By M.A. Athul*

On July 9, 2015, Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) team of Meghalaya Police killed a Garo National Liberation Army (GNLA) ‘commander’, identified as Savio Marak, at Rengregre village in East Garo Hills District. Inspector General of Police (Operations) G.H.P Raju disclosed that Savio, a former Meghalaya Police constable was wanted in several cases of murder, abduction, bombings and extortion in the Garo Hills region. Savio had deserted the Police Force in February 2011, while on duty at a relief camp for victims of the Garo-Rabha ethnic clashes during the month of January 2011.

On June 28, 2015, two unidentified Achik Matgrik Elite Force (AMEF) militants were killed during a joint operation by the Army and State Police at Resubelpara in North Garo Hills District. One 9mm pistol and two live rounds and a 7.65mm pistol with three live rounds were recovered from the possession of the slain militants.

These encounters are part of Operation Hill Storm 2, launched by Security Forces (SFs) on April 2, 2015. According to the State Police, between April 2 and June 6, 2015, at least 17 militants have been killed during the anti-insurgency operation. These included seven cadres of GNLA, four cadres of AMEF, two cadres of A’chik Songna An’pachakgipa Kotok (ASAK), and one cadre each of Independent faction of United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA-I) and Liberation of Achik Elite Force (LAEF). Group affiliation of the remaining two was not known. According to partial data collected by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), SFs involved in the operation have killed another three militants since June 7, 2015, (data till July 19, 2015). Though Police data did not reveal the number of SF personnel killed during Operation Hill Storm 2, SATP data records four SF fatalities and another seven injured between April 2, 2015 and July 19, 2015.

State Police data further indicates that, between April 2 and June 6, 2015, 25 militants surrendered to SFs. These included 10 GNLA cadres, four ASAK cadres, and three cadres each of United Achik Liberation Army (UALA), Achik National Liberation Army (ANLA), and AMEF. Group affiliation of the remaining two surrendered militants was not known. Since June 7, according to SATP, at least another nine militants have surrendered. These include six GNLA cadres and one cadre each of Liberation A’chik Matgrik Army (LAMA), Hynniewtrep National Liberation Council (HNLC) and United Achik Matgrik Army (UAMA). In a significant incident of surrender, on July 12, 2015, GNLA ‘joint political secretary’, Benjamin M. Marak and another militant identified as Kenny Roger Sangma, surrendered before Tura Police in West Garo Hills District.

Earlier, SFs had conducted Operation Hill Storm 1 between July 7, 2014, and December 31, 2014. During that phase of the operation, SFs had killed 16 militants [seven GNLA, five ASAK, two UALA, and one each of ULFA-I and LAEF]. Another 24 militants were injured during the operation. The official statement had also disclosed that six Policemen were killed and another 10 police personnel were injured during this period. 973 arms with ammunition, mostly belonging to GNLA, ULFA and ASAK, were recovered by Police during Operation Hill Storm 1. 174 militants of different militant groups active in the Garo Hills region were arrested during the operation, including 55 GNLA cadres, followed by 24 of ANVC-B, 22 ULFA, 19 ASAK, 13 LAEF, 11 UALA, 11 AMEF, eight Achik National Cooperative Army (ANCA), and one each of ANLA and the A’chik National Liberation Co-operative Army (ANLCA). Affiliations of the remaining arrested militants were not known.

These operational successes have indeed helped in providing a relatively secure environment for the civilian population of the State. According to the SATP database, during a period of 12 months and 12 days, since the launch of the operation’s first phase on July 7, 2014, the State recorded a total of 19 civilian fatalities. In the corresponding period prior to the launch of the operation, fatalities among civilians totalled 31.

Numerous challenges, nevertheless, persist. The most lethal group, GNLA, which was the primary target of the Operation, still retains the capacity to unleash periodic violence. Significantly, out of 19 civilians killed since the launch of the Operation on July 7, 2014, GNLA was responsible for five in five separate incidents; AMEF was responsible for five in four incidents; while nine civilian killings remained unattributed. GNLA was also responsible for seven of 12 explosions recorded during this period, and for the lone incident targeting Policemen during this period. On March 10, 2015, four Policemen were killed and another two were injured when GNLA militants ambushed a Police team at Panda Reserve Forest in the South Garo Hills District. That the outfit continues to operate is also evident from the incident of May 27, 2015, where nine civilians, including three women, sustained injuries when GNLA militants triggered an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) blast outside a hardware store in Tura town in West Garo Hills District. According to reports, GNLA ‘area commander’ of West Garo Hills District, Karak Momin alias Hedeo, had earlier served an extortion notice on the shop for INR 2 million. Later, a GNLA militant identified as Junepaul Sangma, arrested on July 7, 2015, confessed that he had planted the IED outside the hardware store.

Apart from GNLA, other militant outfits such as ASAK and AMEF continue to operate, though they are mainly involved in acts of abduction-for ransom, especially in the Garo Hills Region. According to SATP data, in the current year, until July 19, 20 incidents of abduction, in which 30 people were abducted, were reported, as compared to 23 such incidents resulting in 33 abductions during the corresponding period of 2014, clearly not much of a respite. Summing up the situation, Union Home Minister (UHM) Rajnath Singh thus conceded, on July 12, 2015,

In Garo Hills, some new splinter groups were kidnapping and looting businessmen at gunpoint. Such criminal activities must be dealt with firmly. There has been a marked increase in low-visibility yet high-impact violent crimes like kidnapping for ransom and extortions in Meghalaya.

Evidently, insurgency in Meghalaya is at critical juncture. Nevertheless, Meghalaya Director General of Police (DGP) Rajiv Mehta stated on February 26, 2015, “there cannot be any deadline to end insurgency in Meghalaya”. He also noted, further, that “there is no new strategy to deal with militancy”, adding that the biggest stumbling block to tackle militancy in the Garo Hills was the terrain. The DGP also observed, on April 10, 2015, that the objective of the ongoing operation was the same as that of Operation Hill Storm 1, that is, to flush out militants from the interior areas of the Garo Hills region.

The ongoing Operation Hill Storm 2, jointly conducted by State Police Forces and the Central Forces, has resulted in limited operational successes, and constitutes a further move towards restoring peace in the State, which has been marred by insurgency for a long period. Nevertheless, if a consolidation of the state’s control over remote regions and difficult terrain is to be secured, the capacities and capabilities of the State Police will have to undergo dramatic review and augmentation. UHM Rajnath Singh, stated, on July 12, 2015,

In view of the improved security scenario, there is a need to review deployment of (Central) Forces in the region. Without compromising the security, we must plan to reduce deployment so as to encourage positive thinking among the outsiders about the region… I would urge all the Honourable Chief Ministers to conduct a realistic audit of deployment of Central Armed Police Forces in their States. However, I assure you of our endeavour to help you in the deployment of Central Forces when actually needed.

Meghalaya already boasts of a Police-population ratio of 416 policemen per hundred thousand [according to National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB) 2013 data], well above the national average of 141. The State Police has set up special multi task force, SF-10, to deal with the insurgency, as well as for riot control and initiatives to ensure communal harmony, especially in border areas. 485 candidates have been selected to form this Force, which is to grow in strength to 1,400. The first batch is expected to be raised by February 2016. Over time, greater responsibility for counter-insurgency will be handled by the State Police itself, rather than the present and excessive dependence on Central Forces.

It is not, however, in the use of force that the principal challenge lies. Insurgency thrives in regions of poor governance, in areas where the state has failed to establish a minimal structure of administration and the delivery of public goods. SFs have repeatedly succeeded in beating back the insurgents, in defeating numerous movements of disorder; such successes have, unfortunately, seldom been followed up with concerted action to secure and promote public welfare, and movements of violence eventually recover spaces within areas of neglect and administrative failure. This fruitless cycle will continue, with its enormous cost in human suffering, as long as these deficits endure.

* M.A. Athul
Research Assistant, Institute for Conflict Management

The post India: Prospective Gains In Meghalaya – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

In mid-July 2015 the Russian city of Ufa was the venue for the 7th BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) Summit and the 15th SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organization) Summit.1 The convergence of the BRICS and SCO Summits at Ufa was due to the coincidental timing of the rotating leaderships of the BRICS and SCO falling to Russia this year.2 Both the BRICS and the SCO are multilateral forums that exist for emerging economies from the developing world, and they offer alternative multilateral venues for developing nations to pursue practical cooperation outside of the Euro-American sphere.3 While the SCO, unlike the BRICS, was originally focused on security cooperation, economic concerns for the SCO members have risen in importance in recent years, and the BRICS-SCO Summits in Ufa have highlighted the convergence in issues of economic cooperation among both the BRICS and SCO member states.

BRICS

Despite the current economic difficulties faced by the BRICS member states, Chinese President Xi Jinping noted at the BRICS Summit in Ufa that these nations still have significant potential for economic growth, and deeper cooperation within the BRICS framework and with other economic powers will help unlock this growth potential. After all, the BRICS economies currently have a combined GDP that has grown to be almost the same size as that of the US; just 8 years ago the US GDP was double that of the BRICS economies. One strategy to unlock this growth potential would be to deploy the BRICS Economic Partnership Strategy to align each BRICS member state’s individual development plan with that of the others. Such strategic alignment is expected to increase the overall competitiveness of the BRICS economies.4

In the run-up to the BRICS Summit, the member states ratified their participation in the BRICS US dollar currency reserve, which will become operational by the end of July 2015. The currency reserve, which will offer its members 100 billion worth of US dollars in emergency funding for liquidity crises, will primarily be funded by China, which will contribute 41 billion USD, followed by Brazil, India, and Russia, which will each contribute 18 billion USD, and South Africa, which will contribute 5 billion USD.5

Apart from the currency reserve, the Ufa Summit also established the groundwork for an eventual free trade agreement for the BRICS economies.6 However, it was the launch of the BRICS New Development Bank (NDB) that was the major achievement of the Ufa Summit. The NDB is not intended to replace existing international financial institutions (IFIs) like the IMF or World Bank, but is instead intended to supplement them by offering financing that the existing IFIs are unwilling or unable to provide. While the NDB will focus on offering financing to projects within the BRICS member states, projects in other developing countries will also be considered. The BRICS member states will select the first projects to be financed by the NDB by the end of 2015, and the bank is expected to issue its first loans by April 2016. The NDB will focus on financing large-scale projects in the areas of industrialization as well as energy and transportation infrastructure. As this fits with the focus of China’s Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the NDB is expected to collaborate with the AIIB when both IFIs begin operation.7

While governments may establish frameworks for economic development and other forms of practical cooperation, it is the business community that has to take advantage of these opportunities. The leaders of the BRICS member states hence took the opportunity of the Ufa Summit to call on their entrepreneurs and business leaders to pursue trade and investment opportunities in the framework of BRICS cooperation, especially in the key economic sectors of infrastructure development, green energy, and industrial manufacturing. Russian President Vladimir Putin, for example, invited Chinese enterprises to explore business, trade and investment opportunities in Siberia and the Russian Far East. Such intensification of business activity can help stimulate an economic recovery in the BRICS member states.8

In the case of China, President Xi used the opportunity afforded by the BRICS Summit to advance his country’s “Belt and Road” development framework, as well as the initiative’s primary financing instrument, the AIIB.9 Apart from the AIIB and the NDB, China is also involved with two other IFI initiatives: the Silk Road Fund, which has already selected its first project—the Karot hydropower plant in Pakistan—and the proposed SCO Development Bank, which will be discussed in the following section.10

China’s practical cooperation with fellow BRICS member Brazil through the BRICS framework, the AIIB, and bilateral projects, highlights China’s interest in practical cooperation beyond the Eurasian landmass. Chinese engagement in Latin America has attracted Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro to seek Venezuelan membership in the BRICS, and also to recommend the Latin American regional grouping of leftist nations, the Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América, to participate in the NDB.11 Apart from Latin America, Africa will also be targeted for cooperation with the BRICS, and China has called on the BRICS to establish a regional center on the African continent. BRICS development projects in Africa will complement Chinese projects there that have been established through bilateral agreements as well as under the framework of China’s 21st Century Maritime Silk Road development plan.12

SCO

The SCO Summit at Ufa saw the expansion of the SCO’s development strategy to include greater practical cooperation including deeper security cooperation and economic integration between the organization’s member states: China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The acceleration of economic cooperation was established during the Ufa Summit as a key goal for the SCO’s official development strategy for the next decade. By 2025 the SCO member states will be expected to have accelerated their economic development through greater practical cooperation and increased trade. China also has a long-term vision for a SCO free trade area, which, when it comes to fruition, will provide a boost for trade between the SCO economies.13 In the case of Russia, deeper economic cooperation through the SCO and BRICS can help alleviate the economic and social challenges of Euro-American sanctions over the Ukraine crisis.14

In the field of economic integration, the SCO offers a useful framework for China and Russia to connect their respective regional development initiatives: the Silk Road Economic Belt and the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), in particular through the construction of key energy and transportation infrastructure like high-speed rail. China and the EEU will also pursue an economic partnership agreement through the SCO framework.15 Indeed, President Xi has called for greater collaboration between the SCO, BRICS, and the EEU to accelerate common development between their member states.16 A good example of regional economic integration would be the proposed China-Russia-Mongolia economic corridor project which would connect China’s Silk Road Economic Belt, Russia’s transcontinental rail project, and Mongolia’s Prairie Road development plan.17

While the focus of the SCO has primarily been security cooperation, its members have long used the multilateral forum to facilitate economic cooperation. In 2005, for example, the SCO Inter-Bank Association was established, and by 2007 had helped its members agree on an estimated 2 billion USD in loans and business deals, including a Tajik-Uzbek highway and a Kazakh hydropower plant.18 This inter-bank mechanism was the first stage of the process that will eventually lead to the establishment of the SCO Development Bank, which could serve as a secondary source of financing for China’s Central and South Asian partners in the Silk Road Economic Belt projects.19 In 2007 Russia started delivering oil to China through the Sino-Kazakh pipeline, an example of energy cooperation which was negotiated through the SCO framework.20

The Ufa Summit also saw the expansion of the SCO into South Asia, with the organization initiating the accession process for India and Pakistan, both of which currently have observer status at the SCO. The longer term vision for the grouping will see the SCO include more countries from South Asia and the Middle East, including Iran.21 India’s and Pakistan’s accession into the SCO will not only provide these South Asian powers with an additional forum for dialogue concerning their troubled bilateral relationship, it will also offer them access to the experience of the SCO’s member states in combatting the “three evil forces” of extremism, separatism and terrorism that both nations currently face.22 Indeed, the meeting of the Indian and Pakistani leaders at the SCO Summit has already triggered greater bilateral dialogue and exchanges.23

Pakistan’s coming accession to the SCO is particularly important to China given their long-standing bilateral cooperation, including the recently announced China-Pakistan Economic Corridor infrastructure megaproject.24 India’s accession is also of great importance to China, as China recognizes India as being a strategic link in the planned integration between the Silk Road Economic Belt and the EEU. China and India are already cooperating on the AIIB and NDB finance initiatives, and both countries are already exploring the proposed BCIM (Bangladesh, China, India, Myanmar) Economic Corridor infrastructure megaproject. Further cooperation to link China’s “Belt and Road” projects with India’s development projects can also be expected in the future.25

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Notes:
1. “BRICS, SCO set to yield pragmatic results,” Global Times, July 7, 2015, accessed July 17, 2015, http://www.ecns.cn/2015/07-07/172067.shtml.

2 “Ufa ready to host BRICS and SCO summits – republic’s head to RT,” RT, June 26, 2015, accessed July 17, 2015, http://www.rt.com/business/269677-hamitov-ufa-brics-summit/. “SCO heads of state to hold summit in Ufa,” TASS, July 10, 2015, accessed July 17, 2015, http://tass.ru/en/russia/807528.

3 “Just-concluded BRICS, SCO summits in Ufa highlight China’s constructive role,” Xinhua, July 12, 2015, accessed July 17, 2015, http://www.ecns.cn/2015/07-12/172787.shtml.

4 “Xi voices confidence in BRICS future, proposes deepening partnership,” Xinhua, July 10, 2015, accessed July 17, 2015, http://www.ecns.cn/2015/07-10/172579.shtml. Anders Borg, “The crack in the BRICS,” World Economic Forum Agenda, July 9, 2015, accessed July 17, 2015, https://agenda.weforum.org/2015/07/the-crack-in-the-brics/. Malcolm Scott, “Here’s the $17 Trillion Reason Why the BRICS Summit This Week Is a Big Deal,” Bloomberg, July 7, 2015, accessed July 17, 2015, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-07-06/here-s-the-17-trillion-reason-why-the-brics-summit-this-week-is-a-big-deal.

5 “BRICS Contingency Fund expected to be operational in 30 days,” Xinhua, July 1, 2015, accessed July 17, 2015, http://www.ecns.cn/2015/07-01/171463.shtml. “China to inject $41 bln to BRICS FX pool,” China Daily, July 8, 2015, accessed July 17, 2015, http://www.ecns.cn/business/2015/07-08/172394.shtml.

6 Samir Saran, “From Cold War to Hot Peace: Why BRICS matters,” The Interpreter, July 13, 2015, accessed July 17, 2015, http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/07/13/Cold-War-to-Hot-Peace-The-Russian-Presidency-and-BRICS.aspx.

