Kenya’s security agencies were put on high alert after around fifty heavily armed Ethiopian soldiers crossed the border and seized control of a police station. According to the Nation, the soldiers arrived in 10 vehicles and attacked the Illeret police station, in the North Horr region, a week after surveyors completed demarcating the Kenya-Ethiopia border.

The soldiers moved 16km into Kenyan territory, inspecting the area and taking photos.

“Their intention is not clear”, local police chief Tom Odero said, adding however that they admitted to inspecting the border area and that the Kenyan government was not aware of their presence.

According to the Nation, this is the third time Ethiopian forces have crossed into Kenya this year. Defence Forces spokesman, Colonel David Obonyo, said he was not aware of the incident. “We do not have information. However, Ethiopia is one of our traditional friends and I do not think they would do anything bad”, assured Col Obonyo.

The post Ethiopian Troops Cross Border Into Kenya appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Can it be that America’s small businesses are finally waking up to the fact they’re being screwed by big businesses?

For years, small-business groups such as the National Federation of Independent Businesses have lined up behind big businesses lobbies.

They’ve contributed to the same Republican candidates and committees favored by big business.

And they’ve eagerly connected the Republican Party in Washington to its local business base. Retailers, building contractors, franchisees, wholesalers, and restaurant owners are the bedrock of local Republican politics.

But now small businesses are breaking ranks. They’re telling congressional Republicans not to make the deal at the very top of big businesses’ wish list – a cut in corporate tax rates.

“Given the option, this or nothing, nothing is better for our members,” the director of legislative affairs at Associated Building Contractors told Bloomberg News. (Associated Building Contractors gave $1.6 million to Republicans in the 2014 midterm elections and nothing to Democrats.)

Small businesses won’t benefit from such a tax deal because most are S corporations and partnerships, known as “pass-throughs” since business income flows through to them and appears on their owners’ individual tax returns.

So a corporate tax cut without a corresponding cut in individual tax rates would put small businesses at a competitive disadvantage.

And since a cut in the individual rate isn’t in the cards – even if it could overcome the resistance of Republican deficit hawks, President Obama would veto it – small businesses are saying no to a corporate tax cut.

The fight is significant, and not just because it represents a split in Republican business ranks. It marks a new willingness by small businesses to fight against growing competitive pressures from big corporations.

In case you hadn’t noticed, big corporations have extended their dominance over large swaths of the economy.

They’ve expanded their intellectual property, merged with or acquired other companies in the same industry, and gained control over networks and platforms that have become industry standards.

They’ve deployed fleets of lawyers to litigate against potential rivals that challenge their dominance, many of them small businesses.

And they’ve been using their growing economic power to get legislative deals making them even more dominant, such as the corporate tax cut they’re now seeking.

All this has squeezed small businesses – undermining their sales and profits, eroding market shares, and making it harder for them to enter new markets.

Contrary to the conventional view of an American economy bubbling with innovative small companies, the rate that new businesses have formed has slowed dramatically.

Between 1978 and 2011, as big businesses expanded and solidified control over many industries, the pace of new business formation was halved, according to a Brookings Institution study released last year.

The decline occurred regardless of the business cycle or which party occupied the White House or controlled Congress.

Contributing to the drop was the deregulation of finance – which turned the biggest Wall Street banks into powerhouses that swamped financial markets previously served by regional and community banks. Not even Dodd-Frank has slowed the pace of financial consolidation.

In consequence, many small businesses can’t get the financing they once got from state and local bankers. Over the past two decades, loans to small businesses have dropped from about half to under 30 percent of total bank loans.

That means the Fed’s rock-bottom interest rates haven’t percolated down to many small businesses.

Tensions have also grown between giant franchisors – restaurant chains, fast-food corporations, auto manufacturers, giant retailers – and their franchisees.

Franchisees have found themselves trapped in contracts that siphon off profits to parent companies, give franchisors the right to unilaterally terminate the agreements, and force franchisees into mandatory arbitration of disputes.

Complaints are mounting about parent corporations closing successful franchisees for minor contract violations in order to resell them at high prices to new owners.

Meanwhile, small businesses are feeling the same financial pinch the rest of us endure from big corporations whose growing market power is letting them jack up prices for everything from pharmaceuticals to Internet connections.

So the willingness of small business groups to take on big business on its top legislative priority could mark the start of a political realignment.

If small businesses were willing to ally themselves with consumer, labor, and community groups, they could press for stronger antitrust enforcement against giant corporations.

As well as for breaking up Wall Street’s biggest banks and strengthening community banks.

They could also get legislation banning take-it-or-leave-it contracts requiring mandatory arbitration.

Such an alliance might even become a powerful voice for campaign-finance reform, containing the political clout of giant corporations.

Don’t hold your breath. Small business groups have done the bidding of big business for so long that the current conflict may be temporary.

But the increasing power of big corporations cries out for new centers of countervailing power.

Even if the political realignment doesn’t happen soon, small businesses will eventually wake up – and could play a central role.

The post The Revolt Of Small Business Republicans – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Neerja Gurnani*

Seas beyond a state’s coastal boundaries have been classified into various maritime zones in the UN Law of Seas Convention[1]. Beyond the 12 nm territorial sea, states have claimed and enjoyed two types of maritime entitlements. First, a state may declare entitlement to an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) where it may exercise sovereign rights regarding the exploration and exploitation of natural resources. It cannot extend beyond 200 nm from the baselines.[2] Second, a state may exercise jurisdiction over the resources of the continental shelf, which however may extend beyond 200 nm, in circumstances which this post seeks to cover.[3]

Disputes arise between states when these areas overlap – the process of maritime delimitation is one utilised to demarcate separate jurisdictions of different states.[4] It is a process which involves establishing the boundaries of an area already in place, in principle, appertaining to the coastal State.[5] There has been a considerable development in this area of jurisprudence in international law,[6] primarily in two directions – a) claimant states dividing the area by agreement, or b) delimitation by an international court or tribunal. No delimitation, however, may be effected unilaterally by one of those States. It must follow negotiations in good faith.[7]

Often boundaries are delimited by drawing the equidistance line, which at each point is equidistant from the nearest points on the states’ coastal baselines; and then consider whether there are factors calling for the adjustment or shifting of the line in order to achieve an equitable result.[8] These factors may include coastal geography, length, concavity, islands, etc[9]. Delimitation is thus primarily based on equidistance, but may diverge from the same, leading to maritime spaces beyond 200 nm, which seems to be the direction that international law is tending towards.

Naturally, legal and environmental aspects and consequences of these extensions must be considered, as they not only enhance the coastal state’s obligations and responsibilities in terms of know-how, exploration and exploitation of its resources, but also influence third party rights. More maritime areas equates to more maritime power, and this cannot be used as an instrument. Coastal States are also bound to have measures to safeguard these areas, for which it requires resources and internal legislations.

When is a State granted space beyond 200 nm? (Not counting, of course, the times when states have delimited their entitlements by agreement beyond 200 nm without prior approval of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf)[10] The natural prolongation of its land mass is observed, but very sparingly. For instance, in Nicaragua v. Colombia[11], the ICJ declined to delimit any maritime spaces beyond 200 nm from Nicaragua’s coast, despite it claiming a “Nicaraguan Rise,” a shallow area allegedly overlapping with Colombia’s maritime areas. One reason cited was the absence of CLCS submissions, and a failure to establish overlapping of the continental margin with Colombia’s EEZ. It is up to the coastal State to prove to the CLCS the outer limits of its extended continental shelf beyond 200 nm. CLCS issued certain scientific and technical guidelines[12] for the same, which takes into account reference lines from the foot of the slope, sediment thickness, distance from the baselines as well as from the isobath.[13]

However, as precise as the guidelines may seem, there exist certain gray areas insofar as delimiting maritime spaces beyond 200 nm is concerned, especially if it falls within 200 nm of another state’s coastlines.[14] These gray areas are fueled in part from the decision in Bangladesh/Myanmar[15] as well as the one in Bangladesh v. India[16], especially in regards to the water column within these areas. For instance, in the above cases, the seafloor in may be under Bangladesh’s jurisdiction, the water column must either belong (1) to the opposing states as residual EEZ or (2) to the global common space known as the “high seas.”  In the first option (preferred in the above two decisions), a bifurcated national jurisdiction emerges—one state has jurisdiction over the the seafloor, while the other exercises jurisdiction over the water column. Customary international law has long recognised the concept of states sharing rights in maritime spaces.[17] In the second option, the water column becomes an area of high seas in which all states share equal rights.

The first option is wrought with practical difficulties, as the water column and seafloor may be considered “inseparable”, and indeed, the ICJ has reasoned that “the public order of the oceans” requires “a simpler and more coherent division” of maritime space and maritime resources.[18]

When entitlements do not actually overlap, states often distribute their rights by arrangements which can be used to circumvent difficulties of the bifurcated gray area.  In Peru v. Chile[19], the dispute was over a triangular maritime space over which Chile had no entitlement. As the nations had agreed to a boundary, the ICJ deemed itself not obliged to answer the question of further delimitation.

This relinquishment of rights to circumvent gray areas is, ironically, a gray area in itself. While evidence of an agreement is compelling, no international court or tribunal has analysed effects of such treaties. Jurisprudence must evolve to fill such gaps, as it undoubtedly will when cases and disputes arise regarding the same.

Notes:

[1] United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS].

[2] See Art. 57, UNCLOS, Yoshifumi Tanaka, The International Law of the Sea 5–8 (2012).

[3] See Art. 76, UNCLOS, Robin Rolf Churchill & Alan Vaughan Lowe, The Law of the Sea 145 (2d ed. 1988).

[4] Tanaka 2006, p. 7.

[5] 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf cases (Federal Republic of Germany/ Denmark/The

Netherlands), 1969 ICJ Reports, para. 18.

[6] Naomi Burke, Annex VII Arbitral Tribunal Delimits Maritime Boundary Between Bangladesh and India in the Bay of Bengal, ASIL Insights (Sept. 22, 2014), http://asil.org/insights/volume/18/issue/20/annex-vii-arbitral-tribunal-delimits-maritime-boundary-between. <last assessed 11th May 2015>

[7] 1984 Gulf of Maine case (United States/Canada), 1984 ICJ Reports,  112(1); Drawing the Borderline- The Equidistant Principle or Equitable Solutions in the Delimitation of Maritime Boundaries, GSTF International Journal of Law and Social Sciences (JLSS) Vol.2 No.1, December 2012

[8] Dundua, Nugzar, ‘Delimitation of Maritime Boundaries between Adjacent States’ (United Nations- The Nippon Foundation Fellow, 2006-2007).

[9] Bjarni Már Magnússon, Is There a Temporal Relationship Between the Delineation and the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf Beyond 200 Nautical Miles?, 28 Int’l J. Marine & Coastal L. 465 (2013)

[10] See generally Bjarni Már Magnússon, Outer Continental Shelf Boundary Agreements, 62 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 345 (2013); Recent Jurisprudence Addressing Maritime Delimitation Beyond 200 Nautical Miles from the Coast, David P. Riesenberg, ASIL, 2014

[11] Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicar. v. Colom.), 2012 I.C.J. 624 (Nov. 19),  8

[12] Read the CLCS guidelines here: http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/171/08/IMG/N9917108.pdf?OpenElement <last assessed 11th May 2015>

[13] Extension of the Continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles: an asset for France, Opinion of the Economic, Social and Environmental Council on the report submitted by Mr. Gérard Grignon, Rapporteur on behalf of the Delegation for Overseas Territories

[14] David Colson, The Delimitation of the Outer Continental Shelf Between Neighboring States, 97 Am. J. Int’l L. 91, 104–05 (2003); Alex G. Oude Elferink, Does Undisputed Title to a Maritime Zone Always Exclude Its Delimitation: The Grey Area Issue, 13 Int’l J. Marine & Coastal L. 143, 143–44 (1998).

[15] Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Bay of Bengal (Bangl./Myan.), Case No. 16, Judgment of Mar. 14, 2012, 12 ITLOS Rep. 4; The Law of Maritime Delimitation and the Russian–Norwegian Maritime Boundary Dispute, Pål Jakob Aasen

[16] Bay of Bengal Maritime Boundary Arbitration (Bangl. v. India), Award (July 7, 2014), available at http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1376 <last assessed 11th May 2015>

[17] Bangl. v. India,  507.

[18] Nicar. v. Colom.,  230; see also Continental Shelf (Tunis./Libya), 1982 I.C.J. 18, 232, 126 (Feb. 24) (dissenting opinion of Judge Oda)

[19] Maritime Dispute (Peru v. Chile), Judgment (Jan. 27, 2014)

The post Maritime Delimitation: The Story Beyond 200 Nautical Miles – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Selcuk Colakoglu

Mongolia has no geographical neighbors apart from China and Russia, and it has no exit to the high seas therefore making it a land-locked country. Compared to its vast territory, it has a population of less than 3 million. Such factors have led to Mongolia’s long isolation from the international arena in the past.

