By N. Sathiya Moorthy*

Now it turns out that President Abdulla Yameen is playing hide-and-seek with the appeal for clemency put forth by lawyer Hassan Latheef on behalf of jailed predecessor Mohammed ‘Anni’ Nasheed. Yameen’s side now says that Nasheed should have exhausted all legal options before approaching the president for clemency.

Spokesperson of the President’s Office, Ibrahim Muaz Ali, told Sun Media that “Yameen asked Nasheed to complete the appeal process.”

Given the stakes and sensitivities involved, it is inconceivable that the Nasheed team would have moved thus far on the clemency plea without some kind of an understanding on what to expect in response. The question thus remains if there was mis-communication from either side, or a wanton goof-up by any players involved, or is it yet another Yameen tactic to keep the opposition confused.

The larger question would revolve around the common credibility of the Yameen leadership in keeping promises. All through Nasheed’s trial in the ‘Judge Abdulla abduction case’, he has been distancing the Executive from the Judiciary, and had indicated that he could do something only after the judicial processes got over.

If there was not mis-communication or wanton goof-up at some quarters, it has been common practice across the world – including Islamic nations – that ‘clemency law’ applies only after all available judicial processes have been exhausted. It thus begs an explanation, how Nasheed, even while staying in prison, could have over-shot the constitutional process involved.

“Blairs” his guns….

Independent of the Nasheed clemency issue, President Yameen has been doing his bit of international PR work. Nasheed and his Maldivian Democratic Party (MDP) have been streets ahead in the department ever since the pro-democracy movement in Maldives commenced about a decade ago when president Maumoon Gayoom was in office. The Yameen leadership has since announced the appointment of ‘Omnia Strategy’, a legal and public relations outfit headed by Cherie Blair, wife of former UK prime minister Tony Blair, to “strengthen the legislative framework of the government”.

In a joint press statement, the foreign ministry and the Attorney-General’s office claimed that the hiring of London-based Omnia Strategy “underscores the government’s commitment to strengthen democratic institutions of the State and to promote a culture of respect for human rights in the Maldives, adhering to international norms, while retaining its unique character”. According to Minivan News, the foreign ministry “declined to reveal the cost and length of the contract or the details of Omnia Strategy’s work” in the country.

According to Minivan News, Omnia Strategy, which has recently opened an office in Washington DC, describes itself as a “pioneering international law firm that provides strategic counsel to governments, corporates and private clients…In addition to providing legal counsel, the company specializes in public relations. The firm advises the governments of oil-rich Gabon and Kazakhstan.”

‘Disgusting’, says MDP

MDP’s International spokesperson, Hamid Abdul Ghafoor has since described Cherie Blair’s decision to accept the Maldivian account as ‘disgusting’, at a time “the international community is united in its condemnation of the Yameen regime’s thuggery and un-democratic behaviour”. Ghafoor said, “It is unethical for Blair to work for this regime”. In hiring Blair, Yameen appears to have hired the most unethical and profiteering mercenaries money can buy. Is there anyone Blair won’t work for?” he has asked in a press statement.

For all this, the MDP has been silent on the Nasheed clemency plea even 24 hours after it made news. It’s inconceivable, however, that a popular and charismatic leader like president Nasheed could spend full 13 years in prison, and still expect the new generation, e-generation voter in the country at the time to remember him with the same fondness and hope as it has been since he hit the pro-democracy political trail.

The answer lies in between, but President Yameen’s response to Nasheed’s clemency plea should now be strengthened by all-round measures that show up the nation’s judiciary as independent and effective. For their part, the MDP too should stop riling the judiciary, as they have been doing, both inside and outside office. Therein may also lie the beginning of a ‘national reconciliation’, as ‘respect for institutions’ alone could begin making the change.

*N Sathiya Moorthy is Director, Chennai Chapter of the Observer Research Foundation. He can be reached at sathiyam54@gmail.com

The post Maldives: Yameen Blowing Hot-And-Cold On Nasheed Clemency? – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Sanchita Bhattacharya*

On June 7, 2015, a team of Detective Branch (DB) of Police arrested nine militants of the Bangladesh Jihadi Group (BJG) from capital city Dhaka’s Banashree and Sutrapur areas, while they were preparing to execute bank robberies. A huge quantity of bombs, explosives and books on jihad (holy war) were seized from their possession. While six of the arrestees – identified as Kazi Iftekhar Khaled aka Khaled aka Ifti, Fahad bin Nurullah Kashemi aka Fahad aka Kayes, Mohammad Rahat, Din Islam, Ariful Karim Chowdhury aka Adnan and Nurul Islam – were picked from the garage of a Banashree apartment, another three – identified as Mawlana Nurullah Kashemi, Delwar Hossain, and Yasin Arafat – were arrested from Sutrapur. Sanwar Hossain, Additional Deputy Commissioner (ADC, South Dhaka) stated that Rahat, Fahad and Khaled were experts in making bombs.

BJG is a platform comprising four militant organisations, Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami Bangladesh (HuJI-B), Ansarullah Bangla Team (ABT), Jama’atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) and Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HuT). Members of BJG follow the strategies of the international terrorist organisation, Islamic State (IS), as clearly declared from their official website: https://jihadbd2.wordpress.com, which also flaunts the infamous IS black flag, along with Jihadi literature and videos in Bengali. Although little information regarding the date and formation of BJG is available, the first post on its official Twitter account appeared on March 14, 2014. On Twitter, BJG is followed by 152 people; and the militants have, so far, tweeted 605 times. According to investigators, the arrested nine were planning to kill noted persons in Bangladesh after amassing money by robbing banks.

On April 21, 2015, suspected ABT cadres carried out a gruesome bank heist at the Kathgora Branch [in the Dhaka sub-urban area] of the Bangladesh Commerce Bank Limited, in which nine people were killed and 23 were injured. The dead included the bank manager and one of the robbers. DB arrested the alleged mastermind behind the bank heist, Mahfuzul Islam Shamim alias Suman, on May 31, 2015, and claimed that Shamim was one of the leaders of ABT and the robbery was conducted to raise funds for the organisation. ABT was banned in Bangladesh on May 25, 2015, but had first hit headlines with the assassination of anti-Islamist blogger Ahmed Rajib Haider, an architect and an activist of the Shahbag Movement which began on February 5, 2013, in Dhaka city. ABT is distinguished from better known Islamist extremist groups in Bangladesh by its propaganda and indoctrination capabilities. ABT projects its doctrine of jihad through 117 web pages, including Facebook and Twitter handles, and various blogs.

Although, data specifically related to Bank robbery is unavailable, the official website of Bangladesh Police provides Crime statistics, including robbery and burglary, since 2010. The data indicates that between 2010 and 2014, a total of 5,268 cases of robbery and 14,733 cases of burglary were registered. There is no separate aggregation of such incidents connected with terrorist organisations.

Meanwhile, referring to the June 7 arrests, ADC Sanwar Hossain stated on June 8,

We have received some alarming information by analysing the laptop. We found a 48-page research book that contains information on how to take control or hack the e-banking system. They made a list of banks having e-banking system and were assessing those that have relatively weak security measures… These militants are experts on technology. They encrypted all the information on the laptop for which we are facing difficulties to recover the data. We need the help of the latest techniques and technology mainly used by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to decode it. The militants were also collecting information on the activities of local and international law enforcement agencies.

According to a June 9, 2015, report referring to the same arrests, these terrorists had not only planned bank robberies but had also formed a ‘research cell’ to take control of the electronic banking (e-banking) system of several banks. Before being neutralised by law enforcers, the group was developing software to infiltrate the e-banking systems and change information about account holders, to have money transferred to their accounts or withdrawn using fake debit and credit cards. DB made these discoveries after interrogating the nine arrestees and analysing the laptop recovered from their possession. They also found software in the laptop that allowed users to withdraw up to BDT 25,000 against each credit card.

Indeed, according to DB sources, arrested terrorists asserted that they considered the money and valuables kept in banks to be “war spoils” and also believe that most of the banks in the country do not operate in accordance with the principles of Islamic Shariah and, consequently, looting them was not a religious offence. DB officials disclosed, further, that Kashemi met detained HuJI-B leader Mawlana Abdur Rauf in jail to chalk out the bank looting plans. During their meeting, Kashemi and others received direction from Rauf, who also asked them to carry on with other organisational activities. Abdur Rauf is a top HuJI-B leader and also a charge-sheeted accused in a case filed for the August 21, 2004, grenade attack on an Awami League rally.

A June 10 report further suggested that these terrorist outfits also planned to loot money from different Non-Government Organisations (NGOs), including the Grameen Bank. Sanwar Hossain argued, “Militants have decided this, since their traditional ways of collecting funds have shrunk thanks to monitoring of the Bangladesh Bank and law enforcement agencies.” According to DB, militants used to collect funds from different sources, including through “well-wishers” who believed in similar ideology. Funds also came from outside the country.

Interestingly enough, in the month of February 2015 the central bank of the country, Bangladesh Bank, had put banks in Bangladesh on maximum alert so that they could protect against being exploited to finance terrorism, following Prime Minister, Sheikh Hasina Wajed’s directive. On February 11, the Deputy Governor of Bangladesh Bank and Bangladesh Financial Intelligence Unit (BFIU) Chief Abu Hena Mohammad Razee Hassan told chief executive officers of all banks of the heightened alert, stating,

You will take the maximum caution so that your banks are not used for any kind of terror financing or by any terrorist for transactions… BFIU or Bangladesh Bank will conduct thorough inspection to see whether the branch officials are aware of the order. Taking into consideration the legal obligations as to whether the anti-money laundering and anti-terror finance mechanism is being applied properly, chief executive of the bank need get the compliance system of his bank evaluated by the internal control and audit department or by forming a separate team, if necessary.

Earlier, on February 5, Prime Minister Wajed had directed all banks and financial institutions to identify those who finance militant and terror activities. She had also called for strict monitoring of financial transactions carried out through banks to stop terror funding.

It is interesting to note that, since 2002, when the Anti-Money Laundering Act was promulgated, Bangladesh has been trying to curb the menace of terror financing. Responding to growing international pressure after 9/11, the Bangladesh Government had also formed a central and regional taskforce on January 27, 2002, to deal with money laundering and terrorist finance. Subsequently, a Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) was established within the Bangladesh Bank on May 16, 2007. A document titled National Strategy for Preventing Money Laundering and Combating Financing of Terrorism 2011-2013, outlines the Government’s present strategy to deal with the problem, and defines its mission, “To bring the anti-money laundering/combating of financing terror system and procedures of Bangladesh in full convergence with international best practice standards set by FATF and other multi-lateral forums”.

In November 2014, Bangladesh furthered regulatory steps by venturing into the NGO finance regulation. On June 3, 2014, Cabinet Secretary M. Musharraf Hossain Bhuiyan stated, “No NGO will be able to run its activities without taking registration from the NGO Affairs Bureau. No registration is required in case of individuals, but approval has to be taken from the Bureau… The proposed law has also a provision for punishment, cancellation of registration and imposition of fines for violating the law”.

The involvement of terror groups in e-banking fraud and bank robbery appears to be an act of desperation to collect fund for terrorism, as ‘traditional’ sources dry up, and the organisations suffer an acute resource crunch. Significantly, the official regulations on money laundering and NGO funding will substantially diminish the scope for terrorist and extremist formations to finance their activities.

Nevertheless, the coming together of various terrorist outfits under a single umbrella is an alarming development, particularly within the context of the present violent and polarlized political scenario in Bangladesh. Indeed, the formation of the International Crime Tribunal-1 (ICT-1) on March 25, 2010, with the objective of bringing the perpetrators of War Crimes of 1971 to justice, has sparked major turmoil and violence in the country. According to partial data collated by Institute for Conflict Management, since that date, at least 467 people, including 261 civilians, 27 Security Force personnel and 179 extremists have been killed, principally in acts of terror targeting civilians, or in street violence. The present initiatives to tighten the e-banking system and to harden the security shield for the banking establishments can be expected to be strengthened further, as the Hasina Government intensifies its enormously successful efforts against Islamist extremism and terrorism in Bangladesh.

* Sanchita Bhattacharya
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management

The post Bangladesh: Islamists’ Desperate Measures – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

The Economist recently highlighted the contrast between post-revolt Asian societies and Middle Eastern and North African societies in the woes of a pro-longed, messy and bloody transition that is pockmarked by revolt and counter-revolt, sectarianism, the redrawing of post-colonial borders, and the rise of retrograde groups as revolutionary forces.

Almost 30 years after they brutally crushed pro-democracy student protests, Korean police are projecting themselves as K-cops, the counterpart of K-pop, South Korea’s most popular cultural export and successful soft power tool. Korean police are largely today everything Middle Eastern and North African security forces are not.

Restructuring Korean police and ensuring that its legitimacy and credibility was publicly accepted was no mean task. Much like Middle Eastern and North African security forces, Korean police emerged from regime change as the distrusted and despised enforcer of repression that had brutally suppressed dissent, killed hundreds if not thousands, and tortured regime critics.

It took almost, a decade for the Korean police to launch deep-seated structural reform that gave substance to a public relations campaign designed to recast the force’s image and engender public trust. By contrast, transition in the Middle East and North Africa is in its infancy and given state and institutional resistance will likely take far longer than it did in Korea and Southeast Asia.

Even so, there are lessons to be learnt from the Asian experience in political transition that has progressed to the point where Korea is projecting its K-cops internationally as models of professionalism in crowd control and the management of protest. The Korean police force has ditched the use of tear gas in favour of the lipstick line, unarmed female officers deployed as a front line defense to defuse tensions with protesters. Big-eared cartoon mascots are ubiquitous on all the police’s insignia, including traffic signs.

The message underlying the approach to policing as well as the marketing campaign is as much driven by a desire to capitalize commercially on Korea’s success as it is by a desire to enhance the country’s prestige is the notion that policing in line with standards of freedom of expression, protest and dissent and adherence to human rights is more likely to ensure public order than brute force. Despite the fact that regimes in the Middle East and North Africa largely see heavy-handed repression of dissent as key to their survival, some like the United Arab Emirates and Oman, have engaged the Koreans’ advisory services in a bid to put a better face on what remain autocratic regimes.

