The deal was sealed early morning Israel time on July 14. By mid day Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had called it among other things, a “stunning, historic mistake.” He has a habit of hyperbole. Lets not forget that he also called the November 2013 Geneva agreement with Iran a “historic mistake,” too.

We in Israel should only hope that Netanyahu’s hysteria does not hurt the legitimacy of our valid concerns regarding the agreement struck between Iran and world powers over its nuclear program. Chief among these are worries about inspections of non-declared nuclear sites, especially those at Iran’s military bases.

Although the deal allows constant access to declared nuclear sites, if illegal activities are suspected to be taking place at an undeclared site, inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will first have to ask Iran to visit that site. Once that request has been made, then a set of procedures has to be followed which could take up to 24 days before an actual inspection takes place.

Dr. Ephraim Asculai, a senior research fellow at the Tel Aviv based Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), worries about not just the 24-day process but also what precedes it.

To initiate an inspection at such a site, one must first show evidence to Iran that illegal activities are taking place there, otherwise why should Iran even consider a request for an inspection visit?

“Presenting evidence could compromise intelligence sources, something which no country will want to do” says Asculai, who worked for Israel’s Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) for over 40 years. “This is specially true if the evidence comes from Human Intelligence Sources or electronic intercepts from organizations such as the NSA [National Security Agency].”

As for the 24-day duration of such a process, Asculai, who also served in the IAEA for six years, says: “Within that time, Iran could remove nuclear activities which do not involve nuclear material, without leaving any traces.”

To be sure, there are positive features of the current deal that could make it very difficult — in fact economically catastrophic — for Iran to decide to secretly make a weapon.

First, 96 percent of Iran’s Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) stockpile will be reduced, part of which will be sold abroad “in return for natural uranium delivered to Iran” and the rest diluted at home. Enrichment is one path to a bomb and with only 300 kilograms (660 pounds) of LEU remaining in Iran, Tehran will not have enough to make a weapon. Even if Iran does have a stockpile of undeclared LEU somewhere, if and when it decides to make a weapon, it will be easier to detect, even after the 24-day procedure required for inspection of non-declared military sites. Removal of residue from nuclear material such as uranium is very difficult; it can stay in soil and water samples for months, if not years.

The deal also blocks Iran’s path to a bomb via plutonium, since the Arak reactor will be removed and redesigned to produce less plutonium,if any.

In addition, the deal’s “snapback” mechanism would reimpose sanctions against Iran in 65 days, if it were to be found in breach of its commitments.

Last but not least, removal of some of the sanctions will also be conditional upon Iran answering questions about the Possible Military Dimension (PMD) of its nuclear program. This refers to allegations that Iran had until 2003 a functional military nuclear program. Iran has been playing coy with the IAEA over this matter for a number of years. However until today, clarification over PMD has not been tied to sanctions. Now that they are, Iran is very likely to resolve this matter.

The leaders of Israel have every right to voice their concerns over the current deal. Even the opposition is concerned about it. But the deal’s restrictions on Iran mean that the breakout time needed to make a nuclear weapon has been pushed back to a year. Without the deal it would be two to three months.

Israel should be just as concerned, if not more, with improving U.S. relations and modifying its expectations. There is so much mistrust of the Obama administration’s Iran policy and the latest Iran agreement that Netanyahu has publicly declared that “Israel is not bound by the agreement.” Israel’s ambassador Ron Dermer has been cut off from the White House — an unprecedented move in contemporary US-Israel relations. This impasse must change. Senior U.S. and Israeli government officials must meet at the earliest opportunity to resolve differences and to come up with a common strategy to address any potential future threats posed by Iran.

It was completely unrealistic for Netanyahu to demand that Iran give up its entire nuclear program. The opposition is also guilty of having unrealistic expectations, for instance, about Iran’s funding of Israel’s enemies. How could any deal aimed at stopping Iranian financial support to Hezbollah and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad be verifiable? Also, when it comes to support for Hezbollah, Iran spends $200 million a year on the organization. Last year, Iran’s official budget was $294 billion. Help for Hezbollah was a mere .07 percent of the funds available to it. Even without the sanctions, Iran could still support Hezbollah.

Meanwhile the leaders of Iran must also think about their actions. It would be unfair and inaccurate to say all Israelis and Jewish diaspora members who oppose a deal with Iran do so because they want war. After the Holocaust, Jews are very sensitive towards anyone who uses eliminationist terms against them. Iranian regime’s constant calls for Israel to be wiped off the face of the map touches this very fear, and creates a strong reaction. Therefore even after a deal, even if Iran abides by all of its commitments, as long as the Iranian regime continues to call for the elimination of Israel, a majority of diaspora Jews and Israelis will distrust anything Tehran does, and will try to counter it in the halls of Congress.

This article was published at Al Jazeera and reprinted with permission.

The post Israel Needs To Be Realistic About Iran Deal – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

(EurActiv) — The French National Assembly was the first national parliament to vote on the Greek debt deal on Wednesday 15 June. MPs accepted the agreement by 412 votes to 69. EurActiv France reports.

The two houses of the French parliament convened on Wednesday 15 June to debate the debt agreement offered to Greece. While the different political parties expressed widely diverging views on the subject, both chambers approved the deal, and a general consensus emerged around strengthening eurozone integration. The National Assembly (France’s lower house) adopted the deal by 412 votes to 69, and the Senate (the upper house) by 260 votes to 23.

Radical left and Communist MPs opposed the deal, as did a number of Greens, but a large part of the opposition came from the Eurosceptic conservatives. 41 of the more right wing members of Nicolas Sarkozy’s Les Republicains (LR) party opposed the agreement, and 35 abstained from the vote.

The split vote on the right reflects the leader of the opposition’s change of opinion: after chiding the soft touch of president François Hollande, Nicolas Sarkozy voted in favour of the agreement.

Bruno Le Roux, the leader of the Socialist group in the French Parliament, welcomed the work of Angela Merkel and François Hollande, but said he feared the deal would lead the EU to be seen as “a debt collection company”.

Prime Minister Manuel Valls said “some hoped to see the end of the French-German partnership on internal affairs, but we achieved the opposite!” He and Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius gave the same strongly pro-European speech in the Assembly and the Senate respectively.

Calls for a eurozone government

Manuel Valls insisted on the need for greater integration among eurozone states, and supported the position of president Hollande, who had called for the establishment of a eurozone parliament and government during a televised address on 14 July.

“The single currency has not brought convergence. We must progress on all fronts, especially on social issues,” the prime minister said.

“This crisis has shown that we need to take the EU back to the drawing board,” he added.

Europhiles from across the political spectrum confirmed their support for a more integrated eurozone. From the centre, Yves Jego was quick to welcome the idea. He tweeted “I will vote Yes to the agreement to avoid Grexit and in the hope that a eurozone government will be set up soon.”

Socialist MP Bruno Le Roux said, “Only political leadership from the eurozone can put an end to the democratic deficit.”

François de Rugy, the head of the Ecologist party, supported the initiative and encouraged François Hollande to act on his principles. This call has also been taken up by French MEPs, including Jean Arthuis, the Liberal head of the parliamentary budgets committee.

“We have been taken for a ride by a manipulative and cynical government,” said Republican MP Christian Jacob. He welcomed the agreement, but criticised the recent comments of Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras. “We are neither reassured nor convinced of the Greek prime minister’s ability to keep his word,” he added. Many within his party shared this view, and chose to vote against the deal.

The Greens were also split over the deal.

André Chassaigne, the president of the French Parliament’s Communist group, opposed the deal. He said, “Europe continues to impose its financial control on the people, at the expense of economic growth.”

And the comedy prize goes to…

In the morning of Wednesday 15 July, the French government’s spokesman Stéphane Le Foll had denounced the “little accountants” that criticised the Greek deal. “They are not aware of the economic and political cost of Greece leaving the eurozone,” the French agriculture minister said.

The former finance minister and political ally of Nicolas Sarkozy, Eric Woerth, hailed the Greek agreement on Monday 13 July as an achievement of none other than… Nicolas Sarkozy. A view that brought an ironic smile to the face of the prime minister.

“I think I understood that you give the credit for Sunday’s agreement to the president of your party. This certainly made me smile and puts you, no doubt in the running for the comedy prize in a few months,” Manuel Valls said.

The post France Accepts Greek Deal, Calls For Eurozone Government appeared first on Eurasia Review.

So far, exoplanet surveys have been most sensitive to planetary systems that are populated in their inner regions by massive planets, down to a few times the mass of the Earth [1]. This contrasts with our Solar System, where there are small rocky planets in the inner regions and gas giants like Jupiter farther out.

According to the most recent theories, the arrangement of our Solar System, so conducive to life, was made possible by the presence of Jupiter and the gravitational influence this gas giant exerted on the Solar System during its formative years. It would seem, therefore, that finding a Jupiter twin is an important milestone on the road to finding a planetary system that mirrors our own.

A Brazilian-led team has been targeting Sun-like stars in a bid to find planetary systems similar to our Solar System. The team has now uncovered a planet with a very similar mass to Jupiter [2], orbiting a Sun-like star, HIP 11915, at almost exactly the same distance as Jupiter. The new discovery was made using HARPS, one of the world’s most precise planet-hunting instruments, mounted on the ESO 3.6-metre telescope at the La Silla Observatory in Chile.

Although many planets similar to Jupiter have been found [3] at a variety of distances from Sun-like stars, this newly discovered planet, in terms of both mass and distance from its host star, and in terms of the similarity between the host star and our Sun, is the most accurate analogue yet found for the Sun and Jupiter.

The planet’s host, the solar twin HIP 11915, is not only similar inmass to the Sun, but is also about the same age. To further strengthen the similarities, the composition of the star is similar to the Sun’s. The chemical signature of our Sun may be partly marked by the presence of rocky planets in the Solar System, hinting at the possibility of rocky planets also around HIP 11915.

According to Jorge Melendez, of the Universidade de São Paulo, Brazil, the leader of the team and co-author of the paper, “the quest for an Earth 2.0, and for a complete Solar System 2.0, is one of the most exciting endeavors in astronomy. We are thrilled to be part of this cutting-edge research, made possible by the observational facilities provided by ESO.” [4]

Megan Bedell, from the University of Chicago and lead author of the paper, concludes: “After two decades of hunting for exoplanets, we are finally beginning to see long-period gas giant planets similar to those in our own Solar System thanks to the long-term stability of planet hunting instruments like HARPS. This discovery is, in every respect, an exciting sign that other solar systems may be out there waiting to be discovered.”

Follow-up observations are needed to confirm and constrain the finding, but HIP 11915 is one of the most promising candidates so far to host a planetary system similar to our own.

Notes:
[1] The current detection techniques are more sensitive to large or massive planets close to their host stars. Small and low-mass planets are mostly beyond our current capabilities. Giant planets that orbit far from their host star are also more difficult to detect. Consequently, many of the exoplanets we currently know are large and/or massive, and close to their stars.

[2] The planet was discovered by measuring the slight wobble it imposes on its host star while orbiting around it. As the inclination of the planet’s orbit is not known, only a lower limit to its mass can be estimated. Note that the activity of the star, which is linked to the variations of its magnetic field, could possibly mimic the signal that is interpreted as the signature of the planet. The astronomers have performed all the known tests to investigate this possibility, but it is currently impossible to completely rule it out.

[3] An example of another Jupiter Twin is the one around HD 154345, described here: http://iopscience.iop.org/1538-4357/683/1/L63/pdf/587461.pdf .

[4] Since the signature of the Brazilian accession agreement in December 2010, Brazilian astronomer have had full access to the ESO observing facilities.

The post Jupiter Twin Discovered Around Solar Twin appeared first on Eurasia Review.

West Coast spot prices for conventional gasoline increased sharply last week, while falling slightly on the Gulf Coast and remaining flat on the East Coast.

The Los Angeles, California, spot price for conventional gasoline increased nearly 90 cents per gallon (cents/gal) between July 6 and July 13, while San Francisco, California, and Portland, Oregon prices increased 24 cents/gal and 5 cents/gal, respectively (Figure 1). This most recent price rise results from a delay in receipts of waterborne imports of gasoline blending components and a decrease in total motor gasoline inventories within an already constrained supply chain.

West Coast spot gasoline prices typically trade at a premium to prices in other regions of the country because of the region’s unique product specifications and relative isolation from other domestic and international markets. As a result, West Coast gasoline markets are primarily supplied by in-region production, and prices react more quickly and strongly during times of local supply shortages. The West Coast gasoline spot price differential has been higher than usual for the past several months following a series sed by an unplanned refinery outage in February and additional refinery outages in April. Also, West Coast gasoline demand is up 4% in the first four months of 2015 compared with the same time last year, putting additional pressure on the supply chain.

Higher spot market prices for gasoline on the West Coast have led to higher retail prices. As of July 13, the West Coast retail price for regular gasoline was 76 cents/gal above the national average, largely because of California’s 105 cents/gal premium compared with the national level (Figure 2). Similar to the gasoline spot market prices, the West Coast retail price premium compared with the national average has been elevated since the February 18 explosion and fire at ExxonMobil’s Torrance refinery in southern California. Each time the market has rebalanced in the wake of subsequent supply disruptions, prices have settled at levels that reflect the higher cost of bringing in alternative supply. However, despite the series of disruptions, retail prices are 41 cents/gal and 21 cents/gal lower than a year ago on the West Coast and in California, respectively, because of lower global crude oil prices.

In the five weeks following the Torrance outage, West Coast total motor gasoline inventories decreased by 3.0 million barrels. While gasoline inventories typically fall during that time of year, this year’s decrease was sharper than in the previous two years, and inventories dropped below the five-year range for four weeks in a row (Figure 3). In times of supply disruptions, inventories provide an immediate, although limited, source of alternative supply. However, because of product specifications and minimum operating inventory levels (tank bottoms), inventories alone are often insufficient to offset a prolonged market disruption. Movements from other regions within the country to the West Coast are limited because of minimal pipeline connectivity with neighboring regions and the fact that not all U.S. refineries can produce gasoline that meets California product specifications. Following the initial rapid decrease in West Coast inventories, storage levels recovered, and even exceeded 2013 and 2014 levels, as imports increased to replace in-region production. However, the reported 1.1 million barrel inventory drawdown for the week ending July 3 may have signaled that the market is experiencing renewed stress.

Because of its unique product specifications and long distance from international gasoline markets, the West Coast does not typically import much gasoline (Figure 4). From 2010 through 2014, total motor gasoline imports (including both finished motor gasoline and blending components) averaged 24,000 barrels per day (b/d) and were mostly from Canada, meeting approximately 1% of regional demand. However, in times of extended supply disruptions, alternative sources of supply come from farther away. These additional gasoline imports require long lead times and higher prices. Several weeks after the Torrance outage, West Coast gasoline imports more than tripled, and averaged 81,000 b/d from March 27 through June 26. Monthly data through April (the latest available) show California total gasoline imports coming from South Korea, Singapore, Japan, and Taiwan in Asia as well as Sweden, the United Kingdom, Italy, and the Netherlands in Europe. For the week ending July 3, West Coast gasoline imports dropped to zero and trade press reports indicate that cargos bound for California have been delayed. Buying may have also slowed in late June as the arbitrage window narrowed, meaning that fewer shipments are on the way to the West Coast. Longer supply chains are subject to such interruptions and when that happens, price reactions are often immediate and significant.