7 “First Loans from BRICS Bank Expected in April 2016: Kamath,” IANS, July 9, 2015, accessed July 17, 2015, http://www.newindianexpress.com/business/news/First-Loans-from-BRICS-Bank-Expected-in-April-2016-Kamath/2015/07/09/article2910869.ece. “New bank will not compete with other agencies, expert says,” China Daily, July 9, 2015, accessed July 17, 2015, http://www.ecns.cn/business/2015/07-09/172437.shtml. “Leaders agree on partnership blueprint,” China Daily, July 10, 2015, accessed July 17, 2015, http://www.ecns.cn/2015/07-10/172583.shtml.

8 “Putin expects Chinese firms to make ‘significant contribution’ to Russia’s Siberia, Far East,” Xinhua, July 11, 2015, accessed July 17, 2015, http://www.ecns.cn/2015/07-11/172736.shtml. “Xi urges business community to contribute to BRICS economic development,” Xinhua, July 10, 2015, accessed July 17, 2015, http://www.ecns.cn/2015/07-10/172658.shtml.

9 “BRICS, SCO set.” Alvin Cheng-Hin Lim, “China’s Transition to the ‘New Normal’: Challenges and Opportunities,” Eurasia Review, April 2, 2015, accessed July 17, 2015, http://www.eurasiareview.com/02042015-chinas-transition-to-the-new-normal-challenges-and-opportunities-analysis/. Alvin Cheng-Hin Lim, “The US, China and the AIIB: From Zero-Sum Competition to Win-Win Cooperation?” Eurasia Review, April 19, 2015, accessed July 17, 2015, http://www.eurasiareview.com/19042015-the-us-china-and-the-aiib-from-zero-sum-competition-to-win-win-cooperation-analysis/.

10 “New Development Bank launched in Ufa,” China Daily, July 10, 2015, accessed July 17, 2015, http://www.ecns.cn/business/2015/07-10/172614.shtml. Chen Jia, “Silk Road Fund makes first investment,” China Daily, April 22, 2015, accessed July 17, 2015, http://europe.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2015-04/22/content_20501261.htm.

11 “China-Brazil ties develop vigorously: Xi,” Xinhua, July 10, 2015, accessed July 17, 2015, http://www.ecns.cn/2015/07-10/172598.shtml. Alvin Cheng-Hin Lim, “Latin America and China’s ‘New Normal,’” Eurasia Review, May 28, 2015, accessed July 17, 2015, http://www.eurasiareview.com/28052015-latin-america-and-chinas-new-normal-analysis/. “Venezuela to apply for membership of BRICS group: Maduro,” Xinhua, July 9, 2015, accessed July 17, 2015, http://www.ecns.cn/2015/07-09/172535.shtml.

12 “Xi voices confidence.” Alvin Cheng-Hin Lim, “Africa and China’s 21st Century Maritime Silk Road,” The Asia-Pacific Journal 13 (2015), accessed July 17, 2015, http://japanfocus.org/-Alvin_Cheng_Hin-Lim/4296.

13 Mirzokhid Rakhimov, “The Institutional and Political Transformation of the SCO in the Context of Geopolitical Changes in Central Asia,” in The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Eurasian Geopolitics: New Directions, Perspectives, and Challenges, ed. Michael Fredholm (Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2013): 73.

14 “BRICS, SCO set.” “Future development blueprint to lift SCO cooperation to new high,” Xinhua, July 12, 2015, accessed July 17, 2015, http://www.ecns.cn/2015/07-12/172751.shtml.

15 “Xi pushes BRICS potential,” Global Times, July 9, 2015, accessed July 17, 2015, http://www.ecns.cn/2015/07-09/172398.shtml. “Xi urges China, Russia to maintain high-level coordination within SCO,” Xinhua, July 9, 2015, accessed July 17, 2015, http://www.ecns.cn/2015/07-09/172402.shtml. Alvin Cheng-Hin Lim, “China and the Eurasian Economic Union: Prospects for Silk Road Economic Belt,” Eurasia Review, May 14, 2015, accessed July 17, 2015, http://www.eurasiareview.com/14052015-china-and-the-eurasian-economic-union-prospects-for-silk-road-economic-belt-analysis/. “China, Eurasian Economic Union to launch EPA talks: official,” Xinhua, July 12, 2015, accessed July 17, 2015, http://www.ecns.cn/business/2015/07-12/172769.shtml.

16 “Xi urges BRICS, SCO, EEU to cooperate for people’s welfare,” Xinhua, July 10, 2015, accessed July 17, 2015, http://www.ecns.cn/2015/07-10/172609.shtml.

17 “Xi urges quickened construction of China-Russia-Mongolia economic corridor,” Xinhua, July 10, 2015, accessed July 17, 2015, http://www.ecns.cn/business/2015/07-10/172596.shtml.

18 Wang Zhengxu and Lim Tin Seng, The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Beijing’s Strategic Objectives in Central Asia, EAI Background Brief No. 342 (Singapore: East Asian Institute): 2-3.

19 Pan Guang, “China in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization,” in China and the New International Order, ed. Wang Gungwu and Zheng Yongnian (New York: Routledge, 2008): 242.

20 Pan Guang, “The Spirit of the Silk Road: The SCO and China’s Relations with Central Asia,” in The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Eurasian Geopolitics: New Directions, Perspectives, and Challenges, ed. Michael Fredholm (Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2013): 24.

21 “BRICS, SCO set.” “Acceptance of India, Pakistan into SCO on Ufa summit agenda,” Xinhua, July 7, 2015, accessed July 17, 2015, http://www.ecns.cn/2015/07-07/172113.shtml. Reid Standish, “China and Russia Lay Foundation for Massive Economic Cooperation,” Foreign Policy, July 10, 2015, accessed July 17, 2015, https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/07/10/china-russia-sco-ufa-summit-putin-xi-jinping-eurasian-union-silk-road/.

22 “SCO starts expansion, ratifies 10-year development strategy,” Xinhua, July 11, 2015, accessed July 17, 2015, http://www.ecns.cn/2015/07-11/172720.shtml. “Russia hopes SCO to become international platform: Putin,” Xinhua, July 11, 2015, accessed July 17, 2015, http://www.ecns.cn/2015/07-11/172730.shtml.

23 Vishnu Som and Suparna Singh, “India-Pakistan Agree Top Army Officers Will Meet in Person, PM Modi to Visit Pakistan,” NDTV, July 10, 2015, accessed July 17, 2015, http://www.ndtv.com/india-news/india-pakistan-agree-top-army-officers-will-meet-in-person-pm-modi-to-visit-pakistan-780077.

24 “Chinese president welcomes Pakistan’s entry into SCO,” CCTV.com, July 10, 2015, accessed July 17, 2015, http://english.cntv.cn/2015/07/10/VIDE1436528646392523.shtml. Alvin Cheng-Hin Lim, “‘Iron Brothers’: Sino-Pakistani Relations and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor,” Eurasia Review, May 7, 2015, accessed July 17, 2015, http://www.eurasiareview.com/07052015-iron-brothers-sino-pakistani-relations-and-the-china-pakistan-economic-corridor-analysis/.

25 “SCO summit to take up India’s membership,” China Daily, July 9, 2015, accessed July 17, 2015, http://www.ecns.cn/2015/07-09/172422.shtml. Pravakar Sahoo and Abhirup Bhunia, “BCIM Corridor a game changer for South Asian trade,” East Asia Forum, July 18, 2014, accessed July 17, 2015, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2014/07/18/bcim-corridor-a-game-changer-for-south-asian-trade/. “Xi calls for joint efforts in building stronger BRICS partnership,” Xinhua, July 9, 2015, accessed July 17, 2015, http://www.ecns.cn/2015/07-09/172407.shtml. Dirk van der Kley, “SCO summit marks steady rise of India in China’s worldview,” The Interpreter, July 8, 2015, accessed July 17, 2015, http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/07/08/SCO-summit-marks-steady-rise-of-India-in-Chinas-worldview.aspx.

The post 2015 BRICS-SCO Summits In Ufa: New Developments In Multilateralism – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Did the US’ military and legal reactions to the 9/11 attacks fundamentally transform its foreign and security policies? Joseph Siracusa doesn’t think so. He argues that the so-called Bush and Obama Doctrines have had more in common with previous presidential approaches than most people realize.

By Joseph Siracusa*

In the ever-changing landscape of international relations, the extent to which the actions of the United States contribute to justice and order remains a source of contentious debate. Indeed, it is difficult to find a point in recent history when the United States and its foreign policy have been subject to such polarised and acrimonious reflection, both domestically and internationally. Notwithstanding recent ‘decline’ debates and the rise of emerging powers, the United States continues to hold a formidable advantage over its chief rivals in terms of formal power assets more than twenty-five years after the end of the Cold War. Few anticipated this situation; on the contrary, many assumed that, after a brief moment of unipolarity following the collapse of the Soviet Union, international affairs would soon regain a certain symmetry. Instead, US hegemony is still par for the course. In this context, because the foreign policy ‘doctrines’ of American presidents remain an important driver of the outlook of the United States, these doctrines continue to play a significant role in shaping international order. Though they have veered from isolationist to interventionist to expansionist over the years, these doctrines in fact exhibit a remarkable continuity – even in the post 9/11 era. Each doctrine has sought to shape international order – through military means if necessary – in accordance with a vision of American ‘exceptionalism.’

Isolationism and empire

Many analysts believe that the only thing we need to understand about a state in International Relations is how much power it has – and that other factors are largely irrelevant. This approach, however, is especially inappropriate in the case of the United States. In particular, it ignores the enduring influence on American foreign policy of the manner in which the United States ascended to power in the first place. The biggest oversight may be the influence of the discourse of exceptionalism – associated with the country’s revolutionary origins and with the tension between isolationism and expansionism that characterized American foreign policy in the 19th century. During the Cold War, this discourse was modified through a series of presidential foreign policy ‘doctrines’ and continues to have ramifications for U.S. conduct and international affairs today.

The first American foreign policy doctrine – the Washington doctrine – emerged out of the disorder of the years before and after the American Revolution. While the new constitution orchestrated a new supreme government that attained international recognition, the young state maintained significant political and commercial ties with European powers and had to contend with European interests along its northern, western, and southern borders. In his farewell address, George Washington famously implored his successors to be wary of the ‘vicissitudes’ of European politics and to avoid ‘entangling alliances’. This wariness was duly cultivated by his successors. By the conclusion of Thomas Jefferson’s presidency in 1809 a new style of American diplomacy had appeared. The desire to avoid complex and potentially harmful affairs with “outside states” would become a significant theme in U.S. foreign policy for well over the next hundred years.

Throughout the 19th century, however, the impulse towards isolationism was in constant conflict with the reality of a growing empire. The acquisition of territory via annexation not only shaped American identity, it ultimately provided the state with a set of geographical, economic and security assets. In ‘securing’ the region not just from Europeans, but also from native Americans, territorial expansion was the crucial factor in the subsequent ascent of the United States to superpower status in the 20^th century. A significant early manifestation of this ‘moment’ was the assertion of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823, which sought to eject European powers from the Western hemisphere altogether, as this was now being imagined as an American sphere of influence.

The tension between isolationism and imperialism was carried forward into the 20th century. In this sense, Woodrow Wilson’s 1917 war aims can be seen as a globalized version of the Monroe Doctrine. Though grounded in the discourse of exceptionalism that had justified a tendency towards isolationism, Wilson’s efforts ultimately re-entangled the United States in European (and global) affairs. Despite a brief period of isolationism after the Great War, the 1920s mark the beginning of the period in which the establishment of an international order based on American values became the foundation of US foreign policy.

A global Monroe Doctrine?

After World War II, the economic and technological superiority of the US provided the Truman administration with a much wider array of policy options. Combined with the threat of Soviet expansionism and Stalin’s apparent inability to adhere to the agreements established in wartime conferences, the Truman administration feared that leftist ideology would ripple throughout Western Europe if it did not attempt to impede it. As the ideological divergence between the two superpowers widened, the United States abandoned its fear of entangling alliances. As the terrain of international relations became increasingly ‘bipolar’, the largest and most destructive arms race in history ensued.

Extending the Truman doctrine of ‘containment,’ Eisenhower and Kennedy would project US-Soviet competition into new domains. Eisenhower pursued a more proactive policy of ‘liberating’ states from the Communist threat, while also incorporating the concept of massive retaliation into the suite of containment instruments. While Khrushchev’s policies towards Berlin and the West were less provocative than Stalin’s, Washington affirmed the belief (powerfully articulated by George Kennan) that the Soviet Union could only be managed through American military power. In this regard, Kennedy’s doctrine of ‘flexible response’ was ultimately an adaptation of Eisenhower’s, while Lyndon Johnson demonstrated ‘Monroe-esque’ thinking in his concern that Communism was creeping into the regional sphere of influence in Latin America.

Subsequent doctrinal variations broadly reinforced this theme of global management through military power. While Nixon required allies to assume primary responsibility for their own defense, this retreat from unconditional defense guarantees to lesser allies was motivated as much by financial concerns as by the re-examination of strategic and foreign policy objectives. It reflected Nixon’s goals of détente and nuclear arms control with the Soviet Union and the establishment of formal diplomatic relations with China. Concern over the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and internal developments in Iran would soon lead to a renewed emphasis on confrontation. Zbigniew Brzezinksi, the architect of the Carter doctrine, believed that détente had allowed the Soviets to expand under the guise of superpower co-operation and stressed the need to compete with Moscow ideologically, particularly in the developing world. In a final variation, Reagan’s strategy entailed opposing Soviet influence by supporting anti-Communist guerrillas against the governments of Soviet-backed client states. On balance, Reagan’s approach was more offensive than those of his predecessors—particularly in regard to newly declared leftist states. Though largely conceived as a response to a perceived lack of American will—the so-called ‘Vietnam syndrome’— the momentum of the Reagan doctrine certainly helped to trigger the collapse of the Soviet economy at the end of the 1980s.

Bush, Obama and the use of force

To many, the events of 9/11 seemed to sweep away the foundations of US foreign and security strategy. In many ways, the fear that chemical, nuclear and biological weapons could be secured by non-state actors did transform the doctrinal foundations American security established throughout the Cold War and during the Clinton administration. The new strategy of the Bush administration, for example, revealed a profound new sense of vulnerability, drawing extensively upon fears of a “nuclear 9/11.” Moreover, in pointing to a “new” environment of global terrorist networks, “rogue states”, and WMD proliferation, Bush called for radically different responses to security threats, including the use of “pre-emptive” measures to counter long-term, potential threats, “even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack.”

Yet there are equally significant continuities between post- 9/11 doctrines and pre-9/11 ones. For Bush, of course, the United States was now at war with a global adversary that was every bit as dangerous as those it had previously encountered in the twentieth century. While what became known as the “War on Terror” was deeply contested – with a lengthy spectrum of analysts questioning its strategic rationality, its implications for relations with the wider Muslim world, and its domestic legality – the United States was clearly moving into a more volatile epoch, similar in character to the Cold War in terms of diplomatic tensions, national security challenges, and the constant spectre of a subversive antagonist determined to undermine international order itself. Although the election of Barack Obama in 2008 raised hopes of a dramatic shift in US foreign policy domain, little has actually changed in the US’s approach to military force and international order.

While the Obama administration has been more willing to offer legal justifications for the use of force, the content of these justifications continues to stretch the self-defence article, mixing pre-emption and prevention. By continuing to separate the imminence of a threat from its immediacy, the Obama administration has indirectly condoned one of the Bush doctrine’s most heavily criticized features. This broad interpretation of the right of self-defense, as well as the congressional authorization to use force, have enabled the Obama administration’s drone program and the air strikes against the Islamic State (ISIS) in Iraq and Syria in 2014-15. Indeed, over a decade after the 9/11 attacks and the identification of Al Qaeda-affiliated groups as ‘lawful’ targets, this justification for the use of force is increasingly evident and could expand further after Obama’s tenure in office concludes.

In the absence of an independent judicial system capable of enforcing international law, one is tempted to consider US security policies to be in pursuit of a general authorization for the use of force itself. While Obama restrained policies in Libya and Syria demonstrated a disinclination towards using force on a large scale, this may paradoxically lower the threshold for using force in the context of targeted killings through drones. Drones, of course, have proven attractive for a president who has little interest in putting ‘troops on the ground’ and recognizes the domestic popularity of this ‘dehumanized’ form of warfare. Moreover, in the context of the Arab Spring, Obama reserved the right to use force unilaterally to defend U.S. security interests and came close to doing so when chemical weapons surfaced in Syria in 2013.

In the post 9/11 era, therefore, presidential doctrines continue to play a significant role in the foreign policy outlook of the United States. Due to the United States’ vast national security apparatus, remarkably dynamic economy, complex array of alliances, and highly exportable popular culture, these doctrines remain an important feature of international order. Though they have veered from isolationist to interventionist to expansionist, they also exhibit a remarkable degree of continuity. Each has invariably sought to shape international order in accordance with a vision of American ‘exceptionalism’ – and to do so through military means if necessary.

*Joseph M. Siracusa is Professor in Human Security and International Diplomacy and Discipline Head of Global Studies in the School of Global Studies, Social Science and Planning, at RMIT University, where he is a specialist in American politics and global security.

The post Presidential Doctrines, The Use Of Force And International Order – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

(RFE/RL) — An explosion at a cultural center in the Turkish town of Suruc near the Syrian border has killed at least 28 people, according to the Turkish Interior Ministry.

The ministry said around 100 people were injured and are being treated in local hospitals.

