By Muhammad Zulfikar Rakhmat*

Throughout the 21st century, China’s ties with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) have strengthened in various domains. China and the UAE’s growing relationship is a case in point. Since Beijing and Abu Dhabi established a diplomatic partnership in 1984, China and the UAE have become major economic partners and the bilateral relationship is well poised to flourish in the future.

China Daily recently reported that China-UAE trade is expected to reach USD 16 billion in 2015, making China the UAE’s second biggest import partner behind India. At the same time, the UAE is responsible for one-third of China-GCC trade and one-fifth of Sino-Arab trade. China exports primarily electronic appliances, mechanical tools, and devices; the UAE exports mainly copper, plastic, and iron.

A Financial and Commercial Hub

Eyeing promising potential in the UAE, several Chinese banks have made their way into the emirates. Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, China’s largest lender, established an office in the Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC) in 2008. DIFC is also home to branches of Bank of China Middle East, the Agricultural Bank of China, and China Construction Bank. Other banks, including China Development Bank, also plan to open branches in the UAE.

At the same time, the UAE has been very active in China’s banking sector, establishing branches and representative offices on the Chinese mainland. Union National Bank was the first Emirati lender to enter China in 2007, setting up an office in Shanghai, followed in 2012 by National Bank of Abu Dhabi (NBAD) and Emirates NBD. Optimistic about the emerging power’s growth, the Commercial Bank of Dubai launched a Chinese banking platform called TianLong in late 2012 to support the business and personal banking requirements of China’s small and medium businesses. Services include a Chinese speaking staff, Chinese language documentation, and renminbi accounts.

Several major Chinese companies outside the banking sector have also begun to see encouraging opportunities in the UAE. The Emiratis’ state-of-the-art port, customs services, free zone facility, and logistics park have made the UAE a strategic point from which to conduct business throughout the greater Middle East. Over 2,400 Chinese enterprises are members of Dubai Chamber. Most of these companies sell electronics, machinery, building materials, gifts, garments, and novelty items. Over 1,400 Chinese firms are reported to be located elsewhere in the country. These companies view the UAE as an important hub, facilitating expansion across the wider Middle East. Many Chinese companies have started to use the Dubai International Financial Centre as a bridge to access wider markets in the region. China’s largest petroleum firm Petro China and the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China have also established footholds in the emirates.

Dragon Mart, China’s largest trading hub outside the mainland, was built in Dubai during 2004. The complex is expected to undergo a massive expansion (and name change) to include retail, residential and leisure developments. The new Dragon City will eventually cover 11 million square feet.

These growing economic ties have facilitated more than China’s access to untapped consumer markets and lucrative investment opportunities. The UAE, with its ‘Look East’ policy, has been interested in luring Asian investment. Attracting Chinese investors and promoting the UAE to China has been an increasingly important priority of officials in Abu Dhabi.

The Dubai Week, for example, was an event held in Beijing by DIFC to showcase Dubai as a competitive global business destination for investment opportunities. Another recent initiative was the agreement signed by China’s New Silk Road Investment Association in May of this year to promote the Emirati-hosted event Global Trade Development Week to Chinese businesses and investors.

The UAE has also been making inroads in China. It is reported that the UAE’s investments in China stood at USD 1.5 billion in 2013. Emirati enterprises and businesses have around 650 projects in China. Several institutions, such as UAE stock exchanges and the Dubai Pearl Project, have exerted efforts to increase their profiles in China and to attract potential investors.

Petroleum

Although not to such an extent as the Qataris and Saudi Arabians have done so, the Emiratis have made energy cooperation an increasingly important aspect of their relationship with China. China imports around 15 percent of the Emirates’ petroleum compared to 12 percent by South Korea. In recent years, this energy partnership has gone beyond buying and selling. In mid-2015, China Petroleum Engineering and Construction Cooperation (CPEEC) signed a USD 330 million agreement with Abu Dhabi Company for Onshore Oil Operations (ADCO) for a development project at the UAE’s southern Mender oilfield.

Under the contract, the CPEEC will be responsible for the building of pipelines, oil gathering stations, sewage systems, and power transmission lines. The deal is expected to increase ADCO’s daily production from 1.4 million barrels to 1.8 million within two years. Since early 2015, CPECC, which is affiliated with China’s largest petroleum and liquefied natural gas company, China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), has been involved in several other projects in the UAE, including the development of the country’s crude pipeline and Asab oilfield.

The company has a history of partnering with its Emirati counterparts. In 2008, for instance, the company secured a USD 3.29 billion deal with the Emirates International Investment Company on the Habshan-Fujairah pipeline project. To complement this, Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC) has established an office in Beijing. As China’s energy needs grow, so will its interests in the UAE’s natural resource wealth.

Infrastructure, Trade, Currency, and Travel

Reciprocity in the infrastructure sector is also on the rise. In recent years, China and the UAE have signed agreements for construction projects worth billions of dollars. Dubai’s DP World, for instance, has invested in several Chinese ports and logistics centres in Hong Kong, Tianjin, Qingdao, and Yantai. In the meantime, it was reported in 2013 by Chinese Ministry of Commerce that between 2011 and 2013, Beijing firms have won more than USD 4.8 billion worth of construction projects in the emirates. This has led many Chinese infrastructure companies to make their way to the UAE.

Chinese companies have done well in the UAE’s automobile sector, previously dominated by European, Japanese, Korean, and American brands. Chinese firms, including Foton, Cherry, Dongfeng and GAC Motors, have now entered the Emirati market. As UAE consumers seek more affordable cars, Chinese manufacturers eye the lower end of the market. Eight Chinese car manufacturers took part in the last Dubai International Motor Show. Chinese car sales are predicted to increase 100 percent each year in the country and their market share is expected to reach double-digits by 2020.

In further efforts to facilitate the economic partnership, China and the UAE signed a currency swap agreement worth 35 billion yuan in 2012. Expected to be activated soon, this agreement will not only ease trade between China and the UAE, it will also help China globalise its currency. The agreement aims to boost trade and investment between the two countries by using the Yuan in the trade of petroleum. By taking part in the currency swap, at a period when the Chinese currency enjoys increasing global use, the UAE is asserting its commitment to strengthen economic ties with the world’s second largest economy.

Travel between the two countries is burgeoning. Presently, there are 21 daily flights from Dubai to China (Beijing, Guangzhou, Hong Kong, and Shanghai), including eight operated by Emirates. Chinese nationals reportedly constitute around four percent of passengers at Dubai International Airport and they are responsible for 12 percent of sales at Dubai Duty Free outlets. To improve the experience for Chinese consumers, the retailer has hired more than 500 Chinese employees at its Dubai Airport outlets. Many stores and hotels in the UAE now have Cantonese and Mandarin-speaking staff. Remarkably, some also accept renminbi as a form of payment.

Another important initiative was the agreement between the Central Bank of the United Arab Emirates with UnionPay International of China for connecting with UAE-Switch, a service that links ATMs across the GCC. The deal aims to allow the use of UnionPay at all ATMs connected to the service, which would ease Chinese investors’ ability to conduct transactions in the country. The most recent measure came when the Dubai Gold & Commodities Exchange (DGCX) and the Bank of China signed a Memorandum of Understanding, which aims for both countries to exchange market information and industry practices between both institutions.

Beyond Energy and Trade

Perhaps the strongest area of China-UAE cooperation is education. The first Chinese international school in Dubai will open in about two years’ time. Breaking down linguistic and cultural barriers will contribute to even deeper political and economic relations in the future. Importance has been placed on cultural events as well. In 2015, the annual Chinese Spring Festival in Dubai attracted an unprecedented number of Chinese tourists and locals.

The Emiratis have also concerned themselves with humanitarian aid, having offered USD 50 million in assistance to finance reconstruction after the Sichuan earthquake in 2008.

The Road Ahead

The ties between China and the UAE are expected to grow in the coming years. On an official visit in February, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Sheikh Abdullah Bin Zayed al Nahyan pledged to expand the China-UAE partnership.

Beijing sees great potential in the emirates. In addition to its natural resources and strategic position, the UAE is viewed as a gateway to access untapped consumer markets and lucrative investment opportunities. China’s growing interests in the UAE and the other Gulf Arab monarchies must also be analysed within a geopolitical context.

As China gains leverage on the international stage, particularly with its recent Silk Road Initiatives and the Asian Investment Infrastructure Bank (AIIB), Beijing cannot afford to ignore the strategically located and resource-rich Persian Gulf nations. As a vibrant trading and commerce center, the UAE is viewed as an important member of the AIIB. At the same time, the UAE serves as a strategic hub for the realisation of Silk Road initiatives. It is important to note that approximately sixty percent of Beijing’s total trade passes through the UAE, where it is then delivered to Europe and Africa.

This is probably why the UAE has already asserted its willingness to support and participate in China’s Silk Road Initiatives and has become the AIIB’s founding member. Engaging in a new partnership with China, an economic power that has no aggressive history in the region since the Mao era, offers the UAE a bargaining chip with Washington. From an economic viewpoint, China, the world’s most populous nation with the second largest economy, offers much to the UAE. In spite of the world’s financial turmoil, the Chinese economy is still expanding at an impressive rate and is expected to surpass the U.S. by the end of the next decade to become the world’s largest economy. Given China’s rise as an economic power, it is difficult to imagine the UAE and China’s relationship not deepening in the coming years.

About the author:
*Muhammad Zulfikar Rakhmat is a Middle East analyst based in Qatar. His areas of expertise include China-Middle East relations, Indonesia-Gulf ties, and Muslim affairs.

Source:
This article was originally published by Gulf State Analytics.

The post The UAE And China’s Thriving Partnership – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Gary Grappo*

The Arab Peace Initiative, presented in 2002 by then-Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, promised Arab recognition of and normalization of relations with Israel once the Jewish state accepted a just and comprehensive solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, including recognition of the 1967 borders for an independent and sovereign Palestinian state.38

With prospects for resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the traditional way (i.e., direct talks between the two sides) currently negligible, a new approach toward fulfilling King Abdullah’s ambitious initiative is necessary. The Arab states, most especially Saudi Arabia, can jump start the normalization process by taking one enormously significant step – security cooperation with Israel. Such cooperation would not only address the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and Israel’s shared security concerns in the increasingly unstable Middle East, but also begin creating a climate of mutual trust necessary for an eventual resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

Since the creation of Israel in 1948, there has been no more opportune time for Arab-Israeli security cooperation. Across the region, Israel and so-called “moderate” Arab states – the GCC, Egypt, Morocco, and Jordan – face the same multiple threats. All cry out for a collective approach.

A Common Foe in Tehran

First among them is Iran’s growing presence and alleged hegemonic ambitions in the Arab world. In addition, the recently concluded P5+1 agreement to curb Tehran’s nuclear program is unlikely to mollify their fears of the Islamic Republic’s agenda vis-à-vis Israel and the GCC, not only with respect to Iran’s nuclear program but also its support for various groups throughout the region, e.g., Hamas, Hezbollah, and others. Indeed, these were no doubt subjects of conversation when a prominent Israeli and Saudi recently met in Washington.39

The Gulf Arab monarchies and Israel, both of whom work closely with the U.S. on anti-missile defenses, can themselves collaborate to neutralize a potential threat that Iran would pose if Tehran ever were to develop a nuclear weapon, regardless of the July 14 deal signed in Vienna.40

GCC-Israeli security cooperation would also send a powerful message to Iran’s governing mullahs. Imagine Tehran’s reaction once it learns that, after almost seven decades of Arab-Israeli antagonism, the perceived Iranian threat to the region has broken the estrangement. Even if waived off by Iran’s blinkered theocratic leaders, the significance would not be lost on Iran’s increasingly frustrated populace yearning for re-integration into the region and the world, starting with the economically prosperous GCC countries.

Countering Militant Islamism

Many of the moderate Arabs and the Israelis harbor similar views of and antipathy toward the same hard-line jihadist factions, most notably Daesh (“Islamic State”). A collaborative approach drawing on the GCC and Israel’s experience and resources would demonstratively increase their collective ability to counter the agendas of militant Islamist extremists.
Teaming up to defeat Daesh should rank especially high on the list of the GCC and Israel’s security priorities. In view of Daesh’s recent victory in Ramadi (the capital of Iraq’s Sunni-majority Anbar province) and its continued advances in eastern Syria, Palmyra being the most recent, only a comprehensive “all-in” strategy on the part of all Middle Eastern governments has any chance of checking the so-called “caliphate,” especially given Washington’s unwillingness to commit anything more than air support and training of Ira- qis and small numbers of Syrian opposition fighters. While it may not be realistic to expect Israel to join any military coalition against Daesh (although that is a possibility in the future) Tel Aviv could either overtly or covertly cooperate with such a pan-Arab force.

The Stakes in Syria

While Israel might once have been willing to accept the ‘devil it knew’ in Syria’s Bashar al-Assad, the increasing uncertainty of his position now requires Israel to reach out to Arab states in an effort to counter the gains that Sunni Islamist extremists could achieve in a post-Assad Syria.41 However, if Assad fell to a relatively moderate political order, Hezbollah’s weapons and logistics lifeline from Tehran would suffer a severe blow, which would potentially cripple Israel’s long-time enemy to the north, and ultimately break the Tehran-Damascus-Hezbollah axis, loathed by leaders of the Gulf Arab kingdoms and the Jewish state.

Security and intelligence cooperation would provide tangible benefits to both sides in their counter-terrorism efforts. It would ensure a comprehensive, genuinely region-wide approach to combating Daesh and other armed jihadist factions, allowing for important sharing of valuable lessons learned. Each of these steps could provide an enormous opportunity for both security and especially intelligence cooperation. In particular, Israeli-Arab intelligence cooperation – further boosted by help from Washington – would provide all sides with invaluable opportunities for circumscribing Iranian ambitions, reining in the region’s most violent extremists and toppling the Iranian-backed regime in Damascus.

Entering into such landmark cooperation would dramatically improve the political climate between Arabs and Israelis. It would make clear that the Arab world is no longer Israel’s enemy and that their security and that of Israel’s are inextricably linked. For Arabs, it would show that the two sides can pursue mutual interests.

Palestinian Statehood

Greater cooperation between the GCC and Israel would set the stage for the first-ever meaningful and constructive dialogue about the Palestinian question. Israel, having chosen to cooperate and to enter into a security dialogue, could consider taking steps necessary for the eventual establishment of a Palestinian state, e.g., giving the Palestinian Authority greater autonomy in the West Bank, relieving the siege of Gaza, facilitating the long overdue elections in the West Bank and Gaza, and ultimately initiating negotiations over other critically important matters such as refugees and Jerusalem.42

This is an especially relevant concern for Saudi Arabia. Having taken the courageous initiative of planting the Arab Peace Initiative, Riyadh can now deliver the first genuine fruits of the tree King Abdullah planted 13 years ago. Were King Salman to take the equally courageous initiative, i.e., reaching out to Israel – either directly or indirectly – he would not only secure his own country’s interests, but also set the stage for the long-awaited resolution of the region’s most enduring conflict.

Unquestionably, King Salman and the ruling family would face a significant element of political risk by making overtures to Israel. Anti-Israel sentiment is strong among Gulf Arabs, which is a reason why Riyadh makes efforts to hide the kingdom’s tacit alliance with Israel.43 However, Saudi Arabia’s long-term security interests are at stake, the same interests that drove then-Crown Prince Abdullah to reach out to Israel in 2002.

To successfully broker a just and lasting resolution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states must address Israel’s security concerns. Tel Aviv, especially today, maintains that the steps required for negotiating Palestinian statehood would jeopardize its security. Surprisingly, within the context of Iran’s potential rise as a regional power, the common threat of extremism and the ongoing Syrian crisis, the GCC and Israel have an opportunity to open the door to solving the Palestinian issue while also improving collective security interests.

