Regional hostilities are commonplace, but examples of once-foes building bridges also abound once the incentives for peace were created. Such incentives have often been of “economic-nature”. There is nothing more effective than the benefits of economics and commerce to overcome ideological and trust hurdles.

What else can explain the proximity between USA-China or Saudi Arabia-USA, if not mutual economic benefits? Asia itself is no stranger to bickering neighbours, be it the Koreas, Israel-Palestine, China-Japan or closer home in South Asia like India- Pakistan. The South Asian neighbours have had their spats on various issues, with relations often turning confrontational.

Amongst the various issues, a thorny one last year had been of border skirmishes along the India-Pakistan line in the states of Jammu and Kashmir/Azad Kashmir. Border skirmishes have occurred in the past as well, led by elements who seem bent on creating a climate of hostility despite the best efforts of the governments and civil societies. So is there any way to create an economics-led solution that can create a sort of incentive to maintain peace in that region?

Let us recall the major issues which each of them are facing in their respective countries, and target one which is common to both. Energy shortage is the first that comes to mind. Pakistan and India are both reeling under severe energy shortages and this is an issue of national debate. Both rely substantially on imported fuels for electricity generation, and prices of fuels like coal, oil or natural gas are not becoming much cheaper in a hurry. Neither are both countries cash-rich by any means. Hence, there is a practical limitation to the increased amounts each can pay for higher imported quantities. But both do need to produce more electricity in order to overcome this chronic challenge. In such an environment, renewable energy using solar resources can provide some relief, however small it might be.

A proposal to transform the entire stretch of border area (along the border line itself, plus an additional 50 km stretch on either sides beyond the no-man’s land) into a landmark renewable energy project is the objective of this article. This means placing thousands of solar-energy panels side-by-side along this stretch which can use solar resource for electricity generation for the ultimate benefit of people on both sides.

So what is the rationale behind this outlandish idea? First is undoubtedly to address the energy shortage issue, even if the benefit from renewable electricity production is on a small-scale as compared to fossil-fuel based power plants. Secondly, the revenue ensuing from this project (i.e. sale of electricity by the government to its people) might help the governments’ public finances to some extent, an area of worry in both countries.

Third, both countries are paying enough for imported fuel. In contrast, the cost of renewable energy comes down over the long-term once the price of solar panels is recovered, since the raw material (sunlight) is free. Moreover, the altitude and low-pollution in a region like Jammu and Kashmir/Azad Kashmir means that the intensity of sunlight is much more, and sunlight absorption would be higher where it is more intense and bright.

Next, the technology is already available within the countries. So there is no question of paying for expensive imported technology, apart from paying for the imported solar panel films itself. There are several renewable energy companies in India engaged in solar technology and setting-up of solar power infrastructure, and I am sure Pakistan has similar enterprises as well. Most importantly, the strategic nature of the project’s benefits might ensure any entity on either side do not resort to skirmishes in the border area. Any border violence will only damage the solar panels and disrupt the production process.

Given that electricity is a sensitive national issue, any damage to these vital assets would only reduce public popularity of the entities involved in the skirmish within its own population, something nobody wants.

Of course, it is possible that any instigator, after causing destruction to panels on his own side, might point fingers at the other side in order to pass the blame and win sympathy points. This is where the government’s ability to put in place an internal monitoring process on its own people coming in proximity to the “solar-zone” holds key, not to mention involving multiple layers for monitoring. Multiple layers means more personnel, which increases the chances of irregularity getting leaked.

Given that electricity shortage is a national issue, a project like this might help resolve some of the energy deficit, even if it is on a smaller scale. Global armament manufacturing companies might dislike this, since continuance of hostilities is of vital importance for their vast sales and earnings. But it is time India and Pakistan think constructively about their own benefits, rather than benefitting other countries by continuing their hostilities.

*Sourajit Aiyer is a finance professional in India. He can be contacted at sourajitaiyer@gmail.com This article was published at South Asia Monitor.

The post Creating A ‘Solar Zone’ Of Peace Between India And Pakistan – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Mr. Usman Ali Khan’s muddled up OpEd (Indian Nuclear Muddle, May 15, 2015) on India’s nuclear program is tellingly short on facts and abundantly long on unsupported opinions.

Pakistan plans to increase its nuclear power capacity from 725 MW to 8800 MW by 2020. India hopes to increase it from 5780 MW to 27,800 MW by 2024. Mr Khan ably supports Pakistan’s program (Pakistan and the Nuclear Option – OpEd, March 11, 2015). However, he portrays India’s plan as “nuclear lust”!

His assessment that the Indian Nuclear Power Industry remains “shrouded in secrecy and opacity, refusing to reveal details on safety”, is incorrect.
The Indian Parliament reviews the activities of the Nuclear Power Corporation of India (NPCIL). The Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) of India audits NPCIL’s accounts.

Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) publishes safety performance of India’s reactors and describes incidents relevant to safety. The reports to the Convention of Nuclear Safety and safety information exchanged between India and the International Atomic Energy Agency are equally useful. If NPCIL is secretive, one would not see such details in public domain.

Khan parroted the views of professional critics for whom anti nuclear sentiments are articles of faith. Fair enough, for their survival, they will have to frame all nuclear incidents big or small in a particular angle. They use catchy anecdotes, rants of individuals with hurt egos and some facts cleverly mixed with fiction in their “analysis”! Relying on such reports, Khan conjures up catastrophic nuclear events in India.

He deftly ignores India’s achievements.

India operates seven uranium mines and two mills; fabricates fuel elements; produces heavy water; designs, constructs and operates nuclear power reactors; reprocesses used fuel and develops advanced waste management technologies.

NPCIL is erecting four nuclear power reactors of 700 MW capacity at Kakrapar and Kota and plans to install more Light Water Reactors and Pressurized Heavy Water Reactors at four additional sites. India may commission its prototype fast breeder reactor (500 MW) shortly.
The Unit 5 of the Rajasthan Atomic Power Station operated continuously for 765 days, second longest in the history of nuclear power and the longest in the last two decades. With average Plant Load factors of 83% in 2013-14, Indian reactors are performing well.

From a fleet of 20 nuclear power reactors, NPCIL earned a profit after tax of Rs. 22,990 million during FY 2013-14.

Units 1 &2 of Tarapur Atomic Power Station provide the cheapest non hydro power to the Indian grid at Re 0.97 (US$ 0.014) per kWh. The average tariff of nuclear power at about Rs2.71 ($ 0.044) per kWh in 2013-14 is comparable to those of other sources. The cost of power from the latest commissioned Kudankulam plant is Rs 3.94 (US$ 0.0645) per kWh.

Can what Mr Khan calls as a “chronically inadequate management”, achieve all these?

India’s latest report to the Convention on Nuclear Safety proves that Khan’s claim that India “simply shrugged off the Fukushima experience” is without any basis.

He portrays the villagers’ protest against Jaitapur nuclear power plant as an indication of repeated failures at different plant sites in India.

Acquisition of land for projects including nuclear projects is a contentious issue.

In the 2014 general election, S P Udayakumar, an anti nuclear activist who contested on the issue of Kudankulam Nuclear Power Plant secured 1.53% (15,134 out of 9,90,337) the votes polled!

Activists may stop kite flying! Villagers of Jaitapur will find reason. Once they receive good compensation, they will accept the plant in their neighborhood.

“The story is one of ignorance, lack of adequate regulation, and finally a total breakdown of institutional responsibility within the Indian republic. They are consuming and bathing in nuclear poison”. Khan’s lament belongs to that of an activist.

When lack of domain knowledge and blind environmental activism combine, sobriety suffers.

Regrettably, Mr Khan who competently defends Pakistan’s nuclear power program (Pakistan Nuclear Energy: Let There Be ‘Light’ – OpEd Eurasia Review, April 3, 2014) behaves like an activist while reporting on India’s program!

The Atomic Energy Act 1962, rules issued under it and AERB’s safety codes and standards form the legal frame work governing India’s nuclear program. Various agencies and authorities fulfill their mandates. Khan’s tale on the “breakdown of institutional responsibility” is the product of a fertile imagination.

Khan finds a 16 year old article by Mr Gopi Rethinaraj as supporting his wrong notion that Indian nuclear establishment is virtually unaccountable to anyone. Rethinaraj claimed that the Department of Atomic Energy exploited the ignorance of India’s judiciary and political establishment on nuclear issues, implying thereby that journalists like him were cleverer as they knew nuclear matters!

Do not believe Rethinaraj. Independent study would show that nuclear legislation of virtually every country contains some provisions to maintain secrecy. Khan may inform Rethinaraj that presently furnishing dose records to radiation workers is mandatory in India.

In conclusion, “India’s nuclear muddle” is a tale told by someone, “full of sound and fury, signifying nothing”.

*Dr K S Parthasarathy is a former secretary of the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board. He can be reached at ksparth@yahoo.co.uk

The post Muddled Up Views On India’s Nuclear Program – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Petrobras, which rose to become the fourth largest company in the world, is now battling a serious corruption scandal that has left its reputation in tatters. How did this global oil major scale such heights spectacularly and and then fall so low? There are lessons in this for India’s public sector oil companies.

By R. Viswanathan*

India’s minister for petroleum Dharmendra Pradhan’s visits to Mexico and Colombia in May were a major part of India’s ongoing strategy to diversify its energy import basket. Not on the itinerary however was Brazil, which is home to one of the world’s largest public sector energy companies.

Petróleo Brasileiro S.A. (Petrobras), the Brazilian national oil company, is at the centre of a major corruption scandal which has been unfolding since March 2014 and sparked widespread protests across Brazil earlier this year. Prosecutors found that bribes of $800 million[1] had been taken by Petrobras executives, private contractors and politicians. The assets and contracts of the firm were inflated and auditors had initially refused to certify its balance sheet in the absence of quantification of the losses caused by the scam.

This marks a considerable fall from grace for Petrobras, which just four years ago launched a $72.8 billion[2] IPO, the largest by any company in the world—and went on to become the fourth-largest global corporation[3], with a market cap of $214 billion[4].

The rise

Petrobras’ transformation from a firm founded as a government undertaking in 1953 that lacked any meaningful oil reserves or expertise, to one that was considered a model for national oil companies globally, was indeed remarkable. In the company’s favour, was a monopoly in the national hydrocarbons sector, which Brasilia opened up in 1997 to the private sector—during the heyday of the Washington Consensus—when neo-liberal policies were viewed with favour. [5]

The company invested in research, and developed deep sea technology, working with local suppliers in much the same way as Brazilian aircraft manufacturer Embraer did. Nationalistic spirit and determination was high. Investments led to discoveries of large off-shore pre-salt reserves.

