By Matt Hadro

Pope Francis will find a country still suffering from ethnic and religious suspicion when he visits Bosnia and Herzegovina this weekend, but some hope that his visit will help encourage unity.

“Catholics have an obligation to be reaching out to their fellow countrymen,” Marc D’Silva, Catholic Relief Services’ representative to the country, told CNA June 3.

Francis will visit Bosnia and Herzegovina’s capital of Sarajevo on Saturday, June 6 and say Mass at the city’s Olympic stadium. At a smaller ecumenical gathering, he will also meet with about 50 leaders of different religions, Catholic, Orthodox, Muslim and Jewish.

The visit comes 20 years after the end of the three-year Bosnian War that killed around 100,000 people and displaced a million more. Its effects exist to this day.

Although ethnic and religious violence tapered off after the peace treaty of 1995-96, deep cultural divides are enduring.

D’Silva said the divisions of the war have been “frozen into place,” with whole communities sharing the same ethnicity and religion and harboring a deep suspicion of their countrymen.

This has created a stagnant economy, with the official unemployment rate at 46 percent. Businesses are reluctant to invest in a divided country with no single economic plan. About 700,000 people live in poverty there, according to CRS.

Many politicians have profited from the polarization and there are few public figures who can transcend the ethnic and religious divides and set an example for the rest of the country. Many young people are educated their whole lives through their own ethnic and religious points-of-view, and so do not understand the historic struggles of their fellow citizens of other faiths.

A typical Croat high school graduate, for example, would have only heard how the predominantly Catholic Croats suffered in the war but would not know about how Muslims suffered.

D’Silva hoped that Pope Francis will spur everyone, especially Catholics, to overcome their differences and begin building a united country. He said that the papal visit is an opportunity to send a “powerful message” to Catholics, Muslims, Orthodox Christians and Jews that there is “an influential person” who will speak to everybody.

The Pope has already sent a video message to the people of the country emphasizing the motto of his upcoming trip: “Peace be with you.”

“With the help of God I come among you to confirm the faith of Catholics, to support ecumenical and interreligious dialogue, and especially to encourage peaceful coexistence in your country,” he said.

However, plenty of work will still remains to rebuild the country after Francis’ visit. Ultimately, D’Silva said, it’s “up to us” to take action. There “will always be enough examples” of people working to overcome their differences, he said.

CRS is already doing this work in their partnership with Caritas International. It has started joint community projects where youth from two communities come together to do service projects in each community.

The charities are also working to fight human trafficking, which is a particular problem in the country since the war in the mid-1990s undermined the legal structure needed to fight it.

Further social discord will come at a steep price, D’Silva added. If the country won’t unite, it will not join the European Union and will continue to suffer economic malaise. This could also set the stage for more conflict in the future.

The post Catholics Hopeful Pope Francis Will Build Bridges In Bosnia appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Almas Shaikh

In 1982, a CIA sponsored logic bomb planted in software, was responsible for the most monumental non-nuclear explosion and fire in Siberia, by exploding a Soviet gas pipeline.[1]

In 2010, the Stuxnet worm was discovered. It was a highly sophisticated cyber weapon which would specifically target the nuclear facilities in Iran by exploiting flaws in Microsoft Windows.

These are only a few of the instances which show that such espionage is on the rise. These crimes challenge the sovereign authorities of the state. Furthermore, the anonymity of such attacks makes it difficult to place State Responsibility.

State responsibility is a fundamental principle of international law, arising out of the nature of the international legal system and the doctrines of state sovereignty and equality of states. It provides that whenever one state commits an internationally unlawful act against another state, international responsibility is established between the two. A breach of an international obligation gives rise to a requirement for reparation.[2]

The essential characteristics of responsibility hinge upon certain basic factors: first, the existence of an international legal obligation in force as between two particular states; secondly, that there has occurred an act or omission which violates that obligation and which is imputable to the state responsible, and finally, that loss or damage has resulted from the unlawful act or omission.[3]

These characteristics have been outlined in many leading cases which claimed that “responsibility is the necessary corollary of a right. All rights of an international character involve international responsibility. Responsibility results in the duty to make reparation if the obligation in question is not met.” [4]

But, this idea of State Responsibility is fast changing, especially considering the increasing usage of internet for causing trouble across State borders. The problem is further aggravated by the speed with which these acts could be perpetrated through the internet and the anonymity that is granted to the perpetrators.

Estonia was victim to a cyber attack in 2008. It was a massive denial-of-service attack which resulted in the country going offline for three weeks. During this period, all services which depended on Internet connectivity was shut down. This meant that basic amenities such as internet banking, access to health care information etc. were denied to the people.[5]

Another example for the same could be when the Ukrainian President’s website was attacked by hackers in 2007. A radical Russian nationalist youth group, the Eurasian Youth Movement, claimed responsibility.[6] In 1999, the NATO computers were attacked and flooded with email as the hackers were protesting the NATO bombings of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade.[7]

Thus, it is conspicuous, that these attacks can be strategically used to create havoc and mess with the running of the Government. Most of these acts are carried out by non-state actors, while only some are carried out by State actors. But there is next to no literature to deal with such attacks on an international level. The science of tracing such attacks to the person responsible is primitive at best.[8] Furthermore, International Law has thus far been ill equipped to deal with the emergence of the new cyber warfare being sponsored by an increasing number of cyber powers.[9] Hence the burden of proof analysis, which is necessary is difficult to come by.

There is a growing necessity to address the problem due to the lack of resources that have been developed to deal with such an attack. In the era where internet usage has become a necessity and a way of life for most, the access to one for anyone has become extremely easy. In such a situation the State, individually and in collaboration with others must take a step towards protecting the cyberspace. State practice usually holds that some level of cyberattack is lawful under International law, particularly in the case of cyber espionage.[10]

To combat these problems, first of all, some clarifying distinction needs to be made. The attacks which have a low potential for the loss of human life must be distinguished from other attacks, and in the former case, greater flexibility must be given to the States to launch and respond to cyberattacks.[11] Another method, which is more viable politically is applying the telecommunications exception. This would assuage many of the concerns that neutral states have about policing their networks. Thirdly, the framework given in UNSCR 1373 could be put to use. This Resolution requires the State to reign in terrorist financing.[12] A more direct approach would be to raise cyber militias not unlike the ones done by Estonia, and closer home, even China.

These are but a few solutions to this problem. Cyber warfare/ Cyberattacks is a relatively new area which is increasingly being abused. Both municipal and the International law have to take immediate and separate measures to prevent any large scale destruction, as these attacks would not cross the armed attack threshold.

[1] Cyberwar: War in the Fifth Domain, ECONOMIST, July 3, 2010, at 25.
[2] Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law, (Cambridge University Press, 6th edition, 2008).
[3] Ibid.
[4] Spanish Zone of Morocco Claims, 2 RIAA, p. 615 (1923); 2 AD, p. 157.
[5] Maryann Cusimano Love, Beyond Sovereignty: Issues for a Global Agenda. Wadsworth, Cengage Learning (2011).
[6] Available at: http://news.kievukraine.info/2007/10/russian-nationalists-claim.html.
[7] Available at: http://www.cnn.com/TECH/computing/9905/10/hack.attack/.
[8] Scott J. Shackleford, State Responsibility for Cyber Attacks: Competing Standards for a Growing Problem, Conference on Cyber Conflict Proceedings 2010 C. Czosseck and K. Podins (Eds.) CCD COE Publications, 2010, Tallinn, Estonia.
[9] Scott J. Shackleford & Richard B. Andres, State Responsibility for Cyber Attacks, Georgetown Journal of International Law, 2011.
[10] Brian T. O’ Donnell & James C. Kraska, Humanitarian Law: Developing International Rules for the Digital Battlefield, 8 J. Conflict & Security L. 133, 140 (2003).
[11] Jeffrey T. G. Kelsey, Hacking into International Humanitarian Law: The Principles of Distinction and Neutrality in the Age of Cyber Warfare, 106 Mich. L. Rec. 1427 (2008).
[12] Supra n. 9.

The post Cyber Warfare And State Responsibility – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Nihar R Nayak

While the international community extended help for the rescue and relief operations immediately after the earthquake struck Nepal on 25 April, SAARC as a regional organization was conspicuous by its absence. Interestingly, Nepal, as the current Chair of the SAARC and its Secretariat which is moreover at present headed by a Nepali national, could have utilized its position to activate the regional organisation and provide it with a leading role in disaster management.

That this did not happen is all the more surprising because SAARC countries have recognised the challenge posed by recurring natural disasters in the region and the consequent imperative of a joint approach in relief, rescue and rehabilitation. For instance, the 2014 Summit at Kathmandu had reemphasized on “the relevant bodies/mechanisms for effective implementation of SAARC Agreement on Rapid Response to Natural Disasters, SAARC Convention on Cooperation on Environment and Thimpu Statement on Climate Change, including taking into account the existential threats posed by climate change to some SAARC member states.” SAARC leaders also agreed “to establish the SAARC Environment and Disaster Management Centre,” although they had failed to set up a dedicated SAARC disaster management rapid action force (SDMRAF) – a necessity that was acutely felt during the recent Nepal earthquake.

The devastating April 2015 earthquake has posed a major challenge not only to Nepal but also raised questions on the preparedness of the countries of the region to meet such challenges in the future. In spite of SAARC having a SAARC Disaster Management Centre (SDMC), which was set up in October 2006 and is functioning at the premises of the National Institute of Disaster Management in New Delhi, the Nepal earthquake brought to the fore the difficulties faced by this organization and its failure to rise to the occasion.

At present, the activities of the SDMC appear to be more that of a consulting organization whose mandate is to coordinate with National Focal Points (NFP) in the member countries in the normal course. Its charter of responsibilities include information dissemination on natural calamities in the region, organizing workshops and conferences on related issues, sharing of information with other countries, engaging in capacity building programmes such as organizing join training camps for disaster management officials and expert groups of member countries, and, research and data analysis on disasters of the region. The SDMC does not have any operations wing or field activities during crises. When the Nepal earthquake happened, despite having spent large sums of money on research and documentation, the SDMC only circulated a brief composed of information from media sources and details of Nepalese agencies involved in disaster management. It did not have any visible role in coordinating between the NFPs of member countries and others for smooth rescue and rehabilitation operations.

Even four years after the Thimpu Declaration, SAARC members have failed to set up regional disaster centres because Afghanistan has not ratified the resolution so far. Due to a weak mechanism, SAARC as an organization could not respond immediately to the earthquake in Nepal. All countries responded individually. India sent rescue and relief teams within six hours of the earthquake and was the first country to reach in Nepal with 16 National Disaster Response Force rescue teams and relief materials. Under ‘Operation Maitri’, India sent 520 tonnes of materials by 32 air force flights, 18 medical and 18 army engineering teams. Eight Indian Mi-17 and five ALH helicopters were also used in evacuation and supply of relief materials under the command of the Nepalese Army.

Other SAARC countries sent their rescue teams and relief materials on April 26. Pakistan sent four Air Force aircraft with rescue and relief assistance, including a 30-bed mobile hospital. Sri Lanka dispatched a contingent of 160 personnel including four civil medical consultants to assist in relief efforts. In addition to sending six medical teams and necessary relief materials to Nepal, Bangladesh also declared its intention to provide 100,000 tonnes of rice and other relief materials including drinking water. Bhutan’s Prime Minister personally led a 63-member medical assistance team to Nepal on April 27 and donated USD one million. The Maldives government donated USD 50,000 to aid recovery efforts on April 28; its police force donated another 1.3 million Nepalese Rupees.

Unfortunately, some media houses and Kathmandu-based elites suspected India’s intention behind its deployment of NDRF and employment of the Indian military in rescue operations. Had there been a SAARC mechanism to deal with the situation, then the needless controversy over India’s role could have been easily avoided.

The United Nations has estimated that USD 423 million would be needed for providing relief to some two million survivors for three months. As of May 25, only USD 92.4 million has been raised – 22 per cent of the required funds – by the various organizations. Although the international community has voluntarily promised to donate, the money generated might be inadequate to meet Nepal’s requirements. Therefore, Nepal has planned to hold an international donors conference on June 25 in Kathmandu to raise funds for reconstruction. Had there been a SAARC disaster relief/reconstruction fund, Nepal’s dependence on other countries would have been minimized.