Being aware of these strategic dilemmas, Mongolia started to follow the strategy of opening up to the world since the end of the Cold War in the 1990s. First, instead of implementing a one-party socialist system, it established a multi-party democratic system and initiated a free market economy. When it comes to foreign policy, in order to overcome its excessive dependence on Russia and China, Mongolia has developed the “Third Neighbor Policy”.

In this vein, the Center for Strategic Studies (SAM) of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Mongolian National Security Council’s Institute for Strategic Studies (ISS) held a joint workshop entitled “Turkey and Mongolia: Past and Future” on May 13, 2015 in Ankara, thus providing an opportunity to comprehensively assess Mongolian foreign policy and Turkey-Mongolia relations.

The Third Neighbor Policy

Aiming to follow a more independent foreign policy with its Third Neighbor Policy, Mongolia has now come to identify some target countries as potential “neighbors” based on three basic criteria: these countries should have democratic political systems, developed economies, and they should respect the national interests of Mongolia. Japan, South Korea, India, Australia, the US, and Turkey are among the third neighbor countries chosen by Mongolia.

Moreover, Mongolia’s Third Neighbor Policy does not only refer to countries, but it also includes international organizations. In this context, international organizations such as APEC, ASEAN, NATO, and the EU have also been targeted within this policy framework. Mongolia became a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1997, a member of the ASEAN Regional Forum in 1998, and a member of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in 2012. Mongolia, which identifies itself as an East Asian country rather than a Eurasian or Central Asian one, has been expecting to become a member of APEC since submitting its application for membership to the organization in 1994. However, Mongolia remains cautious towards its possible accession to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which was established under Chinese initiative, and to the Russia-led Eurasian Union. Mongolia considers the aim of the establishment of these two organizations as more political rather than economic, and does not want to become more dependent on the political and economic terms set by Russia and China were it to become a full member of these organizations.

On the other hand, Mongolia has been included in NATO’s Partnership for Peace program. Furthermore, in the 2000s Mongolian troops took part in NATO military missions in Afghanistan, Iraq and Kosovo. While developing its relations with NATO, Mongolia is also striving to keep military cooperation alive with its big power neighbors, namely Russia and China. While increasingly engaging NATO when it comes to training and technical cooperation, Mongolia nonetheless continues to carry out joint military exercises with the Russian and Chinese armies. Turkey’s Embassy in Ulan Bator is hosting the NATO liaison office in the country for the year of 2015.

Turkish-Mongolian Relations

Mongolia declared its independence in 1921, but its diplomatic relations with Turkey were first founded in 1969 and the reciprocal opening of mutual resident embassies occurred in the 1990s. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ankara developed intensive relations with the newly independent Central Asian countries, and considering Mongolia as a part of this classification, Turkey also began to develop relations with Mongolia at this time as well. The Turkish Embassy in Ulan Bator went into full operation in 1996, after which time Mongolia opened its embassy in Ankara, in 1997. Furthermore, the intensive high-level visits between Turkey and the newly dependent countries of Central Asia also included Mongolia. A particular set of attractions in Mongolia that has encouraged Turkish leaders to visit the country are the Orkhon inscriptions, which are two memorial installations written in the Old Turkic alphabet and erected by the Göktürks in the early 8th century in the Orkhon Valley in Mongolia.

Despite the strengthening of political relations between Turkey and Mongolia over the last 25 years, economic relations between the two have developed far less than desired. Bilateral economic relations, starting with a trade volume of $1 million in 1992, reached their highest volume at $49 million in 2013. Yet in 2014, the bilateral trade volume declined to $35 million. The trade volume between the two countries is primarily made up of Turkey’s exports to Mongolia. Logistical deficiencies as well as geographical distance have perpetuated the low level of trade and economic exchange between Turkey and Mongolia. It is not possible to ship cargo to Mongolia by sea, and to dispatch goods from Turkey via railroad or highway takes an extensive amount of time while also increasing the risk of lost property due to inadequate infrastructure. In 2012, Turkish Airlines commenced direct flights between Istanbul and Ulan Bator, an act that has significantly facilitated the exchange of business personnel between the two countries.

Turkey could develop economic cooperation with Mongolia in three main areas. Firstly, Mongolia has great potential in the fields of farming and agriculture. Secondly, especially considering Mongolia’s major infrastructure projects, the construction industry represents another potential sector in which bilateral cooperation could flourish. However, in terms of logistics and costs, Mongolia’s neighboring country of China seems to be in much more of an advantageous position in the contracting sector compared with Turkish companies. The third area of cooperation could be mining. Mongolia is a country rich in minerals such as coal, iron ore, copper, and uranium as well as shale gas. Turkish mining companies could cooperate with their Mongolian counterparts by way of either single or joint ventures.

Social and cultural exchange between Turkey and Mongolia is increasing day by day. To date, the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TİKA) has spent $28 million in Mongolia for infrastructure and cultural projects. Since 1992, Turkey has also allocated a number of state scholarships for Mongolian students in order to allow them to receive their educations in Turkey. Recently, the number of Mongolian students who are receiving their educations in universities in Turkey reached 1,000. Consequently, relations between Turkey and Mongolia over the last 25 years can be characterized as a slowly but steadily growing partnership, and considering this, Turkey deserves to be a third neighbor of Mongolia.

The post Could Turkey Be A Third Neighbor Of Mongolia? – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

The TPP would deepen trade and corporate regulation for 12 Pacific Rim nations.

By David Dapice*

The US debate between President Barack Obama and Massachusetts Senator Elizabeth Warren over the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership has spiced up a dense and hard-to-understand issue relating to a mainly secret bill about trade and regulations with trading partners. The debate draws attention to public distrust of government looking after public interest rather than that of corporations.

While the Senate Democrats initially blocked consideration of “fast track” authority – the ability of the Congress to vote the unchanged agreement either up or down – there was a reversal after some compromises on currency manipulation. The bill will not be secret when voted upon, but its provisions are not now widely known, except among corporate interests that helped draft the provisions relevant to them. The public knows what it does mainly due to WikiLeaks, which has published parts of the draft agreement concerning internet policies, pharmaceuticals and the rights of companies to sue governments. A difficult fight for acceptance of fast-track authority in the House of Representatives awaits, since many in the informal Tea Party share suspicions with liberals, like Warren, about the TPP.

The TPP process was launched in 2005 by four nations. The United States joined in 2008, and the group now includes 12 nations, most of whom are major US trading partners: Canada, Mexico, Chile, Japan, Australia and Singapore as well as New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, Brunei and Vietnam are in the negotiations which have gone through 19 rounds and are complex. The TPP does not currently include China, India, South Korea, the Philippines, Thailand or Indonesia, but in principle they could be accepted later subject to negotiation.

The TPP is perhaps better seen as a way to adopt common international regulations for businesses than a trade bill that simply lowers tariffs, though it does that too. It pushes a kind of “deep” integration such as that developed in NAFTA and the EU. Some ceding of national sovereignty is inevitable, though it may be limited and acceptable if the benefits outweigh the costs. Favoritism to state enterprises or in national procurement is discouraged and intellectual protection is advanced – a key concern of many multinationals.

Progressives – Senators Warren and Bernie Sanders of Vermont are good examples – express concern that corporate lobbyists heavily influenced the provisions and the agreement could thus fail to take into account the interests of ordinary people. Provisions kept secret or available on a limited basis to many in Congress are known to many lobbyists. Warren and Sanders question if international arbitration could trump domestic regulation of banks or the environment. Public interest activists worry about extreme anti-counterfeiting provisions that could impair many current internet activities. Public health groups worry that drug prices would rise because of stricter controls on patented drug production and trade.

In short, there are many objections based on the way the bill has been drafted, its current lack of public transparency, and specific provisions that reflect corporate rather than public priorities.

The centrists and conservatives who defend the bill argue that the entire bill will eventually be public and the Congress will know what it is voting on. While true, this does not necessarily allow sufficient time to evaluate the likely impact of complex provisions. They also argue that this is an attempt to have the US and its partners create the rules for companies to operate. If the US does not do this, it’s argued, then China will. Protections of intellectual property, for example, would be much weaker and that would hurt US interests. Finally, they argue that if US companies are to be protected abroad, then similar protections should be extended to foreign companies operating in the US.

TPP supporters do not say that US tariffs are already so low that any US concessions in this area would likely not have much impact – they will not mean much for US consumers. On the other hand, many trading partners have more substantial barriers so better market access would be meaningful for US farm interests and some exporters.

Many – not just Democrats – worry about currency manipulation by trading partners. This is not adequately covered in this agreement, so far as one can tell. There is no doubt that South Korea, Taiwan, Japan and China have managed their currencies in the past to boost exports. Japan is doing what the US Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank have also tried – engaging in massive bond buying to get their economy to expand, although Japan may be explicitly targeting a weaker currency in a way the Federal Reserve did not. In 2011 there were fewer than 80 yen per dollar and there are now nearly 120! If a product from Japan costs 1 million yen, the price in dollars has fallen from $12,500 four years ago to $8,400. Such monetary policy has the effect of depreciating the currency, aimed to make exports more competitive.

China is the main target of such concern but it is not even party to the agreement. The country had an undervalued currency but through a combination of modest nominal appreciation and aggressive wage increases, the real or inflation-adjusted yuan is now valued about right, at least according to the International Monetary Fund. China’s goal is to make the yuan an international currency so it keeps a stable value despite sluggish exports. In any case, figuring out if a currency is overvalued is difficult since that is a direct result of legitimate domestic monetary policy. Putting this into a trade agreement would be difficult to enforce without causing huge uncertainty.

Sluggish real wage growth in the US is feeding skepticism about the TPP. US manufacturing employment has not gained much – it had been more than 17 million in 2000 and fallen to 11.5 million in 2010 before weakly rebounding to 12.3 million recently. With non-agricultural employment of 140 million, most jobs are created in services rather than increasingly automated factory work. The main direct impact of TPP will be on how corporations operate, not on workers. On balance, the main impact will not be from lower tariffs but from uniform and generally more powerful corporate control of intellectual property. If a standard set of rules protects intellectual property without creating undue burdens of monopoly, then that should result in a net gain in productivity from research and development. But given recent trends in inequality, it’s not surprising that such abstract and indirect gains generate scant enthusiasm.

If the US wants to play a major role in Asia, it needs another component to its “pivot” than just military power. Ultimately, if US-based rules are fair and not arbitrary, they will garner more support from others than what are currently perceived as “Middle Kingdom” rules favoring China. But such a policy needs to be implemented. It’s hard to see what is left of the much ballyhooed Asian pivot without TPP. That concern about letting China set the rules, along with warm corporate support and lobbying, will probably see the trade agreement move through the Congress. Most other countries are also likely to approve the negotiated provisions, albeit with considerable opposition from parties who would be adversely affected.

*David Dapice is the economist of the Vietnam Program at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government.

The post Headwinds As US Moves Toward Secretive Trade Agreement – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Nick Cunningham

Is US shale about to make a comeback?

Oil prices have rebounded strongly since March. The benchmark WTI prices soared by more than 36 percent in two months, and Brent has jumped by more than 25 percent. There is a newfound bullishness in the oil markets – net long positions on Brent crude have hit multi-year highs in recent weeks on a belief that US supply is on its way down.

That was backed up by recent EIA data that predicts an 86,000 barrel-per-day contraction for June. The Eagle Ford (a loss of 47,000 barrels per day) and the Bakken (a loss of 31,000 barrels per day) are expected to lead the way in a downward adjustment.

But that cut in production has itself contributed to the rise in prices. And just as producers cut back, now that prices are on the way back up, they could swing idled production back into action.

A series of companies came out in recent days with plans to resume drilling. EOG Resources says it will head back to the oil patch if prices stabilize around $65 per barrel.

The Permian is one of the very few major shale areas that the EIA thinks will continue to increase output. That is because companies like Occidental Petroleum will add rigs to the Permian basin for more drilling later this year. In fact, Oxy’s Permian production has become a “sustainable, profitable growth engine,” the company’s CEO Stephen Chazen said in an earnings call. Oxy expects to increase production across its US operations by 8 percent this year. Diamondback Energy, another Permian operator, may add two rigs this year.

Other companies – including Devon Energy, Chesapeake Energy, and Carrizo Oil & Gas – have also lifted predicted increases in output for 2015.

In the Bakken, oil production actually increased by 1 percent in the month of March, a surprise development reported by the North Dakota Industrial Commission.

Taken together, momentum appears to be building in the US shale industry.

But let’s not get ahead of ourselves.

The US oil rig count has plummeted since October 2014, falling from 1,609 down to 668 as of May 8 (including rigs drilling for gas, the count dropped from 1,931 to 894). That is a loss of 941 rigs in seven months. Just because a few companies are adding a handful of rigs does not mean that the drilling boom is back. It takes several months before a dramatic drop in the rig count shows up in the production data. The EIA says production will start declining this month – but further declines in production are likely.