About the author:
*Gary Grappo is a retired Senior Foreign Service Officer from the U.S. Department of State, with extensive ser- vice in the Middle East, including as U.S. Ambassador to the Sultanate of Oman and Charge d’Affaires at the U.S. Embassy in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.

Source:
This article was originally published by Gulf State Analytics.

The post Saudi Arabia And Israel’s Fertile Common Ground – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Analysts and think tanks alike have been hard at work attempting to figure out the Islamic State’s long-term strategy, its recruiting methods and its financing. The goal is, of course, is to find an approach to counter the terrorist group’s expansion and ultimately defeating it. Thus far it would appear that no one really understands the whys and how’s of ISIS, as facts on the ground clearly testify.

Early on when ISIS was beheading Westerners it was widely believed that those acts were acts of desperation. When the coalition air campaign started it was thought that ISIS was using beheadings as its last card in its attempts to discourage the aerial onslaught. It turned out that ISIS was doing just the opposite; it was daring the world to get involved. It was an act of defiance rather than an act of weakness.

When Tikrit was “liberated”, it was thought that a formula for defeating ISIS had been figured out, but that was far from reality. It soon became clear that acts of brutality perpetrated by ISIS were intended to illicit vengefulness in its enemies in case it lost some areas or possibly intentionally allowing them to fall – I personally believe that the only battle that ISIS really wanted to win, but ended up losing was that of Kobani because of its strategic value as a passage for new soldiers from Turkey.

True enough when the Shia Militias entered Tikrit, they committed acts of barbarism that made ISIS come across as the savior in the eyes of Sunnis within Iraq and abroad. At the very least it made the militias come across as brutal as ISIS is.
Those atrocities committed by Shia Militias against Sunnis cleared the way for ISIS to start attacking Sunnis outside Syria and Iraq and that too was a well calculated and well timed move. Because large scale attacks against Shias outside Iraq and Syria took place after atrocities committed by Shia militias, violence against Shias in the region was now being translated by a significant (not majority) number of Sunnis as acts of revenge on their behalf. Consequently, that manoeuvre, which was too complicated for observers to foresee, was yet another effective recruitment tool for ISIS.

The point is that ISIS is almost always ahead in its strategy and it all to often appears that those who have attempted to get into ISIS’s mind have failed (as such I cannot dare claim to know why the Islamic State Think Tank is taking certain actions at the moment). Nevertheless, the reason why it is hard to determine ISIS’s goal is simply the fact that ISIS is making many actions at the same time — actions that seem contradictory at times, and that as time passes and ISIS’s stratagem appears to start to unfold, it is then replaced by other hidden future plans. Analysts are thus thrown back to square one.

When, for instance, ISIS kills tourists in Tunisia, attacks the Egyptian army and terrorizes France in the same week, it is almost impossible to figure out what the “group” is up to. What the world might see as chaotic attacks is in fact a well laid out strategy. One thing that can be ascertained is that ISIS doesn’t mind how its enemies view it, and whatever acts of brutality it commits does seem to motivate its intended audience — namely potential fighters and financiers. This week’s attack on a local market in Diyala that killed more than 200 people proves that ISIS cares less of what the world thinks of it. The scale of the violence is unthinkable and must turn the majority of the world even more against it. But what is important to ISIS is the message it intends to send to its present and potential supporters and that is the attack was carried out to avenge the massacre of Sunnis in Beiji.

John Cantlie’s article titled Paradigm Shift is the only one where we can perhaps try to deduce an overall strategy for ISIS. In the article, Cantlie quotes Chuck Hagel as describing ISIS as a militarily powerful organization with a highly sophisticated media wing. He later on goes to suggest that ISIS is so powerful and growing in power that its enemies will reach a point where they would have no choice but to accept a truce with it. Of course what John Cantlie says has to be approved by ISIS before publication and as such the article itself must be portraying the “group’s” own view.

The main article itself hints of a long term strategy where it is suggested that a truce with ISIS is the only way the war would stop. The elaboration of the hint is in the Editor’s Note section. There it says that “A halt of war between the Muslims and the Kuffar (infidels) can never be permanent as war against the Kuffar is the default obligation upon the Muslims to be halted temporarily by truce for a greater Sharia interest as in the offer of truce from the prophet Swalla Allahu Alaihi Wassallam to the Mushrikiin (infidels) of Makkah in Hudaybiya”.

It is noteworthy that ISIS doesn’t talk much and doesn’t bluff and a great deal of what it says is what it means. As such the footnote drawing on events that took place during the prophet’s time are intended to show that ISIS is sticking to examples that it claims were set by the prophet. Before the Prophet Swalla Allahu Alaihi Wassallam had amassed enough strength to impose a truce on the enemies he left behind, Quraish, he and his early companions had suffered much abuse from them in Mecca effectively forcing them to leave.

In Medina where he and his companions settled, he was received well and there he established himself and gradually reached the point of signing the Truce. The people who received him and his companions in Medina were called Al-Ansaar and those who arrived with the prophet were called Al-Muhajireen. These are the same terminologies used by the Islamic State to describe its original members and incoming foreign fighters, respectively.

Many of ISIS’s fighters come from lands they believe are anti-Islam and when they reach Iraq and Syria they are received by fellow Muslims who share their view and cause. In this regard, and related to the above explanation, Iraq and Syria is therefore representative of Medina and the rest of the world is representative of the lands of infidels that they immigrated from.

The initial goal of ISIS is therefore to acquire what is essentially and figuratively speaking a modern-time Medina by imposing on its enemies to accept it as a nation worthy of making a truce with and to achieve that end it will use all means it deems necessary. The prophet Swalla Allahu Alaihi Wassallam as we know eventually returned to Mecca with a formidable army. There was no war, however, as the former enemy was overwhelmed and simply surrendered to the will of Islam. Thereafter Islam was spread to the wider world and that is what ISIS openly says it wants to achieve.

In ISIS’s eyes, the land to return to and conquer before spreading Islam to the wider world is not limited to Mecca, but the Arabian Peninsula as a whole and with Saudi Arabia at its center. In which case, ISIS would be in position to have an army of people purely believing in its cause or willing to live within it by its conditions. Thus ISIS’s first goal, it would appear, is to reach a point where the world has no choice but to accept it as a State rather than as a group. If ISIS achieves that then what happens next won’t be much different from what has been discussed above.

The post Islamic State’s Long-Term Overall Strategy Embedded Within John Cantlie’s ‘Paradigm Shift’ – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

The Council of Senior Scholars praised the Saudi security forces for dismantling a cluster of terror cells linked to Daesh in the Kingdom and said that those linked to terrorism have drifted away from Islamic values.

The council condemned terrorism, saying the actions by deviant groups are only serving the agendas of the enemies of Islam and Muslims, local media reported.

It emphasized that all citizens, including students, preachers, teachers and media persons are responsible for uncovering such deviant and evil designs emitting from these terrorist groups.

The council also noted that families have a major role to play in keeping their children away from such evil ideas and thoughts.

Meanwhile, a man who threatened to kill Saudi satirist Nasser Al-Qasabi last month is among the 144 Daesh-linked suspects detained, Al Arabiya News Channel reported.

Al-Qasabi’s sketch comedy show “Selfie” earned him death threats from Daesh after mocking the extremists. In one scene, a group of warriors at a “girl market” pick concubines from a line of chained women abducted from the battlefield.

In a response from a supporter of the militants, a Twitter user named Jalabeeb Al-Jizrawi wrote to Al-Qasabi: “I swear to God you will regret what you did, you apostate.”

“The holy warriors will not rest until they cut your head from your body, in just a few days hopefully,” he wrote in a post that was retweeted over 3,000 times.

It is now believed “Jalabeeb Al-Jizrawi” has been arrested as part of a crackdown.

“God is my protector. I’m an artist, and the artist’s essential role is to reveal society’s challenges even if he pays a price,” Al-Qasabi had said following the threat. “Warning the people about Daesh is the true jihad, because we’re fighting them with art not war,” he added.

The post Saudi Scholars Say Deviants ‘Are Only Aiding Islam Foes’ appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Friday, July 10, 2015 was a historic moment in the history of the United States of America. On Friday morning just after 10 a.m., the Confederate flag on South Carolina’s (SC) State House grounds was removed. It was an event that was surely overdue for decades. But thanks to the SC politicians, many of whom were overtly racists, if not covertly, and their supporters within the general population, this flag, which has been seen as a symbol of intolerance and racism by all African-Americans, had remained hoisted all these years, until it was brought down lately.

So, what made the difference this time? It was that Charleston shooting at the Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal (AME) Church by a white terrorist – Dylann Roof – who like many other fellow racists revered that confederate flag very dearly. Nine Black church members were shot to death by Roof on June 17 when they were having a Bible Study.

As I noted earlier, the massacre of those African-Americans in Charleston was classified as a possible hate crime and not as terrorism. This, in spite of the overwhelming evidence that the killer himself wanted to ignite a race war. He reportedly had told friends and neighbors of his plans to kill people, including a plot to attack the College of Charleston. An online photo showed him sitting on the hood of his parents’ car with an ornamental license plate with a Confederate flag on it. He also left a racist manifesto in which he included photographs holding the flag, visiting the Confederate museum and a Confederate cemetery.

Debates over displaying the Confederate battle flag became quite familiar in South Carolina after the shooting. Most Republicans avoided taking a position on the flag, though Jeb Bush highlighted his role in removing the flag from Florida’s Capitol in 2001. Democratic frontrunner Hillary Clinton forcefully called on Americans to discuss racial divisions but avoided talking whether South Carolina should remove the flag from the Capitol complex. Gov. Nikki Haley, who said the issue was worth a conversation, was under immense pressure to convene a special session to take up the flag question.

Lawmakers agreed to take down the flag on the week of July 6, following an impassioned debate at the House which went on for over 12 hours. Governor Nikki Haley signed the final legislation to remove the flag on Thursday, July 9, calling for it to come down in a respectful manner.

The politics of the flag are complicated in South Carolina. The Confederate flag was first placed on the dome in the 1960s. In 2000, the flag was moved from the State House dome to the Confederate memorial, amid protest. A November poll from Winthrop University found that 73% of whites in the state want the flag to remain where it is. The same poll reported that 61% of blacks want it taken down.

For some whites, many of whom can trace their ancestry back to the Civil War, the flag represents heritage and pride.
“It’s a symbol of family and my ancestors who defended the state from invasion. It was about standing up to a central government,” said Chris Sullivan, who is a member of the Sons of the Confederacy. “The things that our ancestors fought for were not novel and they really are the same issues we have today.” “What’s the difference between the flag and the monument,” Sullivan asked. “That’s what people are upset about now, but what about later?”

The flag is just one of several monuments that includes a statue of one-time segregationist Sen. Strom Thurmond and Ben Tillman, who sought to disenfranchise black citizens while he was governor. A stone marks the site of the state house before Sherman’s troops burned it the ground during the Civil War.

Southern states of the United States always has been somewhat different than its northern sister states, not just in matters of resisting to end slavery but on a plethora of issues. After slavery ended, some Southern business leaders moved on to exploiting children.

During the late 19th and early 20th centuries, millions of children across the country were forced to work in factories, textile mills and mines. The forced labor stunted their growth and kept many away from schools. Factory owners preferred children because they were cheaper, more submissive and less likely to strike.

Southern industrialists became so invested in child labor that when Congress passed a law in 1916 banning child labor, a group of Southern textile mill owners went all the way to the Supreme Court to get the law declared unconstitutional in Hammer vs. Dagenhart, until child labor was outlawed in U.S. v. Darby in 1941.
Southern economics (commonly known as Southernomics) also developed a way to exploit workers through the justice system.

In his Pulitzer Prize-winning book, “Slavery by Another Name,” Douglas A. Blackmon recounts how Southern law enforcement officials routinely arrested poor blacks on trumped-up charges such as selling cotton after sunset. When those arrested could not afford to pay their bond, they would be leased out to private businesses that would work them for free.
After slavery ended, Southern leaders were content to exploit white tenant farmers and child laborers. Some even experimented with bringing in indentured servants or “coolies” from Asia after the Civil War, historian Michael Lind says.

Though the Old South may have lost the military battle during the Civil War, Lind is concerned that it is winning the battle on the economic front. He says more states outside the South are adopting the region’s economic model: passing “right-to-work” laws, slashing taxes to attract corporations and pulling back on investing in public services like public schools and infrastructure.

Every Southern state is a “right-to-work” state, which means it has laws that make it more difficult for unions to organize. And though there is a national movement to raise the federal minimum wage, there are still five states that have refused to adopt a state minimum wage. All of them — Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina and Tennessee — are in the South.

Less worker power may be one reason the South is often touted as a “business-friendly climate.” The Old South has long pioneered other ways of exploiting workers besides weakening their bargaining power, Michael Lind and other historians say. Some Southern governors like former Texas Gov. Rick Perry have openly boasted about traveling to other states to steal businesses with promises of low taxes.

The South has consistently been rated by CEOs as the best region to do business in, according to Chief Executive Magazine.
In its 2015 annual survey, the magazine asked CEOs which states were the best and worst for business. The top five most business-friendly states were all in the South, the survey revealed. (Texas was No. 1, followed by Florida, North Carolina, Tennessee and Georgia.)

Supporters of the Southern economic model say that businesses move to states with a more stable labor environment and that more business means more jobs with higher wages. They also say that right-to-work laws actually help unions by forcing them to work harder to retain members.

Lind calls this process the “Southernization” of the American economy and says it’s ultimately not about racism. “The ongoing power struggle between the local elites of the former Confederacy and their allies in other regions and the rest of the United States is not primarily about personal attitudes. It is about power and wealth,” Lind wrote in an essay for Salon entitled, “The South is Holding America Hostage.”

Studies of the South, however, suggest that while it may be a good place for business, it isn’t necessarily good for people’s health and welfare.

Southern residents have the lowest healthy life expectancy of any U.S. citizens regardless of race, according to the Centers for Disease Control. The region also has the worst child poverty — 12 of the 15 states with the highest child poverty rates are in the South. And Southern states have the highest rate of citizens without health insurance.

On July 10, the flag was on the Confederate memorial and had previously flown from the State House dome. A few minutes before it was set to be removed, the crowd began to chant “Take it down! Take it down!”

The Honor Guard arrived just after 10 a.m. to take down the flag. Seven members of the guard were present at the ceremony. They pulled the flag down the flag pole quickly. After it was removed, there were chants from the ground and some began singing “Na, na, na, hey, hey, hey, goodbye.”

The flag will be moved into the Confederate Relic Room and Military Museum. A member of the guard rolled up the flag and presented it to the president of the museum.

The Confederacy may have surrendered on the battlefield in 1865, and its divisive flag brought down in South Carolina Statehouse nearly one and a half century later, but the battle over the Confederate flag is not over yet. Not only does Southernomics persist in other parts of the country as a viable economic model that deliberately keeps ordinary workers weak, dependent and scared but many Americans continue to revere the confederate flag as part of their heritage. Supporters embrace the battle flag as a reminder of ancestors who fought for the Confederacy or as an emblem of regional pride. Critics see it as a symbol of a defiant white supremacist society that fought to perpetuate slavery and segregation.

Just days before the flag was brought down in South Carolina, an eight-mile convoy of pickups, motorcycles and cars wound through a central Florida town Ocala for the “Florida Southern Pride Ride”. Some 4,500 people rallied in support of flying the Confederate flag. Horns blared and nearly 2,000 vehicles, adorned with the Civil War-era flag, took part in the gathering. The event was being held to back a decision by Marion County in that area of central Florida to return the Confederate flag to a display outside its government complex. The rally also came as Tennessee announced that it will celebrate the birthday of Confederate army general and early Ku Klux Klan leader Nathan Bedford Forrest.

Shots were fired at the Ocala rally during an argument over the flag, but no one was injured. The Ocala Star-Banner reported participants wore shirts with phrases including “heritage not hate” and talked of defending Southern traditions, WKMG reported.