SAARC’s failure to respond to the Nepal tragedy reflects the absence of a collective response mechanism to mitigate common threats to the region. Consequently, the dominant narrative in South Asia has been that SAARC is a lost cause and cannot rise to the occasion even during a natural disaster. Nepal has good relations with other SAARC members. Instead of blaming India and Pakistan for SAARC’s failure, Nepal could have set an example by providing leadership to charter an effective role for SAARC in disaster management. The relevance of a regional organization becomes evident when it stands with member countries during crises. It is therefore desirable to establish a SAARC disaster management corps for prompt action during natural disasters in the South Asian region.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India

Originally published by Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (www.idsa.in) at http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/TheNepalEarthquakeCouldSAARC_nnayak.html

The post The Nepal Earthquake: Could SAARC Have Been Effective? – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Christopher Wood*

On the sidelines of this week’s OECD meetings in Paris, South Africa’s Minister of Trade and Industry Rob Davies and US Trade Representative Mike Froman will try and overcome the protracted dispute between the two countries on chicken exports.

At a distance, the US-South Africa chicken dispute is a familiar story. South Africa claims US producers dump dark-meat chicken pieces in the South African market, and thus maintain anti-dumping duties against US imports, effectively shutting them out of the market. The US claims that its producers are not dumping, and points to the fact that US producers sell their chicken in South Africa at prices above that found in the US, as evidence that anti-dumping measures amount to poorly disguised protectionism. Half the world’s meat trade is stuck in similar disputes, with the US fighting ongoing poultry skirmishes with China, India, and a host of other counties. It looks like business as usual in the nasty world of dinner in a global marketplace.

Finding who is definitively right in the South African dispute relies on industry data that, understandably, the chicken people keep close to their breasts – and for this reason this article does not claim to know who is right in the US-SA chicken dispute. But the dispute has broader importance, and illustrates a more nuanced phenomenon than good old-fashioned protectionism.

It is an example of a blind spot in global trade regulation: structural oversupply markets. These are markets that are in a state of permanent disequilibrium, in which supply always outstrips demand.

To illustrate, assume a market that demands 125 white meat chicken pieces and 100 dark meat chicken pieces. Chicken farmers must produce the two in fixed proportion, since both are derived from a whole chicken. If the margins are high enough, farmers will aim to produce enough chicken to meet the greater demand of the white meat market. 125 chickens are therefore produced, meaning there is a 25% oversupply in the dark meat market. This oversupply drives prices down (potentially below cost), as producers strive to make some money on their dark meat pieces, and avoid being stuck in the 25% group that makes nothing.

The United States is a dramatic example of this situation. Americans consume five times more white meat pieces than dark meat pieces.

If the markets are available, these producers can export their dark meat pieces, and this is where the problem arises. These exporters set their prices at or above the price level determined in the oversupply market, which will often be lower than equilibrium prices in the import market (where demand for dark meat is the driving force in producing chicken). These producers are not acting unfairly, it is entirely sensible for them to set prices so low. But domestic producers in the import market may end up facing prices that they cannot compete with. This is not necessarily because they are less efficient. It’s simply because they are setting their prices at equilibrium rates, rather than structural oversupply prices.

This is not a case of dumping, as it is traditionally understood. But it is also not a case of fair trade. Opening up in this case does not lead to more efficient local production. Instead, it can lead to local producers going out of business, which in the long-run may drive up prices faced by consumers, as the supply of chicken shrinks. Anti-dumping measures, though, are also unfair. The exporting chicken producer is doing nothing wrong, they are simply responding to market conditions.

Structural oversupply is not limited to pieces of meat. It is particularly prominent in markets based on industrial byproducts, such as petroleum waste or certain milk based products, as well as in markets with inflexible productive structures like coffee or steel.

There is no mechanism provided in global trade rules to protect local industries from imports at oversupply prices. This is why the likes of South Africa resort to claims of dumping in the case of US chicken, because dumping comes equipped with a mechanism to defend local producers.

Whether such a mechanism should exist is up for debate. On one hand, oversupply in one domestic market is perfectly suited to trade, creating benefits for exporters (who can sell excess goods) and importers (whose consumers face lower prices). This perspective would see this cost advantage as being no different from one based on better technology or lower wages. A limited entry of imports could also prevent domestic demand from outstripping supply, and thus stop local producers from setting excessively high prices.

On the other hand, one could see this trade as being unfair, and holding the potential to disrupt otherwise balanced markets in the rest of the world. In the long-run, an aggressive entry of under-priced (potentially below cost) imports from oversupply markets could drive local firms out of business, undermining local employment and driving up food prices, a lose-lose scenario for the importing country.

Regardless of the perspective one takes, this gap in global trade regulation needs some sort of recognition. So long as the gap remains, issues of oversupply-price trade will be spoken about in the language of dumping and countervailing measures, triggering further dispute.

The US-SA trade dispute is struggling to find a resolution that is outside global trade rules, and therefore in the world of politics. That is a dangerous setting for this week’s showdown in Paris.

*Christopher Wood is a Researcher in the Economic Diplomacy programme at the South African Institute of International Affairs.

The post What Came First: The Chicken Or The Leg? – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Hackers breached the system of the US government agency responsible for gathering personnel information on federal employees and granting security clearances, potentially affecting the data of 4 million people, officials said.

It is not known who is responsible for the breach, but officials told Reuters that a foreign government or entity is to blame. The Washington Post and Wall Street Journal cited unnamed government officials who blamed Chinese hackers.

Sen. Susan Collins (R-Maine) also said Chinese hackers are believed to be behind the attack, according to the Associated Press.

The Chinese Embassy in the US has called the accusations against Chinese hackers “hypothetical” and irresponsible.

“Jumping to conclusions and making a hypothetical accusation is not responsible” and is “counterproductive,” the embassy’s spokesman, Zhu Haiquan, said in reply to a Reuters inquiry, adding that it is difficult to track hacker activity across borders. China is applying great efforts to combat cyber-attacks, Zhu said.

The security breach was revealed Thursday by the US Office of Personnel Management (OPM), which is also the affected agency. However, the attack itself occurred in April.

In a press release, OPM said it will contact roughly 4 million people whose personally identifiable information may have been compromised.

Protecting our Federal employee data from malicious cyber incidents is of the highest priority at OPM,” said OPM Director Katherine Archuleta in a statement. “We take very seriously our responsibility to secure the information stored in our systems, and in coordination with our agency partners, our experienced team is constantly identifying opportunities to further protect the data with which we are entrusted.”

An unnamed US official told the Associated Press that the hack could potentially affect every federal agency.

Striking the OPM is particularly notable, since the department is responsible for more than 90 percent of all federal background checks, the AP reported.

According to the Washington Post, the attackers may have accessed information such as peoples’ job assignments, work evaluations. and training.

“Certainly, OPM is a high value target,” said OPM Chief Information Officer Donna Seymour to the newspaper. “We have a lot of information about people, and that is something that our adversaries want.”

Following reports of officials blaming Beijing for the attack, the Chinese Embassy in Washington said the US should not be “jumping to conclusions.”

“Jumping to conclusions and making hypothetical accusation is not responsible, and counterproductive,” ebmassy spokesman Zhu Haiquansaid in an email to Reuters.

Meanwhile, the FBI announced it is looking into the situation.

“The FBI is working with our interagency partners to investigate this matter,” it said in a statement. “We take all potential threats to public and private sector systems seriously, and will continue to investigate and hold accountable those who pose a threat in cyberspace.”

Since the attack, OPM said it has implemented new security measures, such as restricting access and powers of remote administrators, and utilizing anti-malware software for further protection. A review of all connections to the network was also initiated.

The post US Government Agency Hacked appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Thai authorities should immediately drop criminal charges against 11 student activists who peacefully expressed opposition to military rule, Human Rights Watch said Friday.

On May 22, 2015, Thai authorities arrested more than 40 activists in Bangkok and other provinces who were holding peaceful rallies to mark the first anniversary of the coup by the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) junta. This was the largest crackdown on dissidents since the NCPO seized power in May 2014.

“The prosecution of students for peaceful protests shows that the military junta has no intention of easing its oppressive rule,” said Brad Adams, Asia director at Human Rights Watch. “Gagging public protests makes a mockery of the junta’s self-proclaimed commitment to return to democracy.”

Four students in Bangkok (Rangsiman Rome, Ratthapol Supasopon, Songtham Kaewpanpruk, and Chonthicha Jaengraew) and seven students in the northeastern Khon Kaen province (Jaturapak Boonpatararaksa, Apiwat Suntararak, Payu Bunsophon, Panupong Srithananuwat, Suwitcha Thipangkorn, Supachai Pukrongploy, and Wasan Sethsitthi) were charged with violating the junta’s ban on political activity and holding a public gathering of more than five people. They were ordered to report to the police on June 8 to acknowledge the charges. All of the students face trial in military court and could be imprisoned for one year and fined up to 20,000 baht (US$625).

On May 22, 2015, Human Rights Watch, together with many journalists, lawyers, and representatives of Thai human rights groups, witnessed soldiers in civilian clothes and police assaulting student activists during the dispersal of a peaceful rally at the Bangkok Art and Cultural Center. The security forces beat, kicked, and slapped the demonstrators without provocation. Some members of the security forces lifted the students up and threw them on the ground. Others grabbed the students by their hair and dragged them away. Kaewpanpruk, one of the students facing charges, was sent to the hospital for emergency treatment after he was found lying unconscious on the ground.

Despite overwhelming evidence, Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister Gen. Prawit Wongsuwan denied that the authorities acted improperly and lashed out at the journalists and rights activists who asked questions about the incident. General Prawit told journalists at a news conference on May 27 that:

There was no crackdown, only minor scuffles when officials tried to control the situation. Did they [student activists] break the laws? Then they should not complain about what happened. They should not resist officials in the first place. Officials did not assault them. There is no need to talk about this anymore. We did not violate human rights of anyone.

Human Rights Watch has repeatedly raised serious concerns about the use of violence by Thai authorities to disperse peaceful anti-coup rallies.

The NCPO replaced civilian courts with military tribunals for alleged crimes related to national security, sedition, and lese majeste (offending the monarchy). Individuals who violate the NCPO’s orders are also subject to prosecution in military courts. Hundreds of people, most of them political dissidents and critics of the NCPO, have been sent for trial in military courts since the May 2014 coup.

International human rights law prohibits governments from using military courts to try civilians when civilian courts are functioning. The use of military courts in Thailand also fails to meet international fair trial standards under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), to which Thailand is a party. The Human Rights Committee, the international expert body that monitors state compliance with the ICCPR, has stated in its General Comment on the right to a fair trial that “the trial of civilians in military or special courts may raise serious problems as far as the equitable, impartial and independent administration of justice is concerned.” This is particularly problematic in Thailand, where every element of military courts functions within the Defense Ministry’s chain of command.

Thai authorities have an obligation to uphold the right to peaceful protest. International human rights law sets out that government measures to protect public safety may be justified only so long as they are provided by law, and are proportionate to the level of threat or legitimate objective to be achieved. In policing demonstrations, all members of the security forces should abide by the United Nations Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, which provide that authorities shall, as far as possible, apply nonviolent means before resorting to the use of force.

The interim constitution provides that members of the NCPO and anyone carrying out actions on behalf of the NCPO “shall be absolutely exempted from any wrongdoing, responsibility, and liabilities.”

“The junta uses arbitrary laws against critics to maintain its hold on power, but has made itself above the law even when the army or police commit human rights abuses,” Adams said. “Officials with unchecked powers and no fear of arrest have little reason to stop using violence against peaceful protesters. With more and more cases against peaceful protesters, Thailand descends deeper into dictatorship.”

The post Call For Thailand To Drop Charges Against Student Activists appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Vikram Sood*

Cooperation between the intelligence agencies of two countries is nothing new. Even during the Cold War, the CIA and KGB maintained communications. But the recent Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the spy agencies of Afghanistan and Pakistan – for long at loggerheads – is a first.