The appeal to autocracies is that smarter policing reduces the risk of repression boomeranging with resentment of security forces becoming a driver of protest as it did for youth groups in Tunisia, Egypt and Syria. By the same token, the risk for activists is that failure to reform security forces in the immediate aftermath of the toppling of an autocrat by a popular revolt, could create the circumstances conducive to a reversal of hard-won political change. Early stage security sector reform would also help enhance the credibility of a post-revolt government and confidence in its sincerity and willingness to initiate structural changes aimed at breaking with the autocratic past.

Failure to reform security forces in Egypt was at the heart of the reversal of the gains of anti-government protests in Egypt in 2011 that toppled President Hosni Mubarak. The police and security forces two years later played a major role in persuading the military to overthrow Mohammed Morsi, Egypt’s first and only democratically elected president, and introduce a dictatorship even more repressive than that of Mr. Mubarak.

Political scientist Terence Lee in his recently published study of military responses to popular protests in authoritarian Asia used the examples of the brutal repression of protest in Korea in 1987, Burma in 1998 and a year later on Beijing’s Tiananmen Square to argue that the military is the ultimate arbiter of whether a popular revolt will succeeds. In doing so, Mr. Lee appears to assume that the role of the role of the military and security forces is interchangeable. That may be true for Asian countries like China and Myanmar where police, security forces and armed forces are effectively branches of the military.

In the Middle East and North Africa where the military and law enforcement are separate entities with different vested interests, protesters need to play one against the other and adopt different post-revolt strategies towards each of them. The need for differentiation is reinforced by the fact that Middle Eastern and North African leaders irrespective of whether they hail from a dynasty or the military distrust their armed forces.

To maintain control, Middle Eastern and North African rulers have adopted strategies towards their militaries ranging from emasculation; provision of economic perks; reliance on elite units populated by members of the ruler’s tribe, clan or family; hiring of mercenary forces; to the creation of parallel armed forces that keep each other in check. Ironically, if Myanmar were in the Middle East or North Africa it would have been in category of its own as the only autocracy ruled directly by the military in uniform.

The flip side of the rulers’ different strategies is that not all Middle Eastern militaries are likely to act as monolithic units in case of a popular challenge to the regime as was the case in Tunisia and Egypt — and Myanmar in the case of Southeast Asia — or contain a reformist faction strong enough to swing the balance against an autocrat like happened in the Philippines and Indonesia or Syria, Yemen, and Libya, Arab countries where the military was built around tribe, sect and clan, have in the wake of mass protests descended into civil war or anarchy.

For protesters, forging an alliance with the military is a double-edged sword particularly in the aftermath of the toppling of an autocrat when the interests of demonstrators and soldiers diverge. Protesters run the risk of being marginalized because they are ill-equipped and don’t have the time and wherewithal to make the transition from contentious street politics to power and backroom electoral politics.

In a perverse way, Tunisians owe the fact that their country emerged from the wave of Middle Eastern and North African protests several years ago as the only relative successful democratic transition to their ousted ruler, Zine El Abdeine Ben Ali. Under Mr. Bin Al, who rose from the ranks of the security forces, the military saw its budget significantly reduced, its manpower downsized and its top leadership side lined, if not physically eliminated.

As a result, the interests of the militaries in Tunisia and Myanmar were not dissimilar. In Tunisia, marginalization meant that the military had a vested interest in a change of regime that would dismantle the security force state. In Myanmar, liberalization albeit with retention of some degree of behind-the-scenes control was needed to eliminate the cost of international isolation for the nation and the ruling generals themselves.

In Egypt, Mubarak’s effort to create a dynasty of his own by grooming his eldest son as his successor posed a threat to the military. Not only was he a man who had not risen in the ranks of the military, he was a neo-liberal that threatened the statist interests of the military, the largest force in the Egyptian economy.

Alliances in political transition between militaries and activists tend to be short-term and short-lived. That is evident from the transitions in both Southeast Asia and the Middle East and North Africa. The interests of the two diverge as soon as an autocrat has been toppled.

For the militaries in for example Myanmar and Egypt, change was not about the ideals of the revolt, but about restructuring an autocratic system in ways that ensured that their vested interests were protected. Myanmar appears to be a process of two steps forward, one step backwards. Egypt has been one of regression that led it from military rule to the election of the country’s first democratically chosen president to a military coup against him and the rise of a repressive regime that makes the Mubarak era look benign.

There are no easy solutions to the management of post-revolt diverging interests. Popular forces do not have the time or the experience to make a quick and effective transition from contentious street politics to the backroom dealings of power or electoral politics. That is true even if layers of civil society that had developed over time in countries like Myanmar played a key role in forming an opportunistic alliance with the military. It is certainly true in the Middle East and North Africa where the main drivers of the revolt often were not the usual suspects – workers and trade unions or political groupings and parties-but what sociologist Asef Bayat called social non-movements like for example soccer fans.

Acknowledging the post-revolt divergence of interests however does not answer the question why countries like the Philippines and Indonesia were relatively successful in making a political transition towards democracy irrespective of how imperfect those democracies may be. Lee boils the answer down to what he calls increased personalism of the autocrat as well as within the Philippine and Indonesian militaries.

In Lee’s view the popular revolts provided an opportunity for some senior officers unhappy with the emergence of military personalities and the personalization of their country’s autocracy to hitch their political ambitions to those of the protesters. That may indeed be true for the individual motivations of dissenting officers. It explains dissatisfaction within the military with Marcos’ interference in appointments and promotions. Lee is also right in his observation that in Asia the militaries remained loyal to the autocratic regime like in Burma in 2007 and on Tiananmen Square because there was an absence of personalism.

Yet, the aspirations and gripes of individual officers can only be part of the picture and not all autocrats interfered with military appointments. In fact, a majority of autocrats in Asia, the Middle East and North Africa did or do not.

Similarly, the fact that Marcos failed to build institutions that would have fortified autocracy fails to provide a satisfactory answer. Neither does the fact that senior military officers close to General Suharto enjoyed political and economic perks that others in the command did not. Libya’s Colonel Moammar Qaddafi and Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh also avoided embedding their authority in institutionalized power sharing.

By the same token, Suharto’s tactic of divide and rule resembles those Arab militaries that were organized around a core of elite units bound by tribe, clan or family as was the case in Syria, Libya and Yemen. The difference was that the disenfranchised in those militaries were not members of the tribal, clan or family elite that uniformly benefitted from the autocrat’s perks but the military’s rank and file. As a result, the interests of the military’s command and key units and those of the regime remained in sync in times of domestic political crisis. The defection of senior officers or even key units in Syria and Yemen during the recent uprisings and subsequent violence do not fundamentally question that notion.

The cases of the Philippines and Egypt demonstrate moreover that the military’s relationship with its US counterpart plays an important role. In both the Philippines and Egypt, a US decision to drop Washington’s support of the autocrat influenced military thinking, The relationship with the US was important to the Egyptian military given that it was independent of and not supervised by the Mubarak government. The military relied on annual US aid to the tune of $1.3 billion and arms deals that satisfied its appetite for arms and equipment and underwrote the armed forces’ military industry.

As a result, the notion of personalism as an impetus for militaries to embrace political change leaves unanswered the question why personalism that characterizes Middle Eastern and North African autocracies has not played a role in attitudes of the military or key segments of Middle Eastern and North African militaries.

One difference between Asia and the Middle East and North Africa is the concept of neo-patriarchy developed by the late Palestinian-American scholar Hisham Sharabi that serves to popularize autocratic personality cults. In Sharabi’s analysis, Middle Eastern and North African autocrats unlike their Asian counterparts with North Korea as an exception positioned themselves as authoritarian father figures who franchise their authoritarianism throughout the society. The autocrat is the father of the nation who sits on top of a pyramid of authoritarian fathers such as the head of government, the provincial governor, the village head and the paternalistic head of the nuclear family.

In characterizing Asian autocracies, Lee draws a distinction between two kinds of autocracies: ones that are built around the person of the autocrat and ones that are built around a sharing of power by underlying institutions. In Lee’s view, autocrats who build their power around themselves like in the case of Marcos and Suharto are more prone to the risk of the military siding with protesters.

That theory seems to be invalid in the Middle East and North Africa where except for perhaps in the case of Iran power sharing is not the norm. More frequently there is deliberate competition between institutions like in the case of Syria’s multiple security services that is designed to keep various forces in check.

Attempting to develop a conceptual framework that enhances frameworks developed in recent decades and explains why, when and how militaries turn against the autocratic status quo and opt for political change is important not only as a key to understanding developments in the Middle East and North Africa and predicting of the role of militaries in popular revolts but also to deepening knowledge about civil-military relations.

The contrast in the analysis of Asia as opposed to the Middle East and North Africa is stark.

Intellectuals and scholars accepted until the eruption of popular revolts in 2011 the notion that the Middle East and North Africa were exceptional in their autocratic resilience and stability.

“Academics directed their attention toward explaining the mechanisms that Arab states had developed to weather popular dissent… We in the academic community made assumptions that, as valid as they might have been in the past, turned out to be wrong in 2011… Academic specialists on Arab politics, such as myself, have quite a bit of rethinking to do… Explaining the stability of Arab authoritarians was an important analytic task, but it led some of us to underestimate the forces for change that were bubbling below, and at times above, the surface of Arab politics,” wrote political scientist and Gulf scholar F. Gregory Gause III.

By contrast, Asia became the hand maiden of contemporary concepts of protest with the Philippines in 1968 coining the phrase, people power.

Other factors that influence the attitudes of militaries towards popular revolts and highlight differences between Asia and the Middle East and North Africa are national identity, the role of regional powers, and donor support of civil society in autocratic societies.

As a summary outline, national identity in the Middle East and North Africa has proven to be far more fragile and contentious than in Southeast Asia. That has raised the spectre of a redrawing of borders in the Middle East and North Africa and the emergence of new states based on ethnicity or sect.

That is not to say that national identity is not a factor in Asia. Yet, Singapore traumatized by its departure from Malaysia has successfully managed communal relations while identity politics remain prominent in Malaysia itself as well as in Myanmar and southern Thailand. Nonetheless, unlike the Middle East and North Africa, Southeast Asian nations are not looking any time soon at a redrawal of their borders.

Similarly, transition in Southeast Asia benefited from the absence of regional powers like Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Egypt, all of which sought and seek to impose their will on other countries in the region.

Finally, Arab autocrats with Egypt in the lead successfully restricted donor aid to civil society organizations in ways that their Southeast Asian counterparts appear not to have.

All of this, amounts to a first tentative stab at developing an agenda for research that would enhance scholarly and policy understanding of the why, when and how of the role of militaries in processes of political change. Southeast Asia and Korea have the benefit of hindsight. The Middle East and North Africa is a messy and bloody work in progress.

The post A Study In Contrasts: Militaries In Political Transitions In Asia, The Middle East And North Africa – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Sanghamitra Kalita*

Over the last decade, many scholars and analysts have assessed the emergence of India as a major global player in the context of military capabilities, economic growth and political dynamism. This has often resulted in the overlooking of India’s credentials for developing its soft power existing in the form of culture, values and policies. This new form of power called ‘soft power’ has gained credence in International relations discourse in the post-Cold War era.

The term ‘soft power’ which was coined by Harvard University Professor Joseph Nye, is the ability to obtain what one wants through attraction rather than coercion or payments. The smart power, according to Nye, is the combination of hard power and soft power. The concept of power is the mainstay of the traditional approaches to security studies in International Relations. Power is the ability of actor A to influence the behaviour of actor B to get the outcomes one wants. The behaviour of a state can be affected in three main ways: threats of coercion (“sticks”), inducement and payments (“carrots”), and attraction that makes the other want what you want.

The outcomes of soft power can be achieved by a particular country in world politics when other countries want to follow it, admiring its values and aspiring to its level of prosperity and openness. Therefore, it becomes pertinent to set the agenda straight and develop good communication between the states. The effects of soft power are long lasting but the results are not as immediate as hard power. India has an enormous potential to tap its soft power credentials. Former minister of state for external affairs during the United Progressive Alliance II (UPA) regime, Shashi Tharoor, has been vocal in support for India’s soft power approach. He has argued that the past classification of major power status has become archaic and India’s strength lies in its soft power. The point of argument lies in the fact that India may lag behind other great powers like US or China in respect to military capabilities and economy but it always had a ‘better story” to tell to qualify as a global power. The attractiveness towards India is showcased through the components of soft power which may be as diverse as Bollywood, yoga, ayurveda, political pluralism, religious diversity and openness.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi has been relentless in his efforts to reposition India’s image as a major global player through his active diplomacy and also attempted to rebrand India with its philosophical and religious traditions in his foreign policy agenda. Yoga has been instrumental in this direction to promote India’s image as a global thought leader, a Vishwa Guru, or guru of the world. Modi’s pitch for making yoga a global phenomenon was witnessed last September when addressing the UN General Assembly, he described yoga as “India’s gift to the world” and successfully lobbied the forum to declare June 21 as World Yoga Day. This global recognisation of yoga will indeed enhance Prime Minister Modi’s efforts to make yoga as an instrument of his soft power diplomacy. A separate ministry called the Ministry of Ayush was formed last year which looks after Ayurveda, Yoga and Naturopathy, Unani, Siddha and Homoeopathy.

The ancient practice of yoga has gained worldwide admiration and recognisation and has become a source of India’s soft power. Many names who have popularised yoga in Europe and America that comes to mind are Paramhansa Yogananda, B.K.S. Iyengar, K. Pattabhi, and T. K.V. Desikachar. The mushrooming of yoga centres in several parts of the world is indeed a testimony to its popularity. Yoga has also gained popularity among many Hollywood and Bollywood celebrities.