“This isn’t about hatred. This isn’t about racism. This isn’t about black and white,” a participant said. “We are not in hate of anybody. We just don’t want our rights taken away to support our Southern heritage.” A replica of the General Lee car from “The Dukes of Hazard” TV show led the procession. Another participant defended flying the Confederate flag, saying “It’s a history thing. The flag is also a military flag. It’s not a race symbol.”

Meanwhile, the next big struggle over Old South symbols is shaping up in Mississippi, the only state that includes the Confederate battle emblem in its state flag. The rebel x has been fluttering over the Capitol and other public buildings since 1894 as part of the state flag. In a 2001 statewide election, people voted nearly 2-to-1 to keep the design.

Mississippi NAACP president Derrick Johnson says the Confederate symbol should be erased from the Mississippi banner because it represents racial hatred and exclusion. “It’s time to write the next chapter of our history.”

North Carolina’s Department of Motor Vehicles recently sold out of a series of specialty license plates featuring the Confederate flag, local media reported. It has ordered more of the plates, which may be discontinued in the future.

In Hurley, Virginia, the rebel flag is more visible than ever as residents show their support for keeping the local high school’s logo, which features the Confederate flag waving from a saber. “A backlash is beginning,” said Ben Jones, a spokesman for the Sons of Confederate Veterans, which represents 30,000 descendants of Confederate soldiers. “We are putting flags out. Everyone time one is taken down, we put five or six of them up.”

Last Saturday, July 18, supporters of the Ku Klux Klan and the Black Panthers clashed outside the South Carolina Capitol in Columbia; five people were arrested and seven were taken to hospital for medical treatment. “The Confederate flag does not represent hate. A lot of Americans died for that flag,” one member of the KKK reportedly told news reporters.

The Columbia rally once again shows that the national push to pull the controversial icon from stores and public displays will continue to be met with determined resistance in some corners of the United States.

The post Confederate Flag Is Down, But Battle Isn’t Over – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By D. S. Rajan*

It may not be wrong to say that China’s adoption of a New National Security Law on July 1, 2015 and a series of other laws in the making symbolize that the political milieu in the country, under the Xi Jinping regime, has become ideology driven. Stifling dissent seems to have become the order of the day now in China. It is not coincidental that around the Law’s promulgation, at least 146 lawyers, activists and their relatives have been taken into custody or questioned by police in 24 Chinese cities and provinces (China Human Rights Lawyers Concern Group, Hong Kong, July 14, 2015). The level of rhetoric against Western values and foreign influences over the society appear to have reached a new high. Making of the Law as an instrument to provide a legal framework to the party principles on National Security, is indeed an ideologically significant development.

The “China’s Military Strategy” document (May 26, 2015) has already listed Taiwan, Tibet and “Eastern Turkestan” independence movements as sources of internal security challenges; it has brought the US, Japan, “some offshore neighbors”, “Smoldering land territory disputes”, “uncertain situation in the Korean peninsula and Northeast Asia” under the same category externally. The latest Law besides encompassing, but without naming, these already listed challenges, has now gone further by including four new fields in that list -sea beds, poles, outer space, and cyberspace. Such addition would certainly mean an aggressive China; the Law’s mention of sea beds is suggestive of the PRC’s harder approach in the coming years towards the South China Sea disputes.

Overall, in strategic terms, China can be expected to be more and more assertive domestically to preserve territorial sovereignty and adopt a confrontational stand internationally in its bid to protect the country from the perceived external challenges. The PRC in the meanwhile may choose a ‘benign’ diplomatic path to solve issues, but that is going to be only tactical.

The Standing Committee of the 12th National People’s Congress (NPC) of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), at its 15th meeting (Beijing, July 1,2015), formally adopted a new National Security Law ( hereinafter called the Law) which is broadest in scope, framing legal provisions to deal with the identified security threats to the country. 154 delegates voted in favor with none opposing and one abstaining. The Law comprising 84 Articles is successor to the PRC’s previous national security law, enacted in 1993, which was followed in 2014 by a counterespionage law. Strikingly, it provides for maintaining security in very wide ranging fields – politics, military, economy, food supply, finance, society, technology, environment and culture. It is a firm proof that under Xi Jinping’s leadership, there is a clear-cut expansion of China’s security interests, going well beyond the country’s geographical borders, and reaching to sea beds, poles, outer space, and cyberspace.

2. The Law has seven chapters under following heads- ‘General Provisions’( giving overall guidelines), ‘Tasks in Preserving National Security’( defining National Security), ‘Duties of Preserving National Security’ ( fixing responsibilities of the NPC and government), ‘National Security System ( focusing on its key components like intelligence collection and Crisis Management and Control), ‘National Security Safeguards’, ‘Duties and Rights of citizens and organizations’, and ‘Supplementary positions’. Full text in English of the Law is given below in the Appendix.

3. The manner in which Beijing is defending the Law needs attention. Ms Zheng Shuna, Deputy Director of the Legislative Affairs Commission of the NPC Standing Committee explained the rationale behind the Law by saying that “China’s national security situation is increasingly grim. We are under dual pressures … Externally, the country must defend its sovereignty, security and development interests, and internally, it must also maintain political security and social stability. She countered criticisms that the Law is ‘vague’ by observing that China’s definition of national security interests “is very clear-cut, and isn’t any broader than those set by other countries, we welcome all enterprises to operate lawfully and provide lawful services in China”. Admitting (Beijing, July 1, 2015) that the “connotation and denotation of national security in the Law is more wide-ranging than in any other time in history”, she argued that Western countries had been enacting similar laws since the 1980s and asserted that “during the process of resource exploration, expedition and utilization in the fields coming under the Law, the PRC government has the right to guarantee the safety of its related activities, assets and personnel according to the Law”.

4. Explaining the application of the Law to safeguarding national security in space, on sea beds and at the poles, the senior official of the PRC stated that it is meant to give China “legal support” for its projects in those realms. On Cyberspace, Ms Zheng observed that cyberspace sovereignty is the embodiment and extension of national sovereignty, adding that the Internet is an important aspect of the nation’s infrastructure and Beijing’s sovereignty over it should be “respected and maintained”. She opined that the new law provided a legal foundation for “the management of internet activities on China’s territory and the resisting of activities that undermine China’s cyberspace security”. Stating that the goal of maintaining national security also applied to Hong Kong and Macau, she revealed that the Law would not be enacted there although the two territories have an obligation under the Basic Law to make their own legislation. (C.Y.Leung, the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region has said that the new Law will not apply in the region, but the region bears the responsibility to maintain national security). What the CCP and State-controlled media have said on the Law could also be important to note. The Global Times (July 30,2015) stated that “compared with the traditional domain of national security such as defense, competition between major powers and territorial sovereignty, China’s security nowadays covers a wide spectrum of areas. It is s not unusual that China’s measures to secure national security display national characteristics”.

5. Salient features of the Law are as under:

Party to play key role in law making: The stipulations respectively in Articles 4, 7 and 15 that the establishment of national security system should be under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), that while preserving national security, the Constitution and law should be followed and that the State persists in the CCP’s leadership, are firm indicators to the Party- State- Judiciary equation evolved as per the ‘’Decision’’ adopted at the CCP Plenum (October 2014) which said that “governance according to law requires that the CCP governs the country on the basis of the constitution and laws and that the party leadership and socialist rule of law are identical. Party leadership is the most fundamental guarantee for comprehensively advancing the rule of law and building country under socialist rule of law”. With party remaining firmly connected to judicial process in this way, it can be said that questions on the independence of courts would persist.

Consolidation of Power by Xi Jinping: Promulgation of the Law implies that the CCP supremo and the PRC President Xi Jinping, has been able to further consolidate political power since he took over in late 2012; a parallel exists only in the case of veteran Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping. Evidences in this regard include references in the Law (Articles 5 and 44) to the role of the “Central Leading institution on National Security”, which point to a pivotal place allotted to the Xi- founded National Security Commission (NSC), set up at the CCP’s Third Plenum held in November 2013; the NSC in fact has sidelined the once powerful Political-Legal Affairs Commission of the party. The NSC’s gaining status is in conformity with the party’s formula that “national security must be under the absolute leadership of the CCP’s efficient and unified command” and that NSC would be responsible for decision-making, deliberation and coordination on national security work” (CCP Politburo meeting, January 23, 2015).

A second reference concerns what the Party and State controlled media (People’s Daily, April 23, 2015) have said; they described the Law as a reflection of “General Secretary Xi Jinping’s spirit”, showing that the new statute is Xi’s brainchild,

Thirdly, the Law needs to be read together with three other bills expected to be passed soon – one on regulating foreign non-governmental organizations operating in China , another on ‘counter-terrorism’ which reveals plans to make China’s key institutions in the fields like finance, military and state-owned enterprises to become less dependent on foreign technology and the third , a new foreign investment law which aims to monitor the investment of foreigners in restricted industries. All the three legislative efforts point to more powers to the country’s security apparatus which is now in Xi’s hands.

Why Xi required a new Security Law? Admittedly the existing ones are themselves adequate to protect national security, but what Xi intended to do has been to provide a firmer legal framework for the CCP’s ideological platform aimed at managing problems in the society, especially arising from the influence of Western ideas, at a time when the people seem to be losing their enthusiasm in the party’s ideology. It is remarkable that Xi, in this way, seems to have succeeded in making ideology a part of the country’s legal domain. Overall, not to be missed is the definite trend the three above mentioned laws signify – Xi Jinping’s stand that ideological security is a prerequisite to the implementation of the country’s reform policies, is being incorporated into law.

Who decides Military’s National Security actions? The Law’s Article 23 says that the Central Military Commission (CMC) directs military actions for maintaining national security. It does not say that the State will direct such actions, which is as expected; China has always stood for the dictum that the party has absolute control over the Army. The fact that the membership of the CCP and State Military Commissions is identical makes sure that it would be the party’s CMC which would call the shots in the military.

Reforms Vs Stability: The Law makes no mention of reforms. Articles 8 and 34, have only said that preservation of national security shall be coordinated with economic and social development and that the State continuously improves the tasks of preserving national security based on the needs of economic and social development and national development interests. ‘Reforms’ not figuring in the Law needs to be understood in the context of What Xi Jinping has said; he has observed (Politburo meeting, January 23, 2015) that “State security and social stability are preconditions for reform and development”. In China, there has always been a debate on which one is a priority requirement- reform or stability. It is obvious that Xi has settled that debate by firmly giving precedence to national security and stability over reforms on the premise that the security situation in China is “grim” (see paragraph 3).

Coordination mechanisms for National Security efforts: Article 45 provides for the State establishing such mechanisms in key fields, for planning overall coordination of relevant central functional departments. This appears to be new organizational effort. Full contours are yet to emerge.

Internet and Information Technology security: On this, the outside world may find Article 25 of great interest on which the Law reads “the State establishes a national network and information security safeguard system, raising the capacity to protect network and information security. It will make Internet and information technology, infrastructure, information systems and data in key sectors secure and controllable”. Such remarks may reflect China’s fears over the domination of the Western technology over Internet in the PRC and intentions to overcome it through developing indigenous systems. Also, the law’s purpose seems to be curbing any social media dissent on the government’s policies.

Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan: The Law’s listing (Article 11) of Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan as national security areas marks first such judicial step; it asserts that “all Chinese people, including those in the three territories, have a common obligation to uphold national sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity.” This strongly signals that for China, Hong Kong has become a national security issue in the aftermath of the pro-democracy demonstrations there.

Powers to Declare War/ Emergency: Article 36 is notable. It says that the PRC President, on the basis of the NPC Standing Committee decision will announce entry into a state of emergency, a state of war, issue mobilization orders, and exercise other duties related to national security provided for by the Constitutional provisions.

Human rights not adequately addressed: The Law is not satisfactory from the point of view of protection of human rights. Article 15 identifies several criminal acts – treason, division of the nation, incitement of rebellion, and subversion of people’s democratic dictatorship regime, the leaking of state secrets, infiltration, destruction and subversion or separatism by foreign influences. Article 23 calls for unspecified measures to “prevent and withstand adverse cultural influence” and “increase overall cultural strength and competitiveness.” Article 27 talks about lawfully punishing the exploitation of religion’s name to conduct illegal and criminal activities that endanger national security. It opposes interference of foreign influences in domestic religious affairs. Tibetans in exile fear that Article 27 can be used against the Dalai Lama followers in Tibet. Article 77 allows for law enforcement agencies to impose collective punishments to the whole family for failure to provide conditions to facilitate national security initiatives and “keeping state secrets they learned are confidential” and provides jurisdictional claim to make arbitrary arrests and detention. Article 83 mentions that in national security work, when special measures are required that restrict the rights and freedoms of citizens, they shall be conducted in accordance with law. It may be seen that all these clauses contain no clear cut details on punishment. It may be possible that rules relating to implementation of the Law are issued subsequently by the government agencies as customary in China. But, as for now, the position is that any action or statement can be treated as a criminal act, which may not be ideal from human rights points of view. .

Negative impact on foreign investment in China. Article 59 of the Law calls for national security reviews for “foreign investments that infringe upon, or may infringe upon, national security.” It adds that such reviews cover investments involving “key materials and technologies,” “internet or information technology products and services,” “construction projects that implicate national security,” and “other major projects and events.” This clause looks meant for providing a legal basis to the PRC government’s imposition of stronger restrictions on foreign business interests. Foreign countries including the US, which are negotiating trade and investment agreements with China may under the circumstances become concerned with the Law. Michael Clauss, the German ambassador to China has said that “the mainland’s sweeping national security law and a series of related laws in the making have created legal uncertainty for foreign companies and new hurdles for their investment”. The question is why China is hurting itself when it knows that foreign investment is essential for its development. The answer seems to lie in its priority now to national security.

6. It may not be wrong to say that China’s adoption of a New National Security Law on July 1, 2015, and a series of other laws in the making symbolize that the political milieu in the country, under the Xi Jinping regime, has become ideology driven. Stifling dissent seems to have become a prominent trend now in China. It is not coincidental that around the Law’s promulgation, at least 146 lawyers, activists and their relatives have been taken into custody or questioned by police in 24 Chinese cities and provinces (China Human Rights Lawyers Concern Group, Hong Kong, and July 14, 2015). The rhetoric against Western values and foreign influences over China appear to have reached a new high. Making of the Law as an instrument to provide a legal framework to the party principles on National Security, is indeed an ideologically significant development.

7. The “China’s Military Strategy” document (May 26, 2015) has already listed Taiwan, Tibet and “Eastern Turkestan” independence movements as sources of internal security challenges; it has brought the US, Japan, “some offshore neighbors”, “Smoldering land territory disputes”, “uncertain situation in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia” under the same category externally. The latest Law besides encompassing, but without naming, these already listed challenges, has now gone further by including four new fields in that list -sea beds, poles, outer space, and cyberspace. Such addition would certainly mean an aggressive China; In particular, the Law’s mention of sea beds is suggestive of the PRC’s harder approach in the coming years to the South China Sea disputes.

8. Overall, in strategic terms, China can be expected to be more and more assertive domestically to preserve territorial sovereignty and adopt a confrontational stand internationally in its bid to protect the country from the perceived external challenges. The PRC in the meanwhile may choose a ‘benign’ diplomatic path to solve issues, but that is going to be only tactical.