Other periods of price spikes have occurred in California, most notably in 2008, 2009, and 2012, that were similar in duration and magnitude to the current situation. By early June of this year, the other refineries were back in operation so only the Torrance refinery remains down. Prices will likely stabilize again when imports and inventories increase, but are likely to remain elevated until the repairs to the Torrance refinery are completed later this summer.

U.S. average gasoline price increases while the diesel price continues to decline

The U.S. average retail price for regular gasoline increased four cents from the previous week to $2.83 per gallon as of July 13, 2015, 80 cents per gallon less than the same time last year. The largest increase came on the West Coast where the price jumped 29 cents to $3.59 per gallon. The Gulf Coast and Rocky Mountain prices both increased one cent to $2.53 per gallon and $2.82 per gallon, respectively. The Midwest price declined two cents to $2.72 per gallon and the East Coast price was $2.71 per gallon, one cent less than last week.

The U.S. average price of diesel fuel decreased two cents from last week to $2.81 per gallon, $1.08 per gallon lower than the same time last year. Prices declined in all regions except the Rocky Mountain region where a marginal increase left the price virtually unchanged at $2.79 per gallon. The largest decline came on the West Coast where the price fell three cents to $3.04 per gallon. The East Coast and Midwest prices both decreased two cents to $2.92 per gallon and $2.70 per gallon, respectively. On the Gulf Coast, the price dropped by less than half a cent, remaining at $2.71 per gallon.

Propane inventories gain

U.S. propane stocks increased by 1.7 million barrels last week to 87.4 million barrels as of July 10, 2015, 24.1 million barrels (38.1%) higher than a year ago. Gulf Coast inventories increased by 2.1 million barrels and Midwest inventories increased by 0.5 million barrels. East Coast inventories decreased by 0.9 million barrels while Rocky Mountain/West Coast inventories remained unchanged. Propylene non-fuel-use inventories represented 5.9% of total propane inventories.

The post California Gasoline Prices Rise Further As Lengthier Supply Chain Strained – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Oregon State University researchers have patented a new strain of a succulent red marine algae called dulse that grows extraordinarily quickly, is packed full of protein and has an unusual trait when it is cooked.

This seaweed tastes like bacon.

Dulse (Palmaria sp.) grows in the wild along the Pacific and Atlantic coastlines. It is harvested and usually sold for up to $90 a pound in dried form as a cooking ingredient or nutritional supplement. But researcher Chris Langdon and colleagues at OSU’s Hatfield Marine Science Center have created and patented a new strain of dulse – one he has been growing for the past 15 years.

This strain, which looks like translucent red lettuce, is an excellent source of minerals, vitamins and antioxidants – and it contains up to 16 percent protein in dry weight, Langdon said.

“The original goal was to create a super-food for abalone, because high-quality abalone is treasured, especially in Asia,” Langdon pointed out. “We were able to grow dulse-fed abalone at rates that exceeded those previously reported in the literature. There always has been an interest in growing dulse for human consumption, but we originally focused on using dulse as a food for abalone.”

The technology of growing abalone and dulse has been successfully implemented on a commercial scale by the Big Island Abalone Corporation in Hawaii.

Langdon’s change in perspective about dulse was triggered by a visit by Chuck Toombs, a faculty member in OSU’s College of Business, who stopped by Langdon’s office because he was looking for potential projects for his business students. He saw the dulse growing in bubbling containers outside of Langdon’s office and the proverbial light went on.

“Dulse is a super-food, with twice the nutritional value of kale,” Toombs said. “And OSU had developed this variety that can be farmed, with the potential for a new industry for Oregon.”

Toombs began working with OSU’s Food Innovation Center in Portland, where a product development team created a smorgasbord of new foods with dulse as the main ingredient. Among the most promising were a dulse-based rice cracker and salad dressing.

The research team received a grant from the Oregon Department of Agriculture to explore dulse as a “specialty crop” – the first time a seaweed had made the list, according to Food Innovation Center director Michael Morrissey.

That allowed the team to bring Jason Ball onto the project. The research chef previously had worked with the University of Copenhagen’s Nordic Food Lab, helping chefs there better use local ingredients.

“The Food Innovation Center team was working on creating products from dulse, whereas Jason brings a ‘culinary research’ chef’s perspective,” said Gil Sylvia, director of the Coastal Oregon Marine Experiment Station at OSU’s Hatfield Marine Science Center in Newport. “The point that he and other chefs make is that fresh, high-quality seaweed is hard to get. ‘You bring us the seaweed,’ they say, ‘and we’ll do the creative stuff.’”

Several Portland-area chefs are now testing dulse as a fresh product and many believe it has significant potential in both its raw form and as a food ingredient.

Sylvia, who is a seafood economist, said that although dulse has great potential, no one has yet done a full analysis on whether a commercial operation would be economically feasible. “That fact that it grows rapidly, has high nutritional value, and can be used dried or fresh certainly makes it a strong candidate,” he said.

There are no commercial operations that grow dulse for human consumption in the United States, according to Langdon, who said it has been used as a food in northern Europe for centuries. The dulse sold in U.S. health food and nutrition stores is harvested, and is a different strain from the OSU-patented variety.

“In Europe, they add the powder to smoothies, or add flakes onto food,” Langdon said. “There hasn’t been a lot of interest in using it in a fresh form. But this stuff is pretty amazing. When you fry it, which I have done, it tastes like bacon, not seaweed. And it’s a pretty strong bacon flavor.”

The vegan market alone could comprise a niche.

Langdon, a professor in the Department of Fisheries and Wildlife at OSU and long-time leader of the Molluscan Broodstock Program, has two large tanks in which he can grow about 20-30 pounds of dulse a week. He has plans to up the production to 100 pounds a week. For now, they are using the dulse for research at the Food Innovation Center on dulse recipes and products.

However, Toombs’ MBA students are preparing a marketing plan for a new line of specialty foods and exploring the potential for a new aquaculture industry.

“The dulse grows using a water recirculation system,” Langdon said. “Theoretically, you could create an industry in eastern Oregon almost as easily as you could along the coast with a bit of supplementation. You just need a modest amount of seawater and some sunshine.”

The post Researchers Patent Seaweed That Tastes Like Bacon appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By John Zaw

Myanmar’s navy has rescued more than 100 Bangladeshi migrants stranded for nearly a month on an island in the Andaman Sea.

The Global New Light of Myanmar newspaper on July 14 said the navy picked up 102 men from Saung Gauk Island near Kawthaung township in the Taninthayi region, in the south of the country.

“Some said they were forcibly taken from their homes, while others were reported to have been enticed by human traffickers to work in Malaysia,” said the state-run newspaper.

All of those found came from Bangladesh, the report said.

They were abandoned on the island in early June and were rescued between the end of June and July 12, the report said.

“The navy is continuing searching the area and the men will be sent back to their country,” the report said.

It gave no details on where the migrants are currently being held.

The rescued men were among thousands caught up in a migrant crisis that gripped South East Asia in May and June.

The crisis was triggered when Thai authorities cracked down on human traffickers after discovering dozens of migrant graves in abandoned camps near the Thailand-Malaysia border.

The crackdown prompted traffickers to abandon their human cargoes, many of whom were still at sea heading to Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia.

The ensuing crisis sparked an international outcry against trafficking gangs preying on Bangladeshi migrants looking to escape poverty in Bangladesh and Rohingya Muslims escaping persecution in Myanmar.

Myanmar officials denied allegations of persecution of the Rohingya.

Under international pressure to help save those stranded at sea Myanmar’s navy rescued around 1,000 migrants in late May and early June.

On May 26, Myanmar’s outspoken Catholic leader, Cardinal Charles Bo had urged the government to show compassion and mercy for the migrants.

Myanmar citizens have a moral obligation to “protect and promote the dignity” of all human persons, he said.

The post Myanmar Rescues 102 Migrants Stranded On Island appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Those who believe the West is experiencing a form of imperial decline cite familiar reasons – eroding military budgets, the growing assertiveness of China and Russia, etc. John Rapley, however, points to another cause. He attributes the West’s decline to capital flows making their way to emerging markets.

By John Rapley*

Since the turn of the millennium, a significant new trend has emerged in global politics. After decades in which talk of the relative decline of the West was belied by the facts, it seems now to have genuinely begun. The collective economic output of the developed OECD countries, for example, has begun to slide relative to the rest of the world. Overall, these countries’ combined share of global GDP has fallen by a quarter. Trailing in its wake is a similar decline in their share of global military expenditure. While fiscal austerity erodes Western military budgets, China and Russia are spending liberally and growing more assertive. Meanwhile, the multiplication of fronts on which asymmetric warfare takes place is challenging all governments to respond to these threats decisively.

None of this should surprise us. On the contrary, the only surprising thing is that anyone should have been caught off guard by it. After all, no empire has yet found a way to maintain its dominance indefinitely. Instead, empires tend to follow a well-worn path of rise, peak and decline, with the only exceptional thing about the Western experience being the character of its decline. As in most stages of imperial decline, the economic centre has shifted away from the traditional ‘core’ and towards the ‘periphery.’ Unlike previous cases, however, the shift is most visible in terms of capital flows and the returns on capital, which are now much higher in emerging markets than in the OECD countries.

The great divergence

Colonizing foreign lands typically involves organising production in such a way as to create a net transfer of wealth from the colonies to the imperial heartland. The crudest form of this is outright plunder, but there is no inherent need for imperial expansion to bring about absolute economic contraction in the periphery. In fact, it may lead to growth in the colonies. When it does, the empire’s defenders may use this as evidence that imperial powers have a civilising mission, an important theme in the literature on empires that recurs throughout history. Typically, however, the heartland grows faster than the colonies, as the net flow of aggregate imperial production favours the dominant power.

For example, although per capita incomes grew in both Western Europe and the European colonies during the high age of European imperialism in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the ratio of per capita incomes widened. In 1800, per capita incomes in Europe and the colonies were roughly level, with a ratio of around 3:1 – i.e., the average person in Europe or its former white dominions (the US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand) earned three times what the average person in the colonies did. By the mid-twentieth century, this ratio had widened tenfold, to about to 30:1.

Of course, a great wave of decolonisation brought an end to the British and French Empires after the Second World War. But while independence was meant to reverse this ‘great divergence’ (as it came to be known), it initially only accelerated the relative rise of the West. By the end of the 20^th century, that ratio of 30:1 had doubled. In fact, one could make a case that the high water mark of Western empire actually came in this post-World War II period, and that the formal dissolution of empires strengthened the West as a whole – which now functioned with a high degree of cohesion.

Americans tend to recoil at the suggestion that they ever had any kind of an empire, beyond a few relatively short-lived colonies in the Pacific and Caribbean. As proof, they cite America’s resistance to Britain’s and France’s efforts to reconstitute their empires after the Second World War. But the suggestion that America was an anti-imperial hegemon rests on a narrow conception of imperialism that is at odds with the historical experience. Washington may not have run the daily affairs of the newly-independent states; but then again, neither do most empires in their colonies. Looking at the Roman Empire, for instance, the communications and logistical challenges of an age in which goods and soldiers moved overland at the speed of a cart made it impossible for Rome to maintain direct control over its outlying regions. Instead, the Roman nobility was drawn together into an ideologically cohesive vision of empire – what the historian Peter Heather has called ‘Latin, towns and togas.’ The structures, legal framework and ideology of empire emanated from Rome, but day-to-day administration was left in the hands of the nobility and a ring of client-states.

Broadly speaking, there are important similarities between this imperial model and the pattern which emerged in the post-World War II period. United by a shared democratic ideology, a series of international institutions bound together a US-dominated alliance: the United Nations, the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, NATO, GATT, the OECD, the G7. Whether by design or simply as a result of the advantages that accrue to dominant powers, the net resource transfer that had been formally organized during the period of European imperialism continued via these informal structures. The global trading regime continued to favor industrial over primary producers, extending the bias against ‘developing’ countries. Meanwhile, as the new Third-World governments engaged in the slow and laborious task of building their own bureaucracies and the education systems that would staff them, their role in international trade negotiations tended towards the passive. Moreover, the global currency system, which encouraged countries to hold foreign reserves in US dollars, allowed a massive buildup of Third-World assets in Western banks. That helped keep the cost of capital in the major economies comparatively cheap.

Finally, the global state system, which was grounded in the Western model of the sovereign nation-state, enforced a system of migration control that limited the movement of people from the periphery towards the core, where incomes were higher. Mass migrations, of course, are a recurring feature of world history. Indeed, it was the movement of peoples from the periphery of the Roman Empire into its heartland, which we know as the barbarian invasions, that ultimately undermined the Roman Empire’s fiscal base, leading to its collapse. In the post-war period, by contrast, national barriers to migration, policed by newly-independent states through the regime of passports and immigration officers, interrupted the flow of populations and built up pressure in the periphery. Bottled up in their homelands, a tide of humanity filled the young cities of newly-independent states at an unprecedented rate. The result was a sort of global-scale apartheid, in which immigration control limited job competition and inflated wages in the ‘white suburbs’ of the West.

The course of empire?

The post-war global system resembled a US-dominated economic empire in which independent states perpetuated a framework that disproportionately benefited the West. Again, this is not unlike the Roman Empire in its final decades, when it maintained its hegemony through client-states. Interestingly, while the conventional wisdom is that the Roman Empire had been in terminal decline for centuries, historians now know that its aggregate output actually peaked during this final period. Earlier historians were misled by the evident decline of the economy of Rome itself, but this would be akin to seeing Britain’s twentieth-century decline relative to the US as evidence that the West was in a terminal phase. In the Roman case, the heartland of empire had simply radiated outwards from its birthplace towards its provinces, which ultimately surpassed the mother country.

This outward radiation from the core to the periphery may be the same logic that is operating against the West today. In its constant search for cheaper supplies and labour, the centre of the global economy is moving towards the erstwhile periphery. Restrictions on labour mobility retarded this process temporarily, but tectonic changes in the global economy overwhelmed even these controls. Changes in transportation technology, like containerization, slashed the cost of shipping. Miniaturisation, the substitution of plastics for metals, and the increasing share of knowledge in products reduced the weight of output, further reducing the need for manufacturers to locate close to their markets. New management technologies thinned administration and substituted networks of autonomous producers for large, hierarchical firms, enabling firms to break up the production process and outsource labour-intensive components to low-wage zones. Finally, when policy regimes lifted controls on capital markets and trade in the late twentieth century, the barriers to capital mobility were largely lifted. Attila no longer needed to sack Rome. The new Rome was shipping its capital to the former colonies.

This tendency began in the late twentieth century, but cyclical features muted its effects until around the turn of the millennium. Then, after two centuries in which the net flow of capital had moved from core to periphery, the direction of global flows reversed. Today, net global investment flows have shifted towards emerging markets. China leads the way, but it is not the only country benefiting from the mobility of global capital. According to World Bank figures, the continental which grew fastest in 2014 was Africa.

The simple fact is that returns on capital are now much higher in the periphery than in the core, which means that the center of the global economy is in the process of relocating. Compared to the Roman case, this time it is capital rather than labour that has overwhelmed imperial defenses. As it did in antiquity, this shift will manifest itself in the slowly eroding fiscal position of core states. The US may remain the world’s dominant economy for the foreseeable future, but, together with its allies, it will be forced to negotiate a world very different from that of the last two centuries.