India celebrated its first International Yoga Day on June 21 with full fervour and enthusiasm. The prime minister himself graced the occasion by performing several asanas (yoga exercises) at Rajpath, Delhi along with a gathering of nearly 36,000 people. External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj was in New York to commemorate the occasion at the UN Headquarters along with UN Secretary General Ban ki-Moon, President of the General Assembly Sam Kutesa, Indian spiritual leader Sri Sri Ravi Shankar and several other diplomats. She reiterated the fact that the UN’s decision to commemorate the International Day of Yoga underlines the appreciation for India and its growing soft power.

Tens of thousands of yoga practioners and enthusiasts across the globe took to their mats in a symbol of universality of the ancient Indian discipline as they marked the first International Day of Yoga. The day also marked the setting of two new Guinness World Records, for the most individuals practicing yoga in Rajpath, Delhi which turned into “Yogpath” in the words of the prime minister, and for the largest number of nationalities in performing the exercises at a single venue.

There are many challenges in this direction as many minority religious groups have dubbed it as a Hindu religious act and as a conspiracy of the state to impose its Hindutva agenda. But the UN General Assembly resolution has vehemently disproved these ideas and reaffirmed the holistic significance of yoga for the physical, mental, and spiritual well-being of all individuals.

*Sanghamitra Kalita, Jawaharlal Nehru University Research Scholar, CCUS&LAS, SIS. She can be reached at sanghamitra082@gmail.com

The post Yoga As Soft Power: Rebranding India’s Global Image – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Despite Washington’s efforts to persuade its Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) allies that a comprehensive nuclear agreement with Iran would serve their long-term interests, most Gulf Arab monarchs remain far from sold. In addition to economic concerns about the potential reintegration of Iranian gas and oil into global markets, the GCC fears that a thaw in U.S.-Iran relations will diminish the council’s strategic value to Washington.

Under the leadership of King Salman, the kingdom has assumed an increasingly hawkish posture aimed at countering Iran’s regional influence. As Riyadh doubles down its support for militant Sunni Islamist extremists (including the al-Qaeda-affiliated Jabhat al-Nusra) fighting the Tehran-backed regime in Damascus, Washington’s incoherent Syria policy seems to prioritize countering Daesh (“Islamic State”). Despite Washington’s rhetoric and its sponsorship of so-called “moderate” anti-Assad militants on Syria’s battlefields, recent jihadist gains in Syria are prompting the Obama Administration to further question the wisdom of pushing for regime change in Damascus.

Washington and Riyadh’s differing perspectives on Iran’s nuclear program and Syria’s civil war have heightened tensions in an already turbulent relationship dating back to September 11, 2001. At the center of the tension are Riyadh’s concerns about Iran’s alleged hegemonic aims in the region and resentment of the Obama Administration’s efforts to shift Washington’s Iran policy away from “containment” toward “limited engagement.”

Despite Saudi Arabia’s anger, Riyadh appears relatively powerless to dissuade Washington from making diplomatic overtures to the Islamic Republic. While the kingdom has significantly deepened its economic ties with China as a means of limiting dependence on the U.S., neither China, nor any other world power, can be expected to replace Washington as Saudi Arabia’s main military partner. Regardless of whether the P5+1 and Iran reach a comprehensive nuclear agreement, the GCC will remain within Washington’s geopolitical orbit. A case in point is Saudi Arabia’s ongoing war in Yemen, which has been sustainable solely due to U.S. support in the form of in aerial refueling, intelligence sharing, and logistics.

Saudi Arabia’s Shifting Foreign Policy

Following the 2011 Arab uprisings, King Salman’s predecessor, King Abdullah, actively countered democratic opposition factions associated with the Muslim Brotherhood in several countries. From Riyadh’s perspective, the Muslim Brotherhood – a grassroots movement that embraces political activism, social justice, democratic institutions, and champions a competing version of Islamic rule – represented an existential threat to the ruling family’s legitimacy, its self-anointed divine right to rule, and its role as custodian of Islam’s two holy cities of Mecca and Medina.

In contrast to other Arab states (Bahrain, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, and Tunisia) with legislative bodies, in which Islamist parties hold seats, democratic institutions do not exist in Saudi Arabia. The rulers in Riyadh viewed forward-thinking, democratic-oriented Islamists as a threat to Saudi Arabia’s authoritarian political model, which is intolerant of dissent and demands full obedience from its subjects.

Back in the 1960s and 1970s, the kingdom provided support and sanctuary to the Muslim Brotherhood members who fled the deadly anti-Islamist crackdowns waged by Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt and Hafez al-Assad in Syria. During this period of the Cold War, Riyadh viewed the Muslim Brotherhood as an ally against Communism, socialism, and Arab nationalism in the Muslim world. The kingdom hosted religious charities (including the Muslim World League and the World Assembly of Muslim Youth) of which the Muslim Brotherhood played crucial roles. During the 1980s, the Saudis utilized international networks that the Muslim Brotherhood established to fuel the flow of young Muslim fighters and weapons into Afghanistan throughout the Soviet invasion and occupation.

However, relations between Riyadh and the movement soured following the Gulf War (1990-1991), during which the Brotherhood supported Saddam Hussein and condemned the ruling Al Saud family for backing a U.S.-led military campaign against a Muslim country.

The kingdom’s crackdown on the group intensified following the Arab revolts of 2011 due to grave concerns that the Brotherhood’s growing influence in Egypt and elsewhere could mobilize the kingdom’s subjects to challenge the monarchy’s political establishment. Last year, Saudi Arabia joined the UAE and Egypt in labeling the Muslim Brotherhood a “terrorist” organization.

Despite this crackdown, the Muslim Brotherhood’s message (anti-corruption, rejection of U.S. foreign policy, and promotion of social justice) has significant support within the Saudi population, according to a poll commissioned by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

The kingdom’s fears of the Muslim Brotherhood were perhaps most underscored by the tension that mounted between Saudi Arabia and Qatar, which provided extensive moral, financial, and diplomatic support to the movement’s regional branches. In March 2014, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the UAE withdrew their ambassadors from Doha as punishment for the Qataris’ backing of the Brotherhood in Egypt and other countries.

Saudi Arabia even threatened to impose a land and sea blockade on Qatar before returning its ambassador to Doha last November. Less than one week after the July 2013 coup d’état, Riyadh offered $5 billion to the Egyptian military, further underscoring Saudi Arabia’s commitment to counter the Islamist party that had gained power in Egypt’s first democratic election.

Early in his reign, however, King Salman began easing Riyadh’s tensions with the Muslim Brotherhood. One of the first signs of this evolving position came in February when Ahmed al-Tuwaijri (a former member of Saudi Arabia’s Consultative Assembly) declared that it was “completely unreasonable” to designate the Brotherhood a terrorist group. Tuwaijri was asked about an interview given by then-Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal, who explained that Riyadh had “no problem” with the Muslim Brotherhood, despite having followed Cairo’s lead the previous year in designating the movement as a terrorist organization. In response, Tuwairjri went so far as to call the Brotherhood Saudi Arabia’s “natural ally” and sought to justify the labeling of the group as a terrorist organization on the grounds that there was a complicated “linguistic context” behind last year’s designation.

Since January, the kingdom has also improved relations with Hamas (a Muslim Brotherhood offshoot) and al-Islah (the Yemeni Muslim Brotherhood branch), both of which have historically troubled relations with Riyadh. Analysts contend that Riyadh’s embrace of Muslim Brotherhood offshoots must be understood within the context of Saudi Arabia’s efforts to establish a pan-Sunni order to counter Iranian-influenced actors in Yemen and other Middle Eastern hot spots. Indeed, having received support for “Operation Decisive Storm” from Hamas and al-Islah, King Salman’s overtures to the Muslim Brotherhood appear to have paid off politically.

In a further move, Riyadh has also officially embraced more extreme Sunni Islamists in the region. Last month a source in Saudi Arabia’s ruling family admitted that Riyadh was working with Turkey and Qatar to back Jaish al-Fatah (“Army of Conquest”) in Syria, marking a significant shift in foreign policy strategy. Jaish al-Fatah is an Idlib-based jihadist coalition dominated by Jabhat al-Nusra and other Sunni Islamist militias, including Ahrar al-Sham, Jund al-Aqsa, Harakat Ahrar al-Sham al-Islamiya (HASI), Faylaq al-Sham, and Ajnad al-Sham.

At the same time, Saudi Arabia’s commitment to defeating Daesh in Iraq and Syria has become increasingly questionable as Riyadh’s voiced concerns about Iraq are more focused on the central government’s relationship with Tehran. Most experts agree that King Salman has prioritized Saudi Arabia’s military campaign in Yemen above efforts to help NATO powers and other Arab states defeat Daesh. Despite the clear and eminent threat that Daesh poses to the kingdom, a number of Saudi Arabians consider the group an effective bulwark against Iranian influence in Iraq and Syria, which Riyadh perceives as a graver threat.

Riyadh’s turnabout regarding Jabhat al-Nusra is likely driven by an understanding that the organization is better poised to gain influence in Syria than other factions fighting the regime in Damascus. This reality was underscored in March, when Idlib fell from the regime’s control to Jaish al-Fatah, marking the second provincial capital to fall from Damascus’ control, the first being Raqqa in March 2014. After Jaish al-Fatah seized control of the entire province the following month, the group’s fighters carried out a massacre in the village of Qalb Lawzah, which targeted the Druze, a religious minority with ancient roots in Syria.

In sum, to achieve its geopolitical objectives of overthrowing Iran’s ally in Syria and crushing the Houthi Zaiydi Shi’ites in Yemen (regardless of whether either of those goals are realistic), Riyadh has concluded that joining Ankara and Doha in supporting Jaish al-Fatah, while improving relations with the Muslim Brotherhood, best advances Saudi Arabia’s strategic objective of countering Iranian influence in the Arab world.

Implications for U.S.-Saudi Relations

U.S. officials are alarmed by Saudi Arabia’s support for Jaish al-Fatah. Whereas Washington’s limited support for militants in Syria is geared toward “moderate” rebels fighting Daesh, Riyadh remains focused on efforts to topple the Damascus regime, which Saudi Arabia blames for Daesh’s rise in Syria. Washington’s commitment to overthrowing Bashar al-Assad has become increasingly questionable now that Daesh – the Obama Administration’s main concern in Syria – has seized large swathes of territory.

By sponsoring Jabhat al-Nusra, Saudi Arabia is supporting a group in Syria that the U.S.-led military coalition continues to target. Last September President Obama ordered air strikes against Jabhat al-Nusra, deemed a direct threat to U.S. national security, along with Daesh targets. Washington has learned that support for such factions is risky, given that such extremist groups’ loyalties to state sponsors, arms providers, and financial backers usually prove maddeningly temporary in the fluid and chaotic morass of the Middle East.

By canceling his visit to last month’s Camp David summit, King Salman sent a clear message of disapproval regarding Washington’s diplomatic overtures to Tehran. Bahrain’s King Hamad, who spent those days at a horse show with Queen Elizabeth in England, delivered a similar message. Ultimately, the summit proved a futile attempt by the Obama Administration to convince most GCC leaders that a comprehensive nuclear agreement with Iran would serve the interests of all states in the region. Like the Israeli leadership, King Salman is not buying the argument and instead perceives a zero-sum game, in which any geopolitical win for Tehran constitutes a loss for Riyadh.

Unquestionably, the Saudi Arabian leadership is resentful of Obama’s efforts to move past the 1979 hostage crisis and to initiate a new chapter in U.S.-Iran relations. Simultaneously, U.S. officials see Saudi Arabia’s backing of hardline jihadist militias as a dangerous policy that threatens to contribute to further terrorist gains in Syria. While cognizant of the widening gaps between American and Saudi Arabian foreign policy strategies, the Obama Administration is determined not to rock the boat with Riyadh. During the visit of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Nayef and Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman to the White House last month, President Obama hailed the kingdom’s “extraordinary friendship” with the U.S. dating back to the 1940s. Officials in the Obama Administration even dismissed claims that King Salman’s absence at the Camp Davis summit constituted any sort of snub against Washington.

While U.S.-Saudi Arabia relations have been strained in the past – particularly due to the Palestinian question, human rights, and oil prices – Washington and Riyadh have maintained a strong alliance, driven largely by economics. Yet the U.S. will have to answer tough questions regarding its alliance with Saudi Arabia as Middle Eastern rulers contemplate the geopolitical implications of a potential comprehensive nuclear agreement with Iran and as Saudi-sponsored jihadist militias in Syria continue to alarm the West.

*Giorgio Cafiero is the Co-Founder of Gulf State Analytics

This article was originally published by the Manzella Report.

The post US-Saudi Relations Face Difficult Questions – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Over the year, I realized that the term ‘left’ is not exclusive to a political ideology, but a mode of thinking championed mostly by self-tailored ‘leftist’ western intellectuals. I grew to dislike it with intensity.

But that has not always been the case.

My father was a communist, or so he called himself. He read the translated work of great communist and socialist thinkers, and passed on to me his own reading of what a socialist utopia could possibly be like. Living in a squalid refugee camp in Gaza, locked in by a heavily militarized sea to the west, and various Israeli ‘death zones’ everywhere else, a proletarian utopia was a great idea, where the peasants and the workers ruled unhindered.

Of course, there was a reason that made the fantasy particularly meaningful. Before the establishment of Israel on the ruins of historic Palestine, most Palestinians, who constituted the majority of the refugees after the war of 1948, were fellahin – or peasants. Following their forced expulsion into refugee camps, lacking land to cultivate, they became cheap laborers, especially after the war of 1967, where all of Palestine was colonized by Israel. No collective anywhere in the Middle East experienced such historical tension in a relatively short period of time as did the Palestinians.

My family, like numerous others, became peasants-turned-workers; in fact that marking became part of the refugees collective identity.

While the political manifestation of socialism failed in Palestine, socialist thinking prevailed: anti-elitist and revolutionary to the core. Even those who subscribe to other ideologies, including Islamic thinking, have been influenced one way or another by early Palestinian socialists.

But Palestinian revolutionary socialism, at its peak in the 1960s and 70s, was rather different from the ‘left’ I experienced living in the West. The latter seemed more detached, less risk-taking, driven by groupthink and lacking initiative. It was also patronizing.