*The writer, D.S.Rajan, is Distinguished Fellow, Chennai Centre for China Studies, Chennai, India. Email: dsrajan@gmail.com

Appendix

http://chinalawtranslate.com/2015nsl/?lang=en National Security Law of the People’s Republic of China 02 (Passed on July 1, 2015 at the 15th meeting of the Standing Committee of the 12th National People’s Congress)

Chapter I: General Provisions

Chapter II: Tasks in preserving national security

Chapter III: Duties of preserving national security

Chapter IV: National Security System

Section 1: Ordinary Provisions

Section 2: Intelligence Information

Section 3: Risk Prevention, Assessment and Warning

Section 4: Review and Oversight

Section 5: Crisis Management and Control

Chapter V: National Security Safeguards

Chapter VI: Duties and Rights of Citizens and Organizations

Chapter VII: Supplementary Provisions
Chapter I: General Provisions

Article 1: This Law is formulated on the basis of the Constitution so as to maintain national security, to defend the people’s democratic dictatorship and the socialist system with Chinese characteristics, to defend the fundamental interests of the people, to ensure the smooth implementation of the reform and opening up and establishment of socialist modernization and to realize the great revival of the Chinese nationality.

Article 2: National security refers to the relative absence of international or domestic threats to the state’s power to govern, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity, the welfare of the people, sustainable economic and social development, and other major national interests, and the ability to ensure a continued state of security.

Article 3: National security efforts shall adhere to a comprehensive understanding of national security, make the security of the People their goal, political security their basis and economic security their foundation; make military, cultural and social security their safeguard and advance international security to protect national security in all areas, build a national security system and follow a path of national security with Chinese characteristics.

Article 4: Adhere to the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party in national security matters and establish a centralized, efficient and authoritative national security leadership system.

Article 5: A central national security leading institution is responsible for deciding and coordinating national security efforts, for conducting research to develop and guide the implementation of strategies and relevant major policies in national security efforts for coordinating major issues and important efforts in national security, and for promoting the building of national security rule of law.

Article 6: The state formulates and continuously improves national security strategy, comprehensively assesses the international and domestic national security situation, clarifies guidelines for the national security, medium and long-term goals and national security policies, tasks and measures for key areas.

Article 7: Preserving national security shall follow the Constitution and law, uphold the principles of socialist rule of law, respect and protect human rights, and protect citizens’ rights and freedom in accordance with law.

Article 8: Preservation of national security shall be coordinated with economic and social development.

National security efforts shall have an overall plan for internal and external security, homeland and populace security, traditional and non-traditional security, and personal and collective security,

Article 9: Preservation of national security shall persist in putting prevention first and treating both symptoms and root causes, combining special efforts and the mass line, fully bringing into play special organs’ and other relevant departments’ functions in maintaining national security, widely mobilizing citizens and organizations to guard against and punish conduct endangering national security.

Article 10: The preservation of national security shall persist in mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and coordination; actively developing security exchanges and cooperation with foreign governments and international organizations, performing international security obligations, promoting common security and maintaining world peace.

Article 11: Citizens of the People’s Republic of China, all state organs and armed forces, each political parties and mass organization, enterprises, public institutions and other social organizations, all have the responsibility and obligation to preserve national security.

The sovereignty and territorial integrity of China cannot be encroached upon or divided. Preservation of national sovereignty and territorial integrity is a shared obligation of all the Chinese people, including compatriots from Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan.

Article 12: Individuals and organizations making outstanding contributions in efforts to maintain the national security are give commendations and awards.

Article 13: Any individual or organization violating this law and other relevant laws, by failing to perform national security obligations or engaging in activities endangering national security, shall be investigated for legal responsibility according to law.

Article 14: April 15 of each year is national security education day.
Chapter II: Tasks in preserving national security

Article 15: The State persists in the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, maintaining the socialist system with Chinese characteristics, developing socialist democratic politics, completing socialist rule of law, strengthening mechanisms for restraint and oversight of the operation of power, and ensuring all rights of the people as the masters of the nation, and strengthening restraint and oversight mechanisms on the operation of power.

The State guards against, stops, and lawfully punishes acts of treason, division of the nation, incitement of rebellion, subversion or instigation of subversion of the people’s democratic dictatorship regime; guards against, stops, and lawfully punishes the theft or leaking of state secrets and other conduct endangering national security; and guards against, stops, and lawfully punishes acts of infiltration, destruction, subversion or separatism by foreign influences.

Article 16: The state maintains and develops the most extensive fundamental interests of the people , defending the people’s security; creating positive conditions for survival and development and a positive environment for living and working; ensuring the safety of citizens’ person and property and other lawful rights and interests.

Article 17: The State increases the construction of border defense, coastal defense, and air defense, taking all necessary defense and control measures to defend the security of continental territory, internal water bodies, territorial waters and airspace, and to maintain national territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests.

Article 18: The State makes the armed forces more revolutionary, contemporary, regular; establishing and defending national security and developing the necessary related armed forces; implements an active military defense strategy directives, taking precautions against and withstanding invasion, stopping armed subversion and separatism; develops international military security cooperation, carrying out military actions in U.N. peacekeeping, international rescue, maritime escort, and protection of the State’s oversees interests, and preserves State sovereignty, security, territorial integrity, development interests, and world peace.

Article 19: The State maintains the basic economic system and order of the socialist marketplace, completing institutional mechanisms for prevention and resolution of risks to economic security, safeguarding security in important industries and fields that influence the populace’s economic livelihood, key production, major infrastructure and major construction project as well as other major economic interests.

Article 20: The State completes macro financial management and financial risk prevention and handling mechanisms, enhancing the construction of financial infrastructure and fundamental capacity, preventing and resolving the occurrence of systemic or regionalized financial risks, and preventing and resisting encroachment of external financial risks.

Article 21: The State rationally exploits and protects resources and energy sources, effectively managing and controlling the exploitation of strategic resources and energy sources, strengthening strategic reserves of resources and energy sources, improving the establishment of strategic paths of, or transport of, resources and energy sources and security protection measures, increasing international cooperation on resources and energy sources, comprehensively raising safeguard capacity for response, and guaranteeing the sustainable, reliable and effective provision of resources and energy sources necessary for economic and social development.

Article 22: The State completes a food security safeguard system, protecting and improving the overall food production capacity, improving the system for food reserves, the transport system, and market regulatory mechanisms; completing early warning systems for food security, ensuring security food supplies and quality.

Article 23: The State Persists in the orientation of the advanced socialist culture, carrying forward the excellent traditional culture of the Chinese people, cultivating and practicing the socialist core values, guarding against and resisting negative cultural influences, taking hold of dominance in the ideological, culture and enhancing the overall strength and competitiveness of the entire culture.

Article 24: The State strengthens the establishment of capacity for independent innovation, accelerating the development of autonomously controlled strategic advanced technologies and key technologies in core fields, strengthen the use of intellectual property rights, protect capacity building in protection of technological secrets, and ensure security in technology and engineering.

Article 25: The State establishes a national network and information security safeguard system, raising the capacity to protect network and information security; increasing innovative research, development and use of network and information technologies; to bring about security core techniques and key infrastructure for networks and information, information systems in important fields, as well as data; increasing network management, preventing, stopping and lawfully punishing unlawful and criminal activity on networks such as network attacks, network intrusion, cyber theft, and dissemination of unlawful and harmful information; maintaining cyberspace sovereignty, security and development interests.

Article 26: The State adheres to and improves upon the ethnic autonomous region system, solidifying and developing unity and mutual aid, harmonious socialist ethnic relationships. Uphold the equality of all ethnicities, strengthening interaction, communication, and mingling of ethnicities, and prevent, stop, prevent and lawfully punish activities dividing ethnicities, preserving social tranquility and the unity of the motherland in ethnic regions, realizing ethnic harmony and a common unified struggle and a common prosperous development of all ethnicities.

Article 27: The State lawfully protects citizens’ freedom of religious belief and normal religious activities, upholds the principle of religions managing themselves, preventing, stopping and lawfully punishing the exploitation of religion’s name to conduct illegal and criminal activities that endanger national security, and opposes foreign influences interference with domestic religious affairs, maintaining normal order of religious activities.

The State shuts down cult organizations in accordance with law, preventing, stopping, lawfully punishing and correcting illegal and criminal cult activities.

Article 28: The State opposes all forms of terrorism and extremism, and increases the capacity to prevent and handle of terrorist activities, developing efforts in areas such as intelligence, investigation, prevention, handling and capital monitoring in accordance with law, lawfully putting an end to terrorist organizations and strictly punishing violent terrorist activities.

Article 29: The State completes effective institutional mechanisms for prevention and resolution of social conflicts, completes the public safety system; actively preventing, reducing and resolving social contradictions; improve the handling of public health, public safety and other types of outbreaks that influence national security and social stability; promoting social harmony and maintaining public safety and societal tranquility.

Article 30: The State improves ecological and environmental protection systems, increasing the force of ecological establishment and environmental protection, drawing red lines for ecologic protections, fortifying early warning and prevention mechanisms for ecologic risks, improving disposition of prominent environmental incidents, ensuring the air, water, soil and other natural environmental conditions upon which the people rely are not threatened or destroyed, promoting harmonious development of man and nature.

Article 31: The State persists in peacefully using nuclear power and nuclear technology, strengthening international cooperation, preventing the proliferation of nuclear technology and improving diffusion mechanisms; strengthening management, oversight and protection of nuclear materials, nuclear activities, and disposal of nuclear waste; and increasing the capacity to respond to nuclear incidents; preventing controlling and eliminating threats by nuclear incidents to citizens’ lives and well-being and to the ecological environment; continuously increasing capacity to effectively respond to and prevent nuclear threats and attacks.

Article 32: The State persists in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space, international seabed areas and Polar Regions, increasing capacity for safe passage, scientific investigation, development and exploitation; strengthening international cooperation, and preserving the security of our nation’s activities and assets in outer space, seabed areas and Polar Regions, and other interests.

Article 33: The State takes necessary measures in accordance with law to protect the security and legitimate rights and interests of overseas Chinese citizens, organizations and institutions; and ensures the nation’s overseas interests are not threatened or encroached upon.

Article 34: The State continuously improves the tasks of preserving national security based on the needs of economic and social development and national development interests.
Chapter III: Duties of preserving national security

Article 35: The National People’s Congress decides issues of war and peace in accordance with Constitutional provisions, and implements constitutional provisions’ other duties relating to national security.

The Standing Committee of the National of the National People’s Congress declares states of war and full or partial mobilizations, in accordance with constitutional provisions, and decisions for the nation or individual provinces, autonomous regions, or directly governed municipalities to enter a state of emergency; and exercises the other powers involving national security invested by constitutional provisions and the National People’s Congress.

Article 36: The President of the People’s Republic of China, on the basis of the National People’s Congress decision and the decision of the Standing Committee of the National of the National People’s Congress, announces entry into a state of emergency, announces a state of war, issues mobilization orders, and exercises other duties related to national security provided for by the Constitutional provisions.

Article 37: The State Council, on the basis of the Constitution and laws, drafts administrative regulations and rules related to national security, providing for relevant administrative measures, release relevant decisions and orders; implements national security laws, regulations and policies; follows the law to decide on some regions at the provincial, autonomous region, or directly governed municipality scale entering a state of emergency; exercises other powers given by the Constitution, laws, regulations and the National People’s Congress and it’s Standing Committee.

Article 38: The central military commission leads the national armed forces, decides military strategy and armed forces combat objectives, uniformly directs military actions for maintaining national security, and drafts military regulations for national security and releases relevant decisions and orders.

Article 39: All departments of central state organs divide labor in accordance with their duties, fully implementing national security directives and policies， and laws and regulations, managing and guiding national security efforts in that system or field.

Article 40: All levels of local people’s congress and standing committees of people’s congresses at the county level or above ensure compliance with and enforcement of national security laws and regulations within that administrative region.

Local people’s governments at all levels follow laws and regulations to manage national security efforts in that administrative region.

The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, and Macao Special Administrative Region shall fulfill responsibilities for the preservation of national security.

Article 41: People’s courts follow legal provisions to exercise the power of adjudication; people’s procuratorates follow legal provisions to exercise prosecution powers, and punish crimes endangering national security.

Article 42: State security organs and public security organs lawfully collect intelligence information related to national security, and perform their duties in accordance with law to investigate, detain, do pretrial work and conduct arrests as well as other duties provided by law.

Relevant military organs lawfully perform their duties in accordance with law in the course of national security efforts.

Article 43: State organs and their employees shall implement the principle of preserving national security.

State organs and their personnel shall strictly handle matters in accordance with law when working on national security efforts and activities related to national security, and must exceed or abuse their authority, and must not infringe the lawful rights and interests of individuals or organizations.
Chapter IV: National Security System
Section 1: Ordinary Provisions

Article 44: The Central leading institution on national security carries out a national security system and working mechanisms that combine centralization and decentralization with highly effective coordination.

Article 45: The State establishes coordination mechanisms for national security efforts in key fields, planning overall coordination of relevant central functional department’s advancement of relevant work.

Article 46: The State establishes mechanisms for oversight, urging, inspections and pursuit of responsibility in national security efforts, ensuring the national security strategy and major deployments are fully implemented.

Article 47: All departments and all regions shall employ effective measures to fully implement the national security strategy.

Article 48: On the basis of national security work requirements, the state establishes mechanisms for cross-departmental consultation, to hold consultation on major matters in efforts to maintain national security.

Article 49: The State establishes coordination and linkage mechanisms on national security between the center and localities, between departments, between military and civilians and between regions.

Article 50: The State establishes mechanisms for national security decision making consultation, organizing experts and relevant parties to carry out national security analysis of the national security situation and advance the scientific decision making in national security.
Section 2: Intelligence Information

Article 51: The State establishes systems for gathering, assessing and using intelligence information, that is uniform and centralized, adeptly reactive, accurate and effective and smoothly operational; and establishes mechanisms for the prompt collection, accurate assessment and effective use and sharing of intelligence information

Article 52: State security organs, public security organs and relevant military organs gather intelligence information related to national security, dividing labor on the basis of their duties and in accordance with law.

State organ departments shall promptly report up information relevant to national security that they acquire in the course of performing their duties.

Article 53: The conduct of intelligence information efforts shall fully utilize contemporary scientific and technical techniques, strengthening the distinction, screening, synthesis and analytic assessment of intelligence information.

Article 54: Reporting of intelligence information shall be prompt, accurate, and objective, and there must be no delays reporting, omissions, concealment or falsehoods in reporting.
Section 3: Risk Prevention, Assessment and Warning

Article 55: The State formulates and improves a national security risk response plan for each field.

Article 56: The State establishes national security risk assessment mechanisms periodically carrying out national security risk assessment in each field.

Relevant departments shall periodically submit national security risk assessment reports to the central leading institution on national security

Article 57: The state completes national security risk monitoring and early warning systems, and in accordance with the degree of national security risk, promptly release related risk warnings.

Article 58: Local people’s governments at the county level or above and their relevant competent departments shall immediately report to the people’s government at the level above and it’s competent departments regarding national security incidents that might soon occur or have already occurred, and when necessary may report up several levels.
Section 4: Review and Oversight

Article 59: The State establishes national security review and oversight management systems and mechanisms, conducting national security review of foreign commercial investment, special items and technologies, internet information technology products and services, projects involving national security matters, as well as other major matters and activities, that impact or might impact national security.

Article 60: Each department of central state organs carries out the duty of national security reviews, issues national security review opinions, and supervises enforcement in accordance with law and administrative regulations.

Article 61: Provinces, autonomous regions, and directly governed municipalities are responsible for national security review and regulation in their administrative region in accordance with law.
Section 5: Crisis Management and Control

Article 62: This establishes a national security crisis management and control system with uniform leadership, coordinated linkages, that is orderly and highly effective.

Article 63: Where an especially major incident endangering national security occurs, relevant central departments and regions follow the uniform deployment of the Central leading institution on national security, lawfully initiate emergency response plans, and employ control and management disposition measures.

Article 64: Where an especially major incident endangering national security occurs requiring entry into a state of emergency, state of war or general mobilization or partial mobilization, the National People’s Congress and the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress or the State Council follow the scope of authority and procedural decisions in the Constitution and relevant legal provisions.

Article 65: After the State decides to enter a state of emergency, state of war or to mobilize national defense, relevant organs performing national security crisis management and control follow legal provisions or provisions of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress in accordance with law, and have the right to employ special measures limiting citizens and organizations rights, increase citizens and organizations obligations.