*John Rapley is a writer and academic based in London, and author of The Money Cult: The Priests, Prophets and Magicians of Economic History (Simon and Schuster, 2016).

The post The Decline Of The West? Been There, Done That – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

The mayor of Chattanooga, Tennessee, Andy Berke, claims that a suspected terrorist on Thursday afternoon killed four U.S. Marines and wounded a Chattanooga Police officer during an attack on two military facilities in the city. According to the U.S. Attorney’s Office and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the shooting is considered to be an “act of domestic terrorism,” but it’s not known of the attacker is linked to any Islamic or white supremacist groups.

During news conferences on Thursday held by local and federal government officials it was learned that the shooter, Kuwait-national Mohammad Youssef Abdulazeez, was also killed but he didn’t say how he met his end. During the attacks at two separate installations, a police officer and others were also wounded.

“I want to say again, it is incomprehensible to see what happened and the way that individuals who proudly serve our country were treated,” Mayor Berke said. Meanwhile, during his press conference U.S. Attorney Andy Berke noted that the killings of four Marines during a terrorist rampage is an “act of domestic terrorism,” which Fox News’ chief intelligence correspondent Catherine Herridge said was a rare statement this soon after a violent incident.

Berke told reporters during the news conference that two separate U.S. military sites were attacked and that Abdulazeez was killed at the Naval Reserve Center (NRC), where he had murdered his victims. There was also a shooting at a military recruitment center about 7 miles away, but no casualties were reported at that site.

Besides the deaths, officials announced that two gunshot victims — a soldier and a police officer — were wounded by the suspected terrorist. The shootings at the two military facilities in Chattanooga had sent the unarmed troops running for cover.

Federal investigators are continuing to compile information on the terrorist and his attack and sources have said they believe Abdulazeez had communicated with someone from the terrorist group Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The FBI is also looking for evidence of the dead terrorists communications with other jihadists here in the United States, according to the U.S. Attorney’s office.

“Despite the fact that the suspected terrorist is now dead, the investigation may result in other suspects being identified including those who are overseas in Muslim countries,” Det. Jonathan Spiegel told the Examiner. Det. Spiegel, a member of a terrorism task force, also provided information to the Examiner gleaned from the suspect’s Facebook and Twitter accounts.

The post Chattanooga Jihad? Suspected Terrorist Kills 4 Marines, Wounds Cop – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

A car bomb exploded at a security checkpoint in the Saudi capital of Riyadh Thursday night, killing the driver and wounding two nearby police officers, Reuters reported.

The officers were transported to a nearby hospital in “stable condition,” a spokesman for the Saudi interior ministry told the Saudi Press Agency.

The explosion occurred after police manning a checkpoint on al-Hair Road stopped the car for a routine inspection.

“The driver blew up the car and killed himself,” the spokesman said.

The checkpoint was nearby the capital’s highest security prison, Reuters reported.

Original article

The post Saudi Arabia: Car Bomb In Riyadh Kills One, Injures Two appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Ihsan Bal

Ending in complete failure, the Arab uprisings that broke out in 2010 throughout the Middle East gave place to a new wave of resistance. With the defeat of the massive movement that sought to bring authoritarian governments of the region to account, harmless street demonstrators initially mobilized in pursuit of justified demands were gradually replaced by wild and unruly organizations expressing themselves with extreme rage and enmity. These violent organizations attracted sympathizers and recruited numerous militants by hijacking the dreams of a segment of the people who previously lost their hopes as a result of their failed attempt at revolution. In the process, dozens of unconventional entities which capitalized on irregular forces and emphasized different ethnic and sectarian identities, among them some “mutated” versions of Al-Qaeda first and foremost, came to prominence in the field. At this stage, we see that these groups have been drawn into a serious power struggle, also among themselves.

As related events continue to haunt the region surrounding Turkey, the risk posed to our country’s security by an increasing number of explosions and massacres taking place right beyond our borders is much greater than that which is actually faced by some of the most concerned Western nations. Frankly, Turkey has suddenly found itself in the line of fire. In this context, the military option has been put on the table over the last couple of weeks as a potential means of countering these groups which exhibit all kinds of operational capabilities along our borders with Syria and Iraq. However, it should be underlined that any misstep at this time can cost a price that is too high to bear. Therefore, we need to find an answer to the question of “is the military option the most viable and accurate one to be resorted to in a setting marked by unconventional warfare in the first place?”

Not to forget the U.S. experience

Combating terrorist organizations which ably employ all sorts of unconventional methods and guerilla tactics is, as everyone would agree, a truly challenging task. Such groups are inherently capable of determining the exact time, place, and target of their attacks, which gives them a tremendous advantage vis-à-vis militaries. These are not easily identifiable entities, as their true capabilities are unknown, their targets are far from clearly defined, and their organizational structures aren’t rigid in the conventional sense. Therefore, any nation that is to confront such a challenge has its operational capacity limited according to the proficiency and quality of its intelligence services and resources. This means that a nation is only able to gather and analyze genuinely actionable intelligence that allows for successful operations against irregular forces if that particular nation can readily identify tangible strategic targets. Yet even here, the ability to capitalize on operational intelligence in and of itself does not mean one has sufficient capacity to effectively combat such groups in the field. One further needs to train special forces which are well-equipped and ready to be mobilized in accordance with the available intelligence. Moreover, it is assumed that one is aiming at only a certain number of targets when accurate intelligence is gathered, and that all the other prerequisites are satisfied. In contrast to this, the terrorist organizations we are currently confronted with have the capacity to carry out activities throughout a vast geographical area spanning all the way from Kuwait to France.

Within such a chaotic environment, the viability of an option founded on a military intervention in Syria is definitely ruled out. That is, any attempt to wrestle with such agile, effective, professional, and violent radical organizations and their various proxies – which are known to carry out surprise attacks throughout such a vast geographical area that includes Turkey itself – by means of conventional forces with boots on the ground is considered to be an option that is doomed to fail. Such a perception is popular at least among the U.S. leadership, which is generally expected to take the initiative in the case of an intervention. At this stage, even a brief flashback can provide us with a striking comparative perspective that can in turn guide us to a fairly reasonable conclusion. The U.S. experience in Iraq and Afghanistan in the post-9/11 years is ridden with extremely heavy losses despite the U.S. military enjoying the most advanced technology currently available to humanity and being entirely comprised of professional soldiers. Considering that, the U.S. interventions in question came at the expense of thousands of troops never making their way home again, and at a huge cost exceeding $5 trillion. These most recent wars probably left a fresh wound in the American psyche similar to that which was inflicted during the war in Vietnam back in the 1960s. On the other hand, we should not forget that the combined number of civilian casualties in Iraq and Afghanistan is expressed in the hundreds of thousands. In that regard, it is not that difficult to understand why the Obama administration has been persistently exercising self-restraint when it comes to Syria.

Diplomatic protection and rearguard support

Those who have been raising their voices in favor of the military option in countering the terrorist threat that is spreading like wildfire throughout Turkey’s immediate neighborhood need to assess the quality of the threat as well as the means and capabilities of the military force which would be expected to tackle the terrorists. They further need to prepare strategic roadmaps based on comprehensive surveys and in-depth field research, relying exclusively on validated data and rational analyses. An important point has to be made here before complicating the matter further: Turkey refrained from a cross-border operation even after a Turkish fighter jet was struck down by the Assad regime, an conventional organization which has rather rigid goals and a regular army. Indeed, even a limited airborne operation was ruled out in this case. Obviously, alternative options gained prominence as the heavy costs that such an operation would possibly entail were widely recognized. Embedded in the current context are acute dangers that virtually overshadow those associated with the case involving the downing of one of our fighter jets by the Assad regime. More specifically, today it would be extremely difficult for any conventional military force to cope with the challenges posed by the complex political scenery that lies to our south, as it is here where making a distinction between civilians and guerillas (or terrorists) is more difficult than ever. In other words, discerning the ‘real target’ from the ‘victim’ is nearly impossible under existing circumstances. Militaries can hardly act in a proactive fashion against organizations that have no moral compass whatsoever and adhere to no ‘warrior ethic’ of any sort. Such groups, which are known to carry out attacks against both people in churches and mosques, as well as at beaches and bazaars, shape their methods of warfare based on an absolutely corrupted mindset that no conventional force can get a firm grasp of.

For this reason, the potential repercussions of a projected military intervention into Syria which can be felt behind the actual frontier, i.e. within Turkey’s borders, should be fully investigated. Organizations like ISIS, which intentionally generate a vicious cycle of violence that is fueled by the systematic exploitation of different ethnic and sectarian identities, has already carried out several attacks in Turkey as well. Indeed, they frequently threaten Turkey. And what makes this grim reality even more disturbing is the perceived lack of clear information concerning the number of ISIS militants hiding within Turkey, a reality that is enough to dash our hopes. It doesn’t seem possible for us to make a healthy assessment of our options pertaining to the Syrian crisis without submitting a realistic answer to the question of to what extent are the police and national intelligence agencies in Turkey willing to take cognizance of the entirety of the activities and organizational structures of terrorist organizations such as ISIS within our own borders.

The Syrian crisis is not a simple issue that can be assessed in isolation from the larger context of which it is a part. We need to understand that viable solutions can be applied to Syria’s problems only by making sure the international community, regional actors, and local entities converge on common ground to the maximum extent that such a convergence is practically possible. As a matter of fact, Westerners, who are nowadays rather focused on the possibility of foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq returning to their home countries, seem reluctant to realize the gravity of the alarming challenge that awaits countries like Turkey which are located just within the immediate line of fire, and even more reluctant to provide solidarity against this threat. However, it is not difficult to realize how narrowly compartmentalized their assessment of the larger crisis is considering the series of terrorist attacks which previously hit them as well and similar incidents which are likely to take place in the future. From the standpoint of these terrorist organizations, national and geographical boundaries are meaningless; and they are targeting people from all ethnic, religious, and sectarian backgrounds. Therefore, the only way out of this quagmire is through international cooperation to its fullest extent and a coalition as broad-based as possible.

To conclude, it should be realized by Turkish decision-makers that a military intervention into Syria, if considered to be a viable option as has widely been articulated over the last couple of weeks, would essentially serve to continue containing the enemy in the background, and hence, it could not be regarded as the ‘vanguard’ of the all-out struggle against irregular forces in the field. On the one hand, our fight against the immense threat that originates from Syria needs to receive international support. On the other hand, our strategic roadmap should be fine-tuned to the dynamics of the ongoing negotiations on an elaborate peace deal between various armed groups in Syria. Another point to be considered, and indeed probably the most important one of all, is the necessity to thoroughly investigate the operational capacity and potential activities of, as well as the means that are available to, terrorist groups like ISIS which will possibly attempt to retaliate with attacks inside Turkey in the case of a direct confrontation in Syria. In sum, the real question is not only how the military will act or whether it is endowed with the sufficient capacity or not, instead, it is what sort of decisions top level decision-makers made or will make within such a chaotic and multifaceted context that harbors various implicit threats; and perhaps most important of all, according to what sort of rational data they will eventually reach a conclusion. Any missteps taken in panic on the verge of this cliff can result in irreparable damage to our national security.

The post Dangerous Developments On Turkey’s Southern Border – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

The head of Iran’s Anti-Smoking Society has announced that the use of hookah in all public places is banned by an order of the Ministry of Industry, Mining and Trade.

ISNA reports that the Ministry of Industry and Minerals, the police and the Ministry of Health will cooperate to collect all hookah from public places.

The Anti-Smoking Society was established six years ago and in addition to securing the ban, it promotes anti-smoking policy through education by providing funding for relevant research and public service announcements.

The society reports that the most challenging aspect of its efforts has been enforcement of the ban.
Last year, 4,000 physicians and health care providers wrote to the president to express concern about the unregulated use of hookahs and their connection to the rising number of cancer patients in the country.

Statistics indicate that smoking hookah is on the rise among women and youth in Iran.
Facebook

The post Iran Bans Hookah Use In Public appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Leo Suryadinata*

On 9 February 2015 the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) led by Peng Jiasheng (also known as Phone Kyar Shin or Pheung Kya-shin) suddenly returned to Laukkai, the Kokang capital with an attack on government security forces there. Serious fighting took place which resulted in the exodus of many Kokang Chinese seeking refuge in Chinese territory. Fighting lasted for several days with heavy casualties on both sides. MNDAA failed to capture Laukkai, however, and fled to the border and allegedly entered into Chinese territory. Myanmar security forces went in pursuit and fired shells at the area they believed to be the rebels’ hiding place. The Myanmar air force joined the fighting and on 13 March a fighter plane dropped bombs on the Chinese side of the border, killing five Chinese villagers and wounding eight (Xue Li, 2015). Beijing protested and Nay Pyi Daw apologized (Tiezzi, 2015). High level meetings followed between the two countries to look for a solution.

Nevertheless, fighting continued for more than three months. On 2 June, China conducted a live firing exercise along the Sino-Myanmar border, raising tensions between the two countries (Peng Nian, 2015). Nevertheless, scholars close to the People’s Liberation Army noted that the purpose of the exercise was to pacify domestic critics, and was not aimed at the central government of Myanmar.

“Myanmar is a key exit to the sea for southwestern China. It also plays a crucial role for the security of the Sino-Myanmar oil pipeline and the development of China’s future maritime silk road. Meanwhile the US and Japan have eagerly drawn Myanmar to their side, and China is in a dilemma, especially on the shelling issue. On the one hand, it would like to stop the civil war in Myanmar from hurting Chinese citizens but on the other, it would also like to prevent a Sino-Myanmar conflict. Therefore China has to move cautiously” (Yangguang Huaxia, 2 June 2015).

On June 10, a National League for Democracy (NLD) delegation led by Aung San Suu Kyi arrived in Beijing, invited by the Chinese Communist Party in what appears to be a move by Beijing to mend ties with Myanmar’s opposition (Deng Yuwen, 2015). Many interpreted this as an expression of a dual-track policy by China towards Myanmar, showing Beijing’s dissatisfaction with Myanmar (Peng Nian, 2015B). Several questions can be posed here: What is China’s position on the Kokang Chinese issue? How does Myanmar see the issue being resolved? How deeply will this affect Sino-Myanmar relations? How soon can the Kokang problem be solved? In order to get some answers, it is useful to look at the history of the Kokang Chinese in Myanmar.

HISTORICAL LEGACY

Kokang (Guo Gan 果敢in Mandarin, meaning the Brave), which is part of the Shan state of Myanmar today, was Qing territory before 1897. Under the Anglo-Chinese Agreement that was signed that year, the Qing government ceded Kokang to British India which then included Burma. Kokang was incorporated into the Shan region when Burma was no longer part of British India. (Myint Myint Kyu, 2011:202).

During the colonial period, the British had some presence at Kokang in the person of a British-appointed regent. But after Burma’s independence, Kokang was left alone to govern itself. The Yang family became de facto leaders of the area. The region soon came under the control of the Kuomintang army, and later the Burmese Communist Party (BCP), which was receiving support from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). It was thus virtually independent of the central government of Burma. Kokang self-defense troops, led by a Kokang Chinese named Peng Jiasheng (birth year 1931), had joined BCP to fight the central government. But in 1989, Peng split from the BCP and signed a ceasefire agreement with the Burmese Government; and Kokang was renamed the “Kokang Special Region” (Myiut Myint Kyu, p.204). Peng was allowed to retain his own army, which was renamed the MNDAA, to maintain border security. A power struggle between Peng and Yang Maoliang, the traditional leader of the Kokang region saw the Peng emerge the winner (Baidu Baike, on Peng Jiasheng). Yang was ousted and eventually left Kokang. His family now lives in Yangon.