Even in my early twenties, I still couldn’t comprehend how a group of self-proclaimed ‘leftist’, who largely existed on the margins of mainstream politics had the audacity to cast judgement on Palestinians for resorting to armed struggle to fend off a very vile and violent Israeli occupation, and busied themselves debating what constituted ‘humanitarian intervention’.

While socialist movements in the south, from Asia, to Africa, to the Middle East to South America took real risks to bring about social equality and political paradigm shifts, many in the West offered ‘solidarity’, yet largely reserved for themselves almost a total hegemony over the socialist political discourse.

They dominated and perfected the language, and dictated the platforms from which ideas – loaded with the right terminology, but vacant of any practical meaning and removed from real-life situations – are imparted.

Like the rest, I parroted the same language, of colonialism and imperialism, hegemony and class struggle, skipping from South America, to Angola and South Africa, to Indochina.

But many gaps in the perfectly summed-up understanding of the world befuddled me.

Firstly, I never understood why those who speak on behalf of the global ‘left’ are so far removed from the actual battlefield and mostly engaged in the ‘battlefield of ideas’.

Secondly, I found it strange that while leftists are meant to be critical thinkers, many of those who spoke as leftist gurus, tended to parrot recycled thoughts, which they embraced as if religious doctrines. ‘Where is the Palestinian Gandhi?’ I was asked by numerous leftists as if the inane question, which reflects more ignorance than inquisitiveness, is a talking point, handed down and repeated without thinking.

Thirdly, I found many western leftists largely oblivious to international conflicts that don’t involve directly or otherwise western hegemons. For example, there are many conflicts that are brewing in Africa right now, from Congo, to Burundi, to the Central African Republic to Sudan and elsewhere. Almost none of them ever register on the leftist radar as long as there is no palpable link to western governments or corporations. Only then, the lives of the Congolese, for example, would register; only then would Sudanese become ‘comrades’ and selected few of them would be celebrated as heroes, while others are cast aside as villains.

How long did the Syria conflict carry on before the western ‘left’ began to formulate a stance? Months. The conflict was just too involved, and initially removed from western engrossment that only few knew what to think. Only when western governments began pondering war, urged on by their regional allies, did the left began to formulate a position around the same old discourse. While the West and their allies had their own sinister reasons to get involved in Syria, the war in Syria, as the war in Libya before it, was not as simple as picking and choosing the good guys versus the bad guys. While vehemently rejecting western military crusades that have wreaked havoc is an admirable act, turning local dictators into modern-day Che Guevaras reflects recklessness, not camaraderie.

Fourthly, if conflicts throughout the so-called Third World are determined largely, if not entirely by western hegemons, then where is the element of agency in the local actors in these conflicts?

Are local populations so submissive and docile that they are hardly considered a factor in determining the outcomes of any conflict? What about regional players? How about the historical context of national and regional conflicts and struggles? Do ordinary people, when they behave as a collective, matter at all?

This belittling view of any other actor aside from western governments, although sold as if global solidarity, carries a degree of racism, where only the ‘white man’ determines the flow of history and outcomes of conflicts. Everyone else is either a helpless bystander or a ‘client regime’ that receive a ‘cut’ from the colonial spoils once the bad deed is done.

Which brings me to my final point: The left’s insistence on the ‘client regime’ theory is beyond limiting, yet, many find it impossible to challenge. When some rightfully noted that Israel had much greater sway over American politics than the traditional ‘client regime’ theory suggested, many leftist intellectuals threw a tantrum. For them, accepting that there might be a need to examine fixed ideas on how power relations play out, meant that the entire discourse is in danger of collapse, from Cuba, to Angola, to Indochina.

In 1984, George Orwell wrote of the ‘B vocabulary’, which “consisted of words which had been deliberately constructed for political purposes: words, that is to say, which were intended to impose a desirable mental attitude upon the person using them.”

While conflicts brew throughout the globe, demanding critical thinking, mobilization and action, many in the standardized western left are actively engaging in branding others who dare disagree with them (thoughtcrime). They resort to the Orwellian ‘newspeak’ and overused dogmas that seem to give them more comfort than true understanding of the world at large, a world that exists beyond the West and its ‘battlefield of ideas’.

The post The B Vocabulary: The Western Left And Its Sterile ‘Field Of Ideas’ – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Kapil Narula*

The Indian Navy announced a slew of ‘green initiatives’ on the eve of World Environment Day 2014, under the guidance of Admiral R.K. Dhowan, Chief of the Naval Staff. In the past year, these initiatives have transformed into a full-fledged mission for environmental sustainability in the Indian Navy. The goal of this drive is to make the navy an energy-efficient and an environmentally aware force, which is capable of meeting the present and future challenges, without compromising on its operational role.

Highlights

Recounting the progress made in the last one year since the introduction of the energy and environmental drive in the Indian Navy, the Ministry of Defence highlighted the efforts and the key results attained by the IN by synergizing its ‘blue water capability with a green footprint’. These have primarily been achieved by the adoption of a comprehensive “Indian Navy Environment Conservation Roadmap” which has been implemented on a pan India basis.

The key initiatives can be divided into two broad areas:

(a) Incorporating resource efficiency:

Indian Navy has consciously undertaken efforts to lower its energy consumption. As a part of the energy conservation efforts, world energy conservation day was celebrated in December 2014 across various establishments of the IN and a 10 percent reduction in power consumption was achieved on the day the conservation drive was undertaken. This was very encouraging, as it hinted at a reduction in energy consumption solely on the basis of voluntary conservation efforts achieved by behavioural changes.

Based on the results of this exercise, a 3-5 percent reduction in power consumption is being targeted, over the long term, annually. Promulgation of guidelines for use of energy efficient machinery onboard seagoing platforms and undertaking energy efficient operations for ships have also been framed. Incorporating energy efficiency in the design and build stage of platforms will ensure that all future naval acquisitions will be optimised for energy use resulting in lower life cycle energy use. This would directly contribute to lowering of Green House Gases (GHG) and local emissions which would enhance the sustainability of naval operations.

(b) Minimising the environmental impact:

Steps have been taken to ensure compliance of marine pollution (MARPOL – International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships) guidelines for waste disposal and discharge of effluents onboard ships. Use of environment friendly Sewage Treatment Plants (STP), commissioning of Effluent Treatment Plants, increasing the use of renewable energy in establishments and setting up of biogas plants in shore establishments have been initiated. The 4Rs (Reduce, Replace, Reuse and Recycle) have also been aggressively pursued to minimise the environmental impact of naval activities both at sea and ashore.

Way Ahead: Possible learning from the US Navy

Achieving sustainability is not a one-man or a one-day show. Sustainability has to be incorporated in all processes, across the continuum of activities and has to be practised by all personnel. While the push for environmental sustainability in the Indian Navy is laudable and it is a great start, there is a clear need to integrate the philosophy of resource efficiency and minimising the environmental impact of naval activities in the existing policy and plan documents. In this regard, the IN can look to the US which has assumed a leadership role in practising energy and environmental sustainability.

The US Department of Navy (DoN) adopted five well-defined energy goals in 2009 to increase war fighting capability, both strategically and tactically. From a strategic perspective, the objective was to reduce reliance on fossil fuels, while from the tactical perspective the objective was to use available energy sources (at site) by increasing energy efficiency. This would reduce the vulnerability associated with long fuel supply transport lines and would lead to an increase in the operational capability. The five energy goals were, energy efficienct acquisition, sailing the “Great Green Fleet”, reducing non-tactical petroleum use, increasing alternative energy ashore, and increasing alternative energy use DoN wide.

A ‘Task Force Energy’ which was headed by an executive steering committee was established by the Chief of Naval Operations to meet these goals. This had various functional groups (maritime, aviation, expeditionary, and shore) and supporting groups (fuels, environment, and strategic impacts) which worked together under the guidance of navy energy coordination office. By 2010, the administrative structure was formally in place and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Operational Energy Plans and Programs (ASD (OEPP)) was created with a mission to strengthen the energy security of US military operations by cutting costs, and lowering operational and strategic risk through better energy accounting, planning, management, and innovation. The US DoD was also the first in the world to formally adopt an energy strategy for military operations. In the document titled, Energy for the Warfighter:Operational Energy Strategy, which was unveiled in 2011, the DoD defined the vision of all three services and the marine corps. It also gave an overall direction for operational energy security for the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Combatant Commands, Defense Agencies, and Military Departments/Services.

Spurred by the successes achieved by the DoN, the US army’s Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations, Energy and Environment, released ‘Strategy 2025’ (at the end of 2014), setting forth the army’s vision for Installations, Energy and Environment. This was followed by the recently-released ‘Energy Security and Sustainability Strategy’, by the US army. These guidelines are aimed at enhancing the US army’s “current and future capabilities, readiness, and performance by building upon its ability to employ resources effectively to support all aspects of operations through effective system design and integration of resource considerations into behaviours and decision processes”. A strong reporting mechanism is also in place and the ‘Strategic Sustainability Performance Report’ , which is updated annually, ensures regular and comprehensive monitoring. The US model is therefore a good example of how the concept of sustainability is being integrated into operational readiness.

Conclusion:

Developing capabilities in meeting current and future uncertainties is critical for ensuring operational readiness and effectiveness of the Indian defence forces. This enhanced capability assumes significant importance in the face of growing energy costs, increasing resource scarcity and impending future environmental challenges. The push for sustainability in the Indian Navy is therefore a much-needed step towards building an environmentally aware and an energy efficient force which is aligned to meet the future challenges.

*Kapil Narula is a certified energy auditor and a PhD Research Scholar at Indira Gandhi institute of Development Research, Mumbai. He works in the area of energy economics, energy security and sustainability. He can be contacted at kapiln@igidr.ac.in

The post A Mission For Sustainability In The Indian Navy – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Joyeeta Bhattacharjee*

Killings of and threats to secular bloggers, by religious extremists in Bangladesh, have once again proved the links between the virtual world and real-time terror. In Bangladesh, three bloggers — Abhijit Roy, Washiqur Rahman and Ananta Bijoy Das, all critical of the rising tide of religious fundamentalism in the country, have been hacked to death this year.

All three attacks have been carried out by the Ansarullah Bangla Team, a religious extremist organisation. The killings happened in February, March and early May respectively. In late May, Ananya Azad, the son of prominent Bangladeshi blogger father Humayun Azad, was threatened.

These cases have precipitated the need for close monitoring of the role of the World Wide Web and radicalisation in South Asia, mainly in the smaller countries of the region and the latter’s preparedness in dealing with such challenges.The common factor among all the Bangladeshi blogger victims was that they chose the World Wide Web to express their views. They also wrote in Bengali, the language of the masses. This indicates that the Internet is no longer restricted to the elite but has penetrated deep into society.

Today, its power to influence society is significant. In Bangladesh, Internet penetration has grown from one per cent in 2000 to five per cent in 2012. Considering that the Bangladeshi population is 160-million strong, the number of Internet users is substantial. Bangladesh had a real time experience of the power of the Internet during the Shahbagh Square movement — a mass campaign against the war criminals of the 1971 War, initiated by a group of bloggers, in February 2013.

This movement was an eye-opener for South Asia. First, the movement was the first of its kind that had its root in social media. Second, it highlighted the popularity of the bloggers who contradicted the views of the religious radicals. Unfortunately, since then bloggers in Bangladesh have been targets of the religious radicals.

The first victim was a blogger named Rajib Hyder, who was killed by radicals in 2013. The religious radicals are not only monitoring the debates and discussions against them in the virtual world but also trying to silence those voices by inflicting terror in the actual world. Preliminary investigation after the murder of the three bloggers this year suggests that the Ansarullah Bangla Team has prepared a long list of bloggers whom it will be targeting.

The anger of the radicals against secular bloggers arises from two factors. The first is that the worldwide reach of the Internet is transcending geographical boundaries. The second is that the power of the Internet to influence people through the social media is increasing. The radicals feel threatened by the flow of voices that are critical of them in the virtual world.

Bangladesh’s radical groups are themselves very active in the cyber world. They use the Internet not only for propaganda and to garner support but also as a medium of communication so as to share news about their activities. For example, Ansarullah Bangla Team used the popular micro-blogging site, Twitter, to take responsibility for the death of the bloggers. Also, various blogs are used by these groups that carry radical content, like videos in Bengali, glorifying jihad.

Although opinion is divided on whether the Internet accelerates radicalisation but there is no doubt that it certainly encourages radicalisation. In case of Bangladesh, it is too early to ascertain the extent of influence that the Internet has had on the rise of radicalisation in the country. But experiences from round the globe show that, in Bangladesh, the Internet is providing a platform for like-minded people to meet, exchange ideas and establish offline contacts. There have cases when radicals have used social media to instigate realtime violence. For example, one attack on the minority community in 2012 was planned on Facebook.

Though the Government is pursuing an active counter-terrorism programme and has attained success in controlling the activities of various radical organisations in the real world, it has failed to curb the activities of the radicals in the virtual world. To understand the gravity of the problem, one need only notice the change in the nature of recruits. These days, many of the young radicals come from affluent backgrounds and have had a liberal education. This is in sharp contrast to the ‘madarssa’-educated recruits of the past.

For the prosperity and stability of Bangladesh, and indeed of the region, it is necessary to control the rising tide of radicalism in the that country. Controlling radical propaganda on the Internet is one of the important steps in this regard. The international community should step forward in helping Bangladesh tackle this existential threat.

*The writer is a Fellow at Observer Research Foundation, Delhi

Courtesy: The Pioneer

The post Bangladesh’s Web Of Jihadi Terror – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

As negotiators are about to gather in Vienna for the final round of talks on Iran’s controversial nuclear program, the US is offering concessions to Tehran to sweeten the deal, a draft document detailing would-be deal’s term shows.

The negotiations between Iran and six leading world powers are to kick off in the Austrian capital, Vienna, on Friday, with deadline set for June 30. Diplomats however indicated that the talks may drag past the date, as was the case with the previous round that produced a preliminary agreement, which seeks to scale down the program in exchange for lifting of international sanctions.

