian Foreign Ministry is that Iran would not seek to block an Israeli-Palestinian settlement but that the process is too weighted toward Israel to yield a fair result.

Iran’s leaders routinely state that Israel presents a serious threat to Iran and that the international community applies a “double standard” to Iran as compared to Israel’s presumed nuclear arsenal. Iranian diplomats point out in international meetings that, despite apparently being the only Middle Eastern country to possess nuclear weapons and not being a party to the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty, Israel does not face internationally imposed penalties as a consequence. In identifying Israel as a threat, Iran’s leaders cite Israeli official statements that Israel retains the option to unilaterally strike Iran’s nuclear facilities. Iran also asserts that Israel’s purported nuclear arsenal is a main obstacle to achieving support for a weapons-of-mass-destruction (WMD) free zone in the Middle East.

Iran’s material support for militant anti-Israel groups has long concerned U.S. administrations. For at least a decade, the annual State Department report on international terrorism has repeated its claim that Iran provides funding, weapons, and training to Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad— Shiqaqi Faction (PIJ), the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades (a militant offshoot of the dominant Palestinian faction Fatah), and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC). All are named as foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs) by the State Department. Iran has long supported Lebanese Hezbollah, which is an FTO and which portrays itself as the vanguard of resistance to Israel. In November 2014, a senior IRGC commander said that Iran had provided Hezbollah and Hamas with training and Fateh-class missiles, which enable the groups to attack targets in Israel.38

Hamas39

The annual State Department report on terrorism has consistently stated that Iran gives Hamas funds, weapons, and training. Hamas seized control of the Gaza Strip in 2007 and now administers that territory. Although it formally ceded authority over Gaza in June 2014 to a consensus Palestinian Authority government, Hamas retains de-facto security control over that territory. Its terrorist attacks using operatives within Israel have significantly diminished in number since 2005, but Hamas continues to occasionally engage in armed action against Israel, using rockets and other weaponry supplied by Iran. Israel and Hamas came into conflict in late 2008-early 2009; in November 2012; and during July and August, 2014.
The Iran-Hamas relationship was forged in the 1990s as part of an apparent attempt to disrupt the Israeli-Palestinian peace process through Hamas’s suicide bombings and other attacks on buses, restaurants, and other civilian targets inside Israel.

However, Hamas’s position on the ongoing Syria conflict caused the Iran-Hamas relationship to falter. Largely out of sectarian sympathy with the mostly Sunni protesters and rebels in Syria, Hamas opposed the efforts by Asad, backed by Iran, to defeat the rebellion militarily. The rift apparently contributed to a lessening of Iran’s support to Hamas in its 2014 conflict with Israel as compared to previous Hamas-Israel conflicts in which Iran backed Hamas extensively. Since the latest Hamas-Israel conflict, Iran has apparently sought to rebuild the relationship with Hamas by providing missile technology that Hamas used to construct its own rockets and by helping it rebuild tunnels destroyed in the conflict with Israel.40 Some Hamas leaders have reportedly welcomed some form of rapprochement with Iran, perhaps because of financial difficulties the organization has faced since the military leadership in Egypt began closing smuggling tunnels at the Gaza-Sinai border in 2013.

Hezbollah41

Lebanese Hezbollah is arguably Iran’s most cherished protégé movement in the region. Hezbollah has acted in support of its own as well as Iranian interests on numerous occasions and in many ways, including through acts of terrorism and armed action. The relationship began when Lebanese Shiite clerics of the pro-Iranian Lebanese Da’wa (Islamic Call) Party began to organize in 1982 into what later was unveiled in 1985 as Hezbollah. As Hezbollah was forming the IRGC sent advisory forces to help develop Hezbollah’s military wing, and these IRGC forces subsequently became the core of what is now the IRGC-QF.42 Iran’s political, financial, and military aid to Hezbollah has helped it become a major force in Lebanon’s politics. According to State Department terrorism reports, Iran has provided hundreds of millions of dollars in support of Hezbollah and has trained thousands of Hezbollah fighters at camps in Iran. The 2014 U.S. intelligence community worldwide threat assessment stated that Hezbollah “has increased its global terrorist activity in recent years to a level that we have not seen since the 1990s,” but the 2015 worldwide threat assessment, delivered in February 2015, did not repeat that assertion. A January 2015 press report detailed U.S. intelligence involvement in a primarily Israeli operation that killed Imad Mughniyah, the leader of Hezbollah’s terrorism wing, in 2008.43

Hezbollah’s attacks on Israeli forces in southern Lebanon contributed to an Israeli withdrawal in May 2000, and Hezbollah subsequently maintained military forces along the border. Hezbollah fired Iranian-supplied rockets on Israel’s northern towns during a July–August 2006 war with Israel, including at the Israeli city of Haifa (30 miles from the border)44 and in July 2006 hit an Israeli warship with a C-802 sea-skimming missile. Iran bought the C-802 from China in the 1990s and almost certainly was the supplier of the weapon to Hezbollah. Hezbollah was perceived in the Arab world as a victor in the war for holding out against Israel. Since that conflict, Iran has resupplied Hezbollah to the point where it has, according to Israeli sources, as many as 100,000 rockets and missiles, some capable of reaching Tel Aviv from south Lebanon, as well as upgraded artillery, anti-ship, anti-tank, and anti-aircraft capabilities.45 In the context of the conflict in Syria, Israel has carried out occasional air strikes inside Syria against Hezbollah commanders and purported arms shipments via Syria to Hezbollah. In January 2015, Hezbollah attacked an Israeli military convoy near the Lebanon-Israel-Syria tri-border area, killing two Israeli soldiers and making it the deadliest Hezbollah attack on Israeli territory since 2006. However, these incidents have not, to date, escalated into a broader Israel-Hezbollah conflict.

In part as a consequence of its military strength, Hezbollah now plays a major role in decision- making and leadership selections in Lebanon. The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) rarely acts against Hezbollah’s forces or interests. However, there has been vocal criticism of Hezbollah within and outside Lebanon for its active supports for its other key patron, Asad, against the Sunni-led rebellion in Syria. That involvement, reportedly urged and assisted by Iran, has diluted Hezbollah’s image as a steadfast opponent of Israel by embroiling it in a war against fellow Muslims.

Yemen46

Yemen

In recent years, Yemeni leaders have claimed that Iran is trying to destabilize Yemen, whose former President Ali Abdullah Saleh resigned in January 2012 following an uprising. Iran has reportedly been supporting Shiite rebels in Yemen—a Zaydi Shiite revivalist movement known as the “Houthis”—with arms and other aid. A senior Iranian official reportedly told journalists in December 2014 that the Qods Force has a “few hundred” personnel in Yemen training Houthi fighters.47 In September 2014, the Houthis and their allies seized key locations in the capital, Sana’a, and took control of major government locations in January 2015, forcing Saleh’s successor, Abd Rabu Mansur Al Hadi, to flee to Aden. The Houthis and their allies subsequently advanced on Aden, prompting Saudi Arabia to assemble a ten-country Arab coalition, with logistical help from the United States, to undertake military action to stop the Houthi advance.48 Saudi officials explained their military action as, in part, an effort to stop Iran from expanding its influence in the region.

Despite the Saudi assertions, there is debate over the extent to which the Houthi advance represents Iranian national policy. By all accounts, Iran’s support for the Houthis has been far less systematic or large-scale than its support to the government of Iraq or to Asad of Syria. Most observers describe Iran’s influence over the Houthis as limited, and claim that the Houthi military action against President Hadi began with no specific prompting from Iran. On April 20, National Security Council spokesperson Bernadette Meehan told reporters that, “It remains our assessment that Iran does not exert command and control over the Houthis in Yemen,” and an unnamed U.S. intelligence official reportedly said, “It is wrong to think of the Houthis as a proxy force for Iran.”49 Still, after taking over Sana’a, the Houthis and Iran agreed on direct flights between the two countries and Iranian special forces were allowed to conduct an operation in Yemen that freed an Iranian diplomat captured by Sunni militants in 2012. Iran also harshly criticized the Saudi military campaign and might be seeking to increase its military support to the Houthis, at least in part as an apparent attempt to frustrate Saudi foreign policy.50 The United States augmented its naval presence off the coast of Yemen with an aircraft carrier in mid-April 2015, in part to try to prevent any additional Iranian weapons shipments to Iran. The Iranian ship convoy turned around rather than confront the U.S. Navy, but subsequently began challenging some U.S. and other commercial container ships transiting the Strait of Hormuz. The challenges caused the United States to begin accompanying U.S. and British-flagged commercial shipping moving through the Strait.

South and Central Asia Region

Iran and South and Central Asia Region. Source: CRS.

Iran’s relations with countries in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and South Asia vary significantly, from close relations with Afghanistan to animosity with Azerbaijan. Regardless of any differences, most countries in these regions conduct relatively normal trade and diplomacy with Iran. Some countries in these regions, such as Uzbekistan and Pakistan, face significant domestic threats from radical Sunni Islamist extremist movements similar to those that Iran characterizes as a threat to regional stability. Such common interests create an additional basis for Central and South Asian cooperation with Iran.

Most of the countries in Central Asia are relatively stable and are governed by authoritarian leaders, offering Iran little opportunity to exert influence by supporting opposition factions. Afghanistan, by contrast, is a weak state supported by international forces, and Iran has substantial influence over several major factions and regions of the country. Some countries in the region, particularly India, apparently seek greater integration with the United States and other world powers and have sought to limit or downplay cooperation with Iran and to comply with sanctions against Iran. The following sections cover those countries in the Caucasus and South and Central Asia that have significant economic and political relationships with Iran.

The South Caucasus: Azerbaijan

Azerbaijan – Iran relations

Azerbaijan is, like Iran, mostly Shiite Muslim-inhabited. However, Azerbaijan is ethnically Turkic and its leadership is secular; moreover, Iran and Azerbaijan have territorial differences over boundaries in the Caspian Sea. Iran also asserts that Azeri nationalist movements might stoke separatism among Iran’s large Azeri Turkic population, which has sometimes been restive. In July 2001, Iranian warships and combat aircraft threatened a BP ship on contract to Azerbaijan out of an area of the Caspian that Iran claims as its territorial waters. The United States called the incident inconsistent with diplomatic processes under way to determine Caspian boundaries,51 among which are negotiations that regional officials say might resolve the issue at a planned 2016 regional summit meeting in Astana, Kazakhstan. Largely as a result of these differences, Iran has generally tilted toward Armenia, which is Christian, in Armenia’s disputes with Azerbaijan. In this context, Azerbaijan has entered into substantial strategic cooperation with the United States, directed not only against Iran but also against Russia. The U.S.-Azerbaijan cooperation has extended to Azerbaijan’s deployments of troops to and facilitation of supply routes to Afghanistan,52 as well as counter-terrorism cooperation.

Israel also is apparently looking to Azerbaijan to counter Iran, announcing in February 2012 a major sale of about $1.6 billion worth of defense equipment, including unmanned aerial vehicles.53 In March 2012, Azerbaijan arrested 22 persons it said were Iranian agents plotting attacks against Israeli and Western targets there.

Azerbaijan has been a key component of U.S. efforts to structure oil and gas routes in the region to bypass Iran. In the 1990s, the United States successfully backed construction of the Baku- Tblisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, intended in part to provide non-Iranian and non-Russian export routes. On the other hand, the United States has apparently accepted Azerbaijan’s assertions that it needs to deal with Iran on some major regional energy projects. U.S. sanctions laws have excluded long-standing joint natural gas projects that involve some Iranian firms—particularly the Shah Deniz natural gas field and pipeline in the Caspian Sea. The project is run by a consortium in which Iran’s Naftiran Intertrade Company (NICO) holds a passive 10% share. (The other significant partners are BP, Azerbaijan’s national energy firm SOCAR, and Russia’s Lukoil.)

Central Asia

Iran has generally sought positive relations with the leaderships of the Central Asian states, even though most of these leaderships are secular. All of the Central Asian states are inhabited in the majority by Sunnis, and several have active Sunni Islamist opposition movements. The Central Asian states have long been wary that Iran might try to promote Islamic movements in Central Asia, but more recently the Central Asian leaders have seen Iran as an ally against the Sunni movements that are active in Central Asia, such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). 54 The rise of the Islamic State organization is a source of collective regional concern because the group has recruited fighters from Central Asia to help fill its combat ranks in Iraq and Syria.55 These fighters could return to their countries of origin to conduct terrorist attacks against the Central Asian governments. Almost all of the Central Asian states share a common language and culture with Turkey; Tajikistan is alone among them in sharing a language with Iran. The Central Asian states cooperate extensively to try to prevent narcotics trafficking emanating from Afghanistan.