Peng sought to replace his deputy, Bai Suocheng (birth year 1954), with his own son Peng Deren. This resulted in a split between the two men (Baidu Baike, on Bai Suocheng).

Meanwhile, the military government of Myanmar had drafted the new constitution of 2008 in which it is stated that there can only be one union army. In other words, all other armed groups were told to demobilize and form a Border Guard Force (BGF) with some involvement of military officers from the central government. They should also be trained in accordance with central government guidelines (Myint Myint Kyu, p.206). Peng refused to comply with the guidelines, and rebel on 8 August 2009. However, he was defeated by the Myanmar Army and fled; and his former deputy, Bai Suocheng, was appointed by the government to become the new leader of the Kokang Special Region. Under the management of Bai Suocheng, Kokang appeared to be peaceful.

When Peng and Bai were still working together, Peng initiated a programme to eradicate opium from the region, and Bai was chairman of the Ban Opium Committee. In 2002 the Kokang authorities announced the region free of poppy cultivation, the first in Myanmar to succeed in eradicating opium. The Kokang Chinese had been dependent on poppy cultivation, and this crop was now replaced by rubber, sugar cane, tea and corn (Myint Myint Kyu, p.5).

After his defeat by the central army, Peng disappeared from the scene for about five years. One source says that he moved to Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore before returning to Kokang in 2014 (Baidu Baike, on Peng Jiasheng). His overseas movements cannot be verified. As a fugitive and outlaw, he could not have used a Myanmar passport. Another source notes that he might have been hiding in Yunnan or northern Myanmar all along as his son is married to the daughter of the leader of the Mangla region. Peng had also contacted the Kachin Independence Army (KIA). According to rumours, he had staged some attacks at Kokang together with the Kachin Independence Army, but again, this cannot be verified. In any case, the Myanmar Army was caught by surprise by Peng’s sudden onslaught in February 2015.

THE KOKANG CHINESE COMMUNITY

Despite becoming part of the Shan State, the Kokang Chinese community was never really integrated into the Burmese national system the way some other ethnic minorities in the northern border areas had done. The situation of Kokang Chinese is also unique in other ways. Due to Kokang’s history and proximity to Yunnan Province, many of the Kokang Chinese still retain strong Chinese cultural characteristics.

According to Myint Myint Kyu, a local scholar who conducted field work there and completed her thesis on Kokang in October 2011, Kokang Chinese constitute about 90% of the region’s population. They are a mixture of local-born and newer migrants. The administrative language of Kokang is Mandarin, and its currency is the Renminbi (not the Myanmar Kyat), and the time it uses is China’s time. Nonetheless, Kokang Chinese are not a homogeneous group. A minority among them are quite integrated into local society and are able to speak local dialects.

Not all Kokang Chinese reside in Kokang. In fact, quite a few live in major cities in Myanmar, and overseas, and have assumed Myanmar identity. Law Sit Han (Lo Xinghan, 1935-2013) who was a leading businessman, for instance, lived in Yangon, and his businessman son U Tun Myint Naing (alias Steven Law) lives overseas and is a respectable business tycoon. (Daw Win, 2012, p. 495; Liang Dongbing 2015, p. 109). Law Sit Han had close relations with the Myanmar government, and was accredited for persuading Peng Jiasheng to leave the BCP in 1989. (Daw Win, ibid.)

Peng was born in Kokang and his ancestors came from Sichuan Province of China (Baidu Baike, on Peng Jiasheng). Bai Suocheng, Peng’s former deputy, was also born in Kokang but his provincial origin is unknown. Peng appears to have multiple identities. Earlier he emphasized his Kokang identity, but after, he was pushed back to the China-Myanmar border following the recent attacks on the Myanmar security forces, he launched a campaign to recruit fighters from the Chinese population in China. He announced that he was a “Han Chinese” and appealed to Han Chinese for support. This identity shift is easy enough to make since the majority of Kokang Chinese still speak Chinese and keep Chinese traditions. Not many of them in the Kokang area speak the Shan language, let alone Burmese.

The central government does not consider MNDAA led by Peng as representing an “indigenous minority”, as they were not included in the nation-wide ethnic peace agreement it had prepared.2 The Kokang Chinese are recognized by the government as one of Myanmar’s 135 “national ethnic groups”,3 but it does not consider Peng and his followers in MNDAA to be their representative.

PERSPECTIVES OF MYANMAR AND CHINA OVER KOKANG CHINESE

After Peng declared himself a “Han Chinese” and appealed for support in Yunnan, one report claims that the Yunnan Chinese did provide support while another says that the support was minimal (RFA China Today, 2015). Beijing had in fact stated that it did not and would not support Peng militarily, although the Myanmar military did not believe that. (Gleeson, 2015).

What is the view of the PRC on the Kokang Chinese? Are Kokang Chinese considered as Chinese? Beijing acknowledges that many of the Kokang Chinese are of Chinese (or Han) descent and they have inherited Chinese tradition and so forth, but they are not Chinese by nationality (citizenship) (Global Times, Editorial), and are instead an ethnic minority in Myanmar. Therefore, the conflict between Kokang Chinese and government is the internal affair of Myanmar and not a problem for the PRC. With regard to the Peng Jiasheng rebellion, Beijing has asserted that it is not supporting Peng Jiasheng, but wants Myanmar to solve the problem peacefully.

China has been very careful in responding to the Kokang rebellion as it may have domestic implications for China. If China intervenes in Kokang Chinese matters, it may create a problem for itself in dealing with its own minorities in Xinjiang and Tibet.

While China does not want to get involved in the Kokang Chinese matter, since that would be interfering in the internal affairs of another country, China will not help Myanmar crush the rebels either. Yun Sun, a fellow at the East Asia Program at the Henry L. Stimson Center and a non-resident fellow with the Brooking Institution argues:

As a national policy, China does not support Peng Jiasheng. However, if Peng does successfully consolidate his control of Kokang, China will not opt to oppose him. China will accommodate such a reality, even if it indicates more uncertainties and risks. …To manage uncertainty and resolve conflict requires strengths and wisdom from the Burmese authorities. Any suspicion of China undermining the process is as equally misplaced as any hope for China to solve the problem for Burma.” (Sun, 2015).

Yun Sun puts forward the argument based on her observation regarding Chinese foreign policy behavior in other region, that “in similar cases of internally divided and unstable countries, such as Pakistan and Afghanistan, China has developed a record of smoothly working with both local tribes/warlords and the central governments” (Sun, 2015). This analogy is inappropriate, however. The tribes in Pakistan and Afghanistan are not linked to the Han Chinese and the situation in these two Islamic states was also beyond Beijing’s control. Moreover, the strategic value of the two countries to China is different from that of Myanmar. China can do something if it wants to, but its actions decided by its foreign policy objectives. If it becomes in China’s national interest to be more interventionist, Beijing would most likely adjust its policy towards Peng Jiasheng accordingly.

Another more realistic argument on Beijing’s foreign policy behavior is put forward by another Chinese scholar, Xue Li. She argues that Myanmar is important for China and maintains that the current passive policy does not serve the interests of China. She therefore suggests that China take initiatives to create favourable environment for peace in Kokang by asking Peng to drop his weapons and negotiate with the Myanmar Government. If Peng refuses, China should cut all weapons supply to Peng. She says that a prosperous Kokang will serve the interests of both China and Myanmar:

Establishing a Kokang Special Administrative Area (a step forward from the current autonomous area), where the Myanmar government is only responsible for defense and diplomacy, might be a viable solution. This will need Myanmar’s government to genuinely implement the Panglong Agreement,4 and to go beyond the 2008 constitution, which is not recognized by local ethnic minorities (Li, 2015).

Xue Li’s view that to have a prosperous Kokang and a more stable Myanmar will benefit China as well. China cannot afford to let the situation worsen as this will only benefit the rivals of China. Her argument is proving to be correct, at least in the short term. On 11 June, one day after Aung San Suu Kyi arrived in Beijing, the MNDAA suddenly announced that it had decided to start a unilateral ceasefire, ending the four months fierce fighting. It also noted that “the government of China has strongly urged that the peaceful situation should be restored along the Sino-Myanmar borders. This is one of the factors which contributed to the [unilateral cease fire] decision.”(Liahe Zaobao, 12 June 2015).

It is also worth noting that when Aung San Suu Kyi visited Yunnan province, the Chinese press reported that she thanked the Chinese government for accepting the refugees and giving them shelter. She was apparently also impressed by the development of Yunnan, which might be a model for Myanmar. The report noted that President Xi Jinping stressed the territorial integrity of Myanmar and expressed China’s strong wish to maintain friendly relations with Myanmar. (BBC Zhongwen Wang, 15-6-2015) The BBC Chinese network commented that this low-profile visit was not widely reported in other media and no report about the contents of the discussion between Aung San Suu Kyi and the Chinese leaders was made available.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Peng Jiasheng had declared a unilateral ceasefire during Aung San Suu Kyi’s visit to China. Myanmar has not made any official response to this but it seems that there is no more fighting being initiated by the government. Nevertheless, one Western scholar noted that “the government has still refused to reconsider its military solution so far” (Haacke, 15 June 2015). However, on 30 June 2015, Reuters reported that the chief of the Myanmar Air Force, Major- General Lwin Oo, had been replaced by Brigadier-General Maung Maung Kyaw. This is seen as a move in response to China’s anger over the stray bomb that fell on Chinese territory and killed four (sic) farmers three months ago.5 (Straits Times, 30 June 2015)
Solving the Kokang issue remains an uphill task. The key to a solution—or to a containment of the problem—lies in the reaching of an understanding between China and Myanmar.

I would like to thank Dr. Tin Maung Maung Than and Mr Daljit Singh of ISEAS for their comments. Nevertheless, I alone am responsible for the views expressed in this paper.

About the author:
*Leo Suryadinata is Senior Visiting Fellow at ISEAS.

Source:
This article was published by ISEAS as ISEAS Perspective Number 37 (PDF)

References:
References:
Baidu Baike, (2015) “Bai Soucheng” (Accessed 20/5/2015)
Baidu Baike, (2015) “Peng Jiasheng” (Accessed 20/5/2015)
BBC Zhongwen Wang (15 June 2015) “Miandian fandui pai lingxiu ang shan shu ji jieshu lishixing de fang hua” (Myanmar’s opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi ends her historic visit to China.)
Daw Win, “Law Sit Han” (2012), in Southeast Asian Personalities of Chinese Descent: A Biographical Dictionary, edited by Leo Suryadinata (ISEAS, 2012) pp. 494-496.
Deng Yuwen (2015) “Beijing dui miandian de liangshou zhengce” (Beijing’s dual track policy towards Myanmar)
Gleeson, Sean (2015) “Chinese, Burmese Officials Meet to Defuse Kokang Tensions”, The Irrawaddy, 9 March 2015. (Accessed 22/5/2015)
Global Times Editorial (16 February 2015). “North Myanmar Peace Imperative for China”. Haacke, Jurgen (2015) “Why did Myanmar’s Opposition Leaders Just Visit China?” The
Diplomat, 15 June 2015 (Accessed 18/6/2015)
Li, Xue, (20 May 2015), “Can China Untangle the Kokang Knot in Myanmar?” The
Diplomat, 20 May 2015. (Accessed 22/5/2015)
Liang Dongbing (2015) “Jinsanjiao chuanqi renwu Luo Xing Han” (Luo Xinghan: a Legendary Figure of the Golden Triangle), in Yihe Shiji (Singapore), no. 26, June-September 2015, pp. 109-111.
Lianhe Zaobao, (12 June 2015) “Zai Beijing shiyaxia, Mian tongmengjun jieshu yu zhengfu jun jizhan” (Under Beijing’s pressure, MNDAA ends fighting against Myanmar’s government Army.)
Myin Myint Kyu,(October 2011) “Spaces of Exceptional Shifting Strategies of the Kokang Chinese along the Myanmar/China Border”, M.A. thesis, Graduate School of Chiang Mai University, October 2011.
Peng Nian, 2015, “Mian Bei zhanshi neng fou pinxi” (Will the war at northern Myanmar end?”, Lianhe Zaobao, 4 June 2015;
Peng Nian, 2015A, “Wengshan Suzhi fang hua de xianji” (The intrigue of Aung San Suu Kyi’s visit to China”, Lianhe Zaobao, 11 June 2015.
RFA China Today (24 March 2015) “Kokang rebels recruiting Chinese nationals as mercenaries in Yunnan” (Newshongkong. Worldpress.com (Accessed 22/5/2015)
Sun, Yun (2015) “The Kokang Conflict: How will China respond?” Opinion, 18 February 2015 (accessed 21/5/2015)
Tiezzi, Shannon, (2015). “Myanmar Apologizes to China for Deadly Strike”. The Diplomat, 3 April 2015. (Accessed 21/5/2015)
Yangguang Huaxia (2 June 2015) “Zhongmian bianjing gao junyan, jiefangjun yishi liangniao “(To conduct military exercise on China-Myanmar border, PLA kills two birds with one stone).

Notes:
1. I would like to thank Dr. Tin Maung Maung Than and Mr Daljit Singh of ISEAS for their comments. Nevertheless, I alone am responsible for the views expressed in this paper.
2. I would like to thank Dr. Tin Maung Maung Than for providing me with this information.
3. It should be noted that the Kokang Chinese are recognized by the Myanmar government as one of the country’s ethnic minority groups. See Composition of the Different Ethnic Groups in Myanmar (https://www.embassyofmyanmar.be/ABOUT/ethnicgroups.htm (Accessed 18/6/2015).
4. On 12 February 1947 the Burmese government under Aung San reached an agreement at Panglong with the Shan, Kachin and Chin people. The Panglong Agreement accepted “full autonomy in internal administration for the frontier area”. See The Panglong Agreement, Wikipedia.
5. The report said that Reuters got the information from a senior official in the Myanmar President’s Office but “it is unclear when the switch happened”.

The post Can The Kokang Chinese Problem In Myanmar Be Resolved? – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

The post neo-liberal regimes which flourished in five Latin American countries in the first decade of the 21st century were a product of three inter-related historical processes.

The breakdown of the neo-liberal development model, which in turn ignited mass popular movements for radical political-economic transformations; the incapacity of the mass movements to produce a viable alternative worker-peasant based regime; the beginning of a decade long mega commodity boom which provided a huge influx of revenues which allowed the center-left regimes to finance a capitalist recovery, and secure support from the extractive capitalist sector and finance generous increases in wages, salaries and pensions.

These hybrid, extractive capitalist-national-populist regimes were repeatedly elected until the middle of the second decade of the 21st century. The capitalist-populist electoral coalition encountered major opposition with the end of the commodity boom. The fall in world-market prices led to demands by the techno-capitalist elites for measures of fiscal constraints aimed at reducing social expenditures. At the same time they insisted the regimes grant fiscal largesse for the agro-mineral elite by lowering capital gains taxes and increase fiscal incentives for investors.