Moreover, even if US producers do come swarming back to the oil fields and manage to boost output from the current 9.3 million barrels per day, that would merely bring about another decline in oil prices. Lower prices would then force further cut backs in rigs and spending. The effect would be a seesaw in both prices and the fortunes of upstream producers.

As John Kemp over at Reuters notes, that is not an enviable position to be in. Much has been made about the geopolitical and economic influence that shale drillers have snatched away from OPEC. The oil cartel has lost its ability to control prices, the thinking goes. Now, the US is the new “swing producer,” and with it comes influence and prosperity.

But if oil companies oscillate between cutting back and adding more rigs as the price of oil bobs above and below the $60 mark, they won’t exactly be raking in the profits. Worse yet, EOG and Oxy may be profitable at $60, but there are a lot more drillers in the red.

In other words, there is still a supply overhang. In order for oil markets to balance, a stronger shake out is still needed. That means that the least profitable sources of production – drillers that have loaded up on debt to drill in high-cost areas – have yet to be forced out of the market. The drilling boom is not back yet.

Source: http://oilprice.com/Energy/Energy-General/Are-US-Drillers-Actually-Making-A-Comeback.html

The post Are US Drillers Actually Making A Comeback? – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Michael Lelyveld

As China seeks to rekindle its slower-growing economy, it continues to struggle with shoddy statistical reports.

The National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) has tried for much of the past decade to improve the accuracy of its economic data. But problems persist, even as the official annual growth rate has slipped to its lowest level in 24 years.

The latest glitch emerged after the NBS reported power generation numbers for the first quarter, showing rates far below the 7-percent rise in gross domestic product (GDP), the weakest quarterly result since 2009.

The electricity data may be a sign that real GDP was far lower than the NBS has said.

Analysts often look to the electricity numbers as an indicator of actual economic growth, particularly for China, which has battled for years with local officials who seek promotions by inflating production data in their districts.

The power figures are also a component of total energy use, which the government compares with GDP to estimate energy efficiency and progress in controlling pollution.

China claimed a major efficiency gain in the first quarter as the NBS recorded a huge 5.6-percent drop in “energy intensity” from the year-earlier period. But the reported savings in energy use per unit of GDP assumes that the GDP accounting is accurate.

If the GDP figures have been overstated, the claims to greater efficiency and conservation won’t stand up.

A closer reading of the power numbers makes it hard to tell.

Figures open to interpretation

Last month, the NBS reported that first-quarter power generation fell 0.1 percent from a year before to 1.31 trillion kilowatt hours (kwh). Consumption of 1.29 kwh rose by a slight 0.8 percent, the National Energy Administration (NEA) reported separately.

The problem is that the NBS website showed a lower generation figure of 1.27 trillion kwh for the first quarter of 2014, suggesting that output in this year’s comparable quarter rose 3 percent instead of falling.

The discrepancy lends itself to several possible interpretations.

If the 2014 figure is right, the 2015 rate must be wrong, or vice versa. Alternately, a 3-percent rise in power output would be more consistent with 7 percent GDP growth. The wide spread between the reported decline in power and official GDP growth raises questions about whether GDP is inflated and by how much.

NBS reports on Monday of power generation in April presented similar contradictions.

The agency said output rose 1 percent in April from a year before, but the year-earlier figure on the NBS website yielded a growth rate of 4.7 percent. Year-to-date numbers were also conflicting.

David Fridley, staff scientist at the China Energy Group of the U.S. Department of Energy’s Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, confirmed that the NBS numbers don’t add up.

“You can’t make sense of their arithmetic based on the numbers they posted,” he said in an email to RFA.

Fridley said such inconsistencies in NBS data are common and nearly impossible to sort out.

The agency complicates the calculations by not reporting figures for January because the dates of the Lunar New Year skew year-to-year comparisons. But trying to derive the January figures by subtracting February and March from cumulative totals also yields different results.

Fridley said the NBS often makes adjustments to earlier figures without posting them retroactively, making growth rates unverifiable.

“NBS is calculating their cumulative change figures from revised numbers we don’t have, so they have to be taken at face value with the caveat that they are subject to further change,” he said.

GDP overstated?

But if the GDP growth rate is accepted as accurate, it would point to a major change in China’s energy consumption patterns, probably much larger than can be explained by declines in heavy industrial use.

From 2005 to 2013, electricity use rose by an average of 1.09 percent for each percentage point of growth in GDP, Fridley said in a comment to the website www.resourceinsights.blogspot.com.

Last year, the power-to-GDP factor fell by more than half to 0.51 percent, raising questions about whether China made a radical change in energy conservation or whether it simply overstated GDP.

“My interpretation is not that the energy data are being fudged, but that GDP is being overstated,” Fridley told RFA.

Economists have voiced doubts about China’s GDP growth claims for years, while the NBS has pursued a series of reforms and efforts to take local officials out of the loop.

Aside from sending false signals to international markets, the NBS data problems raise questions about whether China’s leaders are getting accurate enough information to make economic decisions at a critical time.

On May 7, the State Council, or cabinet, announced a change of leadership at the NBS, naming a former finance vice minister, Wang Bao’an, to replace Ma Jiantang as director.

Ma, who headed the agency since 2008, made several attempts to overhaul data collection and reporting. In his first year, the NBS investigated over 17,000 cases of statistical fraud, the official English-language China Daily said.

But the mismatch of the latest power numbers suggests that some flaws in statistical practices are deeply ingrained.

Fridley pointed to a more serious discrepancy that may raise doubts about both the official energy and economic reports.

In a recent memo, Berkeley Laboratories researchers noted that the NBS made a series of revisions to previous data as part of a statistical communique in February.

The agency adjusted GDP figures as far back as 2010 and revised energy totals for 2013, affecting calculations all along the line.

Among the changes, the NBS now says that GDP rose 10.6 percent in 2010 instead of the previous estimate of 10.4 percent, while 2011 GDP grew 9.5 percent, not 9.3 percent.

Those adjustments may be water under the bridge, although they also require recalculation of energy efficiency claims.

A more significant revision was a major increase in estimates of 2013 total energy consumption, which translated into the addition of 590 million metric tons of raw coal to previous consumption figures, the researchers said.

In February, the NBS said coal use in 2014 fell 2.9 percent, marking the first decline in 14 years.

The rate confirmed industry estimates that China burned 3.51 billion tons of coal last year. But the revisions to total energy consumption implied consumption of at least 3.9 billion tons, based on the NBS statement that coal provides 66 percent of the country’s energy.

Since China already accounts for half the world’s coal consumption, the new reading suggests a substantial increase in estimates of greenhouse gas emissions.

The increase in the 2013 energy figures in terms of coal use represents an additional 1.2 billion metric tons of carbon dioxide (CO2), Fridley said.

The NBS is expected to readjust its figures again in September and reflect the changes in new growth rate calculations. But until then, estimates of economic growth and energy consumption may be largely a guessing game.

The post Statistical Flaws May Inflate China’s GDP – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Rupak Bhattacharjee*

India-Bangladesh relations have received a tremendous boost with the ratification of the Land Boundary Agreement (LBA) by the Indian parliament. In a significant development on May 7, the Lok Sabha unanimously passed the Constitution (119th Amendment) Bill to operationalise the LBA and its 2011 protocol.

In a rare demonstration of bipartisanship, all 331 members present in the 543-strong Lok Sabha voted for the bill. The previous day, a total of 181 members of the Rajya Sabha voted in favour of the bill. In both the Houses, there was neither a vote against it nor any abstention. All the members of parliament temporarily sidelined sharp ideological differences to allow unimpeded passage of the bill.

This has sent a clear message to Dhaka that the Indian political elites want good relations with an immediate neighbour like Bangladesh. Despite its intent, India under prime minister Manmohan Singh could not deliver on key bilateral issues, including LBA, due to the opposition of some political parties. Thus the building of consensus on India-Bangladesh relations is a positive development and this will undoubtedly add a new momentum to the multi-faceted bilateral ties.

Indian political parties across the board agreed that the historic agreement would contribute to a stable and peaceful boundary with Bangladesh. During discussion on the bill in parliament, External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj stated that implementation of the LBA would lead to better management and coordination of borders and strengthen India’s ability to deal with cross-border militancy, smuggling and other illegal activities. She added that the LBA, apart from demarcating the boundary, could check illegal immigration. Prime Minister Narendra Modi described the ratification of the bill as “a historic milestone in India-Bangladesh relations”, saying it ensured a permanent settlement of the land boundary issue with Bangladesh.

The LBA was inked on May 16, 1974 by then prime minister Indira Gandhi and her Bangladesh counterpart Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. Bangladesh’s Jatiya Sangsad ratified the LBA immediately after it was signed in 1974. Since then, Dhaka has been anxiously waiting for ratification by India. New Delhi could not ratify the agreement as it involved transfer of territory which required constitutional amendment. The LBA had undergone some modifications through letters exchanged subsequently and a protocol signed on September 6, 2011.

The Indian Parliament’s unanimous approval of the bill has been hailed in Bangladesh. Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina welcomed the ratification and expressed gratitude to India on behalf of Bangladesh. She called India “a trusted friend of Bangladesh” and hoped that the warm and friendly relations between the two countries would be further strengthened. Bangladesh’s ex-premier and leader of opposition Khaleda Zia too applauded the ratification of the LBA to settle the 41-year-old border issue between the two neighbours. State Minister for Foreign Affairs Shariar Alam said Dhaka would now initiate steps for speedy implementation of the treaty.

The mood is upbeat in Bangladesh as the country’s both land and maritime disputes with India have been amicably resolved. In a landmark judgment on July 7, 2014, the Hague-based Permanent Court of Arbitration clearly delineated the course of maritime boundary between the two South Asian neighbours in the territorial sea, Exclusive Economic Zone and continental shelf within and beyond 200 nautical miles.

The peaceful resolution of boundary disputes would definitely help Hasina’s Awami League (AL) politically. She maintains that the ratification of the long-pending LBA is a “huge diplomatic success” for Bangladesh. She pointed out that it was her father Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujib who first had taken initiatives following Bangladesh’s independence to resolve boundary problems with India. However, no post-1975 regime tried to settle boundary issues with India — both land and maritime. The prime minister said after the assumption of power in 2009, the Awami League government settled all outstanding boundary issues with India.

The ratification of the LBA has sorted out three vexed issues —un-demarcated land boundary of 6.1 km, exchange of enclaves and adverse possessions. For the first time in four decades, a 6.1 km undefined border will be demarcated and fenced. Moreover, under the LBA, India is to transfer 111 enclaves measuring 17,160.63 acres to Bangladesh and receive 51 enclaves covering 7,110.02 acres. The four border states involve in the exchange of territories are Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura and West Bengal. The 111 Indian enclaves inside Bangladesh include 12 in Kurigram district, 59 in Nilphamari and 36 in Panhagarh. The Indian enclaves are home to nearly 37,000 people while Bangladeshi enclaves have about 14,000 residents. According to the agreement, the people of these enclaves are free to choose citizenship of either country.

The implementation of the LBA will provide much needed relief to more than 51,000 “stateless” people. Populist Chief Minister of Bengal Mamata Banerjee sought a development package for the enclave dwellers from the centre to facilitate ratification of the LBA. The National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government accepted the demand and announced a package of Rs.3,008 crore to Bengal for rehabilitation of Indian nationals who will come from Bangladesh. Reports indicate that their numbers may exceed 30,000.

In order to make the agreement fully operational, the four affected states will have to endorse the bill in their assemblies. But it may be a mere formality after the consensus reached in both the Houses. While moving the bill in parliament, Sushma Swaraj said the LBA was beneficial for India and Bangladesh as there would be a “notional” loss of territory without borders getting contracted.

The LBA ratification is considered as a major breakthrough in India-Bangladesh relations. The goodwill generated by the smooth passage of the bill may push the two sides to find mutually acceptable solutions to other outstanding issues like the Teesta river water sharing. With the settlement of the boundary disputes, both the countries could accelerate the pace of building border infrastructure, especially in the north east to boost trade and sub-regional connectivity. This would immensely benefit the landlocked and economically isolated northeastern states.

The LBA’s implementation has wide implications on India’s national security. It will facilitate complete sealing of the porous India-Bangladesh borders. The leaders of two nations may formulate joint strategy to combat cross-border terrorism and various transnational crimes.

The ratification has also brightened the prospects of the Indian prime minister’s visit to Bangladesh. Reports suggest that Modi is likely to visit Dhaka in June. He has already made a commitment to undertake a trip to the neighbouring country after resolving at least one of the two long-standing issues — LBA or Teesta. Following the ratification, Bangladesh is “eagerly waiting” for his first official visit. New Delhi continues to support Sheikh Hasina and appreciates her relentless efforts to address India’s vital security concerns.