As the hard talks are set to start, the US is willing to offer concessions to Tehran that would boost its civilian nuclear industry, AP reported citing a confidential document perpetrating to the deal. The draft is one of several technical appendices meant to detail the terms, and it has dozens of text marked by brackets that indicate wordings over which the parties do not agree.

Titled ‘Civil Nuclear Cooperation’, the eight-page document details the practical steps that the US, the UK, France, Germany, China and Russia are willing to offer to compensate Iran the closure of parts of its nuclear program through cooperation.

One of the stumbling blocks is the fate of Arak heavy water reactor that Iran is in the final stages of constructing. The reactor would be capable to produce plutonium, a fissile material that can be used to make a nuclear weapon. The draft document offers rebuilding the facility to a more proliferation-friendly light water reactor, with sensitive technology and know-how transferred to Iran. Tehran would retain “the leadership role as the project owner and manager,” the draft said.

The document also offers arrangements for the underground uranium enrichment facility in Frodo, which would be converted with international help to produce radioactive isotopes for medical and scientific purposes. The facility is believed to be highly resistant to potential airstrikes and the US has been insisting on its conversion.

The concessions offered however may give ammunition to critics of the would-be deal both in US and internationally, who believe that it would give too much ground to Iran and puts too little restrictions on its nuclear program. On Wednesday several former US officials, including President Barack Obama’s former Iran advisor Dennis Ross published an open letter calling on Washington to seek a stronger deal.

“We know much about the emerging agreement. Most of us would have preferred a stronger agreement,” the group, which also includes former CIA head David Petraeus, Stephen Hadley, former national security adviser to President George W Bush, and General James Cartwright, former vice-chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

“We fear that the current negotiations, unless concluded along the lines outlined in this paper and buttressed by a resolute regional strategy, may fall short of meeting the administration’s own standard of a ‘good’ agreement,” they said.

The White House deflects criticisms that the potential deal would be ‘bad’ voiced by Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu and other officials and experts, saying that it would be as good as it can be realistically expected and that it would significantly reduce the risk of Tehran rushing to obtain nuclear capability.

Iran denies any intention to build a nuclear weapon and says it needs a nuclear industry for civilian purposes only. Opposition to the upcoming deal remains strong inside the Islamic Republic as well, as fears linger that the negotiators would concede too much of Iran’s treasured nuclear advances.

On Tuesday Iran’s supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei reiterated his position, saying that no deal would be made that would allow international inspectors to visit military facilities. Tehran is concerned that such inspectors would double as spies for the US and its allies. Washington says it wants such inspections to maintain a robust verification regime to ensure that Iran is sticking to its part of the bargain.

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The United States Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) decision to scale back its use of family immigration detention could help thousands of children and mothers who are fleeing persecution, according to Human Rights Watch. DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson announced on June 24, 2015, that the Obama administration was committed to “substantial changes” to family immigration detention.

The greatest benefit would be for families who are seeking asylum in the US, Human Rights Watch said. Johnson said that “once a family has established eligibility for asylum or other relief under our laws, long-term detention is an inefficient use of our resources and should be discontinued.”

“By scaling back family detention, the US may finally be coming to its senses on immigration,” said Antonio Ginatta, US advocacy director at Human Rights Watch. “The US never should have locked up families indefinitely, much less those who are seeking asylum.”

According to US government statistics, 88 percent of families in detention have shown that they have reasonable or credible claims of fear of returning to their home countries, a first step in qualifying for asylum in the US.

The DHS statement follows a US congressional delegation visit to family detention centers in Texas. On June 22, delegation members called for an end to family detention. Human Rights Watch has documented serious harm from the practice, and, along with other human rights groups, has repeatedly called for an end to family detention.

Over the past year the US vastly expanded its family detention capacity, from under 100 beds to almost 3,000, purportedly in response to an increase in families trying to enter the US.

The DHS statement did not detail how the department would address problems of high bonds that were keeping families in detention, or whether it would end the indefinite detention of families who were not seeking asylum. The statement repeatedly referred to the act of seeking asylum as “illegal migration,” which wrongfully suggests that those fleeing threats to their life or freedom are somehow acting illegally, Human Rights Watch said.

Indefinite immigration detention takes a severe psychological toll on children and their parents, Human Rights Watch said. International law prohibits the detention of children without exception, and prohibits detention of asylum seekers except as a measure of last resort and only for reasons such as concerns about danger to the public.

“The Department of Homeland Security had embraced family detention as an option of first resort, ignoring the damage it causes children,” Ginatta said. “This new approach should be the first step on a road that puts an end to family detention for all families – permanently.”

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Defense Secretary Ash Carter met yesterday with Ukraine Defense Minister Colonel-General Stepan Poltorak at the NATO Defense Ministerial in Brussels, according to a Defense Department news release issued today.

This was two leaders’ first meeting, the release said.

The defense leaders discussed Russia’s ongoing aggression in eastern Ukraine, the release said, and Carter commended the general for Ukraine’s efforts toward implementing the Minsk agreements despite Russia’s destabilizing actions.

Carter emphasized that the United States, together with its allies, “remains committed to supporting Ukraine in its effort to define its own course as a sovereign, democratic nation,” the release said.

The leaders reviewed ongoing U.S. security assistance to Ukraine’s armed forces and border guard service, including the mid-July delivery of an additional 100 Humvees and the ongoing training of Ukrainian national guard forces in Yavoriv, the release said.

The defense secretary also reaffirmed the United States’ commitment to continuing defense cooperation with Ukraine, including through annual bilateral and multilateral exercises and training, the release said.

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By Peter A. Petri and Michael G. Plummer*

The Trans-Pacific Partnership, or TPP, negotiations are in their final phase and the policy debate is in full swing. Unfortunately, it’s shaping up as a debate about trees, not forests; it ignores the central goal of the TPP: to renew the Asia-Pacific trading system and firm up America’s role in it.

World trade rules have not changed since 1994 — not since the rise of the internet, China and ubiquitous global production chains — and so trade has become very contentious and its growth has slowed. The TPP is controversial because it addresses varied obstacles to trade and investment — not just tariffs, but many conflicting regulations and standards (or lack of them, in the case of labor and the environment) in 12 countries at various stages of economic development.

It’s “Catch 22″: Because trade rules are so hard to change, the TPP has to take on many issues at once. This invites an onslaught of criticism, from corporations and unions to the activists of the right and left. In fact, the provisions of the TPP — results of long, painstaking negotiations — will simply not be as extreme or consequential as those opponents will claim.

What is really at stake? For the past four years, we have studied the TPP closely with a data-intensive, state-of-the-art economic model. We have published many detailed results, but three conclusions stand out:

1. The TPP will not have early, large effects in the United States. More than 90 percent of our economic activity involves markets and jobs minimally related to trade, and the TPP will apply best practices that are mostly already in place here. Changes will be gradual — some stretching to 10 years or more — giving companies, workers and countries time to adjust.

2. The agreement will generate significant, if not dramatic, increases in U.S. living standards over time. It will stimulate America’s most competitive sectors and help them gain a stronger foothold in production chains centered in Asia. For example, the TPP’s investment and intellectual property provisions will make sure that American computer technologies, robots, medical devices, medicines and music have access to and are safe from piracy in dynamic markets.

U.S. real incomes should increase by $77 billion per year by 2025. The benefits will extend across the economy through higher wages and lower prices. We do not calculate an increase in the number of people at work — our economy cannot add jobs permanently once it reaches full employment — but by 2025, around 650,000 more people should be working in export-related jobs that pay as much as 18 percent more than jobs in import-competing industries.

3. Ultimately, the TPP should stimulate further deals with Europe and other Asian and Latin American countries, establishing its updated rules as a global benchmark. In this case, benefits to the United States and the world would be multiplied by a factor of three.

The TPP will not cure all of our economic ills. With or without it, America’s prosperity depends on investments in innovation, infrastructure, workers and education for data-hungry services and manufacturing. These investments will make the gains from the TPP larger and address fundamental problems like wage growth and inequality. And we have to make sure that people who face difficult changes — due to technological advances, trade policy and other forces — are generously supported in making adjustments.

The TPP debate should be confident and forward-looking, befitting America’s enormous assets and recovering economic engine. The TPP offers significant economic benefits and an historic opportunity to deepen U.S. ties with the Asia-Pacific, the world’s most dynamic economic region.

*Peter A. Petri is the Carl J. Shapiro Professor of International Finance at Brandeis University, and a Nonresident Senior Fellow with the East-West Center. Michael G. Plummer is Director of Johns Hopkins SAIS Europe and also an East-West Center Senior Fellow.

Note: This commentary first appeared in The Honolulu Star-Advertiser on April 12, 2015.

The post Cutting Through The Noisy TPP Debate – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

The monthly total of contributory pensions paid out by the Spanish Social Security system amounted to 8.24 billion euros at 1 June 2015. Year-on-year growth in this figure now stands at 2.9%.

​The average retirement pension stood at 1,020.80 euros, 2.1% higher than in the same period last year. The average pension from the Spanish Social Security system as a whole, which includes all the various types of pension available (retirement, permanent disability, widowhood, orphanhood, and those paid out to relatives), stood at 886.46 euros per month. This represents a year-on-year increase of 1.8%.

The public system comprises 9,293,058 pensions in total, an increase of 1.1% on last year. 5,632,018 of these are retirement pensions, representing more than half the total, while 2,351,794 are widowhood pensions, 930,888 are permanent disability pensions, 339,342 are orphanhood pensions and 39,016 are pensions paid out to relatives.

The post Spain: Contributory Pensions For June Amount To 8.24 Billion Euros appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By David Kaye

This is a letter from the UN Whistleblower Coalition to the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression, David Kaye, who will be presenting a report on protection of sources and whistleblowers to the UN General Assembly in October.

Over the past decade the United Nations and its specialized agencies have established new whistleblower policies. Unfortunately, implementation is weak in many of the UN agencies and the policies themselves may lag behind best practice standards. In practice, it is our experience that the policies afford little meaningful protection for whistleblowers.

As the case summaries below demonstrate, retaliation against whistleblowers can affect the entire UN system. Some UN whistleblowers have been fired or demoted; others have been subjected to more subtle forms of abuse like non-renewal of contracts or sudden transfer to distant duty stations; many face plain, simple harassment and intimidation. UN whistleblowers may also have their visas revoked or be required to flee the country where they are living and working as a result of the retaliation. Consequently, we can assert that fear of reporting wrongdoing is common.

Because the UN enjoys extensive legal immunities, particularly with respect to personnel conflicts, staff members are not able to access national courts to resolve employment disputes. UN whistleblowers are therefore forced to go through lengthy, and often expensive, internal appeal processes that are compromised by a structural conflict of interest. The organization is a defendant in any case brought before its internal tribunals, at the same time that the tribunal is housed in, and funded by, the institution.

Put simply, the UN system of justice fails whistleblowers, and most of us have been forced to leave the UN to save our livelihoods, our health and our reputations. The UN Ethics Office, which receives appeals for protection from whistleblowers, has substantiated retaliation in less than 4 percent of the cases that it has reviewed since its establishment in 2006 (the Office was contacted by more than 440 potential whistleblowers, reviewed approximately 120 cases and substantiated retaliation in 4 cases and one of those whistleblowers claims he was not adequately protected from retaliation). The two-tier internal justice system through which UN employees formally contest violations of their administrative rights has also failed to protect most whistleblowers. While the lower UN Dispute Tribunal (UNDT) has ruled in favor of some whistleblowers, the UN Appeals Tribunal (UNAT) has established a record of vacating these decisions on technicalities.

UNAT appears to have a clear bias in favor of the Secretary-General. According to Office of Administration of Justice’s seventh activity report (1 January to 31 December 2013), 72% of appeals filed by applicants were rejected by UNAT, whereas only 18% of appeals filed by the Secretary-General were rejected. This pattern was also evident in UNAT’s most recent session, when it dismissed the majority of appeals filed by staff members and granted the majority filed by the Secretary-General. We are particularly concerned about UNAT’s record on whistleblower claims. In case after case, UNAT judges have ruled against the whistleblower. Even when UNAT decides in favor of the whistleblower, the Tribunal often reduces the compensation awarded by UNDT to an amount that fails to cover the full consequences of the retaliation. One particularly clear example is the Wasserstrom judgment described below. The Nguyen-Kropp & Postica, Hunt-Matthes, Rahman, Shkurtaj and Tadonki cases also demonstrate the Appeals Tribunal’s record of hostility toward whistleblowers.

Whistleblower rights are human rights. Whistleblowers should be protected by the principles of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, especially when they work for organizations charged with upholding those conventions. An organization should not be allowed to retaliate against whistleblowers with impunity simply because it is immune from national laws.

We call on you to urgently review whistleblower protection for UN staff, and for those serving in affiliated specialized agencies and international organisations not protected by national laws. In the case of whistleblowers, this immunity can easily become raw impunity. Without proper whistleblower protection, wrongdoing at the United Nations—be it sexual exploitation, abuse of power, fraud or corruption—will be under-reported and will continue to go unchecked. There will be no accountability. This can only damage the UN’s moral standing and, ultimately, its legitimacy.

POLICY LIMITATIONS

The enclosed document by the Government Accountability Project, a U.S. non-profit organization that helps whistleblowers, describes some of the shortcomings in the UN Secretariat’s whistleblower policy. In addition, our coalition would like to highlight the additional policy problems set out below.