The cultural center is around 10 kilometers away from the Syrian border town of Kobani.

In a written statement, the Turkish Interior Ministry called the blast a “terrorist attack.”

Two senior Turkish officials told Reuters evidence suggests the Islamic State militant group was behind the attack.

According to news reports, 300 people from the Federation of Socialist Youths association were staying at the center ahead of a planned trip to Kobani to help with the rebuilding.

Kobani was the biggest defeat for the Islamic State militant group and has since become a symbol of Kurdish resistance against the group.

In June, IS attacks on Kobani killed more than 200 people.

Shortly after the blast in Suruc, a suicide bomber detonated a car bomb at a checkpoint in Kobani’s south, killing two Kurdish soldiers, Rami Abdel Rahman, director of the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, told AFP.

The post Turkey: At Least 28 Killed In Blast In Border Town appeared first on Eurasia Review.

It is worth noting that the UK Parliament was against it, namely, enlarging a campaign against the Islamic State that would also involve targeting Syrian positions. The security cognoscenti were always insisting that any conflict with IS worth its salt would have to involve strikes in Syria.

In 2013, however, the Commons took to the vote and say nay to the issue of striking Syria. The issue then was a supposed “red line” on the alleged use of chemical weapons by the regime of Bashar al-Assad. Punishment by way of airstrikes was in order. President Barack Obama was making mutterings about authorising them, and the French were getting hawkish.

The house, however, would not be swayed, and the government motion was defeated by 285 votes to 272. Chancellor George Osborne was left to tell Radio 4’s Today programme that there would be “national soul searching about our role in the world”.

Be that as it may, intervention in Syria has continued to remain a rather stealthy, vicarious affair for those in the UK cabinet. The result is a dog’s breakfast of rationales as to who should receive British support, generally of a more covert variety. Assad continues to be worth deposing, but he remains a foe of IS, which has roared into the geopolitical front line with ruthless aplomb.

This week, it came to light that the UK involvement in Syria has gone well beyond what Parliament authorised. Initial authority had been given to UK forces to strike IS targets in Iraq. Those actions have also been shielded by Baghdad’s blessing. To date, however, UK Defence Secretary Mike Fallon has maintained that the embargo would remain on British strikes against Syrian positions, at least till Parliament said otherwise.

The human rights group Reprieve, was not convinced. Yes, it may well be that the planes used in the operations continued to be American – but that did not necessarily say much about the pilots involved in the missions. In a Freedom of Information request, the organization decided to dig deeper into what, exactly, the Ministry of Defence had been up to on the issue of air involvements.

In the words of Jennifer Gibson, Reprieve’s staff attorney, “UK personnel have already been involved in bombing missions over Syria for some time – making the current debate over whether Britain should carry out such strikes somewhat obsolete.” The avarice of executive power was very much in evidence.

A spokeswoman for Prime Minister David Cameron initially tried to sidestep the issue of whether British personnel had been involved by taking a leaf out of the book of vague and trusty protocol. Since the 1950s, it had been a “well known” practice that UK personnel had been embedded with allies. There were currently “upward of a dozen” such personnel operating in the campaign against IS.

Then, the clinching remark: “The PM was aware that UK personnel were involved in US operations and what they were doing.” To date, the air aspect of the campaign has been confined to logistical support for other Coalition forces, air-to-air refuelling missions and surveillance.

This, in effect, was not so much mission creep as mission stretch, with its fair share of dangerous consequences, despite efforts on the part of such figures as former chief of the air staff, Sir Michael Graydon, to suggest otherwise. As Tory backbencher John Baron opined on the Today programme, “we should be very sensitive to the fact that we have military personnel participating, in effect, in military intervention.” Tim Farron, the new Liberal Democrat leader, suggested that the move had effectively played “into the hands” of IS, a body ever keen to find more recruits.

Alex Salmond, the Scottish National Party’s foreign affairs spokesman, was distinctly unimpressed by this shadowy widening of conflict. “The Government’s policy in this matter is entirely unacceptable – effectively overseeing a bombing campaign by stealth – and we need to know what the defence secretary knew, when he knew it, and when he was proposing to tell the country. He clearly didn’t do so in the debate on 2 July.”

Salmond’s concerns have echoed the general scepticism about which warring horse to back in the conflict. Support for one faction, he suggested, would not necessarily lead to any “desirable” outcomes. Trite, but undeniable. “Experience tells us that interventions can have unforeseen consequences.”

Experience, however, tends to be the neglected sage in the rooms of policy makers, with the Middle East continuing to draw in the incapable, the blind and, ultimately, the anti-democratic.

The post Expansion By Stealth: UK Strikes In Syria – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Worldwide observance of the International Yoga Day has been criticised as attempting to promote Hindu nationalism, directly linked to Narendra Modi’s past affiliations with Hindu nationalist groups. Further analysis suggests it is a viable soft power measure of the Indian government.

By Juhi Ahuja*

The United Nations General Assembly adopted International Yoga Day on 21 June 2015 at the suggestion of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. It was inaugurated in New York by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and in New Delhi by Modi. More than 35,000 people participated in the mass yoga event in the Indian capital.

However the event resulted in domestic social backlash from religious minorities, especially Muslim groups. They accused Modi of pursuing a Hindu agenda through yoga, which the groups say is against Islamic teachings. The uproar was fuelled when key Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) leaders made derogatory remarks about Muslims and their reaction to the yoga day.

Is yoga Hindu?

Nevertheless, the BJP government maintained that it upholds secular democracy in India. The controversy arose because of Modi’s past and current affiliations to Hindu nationalist groups, his failure to adequately resolve inter-religious tensions despite international criticisms and exaggeration of the issue by the Indian media. Putting aside the religious underpinnings and reactions, the International Yoga Day is a key soft power strategy for India and a major personal accomplishment for Modi considering that more than 170 countries co-sponsored the resolution to celebrate the ancient practice which originated in geographical India.

The controversy calls for a critical assessment of the allegations against Modi’s use of yoga, an ostensibly religious practice, as an instrument of soft power. To be sure, the practice of yoga sometimes involves chanting in Sanskrit – liturgical in Hinduism – or the adoption of bodily postures that display reverence to the sun. It is widely mentioned in Hindu scriptures such as the Vedas, Upanishads, and Bhagavad Gita as being beneficial for all of humankind to keep the body and mind healthy, and for self-awareness and consciousness.

While the knowledge of yoga originated in India, and was passed down through generations of saints, sages, and gurus, still, it was meant purely for the betterment of the individual, not the religious community or some god or gods. The practice of yoga predates the formal establishment of the Hindu religion and came about long before the natives of the Indian sub-continent were identified as ‘Hindus’.

However, certain religious (i.e. Hindu and Muslim) and political groups may have a vested interest in labelling yoga as Hindu as it would both resonate with the Hindu-majority populace and at the same time create avenues for the Muslim-minority groups to voice their grievances. For example, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), a right-wing political party seeking to establish a Hindu state in India, actively promoted the International Yoga Day both domestically and abroad.

The coupling of yoga with Hinduism so publicly sent a strong signal to religious minority groups that the Hindutva agenda was once again being imposed upon them. Earlier this year, Hindu extremists carried out isolated attacks on churches in south India – impacting the sentiment of the religious minority groups in general. As such yoga has been used as a tool for exacerbating interfaith disharmony.

Soft power posturing

Since assuming power in May 2014, Modi has been unabashedly extending Indian influence onto the world stage through strategic diplomacy, trade, and culture. In line with his efforts to project Indian ascendancy, he proposed the idea of a yoga day at his UN General Assembly speech on 27 September 2014, which was well received internationally. The UN recognised yoga as providing a holistic approach to health and well-being, and there was no attempt to present it as a religious or spiritual practice.

Modi’s use of yoga as a soft power strategy is critical not only because having an annual event to commemorate it worldwide reminds global citizens of India, but also because it associates yoga with the Indian identity. The International Yoga Day also reinforces the growing popularity of yoga as a lifestyle choice worldwide. Few other countries are able to boast a UN-mandated event to their name.

The effects of soft power are long lasting but the results are not as immediate as hard power. If India wants to improve its bilateral and multilateral relationships and bring states around to its side, creating a positive image of itself through yoga is just one soft power strategy. It has in fact been counter-productive with regards to its crucial neighbour, Pakistan, which has declined to co-sponsor the resolution, citing religious reasons.

Bad timing, tough luck

The announcement of International Yoga Day came at a time when India was (and still is) pushing hard to be a permanent member of the UN Security Council. Any positive developments in India’s favour are yet to be seen. Although it seems to have had a positive response internationally, it has had damaging effects domestically. The controversy has become more about Modi and less about India – an obvious indicator of the politicisation of the issue.

Furthermore, Modi became prime minister at a time when religious fundamentalism in India is gaining political attention (with extremism in the name of Islam and the Hindutva agenda). It certainly does not help his case that his past is coloured with religious controversy – the Gujarat riots in 2002 between Hindus and Muslims.

It is certainly unfortunate that Modi’s personal record has become an impediment to his state’s foreign policy strategies. Save for deteriorating interfaith relations at home, the International Yoga Day is a promising soft power strategy for India for years to come as it is a constant reminder of India’s cultural heritage and serves as an avenue for diplomatic exchanges.

*Juhi Ahuja is a research analyst with the Studies in Inter-Religious Relations in Plural Societies (SRP) Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.

The post International Yoga Day Controversy: India’s Soft Power Or Modi’s Hindu Agenda? – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

The influence of Mongolia on Buryatia has increased dramatically, according to a Moscow historian who visited Ulan-Ude after a gap of just over seven years, a development due at least in part to the overbearing attitude of Russian officials and the bad feelings that has generated among the Buryats.

In a Facebook post picked up by Buryat and Mongol outlets, Aleksandr Morozov says he is struck by how rapidly the Buryat capital has developed: “Those who say that in Putin’s Russia nothing is changing or is changing only in Moscow have never travelled beyond the ring road” (facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=481839078632382&id=100004188811429&fref=nf and asiarussia.ru/blogs/8370/).

But in addition to these positive changes, there are other more negative ones: “public dissatisfaction is evident” given that “Moscow seeks to run everything, and this is not well received.” Moscow suggestions are seen “as orders” that “must be fulfilled and over-fulfilled at any price. The problems of federalism are superimposed on complicated inter-ethnic relations.”

“The Buryats,” Morozov says, “are dissatisfied by the fact that important positions are occupied by non-Buryats … and up to the present are upset by the unification of Buryat districts in the 2000s to Chita and Irkutsk oblasts. As a counterbalance to the loss of political influence are being taken persistent efforts to develop Buryat culture and language.”

Buryats are also unhappy about the influx of people from Central Asia and the Caucasus, he says, and they are very attentive to Buryatia’s neighbors. “Everyone fears” China, “but Russian bureaucrats look at it already as certain that Russia sooner or later will lose these places.”

“For Buryats,” the Moscow historian says, “the example of Mongolia is important.” Until recently, that country was much poorer, but now “everything is changing before their eyes. Mongolia is developing rapidly, something that generates delight and envy” among the culturally close Buryats.

After the introduction of a visa-free regime and the collapse of the ruble, he continues, Buryatia was flooded with cheap goods from Mongolia, and Mongols came for vacations on Lake Baikal.

“If Mongolia in the future will develop as it is now, its influence on Buryatia will grow,” Morozov suggests. “The example of a successful, ethnically close, independent state inevitably will be conceived by part of the Buryat elite as an inspiring example for emulation.”

According to the Russian historian, young Buryats also look to South Korea, the result of Seoul’s promotion of itself. Today, young Buryats seek to enroll in universities in Seoul or in Beijing; their desire to study in central Russia “has weakened,” thanks, Morozov says to “Russia’s little Nazis, may they be cursed.”            

Taken together, he says, these shifts are “not the most favorable for Russian statehood. Problems are building up which are not being resolved, only put off.” The large number of people who commented on his post echoed his words on every point.
But with respect to the Buryats, Moscow does not now seem to be able to put a foot right. Today’s “Novaya Buryatia” reports that Buryats are upset that a copy of the Ivolgin datsan that was erected in Sochi as part of the “My Russia” exhibit is now being used as a bar and restaurant (newbur.ru/articles/21680).

They say that Russian laws about offending the feelings of believers must be enforced in this case which affects them just as Moscow has done in the case of supposed denigration of Russian Orthodox feelings. The Buryats have had some success in this regard: In 2003, their complaints led the owners of Moscow’s Buddha Bar to rename it the Karma Bar.

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The Autonomous Republic of Nakhchivan, the western most territory of Azerbaijan, is a gold mine of ancient archeological monuments, fortresses, religious architecture and a living testimony of ancient city formations. The remnants of the Stone Age are reflected today in a number of caves in Nakhchivan, such as: Gazma, Ashabi-kahf and Kilit. On the other hand, this historic region of Azerbaijan has a significant number of Bridges and Castles that were built during the time period between the X and XVII centuries. Nakhchivan is undoubtedly the only territory in Eurasia for having such a large number of ancient bridges crammed in a region that is barely 5,500 km2.

The Gilanchay River is surrounded by majestic ancient bridges, archeological sites that are extremely important for the study of ancient world’s history and is home of many ancient battles. The Aza Bridge is an ancient monument, located in the village of Aza, in Ordubad region, crossing the Gilanchay river. Aza Bridge connects the village of Aza with Darkandi village. This bridge has a width of 3.5 meters, 46 meters in length, has five arches constructed with red stone that is a typical material found locally in the surrounding mountains. Four of the arches are built with wave cutters; this bridge was heavily used by trade caravans moving from East to West during the time of Silk Routes.

The Aza Bridge was constructed during the period of Shah Ismayil (1587-1629), the Safavid leader promoted trade caravan and commercial affairs between India, China with the Black Sea countries, his visionary policies were considered to be a great benefit by the European Countries during the XVII century and beyond. The Aza Bridge has been the main route of exported goods from the Far East towards Europe, some of the main products that have passed by are: dry fruits, grains, silk, handicraft products as well as high quality locally made products of Azerbaijan. As a result of violent historical events and natural disasters, such as the flooding of 1977, the bridge has been partially destroyed. Immediately thereafter the bridge was completely restored with assistance from the Government of Azerbaijan.

At the present the local people and vehicles continue to use the Aza Bridge, of the XVII century, every time they travel from Nakhchivan and Ordubad region to the Aza Village.

Another remarkable historic landmark in Nakhchivan is the Bilav Bridge, which is also located over the Gilanchay River, to the south of Bilav Village as part of the Ordubad Region. This Bridge consisted of five roman arches, however today there are found only parts of this architectural masterpiece. The distance between the arches was different, the columns had a square shape; it had a width of 3.3 meters and had a length of 55 meters. The Bilav Bridge was constructed of big stones and rock pieces with lime mixture, and covered with hewed rocks. This bridge was built in the XVIII century.

In the village of Bist, over the Alahi River, are located two bridges that have unique shapes and embody a tremendous historic value for the whole region of Nakhchivan, those are: Bist Bridge I and Bist Bridge II. Bist Bridge I, a historical monument with impressive archeological values, connects the west of Bist Village in Ordubad region. It was built of stone and brick and it has a different width on both sides. The western Span is big and the Eastern span is relatively smaller, it has a length of about 21 meters, a height of 10 meters and the width is 3.8 meters. Both of the sides of the bridge have metal lattices. The objective of this structure was to facilitate the commercial routs in ancient and medieval Nakhchivan as well as provide connectivity between the Village of Bist and the rest of the world. According to local stories, the bridge was constructed during the rule of Shah Abbas the First; this Bridge is related to XVII century architecture.

Bist Bridge II is located over the Nasirvaz River, in the south east side of Bist Village, region of Ordubad. This structure was built with stones and bricks and has only one span. Its length is about 23 meters, a height of ten meters and width of four meters. Both sides of the Bridge are latticed with metal bars. Bist Bridge II has contributed in the local trade and has been vital for visiting the outskirts of Ordubad region. In the southern walls of the Bridge is carved the year 1869, however the architecture used in this stone structure is testimony of a late XIX century construction practice.

In the northern parts of Havush village in Shahrur region, is located the sanctuary of Choban Sacred Place. In the central part of this place there is a creek and rose bushes, it is surrounded by small rocks. There are many tourists who visit this location which belongs to the early middle ages, approximately to the VII century.

Nakhchivan is also the sanctuary of an important fortress in the history of Azerbaijan; the Dana Fortress, located south of Havush Village, on the high hills in the north of Akhura village in Sharur region. According to archeological research done by A. I. Novruzlu, Dana Fortress is related to Tanan, a Saljug leader, ancient big-stone walls have also been discovered in this location. There were also found unglazed earth ware, glazed table ware pieces, metal items. All these artifacts belong to various time periods between the XI and XVII centuries. For over seven centuries the armed forces of Azerbaijan have been stationed in the Dana Fortress in order to defend the territorial integrity of their homeland.

A treasure in Nakhchivan’s ancient history is Danyeri Fortress, located near the Danyeri village in Sharur region; it consists of two parts-Big Fortress and Small Fortress. The Danyeri Fortress dates back in the VIII century, the walls of the Fortress were built by large rock pieces and enforced with clay solution and some parts were constructed by hewed stones. Its principal walls were strengthened by means of half round towers and counter force walls. Today’s visitors will experience the impressive architecture style implemented in the square angled buildings which are near to the fortress walls and inside the fortress. In this location archeologists of Nakhchivan have discovered ceramic pieces, table ware items burned in pink and grey colors, glazed table ware and other important archeological data.