Iran and the Central Asian states carry on normal economic relations. In December 2014, a new railway was inaugurated through Iran, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan, providing a link from the Persian Gulf to Central Asia.56

Along with India and Pakistan, Iran has been given observer status in a Central Asian security grouping called the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO—Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan). In April 2008, Iran applied for full membership in the organization. Apparently in an effort to cooperate with international efforts to pressure Iran, in June 2010, the SCO barred admission to Iran on the grounds that it is under U.N. Security Council sanctions.57

Turkmenistan

Turkmenistan

Turkmenistan and Iran have a land border in Iran’s northeast. Iran’s Supreme Leader, Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamene’i, is of Turkic origin; his family has close ties to the Iranian city of Mashhad, capital of Khorasan Province, which borders Turkmenistan. The two countries are also both rich in natural gas reserves. A natural gas pipeline from Iran to Turkey, fed with Turkmenistan’s gas, began operations in 1997, and a second pipeline was completed in 2010. In 2003, then President of Turkmenistan, Saparmurad Niyazov, signed a 25-year accord with Russia to sell most of Turkmenistan’s natural gas to Russia. However, China is its largest natural gas customer and Turkmenistan still exports some natural gas through the Iran-Turkey gas pipeline as well. Perhaps in an attempt to diversify gas export routes, Niyazov’s successor, President Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov, signaled in 2007 that Turkmenistan sought to develop a trans- Caspian gas pipeline. That project has not proceeded, to date.

Another potential project favored by Turkmenistan and the United States would likely reduce interest in pipelines that transit Iran. President Berdymukhamedov has revived Niyazov’s 1996 proposal to build a gas pipeline through Afghanistan to Pakistan and India (termed the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India, or “TAPI” pipeline). Some preliminary memoranda of understanding among the leaders of the nations involved have been signed. U.S. officials have expressed strong support for the project as “a very positive step forward and sort of a key example of what we’re seeking with our New Silk Road Initiative, which aims at regional integration to lift all boats and create prosperity across the region.”58 However, doubts remain that the pipeline will actually be constructed.

Tajikistan

Tajikistan

Iran and Tajikistan share a common Persian language, as well as literary and cultural ties. Despite the similar ethnicity, the two do not share a border and the population of Tajikistan is mostly Sunni, not Shiite. In March 2013, President Imamali Rakhmonov warned that since Tajikistan had become independent, the country and the world have experienced increased dangers from “arms races, international terrorism, political extremism, fundamentalism, separatism, drug trafficking, transnational organized crime, [and] the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.” These are threats that Iranian leaders claim to share. Rakhmonov also stated that close ties with neighboring and regional states were a priority, to be based on “friendship, good-neighborliness, [and] non- interference in each other’s internal affairs,” and to involve the peaceful settlement of disputes, such as over border, water, and energy issues.59 He stated that relations with Iran would be expanded. Tajikistan is largely dependent on its energy rich neighbors and has not announced any significant energy-related projects with Iran.

Some Sunni Islamist extremist groups that pose a threat to Tajikistan are allied with Sunni extremist groups, such as Al Qaeda, that Iranian leaders have publicly identified as threats to Iran and to the broader Islamic world. The Tajikistan government has detained members of Jundallah (Warriors of Allah)—a Pakistan-based Islamic extremist group that has conducted bombings and attacks against Iranian security personnel and mosques in Sunni areas of eastern Iran. In part because the group attacked some civilian targets in Iran, in November 2010, the State Department named the group an FTO—an action praised by Iran. In July 2013, Tajik police detained alleged operatives of the IMU, which is active in Uzbekistan and which also operates in Afghanistan.

Kazakhstan

Kazakhstan

Kazakhstan is an important power in Central Asia by virtue of its geographic location, large territory, ample natural resources, and economic growth. Kazakhstan possesses 30 billion barrels of proven oil reserves (about 2% of world reserves) and 45.7 trillion cubic feet of proven gas reserves (less than 1% of world reserves). There are five major onshore oil fields—Tengiz, Karachaganak, Aktobe, Mangistau, and Uzen—which account for about half of the proven reserves. There are two major offshore oil fields in Kazakhstan’s sector of the Caspian Sea— Kashagan and Kurmangazy—which are estimated to contain at least 14 billion barrels of recoverable reserves. However, Iran and Kazakhstan do not have any joint energy ventures in the Caspian or elsewhere.

In September 2014, Kazakhstan’s President Nursultan Nazarbayev held talks with Iran’s President Hassan Rouhani. In his welcoming speech, Nazarbayev said that Iran’s decision on its nuclear program will play an important role in the development of bilateral relations: “Kazakhstan views Iran as an important partner in the world and a good neighbor in the Caspian region. We are confident that you will achieve successful solution on the biggest challenge in Iran—the nuclear program. It will influence the development of the Iranian economy and our relations.”60 The bilateral meeting reportedly included a broad agenda, including oil and gas, agriculture, and infrastructure issues.

Uzbekistan

Uzbekistan

Uzbekistan and Iran do not share a common border, or significant language or cultural links. Since its independence in 1991, Uzbekistan, which has the largest military of the Central Asian states, has tended to see Iran as a potential regional rival and as a supporter of Islamist movements in the region. Over the past year, Uzbekistan and Iran have moved somewhat closer together over shared stated concerns about Sunni Islamist extremist movements such as the Islamic State and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). The Islamic State was an offshoot of Al Qaeda’s affiliate in Iraq and the IMU remains an Al Qaeda affiliate. The IMU, which has a reported presence in Afghanistan, has not claimed responsibility for any terrorist attacks in Iran and appears focused primarily on activities against the governments of Afghanistan and Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan has substantial natural gas resources but the two countries do not have joint energy-related ventures. Most of Uzbekistan’s natural gas production is for domestic consumption.

Uzbekistan’s intense focus on the IMU began in February 1999 when, according to various reports, six bomb blasts in Tashkent’s governmental area killed more than 20 people. Uzbekistan’s President Islam Karimov had been expected to attend a high-level meeting in that area when the bombings took place, and the act was widely viewed as an effort to decapitate the Uzbek government. The government alleged that an exiled opposition figure led the plot, assisted by Afghanistan’s Taliban and IMU co-leaders Tahir Yuldashev and Juma Namangani. The Taliban were, at that time, in power in Afghanistan and granting safe haven to Osama bin Laden and other Al Qaeda leaders. In September 2000, the State Department designated the IMU as an FTO, stating that the IMU resorts to terrorism in pursuit of its main goal of toppling the government in Uzbekistan, including taking foreign hostages.61 During U.S.-led major combat operations in Afghanistan during 2001-2003, IMU forces assisted the Taliban and Al Qaeda, and IMU co-head Namangani was probably killed at that time.62

South Asia

The countries in South Asia face an even greater degree of threat from Sunni Islamic extremist groups than do the countries of Central Asia, and on that basis share significant common interests with Iran. Moreover, the governments in South Asia are elected governments and thus tend to be more constrained by domestic laws and customs in their efforts to defeat extremist groups than are the Central Asian states. Iran apparently looks to countries in South Asia as potential allies to help parry U.S. and European pressure on Iran’s economy and its leaders. This section focuses on several countries in South Asia that have substantial interaction with Iran.

Afghanistan

Afghanistan – Iran Relations. Credit: Wikipedia Commons.

In Afghanistan, Iran is apparently pursuing a multi-track strategy by helping develop Afghanistan economically, engaging the central government, and supporting pro-Iranian groups and anti-U.S. militants. A long-term Iranian goal appears to be to restore some of its traditional sway in eastern, central, and northern Afghanistan, where “Dari”-speaking (Dari is akin to Persian) supporters of the “Northern Alliance” grouping of non-Pashtun Afghan minorities predominate. Iran has also sought to use its influence in Afghanistan to try to blunt the effects of international sanctions against Iran.63 The two countries are said to be cooperating effectively in their shared struggle against narcotics trafficking from Afghanistan into Iran; Iranian border forces take consistent heavy losses in operations to try to prevent this trafficking.

Iran has sought influence in Afghanistan in part by supporting the Afghan government. President Hamid Karzai was replaced in September 2014 by Ashraf Ghani: both are Sunni Muslims and ethnic Pashtuns. On October 26, 2010, Karzai admitted that Iran was providing cash payments (about $2 million per year) to his government, through his chief of staff.64 Iran’s close ally, Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, a Persian-speaking Afghan who is partly of Tajik origin, has become “Chief Executive Officer” of the Afghan government under a power-sharing arrangement that resolved a dispute over the most recent election.

Reflecting apparent concern about the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan, Iran reportedly tried to derail the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) that Ghani’s government signed on September 30, 2014. The BSA allows the United States to maintain troops in Afghanistan after 2014 but prohibits the United States from using Afghanistan as a base from which to launch military action against other countries. The two countries appear to have overcome differences over the BSA; President Ghani visited Tehran during April 19-20, 2015, and held discussions with Iranian leaders that reportedly focused on ways the two governments could cooperate against the Islamic State organization, which has developed affiliates inside Afghanistan. 65

Even though it engages the Afghan government, Tehran has in the recent past sought leverage against U.S. forces in Afghanistan that are supporting that government. Past State Department reports on international terrorism have accused Iran of providing materiel support, including 107mm rockets, to select Taliban and other militants in Afghanistan, and of training Taliban fighters in small unit tactics, small arms use, explosives, and indirect weapons fire.66 The State Department terrorism reports also assert that Iran has supplied militants in Qandahar, which is a Pashtun-inhabited province in southern Afghanistan, and that this demonstrates that Iran is not limiting its assistance to militants near its borders. The support Iran provides to Afghan insurgents gives Iran potential leverage in any Taliban-government political settlement in Afghanistan. In July 2012, Iran reportedly allowed the Taliban to open an office in Zahedan, in eastern Iran.67

Pakistan68

Iran – Pakistan relations. Credit: Wikipedia Commons.

Relations between Iran and Pakistan have fluctuated over the past several decades. Pakistan supported Iran in the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war, and Iran and Pakistan engaged in substantial military cooperation in the early 1990s. It has been widely reported that the founder of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, A.Q. Khan, sold nuclear technology and designs to Iran.69

However, several factors divide the two countries. During the 1990s, Pakistan supported the Taliban in Afghanistan, whereas Iran supported the Persian-speaking and Shiite Muslim minorities there. The Taliban allegedly committed atrocities against Shiite Afghans (Hazara tribes) while seizing control of Persian-speaking areas of western and northern Afghanistan. Taliban fighters killed nine Iranian diplomats at Iran’s consulate in Mazar-e-Sharif in August 1998, prompting Iran to mobilize ground forces to the Afghan border. Afghan Taliban factions have a measure of safe-haven in Pakistan, and Iran reportedly is concerned that Pakistan might still harbor the ambition of returning the Taliban to power in Afghanistan.70 In addition, two Iranian Sunni Muslim militant opposition groups – Jundullah (named by the United States as an FTO) and Jaysh al-Adl – operate from western Pakistan. These groups have conducted a number of attacks on Iranian regime targets.

An additional factor distancing Iran and Pakistan is that Pakistan has always had strategic relations with Iran’s strategic adversary, Saudi Arabia. In March 2015, Saudi Arabia requested Pakistan’s participation in a Saudi-led coalition to try to turn back the advance in Yemen by the Iranian-backed Houthis (see above). Pakistan’s government is abiding by an April 2015 vote of its parliament not to enter the conflict, on the grounds that Pakistan could become embroiled in conflict far from its borders. The decisions has complicated Pakistan’s relations with the GCC states but been applauded by Iran.71 Experts also have long speculated that if Saudi Arabia sought to counter Iran’s nuclear program with one of its own, the prime source of technology for the Saudi program would be Pakistan.

Despite these differences, Iran and Pakistan conduct low-level military cooperation, including joint naval exercises in April 2014. The two nations’ bilateral agenda has increasingly focused on completing a major gas pipeline project that would link the two countries. Pakistan asserts that the Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline could help alleviate Pakistan’s energy shortages, while the project would provide Iran an additional customer for its large natural gas reserves. Then-president of Iran Ahmadinejad and Pakistan’s then-President Asif Ali Zardari formally inaugurated the project in March 2013. Iran has completed the line on its side of the border, but Pakistan has had persistent trouble financing the project on its side of the border. That roadblock might have been cleared by an agreement by China, reported on April 9, 2015, to build the pipeline at a cost of about $2 billion.72 The United States opposes the project as providing a benefit to Iran’s energy sector and U.S. officials say that the project could be subject to U.S. sanctions under the Iran Sanctions Act.73 As originally conceived, the line would continue on to India, but India has withdrawn from the project.

India74

India – Iran Relations. Credit: Wikipedia Commons.