In January 2014 the U.S. Congress passed legislation that prohibits the allocation of 15 percent of its contribution to the United Nations Secretariat or any UN agency until the Department of State reports that the organization is implementing best practices for whistleblower protection, including: “(i) protection against retaliation for internal and lawful public disclosures; (ii) legal burdens of proof; (iii) statutes of limitation for reporting retaliation; (iv) access to independent adjudicative bodies, including external arbitration; and (v) results that eliminate the effects of proven retaliation.”[1]

Currently, the UN clearly fails to meet three of these key standards. First, the UN does not offer whistleblowers access to external arbitration. Two UN whistleblowers – Khalilur Rahman from UNCTAD and Miranda Brown (formerly at WIPO and OHCHR) – recently requested access to external arbitration and they were both denied. The Office of the Secretary General wrote to each asserting that the UN internal justice system does not provide for such access. Secondly, the UN fails to comply with best practice statutes of limitation. Although the UN whistleblower policy says that whistleblowers have years to report retaliation, in practice they have only 60 days to challenge a retaliatory act through the organization’s justice system (the best practice statute of limitations is at least six months). The United Nations also has a poor record of protecting whistleblowers and of providing them with comprehensive relief that eliminates the effects of proven retaliation, as demonstrated by the cases below.

CASE EXAMPLES

The following cases show how whistleblowers protections in the UN system are implemented in practice. We would be glad to provide additional information about any of these cases upon request. Not all of these whistleblowers are members of our coalition, but they have authorized us to share their cases publicly.

AICHA ELBASRI: (SECRETARIAT) Elbasri is the former spokesperson for the African Union-UN Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). She claims that UNAMID and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations routinely misled the media and UN Security Council members by covering up atrocious crimes committed by Sudanese government forces, including ethnic targeting; forced displacement and bombing of civilians; systematic, mass rape; as well as attacks on UN peacekeepers. Elbasri resigned on April 2013 in protest and asked UN’s Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) to investigate her disclosures, which failed to do so. On 23 June 2014, the International Criminal Court called on Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon to set up a “thorough, independent and public inquiry” into Elbasri’s public allegations. Ban failed to meet this call, ordering instead an internal Team Review made up of UN staffers, lacking the required investigative expertise and independence. The Team concluded that in five instances UNAMID withheld from DPKO key evidence that establishes the responsibility of the government forces in crimes, including the massacre of up to 100 civilians, but failed to identify the Mission’s misbehavior and “lack of frank reporting” as misconduct. To this day, the UN refuses to make the full report public and to hold any senior UNAMID official to account.

JAMES WASSERSTROM: (UN SECRETARIAT) Wasserstrom, an American citizen, was a senior official at the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) who disclosed a probable kickback scheme involving local politicians and senior UNMIK officials. After disclosing this, his assignment was not extended, his passport was confiscated, his car and apartment were searched, he was subjected to administrative and criminal investigations, and his photograph was placed at the entrances of his former workplace. The United Nations Dispute Tribunal found that the UN Ethics Office misapplied the burden of proof in his case and reached a “fundamentally flawed” conclusion when it failed to substantiate retaliation. UNDT ruled that the retaliation was so extreme that it violated the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In 2014 the UN Appeals Tribunal reversed UNDT’s judgment because it found that the case was not receivable because Ethics Office findings cannot be challenged before the formal justice system.

KHALILUR RAHMAN: (UNCTAD/SECRETARIAT) Rahman’s case represents the first instance in which the UN Ethics Office confirmed retaliation. In 2010 the Office found that several high-level officials of the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) retaliated against him for having reported serious misconduct by a senior official. The Office recommended that he be transferred and that disciplinary action be taken against the perpetrators. The Secretary General rejected this recommendation and ordered him to return to UNCTAD, even though UNCTAD said it could not protect him from retaliation. The UN refused to compensate him for his damages and failed to protect him from spillover retaliation. Although the retaliators were assessed minimal fines, one was promoted and both are employed by UNCTAD post-retirement. Rahman requested external arbitration in his case, but the Secretary General refused. He also appealed to UNAT the failure of the institution to restore him to the professional and financial standing he had prior to making protected disclosures. In judgment 2014-UNAT-453, UNAT dismissed this appeal. In response, George Irving, counsel for Rahman, said, “The UN missed the final opportunity to meet even the minimum thresholds of universally accepted best practices in this very first case of proven retaliation within the Secretariat. My client has been left worse off than his retaliators…”

CAROLINE HUNT-MATTHES: (UNHCR/SECRETARIAT) Hunt-Matthes was a senior investigation officer with UNHCR’s Inspector General’s Office who reported, among other things: interference with an investigation of an alleged rape by a UN staff member; the failure to register a sexual harassment complaint against the High Commissioner; and the unlawful detention of refugees by senior UNHCR staff. After making her disclosures, she was fired with one day’s notice. The UN Ethics Office failed to find a prima facie case of retaliation in her case. UNDT issued a first verdict in her favor that was highly critical of the Ethics Office and a second verdict that found that she was retaliated against. In 2014 UNAT overturned the first verdict because the retaliation predated the establishment of the Ethics Office, and sent the second decision back to UNDT on a technicality. UNAT’s ruling ignored the fact that Hunt-Matthes’ request to the Ethics Office was made in 2006, after the new whistleblower policy went into effect. Moreover, she requested protection from ongoing retaliation that was occurring in 2006. Meanwhile, Hunt-Matthes continues to wait for relief after 10 years of legal battles.

MS. X: (SECRETARIAT) Ms. X is an American who worked as a police officer with the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), through a company under contract with the State Department. Ms. X made several disclosures, including one about potential sexual exploitation and abuse by UN police officers of women living in a camp for earthquake victims. In retaliation, she was given a negative performance evaluation, threatened with an investigation, and abruptly terminated. Ms. X filed a retaliation complaint with the UN Ethics Office, but it concluded that the UN whistleblower protection policy does not apply to police officers and that it could not protect her.

MONCEF KATEB: (WIPO) Kateb was the former president of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Staff Council. He was dismissed in September 2014 after making several whistleblower disclosures, including about an illegal shipment of sophisticated IT equipment to North Korea. His dismissal was done in advance of WIPO’s annual governing body meeting, where he was expected to criticize the controversial management style and behaviour of Director-General Francis Gurry. Both the special rapporteur and the UN staff union have issued a letter to the governing body of WIPO calling for Kateb’s reinstatement, but he has not yet been reinstated.

JAMES POOLEY: (WIPO) Pooley was a Deputy Director General of WIPO. He disclosed unchecked abuses of authority by the Director General (DG), Francis Gurry, to whom he reported directly. Mr. Pooley alleged, first, that DG Gurry violated procurement rules by ordering an internal committee to make changes to a competitive bidding process in order to favor a company run by a friend and fellow Australian. When the committee refused, Gurry cancelled the process and ordered that the contract be awarded directly to his friend’s company. Pooley also alleged that DG Gurry gave Swiss police stolen forensic evidence in order to incriminate staff members he suspected of criticizing him. Pooley was subjected to reprisal in the form of restriction on work travel, marginalization, exclusion from consultations and loss of responsibilities. He filed a complaint of retaliation as required under the WIPO policy, but because his term ended two months later, WIPO refused to consider it, since he was no longer a staff member.

MIRANDA BROWN: (WIPO) Brown was the Strategic Adviser to WIPO Director General Francis Gurry. She disclosed unchecked abuses of authority by DG Gurry, to whom she reported directly. Brown alleged that Gurry engaged in a pattern of degrading treatment, discrimination and abusive behavior towards staff. She also alleged that Gurry gave Swiss police stolen forensic evidence in order to extract staff members’ DNA and incriminate those he suspected of criticizing him. Brown was forced to leave WIPO. She moved to another UN organization, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), dropping two grade levels. Within days of being called to testify as a witness in the WIPO investigation, Brown’s contract at OHCHR was not renewed and when she appealed, she was advised that she would be transferred to Fiji (among the furthest duty stations from Geneva) with immediate effect.

AI LOAN NGUYEN-KROPP & FLORIN POSTICA: (SECRETARIAT) In 2009 these investigators disclosed that the acting director of OIOS’ Investigations Division withheld and tampered with evidence in a case. The acting director subsequently expelled Nguyen-Kropp from her office and negatively influenced her performance evaluation. The Department of Management escalated the retaliation by initiating an investigation of Nguyen-Kropp & Postica and requesting that several intergovernmental organizations supply a specialist to lead it. Neither whistleblower was given notice or opportunity to respond. The Ethics Office found a prima facie case of retaliation, but failed to substantiate retaliation after an investigation. UNDT ruled in the whistleblowers’ favor, concluding that they were retaliated against and that “it is difficult to find a more direct causal link between a protected activity and an adverse action.” But in 2015, UNAT ruled that the case was not receivable and overturned UNDT’s judgment, leaving the whistleblowers without relief.

GEORGES TADONKI: (SECRETARIAT) Tadonki worked for the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) as head of office in Zimbabwe. In 2008 he raised concerns about the humanitarian preparedness of the country and the severe risk of cholera there (an unmitigated cholera epidemic subsequently resulted that could have been addressed if the UN had heeded his warning). Tadonki was subsequently investigated, abruptly removed from the office, and told his contract was not renewed. UNDT found that he was retaliated against and referred several senior officials to the Secretary General for possible action to enforce accountability. Rather than discipline the officials, the Secretary General appealed to UNAT, which upheld the referrals and retaliation finding, but greatly reduced the compensation to an amount that was insufficient to eliminate the effects of retaliation.

VESNA DZUVEROVIC: (UN-HABITAT/SECRETARIAT) After working for 5 years as a UN Volunteer, Dzuverovic was recruited by UN Habitat for a professional post of financial nature. When OIOS circulated a memo inviting staff to report on financial abuses – faced with daily irregularities that she could not stop – she went to OIOS, as advised by the UN ombudsman. A week after that she was transferred against her will, and then transferred again and again to new and different posts each year although her performance evaluations were always very good. Finally, her contract remained unextended only 5 months before she would have qualified for a UN pension. She followed all available internal staff-protection routes but in spite of their support, she has never been re-instated. In 2011 she contested before UNDT OIOS’ refusal to investigate both her original disclosure and the retaliation she suffered (she claims that she was ‘blacklisted,’ as she has never been selected again for any position anywhere in the UN system, although she applied regularly and was fully qualified). UNDT found that her case was inadmissible for procedural reasons, but added a 16-paragraph recommendation asking the Secretary General to review it and “reassure whistleblowers that they are indeed protected.” Two years have passed, but the SG has yet to act on this recommendation.

ARTJON SHKURTAJ: (UNDP) Shkurtaj disclosed financial and administrative irregularities in the UN Development Program’s (UNDP) operations in North Korea, including the apparent transfer of hard currencies to North Korean officials and entities in violation of UNDP regulations. Shkurtaj’s appointment was rescinded and he was barred from entering UN grounds. In 2007 the UN Ethics Office Director asserted that a prima facie case of retaliation existed. In response, the UNDP Administrator claimed UNDP was not subject to the Office’s jurisdiction and appointed an ad hoc panel. The Ethics Office reviewed the panel’s findings and recommended that Shkurtaj be compensated because UNDP released negative findings about him without notifying him or allowing him to respond. UNDT & UNAT upheld the Office’s recommendation, but UNAT reduced the compensation awarded to six months net base salary, which barely covered his costs, let alone the effects of retaliation. The U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations reviewed the case and concluded that UNDP “undermined its whistleblower protections.”

CYNTHIA BRZAK: (UNHCR) In April 2004 Cynthia Brzak, a long-time UNHCR staff member and elected staff union representative, claimed to OIOS NY that she was indecently assaulted by UN High Commissioner for Refugees Ruud Lubbers, and subsequently harassed twice by Werner Blatter, then-Director of Human Resources. An investigation by OIOS in May-June 2004 found a pattern of sexual harassment and misconduct by Mr. Lubbers, and misconduct by Mr. Blatter. OIOS recommended inter alia action against them, and that investigation findings be shared with UNHCR staff, but then UN Secretary General Kofi Annan decided the “allegations could not be substantiated,” the report was buried and the OIOS Director was hounded out of office. Lubbers eventually resigned in February 2005 when the UN and Dutch government called for him to step down, as he became a high-profile liability when the UN Oil-for-Food scandal broke.

Largely due to her case, the UN General Assembly called for creation of the Ethics Office and whistleblower protection, resulting in issuance of ST/SGB/2005/21 in December 2005. When Ms. Brzak and Nasr Ishak (a senior UNHCR inspector perceived to have advised her) met with the then Ethics Office Director to request protection from ongoing retaliation, he told them they were “wasting his time,” even though it’s the Director’s duty to protect whistleblowers. Brzak and Ishak brought a case in the U.S. 2nd Circuit Court in New York, in which they claimed retaliation and racketeering. It was thrown out there, then on appeal, as the Secretary General refused to lift diplomatic immunity to allow prosecution. Then, in October 2010 the U.S. Supreme Court refused to examine the constitutionality of diplomatic immunity, rejecting their petition. Meanwhile, despite her post being targeted for cutting in May 2005 and retaliation that never abated, Ms. Brzak (and Mr. Ishak) managed to maintain employment. Ms. Brzak was hospitalized twice for service-incurred reasons recognized by the UN, and was forced to navigate new ‘procedural’ labyrinths that resulted in two-year delays handling her medical bills. Two years before mandatory retirement, she took UNHCR’s standard separation package after 30+ years of service.

NASR ISHAK: (UNHCR) Ishak worked at UNHCR for nearly 30 years, holding various positions at Headquarters and in the field. In the 1980s and ‘90s, he became aware of cases of mismanagement and misconduct including rape, sexual harassment and exploitation, and even killing/needless loss of life of staff. Those crimes often involved or were known to the senior-most managers, who routinely escaped accountability in the context of a culture of silence and impunity. In 1992, as chairman of the UNHCR Staff Council, he blew the whistle on serious irregularities by the director of the Personnel Department. Although the said director was immediately removed from his position, Ishak was subjected to threats and retaliatory acts including by the then High Commissioner, who decided to suspend the implementation of Ishak’s duly-recommended promotion until he agreed to leave the Staff Council, a proposition which Ishak rejected. Ishak then established a UNHCR staff newspaper and was sued after the issuance of the first edition by a senior representative because the paper exposed that he was hiring his wife under a UNHCR-funded project and was letting her abuse staff and office resources.