The Autonomous Republic of Nakhchivan and the Government of Azerbaijan remain at the forefront while leading proactive initiatives that are destined to maintain, restore and recover the rich cultural and historical sites that deeply reflect an important aspect of the ancient and medieval history of Azerbaijan and the World. The Fortresses and Bridges located in Nakhchivan region are an important asset for the history of Azerbaijan and clearly demonstrate to the world that Azeri nation has a millenarian culture that ought to be known and acknowledged throughout Eurasia and beyond.

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The son of a polisario senior officer Mr. Ahmed Braih, aka Ahmed Khalil. Ahmed Khalil, who was tasked with monitoring human rights and security in the camps of Tindouf, denounced the mysterious disappearance of his father on the Algerian soil, holding the polisario separatists responsible for his abduction.

Ahmed Braih is from the tribe of “Rguibate Souaad”, one of the largest tribes of the region, he was born in Tantan, south of Morocco, in 1953. He got his PhD in Political Sociology from the University of Fes in Morocco. Mr. Ahmed Braih is considered to be one of the original founders of the Polisario separatist movement.

In the Tindouf Camps, located in southeastern Algeria, Mr. Ahmed Braih held various positions in the Polisario Front. He was the president of the Polisario Intelligence services, the senior advisor to the president of the “ Sahara democratic republic” and the person in charge of Media and public policy. Mr. Ahmed Braih/Khalil has also held the position of the President of the union of Sahraoui writers and authors.

The last position held before disappearing was that of Media and Human Rights councilor of the Polisario front in the Algerian capital of Algiers.

His brother, Mr. Brahim Braih and other close relatives who have recently left the Tindouf Camps in Algeria have declared that Mr. Ahmed Khalil (Braih) disappeared in January 1st, 2009 from the offices of the Polisario Media and Human Rights in Algiers. They accuse the Algerian authorities of the kidnapping.

According to Khalil’s son, the case has been referred to the UN Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances (WGEID). Rashid Khalil lodged a complaint with the WGEID and told the media that he had tried for more than five years to get clarifications from Algerian authorities on the fate of his father and on the circumstances and motives of his mysterious disappearance in Algeria but without success.

“We have not heard from my father since April 1, 2009 while he was on Algerian territory. We do not know if he is dead or alive,” he told reporters.

Khalil’s son blamed Algerian authorities and the Polisario leaders for his father’s disappearance and said they are “fully responsible for any harm that might have befallen him.” He added “The polisario leadership is the first responsible for the disappearance of my father since Jan. 2009 when he was in Algeria, said Rachid Khalil who has been living in Saint Sebastian (north of Spain) since 2005, adding that his family did not receive any news of Ahmed Khalil for 6 years. “We want justice”, the young Sahrawi told Spanish news agency EropaPress, condemning the oppression and lack of freedom on the camps of Tindouf (south-western Algeria).

Rachid Khalil believes that his father is kept in an Algerian military prison, while blasting over the blackout on this case by the polisario leadership and Algerian authorities.

Talking about the sufferings and consternation endured by his family members who do not have any information on the whereabouts of their dear one, he called on international human rights organizations to press Algeria and on the Polisario to save his father from physical liquidation, if he was still alive.

No official reasons were given about the disappearance, but his relatives claim that Mr. Ahmed Braih was having second thoughts abut his affiliation with the Polisario and was thinking of going back to Morocco

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By Andrew Lumsden

This past April, in a ceremony attended by the Chinese ambassador, Barbados announced the establishment of a Confucius Institute at the University of the West Indies (UWI)-Cave Hill. This institute is one of over 400 Confucius Institutes established in schools across 115 countries. Officially, the Confucius Institute (CI) is a non-profit educational initiative which partners with schools across the globe to provide Chinese language instruction, scholarships for students to study in China, and to promote greater understanding and appreciation of Chinese culture. However, the organization’s close ties with China’s communist government, the sometimes ideological nature of its lessons and its efforts to enforce China’s political positions, have raised concerns that the organization’s intentions may be less about promoting Chinese language and culture and more about expanding China’s political influence globally and spreading the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) ideology.

The Confucius Institute

The Confucius Institute is owned and overseen by the Office of Chinese Language Council International, known as Hanban. Hanban labels itself as a non-governmental, non-profit organization affiliated with the Chinese Ministry of Education; however, the organization has been described as a “government entity,” because its leadership is comprised mostly of incumbent Chinese government ministers and CCP officials.[1] Hanban’s chair, Liu Yandong, is also the vice-premier of China and a member of the Central Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party, the group of 25 officials who oversee the party.

Hanban provides partner schools with grants of about $100,000 to $150,000 USD to help establish CIs. Once established, Hanban funds the institute’s operation jointly with the host school. The organization also provides teachers from China and pays their transportation costs and salaries. Hanban supplies its own books, videos, and other teaching materials to its institutes.[2] Between 2004 and 2011, Hanban spent an estimated $500 million USD establishing and funding CIs around the world.[3]

Beginning with Mexico in 2006, 33 CIs have been established in 11 countries in the Latin America-Caribbean region, welcomed in by schools and government officials.[4] Robert Jones, Barbados’ minister of education, said that the institute will bring about the “cross fertilization of ideas” and linguistic and cultural diversity.[5] During the opening of the Confucius Institute at UWI-Mona in Jamaica in 2009, the university’s head, Professor Gordon Shirley, said that the institute will attract “increased numbers of students” and further benefit the university by “increasing and deepening our understanding and appreciation of the culture of the people of China.”[6] Dr. Courtney Hogarth, director of the Confucius Institute at UWI-Mona explained that the institute holds celebrations for major Chinese festivals, teaches Chinese history and geography, Chinese language and culture, as well as Chinese calligraphy and tai-chi. The institute also shows films offering a “glimpse on life in China.” Hogarth urged Jamaicans to “make full use of those services we [at the institute] have to offer.”[7] China’s foreign minister Hua Chunying said that the CIs “promote international friendship” and describes them as a “bridge of friendship connecting the world with China.”[8] However, evidence suggests the institute’s intentions may be more political than educational.

The Confucius Institute’s Intentions

The Confucius Institute’s stated mission is to promote Chinese language and culture internationally, and Chinese state-run media has said that the institute “avoids ideological content.” [9] However, CIs have been known at times to promote ideological content under the guise of language and historical instruction. In 2014, The Epoch Times reported that textbooks provided and used by the institute to help students learn Chinese included propaganda songs with lyrics, such as “Our mighty leader Chairman Mao, Leading all of us forward.”[10] While Epoch Times is a publication devoutly critical of the CCP, it is worth noting such songs have been a part of education in China and have been performed by CI students at events sponsored by CIs.[11] Also, at least one advertisement in China for those wishing to apply for positions as CI teachers in Canada warned that all applicants would be “assessed to ensure they meet political ideology requirements.”[12]

A video on the CI website’s ‘For Kids and Teens’ section provides an example of how language learning material is at times marked by CCP ideology. The animated video, which is in Mandarin Chinese with English subtitles, offers a pro-communist, anti-American account of the Korean War. The video consistently referred to the conflict as “the war to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea,” as do some history books used by the institute. The video, ostensibly to help children learn Chinese language and history, condemned the UN’s intervention in the war and accused the U.S military of trying to “seize the whole (Korean) peninsula.” Yet, it praised the Chinese government for intervening on the side of North Korea.[13] Terence Russell, an associate professor at the Asian Studies Centre at the University of Manitoba, explained that the video was most disturbing because of its orientation towards young children who “lack the critical faculties to parse propaganda.”[14] The video has since been removed from the Confucius Institute’s website, after controversy emerged over its content. June Teufel Dreyer, a professor of political science at the University of Miami, said the history lessons taught in the institute’s videos and books are “outrageous distortions of what actually happened.”[15] Dreyer added that historical events embarrassing to the CCP, such as the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, are not included in the institute’s teaching materials.[16] The institute’s lessons also exclude any information on the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre.”[17] It should be noted that Li Changchun, a former member of the CCP’s Politburo Standing Committee, the highest branch of the Chinese government and former head of the CCP’s Central Commission for Guiding Cultural and Ethical Progress, called the CIs, “an important part of China’s overseas propaganda setup” in 2009, lending some credence to the allegations.[18]

Hanban and the CIs have also worked to promote China’s geopolitical stances, especially regarding the controversy over the sovereignty of Taiwan and Tibet. Hanban’s website describes Taiwan as “China’s largest island,” and maps used in the institute’s classrooms depict Taiwan and large portions of the South China Sea as Chinese territory.[19] When talking about the CI’s teachers, Xu Lin, Hanban’s chief executive, said in a BBC interview, “All of them will say, Taiwan belongs to China.“[20] Falk Hartig, a researcher at Frankfurt University and contributing scholar for the University of Southern California Center for Public Diplomacy, wrote that all foreign directors of CIs are told in orientation, “Taiwan and Tibet are part of China.”[21] However, Taiwan and many of the islands in the South China Sea depicted by the institute as part of China are not under Beijing’s administration, and Taiwan adamantly rejects that it is part of the People’s Republic of China. Also, many of the islands over which China claims control are controlled by other countries that reject Beijing’s claims and are concerned over its increasingly aggressive, irredentist behavior in the region. Hartig added that while he did not agree that the institutes are “sinister” propaganda, “the fact is that CIs are not apolitical organizations.”[22]

The promotion of the ‘one-China’ policy in CIs is especially important for Latin America and the Caribbean. Twelve countries in the region still recognize Taiwan, and, as Bucknell University professor Zhiqun Zhu explained, China has “quickly and quietly doubled its efforts to win Latin American and Caribbean countries away from Taiwan” in order to “further isolate Taiwan diplomatically.”[23] CIs may very well be part of these efforts, as its teaching seems to be more about promoting China’s vision of the world than providing apolitical education.

CIs have played a much more forceful role in promoting the CCP’s position on Tibet in schools across the world. Since China’s communist government invaded and seized control of Tibet in 1950, maintaining that its right to sovereignty over Tibet comes from historical periods of Chinese rule in the region, it has been determined to crush any discussion of Tibetan independence or the numerous human rights violations it has committed in Tibet. The UN has described the nature of Chinese rule in Tibet as an attempt “to destroy in whole or in part the Tibetans as a separate nation and the Buddhist religion in Tibet.”[24]

Despite the controversy surrounding the issue, as Professor Dreyer recalled, CIs would host speakers at universities who would endorse the Chinese government and “talk about how happy all the Tibetans were.” She added that these endorsements often occurred concurrently with “self-immolations happening.”[25] This is a reference to the Tibetans who publically set themselves on fire to protest and draw attention to Chinese oppression. Over a hundred Tibetans have self-immolated since 2009.[26] The University of Maryland’s CI, for example, hosted Xie Feng, an official for China’s U.S. embassy, in 2009. In his remarks, Xie described the period of Tibetan independence as one of “darkness and cruelty,” and asserted that all attempts by Tibetans to gain independence or more autonomy “will get nowhere.”[27] Promotion of the CCP’s political agenda is even part of the instructions given to CI teachers. Sonia Zhao, a former CI teacher in Canada, explained that while the institute’s teachers are instructed to try to avoid answering questions on Tibet and Taiwan, if pressed they must “say something the Chinese Communist Party would prefer,” namely that “Taiwan is part of China, and Tibet has been ‘liberated.’”[28]

The institute has also made efforts to suppress criticism of China, including an attempt at media censorship. In 2008 Yan Li, a former reporter for Chinese state-run media and director of the Confucius Institute at the University of Waterloo in Ontario, Canada, told students to “work together to fight with Canadian media.” Yan opposed the media’s reporting of Beijing’s brutal crackdown on Tibetans protesting Chinese rule and accused the media of supporting “separatists.”[29] An article on Wenxinshe, a Chinese-language website for Chinese scholars, praised Yan, saying that her influence encouraged Canadian students to “bravely” debate and oppose “anti-China elements” in Canadian television media, newspapers and on the internet. The article further explained that Yan’s efforts even yielded an apology from a Canadian news station.[30] While Yan took umbrage to the Canadian media’s negative portrayal of China’s crackdown on Tibetans, eyewitness accounts of the events paint a more gruesome picture of China’s actions, with reports of demonstrators being beaten, shot indiscriminately, and thrown off buildings by police. [31]

It should be noted that Liu Yunshan, a member of the Politburo Standing Committee and current head of the CCP’s Central Commission for Guiding Cultural and Ethical Progress, called on the communist party to use propaganda to “create a favorable international environment for us” and to exercise “control and management of foreign journalists” to “guide them to report China objectively and friendly.”[32] Yan’s actions represent a connection between the CI and the CCP’s propaganda aims, and the extent to which the institute’s agents are willing to manipulate students to try and censor any criticism of China’s human rights violations.

Confucius Institute and the Universities

Students are not the only ones who have been manipulated by the Confucius Institute. The institute’s connections with the Chinese government and many schools’ reliance on Hanban funding have raised concerns over how much influence the institutes, and by extension, the Chinese government, have on their host schools. In 2011, Peng Ming-min, a former senior advisor to Taiwan’s president, in the Taipei Times, explained that colleges and universities hosting CIs must first “declare their support for Beijing’s “one China” policy.[33] This policy states that Taiwan is part of China and the CCP’s regime is the “sole legal government” of the Chinese people.[34] It has, however, been suggested that this requirement is—at least publically—no longer enforced.[35]

Self-Censorship

The administrations of many universities hosting Confucius Institutes across the globe have self-censored their activities to keep from offending China. In 2009, North Carolina State University cancelled a visit by the Dalai Lama, after the director of the school’s Confucius Institute warned that hosting the Tibetan leader would disrupt “strong relationships we were developing with China.” Sydney University in Australia also cancelled a lecture by the Dalai Lama in 2013. Australian politicians and activists charged that the university withdrew its support for the event “to avoid damaging its ties with China” and to secure “funding for its cultural Confucius Institute.”[36] New South Wales MP John Kaye accused the university of selling off its “internal integrity” to “maintain close financial ties with the Chinese government.” The university relented after protest and controversy. Also, in 2009 a district court in Tel Aviv, Israel, ordered the city’s university to reopen an art exhibit made by practitioners of Falun Gong, after the exhibit’s organizers sued. Falun Gong is a religious sect banned in China in 1999 and whose practitioners are still actively persecuted by authorities. The court found that the university’s dean closed the exhibit under orders from the Chinese Embassy. Judge Amiram Benyamini, who presided over the case said that the evidence did not support the dean’s claim that the embassy’s remonstrance did not influence his decision to close the exhibit. Judge Benyamini concluded that based on the evidence provided by the plaintiffs, the dean shut down the exhibit solely for fear of losing the university’s CI and the associated funding.[37]

Russell explained that many universities see China as a “sugar daddy” and regard partnering with it and establishing CIs as a “pragmatic way of getting more funding.”[38] The United Nations identified under-funded schools as one of the major “overarching blocks” to proper education in Latin America and the Caribbean.[39] With schools in the region in need of funding and the generous amounts of funding provided by Hanban, it should be taken into concern how much influence the CIs will have over their hosts in the region, and how likely it will be for students to receive an objective and realistic view of China and the CCP.

Hiring Transparency and Discrimination

There are also concerns over the institute’s hiring practices and the degree of input host schools have in the institute’s hiring process. Chinese state-run Xinhua News Agency reported that such concerns are unfounded. Xinhua asserts that all institutes are managed by a committee consisting of “both Chinese and foreign experts” and that hosts “have their say in decision-making.”[40] However, reports from universities paint a different picture. Glenn Cartwright, head of the Renison University College in Ontario, Canada, said in 2013 that the host school does not “know anything about the contract they [Hanban] force their teachers to sign,” and that while Hanban has its own conditions under which teachers are hired, “whether we can dictate what those conditions can be is another story.”[41]In his article for The Nation, China U., Marshall Sahlins, anthropology professor at the University of Chicago, cites the director of his school’s Chinese language program who works with Hanban’s teachers. The director described the negotiation process of hiring teachers for the school’s CI as simply, “We don’t choose. They recommend, and we accept.”[42]

Most controversial, however, has been the conflict between Hanban’s hiring practices and religious freedom. Hanban requires that all those wishing to work at CIs, in addition to having no criminal record, must have “no record of participation in Falun Gong.”[43] Opponents of the institutes’ hiring practices like Sonia Zhao argue that this stipulation is tantamount to religious discrimination and that schools who work with Hanban are party to a violation of human rights and local laws. . Zhao, a Falun Gong practitioner was allowed to teach at the Confucius Institute at McMaster University in Ontario, Canada provided she refrain from practicing her religion and doing anything deemed “detrimental to China’s national interest.”[44] Zhao explained that she was told she would be punished if she breeched these conditions, and all teachers for the institute were made to sign similar contracts. Zhao left the Confucius Institute in 2010 and has been granted asylum in Canada on the grounds of religious persecution. McMaster University denied any knowledge of Hanban’s conditions regarding Falun Gong or of the contents of contracts signed by CI teachers. If McMaster’s denials are true, this case is a testament to Hanban’s lack of transparency in its hiring process. McMaster University shut down its CI in 2013, declaring Hanban’s hiring practices to be discriminatory. When confronted on the issue of religious discrimination in Hanban’s hiring, Xu Lin said only, “it is simply a matter of Chinese law.”[45] Chinese law, however, enforced on campuses across the world in violation of recognized fundamental human rights and the laws of most countries.