*Dr. Rupak Bhattacharjee is an independent analyst based in Delhi. He can be reached at contributions@spsindia.in

The post Ratification Of LBA Will Take India-Bangladesh Ties To Higher Level – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

“The streets of every city are thronged with men who would pay all their money they could get their hands on to be transformed – even for a day – into hairy, hard-fisted brutes who walk over cops, extort free drinks from terrified bar tenders and thunder out on motorcycles after raping the banker’s daughter.” — Hunter S. Thompson, Hell’s Angels: A Strange and Terrible Saga (1966)

Blood soaked, violent encounters at the Twin Peaks Sports Bar and Grill in Waco, Texas. Territorial disputes between guerrilla sounding names – the Bandidos and the Cossacks. Gangland warfare over self-appointed and consecrated areas of interest. The lethal encounters on May 18 have again propelled bike gangs to front print. On this occasion, there was reason to worry. Nine corpses, 18 wounded and 170 arrests is no mild distraction in the field of domestic law enforcement.

The use of fists quickly turned to weapons, the police claiming to have found over a hundred of them with shell casings. A the height of the mayhem, as many as 30 gang members were blazing at each other in the parking lot.

The mythmaking of the biker culture was not something that began with Hunter S. Thompson, though he examined it with his pen and that interest which, in his own words, “borders on psychic masturbation.” Cooking it up from a range of ingredients, he saw in these violent adventurists “the hundred-carat headline”, a lawless phenomenon stretching through country and imagination.

Marlon Brando’s The Wild One similarly added a glistening gloss to the tales of the outlaws – in Thompson’s own words, giving them “ a lasting, romance-glazed image of themselves, a coherent reflection that only a very few had been able to find a mirror.” The reflections facing many former combatants coming back from what was supposedly the good war were decidedly unpleasant. It demonstrated, if nothing else, that radicalisation is not a new phenomenon, that it need not be issue from religious fundamentalism.

It was adventure in a dance with deracinated desperation. Not recognised till 1980, Post Traumatic Stress Disorder had its various manifestations. “Thus,” poses William L. Dulaney in 2005, “it seems logical that the horrors of war and the hell of combat may have melted down the pre-war personalities of these men only to recast them forever in new form, a form that didn’t fit well with the post-World War II American culture.”

Wars, in short, are the most radical of distortions for the human, an incessant infliction of trauma long past the event. Those returning back to the dreariness of domestic life baulked. In the words of Dulaney, “Many found the transition back to a peaceful civilian life a more monotonous chore than they could handle. Some combat vets were trained in riding motorcycles, especially Harleys and Indians, while serving overseas.”

In the United States, rampant dysfunction met mobile technology. The motorcycle was wedded to the adventuring, law defiant bikers. Production lines featuring Hendee and Hedstrom’s Indian Motorcycle Company and the Harley-Davidson Motor Company sprang up in the early 1900s, less than a decade after historian Frederick Jackson Turner proclaimed the sacred transformation inherent in the frontier. In time, the biker culture would become a money earner and a drug racket, true capitalist traditions of the darker variety. Counter-cultural values became more orthodox criminal ones.

Biker mystique, with its violent fraternal calling, has continued to attract its infiltrating scribblers and commentators. Eye-witness accounts read like shabby anthropology and ritual gazing. They tend to feature titles such as Charles Falco’s Vagos, Mongols, and Outlaws: My Infiltration of America’s Deadliest Biker Gangs.

The reaction of authorities has, however, varied. “The Menace,” as it has been termed in various circles, varies. Where freedom of assembly laws are strong, activities are less of an issue than in societies where they do not exist. The US frontier of violence neatly dovetailed into the urbanised violence of biker warfare.   In some cases, even police dreamed of violent escapism – the biker life as freedom.

Other countries have not been so accommodating of this law and disorder phenomenon. Australian states have, over the years, passed a range of laws targeting biker gangs with authoritarian specificity. This response has effectively channelled social fears into convenient targets, while enlarging police powers in arrest and surveillance. The result is a perversion of some proportion, the emancipatory appeal of biker gangs in the name of civil liberties. Even the rotten can save the law.

That is the logical consequence of authoritarian control and those milking the agenda of law and order populism. The Hells Angels’ pool of notoriety was well fed by such rough figures as the FBI’s J. Edgar Hoover. It was bound to happen: the compromised, power hungry head of a police entity marshalled against the legally estranged cowboys on wheels. He proved a defining catalyst, and they provided the muscular counter mythology. Freedom can be vicious.

The outlaw image also given a popular cultural padding as well, with such staged acts as the shots of Barney Peterson of the San Francisco Chronicle, who is said to have contrived the photo of a drunken biker, Eddie Davenport, astride a Harley-Davidson bedded by the detritus of smashed bottles even as he sported beers in each hand with displayed club insignia. That was the occasion of the somewhat inflated Hollister riot, starring the rowdy antics of those attending the Gypsy Tour motorcycle rally in early July 1947.

Despite the blood, the impressive array of corpses, and the carnage, the bikers remain carriers of mythology. Plain vicious criminality and syndication tend to be papered over by the glory of an escapist life. But escapism eventually catches up. In one sense, the American frontier, with its symbolic and actual acts of violence, never closed.

The post The Biker Mythos In Waco – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Dhanasree Jayaram*

Coastal security is one of the most discussed subjects among the strategic, security and policy circles in India. However, the focus has largely been on traditional threats such as terrorism, smuggling of goods and trafficking. Non-traditional security threats such as environmental change that pose an equal, if not bigger, threat to the coastal communities and infrastructure are yet to find their rightful place in the coastal security policy discourse. While the theoretical entanglement of these issues – national security versus human security – can be debated on a separate platform, the practical considerations need to be examined and incorporated into the policy apparatus of the country at all levels.

Not only is India’s long coastline of over 7,500 km endangered by rising sea levels, which usually grabs more analytic space, it is equally affected by cyclonic storms, coastal erosion, pollution and land subsidence that may not be directly caused by climate change, but could be exacerbated by it. The country – 13 coastal states/Union Territories comprising 84 coastal districts – is susceptible to close to 10 percent of the world’s tropical cyclones. Marine pollution, caused mainly by oil spills, dumping of wastes by shipping activities and industrial pollution and ship breaking, is a serious concern in the Indian context. Yet another independent study has shown that nearly 40 percent of India’s coastline is eroding at an “alarming” rate due to rampant construction activities, such as construction of new ports and deepening of existing ones, dredging and construction of jetties among others.

Coming to climate change and one of its main effects, sea level rise, a government report reveals that parts of India’s western coast, such as the regions of Khambat and Kutch in Gujarat, Mumbai in Maharashtra, parts of the Konkan coast and south Kerala as well as the deltas of the Ganga, Krishna, Godavari, Cauvery and Mahanadi on the eastern coast, are extremely vulnerable to it. Along with sea level rise, land subsidence caused by reckless groundwater extraction could also result in loss of land and saltwater intrusion.

If the sea level rises by 1m, the Godavari-Krishna mangrove delta and the Sundarbans in West Bengal are expected to lose more than a quarter and over a half of their areas respectively. Like Maldives, Lakshadweep (which is a part of the same archipelago) is equally affected by disappearance of coral reefs largely due to mining and rising sea temperatures and ocean acidification – caused by climate change – and is at risk of submergence under extreme scenarios. There are confirmed reports of disappearance of islands too in the Sundarbans region due to rising sea levels and erosion. For instance, the New Moore Island and Lohachara have completely sunk and Ghoramara has lost half of its land, with ten other islands in the region facing similar risks due to accelerated rate of sea level rise.

India has also joined the race of sea-bed mining, securing new exploratory license in 2014, allowing the country to hunt for polymetallic sulphides rich in copper, zinc, gold and silver in the Indian Ocean Basin. Such activities have the potential to destroy or alter the marine ecosystems, including corals, mainly due to release of waste water during the processing of ores that may contain sediments and heavy metals as well as underwater noise that is likely to hinder movement and breeding patterns of marine species. Studies suggest that sea-bed mining is likely to affect rare, endemic and localised species more.

Very clearly, the human and national security implications of these developments are enormous. On the one hand, they have an adverse impact on ecosystems such as mangrove forests and coral reefs that have a direct bearing on the livelihoods of the coastal communities, especially the fisherfolk. On the other, the loss of land and saltwater intrusion lead to displacement of millions of people living in coastal areas. Many of the country’s energy and defence installations that are critical for India’s national security are located along the coast. Moreover, rising sea levels could result in more powerful cyclonic storms and higher storm surges. With beach erosion, the natural defence mechanism against such calamities and saltwater intrusion is also compromised.

Adaptation on the Coastal Front

India has always favoured an adaptation-friendly international climate change treaty that allocates equal amount of finances and technologies aimed at adaptation. India is arguably one of the most vulnerable countries in the world and therefore, it needs to focus a lot more on building climate resilience. The Indian government allotted US$200 million for the National Adaptation Fund in 2014 but the primary target areas of this fund are agriculture and the Himalayas; and in any case the amount is far from what is required for a wide range of adaptation programmes in the country.

At the macro policy level, environmental and climate risk assessment and management have to be integrated with policy planning and implementation. In this exercise, it is not enough to involve only the government agencies; different sectors such as science and technology, insurance, architecture, urban and rural planning, agriculture and aquaculture and the military among others have to pool in their resources to enhance the coastal areas’ climate and disaster preparedness. This could be strengthened further by putting in place early warning and monitoring systems for both floods and storms.

As far as fighting sea level rise on the ground is concerned, India could turn to many success stories across the world. The Netherlands, one of the vulnerable low-lying countries in the world, has erected a string of dykes, drains, floodgates and walls to prevent flooding and storm surges – something that India would have to execute in a manner that it does not trigger further ecological and socio-economic problems. Flood resistant homes have become a common phenomenon in many vulnerable parts of the world such as Bangladesh and Vietnam based on the local availability of materials such as bamboo (in the case of Vietnam). India could also look for low-tech and low-cost measures to curb flood related damage.

Many are now thinking on the lines of “living with the water” instead of fighting or resisting it. For instance, the Netherlands is increasingly resorting to “aquatecture” – floating buildings and city planning. In Bangladesh and Thailand too, floating buildings are becoming more and more popular. This could be emulated – with modifications as per the local requirements – in the delta regions, in cities such as Mumbai, the backwaters in south Kerala and the Sundarbans.

As far as erosion is concerned, it could only be addressed through judicious coastal development policies such as coastal zoning. The more biophysically vulnerable regions need to be protected through implementation of stringent laws. There are already existing legislations that regulate activities along the coastal stretches of the country. For instance, the Coastal Regulation Zone was introduced by the Environment (Protection) Act (1986) that includes the mangroves among the most eco-sensitive category, restricting projects, discharge of effluents, waste dumping, land reclamation and so on in those areas. Coastal infrastructure cannot be avoided in many cases but this could be made more sustainable by at least regulating it and by implementing sand bypass and beach nourishment measures. Off-shore barriers and sea walls could be considered long-term measures, but this would mean continuous supply of rocks that would in turn entail bombardment of inland hills and mountains – which cannot be considered sustainable either.

Finally, it is not enough to have a National Action Plan on Climate Change (NAPCC) in place for adaptation and mitigation measures to work in the long run. All development and security policies, strategies and programmes need to encompass environmental and climate change concerns so that they are sustainable and smart too.

*Dhanasree Jayaram is a PhD candidate in the Department of Geopolitics and International Relations. She is also a research fellow in the Earth System Governance Project and a visiting PhD scholar at the Leiden University Institute for Area Studies. She can be reached at dhanasreej@gmail.com

The post India’s Policies Must Factor Environmental Concerns – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

In a couple of days, the so-called US Justice Department will be announcing an “agreement” reached with five large banks, including two of the largest in the US — JP Morgan Chase and Citigroup, the holding companies for Chase and Citibank — under which these banks or bank holding companies will plead guilty to felonies involving the manipulation of international currency markets.

This is not really a plea deal, or what in the lingo of criminals is called “copping a plea.” It’s a negotiation in which the nation’s top law-enforcement organization — the one that just sentenced a teenager to death in Boston in the Marathon bombing case, and that routinely sends ordinary people “up the river” for minor drug offenses or even tax fraud — is taking seriously these banks’ concerns that if they plead guilty to felonies they might be barred by SEC rules from engaging in many profitable practices. So — get this — the Justice Department is seeking assurances from the commissioners of the Securities and Exchange Commission that they will not enforce those rules against these particular felonious banks.

There will be fines, of course, though nothing that will even dent the profits of these megabanks, which also include two British-based institutions, Barclays and the Royal Bank of Scotland, as well as the Swiss-based bank UBS. But under these deals, not one bank executive will even be forced to quit his post, much less face jail time or even a fine. As the New York Times put it in an article last Thursday, “In reality, those accommodations render the plea deals, at least in part, an exercise in stagecraft.”

What this means is that the departure of bankers’ friend Eric Holder as Attorney General, and his replacement by Loretta Lynch, has not changed the policy announced by Holder several years back that there would be no prosecutions of the leaders of the so-called “too-big-to-fail” banks for the scandals and crimes that collapsed the US and the global economies in 2008, bringing on the so-called Great Recession that is still punishing the people of the US and many other countries. In fact it demonstrates that there will be no real prosecution of wrongdoing by these monolithic banks for crimes committed since the financial crisis either and going forward.