As a result, the end of the commodity boom led to the termination of the center-left brokered “consensus”. In its place the regimes faced a right-left crossfire: rightwing business associations led successful electoral challenges and large scale street mobilizations, and the left-wing trade unions and social movements resisted through strikes in defense of existing social gains. The question raised by this left-right crossfire is whether this spells the end of the post neo-liberal, hybrid regimes and the return of neo-liberal regimes or class based leftist politics?

What is not in question is the increased class polarization and the challenges to the stability of post neo-liberal regimes.

Clearly the global conditions which sustained the broad social coalition of post neo-liberalism have changed for the worst. The deteriorating prices of commodities and the corresponding decline in revenues that sustained it are no longer present.

The conditions are set for a change in development strategy and socio-economic policies. These changes will necessarily result from the nature and impacts of the attacks from the crossfire between Right and Left.

We will proceed by analyzing the nature and impact of the Right-Left crossfire under five post neo-liberal regimes in Ecuador, Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia and Venezuela.

We will then proceed to evaluate the relationship of class forces resulting from this conflict and the probable outcomes, including the ways in which the post neo-liberal regimes respond to the crossfire.

Finally, we will address the reason why, in the immediate aftermath of the decline of the post neo-liberal regimes, the Right will probably return to power, rather than the Left.

Ecuador: President Correa and the Right-Left Crossfire

Throughout the months of June-July 2015, a coalition of business, banking and big city mayors led large scale demonstration opposed to progressive inheritance and excess profit taxes proposed by President Correa. At the same time, the left led by CONAIE and a sector of the labor movement also organized mass protests denouncing repressive labor reforms and oil exploitation contracts encroaching on Indian communities.

President Correa convoked large scale pro-government demonstrations backed by supporters of his “Citizens Revolution” and sectors of the Indian and trade unions.

The rightwing-business mobilization which began as a tax protest escalated toward calls to oust the government – a coup.

The Right-Left opposition, however, faced a mobilized public, which included large sectors of the urban middle and lower class.

In the confrontation, the Rightwing opposition movement was far stronger and better organized than the Left – and more likely to be the principle beneficiary of any coup.

While a coup attempt is possible, the Right is firmly ensconced in institutional power , namely they control three of the most important municipal governments. The Right is not likely to risk a coup which, if defeated, would lead to strengthening Correa’s Presidency.

The anti-Correa left seems to reject the idea that what is at stake in this confrontation is the question of democracy. For the left the ouster of Correa is the primary objective. They ignore the fact that a ‘regime change’ would mean a return to oligarchical pro-US rulership and the end of democratic rights.

Correa’s strategy of relying on extractive capital to finance social reforms, has strengthened the Right economically, while alienating sectors of the progressive Indian movement. He has in turn used state revenues to reach the non-CONAIE Indian communities especially in the Amazon region.

The Right in 2014 gained electoral victories in major cities thanks to the end of the commodity boom. Even if the coup fails, they have at least forced Correa to retreat and withdraw his inheritance tax.

Argentina: the End of Kirchnerism and the Return of the Hard Right

Despite repeated electoral victories based on a decade of social reforms financed by the extractive commodity boom the Nestor Kirchner – Cristina Fernandez regimes have not created a distinct political presence capable of challenging the resurgent neo-liberal right.

The “Front for Victory” party which supports President Fernandez is made up of rightwing Peronists, provincial neo-liberals (supporters of ex-President Menem) and a motley collection of trade union officials and political opportunists.

Facing the end of the mega commodity boom and the decline of government revenues, the post neo-liberal regime of Fernandez deepened ties with the major foreign oil companies. The regime turned away from indexing wages and salaries to rising inflation which provoked a wave of strikes from left and rightwing trade unionists.

The rightwing mayor of Buenos Aires, Macri and his Republican Proposal Party (RPP) tightened its control over the capital and waged war on the regime. Backed by the major agro business, banking and industrial associations, the RPP is a serious contender to win the Presidential elections.

The Frente de Izquierda de los Trabajadores (FIT) and related left wing parties received approximately 7% of the vote in the Buenos Aires municipal elections. However, one sector of the left trade unions have played an ambiguous game. The ‘Partido Obrero’ (the Workers Party) has mobilized its trade union activists in common cause with rightwing Peronist union bosses in general strikes and road blockages.

Clearly the main beneficiary of the demise of the Kirchner era, and the dissolution of the progressive coalition backing it, will be the neo-liberal right led by Macri and the right wing Peronists.

Even President Fernandez’s choice of right wing Vice President Scioli as a Presidential candidate is a recognition that the capitalist-worker alliance is finished.

The Right Peronists allied with the agro-financial-industrial elite will compete with the far right neo-liberals for office.

The left will be marginalized from the electoral process and will rely on its trade union militants to forestall major reductions in social expenditures, public sector salaries and the deepening of the extractive capitalist model.

If the past and present is any indication, the left trade unionists will concentrate on wage-salary struggles and street action in opposition to privatization of public enterprises that lead to the discharge of workers and the reversion of collective bargaining agreements.

In summary the political advance of the class struggle from above will narrow the focus of the struggle from below to a defensive mode.

However, it is likely that the adoption of radical neo-liberal measures will lead to greater inequalities, unemployment and devastation of the environment. Corporate environmental damage should fall heaviest on the provinces away from the concerns of the Buenos Aires right and left. Mass ecological protests are likely in the provinces.

Recent history teaches us that the implementation of neo-liberal measures leads to great imbalances and volatility. The model is prone to deep crises, such as took place in 2000 – 2003. The very success of the class struggle from above in imposing its policies provides the bases for a return of intense class struggle from below. This was the case a decade and a half ago (2001-2003).

Brazil: The Post Neo-Liberal Lefts’ ‘Conversion’ to the Rightwing Agenda

While the class struggle from below politicized and mobilized the electorate to vote into office the Workers Party (WP) in 2002, and re-elect it three times, at no point did Presidents, Lula Da Silva and Dilma Rousseff move beyond the neo-liberal policies of their predecessors. Instead, taking advantage of the commodity boom and huge influx of revenues from high oil, iron, soya, beef and other agro-mineral prices, the PT regimes increased social expenditures, the minimum wage and easy credit for mass consumption.

The PT, with the collaboration of its trade union affiliate the CUT, replaced class consciousness with mass consumerism.

The class struggle in the factories and the countryside diminished, as the CUT and MST negotiated agreements with the regime. The PT, in turn, increasingly depended on large scale bribes and swindles with major construction companies to finance its electoral campaigns and to purchase the loyalty of opposition congresspeople in order to pass legislation.

The PT under Lula organized Brazil’s biggest clientelistic , multi-billion dollar anti-poverty program. The PT regime financed a $60 dollar monthly family subsidy program that ensured large electoral majorities in the Northeast of Brazil.

The left opposition to the PT, both electoral and trade union, was marginalized. In contrast the right wing PMDB allied with the PT, in a power sharing agreement, to pass legislation and share the multi-billion dollar windfalls from the bribe taking. The neo-liberal Social Democratic Party retained positions of power in Sao Paulo including the governorship.

With the end of the commodity boom (2012-2016) the economy stagnated. Revenues to fund the clientelistic programs diminished. The foreign flow of capital declined. Trade and fiscal deficits emerged. The PT’s large scale pillage of the public oil giant Petrobras provoked mass unrest, led by the upper and middle class.

The PT’s extravagant spending on sports complexes for the World Cup Games and the Olympics outraged the urban middle and lower classes. They organized multi-million mass protests over deteriorating educational, health and transport facilities and the lack of public housing for the poor.

The PT was caught in a Right-Left crossfire. President Rousseff responded by adopting the entire political economic agenda of the neo-liberal right. Social expenditures were cut, pensions and poverty programs were reduced.

Rousseff appointed hardline neo-liberals to head the Finance and Agricultural Ministries.

Rousseff pledged to privatize the majority of infrastructure – ports, airfields, highways and railroads.

Rousseff agreed to break Petrobras public monopoly on off-shore oil exploitation, auctioning off to Shell the most lucrative sites.

In other words instead of resisting the advance of the upper class struggle from above, Rousseff joined it and implemented its agenda.

In contrast, on the Left, the urban mass movements rose and fell or were reduced to occasional local protests. The CUT and MST remained passive or even supported the Rousseff regime using the pretext of a mythical coup threat.

In other words, the class struggle from above led by financial, agro-mineral and commercial capital found a willing accomplice in the PT President .

The conversion of the PT into an ally of the hardline neo-liberal Right was also evident in Rousseff’s pledge of collaboration on promoting free trade with the Obama regime, thus backing Washington’s drive to re-assert hegemony in the hemisphere.

If the class struggle from below brought the PT to power, the very same party neutralized and disarmed and ultimately betrayed their former allies by embracing the economic elites, who were engaged in class struggle from above.

The correlation of forces in this new context is heavily weighted in favor of a rightwing return to power and a prolonged period of class struggle from above in the pursuit and implementation of a radical neo-liberal agenda.

Bolivia: From Left-Right Confrontation to Accommodation and Continuity

The center-left government of Evo Morales has swept to three electoral victories (2005-2016); secured the backing of the major trade union and peasant confederations; and proceeded to deepen the extractive capitalist model, despite the decline in world commodity prices.

Morales party, the Movement to Socialism (MAS) was the prime beneficiary of the worker-peasant uprisings of 2003 and 2005 which ousted neo-liberal Presidents Sanchez de Losada and Carlos Mesa. With mass support and the backing of the Armed Forces, President Morales easily put-down a coup (2009) originating in Santa Cruz and backed by the US Ambassador, USAID and the Drug Enforcement Agency.

As the MAS government consolidated its hold over national, state and municipal governments, its ranks were filled with opportunists defecting from other parties – diluting its original popular base.

At the center of policymaking, especially in the economic realm, technocrats and fiscal conservatives predominated.

Morales utilized anti-imperialist rhetoric, criticizing US imperial wars and intervention in Venezuela and Honduras and elsewhere, to disarm critics of his extensive links to dozens of foreign multi-national mining corporations operating in Bolivia.

He embraced ‘Mother Earth” rhetoric, while opening highways and mining operations in nature preserves (TIPNIS).

Through co-optation of trade union leaders and incremental wage increases’ Morales de-radicalized the trade union movement. Through symbolic representation, anti-poverty spending and regulation of coca farming he secured the support of the bulk of the Indian movement.

In effect Morales has de-radicalized the working class-Indian movements, while encouraging the growth and prosperity of his new allies among the agro-mineral elites.

The result has been a resurgence of a ‘new right’ based on the middle class in the principle cities.

The ‘new right’ attacks widespread, large scale corruption in state and municipal government. It exploits popular grievances over the failure of MAS officials to implement socio-economic programs and the abuses of power by the governing elites.

In the state and local elections of 2014, the MAS suffered major defeats in La Paz, Cochabamba, Santa Cruz and most other cities, including in its former proletarian bulwark El Alto.

The decay of the MAS, and the rise of the Right and, to a lesser degree, the eco-socialist left, has, however, not directly affected the popularity of Morales. He was quick to decry the corruption rampant in the MAS and call for a ‘rectification’.

The shift in the correlation of forces toward right-wing resurgence, however, is tempered by the working relations emerging between local and state opposition officials and the national government.

While ideological differences persist, Morales moderate socio-economic policies, especially his conservative fiscal and pro-extractive policies, neutralize any right-wing challenge for state power.

The leftwing attack on extractivism has received backing from several peasant leaders and NGOs. MAS policies promoting agro-exporters has alienated landless peasants. The mostly symbolic representation of Indians has provoked opposition from militant Indian leaders.

Nonetheless, the left-Indian-ecology opposition remains fragmented. The left has been unable to fashion a national political coalition, to compete electorally with the MAS and the middle class right. Their main venue is street protests, road blockages and public demonstrations.

In the meantime the right has secured local and provincial political platforms to challenge the Morales regime in future elections.

Venezuela: The Right-Left Confrontation

Venezuela has been the center of the most intense class struggle in Latin America for over a decade and a half.

On the one hand, the upper-class and the US have resorted to every instrument of class struggle from above. These include a military coup (2002); a bosses lockout of the strategic oil industry in 2002/3; a recall referendum and violent street protests leading to 43 deaths in 2015/15; capitalist induced consumer goods shortages; paramilitary operations; contraband activities to provoke scarcities; US funded electoral campaigns.

In response the Venezuelan Socialist government under the leadership of Hugo Chavez and Maduro, backed by its mass organizations – trade unions and community based movements and the loyalties of the military – has mobilized and defeated rightwing violent assaults in the streets, factories and fields as well as at the ballot box.

The Venezuelan Socialists combined the struggle from below with radical structural changes by the government. In response to the failed coup thousands of community based councils were formed. In response to the oil lockout, the oil workers and technicians took control.

The government nationalized and reallocated oil revenues to finance vast social programs, raising income, instituting a free national health program and establishing tuition free universities.

The class struggle in Venezuela was internationalized. The US established seven military bases in Colombia and trained paramilitary death squads for cross border attacks in Venezuela. The Venezuelan government responded by supporting popular struggles in Colombia.

Washington launched an international “war on terror” – a pretext for wars in Iraq, Syria, Libya and Yemen; Venezuela opposed it and rallied support in Latin America.

Washington sought to secure a US centered Latin American Free Trade agreement. Venezuela and its center-left allies in Latin America rejected it.

Venezuela countered by organizing and backing two new regional organizations which excluded the US: ALBA for the Andean countries and Petro Caribe including mainly Caribbean and Central American countries.

Throughout the greater part of the decade and a half of class struggle (1999-2015) the correlation of forces favored the leftist Venezuelan government over the US backed Venezuelan rightist elites.

To a large degree the intensity of the bipolar class struggle precluded the emergence of a tri-polar struggle as is the case in Ecuador, Brazil and Argentina.

Most of the radical left functions as tendencies within the Venezuelan Socialist Party. Likewise on the right, the divisions between the electoralists and the coup advocates are blurred, especially during elections and street confrontations.

The intensity and duration of high levels of class struggle in Venezuela, is largely a function of the deep and pervasive involvement of the US imperial state in all facets of the class struggle.

As we have seen in Bolivia and Ecuador, and more so in Venezuela, the intervention of the US imperial state agencies exacerbated class struggle by escalating the organizational and material resources to the upper classes. This forced the center-left in the Socialist Party to radicalize its socio-economic to secure mass support.

US destabilization efforts in Venezuela served as the catalyst for President Chavez to adopt a socialist, anti-imperialist agenda and to promote the wide diffusion of socialist ideology among the popular classes.

In a word, the combination of upper class socio-economic and US imperialist demands reinforced the extremist nature of the class struggle from above. Rightwing extremism in turn provoked a radicalization of the class struggle from below.

The intransigent Venezuelan upper class – US opposition to redistributive socio-economic policies, their total rejection of an independent “Bolivarian” foreign policy and increased social expenditures, forced the Socialist government to take measures changing the structures of property ownership: the government expropriated oil and bauxite firms, large scale farms and several factories.

However with the onset of the collapse of oil prices, the class struggle from above gained momentum. The Socialist government is vulnerable because it did not diversify its economy. As a result, as revenues declined, social programs were reduced.

Private capital remained dominant in the retail and banking sector. Taking advantage of their strategic positions the elites induced shortages and capital disinvestment, provoking shortages and unemployment.