Article 66: Relevant organs performing national security crisis management and control duties that lawfully adopt management and control measures to address national security crises, shall match them to the nature, extent and scope of the harm that might be caused by the national security crisis.

Article 67: The State establishes mechanisms for information reporting and release on national security crises.

After national security crises occur, relevant organs performing national security crisis management and control duties shall follow provisions to promptly and accurately report, and make uniform announcements on the occurrence, development, control and management and aftermath of the national security crisis.

Article 68: After national security threats and crises have been controlled or eliminated, control and management measures shall be promptly lifted and aftermath efforts done well.
Chapter V: National Security Safeguards

Article 69: The State completes a system of national security safeguards, increasing capacity to preserve national security.

Article 70: The State completes the system of laws on national security, promoting the establishment of national security rule of law.

Article 71: The State increases investment in all matters of national security construction to ensure that national security efforts have the necessary funds and equipment.

Article 72: Units undertaking national security strategic stockpile tasks shall follow the relevant national provisions and standards to stockpile, protect and maintain national security reserves, and periodically adjust and change them to guarantee the effectiveness and security of the stockpile reserves.

Article 73: Technological innovation is encouraged in the national security field, bringing into play the role of technology in maintaining national security.

Article 74: The State employs necessary measures to recruit, cultivate and manage professional talent and special talent in national security efforts.

As needed by efforts to maintain national security, the State lawfully protects the identity and lawful rights and interests of personnel at state organs specially engaged in national security efforts, increasing the extent of physical protections and placement safeguards.

Article 75: State security organs, public security organs and relevant military organs carrying out special national security efforts may lawfully employ necessary means and methods, and relevant departments and regions shall provide support and cooperation within the scope of their duties.

Article 76: The state strengthens new publicity and guidance of popular opinion on national security, developing national security publicity and educational activities through multiple forms; and including national security education in the citizens’ education system and public officials’ education training systems, strengthening the awareness of the entire populace.
Chapter VI: Duties and Rights of Citizens and Organizations

Article 77: Citizens and organizations shall perform the following obligations to preserve national security:

(1) Obeying the relevant provisions of the Constitution, laws, and regulations regarding national security.

(2) Promptly reporting leads on activities endangering national security;

(3) Truthfully providing evidence they become aware of related to activities endangering national security.

(4) Providing conditions to facilitate national security efforts and other assistance;

(5) Providing public security organs, state security organs or relevant military organs with necessary support and assistance;

(6) Keeping state secrets they learn of confidential;

(7) Other duties provided by law or administrative regulations.

Individuals and organizations must not act to endanger national security, and must not provide any kind of support or assistance to individuals or organizations endangering national security.

Article 78: State organs, mass organizations, enterprises, public institutions, and other social organizations shall cooperate with relevant departments in employing relevant security measures as required by national security efforts. shall educate their units’ personnel on the maintaining national security , and mobilize and organize them to prevent conduct endangering national security.

Article 79: Enterprise and public institution organizations shall cooperate with relevant departments in employing relevant security measures as required by national security efforts.

Article 80: Citizens and organizations conduct supporting or assisting national security efforts is protected by law.

Where due to supporting or assisting national security efforts, a person or his close relatives face a threat to their physical safety, they may request protection from the public security organs and state security organs. Public security organs and state security organs shall employ protective measures together with relevant departments.

Article 81: Where citizens and organizations suffer asset losses caused because they supported or assisted national security work follow the relevant national provisions to obtain compensation; where physical injury or death was caused, follow relevant national provisions to give bereavement benefits.

Article 82: Citizen’s and organizations have the right to raise criticisms and recommendations to state organs regarding national security efforts, and have the right to file complaint appeals, accusations or reports regarding unlawful activity of state organs and their personnel.

Article 83: In national security work, when special measures are required that restrict the rights and freedoms of citizens, they shall be conducted in accordance with law, and limited by the actual needs to of safeguarding national security.

Chapter VII: Supplementary Provisions

Article 84: This law takes effect on the date of promulgation.

The post Making Sense Of China’s New National Security Law – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

A new study of ocean temperature measurements shows that in recent years, extra heat from greenhouse gases has been trapped in the subsurface waters of the Pacific and Indian oceans, thus accounting for the slowdown in the global surface temperature increase observed during the past decade, researchers say.

A specific layer of the Indian and Pacific oceans between 300 and 1,000 feet below the surface has been accumulating more heat than previously recognized, according to climate researchers from UCLA and NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory. They also found the movement of warm water has affected surface temperatures. The results were published July 9 in the journal Science.

During the 20th century, as greenhouse gas concentrations increased and trapped more heat on Earth, global surface temperatures also increased. However, starting in the early 2000s though greenhouse gases continued to trap extra heat, the global average surface temperature stopped climbing for about a decade and even cooled a bit.

In the study, researchers analyzed direct ocean temperature measurements, including observations from a global network of about 3,500 ocean temperature probes known as the Argo array. These measurements show temperatures below the surface have been increasing.

The Pacific Ocean is the primary source of the subsurface warm water found in the study, though some of that water now has been pushed to the Indian Ocean. Since 2003, unusually strong trade winds and other climatic features have been piling up warm water in the upper 1,000 feet of the western Pacific, pinning it against Asia and Australia.

“The western Pacific got so warm that some of the warm water is leaking into the Indian Ocean through the Indonesian archipelago,” said Veronica Nieves, lead author of the study and a UCLA researcher with the UCLA Joint Institute for Regional Earth System Science and Engineering, a scientific collaboration between UCLA and NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory.

The movement of the warm Pacific water westward pulled heat away from the surface waters of the central and eastern Pacific, which resulted in unusually cool surface temperatures during the last decade. Because the air temperature over the ocean is closely related to the ocean temperature, this provides a plausible explanation for the global cooling trend in surface temperature, Nieves said.

Cooler surface temperatures also are related to a climatic pattern called the Pacific Decadal Oscillation, which moves in a 20- to 30-year cycle. It has been in a cool phase during the entire time surface temperatures showed cooling, bringing cooler-than-normal water to the eastern Pacific and warmer water to the western side. There currently are signs the pattern may be changing, with observations showing warmer-than-usual water in the eastern Pacific.

“Given the fact the Pacific Decadal Oscillation seems to be shifting to a warm phase, ocean heating in the Pacific will definitely drive a major surge in global surface warming,” Nieves said.

Previous attempts to explain the global surface temperature cooling trend have relied more heavily on climate model results or a combination of modeling and observations, which may be better at simulating long-term impacts over many decades and centuries. This study relied on observations, which are better for showing shorter-term changes over 10 to 20 years.

Pauses of a decade or more in Earth’s average surface temperature warming have happened before in modern times, with one occurring between the mid-1940s and late 1970s.

“In the long term, there is robust evidence of unabated global warming,” Nieves said.

The post Oceans Have Slowed Global Temperature Rise appeared first on Eurasia Review.

The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) on Friday signed a Special Currency Swap Agreement with the Central Bank of Sri Lanka. Under the arrangement, the Central Bank of Sri Lanka can draw up to $1.1 billion for a maximum period of six months.

The proposal to extend the additional currency swap facility of $1.1 billion for a limited period was decided by the Union Government in April 2015 based on the recommendation of the Reserve Bank of India for mitigating the possible currency volatility in the spirit of strengthening India’s bilateral relations and economic ties with Sri Lanka.

This special arrangement is in addition to the existing Framework on Currency Swap Arrangement for the SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation) Member Countries. SAARC has eight member countries – Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka.

On March 25, 2015, the Reserve Bank of India had signed a Currency Swap Agreement with the Central Bank of Sri Lanka for $400 million under the existing SAARC Currency Swap Framework within the overall limit of USD 2 billion.

The swap arrangements are intended to provide a backstop line of funding for the SAARC member countries to meet any balance of payments and liquidity crises till longer term arrangements are made or if there is need for short-term liquidity due to stressed market conditions.

The post India, Sri Lanka Sign Currency Swap Agreement appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Alessandro Bruno*

There has been a tendency lately to blame all terrorism in North Africa and the Middle East on Islamic State, ignoring socio-economic phenomena at the local level. IS has become a convenient catch-all explanation, just as al-Qaida was in the first decade of the 2000s. The recent attacks that left tens of British tourists killed in Sousse, Tunisia last June 26 is but the latest episode. In fact, by ignoring Tunisia’s internal conditions, little is accomplished in containing the problem of terrorism inspired by radical Islam. The focus on al-Qaida and IS or any other such group is useful in generating headlines, and helps to construct the monster in the style of a 007 movie villain. The problem is that Islam serves more as the tool of discontent than the goal, even if the respective leaders of al-Qaida and IS profess the goal of Islamizing society. Islamic State has such a goal clearly stated in its name. But the anger, the conditions that prompt young men, and women, to join such groups are borne locally and often the violence to which they sometimes resort is a form of imitation, even as it speaks of local challenges.

The attack in Sousse “will only do further damage to an industry that had not yet fully recovered from the events of 2011.” The Sousse shooting, the second major attack in months, has dealt a heavy blow to confidence, which will discourage capital inflows as it will tourism. Cancellations are coming faster than tour operators can process and the tourism sector appears to be heading for a total collapse. The problem is that Tunisia, which has been in economic crisis for years, desperately needs capital and the cancellations are only going to make terror and violence more likely. The United Kingdom, Finland, Denmark and Ireland have advised their citizens not to travel to Tunisia. And on top of that, even Tunisian tourists with weekend reservations have canceled. This shows the extent of panic and fear prevailing in Tunisia, crushing tourism, which has already suffered in recent years the effects of post-revolution political instability.

There have been suggestions that the terror attacks in Sousse and against the Bardo museum last March, allegedly claimed by Islamic State – or at least inspired by it – were somehow a response to Tunisia’s successful democratic transition. Doubtless, IS as much as any other group or individual devoted to the propagation of a harsh ideology finds an enemy in democracy, but it also finds fuel in instability. Just as was the case for oil and gas before the collapse of the Qadhafi regime, Libya has also served as the main exporter of instability to its neighbors, democratic or otherwise, serving as a source for weapons that have crossed its borders to find combatants in Niger, Mali, Egypt, Algeria and Tunisia. Tunisians have also filled the ranks of IS and other fighters in the Syrian war more than any other nationality by percentage of population. Tunisia is therefore very vulnerable and the attack that killed almost 40 tourists in Sousse has the same goal as the one against the Bardo museum in Tunis: to destroy the tourism sector and the Tunisian economy.

Tourism accounts for at least 6% of Tunisia’s GDP and the terrorists have ensured that rather than devote more resources to economic growth, Tunisia will now have to divert them to security in order to confront the threat. ​​Sousse had recently benefited from a plan to improve security, to ensure a trouble-free tourist season. The hotel that was targeted by the killers happened to be one of the most frequented by Western tourists, who were already less evident along Tunisia’s shores, as the Bardo attack has already prompted a drastic drop in foreign visitors compared to a year ago. Tunisia has almost an impossible challenge ahead in attracting visitors and their valuable foreign currency. The European economic crisis has hurt investment in Tunisia and this was one of the main causes of the so-called ‘spring’ of 2011. Secular protests failed to bring in change, also because the EU was unable or unwilling to intervene to help stimulate the nascent democracy in the North African country with an economic lifeline.

Islamic State in Tunisia

As for IS, there is no doubt that Tunisia represents an ideal target. It is one of the most secular Arab countries, close to Europe geographically and culturally. But just how much of a threat is Islamic State in Tunisia? Does IS, borne out of the flawed social reintegration under the Shiite-dominated government in Baghdad after a disastrous US war, finding fertile ground in the Syrian civil war, really have a solid grasp in North Africa? Even if Islamic State is spreading, it professes a particular ideology, and understanding local conditions and socio-economic mechanisms can only add to understand it. Ultimately, such an approach will make efforts to fight IS more effective. So far, the West’s main, and apparently only, response has been to fight IS militarily, either by deploying and facilitating attacks against its positions and through tougher legislation aimed at increasing security at the expense of personal liberty and privacy. This approach has an obvious flaw. It is not possible to challenge an ideology with guns, rather you must eradicate the social roots that lie beneath its rise.

One of Tunisia’s highest ranking military officers, retired Chief of Staff General Rashid Ammar, said that Islamic State did not perpetrate the attack at the Imperial Marhaba hotel in Sousse. The general, no friend of Islamic radicals, told a Tunisian newspaper that one of the perpetrators, who was captured alive, revealed a much more local radicalization and organization process. Islamic State has devoted much attention to Tunisia, attracting many fighters to Syria, without actually having deep roots in the country. Kairouan in Tunisia’s interior, not far from Sidi Bouzeid, where the self-immolation of a disgruntled street vendor sparked the revolt that has come to be known as the Arab Spring, is the main focus of radicalization in Tunisia. Accordingly, Tunisia’s Prime Minister Habib Essid has ordered the closure of 80 mosques that have been spreading radical ideas, inspiring some to stage attacks against soft targets. The collapse of Libya and the porosity of its borders has contributed to the problem, as weapons have proliferated freely and easily since 2011. The presence of a democratic civil society and inclusive institutions remains the best antidote to the spread of religious extremism but Tunisia cannot prevent or combat the phenomenon of jihadism alone.

There is a need for cooperation between Europe and Tunisia; not on Islamic State, but rather on how both sides of the Mediterranean should coordinate on issues such as economy, immigration, and terrorism by virtue of their historical and geographical proximity. Tunisia must also attract foreign investment while creating the conditions to attract investments by domestic entrepreneurs to help spread wealth and offer young people hope for a better future. The situation is made more complex because of social media, which fueled the protests that brought down the government of Ben Ali in January 2011, allowing young people to see what life is like in other countries, raising their expectations. Their government, however, cannot provide answers and give them the prospects they seek. IS has manage to attract some of these recruits with the promise of money – Islamic State is a money-making organization it should be remembered – while anger finds its outlet in violence at the local level. Tunisia, bordered to the east by Libya, has not been sufficiently helped by EU countries, the very same which were partners during the Ben Ali period and friends during the difficult transition to democracy. If Europe wants more security, it must help Tunisia to recover from the economic crisis and the EU must commit to include projects that concern Tunisia in its plans to boost investment in the country. But, of course, the EU is going through its own existential crisis with the issue of Greece and austerity.

The importance of distinguishing Islamic State attacks from others became evident after a bombing in Cairo against the Italian consulate. After proclamations of Islamic State’s responsibility, a more careful analysis showed that the explosive used was identical to that used to kill Egyptian chief prosecutor Hisham Barakat in Cairo on June 29. The target was not Italy and the perpetrators were more than likely aiming for Judge Ahmed al Fuddaly, another prosecutor who has focused on the banned Muslim Brotherhood. The attribution of responsibility for attacks in Middle East and North Africa is a risky exercise because of the confusion created as terrorist organizations like IS take ownership of actions by individuals or isolated groups and vice versa. Islamic radicalism or not, the facts count. Many outlawed Muslim Brotherhood members in Egypt have found refuge and help in Libya, taking up a more combative Islam there than that practiced by the Brotherhood in Egypt. The ground was and is conducive to the repressed Islamists in Cairo, who are eager to avenge their comrades killed or imprisoned, and ready to practice a violent jihadism. A similar process is also taking place for Tunisia. Surely, terrorism arises from a distorted interpretation of the Koran, but, in Tunisia, the drop in tourism, by 3.2% last year, has caused unemployment to rise to some 31 percent. Foreign investments decreased by 5% in 2014.