As the Times wrote by way of explanation for this refusal to prosecute the criminal banker class: “…as much as prosecutors want to punish banks for misdeeds, they are also mindful that too harsh a penalty could imperil banks that are at the heart of the global economy.”

This statement, made by the paper’s two reporters, Ben Protess and Michael Corkery, as if it were a fact, is clearly nonsense.

The big banks, far from being “at the heart of the global economy,” actually function more like tapeworms feeding on that economy. And the case in question, the manipulation of currency markets, is a good example of this. By manipulating currency markets, these banks have been doing nothing to facilitate trade and commerce. On the contrary, they have been profiteering by rigging the markets and raising the costs of doing business for all companies and for all people who need to change one currency for another. Every raw material that a company in the US buys from abroad, every product that a foreign buyer purchases from a US producer, every consumer good that a US citizen buys from a foreign supplier, costs more because of the rigged currency trading that the banks have secretly been engaging in.

How much did this massive conspiracy cost, and how much did these corrupt banks make by manipulating currencies? Here’s what Matt Levine wrote about that in Bloomberg News:

“How much money did those banks make manipulating that $5.3 trillion foreign exchange market? I don’t know! No one seems to care. The U.K. Financial Conduct Authority says ‘that it is not practicable to quantify the financial benefit’ that each bank got from its manipulations; the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission and Office of the Comptroller of the Currency don’t even acknowledge that the question might be interesting.”

So that’s how the US is handling criminality by some of the largest and most predatory corporations in the US and the world today.

Compare the US to Iceland, a country that responded to the same banking crisis of 2008 by aggressively prosecuting and jailing its top bankers. This past February, Iceland’s Supreme Court upheld the convictions and sentences of four top executives of Kaupthing Bank, one of the country’s biggest financial institutions. Those bankers are will now be serving four-to-five-year sentences for their felonies, at least if they want to ever return to Iceland. A number of other Iceland bankers, including top executives of three of the country’s top banks, were convicted earlier and sentenced to prison terms.

Here’s the thing. If the government really believes that banks like JP Morgan Chase, Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Citibank and Wells Fargo are “too big to fail” because prosecuting their chief executives — or even forcing their chief executives to quit their posts! — could lead to a new financial crisis (a claim that seems totally absurd), then those institutions are simply too big to allow to exist.

And there is a simple answer to that: break the damned things up! It’s not as if these huge banks are responsible for running the US economic engine by lending money to businesses and the public. In fact, they are not doing that at all. Mostly, they are taking free money from the Federal Reserve and gambling with it, not lending it, and are putting smaller banks that actually do lend money out of business. We’d be better of if each of these huge banks became ten smaller independent banks that would have to behave like banks, and that wouldn’t have the outsize power of banks that are bigger than entire countries.

The idea that certain companies and their executives and owners are simply beyond prosecution whatever their crimes is intolerable. It should be intolerable not just in a supposed “democracy,” but in any county.

When people whose primary driving motive in life is greed, power and endless acquisitiveness — which is what we’re talking about when we consider people like JP Morgan Chase’s chairman, president and CEO Jamie Dimon or Goldman Sachs CEO Lloyd Blankfein — are told that they are beyond prosecution, it is an open invitation to rapacious criminal activity, and that is what we have witnessed in the years both running up to the 2008 financial meltdown and in the years since.

It’s past time for the American people to wake up and demand an end to this outrage. We need to be more like Iceland: Prosecute the bankers!

The post The US Needs The Iceland Option – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Mongolian Prime Minister Chimed Saikhanbileg will welcome Modi in Ulan Bator on May 17 as the first Indian leader to address the Mongol Great Hural (parliament). The year 2015 marks the 60th anniversary of establishment of diplomatic relations between India and Mongolia and the 25th anniversary of Mongolia becoming a democracy. Modi is scheduled to begin his visit at the famous 19th century Gandantegchinlen Monastery where he will plant a sapling of the Mahabodhi tree. He will also witness a special session of Mongolian national festival, the Naadam Games (“eriin gurvan naadam”).

The question that begs attention is what brings Modi to Ulan Bator to refresh bilateral relations with a country that hosts a few hundred Indian diaspora and with which the volume of trade is not even one percent of India’s total trade. In the past the constitutional entities and parliamentary appointments have been doing the needful. This article looks at some facets of the India-Mongolia bilateral relations.

India-Mongolia Relations

The first direct political contact between India and Mongolia took place in March 1947 just before India’s independence, when a three-member Mongolian delegation came to New Delhi at the behest of Pt. Jawaharlal Nehru to attend the First Asian Relations Conference. India was the first country outside the Soviet bloc to establish diplomatic ties with independent Mongolia on December 24, 1955. Notwithstanding the civilisational links spanning over 2,700 years, the two events indicate the depth of India-Mongolia relations in modern times.

Post 1955 India and Mongolia have had an active diplomatic engagement, 30 agreements have been signed between the two nations. India is now not just looking to revitalize its old historical and cultural links but take them to a higher level. Buddhism and democratic values are seen as the drivers. Mongolia has looked upon India as a “spiritual neighbour”.

Trade has been constrained due to lack of infrastructure in Mongolia. Bilateral trade has dropped in volume in the last two years. The two countries are looking at options to increase trade, investment and economic exchanges, building upon the Bilateral Investment Protection and Double Taxation Avoidance Agreements that are already in place. India and Mongolia in September 2009 signed a civil nuclear agreement for supply of uranium, making Mongolia then the sixth country with which India signed such a pact.

As a landlocked nation, Mongolia shares its boundaries with two feuding and at times competing countries; China and Russia. To seek an independent role in international affairs beyond its two neighbours, Mongol strategic thinkers articulated the “third neighbour” policy to develop new partnerships. Mongolian foreign policy of the past few decades has also been aimed at securing its democracy and effecting market reforms through multilateral efforts.

Third Neighbour Policy

The third neighbour policy has featured importantly the United States, India, Japan and South Korea. This policy has had two significant outcomes: vibrant multilateral approach to foreign affairs and active defence diplomacy; in both of which India has participated and partnered Mongolia on common issues for mutual benefit.

In November 2012, Mongolia became Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)’s 57th participating state. The Forum for Security Cooperation is the main body of the OSCE which considers security aspects of politico-military dimension. Mongolia chaired the Forum during the first trimester of 2015. Last year, the country inked an agreement with North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) aiming to promote common understanding on regional and global security issues. These are some of the examples of Mongolia’s international profile in multilateral forums. In 1972 Mongolia co-sponsored with India and Bhutan a UN resolution for the recognition of Bangladesh while, while India sponsored Mongolia’s entry as an observer into NAM.

Defence Diplomacy

Mongolia has hosted or taken part in several multi-national military exercises with the aim to develop the Mongolian army’s peacekeeping abilities, as well to leverage military-to-military ties as a tool of diplomacy. India annually participates with the Mongolian armed forces in joint exercises called ‘Nomadic Elephant’, besides the annual peacekeeping exercise, Khaan Quest.

The Khaan Quest exercise is the pivot of Mongolian defence diplomacy, The exercise involves different types of forums such as staff planning and field training exercises, engineering projects like renovating schools and medical facilities, and providing medical aid to local communities. Roughly 1,200 troops from 24 countries took part in Khaan Quest in June 2014. Mongolia’s contribution to US-led coalition operations in Iraq and Afghanistan (International Security Assistance Force- ISAF) and several UN peacekeeping missions have made it the largest troop contributor from the northeast and Central Asia.

Mongolian leaders have used these exercises to modernize the armed forces, raise its international profile and importance globally. This has also aided Mongolia in projecting itself as a neutral forum for dialogue and cooperation because it is the only state with no territorial disputes with neighbours and maintains amicable relations with all East Asian states. Leveraging this neutrality, Mongolia hosts rounds of the North Korea-Japan dialogue and the newly announced Ulaanbaatar Dialogue, on Northeast Asian Security.

Internal Issues

President Elbegdorj won a second term as president in June 26, 2013. His narrow margin of re-election raised expectations that he would follow a policy of anti-corruption initiatives targeted mainly at opposition party officials, rebalance the Chinese monopoly in foreign investment and trade through a diversification of foreign trade partners and shore-up the domestic technical capacity. Mongolian politics were shaken on November 5, 2014 when the parliament voted to dismiss prime minister Norov Altankhuyag for not addressing the country’s drastically slowing economic growth, plunging foreign investment, and alleged corruption and cronyism.

Mongolia has seen a precipitous fall in foreign direct investment (FDI) from $4.4 billion in 2012, to $1.8 billion in 2013, to just $0.8 billion in 2014. This trend, coupled with the 40 percent fall in the Mongolian tugrik versus the US dollar over the last two years has greatly weakened the once booming Mongolian economy and increased its foreign debt. The World Bank forecasts Mongolia’s annual GDP growth to slow to 6 percent in 2015, down from 6.3 percent in 2014, and 11.7 percent in 2012. Furthermore, Mongolia needs to develop an action plan to refinance or repay its external public debt of $1.08 billion by 2017–2018.

Areas of Cooperation

One of the key priorities of the Mongolian government has been to diversify the economy away from its dependence on the mining sector and increase foreign investment. The government has recognised the lack of infrastructure and the fact that dependence on the mining sector needs to be reduced through a process of industrialization.

Mongolian democratic leaders also realise that without tighter economic policies and more FDI, the economy will remain vulnerable, and the country dependent on China and Russia. They have reached out to “third neighbours,” such as Japan, Germany, for investment.

The Indian government has responded with initiatives such as the Atal Bihari Vajpayee Centre for Excellence in Information & Communication Technology, setting up a milk processing plant and the India-Mongolia Joint Information Technology Education and Outsourcing Centre. But is Modi going to explore new areas of cooperation between India and Mongolia?

Some analysts point to India’s plans to deliver wheat and possibly other grains to North Korea following a rare meeting between External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj and her Pyongyang counterpart Ri Su Yong in New Delhi recently. The Modi government’s inclination to assist North Korea, albeit for humanitarian reasons, is seen as an indication of its plans to expand India’s role in the Asia-Pacific region, including the Korean Peninsula, as a truly important Asia-Pacific player.

India’s steady and sturdy relations with Mongolia and Mongolia’s good relations with its third neighbours in East Asia, including the two Koreas, may provide just the platform India might be looking for its Asia-Pacific role.

*Monish Gulati is Associate Director (Strategic Affairs) with the Society for Policy Studies. He can be contacted at m_gulati_2001@yahoo.com. This article was published by South Asia Monitor.

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By Siraj Wahab

Iran will not be allowed to continue its interference in Arab affairs, said Saudi Arabia’s Prince Turki Al-Faisal, the former Saudi ambassador to the US and UK.

In his keynote address, which was read out by Prince Faisal bin Saud bin Abdul Mohsin, director of cultural affairs and public relations at King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies, at the 40th Anniversary celebrations of Arab News in Riyadh on Monday, Prince Turki said: “As we are dealing with Yemen, Iran’s imperial ambitions will be checked in Lebanon, Syria and Iraq.”

Prince Turki exhorted Arab and Muslim nations to become proactive and self reliant. “Our nations and peoples are experiencing a period of chaotic and harmful interventions and changes,” he said. “We, as Arab and Muslim nations, must become more self-reliant to secure our borders, pursue our interests. For God helps those who help themselves.”

On the nuclear framework agreement with Iran, Prince Turki said: “The devil is in the details, which we will await.” He said there are missing ingredients, including a universal security umbrella for regional countries who feel threatened by current and future nuclear-armed neighbors; and a military option to threaten anyone who refuses to cooperate.

He called on US President Barack Obama, who made universal disarmament his goal, to “find the way to make our area free of weapons of mass destruction.”

In the first Saudi reaction to the Pakistani Parliament’s decision to stay neutral in the war against the Houthi terrorists in Yemen, Prince Turki called it “disappointing” and said “some mealy mouthed politicians have forgotten what the Kingdom has done for Pakistan since its birth.”

Prince Turki said Saudi Arabia will continue to support the Pakistani people who have expressed their overwhelming support for the Kingdom.

“Just look at the masses of ordinary Pakistanis marching in the streets of all Pakistani cities, carrying King Salman’s portrait and shouting their unflinching support of Saudi Arabia,” he said, pointing out the clear distinction between the Pakistani politicians and the Pakistani people.

He said Pakistan faces complex problems. “On its northwestern frontier, it has the Durand Line, which has not been demarcated. On its northeastern border, it has Kashmir, which has been a festering wound since 1948. Until these issues are resolved, Pakistan will remain in a ‘yo-yo like’ swing from one to the other. Each border, by pulling on Pakistani resources, weakens the other border,” he said.