The death of President Chavez created a leadership problem. In response the US intensified its support for groups engaged in violent destabilization campaigns, attempting to lay the groundwork for an upper class electoral victory in the Congressional elections in December 2015 as a prelude to a referendum revoking President Maduro’s term in office

Under conditions of economic stagnation, declining revenues, consumer goods shortages and inadequate administration responses, the class struggle from above has advanced. The class struggle from below has shifted into a defensive mode.

This raises the question of whether the left’s decade long favorable correlation of forces can continue in the immediate future.

Conclusion

The decade long commodity boom coincided with the rise of center-left parties and the eventual ‘moderation’ of intense class struggle from below.

The key to the rise and dilution of the class struggle is found in the changing political, economic and global context in which it is located.

In most instances, the mass socio-political movements, when fully mobilized, can establish a favorable correlation of forces as evidenced in the overthrow or electoral defeat of incumbent neo-liberal regimes. However, the proponents of class struggle from below have difficulty in forming a worker-peasant government.

In all cases, except Venezuela, center left political leaders rose to power and filled the political vacuum. While they initially met some of the immediate popular demands, in the course of ruling, they diluted and de-radicalized the class struggle from below.

The case of Venezuela is exceptional in part because of the continuous intervention of the US imperial state which undermined the possibility of a successful center-left political compromise between capital-labor.

The correlation of class forces is in constant flux, reflecting larger political and economic processes. In the context of the demise of neo-liberalism, the class struggle from below became the radical axis of political power. The class struggle from below gained adherents among broad sectors of the impoverished middle class, the unemployed and the self-employed.

The ascendancy of the center-left governments had a major impact in moderating the class struggle.

The capitalist class recovered its influence as the economy prospered and the popular classes were de-radicalized.

The end of the commodity boom, created a zero-sum situation, in which the center-left turned right and the capitalist class launched a new wave of class struggle from above.

As a result, the class struggle from below, much weakened, took a ‘defensive turn’ trying to secure the reforms achieved over the previous decade.

In other words, the social dynamics of the class struggle is deeply influenced by two key factors: the state of the economy (breakdown, stagnation) and the class nature of the political incumbents (neo-liberals, center left).

When rightwing neo-liberal regimes preside over economic breakdowns, the class struggle-from-below gains ascendancy.

When the economy goes into crisis under a center-left regime and the commodity boom ends leading to economic stagnation, class struggle-from-above gains force and the Right moves to take state power.

These tendencies are deeply influenced by the role and intervention of the US imperial state. By radicalizing the class struggle from above, the imperial state destabilizes center-left options and deepens the class struggle from below.

The weakening of the economy and the neoliberal compromises of the center-left results in the triangulation of the class struggle between the rising right, the retreating center, and the defensive left.

Throughout Latin America, the class struggle is a constant. As Karl Marx rightly observed, it is ‘the motor force of history’. But in each period, as we have seen in our case studies, the direction of ‘history’s’ movements is largely dependent on which class forces dominate.

The likelihood of a revival of intense class struggle from below is high, given the data recently published by the World Bank’s Vice President for Latin America and the Caribbean. According to the WB report, the de-accerelation of the Latin American economies threatens to relegate over 40% of the population, back into poverty (208 million people) (La Jornada 7/9/15, p. 1).

This group which recently emerged from poverty is “vulnerable” because in large part its improvement was a result of the commodity boom – which has ended.

Downward mobility of this class may initially adversely affect the center-left, but it will likely move left when the right returns to power. Downwardly mobile middle classes ‘gyrate’, looking for salvation from whichever classes can stabilize their position and prevent their impoverishment.

The post The Right-Left Crossfire And The Post Neo-Liberal Left – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Graham Land

The centuries-old international dispute over islands in the South China Sea has taken on an environmental aspect, as biologists weigh in over activities including the building of artificial islands, land reclamation and dredging of the sea floor.

A sad history and an uncertain future

China, Malaysia, Vietnam, Taiwan, Brunei and the Philippines all have conflicting claims over the territory, including the Spratly and Paracel Islands and the Scarborough Shoal. In addition to its major shipping routes and fishing grounds, it is believed that there may be vast untapped mineral resources in the South China Sea.

The conflict has long been a political sticking point between involved countries, with China largely being the belligerent power, particularly against Vietnam and the Philippines. For example, China seized the Paracel Islands from Vietnam in 1974, killing 70 Vietnamese troops, and a further 60 sailors during another conflict with Vietnam in 1988 over the Spratly Islands.

The Philippines takes China to court

The Philippines is currently pursuing a court case against China in order to stop land reclamation of disputed islands. China has stated that it will not participate in any international hearing and that it prefers bilateral negotiations with the Philippines.

Recently at the International Court of Justice in The Hague, Netherlands, the Philippines argued in front of a tribunal that there is a strong case against China for irreversibly damaging the ecology of the South China Sea (also known as the West Philippine Sea). The Philippines contends that China has operated within the Southeast Asian country’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ), harvesting endangered species, destroying coral reefs and participating in destructive fishing practices.

Subsequent events, including China’s acceleration of massive land reclamation activities, which it has undertaken – and continues to undertake – in blatant disregard of the Philippines rights’ in its EEZ and continental shelf, and at tremendous cost to the marine environment in violation of UNCLOS – only serve to reconfirm the need for judicial intervention.

— Philippine Foreign Secretary Albert Del Rosario (via Rappler)

An expert biologist weighs in

Regardless of which power lays claim to the islands, the environmental concern, according to Professor John McManus — a marine biologist and expert on the ecology of the South China Sea — is that activities such as dredging used to create artificial islands may be burying coral reefs in sediment, thereby destroying these vibrant and vital marine ecosystems. Despite already being overfished, the unique currents of the South China Sea have provided respite by replenishing depleted stocks with larval fish from the reefs each season.

But China’s activities in the area may put these invaluable reefs at risk, which could affect regional food security.

From an article in the Guardian:

Dredgers sweep back and forth, creating clam shell patterns in the sand that are clearly visible by satellite. In the process, they destroy whatever lives there, including reef-building organisms, turtles and giant clams, while sending up plumes of corrosive sand and sediment that settle on surrounding reefs, killing them, McManus explains. For the many scientists who are predicting that coral reefs globally are in danger of disappearing by as early as the middle of the century due to bleaching, ocean acidification and rising seas, the reclamation is comparable to switching off an ailing patient’s life support.

McManus’s solution would be to put a stop to development and regulate fishing in the Sea in order to protect these ecosystems that are so important for providing fish to millions of people. He believes that since China has already staked its claim on the area, it would do better to protect its ecology rather than destroy it.

The post Potentially Disastrous Environmental Cost Of South China Sea Dispute – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Kevin D. Stringer

Global climate change has catapulted the Arctic into the center of geopolitics, as melting Arctic ice transforms the region from one of primarily scientific interest into a maelstrom of competing commercial, national security, and environmental concerns.1 Security in the Arctic encompasses a broad spectrum of activities, ranging from resource extraction and trade to national defense.2 With the thawing of the ice, and Russia’s expanding strategic interests in the polar region, the Arctic takes on profound importance for the international security of a number of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and neutral Nordic states. Even if the recent reduction in Arctic ice is only a cyclical phenomenon, it still poses defense challenges in the present for these nations.3

While coast guard and naval forces will have primacy for this domain, special operations forces (SOF), principally maritime and air, can play a narrow but significant role in the areas of special reconnaissance (SR) and related sovereignty assertion and platform seizure missions to support polar national security objectives. SOF are ideally suited to this harsh and complex environment given their expertise, training, and resilience, which are not found in conventional military forces or law enforcement organizations. This article illustrates the growing relevance of the Arctic domain, examines Russia’s expanding national interest in polar matters, and shows the potential role of SOF for several niche missions in this increasingly relevant region. Danish and Finnish examples are highlighted to illustrate that the United States, in partnership with the other Arctic NATO and neutral nations, should focus on customizing an appropriate SOF segment to perform specified tasks, given future uncertainties in this unique ecosystem.

Climate Change, Resources, and Territorial Disputes

The Arctic covers more than one-sixth of the Earth’s total land mass plus the Arctic Ocean.4 The geopolitical significance of the Arctic Ocean increases because of growing shortages of land-based raw materials, its expected resource wealth, new conveyor and transport technologies, and progressive climatic amelioration.5 According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the Arctic warms nearly twice as fast as the rest of the world. Along with rising temperatures, the Arctic has experienced a dramatic decrease in the annual extent of sea ice. This decline in sea ice coverage is particularly pronounced in September.6 Estimates show that approximately 41 percent of the permanent Arctic ice has completely disappeared, “and every year a further million square miles or so vanishes, shrinking the ice cap to around half of the size it covered in the mid-twentieth century.”7 In fact, the U.S. Navy’s “Arctic Roadmap” predicts ice-free conditions for a portion of the Arctic by the summer of 2030.8 These spectacular changes in the Arctic environment will have a range of economic, political, and security consequences.

Arctic climate change makes the region the subject of growing international attention. The melting of the ice cap has led to speculation that new economic opportunities are opening in a region that has been frozen for centuries. Beyond commercial conjecture, the diminishment of Arctic sea ice has led to increased human activities in the Arctic and has heightened interest in, and concerns about, the region’s future. The Arctic Ocean seabed is rich in mineral resources, most notably natural gas and oil. However, forecasts of greater economic activity raise concerns of competing Arctic sovereignty claims: increased commercial shipping through the Arctic; aggressive oil, gas, and mineral exploration; threats to endangered Arctic species; and expanding military operations in the region that could lead to conflict.9

The primary catalyst for greater Arctic activity in the wake of the receding ice cap is the potential economic value inherent in the region. For energy resources, Science magazine indicated that 30 percent of the world’s undiscovered natural gas and 13 percent of its undiscovered oil might be found north of the Arctic Circle.10 A 2008 U.S. Geological Survey appraisal of undiscovered oil and gas north of the Arctic Circle reinforced this view with the assertion that the “extensive Arctic continental shelves may constitute the geographically largest unexplored prospective area for petroleum remaining on Earth.”11 While more research is needed to define the resource potential accurately, the Arctic stands out as one of the most promising energy venues in the world.12 Furthermore, the Arctic is an important commercial fishing ground, especially for the largest populations (salmon, cod, and coalfish).13 Beyond natural resources, professional tourism, particularly polar cruises, will become more attractive as the ice melts.14 Finally, new maritime routes from Asia to the Atlantic will create opportunities to save vast fuel costs for the shipping industry. Use of the Northwest Passage over North America could shorten transport routes between Asia and the U.S. East Coast by 5,000 miles. The Northern Sea Route over Eurasia is also important because it shortens shipping routes between northern Europe and northeast Asia by 40 percent compared with the existing routes through the Suez or Panama canals, and takes thousands of miles off sea routes around Africa or Latin America.15

Obviously, the Arctic emerges as an increasingly attractive market for investment and trade, based largely on the opening of new Arctic sea lines and the access they provide.16 Considering the aforementioned commercial opportunities, Arctic politics center increasingly on access to natural resources and sailing routes, with the security interests of Arctic nations closely related to their territorial boundaries and exclusive economic zones (EEZ). Since commercial objectives are often seen as potentially conflicting rather than shared, a “zone of peace” in the sense of an Arctic security community has not yet developed.17 This situation is exacerbated by the geography of the Arctic as a semi-enclosed sea encircled by littoral states, since extensions of continental shelves and delimitations of maritime boundaries invariably lead to overlapping sovereignty claims, which can cause interstate friction.18 This is not a new phenomenon, though. The Canadian archipelago, for example, has been investigated, mapped, and claimed by different nations in the past.19 Overall, the combination of melting Arctic sea ice, potential polar riches, and conflicting territorial claims creates the conditions for heightened interstate tensions among all the players. This state of affairs is further magnified by increased, yet unpredictable, Russian actions in the region.

A Russian Threat?

The Arctic is vital to Russia’s relevance in world affairs. In addition to possessing the longest Arctic coastline, Russia encompasses at least half of the Arctic in terms of area, population, and probably mineral wealth.20 As such, with its geographical location and the length of its northern coastline, Russia is a key regional player, and its future geopolitical and economic power in international matters is directly linked to its potential exploitation of valuable Arctic resources.21 Moreover, the Arctic has always played a significant role for the Russian military, particularly its navy.22 Consequently, Russia has a stake in essentially all contentious Arctic issues: delimitation of territory; ownership and management of economic resources, particularly natural resource deposits; and the prevention of conflict between the military forces of the Arctic coastal states, all of which are improving, to one degree or another, their Arctic-oriented defense capabilities.23

Russia’s North is one of the country’s richest areas. Its value derives from the vast quantities of precious raw materials to be found there including oil, gas, gold, diamonds, nickel, copper, platinum, iron, and timber. While the northern region of Russia is home to less than 10 percent of the population, its contribution to national revenue is about one-fifth of overall gross domestic product. Approximately 60 percent of raw materials exports come from the north of the country. Estimates show that 90 percent of Russia’s gas and 60 percent of its oil can be found in the polar region. The total value of these mineral resources in Russia’s North exceeds $22.4 trillion according to Western estimates. By comparison, the total value of U.S. mineral resources is $8 trillion.24

For Russia, the melting sea ice in the Arctic creates huge opportunities regarding accessing the oil and gas fields located within its EEZ. Of all the great powers, Russia will benefit most from Arctic changes.25 As such, Moscow is keen to capitalize on natural resource development and shipping in the region by exploiting areas such as the Barents Sea, 540 kilometers off the coast of the Kola Peninsula and home to one of the world’s biggest proven offshore gas fields.26 Yet such exploitation will hinge on its ability to project elements of national military power into the region.

Militarily, Russia’s ambitions remain lofty, and contrary to the 1990s, the political willingness and money to increase defense spending now exist. This increase in military activity in the Arctic, and Russia’s assertiveness and increasingly confrontational rhetoric in foreign policy issues, are most probably only the beginning of a more visible Russian presence in the region.27 Russia seeks to project its sovereign authority through improved border control to provide safety and security, especially in the Northern Sea Route (NSR), and to maintain credible forces to secure critical infrastructures. Russia also strives to maintain, develop, and project a convincing military force—primarily naval, aerial, and missile assets—in the region to be able to react in various politico-military scenarios as well as to deter the expansion of unwanted foreign military presence into the (Russian) Arctic.28 The primary maritime instrument of Russian power is its Northern Fleet. While dramatically reduced from its Cold War size, the Russian Northern Fleet is the largest of the five Russian fleets and is the single most substantial combat naval force permanently deployed in the marine Arctic.29 Apart from the Russian Northern Fleet, not a single Arctic state deploys combat naval forces in the marine Arctic, although the coast guards of these states do patrol the area. Furthermore, Arctic state ability to redeploy naval forces from other areas of operations is either limited or nonexistent since none of the other polar nations has warships designed for operation in the extreme Arctic conditions.30

According to Russian national security documents, Moscow plans to establish special Arctic military formations to “protect the county’s national interests and to guarantee military security in different military and political situations.”31 To guard critical lines of transportation such as the NSR and to secure northern borders, then–Russian Defense Minister Anatoliy Serdyukov in July 2011 announced plans to create two special army brigades to be based in the Arctic cities of Murmansk and Arkhangelsk. This concept derived from Russian studies of specialist Arctic troops in Finland, Norway, and Sweden.32

This rising role of the Arctic in Russian security policy and Moscow’s preparation to defend its rights to natural assets with force if needed has been accentuated by official government statements.33 For example, in a national security document released in May 2009, the Kremlin stated that “in a competition for resources, it can’t be ruled out that military force could be used for resolving problems.”34 The Russian government reinforced this view with the statement that “although it deplores the notion of an arms race in the high north and does not foresee a conflict there, it intends to protect its Arctic interests.”35 Of greater concern, however, are the security perspectives and military doctrine underlying Russia’s military buildup and modernization in the Arctic. While the strategic thinking of the Russian political elite is not monolithic, a “defense-driven” zero-sum orientation dominates recent Russian strategy.36 Such policy statements, combined with a series of Russian actions such as the resumption of strategic bomber flights over the Arctic, cyber attacks on Estonia, the Russo-Georgian War of 2008, the 2014 annexation of the Crimea, and Russian support for the insurgency in Eastern Ukraine, all contribute to growing uneasiness over future Russian intentions in the Arctic region. Among the Arctic neutral states, for instance, Sweden notes an increasing regional instability and the likelihood of crises in both the Baltic Sea and Arctic regions, which require an overall reevaluation of Swedish defense policy.37 Similarly, rising Russian activities in the Kola Peninsula and the increasing strategic importance of the Barents Sea are forcing Finland to carefully reevaluate its defense of adjacent Lapland.38 This overall security situation leads to a discussion of the role of SOF in this austere but potentially volatile environment.