By 2008, Petrobras had arrived.

It was listed among the top 50[6] companies in the world for its high transparency levels, according to Transparency International. And by 2011, the company had become a giant, producing over 2.5 million barrels per day of oil a day[7], working its way to making Brazil self-sufficient in crude oil. Boasting assets in 17[8] countries across Africa, Latin America and the U.S., Petrobras possessed cutting-edge expertise in deep-sea drilling and production.

But the oil giant was not done yet. It sought to enhance its management and financial information systems by incorporating best practices and technology from the developed countries. So the company decided to make its international debut, through a public listing on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). Petrobras kept the controlling 64% shareholding[9], and the rest were sold to foreign investors. All of Brazil cheered when CEO José Sergio Gabrielli rang the bell at the Sao Paulo exchange on September 23, 2010[10], and Petrobras’ shares began to trade simultaneously on the NYSE.

Thus refurbished, Petrobras embarked on an ambitious investment plan—the largest ever corporate investment plan at the time—of $220.6 billion during 2014-18[11]. Its bonds were the benchmark for other Brazilian companies. The Índice Bovespa (Íbovespa), the key stock index, rose and fell with Petrobras’ stock. The company was also the country’s largest patron of cultural and sports institutions, and events, and conservation efforts. Petrobras became the crown jewel of Brazilian industry and its rise was seen by Brazilians and the world as emblematic of the emergence of a New Brazil.

So, what went wrong?

The fall

A massive decade-long corruption scandal was uncovered in early 2014 by Brazilian police investigating a money launderer, linked to Swiss accounts, politicians and Petrobras. Since then, over 30 Petrobras executives and the company’s contractors have been indicted by the courts, and investigations by police and prosecutors have been initiated against 54 politicians[12] and 24 top private building and engineering firms. A senior Petrobras executive Pedro Barusco—who stole and kept money in Swiss accounts—turned approver, and agreed to return around $100 million from his Swiss bank accounts[13].

Unlike Delhi’s bafflingly slow investigation into money laundered by Indians and kept in Swiss accounts, the Brazilian authorities acted fast. They approached the Swiss government which collaborated quickly and froze suspect accounts. The banks promptly returned the money, and $57 million has already been received by Brazilian courts[14]. Meanwhile, some U.S. law firms have filed class action suits on behalf of minority share holders like Wall Street firms and other investors, and the U.S. Security and Exchange Commission has begun an investigation of its own.

In February 2015, Maria das Graças Foster—appointed Petrobras CEO by President Dilma Rousseff­—along with five directors, were forced to resign. The state-run Banco do Brasil’s former CEO Aledemir Bendine, who is perceived to be close to the government, succeeded Graças Foster.

The fallout of the scandal and declining oil prices is that Petrobras’ stock in March 2015 was down by nearly 70% over four and a half years[15]. The day Jose Gabrielli rang the bell at the Sao Paulo exchange was a distant memory. In the meantime, the company has lost its investment grade rating, and raising finance from the global market to service its massive debt that now stands at $170 billion[16] will be difficult and expensive.

The construction and engineering firms working with Petrobras that are also involved in the scandal, face a credit squeeze and financial problems. This means that the company’s ongoing exploration and production projects mainly in Brazil’s deep seas will be delayed. So too will the country’s own infrastructure projects like roads, dams and airports that were being undertaken by the same contractors that worked with Petrobras, now hit by the corruption scandal and the credit freeze by banks.

The domino effect of the scandal is touching every aspect of Brazilian life, from political uncertainty to economic recession, water and power shortages. The fall of Petrobras is seen as the fall of Brazil itself. From its go-go growth years of 2003 to 2010 when the country looked as though it had arrived on the global stage, Brazil is beginning to resemble a lesson in overreach.

The factors for the fall

The decline of Petrobras is closely woven into the way Brazilian politics, economics and society function.

The first major factor was corruption—a national disease that Petrobras could not escape. While in the past the company was relatively clean, the multibillion dollar contracts brought out the company executives’ avaricious side.

Secondly, the company became too big and diverse for control. It expanded beyond its core competencies—deep sea prospecting and drilling—and ventured into petrochemicals, fertilisers, biofuels, electricity and wind energy. This massive and diverse structure was exploited by crooked executives who took cuts in contracts and inflated deal prices.

Third, hubris began to set in with the successful discovery of large pre-salt fields and the world’s largest initial public offering that raised around $70 billion in 2010. Swept up in the euphoria, top management and the government neglected to check the books of the company which contained the inflated contracts.

Fourth, the government has caused considerable loss to the company by forcing it to sell petrol at prices far below market prices. Like India, Brazil subsidises retail petrol sales, so the loss to Petrobras has been massive.

The final factor was the incompetence of the CEO, board and auditors who failed to detect, and take action against corrupt practices. Even if they were aware of such practices, it is possible that they did not take action because Petrobras executives had become too powerful and had deep political connections.

The future

Despite these overwhelming problems, Petrobras can recover – for a variety of reasons, both technical and political.

First, it is still one of the largest oil producers in the world with ample reserves—over 16 billion barrels per day (bpd)[17]–and the ability to double production from 2.5 to 5 million bpd[18] in the next decade. This can be done by continuing its investment in technology and production.

Second, Petrobras is a research and innovation-driven company. It earmarks 1% of its $130 billion in revenue (2013)[19] for R&D, outspending Exxon. Petrobras holds the world record in deep-sea production—5,000 metres[20] below the sea—and in addition to in-house development technology, it has obtained numerous patents through smart collaboration with suppliers and subcontractors on technology.

Third, it really is too big to fail. Petrobras is the country’s largest tax payer and the corporate contributor to GDP—6.3% in 2013[21]. Rousseff simply cannot afford to let Petrobras fail.

The company can exit from its loss-making operations and sell some assets such as a few refineries and retail outlets, to recoup finances. The full financial recovery of the company of course depends on oil prices firming up. At prevailing rates, recovery will take longer. And Rousseff must persevere in quickly drilling out the corruption and institutionalising procedures to prevent such a scandal again. Institutionalising a more transparent system with adequate checks and balances will be key.

Lessons for Indian oil companies

The impact of the Petrobras scandal is unlikely to be adverse for the investment by Indian companies like ONGC Videsh which are part of a consortium with Petrobras in some Brazilian oil fields. Petrobras was established around the same time as ONGC was created in India. Despite the joint discovery of a new oil reservoir in the ultra-deepwater Sergipe-Alagoas Basin—off the east coast of Brazil—by Petrobras in a venture partly funded ONGC this month, the Brazilian giant has moved way ahead of its Indian counterpart. Petrobras’ relentless, aggressive and innovative search for oil through the deepest parts of the sea, helped to make Brazil self reliant in oil by 2006, and make it an exporter too.

Besides oil, Petrobras has helped in the country’s goal to reduce dependence on fossil fuel and increase the share of renewable energy. Petrol consumption has been reduced by a third since the introduction of ethanol. Petrobras enthusiastically took to ethanol, bio-diesel and other biofuels and collaborated with car companies and ethanol producers to make the pioneering ‘fuel ethanol’ programme a success. Thanks to this collaborative spirit, Brazil has cut oil consumption, contained pollution, increased the income of sugar cane farmers and strengthened the domestic sugar-alcohol industry.

In contrast, India is becoming more dependent on oil imports. ONGC has not been as aggressive and innovative an explorer as Petrobras. It is likely that India’s imports of Brazilian crude will only increase. Private sector players like Reliance will continue to export diesel to Brazil, where refining capacity is inadequate. These will likely increase since the new refinery projects of Petrobras have been hit and delayed by the corruption scandal.

Indian public sector oil marketing companies have taken the easy route of increasing imports—more imports means more consumption, and higher prices of oil mean more revenue for them. They do not align their business model to the strategic energy policy of the country, to reduce imports, increase renewable sources and cut pollution. They do not play for Team India in energy, happy to remain in their own narrow silos of earnings sinecures, minus a larger vision. New Delhi has also opted not to put much pressure on them, since middlemen and politicians can and do benefit from large imports. As a result, there has been very little investment in research or technology, and even less interest in building an ecosystem of research, as Petrobras did, supporting universities and local innovators.

For the ‘Make in India’ campaign to be truly successful, investment in a research ecosystem is Petrobras’ real lesson for India.

*Ambassador Viswanathan is Distinguished Fellow, Latin America Studies, Gateway House. He is the former Indian Ambassador to Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay and Venezuela, and Consul General in Sao Paulo. This article was published by Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations.

Notes:

[i] Daily Herald, Brazil marchers hit streets to support Petrobras, president, Lehman Stan, March 2015, <http://www.dailyherald.com/article/20150313/business/303139683>

[ii] Bloomberg News, Petrobras Raises $70 Billion as Investors See Growth, Millard Peter, September 2010, <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2010-09-24/petrobras-raises-70-billion-in-world-s-largest-share-sale-to-fund-fields>

[iii] International Political Economy Series, The Political Economy of an Emerging Global Power: In Search of the Brazil Dream, Casanova Lourdes, Julian Kassum, June 2014, p.50, <http://bit.ly/1KJlfOD>

[iv] Ibid

[v] Petrobras, Our History, <http://www.petrobras.com/en/about-us/our-history/>

[vi] Transparency International, Shining a light on the world’s biggest companies, July 2012, <http://www.transparency.org/news/feature/shining-a-light-on-the-worlds-biggest-companies/>

[vii] Petrobras, Sustainability Report, 2010, p.10, <http://bit.ly/1Gilzk5>

[viii] Petrobras, Sustainability Report, 2010, p.48, <http://bit.ly/1Gilzk5>

[ix] Routledge, Routledge Handbook of Latin America in the World, Dominguez I Jorge, Ana Covarrubias, January 2014, p.437, <http://bit.ly/1QQH5iJ>

[x] BM&FBOVESPA, BM&FBOVESPA celebrates with Petrobras the largest share offering in history; exchange announces second place in global market capitalization ranking, September 2010, <http://www.bmfbovespa.com.br/en-us/News/2010/BMFBOVESPA-celebrates-with-Petrobras-the-largest-share-offering-in-history-2010-09-24.aspx?tipoNoticia=1&idioma=en-us>

[xi] Petrobras, 2030 Strategic Plan and 2014-2018 Business Plan, February 2014, p.44, <http://bit.ly/1e7yhsY>

[xii] Forbes, Brazil’s Two Most Powerful Politicians Saved From Huge Oil Scandal, Rapoza Kenneth, March 2015, <http://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2015/03/07/brazils-two-most-powerful-politicians-saved-from-massive-oil-company-scandal/>