Resistance

There has been increasing resistance to the CIs by educators and governments in recent years. In 2013, the Canadian Association of University Teachers (CAUT) called on colleges and universities in Canada who host Confucius Institutes to shut them down. CAUT also urged schools in negotiations with Hanban to establish institutes to “pursue them no further.” CAUT’s director, James Turk, said that the Confucius Institutes are owned, operated by the CCP and “beholden” to the politics of an “authoritarian government.” Turk explained that the amount of influence CIs have over “curriculum, texts, and topics of class discussion” compromises integrity for universities and violates academic freedom.[46] In addition to McMaster, the University of Manitoba refused to open a CI, citing concerns over human rights. Also, in 2014, the Toronto District School Board terminated negotiations to establish a Confucius Institute.[47] CAUT’s American counterpart, the American Association of University Professors (AAUP), also called for U.S schools to either end or renegotiate their contracts with Hanban to ensure transparency, unilateral control by the host university over academic matters and hiring, as well as to safeguard academic freedom.[48] The University of Chicago and the Pennsylvania State University both shut down their Confucius Institutes. Resistance to the Confucius Institute has expanded beyond North America. In 2010, Osaka Sangyo University in Japan shut down its Confucius Institute, calling it a “spy department.” The university later apologized for the comment, but the institute remains abolished.[49] Schools in France, Sweden and Vietnam have either closed down CIs or expressed disapproval over their behavior and links to the Chinese government.[50] Rajyavardhan Singh Rathore, India’s minister for information and broadcasting, warned that the view of China propagated by Confucius Institutes could lead the next generation of intellectuals to have a “pro-China tilt.”[51]

China’s Response

China has responded viciously to criticism of its CIs. Chinese state-run Xinhua News Agency published a response to criticisms of the Confucius Institute. The response asserted that accusations of the political behavior by the CIs are only attempts to “defame and smear China’s goodwill.”[52] Another Xinhua article claimed that criticism of the CIs is all rooted in “intolerance” and “biased preconceived notions.”[53] The article also accused critics of the CI of trying to “smear and isolate the [Communist Party of China].” The article concluded by describing the institute as a “unique contribution from [China] to world peace.”[54] Global Times, another state-run media outlet, published a more vitriolic response. Its article charges that the real reason behind calls for schools to cut ties with CIs is because “China is on the rise” and that the intelligentsia in other countries lack “confidence in their culture and their system.”[55] The article further adds that critics of the Institute are “ashamed and scared” because the “pirate culture” in North America is inferior in the face of “5,000 years of Chinese culture.”[56] Xinhua did admit, however, that “without doubt, CI has its problems, in management style, hiring methods or quality of its teachers,” but it added that problems are to be expected with an institution undergoing such “rapid development” and stressed that there still is no justification for calls to reject Confucius Institutes.[57]

Support for CIs Outside of China

Confucius Institutes have also received support from school faculty outside of China. State-run People’s Daily interviewed university faculty members and CI directors from schools in nine countries who all expressed support for the institute, all of whom rejected the CAUT/AAUP assessment of the Confucius Institute, the dean of Suez Canal University in Egypt, for example, called the groups’ comments “unfounded” and “simply ridiculous.” They stressed that the institute is no threat to academic freedom.[58] The head of the Confucius Institute at Moscow State University said that discussion of any subject of interest to students “has never been restricted.” Edward McCord, associate professor of History and International Affairs at George Washington University also expressed support for the CI. McCord argued that it is unfair that CIs are expected to discuss the issues of Tibet and Taiwan and are then “treated with suspicion” for simply offering “counter perspectives supporting the [People’s Republic of China’s] view.” The problem, however, is not necessarily that the CIs support the CCP’s view of the issue, but rather that teachers are required by Hanban to recite the party’s line, as Sonia Zhao explained, and the information they disseminate is not always factual, as Dreyer and Russell point out.[59] McCord also argued that Li Changchun’s comments have been misunderstood, explaining that the word “propaganda” has an innocuous meaning in Chinese. However, Chinese media often uses the same word to condemn U.S. or Western “propaganda.”[60] Also, Li’s successor, Liu Yunshan called on the party to “actively carry out international propaganda battles against issues such as Tibet, Xinjiang, Taiwan, human rights, and Falun Gong.”[61] In Liu Yunshan’s comments, the word “propaganda” has a clearly combative connotation, as he calls on the party to use it to suppress criticisms of China’s political stance and human rights record internationally.

Conclusion

China’s response to criticism of the CIs, though sometimes histrionic, may have a degree of truth. Reactions to the Confucius Institutes have been generally positive outside of countries not geopolitically opposed to China. However, the CIs’ trend of promoting the CCP’s positions on major political issues to students should also be of concern in Latin America and the Caribbean. Despite their own claims and those of its supporters, the Confucius Institutes, headed by incumbent politicians, are not apolitical organizations. Their goal is to expand China’s soft power and present a positive, sanitized image of China, or as one professor put it, one of “pandas and chopsticks.” Given their history struggling with Western colonialism and coercion, it may be understandable why those in Latin America and the Caribbean want closer ties with China. However, the nature of the CCP’s rule and the censorship and political repression it practices should not be overlooked, especially in education. Thus, greater scrutiny should be applied to the institute’s practices in the region.

*Andrew Lumsden, Research Associate at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs

Notes:
[1] http://www.economist.com/news/china/21616988-decade-ago-china-began-opening-centres-abroad-promote-its-culture-some-people-are-pushing

[2]https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2014/04/29/chicago-faculty-object-their-campuss-confucius-institute; http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2010/10/06/06chinese_ep.h30.html

[3] http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-11-01/china-says-no-talking-tibet-as-confucius-funds-u-s-universities

[4] Zhu, Zhiqun. China’s New Diplomacy Rationale, Strategies and Significance. Farnham, England: Ashgate, 2010.

[5] http://gisbarbados.gov.bb/index.php?categoryid=9&p2_articleid=12659

[6] http://www.mona.uwi.edu/marcom/newsroom/entry/3450

[7] http://jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20111102/news/news8.html

[8] http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-12/05/c_133835935.htm

[9] http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-11-01/china-says-no-talking-tibet-as-confucius-funds-u-s-universities

[10] http://www.theepochtimes.com/n3/744030-cut-ties-with-confucius-institutes-american-profs-urge-universities/

[11]http://english.hanban.org/article/2010-10/18/content_183903.htm;

[12] http://www.theepochtimes.com/n3/730001-concerned-parents-activists-protest-against-confucius-institutes-in-toronto-schools/;http://www.saynotoci.ca/

[13] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=13k3AEjHNR0; http://abcnews.go.com/US/Parenting/mandarin-language-classes-mixed-reaction-chinese-institutes-motives/story?id=17485209; http://japanfocus.org/-Marshall-Sahlins/4220/article.html

[14] http://www.theepochtimes.com/n2/china-news/chinese-history-according-to-the-confucius-institute-255366-all.html

[15] ibid

[16] http://japanfocus.org/-Marshall-Sahlins/4220/article.html

[17] http://www.theepochtimes.com/n2/china-news/chinese-history-according-to-the-confucius-institute-255366-all.html

[18] http://www.wsj.com/articles/beijings-propaganda-lessons-1407430440

[19] http://www.wsj.com/articles/david-feith-chinas-beachhead-in-u-s-schools-1401124980; http://www.japanfocus.org/site/view/4220

[20] http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-30567743

[21] http://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/blog/what-foreign-confucius-institutes-directors-learn-china

[22] ibid

[23] Zhu, Zhiqun. China’s New Diplomacy Rationale, Strategies and Significance. Farnham, England: Ashgate, 2010.

[24] https://www.savetibet.org/policy-center/united-nations/un-general-assembly-resolutions/

[25]https://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/news/wests-universities-reconsider-china-funded-confucius-institutes/2002870.article

[26]http://www.voanews.com/content/what-makes-tibetans-self-immolate/1676255.html

[27] http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/gyzg/t556909.htm

[28] http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/canadian-universities-colleges-confront-questions-about-chinese-ties/article4353705/;http://www.theepochtimes.com/n2/canada/former-mcmaster-confucius-institute-teacher-seeks-asylum-in-canada-60805.html

[29] http://www.thenation.com/article/176888/china-u

[30] ibid

[31] http://www.hrw.org/node/91846/section/6#_ftn45

[32] http://japanfocus.org/-Marshall-Sahlins/4220/article.html

[33] http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2011/05/31/2003504575

[34] http://www.china-un.org/eng/zt/twwt/t39576.htm

[35] http://thediplomat.com/2014/03/confucius-institutes-hardly-a-threat-to-academic-freedoms/; http://archives.republicans.foreignaffairs.house.gov/112/HHRG-112-FA17-WState-MosherS-20120328.pdf

[36]http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/apr/18/sydney-university-dalai-lama

[37] http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/court-tau-bowed-to-chinese-pressure-over-falun-exhibition-1.6933

[38] https://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/news/wests-universities-reconsider-china-funded-confucius-institutes/2002870.article

[39] http://www.ungei.org/gap/reportLatin.html

[40] http://english.cntv.cn/2014/06/24/ARTI1403568561698629.shtml

[41] http://japanfocus.org/-Marshall-Sahlins/4220/article.pdf

[42] http://www.thenation.com/article/china-u/

[43] http://english.hanban.org/volunteers/node_9806.htm

[44] http://www.theepochtimes.com/n2/canada/former-mcmaster-confucius-institute-teacher-seeks-asylum-in-canada-60805.html

[45] http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-30567743

[46] http://www.caut.ca/news/2013/12/17/universities-and-colleges-urged-to-end-ties-with-confucius-institutes

[47] http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/toronto/toronto-school-board-votes-to-sever-ties-to-confucius-institute/article21376636/

[48] http://www.aaup.org/report/confucius-institutes

[49] http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90782/7023278.html

[50] http://www.gregorylee.net/; http://www.dn.se/nyheter/kontroversiellt-institut-laggs-ned/

[51] http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report-confucius-institutes-raises-a-cause-of-concern-for-indian-youth-2054691

[52] http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/indepth/2014-09/28/c_133679342.htm

[53]http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-06/24/c_133431220.htm

[54]ibid

[55]http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=42947&cHash=f6c612809cf77ea8295fcca43fd2f807#.VZwkrBtViko; http://opinion.huanqiu.com/opinion_world/2014-10/5158339.html

[56] ibid

[57] http://china.org.cn/china/Off_the_Wire/2014-09/28/content_33639773.htm

[58]http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=42947&cHash=f6c612809cf77ea8295fcca43fd2f807#.VZwkrBtViko; http://www.qstheory.cn/international/2014-06/20/c_1111236450.htm

[59] http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/canadian-universities-colleges-confront-questions-about-chinese-ties/article4353705/

[60] http://navy.81.cn/content/2013-08/23/content_5450667.htm; http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2014-11/12/c_127200482.htm; http://news.sina.com.cn/m/news/roll/2014-11-12/105231131895.shtml

[61] http://theory.people.com.cn/GB/41038/10855384.html

The post Big Dragon On Campus: China’s Soft Power-Play In Academia – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Recently, we must have witnessed the hype in Press about the International Yoga Day celebrations led by India all over the world.

The event evoked mélange of reactions, while some highly appraised the initiative there were also some criticisms as well. Moreover analysts didn’t fall short to offer their own analysis by analyzing the ancient Indian scriptures and offering their analyzing in the context of present government under Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s leadership. What is the essence of Yoga? How is it related with Religion? Is it a way to exercise India’s soft power? How is Yoga entering the arena of Diplomacy and International Affairs? With an intention of offering a holistic view, I will lay down some perspectives from different angles to enlighten our reader’s attention.

What is Yoga?

The contemporary analysis of Yoga by journalists and certain teachers has been limited only to the postures. Of course as we see that the west has adopted the more physical form of yoga which has been a billion dollar business so far. The flagship film of Yoga Day clearly states that the object of Yoga is Samadhi, by traditional means one has to perfect the asanas to achieve a healthy body, mind and spirit, then he has to internalize the process by focusing more on meditation which will lead to the state of Yoga. Essentially, Yoga is Sanskrit word, it means the union and connection with the divinity thereby achieving self-realization. Thus at the out the outset it is the process of self-realization which is an outcome of Yoga.

A Yogi is a person who practices Yoga, he has to obtain the state of Yoga, i.e. achieving the state of Nirvikilpa Samadhi, and it means that a Yogi enters into the dimension of thoughtless awareness which means connection of ones soul with the divinity. This state is more or less like an ecstatic experience of vibrations which a yogi feels after having attaining the state of Samadhi. Therefore practicing only physical posture may present us certain benefits but they won’t offer us the spiritual bliss and peace which is the ultimate aim of Yoga. This is where philosophy of Saint Kabir enlightens us, in his poetry he mentions “Pothi Padh Padh Kar Jag Mua, Pandit Bhayo Na Koye, Dhai Akhshar Prem Ke, Jo Padhe So Pandit Hoye.” Which means “Reading books hasn’t made anyone wiser. But the One who has experienced even the first flush of love, knows more about Life than a learned man. This leads us to conclusion that one doesn’t becomes a Yogi by analyzing or mere practicing, one actually becomes a Yogi by achieving the state of Yoga.

Another confusion created by analysts is about whether Yoga is the part of Hinduism. It is true to some extent that the science of self-realization was first expounded in India in prehistoric era, but the emphasis of yoga on scriptures in no way leads to conclusion that yoga is a part of Hindu philosophy. Firstly Hinduism was never a formalized religion. Secondly, it acknowledges the incarnations of realized souls who descent on earth to alleviate the human lives. Thus every soul who walked on the earth to propagate the message of divinity is promoting Yoga in other words, all the prophets spoke about it.

For example Jesus Christ did mention about connection with Holy Ghost and Supreme Father, Prophet Mohammad did emphasized that the Islam is surrender to Allah and that one has obtain divinity by completely surrendering to the formless and omnipresent god, similarly Buddha in his quest for liberation founded eight fold path for Nirvana. All of them are essentially speaking of the same connection in different times of history but the purpose is same, i.e. to uplift the consciousness of humans and to establish the process of self-realization within humans. Another beautiful example about unity of purpose in religions could be found in a classic titled Majma-Ul-Bahrain or The Mingling of the Two Oceans, written by King Dara Shikoh who was the eldest son and the heir-apparent of the fifth Mughal Emperor Shah Jahan. In this explores the interconnection and similarities between Sufism and Vedanta traditions.

We may also turn our attention towards Sahaja Yoga which is unique from other branches of Yoga, Sahaja Yoga claims to be the Yoga promoting universal harmony by emphasizing about the role of sacred masters hailing from different religions. Most of the time it is assumed that Yoga Gurus are mostly male, but it is also interesting to note that this global movement was founded by Shri Mataji Nirmala Devi who was the wife of late Dr. Sir C.P. Srivastava, International Maritime Organization Secretary-General Emeritus. In fact back in 1990 she conducted a Sahaja Yoga session at United Nations New York on the topic of Self Realization. Due to the diplomatic career of Sir C.P. Srivastava, Shri Mataji often spent her time out of India, travelling different countries, this further on acted as a catalyst for her to understand the western culture and thereby introducing them to Yoga which is simple and spontaneous.

Yoga and Diplomacy

The French case of promoting the French Culture and Language is a very interesting example of pursing diplomacy of preserving and promoting the heritage, art and culture. The role of France in creating International Organization La Francophonie in 1970 shows that it is assuming its authority in preserving the language, and through its means it would exercise its soft power in francophone countries. According to the organizations website, the member countries “also share the humanist values promoted by the French language. The French language and its humanist values represent the two cornerstones on which the International Organisation of La Francophonie is based.” In the same way, France is promoting French Language and culture through Alliance française. French Language, Wine and Cheese Tasting, Art, Culture and Education are one of the key activities promoted by Alliance française across the world.

Throughout the course, India managed to embrace the influx of different cultures but has still managed to retain the essence and the crux of divinity imbibed in its pluralistic traditions. At the times where British and French took pride in having colonies, India was still keeping its values and traditions alive. Being more than 5000 years old, Yoga as a science of self-realization has still managed to survive, neither India exercised its power to control it nor it promoted it. It played a vital role in creating state of art kings who would seek the guidance of yogis, moreover the fame of India and its philosophy spread across the world which dragged the attention of mystics, traders, monks and even philosophers and even colonizers. However India, since its independence hasn’t exercised cultural diplomacy as a part of its main stream diplomacy.

The complexities within the Indian Culture and the diversity in makes it more complicated for India play a legitimate role on promoting its own heritage and culture. At the same time India takes pride of its rich past, from the science of Ayurveda to the secular values of Emperor Akbar and monuments like Taj Mahal, India cherishes it all, but it fails to endorse it. Moreover India is one of the largest contributor of UN Peace Forces as well. So Logically, India has all right to promote Yoga, just like France does for French Language, this is essentially important because of two primary reasons.

Firstly, why didn’t previous governments undertook such step, were they ignorant or yoga was not on their agenda. Secondly, the west adopted yoga much faster than India did, that’s the reason why so many gurus settled out of India. The Yoga also flourished as a business where various forms of yoga were introduced which are completely opposite to the original philosophy. It is at this time, India had to reassume its position by sharing the true knowledge and true purpose of yoga which is to achieve peace and harmony.