There is something of an “in your face” attitude in it. There is a message for India as well as for the neighbourhood with an approving nod from the Americans and the Chinese.

Afghan intelligence and Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) have not had common strategic or tactical targets. Yet the two signed a memorandum of understanding to “jointly fight terrorism” and “enemy espionage agencies”. The agreement will allow ISI to probe terrorist suspects in Afghan detention. The memorandum also states that the two agencies agree to jointly fight separatism and separatist groups.

For Afghanistan the terrorists are the Taliban, Haqqani Network, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba and other Pakistan-based terror groups operating in Afghanistan. Pakistan is interested in the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). For Afghanistan it is the ISI which has been the enemy espionage agency so far, for Pakistan it is India’s Research & Analysis Wing (RAW).

Afghanistan has no separatist groups but Pakistan has several – in Balochistan, Sindh and even parts of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Pakistan seeks unilateral cooperation in this regard and every time there is trouble in Balochistan and Sindh, Pakistan will blame Afghanistan and seek cooperation under the other clauses. In return, the ISI will train and equip National Directorate of Security (NDS) personnel, and the two agencies will mould public opinion and narrative about Pakistan in Afghanistan.

The public announcement of the scheme left Fazl Muslimyar, chairman of the Afghan Masharano Jirga (Upper House), apoplectic. He made no attempt to hide his anger, saying, “Pakistan is an enemy to Afghanistan and will never develop friendship with us. Pakistan has always plotted to destroy Afghanistan and will continue to do so, therefore how can we afford to send our security forces for training to that country?”

Similarly, the Wolesi Jirga (Lower House) described the MoU as against Afghan interests. NDS chief Rahmatullah Nabil opted out of signing it. Moreover, the deputy leader of the government, Dr Abdullah Abdullah, came to know of the deal only when former president Hamid Karzai informed him of it the following morning. The ferocity of the response has probably surprised President Mohammad Ashraf Ghani and led to backtracking in Kabul.

But the anger was understandable. Afghanistan has been terrorised by the Taliban for 21 years, so a blithe deal with the people who had harboured and sent these terrorists across the border repeatedly was bound to raise hackles.

The reason the deal is so difficult to understand is that the two countries have essentially agreed to cooperate on the same issue that has always pitted them in opposition.

The Afghans have considered Pakistan their enemy and often have made no attempts to hide it. One million Afghans are estimated to have died since the Afghan jihad started which was led by the US with the active participation of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Not all Pushtuns were/are with the Taliban – and it is they who faced US daisy-cutters designed to bring them democracy. Pakistan sheltered and revived the Taliban after 2001. They have no hesitation in acknowledging this association some of the time while pretending at other times that they have no control over the Taliban.

It was always more than Khadamat-e Aetela’at-e Dawlati (KHAD) versus ISI in the past and ISI versus NDS now. The ISI and CIA cooperated in the hunt for Osama bin Laden, but were also watching each other. TV series Homeland describes vividly this mutual distrust as the CIA hunted for terrorists. The US and Pakistan did not have common strategic aims. Therefore, the Pakistanis would drive a hard bargain whenever they could. Ultimately, as we know, bin Laden was found to have lived in ISI custody for years. The Afghan leadership must ask itself why the ISI would behave any differently with it. Perhaps Ghani was acting under duress and not out of conviction, because the US has not given up its habit of trying to appoint its consuls in positions of authority.

Former Pakistan Ambassador Munir Akram spoke of what might be his country’s endeavours. In a recent article in Pakistan’s Dawn newspaper, Akram outlined his hopes that Pakistan would be able to get international recognition through the UN Security Council for Mullah Omar as the legitimate representative of the Taliban in the negotiations. Further, he proposed that the Afghan government would acknowledge the legitimacy of the Taliban and agree to power-sharing with them. In return, Pakistan would use its powers to bring all the Taliban to the table. In addition, the US, Pakistan and Afghanistan could talk to the Taliban to help solve issues, and China should aid the peace process.

There is no room for India in these calculations. Pakistan is obviously not going to put in all this effort and let the Indians in. The US is comfortable with this arrangement. So we will have to fend for ourselves.

A high-level Afghan delegation including the new defence minister met Taliban leaders Abdul Jalil, Hassan Rahmani and Abdul Razaq in May. All three are Pakistan-based and close to the Quetta Shura. The meeting was held in Urumqi and both Chinese and ISI representatives participated. The US-inspired Qatar process of Taliban negotiations seems to be over and the Chinese-Pakistani process is currently on.

A day after the MoU was signed, a suicide bomber killed five people in the Afghan ministry of justice’s parking lot and injured 50. There have been six attacks in Kabul in May, including one at an event the Indian Ambassador was supposed to attend. The Afghan Taliban claimed responsibility and threatened more attacks.

Meanwhile, attacks across the country continue. A truck bomb near government offices in Qalat, the capital of Zabul province, killed at least four and injured about 70 on May 25. The Taliban claimed responsibility for the attack. The same day, in a major attack in Helmand province, the Taliban attacked a police compound and killed 19 policemen and wounded seven. In another incident the same day, four policemen “in touch with militants” killed three of their colleagues and fled their checkpost in Kandahar’s Maiwand district. The governor of Uruzgan’s Shaheed Asas district was killed on May 23. Four civilians died in a roadside bombing in Ghazni’s Gailan district. There were reports of clashes between the Taliban and the ISIS in Farah province.

The situation in Kunduz province in the north has also been deteriorating for some years, with the Taliban making inroads. The Taliban launched their 2015 ‘spring offensive’ in Kunduz. Although initially surprised, the ANSF pushed them back in some areas though the Taliban held their ground in others. The exchange highlighted the lack of coordination between different forces (army, police, local police), which has been made worse by recruitment problems and ‘ghost soldiers’ and ‘ghost policemen’. Although the Taliban may be some way away from a military victory, they showed an ability to mount large and simultaneous operations in different areas, away from their traditional strongholds in the south and east. The Taliban also released a propaganda video depicting their shadow governor of Badakshan, Qari Fasehuddin, showcasing a series of attacks against government forces in April and May.

It appears the government has sought the help of old warlords to form local militias to fight the Taliban in the north, where the government is losing ground. It could be said the Kabul government is bolstering its counterinsurgency capability through its own version of Blackwater.

Pakistan is not even remotely embarrassed about its links with the Taliban or Haqqanis or even the LeT. They admit to having dealt with them but add that the next time they will do it better, whatever that means. Former President Pervez Musharraf even boasted about these connections. Pakistan has often used religious elements to curb nationalist sentiments in the country. The Taliban would serve two purposes – help provide strategic depth in Afghanistan and curb Pushtun nationalism through their religiosity. Pakistan also hoped that the Taliban would recognise the Durand Line. Instead, the Taliban became a political force with trans-border connections. They have not recognised the Durand Line and they have adhered to their own ideology, close to Al-Qaeda’s. In the process, extremists in Pakistan have succeeded in making space for themselves inside Pakistan.

President Ghani is entitled to snub India if he assesses it to be in Afghanistan’s interests. He did announce well in advance that his country would not be making the purchase of military equipment from India that his predecessor had so ardently pursued. He then took his own time showing up in New Delhi after kowtowing in Beijing and Islamabad. He went one step further when he called on the Pakistan Army chief in the latter’s office in Rawalpindi. This was a practical decision, one supposes, for it only underscored the obvious about who calls the shots in Pakistan (apart from the terrorists). But to sign a deal with your tormentor must be listed as a daft decision, and so early in his tenure. Conceivably, he must have been cajoled into taking this step by the Americans who, anxious to quit Afghanistan, wanted all the loose ends tied up and Pakistan’s wishes met before they left.

Karzai made several attempts to convince India that Afghanistan needed weapons and training of its armed forces by India for the inevitable resurgence of the Taliban after the American exit. But New Delhi was just too scared of upsetting the US and annoying Pakistan. So India hemmed and hawed. New Delhi left Karzai in the lurch and refused to behave like a regional power with regional interests. Ghani came to power and seemed to be doing India a favour by visiting six months later. He was snubbing India. Or being told to do so.

Ghani is beholden to America and fears Pakistan. His predecessor was eased out the moment he tried to be independent and became critical of both the US and Pakistan. He was too much of an impediment regarding negotiations with Pakistan-sponsored nominees from the Taliban. He wanted to be closer to India. This did not suit Pakistan and the US. And, after 15 years in Afghanistan, the US is quite comfortable with leaving a country that is militarily ill-equipped, undertrained and underpaid.

Afghanistan is no longer a primary US interest now that bin Laden is dead and the global war on terror can be declared over. And Pakistan is certainly not going to let the efforts of a venture launched 21 years ago and the gains of the last 14 years be wasted now.

Over that same period, India has failed to develop links with the various actors in Afghanistan and have not attempted to rebuild ties among the Pushtuns of Kandahar, Paktia and Nangarhar. India ceded ground to Pakistan without even trying. New Delhi failed to engage Afghanistan’s Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras and Pushtuns. India has always had close relations with all Afghans, especially the Pushtuns who had commercial links with it. Perhaps, somewhere in India’s calculations, it presumed that all Pushtuns were Taliban.

The ‘Great Game’ is likely to get more complicated in times ahead. There are reports of ISIS presence in eastern Afghanistan, with some signs of the ISIS in Pakistan as well. There are also some reports of clashes between the Taliban and ISIS in western Afghanistan. The position is unclear. Al-Qaeda, Taliban, the various sectarian militias in Pakistan and the Lashkar-e-Tayyiba are the other Big Guns whose turf will be impinged on by ISIS activity. One will have to wait and see how this other Great Game is played out on our western border.

*The writer is Adviser, Observer Research Foundation

Courtesy: (Hardnews) 4 June, 2015

The post Spy Game In Afghanistan – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

US and Swiss investi­gations into corrup­tion in FIFA and the awarding of World Cup tournaments to Russia and Qatar are likely to force Qatar to provide chapter and verse about its bid rather than allow it to stick to its tired reiteration that it did nothing wrong, will cooperate with any and every inquiry and that allegations against the Gulf state are rooted in racism.

Former Qatari prime minister Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim bin Jaber al-Thani responded to the latest FIFA crisis as it related to Qatar by saying that it was “not fair” and based on Western Islamophobia and racism towards Arabs. No doubt, debate about the Qatari World Cup has been burdened by sour grapes, envy, ulterior motives, prejudice and bigotry.

That, however, does not distract from real issues Qatar needs to confront and the multiple threats it faces. Those threats have been magnified as much by external factors as by Qatar’s own handling of affairs.

To be sure, Qatar, unlike other Gulf states, has since winning the World Cup engaged with its crit­ics. It has granted human rights and trade union activists access and worked with them to develop standards for working and living conditions for migrant workers. Qatar also cooperated in drafting proposals for a significant updating of the kafala sponsorship system that puts employees at the mercy of their employers.

Nonetheless, Qatar failed to capitalise on credibility it built with its failure to demonstrate sincerity by translating words into deeds. It further squandered credibility in a series of inelegantly handled incidents, including the repeated detention of foreign journalists. Making things worse, Qatar has recently tightened the screws on its critics.

All of that, coupled with the FIFA crisis, means that Qatar’s reputa­tion even before the dramatic announcement of legal proceedings was tarnished by repeated allega­tions of vote buying and the labour issue.

As a result, for a country that has proved to be a shrewd financial investor, Qatar’s return on invest­ment in soft-power instruments, such as the World Cup, designed to position it as a progressive ally of world powers in the hope that they will come to the aid of the wealthy Gulf state in times of emergency, has proven to be abysmal.

Instead of having amassed soft power, Qatar confronts multiple threats to its World Cup hosting rights. Those threats have raised the spectre of Qatar ultimately be­ing deprived of its hosting rights.

Yet, even though millions of documents obtained by the Sunday Times suggest that Qatar bought the World Cup, it ultimately is not the core issue. Even if it did, Qatar, like Russia, played the game the way it is played in FIFA. England lost its 2018 World Cup bid for the simple reason that it insisted on largely walking a straight and ethi­cally and legally correct line.