[xiii] Wall Street Journal, Former Petrobras Executive Paying Back Millions in Graft Funds, Kiernan Paul, March 2015, <http://www.wsj.com/articles/former-petrobras-executive-paying-back-millions-in-graft-funds-1426116983>

[xiv] Ibid

[xv] CNN Money, Petroleo Brasileiro Petrobras SA, <http://money.cnn.com/quote/quote.html?symb=PBR>

[xvi] Forbes, Petrobras’ Debt Burden Getting Costlier,Rapoza Kenneth, March 2015, <http://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2015/03/06/petrobras-debt-burden-getting-costlier/>

[xvii] Petrobras Magazine, Deep Future, Edition 64, < http://www.petrobras.com/en/magazine/post/deep-future.htm>

[xviii] Petrobras, 2030 Strategic Plan and 2014-2018 Business Plan, February 2014, p.14, <http://bit.ly/1e7yhsY>

[xix] Shareholders’ Foundation, Petroleo Brasileiro Petrobras SA (ADS) (NYSE: PBR) Investor Securities Class Action Lawsuit, August 2014, <shareholdersfoundation.com/case/petroleo-brasileiro-petrobras-sa-ads-nyse-pbr-investor-securities-class-action-lawsuit-12082014>

[xx] Global CCS Institute, Petrobras Lula Oilfield CCS Project, July 2014, <http://www.globalccsinstitute.com/project/petrobras-lula-oil-field-ccs-project>

[xxi] Financial Times, Counting the cost of the Petrobras Scandal, February 2015, <http://www.ft.com/intl/fastft/288532/post-288532>

The post The Rise And Fall Of Petrobras – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

The government’s media rhetoric and aggrandisement is doing more harm than good to its reputation. It seems intent upon proving right the age-old adage, pride goes before a fall.

By Seema Sirohi*

When the act itself is the message, why diminish the impact by incendiary triumphalism? But the prime minister’s men with their adolescent fervor to brag about their “score” have been doing just that recently, giving India’s critics a handle to skewer New Delhi.

The Pakistani establishment is making full use of every inflammatory statement coming from Indian leaders. Western reporters who blithely equate the complex history of India and Pakistan in set paragraphs written for kindergartners are also jumping in – and seeing Islamabad as the victim.

This is how you pull defeat from the jaws of victory.

What could have been a quiet, covert operation against Northeastern insurgents, who ambushed an Indian army convoy last week killing 18 soldiers, has turned into a public relations disaster. Intention and deterrence were both contained in the act itself–the medium was the message.

Instead, every rule in the book was violated because Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s men can’t contain themselves. The strutting is embarrassing and a depressing indicator of maturity levels.

The operation was covert but before its impact could be assessed, even the most minor details were leaked. Prominent journalists on Twitter were debating the exact time the operation started and how deep it went.

While the spin machine was in overdrive, it put the Myanmar government in a no-win position. How could it admit in public it allowed foreign troops to come in? Of course, it denied any penetration of its territory, prompting a prominent Pakistani commentator to declare that India was caught “lying.”

He and others exploited the opening, choosing to forget that Pakistan’s military has cooperated with the US on drone strikes against terrorists while complaining about violation of sovereignty and whipping up anti-American hysteria in public.

The Twitter machismo displayed by junior information minister Rajyavardhan Singh Rathore shortly after the operation may have appealed to the BJP constituency but it was unappealing to India’s friends watching from afar. India’s security establishment already has a reputation in Washington of “talking too much” and now it is matched by politicians who come with a side order of chest-thumping.

Strutting about the cross-border operation, it turns out, may have been premature at the most basic level. The operation appears to have culled fewer insurgents than boldly stated before – seven, according to the Indian Express and not between 20 and 100 as previously reported.

To add to the embarrassment, Rathore’s eager brags that the Indian army had gone deep inside Myanmar, managed to upset the neighbor enough that an official decided to go on the record. This in diplomatic terms, is a slap.

Zaw Htay, director in the Myanmar president’s office, told The Telegraph from Nay Pyi Taw, “We will not allow any foreign military operations in Myanmar territory.” He added for good measure: “Every country must respect the other country’s sovereignty.”

This should be a crisp lesson on how not to embarrass a friendly government and jeopardize future cooperation. The desire to turn a relatively modest operation into political gain can backfire.

It is time to end the low-level “mohalla” rhetoric and “tana-bazi” – it is uncouth, unseemly and damaging for India’s image. Over the last month, irresponsible statements from various ministers have come thick and fast, giving India’s enemies the public relations advantage.

No surprise that Pakistan’s military establishment and civilian leaders have turned up the heat, turning in the knife on a daily basis. Gen. Raheel Sharif is believed to have “instructed” the Pakistani civilian leadership to keep up the blame-game against India and RAW for attacks against the Baloch and Shia.

Pakistan’s rapid fire began in May after Indian defence minister Manohar Parrikar talked of neutralizing “terrorists with terrorists.” And then he went on to joke, crassly, about how his statement made Pakistan see red (“mirchi lag gaye”).

Maybe it is hard for BJP ministers to measure the “moral advantage” India has logged over time as Pakistan’s use of terrorists as an instrument of state policy has slowly but surely been exposed. To hand it over because a minister couldn’t resist a one-liner shows his innocence about the real public relations battles that are long and hard. They are not fought on prime time.

Communication and messaging must be strategic and even subtle at times. The hammer approach is good in Bollywood, not in the real world.

*Seema Sirohi is a Washington-based analyst and a frequent contributor to Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. Seema is also on Twitter, and her handle is @seemasirohi

This feature was written for Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations.

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The US has transferred six Yemeni detainees, held at the Guantanamo Bay prison in Cuba for a decade, to Oman for settlement, the Pentagon says.

The detainees boarded a flight from the prison on Friday and arrived in Oman on Saturday.

The six Yemenis were identified as Idris Ahmad Abd al-Qadir Idris, Sharaf Ahmad Muhammad Mas’ud, Jalal Salam Awad Awad, Saa’d Nasser Moqbil al-zani, Emad Abdullah Hassan and Muhammad Ali Salem al- Zarnuki.

Emad Abdullah Hassan has been on hunger strike since 2007 in protest of his confinement without charge since 2002. He said detainees have been force-fed up to a gallon of nutrients and water at a time, according to files protesting force-feeding practices.

“The United States is grateful to the government of Oman for its humanitarian gesture and willingness to support ongoing US efforts to close the Guantanamo Bay detention facility,” the Defense Department said in a statement on Saturday.

“The United States coordinated with the government of Oman to ensure these transfers took place consistent with appropriate security and humane treatment measures,” the statement read.

A US administration official said Oman agreed to accept the six detainees about a year ago.

The eleven detainees transferred from the Guantanamo prison so far this year have all been from Yemen. Sixty-nine Yemenis are still being held at the prison, making up more than half of the remaining detainees there.

The transfer brings the number of detainees remained in the prison to 116. It marked the second prisoner transfer from Guantanamo this year. A total of 28 other inmates were also transferred out of the prison in 2014.

The Guantanamo Bay prison at the US naval base in Cuba was established in January 2002 to hold terror suspects captured during the so-called war on terror.

US President Barack Obama had promised to close the prison before his election in 2008, citing its damage to the US reputation abroad. With only a year and half remaining from his second term, the president remains far from delivering on his campaign promise.

Original article

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By Srinivas Raman

The idea of humans inhabiting the moon and calling it home may seem like something out of a sci-fi novel; however it is much closer to reality. If news reports are to be believed, people are actually selling property on the moon. What’s more? The United States of America seeks to secure property rights on the moon.[1] When Neil Armstrong first stepped on the surface of the moon and said “That’s one small step for man, one giant leap for mankind”, I doubt even he imagined that less than half a century later earthlings would actually start buying land by the acre on the moon. Whimsical as it may seem, several people across the world have indeed entered into ‘Lunar Deeds’ and purchased land on the moon from sellers, notwithstanding the feeble legal standing of such contracts.[2]

Under International Law, outer space including the moon and other celestial objects all form part of the common heritage of mankind and are protected by the Outer Space Treaty (officially known as Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies) in a way similar to the protection granted to the seabed and sea resources by the UNCLOS. Article II of the Outer Space Treaty states that “Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means”[3] .Other parts of the Treaty also advocate protection of celestial objects and outer space from weapons of destruction and prohibits nations from using them to harbor or develop and test weapons.

The moon is a goldmine of natural resources, large deposits of which are freely found on the surface itself making excavation easier. Rare earth metals and other metals such as Platinum provide a huge incentive for private companies to send spaceships to the moon to bring back these resources. Currently, more than 90 % of the world’s rare earth metals are mined from China, which makes it all the more important for other developed nations such as U.S.A. to source these scarce natural resources from outer space to gain economic and political leverage. Scientists and space miners have also reason to believe that the moon is a viable source of water which they hope to tap and use for their missions. In additions, luxury goods such as moon rocks, which have an estimated value of being at least 200 times costlier than gold in the market can easily be brought back from the moon as a multi-billion dollar market would fund missions to outer space.[4]

Considering the near future possibilities of commercializing the moon and perhaps other celestial bodies, the question of regulation arises. Who will monitor these operations and how will these commercial transactions be treated under laws applicable to various jurisdictions on Earth? How will the exploitation of outer space resources impact Earth? Despite the existence of the Outer Space Treaty, there are still several grey areas and lacunae in the realm of international space law and the regulatory framework for outer space commercial ventures. Another problem which needs to be resolved is the harmonization of conflicting Federal laws of various countries with the international law. For instance the U.S. Space Act states that “Any asteroid resources obtained in outer space are the property of the entity that obtained such resources, which shall be entitled to all property rights thereto, consistent with applicable provisions of Federal law.” Such laws clash with the principles governing international space law which essentially seeks to discourage privatization of outer space resources.

Another significant instrument is the Moon Treaty 1979[5], which essentially seeks to transfer the jurisdiction of all activities concerning celestial bodies to the international community. This Treaty was created subsequent to the Outer Space Treaty and it provides more specific guidelines. Importantly, it bans ownership of extra-terrestrial property by any entity unless it is international and governmental. It also bans activities which do not benefit other states in accordance with the doctrine of common heritage of mankind. It also bans the alteration of the environment of celestial objects and seeks to preserve them in their natural state. However, despite some of the detailed provisions of this Treaty, it is considered a failed Treaty because none of the countries which engage in self-launched manned space exploration have ratified this Treaty and it has not generated more than a lukewarm response from the international community at large. As of 2014, only 16 countries have ratified it, rendering it practically insignificant in terms of actual space operations.[6]

It is imperative for the international community to give more importance to this rather under-appreciated sphere of law and recognize the future implications of space missions. The Moon Treaty in particular deserves to be ratified by the countries engaged in space missions and be given adequate weightage. Other areas of law such as commercial transactions, tax laws etc. need to be incorporated within the regulatory framework to deal with the complicated issues arising from future space exploration.