The SOF Niche

There is debate about the future of security developments in the Arctic. Some observers postulate a remilitarization of the Arctic and the occurrence of “armed clashes” in the region sooner rather than later. Others state that both the logic of this argument and the evidence supporting it are flimsy, arguing that there is no reason to expect that matters relating to military security will rise to the top of the Arctic agenda soon.39 While some have argued that terrorism and hijacking may constitute security concerns in the region, others maintain that such threats are chimerical, given the challenges of distance and geography and the difficulty of navigating in a polar environment.40 Even if a direct military conflict may be unlikely, tensions with Russia may still precipitate some level of U.S. and NATO engagement in the Arctic, and SOF, with their unique capabilities and small footprint, may be the deterrent and surveillance force of choice.

In the harsh polar ecosystem, the military becomes the tool of national policy almost by default. The Arctic is a complex environment, and a report by the Arctic Institute noted that “the armed forces, beyond their responsibility for handling all contingencies, are also the only agencies with both the requisite monitoring instruments and the physical capabilities to operate in such a vast and inhospitable region.”41 A further concern is that the Arctic is an environment of extreme operational challenges, even for armed forces with longstanding Arctic experience.42 These problems range from limited communications due to magnetic and solar phenomena that reduce radio signals to environmental degradation of personnel, weapons systems, and navigation equipment. Considering the nature of SOF, with their recruitment of more experienced personnel, a rigorous selection process, high resilience, and extensive training to achieve proficiency in applicable mission sets, these elite units offer the innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approach needed to achieve nuanced national security objectives in a challenging region.43

While the first decade of the 21st century has seen an enormous increase in the use of U.S. and NATO SOF for the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, SOF focus has skewed to direct-action operations. These operations are defined as short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions that are conducted in hostile, denied, or diplomatically sensitive environments, and which employ specialized military capabilities to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover, or damage designated targets.44 The most visible of such activities was the elimination of Osama bin Laden in the May 2011 raid on his compound in Pakistan. This emphasis on direct action has come at a price, however, causing SOF units to neglect a number of other useful mission sets. The commander of the Colorado-based U.S. Special Operations Command North, Rear Admiral Kerry Metz, stated that over the past decade of war in the Middle East, “we’ve gotten out of the routine work up in the Arctic area. SOF as an entity has not focused on that area, and I think over the next few years, we’re going to have to sort of return to those roots.”45 Similarly, then–Major General Brad Webb, commander of U.S. Special Operations Command Europe, affirmed, “while Africa may be the challenge for this generation the Arctic will be the challenge for the next.”46 For the Arctic, the tasks of special reconnaissance, sovereignty operations, and platform seizure missions come to the forefront for SOF employment.

Special Reconnaissance and Sovereignty Assertion

Considering Arctic climate dynamics and increased human activity on polar air, land, and sea routes, the assertion of sovereignty and the need for “on the surface” situational awareness takes on strategic significance. This requirement is compounded by key challenges that include shortfalls in ice and weather reporting and forecasting and limitations in command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance due to lack of assets and harsh environmental conditions.47 Yet politically, sovereign presence and domain awareness are essential prerequisites for Arctic national security. For example, Norwegian Defense Minister Ine Eriksen Søreide stated that she did not want to remilitarize the border, but “at the same time we do have, and want to have, situational awareness for our own country and the alliance.”48 Similarly, since 2006, Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper has placed enormous emphasis on “exercising sovereignty over Canada’s North . . . our number one Arctic foreign policy priority.”49 While these objectives can be partially attained with satellite, ship, and aerial platforms, a comprehensive knowledge of the Arctic physical environment can be achieved only by an actual human presence on the ground.

Hence, with increased activity in and over Arctic waters, a military’s knowledge base will need to be improved significantly concerning the evolving operational environment in the Arctic (including newly accessible uncharted waterways), as will the military’s ability to conduct search and rescue, disaster response and relief, and environmental security operations, among other essential missions, within the Arctic region. In this context, building a greater capacity for maritime domain awareness (MDA) looms as an especially critical requirement and obligation for forces assigned to the Arctic.50 One option to achieve MDA is through the conducting of “on the surface” SR missions by SOF elements. Special reconnaissance entails reconnaissance and surveillance actions normally conducted in a clandestine or covert manner to collect or verify information of strategic or operational significance, employing military capabilities not normally found in conventional forces. SR may include collecting information on human activities or securing data on the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area.51 For the Arctic, Denmark provides an excellent model for the use of SOF in SR and sovereignty operation roles, with Finland offering additional considerations for this mission.

Although the Danish armed forces currently undertake important tasks in the Arctic, including enforcement of sovereignty, Denmark’s military posture there will inevitably have to adjust to take on new roles and capabilities, such as wider ranging patrol and domain awareness missions within Greenland, a desirable territory rich in both oil and precious metals.52 The launch of the Danish Defense Force (DDF) Greenland-headquartered Joint Arctic Command in October 2012 initiated plans to expand training and deployment of special operations forces to reinforce Denmark’s sovereignty over its Arctic territories, which extend to 1.6 million square miles.53 The Arctic command organization took over responsibility for the SOF Arctic defense unit known as the Sirius Patrol, which has spearheaded the DDF’s long-range reconnaissance patrols in Greenland since 1941, often operating in temperatures as low as -67°F, while overseeing sovereignty enforcement in the remote reaches of Greenland. These multiple, two-man teams with dogs operate for long periods over 160,000 square kilometers of Arctic terrain to provide real-time presence, reporting, and surveillance to assert Danish sovereignty over its polar realm. Many of the DDF’s core SOF, past and present, have sharpened their survival and reconnaissance skills on Sirius missions.54

In addition to Denmark, Finland has significant experience in operating in hard winter conditions and is well placed to offer cold climate training and exercises to its international partners.55 This hard-won experience is not present within many other Arctic countries, particularly in the United States. Operations in the Arctic require special cold-weather gear, tactics, techniques, procedures, and especially training for the armed forces. Finland’s airmobile special forces training center in Utti (Utin Jääkärirykmentti) specializes in performing in severe Arctic conditions, with the ability to operate even when the outside temperature is as low as -40°F. This training in operating in cold climate surroundings is a tangible resource Finland could offer to other NATO or neutral Arctic nations for SOF SR and sovereignty operation missions.56 For U.S. SOF, the SR and sovereignty missions would be best placed with selected U.S. Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command long-range reconnaissance units, trained in Arctic conditions and using Danish and Finnish SOF expertise for extreme polar operations.

Platform Seizure Missions

Under the designation of counterterrorism tasks, hostage rescue and recovery operations are normally sensitive crisis missions in response to terrorist threats and incidents. Adapted to the Arctic—and given the low probability of terrorist activity there considering the distances involved, Arctic geography, and the overall polar environment—these missions are more likely to involve the protection of Arctic weather stations, military bases, petroleum infrastructure such as oil rigs, pipelines, terminals, and refineries, and even ships in the region from adversarial state, criminal, or environmental protester activity.57 Such action is likely to involve the retaking of an occupied installation, offshore platform, or cruise ship, potentially with nonlethal means. In Denmark, for example, more resources will be directed at the army’s and navy’s main SOF units, the Hunter (Jægerkorpset) and Frogman (Frømandskorpset) corps, for this purpose. Both units, which have been extensively deployed in Afghanistan, are spending more hours on mission-specific training that requires honing the skills necessary to deal with a broad range of tasks, from assaulting enemy ships and using stealth to restoring control and sovereignty over Danish fixed oil and gas installations in the Arctic, by air or sea.58 For the United States, Navy SEALs already have this capability in their core mission and need only to attain Arctic proficiency for this contingent polar operation. Again, leveraging Arctic-capable partner-nation SOF expertise and linking this role to the previously discussed SR task would be the most effective method for exercising this competence.

Both the SR and platform seizure tasks will require air SOF units in support. Possible units of action for this assignment are U.S. Air Force Special Operations, MC-130P aircraft squadrons, and related CV-22 tiltrotor units, coupled with selected SOF pararescuemen and combat rescue officers from the special tactics squadrons. By locating such assets at Thule Air Base in Greenland and Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson in Alaska, selected air SOF units could provide air coverage and support for most of the North American Arctic and Northwest Passage. Although the Air Force has assets in its conventional Service with similar profiles and equipment, air SOF may be better suited for a niche Arctic mission because of their ability to train selected crews to specialize in Arctic air and survival as well as their overall organizational linkage to SOF maritime units performing the other SR, sovereignty, and platform seizure missions in the polar environment.

While direct military conflict may be unlikely in the Arctic, the uncertainty about the direction in which developments in the region will unfold and, as a result, the uncertainty about the precise nature of the challenges and threats deriving from those developments, justify the increased attention of the international community toward the Arctic.⁵⁹ Simultaneously, Russia’s bellicose actions in other regions, overall martial rhetoric, and polar military presence make its intentions unclear, and thus a key player to watch in Arctic affairs.⁶⁰ As the ice recedes and maritime passages open, the potential for territorial conflict and state-on-state confrontations could increase. Hence, this is an ideal niche situation for low-profile, small-footprint maritime and air SOF teams to monitor the region and provide presence, strategic reconnaissance, and surveillance for sovereignty purposes, as well as platform seizure or recovery capacity in readiness. For the United States, these Arctic missions require a mix of specialized maritime and air SOF that can leverage the Arctic expertise and capabilities of benchmark-setting partner nations such as Denmark and Finland, and operate in a unique joint special operations environment.

Source:
This article was originally published in the Joint Force Quarterly 78, which is published by the National Defense University.

Notes:

1. Charles K. Ebinger and Evie Zambetakis, “The Geopolitics of Arctic Melt,” International Affairs 85, no. 6 (November 2009), 1215–1232, specifically 1215.
2. Arctic Strategy (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, November 2013), 2.
3. Luke Coffey, “The Future of U.S. Bases in Europe—A View from America,” Baltic Security & Defence Review 15, no. 2 (2013), 135.
4. Kingdom of Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 2011–2020 (Copenhagen: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, August 2011), 9.
5. See Eva Ingenfeld, “Just in Case Policy in the Arctic,” Arctic 63, no. 2 (June 2010), 257–259.
6. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Working Group 1 Contribution to the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report, June 7, 2013, 12–33.
7. Roger Howard, The Arctic Gold Rush: The New Race for Tomorrow’s Natural Resources (New York: Continuum, 2009), 8.
8. David Titley and Courtney St. John, “Arctic Security Considerations and the U.S. Navy’s Roadmap for the Arctic,” Naval War College Review 63, no. 2 (Spring 2010), 36.
9. Andrei Zagorski, “The Arctic: A New Geopolitical Pivot?” Russia Direct Monthly Memo, no. 5 (December 2013), 2; and Ronald O’Rourke, Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress, R41153 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, April 2014), 1.
10. Donald L. Gautier et al., “Assessment of Undiscovered Oil and Gas in the Arctic,” Science 324, no. 5931 (2009), 1175–1179.
11. U.S. Geological Survey Fact Sheet 2008-3049, “Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal: Estimates of Undiscovered Oil and Gas North of the Arctic Circle,” available at <http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2008/3049/>.
12. See Kataryna Zysk, “The Evolving Arctic Security Environment: An Assessment,” in Russia in the Arctic, ed. Stephen Blank (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, July 2011), 91–138.
13. Ingenfeld, 258.
14. Vesa Virtanen, The Arctic in World Politics. The United States, Russia, and China in the Arctic—Implications for Finland (Boston: Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 2013), available at <http://projects.iq.harvard.edu/files/fellows/files/virtanen.pdf>.
15. Ibid.; and Ebinger and Zambetakis, 1221.
16. Charles M. Perry and Bobby Anderson, New Strategic Dynamics in the Arctic Region: Implications for National Security and International Collaboration (Washington, DC: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, February 2012), 28.
17. Kristian Atland, “Russia and Its Neighbors: Military Power, Security Politics, and Interstate Relations in the Post-Cold War Arctic,”Arctic Review on Law and Politics 1 (February 2010), 295.
18. Ebinger and Zambetakis, 1227; and Claudia Cinelli, “The Law of the Sea and the Arctic Ocean,” Arctic Review on Law and Politics 2, no. 1 (2011), 4–24.
19. Ingenfeld, 258.
20. Zysk, “Evolving Arctic,” 97; “The Arctic: Special Report,” The Economist, June 16, 2012, 11; and Barbora Padrtova, “Russian Approach Towards the Arctic Region,” in Panorama of Global Security Environment 2012, ed. M. Majer, R. Ondrejcsak, and V. Tarasovic (Bratislava: Centre for European and North Atlantic Affairs, 2012), 339–350.
21. Virtanen.
22. Padrtova.
23. Perry and Anderson, 50.
24. Valery P. Pilyavsky, “Russian Geopolitical and Economic Interest,” Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Briefing Paper, March 2011; and Padrtova, 341.
25. Virtanen.
26. Atland, 280; and O’Rourke, 54.
27. See Katatzyna Bozena Zysk, Russian Military Power and the Arctic (Brussels: EU-Russia Centre, October 2008); and Virtanen.
28. Mikkola Kaplya and Harri Juha, “The Global Arctic: The Growing Arctic Interests of Russia, China, the United States and the European Union,” The Finnish Institute of International Affairs Briefing Paper 133, August 2013, 4; and Padrtova, 347.
29. Zagorski, 6; and Virtanen.
30. Zagorski, 6.
31. Strategia natsional’noi bezopasnosti Rossiiskoi Federatsii do 2020 goda, 2009, Sovet Bezopasnosti Rossiiskoi Federatsii, available at <www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/1/99.html>; and Osnovy gosudarstvennoi politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii v Arktike na period do 2020 goda i dalneishuiu perspektivu, September 2008, Sovet Bezopasnosti Rossiiskoi Federatsii, available at <www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/15/98.html>.
32. “Russia Plans Arctic Army Brigades,” BBC News, July 1, 2011, available at <www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-13997324>; and Padrtova, 345.
33. Virtanen.
34. Roger Howard, “Russia’s New Front Line,” Survival 52, no. 2 (April–May 2010), 141–155.
35. O’Rourke, 62; and Virtanen, 45.
36. Perry and Anderson, 64.
37. Justyna Gotkowski, “Swedish Security in Crisis,” Centre for Eastern Studies, February 13, 2013.
38. Virtanen, 45, 5.
39. Oran Young, “Arctic Politics in an Era of Global Change,” Brown Journal of World Affairs 19, no. 1 (Fall/Winter 2012), 165–178, specifically 169.
40. “The Arctic: Special Report,” The Economist, June 16, 2012, 10.
41. O’Rourke, 59; and Ebinger and Zambetakis, 1218.
42. Zysk, “Evolving Arctic,” 109.
43. Arctic Strategy, 7.
44. Joint Publication (JP) 3-05, Special Operations (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, April 18, 2011), II-5–II-6.
45. Paul McLeary, “U.S. Special Ops Commanders: We Need ISR in Africa, Comms in Arctic,” Defense News, May 20, 2014, available at <www.defensenews.com/article/20140520/DEFREG02/305200052/US-Special-Ops-Commanders-We-Need-ISR-Africa-Comms-Arctic>.
46. Ibid.
47. O’Rourke, 66.
48. Julian E. Barnes, “Cold War Echoes Under the Arctic Ice,” Wall Street Journal, March 24, 2014, available at <http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304679404579461630946609454>; and O’Rourke, 64.
49. Government of Canada, “Statement on Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy: Exercising Sovereignty and Promoting Canada’s Northern Strategy Abroad,” August 2010, available at <www.international.gc.ca/polar-polaire/assets/pdfs/ CAFP_booklet-PECA_livret-eng.pdf>.
50. Perry and Anderson, 172.
51. JP 3-05.
52. Kingdom of Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 2011–2020, 13; and Perry and Anderson, 71.
53. Gerard O’Dwyer, “Denmark Boosts Resources for the Arctic,” Defense News, October 8, 2013.
54. Ibid.; Kingdom of Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 2011–2020, 21; Mia Bennett, “Denmark’s Strategy for the Arctic,” Foreign Policy Association, November 14, 2011, available at <http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2011/11/14/denmarks-strategy-for-the-arctic/>; and “Greenland by Dog Sledge: The Sirius Patrol in Numbers,” BBC News, November 30, 2011, available a <www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-15940985>.
55. Finland’s Strategy for the Arctic Region 2013 (Helsinki: Prime Minister’s Office, August 2013), 14.
56. Virtanen, 93.
57. JP 3-05, xi; and Atland, 279–298, specifically 284.
58. O’Dwyer.
59. Zysk, “Evolving Arctic,” 117.
60. Atland, 280.