Hamad’s dismissal of the allega­tions as racist may ring hollow in failing to confront the substance of the allegations but it does forebode the geopolitical fallout and regional outcry were Qatar to lose its World Cup hosting rights.

Moreover, a Qatar under fire by legal authorities against the back­drop of a failed soft-power policy could either stiffen its back, decide to walk away from the tournament or be more inclined to attempt to repair suffered damage.

Qatar’s engagement with its crit­ics and promulgation of standards that comply with international labour norms hold out the prom­ise, despite Qatar’s failure so far to act on its lofty pledges, of the Gulf state’s tournament being one of the few World Cups to leave a legacy of change. That is far more important than seeking retribution for wrong­doing in an environment in which wrongdoing was the norm.

This article appeared at Arab Weekly

The post Keep World Cup In Qatar Even If It Bought Its Way In – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Tareq Aziz, a former senior figure in the government of Iraq’s late dictator Saddam Hussein, died on Friday in a prison hospital in southern Iraq aged 79, a local Iraqi official said.

Aziz served as foreign minister and deputy prime minister until the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq.

“Aziz died today at the al-Hussein hospital of a heart attack,” Adel Dakhil, the deputy governor of the southern Dhi Qar province said, according to the Iraqi independent broadcaster Alsumaria News.

In 2012, Iraq’s Supreme Criminal Court sentenced Aziz, a Christian, to death on charges of persecuting Shiite Muslim parties when Saddam was in power. The execution was never carried out.

During his rule, Saddam, who was a Sunni, suppressed Iraq’s majority Shiite community.

Original article

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On his recent trip to the Republic of Korea, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Park Geun-Hye upgraded bilateral ties to a “special strategic partnership” and pledged to expand defence cooperation, with Modi hard selling his ‘Make in India’ initiative. The two countries, however, have their work cut out.

By Sumitha Narayanan Kutty*

India-South Korea relations received a major boost in May when Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced that bilateral relations would be upgraded to a “special strategic partnership.” This makes South Korea the second East Asian country to be awarded such status (after Japan).

With an aim to elevate bilateral defence and security ties, India and South Korea agreed to hold the bilateral joint diplomatic and security dialogue in a 2+2 format: their foreign and defence ministers to meet annually to consult on security and political issues. Korea is the second country to receive this consideration (the first being Japan). With these moves, Modi tried to signal yet again “how seriously” India takes its new framework of engagement with the east, dubbed “Act East”. This new framework is rooted in India’s ‘Look East’ policy of the 1990s and has primacy of place in the current government’s outreach strategy.

Getting to “Special Strategic Partnership”

Since the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1973, engagement between India and South Korea has traditionally been driven by their private sectors. Their growing economic relationship provided a secure base for the two governments to expand ties across other sectors, including defence and security. But the going has been slow.

Both countries first evinced interest for closer security ties 15 years ago in 2000. Following this, the two navies kicked off joint naval exercises and a MoU on cooperation in defence industry and logistics was signed in 2005. However, it took another five years for the two countries to elevate their relationship to a strategic partnership. This announcement was made in 2010 when South Korean President Lee Myung-bak visited India as chief guest at its Republic Day parade.

Building on this momentum, AK Anthony became the first Indian defence minister to visit South Korea. Defence ties received another push with two agreements – the first, on the protection of ‘classified military information’ that strengthened intelligence cooperation (which includes nuclear proliferation activities by Pakistan, North Korea) and the second on defence R&D between India’s Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and the Korean Defence Acquisition Programme Administration (DAPA).

Acknowledging the growing potential in the sector, India opened a defence wing at its Seoul embassy in 2012. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh also visited South Korea the same year. High-profile defence interactions included visits by Korean defence minister Kim Kwan Jin (November 2012) and Chief of Air Staff General Sung Hwan (2013). This culminated in South Korean President Park Geun-hye’s visit (January 2014) to promote “sales diplomacy” in the defence space and expand security consultations.

Hard Selling “Make in India”

Since Narendra Modi’s rise to power, New Delhi has put in much effort to revitalise this bilateral partnership with both the external affairs minister Sushma Swaraj and defence minister Manohar Parrikar travelling to Seoul earlier this year to prepare the ground for Modi’s visit. Their primary task was to push forward Modi’s ‘Make in India’ drive, a national programme that encourages foreign companies to manufacture their products in India.

As Modi sees it, India’s developing domestic defence industry lies “at the heart” of this programme and offers opportunities for Korean companies to invest in the sector. Indian companies have expressed interest in collaboration around manufacturing artillery systems, radars, simulators, engineering systems for land and marine forces, and the like. There is a definite convergence of interests here. The South Korean defence industry aims to improve its global standing in arms exports and finds great potential in the Indian market. Yet, the road ahead remains complicated.

Despite high-profile political bonhomie, the results on ‘big ticket items’ in India-South Korea defence trade have been mixed. The following two episodes are telling.

In the year 2011, South Korean defence firm Korean Aerospace Industries (KAI) objected to the “unfair bidding process” that was employed to award the deal to rival firm Pilatus Aircraft Ltd. (Switzerland) for India’s military basic trainer acquisition programme. Formal protests poured in from the South Koreans including the defence minister Kim Kwan-jin. Though his Indian counterpart took note of the complaint, the deal was handed to the Swiss firm after a year’s delay, leaving the Koreans miffed.

Another instance involved the purchase of eight mine countermeasure vessels (MCMV) which was touted to become India’s first major defence hardware import from East Asia. In this case, the South Korean firm Kangnam Corporation found itself facing allegations that the firm employed middlemen to secure the deal (a practice banned at the time). President Park herself flagged the issue during her 2014 visit. It was the Modi government that finally pulled the plug on the deal in December 2014, six years after its original closing.

Managing expectations

Going forward, it is important that the Koreans note that ‘Make in India’ is ‘work in progress’. The campaign in its current form is heavier on atmospherics than policy and is particularly complicated to execute within the defence sector. The Indian defence ministry is working on a major overhaul of the country’s defence offset policy to simplify the acquisition process. According to Parrikar, the guidelines will be in place before August. Pilot testing, refining this process and due-diligence will take its own course.

Second, if India aims to produce technologies licensed from foreign manufacturers domestically, it will have to give serious thought to raising the FDI cap in the defence sector further. Though increased to 49 percent last year, the number remains inconsequential as foreign firms much prefer greater control over their technology. Intellectual property rights (IPR) and technology transfers are other delicate areas that warrant attention.

Third, it would be prudent for both sides to manage expectations from defence cooperation in the short term. Closer and regular defence consultations between New Delhi and Seoul would keep the partnership thriving despite inevitable procedural glitches. The 2+2 format initiated by India is a positive step in this direction.

South Korea remains a good case for India to ‘Act East’. In the short term, the onus continues to lie on other sectors to power the partnership forward even as the chinks in defence cooperation are worked out. A slow and steady approach would work best.

Sumitha Narayanan Kutty is Associate Research Fellow, South Asia Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.

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Three weeks ago was Naqba Day – the day on which Palestinians inside and outside Israel commemorate their “catastrophe” – the exodus of more than half of the Palestinian people from the territories occupied by Israel in the 1948 war.

Each side has its own version of this momentous event.

According to the Arab version, the Jews came from nowhere, attacked a peace-loving people and drove them out of their country.

According to the Zionist version, the Jews had accepted the United Nations compromise plan, but the Arabs had rejected it and started a bloody war, during which they were convinced by the Arab states to leave their homes in order to return with the victorious Arab armies.

Both these versions are utter nonsense – a mixture of propaganda, legend and hidden guilt feelings.

During the war I was a member of a mobile commando unit that was active all over the southern front. I was an eye-witness to what happened.

I wrote a book during the war (“In the fields of the Philistines”) and another one immediately afterwards (“The Other Side of the Coin”). They appeared in English together under the title “1948: A Soldier’s Tale”. I also wrote a chapter about these events in the first half of my autobiography (“Optimistic”) that appeared in Hebrew last year. I shall try to describe what really happened.

First of all, we must beware of looking at 1948 through the eyes of 2015. Difficult as it may be, we must try to transport ourselves to the reality of then. Otherwise we shall be unable to understand what actually occurred.

The 1948 war was unique. It was the outcome of historical events which had no parallel anywhere. Without taking into account its historical, psychological, military and political background it is impossible to understand what happened. Neither the extermination of the Native Americans by the white settlers, nor the various colonial genocides resembled it.

The immediate cause was the November 1947 UN resolution to partition Palestine. It was rejected out of hand by the Arabs, who considered the Jews as foreign intruders. The Jewish side did accept it, but David Ben-Gurion later boasted that he had had no intention of being satisfied with the 1947 borders.

When the war started at the end of 1947, there were in British-governed Palestine about 1,250,000 Arabs and 635,000 Jews. They lived in close proximity but in separate neighborhoods in the towns (Jerusalem, Tel-Aviv-Jaffa, Haifa), and next to each other in neighboring villages.

The 1948 war was actually two wars that blended into one. From December 1947 until May 1948 it was a war between the Arab and the Jewish population inside Palestine, from May until the armistices in early 1949 it was a war between the new Israeli army and the armies of the Arab countries – mainly Jordan, Egypt, Syria and Iraq.

In the first and decisive phase, the Palestinian side was clearly superior in numbers. Arab villages dominated almost all highways, Jews could move only in hastily armored buses and with armed guards.

However, the Jewish side had a unified leadership under Ben-Gurion and organized a unified, disciplined military force, while the Palestinians were unable to set up a unified leadership and army. This proved decisive.

On both sides, there was no real difference between fighters and civilians. Arab villagers possessed rifles and pistols and rushed to the scene when a passing Jewish convoy was attacked. Most Jews were organized in the Haganah, the underground armed defense force. The two “terrorist” organizations, the Irgun and the Stern Group, also joined the unified force.

On both sides, everybody knew that this was an existential struggle.

On the Jewish side, the immediate task was to remove the Arab villages along the roads. That was the beginning of the Naqba.

From the start, atrocities cast a sinister shadow. We saw photos of Arabs parading in Jerusalem with the severed heads of our comrades. There were atrocities committed on our side, reaching a climax in the infamous Deir Yassin massacre. Deir Yassin, a neighborhood near Jerusalem, was attacked by an Irgun-Stern force, many of its male inhabitants were massacred, the women were paraded in Jewish Jerusalem. Incidents like these formed part of the atmosphere of existential struggle.

Throughout, this was a total ethnic struggle between two sides, each of which claimed the entire country as its exclusive homeland, denying the claims of the other side. Long before the term “ethnic cleansing” was widely used, it was practiced throughout this war. Only a few Arabs remained in the territory conquered by the Jews, no Jews at all remained in the few areas conquered by the Arabs (the Etzion Bloc, the Old City of Jerusalem.)

With the approach of May and the expectation that the Arab armies would enter the conflict, the Jewish side tried to create a zone from which all non-Jewish inhabitants were removed.

It must be understood that the Arab refugees did not “leave the country”. When their village was shot at (generally at night), they took their families and escaped to the next village, which then came under fire, and so on. In the end they found an armistice border between them and their home.

The Palestinian exodus was not a straightforward process. It changed from month to month, from place to place and from situation to situation.

For example: the population of Lod was induced to flee by shooting at them indiscriminately. When Safed was conquered, according to the commander “we did not drive them out, we only opened a corridor for them to flee”.

Before Nazareth was occupied, the local leaders signed a surrender document and the townspeople were guaranteed life and property. The Jewish commander, a Canadian officer named Dunkelman, was then verbally ordered to drive them out. He refused and demanded a written order, which never came. Because of that, Nazareth is an Arab town today.

When Jaffa was conquered, most inhabitants fled by sea to Gaza. Those who remained after the surrender were loaded onto trucks and sent on their way to Gaza, too.

While much of the expulsion was dictated by military necessity, there certainly was an unconscious, semi-conscious or conscious wish to get the Arab population out. It was “in the blood” of the Zionist movement. Indeed, long before the founder, Theodor Herzl, even thought about Palestine, when writing the initial draft of his ground-breaking book “Der Judenstaat”, he proposed founding his Jewish State in Patagonia (Argentina), and proposed inducing all the native inhabitants to leave.