On the 21st June, a record was created where millions of people practiced Yoga, which was even a rare fact for Indian to cherish its own heritage. I am not sure except any victory in sports if an Indian can recall when was the last time the world followed India’s footsteps? When was the last time they saw a Head of State appealing UN to adopt a Yoga day and himself practicing Yoga? Those practicing Yoga on yoga day across the world didn’t come for showoff, they rather came because they saw hope, because they are seeking the peace within and because it’s worth trying.

Although analysts may accuse government’s agenda and may find out loop holes in organization of mass event, they miss out the bigger picture of a massive country which has been at the epicenter of spirituality for the world and its role to lead the world by example. Of course Modi may find it inevitable to avoid criticisms, however some of his remarks do strike a chord with ancient wisdom. During his speech at UN General Assembly, he said that Yoga could help to tackle climate change and in recent International Conference of Yoga, he mentioned that Yoga could play a vital role in developing peaceful societies, responsible leaders so that we may leave planet in good conditions for future generation. This adds a new dimension of Spirituality in order to achieve Sustainability in every sector. Of course given the state of the world so far, we can make out that neither does industrialization nor investment helps us in tackling with emergent issues, if the mind of the person is not ready to absorb the change. It only through the process of sustainable transformation inside each one of us the society by its collective effort will be able to raise its own consciousness level, this in turn will bring mass change across the civilization. So far we have seen a glimpse of Modi’s vision, but how far it will lead to tangible results is still to be seen.

Future of Yoga

“Besides the Yogacara, …esoteric teachings of paticcasamuppada are considered a core of Buddhism. Applying the extensive philosophical interpretation to this teaching, it remarkably fits to the astrophysical theory of the so-called dependent origination, as it well supports basic laws of both quantum mechanics and evolutionary biology – a self-organizing system in an ever self-expanding dynamic, non-directional but dialectic, equilibrium” – reminds us on these pages prof. Anis Bajrektarevic about the huge (forgotten or disregarded) potentials.

Indeed, many companies across the world have recently integrated Yoga in their HR practice, whereas there are many who practice it on daily basis for spiritual or physical benefits. Certain amount of research is also indicating that it can help us to deal with stress and emotions, Thus it is clear that irrespective of criticisms, Yoga is all set to pave its path for growing popularity. More importantly, it can play a vital role in creating Sustainable Leaders, who have higher level of insights into the issues of the world and which in our definition have capacity to work at intergenerational level and to lay the foundations for next generation. At the Sustainable Leadership blog you can see from the interview of change makers on how they are transforming ideas into action. At the heart of the Sustainable Leadership, the spiritual consciousness plays a vital role in developing a mindset of the leader which allows him to connect the dots between international affairs, entrepreneurship, business and civil society. Through this mindset he is uniquely positioned to offer a novel perspective to deal with issues compared to traditional leaders working in disciplinary silos.

Finally, it needs to reiterate that Yoga is not a fashion, it’s an invaluable asset which is open to humanity, it is up to member states and people across the world to realize its worth and how it could contribute in health care, education, sustainable development issues. It should provoke an internal change which could bring in positive transformation, As Shri Mataji Nirmala Devi says “Divinity is not a fashion. It is the way of Life. It is the need of your being. You have to become that.”

About the author:
*Umesh Mukhi has a diverse profile with active interest in Business, International Relations and Youth affairs. He is the co-founder of an international initiative titled Sustainable Leadership Initiative; it aims at mapping new leadership models required for resolving challenges of 21st century. He was also awarded with the title of Honorary Cross Cultural Ambassador of UNESCO Club, Sorbonne University, and Paris for his inter-cultural contribution between India (spirituality and Indian culture) and World. First published by www.moderndiplomacy.eu

The post Yoga Diplomacy – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Truong-Minh Vu and James Borton

The increasingly loud accusations and declarations from Beijing and Washington over China’s ambitions to reclaim a string of small islands, coral reefs and lagoons show no signs of ending. However, given the number of international stakeholders in the region, the real promise of science for diplomacy may now be at hand in this complex geopolitical climate.

The arena for this convergence of two words- science and diplomacy- was displayed at a Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Washington symposium, where marine science, and the emergence of China’s ‘blue economy’ framed a new narrative in understanding the environmental stakes in the region’s escalating conflict.

Panelists Dr. John McManus, Rosentiel School of the University of Miami, and Professor Kathleen Walsh, U.S. Naval War College, demonstrated to policymakers how this contested region is not simply about sovereignty claims, but is likely to be recognized as one of the most significant environmental issues of the 21st century.

Policymakers may do well to take a lesson or two from nature as they examine how best to address the complex and myriad of sovereignty claims. Just as scientists place their subjects under close microscopic inspection, the policymaker, now more than ever, needs to visit science laboratories, where many contested nations’ researchers are sharing data about the future of South China Sea coral life.

At the 16th Meeting of the ASEAN Working Group on Coastal and Marine Environment held last month in Singapore, Dr. Leong Chee Chiew, Deputy CEO, National Parks in Singapore highlighted that the ASEAN region, with its combined coastline of about 173,000 kilometers and rich coastal and marine biodiversity, faces enormous challenges to sustainability in coastal and shared ocean regions. Unless a scientific ecosystem approach is adopted, trans-boundary marine areas conflicts will only become worse.

The problems are disturbing. Nearly 80 percent of the SCS’s coral reefs have been degraded and are under serious threat in places from sediment, overfishing, destructive fishing practices, pollution and climate change.

Challenges around food security and renewable fish resources are fast becoming a hardscrabble reality for more than just fishermen. With dwindling fisheries in the region’s coastal areas, fishing state subsidies, overlapping EEZ claims, and mega-commercial fishing trawlers competing in a multi-billion dollar industry, fish are now the backbone in this sea of troubles.

An ecological catastrophe is unfolding in the region’s once fertile fishing grounds, as repeated reclamations destroy reefs, agricultural and industrial run-off poison coastal waters, and overfishing depletes fish stocks.

A recent issue of The Economist underscores the importance for science diplomacy: “The littoral states ought to be working together to manage the sea, but the dispute over sovereignty fosters the fear that any collaboration will be taken as a concession.”

The United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) confirms that the South China Sea accounts for as much as one tenth of global fish catches and by 2030, China will account for 38 percent of global fish consumption. Overfishing and widespread destruction of coral reefs now necessitates the intervention of science policy to safeguard the stewardship of this vital sea.

The immense biodiversity that exists in the South China Sea cannot be ignored. The impact of continuous coastal development, escalating reclamation and increased maritime traffic is now regularly placed in front of an increasing number of marine scientists and policy strategists.

Marine biologists, who share a common language that cuts across political, economic and social differences, recognize that the structure of a coral reef is strewn with the detritus of perpetual conflict and represents one of nature’s cruelest battlefields, pitting species against species. At the same time, the coral reef, often referred to as a jewel of the sea, offers a sanctuary to many of the sea’s life forms like the mollusk, which in turn provides lodging to a mantis shrimp and a miniature eel in exchange for food and cleaning services.

While traditional diplomatic and military tactics are not completely exhausted in the latest round of diplomatic salvos between China and the U.S., perhaps the timing is excellent for the emergence of science as an optimal tool to bring together various claimants, including Brunei, China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Taiwan in the highly nationalistic contested sea disputes.

For the analysts and ministry policy shapers, this means a shift of focus, away from military capacities and maneuvering of naval vessels and surveillance planes to a deepening of registers and practices found in science diplomacy. If the U.S. and China are to find substantive common ground in this complicated and intractable history, it requires a creative and flexible diplomatic policy. That bridge for communication may be tapped among marine scientists currently engaged in cooperative research in the region.

For example, the build-up of maritime biology, maritime mapping and geology, deep-sea explorations, and systematic knowledge production was absent only 20 years ago. However, these scientific advancements fail to support a Chinese position with the UN Seabed Commission, and in other legal battles in the context of international law of the seas. On the contrary, the Commission fosters and provides the framework for the expansion of cooperative research in scientific marine study on deep-sea ecosystems.

In an amplification of science’s vaulted role, the International Seabed Authority is involved in the vast effort of collecting, analyzing, rationalizing, and disseminating results of marine scientific research and data. Their one hundred and sixty seven members, including China, recently met at the United Nations to develop and to discuss the exploitation code.

The scientific community does not refute the overwhelming evidence that China’s continued reclamation of atolls and rocks through the dredging of sand in the Spratlys disrupts the fragile marine ecosystem. The area has been recognized as a treasure trove of biological resources and is host to parts of Southeast Asia’s most productive coral reef ecosystems.

With coral reefs threatened around the world, reef specialist, Dr. McManus in his CSIS presentation, expressed concern for the plight of the region’s hard and soft corals, parrotfish, spinner dolphins, sea turtles, groupers, and black-tipped reef sharks.

Recent biological surveys in the region and even off Mainland China reveal that the losses of living coral reefs present a grim picture of decline, degradation, and destruction. More specifically, reef fish species in the contested region have declined precipitously to around 261 from 460 species.

While science provides as many answers as questions, the evidence is alarming that the world may be witnessing a reef apocalypse. This crisis should weigh heavily on all claimant nations who need the fish protein to feed a burgeoning 1.9 billion people.

As early as 1992, McManus was one of several marine scientists who wrote scientific articles advocating for an international peace park or marine protected area. While the geopolitical intractable SCS impediments remain, the Spratlys might be seen as a “resource savings bank,” where fish, as trans-boundary residents, spawn in the coral reefs and encircle almost all of the South China Sea waters, before returning home.

In an e-mail, McManus acknowledged that others have added international gravitas in the call for a marine protected area in the Spratlys. They include, Dr. Liana Talaue-McManus, his wife and an expert on resource management, Dr. Porfirio Aliño, a coral reef ecologist, and Dr. Mike Fortes, a seagrass ecologist, and Dr. Alan White, a senior scientist at the Nature Conservancy, now responsible for the Coral Triangle Program, representing a coordinated conservation policy driven effort on the part of six countries including, Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, the Philippines, Timor Leste and Malaysia.

Additional marine protected area endorsements have come from conservationist Tony Claparols, former Philippine President Fidel Ramos, Vietnam’s Dr. Vo Si Tuan and Taiwan’s, Dr. Kwan-Tsao-Y Shao.

The Nature Conservancy report ‘Nature’s Investment Bank’ points to improved fish catches outside MPA boundaries, increased protein intake and even poverty alleviation through ecotourism. Because of earlier scientific work and published articles, the Taiwanese government recognized Dongsha atoll’s prominence as a model for the sustainability of fishery resources in the SCS and the Taiwan Strait and was designated as the first marine protected area in March 2004.

The International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) provides a generous definition of trans-boundary conservation: “in its simplest explanation, trans boundary conservation (TBC) implies working across boundaries to achieve conservation objectives,” writes Maja Vasilijevic, chair of the IUCN World Commission on Protected Areas. Scholars or scientists should provide the interpretations and guidelines for the establishment of trans-boundary-protected areas.

The classic example of ‘science diplomacy’ was the original Antarctic Treaty, which most consider to have been a direct and natural extension of the multinational research in Antarctica associated with the International Geophysical Year studies in 1957-1958. Marine scientists have disclosed that a similar well-funded project in the South China Sea would be the natural lead-in to a Spratly Island agreement. There have been several international projects in the region. However, the ones that had a serious emphasis on the Spratly Islands have been minor because of the regional tensions.

The Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research (SCAR) is a committee of the International Council for Science (ICSU) charged with the initiation, promotion, and co-ordination of scientific research in Antarctica. SCAR is an international, interdisciplinary, non-governmental organization that can draw on the experience and expertise of international scientists. Another function of SCAR is to provide expert scientific advice to the Antarctic Treaty System.

Science Councils and Treaties Offer Diplomatic Solutions

Antarctica is the one place that arguably is the archetype for what can be accomplished by science diplomacy. Under the Antarctic Treaty, no country actually owns all or part of Antarctica, and no country can exploit the resources of the continent while the Treaty is in effect.

Over time, the Antarctic Treaty has developed into the Antarctic Treaty System, which includes the protection of seals and marine organisms and offers guidelines for the gathering of minerals and other resources.

Additionally, the Arctic Council has been able to effectively steer the passage of domestic legislation, international regulations, and, most importantly, international cooperation among the Arctic States. Eight nations—Canada, Denmark (Greenland), Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the United States—have territories (claims) in the Artic, and the domestic laws of these nations govern actions taken within their territorial waters.

Many of the adopted Arctic Council key recommendations could be adopted for the South China Sea: create a South China Sea Maritime Council or SCS Oceanographic Council; the United States should ratify UNCLOS to enhance U.S. authority on SCS issues; develop improved communications, standardized procedures and multilateral training for search and rescue, military movements, natural disasters, maritime awareness, oil spill management, shipping infrastructure, and oil, gas and mineral development; identify priorities for scientific study; develop more small-scale and renewable energy projects to improve the economic future of small communities; improve individual and community health and food security; and improve early-warning systems for environmental change.

Unfortunately, none of these recommendations are operative in the political currents of the South China Sea. Dr. Michael P. Crosby, President and CEO of Mote Marine Laboratory in Sarasota, Florida weighs in on benefits of using this paradigm for interactions between scientists and resource managers through international marine science partnerships. He has even extolled the merits of the Red Sea Marine Peace Cooperative Research, Monitoring, and Resource Management Program (RSMPP). Crosby states that “RSMPP may serve as a model for improving international relations and building capacity through marine science cooperation.”

Asia has the world’s largest fishing fleets, representing nearly three million of the world’s four million fishing vessels. And most estimates show that the numbers are increasing. China’s fleet of 70,000 fishing boats, the largest in the world, is increasingly flaunting the few international rules that exist around fishing. With other coastal claimants like the Philippines and Vietnam increasing their fishing fleets, it’s not surprising that China is rolling out a “blue economy” plan.

Professor Kathleen Walsh’s scholarship on China’s rising blue economy reveals that some Middle Kingdom marine scientists are concerned about conservation and sustainability issues. After all, coral reefs once found off China’s own shores have shrunk by an astonishing 80 percent over the last 20 years. Pollution, overfishing and coastal development are blamed for this environmental collapse. In her examination of China’s blue economy, which includes marine, maritime, and naval sector ambitions, Walsh argues that China’s new maritime development programs could have a big impact on the United States and other nations. According to her (disclaimer: these are her personal views and not the U.S. Department of Defense, US Navy or US Naval War College), Chinese leaders are looking at water resources—including coastal areas, rivers, lakes, and oceans—as the nation’s next economic development frontier.

Perhaps at the first sight, these observations and practices seem unconnected. But they operate together, and this notion of a Blue Economy reflects all of the elements of a broader strategic planning in Beijing.

But the crucial point here is that the assemblage of the South China Sea is increasingly shaped in scientific terms. Nevertheless, it’s painfully clear that today’s ecological policy issues face formidable challenges to inform policy deliberations. In other words, as the disposition of regional maritime space becomes greater, adding seabed research, geology and mapping, deep-sea biology, underwater archeology, cultural registers, environmental symposia, marine protected areas and art history, there are more avenues for the creation of common ground for all claimants. In this unfolding maritime drama, science offers all claimants the ability to monitor and to intervene.

Science diplomacy reveals at its core an ontological redefinition of this region. Knowledge sharing rather than naval vessels, commercial trawlers, advanced weaponry, and infrastructure, may prove to be the most powerful and essential tool to realizing peace and resolving territorial claims.

Diplomats need to take a page from scientific collaboration to better understand the myriad of South China Sea environmental challenges, since China’s success or failure in developing a blue economy will have implications for the rest of the globe.

This article was published by Geopolitical Monitor.com

The post Science Diplomacy Crucible For South China Sea Disputes – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

In a move that Alan Zarembo of the Los Angeles Times reports could result in the US government barring millions of Americans from owning guns, President Barack Obama’s administration has been quietly planning to have the Social Security Administration report the private information of Social Security recipients to the National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS).

Among the millions of people who may, as a result, be deprived of the ability to legally possess guns are, Zarembo notes, about 1.5 million Social Security recipients who “have their finances handled by others for a variety of reasons” and about 2.7 million people who receive Social Security disability payments due to mental health problems.

The Obama administration’s planned Social Security program is similar to an ongoing Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) program for reporting private mental health and other information to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for inclusion in NICS. My April 22 Ron Paul Institute article “VA Sending Veterans’ Mental Health Information to the FBI to Aid Gun Restrictions” provides details and analysis regarding the VA program. The RPI article also puts the VA program in the context of the “ongoing expansion of the scope of mental health databases and of the databases’ use by the US and state governments to prevent people from exercising gun rights.”

As with the VA program, the planned Social Security program baselessly equates a person’s inability or disinclination to handle some or all of his financial activities or decisions with the person posing a danger to others. Zarembo writes:

Though such a ban would keep at least some people who pose a danger to themselves or others from owning guns, the strategy undoubtedly would also include numerous people who may just have a bad memory or difficulty balancing a checkbook, the critics argue.

‘Someone can be incapable of managing their funds but not be dangerous, violent or unsafe,’ said Dr. Marc Rosen, a Yale psychiatrist who has studied how veterans with mental health problems manage their money. ‘They are very different determinations.’

While National Rifle Association (NRA) chief lobbyist Chris W. Cox’s quote in the Zarembo article suggests the NRA opposes the planned Social Security program, there is reason for skepticism. The NRA has worked over the years to create government mental health databases, to encourage the addition of more information in those databases, and to promote using such databases to restrict gun ownership.