India and Iran have overlapping histories, civilizations, and interests, aligning on numerous issues; for example, both countries have strongly supported minority factions based in the north and west of Afghanistan. India also is home to tens of millions of Shiite Muslims. As U.S. and international sanctions on Iran increased in 2010-2012, India sought to preserve its long-standing ties with Iran while still cooperating with U.S. and international sanctions on Iran. In 2010, India’s central bank ceased using a Tehran-based regional body, the Asian Clearing Union, to handle transactions with Iran. In January 2012, Iran agreed to accept India’s local currency, the rupee, to settle nearly half of its sales to India; that rupee account funds the sale to Iran of Indian wheat, pharmaceuticals, rice, sugar, soybeans, auto parts, and other products. Over the past three years, India has cut its purchases of Iranian oil at some cost to its own development, and has received from the U.S. Administration the authorized exemptions from U.S. sanctions for doing so. By mid-2013, Iran was only supplying about 6% of India’s oil imports (down from over 16% in 2008)—reflecting significant investment to retrofit refineries that were handling Iranian crude. India’s private sector has come to view Iran as a “controversial market”—a term used by many international firms to describe markets that entail reputational and financial risks. As a result, investment in Iran by Indian firms, including in Iran’s energy sector, has been largely dormant over the past four years.

Still, India apparently seeks to preserve ties to Iran in support of India’s own strategic interests. India has long sought to develop Iran’s Chabahar port, which would give India direct access to Afghanistan and Central Asia without relying on transit routes through Pakistan. India had hesitated to move forward on that project because of U.S. opposition to projects that benefit Iran. After the JPA, India announced it would proceed with the project, but there has been little actual construction done at the port.75

In 2009, India dissociated itself from the Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline project. India publicly based its withdrawal on concerns about the security of the pipeline, the location at which the gas would be transferred to India, pricing of the gas, and transit tariffs. However, the long-standing distrust and enmity between India and Pakistan likely played a significant role in the Indian pullout. During economic talks in July 2010, Iranian and Indian officials reportedly raised the issue of constructing a subsea natural gas pipeline, which would bypass Pakistani territory.76 However, an undersea pipeline would be much more expensive.

During the late 1990s, U.S. officials expressed concern about India-Iran military-to-military ties. The relationship included visits to India by Iranian naval personnel, although India said these exchanges involved junior personnel and focused mainly on promoting interpersonal relations and not on India’s provision to Iran of military expertise. The military relationship between the countries has withered in recent years.

Sri Lanka

Sri Lanka was a buyer of small amounts of Iranian oil until 2012, when U.S. sanctions were imposed on countries that fail to reduce purchases of Iranian oil. Shortly thereafter, Sri Lanka ended its oil purchases from Iran and in June 2012, the country received an exemption from U.S. sanctions.

Europe

U.S. and European approaches on Iran have converged since 2002, when Iran was found to be developing a uranium enrichment capability. Previously, European countries had appeared less concerned than the United States about Iranian policies and were reluctant to sanction Iran. Since the passage of Resolution 1929 in June 2010, European Union (EU) sanctions on Iran have become nearly as extensive as those of the United States.77 Among its most significant actions, in 2012 the EU banned imports of Iranian crude oil and natural gas. The EU is a party to the JPA and the April 2, 2015, framework nuclear agreement, and three EU states—Britain, France, and Germany—are part of the P5+1 negotiating group on the Iran nuclear issue. In July 2013, the EU designated the military wing of Lebanese Hezbollah as a terrorist organization, an action that followed the attack on Israeli tourists in Bulgaria in 2012, mentioned in the table above.

Still, the EU countries generally conduct normal trade relations in civilian goods that are not the subject of any U.S., EU, or U.N. sanctions. Iran also has maintained full diplomatic relations with all the EU countries, with the exception of occasional interruptions caused by Iranian assassinations of Iranian dissidents in Europe or attacks by Iranian militants on EU country diplomatic property in Iran. There are daily scheduled flights from several European countries to Iran, and many Iranian students attend European universities.

During the 1990s, U.S. and European policies toward Iran were in sharp contrast. The United States had no formal dialogue with Iran; however, EU countries maintained a policy of “critical dialogue” and refused to join the 1995 U.S. trade and investment ban on Iran. The EU-Iran dialogue was suspended in April 1997 in response to the German terrorism trial (“Mykonos trial”) that found high-level Iranian involvement in killing Iranian dissidents in Germany, but it resumed in May 1998 during Mohammad Khatemi’s presidency of Iran. In the 1990s, European and Japanese creditors bucked U.S. objections and rescheduled about $16 billion in Iranian debt bilaterally, in spite of Paris Club rules that call for multilateral rescheduling. During 2002-2005, there were active negotiations between the European Union and Iran on a “Trade and Cooperation Agreement” (TCA) that would have lowered the tariffs or increased quotas for Iranian exports to the EU countries.78 Negotiations were discontinued in late 2005 after Iran abrogated an agreement with several EU countries to suspend uranium enrichment. Also, although the U.S. Administration ceased blocking Iran from applying for World Trade Organization (WTO) membership in May 2005, there has thus far been insufficient international support to grant Iran WTO membership.

Russia

Iran – Russia relations. Credit: Wikipedia Commons.

Iran appears to attach significant weight to its relations with Russia, which is a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, and has been Iran’s main supplier of conventional weaponry. In the past, Russia has also supplied Iran with missile-related and other technology. Russia also built and still supplies fuel for Iran’s only operating civilian nuclear power reactor at Bushehr—a project from which Russia earns significant revenues. Russia and Iran reportedly are negotiating for Russia to build at least two additional nuclear power plants in Iran. As a permanent member of the Security Council, Russia is also a member of the “P5+1” countries negotiating with Iran on a nuclear agreement.

Perhaps in part to protect its commercial interests in Iran, Russia has tended, in the past, to argue within the Security Council for relatively lighter sanctions than those supported by the United States, France, and Britain.79 In the context of a possible comprehensive nuclear deal, Russia might also seek to ensure that Iran does not align itself with the West.80
Despite its commercial and military involvement with Iran, Russia has abided by all U.N. sanctions, even to the point of initially cancelling a contract to sell Iran the advanced S-300 air defense system after Resolution 1929 banning arms exports to Iran was adopted—and even though the resolution did not specifically ban the sale of defensive systems. On the other hand, some reports suggest that in 2015 a Russian defense firm might have offered to sell Iran the advanced Antey-2500 air defense system.81 In January 2015, Iran and Russia signed a memorandum of understanding on defense cooperation, including military drills.82 After the April 2, 2015, framework nuclear accord was announced, Russia lifted its ban on the S-300 sale, although by all accounts the system has not been delivered to date.

Some argue that Iran has largely refrained from supporting Islamist movements in Central Asia not only because they are Sunni movements but also to avoid injuring Iran’s relations with Russia. Russia has faced attacks inside Russia by Sunni Islamist extremist movements and Russia appears to view Iran as a de-facto ally in combating such movements. These common interests might explain why Iran and Russia are each assisting the Asad regime against the armed insurgency it faces from Sunni extremist and other rebel groups.

Iran and Russia have both asserted that they are the main targets of U.S. and other Western sanctions (over the Ukraine issue, in the case of Russia). The two countries also allege that the United States and Saudi Arabia are colluding to lower world oil prices in part to pressure Iran and Russia economically. In August 2014, Russia and Iran reportedly agreed to a broad trade and energy deal which might include an exchange of Iranian oil (500,000 barrels per day) for Russian goods83—a deal that presumably would go into effect if sanctions on Iran were lifted. Russia is an oil exporter, but Iranian oil that Russia might buy under this arrangement would presumably free up additional Russian oil for export. Iran and Russia reaffirmed this accord in April 2015.

East Asia

The countries of East Asia include the largest buyers of Iranian crude oil. Because of the demand of Asian countries for Iranian oil, Iran’s leaders appear to view them primarily as economic partners and as potential advocates against adding international sanctions on Iran. The countries in Asia have sometimes joined multilateral peacekeeping operations in the Middle East but have not directly intervened militarily or politically in the region in the way the United States and its European allies have. Countries in Asia have rarely been a target of official Iranian criticism.

China84

China

China, a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council and one of the P5+1 countries that is negotiating Iran’s nuclear program, remains Iran’s largest oil customer. China has also been a supplier of advanced conventional arms to Iran, including fast patrol boats that Iran operates in the Persian Gulf. Until 2010, there were reports that some Chinese firms were supplying missile guidance and other weapons-related technology to Iran.85 As with Russia, China has reportedly tended to argue for less stringent sanctions and for more deference to Iran’s positions within the U.N. Security Council and within the P5+1 negotiations with Iran, than have the United States, France, Britain, and Germany.

China’s compliance with U.S. sanctions has been pivotal to U.S. efforts to reduce Iran’s revenue from oil sales. China has cut its buys of Iranian oil from about 550,000 bpd at the end of 2011 to about 400,000 bpd by mid-2013. Because China is the largest buyer of Iranian oil, cuts by China have had a large impact in reducing Iran’s oil sales. Several Chinese energy firms have invested in Iran’s energy sector, but some of these projects have been given to Iranian or other country firms or show little evidence of actual development work. These investments are discussed in detail in CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions.

A U.S. sanction requiring that Iran be paid in local currency accounts, which went into effect February 6, 2013, caused Iran to increase importation of clothing and household appliances from China in order to avoid drawing on any hard currency accounts. Even before that sanction was imposed, China had begun to settle much of its trade balance with Iran with goods rather than hard currency, in part because doing so is highly favorable to China. Press reports indicated that Iran’s automotive sector obtains a significant proportion of its parts from China, and two Chinese companies, Geelran, affiliated with China-based Geely and Chery, produce cars in Iran. These exports were reduced substantially during 2013 because of U.S. sanctions, but recovered significantly as a consequence of the JPA, which eased sanctions on Iran’s automotive sector.

Japan and South Korea

Iran’s primary interest in Japan and South Korea has been to maintain commercial relations and evade U.S. sanctions. However, both countries are close allies and large trading partners of the United States and their firms have been unwilling to risk their positions in the U.S. market by violating any U.S. sanctions.

Since 2010, in part in deference to their alliances with the United States, Japan and South Korea have imposed trade, banking, and energy sanctions on Iran—similar to those of the EU. Iran has tried to use the oil import dependency of the two countries as leverage; however both countries have cut imports of Iranian oil sharply since 2011. In 2010, Japan withdrew from an investment in a large Iranian oil field, Azadegan, in cooperation with U.S. efforts to discourage foreign investment in Iran’s energy sector.

The U.S. sanction requiring oil buyers to pay Iran in local accounts has not affected Japan and South Korea’s trading patterns with Iran significantly. South Korea has always generally paid Iran’s Central Bank through local currency accounts at its Industrial Bank of Korea and Woori Bank, and it exports to Iran mainly iron, steel, consumer electronics, and appliances. Japan exports to Iran significant amounts of chemical and rubber products, as well as consumer electronics. These exports have continued. The two countries also have comprised a large portion of the $700 million per month in direct hard currency payments to Iran for oil, as provided for by the JPA.

North Korea

North Korea

Iran and North Korea have generally been allies. Because of their separate nuclear programs and perceived threats to stability in their respective regions, both have been considered “outcasts” or “pariah states” subject to wide-ranging international sanctions. Even though the economic benefits to Iran of a relationship with North Korea are minimal, the relationship offers Iran some strategic gains. North Korea is one of the few countries with which Iran has military-to-military relations. The two countries have cooperated on a wide range of military and WMD-related ventures. The two have, by many accounts, cooperated in the development of missile technology. In the past, Iran reportedly funded and assisted in the re-transfer of missile and possibly nuclear technology from North Korea to Syria.86

North Korea has made no public commitment to comply with international sanctions against Iran, but its economy is too small to significantly help Iran. According to some observers, a portion of China’s purchases of oil from Iran and other suppliers is reexported to North Korea, but Iran is paid with Chinese goods rather than any hard currency or major products from North Korea. Press reports in April 2013 said that Iran might supply oil directly to North Korea, but it has not been reported that any such arrangement was finalized.

Latin America87

Some U.S. officials and some in Congress have expressed concern about Iran’s relations with certain countries and leaders in Latin America that share Iran’s distrust of the United States and might be willing to help  Iran circumvent some international sanctions.

Some experts and U.S. officials have asserted that Iran, primarily through its ally, Hezbollah, has sought to position IRGC-QF and other agents in Latin America with the potential to carry out terrorist attacks against Israeli targets in the region or even in the United States itself.88 Some U.S. officials have also asserted that Iran and Hezbollah’s activities in Latin America include money laundering and trafficking in drugs and counterfeit goods.89 In contrast to his predecessor, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, however, President Rouhani has expressed minimal interest in further expanding ties in Latin America. During the Ahmadinejad presidency, Iran reportedly expanded its relations with all of those countries, as well as in Mexico. In Ahmadinejad’s visits to the region, some economic agreements were reached but few were implemented, by all accounts.