Prince Turki said Pakistan’s support for the Afghan Taleban was based on an effort to secure her border with Afghanistan. “So, by fixing the Durand Line, a heavy weight will be lifted off Pakistan’s shoulders, and her increased sense of security will give her more confidence to deal with Kashmir,” he said.

On Iraq, Prince Turki recalled his address at the 35th anniversary celebrations of Arab News in 2010. “Five years ago, and still, the agony of Iraq continues,” he said. “I then said, ‘Sinister are the designs of some of Iraq’s neighbors to take advantage of impending Iraqi internal conflict to advance their acquisition of Iraqi territories’,” he said. “We have already seen Iranian encroachment on Iraqi land at the beginning of the year. Imagine what will happen once internal strife and fighting escalates.”

He said former Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri Al-Maliki had deliberately hijacked the results of the elections. “That added to the brutal mayhem taking place in Iraq. The consequences of that was more bloodshed and potential civil war and also a regional conflict on a scale not seen since the Ottoman-Safavid wars of the 17th and 18th centuries,” he said.

Prince Turki said Daesh or the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) was a direct result of Al-Maliki’s lust for power. “Fahish, which is wrongly named ISIS, although new to the scene, is the unquestionable direct offspring of Al-Maliki’s grab for power and Iran’s continuous promotion of sectarianism wherever it lays its hands.”

He said five years ago he had suggested that America should be the “Big Bear” pushing everyone in the region to achieve the two-state solution, which has been Obama’s stated policy.

“He has articulated his position very eloquently; now we want him to be equally eloquent in implementing what he said,” said Prince Turki. “He has to walk the talk. If he does not succeed, and as President Truman so crassly calculated his electoral alternatives and decided to recognize Israel under Resolution 181 of 1947 of the General Assembly of the United Nations, then I ask President Obama to do the morally decent thing and recognize the Palestinian State that he so ardently wishes to exist, under the same resolution of the General Assembly. He can then pack up and leave us in peace and let the Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese negotiate directly with the Israelis. No more platitudes, good wishes and visions, please.”

He said Afghanistan has a special place in his heart. “What Afghanistan needs now is a shift from nation building to effectively countering terrorists,” he said, recalling his words five years ago. “The point has been made that America and the rest of the world cannot accept that any country be the launching ground of terrorist activity as Afghanistan has been from 1997 until today. The moral high ground which America acquired after Sept. 11 has been eroded because of American negligence, ignorance and arrogance.”

“I had stated then that, as long as American boots remain on Afghan soil, they remain targets of resistance for the Afghan people and ideological mercenaries.”

“The attempts being made now are a step in the right direction. President Ashraf Ghani is starting with a clean slate. The Taliban of today are no longer the exclusively Pashtun warriors who ruled Afghanistan until 2002. They are now any and every Afghan of whatever ilk who raises arms against the foreign invaders. By declaring them the enemy, we declare the people of Afghanistan the enemy. Here also, there should be no more platitudes and good wishes.”

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By Rupak Bhattacharjee*

There has been a sudden spurt in Naga militancy in recent months with the National Socialist Council of Nagalim-Khaplang or NSCN (K) launching fresh offensives against the security forces in some parts of the northeast. On May 3, seven Assam Rifles personnel and a Territorial Army jawan were killed in an ambush by the NSCN (K) rebels in Nagaland’s Mon district.

This was the third major attack on the security forces in the last two months. In another incident on April 2, three army personnel were killed when suspected NSCN (K) militants ambushed their vehicle in Tirap district of Arunachal Pradesh bordering Mon. Earlier, on March 21, the same outfit killed two security personnel in Manipur’s Tamenglong district.

The resurgence of Naga insurgency poses a direct threat to the northeast’s peace, stability and territorial integrity because the NSCN is the oldest, well-armed and most aggressive militant group of the region. It is also regarded as the mother of all northeastern separatist groups. Besides Nagaland, the two dominant factions of NSCN — Issak-Muivah (IM) and Khaplang are active in Manipur’s Ukhrul, Chandel, Senapati and Tamenglong and, Arunachal’s Tirap, Changlang and Longding districts —all share border with Myanmar. Some outfits, including NSCN (K) and United Liberation Front of Asom-Independent or ULFA (I) have been using Mon and Arunachal’s Changlang districts to sneak into the Indian territory from their camps in Myanmar. The inhospitable terrain of Arunachal and its 520 km unfenced border with Myanmar put the militants in an advantageous position.

In order to curb cross-border movement of insurgents, the Centre extended the Armed Forces Special Powers Act to 12 districts of Arunachal, including highly sensitive Tirap, Changlang and Longding on March 27 for one year. Both the factions of NSCN had been engaged in extortion, abduction and other illegal activities in territories outside Nagaland as the terms of ceasefire are not applicable there.

The NSCN (K) abrogated the ceasefire agreement with the Centre on March 27. The outfit’s chairman S.S. Khaplang, a Hemi Naga from Myanmar, noted that 14 years of agreement has become “a mockery and futile exercise”. The Centre also decided not to engage with the NSCN (K) any longer in the peace process. It may be added that though the ceasefire agreement was signed in 2001, the two sides have not started political dialogue so far. Since the NSCN (K) called off truce with the Centre, its armed cadres have been targeting the security forces frequently.

The NSCN (K)’s growing belligerence is to seen against the backdrop of the organisational crises faced by the outfit. Khaplang recently “expelled” two senior leaders — Wangtin Naga and Arunachal-based V. Tikhak – after serious differences arose over the course of Naga peace process. Reports suggest that the duo wanted to continue with the ceasefire saying the Naga problem could only be resolved through “peace and negotiation”. They soon floated a new outfit called NSCN-Reformation(R).

The NSCN (K) previously split into NSCN-Khole-Kitovi (K-K).On April 28, the centre signed a ceasefire agreement with the newly-formed NSCN(R) for one year. The same day also witnessed an extension of ceasefire with NSCN (K-K). Both the factions reaffirmed their faith on peaceful settlement of the long-standing Naga question. This is in fact an endorsement of the prevailing mood among the Nagas who suffered heavily during the high days of insurgency and now want peace.

However, no breakthrough could be achieved on the contentious issues like sovereignty and integration of Naga-dominated areas of northeast despite continuation of the peace process for more than 15 years. NSCN (IM) general secretary T. Muivah, a Thanghkul Naga from Manipur’s Ukhrul district, reiterated that his organisation has not given up the most important issues, including “sovereign rights and integration of all Naga contiguous areas”. The NSCN (K) also reaffirmed that it would not compromise on “Naga sovereignty and Pan-Naga identity”.

The six decade-old Naga insurgency is one of the most intractable problems facing the region. Occasional raising of the sovereignty demand sounds more like political rhetoric as the NSCN leaders are aware that the Centre considers the issue non-negotiable. But they are firm on realising “Greater Nagalim” comprising Naga-inhabited areas of Manipur, Arunachal and Assam. No forward movement has been noticed on the integration aspect either since these states are not ready to concede their territory for the Naga cause. Manipur has reacted strongly whenever such demands were raised. Finding a mutually acceptable solution of the vexed Naga problem without disturbing the territorial integrity of the three states is the real challenge before the centre.

The recent regrouping of the separatists is another key concern of the union and state governments. In a significant development on April 17, four anti-talk militant outfits, namely, NSCN (K), ULFA (I), National Democratic Front of Bodoland-Sangbojit or NDFB(S) and Kamatapur Liberation Organisation formed a common platform called United National Liberation Front of Western South East Asia (UNLFWSEA). Intelligence inputs indicate that the new front also includes six Meitei outfits of Manipur. Khaplang was made the nominal head of UNLFWSEA while ULFA (I) chief Paresh Baruah would play a key role in it. The UNLFWSEA has claimed responsibility for the latest killing of security personnel with Baruah describing the incident as the “first successful combined operation of UNLFW”.

The government must be worried about the reported Chinese involvement in the realignment of separatist forces. The security forces maintain that the Chinese intelligence encouraged the militant groups to form a common platform. The Chinese Intelligence, which is active in Sagaing division of Myanmar, assured the militant leaders to provide weapons and logistics to the new grouping. China’s larger objective is to “keep things boiling” in the northeast in view of its claims over the territory of Arunachal. Under such circumstances, the possibility of launching more attacks by the UNLFWSEA in coming days cannot be ruled out.

Assam is particularly concerned over the fresh security threat posed by the UNLFWSEA in which ULFA (I) is a key component. State Chief Minister Tarun Gogoi said the coming together of several militant outfits is a major development from the security perspective and has drawn the centre’s attention in this regard.

The insurgents also floated similar fronts in the past but those were short-lived and proved ineffective. It remains to be seen how the new force operates in the face of intensive counter-insurgency operations launched in the region following the massacre of over 60 Adivashis by the NDFB(S) militants in December 2014. China’s covert efforts to destabilise the northeast should be taken seriously by the centre. New Delhi may raise the issue with the Chinese leaders at the highest level during Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Beijing this month.

*Dr. Rupak Bhattacharjee is an independent analyst based in Delhi. He can be reached at contributions@spsindia.in

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I sometimes read that drone strikes are counterproductive to western security interests because each person killed by a drone results in more new ‘terrorists’. See, for example, ‘The more civilians US drones killin the Mideast, the more radicals they create‘.

However, this analysis completely fails to understand what is driving elite military policy, carried out by the United States elite and key elite allies within NATO and elsewhere. In brief: drone strikes work precisely because they provoke violent responses which help elites to ‘justify’ their perpetual war to secure control of the world’s diminishing supplies of fossil fuels, water and strategic minerals while tightening control of domestic populations through expansion of the security and surveillance state.

Elites want more violence. They are unconcerned that innocent civilians are killed. In fact, they kill civilians deliberately. See, for example, ‘Israel “directly targeted” children in drone strikes on Gaza, saysrights group‘ and ‘41 men targeted but 1,147 people killed: US drone strikes – the facts on the ground‘.

Violence, particularly by demonised ‘others’ who often have to be seriously provoked into responding with violence, makes it easier to scare domestic populations into accepting restraints on their civil liberties, massive military expenditure at the cost of domestic social and environmental programs, military attacks against innocent ‘foreigners’ and massive profits for those few corporations and individuals who benefit from military spending.

Attacks by drones on innocent civilians, such as wedding parties in Afghanistan, serve the purpose of provoking retaliatory responses brilliantly. And by not mentioning the violence that provokes the retaliations while emphasising the retaliations themselves, elites and their agents are able to ‘justify’ western military policy for those not paying much attention or gullible enough to believe the warped perspective presented by compliant academics and the corporate media.

So do elites want to kill people just to make a profit? No. It’s not that simple. Elites want to kill people because they are insane. See ‘The Global Elite is Insane‘.

If you think this is overstated, it is only because you have spent a lifetime unconsciously adjusting to absurd and dysfunctional behaviours that you could not explain: an outcome of suffering the ‘invisible’ and ‘utterly invisible’ violence that adults inflicted on you during your childhood. See ‘Why Violence?‘ and ‘Fearless Psychology and Fearful Psychology: Principles and Practice‘.

Until we participate in comprehensive strategies to resist elite (and other) violence exclusively with strategically applied nonviolence, we will continue to be their ‘complementary doubles’, and thus victims, in the use of violence. Activists, scholars and others who do not realise this are simply playing into elite hands.

Of course, having the emotional and intellectual capacity to resist violence with strategically applied nonviolence is a big ‘ask’ of anyone. But while our fear gets in the way of us learning how to intelligently analyse and strategically resist the psychology that drives violence, we condemn ourselves to perpetual victimhood and assist elite efforts to victimise us even further.

While we play the game by elite rules and rely on violence to confront them, we ensure our own defeat: the military-nuclear-industrial complex is under their control and the smaller weapons we have at our disposal are only useful as tools for them to use to scare us into fighting each other or to justify their violent attacks, including by their police, on us.

If you are interested in devoting your emotional and intellectual capacities to a strategy that makes violence irrelevant in the medium term, you might consider signing the online pledge of ‘The People’s Charter to Create a Nonviolent World‘ and participating in ‘The Flame Tree Project to Save Life on Earth‘. And if you want to develop nonviolent strategies to resist elite military violence, see ‘The Strategy of Nonviolent Defense: A Gandhian Approach‘.

We might fail. But I would prefer to implement a strategy that can work rather than repeat, for the umpteenth time, a strategy that history teaches us never works. And history does teach us that violence never works although elites work hard to convince us that, in this or that context, violence succeeded.

This is a delusion. Violence always sows the seeds for the next bout of violence (World War I led to World War II which led to…) and/or shifts the violence to the structural domain (where, for example, economic structures cause poverty) and/or the cultural domain (so that, for example, ‘ending’ slavery in the US gave way to institutionalised racism).

So I invite you to consider participating in a comprehensive strategy that is designed to undermine violence, in all of its manifestations, and to break the cycle that is driving us to extinction.

The Reverend Martin Luther King Jr. once said: ‘The enemy is violence.’ But I believe the true enemy is our fear: the fear of nonviolently resisting violence, in all of its manifestations. Are you afraid?