Ishak continued to report misconduct and to be subjected to retaliation, including tampering with his office and computer and the denial of a promotion. But it was the sexual harassment claims filed in 2004 against the then High Commissioner that brought retaliation against Ishak to a much more serious level (see the case of Cynthia Brzak), as he was perceived to have advised Brzak to file a formal complaint against the Commissioner. In 2009, Ishak was placed on medical leave and was hospitalized for a service-incurred health condition (for which an “Appendix D” claim was submitted). When he availed himself of the internal processes, UNHCR officials (namely the Ethics Office director, mediator, and inspector general/Investigation Section) failed to take appropriate actions. Ishak’s legal cases were subsequently reviewed by the UN Dispute Tribunal and were all summarily dismissed in an arbitrary manner by UNDT Judge Cousin (who was hired outside the rules established by the UN General Assembly). According to Ishak, the Judge manifestly violated his fundamental right to have his cases heard on their merits and threatened him. At the request of the representative of the Secretary-General, the Judge even fined Ishak over US$ 2,000 for exercising his right to pursue his case before UNDT. Ishak retired from UNHCR as of October 2013 without the settlement of his Appendix D claim.

RASNA WARAH: (UN-HABITAT) Warah approached the UN Ethics Office, the Executive Director of UN-Habitat and the Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations Office in Nairobi (UNON) for protection against retaliation after she accidentally stumbled upon irregularities within her section at UN-Habitat, which led to retaliatory actions by her supervisors. The outgoing Executive Director of UN-Habitat said she could not take any action to address the misconduct, while the USG of UNON advised her to leave the organization and “take a break.” At the time, Warah had been shortlisted for a position within her section. During the interview, one of the interviewers asked her why she wanted to work for an organization she considered to be corrupt. This and other questions by the interviews were clearly intended to intimidate her. When Warah approached the UN Ethics Office for protection, the Office found that she engaged in a protected activity, but that her reports of misconduct were not a contributing factor to the alleged retaliation. Warah then pursued the case with the current Executive Director of UN-Habitat, whose office responded by saying that they had conducted investigations and found no wrongdoing. They did not say who was investigated and did not even interview Warah, which suggests that no investigation actually took place.

END NOTE

[1] Section 7048 (a) (1) (b) of the 2014 U.S. Consolidated Appropriations Act.

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By US President Barack Obama

THE PRESIDENT: Good morning, everybody. Have a seat. Five years ago, after nearly a century of talk, decades of trying, a year of bipartisan debate — we finally declared that in America, health care is not a privilege for a few, but a right for all.

Over those five years, as we’ve worked to implement the Affordable Care Act, there have been successes and setbacks. The setbacks I remember clearly. (Laughter.) But as the dust has settled, there can be no doubt that this law is working. It has changed, and in some cases saved, American lives. It set this country on a smarter, stronger course.

And today, after more than 50 votes in Congress to repeal or weaken this law; after a presidential election based in part on preserving or repealing this law; after multiple challenges to this law before the Supreme Court — the Affordable Care Act is here to stay.

This morning, the Court upheld a critical part of this law -– the part that’s made it easier for Americans to afford health insurance regardless of where you live. If the partisan challenge to this law had succeeded, millions of Americans would have had thousands of dollars’ worth of tax credits taken from them. For many, insurance would have become unaffordable again. Many would have become uninsured again. Ultimately, everyone’s premiums could have gone up. America would have gone backwards. And that’s not what we do. That’s not what America does. We move forward.

So today is a victory for hardworking Americans all across this country whose lives will continue to become more secure in a changing economy because of this law.

If you’re a parent, you can keep your kids on your plan until they turn 26 — something that has covered millions of young people so far. That’s because of this law.

If you’re a senior, or an American with a disability, this law gives you discounts on your prescriptions — something that has saved 9 million Americans an average of $1,600 so far.

If you’re a woman, you can’t be charged more than anybody else — even if you’ve had cancer, or your husband had heart disease, or just because you’re a woman. Your insurer has to offer free preventive services like mammograms. They can’t place annual or lifetime caps on your care because of this law.

Because of this law, and because of today’s decision, millions of Americans who I hear from every single day will continue to receive the tax credits that have given about eight in ten people who buy insurance on the new marketplaces the choice of a health care plan that costs less than $100 a month.

And when it comes to preexisting conditions — someday, our grandkids will ask us if there was really a time when America discriminated against people who get sick. Because that is something this law has ended for good. That affects everybody with health insurance — not just folks who got insurance through the Affordable Care Act. All of America has protections it didn’t have before.

As the law’s provisions have gradually taken effect, more than 16 million uninsured Americans have gained coverage so far. Nearly one in three Americans who was uninsured a few years ago is insured today. The uninsured rate in America is the lowest since we began to keep records. And that is something we can all be proud of.

Meanwhile, the law has helped hold the price of health care to its slowest growth in 50 years. If your family gets insurance through your job — so you’re not using the Affordable Care Act — you’re still paying about $1,800 less per year on average than you would be if we hadn’t done anything. By one leading measure, what business owners pay out in wages and salaries is now finally growing faster than what they spend on health insurance. That hasn’t happened in 17 years — and that’s good for workers and it’s good for the economy.

The point is, this is not an abstract thing anymore. This is not a set of political talking points. This is reality. We can see how it is working. This law is working exactly as it’s supposed to. In many ways, this law is working better than we expected it to. For all the misinformation campaigns, all the doomsday predictions, all the talk of death panels and job destruction, for all the repeal attempts — this law is now helping tens of millions of Americans.

And they’ve told me that it has changed their lives for the better. I’ve had moms come up and say, my son was able to see a doctor and get diagnosed, and catch a tumor early, and he’s alive today because of this law. This law is working. And it’s going to keep doing just that.

Five years in, this is no longer about a law. This is not about the Affordable Care Act as legislation, or Obamacare as a political football. This is health care in America.

And unlike Social Security or Medicare, a lot of Americans still don’t know what Obamacare is beyond all the political noise in Washington. Across the country, there remain people who are directly benefitting from the law but don’t even know it. And that’s okay. There’s no card that says “Obamacare” when you enroll. But that’s by design, for this has never been a government takeover of health care, despite cries to the contrary. This reform remains what it’s always been: a set of fairer rules and tougher protections that have made health care in America more affordable, more attainable, and more about you — the consumer, the American people. It’s working.

And with this case behind us, let’s be clear — we’ve still got work to do to make health care in America even better. We’ll keep working to provide consumers with all the tools you need to make informed choices about your care. We’ll keep working to increase the use of preventive care that avoids bigger problems down the road. We’ll keep working to boost the steadily improving quality of care in hospitals, and bring down costs even lower, make the system work even better. Already we’ve seen reductions, for example, in the number of readmissions at hospitals. That saves our society money, it saves families money, makes people healthier.

We’re making progress. We’re going to keep working to get more people covered. I’m going to work as hard as I can to convince more governors and state legislatures to take advantage of the law, put politics aside, and expand Medicaid and cover their citizens. We’ve still got states out there that, for political reasons, are not covering millions of people that they could be covering, despite the fact that the federal government is picking up the tab.

So we’ve got more work to do. But what we’re not going to do is unravel what has now been woven into the fabric of America. And my greatest hope is that rather than keep refighting battles that have been settled again and again and again, I can work with Republicans and Democrats to move forward. Let’s join together, make health care in America even better.

Three generations ago, we chose to end an era when seniors were left to languish in poverty. We passed Social Security, and slowly it was woven into the fabric of America and made a difference in the lives of millions of people. Two generations ago, we chose to end an age when Americans in their golden years didn’t have the guarantee of health care. Medicare was passed, and it helped millions of people.

This generation of Americans chose to finish the job — to turn the page on a past when our citizens could be denied coverage just for being sick. To close the books on a history where tens of millions of Americans had no hope of finding decent, affordable health care; had to hang their chances on fate. We chose to write a new chapter, where in a new economy, Americans are free to change their jobs or start a business, chase a new idea, raise a family, free from fear, secure in the knowledge that portable, affordable health care is there for us and always will be. And that if we get sick, we’re not going to lose our home. That if we get sick, that we’re going to be able to still look after our families.

That’s when America soars -– when we look out for one another. When we take care of each other. When we root for one another’s success. When we strive to do better and to be better than the generation that came before us, and try to build something better for generations to come. That’s why we do what we do. That’s the whole point of public service.

So this was a good day for America. Let’s get back to work. (Applause.)

The post President Obama On Supreme Court’s Ruling Of Affordable Care Act – Statement appeared first on Eurasia Review.

It was clear even before the Riga summit held on May 21-22 that the discussion would not be easy. The stumbling block, as should have been expected, was a problem that has been included in the agenda at the request of Europe’s major powers, though it was not directly related to the main idea of the project – the European integration of six post-Soviet states, namely Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. Contrary to the initially declared objectives of the Eastern Partnership (EaP) program, most of the attention at the negotiations between the leading countries of the European Union was given to Russia, a country that is not a member of this programme.

Such a situation suited Ukraine and two other EaP countries – Georgia and Moldova – (in Riga, all these countries reaffirmed their intention to become EU members), but was contrary to the interests of the other three countries that had chosen a less tight integration with the EU. Belarusian leader Alyaksandr Lukashenka, who is not accustomed to speaking diplomatically, later got indignant, saying that the participants in the Riga summit “were prepared to stigmatize Russia in each document, either directly or indirectly … Russia is not a member of the Eastern Partnership. Then why should we batter Russia in its absence, including for Crimea?”

Dissatisfaction of the president of Belarus, which is historically bonded with Russia by a variety of ties and integration associations, is understandable. The reaction of Russia’s satellite, Armenia, was even more predictable. After all, the European Union does not expect Armenia to be independent in its actions, much less to do something that may anger Moscow, ever since the Armenian leadership suddenly renounced its original idea of participation in the Eastern Partnership and hastily joined the Eurasian Union two years ago, just before the Vilnius summit. As for Azerbaijan, it was resentful at the reluctance of Europeans, who seemed to be so strict in their approaches to the letter of the law, to treat conflicts on the territory of EaP member countries in the same way and to condemn Armenia, the aggressor, just as the European Union now unanimously castigates Russia for the annexation of Crimea and for what is happening in the south-east of Ukraine.

As a result, Azerbaijan considered the text of the final document of the summit, the Riga Declaration, as biased because the drafters did not mention the four UN Security Council resolutions which should serve as a basis for solving the problem of the Armenian occupation of Azerbaijani territories.

The absence of President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev at the summit did not prevent Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration Novruz Mammadov and Minister of Foreign Affairs Elmar Mammadyarov from being at least as categorical in stating the presence of “double standards” and their unwillingness to sign the document on behalf of the republic, which showed a biased approach of the Europeans to the fundamental issue of sovereignty and territorial integrity.

This decision of Azerbaijan called into question the outcome of the entire summit, and the organizers started to persuade the representatives of the republic to soften their stance. To this end, President of the European Council Donald Tusk even had to call President Ilham Aliyev in Baku (according to some sources, he called twice). Eventually, Azerbaijan signed the document with reservations.

Speaking after the summit, Mammadyarov told reporters that reservations reflected the main objection to the text of the Riga Declaration – the absence of words that the solution to the Nagorny Karabakh conflict should be based on international law; in particular, it should comply with the UN Security Council resolutions.

Thus, Azerbaijan has carried its point but the unpleasant taste remains. Later, Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration Novruz Mammadov admitted that by signing the Riga Declaration, Azerbaijan made concessions to the EU: “We believe that the spirit of this Declaration does not correspond to the nature of the cooperation between the EU and Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan is a country that has successfully and fully been cooperating with the EU in the post-Soviet space. However, the Declaration’s articles concerning Azerbaijan do not meet this spirit. At the same time, we are not happy with the approach to the settlement of the Nagorny Karabakh conflict”.

What happened in Riga showed the correctness of the position of Azerbaijan, which maintains the need for a uniform attitude to the problems of territorial integrity and the EU’s individual approach to each of the Eastern Partnership countries depending on its interests and level of economic development. Now it has been recognized by Brussels, too. “We fully realize that we, the EU and Eastern Partnership, need new instruments. This was the main issue during our telephone conversation with President Aliyev, which took place after the summit. We talked about the new tools and new approaches. Azerbaijan is set to continue and strengthen cooperation with the EU, there is no doubt about that, and Aliyev made it clear,” Donald Tusk was quoted by the Wall Street Journal as saying.

Meanwhile, the provision of the Riga Declaration on the need to solve conflicts in the Eastern Partnership space, including the Nagornyy Karabakh conflict, on the basis of territorial integrity of states deserves special attention. What is more, this document was signed by Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan. All international organizations as well as the United Nations recognize the territories occupied by Armenia, including Nagornyy Karabakh, as an integral and sovereign part of Azerbaijan.
Another interesting aspect is also worth noting. By signing this document, which reflects support for the territorial integrity of countries participating in the Eastern Partnership, Sargsyan has thus backed the Madrid principles of Karabakh settlement, the implementation of which requires the withdrawal of Armenian troops from the occupied Azerbaijani territories. On the other hand, knowing the degree of Armenia’s dependence on Russia, it could be argued that the participation of the Armenian president in the Riga summit and his signature on the final declaration would not have been possible without Moscow’s approval. Therefore, we can assume that Russia has begun to urge Yerevan to withdraw its troops from the sovereign territory of Azerbaijan.

Along with all this, the latest Eastern Partnership summit can make Baku revise its relations with the EU which, driven by its excessively diplomatic attitude to the problem of Nagornyy Karabakh, is stubbornly trying to equate the aggressor and the victim of aggression. As can be seen, courteous Europeans do not wish to offend Armenia, even taking into account its total disregard for the Eastern Partnership.

In general, the further the Eastern Partnership programme develops the more problems it breeds. The Vilnius summit in 2013 provoked a war in Ukraine, which is still going on, resulting in new victims. Meanwhile, the Riga summit has clearly identified another profound problem: European states are still pursuing a policy of double standards in relation to conflicts in the region of Eastern Partnership, which calls into question the future of this programme in the format in which it was conceived.