The main perpetrator of the Sousse attack followed a predictable path to radicalization. Seif Rezgui, was like any of the hundreds of students that go to Kairouan, and despite claims of IS involvement, it is safer to suggest that it was an IS-inspired bombing. And this is an important distinction because, the efforts to blame attacks on IS somehow shifts responsibility for the violence elsewhere while ignoring the very domestic radicalization process. For Tunisia to resolve the problem and restore tourism and confidence it must tackle the actual causes of terror. Yes, Rezgui is said to have chatted about al-Qaeda an then Islamic State — he even wrote that on his Facebook page; however, the role of Kairouan, an ancient Islamic center and home to the oldest mosque in North Africa, 60km from Sousse, has a symbolic resonance for radical groups. The city offers students opportunities to study and work, drawing thousands from Tunisia’s impoverished and marginalized interior such as the 23-year-old Rezgui, himself who came from the town of Gaffour. Most of the thousands who come to the city move to its crowded outskirts, where dozens of mosques deemed by the government “outside state control” have been suspected for spreading radical ideology – long before IS or even al-Qaida.

In response to the Sousse attack, the government in Tunis has shut down 80 unregistered mosques around the country, out of an estimated 300. But analysts say the move will anger non-radical Islamists and is probably irrelevant, given that militants are more likely to network through the internet and via personal relationships. Ultimately, IS and the mosque help to radicalize ideas that stem from wider social problems such as unemployment and discrimination against those from poorer regions and those with darker skin. Islamists feed on these divisions. Tunisia’s poor neighborhoods have served as the supply line for the jihadis. Moreover, just as students in the 1970s in Egypt when the Muslim Brotherhood was gaining strength – eventually staging the murder of President Sadat – many students complain they cannot challenge a well-funded and powerful Islamist student union, of which they say Rezgui was a member. The group offers poorer students money for housing, food and even mobile phone credit. Islamists can spread their ideology along with their bread, just as the Brotherhood has done and just as many narcotics traffickers do in Latin America to win support from villagers. Before IS was on everybody’s lips and keyboards, in 2012, Salafist flags were being waved in Tunisia and especially in Kairouan. Some jihadis have made it to Sousse and some mosques have been raided by authorities. It doesn’t matter which mosques are closed, more will be found. The government and the West cannot hope to challenge Islamists, IS or otherwise, with drones and targeting mosques. They must challenge them in the social fabric, using the same socio-economic tactics.

The path to Islamist militancy is more complicated than that of developing radical views. Rezgui’s case shows how the line between what is considered normal youth behavior and radicalism become blurred. Rezgui was using drugs, which is forbidden in Islam. He has posted on social media about his love for the Real Madrid soccer team and break dancing while also writing on his Facebook picture: “If being a mujahid [holy warrior] is a crime, then I am a criminal.” Locals said Rezgui worked in Sousse as an entertainment organizer, perhaps sowing the seeds of envy and possibly lust from observing the lives of foreign tourists, who could enjoy the best of his country, dressed provocatively and flashing money around. Another problem is how Ennahda’s rise was handled in the aftermath of the 2011 revolt. Many secular Tunisians have attributed the Muslim Brotherhood’s affiliated party for the rise of radicalism. Ennahda actually won the first election after authoritarian ruler Ben Ali was overthrown in 2011 but they secularists ignored it and there was no dialogue between the two very entrenched sides.

To avoid ‘infection,’ Tunis plans to build a wall along the border, but this solution is merely a band-aid that cannot prevent local radicalization unless more structural solutions are adopted. Tunisia’s government, formed by liberals and moderate Islamists, has already adopted additional security measures to restore confidence but European fears, such as the British government’s advice to its citizens to avoid Tunisia as a destination, will not help either. Hundreds of arrests, fundamentalist mosques closed, emigration prohibited to young people suspected of wanting to achieve the caliphate in the valley of the Tigris and Euphrates, these efforts will continue but they remain a mere patch-up job.

This article was published at Geopolitical Monitor.com

The post Tunisia’s Terrorism Problem Goes Beyond Islamic State – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

High suicide rates are often cited as evidence of social failure. Despite this, some countries and regions that do very well in terms of happiness have among the highest suicide rates. This column explores this paradox using global data on suicide and self-reported life satisfaction. Although the paradox is confirmed for Eastern European and wealthy countries, inconsistent patterns emerge when other demographic factors are taken into account. This might reflect the empirical difficulty of explaining suicide, but might also be indicative of the unreliability of self-reports of happiness.

By Anne Case and Angus Deaton*

Suicide is the ultimate act of desperate unhappiness, marking the point when life is going so badly, that no life at all is better than going on living. High suicide rates are often cited as evidence of social failure, as in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union under communism. So it comes as a surprise that countries that do very well in life satisfaction, such as Finland, have among the highest suicide rates in Western Europe, or that the states in the ‘suicide belt’ in the United States, which stretches up the Rocky Mountains from Arizona to Montana, and on to Alaska, should be among those with the highest life evaluation.

Suicide has always posed a challenge to those who try to understand it – Durkheim’s famous book of 1897, Suicide, one of the foundations of empirical sociology, found many regularities, some of which still hold true today. Some economists, such as Layard (2005), or Helliwell (2007), who believe that self-reported life satisfaction (often referred to as ‘happiness’) summarises the success of a society, have argued that, in spite of the disturbing correlations, there is no real paradox, and that the same factors that promote happiness – high income, marriage, good health – also inhibit suicide.

In a recent study, we again confirm the paradox of high suicide rates and high life evaluation – we find that some of the factors that correlate with happiness also correlate with low suicide rates, but that just as many do not (Case and Deaton 2015). We further try to understand why suicide rates have recently increased among middle-aged Americans.

Figure 1. Suicide and life evaluation across countries

Figure 1 illustrates a typically ambiguous picture. It plots national suicide rates for 2006–2010 (deaths per 100,000 per year, age-adjusted, from the WHO’s mortality database) against mean life evaluation scores. The latter are taken from the Gallup World Poll, which asks people to place themselves on a ‘ladder’ from 0 to 10, where 0 is ‘the worst possible life,’ and 10 is ‘the best possible life.’ Although the overall correlation is negative – the non-paradoxical result that we might expect – the result is entirely driven by the comparison of Eastern European countries with wealthy countries¹ and Latin America.² The paradox arises within the wealthy countries and within Eastern Europe, where the correlations are positive. In particular, the highest income countries have high life evaluation and high suicide rates, while the opposite is true in the lower income rich countries. Within eastern Europe, the extraordinarily high suicide rates are again positively correlated with life evaluation. Much the same is true across the states of the US, with life evaluation and suicide rates highest in the West, and lowest in the East.

What about patterns over the life cycle? In the US today, as in other rich, English-speaking countries, life evaluation dips in midlife, and then rises with age among the elderly. In a partial match, suicide rates peak in midlife, but only for women. For men, suicide rates are approximately constant from ages 20 through 60, and then rise rapidly with age, which is nothing like the age pattern of life evaluation. Life cycle models can be constructed that predict suicide rates should rise with age (see Hamermesh and Soss1974), and the finding and claim for generality goes back to Durkheim. Indeed, suicide rates rise with age among the elderly, but this is true only for men, and even then, suicide rates rise alongside increases in life satisfaction.

What about the other factors that affect suicide and life satisfaction? Some match up, but more do not. Women have slightly higher life satisfaction than men, but much lower suicide rates. Blacks have slightly lower life evaluation than whites, but much lower suicide rates. Married people are more satisfied and are less likely to kill themselves, but while divorce strongly predicts suicide, it has a relatively modest effect on life satisfaction. Widowhood raises suicide among men but reduces it among women. Taking these and other factors (such as education) together, there are indeed matches but also many contradictions. The effects of personal circumstance on life satisfaction do not predict the effects of the same circumstances on suicide rates any better than spatial patterns of life satisfaction predict spatial patterns of suicide.

Unhappy Mondays

Americans kill themselves most often on Mondays, and the suicide rate declines through the week to Saturday, with Sundays a little higher, but still much less than Mondays. Most people would guess that something like this is true; Mondays can be bleak, but life looks better as the weekend approaches, though Sunday is a little overshadowed by the prospect of Monday. Yet this is not the pattern of life evaluation, which is much the same on all days of the week.

One objection to all this is that it is not mean life evaluation that matters, but the fraction of people whose life evaluation is at rock bottom; those who report zero, one, or two on the ladder. But it turns out that these measure are no more predictive of suicide rates than the mean.

Long-term patterns

Long-term patterns of suicide make rather more sense. Cutler et al. (2001) have shown that from the 1930s to the 1990s, suicide rates fell among the elderly. In the US, this pattern matches the long-term improvement in the relative economic status and health provision that were brought to the older population by Social Security and Medicare. Of course, we do not have the long-term data on life satisfaction that could clinch the argument.

In our work, we find that, across the countries in Figure 1, countries where the elderly do relatively well in ladder scores are also the countries where the elderly do relatively well in suicide rates (see Figure 2). For example, in Britain, the mean ladder score of those aged 60 and over is 5% higher than the mean ladder score for those aged 25–59, and the suicide rates of the elderly are only about half of the rates for younger adults. At the other end of the scale, in Armenia and Bulgaria, ladder scores for the elderly are 15% lower than those for adults and suicide rates are more than twice as high. In many of the countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, the transition was a disaster for the elderly. They lost a system that many believed in and, in many cases, lost their pensions too. At the same time, the world of opportunities opened up for young people like never before.

Figure 2. Old versus young, suicide and life evaluation

Except for these long-term trends, we suspect that life satisfaction and suicide do not, in reality, have much to do with one another. Life evaluation may refer to the long-term outlook, or to achievement as conventionally measured – education, income, marriage, and good health – while suicide may be an impulsive response to short-term factors. The impulse theory tends to implicate gun ownership, at least for men, for whom guns are the most common method of suicide; if the means of a quick and reliable exit is immediately at hand, suicide is more likely in response to short-term unhappiness. Somewhat surprisingly though, we replicate a finding of Cutler et al. (2001) that gun ownership is not related to suicide rates across counties within broad geographical areas, even though there is a great deal of variation of ownership across counties within those areas.

We do, however, find that suicide is strongly related to self-reported pain, across the states and (more strongly) across counties in the US. The prevalence of self-reported pain has been rising in midlife over the last 15 years, during which there has also been a rapid increase in midlife suicide. A large majority of suicides are associated with alcohol and drug abuse, which are also implicated in a spate of other deaths, from alcohol-related liver disease, and from accidental poisonings from alcohol and from illegal and prescription drugs. The puzzle is then not so much why an increase in these factors should increase suicide rates, but why this increasing distress does not show up in life evaluation. Perhaps this rising tide of mortality and morbidity in midlife explains the midlife dip in happiness, but this story runs up against the fact that the U-shape of happiness is apparent in other countries, none of whom are experiencing a similar epidemic.

Concluding remarks

The lack of any clear relation between suicide and happiness remains a disturbing and unresolved puzzle. Perhaps it is simply that suicide is hard to explain. But perhaps we should also be cautious giving too much weight to self-reports of life satisfaction.

*About the authors:
Anne Case, Alexander Stewart 1886 Professor of Economics and Public Affairs, Princeton University

Angus Deaton, Dwight D. Eisenhower Professor of Economics and International Affairs at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs and the Economics Department, Princeton University

References:
Case, A and A Deaton (2015) “Suicide, age, and wellbeing: an empirical investigation”, NBER Working Paper, No. 21279.

Cutler, D M , E L Glaeser and K E Norberg (2001) “Explaining the rise in youth suicide”, in Jonathan Gruber, (ed.), Risky behavior among youths: an economic analysis, Chicago. UC Press for NBER.

Durkheim, E (1951) (1897), Suicide: a study in sociology, translated by John A. Spaulding and George Simpson, New York. The Free Press.

Hamermesh, D S and N M Soss (1974), “An economic theory of suicide”, Journal of Political Economy, 82(1): 83–98.

Helliwell, J F (2007), “Well-being and social capital: does suicide pose a puzzle?”, Social Indicators Research, 81(3): 455–96.

Layard, R (2005), Happiness: lessons from a new science, London. Allen Lane.

Footnotes:

1 Western Europe, plus Australia, Canada Japan, New Zealand, and USA.

2 There are no reliable data on suicide for other regions of the world.

The post Suicide And Happiness – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

A violent display of racism by extreme nationalist supporters of storied Israeli football club Beitar Jerusalem coupled with recent Ethiopian Israeli protests against discrimination and the government’s handling of the capture of two Israelis by Hamas has moved racist attitudes towards dark-skinned Jews and Israeli Palestinian up the government’s agenda.

Driving calls for the banning of La Familia, the racist anti-Arab, anti-Muslim fan group of Beitar is concern about damage the group did to Israel’s image abroad rather than a worrisome trend in society at a time that Israel is anxious about the gathering momentum of calls to boycott, disinvest from and sanction the Jewish state for its policy towards the West Bank and Gaza.

Israeli foreign ministry officials charged that an incident in Belgium in which Beitar fans waved flags of the outlawed racist Kach party founded by assassinated Rabbi Meir Kahane and threw flares and smoke guns on to the pitch as well as a missile that hit a goalkeeper during their club’s Europa League qualifier against Charleloi SC had damaged Israel’s international image. La Familia hung the Kach flags next to the Israeli flag in the stadium. The Israeli fans were welcomed in the stadium by neo-Nazi supporters of Charleroi with swastikas and Palestinian flags.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu responded to the incident, saying that he had discussed possible legal action against La Familia, believed to have several thousand followers, with internal security minister Gilad Erdan. “We will not allow them to besmirch the club’s entire fan base or harm the country’s image,” Netanyahu said.

In an editorial liberal newspaper Haaretz warned that “the problem is not Israel’s image in the world, but the overt racism that is fuelled by exactly those same officials who are now condemning it. Netanyahu and (culture and sports minister Miri) Regev are preaching to others what they themselves do not practice. With their racist remarks (‘The Arabs are flocking to the polling stations’), their conduct (threatening the funding of Arab cultural institutions) and their antidemocratic legislation – which is so typical of the government they head – they legitimize the phenomenon called Beitar Jerusalem,” Haaretz said. The paper was referring to Mr. Netanyahu’s fearmongering during the May election in which he warned that strong Palestinian participation threatened the outcome of the vote.

Founded by the revanchist wing of the Zionist movement with strong links to the right-wing nationalist Jewish underground in pre-state Palestine, Beitar has long been a darling of the Israeli right that counted nationalist leaders, including Mr. Netanyahu, among its supporters.

The only club to have consistently refused to hire a Palestinian in a country in which Palestinians ranks among its top players, Beitar has maintained its racist stance despite repeatedly being penalized by the Israel Football Association (IFA).

The economy ministry’s Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, in a historic break with past IFA and government policy of only mildly chastising Beitar, summoned the club days before the Belgium incident to justify its racist hiring policies.

The move came weeks after the IFA had narrowly pre-empted adoption of a resolution put forward by the Palestine Football Association (PFA) to suspend Israel’s membership in world soccer body FIFA in part because of its failure to crack down on racism in Israeli soccer. In a compromise, the PFA withdrew its demand in favour of the establishment of a FIFA committee that would monitor Israeli efforts to address Palestinian grievances.

“The more deeply one looks into the reasons and motives for Beitar’s racist conduct, the more strongly the impression emerges that the problem stems from the forgiving attitude of the authorities around it – from the Israel Football Association to the league administration, all the way to ministerial level. These bodies, using various and sundry pretexts, lend a hand to the phenomenon and allow it to exist – whether by turning a blind eye to it or giving convoluted and evasive explanations,” Haaretz said.

“The time has come to stop talking about image, ‘education’ or ‘processes,’ and start taking practical steps. Alongside harsh penalties for manifestations of racism, Beitar Jerusalem must be given a limited window of time during which it will be required to sign Arab players – even at the cost of a major confrontation with its fans. Instead of condemnation, the time has come to act,” the paper said.

The focus on Beitar’s racism further comes on the heels of protests in recent months by Ethiopian Israelis who first demonstrated against the beating up in April by police of an Israeli soldier of Ethiopian extraction and the subsequent closing of an investigation into the incident.