Notes:
[1] http://sputniknews.com/us/20150528/1022670095.html
[2] “DENNIS M. HOPE HAS OWNED THE MOON SINCE 1980 BECAUSE HE SAYS SO”. VICE. 11 April 2013. Retrieved 5 April 2014
[3] Outer Space Treaty of 1967
[4] http://www.gizmodo.in/science/Heres-Where-Well-Build-Our-First-Space-Mines-According-to-the-Miners/articleshow/47462808.cms
[5] Moon Treaty of 1979
[6] Status of international agreements relating to activities in outer space as at 1 January 2008 United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, 2008

The post Future Of International Space Law: Implications And Impediments – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s completion of the South Asia circuit demonstrates the importance of the neighbourhood in his government’s foreign policy. The improved perception of India in the neighbourhood, especially in Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, is a positive, but the neighbours must recognise that India’s federal structure makes decision-making slower and more difficult on issues that affect neighbouring Indian states like West Bengal and Tamil Nadu.

By Neelam Deo and Karan Pradhan*

Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Bangladesh on June 6-7 completes his arc of reaching out to India’s neighbours in South Asia.

But, for now, two exceptions remain—the Maldives, where former president Mohamed Nasheed has been imprisoned, and Pakistan. With both countries, India’s relations are at a low point. Despite these exceptions, the year-old Bharatiya Janata Party government has clearly demonstrated that India’s neighbourhood foreign policy is a priority.

This new focus has replaced India’s past reticence in engaging with its neighbours—a holding back that was misplaced, as is evident from the warm welcome given to Modi, both by the people and by the parliaments, in Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Bhutan.

With their enthusiastic responses, and the signing of numerous agreements and project deals, India’s neighbours too have made it clear that they prefer a proactive and supportive India—and that the alleged big brother of the past was a misapprehension.

Modi has also emphasised the importance of bipartisan support in his foreign policy by drawing in the leaders of the opposition—he met former president Mahinda Rakapakse of Sri Lanka and former prime minister Khaleda Zia of Bangladesh. Both meetings were reportedly “positive”, and a departure from the past—in March 2013, for example, Khaleda Zia had turned down an invitation to meet President Pranab Mukherjee.

During Modi’s visits, various agreements have been announced or concluded—including the June 2014 deal to develop hydroelectric power along with Bhutan and start the Kholongchu Hydro-electric project; the November 2014 $1 billion[1] agreement for Indian company SJVN to build a hydropower station in Nepal; and the assurance in March 2015 to develop Trincomalee as a petroleum hub. All of them signal that a positive approach on both sides can bring substantive gains for the neighbourhood.

India has also extended lines of credit ranging from $318 million[2] for the development of Sri Lanka’s railways, to $2 billion[3] to Bangladesh for improving rail and road connectivity. But clearly this is just a start—with tremendous potential for more if the governments of India and its neighbours avoid politicising the conversation, and remain pragmatic about the benefits of a cooperative approach.

This progress has been possible in part also due to a shift—brought about by changes in government as well as in perception—in the attitude of neighbouring countries towards India’s past actions. In Sri Lanka, for example, a memorial to the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) was constructed in Colombo in 2008 in memory of those who fought for Sri Lanka from 1987-1990.

Similarly, India’s contribution to Bangladesh’s Independence was recognised with the Award of Liberation War Honour, conferred on former prime minister Atal Behari Vajpayee during Modi’s visit; Indira Gandhi was similarly (posthumously) honoured in 2012. Bangladesh’s recent acknowledgement of India’s role in its liberation in 1971 is in contrast to its earlier dismissal of these efforts as New Delhi’s agenda to split Pakistan.

Taking further this process of building bilateral bridges, the line of credit extended to Bangladesh by Modi during his visit will augment the $800 million[4] of 2010 to build rail and road networks. Connectivity to and through Bangladesh is crucial for linking India to its Northeast and beyond into ASEAN countries through Myanmar. India’s maritime connectivity with its Northeastern states will also improve with the recent agreement to allow Indian cargo ships to use Bangladesh’s Mongla and Chittagong ports.

The ratification of the Land Boundary Agreement (LBA) after more than 40 years is an encouraging start, but both countries must now work consistently to address the problems created by a long unsettled border—smuggling, trafficking, and illegal immigration—in order to gain from the economic and people-to-people exchanges that can come from a cooperatively-managed border.

Modi will now have to strike a fine balance between the Centre and the states in India’s relations with its neighbours. This is an inescapable aspect of cooperative federalism—it is not possible to implement the LBA without the support of governments of the states where the Border Security Force will have to work to implement the agreement on the ground along with the local law and order authorities.

As a federation, the views of individual states in India may vary. For now, West Bengal chief minister Mamata Banerjee and the BJP-led opposition in Assam have agreed to the LBA. But the chief minister of Assam, Tarun Gogoi, is concerned that he and the chief ministers of Meghalaya, Tripura, and Mizoram—all states that also border Bangladesh—were not included in the prime minister’s delegation to Dhaka.

While the LBA, despite these difficulties, is moving forward, it will take even more balancing and time to accommodate the state governments in India on the crucial issue of sharing the waters of the rivers that flow into Bangladesh through the Indian states of Sikkim, West Bengal, and Bihar. The rivers impact the livelihoods of the farmers of both countries, and neither side is ready to cede ground.

Solutions to the process of water-sharing may emerge when the benefits of a fixed boundary begin to be apparent. For that to eventually happen, New Delhi must also consider Dhaka’s role in the water-sharing equations of the broader region, which includes China. Both India and Bangladesh are lower riparian countries (relative to China), and if both are united in taking up water-sharing issues with China, it may generate international support and a positive response from China.

On the question of trade, India must be sensitive to Bangladesh’s concerns about the deficit of over $ 5 billion[5], in a total trade relationship of $ 7 billion. India can, for example, invest in Bangladesh through an SEZ—as Bangladesh has offered—to start mitigating the deficit.

The Sheikh Hasina government’s positive response to India’s security concerns (it has repatriated separatists engaging in anti-India activities), among other measures, sets the stage for further cooperation. Over time, this can set the wheels in motion for sub-regional ideas, such as cooperation between India, Bangladesh, Thailand, and Myanmar on the security of the Bay of Bengal.

Progress can be made on the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor, which has been discussed for many years. The corridor requires an infrastructure build-out that will contribute to growth in the sub-regional economy, and, in time, expand Modi’s “neighbourhood first” policy to “Act East”, through Myanmar, with ASEAN countries.

*Neelam Deo is Co-founder and Director, Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations; She has been the Indian Ambassador to Denmark and Ivory Coast; and former Consul General in New York. Karan Pradhan is a Senior Researcher at Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations.

This feature was written for Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations.

[1] Reuters, Nepal gives Indian firm green light for $1 billion hydroelectric plant, Sharma Gopal, November 2014, <http://in.reuters.com/article/2014/11/25/nepal-energy-idINKCN0J908520141125>

[2] Reuters, Nepal gives Indian firm green light for $1 billion hydroelectric plant, Sharma Gopal, November 2014, <http://in.reuters.com/article/2014/11/25/nepal-energy-idINKCN0J908520141125>

[3] Times of India, $2 billion line of credit to Bangladesh to create 50,000 Indian jobs, Gupta Surojit, June 2015, <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/india-business/2-billion-line-of-credit-to-Bangladesh-to-create-50000-Indian-jobs/articleshow/47570507.cms>

[4] Asian Development Bank, Development Coordination, p.1, <http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/linked-documents/46168-001-dc.pdf>

[5] Hindu Business Line, Let’s mend fences with Bangladesh, Kibria Asjadul, August 2014, <http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/lets-mend-fences-with-bangladesh/article6367091.ece>

The post Bangladesh And Beyond – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Thousands of Syrian refugees trying to enter Turkey have been repelled by Turkish border guards as clashes flare up between Syrian Kurds and the ISIL (also known as Daesh) militants over the control of a town on the Syrian-Turkish border.

Turkish forces on Saturday used water cannon and fired warning shots to disperse massing refugees at a border crossing in the town of Akcakale in southeastern Turkey.

Eyewitnesses said Turkish forces pushed away Syrians who were waiting behind the barbed-wire fences. The new exodus has been triggered by escalated fighting between the Syrian Kurdish forces of the People’s Protection Units, also known as the YPG, and ISIL over the control of the Syrian town of Tal Abyad.

The YPG fighters announced earlier in the day that they began advancing toward the ISIL-held town, further penetrating into Raqqa Province.

Officials in Ankara had announced on Thursday that they will restrict the flow of the Syrians into the Turkish territory. The announcement came in the wake of the reported arrival of about 13,500 people from Syria over the past days. It was also against a declared policy of “open-doors,” under which Turkey has accepted 1.8 million Syrian refugees since the crisis began in the Arab country in 2011.

Turkish Deputy Prime Minister Numan Kurtulmus has said, however, that Turkey would only consider new entries in case of a humanitarian tragedy in Syria.

The battle over Tal Abyad has increased concerns about an unprecedented influx of refugees being stranded at the Turkish borders. The fighter jets of the so-called international coalition against ISIL is also assisting the YPG in the offensive, prompting fears of ISIL’s assault on civilians as a way of retaliation.

Syrian Kurds have already encircled ISIL in the town of Suluk, about 20 kilometers (12.5 miles) southeast of Tal Abyad, retaking 18 villages and eight farms in the vicinity.

Original article

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African-American adults — particularly women — are much more likely to know or be related to someone behind bars than whites, according to the first national estimates of Americans’ ties to prisoners.

The research, led by Hedwig Lee, University of Washington associate professor of sociology, reveals the racial inequality wrought by the U.S. prison boom, with potentially harmful consequences to families and communities left lacking social supports for raising children and managing households.

In an article published May 20 in the Du Bois Review: Social Science Research on Race, Lee and co-authors analyzed data from the 2006 General Social Survey, which involved about 4,500 respondents. They studied blacks and whites’ self-reported ties to acquaintances, family members, neighbors or people they trust in state or federal prison.

The data tell a grim story: 44 percent of black women and 32 percent of black men have a family member in prison, compared to 12 percent of white women and 6 percent of white men; Black women are far more likely to have an acquaintance (35 percent vs. 15 percent), family member (44 percent vs. 12 percent), neighbor (22 percent vs. 4 percent), or someone they trust (17 percent vs. 5 percent) in prison than are white women

The authors note that while research has considered the cause of the ‘prison boom’ and its effect on crime rates and on those imprisoned, the ‘spillover effects’ of that imprisonment trend have been elusive until now.