Proceeding from their foreign policy priorities, six post-Soviet countries have chosen different forms of cooperation with the European Union. Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova have decided to cooperate within the framework of the Association Agreement, Belarus and Armenia have opted for the Eurasian Economic Union in which Russia is the engine room, while Azerbaijan builds its relations with the EU in a bilateral format considering it the most convenient format of relations.

Incidentally, on the eve of the summit, the Azerbaijani Foreign Minister passed to EU Commissioner for European Neighborhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations Johannes Hahn and European foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini a draft agreement on strategic partnership between Baku and Brussels. It was noted during the meeting that Azerbaijan has strategic partnerships with a majority of EU member countries. It was also emphasized that this document may create opportunities for the development of cooperation between Azerbaijan and the European Union in the strategic dimension.

However, if the European Union has decided to divide the six EaP member countries into “friends” and “foes” based on their attitude to the events in Ukraine and, at the same time, continue to maintain different attitudes towards separatism in other regions, then Azerbaijan and the EU will go their separate ways. The partnership involves consideration for mutual interests of the parties, whereas the current cooperation between Baku and Brussels is largely a one-sided relationship. If the European Union continues to ignore the problem of the occupation of parts of Azerbaijani territory, the republic may seriously reconsider the bilateral relations. Love cannot be forced. After all, what kind of partnership is it if your partner does not recognize your sovereignty?

Summing up the topic of Azerbaijan’s expectations for the integration with the European Union, which were natural but proved to be too high, it would be good to quote an apt expression of French Senator Nathalie Goulet: “Today, our continent is like a big marketplace, why to get involved?”

The post Riga: A Summit Of Discord – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Rajeshwari Krishnamurthy*

On 22 June 2015, the Afghan Taliban claimed a suicide bombing attack by seven militants on the Afghan parliament that killed two and injured several. The attack, dramatic even for Afghanistan standards, took place as the Wolesi Jirga was about to finalise Afghan President Ashraf Ghani’s nominee Mohammed Stanekzai as the Afghan Defence Minister – an office that had remained vacant for nine months.

The Afghan Taliban have become stronger over the past year, and more so in 2015. Their 2015 spring offensive, Azm, is their deadliest operation since 2001. Over the past few weeks, the attacks have intensified, with offensives taking place all over the country, especially in the northern and southern provinces. In fact, despite stiff resistance from the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), the Afghan Taliban managed to capture two districts – Dasht-e-Archi and Chardara – in Kunduz Province this week.

Furthermore, they are operating on all platforms to boost public support. This week, the Afghan Taliban announced the launch of a 24-hour hotline and e-mail addresses for Afghan government officials willing to defect to them. Their attacks between January-April 2015 have claimed over approximately 1000 civilian lives – a sharp rise as compared to the same period in 2014. The insurgents have also ignored the religious scholars’ council’s call for ceasefire during the ongoing holy month of Ramzan.

Reportedly, the Afghan Taliban held talks with the Iranian officials to seek support against the Islamic State (IS) in mid-June. Although the Iranian Ambassador to Afghanistan refuted these reports and stated that Tehran supports the government in Kabul, the incident indicates that the Afghan Taliban is worried about the IS’ impact on the splinter groups within the Taliban ranks. There currently exists a schism in the Taliban leadership ranks vis-à-vis loyalties and levels of hardline. Now the Afghan Taliban feels the pressure to remain relevant in Afghanistan in the face of the IS’s steady gains in terms of ‘achievements’ and support base. Therefore, they are trying to ‘prove their worth’ to gain supporters is by leveling-up to and/or outdoing their competitors. This explains their rush and unceasing effort to make territorial gains – especially in the north, given the IS’s potential for entry via the northern borders.

What have the Afghan Taliban been Up To?

Since April, the Afghan Taliban has been simultaneously operating on two contradictory fronts: talking peace with various government officials in various parts of the world, and carrying out one of the most elaborate offensives in the country. It is possible that the Afghan Taliban want to ensure that they have Kabul’s attention when the government is weak in order to prevent any other group from capitalising on the weakness. They have already met officials in China, Qatar and Norway in the past two months.

There have been some positive developments such as the Taliban’s change of stance on women’s right to education and employment, and even hints at power-sharing. While this does sound exciting and if true, could be a huge shift, all this is just rhetoric at this point. Delivery on these statements is still pending.

In fact, despite several rounds of talks in 2015, the Taliban have not demonstrated any intent to end or reduce hostilities – even as the next date for their negotiations with the Afghan government, scheduled to take place post Ramzan in July, inches closer.

The 22 June attack on the Afghan parliament was them signaling that they are capable of striking anywhere at their any time of their choosing.

What are their Current Priorities?

There is a question of whether the Afghan Taliban is entirely on board the idea of Pakistan playing mediator, or them being viewed as Pakistani proxy fighters. The Afghan Taliban, unlike the IS or other groups, have characteristically been more nationalistic in nature. For the most part, their ambitions are limited to Afghan territories only.

The Afghan Taliban do not want to be negotiated with via Pakistan alone. They seek direct access to the Chinese leadership as well as to the US leadership. China is being cautious vis-à-vis directly engaging with the Taliban. If this continues, when the US leaves Afghanistan, the Afghan Taliban would be left with nobody but Pakistan to be negotiated with via. This is the opposite of what the insurgents seek right now.

What do they Seek?

They cannot be seen negotiating with President Ghani because they have refused to recognise his presidency. But they have been passing messages via Afghan representatives they meet with for talks. The Afghan Taliban wants the US to be part of the negotiations and this is evident in their insistence that their Doha office be reopened. They likely also seek to negotiate with the Afghan government, albeit via interlocution by the US, China and Pakistan; but they also need to find a ‘legitimate’ authority to negotiate with.

The US must [emphasis added] talk to the Taliban now [emphasis added], especially when regional countries are aligning themselves. And the ANSF will need to make gains on the ground for Kabul to be in a position to make demands.

The current state of indecisiveness and running in circles will prove counter-productive for any positive movement towards end or reduction of hostilities. In the meanwhile, the political uncertainty vis-à-vis – and absence of clarity within – the Kabul government is being thoroughly exploited by the insurgents; and this only implies ominous times for the immediate future.

* Rajeshwari Krishnamurthy
Research Officer, IPCS
E-mail: rajeshVvari@gmail.com

The post What Are The Afghan Taliban Up To? – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Rupak Bhattacharjee*

Connectivity is one area of cooperation in which India and Bangladesh have made real progress during the visit of Prime Minister Narendra Modi to Dhaka. Clearly displaying mutual trust and confidence, the two neighbouring nations decided to connect each other through road, rail and sea. Both the sides agreed to open new road linkages and revive the British-era transport networks, especially railways and waterways.

New Delhi and Dhaka had been engaged in hectic negotiations to upgrade cross-border connectivity in recent years. India wants transit facilities through the territories of Bangladesh for movement of goods and people from and to northeastern states, which are isolated from the country’s mainland. Bangladesh too has been seeking better regional connectivity, including with India, since 2010.

During the bilateral talks, Prime Minister Modi and his Bangladesh counterpart Sheikh Hasina reiterated that greater connectivity is vital for the development of two countries and South Asia. Modi noted that “connectivity is the catalyst for deeper engagement”, while Hasina said connectivity across the region would reduce inequalities and maximise welfare gains.

As part of a major initiative under sub-regional cooperation, the two countries finalised a motor vehicle agreement between Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal and India (BBIN). The pact, which was approved by the Hasina cabinet soon after Modi’s visit, seeks to facilitate movement of cargo from all four countries using the transit corridors. The agreement is set to boost trade, investment and people-to-people contact among the four South Asian countries.

Finalisation of the BBIN agreement has resulted in a win-win situation for both the countries. Among other gains, it was a diplomatic victory for the Modi government after Pakistan scuttled the initiative during the November 2014 South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation Summit citing domestic reasons. Bangladesh stands to benefit immensely as the country is poised to emerge as South Asia’s gateway to Southeast Asia through much-needed renovation of its transport infrastructure.

India granted a fresh $2 billion soft loan to Bangladesh for use in connectivity projects. Reports suggest that Dhaka had already identified 15 projects in consultation with the Indian government for this purpose. Ten of them are related to the up-gradation of road, rail and port in Bangladesh. The proposed projects could bring about a sea change in sub-regional connectivity when they become fully operational.

The agreements on connectivity that were inked on June 6, included: Kolkata-Dhaka-Agartala and Guwahati-Shillong bus services; Kolkata-Khulna train service; use of Chittagong and Mongla sea ports and coastal shipping between the two countries. Besides, a trade agreement was signed and a protocol under it —Protocol on Inland Water Transit and Trade, was renewed for another five years.

The opening of two bus routes will accelerate the process of northeastern states’ integration with India’s mainland. To overcome its geographical constraints, Tripura has long been demanding a direct bus service between Agartala and Kolkata through Bangladesh. The total distance between Kolkata and Agartala via Guwahati is 1,650 km. But with the opening of a new route via Bangladesh, the distance will be reduced to just about 600 km.

This bus service has provided huge relief to the people of Tripura, which is virtually Bangladesh-locked. The Manik Sarkar government, that enjoys warm ties with the Awami League (AL) government, is also pitching for direct bus service between Tripura and other northeastern states through Bangladesh for easy movement of people in the region.

The Guwahati-Dhaka via Shillong and Sylhet bus service was formally launched after two successful trial runs. Following the opening of this bus route, trade and historic ties between the two key northeastern states — Assam and Meghalaya, and Bangladesh are bound to witness an upswing.

Efforts are on to open bus services on the Kolkata-Chittagong, Shillong-Chittagong, Kolkata-Khulna, Kolkata-Jessore and Silchar-Karimganj-Sylhet routes. Till Modi’s Dhaka visit, India and Bangladesh had only two regular bus services — Kolkata-Dhaka and Agartala-Dhaka.

India and Bangladesh intend to develop overall connectivity between them in the next few years. In its bid to improve cross-border connectivity, India is currently working on several infrastructure projects, including construction of a bridge over the Feni river, to access Chittagong port, building a 15 km railway link between Agartala and Akhaura and a 70 km-long road from Sabroom to Chittagong port, and renovating Ashuganj port in Bangladesh.

Both the governments are keen to augment railway connectivity, particularly to revive the links that existed before the 1965 India-Pakistan war. Responding to the popular demand of opening a train service between Khulna and Kolkata, the two sides have agreed to initially operate this once in a week via the longer Gede-Darsana route.

In a recently held inter-governmental railway meeting, India sought access to Bangladesh’s railway network for transportation of goods to and from eastern and northeastern states. India urged Bangladesh for immediate introduction of container train services to avoid lengthy procedures of border clearance of goods and minimise the transaction cost of trade. The two countries underscored the need to upgrade the existing interchange points at Rahanpur in Bangladesh and Singabad in India.

The two countries also signed a coastal shipping agreement to facilitate cheaper and faster cargo movement between them. So far, Bangladesh has been importing various essential commodities from India through a long and arduous route. The ships carrying goods reach Bangladesh via Singapore or Colombo, as they could not ply between the two countries in the absence of an agreement.

But under the new pact, Indian vessels will be allowed to carry goods using Bangladesh’s Chittagong and Mongla ports. Bangladeshi ships could now carry goods using the Indian ports like Haldia, Paradip and Vishakhapatnam. This agreement will substantially reduce freight charges, bring down the price of necessary items, improve utilisation of port capabilities, minimise the load on busy roads and increase volume of trade between India and Bangladesh.

There is enough potential to enhance waterways connectivity since both the nations share more than 1,100 km riverine border. In the shipping agreement, some river ports of the two countries, including Bangladesh’s Khulna, Narayanganj, Sirajganj and Ashuganj, and India’s Kolkata, Karimganj, Pandu and Shilghat are named as ports of call.

Both the sides agreed to open shipping routes under the Protocol on Inland Water Transit and Trade which was inked in 1972 for boosting trade and commerce through river routes. In view of the Assam government’s persistent demand to revive the old waterway links between the northeast and Bangladesh, talks are on to start steamer service from Guwahati to Dhaka.

The expansion of sub-regional connectivity is about to open the floodgate of trade opportunities, increase investment and strengthen people-to-people relations in South Asia. Some of the pacts on connectivity signed during Modi’s recent Dhaka visit are going to benefit landlocked Nepal and Bhutan in addition to India and Bangladesh. Moreover, it will pave the way for South Asia’s economic integration with dynamic Southeast and East Asia, making the northeast and Bangladesh as hubs of trade, transit and connectivity.

Deepening of bilateral cooperation in the arena of connectivity has strategic and security dimensions too. The agreement on the use of Chittagong port assumes significance against the backdrop of growing Chinese involvement in the up-gradation of Bangladesh’s maritime infrastructure. India has agreed to enhance the capability of Bangladesh’s busy Chittagong port in an effort to keep its strategic adversary China away from the Bay of Bengal region.

The agreements on connectivity have also taken care of Bangladesh’s security concerns. The word “transit” has been removed from the bilateral discourse because of the sensitivity of the issue in Bangladesh. The ruling AL is careful not to allow the country’s ultra-rightist and reactionary forces to indulge in jingoism.

*Dr. Rupak Bhattacharjee is an independent analyst based in Delhi. He can be reached at editor@spsindia.in

The post Modi’s Dhaka Visit: A Game Changer For Regional Connectivity? – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

A spokesman for the Iraqi defense minister speaking with the Associated Press on Thursday said an Iraqi pilot who has been training for four years in the United States was flying an F-16 Fighting Falcon that crashed in southern Arizona, AP reported.

Brig. Gen. Tahseen Ibrahim told The Associated Press, “We have no word yet on his fate or the reason behind the crash,” adding that Iraqi defense officials were awaiting further details from the American government.

No information has been released about the pilot by the Arizona Air National Guard. The pilot was the only person on board when the plane went down during a training mission Wednesday night, AP reported.

The post Iraqi Pilot Flying Plane In Arizona F-16 Crash appeared first on Eurasia Review.