In the 112th Congress, the “Countering Iran in the Western Hemisphere Act,” requiring the Administration to develop within 180 days of enactment a strategy to counter Iran’s influence in Latin America, passed both chambers and was signed on December 28, 2012 (H.R. 3783, P.L. 112-220). The required Administration report was provided to Congress in June 2013; the unclassified portion asserted that “Iranian influence in Latin America and the Caribbean is waning” in part because of U.S. efforts to cause Latin American countries to assess the costs and benefits of closer relations with Iran.90

Observers have directed particular attention to Iran’s relationship with Venezuela (an OPEC member, as is Iran) and Argentina. U.S. counterterrorism officials also have stated that the tri- border area of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay is a “nexus” of arms, narcotics and human trafficking, counterfeiting, and other potential funding sources for terrorist organizations, including Hezbollah.

Venezuela91

Venezuela

During Ahmadinejad’s presidency, Iran had particularly close relations with Venezuela and its president, Hugo Chavez, who died in office in March 2013. Neither Rouhani nor Chavez’s successor, Nicolas Maduro, have expressed the enthusiasm for the relationship that Chavez and Ahmadinejad did. However, even during Chavez’s presidency, the United States did not necessarily perceive a threat from the Iran-Venezuela relationship. In July 2012, President Obama stated that Iran-Venezuela ties have not had “a serious national security impact on the United States.”92

Only a few of the economic agreements between Iran and Venezuela during the Ahmadinejad and Chavez presidencies were implemented. A direct air link was established but then suspended in 2010 for lack of sufficient customer interest. It was reportedly restarted by President Maduro in January 2015 in order to try to promote tourism between the two countries.93 A deal for Petroleos de Venezuela to supply Iran with gasoline was signed in September 2009, apparently in a joint effort to circumvent U.S. sanctions on sales of gasoline to Iran, and Petroleos was therefore sanctioned under the Iran Sanctions Act in May 2011.94

Argentina95

Argentina

Argentina is the one country in Latin America in which there is substantial evidence that Iran and Hezbollah have carried out acts of terrorism, in this case against Israeli and Jewish targets.

The two major attacks in Buenos Aires—the 1992 bombing of the Israeli embassy and the 1994 bombing of a Jewish community center (Argentine-Israeli Mutual Association, AMIA)—still affect the Argentine political system. Based on indictments and the copious investigative information that has been revealed, there is a broad consensus that these attacks were carried out by Hezbollah operatives, assisted by Iranian diplomats and their access to diplomatic privileges. Many in Argentina’s Jewish community opposed a January 2013 Iran-Argentina memorandum of understanding to investigate the 1994 bombing by forming a “truth commission,” rather than to aggressively prosecute the Iranians involved. Opponents of that agreement assert that it undermined Argentina’s efforts to prosecute the Iranians involved. In May 2013, the Argentine prosecutor in the AMIA bombing case, Alberto Nisman, issued a 500-page report alleging that Iran has been working for decades in Latin America, setting up intelligence stations in the region by utilizing embassies, cultural organizations, and even mosques as a source of recruitment. In January 2015, Nisman was found dead of a gunshot wound, prompting turmoil in Argentina amid reports that he was to request indictment of Argentina’s president for allegedly conspiring with Iran to bury the AMIA bombing issue.

The Buenos Aires attacks took place more than 20 years ago and there have not been any recent public indications that Iran and/or Hezbollah are planning attacks in Argentina. However, in February 2015, Uruguay stated that an Iranian diplomat posted there had left the country before Uruguay issued a formal complaint that the diplomat had tested the security measures of Israel’s embassy in the capital, Montevideo.96

Africa

With few exceptions, Sub-Saharan Africa has not generally been a focus of Iranian foreign policy—perhaps because of the relatively small size of most African economies and the limited influence of African countries on multilateral efforts to limit Iran’s nuclear program or contain its strategic capabilities. Former President Ahmadinejad tried to enlist the support of some African leaders to reduce Iran’s international isolation, but most African countries did not want to risk their economic and political relationships with the United States by undertaking substantial dealings with Iran. Joint venture agreements between Iran and African countries were generally not implemented. Rouhani has made few statements on relations with countries in Africa and has not made the continent a priority. Still, the increase in activity by Islamic State and Al Qaeda-affiliated Sunni extremist movements could cause Iran to increase its focus on politics and security issues in Africa.

Iran is positioned to intervene more actively in Africa if it chooses to do so. The IRGC-QF has established a presence in some countries in Africa (including Nigeria, Senegal, and Kenya), possibly to secure arms-supply routes for pro-Iranian movements in the Middle East. Iran might also be seeking ways to retaliate against the United States or its allies if military action is taken against Iran’s nuclear facilities. On May 2, 2013, a court in Kenya found two Iranian men guilty of planning to carry out bombings in Kenya, apparently against Israeli targets. In September 2014, Kenya detained two Iranian men on suspicion of intent to carry out a terrorist attack there.

The only country in Africa in which Iran has appeared to invest substantial strategic resources and attention is Sudan.

Sudan

Sudan

Iran’s closest relationship in sub-Saharan Africa has been with the government of Sudan, which, like Iran, is identified by the United States as a state sponsor of terrorism. Iran’s relations with Sudan give Iran leverage against Egypt, a U.S. ally that has a peace treaty with Israel, and a channel to supply weapons to Hamas and other pro-Iranian groups in the Gaza Strip.97 The relationship began in the 1990s when Islamist leaders in Sudan, who came to power in 1989, welcomed international Islamist movements to train and organize there. Iran began supplying Sudan with weapons it used on its various fronts, such as the one with South Sudan, and the QF reportedly has armed and trained Sudanese forces, including the Popular Defense Force militia.98 Some observers say Iranian pilots have assisted Sudan’s air force, and Iran’s naval forces have periodically visited Port Sudan.

For Iran, the key to the relationship with Sudan has been its role in transshipping Iranian weapons to Hamas. Israel has repeatedly accused Iran of shipping weapons bound for Gaza through Sudan and,99 in October 2012, Israel bombed a weapons factory in Khartoum, purportedly a source of Iranian weapons supplies for Hamas. In March 2014, Israel intercepted an Iranian shipment of rockets that were headed to Port Sudan.100

However, Sudan is inhabited by Sunni Arabs and has always been susceptible to overtures from wealthy Sunni nations (such as Saudi Arabia) to distance itself from Iran. Apparent Saudi pressure on Sudan, coupled with apparent Saudi offers of generous economic assistance and investment, led to a downturn in the Iran-Sudan relationship. In September 2014, the Sudan government closed all Iranian cultural centers in Sudan and expelled the cultural attaché and other Iranian diplomats. Sudan’s press speculated that the Sudanese government perceived that Iran was using its facilities and personnel in Sudan to promote Shiite Islam.101 In March 2015, Sudan joined a Saudi-led Arab coalition to intervene against the Iran-supported Houthi rebel movement in Yemen, appearing to confirm that Sudan has significantly downgraded its strategic relations with Iran.

Prospects and Alternative Scenarios

There are a number of factors that could cause Iran’s foreign policy to shift. An uprising in Iran or other event that changes the composition of the regime could precipitate a shift in policy, presumably in favor of greater integration with the international community. Were Supreme Leader Khamene’i to leave the scene unexpectedly, Iran’s foreign policy could change sharply if his successor’s views differ from his or if a successor is unable to consolidate authority. Other factors that could force a shift could include the continued growth of a Saudi-led coalition of Arab Sunni states that might succeed in defeating movements and governments backed by Iran.

One variable that could cause an alteration in Iran’s foreign policy would be the finalization of a comprehensive nuclear agreement between Iran and the P5+1. Some experts and officials, including Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, argue that the broad sanctions relief envisioned by the tentative nuclear deal will provide Iran more financial and other resources with which to fund and arm regional factions who are acting against U.S. and allied interests. Other experts argue that Iran might seek to demonstrate that a nuclear agreement has not caused Iran to abandon its ideology and that Iran might try to increase its influence in the region.102 Those who support these arguments assert that Iran’s foreign policy would become even more challenging for the United States and its allies than it is without a nuclear agreement. As examples:

• Iran could decide to increase its assistance to hardline opposition factions in Bahrain, who have thus far made little headway in challenging the government’s control of the country.103
• Sanctions relief could enable Iran to acquire, licitly or illicitly, technology to enhance the accuracy of rockets and short-range missiles it has supplied to Hezbollah and Hamas.
• Sanctions relief could enable Iran to modernize its armed forces, potentially to the point where it has increased ability to move ground forces across waterways such as the Strait of Hormuz—and thereby further intimidate the GCC states.
• Iran’s reintegration into the international community could enable Iran to expand its relationships with countries in Latin America or Africa that have thus far been hesitant to broaden their relations with Iran.

A counterargument is that a nuclear agreement would give Iran incentive to avoid actions that could provoke calls among U.S. allies for the reimposition or addition of international sanctions.104 A nuclear agreement could also produce a broader rapprochement with the United States that leads to increased U.S.-Iran cooperation on regional issues. Some examples of possible Iranian foreign policy outcomes—and other possible shifts—in the event a nuclear deal is finalized are discussed below.

• Iran and the United States could cooperate directly against Islamic State forces in Iraq, and Iran could reduce its support for Asad of Syria and support a political solution that explicitly includes Asad’s departure from office.
• Iran and the UAE could resolve their territorial dispute over Abu Musa and the two Tunbs islands in the Persian Gulf.
• Iran might curtail its delivery of rockets and short-range missiles to Hezbollah and Hamas, although Iran is unlikely under any circumstances to reduce its political support for Hezbollah.
• Depending on the Saudi perception of a post-nuclear agreement threat from Iran, Saudi Arabia and Iran could decide to cooperate within OPEC to try to lift oil prices.
• Iran could be admitted to the WTO.
• A lifting of U.S. sanctions could cause Iran, Azerbaijan, and international energy firms to expand joint projects to develop the energy fields in the Caspian Sea. U.S.-Azerbaijan strategic cooperation might diminish as their shared perception of the Iran threat recedes.
• China and other members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization might drop their objections to Iran’s full membership in the organization because Iran would no longer be under strict multilateral sanctions.
• The United States might drop its opposition to additional gas pipelines that transit Iran, potentially undermining the TAPI pipeline project.
• The planned Iran-Pakistan natural gas pipeline might proceed to completion with the threat of U.S. sanctions on firms involved in the project removed.
• India likely would intensify its efforts to develop Iran’s Chahbahar port as U.S. opposition to the project diminishes.
• Both India and Pakistan might expand their separate military cooperation with Iran.

About the author:
*Kenneth Katzman, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