Lee said, ‘Our results extend previous research on connectedness to show just how pervasive contact with prisoners is for Americans, especially black women. We make visible a large group of women dealing with the consequences of having a family member in prison. Mass imprisonment has reshaped inequality not only for those in prison, but also for those intimately connected to them.’

The researchers write in the paper that it is likely that mass imprisonment has reshaped inequality, not only for the men ‘for whom imprisonment has become so common,’ but also for their families, friends, neighbors and confidants ‘who bear the stigma of incarceration along with them.’

Co-author Christopher Wildeman of Cornell University said the estimates show deeper racial inequities in connectedness to prisoners than implied by previous work.

‘Because imprisonment has negative consequences not only for the men and women who cycle through the system but also for the parents, partners and progeny they leave behind,’ Wildeman said. ‘Mass imprisonment’s long-term consequences of racial inequity in the United States might be even greater than any of us working in this area had originally suspected.’

In the past four decades, the U.S. incarceration rate has soared to the highest in the world. According to recent estimates, the U.S. imprisonment rate is 716 per 100,000 individuals, outpacing repressive nations such as Russia and well beyond other developed countries. Currently, one in every 15 adult black men is behind bars, compared to one in every 106 adult white men.

Lee said for future research along these lines, the team would like to examine how connections to prisons vary not only by race and gender, but also by class.

The post Nearly Half Of African-American Women Know Someone In Prison appeared first on Eurasia Review.

EU-funded researchers with the MAPPING project have developed a new observatory to monitor policies and projects that focus on the social and legal impact of the internet.

The MAPPING observatory will gather, organize and make publicly available information related to issues such as privacy, intellectual property rights and internet governance. By doing so, the observatory will avoid replicating and duplicating existing research work and allow interested parties to reuse this information free of charge.

Run from a dedicated website, it will also monitor relevant policy decisions and trends, such as the EU’s push for obtaining encryption keys from internet firms to counter terrorism.

The tool is a key deliverable of the MAPPING (Managing Alternatives for Privacy, Property and Internet Governance) project, launched in March 2014. The overall objective of the project is to achieve a better understanding of the many economic, social, legal and ethical aspects related to internet development, along with their consequences for the individual and society. The project brings together universities, research institutes, international organisations, NGOs and software companies.

MAPPING also aims to provide stakeholders with a forum for informed discussion on issues ranging from personal data and e-government applications to open innovation. For example, a roundtable event was recently organised covering the topic of ‘Privacy, Personality & Business Models’. Various experts from academia and the private sector shared their views on topics like technical and legal aspects of cryptography, antivirus standards, IT security legislation and new business models.

In the upcoming year the MAPPING consortium plans to pursue further dialogue online and offline, enabling an even wider range of relevant actors and stakeholders to come together in a multidisciplinary environment in order to tackle the most pressing issues of the digital transition.

The next major project event is planned for Autumn 2015, when the consortium will be organising the first General Assembly in Hanover, Germany. The team also hopes to publish the first results of the focus groups shortly.

Finally, MAPPING’s conclusions and recommendations will be compiled in a road map, which the team believes will help shape the future of internet technologies in Europe. For example, in order for the Internet of Things concept to become a reality, the boundaries of internet privacy need to be clearly defined and understood. There are hopes that the Internet of Things – a network of physical objects or ‘things’ embedded with electronics, software and sensors – will create a new world of benefits and market opportunities.

MAPPING is due for completion in February 2018.

Source: CORDIS

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Back on March 31, the US Department of Justice (DOJ) announced what many media reports heralded as a big rollback in the use of structuring allegations to justify seizing assets from individuals. Yet, here we are less than three months later with the DOJ prosecuting former US House of Representatives Speaker Dennis Hastert (R-IL) for two crimes — structuring and lying to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) about why he employed structuring.

Despite the DOJ’s March 31 talking points used to allay people’s worries about the US government punishing people for the nonviolent action of moving cash in or out of their own accounts in a manner the US government disapproves, the Hastert prosecution shows that business as usual continues at the DOJ. In fact, the willingness of the DOJ to undertake this very high-profile prosecution where there is no alleged crime beyond structuring and lying about structuring may well indicate an escalation in the US government’s structuring crackdown.

According to the DOJ, Hastert faces punishment of up to 10 years in prison and a $500,000 fine if he is convicted. It is thus hard to argue that Hastert is in a better position than the many people whose money has been seized because of structuring allegations but who can choose to just walk away with a significant monetary loss. Hastert’s legal bills are mounting to defend himself against the DOJ that can spend without restraint in pursuit of a conviction. Even if Hastert can beat the charges or make a deal so he can walk free, his financial loss will be very high.

Though allegations are flying that Hastert has committed “sexual misconduct” (criminal or not), none of that is used as a basis for his prosecution. Instead, as Conor Friedersdorf notes in The Atlantic, “The alarming aspect of this case is the fact that an American is ultimately being prosecuted for the crime of evading federal government surveillance.” “That has implications for all of us,” continues Friedersdorf.

Indeed, Ludwig von Mises Institute President Jeff Deist categorizes Hastert’s prosecution as part of the US government’s larger war on cash that puts Americans’ privacy and liberty in peril.

One of the great benefits of using cash for transactions is the anonymity it can provide, allowing, for example, buyers and sellers to keep their identities secret from one another and from the snooping eyes of third parties, including governments. But, this benefit from using cash is under attack in America. One of the primary means of attack is the US government’s practice of seizing cash from individuals who at one time move $10,000 or more in cash, or who engage in multiple actions that together move $10,000 or more in cash.

Carl Menger Center for the Study of Money and Banking President Paul-Martin Foss lays out in his article “The Kafkaesque World of Financial Reporting and Asset Forfeiture” the process by which American financial institutions — from banks to money wiring services — have been ratting to the US government on their customers’ cash activities. Foss explains how the US government has in turn used that information to seize large sums of money from people without the presentation of any proof that the individuals committed any crimes — other than moving their own cash. As Foss details, financial institutions are required to report all cash transactions of $10,000 or more via a “currency transaction report” as well as, via a “suspicious activity report,” all transactions of less than that amount that may be seen as “structuring” to avoid the $10,000 reporting threshold. Foss points to the enactment of a law nearly thirty years ago as putting this process into high gear by relieving financial institutions of all liability for their betrayals of customers’ privacy:

Because the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986 released banks from liability for reporting “suspicious” transactions to law enforcement, there is no reason for banks not to report your transactions to the government. They cannot be held liable for reporting too much of your information, but they could be prosecuted by the government for reporting too little information, if the government decides that suspicious activity was taking place and was not being reported. So to cover their own derrieres and keep from going to jail, banks report as much information on you as they can.

The result is the government seizing people’s cash though there is no proof whatsoever that the individuals did anything illegal aside from moving their own cash. The burden is then on the seizure victims to go through a difficult and often unsuccessful effort to regain their funds. The process to regain seized money can be very costly with high lawyer fees that may be impossible to pay because of the deprivation of the seized funds that started all the legal mess. As Foss notes, this is Kafkaesque.

Ron Paul Institute Advisory Board Member Andrew Napolitano relates in an April Fox News interview some of the absurd travails of dairy farmer Randy Sowers from whom the US government — through the Internal Revenue Service — is keeping nearly $30,000 dollars it seized from him based merely on the fact that Sowers deposited large amounts of cash from his farm’s sales in his own bank account. Going to the root of the problem, Napolitano explains that “the true culprit is the Congress that intentionally wrote these laws very loose so that the IRS does not even have to have any evidence that the structuring is unlawful; it could just be coincidental.”

Rachel Wiener describes more of Sowers’ predicament in the Washington Post. Initially, she relates, the US government had seized $295,220 from Sowers. That seized money was used against Sowers as leverage to pressure him to agree to allow the government to keep 10 percent. Wiener concludes that, three years after the seizure, Sowers has not gotten back any of that 10 percent “and almost certainly never will.” This puts Sowers in the same boat with many other victims of the US government’s seizures program. Wiener explains:

Based on Freedom of Information Act requests, the libertarian Institute for Justice has reported that the Internal Revenue Service has seized almost a quarter-billion dollars in such cases from 2005 to 2012, about half of which was never returned. A third of those cases, like the Sowers case, did not involve allegations of criminal activity beyond the structured deposits themselves.

Some hope for restraint in the US government’s pursuit of such cash seizures may seem to be offered by the issuing on March 31 of a new DOJ policy directive. The press release announcing the policy directive does have a promising title: “Attorney General Restricts Use of Asset Forfeiture in Structuring Offenses.” But, from past experience with DOJ policy changes supposedly restricting prosecutions of people complying with state medical marijuana laws and “equitable sharing” of property seizures with state and local police, we are well advised to be very skeptical of any DOJ announcements of limitations on policing or prosecuting powers.

While the DOJ received some media coverage heralding its March 31 announcement, a close look at the supposed rollback shows that it is illusory, amounting to little more than an appeal by the US government for us to just trust it to behave better.

Looking at what the policy directive says, its restrictions on asset forfeiture are underwhelming. A listing of a few of the significant problems with the supposed rollback follows.

First, to the extent the memorandum defining the DOJ policy directive includes restraints on asset seizures, those restraints only apply to seizures based on the allegation of structuring. The memorandum does not address, and thus leaves unrestrained, seizures arising from reports of deposits or withdrawals of $10,000 or more. It should go without saying that moving $10,000 or more in cash at one time is no more wrong and deserving of punishment than are several actions that over time add up to moving $10,000 or more in cash. Nevertheless, if you dare to move $10,000 or more in cash all at once, the memorandum does not offer you any hope whatsoever.

Second, the DOJ memorandum confesses no DOJ wrongdoing concerning any asset forfeitures it has ever undertaken or defended. Indeed, no concern whatsoever is expressed in the memorandum for victims of the asset seizures. The two introductory paragraphs of the memorandum make clear that the DOJ is in no way admitting even one instance, much less many, where its seizures based on structuring allegations were unjust. Instead, the policy announced in the memorandum is described as arising from the DOJ’s “ongoing review of the federal asset forfeiture program.” Consistent with this “housekeeping” explanation for the origin of the policy change, the memorandum declares that “The guidance set forth in this memorandum, which is the result of that review, is intended to ensure that our investigative resources are appropriately and effectively allocated to address the most serious structuring offenses, consistent with Departmental priorities.”

There you have it: The purpose of the policy change is entirely to promote DOJ efficiency in accomplishing its priorities. Those DOJ priorities are in no way changed by the policy directive. Liberty violations caused by asset seizures are not taken into account, and the priorities of asset seizure victims are not considered relevant.