After the Arab armies entered the war in May, the Egyptians were stopped 22 km from Tel Aviv. A month-long cease-fire was decreed by the UN, and used by the Israeli side to equip itself for the first time with heavy arms (artillery, tanks, air force) sold them by Stalin. In the very heavy fighting in July, the balance shifted and the Israeli side slowly gained the upper hand.

From then on, a political – as distinguished from military – decision was taken to remove the Arab population. Units were ordered to shoot on sight every Arab who tried to return to their village.

The decisive moment came at the end of the war, when it was decided not to allow the refugees to return to their homes. There was no official decision. The idea did not even come up. Masses of Jewish refugees from Europe, survivors of the Holocaust, flooded the country and filled the places left by the Arabs.

The Zionist leadership was certain that within a generation or two the refugees would be forgotten. That did not happen.

It should be remembered that all this happened only a few years after the mass expulsion of the Germans from Poland, Czechoslovakia and the Baltic states, which was accepted as natural.

Like a Greek tragedy, the Naqba was conditioned by the character of all the participants, victimizer and victim.

Any solution of the “problem” must start with an unequivocal apology by Israel for its part in the Naqba.

The practical solution musty include at least a symbolic return of an agreed number of refugees to Israeli territory, a resettlement of the majority in the State of Palestine when it comes into being, and generous compensation to those who choose to stay where they are or emigrate elsewhere.

The post The Real Naqba – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

The Iraqi army has destroyed two two bomb-making factories used by Islamic State (also known as Daesh) militants in the country’s western Anbar province.

According to the Iraqi Defense Ministry, the factories targeted by Iraqi warplanes were located in the city of Hiit.

The Iraqi airstrikes also killed dozens of militants operating in Anbar.

This comes as Iraqi forces, backed by Popular Mobilization Forces, have been fighting to retake Anbar’s provincial capital city of Ramadi from ISIL militants.

Separately in Salahuddin Province, located north of the capital Baghdad, Iraqi forces managed to secure roads leading to the Baiji oil refinery where Iraqi joint forces ended an ISIL siege on the refinery last month.

The Iraqi army has recently stepped up its fight against the militants in Anbar and Salahuddin provinces, inflicting heavy losses on the militatnts.

Earlier this week, Iraqi volunteer forces seized Saudi-made equipment including electronic bombs, rockets, and some automatic munitions, from the ISIL militants in Anbar, which is the militants’ major stronghold.

The northern and western parts of Iraq have been witnessing unrest since ISIL militants started its campaign in early June 2014.

Iraq’s army has since been joined by Kurdish forces as well as Shia and Sunni volunteers to drive ISIL out of the areas they have seized.

Original article

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By Farangis Najibullah

(RFE/RL) — It wasn’t so long ago that Farrukh Sharifov had settled into a home in Syria with a group of fellow Islamic State (IS) group recruits, believing he was there to fight the good fight.

Now the 25-year-old is back in his native Tajikistan, helping the government prevent others from following his path to militancy.

Sharifov is among a small number of former IS fighters who’ve taken Dushanbe up on its offer to grant amnesties to Tajiks who voluntarily leave the radical militant group and who are deemed not to be a threat to society.

Those who pass the vetting process and are amnestied are spared criminal charges upon their return, but the state has put some, like Sharifov, to good use.

Eloquent and fluent in Tajik and Russian, Sharifov tells packed audiences about the horrors he witnessed during his monthlong stint in the IS stronghold of Raqqa earlier this year. He describes seeing people summarily executed without trial, women used as sex slaves, and militants putting severed heads on display as a warning to anyone who dares challenge their strict interpretation of Islam.

A Forgiving Approach

Countries around the world are considering what to do in the event that citizens of theirs who left to join IS decide to come back.

In the case of Tajikistan, some of the hundreds who went to fight in Iraq and and Syria have vowed to return home and wage war against the government in Dushanbe.

But despite the significant threat posed by IS-trained militants, Tajikistan has opted for a forgiving approach for those who had no previous affiliation with terrorist or extremist groups and who repent for joining IS.

“Young people who took part in military conflicts in Syria, Iraq, and other countries but have realized their mistake, regret their action, and voluntarily leave the conflict zone … will be allowed to return home,” the Ministry of Internal Affair announced on May 9, clarifying the conditions of the long-standing amnesty offer.

It’s up to those individuals to find their way to Turkey or other states, but once there the government will provide them assistance in getting their documents together and setting them up with transportation home.

It also offers assistance — for those who leave IS-controlled territories and reach Turkey – in obtaining passports and tickets to come home.

In order to convince prospective returnees that the offer is genuine, the ministry has set up a hotline, called the Trust Line, that fighters considering a return can call.

Six Tajiks Have Returned

Contacted by RFE/RL, an operator said the Trust Line has received “several phone calls” — including from fighters in Syria and their relatives in Tajikistan — since it was set up on May 9.

“When a Tajik fighter calls from abroad and asks for help to come home, our officers and psychologists talk to them to identify the fighter and their intentions,” the operator said.

At least six Tajiks, including a young woman, have returned from Syria in recent months.

After being questioned by authorities, five of the returnees were granted full amnesties and set free. One is to go on trial in Dushanbe after being charged with taking part in a foreign military conflict.

Officials in Dushanbe’s Somoni district court said “the details of the case will be made public in coming days.”

The Tajik government, which fought a five-year civil war with its Islamic opposition in the 1990s, is no stranger to the threats posed by home-grown militancy.

The eastern Rasht Valley, a former stronghold of the Islamic opposition, has seen a string of deadly militant attacks, including an ambush in 2010 that left 25 government troops dead.

The same month, Tajikistan suffered its first suicide bombing when a police headquarters in the northern city of Khujand was targeted.

That attack was blamed on an alleged member of the banned Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, an extremist group the government says has many supporters in Tajikistan, and parts of which have expressed allegiance to IS in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Despite potential security risks by the new breed of IS-trained militants, many Tajiks support the amnesty, with some hailing it as a second chance for “young people who have recognized their mistakes.”

“Some of the fighters have, indeed, gone to Syria and Iraq for the so-called jihad, but there are many others who went there just to make money,” says Abdulghani Mamadazimov, the head of Tajikistan’s Association of Political Scientists.

“Many were migrant laborers who were recruited in Russia and Kazakhstan,” Mamadazimov said. “They were promised money.”

Mamadazimov says it is the government’s responsibility to help bring home such “deluded young Tajiks” and help them rejoin society.

There is currently no rehabilitation program in place to aid the returnees’ reintegration, but the authorities are giving assurances that they will be free to resume their work or education.

‘There Is No Religion’

Rizvon Ahmadov, a former IS fighter who has recently returned from Raqqa, told Tajik state TV that there are many Tajiks in Syria willing to leave the IS group.

Ahmadov, 22, said he went to Syria to fight for a religious cause and spent nine months there undergoing militant training.

“But there is no religion,” Ahmadov said. “When they occupy a place, they kill local men and marry or sell their wives. They rape women and sell children. They oppress people living there.”

Disillusioned and deeply traumatized by IS atrocities, Ahmadov and fellow Tajik Mavjuda Saburova managed to escape to Turkey and sought help from the Tajik Embassy.

Officials say first-hand accounts of IS horrors will help prevent young Tajiks from being swayed by extremist propaganda.

Former militant Sharifov frequently accompanies government officials and religious leaders as they meet with people across the country as part of Dushanbe’s antiextremism campaign.

Since his first public appearance at a gathering moderated by Interior Minister Ramazan Rahimzoda on May 7, Rahimov’s schedule has been packed with meetings and speeches.

Rahimov even recently gave a speech at the Dushanbe Grand Mosque during a sermon after Friday Prayers, an honor normally reserved only for chief imams.

The post Tajikistan Offers Amnesty For Islamic State Militants appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Iran-backed Houthi Shiite rebels and Yemen’s government agreed Friday to attend UN-brokered peace talks in Geneva aimed at ending a more than two-month war.

The Geneva meeting, provisionally set for June 14, would be the first significant effort to stop the fighting which has led to what the United Nations has called a “catastrophic” humanitarian situation.

Ezzedine Al-Isbahi, information minister of the Yemeni government based in Riyadh, said they would send a delegation to Switzerland.

UN envoy Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmed told the Security Council on Wednesday that the government would attend but that he was still in consultation with the rebels.

“The government agreed to participate in the Geneva talks,” Isbahi said. He added that the meeting would involve “consultations on implementing Resolution 2216” which the Security Council passed in April.

Meanwhile, Qatari foreign minister said in Paris that the armed intervention had prevented a Houthi takeover.

“If there had not been (Operation) Decisive Storm, we would have seen the Houthis and Ali Abdullah Saleh’s people all over Yemen,” Khaled Al-Attiyah said. “I think Decisive Storm … has restored legitimacy in Yemen.

“Is it enough or not? I think it will be enough when the Houthis and Saleh’s followers fulfil the elements of 2216.”

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The mushrooming governance scandal in world soccer body FIFA increasingly spotlights political in addition to financial corruption in global soccer.

Revelations about government and corporate deals made to secure Germany’s hosting of the 2006 World Cup alongside the prominence of political figures in sports governance, frequently aligned with autocratic regimes, emphasizes the need for a clean-up of soccer governance. Reforms will have to regulate the relationship between politics and sports and guard against political and corporate interference alongside the effort to eradicate related financial corruption and dismantle patronage.

The German revelations together with an analysis of membership in the executive committee of for example the Asian Football Confederation (AFC), a regional confederation within FIFA that is likely to become a target of US and Swiss investigations into soccer corruption, belies the fiction upheld by the game’s top administrators that soccer and politics are separate.

It also adds to Asian soccer’s looming troubles as a result of AFC president Sheikh Salman Bin Ebrahim Al Khalifa’s burial of a devastating 2012 independent audit of his group’s financial and commercial management. To be clear, the period audited preceded Mr. Salman’s presidency.

If anything, sports in general and soccer in particular are inextricably joined at the hip – a fact that albeit belatedly even the International Olympic Committee (IOC) has acknowledged.

“In the past, some have said that sport has nothing to do with politics, or they have said that sport has nothing to do with money or business. And this is just an attitude which is wrong and which we cannot afford anymore,” IOC president Thomas Bach said last September. He said politicians and business leaders needed to respect the autonomy of sporting bodies or risk diminishing their positive influence.

Recognition of the incestuous relationship between politics and sports propels three fundamental reforms of soccer governance to the top of any agenda designed to root out political and financial corruption:

• Development of a system of governance that oversees, monitors and governs the relationship between politics and sports in addition to that of the integrity and political independence of officials at all administrative levels of the game;
• Inclusion of all stakeholders, including clubs, players and fans in governance boards at the level of clubs, national associations, regional associations and FIFA; and
• Dismantling patronage by creating independent entities to distribute and monitor the disbursement of development and other funds to national associations by FIFA and confederations.

Revelations in respected German weekly Die Zeit disclosed that a deal between the German and Saudi governments coupled with investments by German corporates in South Korea and Thailand ensured that Germany won its 2006 hosting rights by one vote in 2000.

Die Zeit reported that the government of then Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder complied with a request from the German Football Association to lift at short notice an embargo on weapon sales to Saudi Arabia and supply it with anti-tank rocket launchers in a bid to ensure that then Saudi member of the FIFA executive committee Abdullah Al-Dabal would vote for Germany rather than Morocco.

The incident highlights the complicity in political corruption of the sport and the World Cup bidding process by both politicians and soccer administrators. The same is true for the cosy relationship between administrators and corporations as is evident in Die Zeit’s disclosure that Germany companies such as Volkswagen, Daimler and Bayer promised to significantly increase their investments in Thailand and South Korea to secure the votes of two other FIFA executive members.

Die Zeit’s revelations position the incestuous relationship between politics that often serves in global soccer governance as an enabler of financial corruption as a global problem that is not exclusive to autocracies like those that dominate the Middle East and North Africa, a region where the sport is politically controlled, but also involves Western democracies.

An analysis of the composition of the AFC’s executive committee and the boards of many of its national associations, who include 13 Middle Eastern federations who account for 28 percent of the Asian group’s 46 member associations, tells the story.