Source:
This article was published by the Congressional Research Service

Notes:
1. Foreign Policy Association. “A Candid Discussion with Karim Sadjadpour.” May 6, 2013. http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2013/05/06/a-candid-discussion-with-karim-sadjadpour/.
2. Khamene’i: “U.S. Would Overthrow Iranian Government If It Could—Media.” Reuters, February 8, 2014.
3. Erik Slavin. “Iran Emphasizes Nuclear Reconciliation, Criticizes U.S. Military Posture in Persian Gulf.” Stars and Stripes, March 5, 2014. http://www.stripes.com/news/iran-emphasizes-nuclear-reconciliation-criticizes-us-military- posture-in-persian-gulf-1.271204.
4. Ramin Mostaghim. “Iranians Rally to Support Iraq; Some Blame U.S. for Sunni Insurgency. Los Angeles Times, June 24, 2014. http://www.latimes.com/world/middleeast/la-fg-iran-volunteers-militants-iraq-20140624-story.html.
5. Soner Cagaptay, James F. Jeffrey, and Mehdi Khalaji. “Iran Won’t Give Up on Its Revolution.” New York Times, op- ed. April 26, 2015.
6. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/21/world/middleeast/iran-us-nuclear-talks.html?_r=0.
7. The text of the section on Iran can be found at http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2013/224826.htm.
8. http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2013/09/30/130930fa_fact_filkins?printable=true&currentPage=all.
9. http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/iranians-are-terrified-irans-isis-nightmare-10856.
10. See, for example. http://www.newsweek.com/what-are-iranians-doing-iraq-303107. Also reported in author conversations with U.S. and Iraq and Afghan officials, 2009-2015.
11. http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2010/oct/26/iran-cash-payments-to-afghanistan
12. http://www.crethiplethi.com/subversion-and-exporting-the-islamic-revolution-in-latin-america/islamic-countries/ iran-islamic-countries/2012/
13. Statement for the Record. U.S. Director for national Intelligence James Clapper. Senate Armed Services Committee, February 2015, p. 14.
14. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/saudi-king-give-cautious-nod-to-iran-nuclear-deal/2015/04/03/ aeb04901-e608-4735-8bf3-4dfd71c4c74d_story.html.
15. Paul Richter and Alexandra Davis. “U.S. Promises to Beef Up Defense Aid to Persian Gulf Allies.” Los Angeles Times, April 7, 2015.
16. For detailed information on Saudi Arabia’s policy toward Iran, see CRS Report RL33533, Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations, by Christopher M. Blanchard
17. For detailed information on Iran-UAE relations, see CRS Report RS21852, The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman
18. http://archive.defensenews.com/article/20140115/DEFREG04/301150034/Source-UAE-Iran-Reach-Accord- Disputed-Hormuz-Islands.
19. http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/02/washington/02UAE.html?pagewanted=print.
20. For detailed information on Iran-Qatar relations, see CRS Report RL31718, Qatar: Background and U.S. Relations, by Christopher M. Blanchard.
21. For detailed information on Iran-Bahrain relations, see CRS Report 95-1013, Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman.
22. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/01/bahrain-accuses-iran-training-rebels-201413144049814960.html
23. http://middleeastvoices.voanews.com/2011/11/bici-report-iran-not-linked-to-bahrain-protests/
24. For detailed information on Iran-Kuwait relations, see CRS Report RS21513, Kuwait: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman.
25. For detailed information on Iran-Oman relations, see CRS Report RS21534, Oman: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman
26. As reported in author conversations in Oman and with Omani officials, 1988-2015.
27. For information, see CRS Report R43612, The “Islamic State” Crisis and U.S. Policy, by Christopher M. Blanchard et al.
28. For more information, see CRS Report RS21968, Iraq: Politics, Security, and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman.
29. Michael Gordon, “Iran Supplying Syrian Military Via Iraqi Airspace,” New York Times, September 5, 2012.
30. “Iran News Agency Reports Death of Iranian Pilot in Iraq.” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. July 5, 2014.
31. Babak Dehghanpisheh. “Iran Dramatically Shifts Iraq Policy to Confront Islamic State.” Reuters, September 2, 2014.
32. Eric Schmitt. “Iran Sent Arms to Iraq to Fight ISIS, U.S. Says.” New York Times, March 17, 2015.
33. For more information on the conflicts in Syria, see CRS Report RL33487, Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response, coordinated by Christopher M. Blanchard
34. Details and analysis on the full spectrum of Iranian assistance to Asad is provided by the Institute for the Study of War. “Iranian Strategy in Syria,” by Will Fulton, Joseph Holliday, and Sam Wyer. May 2013.
35. Will Fulton, Joseph Holliday, and Sam Wyer, “Iranian Strategy in Syria,” Institute for the Study of War, May 2013.
36. As reported in author conversations with European and U.S. experts on Iran and Syria in Washington, DC, 2014-2015.
37. For more information, see CRS Report R42816, Lebanon: Background and U.S. Policy, by Christopher M. Blanchard; CRS Report R41514, Hamas: Background and Issues for Congress, by Jim Zanotti; and CRS Report RL33476, Israel: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti;
38. “Iranian General: Palestinians Have Longer-Range Missiles.” The Times of Israel, November 12, 2014.
39. For more information, see CRS Report RL34074, The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti
40. Stuart Winer. “Iran Boasts of Rocket Aid to Palestinians, Hezbollah.” The Times of Israel, February 3, 2015; and, http://www.wsj.com/articles/iran-rekindles-relations-with-hamas-1429658562.
41. CRS Report R41446, Hezbollah: Background and Issues for Congress, by Casey L. Addis and Christopher M. Blanchard.
42. Kenneth Katzman. “The Warriors of Islam: Iran’s Revolutionary Guard.” Westview Press, 1993.
43. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/cia-and-mossad-killed-senior-hezbollah-figure-in-car-
bombing/2015/01/30/ebb88682-968a-11e4-8005-1924ede3e54a_story.html.
44. “Israel’s Peres Says Iran Arming Hizbollah,” Reuters, February 4, 2002.
45. IAF Chief: Israel Will Destroy Hezbollah Bases in Lebanon, Even Ones in Residential Areas.” Reuters/Jerusalem Post, January 29, 2015.
46. For more information, see CRS Report R43960, Yemen: Civil War and Regional Intervention, by Jeremy M. Sharp
47. “Iranian Support Seen Crucial for Yemen’s Houthis.” Reuters, December 15, 2014.
48. Ali al-Mujahed and Hugh Naylor. “Yemen Rebels Defy Saudi-led Attacks.” Washington Post, March 28, 2015.
49. Ali Watkins, Ryan Grim, and Akbar Shahid Ahmed, “Iran Warned Houthis Against Yemen Takeover,” Huffington Post, April 20, 2015.
50. Michael Shear and Matthew Rosenberg. “Warning Iran, U.S. Sends Two More Ships to Yemen.” New York Times, April 21, 2015.
51. http://usembassy-israel.org.il/publish/peace/archives/2001/july/0725a.html.
52. http://foreignpolicynews.org/2014/04/10/azerbaijans-strategic-relations-united-states/.
53. http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/azerbaijans-cooperation-with-israel-goes-beyond-iran- tensions.
54. Sebastien Peyrouse. “Iran’s Growing Role in Central Asia? Geopolitical, Economic, and Political Profit and Loss Account. Al Jazeera Center for Studies. April 6, 2014. http://studies.aljazeera.net/en/dossiers/2014/04/ 2014416940377354.html.
55. Stratfor. “Re-Examining the Threat of Central Asian Militancy” January 21, 2015. http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/ re-examining-threat-central-asian-militancy#axzz3PTRMU0el.
56. http://www.railwaygazette.com/news/news/asia/single-view/view/iran-turkmenistan-kazakhstan-rail-link- inaugurated.html.
57. Substantially more detail on Iran’s activities in Afghanistan is contained in CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman.
58. U.S. Department of State, Daily Press Briefing, May 23, 2012
59. Center for Effective Dispute Resolution (CEDR), March 16, 2013, Doc. No. CEL-54015758.
60. http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn=13930618000811.
61. http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2001/html/10252.htm#imu.
62. U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003, April 2004.
63. Matthew Rosenberg and Annie Lowry, “Iranian Currency Traders Find a Haven in Afghanistan,” New York Times, August 18, 2012.
64. Dexter Filkins. “Iran Is Said to Give Top Karzai Aide Cash by the Bagful.” New York Times, October 23, 2010.
65. “Afghanistan, Iran to Work together Against “Macabre” IS Threat.” RFE/RL, April 22, 2015.
66. State Department. Country Reports on International Terrorism: 2011. http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2011/ 195547.htm.
67. Maria Abi-Habib, “Tehran Builds On Outreach to Taliban,” Wall Street Journal, August 1, 2012.
68. For detail on Pakistan’s foreign policy and relations with the United States, see CRS Report R41832, Pakistan-U.S.
Relations, by K. Alan Kronstadt.
69. John Lancaster and Kamran Khan, “Pakistanis Say Nuclear Scientists Aided Iran,” Washington Post, January 24,
2004.
70. Author conversations with experts in Washington, DC, who consult with Iranian government officials. 2013-15.
71. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2015/04/10/6dc494fc-df62-11e4-a500-1c5bb1d8ff6a_story.html.
72. http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/china-to-build-pakistan-iran-gas-pipeline- pakistan-government/articleshow/46867932.cms.
73. http://www.thenational.ae/business/energy/big-powers-block-iran-pakistan-gas-pipeline-plans.
74. For detail on India’s foreign policy and relations with the United States, see CRS Report R42823, India-U.S. Security Relations: Current Engagement, by K. Alan Kronstadt and Sonia Pinto.
75. Author conversations with Indian diplomats in Washington, DC, March 2015.
76. http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/world/iran-backs-deepsea-gas-pipeline-to-india/article5466999.ece.
77. For information on EU sanctions in place on Iran, see http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/iran/eu_iran/ restrictive_measures/index_en.htm.
78. During the active period of talks, which began in December 2002, there were working groups focused not only on the TCA terms and proliferation issues but also on Iran’s human rights record, Iran’s efforts to derail the Middle East peace process, Iranian-sponsored terrorism, counter-narcotics, refugees, migration issues, and the Iranian opposition PMOI.
79. Anna Boshchevskaya. “How Russia Views the Iran Nuclear Talks.” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, March 12, 2015.
80. Karoun Demirjian. “Russia’s Preemptive Strike as Iran Warms to West.” Washington Post, April 19, 2015.
81. Ibid.
82. Ibid.
83. “Iran, Russia Negotiating Big Oil-for-Goods Deal.” Reuters, January 10, 2014.
84. CRS Report IF10029, China, U.S. Leadership, and Geopolitical Challenges in Asia, by Susan V. Lawrence.
85. CRS Report RL31555, China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues, by
Shirley A. Kan
86. http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303763804579183231117914364.
87. For more information on the issues discussed in this section, see CRS Report RS21049, Latin America: Terrorism Issues, by Mark P. Sullivan and June S. Beittel.
88. Ilan Berman. “Iran Courts Latin America.” Middle East Quarterly, Summer 2012. http://www.meforum.org/3297/ iran-latin-america.
89. Posture Statement of General John F. Kelly, Commander, U.S. Southern Command, before the 114th Congress, Senate Armed Services Committee, March 12, 2015.
90. Department of State, “Annex A: Unclassified Summary of Policy Recommendations,” June 2013.
91. For more information, see CRS Report R43239, Venezuela: Background and U.S. Relations, by Mark P. Sullivan 92. Comments by President Barack Obama on “CNN: The Situation Room,” July 11, 2012.
93. http://panampost.com/sabrina-martin/2015/04/06/iran-takes-venezuelan-money-passes-on-deliveries/
94. http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/05/24/us-iran-usa-sanctions-idUSTRE74N47R20110524
95. For more information, see CRS Report R43816, Argentina: Background and U.S. Relations, by Mark P. Sullivan and Rebecca M. Nelson
96. “Questions Swirl Over Incident Involving Iranian Diplomat in Uruguay.” LatinNews Daily, February 9, 2015.
97. Michael Lipin. “Sudan’s Iran Alliance Under Scrutiny.” VOANews, October 31, 2012. http://www.voanews.com/ content/article/1536472.html.
98. http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Security-Watch/terrorism-security/2012/1025/Did-Israel-just-blow-up-an-Iranian- weapons-factory-in-Sudan.
99. “Were the Israelis Behind the ‘Mystery’ Air Strike in Sudan?” Time, April 6, 2011; “Car Blast in E. Sudan, Khartoum Points to Israel,” Reuters, May 22, 2012; “Rockets and Meetings,” Africa Confidential, May 25, 2012.Weapons Documented in South Kordofan,” Small Arms Survey, April 2012.
100. http://www.jpost.com/Defense/Israel-Navy-intercepts-Gaza-bound-Iranian-rocket-ship-near-Port-Sudan-344369. 101. Sudan Expels Iranian Diplomats and Closes Cultural Centers. The Guardian, September 2, 2014.
102. Kenneth Pollack. “Iran’s Regional Policy After a Nuclear Deal” Brookings Institution, March 2, 2015. http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/markaz/posts/2015/03/02-iran-after-a-nuclear-deal-pollack.
103. Ibid.
104. “David Kirkpatrick. “Saudis Make Own Moves as U.S. and Iran Talk.” New York Times, March 31, 2015.

The post Iran’s Foreign Policy – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

At the prospect of the international community’s nuclear deal with Iran, Saudi Arabia has reportedly taken a decision to call in an old favor from Pakistan and get some of its nuclear weapons.

Saudi Arabia is widely believed to have bankrolled the Pakistani nuclear weapons program. In exchange, Riyadh reportedly expects Islamabad to provide missiles in times of trouble to defend the kingdom.

“For the Saudis the moment has come,” a former American defense official told The Sunday Times newspaper. “There has been a longstanding agreement in place with the Pakistanis, and the House of Saud has now made the strategic decision to move forward.”

According to the report, no actual transfer of weapons has taken place yet, but “the Saudis mean what they say and they will do what they say,” the source reportedly said.

The report comes a month ahead of a meeting between Tehran and the P5+1 group to finalize a deal, which would lift sanctions from Iran in exchange for making its nuclear program more transparent and restricted. Key US allies in the Middle East, Israel and Saudi Arabia, are objecting to the deal, saying it would ultimately allow Iran to acquire nuclear weapons.

Reports of Saudi Arabia getting nukes aren’t new. In November 2013, BBC’s Newsnight reported on the alleged nuclear sharing agreement between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.

The program cited Amos Yadlin, a former head of Israeli military intelligence, telling a conference in Sweden that if Iran got the bomb, “the Saudis will not wait one month. They already paid for the bomb, they will go to Pakistan and bring what they need to bring.”

The speculation came just as nuclear talks between Iran and the P5+1 were showing progress in Geneva.

Some experts, however, doubted that the supposed nuclear arming by Saudi Arabia was as simple as calling in the debt.

“I doubt that Pakistan is ready to send nuclear weapons to Saudi Arabia,” Mark Fitzpatrick, a non-proliferation expert with the International Institute for Strategic Studies, told the Guardian at the time.