Third, the DOJ memorandum continues to allow asset seizures based on nothing more than multiple cash transactions adding up to over $10,000. In the first paragraph of section one of the memorandum the Justice Department seems to be saying it is prohibiting seizing funds for structuring except when a criminal charge has been filed or “unless there is probable cause that the structured funds were generated by unlawful activity or that the structured funds were intended for use in, or to conceal or promote, ongoing or anticipated unlawful activity.” Even this language alone would leave incredible leeway for seizures as it allows the DOJ, based on its own assertion of probable cause, to seize funds without even having a court hearing at which the person whose funds are seized can argue his case. Further, the memorandum goes on to weaken even the internal affirmation that must be made in an asset forfeiture by stating that “For these purposes ‘unlawful activity’ includes instances in which the investigation revealed no known legitimate source for the funds being structured.” There you have it. The person whose cash is seized is assumed guilty until proven innocent.

Fourth, while the DOJ memorandum includes a promising general rule that cash seized based on structuring must be returned after 150 days if a prosecutor has not filed “a criminal indictment or a civil complaint against the asset,” that rule offers little real protection. Initially, this rule still allows keeping the cash with no court process even initiated for five months. The power to, on a whim, retain a person’s confiscated money for nearly half a year also gives the DOJ plenty of leverage to pressure an asset seizure victim to enter a deal allowing the US government to keep a chunk of the seized money, just like dairy farmer Randy Sowers did.

Further, the “protection” that kicks in after a victim has been deprived of his money for nearly half a year allows for the bypassing of the criminal system that can hold the government to higher burdens of proof. It also maintains the government-aiding fiction that the structuring of the cash itself is some sort of crime by terming the cash as the “defendant” in a legal action.

Even this rather weak protection can be entirely bypassed via an exception you can drive a truck through. Here is the exception: The cash can be kept forever if approval is obtained from the right higher up in the DOJ — a US Attorney or the Chief of the Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section (AFMLS) of the DOJ, depending on the circumstances. So, the DOJ has to go to a court after several months unless a DOJ manager says not to bother with that.

Fifth, the DOJ memorandum “graciously” mandates that settlements that might provide for the return of a portion of cash seized for structuring must comply with requirements found in two DOJ policy manuals. If you maintain high hopes that these manuals will protect the rights of cash seizures victims, you haven’t been paying close attention. The system is stacked in the government’s favor. This provision, like other provisions in the policy directive, mandates little to no improvement in how victims will be treated.

Sixth, the concluding paragraph of the memorandum makes clear that the DOJ is not bound by anything in the memorandum, noting that the memorandum “is intended solely as a guide to the exercise of investigative and prosecutorial discretion, and does not alter in any way the Department’s authority to enforce federal law.” And to put suspenders on the belt, the paragraph continues with a sweeping renunciation of the idea that the memorandum amounts to any change that any victim may rely upon, stating, “This memorandum is not intended to, does not, and may not be relied upon to create any rights, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by any party in any matter civil or criminal.”

The Hastert prosecution, however, is probably the clearest indication that the March 31 “rollback” is nothing more than public relations cover for the US government continuing its anti-structuring prosecutions, its asset seizures, and its larger war on cash. Initiating such a high-profile prosecution in direct conflict with the public relations message of the March 31 DOJ policy directive announcement is a pretty definitive way of saying “we really didn’t mean any of that rollback stuff.”

A real rollback, or even the total abandonment, of privacy and liberty violating policies comprising the war on cash can only be hoped for if public pressure for such a change increases instead of being mollified by government PR efforts.

The many Americans who despise Hastert for his activities in politics or alleged sexual misconduct should remember that in his legal battle against the DOJ Hastert is just another victim, like dairy farmer Randy Sowers and so many others, targeted for destruction by the US government. The government can persecute and steal from these individuals because it refuses to tolerate privacy from its prying eyes. If we want to end the US government’s war on cash, war on privacy, and war on liberty, how can we turn our backs on Dennis Hastert?

This article was published by the RonPaul Institute.

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On June 9, Joseph Hickman, a former guard at Guantánamo, posted the following tweet: “9 years ago today I was at Guantánamo Bay. Three detainees were murdered while I was on duty. All should remember those three men today.”

It was a poignant message, and a reminder of how, at Guantánamo, the years may pass but the injustices — horrible injustices involving unexplained deaths, torture and indefinite detention without charge or trial — remain or are inadequately addressed.

On June 9, 2006, as Joe Hickman pointed out, three prisoners died at Guantánamo — 37-year old Salah Ahmed al-Salami (aka Ali al-Salami), a Yemeni, 30-year old Mani Shaman al-Utaybi, a Saudi, and 22-year old Yasser Talal al-Zahrani, another Saudi, who was just 17 years old when he was seized in Afghanistan at the end of 2001. The Bush administration claimed that they died in a suicide pact, by hanging themselves, but that always seemed unlikely. How were men who were scrutinized incessantly supposed to get the materials to hang themselves and then do so without anyone noticing? And could it really not be relevant that all three men had been long-term hunger strikers, and a thorn in the side of the authorities at Guantánamo?

I wrote regularly about the men who died in June 2006 — on the second anniversary of their death, when no one in the mainstream media noticed, and in August 2008, after an official and unsatisfactory statement based on the NCIS investigation of the men’s death was released  — and then, in January 2010, came a dark and powerful revelation: “The Guantánamo ‘Suicides,’” an article in Harper’s Magazine by the law professor and journalist Scott Horton, based on interviews with former guards, including, in particular, Staff Sgt. Joe Hickman, who had been in charge of the guard towers on the night the men died, and who swore that the official story could not have been true. My immediate response to Horton’s article is here.

Hickman observed vans coming and going on the night in question, which, he thought, had taken the three men to another location — a secret site he and his colleagues identified as “Camp No” — where, he thought, some sort of torture session had gone wrong, and they had died. They were then returned to the main camp, where the suicide story was swiftly concocted by the authorities.

Two compelling facts also emerged to cast doubts on the official narrative: the men who died all had rags stuffed down their throats, which would have been impossible for them to do themselves — and was a detail that was suppressed in official reports — and another prisoner, Shaker Aamer, the last British resident in the prison, who is still held despite having been approved for release in 2007 and 2009, said that, on the night of the men’s deaths, he too was subjected to horrible abuse, and thought that he would die.

Scott Horton was eventually awarded a prize for his story, but it never led to an official inquiry. I and others continued to raise it over the years — in June 2010, I wrote Murders at Guantánamo: The Cover-Up Continues, in June 2011 I promoted the work of Jeff Kaye relating to the men’s deaths, in June 2013 I first coined the phrase “The Season of Death at Guantánamo,” and in June 2014 I covered additional information covered by Scott Horton.

However, it was not until January this year that it resurfaced in a notable manner when Joe Hickman’s account was published as a book, Murder at Camp Delta, which I spoke about in a radio show at the time, and mentioned here.

Below I’m making available the interview that Joe Hickman did with Jason Leopold of Vice News when his book was published, and check out Jason’s article, How Guantánamo Became America’s Interrogation ‘Battle Lab’, which looks at the book’s closing chapter, and its suggestions that Guantánamo was “the ideal long-term interrogation facility, a ‘battle lab’ where detainees would be subjected to untested interrogation methods and ‘exploited’ for their intelligence value in what turned out to be a massive ‘experiment.’” This was based on a report by the Seton Hall Law School in New Jersey, where Hickman now works — and is just one of many important reports produced since 2006.

Please also see the coverage on Democracy Now! and an article in Newsweek.

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The other deaths

The three deaths in June 2006 are not the only suspicious deaths to have taken place in the “season of death.” My very first articles, in May/June 2007, were written in response to the alleged death by suicide, on May 30, 2007, of a Saudi prisoner, Abdul Rahman al-Amri. Former prisoner Omar Deghayes later told me that al-Amri had been profoundly upset by the sexual harassment at Guantánamo — enough, perhaps, to lead him to take his own life — but Jeff Kaye (psychologist and journalist) later looked into the investigation into his death and found another murky story, as he did for Muhammad Salih (aka Mohammed al-Hanashi), another long-term hunger striker and agitator who died on June 1, 2009.

The sixth death in this period came on May 22, 2011, when Hajji Nassim (an Afghan known in Guantánamo — and only in Guantánamo — as Inayatullah), who was a prisoner with profound mental health issues, and was also a case of mistaken identity, committed suicide. In his case there is no reason to suspect foul play, but it is disturbing and disgraceful that a profoundly troubled man, who was not who the authorities pretended he was, died instead of being released.

That is also true of Abdul Latif, a Yemeni with mental health problems, repeatedly cleared for release, who died outside of the “season of death,” in September 2012, and it is also worth remembering the other deaths — Abdul Razaq Hekmati, a profound case of mistaken identity, who died of cancer in December 2007, and Awal Gul, an Afghan who died after taking exercise in February 2011.

It is, I think, rather bleakly remarkable that no one has died at Guantánamo since September 2012, but as the men age, and their ailments multiply, it must be the case that there is little room for complacency at the prison these days. One very ill man still held is Tariq al-Sawah, an obese Egyptian who was approved for release in February by a Periodic Review Board, and, in addition, an independent expert who was allowed to visit Shaker Aamer in December 2013 concluded that he has a host of physical and psychological problems and should be freed. The safest way forward for the administration would be to release the men approved for release — 51 of the remaining 116 men now held, including al-Sawah and Shaker Aamer — as swiftly as possible, and to review the cases of the others (all but the handful of men facing trials) to ascertain if there is any good reason why they too should not be released before they, in turn, become grim statistics at a prison that should never have existed.

The post Remembering The Season Of Death At Guantánamo – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Tens of thousands of Palestinians from across the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip headed to pray in the Al-Aqsa mosque compound for the first Friday of Ramadan, passing into Jerusalem with permits issued by Israel during the holy month.

As worshipers made their way to the holy site, Palestinian police were deployed near Israeli checkpoints to regulate traffic.

Israeli police spokesperson Micky Rosenfeld told Ma’an Israeli security forces were deployed according to standard security measures, although he said that forces were working in increased coordination.

Palestinian sources reported increased presence of Israeli forces at checkpoints and on Jerusalem street corners.

While Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza are subject to strict limitations on movement into East Jerusalem, part of the occupied Palestinian territories, Israel has historically made gestures ahead of and during Ramadan, partially easing restrictions.

This year Israeli authorities gave permission for the entrance of men above the age of 40, children under 12, and women of all ages. Nearly a quarter of a million worshipers from occupied East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and Israel are expected to perform prayers in the Al-Aqsa Mosque Friday.