The post The Arctic Domain: A Narrow Niche For Joint Special Operations Forces – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Scientists have provided the first robust assessment of climate change impacts on extinction risk in the tropical Andes, an area of global importance for biodiversity.

Bournemouth University experts have analysed the potential impact of changing climate conditions on the tree species that occur in the tropical Andes, along with other factors.

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has estimated that 20–30% of the world’s species are likely to be at increased risk of extinction as a result of climate change. Other estimates have suggested that 15–37% of species could be ‘committed to extinction’ owing to climate change by 2050. However, such estimates have been controversial, owing to doubts about the extent of climate change that might occur, and how species may respond to such changes.

The study focused on trees that are restricted to the highest elevations in these mountains, occurring in upper montane forest and cloud forest ecosystems. “Species living at the top of tropical mountains are thought to be among those most at risk of climate change”, said Natalia Tejedor-Garavito, who led the investigation. “While species in lowland areas can potentially migrate as the climate changes, those that live on the mountain tops literally have nowhere else to go”.

Some 129 species of tree that are endemic to this region were assessed as a part of the study.

Results indicated that climate change increased the risk of extinction of 18-20% of these species, depending on the climate scenario adopted. The researchers also used a new metric that enables quantification of this risk, relative to other pressures affecting biodiversity.

Based on the IUCN (International Union for Conservation of Nature) Red List of Endangered Species, the Red List Index indicated that climate change accounts for about a 15% increase in extinction risk for this group of species.

“This research shows that while climate change is certainly an important threat to species, there are many other factors that are currently increasing the extinction risk of species in montane tropical forests,” said Professor Adrian Newton of Bournemouth University, one of the researchers involved in the study. These factors include clearance of forest for agriculture and over-harvesting of tree species, as well as the effects of fire and grazing associated with agricultural activity.

The study’s conclusion suggests that conservation efforts need to address the multiple factors currently affecting biodiversity, rather than focusing exclusively on climate change. “Tropical montane forests are special places, with high numbers of species that are found nowhere else,” said Tejedor-Garavito. “Our concern is that if efforts to conserve them are not strengthened as a matter of urgency, then many species may be lost before longer-term threats such as climate change really begin to take effect”.

The post Climate Change Is Just One Of Many Risks For Trees In Tropical Andes appeared first on Eurasia Review.

On Wednesday afternoon, Spain’s Lower House of Parliament approved the participation of the Spanish Armed Forces in the European Union mission EUNAVFOR MED, set up to combat illegal people trafficking in the Southern Central Mediterranean, with 301 votes in favor, 14 abstentions and only 1 vote against. Its immediate priority is avoiding further lives being lost at sea, according to the Spanish government.

The instability in Libya is creating an ideal environment for criminal activities and hence the European Union has decided to increase its presence in the Mediterranean Sea to combat human traffickers, prevent illegal migratory flows and strengthen support and internal responsibility. Spain, as a responsible partner of the European Union and in light of the dramatic death of thousands of people at sea, has offered various forms of military resources.

In his intervention in the Lower House, the Minister for Defence, Pedro Morenés, requested “a favorable vote for this initiative and hence the authorisation of the Lower House for the armed forces to take part in the European Union initiative in the Southern Central Mediterranean EUNAVFOR MED.

The initiative includes a contingent of 12 military personnel from the Spanish Air Force and Navy to be deployed at both the Operational Headquarters in Rome and at the Force Headquarters set up on the Italian aircraft carrier ‘Cavour’.

During this first phase, a patrol and maritime reconnaissance aircraft will be deployed at the advance operations base in Sigonella (Sicily), with 50 personnel and the corresponding support and maintenance resources.

Depending on how the situation evolves and the possible progress in the successive phases of the operation, Spain’s participation may include the contribution of navy, support and air resources up to a maximum of 250 personnel”.

The mission will last for one year as from the time at which it reaches its full operational capacity and the expenses deriving therefrom will be included in the budgetary heading of Defence for Peacekeeping Operations.

The operation falls under the strategic concept of the global focus of the EU, which involves the comprehensive mobilisation of all the instruments and tools at its disposal to resolve conflicts.

The post Spain: Lower House Approves Participation Of Armed Forces In EUNAVFOR MED appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Pakistan’s Army claimed on  Wednesday to have shot down an Indian “spy” drone, which it alleged was being used for aerial photography near the Line of Control, the Hindu reported.

The incident come days after a meeting between Indian PM Narendra Modi and his Pakistani counterpart Nawaz Sharif in Russia last week.

The Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR), in a brief statement, said the Indian drone was brought down near the Line of Control in Bhimber area of Pakistan occupied Kashmir.

The army claimed that the drone was being used for aerial photography and was “brought down for violation of Pakistan’s territorial integrity.”

“An Indian spy drone was shot down by Pakistani troops which intruded into Pakistan along [the de facto border that divides the region] near Bhimber today. The spy drone is used for aerial photography,” a statement from the Pakistani military said on Wednesday, reported BBC.

Pakistan also summoned the Indian envoy in Islamabad over the incident.

But a spokesperson for the Indian Army denied the report.

“Some reports of a drone crash in PoK [Pakistan-controlled Kashmir] are being referred to. No drone or UAV [unmanned aerial vehicle] crash of the Indian Army has taken place,” the spokesperson told the Press Trust of India news agency, BBC reported.

An Air Force spokesperson also denied that any of their drones had been brought down.

The post Pakistan Army Claims To ‘Shoot Down’ Indian Drone In Kashmir appeared first on Eurasia Review.

The reported move by Moscow to issue an arrest warrant against Russian opposition State Duma Deputy Ilya Ponomarev represents a familiar abuse of the legal system, says lawyer Robert Amsterdam.

According to Russian media reports on Wednesday, the Basmanny District Court is preparing to issue the arrest warrant as soon as Friday, relating to a trumped criminal case which Amsterdam says was fabricated against Ponomarev as a form of political persecution. The Basmanny District Court has become infamous for dispensing ordered justice including in the case of opposition-leader Aleksey Navalniy and the lawyer Sergei Magnitsky.

“The international community is exhausted by this sort of continuous instrumentalisation of the Russian judicial system by Putin and his cronies, and the fact that they are using the Basmanny Court is no coincidence,” said Amsterdam.

The term “Basmanny Justice” was coined more than 10 years ago during the first trial against Mikhail Khodorkovsky, who was convicted and sentenced as one of Putin’s most well known political prisoners before his release in late 2013, becoming synonymous with distortions of judicial process that are implemented in highly political cases. According to Amsterdam, this same process of arbitrary prosecution is now being pointed at Ponomarev.

“We intend to vigorously fight this absurd case and expose the total absence of grounds before all relevant multilateral organizations, including Interpol and the European Court of Human Rights,” says Amsterdam. “There comes a point when politically motivated criminal cases can no longer be taken seriously by any credible institution, and the Russian government’s track record here is well established.”

The Honorable Mr. Ponomarev has led a distinguished political career, including making history as the lone vote against the annexation of Crimea in a 445-1 decision. He has, however, also been forced to live in exile since August 2014, as the Russian authorities have mounted a bogus legal campaign against him, preventing his return home.

In April 2015, the Duma voted 438-1 to strip Ponomarev’s immunity so that he could be prosecuted on criminal charges relating to a civil case regarding disbursements of funds for the Skolkovo innovation fund, even though he never had any authority over the project finances, says Amsterdam, who represents Ponomarev on a pro bono basis.

Amsterdam & Partners LLP is an international law firm with offices in London and Washington DC. Past clients have included the former head of Yukos Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the former Prime Minister of Thailand Thaksin Shinawatra, and the former President of Zambia Rupiah Banda. In 2013, the firm was awarded the American Lawyer Global Pro Bono Dispute of the Year award for representing the whistleblower Georges Tadonki in a case against his former employer at the United Nations.

The post Ilya Ponomarev Will Fight ‘Basmanny Justice,’ Says Amsterdam appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By R.S. Kalha*

The recent turmoil witnessed in the Chinese stock markets, particularly in the Shanghai and Shenzhen bourses, brought to the forefront the question of the political fallout of recent events. The problem is acute for the very reason that as per Thomson Reuter’s data, foreign investors account for less than 1 percent of the mainland equity market as compared to nearly 25 per cent for India.

The bulk of investors in Chinese stock markets are small and medium size companies as also individual investors that are estimated to be holding about 112 million accounts in the Shanghai Exchange, about 142 million in the Shenzhen Exchange and about 20 million are novice account holders. These are ordinary Chinese people who had invested their life savings or borrowed heavily to take advantage of the bull run in the Chinese market that was encouraged in no small manner by an article in the People’s Daily by Wang Ruoyu that declared 4,000 index points as “merely the start of a bull market”. The People’s Daily writer openly boasted that “economic reform and macroeconomic support” underpinned the bull-run. Tragically many individual Chinese investors fell for the gambit and borrowed heavily to invest. Since then, ordinary Chinese angry at the way their entire life savings have evaporated, have poured out their angst in the Chinese social media by simply typing out the words ‘4000’. One blogger even sarcastically suggested that the People’s Daily change its name to ‘4000’. Since June this year some US$2.4 trillion has been wiped out from Chinese equities, but to be fair the present benchmark figure is still above what it was a year ago and seems to have stabilized somewhat.

When stock prices continued to fall, Prime Minister Li Keqiang on a visit to Europe and came back home rather worried. The Chinese authorities realizing the gravity of the situation hastily called several emergency meetings in Beijing. They decided to immediately suspend new stock listings (IPOs), and 21 brokerage firms were encouraged to set up a $19 billion stabilization fund to help stabilize the markets. Chinese insurance companies were allowed to invest up to 10 per cent of their assets in blue chip companies up from previous 5 per cent. The Central Bank (Peoples’ Bank of China) agreed to provide funds to the China Securities Finance Corporation to help stabilize the securities market. In addition the China Securities Finance Corp has provided $41.8 billion to 21 brokerage firms. Despite of all these efforts the Chinese authorities were forced to de-list nearly 1,430 out of 2,800 listed companies, which is about one half of all the listed companies. The China Securities Regulatory Commission has also banned major shareholders, corporate executives and directors from selling any of their stakes for six months. Such has been the scale of the effort to keep the bourses afloat.

What is a cause of worry is the fact that with the slowing down of the Chinese economy, coupled with extensive volatility on the stock market, the demand for goods in China will also be adversely affected which in turn will lead to a slowing down of Chinese imports, particularly commodities with consequent ill effects on the world commodity market. Already some commodities have seen significant downward trends, including oil. The second important casualty is likely to be the enthusiasm of the Chinese government’s desire for economic reforms. In May last year the Chinese government issued guidelines on modernizing China’s capital markets, including stocks, futures and bonds. The guidelines called for “respect the laws of the market, abide by market rules, pricing and competition to maximize gains and optimize efficiency”. And President Xi Jinping had opined to “give the markets a decisive role in allocating resources”. All this may now be postponed for the Chinese leadership is perhaps now disinclined to let the ‘markets’ have the final say seeing what it has done to the stock market.

Internally with so many ordinary people affected by the stock market volatility there is bound to be anger at the authorities for letting things come to this pass. Financial losses are starting to stir a populist reaction on social media in China. Many bloggers are calling for the government to play a more active role, despite knowing that earlier it was the government that had encouraged them to invest. Others are accusing Beijing of not being nimble footed in its intervention. It is popular ridicule that often hurts the prestige of a government. How this anger translates itself or would the authorities be able to channel it away from targeting them personally is a question that is moot. Already China suffers from a plethora of small demonstrations almost on a daily basis where the confiscation of land is the primary motive, and it is for this reason that China’s budget for internal security ($124billion) is larger than for national defence ($118billion). Should the authorities as a consequence therefore anticipate some social unrest? That perhaps was the fear underlying the government decision to bring in the heavy artillery to weather the storm.

These are trying days for the Chinese leadership. The gloss and awe that accompanied them for China’s outstanding economic performance is beginning to wear a bit thin. The Chinese stock market has taught at least one lesson; and that is that the Chinese leadership is after all human and can often err in its judgements. But one should also not be hasty in making a judgement for the market was only ‘correcting’ itself for being grossly overvalued.

Despite the huge efforts of the Chinese leaders in which the financial might of the Chinese state was thrown in, we should also remember that the Chinese people voted with their feet by withdrawing their cash from the market, thus indicating what they thought of the pledges made by the Chinese authorities that there was nothing to worry about.

*R.S. Kalha is a former Indian diplomat and author of book “India-China boundary issues; Quest for settlement”. He can be contacted at editor@spsindia.in

The post China’s Stock Market Crash: Can It Lead To Social Unrest? – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.