“Pakistan’s reputation suffered greatly the last time they assisted other countries with nuclear weapons technology (i.e., the sales by [Pakistani nuclear project chief] A.Q. Khan, with some governmental support or at least acquiescence, to North Korea, Iran and Libya). Pakistan knows that transferring nuclear weapons to Saudi Arabia would also incur huge diplomatic and reputational costs.”

The potential of a nuclear arms race in the Middle East triggered by the Iran deal is one of the argument critics use to denigrate the talks. At the moment there are several countries in the region known or believed to have nuclear weapons.

Pakistan has a stockpile of 80 to 120 warheads designed to counterbalance India’s arsenal, while Turkey hosts NATO nuclear weapons. Israel is said to have a stockpile, although it has never officially confirmed this.

Several other nations have civilian nuclear programs, including Iran, Egypt and UAE.

The post Pakistan To Offer Nukes To Saudi Arabia? appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Roshni Thomas*

When the new government of Sri Lankan President Maithripala Sirisena decided to review every Chinese investment approved by the previous President Mahinda Rajapakse’s government – including the Colombo Port Expansion Project (CPEP) – many believed this would lay the groundwork for Sri Lanka’s China policy.

Indian observers keenly monitored developments to see if the CPEP would be approved, as a disapproval of the project would lead to probable closer relations with India. Much to India’s dismay, the Sri Lankan government approved the $1.4 billion project in April 2015, indicating that Sirisena’s foreign policy was going to be rather China-friendly.

Why Does China Invest in Sri Lanka’s Maritime Infrastructure?

China depends heavily on Africa and West Asia for its oil and gas imports. Beijing has revamped its policy to have strategic influence in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) to reduce its dependence on the Malacca straits.

China’s cargo ships have tremendously increased in size to accommodate the growing trade. These state-of-the-art cargo ships require modern ports to handle logistics.

Sri Lanka receives a great deal of its revenue due to its strategic position in the Indian Ocean. Economically Colombo would greatly benefit from the modernisation of its ports. China has a strong involvement in Sri Lankan ports; for instance, the re-structuring and revamping projects for both Colombo and Hambantota ports have been commissioned to Beijing. These ports will now be developed to accommodate the large-sized cargo vessels.

China is economically aggressive in its approach and invests wherever it can reap benefits from. Sri Lanka knows it needs to build on its strengths of occupying a strategic geographical position in the IOR. Thus, it’s a win-win situation for both countries.

But is this engagement solely an old-fashioned trade and economic exchange or are there ulterior motives to the Chinese economic activity?

In September 2014, New Delhi was alarmed when Sri Lanka agreed to dock China’s warship and nuclear submarine at the Colombo port – that is controlled by a Chinese developer. Warship Chang Xing Dao and submarine Changzheng-2 arrived at the southern port of Colombo, supposedly for refuelling purposes. New Delhi raised concerns about Chinese influence in the Palk Strait, located in close proximity to the Indian coastline. With the construction of these new ports, will India witness more Chinese warships and submarines at its doorstep in the name of anti-piracy rounds in the Gulf of Aden?

To matters complex, India does benefit from the re-construction and modernisation of Colombo Port as over 70 per cent of India’s trading ships make halts at Colombo. This is due to an age old Indian policy that does not allow merchant ships to make more than one port call at a time on the Indian coast. These ships have to invariably go through Sri Lanka. This is due to the lack of facilities in our domestic ports and our outdated maritime policy.

Why India Needs to React

Most of India’s trade passes through Sri Lanka, which makes the latter a key component of ensuring India’s security. New Delhi’s inability to invest in Colombo and Beijing’s growing readiness is a matter of concern. There is an urgent need to modify our maritime policies in the light of the changing global maritime environment.

India may not undertake large commercial investments like China, but it invests on the lines of aid –unlike Chinese investments, which are in the form of loans.

Besides the construction of ports in Sri Lanka, the state-owned China National Electronic Import and Export Corporation (CNEIEC) has also undertaken the $103 million Lotus Tower project. The CNEIEC is involved in defence electronics and other military services. It is not difficult to believe that the Lotus Tower, the tallest in South Asia, will be used as a surveillance facility. This not only raises security concerns in India but also in the broader South Asian region.

India does not have the required investment capability to match or outbid the Chinese capacity, but is not investing hampering our security? There are also growing concerns due to the flourishing China-Pakistan bilateral. India may be unable to, and will not, directly counter China. However, it could adopt a collective security mechanism along with other regional powers. This would be a much-needed pragmatic approach to counter China’s influence in the region.

Given the evolving geopolitics in the larger IOR, India has begun playing a more strategic role. There are great expectations from Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s recently-concluded China visit, (that preceded his visits to Mongolia and South Korea). Is this India’s response to Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visits to India’s neighbours? Most countries in Asia are apprehensive about their relations with China. With China’s phenomenal rise, it is understood that they do not hesitate to exploit but India still maintains a more fair and peace-oriented image among its neighbours. With the Indian Ocean being an integral factor for security, it is time for Modi to apply his best diplomatic efforts with the rest of the Asian countries to bring about greater cooperation and security in the region before the string of pearls becomes a hangman’s knot.

*Roshni Thomas
Research Intern, IPCS
roshnithomas92@gmail.com

The post China-Sri Lanka: Maritime Infrastructure And India’s Security – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Eleven people have been detained in connection with an ambush of a Saudi prince’s diplomatic convoy in Paris last year, the Paris prosecutor’s office told AP on Monday.

Spokeswoman Agnes Thibault-Lecuivre confirmed the arrest but declined to provide more details.

Armed robbers in August ambushed the Mercedes vehicle while the convoy was on its way to the airport, torching and abandoning the car later. Inside were 250,000 euros ($280,000) and embassy documents. Officials said the robbers seemed well informed of the itinerary.

No officials have named the prince, AP said.

Original article

The post France: 11 Detained For Ambush Of Saudi Prince’s Convoy In Paris appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Last month when Florida postal worker, Doug Hughes, landed his tiny aircraft, known as a gyrocopter, on the lawn of the U.S. Capitol with 535 letters addressed to every member of Congress, the conversation should have been about his desperate message. Instead, his letter to each Senator and Representative arguing for an end to the corruption of private money in public election campaigns was largely ignored. The media focused instead on an airspace violation with an unregistered aircraft.  The delivery of a letter remarking on racism or sexism in the United States may have gotten far more attention. While issues of gender and race are important and making much progress, less personal topics that don’t invoke a human, emotional reaction, are in danger of being swept under the rug.

Hughes is currently under house arrest in Ruskin, Florida, amidst a torrent of media speculation about how he got through restricted airspace and a no-fly zone undetected (the readers of the radar screens thought he was probably a flock of geese).

Undiverted, the well-read and articulate Hughes, 61, a former Navy veteran, responded on his website, the Democracy Club: “anybody in politics or the news media who want to spend inordinate amounts of time talking about me is avoiding the real discussion—which is about Congress. Let’s keep the discussion focused on reform—not me.”

While recognizing this crucial point, even journalist William Greider couldn’t avoid writing “we spend $600 billion a year on defense, but couldn’t stop a mailman from landing his gyrocopter on the Capitol Lawn.” So far Hughes, not any of the blundering security specialists, is the only one feeling the force of the law.

Hughes started thinking about what to do on campaign finance reform when he met a fellow rural letter carrier, army veteran Michael P. Shanahan. (Yes, all reform starts with a small conversation between citizens.) Shanahan had developed a proposal called “Civilism” which he described as “a systematic plan to fix Congress” by organizing an association of moderates “united by faith in principles of democracy.”

Greider sees this risky landing, which could have cost Hughes his life, as more evidence of an emerging “convergence of left and right…among rank-and-file voters at the grassroots. For all their angry differences, Tea Party adherents and working-class Dems share many of the same enemies and same frustrated yearnings,” he added.

Certainly, Hughes’ condemnation is transpartisan. He points out that nearly half of retired members of Congress are subsequently employed as lobbyists, drawing down big money rewarding their votes as Senators and Representatives. He calls this scenario “legalized, institutionalized bribery.”

It wasn’t as if his spectacular landing on the West Lawn was a secret. His “Freedom Flight,” as he calls it, was announced September 16, 2013 on his website, he told the Tampa Bay Times in detail about his plans, the Secret Service visited his home in October of 2013, and he sent out an all points email to Florida media well before he took off from a Maryland airstrip.

Unfortunately, he got little national press, other than the Tampa Bay Times, which published his letter in its entirety. But, quoting Senator John Kerry’s words in his farewell speech to the Senate that “the unending chase for money I believe threatens to steal our democracy itself,” Hughes did stimulate some congressmen, such as Republican Walter Jones, Jr., to make statements on the House floor about the worsening influence of money in politics.

Interviewed from his home on Democracy Now by Amy Goodman, Hughes, a grandfather, said he sees “the change over the decades as we slide from a democracy to a plutocracy. Just like Alan Grayson said, the fat cats are calling the shots. They’re getting everything they want. And the voters know it. Across the political spectrum—center, left and right—they know that this Congress isn’t representing the people. And yes, it was worth risking my life, it was worth risking my freedom, to get reform so that Congress works for the people.”

Hughes related that he and Shanahan, in their research, “discovered the existence of other groups and other very sophisticated plans that had been written by people a lot smarter than me. But we also observed these groups weren’t getting any traction.” He also stated their lack of media attention and mentioned the need for a states-driven constitutional convention.

Well, Doug Hughes, you’re on the right track. All you have to do with your buddy Shanahan is get less than one percent of the American people to organize in each of the 435 congressional districts, throw in their pledge to each devote 200 volunteer hours a year and open up one office in each district with two full-time people and you’ll get public financing of public campaigns through a constitutional amendment.

Why? Because this peoples’ One Percent would have the overwhelming public sentiment behind them—Left/Right and unstoppable. So take your Democracy Club viral with the gyrocopter gang. Lead and the politicians will follow.

(Interested voters can go to The Democracy Club to spread the quest for this One Percent in their Congressional District.)

The post Can The Gyrocopter Gang Start A Political Reform Movement? – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Ambreen Agha*

As long as we rely upon the hammer when a file is needed and press Islam into service to solve situations it was never intended to solve, frustration and disappointment must dog our steps.. — The Munir Report, 1954

On May 13, 2015, at least 45 Ismaili Shias, including 16 women, were killed and another 24 were injured in Safoora Chowrangi in the Gulshan-e-Iqbal Town of Karachi, the provincial capital of Sindh, when terrorists attacked a bus carrying Ismaili Shias. The Police disclosed, “The gunmen stopped the bus and first fired at it from outside. Then they entered inside the bus and opened fire indiscriminately. After that they checked to see if anyone was left uninjured.” One of the wounded women narrating the spine-chilling incident said, “As the gunmen climbed on to the bus, one of them shouted, ‘Kill them all!’ Then they started firing at everyone they saw.” According to reports, six terrorists riding motorcycles carried out the attack using 9mm pistols.

Leaflets, written in English, left in the bus were headlined, “Advent of the Islamic State!” and used a derogatory Arabic word for Shi’ites, accusing them of “barbaric atrocities … in the Levant, Iraq and Yemen”. Later, a statement distributed on social networking site Twitter by a group calling itself Khorasan Province Islamic State, claimed responsibility for the attack: “Thanks to God 43 apostates were killed and close to 30 others were wounded in an attack by the soldiers of Islamic State on a bus carrying people of the Shia Ismaili sect … in Karachi.”

Jundullah, a splinter group of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which had pledged allegiance to Islamic State (IS / also known as Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, ISIS) on November 12, 2014, also claimed responsibility for the attack, declaring, “These killed people were Ismaili and we consider them kafir (non-Muslim). We had four attackers. In the coming days we will attack Ismailis, Shias and Christians.” Significantly, Fahad Marwat, a ‘spokesman’ of Jundullah, in his pledge had asserted, “They (Islamic State) are our brothers, whatever plan they have we will support them.”

On April 16, 2015, an American woman, 55-year-old Debra Lobo, an Associate Professor of Community Health Science at Karachi’s Jinnah Medical and Dental College, was shot at and injured in Karachi. IS leaflets were found at the incident site, one of which read, “We shall lie in wait until we ambush you and kill you wherever you may be until we confine and besiege you in America and then God willing, We Will Burn America!!!”

Islamic State has, indeed, made deep inroads in Karachi and across Pakistan. General John Campbell, the Commander of the Resolute Support Mission, the new US and NATO mission in Afghanistan, warned on January 18, 2015, that IS was recruiting in Afghanistan and Pakistan: “We are seeing reports of some recruiting. There have been some night letter drops, there have been reports of people trying to recruit both in Afghanistan and Pakistan…”

Exploiting old faultlines of Shia-Sunni rivalry and the anti-Shia sentiment in Pakistan that has been legitimized by state-backed orthodox Sunni ulama and their religious organisations virtually since the creation of Pakistan, the IS has easily found sympathizers, supporters, and fighters in its ‘global war’ against Shias.