The Israeli authorities also allowed 500 Palestinians from the Gaza Strip to travel to the compound via the Erez crossing.

Compounds and hallways of the mosque were crowded with worshipers Friday from all Palestinian cities and villages, as well as Muslims from other countries.

The announcement of eased restrictions this Ramadan came shortly after the director of the Palestinian Ministry of Endowment, Sheikh Azzam al-Khatib, told Ma’an that every Palestinian Muslim has the right to pray at the holy site during Ramadan, criticizing heavy Israeli restrictions on access.

“All the people of Palestine have the right to access the city and pray in the Al-Aqsa Mosque in full freedom without the need for permits,” he said.

Despite announcements that 400 Palestinian buses would be arranged to carry worshipers from checkpoints to Jerusalem Friday, the Ministry of Transportation has not received the necessary permits from the Palestinian civil affairs department, the Palestinian official Jamal Shqeir, told Ma’an.

Sources at the Palestinian liaison told journalists at the checkpoint 300 in northern Bethlehem that Palestinian buses may be allowed to carry people from city centers next Friday if more permits are issued.

If executed, the move marks the first time since the nineties that Palestinian-plated buses are allowed to travel directly to Jerusalem through checkpoints, according to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.

The post Thousands Pray In Aqsa Mosque For Ramadan appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Global decisions like the US pulling out of a treaty banning strategic anti-ballistic missile defenses are pushing the world towards a new Cold War, Russian President Vladimir Putin said. Military conflicts have a far lesser impact, he added.

“Not military conflicts but global decisions like the US unilateral withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty lead to a Cold War,” Putin said. “This more in fact pushes us to a new round of the arms race, because it changes the global security system.”

Putin made his comments at a key plenary session at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum.

The 1972 ABM treaty between the US and Soviet Union ensured that neither side tried to neutralize its foe’s nuclear deterrence by building an anti-missile shield. The US unilaterally withdrew from it in 2002, as the Bush administration claimed it needed protection from “rogue states” such as North Korea and Iran. Moscow believes that the US is actually building a global anti-missile system to undermine the defenses of Russia and China.

The Russian president’s comments came in response to a question whether he felt that the Ukrainian armed conflict was pushing Russia and the US towards a Cold War-like confrontation.

Putin warned the US against trying to use the language of ultimatums in its relations with Russia.

“The problem is that they are constantly trying to impose their standards and decisions on us with no regard to our interests,” he explained. “In essence they say: ‘we are better’ as if the US knows better what is good for us. Well, let us decide for ourselves what our interests and needs are as dictated by our history and culture.”

He accused Washington of meddling in Russia’s internal affairs and sticking to an arrangement that pits Russia either with America or against it.

“This is no dialogue. It’s an ultimatum. Don’t speak the language of ultimatums with us.”

Ukraine is another example of how the US is causing trouble by maintaining its arrogant approach to international politics, Putin said.

“They should not have supported the anti-constitutionalists’ armed coup that in the end led to a violent confrontation in Ukraine, a civil war in fact,” he said. “We are not the cause of all those crisis events that Ukraine is experiencing.”

The post Putin Says Unilateral US Withdrawal From ABM Treaty Pushing Russia Toward New Arms Race appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Rini Babu*

The phrase ‘Indo-Pacific’, which has been drawing significant attention of late, was first officially articulated in Australia’s Defence White Paper in 2013. In addition to being a geographical construct, the Indo-Pacific can also be seen as a changing network of nations. Against this background, it would be pertinent to ask why this term is gaining traction now and what roles are envisaged for India and China in it.

Both India and China have geo-political and geo-economic reasons for their interest in this spatial construct. Running countries as big as India and China demands energy, and this region has it in abundance.

India and the Indo-Pacific

Capt (Dr) Gurpreet S Khurana, Executive Director at National Maritime Foundation, in his article ‘Security of Sea Lines: Prospects for India-Japan Cooperation’ analyses the idea of the Indo-Pacific from an Indian perspective. He writes that as a regional or spatial concept, it serves India’s interests as a growing regional power.

It is clear that the present NDA government wants to revamp the Indian economy by attracting more foreign investments. Since the majority of its trade relations are through the sea, resolving the present and future maritime threats by giving more attention to the Indo-Pacific construct is of prime importance. India has declined China’s offer to join the latter’s Road and Belt project, as there are fears that it might be a means to contain India. Modi’s visit to India’s neighbouring Indo-Pacific regional nations, prior to his visit to China, implies not only the strategic importance of the region for India, but also shows how India wants to counter possible Chinese threats China in the Indian Ocean Region.

In keeping with the pragmatic nature of India’s foreign policy, the Indo-Pacific construct allows India to further enhance its Look East/Act East Policy. Australia’s strategic position in the region makes it important for India’s Act East Policy. Australia, in turn, in its attempt to balance its dependence on China, has signed new agreements for security cooperation with India. The insecurity India feels from the growing influence of China has led to intensified defence and security cooperation with Japan, Vietnam and the US, strengthened security ties with ASEAN, and deepening cooperation with islands in the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Modi’s recent engagement with the Indian diaspora in Australia, Fiji, Mauritius and South Korea was an attempt to highlight historical and cultural linkages, which is essential to increase India’s role in the region.

China and the Indo-Pacific

China has been drawn towards Indo-Pacific to satisfy its economic and energy requirements, like India. The US’ presence in the region has also contributed to China’s increasing interest in the Indo-Pacific. The Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP), a free trade agreement initiated by the US, excludes China and it has been speculated that this is an economic tool to contain China’s rise in East Asia.

The Indo-Pacific has many critical sea lanes of communication (SLOC) that are crucial for China’s energy transportation. China has long been using its strategies to reach out and find a permanent position in the Indian Ocean Region because the area is viable for long-term infrastructure development to reduce transport dependency through the Straits of Malacca. The availability of other choke points along these SLOCs, the Sunda Strait and Lombok Strait, which connect China to the mainland is also a contributing factor.

The similarities between India and China are not only in their size and population but also in their national interests. Both of them have a large economic drive: China to maintain its global position and India to increase its import surplus. Maritime security is also an essential to both. These reasons have led to both the countries investing time, energy and capital in the Indo-Pacific region.

* Rini Babu
Research Intern, IPCS

The post India, China And The Indo-Pacific – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Debalina Ghoshal*

In April 2015, soon after the negotiations in Lausanne, Russia decided to supply Iran with the sophisticated defence system, the S-300, a deal due since 2010. The deal had been struck in 2007 but owing to pressure from the West and thereafter, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1929 coerced Russia to cancel the deal. Though the Resolution did not include ground-to-air missiles, the move to cancel the deal was believed to aid the progress of the Iranian nuclear negotiations.

Since then, the deal has been mired in controversies. It was signed for US$800 million out of which Tehran immediately paid a sum of US$167 million. However, the system was never received. According to reports, Iran dragged this case to the International Arbitration Court of Geneval and also filed a $4 billion lawsuit against Russia.

The Lausanne talks in April 2015 are viewed by Moscow to have achieved a “substantial level of progress,” which has led to its immediate decision to sell the S-300s to Iran. This weapon system is believed to remove any scope of Israeli and also Saudi aircraft to bomb Iranian nuclear facilities and therefore, viewed by many as a game-changer. More so, this defence system is crucial since owing to Israeli and Saudi dissatisfaction over the Iranian nuclear deal has led the two to not rule out bombing Iranian nuclear facilities.

Why Now?

First, this is a step towards enhancing Russia-Iran military cooperation also viewed by the Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu as “a theoretical basis for cooperation in the military field.”

Second, the Russia-China-Iran nexus is growing as a counter against the North Atlantic Treaty Organiation (NATO). The Anti-Access Area Denial (A2/AD) strategy against the US is being implemented by China, Russia and also Iran. The missile defence system could protect Iranian weapon systems capable of deterring NATO states. The military cooperation is veiwed as Iran and Russia’s ability to counter the ‘expansionist’ tendencies of the US, especially in West Asia.

Third, the sale is also a response to the sanctions imposed on Russia following the Ukrainian crisis. The Russian economy has suffered due to sanctions, and defence sales would likely provide an impetus to its economy.Tehran has a budget of US$40 billion for modernising its army and hence, Russia could find this defence market lucrative. On Iran’s part, the S-300s will be a major relief for the Iranian air defence systems that have lagged behind in terms of development, considering the sanctions imposed the country.

Fourth, there are also other windows of opportunity for cooperation with Iran, especially, nuclear cooperation. Russia’s State-owned ROSATOM is already looking for a big stake in West Asia, and Iran’s nuclear ambitions would prove beneficial in this regard. Russia has played a crucial role in the Iranian nuclear programme; most recently, in November 2014, Russia signed a contract to build nuclear reactors in Iran.

Fifth, Iran is already an observer at the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) and may become a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) in the near future. Russia and China both are backing this, and the strengthening of relations between Iran and Russia would also strengthen the pillars of these two organisations.

Implications

The arms-race in West Asia is growing and with States in the region acquiring sophisticated weapon systems, this could aggravate. Additionally, reports have confirmed that Israel was willing to sell drones to Ukraine in 2014, which has been seen as a destabilising move by Russia. However, in 2014, Israel cancelled the deal. Israel reasoned this as the result of its neutrality towards the Ukrainian crisis, and also as a response to Moscow’s decision to not sell arms to Iran and Syria then. This Russian deal may coerce Israel to revert to its earlier decision. It could also result in an increase in arms supply to Ukraine by the US. Therefore, the domino effect in arms races may not be confined just to West Asia but also to Europe. Finally, the weapons may lead to proliferation concerns since Iran is reported to provide weapon systems to asymmetric organisations including the Hezbollah and the Hamas.

That said, the initial deal struck in 2007 was to avail of the older S-300 defence systems. However, Russia has stopped manufacturing these systems and has instead offered Iran the Antey-2500s, an advanced version of the S-300s. It is a matter of time before Iran reveals whether it is willing to accept the advanced version. If Russia’s desire to check US influence in Asia and Europe becomes more intense, it could lead to the sale of the S-400s which are technologically more advanced than the S-300s.

* Debalina Ghoshal
Research Associate, Delhi Policy Group

The post Russia-Iran: Why Is The S-300 Sale Significant? – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Is the West too focused on Ukraine and thereby diverting its attention from Russia’s attempts to consolidate its influence elsewhere? Just look at what’s happening in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, says Tracey German. Both territories are on the verge of being absorbed into the political and military structures of the Russian Federation.