Read Zarembo’s complete, informative Los Angeles Times article here.

This article was published by RonPaul Institute.

The post On Social Security? Obama Wants Your Gun! – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

A local police source, speaking on condition of anonymity, said ISIL terrorists kidnapped 35 families, among them women, children and elderly people, as they were traveling from the town of Hawijah in Kirkuk to Tikrit, situated 140 kilometers (87 miles) northwest of Baghdad, on Monday evening, the al-Sumaria satellite television network reported.

The source added that ISIL members took the people to an unknown location in the Hamrin Mountains, adding that the fate of the abductees remains unclear.

On March 31, Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi said units of government forces, backed by Shia and Sunni volunteer forces, had managed to retake control of Tikrit – which is the provincial capital of Salahuddin Province – from ISIL.

In a separate development, at least eight civilians lost their lives and 20 others sustained injuries as mortar rounds fired by ISIL militants slammed into the al-Hadid neighborhood of Khalis town, situated 75 kilometers (46 miles) northeast of Baghdad.

Khalis’ Deputy Mayor Uday al-Kadran said security personnel had located the source of the projectiles in al-Kasasbeh district of the town, and had subsequently completely destroyed the launching site.

The northern and western parts of Iraq have been plagued by violence ever since ISIL began its march through the Iraqi territory in June 2014.

Iraqi soldiers, police units, Kurdish forces, and Shia and Sunni volunteers are engaged in battles with the terrorists to drive them out of the areas they have under control.

Original article

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By Sylvia Mishra*

On 24 June 2015, the United States President Barack Obama was given the authority by the United States Congress to expedite negotiations for a massive trade deal – the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) – with countries on the Pacific-rim. The TPP is a proposed regional, regulatory and investment treaty – a key trade initiative through which the Obama administration seeks to advance the United States’ multi-faceted trade and investment interests in the Asia Pacific region. The ambitious 21st century trade agreement treaty, which is also an economic arm of the US Rebalance to Asia-Pacific, is being negotiated with 11 Asia-Pacific countries including Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam. The Obama administration has been pursuing TPP to unlock opportunities for American manufacturers giving an impetus to ‘Made in America’ exports thereby supporting job creation and increase in wage growth.

The interesting thing to note regarding the TPP is that the proposed trade deal will be a comprehensive deal for all TPP member countries that would range from providing market access for goods and services to ensuring strong and enforceable labour standards and strict adherence to standardized environmental commitments. Through the TPP, the Obama administration wants to ensure the vitality of American economic commitment to its allies and partner countries in the Asia-Pacific.

The conspicuous absence of China from the TPP grouping highlights the US need to write the rules of global trade and position itself at the epicenter of geo-economics. However, the US-led TPP would face increasing competition as China recently concluded a free trade agreement with Australia (ChAFTA) and South Korea and is pushing for a broader Asia-trade pact – Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). Adding new vigour to TPP negotiations, the US will be hosting a meeting of trade ministers from 12-nations in Maui, Hawaii marking the final stage in the TPP negotiations expected to cover 40 percent of world’s economy.

The TPP is an economic arm of the US Rebalance to Asia Policy. Since India has been an important part of the Asia policy, and is not a signatory to the TPP, there are widespread speculations as to how the TPP will impact India. While several opine that the overall impact is uncertain at this point, there are various channels through which the TPP can affect India. For instance, India’s exports are going to be impacted when the TPP is in place as there would be significant diversion in trade and foreign investments from the Indian market. A large portion of India’s exports are in services. With the anticipated reduction in barriers to trade in services among TPP members, there is the possibility that some of India’s services exports to those countries will be replaced by services trade with the TPP member countries.

The TPP would set a precedent to high global standards and in the event of India’s failure to mature and revitalize its manufacturing industry, and induce efficiency in its export sector, it would be increasingly difficult for India to be able to export even if it’s a part of RCEP. Even though TPP is open for new members, the standards set by TPP are too high for India to join. India may not be able to meet many of the commitments, for instance the supply chain management or regulatory coherenceamong others. By not being a part of TPP, India is going to lose the preferential access to the US market which is a big market for Indian exports, however, the extent of the impact from trade diversion would depend on the concessions finally agreed. India is in negotiations with the US on a Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT), but the success of negotiations on the BIT would depend on the relevant standards of the BIT agreement whether they are at par with the TPP level or below the level. In case, the standards set by BIT are at par with TPP level, then the challenges for the Indian exporters would remain the same and eventually there would be an urgent necessity to improve Indian manufacturing efficiency standards, procedures and processes.

India’s bilateral free trade agreements (FTA) with some of the TPP members – Japan, Malaysia, and Singapore – and FTAs, which are underway with Australia, Canada and New Zealand, may dilute the impact of trade diversion caused by TPP to some extent.

With the TPP in place, Indian industries are likely to face trade diversion effects in some of the key sectors such as textiles and clothing industries. The United States accounts for 30-35% of India’s ready-made garments exports and the TPP is expected to affect India’s textile and clothing sector in two ways: First, TPP member countries will get preferential access in the US market vis-a-vis exporters such as India. This would disadvantage India as US import duties on ready-made garments are high; Secondly, the ‘Yarn Forward Rule’— a key feature of the TPP — makes it mandatory to source yarn, fabric and other inputs from any or a combination of TPP partner countries to avail duty preference. This would change the dynamics of the existing global supply chain in textile and clothing sector. This is one instance of the adverse impact of TPP on India. Similarly, the loss of market access may also impact other products such as grains and other crops, processed food and heavy manufacturing.

Indian exports will be adversely impacted more due to the non-tariff measures rather than tariff measures as the tariff measures are already low in larger markets such as the US and EU. In addition to labour and environmental regulations, intellectual property rights (IPR) protection is a significant component to the TPP negotiations. The IPR standards are much more demanding than those of WTO. Most of the standards in the TPP negotiations are to converge to US standards or to the standards of developed markets. There is expectation of significant foreign investment diversion from India and since, a large proportion of India’s exports are in services, the impact would be significant.

BIT negotiation may shelter India for some of the adverse impacts of the TPP, however, the BIT negotiations would be a long-drawn process. There still exists a vast divergence on issues of IPR and market access which is unlikely to be in favour of India as the TPP reduces India’s bargaining power with the US. Lastly, RCEP also has members who are part of TPP. Due to overlap of members, it is expected that the standards for RCEP would also to an extent converge to the even higher standards of TPP. This would require significant efforts by India to reform its domestic policies to comply with the same or be left out of the growth in global trade which would be witnessed due to these multilateral trading arrangements.

Even though the magnitude of impact from trade diversion on India when the TPP is in place can be debated, it is certain that trade and investment diversions hurting the Indian economy is most likely to occur. Some of this impact may be mitigated due to a combination of inclusion in RCEP and other bi-lateral agreements. India should also re-engage the US in advancing BIT negotiations. However, a new ‘trade order’ is expected with much higher standards congruous to TPP standards and hence, efforts are required on the domestic front for India to acquire preparedness across industries to be able to compete globally.

*The writer is a Junior Fellow with Observer Research Foundation, Delhi

Courtesy: www.huffingtonpost.in

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By Kester Kenn Klomegah*

The Strategy of Economic Partnership identifies priority areas of BRICS cooperation – in such sectors as power, manufacturing, mining, agribusiness, and innovative technologies and many others, according the summit documents. It is aimed at expanding multilateral business cooperation with the goal of stepping up social and economic development, and increasing the competitiveness of BRICS countries in the global economy.

A range of other documents besides this one were signed in the presence of the leaders, including a memorandum on mutual understanding between foreign policy agencies of the BRICS countries to create a joint website — a virtual secretariat of the group.

Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov, who is Russia’s Sherpa at BRICS, told the summit that “BRICS is coming of age, and this maturity process is getting deeper and more oriented at practical results and, consequently, at coordination,” and pointed out that the Strategy of Economic Partnership was one of the summit’s finest achievements, in addition to the creation of the BRICS New Development Bank.

President Vladimir Putin expects that the New Development Bank will implement its first projects in 2016. “The new bank with a capital of $100 billion will carry out large-scale development projects in the countries of our association. We expect the first of them to be launched already next year,” Putin said at an enlarged meeting of the BRICS leaders. Companies from BRICS member states “are ready to establish joint ventures, build up mutual investment and commodity flows,” the Russian president said.

INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT

The Ufa Declaration points to industrial development as the key source of growth for the group: “We recognize that industrial development is a fundamental source of growth for the BRICS countries, which possess ample natural resources and significant labor, intellectual and technical capacities. Increasing production and export of high value-added goods will help BRICS countries enhance their national economies, contribute to their participation in global value chains and improve their competitiveness,” the declaration said.

“In this connection, we reaffirm the unique mandate of the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) to promote and accelerate inclusive and sustainable industrial development,” the declaration said.

“We are convinced about the importance of economic growth based on the balanced development of all economic sectors and on the development and introduction of advanced technologies and innovations, the mobilization of resources from financial institutions and the encouragement of private investment,” it said.

“In this context, we note the potential to boost collaboration in developing technology and innovation in the potential sectors of BRICS economies, such as mining and metal industry, pharmaceuticals, information technology, chemicals and petrochemicals, both in the area of exploration and extraction of natural resources and in their processing, transformation and use, including through the promotion of a favourable investment climate and the implementation of mutually beneficial joint projects,” the document said.

“We stress the importance of intensifying cooperation of industrial production capabilities, establishing industrial parks and clusters, technology parks and engineering centers with a view to developing and introducing cutting-edge technologies, providing training for engineering and technical personnel and managers,” it said.

“We highlight that encouraging investment in priority areas such as infrastructure, logistics and renewable sources of energy is a strategic goal for the sustainable growth of our economies. We reiterate our interest in joining efforts in order to face the challenge of competitiveness,” the declaration said.

“In this regard, the BRICS countries agree to collaborate for the promotion of investment opportunities in railways, roadways, seaports and airports among our countries,” it said.

NATIONAL CURRENCIES

“We acknowledge the potential for expanding the use of our national currencies in transactions between the BRICS countries,” the document reads. “We ask the relevant authorities of the BRICS countries to continue discussion on the feasibility of a wider use of national currencies in mutual trade.”

BRICS countries have confirmed their adherence to developing international standards in the tax sphere.

“The BRICS countries reaffirm their commitment to participate in the development of international standards of international taxation and cooperation for countering the erosion of tax base and profit shifting, as well as to strengthen mechanisms for ensuring tax transparency and to exchange information for taxation purposes,” the declaration says.

“We remain deeply concerned about the negative impact of tax evasion, harmful practices, and aggressive tax planning which cause erosion of tax base. Profits should be taxed where the economic activities driving the profits are performed and value is created.”

MULTILATERAL POLICY

The final summit declaration seeks to strengthen multilateral approaches to global affairs. “We affirmed the need for comprehensive, transparent and efficient multilateral approaches to addressing global challenges, and in this regard underscored the central role of the United Nations in the ongoing efforts to find common solutions to such challenges,” the BRICS leaders said in the declaration.

“We expressed our intention to contribute to safeguarding a fair and equitable international order based on the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and to fully avail ourselves of the potential of the Organization as a forum for an open and honest debate as well as coordination of global politics in order to prevent war and conflicts and promote progress and development of humankind.”

“We recall the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document and reaffirm the need for a comprehensive reform of the United Nations, including its Security Council with a view to making it more representative and efficient so that it could better respond to global challenges. China and Russia reiterate the importance they attach to the status and role of Brazil, India and South Africa in international affairs and support their aspiration to play a greater role in the UN,” the declaration reads.

In April, Russia took over BRICS chairmanship, and the 7th BRICS summit was held in July 2015. Leaders of Russia, Brazil, India, China and South Africa (BRICS countries collectively represent about 26% of the world’s geographic area and are home to 42% of the world’s population) made the summit’s key topic “BRICS Partnership — a Powerful Factor in Global Development”; the summit ended in Ufa, the capital of Russia’s Volga republic of Bashkiria.

*Kester Kenn Klomegah is an independent researcher and writer on African affairs in the EurAsian region and former Soviet republics.

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The Knesset passed into law on Monday night an amendment enabling harsher punishments for stone-throwers, a Knesset press release said.

The move raised outcry among Palestinian MK’s.

As the law stood prior, those who throw stones at cars could be convicted and sentenced for up to 20 years without the state having to prove the throwers’ intent of trying to damage cars or harm their occupants.

Under the new law approved by the Knesset– Israel’s parliament — stone-throwing violations will now fall into two categories.

One category enables the state to put someone behind bars for 10 years if they are found to have thrown “a stone or any other object at a vehicle in motion in a manner liable to endanger the passengers in the vehicle or people in the vicinity.”

Under the “harsher category,” it continues, the 20-year sentence can still be given, however imprisonment “includes the issue of intent, and forbids the throwing of stones or any other objects at a moving vehicle with the intent to seriously harm the occupants.”

The new law also makes it easier to punish those who throw stones at police patrol cars.

Five-year sentences will now be possible where it can be proven there is “intent to interfere with the policeman’s performance of his duties or to prevent him from performing them.”

The move was widely condemned by Palestinian members of the Knesset.

Of the Knesset’s 120 members, 69 voted in favor of the law, while only 17 members opposed it.

The bill was presented to the Knesset by MK Nissan Slomiansky, a member of far-right Naftali Bennet’s Habayit Hayehude (Jewish Home) party.

According to the statement, Slomiansky said: “David killed Goliath, the strongest Philistine of all, with a stone; in other words a stone can kill.”

He alleged that a third of all arrests in Jerusalem dealt with “this dangerous phenomenon of throwing stones,” and said that the practice “must be aggressively eradicated.”

He added: “The courts give very light sentences compared to the punishments set by the legislature even in more serious cases.”

Israel detains hundreds of Palestinians for alleged stone-throwing every year, and Israeli rights group B’Tselem reported that from 2005 to 2010, “93 percent of the minors convicted of stone throwing were given a prison sentence, its length ranging from a few days to 20 months.”

Five Palestinian youths from the West Bank village of Hares could face life imprisonment after they were charged with attempted murder following an alleged stone-throwing incident.

The youths, 16 and 17 at the time of their arrest, hit two years behind bars in March.

‘What symmetry is there?’

According to the Knesset statement, Palestinian MKs slammed the bill.

MK Jamal Zahalka said: “Who will the judge send to prison? He who demolished the home, seized the land, killed the brother, or the boy who threw a stone?”

“The one who demolishes the home gets a medal, but the boy whose anger is justified gets punished. There is no justice in this law.”

Another Palestinian MK Hanin Zoabi, said: “We are not talking about a law, we are talking about the occupation. If the law is meant to protect the weak, it is also meant to protect those victims who are killed every week by soldiers.”

Earlier this month 17-year-old Muhammad Kasbah was shot dead in Qalandiya refugee camp after he threw a stone at an Israeli army jeep.

The Israeli commander responsible for his death claimed his life had been in danger, although video footage later confirmed witness reports that Kasbah was shot while running away.

“Imagine a soldier with a gun facing a teenager with a small stone, what symmetry is there?” Zoabi said.

According to the statement, the Knesset’s deputy chairman MK Hilik Bar defended Israeli military, claiming: “Just as they protect me, they are protecting you, in this Middle Eastern Jungle.”

Palestinians living under Israeli military occupation routinely throw rocks at heavily armed security forces during clashes as one of the few means available to protest their subjugation.

Youths often throw stones at settler cars driving in the occupied West Bank, while it is also common for settlers themselves — both armed and protected by armed Israeli forces– to target Palestinian vehicles with rocks.

Settler violence against Palestinians in the occupied West Bank is routine and goes unpunished by Israel, with 324 incidents of violence recorded in 2014, according to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.

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With strong ties to Pakistan, China extends economic and strategic influence over the Indian Ocean region.

By Dilip Hiro*

In most countries, governments change and policy follows. In China, where the Communist Party is determined to stay in power for perpetuity, the government can lay down policies and carry them out over the long haul. The long-term policy can be upgraded as the economy and technology permit.

This is happening with China’s ambitious One Belt, One Road project, and its all-weather alliance with Pakistan, the latest example being active involvement in helping Islamabad bring the Afghan government and the Taliban to the negotiating table officially for the first time.

After the 1962 Sino-India War, Chairman Mao Zedong decided to contain India’s regional clout by forging an alliance with its rival Pakistan, even though the latter was then firmly in the “imperialist” camp of the United States. This alliance is now being given a new varnish as part of the modern Silk Road network aimed at extending China’s economic-strategic influence to the Indian Ocean region.

The enduring stability of Sino-Pakistan ties stems from mutual interest in containing India. Strained relations between the two South Asian neighbors date back to the founding of Pakistan on the eve of the independence and partition of British India in August 1947. Since then Pakistan, the smaller of the twins, has struggled to even up to its larger, more powerful sibling. In this quest, it has found China a pivotal ally.

Whereas Washington has had wildly fluctuating relations with Islamabad, Beijing has proved to be its all-weather ally. In May 2011, when Pakistan protested that the United States had not given it the merest hint of the impending clandestine operation to kill Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad, there was silence in capitals worldwide – except Beijing. China supported Islamabad’s stance, arguing that Pakistan had been foremost in combatting terrorism at home. This led Pakistan’s ambassador to China, Masood Khan, to laud the Sino-Pakistani friendship. “We say it is higher than the mountains, deeper than the oceans, stronger than steel, dearer than eyesight, sweeter than honey, and so on.”