Meanwhile, sectarian attacks in Pakistan continue unabated. According to partial data compiled by South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), the country has recorded at least 2,988 sectarian attacks, resulting in 5,119 deaths and 9,745 persons injured, since 1989. 2015 has already recorded 27 such incidents, with 199 fatalities and 242 persons injured (all data till May 17, 2015).

Out of 4,116 persons killed in such attacks since 2001, 2,461 were identified as Shias. Among them, at least 72 Ismailis (including, Bohra Ismailis, who are a sub-sect of the Ismaili Shias) have been killed in 15 such attacks since 2012.

The first attack on Ismailis recorded by SATP dates back to September 18, 2012, when two bombs exploded on a road between two apartment buildings, Qasr-e-Kutbuddin and Burhani Bagh, in Block C of the North Nazimabad Town in Karachi, commonly called Bohra Compound, killing seven and injuring another 22. Sindh has been the primary centre of violence against Ismailis. Out of the 15 targeted attacks against this sect, 13 have occurred in Karachi alone. The remaining two were reported in the Hyderabad District of the Province. In one such attack in Hyderabad on November 6, 2012, at least three people, belonging to the Bohra community, were killed and three sustained injuries, when unidentified terrorists opened fire at a shop on Risala Road in the District.

Significantly, on February 2, 2014, TTP had issued a chilling 50-minute video message of “armed struggle” against the Ismailis and the indigenous Kalash tribe of Chitral Valley in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), escalating the threat against minorities. The Kalash retain a range of pagan beliefs and are thought to be the descendents of the armies of Alexander the Great. They maintain distinct cultural traditions that make them vulnerable targets. The ‘spokesperson’ in the video identified a charitable organisation headed by the Aga Khan, the Ismailis’ spiritual leader and threatened their elimination, calling on Sunnis to support their ’cause':

The Aga Khan Foundation is running 16 schools and 16 colleges and hostels where young men and women are given free education and brainwashed to keep them away from Islam… The foundation’s schools and hospitals, which are free for members of the public, are espionage tools in the hands of foreign powers.

Sectarian demagoguery has been visible in pamphlets and videos released by the terrorist formations. On March 20, 2015, a handbill by extremists belonging to the Ahl-e-Sunnat-Wal-Jama’at (ASWJ) was found in Bahadurabad area of Gulshan Town, declaring “open war” against Shia Muslims and Sunni-Sufi Muslims, as well as the Pakistan Army, media and Christians. On January 24, 2014, TTP had launched its Urdu website, umarmedia.com, which uploaded videos threatening Shiite Muslims in Pakistan and declaring a war against them. The website included the TTP flag, verses from the Quran, statements and videos containing sectarian, hate and propaganda material. The website was registered on the internet on November 24, 2013, with an address in Queensland, Australia.

The latest attack comes despite almost two years of a high-profile ‘operation’, launched by the Federal Government on September 5, 2013, against gangsters and terrorists in Karachi, and led by the Rangers, a paramilitary force controlled by the Army. The cosmetic nature of the ‘operation’ in Pakistan’s commercial capital has, in fact, widened the space and expanded targets for Islamist fanatics. The terror attacks continue with the proliferation of sectarian jihadi-terrorist groups, amidst the ongoing operation, which has had miniscule impact on overall security. The systematic targeting and killing of large numbers of Shias, including their sects and sub-sects, is a part of the unfettered extremism that dominates Pakistan.

With IS joining the sectarian terror outfits operating within Pakistan under the umbrella of benign state neglect, the threat of sectarian violence in Pakistan has multiplied exponentially. As Pakistan lurches from one crisis to another, the Islamist extremists flex their muscles at beleaguered minorities. Pakistan persists in its catastrophic game of deceit, encouraging and even supporting majoritarian terrorism and terrorism against the country’s neighbours, ceding spaces to global terrorist formations such as al Qaeda, IS and their proliferating local collaborators that constitute an increasing threat to the nation-state itself.

*Ambreen Agha
Research Assistant, Institute for Conflict Management

The post Pakistan: Escalating Savagery – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

The self-styled Islamic State’s (IS) conception of a caliphate, which accords women a significant role in building and sustaining a state, has mobilised a large number of female supporters and sympathisers to Iraq and Syria from the West. Why is this so?

By Sara Mahmood*

In the last few years there has been an unprecedented flow of Islamist foreign fighters to conflict zones in Syria and Iraq. A significant portion of these supporters, sympathisers and fighters of the self-styled Islamic State comprises women. Around 3,000 individuals, including 550 women, have travelled to conflict zones from the West. No jihadist conflict in the past has seen such a large mobilisation of women. Women from the West in particular, who used to stay away from such conflicts, have been particularly involved.

The unparallelled flow of female fighters joining the ranks of IS gives rise to two questions: Firstly, why do females have a bigger role in the IS jihad model; and secondly, what are the factors that have mobilised large numbers of female from the Western countries? Two variables in this scenario are worth considering: demand factors and the broader appeal of the so-called caliphate.

The demand for ‘jihadi brides’ and ‘jihadists’

Unlike other Islamist terrorist organisations, it is evident from IS propaganda literature that this jihadist group espouses a long-term vision of the future – to establish a state. Since, the ideology of the group is grounded in territory it also thinks like a social movement in which women are an integral part. IS strategically defines its policies to ensure survival in the distant future. Within IS, there is a well-defined structure in which two roles have been granted to women: the primary roles and secondary roles.

The first manifestation of the primary role is women as ‘jihadi brides’ or the foundation of a family. Marrying women to the jihadists will ensure that the lineage of the Muslims fighting to create the ultimate caliphate persists. Helping the foreign fighters set up families in Iraq or Syria will also prevent them from returning to their home countries. IS understands that a state cannot persevere without the future generation and has also offered families remuneration for bearing children. This means of incentivising relates back to the crucial role of women in ensuring the strength of the caliphate through procreation.

The second instance of the primary role is the woman as a mother, whose responsibility is to educate and raise her children to become future jihadists. In this case, the woman is to play a critical role in ideologising the future generation. Thus, her role does not diminish once she gives birth to the future jihadists. Instead it becomes equally crucial in inculcating the values that reinforce the desire to establish and maintain the so-called Islamic Caliphate.

In terms of the secondary role, IS grants women permission to abandon their domestic roles to wage jihad if there are not enough men to protect the caliphate. Within their secondary functions, IS also directs women to gain education and work for the welfare of the society as doctors and teachers for other women. Presently, women are fighting in the frontlines for the Al-Khansaa Brigade, the IS female fighters wing. The Al-Khansaa Brigade is also operating as a police squad that maintains law and order, which includes ensuring that women are properly dressed and do not deviate from acceptable Islamic norms.

Appeal of the self-proclaimed Caliphate

The largest number of female recruits originates from France and Britain, with 63 and 50 girls travelling to Iraq and Syria respectively, since mid-2014. The themes of respect and revenge are central to the appeal for women to join IS in Iraq and Syria.

The young girls joining IS are essentially seeking respect. With the rise of Islamophobia in Europe, countries such as France and Britain are experiencing an increase in hate speech and vigilante attacks against women wearing the hijab (head covering). Most Western Muslims view such incidences as reinforcing their status as second class citizens. Thus, IS’ attraction stems from the absence of Islamophobia and the ability to practise religion without any discrimination which is central to self-respect and freedom of religion.

Women who join IS see their action as a means of seeking revenge against the system that has alienated them. This form of revenge does not relate to developing an offensive towards the system, but to attain protection from the life of second class struggle by challenging the authority. Leaving their home countries in the West to join the struggle for the caliphate is symbolically elevating their status in their home countries.

IS advocating a participatory role for women?

While IS is a patriarchal organisation and gives comparatively more importance to the men, it does not deny the critical role of women in a state as well. Women contribute to the longevity of the movement through bearing children that are the future generation, and through the retention of foreign fighters by providing them a stable family life.

However, it is pertinent to understand that IS allowing women to participate in combat and giving them broader functions in the society does not imply that the women possess agency and freedom. One should not associate the more visible role of women with IS as suggesting men and women to be of equal footing.

Instead, for the IS strategic thinkers, the resilience of the caliphate supersedes other considerations. This establishes the core reason for the more visible functions assigned to women, which are attributed to nothing more than the survival of the state that requires participation by both genders alike.

*Sara Mahmood is a research analyst with the International Centre for Political Violence & Terrorism Research (ICPVTR) at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.

The post Female Fighters Of Islamic State: Why More From The West? – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Introduced as one of the most progressive developments in the school education along with the enactment of the Right to Education Act, the Continuous and Comprehensive Evaluation (CCE) System is to reduce students’ stress of exams and to have a uniform and comprehensive system of education for children all across the country. The main objective of the new evaluation system was to shift the focus from ‘just academics’ to holistic development of students and to reduce the burden of exams on students. In accordance with the system, students appear for six exams during one academic year, including four formative and two summative assessments. Summative tests are the regular three-hour long exams conducted by the school and board. Twenty per cent of marks will be based on internal assessment, which will be the average of formative assessment done at four different levels, and 80 per cent on board exams. In addition to that, students are expected to show their mettle in various projects, assignments, activities and events spread over the academic session.

CCE is a holistic assessment system aiming to develop skills of students in all areas in order to make children stress-free. The system is designed to assess students from various perspectives, intending eventually to eliminate rote-learning and cramming. This concept of CCE imported from the West is certainly laudable. But CCE is not new to India. This has been in vogue from time immemorial – say Ramayana, Mahabharata periods – which included all aspects of personality development of a student. This was recommended by Kothari Commission and also National Policy on Education and National Curriculum Frame Work.

But the system is facing enough flak from all those impacted by its implementation. While it began with the objective to reduce the workload and the phobia of exams, it seems, in reality, the same has been spread across almost every week of the school year. Along with these, its implementation encompasses — awarding grades instead of marks through a series of curricular and extra-curricular evaluations, along with academics, and measuring every possible ability (scholastic and non-scholastic) of students from innovation, dexterity, teamwork, public speaking, behaviour to steadiness.

In its present state, our education system has primarily been reduced to an assessment-driven education where we assume that students need to be goaded with the stick of evaluation to make their learning complete. How else can one explain almost 30 per cent of working days dedicated to testing them in some form or the other? Besides, Summative Assessments, Formative Assessments, there are class tests, then there are revision tests for these tests, there are some more oral tests, their speaking is tested, their reading is tested, their social skills are tested. And the list is actually endless. Practically, how many teaching and learning hours this schedule leaves one with? Moreover, with tests galore in a student’s life, the seriousness that a test earlier warranted has gone completely. Perhaps, rightly so because, is it justified to expect a student to be performing at his/her best all the time?

Some students feel the stress has increased manifolds while it also encourages ‘copy paste’ and ‘laid-back attitude’ in many. Quantum of things has increased but the quality in each activity is highly compromised. Earlier, the board exams enjoyed a unique reverence but now the same have been reduced to just another school tests and are not taken up seriously. There are many who point out the unfairness of the system as well, as CCE puts both bright and average students in the same category. As such there is no incentive for the brilliant and no way to reward persistence and hard work.

More co-curricular activities, projects, assignments, etc., that have been introduced in order to enhance learning, in itself is a great idea. But too many of these have left the students and teachers with no time to strengthen the foundation. If a student wants to dedicate even one week to a particular topic to understand it thoroughly, he/she simply cannot do so. There would be some tests, some project reports that would keep vying for his/her attention. So learning at one’s own pace, learning to understand — is only a dream.

Furthermore, there are some very obvious pitfalls in which the CCE system finds itself caught. Firstly, the introduction of it was not supported by sufficient due diligence that should have gone behind such an ambitious transition. The intensive training that the schools, teachers and other stakeholders required was missing initially leaving everybody guessing about the changed system. The worst caught were the ones who had the direct impact of the system — students and teachers.

While students are made to jump from one evaluation to another assessment, the plight of teachers is no better. Their work has increased tremendously with more descriptive indicators on which they need to assess each and every student. After having seen the working of CCE system in action now, there is no ambiguity that some systemic changes needed to be in place in order to make use of this evaluation procedure.