By Tracey German*

As the conflict in eastern Ukraine enters its second year, international attention has been diverted from Russian involvement in the unresolved conflicts of the South Caucasus. The West’s focus on Ukraine has enabled Moscow to consolidate its position in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, signing alliance and integration treaties with both. In November 2014 Russia concluded a Treaty of Alliance and Strategic Partnership with Abkhazia, which came into effect on 5 March 2015, only weeks after a similar treaty with South Ossetia was concluded in February 2015. In a highly symbolic gesture, Putin formally signed the pact with the South Ossetian leader Leonid Tibilov in Moscow on 18^th March 2015, the first anniversary of the Russian annexation of Crimea. With the world’s attention focused on Russia’s activities elsewhere, both separatist regions are accelerating their move into the Russian orbit.

A tale of two territories

Both Abkhazia and South Ossetia have been de facto independent since fighting brief wars with Georgia in the early 1990s and have enjoyed enduring support from Moscow, which has used the unresolved conflicts to maintain political leverage over Tbilisi. Efforts to restore central Georgian control over South Ossetia in August 2008 triggered a Russian military invasion, jeopardising security across the unstable Caucasus region. With the majority of the South Ossetian (and Abkhazian) population claiming Russian citizenship, Moscow was able to cite concerns for the security of its citizens as a motive for launching a military operation on Georgian territory. Having secured the two regions militarily, Moscow took its political support one step further, formally recognising the independence of Georgia’s separatist regions at the end of August 2008. However, subsequent events have done little to reinforce this ‘independence’. Rather, Abkhazia and South Ossetia have become increasingly dependent on Moscow’s patronage, a situation reinforced by the recent treaties. One of the most significant provisions to be found in both documents is a clause stating that any aggression or armed attack against one party will be considered an attack against both. This acts both as a warning to Tbilisi and formalises what has been clear since 2008: Moscow is determined to obstruct any Georgian attempts to restore its territorial integrity and will respond to any such efforts.

There are some important differences between the two documents, however, reflecting the different positions of the two territories. The leadership of South Ossetia is content to increase its reliance on Russia, reflecting an understanding that the region would be unable to survive as a truly independent state (although there is still support for South Ossetia retaining its ‘independence’). The agreement signed with Moscow in March envisages the incorporation of South Ossetia’s armed forces, security agencies and customs authorities into those of the Russian Federation, and also includes a clause facilitating the acquisition of Russian citizenship for citizens of South Ossetia.

This is in contrast to Abkhazia, which is less keen to remain so dependent upon Moscow’s continuing patronage. Unlike South Ossetia, which, prior to 2008, had been seeking reunification with the Russian republic of North Ossetia, Abkhazia has always sought full independence, based on close political and economic integration with Russia. Since 2008 there has been growing unease in Abkhazia about its increasing reliance on Moscow, and its desire to remain as independent as possible was reflected in the final version of the treaty: the first draft was a Treaty of ‘Alliance and Integration’, whilst the version that was signed saw ‘integration’ replaced with ‘strategic partnership’, suggesting a mutually beneficial relationship between two equal partners. The first article of the treaty stresses the bilateral nature of the relationship between the two, which is to be based on mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity. The principal aims of the partnership are the development of a coordinated foreign policy (meaning, in reality, Moscow will oversee Abkhazia’s foreign policy) and the development of common security, defence, economic and social spaces. Nevertheless, Abkhazia will retain its own armed forces, which are to be modernised in order to ensure interoperability with their Russian counterparts. Furthermore, a Joint Group of Forces, comprising Abkhaz and Russian forces, will be established to repel any aggression against Abkhazia.

In a clear manifestation of the balance of power within the relationship, the Commander of this Joint Group will be a Russian with an Abkhaz as the deputy. Following the ratification of the treaty, there have been indications that Moscow is seeking to strengthen its control over Abkhazia, after a retired Russian general, Anatoly Khrulev, was appointed as the republic’s minister of defence. Although the appointment, announced in May 2015, was ostensibly made by Abkhazia’s de facto president Raul Khadjimba, the timing of the decision coincided with his return from a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin, suggesting that the choice was not Khadjimba’s alone. The background of the appointee was also instructive: Khrulev commanded Russia’s 58 ^th Army until his retirement in 2010 and was wounded in South Ossetia during the 2008 war.

The different positions of the two territories towards their relations with Moscow is highlighted in the length of the respective treaties, both in terms of the number of clauses and terms of validity: the treaty between the Russian Federation and South Ossetia only contains 15 clauses and is valid for 25 years, automatically extended for successive ten-year periods. Abkhazia’s treaty is far more complex, running to 24 clauses and is valid for 10 years, automatically renewed for successive five-year periods.

Russia and Europe

Russia’s decision to assist Georgia’s separatist regions and build up a strong military presence there, reflects the Kremlin’s wider efforts to retain its influence over the post-Soviet space, in this case by manipulating existing fault lines and using separatist conflicts as foreign policy instruments. Georgian President Giorgi Margvelashvili has described the treaties as annexation and criticised Russia’s ‘destructive’ response to negotiation efforts. However, Georgia is in a difficult situation — under growing pressure from Moscow, which continues to seek the disruption of relations between the West and states within the post-Soviet space. Strengthening its already strong relationship with the two territories presents the Russian leadership with further opportunity to thwart its southern neighbour’s Euro-Atlantic ambitions. As it stands, Georgia’s aspirations of NATO membership remain a distant dream, and other states in the region are wary of developing closer ties with the West, whose response to Russia’s increasing absorption of South Ossetia and Abkhazia has been muted.

In March, the EU reiterated its support for Georgia’s territorial integrity and its High Representative Federica Mogherini warned that the treaties risked undermining security and stability across the Caucasus region. With the ongoing insurgency in eastern Ukraine, unresolved conflicts in Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and Trans-dniestr, and instability in the North Caucasus, Europe’s eastern periphery is very volatile. However, European organisations such as the EU and NATO appear powerless to act. Despite a desire to stabilise and contribute to the security of the wider post-Soviet space through indirect means, they are deterred by Russia’s sustained influence, as well as a lack of consensus or clear long-term vision of how to engage states within what Moscow considers to be its ‘zone of privileged interest’.

*Dr Tracey German is a Senior Lecturer in the Defence Studies Department at King’s College. Prior to this she lectured at RMA Sandhurst and the University of Aberdeen, and worked as a research manager for a business intelligence company, specialising in energy security. She is a graduate in Russian from the University of Edinburgh and was awarded a PhD on the topic of Russia’s conflict with Chechnya. Her current research interests are the ongoing conflict in Chechnya, security in the Caucasus and Central Asia, and energy issues in the former Soviet states.

The post Russia And The South Caucasus: Exploiting Unresolved Conflicts – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Tunisia is shutting its consulate in the Libyan capital Tripoli, just hours after the news that its ten staff members abducted on June 12 by an armed militia were freed.

The announcement was made by Tunisian Foreign minister Taïeb Baccouche, in a statement aired by Radio Mosaique, specifying that the consulate staff will arrive today in Tunisia.

According to the radio, the Tunisian consulate staff was abducted by a group close to the Fajr Libya (Libya Dawn), the Islamist coalition that controls Tripoli, to obtain the release of one of their leaders Walid Glib, in prison in Tunisia.

Despite Baccouche denied any connection between the two episodes, Glib will be extradited to Tripoli in the next days, following a ruling issued Wednesday by the Tunisian judiciary.

Though not recognizing the Tripoli government, Tunisia had so far maintained relations with the Fajr Libya coalition through its consulate in Tripoli.

The post Libya: Tunisia Closes Tripoli Consulate, Staff Released appeared first on Eurasia Review.

The House of Representatives voted Thursday to repeal Obamacare’s medical device excise tax, the 2.3 percent tax levied on medical devices sold in the United States. The tax is certainly harmful. Whether it deserves the highest priority in repealing Obamacare, we’ll leave to discuss another day.

Although, repealing the medical device excise tax does nothing to repeal Obamacare. It just gives us a deficit-financed Obamacare. This is the second time the Republican-majority Congress has voted to increase deficit spending on health care this year, without winning any meaningful reform to any program.

With 46 Democrats joining the Republican majority, the votes in favor added up to 280, just 8 short of the number needed to override the promised presidential veto. We’ll see how it does in the Senate.

The bill was scored by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), which determined that it would increase the deficit by over $24 billion in the next 10 years. We seldom see explicit budget scores of individual Obamacare taxes. This score overlaps the original 2010 CBO score for four years, 2016 through 2019. Comparing the two scores (see Table 1) shows how much the tax’s estimated revenues have shrunk – 36 percent, from $12.7 billion to $8.1 billion over the period.

I’ve previously noted how Obamacare’s spending estimates have also dropped. We need a new, comprehensive CBO score of all Obamacare provisions, so we know what we’ll be tackling when it comes time to repeal and replace it.

The post Obamacare’s Shrinking Revenues: Medical Device Excise Tax – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Speaking to a global gathering of priests, Pope Francis signaled an openness to changing the date of Easter in the West so that all Christians around the world could celebrate the feast on the same day.

The Pope on June 12 said “we have to come to an agreement” for a common date on Easter.

His comments came in remarks to the World Retreat of Priests at the Basilica of Saint John Lateran in Rome. The event drew priests from five continents.

Noting jokingly that Christians could say to one another: “When did Christ rise from the dead? My Christ rose today, and yours next week,” he said that this disunity is a scandal.

The Orthodox churches normally celebrate Easter a week after the Catholics. Some Orthodox leaders have also reflected on the dating of the Christian holy day. In May, Coptic Orthodox Pope Tawadros II wrote to the papal nuncio in Egypt suggesting a common date for Easter.

Historian Lucetta Scaraffia, writing in the Vatican daily newspaper L’Osservatore Romano, said the Pope is offering this initiative to change the date of Easter “as a gift of unity with the other Christian churches.”

A common date for Easter, she said, would encourage “reconciliation between the Christian churches and …a sort of making sense out of the calendar.”

She noted that the proposal could help reinforce the identity of persecuted Christians, particularly those in the Eastern churches that are at risk of disappearing.

Scaraffia wrote that the simultaneous celebration of the Resurrection by all Christians “would increase the importance of the central feast of the faith in a moment when changes seem to be suddenly coming throughout the world.”

“The Pope’s remarks implicitly underscore an important fact: in the countries where Christian identity is being overshadowed, the marking of time continues to be tied to the life of Jesus,” she added. “We also know also that the calendar is not only a convention but also something profound and symbolically relevant.”

Scaraffia said Easter and related feasts “constitute a distinct aspect of the liturgical year because they are connected with a cycle of time that repeats every year and marks the returns of the seasons.”

She also pointed out that the date of Easter is established based on the cycle of the moon, just as the Muslims and Jews establish their important feasts with the lunar calendar.

The post Is Pope Francis Planning To Change Date Of Easter? appeared first on Eurasia Review.