The post Why Elites Love Drones – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Renald Luzier, the Charlie Hebdo cartoonist known as Luz, plans to leave the magazine

Luz is sure to be hailed for his courageous career poking fun at religious figures. This is twice wrong: he is a coward and a pornographer, just like his co-workers.

After the Paris murders last January, Luz was praised for his bravery: he had the guts to put Muhammad on the cover of the next edition. The kudos were undeserved. In fact, his portrayal of the Prophet was benign: it showed him weeping, saying, “All Is Forgiven.” No wonder The Independent, a London newspaper, characterized the image as a “relatively cuddly and would-be consensual character.”

This would not matter much save for what was in this same issue: it featured an obscene anti-Catholic cartoon. Even though it was not done by Luz, it’s a sure bet he gave it his blessings.

Here is how The Independent described the cartoon: “A celebrated French nun, Soeur Emmanuelle, reflects on her life. She says: ‘Down here I masturbated. In heaven, I will suck c****.'”

Of course, it takes no guts to mock Catholics. That’s because a) we don’t murder those who offend us, and b) there is a big appetite for anti-Catholic bigotry.

Poking fun at religion, including Catholicism and Islam, is fair game for satire, and those who object need to get over it. But there is nothing legitimate or funny about pornography—it is sick.

Luz is no Mel Brooks. Brooks could lampoon everyone while insulting no one. More than that, he was truly original and comedic, qualities that neither Luz nor his colleagues possess.

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By Evan A. Feigenbaum*

Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to China must be seen against the backdrop of an increasingly volatile Asia. The region’s geopolitics and economics are shifting rapidly, as security tensions intensify and countries, from China to Indonesia to India itself, struggle with structural adjustment and the need for growth-conducive reforms.

For two decades, Asia has defied the gloomy predictions of those who believed its future would simply resemble Europe’s conflict-ridden past. Like Europe before 1945, Asia is beset by territorial disputes, nationalisms, and a long history of war and conflict. Yet Asian countries have managed in the post–Cold War period to grow and prosper while keeping their disputes in check.

Today, however, the Indo-Pacific is increasingly turbulent. Whether that continues depends, in large part, on the dynamics that will shape relations among four states: China, India, Japan, and the United States.

In that context, Modi has already had a dynamic effect on India’s options by injecting new energy—and new questions—into New Delhi’s relations with the other three.

China stands out because it encapsulates the central strategic dynamic that defines Asia today—the collision between economic integration and security fragmentation. Over half of Asia’s trade is now conducted within the region, powering a $21-trillion regional juggernaut. But these same countries that are trading, investing, and growing together are beset by security tensions and dysfunctional diplomatic relationships. Modi and Chinese president Xi Jinping find themselves in precisely this predicament. China is India’s number one trading partner, with further room to grow. But border tensions and New Delhi’s suspicion of Chinese activities in South Asia and the Indian Ocean crosscut and undermine that positive dynamic.

Modi should begin with economics—first, because his own instincts seem to point in that direction, but also because, unlike previous Indian prime ministers, he will be visiting a China whose growth model has sputtered, yet whose leaders recognize this fact and have embarked on significant domestic reforms.

These could permanently alter the structure of the Chinese economy, creating new opportunities for India. Just take overseas investment: China has some $4 trillion in foreign exchange reserves and billions more on the balance sheets of state and private corporations. Since much of this sits in low-yielding vehicles like US Treasuries, Beijing and numerous companies have begun to recycle those savings into higher-yielding direct investments overseas.

For China, investing in countries like India offers an opportunity to diversify risk from domestic markets. The principal question will be whether and how India successfully turns that Chinese interest to its own advantage.

Many in India, quite rightly, fret about China’s tendency to export its industrial overcapacity, and even Chinese labor, to infrastructure projects overseas. But there is no single model of Chinese investment, thus India has room to shape the terms of play.

Consider Chinese labor: it has been deployed to Africa but, by and large, not to Latin America. And infrastructure projects can be structured in various ways, including a creative mix of debt and equity, public-private partnerships, or the marrying of Chinese capital with private capital from global market participants that delivers return to Chinese investors while balancing shareholding within specific projects.

A changing Chinese market offers other opportunities: For all India’s trade tensions with the G7, Modi may find it to India’s advantage to align negotiating objectives with the US, EU, and others who aim to piggyback on reforms, now being debated in Beijing, that would introduce competition by breaking state-led oligopolies and opening new sectors.

That debate is happening because, as its economy slows, China needs new growth drivers to boost employment, to the tune of some 10-11 million new jobs annually. Bluntly put, that effort cannot succeed without greater competition—particularly in services, a high growth sector that remains dominated (but weighed down) by state-led firms. With its strengths in IT, healthcare, and management consulting, India should be a principal beneficiary of the very competition reforms that Washington, Brussels, and China’s own private sector now advocate, including via prospective bilateral investment treaties.

Of course, security realities cannot be wished away. Nor can economic interdependence alone serve as a conflict-mitigating mechanism. So it is better to straightforwardly acknowledge the realities of India-China competition while working to insulate other aspects of the relationship from its debilitating effects.

For China, India and South Asia are third-tier security priorities at best—distantly behind internal stability and challenges in the East Asian littoral. India, however, cannot but view China as a first-tier priority, not least because Beijing’s choices are central to debates about the reliability of India’s strategic deterrent and defense posture.

But that is why Modi would do well to focus on the determined pursuit of India’s interests, rather than trying to “game out” China’s responses.

Consider Pakistan: As China-India economic ties have grown, some have argued that India should triangulate by leveraging economic interdependence to “loosen” the bonds between Beijing and Islamabad. Yet this seems utterly fanciful. Strategic abandonment is not Beijing’s style (as North Korea can attest). And Xi’s recent infrastructure pledges to Islamabad have made clear that, while Beijing is increasingly attentive to political and investment risk, Pakistan is important to broader Chinese goals in continental Eurasia.

Ultimately, that is precisely why Modi is wise to pursue dogged economic and strategic diplomacy with the other two sides of the Asia quadrangle. Tokyo and Washington have their own goals with Beijing. But positive Indian relations with both will shape the context through which China views India’s emerging role in Asia.

*Evan A. Feigenbaum is Vice Chairman of the Paulson Institute at the University of Chicago and Nonresident Senior Associate in the Asia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He is a former US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for both South Asia and Central Asia and policy planner for East Asia. The views expressed are personal. He can be contacted at contributions@spsindia.in

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By Mohammed Fahad Al-Harthi

The many analytical reports after the Camp David Summit focused on the Iranian nuclear deal and its impact on relations between the Gulf Cooperation Council and America. This is because final negotiations would be completed by the end of June, but this issue was not specifically tackled in the talks despite the strategic partnership between the Gulf nations and the United States.

There was instead a focus on forging a new relationship, to solving issues that would be of mutual benefit to both sides, and which would ultimately secure peace and stability in the region.

The final communiqué issued after the summit stated that the US wanted to reaffirm and deepen the strong partnership and cooperation between the US and the GCC. The leaders underscored their mutual commitment to a US-GCC strategic partnership to build closer relations in all fields including defense and security.

The sentence “collective approach to regional issues” is important when considering the present and future of the region.

The conflict between the GCC and the US on regional issues, especially because of its lukewarm approach to the Syrian crisis, is not a secret. The US has also failed in Iraq, which resulted in Tehran expanding its influence in the region.

The US approach to the regime change in Egypt and its opposition to the June 30 revolution was another issue that has irked the GCC. All these regional issues had direct bearing on the GCC countries, so a summit where frank views could be expressed was necessary to determine the course of a new partnership.

Although the summit participants had discussed the Iranian nuclear deal, the GCC leaders had pointed out that the issue was not only about Iran possessing nuclear weapons but also its interference in the internal affairs of GCC countries and supporting militias to conduct proxy wars. The signing of a nuclear pact does not mean Iran will morph into an angel. Iran has revealed its expansionist ambitions in the region by taking part in the Yemen war.

Here the communiqué has made it clear that the US is prepared to work jointly with the GCC states to deter and confront an external threat to any GCC state’s territorial integrity. The US has proven its commitment to the GCC during the recent war.

It has also given assurances that it would inform the GCC about developments in its nuclear negotiations with Iran.

Some analysts have not been analyzing the situation correctly. The critical issue at the talks was about developing a clear and shared vision to tackle regional issues. Saudi Foreign Minister Adel Al-Jubeir said as much when he stated that the GCC countries had not presented specific demands during the summit.

The media in the US had been positive about the summit, because it was preceded by a high-level meeting that included US President Barack Obama, and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Naif and Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman who were representing Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques King Salman. This resulted in creating some sort of understanding between the two sides on many issues, which helped make the summit a success.

The leaders have decided to hold a similar summit in the Gulf region next year. This is a clear indication that the GCC countries are capable of talking with one voice. This will strengthen their position in international forums and negotiations with super powers. In the world of politics, only the powerful are respected. Naturally, when GCC countries act as one powerful political and economic group, their position during negotiations become stronger, benefiting all peoples in the region.

The Saudi-led Operation Decisive Storm was instrumental in developing a strong GCC political position. The consultative summit that was held in Riyadh days before the Camp David summit contributed to this situation.

The Camp David Summit has set the foundation for a new political phase in the region. It is an opportunity for Gulf countries to make greater gains based on their current alliance. It is important for the GCC to have stronger relations with Washington, to serve their common interests and contribute to resolving regional issues.

The post New Phase Beckons In GCC-US Relations – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Palestinian civil society thinks that calling for “Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions” (BDS) represents a creative breakthrough to shake off the burden of Israel’s occupation regime in historic Palestine. Historically, resistance to Zionist intrusion into Palestine can be traced back to the mid-1920s. So far, however, all strategies have failed both before and after the establishment of the State of Israel.

The British colonial Mandate regime subdued the Arab revolt of 1936-1939 and killed its leader Izz ad-Din al-Qassam. In his memory, the Palestinian resistance movement Hamas established in 1991 the “Al-Qassam Brigades” tasked to resist further Israeli land theft and the strangulation of Palestinians. The strategy of “armed struggle” pursued by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), was abandoned after the organisation was expelled from Lebanon in 1982 and scattered to the four winds.

Slowly but surely, the PLO adopted a more realistic approach that led – besides the proclamation of the State of Palestine – to the recognition of the State of Israel in Algiers on 15 November 1988, although Israel’s right-wing government under Yitzhak Shamir didn’t relish to be recognized by a “terror organization”.

The political collapse of the Soviet Union affected the Middle East too and gave the U. S. Empire a free rein in the region reflected dramatically in devastating military operations against Iraqi infrastructure and economic sanctions that left 500,000 children dead.

Yasser Arafat’s fatal mistake in visiting Saddam Hussein at the time and demonstrating solidarity with him, led wealthy Arab countries in the Gulf to stop funding the PLO and kick hundreds of thousands Palestinian workers and professionals out of their countries. Arafat’s PLO was verging on bankruptcy.

The Israeli government knew about Arafat’s grave situation and reached out to him. It offered him an agreement in Oslo in 1993 that allowed him rub shoulders with the President of the United States but nailed the coffin of Palestinian statehood. He and Israel started so-called negotiations that led nowhere. They called this charade a “peace process”, which reached its final impasse under the Netanyahu government.

Palestinian civil society drew consequences from this politically untenable situation and launched a movement calling for “Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions” of products produced in the Palestinian Occupied Territories (POT) by Israeli companies. BDS calls further on Western companies and institutions to divest from businesses working in the POT.

The BDS movement was launched in 2005 with sound goals. The first was “ending the occupation and colonization of all Arab lands and dismantling the Wall.” The phrase “all Arab lands” included also the territory of the State of Israel. This was interpreted by Zionist forces as delegitimizing the State of Israel. In 2010, that goal was secretly changed to the following: “Ending its occupation and colonization of all Arab lands occupied in June 1967 and dismantling the Wall.” This change took place only in the English, but not in the Arabic version.

BDS and its main protagonists are financially supported by Georges Soros. He supports so-called progressive liberal causes and is considered a philanthropist and a liberal Zionist. But American politics are heavily influenced by other Zionist tycoons such as Sheldon Adelson, who supports Benyamin Netanyahu and the Republican presidential candidates; Haim Saban, who is the largest individual donor to the Democratic Party in the U. S.; and Paul E. Singer, a director at the Republican Jewish Coalition, a large donor to different groups, which promote an extremist line on Iran. All of them are considered loyal supporters of the State of Israel.

Saban, in an interview with Andrew Ross Sorkin in the New York Times of 5 September 2004 (Schlepping to Moguldom), admitted that he is only concerned with Israel. “I’m a one-issue guy and my issue is Israel.” At the end of March 2014, Adelson held court for several Republican hopefuls such as Jeb Bush, Chris Christie, Scott Walker and John Kasich in order to test their unconditional support for Israel. In 2012, Adelson invested tons of money in Mitt Romey, President Obama’s contender, but to no avail.