Six of the AFC executive committee’s 21 members in the period from 2011 to 2015 hailed from the Middle East. They include its president, Mr. Salman, a member of a minority Sunni ruling family that in its brutal suppression of a 2011 popular revolt arrested scores of sports officials and athletes among whom national soccer team players who were tortured; Prince Ali Bin Al Hussein, a half-brother of Jordan’s King Abdullah who as a reformer was a thorn in Mr. Salman and embattled, outgoing FIFA president Sepp Blatter’s side; the United Arab Emirates’ Yousuf Yaqoob Yousuf Al Serkal who maintains close ties to his country’s ruling elite; Sayyid Khalid Hamed Al Busaidi, a member of Oman’s ruling family; and Hafez Al Medlej, a member of the board of Saudi Arabia’s tightly controlled soccer association who made his career in the kingdom’s state-run media.

That number has risen to seven in the executive committee elected in April 2015 that includes Mr. Salman as well as Mohammed Khalfan Al Romaithi, deputy commander-in-chief of the Abu Dhabi police force, a force tainted by multiple allegations of abuse of human rights; and representatives of Kuwait, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia and the head of Islamic Republic of Iran Football Federation (IRIFF), whose premier league teams are largely government-controlled.

The close ties between sport and politics, particularly in the Middle East, is also reflected in the composition of the boards of the region’s national soccer associations and many of its major clubs. Almost half of the West Asian Football Federation’s members are headed by members of ruling families or commoners closely associated with them, including Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, Bahrain, Qatar and Jordan as well as people with close government ties as in Iran and Syria.

The Middle East’s incestuous political ties to sport are also evident in the Olympic Council of Asia (OAC) that is headed by Sheikh Ahmed Al-Fahad Al-Ahmed Al-Sabah, a prominent member of Kuwait’s ruling family and former oil minister, member of the IOC), and head of the Association of National Olympic Committees (ANOC), who recently suffered a humiliating political defeat at home and is mulling running for the FIFA presidency. Mr. Ahmed is widely viewed as one of world sport’s most powerful movers and shakers who played a key role tainted by allegations of vote buying in Mr. Salman’s AFC election in 2013.

In a recently published memoir, former AFC general secretary Peter Velappan put his finger on the problem. “Football enjoyed complete patronage from the royal families and the sheikhs,” Mr. Velappan said.

The post Reforming Soccer Governance: Tackling Political Corruption Alongside Financial Wrongdoing – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Abdulrahman Al-Rashed

The Middle East is going through a chaotic phase. The situation is worse than what the region had witnessed during the two world wars. From primitive weapons like knives to the most high-tech ones like drones are currently being used in the ongoing regional conflicts.

The most dangerous of all these weapons is the use of religious rhetoric, as it is capable of mobilizing communities and brainwashing armies of young people willing to lay down their lives. It is similar to a nuclear bomb, as its impact is likely to be felt long after the end of the conflicts. The radiations emitted by the nuclear bombs killed many even after years they were dropped on the two ill-fated Japanese cities. The same could be predicted about sectarian wars. Their negative effects would be felt for decades to come.

Mesmerized by propaganda, people are lured into civil wars after centuries of coexistence. If you want to understand your opponent, put yourself in his shoes. Ever since their failure in Syria and the ever-worsening situation in Iraq; Iran, Hezbollah and the Syrian regime have been keen on transmitting the sectarian bacteria to the Gulf countries.

Daesh, the terrorist organization, is using the same trick by inciting people (read its followers) against Shiites. Uncivilized people with a poor understanding of religion have been dragged into sectarian clashes. Unfortunately, many clerics have also fallen into this trap and knowingly or unknowingly promoting the interest of such deviant groups. That is exactly what Iran, the Syrian regime and Daesh want.

Those who are blindly engaged in the war do not understand that they are cheap soldiers unconsciously fighting against their own interests. They cannot see beyond the end of their nose. Sowing strife within communities through hate speech and websites would only lead to fighting in the streets and destruction of countries. Why do people destroy their homes with their own hands? This is willful ignorance, to say the least.

We have witnessed Sunni, Shiite and Alawite conflicts because of the exploitation of religion. Hezbollah, Daesh and Al-Qaeda are all political organizations with deviant ideologies. Violence is not limited to sectarian groups. It was used by Baathist, nationalist and communist parties, which hijacked planes, led suicide operations, booby-trapped cars and plotted assassinations. Most of their battles were directed against their own people such as the Abu Nidal group, which often targeted Palestinians and Arabs despite claiming to be anti-Israel. This applies to Al-Qaeda and Daesh today. Despite the similarities between leftist and anarchist organizations and the sectarian ones today, and despite their excessive use of violence — claiming that the end justifies the means — religion-driven groups are the most dangerous.

Political disagreements between countries could be resolved in one night, but the use of religion in conflicts causes deep wounds that are difficult to heal. That is why religious communities affected by war, such as in Iraq, will suffer for a long time.

The war in Syria was not religiously driven until the regime decided to classify it as such. The war against the Iraqi Baath party would have only been against its practices and crimes were it not for Iranian interference that led to a sectarian war. Daesh, like Hezbollah, is using sectarianism as a weapon to mobilize people.

Facing sectarian wars requires the awareness of those working in the religious field. They should be warned that they are being used by external forces to destroy their countries. This should not be tolerated.

The post Middle East And The Sectarian Divide – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

In April 2013, the Tsarnaev brothers detonated a pair of homemade bombs at the Boston Marathon, unleashing terror and chaos onto the streets of the Massachusetts capital and the suburbs nearby. Last month, just over two years since that fateful spring day, Dzhokhar was sentenced to death. Much of the trial focused on his brother’s connections to the Caucasus Emirate (IK), a jihadist organization based in the North Caucasus – a historically tumultuous and Muslim-dominated region in southern Russia. Today, members of the IK, along with disaffected citizens from the Caucasus and Central Asia, have abandoned the fight at home to join ISIS, resulting in a notable decline in terrorist violence in the North Caucasus. However, these emboldened militants could soon return from the Middle East, rekindling the threat of terrorism in the post-Soviet world.

Regional authorities speculate that ISIS might soon attempt to establish a “Northern front” in the North Caucasian republic of Dagestan. Their concerns are not unfounded; Eurasian Muslims (particularly migrant workers from Central Asia), disgruntled by political, religious, and economic disenfranchisement at home and abroad, are heeding ISIS’s call to arms in increasingly large numbers. In a widely cited January report, the International Crisis Group estimated that between 2,000 and 4,000 Central Asians have left their home countries to fight for ISIS, a figure which now includes Colonel Gulmurod Khalimov, the former head of Tajikistan’s elite police force. In February, Alexander Bortnikov, the Director of the FSB (a Russian security agency with historical connections to the Soviet KGB), announced that 1,700 Russian nationals, mostly Chechens, have joined the group as well.

The exodus of militants from the post-Soviet region to the Middle East (along with Russia’s heavy-handed counterterrorism tactics ahead of the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi) has severely weakened the Caucasus Emirate’s ability to inflict damage on the Russian state. The numbers speak for themselves: according to Caucasian Knot, 1,705 people were killed or wounded due to terrorism in the North Caucasus in 2010, compared to 1,225 in 2012, 986 in 2013, and 525 in 2014. Furthermore, Russian security forces recently killed IK Emir Aliaskhab Kebekov. Kebekov had tried to steer IK militants away from ISIS, condemning defectors as traitors. With him gone, some analysts predict that the IK will lose even more fighters to ISIS in the coming months.

Although the North Caucasus has restabilized over the past year and a half due to the IK’s weakened state, what we are witnessing is only the eye of the storm. In the long term, ISIS poses a very real security threat to the post-Soviet region. Some of the Eurasian militants fighting with the Islamist group will eventually return home battle-hardened and more resolved than ever, where they might commit acts of terror either as lone wolves or in coordination with local extremist groups, such as the Taliban or the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). Regional governments have responded by attacking moderate Islam and political opposition in the name of counterterrorism, as has been seen in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Russian-annexed Crimea. These repressive policies are backfiring and pushing otherwise non-radical Muslims to engage in Islamist violence.

If we have learned anything from the post-9/11 security dynamic, it is that extremism is not a self-containing phenomenon – it spreads like a disease. The Boston Marathon bombings demonstrated all too painfully the threat that Eurasia-based Islamism poses not just to the Caucasus and Central Asia, but also to the United States itself. If and when Eurasian ISIS militants return home from the frontlines in the Middle East, international attention will need to be paid to the post-Soviet world – a tinderbox just waiting for a match.

A shorter version of this piece was published on the American Enterprise Institute’s foreign policy blog.

*Daniel Frey is a freelance writer with a focus on Russia and Eurasia. A graduate of Tufts University, Daniel studied abroad for a year at St. Petersburg State University and traveled throughout Russia. Also a photographer, Daniel manages a portfolio through his website, www.frey-photography.com. Daniel is fluent in Russian and currently interns at the Institute of Modern Russia. He resides in the New York metropolitan area.

The post The Threat Of Eurasian Terrorism: A Tinderbox Waiting For A Match – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Veli Mbele*

(This talk was delivered at the Afrikan Liberation Day symposium, at the Drill Hall, Gauteng, South Africa, 25 May 2015.)

OPENING REMARKS AND DEDICATION

Let us start by expressing our humble thanks to the organisers for the honour of inviting us to come and share our perspective, on the range of issues that affect Black people in Afrika and other parts of the world. And for also affording us the privilege to be here and be in a position to learn from the many enlightening perspectives of others.

Allow us to also acknowledge the leaders of the various organisations of our people, our guests from the various parts of the Black world, and each and every Black sister and brother, here present. It is always heart-warming to be in the company of our own and freely and to honestly discuss all the issues that concern us as a people. This is an intellectual space we rarely afford ourselves and we definitely need to create more such spaces.

We meet here today on a very special and significant day, which as you know, was initially designated for the 15 of April and referred to as “Africa Freedom Day” and only became “Afrikan Liberation Day” on the 25 of May, 1963, after a historic meeting of Afrikan leaders in Ethiopia.

We decided to dedicate our talk here today to 2-year-old Onkarabile, 6-year-old Nkune, 7-year-old Sebengu and 9-year-old Mapule, of Verdwaal, who in October, 2011, left their home and undertook what later became a fatal 18-km journey in the sweltering heat in search of their mother and food. They never found their mother or food. A couple of days later, their tiny, life-less bodies were found in a veld, badly dehydrated and with hardly any food in their stomachs.

We dedicate our talk to 33-year-old Andries Tatane of Meqheleng, who, in April, 2011, was savagely attacked by a gang of police, shot with rubber bullets in the chest, resulting in his death on the spot. All of this happened in full view of members of his community.

We dedicate our talk to 17-year-old Nqobile Nzuza of Cator Manor, who in September 2011, was shot twice in the back by police, while running away and died shortly thereafter. The 34 Black workers of Marikana, who in August 2012, formed part of the Marikana Uprising and in defence of foreign-white-monopoly capital were mercilessly gunned down by the police.

We dedicate our talk to 27-year-old Mido Macia of Daveyton, who in February, 2013, was tied to the back of a police vehicle and after being dragged for a few meters, died several hours later in police custody. He was in his underwear and socks. His pants were later found at another part of the police station and a post-mortem stated that he died from a lack of oxygen and witnesses reported that he also had wounds to the head.

Our talk is also dedicated to 21-year-old Jan Ravimbo of Tshwane, who in January this year was shot at close range and killed by police, for simply demanding to know why they were taking his fruits and vegetables, which he was selling in the Tshwane central business district.

29-year-old Osiah Rahube, 26-year-old Lerato Seema and 64-year-old Bra Mike Tshele, who in January this year, were all killed by the police, when the community of Mothutlung, was protesting for something as basic as water.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The incessant violence that continues to be unleashed on the Black body – and is now also being perpetuated by governments that are led by our own – helps us to understand why our history, as a continent and people continues to be the most tragic paradox of human existence.