Ethiopian activists have since agreed to a request by the family of Avera Mengistu not to protest against the government’s handling of his disappearance in Gaza some ten months ago. The government issued a gag order on reporting of the incident that was lifted earlier this month under pressure from the media and various politicians. As a result of the gag order, even members of Mr. Netanyahu’s security cabinet and parliament’s foreign affairs and security committee were kept in the dark

Similarly, Mr. Netanyahu did not visit the Ethiopian family until earlier this month and only after his hostages and missing persons coordinator, Col. (Res.) Lior Lotan, was forced to apologize for telling the family that their son’s release would be delayed if they criticized the prime minister.

Col. Lotan also insisted that the family refrain from connecting the government’s handling of their son’s case to the Ethiopian protests against discrimination. “I’m going to tell you this in the toughest way possible: Whoever puts on Avera the story of what’s between the Ethiopians and the State of Israel will leave him in Gaza for another year,” Col. Lotan was heard saying on tape.

Mr. Mengistu was detained after he climbed over a fence to enter Gaza. Hamas said it had released him after questioning but was still holding an Israeli Bedouin who legally crossed into Gaza in April. Mr. Mengistu is still missing.

Israeli media charged that the government had kept Mr. Mengistu’s disappearance secret because of his skin colour, noting that his family speaks poor Hebrew, lives in poverty, and does not have the wherewithal to stand up for their son’s rights.

Some analysts argue that the government’s handling of the case of Mr. Mengistu and the Bedouin, whose name has not been released, are not unique. Families of past Hamas prisoners and soldiers missing in action who are not of Ethiopian or Arab descent said they too had been humiliated and forcibly silenced by the government during their ordeal.

Nevertheless, the combustible mix of Israel’s image being on the line as a result of the violence of Beitar fans as well as Palestinian soccer efforts to force changes in Israeli policy, the protests against discrimination against dark-skinned Israelis, and the disappearance of Israeli nationals in Gaza puts Israeli racism in the spotlight. Israel cannot afford to be seen to be ignoring a dark side of its society and culture.

The post Israeli Soccer Violence Moves Racism Up Government’s Agenda – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Kanchi Gupta*

Iran and the P5+1 announced that they have reached a final agreement on the nuclear issue, a day after the self-imposed deadline of July 13, 2015. The negotiating parties, particularly Washington, DC and Tehran, were under tremendous pressure from their European counterparts to meet the final deadline set after nearly two years of negotiations. The deal, which is subject to a UN resolution and a US Congressional vote before it is codified, signals the potential end to Iran’s political and financial isolation.

With US President Barack Obama promising to veto “any legislation that prevents the successful implementation of the deal”, the stage is set for the removal of all sanctions against Iran. While the nuclear talks have been largely welcomed internationally, Iran’s regional counterparts have been severely critical of them. Regional powers, including Israel and Saudi Arabia, have voiced concerns about an “emboldened” Iran boosting its “interference” in the conflicts in Syria, Iraq and Yemen and creating conditions for greater destabilisation in the region.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is the only regional leader, thus far, to remark on the final deal calling it a “mistake of historic proportions”. Israeli Interior Minister Silvan Shalom encapsulated his Government’s position since the beginning of the talks, in stating that Iran will be “completely free” to produce a nuclear bomb in 10 years. He added that Iran could pose an existential threat to Israel and to the entire region by causing an arms race with Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Egypt and leading them to pursue nuclear capabilities.

Israel, which has traditionally considered itself the supreme military and nuclear power in the region, could now be challenged by Iran. Israel not only fears a security threat from Tehran’s ability to enhance support to groups like Hezbollah and Hamas but also from the possibility of Iran’s regional rivals shoring up their military arsenals. Israeli Defence Minister reiterated these concerns just days before the deal, stating that Israel is likely to enter into talks with the US “to preserve its qualitative military edge” not only because of Iran but because Washington provides sophisticated weapons systems to Iran’s rivalling Arab states.

While the Israeli administration has actively expressed its reservations over the nuclear deal, the responses of the Arab states have been relatively muted throughout the negotiations. Even though they officially endorsed the nuclear negotiations, the Gulf leaders, Egypt and Turkey used the media to convey their apprehensions. The announcement of the final deal met with almost complete silence from the Gulf leaders, with only Kuwait and the UAE sending congratulatory messages to Iran. The Saudi Press Agency, on the other hand, issued statements reiterating concerns about Iran’s “aggressive” regional policy.

Riyadh’s mild warning encased its increasing effort towards taking greater military initiatives in order to offset Iran’s influence in the region. While Riyadh is likely to look for shifts in Iran’s regional policy, it will continue to take assertive actions in the region to counter Iran’s policies. These include increasing support to rebel groups in Syria, building stronger military alliances with other Sunni states like Turkey and Egypt as well as pursuing military and nuclear ties with extra-regional powers.

Saudi Arabia, which had initiated an ambitious plan for the development of nuclear power production in 2011, has given significant impetus to nuclear projects in the last year. It set aside its differences with Moscow over the conflict in Syria to sign a nuclear energy deal in 2015. It also inked nuclear energy deals with China and South Korea in August 2014 and March this year, respectively. France has emerged as an important partner for the Gulf states to diversify their security portfolios and reduce dependence on the US.

The nuclear deal could, therefore, mark a strategic realignment between the US and its traditional Sunni allies in the region. The Arab countries have been vocal in criticising Washington’s policies in Egypt, Syria and Iraq, which they say have given an upper hand to “Iranian allies”. Leaders of the Gulf Cooperation Council leaders openly “snubbed” President Obama’s Camp David initiative in May that was meant to assuage their concerns over the nuclear negotiations.

Even though Mr Obama reportedly spoke with Mr Netanyahu and Saudi King Salman after the deal in order to reiterate US support for curbing Iran’s “terrorist” activities, it is evident that the regional powers are moving towards a ‘go it alone’ policy. Unless Washington demonstrates a tangible effort to restrict Iran’s regional policy, it is likely that there could be an escalation of conflicts in Syria and Yemen, where Riyadh and Tehran are locked in a geo-strategic battle.

*The writer is an Associate Fellow at Observer Research Foundation, Delhi

Courtesy: The Pioneer, July 17, 2015

The post Post-Iran Deal: New Balance Of Powers – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

The UN Security Council on Monday adopted a resolution endorsing a deal that placed long-term curbs on Iran’s nuclear program and beginning a process to remove UN sanctions against the country.

The unanimously adopted resolution will terminate all previous UNresolutions, imposing stringent sanctions which the country’s leaders say have hurt its economy, once the International Atomic Energy Agency verifies that Tehran has implemented a series of nuclear-related measures.

However, it contains a “snap back” mechanism that will reverse the lifting of sanctions if Tehran breaches the deal it signed last week with the P5+1 group of countries — China, France, Russia, the UK, the US and Germany.

The resolution also keeps in place an embargo on the import and export of conventional arms for five years and a ban on supply of ballistic missile technology for eight years.

Iran and the P5+1 signed a final agreement in Vienna on Tuesday, bringing to a close nearly two years of contentious talks that focused on providing Tehran with sanctions relief in return for unprecedented curbs and inspections on its nuclear program.

The resolution’s adoption in the Security Council was considered almost certain, as the council’s five veto-wielding members were involved in the negotiations that led to the deal.

The agreement is expected to face its biggest challenge at the US Congress, for which a 60-day period started last week to review it before voting on whether or not to endorse it.

There is strong Republican opposition to the deal in both the House of Representatives and the Senate, but President Barack Obama has said he will exercise his veto if Congress rejects the proposal.

Overriding his veto would require a two-thirds majority in both houses.

Original article

The post UN Security Council Endorses Iran Nuclear Deal appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Last week’s successfully concluded Iran agreement is one of the two most important achievements of an otherwise pretty dismal Obama presidency. Along with the ongoing process of normalizing relations with Cuba, this move shows that diplomacy can produce peaceful, positive changes. It also shows that sometimes taking a principled position means facing down overwhelming opposition from all sides and not backing down. The president should be commended for both of these achievements.

The agreement has reduced the chance of a US attack on Iran, which is a great development. But the interventionists will not give up so easily. Already they are organizing media and lobbying efforts to defeat the agreement in Congress. Will they have enough votes to over-ride a presidential veto of their rejection of the deal? It is unlikely, but at this point if the neocons can force the US out of the deal it may not make much difference. Which of our allies, who are now facing the prospect of mutually-beneficial trade with Iran, will be enthusiastic about going back to the days of a trade embargo? Which will support an attack on an Iran that has proven to be an important trading partner and has also proven reasonable in allowing intrusive inspections of its nuclear energy program?

However, what is most important about this agreement is not that US government officials have conducted talks with Iranian government officials. It is that the elimination of sanctions, which are an act of war, will open up opportunities for trade with Iran. Government-to-government relations are one thing, but real diplomacy is people-to-people: business ventures, tourism, and student exchanges.

I was so impressed when travel personality Rick Steves traveled to Iran in 2009 to show that the US media and government demonization of Iranians was a lie, and that travel and human contact can help defeat the warmongers because it humanizes those who are supposed to be dehumanized.

As I write in my new book, Swords into Plowshares:

Our unwise policy with Iran is a perfect example of what the interventionists have given us—60 years of needless conflict and fear for no justifiable reason. This obsession with Iran is bewildering. If the people knew the truth, they would strongly favor a different way to interact with Iran.

Let’s not forget that the Iran crisis started not 31 years ago when the Iran Sanctions Act was signed into law, not 35 years ago when Iranians overthrew the US-installed Shah, but rather 52 years ago when the US CIA overthrew the democratically-elected Iranian leader Mossadegh and put a brutal dictator into power. Our relations with the Iranians are marked by nearly six decades of blowback.

When the Cold War was winding down and the military-industrial complex needed a new enemy to justify enormous military spending, it was decided that Iran should be the latest “threat” to the US. That’s when sanctions really picked up steam. But as we know from our own CIA National Intelligence Estimate of 2007, the stories about Iran building a nuclear weapon were all lies. Though those lies continue to be repeated to this day.

It is unfortunate that Iran was forced to give up some of its sovereignty to allow restrictions on a nuclear energy program that was never found to be in violation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. But if the net result is the end of sanctions and at least a temporary reprieve from the constant neocon demands for attack, there is much to cheer in the agreement. Peace and prosperity arise from friendly relations and trade – and especially when governments get out of the way.

This article was published by the RonPaul Institute.

The post Ron Paul: Iran Agreement Boosts Peace, Defeats Neocons – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan and Arka Biswas*

With the commissioning of Gaoxin-6, also called as Y-8GX6, into the PLA Navy’s (PLAN) North Fleet, China’s anti-submarine warfare capabilities appears to have advanced significantly. Even though China has been paying greater attention to overall naval modernisation, there remain several areas that it needs to catch up on. Anti-submarine capability is one front where China for long has been lagging behind. With the induction of Gaoxin-6, China seems to have filled that capability gap. The Gaoxin-6 aircraft had been in the testing stage for several years – the first flight test took place in 2012. Gaoxin-6’s commissioning within three years of testing underlines the urgency with which China has pursued anti-submarine capability.

Military and security experts, who have been tracking the developments for a while, suggest that using Y-8 and Y-9 transport aircraft as base platforms, China has gone on to make 10 different planes under the series called Gaoxin. China developed these by altering fuselages and fitting new electronic systems for a range of civil and military utilities such as electronic reconnaissance, marine patrol, anti-submarine, air control, early warning and air survey. Many of these are reported to have entered the service.

Gaoxin-6 aircraft, in particular, uses advanced 6-leaf sweepback turboprop engine allowing it to achieve superior range, speed, coverage and endurance. Before commissioning Gaoxin-6, China had to rely on anti-submarine helicopters. Capabilities of Gaoxin-6, as Chen Hu, a military expert, argues, make it equivalent to 100 anti-submarine helicopters. Gaoxin-6 is, thus, certainly a leap in China’s anti-submarine capability.

Gaoxin-6 is considered to be China’s own version of the American P-3C maritime patrol and anti-submarine aircraft, although the P-3 made its first appearance in the 1960s. The US is in fact planning to replace them with P-8A Poseidon. Both Gaoxin-6 and P-3C have similarities in terms of their overall shape and equipments used. While there remain uncertainties on whether Gaoxin-6 and P-3C can demonstrate similar capabilities, some Chinese experts claim that Gaoxin-6 even surpasses P-3C in certain regards.

It is claimed that Gaoxin-6 aircraft’s speed and take-off weight are similar to that of P-3C. Gaoxin-6 is also equipped with a gill-shaped fairing on its nose, which combined with a 360-degree large sea search radar increases its surveillance coverage. There is also a “magnetic anomaly detector” installed in its tail which is useful in detecting submarines. With an antenna longer than that of P-3C, Gaoxin-6 probably has better submarine detection capability.

Gaoxin-6 is equipped with both offensive and defensive weapons. As an anti-submarine aircraft, it carries weapons like torpedoes, depth charges, mines and air-to-submarine missiles. It also has self-defence warning system and air-to-air missile. Its ability to respond to air threats makes it similar to P-3C.

Some experts are in fact arguing that “there is no great technical generation gap of anti-submarine capabilities between Gaoxin-6, Japan’s P-1 and US P-8A” Poseidon aircraft, although they also note that Gaoxin-6 lacks in terms of software, when compared to advanced anti-submarine aircrafts like the P-8A. Thus, while Gaoxin-6 fills in the void in PLA’s anti-submarine warfare capabilities, China is likely to continue developing more advanced anti-submarine aircrafts.

The US Navy has stationed dozens of attack submarines as well as strategic nuclear missile submarines in the Indo-Pacific waters. Japan, with which China continues to remain embroiled in territorial dispute, also possesses 20 advanced submarines. With its interest growing in regions beyond its immediate waters, China is also eyeing the rise of submarine warfare capabilities of some of the major Indian Ocean naval powers, such as India, Australia, Indonesia and Vietnam. As China continues to expand its presence in international waters, it is developing capabilities to counter foreign submarines which, otherwise, may pose challenge to its ambitions. This is where Gaoxin-6 becomes important for Beijing. However, considering that countries like India and Japan are now acquiring and developing advanced anti-submarine aircrafts, China will find that its advances are being matched by others in the region, at least in qualitative terms if not in quantity.

*Dr. Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan is a Senior Fellow and Arka Biswas a Junior Fellow at Observer Research Foundation, Delhi)

The post Gaoxin-6: Attempting To Fill Capability Gap In Chinese Navy – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Fakir Mohan Pradhan*

The Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) abducted four auxiliary constables [former Salwa Judum cadres] of the Chhattisgarh Police near Sukanpali village under Kutru Police Station area in Bijapur District on July 13. Their dead bodies were found strewn on a road near Gudma village, close to the place of abduction, two days later. Maoists claimed responsibility for the killings, accusing them of participating in anti-Maoist operations. According to reports, Maoists stopped a passenger bus on the Kutru-Sukanpali road, in the evening of July 13 and abducted Mangal Sodi and Majji Rama who were travelling in it. A few minutes later, Raju Tela and Jayram Yadav, who were travelling on a motorcycle, were abducted from the same location. Three of them were posted in Kutru Police Station and one was posted in Bedre. They were returning to their base camps after collecting their salaries.

Some 18 to 20 other policemen were lucky to escape death as they were also travelling on the same road in another passenger bus, but stopped at a Police Post after receiving news of the abductions.

According to Bijapur Additional Superintendent of Police (ASP) Kalyaan Elesela, “Almost all the vehicles moving on that road were stopped by the Maoists and all the passengers were taken one kilometre inside the forest, after which the four policemen were identified and separated. The road where the incident took place, was under construction and secured for the last eight months. However, because of rain, the work had stopped and there was no movement of forces.” It has come to light that local Police knew about the Maoists conducting a similar search operation in the same area in the first week of July, but the incident was not reported to the Superintendent of Police (SP) of the District.