The first and most important among them is to have reduced teacher-student ratio. Indian schooling also has a dubious student-teacher ratio. There is a huge shortage of about 15 lakh teachers. Average student teacher ratio in India is 42:1, much higher than RTE stipulation. The phenomenon of ‘missing teachers’ is alarming i.e. teachers who sign the school attendance and go elsewhere “on duty.” If a teacher is to observe, understand and guide the students constructively then ideally there cannot be more than 20 students to a teacher. When a teacher is expected to maintain a number of diagnostic records of every student from basic profile to highly intrusive anecdotal records, it is not viable for one teacher to get the same implemented in the right spirit with class size ranging from 40 to 60 students in a class. Too much of record keeping leaves teachers with no breathing space. The focus has shifted to putting down the grades on everything. We are missing the fun of free-form interaction with students without worrying about completing our grading procedures.” CCE system has reduced a teacher to a record keeper as a teacher is forced to spend more time recording things than teaching.” With number of heads on which the students are to be evaluated has increased exponentially, where is the scope, time and energy for an unhindered interactive educative sessions in a class? As teachers are overwhelmed with more of documentation and reporting, there are bound to be many areas that get compromised on its altar and constructive collective discussions on lesson planning among/across subject teachers is one of them. In order to work towards the aspiration of bringing in more inter-disciplinary areas and subjects starting from the school level, adequate resources in terms of teacher’s time should be allocated to the same. Additionally, to keep the education field vibrant with energy and fresh ideas, continuous learning of teachers through workshops, courses and discussions should form an indispensable part of the holistic education program.

While the idea to encourage students to bloom in whichever field they feel their calling lies, is a great initiative and should be the right way to go about guiding and mentoring students. However, the new system starts ailing and failing when the quality in everything goes for a toss as the same system clutters a mentor’s mind with pushes and pulls for ticking the unending check list.

Teachers need to be sensitized on CCE. “Without being trained in the essence and spirit of CCE, we do not know if the improved pass percentage reflects actual learning at all. When done in an objective way, CCE keeps track of the child’s learning and takes action when improvement is required. However, fudging marks or simply giving high marks to the students does not indicate learning at all and is not beneficial to the child’s learning in the long run. Teachers are used to the final examination model and focus on that. But this is an evaluation model and not examination. Evaluation is when you assess something, find out where the problem is and improve on it where classroom transaction also improves and the child is not victimized for failure. However, internal assessments are often misused. No specific parameters are used while gauging these 20 marks and teachers are partial towards many students. They give full marks without thinking much.

Children on the other hand are not very co-operative when these assessments are conducted. The teachers cannot be blamed entirely. “There are so many students to assess and they end up throwing marks due to lack of time. To a certain extent, it is unfair. Students sometimes get the marks they don’t deserve leading to an overall improvement in performance this time as gaining 20 marks is comparatively simple.

The idea of Continuous Comprehensive Evaluation is a good one and this is what it should be under ideal circumstances as this eliminates the fear factor from the class-room that examination brings. But CCE is not fully understood and appreciated by majority of teachers possibly on account of sudden introduction, without adequate preparation. Educating, training and evaluating the teachers are essential pre-requisites for the success of the system. Also, there is a tendency among students to make presentation of papers and preparation of projects based on inputs down-loaded from internet or copied from friends However, in rural India, are teachers capable of doing CCE and ensuring that the child is learning regularly even when the fear of examination is not there? CCE is yet to be properly installed but the old exam system has been done away with, children are therefore learning less. Nonetheless, given the serious implication, it is important for all agencies working on RTE to do an independent checking on their own and RTE needs re-thinking. There is no point in wasting public money.

One thing is clear – Government, Civil Society Organizations and international agencies working on basic education in India cannot afford to sit idle. With so many impediments, can CCE succeed? Another impediment as actually seen in colleges in regard to CCE is the subjective assessment by teachers rather than objective assessment. This is likely to happen in schools too. Thus favours and discrimination of students will defeat the very purpose of the scheme. Without commitment from teachers, without proper teacher training and evaluation, with no stipulation of Code of Conduct for students, and teachers behaving as trade union members and as powerful political force at the time of elections, this scheme may be a damp squib.

The post India: Right To Education Act And CCE – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By S. Binodkumar Singh*

On May 12, 2015, Ananta Bijoy Das (32), a progressive writer, blogger, editor of science fiction magazine Jukti, and an organizer of Gonojagoron Mancha (People’s Resurgence Platform), was hacked to death, using machetes, by four assailants at Subidbazar Bankolapara residential area of Sylhet city, for writing against religious fundamentalism. Within hours of the murder, a Twitter username “Ansar Bangla 8”, an apparent reference to Ansarullah Bangla Team (ABT, Volunteer of Allah Bangla Team), a militant outfit, expressed their delight and claimed responsibility for killing the blogger. The same page, Ansar Bangla 8, later Tweeted: “Al-Qaeda in Indian Sub-Continent (AQIS) is taking responsibility of killing Ananta Bijoy.” AQIS, in another message posted on justpaste.it declared: “We want to say to atheist bloggers! We don’t forget and we will not forget others who insult our beloved Prophet Muhammad and Allah. Another file closed! Stay tuned for next target.”

On the same day, Police Headquarters sent a letter to the Home Ministry suggesting a ban on ABT, citing its involvement in multiple attacks on secular bloggers and writers. If banned, ABT would be the sixth such organization to be outlawed for terrorist and anti-state activities in the country. The other five are: Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HuT), Jama’atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB), Harkat-ul-Jihad-al Islami Bangladesh (HuJI-B), Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh (JMJB) and Shahadat-e Al-Hikma (SAH).

Earlier, on March 30, 2015, another blogger and online activist Oyasiqur Rahman Babu (27) had been hacked to death in broad daylight in Dhaka city for his allegedly atheist views. On April 1, 2015, Detective Branch’s (DB) Joint Commissioner Monirul Islam at a press briefing disclosed “Zikrullah and Ariful, who were caught by locals immediately after the murder, are the active members of radical ABT.” The killers, Zikrullah (22), a student of Hathajari Madrasa in Chittagong District and Ariful Islam (22), a student of Darul Ulum Madrasa in Dhaka city, also confessed to the Police during preliminary interrogation that they had killed Rahman Babu for his writings against Islam.

On February 26, 2015, Bangladesh-born American citizen blogger Avijit Roy (42), the founder of the Mukta-mona.com blog, had been hacked to death in Dhaka city. His wife Rafida Ahmed Banna was also injured seriously in the attack. In a video posted on May 2, 2015, on the Jihadist Media Forums of Jihad Intel (presented by the Middle East Forum, which promotes American interests in the Middle East and protects Western values from Middle Eastern threats), AQIS claimed responsibility for Avijit Roy’s murder. On May 4, 2015, however, Detective Branch (DB) Joint Commissioner Monirul Islam asserted, “ABT organized the killing mission”. In fact, ABT had owned up to the attack soon after the Roy killing, declaring, “Anti-Islamic blogger US-Bengali citizen Avijit Roy is assassinated in capital Dhaka due to his crime against Islam.”

In 2013, ABT had issued a list of 84 “atheist bloggers” on the grounds that “All of them are enemy of the Islam (sic).” ABT operatives skilled in information technology were managing fake Facebook pages and using accounts to hunt down “atheists” so that its armed cadres could attack them. Of the 84 atheist bloggers named in the list, nine, have been killed so far (till May 17, 2015). In addition to the three already mentioned, the other six who have been killed include Jagatjyoti Talukder, on March 2, 2014; Mamun Hossain, on January 12, 2014; Ziauddin Zakaria Babu, on December 11, 2013; Arif Hossain Dwip, on April 9, 2013; Ahmed Rajib Haider, on February 15, 2013; and Jafar Munshi, on February 14, 2013.

ABT first hit headlines in Bangladesh with the assassination of anti-Islamist blogger Ahmed Rajib Haider, an architect and an activist of the Shahbag Movement, which began on February 5, 2013, in Dhaka city, demanding capital punishment for Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI) leader Abdul Quader Mollah for War Crimes. The movement later spread to other parts of Bangladesh and became known as the Gonojagoron Mancha in Dhaka city. Five students, enrolled at North South University, a private university in Dhaka city, were arrested on March 2, 2013, in connection with the murder of Ahmed Rajib Haider. In their confessions, they mentioned ABT’s ‘spiritual leader’ Mufti Jasimuddin Rahmani as the instigator for the ‘blogger’ murder. Later, Police arrested Mufti Rahmani, along with 30 of his followers, while they were holding a meeting at a house in Khajurtola on the outskirts of Barguna Town on August 12, 2013.

Using Ansar al Mujahideen English Forum (AAMEF), an al Qaeda affiliated website, ABT started advocating armed jihad towards the end of 2012. Militants belonging to some other pro-al Qaeda groups, such as JMB and HuJI-B, which had come under extraordinary pressure from authorities and had lost much of their top leadership, started joining ABT in the due course, inspired by Rahmani’s sermons. It is useful to recall that, after assuming power on January 6, 2009, the Sheikh Hasina Government took strong measures against Islamist outfits, primarily the JMB and HuJI-B, considerably weakening these.

ABT’s main base in Dhaka city, Markajul Ulum Islamia, became a rallying point for all Islamist militants, including JMB and HuJI-B cadres, primarily because ABT succeeded in filling up the vacuum created due to the waning prowess of these groups. ABT is now estimated to have over 5,000 militant followers committed to carrying out armed jihad in the country.

ABT is distinguished from better known Islamist extremist groups in Bangladesh by its propaganda and indoctrination capabilities. ABT projects its doctrine of jihad through 117 web pages, including Facebook and Twitter handles, and various blogs. In addition to its own activities, ABT has been circulating statements and activities of global Islamist networks like al Qaeda through its web media. ABT was, in fact, the first to translate the Bangladesh-related parts of al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahri’s statements into Bangla, and to upload them on its various social media sites. Utilizing its strong presence in cyberspace, ABT has been able to locate and radicalize elements on the vulnerable fringes of Bangladeshi youth.

The potential for ABT inspired violence is significant. On January 6, 2015, the fugitive ABT cleric Tamim al-Adnani, in an 11-minute video statement released on You Tube, called upon the Islami Chhatra Shibir (ICS), the student wing of JeI, the largest Islamist party in Bangladesh, to sever ties with Begum Khaleda Zia, the Chairperson of Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), and instead break jails to free JeI leaders indicted for War Crimes. In a daring operation on April 21, 2015, 10 ABT terrorists robbed a branch of the Bangladesh Commerce Bank Limited (BCBL) in Ashulia District. The incident left eight people dead, including the Bank Manager and one of the robbers, and another 24 injured. On May 5, 2015, one of the suspected robbers, Muhamad Jasim Uddin alias Asad (22) was arrested from Doulatpur town in Manikganj District, and claimed that the motive behind their robbery to fund ABT operations. Bangladesh Taka (BTK) 700,000 was looted in the heist.

Remarkably, on December 16, 2014, Dhaka Metropolitan Police (DMP) personnel arrested two ABT cadres along with drone making equipment, from Dhaka city’s Jatrabari area. The next day, Masudur Rahman, Deputy Commissioner of DMP disclosed, “In primary investigation, they confessed that they were making plan to capture photos of key Government infrastructures by the device in order to launch attacks on those.” Further, Sheikh Nazmul Alam, Detective Branch Deputy Commissioner of Police added, on April 3, 2015, that, together with aggressive members of JMB, ABT was planning to create a new outfit, Al-Jamah, to commit ‘silent killings’ using sleeper cells. Detectives learned about the plan to form the new outfit from two ABT cadres arrested on March 30, 2015, in connection with the murder of blogger Oyasiqur Rahman Babu.

ABT is the first terrorist outfit to use sleeper cells in Bangladesh to insulate its top leadership from field operations. Lieutenant Colonel Mohammad Abul Kalam Azad, Director (Intelligence) of the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB), disclosed on April 5, 2015, that as many as 100 ABT sleeper cells were operating across the country, including the capital city Dhaka. The cells, each comprising three to seven people, were tasked to carry out assassinations of “anti-Islamists” across the country.

The emergence of ABT demonstrates the speed with which violent extremists adapt to even to the most extraordinary pressures and changes in the security environment. Despite the country’s extraordinary success against terrorists and Islamist extremists, Bangladesh will need to continue with its efforts to suppress rapidly transforming threats, building greater counterterrorism capabilities to continue with the effective implementation of its zero-tolerance policy towards terrorism. Pakistani terrorist formations and the Inter-Services Intelligence continue to seek opportunities to restore their networks, linkages and influence in Bangladesh, even as global Islamist terrorist formations such as al Qaeda and the Islamic State seek recruits and operational capabilities on the country’s soil. At the same time, a range of international organizations, prominently including HuT, International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO), Lajnat-al-Birr-al-Islam (Benevolence International Foundation, BIF) and Al Rajhi Bank are bringing enormous resources into the country to promote Islamist radicalization. New technologies also lend themselves to a discontinuous escalation of the threat. The processes of Islamist entrenchment have been ongoing for decades in Bangladesh, before the Sheikh Hasina Government began to act with determination against the extremists. While leaderships of extant groups have come under pressure, hundreds of thousands who have undergone various degrees of radicalization remain in the country as a potential pool of recruitment for violent mobilization, and in Bangladesh’s unstable political environment, it is difficult to predict what could trigger a new cycle of escalating terrorism. The only defence is constant vigilance and unwavering action to nip every extremist manifestation in the bud.

*S. Binodkumar Singh
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management

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