We have a glorious history characterised by breath-taking advances in the various spheres of human endeavour. However, our history is also punctuated by bloody but heroic tales of battles, against all manner of foreign invaders, rape, murder and lynching, land robbery, slavery and colonialism (in their classical and neo-classical forms), white racism and systematic genocide.

As the Tanzanian scholar, Issa Shivji observes, ours is “a tale of treasures at one end and tragedies at the other”.

And because of these tragic paradoxes in our history, today, we Blacks, in many respects, remain at the bottom of the human pyramid. Our powerlessness, in a ruthlessly anti-Black world, is perhaps best captured by Steve Biko, when he says:

“. …All in all the black man has become a shell, a shadow of man, completely defeated, drowning in his own misery, a slave, an ox bearing the yoke of oppression with sheepish timidity.”

In an attempt to undo the paralysis of Black existence and articulate Pan-Afrikanism and Black Power in a statist form some of our more intrepid and visionary forebears decided to form the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), which as we know, was officially ordained in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in 1963. Ethiopia was perhaps one of the most appropriate places to give birth to such an important institution of our people – not just because it formed part of the spectacular tapestry of our ancient Nubian-Kemetian civilisations – but also because of how it gallantly resisted the organised violence of Italian white supremacy.

THE CONTEXT PRECEDING THE FORMATION OF THE OAU

To develop a fuller appreciation for why the OAU was not able to achieve some of its cardinal goals, is it critical that we understand the context that preceded the formation of this institution of our people. Many of Afrika’s leaders, who today are counted among some of the leading protagonists of 20th century Pan-Afrikanist thought and practice, were beneficiaries of the Pan-Afrikanist thought and practice of an earlier generation of Black thinkers and revolutionaries.

The Pan-Afrikanism of many of Afrika’s leaders was inspired by such imminent Black thinkers as Prince Hall, Paul Cuffee, David Walker, James Horton , James Johnson, Edward Blyden, who is regarded as the first Pan-Afrikanist thinker to use the concept of the ‘Afrikan Personality’ and portrayed Africa as “the spiritual conservatory of the world”, and Henry Sylvester Williams, who is credited with coining the concept of Pan-Afrikanism.

And of course, William Du Bois, George Padmore, Marcus Garvey, Cyril James and others such as Daniel Coker, Lott Carey, John Russwurrum, Martin Delaney, Henry Highland Garnet, and Alexander Crummell. Du Bois and Garvey are particularly critical because they played a pioneering role in giving Pan-Afrikanism and Black Power the form of a global political movement.

There are however two critical historical events, which also had a profound impact on the evolution of Pan-Afrikanist thought and practice and that of related Black radical traditions such as Black Consciousness. One is the Haitian Revolution, first led by Boukman in 1791 and later by Toussaint L’overture, which holds the distinction of ushering in the first Black republic in the western hemisphere in 1804. The other is Ethiopia’s decisive victory over Italy in the Adwa in 1896.

Fired-up by this rich political and intellectual heritage, a number of Afrikan states achieved one form of independence or another, and unsurprisingly, they expressed a growing desire for more unity within the continent. However, there was no common view on how this unity should be pursued and as a consequence two groups emerged in this respect.

The one group was known as the Casablanca bloc, led by Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana. This bloc included Algeria, Guinea, Morocco, Egypt, Mali and Libya and argued that unity should be pursued through a political federation. The other was the Monrovian bloc led by Sedar Senghor of Senegal, which argued that, unity should be achieved gradually, through economic cooperation. Its other members were Nigeria, Liberia, Ethiopia and most of the former French colonies.

Some of the initial debates took place in Liberia and were eventually harmonised when Ethiopian emperor Haile Sellassie invited the two groups to Addis Ababa, where, as we know, the OAU and its headquarters were subsequently established. And the Charter of the Organisation was signed by 32 independent Afrikan states.

In a number of respects, this was a critical milestone for Pan-Afrikanism and Black Power, both on the Afrikan continent and other parts of the Black world. But the birth of the OAU was also a big obstacle for the success of the project of western imperialism on the Afrikan continent.

And for this reason, western imperialism did all it could to frustrate this act of self-liberation. They bank-rolled those Afrikan leaders who were willing to sell their souls, orchestrated coups against those who refused to be co-opted, and assassinated those of our leaders who were openly and radically opposed to western control of Black people’s destiny.

THE CHALLENGES FACED BY THE OAU

Despite this major step, the OAU still remained largely divided. The former French colonies were still hopelessly dependent on France (something which persists even today). There was a further split along ideological lines, between those Afrikan states that supported the USA and those that supported the USSR, in the so- called Cold War of ideologies. The pro-Socialist bloc was led by Nkrumah, while, Felix Houphouet- Boigny, of the Ivory Coast, led the pro-Capitalist bloc.

Because of these divisions, it was difficult for the OAU to intervene decisively in intra or inter-state conflicts and for this and other reasons, some dismissed the OAU as “a glorified talk shop”, arguing that its policy of non-interference in the affairs of member states limited its effectiveness. This criticism became particularly strong in the context of the internal political crisis in Uganda, under Idi Amin.

In addition to the barrage of capacity and ideological challenges that the OAU had to contend with at inception, we wish to argue that, when viewed as a far-reaching statist articulation of Pan-Afrikanism and Black Power – the systematic assassinations of Patrice Émery Lumumba, Amilcar Lopes da Costa Cabral, Eduardo Chivambo Mondlane, Samora Moisés Machel, Thomas Isidore Noël Sankara, Malcolm X, Ramothibi Tiro and Bantubonke Biko – including the passing of Kwame Nkrumah, Mangaliso Sobukwe and not so long ago, that of Kwame Toure, were a big blow to the cause of Pan-Afrikanism and Black Power both in Afrika and the rest of the Black world. And we are not sure whether we have or will ever recover from these incalculable losses.

SUCCESSES OF THE OAU

In spite of these set-backs and systematic treachery, in our view, the OAU nevertheless made a number of strategic strides, some of which include giving greater structure and focus to Afrika’s resistance to western imperialism, laying the structural basis for continental unity and greater co-operation, and as stated earlier, giving practical expression to the cause of Pan-Afrikanism and Black Power.

This acknowledgement is particularly critical considering that, at the time of its formation, the so-called Cold War was in full swing and the leading actors in this conflict, the USA and Russia (and to some extent China), viewed territories such as Afrika as part of their battle-ground.

In addition to setting up a number of committees and agencies to facilitate various aspects of the national development of Afrikan states, the OAU’s Liberation Committee aided a number of liberation movements on the continent. It provided much needed weapons, training and military bases to various movements that were fighting against white-minority rule on the continent. Liberation movements in Azania also received various forms of OAU assistance.

HAS AFRIKA ACHIEVED THE OAU VISION?

Today, more than 50 years later, the OAU is no more and has been replaced by the African Union (AU) and most Afrikan countries (as previously defined by the borders of the white supremacist Berlin Conference of 1884-85), have formally raised their flags of independence, some have changed their names and the management of their respective states is now under the control of the indigenous people.

Because of this, can we confidently say Afrika has achieved the kind of liberation that the founders of the OAU envisioned? Put differently, has Afrika, under the AU, been able to free itself from the clutches of white supremacist-western imperialism? We think definitely not.

In our view, while some Afrikan states have made some governance and infrastructural advances, to a large extent, Afrika remains a colonised territory and today this colonisation is not obvious because, in the majority of cases, it happens indirectly. While some of the reasons are historical and external, one of the key factors that makes it difficult for the AU to advance the historical agenda of Afrikan liberation is the failure of many of Afrika’s contemporary leaders to grasp, the point that Issa Shivji makes, in an article titled, ‘The Struggle to Convert Nationalism to Pan Africanism: Taking Stock of 50 Years of African Independence’.

In this article, Shijvi argues that:

“To the extent that colonialism and imperialist oppression itself was ideologised in terms of White supremacy, the anti-racist, racial constructs and demands of pan-Africanists were anti-imperialist. It is important to keep this dimension of Pan-Africanism in mind – that in its genesis and evolution the ideology and movement was primarily political and essentially anti-imperialist.”

Flowing from this, even though it is the legitimate successor to the OAU, is Pan- Afrikan in its structure and some of its leaders occasionally invoke the ideas of the founders of the OAU, in their speeches, in the manner that it functions, the AU is not necessarily a Pan-Afrikanist instrument, in the ideological sense, as described by Shivji.

For instance, the AU has located the development of the Afrikan continent within the hegemonic-western-neo-liberal ideological paradigm, by among others, setting as key development benchmarks, the installation of liberal democracy, holding regular elections, having free-market-economies, that are mainly geared towards attracting foreign investment and meeting the targets of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Nothing about reclaiming the land, wealth and dignity of Black people, that were (and continue to be) taken through covert and overt imperialist conquests.

One of the programmes that perhaps best illustrates the AU’s inclination towards neo-liberalism is the New Partnership for Africa’s Development or NEPAD. The dominant thinking within the AU seems to be that, Afrika’s economic problems are primarily problems of poor governance, infrastructure, low economic growth rates and armed conflict, and once these are solved the majority of Afrika’s people will automatically experience meaningful development in their lives. Or as the gospel of the high-priests of capitalism often goes: “The benefits of economic growth will trickle down to all”. What about who owns the wealth of Afrika?

This thinking is not just neo-liberalist to the core-but seems to be operate along a logic that says, in order to advance themselves meaningfully, Afrikan states and Blacks in general should behave as though the fight against slavery, white supremacy and western imperialism is over, and that all that Afrikans must now focus on is to manage their countries and economies “responsibility”, and the rest will take care of itself.

It is also instructive to note that, given its influence at the time, through its former head of state President Thabo Mbeki, South Africa was instrumental in shaping the AU’s neo-liberal deportment. Therefore, instead of championing Afrika’s extrication from the clutches of white supremacist-monopoly capital- the AU dedicated a lot of its time to fighting for Afrika’s integration into the global power constellation of white-supremacist- western imperialism.
As a consequence, today, much of Afrika’s mineral and other forms of wealth, remain under foreign control. This is not always obvious, because many of Afrika’s governing elite are essentially the Mantshingilanes of western interests. This should bring us closer to the real reasons behind the persistence of armed conflict in Afrika (and other parts of the world), particularly in such mineral-rich countries as the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Central African Republic, Sudan, Nigeria and Libya.

It would be extremely difficult to find an armed conflict in Afrika which is not, in some way, a manifestation of the phenomenon of proxy imperialist wars. Just as in the era of the OAU, armed conflict in Afrika today (and other parts of the world) is largely orchestrated by western intelligence agencies in defence of the interests of foreign multi-national corporations.

This is particularly true for those MNCs involved in the oil business and explains why, as alluded to earlier, imperialist nations like France, continue to control the political and economic affairs of their former colonies on our continent. Therefore, to attribute armed conflict in Afrika purely to ethnic or religious chauvinism or state corruption is not just an act of intellectual laziness, but also a treacherous tactic to conceal the real cause of armed conflict in Afrika – which is economics. Put differently, religious and ethnic chauvinism are merely used to fuel the fire – they don’t start it.

The hegemony of neo-liberalism over Afrika’s contemporary politics and economics also helps us to understand why it was possible for western intelligence operatives to come into Libya and ferment the kind of climate that led to the brutal assassination of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi.

History must record that, even though they had the option to abstain, as Russia, China, Brazil and others did in March 2011, at a meeting of the UN Security Council, South Africa, Nigeria and Gabon, voted in support of imperialist countries such as the USA, France and Britain, to get the repugnant Resolution 1973 passed. Their votes effectively facilitated the armed invasion of a fellow Afrikan state and legitimised the brutal political assassination of a fellow Afrikan. Is it unreasonable to wonder whether they could not have done the same thing to President Mugabe? Definitely not!

The brash impunity of neo-liberalism is perhaps best demonstrated by the fact, despite the many atrocities that they have and continue to commit, that the Western warlords of our time, like George Bush (senior and junior), Bill Clinton, Tony Blair, David Cameron and of course Barrack Obama are not likely to appear in front of the International Criminal Court for crimes against humanity in various parts of the world and in particular those committed against Black people.