The Paul E. Singer Foundation is a “core funder “ of the Philos Project that supposedly promotes “Christian engagement in the Middle East.” Under the disguise of support for Christians in the Middle East, the Philos Project supports an aggressive anti-Iranian policy and therefore falls in line with other warmongering Zionist and neoconservative groups, who push for a U. S. war against Iran. Eli Clifton summarizes on the website “lobelog” the real intentions of the Singer project as follows:

“The Philos Project might be a clever example of astroturfing, attempting to portray itself as speaking for persecuted Christians while simultaneously promoting the aggressively pro-Israel agenda of a Jewish billionaire. If that was the intent, Singer and his employees should have been more careful in covering their tracks.”1

Returning to the hijacking of the BDS movement by liberal Zionists it seems as if not Zionist tycoons like Soros or their ilk are causing most damage but rather the grassroots “liberal Zionists” who pretend speaking for the Palestinian people. Because Zionism is an exclusivist and racist ideology, there can’t be such a thing as “Liberal Zionism”. Half pregnant does not work.

The Israeli writer and political activist Yitzhak Loar has exposed the Israeli “liberal Zionists” in his book “The Myth of Liberal Zionism”2 as a myth. Liberal Zionists have been trying to square the circle by claiming that a Jewish state and democratic principles are compatible. They have been arguing that Israel’s conundrum began in June 1967, ignoring that Israel’s sins were committed in 1948. “Israel was born in sin”, as Ilan Pappé used to say.

This “liberal Zionist” attitude secretly seeped into the BDS movement, as manifested by the change of the first principle from ending the occupation of “all Arab lands” into ending the occupation of “all Arab lands occupied in June 1967.” By changing the central thrust of the BDS movement, its protagonists were able to secure support by so-called liberal Zionists and thus hijacking this movement for Zionist purposes. It seems, however, that without the support of “liberal Zionists” the Palestinian struggle for freedom can’t succeed.

Notes:
1. http://www.lobelog.com/the-jewish-billionaire-behind-a-new-christian-anti-iran-group/
2. http://between-the-lines-ludwig-watzal.blogspot.de/2010/02/myths-of-liberal-zionism.html

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Introduction

There are multiple interpretations of Indian PM recent visit to China. Fundamentally while there has been significant movement on the economic side in terms of trade, investment and opening of markets, there has been little progress on major irritants impacting relations such as the boundary, water issue or the Chinese – Pakistan economic corridor passing through POK which India claims as its territory. There remains an unmistakable shadow of lack of mutual trust and unwillingness on the part of the Chinese to address any of these irritants. In fact during the visit an attempt was made to vitiate the atmosphere by showing an Indian map exclusive of Kashmir and Arunachal Pradesh.

The vast gulf in perceptions forced the Indian PM to highlight these differences twice during the visit. Once during the Joint Statement, which specifically states early settlement of the boundary question serves the basic interests of both countries and should be pursued as a strategic objective by the two governments. This was followed up during his address at Tsinghua University, by stressing the need to clarify the LAC as means to maintaining peace and tranquility on the borders. He emphasised that the non resolution of outstanding issues leads to hesitation, doubts and even distrust in our bilateral relationship.

From the Prime Minister’s candor two quick inferences can be drawn. One: the Chinese were obviously not very forthcoming for on early resolution of the boundary dispute, harping on standard narrative of historical legacy. We had an inkling of this during Track II Dialogue with Chinese counterparts, in late January 2015. The overriding Chinese position was that political determination for boundary resolution with India had not yet been made, the outcome of the visit highlights that the period of sizing up new Indian government continues.

What is however more significant is the fact that an Indian PM standing on a podium in Beijing was telling his Chinese counterparts that the “historical narrative” has outlived its utility and lost its shine. If the two countries have to have normal relations, the boundary issue can no longer be put on back burner. From the editorials in Global Times and Xinhua it appears that message has gone home, with Global Times editorially praising Modi’s strategic insights and pragmatism; which could be a game changer like that of Richard Nixon’s 1972 visit to China.

There is yet another context to PM Modi’s assertions for early resolution of boundary disputes. He was holding a mirror to the Chinese leadership that attempts at creating an China centric Asian century will be in jeopardy if it persisted with assertive behavior and put off boundary resolutions (both continental and maritime) on specious grounds. He was in a way reassuring strategic partners in Asia of the emergence of India as a benign regional balancer whom they could look up to?

CBM’s in Context

As brought out by the PM in Beijing, the existing border disputes between the two countries is a major impediment not only to bilateral relations, but for broader peace and security in Asia. CBMs or Confidence-Building Measures between the two countries are essential for reducing tensions, preventing escalations of hostilities, maintaining peace and tranquility along the disputed border, and building mutual trust and confidence. CBMs can be broadly defined as “measures that address, prevent, or resolve uncertainties among states. They are particularly pertinent in addressing and working towards the resolution of long-term political stalemates.” The main objective of these CBMs is to provide a framework within which border security confidence can lead to the eventual settlement of the boundary issue. It calls for reduction of troops deployed along the border region and military disclosure when either of the parties is undertaking major military exercises.

India has two major outstanding border disputes one with Pakistan and the other with China. The Line of Control with Pakistan is clearly defined but despite this, there are regular instances of firing at the border and incidences of cross border infiltration leading to casualties and turbulence. On the other hand, the Line of Actual Control which is un-demarcated marks the disputed boundary between India and China; which has, witnessed reasonable peace and tranquility with no major instances of firing or skirmishes since the Sumdorong Chu valley incident of 1987.

Boundary Issue: State of Play

Since the 1962 conflict and tensions between India – China remain high despite years of attempts to resolve the boundary issue with no signs of early resolution. The border runs along an imaginary line called the Line of Actual Control (LAC), which complicated by its myriad and differing perceptions.

Since Rajiv Gandhi’s breakthrough visit to China in 1988, significant attempts have been made for the restoration of friendly relations. The India – China CBMs, unlike other CBMs, is not a knee-jerk response under some possible threat of an impending nuclear apocalypse, but instead have put in place an elaborate mechanism that represents several areas of interest for bilateral relations. The main objective is to construct a framework that focuses on the resolution of the boundary question. Additionally, it also provides a platform for dialogue regarding other areas of bilateral and mutual interest. The strategy is essentially, threefold. The first step is laying down the foundation of the political principles which are to guide the process of settlement; the second step involves ensuring a framework for the implementation of these guiding principles; and the third and the most important step is to demarcate and delimit the boundary.

The first CBM in 1993 was path-breaking in its arrival at the Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility along the LAC which was a virtual no-war pact. What followed in 1996 was the Agreement on Confidence-Building Measures in the Military Field along the LAC. The primary objective of these measures was the commitment to the maintenance of peace and tranquility along the border. The Declaration of Principles for Relations and Comprehensive Cooperation was signed in 2003 in which The Joint Working Group that was set up and functional at a purely bureaucratic level was upgraded to a meeting of Special Representatives, thereby providing much desired political impetus for resolution. These agreements led up to the adopting of the ‘Political Guidance Principles for the Settlement of Boundary Question’ signed in 2005.

Additionally, it was responsible for the establishment of border meeting points at Kibithu-Damai in the Eastern Sector and Lipu Lekh Pass in Uttaranchal in the central Sector, together with the facilitation of exchanges between commanders of the respective India and China military regions. The exchanges between training institutions, and sports and including cultural formed other CBM’s.

A comprehensive push on promoting bilateral military relations remained on track following the visit of the then Indian Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee, to China in May 2006. The visit led to the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) that called for the institutionalization of frequent exchanges between the officials of the Defence Ministries and the armed forces through an Annual Defence Dialogue, in addition to developing an annual calendar for joint exercises and training programmes. In April – May 2013, following three week long confrontation at Depsang valley in Ladakh, two sides signed Border Defence Cooperation Agreement to address tactical problems and to prevent their escalation. To further enhance mutual cooperation and promote understanding between the two armed forces, the two sides have also conducted low-level tactical military exercises whose scope is being increased to naval and air cooperation.

The several measures adopted as part of the CBMs can be broadly categorized into declarative principles, information exchange and constraining measures. The inhibiting factor with regards the effectiveness of these CBMs is that most of the current measures undertaken fall primarily under the first two categories, with less importance being given to the third category.

With regards the boundary issue, the CBMs that were adopted followed a two-track policy with the twin objectives of maintenance of security along the Line of Actual Control and the permanent resolution of the border dispute. The tackling of the boundary issue was always viewed from the perspectives of border management and not border resolution.

Despite effective border management measures some more of which have been suggested in the joint Statement following PM’s recent visit the reality is that incursions by the Chinese are on the increase. According to Union Ministry of Home Affairs’ figures, China has transgressed into Indian boundary over 1600 times during January 2010 to August 2014. Two most recent and serious violations were the Depsang incursion of 2013 and the Chumar incident of 2014; later took place during Chinese President’s maiden visit, to India. Main question is what is provoking China? What does it gain from these, is it an attempt to creep forward and occupy vantage points along the LAC useful for future operational contingencies, gaining better intelligence or for trade of during eventual settlement?

However, as far as boundary resolution is concerned, a broad framework for settlement has been defined but nothing more concrete has been achieved. The fundamental perception of threat and the security outlook which has its roots in hostility and suspicion has not changed. In spite of progress in economic and political relations, the wide security gap remains un-bridged. Development attempts undertaken by the Chinese in terms of communication technology and infrastructure upgrades in the Tibetan region is also a cause of worry for India.

Another major limitation of the framework for resolution as achieved by these agreements is the lack of clarity regarding the principles on which talks of resolution are to be defined – whether it is the demarcation of the Line of Actual Control that is the objective or the definition of the area within it or is it concerned with the exchange of maps which till date has not been done for the eastern and western sectors?

Differing Approaches

India and China have differing approaches on the boundary issue. The Chinese approach has been to ensure peace and tranquility along the borders and prevent major flare up which could draws its attention from internal political consolidation, reigning wayward economy and dealing with tensions in South China Sea and in North East Asia. Thus peace and tranquility along the India – China border allows Chinese a period of strategic consolidation without compromise. This also allows time for executing its new Silk Route policy of “one belt one road” aimed at consolidating its economic, trade and political influence in SE and South Asia and the sea lanes of Indian Ocean. In Chinese calculations next 5 to 10 years are critical for execution of these plans and undermine India’s strategic interests in the region creating a sense of isolation in Asia – Pacific and containing its Act East Policy. If the above hypothesis has validity then China is unlikely to agree to border resolution any time soon.

India until now i.e. the PM’s recent visit to China was sanguine to make haste slowly on the resolution of boundary dispute. It was content with maintenance of peace and tranquility along the borders while concentrating on building strong economic relations. The new government in Delhi is attempting to shift the discourse from this gradualist approach to the boundary question by pushing China for early resolution. Their concerns from the face of it are less geo strategic i.e. allowing China period for economic and political consolidation but are more driven by recent events of border intrusion underscoring the tenuous nature of peace and tranquility. An underlying calculation being given India’s improving relations with the US, Japan, Australia, Vietnam etc provides India with a leverage to push China on the boundary issue – a sort of classic opportunity?

Path Ahead

It has been more than 50 years since the Indo-China border war. The CBMs have been successful in providing a framework for the continuation of talks and friendly relations, especially, economic relations and preventing military conflict; but is that sufficient? For all the border management that the CBMs have achieved, they have barely accomplished anything tangible with regards the permanent resolution of boundary disputes and long term security along the LAC.
Chinese approach to CBMs and border resolution indicate a clear rhetoric for political resolution of the boundary issue. However this sentiment hasn’t been translated into political action nor is it clearly decipherable how the Chinese intend their long term relationship with India to be developed. There is a lack of clarity regarding whether the approach to be adopted should be one of co-engagement or co-competition. The resolution of this dilemma would be crucial in furthering political, strategic and economic interactions between the two countries.

From the Indian perspective, there are further challenges that present themselves. The main question that one needs to address is whether we want to push for an early resolution or allow the issue to fester. Apart from the factors discussed earlier, there is the consideration of growing asymmetry, of power which will get only accentuated over time. Feeling one gets is that China looks upon this growing asymmetry as a strong leverage to seek favourable resolution and draw India into its circle of influence. Added to it is the issue of Dalai Lama. As long as a closure on next Dalai Lama on terms favourable to China does not take place the two issues will always remain linked.

The Indians and the Chinese differ in their approaches towards each other. The question of perception also plays a huge role. Differences in value systems, worldviews and strategic objectives are also factors to be considered. The Chinese are largely concerned with the development of a China-centric and China-dominated Asia and in keeping with its revisionist tendencies, considers India as the status-quoist and militarily weaker state. The Indian narrative till now has emphasised relationship based on friendship, sentimentalism, wishful thinking and engagement. PM Modi during his recent visit has sought to change this discourse by clearly pointing to the Chinese the festering border issue as a crude coercive tactic aimed at keeping tensions alive which India will not countenance.

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