Pakistan’s location has been a key factor in the geopolitical alliance. On the edge of the Persian Gulf, Pakistan offers a bridging role for China. Pakistan’s ports overlooking the busiest oil shipping lanes have been a key element in China’s implementation of its “string of pearls” strategy linking the South China Sea, South Pacific Ocean and Indian Ocean. Aiming initially at safeguarding the sea lanes used to ferry Middle East oil for its voracious industry and rising living standards of its people, China has come to view Pakistan as a critical element in containing India on a wider scale.

According to China’s ambitious plan, the westernmost pearl in its string of pearls is Gwadar port, to be linked by rail and road to the Chinese city of Kashgar, end points of the proposed China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, or CPEC. Gwadar is 386 kilometers from the Strait of Hormuz through which about 30 percent of world oil shipments pass daily. China aims to import Middle East petroleum through Gwadar, thus discontinuing reliance on the long, expensive sea route, exposed to potential blockade of the Malacca Straits by the US Navy.

The CPEC project – a network of roads, railway and pipelines – moved up from blueprints in April when Chinese President Xi Jinping and his senior officials signed 51 agreements with Pakistan, 31 related to CPEC to which China has committed an investment of $46 billion.

Deviating from diplomatic protocol, Pakistan’s military chiefs called on Xi during his Islamabad visit, to thank him for ongoing Chinese cooperation with their forces dating back to 1966. Following the Indo-Pakistan War in disputed Kashmir in 1965, Washington suspended supplies of war materials to both belligerents even though Pakistan continued to be a member of the US-led South East Asia Treaty Organization and the British-led Central Treaty Organization. China stepped in to fill the gap, shipping weapons to Pakistan and participating in the building of its domestic arms industry.

Following the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan in 1979, Pakistan, then governed by General Muhammad Zia ul Haq, became a frontline state in the Cold War. The US under President Ronald Reagan resumed arms supplies to Pakistan subject to the US Nonproliferation Act of 1978 which barred any country testing a nuclear weapon from receiving American assistance and imposed sanctions against countries that attempted to acquire unauthorized nuclear technology.

This did not stop Islamabad from seeking clandestine assistance for its nuclear weapons program from Beijing. Intent on helping Pakistan to overcome military inferiority compared to India, China provided Pakistan by providing an atom bomb design and fuel. In early 1984, a nuclear bomb assembled by Pakistan was detonated successfully at the Chinese test site of Lop Nor in Xinjiang. With that, much to Beijing’s contentment, Islamabad achieved parity with Delhi in military deterrence.

So single-minded was Reagan in expelling the Soviets from Afghanistan that he ignored the CIA’s 1986 reports of the secret testing of a Pakistani atom bomb in China. Military aid to Islamabad continued subject to the US chief executive certifying each fiscal year that Pakistan was not engaged in a military nuclear program.

This charade ended soon after George W. H. Bush, a former CIA director, became the US president in 1989. With the Afghan war ending that year, he refused to certify that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear explosive device. US weapons shipments ceased in October 1990.

That opened Pakistani gates for Chinese arms manufacturers. Within a few years, China became Pakistan’s leading arms supplier. Now Islamabad-Beijing collaboration includes personnel training, joint military exercises, intelligence sharing and counterterrorism efforts. Since 2010, Pakistan has produced the JF-17 (Joint Fighter) Thunder multi-role combat aircraft and K-8 Karakorum light attack aircraft jointly with China.

Significantly, Xi’s delegation in Islamabad included high officials of the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, China Development Bank Corporation and EXIM Bank of China – in line with the China’s Politburo to have an increased economic footprint in the Indian Ocean region.

Leadership change may augur policy shifts in the arena of diplomacy and foreign policy. It is in this light that the upcoming 2016 Philippine Presidential elections deserves attention, as it may have a significant bearing on future Philippine foreign policy directions, including on the management of the territorial and maritime disputes in the West Philippine Sea (WPS) and overall Philippines-China relations. Indeed, because of recent developments, foreign policy, especially dealing with China, may just become a major electoral issue that the Filipino public would like to hear from aspiring Presidential candidates.

The possible outcome of the legal challenge initiated against China’s expansive nine dash line claim and China’s recent building of artificial islands in some WPS features will cast a long shadow in the calculus of the next Philippine national leader. At the same time, the emergence of the world’s second largest economy not only as a huge proximate market and trade partner, but also as a key outbound investor and financier for infrastructure projects, presents immense opportunities that can be tapped to address the country’s needs. Therefore, the next Filipino leader must skillfully balance the demands of upholding territorial integrity, maritime entitlements, and national security with economic imperatives and the need to maintain harmonious relations with neighbors. He/she would have to weigh in and navigate through competing interests of various constituencies, balance continuity with flexibility to suit prevailing conditions, make necessary compromises without losing sight of core national goals and most importantly ensure that the best interests of the country are served. This is no easy feat, but all these challenges comes with being the country’s chief foreign policy architect.

A shift towards moderation?

This early, several Presidential bets had already offered their initial thoughts on the issue of dealing with China with most candidates demonstrating an attempt to balance economic engagement and managing jurisdictional disputes in WPS. Incumbent Vice President and longtime Makati Mayor Jejomar Binay, the first candidate to express his interest to run in 2016, seems to gravitate towards more moderation and engagement stressing that China has money and that the Philippines needs capital. He also seem receptive to the idea of a joint venture in the WPS, similar to what former President Macapagal-Arroyo entered into with China and Vietnam during her term in office. Vice President Binay also pointed out that the longstanding disputes with China over WPS may not be resolved immediately.

Longtime Davao City Mayor Rodrigo Duterte, renowned for his tough stance against criminality and his support for federalism, appears to take a bolder stance on the matter of dealing with China compared to his peers, although he also expressed his openness for negotiations and for a joint oil and gas exploration with other South China Sea (SCS) claimants. While emphasizing the need for the Philippines not to rely on the United States in defense of its territory, he said that China’s unprecedented buildup of structures in WPS may prompt the return of U.S. bases. He also called for the revival of youth military training as part of collegiate curriculum saying that it would help in building up a “credible self-defense force,” as well as instill “discipline, nationalism, and the patriotic duty” among young men. While saying that the country doesn’t “need to add an external security threat by saber-rattling against China,” he maintained that “China should not be allowed to use its military and economic might to bully smaller countries like the Philippines.”

Another Presidential candidate who offered a glimpse of her China policy is incumbent neophyte Senator Grace Poe, daughter of the late popular action star and defeated Presidential candidate Fernando Poe Jr. Senator Poe supported the continuation of the arbitration case saying that both the Philippines and China are UNCLOS signatories. However, she also called for the continuation of the other aspects of bilateral relations, such as in the field of economics, humanitarian aid and cultural exchanges, among others, pointing out that the country’s “relationship with China dates back centuries.” In a speech she gave at a Rotary Club of Manila forum with the presence of US Ambassador to the Philippines Philip Goldberg, the Senator shared the view held by Mayor Duterte that Philippines should not rely on the US in relation to WPS.

Erosion of confidence on the U.S.?

In the face of the massive and unprecedented reclamation and island-building activities conducted by China in WPS, militarily-disadvantaged Philippines deepened its security and defense engagement with the US, as well as with Japan. Opposition to the PH-US Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement on Constitutional and legal grounds also diminishes as a result of the increased external threat perception brought about by China’s assertive actions in WPS. However, joint military exercises, reconnaissance flights, naval patrols and official statements criticizing China’s actions in WPS aired by Philippine, U.S. and Japan leaders did not deterred China from changing the facts on the ground and completing its construction of military-civilian structures in some WPS features. This may have serious implications in the reckoning of aspiring Philippine leaders as it showed the possible limits of what the U.S. can do for a Mutual Defense Treaty ally. This failure may also reverberate to other littoral states with varying degrees of security engagement with the U.S. and which are also locked in territorial and maritime disputes with China.

In relation to this, Senator Poe remarked, “I’m sorry to say this Mr. Ambassador (referring to the U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines) but I know the U.S. is our ally. But we cannot fault them for thinking of their own interests. In pursuing any conflict, the first interest that we need to think of are our constituents.” Mayor Duterte also reiterated the importance of self-reliance. While these statements are to be expected, the context under which they were voiced out betrays a sense of frustration over U.S. security guarantees. Such frustration if prolonged over time may conditioned in the minds of Philippine and other regional leaders the perceived futility of closer security engagement with the U.S. One can even argue that the U.S. failure may embolden future Chinese actions in the contested features and waters in maritime East Asia.

The U.S. pivot or rebalance to Asia is poised to counter China’s growing influence in the region and offer countries an alternative from the exigencies of being too tied to China’s orbit. But with recent reports on defense cuts, geographic spread in multiple theaters, and opposition to a heftier defense budget that could put real substance to its pronounced commitments, many are concerned about whether the U.S. can muster the resources needed to effectively pivot back to Asia. In addition, the much-touted economic pillar of the pivot, the Trans-Pacific Partnership, to which the Philippines had expressed interest in joining, is still experiencing tremendous opposition within the U.S. itself and it remains to be seen when it will really take off. Meanwhile, China’s initiatives, notably the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the “One Belt, One Road” (OBOR) had been gathering pace and already counts in its roster of members staunch U.S. allies like the UK and Australia.

Finally, there are some concerns about a possible softening of U.S. stance on the SCS in the run-up to President Xi’s visit to U.S. in September. A lot of items will surely be placed in the agenda and SCS may not even make it in the priority list given the wide range of more pressing issues, such as China-US Bilateral Investment Treaty, climate change and the threat posed by nuclear North Korea, that are up for discussion between the two powers. The possibility that the U.S. would enter a compromise on the SCS in order to get China’s support on other issues such as reduction of greenhouse gasses or opening more sectors of the Chinese economy to American investors is always an open possibility.

This is where the interests of claimant states like the Philippines and that of the U.S. clearly diverge in relation to WPS. For the Philippines, WPS is important from the vantage point of territorial integrity, sovereignty and sovereign rights, national security, marine environment and economic development whereas for the U.S., who maintains neutrality on territorial and maritime disputes and largely emphasized freedom of navigation and overflight, it may just be one of the bargaining chips in its great power rivalry with China. This realization, if properly considered and appreciated by Filipino Presidential candidates, may have far reaching consequences on the way they would frame their China policy.

Towards more accommodation with China?

Chinese actions in the WPS push the Philippines closer to the U.S., while U.S. failure to stop further Chinese incursions in WPS may push the Philippines to adopt more accommodationist measures towards China. Highlighting or downplaying the WPS dispute in its bilateral relations with China is a political decision that the next Philippine President will undertake and domestic and external factors may influence this choice.

The minimal and unenthusiastic support the Philippines received from its fellow ASEAN members may lessen the perceived value attached to this regional body as a venue for resolving the SCS disputes, which may not sit well for the whole region especially in light of the on-going efforts to work on the Code of Conduct. The divided position and relative silence of some ASEAN members is not surprising given the fact that China had become ASEAN’s largest trading partner. Therefore, erosion of confidence on U.S. security guarantees and diminution of ASEAN’s collective leverage in dealing with China may raise the salience of bilateral talks between the Philippines and China as a way to manage relations, including the WPS disputes. That most candidates intimated their receptiveness towards constructive engagement with China on the economic front, as well as the revival of a joint exploration in WPS, supports this case.

While U.S. and ASEAN’s behavior may help shape how the next Philippine President will craft his/her foreign policy in dealing with China, it would still be China’s actions, at the end of the day, which would exert the greatest influence in the formation of the future China policy for the Philippines. So far, China had been sending mixed signals promoting potential financing vehicles for Philippine infrastructure needs through AIIB and OBOR, but at the same engaging in the creation and fortification of military facilities in WPS features. In the context of continuous artificial island-building, prevention of Filipino fishermen from accessing their traditional fishing grounds in WPS and blockading of regular supply trips to Filipino settlers and troops in Philippine-occupied WPS features, the idea of constructive engagement will be a tough sell and candidates who will advocate for such position may become unpopular. If China will continue with its current posture, it may contribute to the hardening of the Philippine position in relation to the disputes and WPS may again take the driver seat in the bilateral relations. For the bilateral relations to advance and veer away from too much emphasis on the jurisdictional disputes, there is a need to contain and manage potential crisis incidents so they do not spill over and affect other aspects of the relations. Surely, subsequent actions by China will be closely watched by Philippine Presidential candidates and their positions would be molded depending on actual conditions and perceived Chinese intentions.

This article was published at China-US Focus

The post A New China Policy For The Philippines Post-2016? – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

While International Yoga Day seeks to promote spirituality and wellbeing, its origin may be linked to Hindu nationalist militant extremism. Will its benevolent ideals prevail?

By Paul Hedges*

On June 21 2015, the world witnessed the first International Yoga Day (IYD), an event declared by the United Nations General Assembly following lobbying by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Associated by many with spiritual wellbeing and harmony, yoga has roots in Hindu religious practices and traditions, even if the type of bodily exercises popularly found today have little connection to that tradition. An association with generic spirituality alongside health and wellbeing benefits have allowed yoga to become a worldwide phenomenon.

Indeed with 170 countries supporting the resolution at the UN it did not even need a vote, while Secretary General Ban Ki-moon’s Message on IYD stressed it could promote “physical and spiritual health”, “respect for one’s fellow human beings”, and “does not discriminate”. In the UN resolution it was seen as part of India’s traditional heritage without explicit ties to Hinduism.

Rising extremist violence

However, Modi’s promotion of this event have ties to his endorsement of Hindu nationalism. Meanwhile, some commentators argue the rise of attacks on Christian churches, and other minorities, in India this year is linked to a tolerant attitude towards such militant extremism by his government.

On 14 June, Hindu militant extremists attacked a church in a town called Attingal, Kerala, severely beating the pastor while he was preaching, before assaulting the congregation. Reports suggest the violence stopped when the police turned up, although they were very slow to appear on the scene. This attack is notable because Kerala is an area of India with a very high proportion of Christians.

While overall Christians make up about 2-3% of the population, it is as high as 40% in Kerala, and in parts of that state and neighbouring Goa as well as some other areas Christians are a significant majority. The event also occurred in a reasonable-sized town of around 40,000 people, whereas the majority of attacks take place in rural areas and where Hindus are in a clear majority.

Media, especially religious news websites like Huffingtonpost.com and Christianpost.com, have reported numerous other attacks this year, including the gang rape of two nuns, one of whom was 71 years old. Despite Modi’s promises of greater security and equality, the reality for those on the ground is very different. Indeed, attacks are not just taking place with greater frequency, but Hindu militant extremists also seem more confident to launch attacks in urban areas including those with high Christian populations.

Hindu nationalist politics

Before he became PM, a number of opponents and commentators expressed worries about Modi’s links with and support for Hindu nationalism, which can be associated with militant extremism. He was chief minister of Gujarat during one of the worst outbreaks of ethno-religious violence in recent years, the so-called 2002 Gujarat Pogroms, which targeted Muslims.

Although Modi condemned the riots, the failure of police to stop them – which some witnesses have claimed was politically controlled – or to follow up and punish the killers left a blot on his reputation in the eyes of many, especially when one of his ministers, Mayaben Kodnani, was jailed in 2012 for her role when trials were eventually instituted.

His party, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), has been linked with militant groups. Despite this history, Modi’s pragmatic business-friendly approach was seen as hopefully meaning that he would ensure equality and safety would prevail so that he could present himself, as he promised in the elections, as the man who would ignite India’s economic prosperity. The current situation, however, suggests no reason for optimism that ethno-religious violence and tensions will be quelled in India anytime soon.Indeed, it is possible that they may further escalate if militant extremists feel they can attack with relative impunity.

International Yoga Day: Ideals or conflicts?

All of this is a far cry from the perceived ideals of IYD, which millions embraced worldwide in a spirit of harmony, wellbeing, and spirituality. Of course, the event was not without its critics. It has been suggested by some that Modi promoted it to enhance Hindu nationalist feelings. In India, some Muslim politicians and leaders suggested it was an attempt to force Muslims to carry out un-Islamic Hindu religious practices. In response, it is recorded that some BJP politicians said such people could go and “drown in the sea”.

Meanwhile, whether directly related to the IDY or not, some Russian government officials, possibly at the behest of the Orthodox Church, have sought to ban yoga, certainly within municipal buildings, claiming an association with “religious cults”. Whether the practice of yoga is compatible with being a Muslim, Christian, or a member of another non-Hindu religion is debatable; but most mainstream Christian churches in many parts of the globe seem to regard the practice of yoga bodily movements as simply a health and well-being issue. Many Muslims in India also felt it was possible to participate.

While IYD clearly has lofty ideals, and is part of India’s soft-power promotion, it must also be seen that despite the rhetoric, it has an association through the support of Modi and the BJP to an agenda that, arguably, promotes Hindu nationalism; and thereby is allied to those who seemingly turn a blind eye to attacks on Christians and other minorities.

While a boycott of IYD is not suggested, nor condemnation of it for hidden Hindu roots or agendas, it must be realised that it is neither innocent nor disassociated from politics. IYD may promote harmony and spirituality, but it is embedded within political discourses and power games. Nevertheless, it is hoped that everyone will promote IYD for its lofty ideals, and that these become its lasting legacy.

*Paul Hedges in an Associate Professor with the Studies in Inter-Religious Relations in Plural Societies (SRP) Programme, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.

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