The incident speaks volumes about the hold of Maoists in the area and negligible presence of State authority even on the main roads. It is appalling, moreover, that local Police personnel deployed in anti-Maoist operations have to travel to nearby towns in public transport to receive their salaries, when there is a standing advisory against unprotected travel by security personnel in public transport.

According to partial data collected by South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) Chhattisgarh has recorded 66 fatalities in Left Wing Extremism (LWE)-related violence in the current year (all data till July 19) – including 16 civilians, 33 Security Force (SF) personnel and 18 Maoists. All these fatalities have occurred in Bastar Division. It has been noted earlier that Bastar Division has emerged as the nucleus of the Maoist Tactical Counter-offensive (TCO), and accounted for 55 out of 87 SF fatalities across all States in 2014; as against 45 out of 111 in 2013. The deteriorating trend seems to be continuing: the Bastar Division accounts for 33 of 40 SF fatalities across all States in 2015 (till July 19). Further, out of a total of eight major incidents (involving three or more fatalities) in all States in 2015, five occurred in the Bastar Division. The Maoists have abducted over 20 civilians and SF personnel in nine incidents, in which four civilians and five SF personnel have been killed.

While the Sukanpali incident does give the impression that the Maoists are getting stronger, all is not going well in the party. Earlier, four senior Maoists — Hemla Bhagat, Kosi, Badru and Hinge — were killed by their own comrades between June 22 and July 5, while another Maoist Hurra, [Malangir Local Operation Squad (LOS) member], who feared for his life, managed to escape and surrender before the Police on July 8. Badru was a Divisional Committee (DVC) member of the Darbha area and a section commander of Maoists’ “military platoon No. 24”. Hemla Bhagat was another Darbha DVC member and chief of the Maoists’ military intelligence wing in the area. Kosi Kursem, wife of Hemla Bhagat, was working with the Dandakaranya Adivasi Kisan Majdoor Sangh (DAKMS), a Maoist front organisation. Nothing much has been reported about Hinge.

Hurra’s disclosures to the Police indicate that the surrender of the Maoists’ Malangir area committee member Sannu Potam alias Kiran to the Police, along with an SLR on May 24, 2015, triggered the spate of killings.

Meanwhile, Ayatu, ‘secretary’ of the Malangir area committee, is known to have been ‘detained’ by the Maoists in the Katekalyan Forest in Dantewada District on suspicion of being a Police informer and of helping Sannu Potam to surrender. Ayatu reportedly uttered some “unpleasant words” against the highhandedness of Darbha DVC member Nirmala.

Issuing a Press statement on July 12 regarding the killing of Badru and others, Darbha DVC secretary Surinder declared, “Our party held a people’s court which awarded death penalty to Badru and Hemla Bhagat. Both of them have been killed for indulging in anti-people, anti-party activities. They were in contact with the Police and were planning to kill some senior leaders of the party. They were also conspiring to surrender with weapons before the enemy [the Police].” The statement did not make any mention of the two other leaders — Hinge and Kosi — who were also killed by the Maoists in the last week of June.

In another incident, not entirely unrelated, the Maoists killed one of their comrades after holding him guilty in a Jan Adalat [people’s court’ a Maoist Kangaroo court] of breaching party discipline. Another Maoist was demoted by the same Jan Adalat. According to a recent document published by the Dandakaranya Special Zonal Committee (DKSZC) of the CPI-Maoist, “Rammurti [a commander of company-2 under DKZSC] had joined the Naxal movement as a member of company-1 in Bastar in 2002. He exhibited indiscipline and anarchist behaviour and hence was transferred to company-2. Despite repeated advice and attempts to reform him, he did not budge. When it was decided to send him home, he threatened to go to the police and divulge details about the movement to them. So after due inquiry and consent from senior leaders, it was decided to give him death penalty. Finally, a public hearing was also organised and the decision was reaffirmed.” In the other case, the in-charge secretary of south Gadchiroli committee of Aitu was demoted to the position of a committee member after a women cadre accused him of sexual misconduct.

Though the killings of Badru and three other senior comrades have been explained as a reaction to the surrender of Sannu Potam, it is not clear why the surrender of an area committee member should have rattled the Maoists so much. CPI-Maoist has witnessed the surrender of many and far more senior cadres in the past, without attracting such a pattern of reprisals against others. Lanka Papi Reddy, a Central Committee (CC) member surrendered in 2007; G.V.K. Prasad Rao aka Gudsa Usendi, ‘spokesperson’ and member of the DKSZC, surrendered on January 8, 2014; Chambala Ravinder aka Arjun ‘commander’ of the ‘2nd Battalion’ of the PLGA, surrendered on August 1, 2014.

The most probable explanation is that, unlike others, Potam surrendered with an SLR. Given the extraordinary secrecy and control exercised over armed cadres and their weapons, it is unlikely that a cadre can escape with a weapon without the collusion of others. The party keeps a close watch, not only over each and every cadre to prevent surrenders and development of ‘anti-party activities’, but also on all villagers in their areas of operation. Even when a villager visits a nearby town or any other place and takes more time to return than is expected, the Maoists are informed and they (Maoists) follow up. The Maoists also maintain and periodically update their database of villages, listing each villager, and with details down to the quantity of foodgrain with each family, and the number of goats, hens, etc. Establishing contact with the Police and taking a weapon out of the jungles to surrender is, consequently, an extraordinarily difficult task without some collective involvement.

Media reports indicate that Hemla Bhagat, Kosi, Badru, Hurra and Hinge were suspected of facilitating Potam’s surrender. All five were ‘detained’ by the Maoists in the second week of June and were kept at different locations in the Gadiras area of Sukma and Aranpur area of Dantewada. Hemla Bhagat was the first to be killed on June 22, probably because he was very close to DKSZC member and South Regional Committee Secretary Ganesh Uike, had accompanied him on his trips to Kolkata, Delhi, and Hyderabad, and had knowledge of the Maoists’ secret urban network. Kosi and Hurra somehow managed to escape from Maoist custody on June 24. While Hurra managed to reach the Police, Kosi was intercepted by the Maoists’ Acheli range committee members and was beaten to death near Gotgul village. Hinge was also killed after Kosi, while Badru was killed on July 2, allegedly on the orders of Darbha DVC member Nirmala and Malangir area committee in-charge Deva, in the absence of Darbha DVC ‘secretary’ Surinder. There is some speculation that Badru’s killing at the hands of Nirmala and Deva, in the absence of area leader Surinder, suggests intense rivalry among the Maoist cadres.

Despite criticism, the large number of surrenders (385 in 2014 and 57, so far, in 2015) in Bastar division seems to have caught the Maoists on the back foot. Muppalla Lakshmana Rao aka Ganapathy, in a supplement to the Central Committee message issued on 10th anniversary of the CPI-Maoist observed:

Some people have lost preparedness to continue along the arduous path of PPW (protracted people’s war) and the will to sacrifice. They assess the might of the enemy as permanent and the people’s strength as always being weak. They are making bankrupt arguments joining hands with the enemy. We should strongly fight back against such betrayers.

Pressure on the Maoists in the Bastar Division is clearly mounting, and harsh action against defecting cadres, or those under suspicion of defecting, is clearly necessary for the Maoist leadership to maintain a modicum of discipline. These moves are likely, however, to prove counterproductive over time, creating mistrust among cadres. Worse, since the four cadres executed by the Maoists in the present instance were all Bastar tribals, this action is likely to increase the already high levels of resentment against the ‘outsider’ leadership from the Telangana and Andhra regions. Disturbing as the continuing spate of killings by the Maoists is, it is an index of their difficulties, rather than of any rising strength.

* Fakir Mohan Pradhan
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management

The post India: Uncertain Rumblings In Chhattisgarh – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

(Civil.Ge) — Placing of demarcation signposts along the breakaway South Ossetian administrative boundary line is part of Russia’s provocations through which it is “testing our patience,” Georgia’s Defense Minister Tina Khidasheli said on July 19.

“The goal is not to make the country victim of provocations, which Russia is permanently undertaking against us,” she said.

“By doing this they are testing our patience on the daily basis, trying to provoke and engage us in the conflict, which, I can assure you, Georgia’s current authorities will not let happen,” she told journalists at the Vaziani military base outside Tbilisi, where Agile Spirit 2015 drills are held with participation of Georgian, U.S., Bulgarian, Latvian, Lithuanian and Romanian troops.

Signposts marking “South Ossetian border” were placed on July 10 close to the villages of Tsitelubani and Orchosani in the short distance from Georgia’s main east-west highway and in the area where a mile-long portion of the BP-operated Baku-Supsa oil pipeline runs.

Series of protest rallies by activists and journalists, who were arriving in the area from Tbilisi followed, with one of the signposts being torn down. Some locals were complaining that those protests were exacerbating situation, affecting further negatively on the local population living in an immediate vicinity of the administrative border. Police restricted access to the area on July 17 for non-local residents. A protest rally, organized by some media outlets and civil society organizations, was held in Tbilisi on July 18, criticizing government’s policies towards Russia and accusing the authorities of not doing enough to prevent Russia’s “creeping occupation.”

After the August, 2008 war and following recognition of South Ossetia’s “independence” by Moscow, Russian forces in the breakaway region started building demarcation line mostly along southwestern, south and southeastern portions of the administrative border. The line mostly follows the Soviet-old administrative borders of former Autonomous District of South Ossetia

The process, referred as “borderization”, involved placing of border markers, erecting of fences and putting barbed wires, cutting farmlands and in some cases dividing villages.

In September, 2010 when one of the early instances of borderization affected farmlands close to the villages of Kvemo Nikozi, Zemo Nikozi, Ditsi, Arbo and Kordi, the Georgian authorities initially started vocal protest, but toned down rhetoric shortly afterwards.

Borderization process was stepped up in the course of 2013 with the dividing fences reaching the length of roughly 45 kilometers by the end of that year.

Currently there are about 200 “border” signposts along the administrative boundary line, according to EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM), whose unarmed monitors observe situation on the ground since the 2008 war; but they have no access to breakaway South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

Head of the EUMM, Lithuanian diplomat Kęstutis Jankauskas, said in an interview with the Georgian public broadcaster on July 16 that this year “we have not seen much borderization activities.”

He said that the recent installation of demarcation signposts were made in close vicinity of strategic infrastructure, including Georgia’s main east-west highway, and “in these issues there are lots of emotions”

“In terms of perceptions these signs for the local population mark the areas where they can or where they cannot go, so for them the boundaries have moved and that’s why it’s so emotional,” he said.

A meeting of Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM) has been scheduled for July 20 to address recent developments. IPRM represents meetings with EUMM facilitation between Georgian and South Ossetian representatives, as well as representatives of the Russian troops on the ground.

The post Georgia Defense Minister: ‘Russia Tests Our Patience’ appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Spain has strongly condemned the terrorist attack on an army unit in the town of Djebel Louh, in the Algerian province of Ain Defla, resulting in the death of nine military personnel and leaving two others injured.

The terrorist organization AQIM claimed responsibility for the attack.

The Government of Spain conveyed its sincere condolences to the victims and to the people, the army and the authorities of Algeria and wishes those injured the fullest and speediest recovery possible.

The Spanish government said it reaffirms its full support for the Algerian authorities in its fight against terrorism and trusts that the authors of these hateful crimes will not go unpunished.

The post Spain Condemns Terrorist Attack In Algeria appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Dozens were killed in fighting in Aden after loyalist forces of President Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi announced the “liberation” of the port city. According to official sources, at least 43 civilians were killed in a bombing attributed yesterday to Houthi rebels, who denied responsibility.

The government of Hadi, based by the Saudi-led coalition and who took refuge in Riyadh, last week announced regaining control of the strategic port city, though rebel resistance pockets remain. Aden was controlled by the Houthis since March.

Based on official data of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the conflict has so far left over 3,500 dead and 17,000 injured, internally displacing more than 1.2 million.

The post Yemen: Dozens Of Civilians Killed As Fighting In Aden Continues appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Studies find airplane crews at high altitude are exposed to potentially harmful levels of radiation from cosmic rays.

“Neutrons which don’t reach the ground do reach airline altitude,” said Adrian Melott, professor of physics and astronomy at the University of Kansas. “Flight crews get a lot more radiation dose from neutrons. In fact, during solar particle events, airplanes are diverted away from the North Pole, where a lot more cosmic rays come down.”

But could these cosmic rays pose hazards even at sea level? In recent years, research has suggested congenital birth defects down on Earth’s surface could be caused by these “solar particle events” — spikes in cosmic rays from the sun that touch off the northern lights and sometimes hamper communications or the electric power grid.

Now, a new NASA-funded investigation has found radiation from solar events is too weak to cause worry at ground level. Results have just been published in the Journal of Geophysical Research and hailed as one of three “Editor’s Choice” publications for the first quarter of 2015 by Space Weather.

“We looked at two different studies,” said co-author Melott. “Both of them indicated a connection between cosmic rays and the rate of birth defects. One also associated mutations in cells growing in a petri dish with a 1989 solar particle event.”

But Melott and colleagues Andrew C. Overholt of MidAmerica Nazarene University and Dimitra Atri of the Blue Marble Space Institute of Science have calculated the dose of radiation from a solar particle event to be less than a visit to the doctor might necessitate.

“We have a contradiction,” Melott said. “Our estimates suggest that the radiation on the ground from these solar events is very small. And yet the experimental evidence suggests that something is going on that causes birth defects. We don’t understand this, which is good. Something one doesn’t understand is a pointer to an interesting scientific problem.”

Melott and his co-authors looked at how cosmic rays from the sun create hazardous “secondaries” by reacting with the Earth’s atmosphere.

“Cosmic rays are mostly protons,” he said. “Basically, they are the nuclei of atoms — with all the electrons stripped off. Some come from the sun. Others come from all kinds of violent events all over the universe. Most of the ones that hit the Earth’s atmosphere don’t reach the ground, but they set off ‘air showers’ in which other particles are created, and some of them reach the ground.”

The air showers pose the most serious threat for the health of humans and other biology on the Earth’s surface via “ionizing radiation,” according to the researcher.

“Ionizing radiation is any radiation that can tear apart an atom or a molecule. It can affect life in many ways, causing skin cancer, birth defects and other things. Normally, about one-sixth of the penetrating radiation we get down near sea level is from secondaries from cosmic rays.”

The authors looked carefully at two forms of radiation formed by solar particle events — muons and neutrons — finding that muons are the most dangerous to biology at the Earth’s surface.

“Muons are a kind of heavy cousin of the electron,” Melott said. “They’re produced in great abundance by cosmic rays and are responsible for most of the radiation we get on the ground from cosmic rays. Neutrons can do a lot of damage. However, very few of them ever reach the ground. We checked this because some of them do reach the ground. We found that they’re likely responsible for a lot less damage than muons, even during a solar particle event.”

Of particular interest to the authors was a massive dose of solar radiation around the years 773-776 A.D.

“Carbon-14 evidence was found in tree rings in 2012 that suggests a big radiation dose came down around 775, suggesting a huge solar particle event, at least 10 times larger than any in modern times,” Melott said. “Our calculations suggest that even this was mostly harmless, but maybe there is something wrong with our assumptions. We used ordinary understandings of how muons may cause damage, but perhaps there is some new physics here which makes the muons more dangerous.”

The researcher said the next step in the investigation should be honing an understanding of how much exposure to muons DNA can withstand.

“In calculating the effect of muons, we used standard assumptions about what the effect of muons should be,” Melott said. “Their physics is pretty simple, just that of an electron with a lot of mass. But no one has ever actually done much experimentation to measure the effect of muons on DNA, because under normal conditions they are not a dominant player. They are not important, for example, in nuclear reactor accidents. We would like to put some synthetic DNA in a muon beam and actually measure the effect.”

The post Can Cosmic Rays Cause Birth Defects? appeared first on Eurasia Review.