These and related factors overwhelmingly point to the fact that, not only has the AU betrayed the OAU’s mission of liberating Afrika, but also, as a collective, the current crop of Afrikan leaders, are not advancing a structured project against white-supremacist-western imperialism. And it is for this reason that the Black radical movement in Azania must never apologise for supporting Black people in Zimbabwe in their quest to reclaim their land and wealth.

RE-IMAGINING BLACK POWER IN THE 21ST CENTURY

One of the cardinal challenges that arise out of the disturbing context we have painted is an urgent need for a radical and fearless re-think of the meaning of liberation, Pan-Afrikanism and Black Power in the context of where Black people find themselves today. To fulfil this task honestly, at a theoretical and ideological level, those concerned with the destiny of Black people must grapple with some of those vexing questions that others prefer to avoid. Some of these are:

• What do Pan-Afrikanism and Black Power, mean in the context of radical Black nationalisms that fail to properly theorise around the questions of land and the national question, the race, class and gender dialectic, ethnic and religious chauvinism, crude afro- and homophobia, neo-liberalism and predatory environmental imperialism?
• What do Pan-Afrikanism and Black Power mean in the context of the long-standing struggle for self-determination by the Sahrawi of Western Sahara under the leadership of the Polisario Front?
• What do Pan-Afrikanism and Black Power mean in the context of the burgeoning struggle for self-determination by the Toureg of Mali, under the leadership of the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA)?
• What do Pan-Afrikanism and Black Power mean in the context of the recent uprisings in Arab-speaking Afrika?
• What do Pan-Afrikanism and Black Power mean in the context of the over 40-year liberation struggle of the Black (Black is used here for emphasis) Melanesians of Papua, under the leadership of the OPM, KNPB and the Free Papua Movement? From the 1960s, on wards, successive Indonesian regimes have been carrying out ruthless campaigns of genocide against the Melanesians of Papua and West Papua, systematically killing over 500 000 Black people. This genocide against our relatives is probably the biggest political injustice of our time yet it doesn’t enjoy the attention it deserves. In fact, it is almost a forgotten genocide.
• What do Pan-Afrikanism and Black Power mean in the context of the continued persecution of Mumia Abu-Jamal and Assata Shakur by the American government?
• What do Pan-Afrikanism and Black Power mean in the context of the structural anti-Black violence that Blacks in North, South and Central America, the Caribbean, Europe, Asia, the Pacific and the Middle East, continue to be subjected to?
• What do Pan-Afrikanism and Black Power mean in the context of a ruthlessly uni-polar world, which is characterised by the military authoritarianism of the USA and its allies, under the leadership of a US President who is partly of Afrikan extraction?
• And in the Azanian context, what do Pan- Afrikanism and Black Power mean in the context of politically weak Pan-Afrikanist and Black Consciousness political formations, the growing grip of anti-Black neo-liberalism on mainstream Black politics, and the profound paradox wherein an essentially landless- economically enslaved, powerless Black majority, periodically pauses , to proudly celebrate “Freedom day”?

CONCLUSION

As we seek answers to these and other such questions, we should perhaps also bear in mind the point made by the Azanian scholar, Pumla Gqola, in her book, ‘A Renegade Called Simphiwe’ wherein she argues that:

“…It is important that a critique of power not end with reaction, but that it goes further to imagine something new, more exciting, and more pleasurable. Picture what we can create if we dare to give ourselves permission to imagine freely. It is important to create alternatives just as it is important to speak truth to power”.

If we are indeed going to create alternatives, as Gqola suggests, and are to give Black people a real and meaningful fighting chance to reclaim their dignity, then there are few urgent and practical tasks we must perform.

Firstly, there is a need to strengthen (and protect) existing Black institutions that are geared towards the advancing the ideals of Pan-Afrikanism and Black Power and where possible, build new ones, particularly in those areas where poor Black people reside.

Second, white supremacy, slavery, colonialism, capitalism and now neo-liberalism are essentially systematic and structural forms of violence against Black people and the poor people in general, and for this reason, we need to have programmes that deliberately equip our people (especially Black young people), to defend themselves against these (and related evils) – not just intellectually, but also physically, if the situation so requires (as it often does). People don’t usually mess with groups that know how to defend themselves.

Third, in the Azanian context, those of my generation, who are associated with the various Pan-Afrikanist, Black Consciousness and Socialist oriented organisations, must cease to be petty, swallow their narrow-minded pride and begin to have a serious conversation about forming a united Black Front. Our people and their daily reality urgently require collective action. However, we must guard against such a conversation being driven by what Michela Wrong refers to as the “It’s our turn to eat” mind-set.

Such a conversation must be inspired by the need to re-ignite the Azanian Revolution for land and genuine national liberation, and give our people genuine and renewed hope. Accordingly, this conversation must include Pan-Afrikanist and Black Consciousness movements in North, Central and South America, The Caribbean, Europe, Asia, the Pacific and the Middle East.

I would like to leave you with the words of Pianke Nubiyang, who believes that:

“It is time for change and that change will come when Blacks who speak Spanish, French, Dutch, Portugese, Yoruba and Arabic (in Sudan) realize that we are Black Afrikans first and foremost and no matter which colonial language we speak, RACE IS THE ISSUE, and in Latin America as well as Arabic-speaking North Africa, or even West Papua, its our Blackness and Afrikan being that pushes people to attack us.”

Inspired by the wisdom of Nubiyang, my main message to us, here today, is that, given where we find ourselves as a continent and as a people, it does seem to me that, there can be no liberated Afrika or Black Power, if there is no Black unity first.

*Veli Mbele is a South African essayist, Black Power activist and political commentator.

The post Pan-Afrikanism And The Quest For Black Power Today – Speech appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Since the end of cold war, the goal of American foreign policy has always been to play an active role in the global politics and maintain the leading position in the world. It was a unique feature of American foreign policy after the end of cold war as they replaced the multi polar system and took up the lead role in international affairs.

With the passage of time various countries have strengthened their economies and have grown militarily, playing a major role in international politics. As a result we can see a multipolar world in the 21st Century. With the changing global strategic environment, the Obama administration has been facing several foreign policy challenges of which rise of emerging countries is one.

In view of the political pundits among the rising economies, China is one country that can pose a challenge to American supremacy in the coming years. According to Francis Fukuyama, the top foreign policy challenge that US faces is about how to deal with the rise of China. Joseph S. Nye holds that America should adopt a balanced approach i.e. ‘Goldilocks policy’ that is neither too hot nor too cold to manage the rise of China which is one of the biggest foreign policy challenge for the policy makers.

Other scholars like Robert Keohane and John Mearsheimer also holds the same views. John Mearsheimer, believes Asia to be the most important region for US security because of China. As America cannot allow the continuous rise of China and in turn dominance of the region the way America dominated the western region.

One can clearly see the limits of American power in several of its initiatives and policies like in war against terrorism. America perceives the new China-dominated infrastructure bank as a challenge to the World Bank and Asian Development Bank. China’s military modernization is also a matter of concern for America. US ‘pivot to Asia’ policy, shift from west to east, signifies the challenge it faces from China in the long run.

In the state of the union address in January by President Obama, while referencing to the Trans-Pacific Partnership, he highlighted the fact that “China wants to write the rules for the world’s fastest-growing region”, which could be disadvantageous for our business and workers so we should write those rules and level the playing field.

Scholars believe that a major shift can be seen in Chinese diplomacy in world politics under the leadership of President Xi Jinping, trying to take a leading position instead of being a participant in international affairs as evident from the latest official slogan “Asia for Asian”. He is certain that “it is for the people of Asia to run the affairs of Asia, solve the problems of Asia, and uphold the security of Asia”, as China has serious concerns over American presence and security assurances to Asia.

Thus China wants to reduce the role of US. Then there is another school of thought which believes that the Chinese rise will not pose a challenge to America as still there is huge power disparity between the two. Besides China’s strategy is inward looking, more domestic oriented, whereas American strategy is outward looking, of dominating the world. Scholars believe that China is not the only major challenger or competitor for America and there is no strategic confrontation between the two. In fact there economies are so deeply integrated.

Security dilemma is a permanent feature of international relations where security of one state leads to the insecurity of the other. States in world politics in the name of sustaining balance of power create imbalance. Great powers fear each other and they face an uncertain international environment in which their primary goal is survival. Thus for the security of great powers the best strategy is maximization of relative power. States try to acquire as much power as they can in comparison to other states.

In this context, if we look at growing economy of China, increasing political influence, military and technological developments, active diplomacy and its national ambitions it becomes evident that China can challenge America’s supremacy in the years ahead.

China has been over stretching to meet its resource needs. China’s GDP is not growing on the same pace as its military budget is as it was estimated that from 1998 to 2007 economy of China grew at the rate of 12.5 approx. whereas the increase in defense spending was around 15.9 percent per annum. The Chinese defense budget for 2015 will rise by 10.1 percent, to roughly $145 billion, that is matter of concern for America. America would not take the risk of containing China as it is practically difficult to do so instead it will go for balancing approach because both are integrated in global economy. As per Ashley Tellis in order to deal with China’s growing capabilities, America should pursue policies that increase the stakes of China in world politics and the costs of abusing its power.

The writer is an M Phil scholar at the School of Politics and International Relations, Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad.

The post Rising Chinese Power And Challenge To United States – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

(EurActiv) — The Spanish government has rejected the Commission’s proposal to place refugees on its territory. The executive’s plan should be “proportionate, fair and realistic”, said Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jose Manuel García-Margallo.

But Brussels dismissed Madrid, renewing its call for solidarity from other EU members. “I do not agree with the criteria they used. We need to review this issue again to determine the capabilities of each country,” Margallo said last week.

Under the Commission’s scheme, the 28 member states would be required to accept asylum seekers in proportion to the size of their economy, unemployment rate, and population.

The proposed susten is based on a distribution index that gives population size a weight of 40 percent, 40 percent based on economic growth, 10 percent on unemployment, and 10 percent on previous engagements with asylum seekers.

Spain asked to absorb 4,288 asylum seekers

Over a two-year period, Spain was asked to absorb 4,288 of the 40,000 asylum seekers (most of them Syrians and Eritreans) currently living in Italy and Greece, who are to be relocated across the EU.

This represents 10.72 per cent of the total (initially the quota for Spain was fixed by the Commission at 9.1 per cent), compared, for instance, with Germany (21.91 percent) and France (16.88 per cent), which would accept a larger proportion.

According to the Commission proposal, Spain is also expected to accept a further 1,549 refugees over the next two years under a“voluntary scheme to settle 20,000 currently living in Europe and fleeing civil war (and potential candidates for asylum). But Madrid has also rejected this proposal.

Spain claims that the Commission has not taken into account the countrys very high unemployment rate (nearly 24%), its previous efforts to absorb asylum seekers, and the “huge effort we are making to control migration from Morocco, Mauritania and Senegal which impacts the whole EU”, Margallo said.

Margallo also pointed out the effort that Madrid is making to manage the constant flow of illegal immigrants from the Spanish North African exclaves of Melilla and Ceuta, and from the Canary Islands.

Despite his criticisms of the Commission’s immigration initiative, the foreign minister said that Spain remains committed to the common EU effort to deal with the crisis in the Mediterranean. Madrid is ready to deploy a ship, and a surveillance airplane, to join the EU mission. It will contribute a CN-235 sea patrol aircraft (or a P-3 Orion) and a surveillance frigate.

Madrid is also keen to deploy around 130 navy personnel, approximately the same number it has provided for the international operation against piracy in the Indian Ocean.

Not the first option for Syrian refugees

So far this year, more than 3,000 Syrians have requested asylum from the Spanish authorities in Melilla. In 2014, Spain accepted all of the 1,681 Syrians who asked for admission. By way of comparison, during the same period, Germany received almost 24,000 asylum requests, and Sweden more than 16,000, according to El Pais.

But Spain is not the first option for these refugees: only 130 Syrians decided to resettle in Spain in 2014. Germany, France and other northern European countries host much larger Syrian communities.

In 2014, the EU received 626,000 asylum applications. If the Commission’s proposal is to be dopted, it would mean Spain would have to accept almost 60,000 asylum seekers a year.

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