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Thailand’s Uighur Refugees: Security Implications For Southeast Asia – Analysis

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Thailand recently deported more than 100 Uighur illegal refugees back to China, triggering criticisms from Turkey and US, as well as the UN and human rights groups. The legalistic perspective of the media skirts the existential threat posed by the illegal traffic of Uighur refugees to the security of Thailand and Southeast Asia.

By Stefanie Kam Li Yee*

Thailand recently deported 109 Uighur refugees back to China, a move that was met with international criticism and questions concerning the legal status of the Uighurs as illegal migrants or refugees. Thailand defended its decision on the grounds that it was a third country, and to show that it would keep some Uighur refugees, it rejected Beijing’s request to return all of the Uighur refugees in Thailand’s detention camps.

The decision to deport the Uighur refugees sparked widespread protests in Turkey, with which the Uighurs share linguistic, cultural and ethnic ties. Both the Thai embassy in Ankara and the consulate in Istanbul were attacked and had to be temporarily shut. The US and the UN expressed strong concerns that the deportations were in violation of international law, while human rights groups like the Uighur American Association condemned the deportation of the Uighur Muslims.

Security Implications for Southeast Asian countries

While the debate mainly centred on the legal aspects of the Uighur migrant issue, these reactions skirted the security implications for Thailand and Southeast Asian countries posed by an influx of Uighur refugees into the region.

In recent years, Uighur Muslims have travelled via Southeast Asia to Turkey with the ostensible hope of escaping the unrest in Xinjiang and resettling in Turkey. In the past, claims by China’s Uighurs, a majority of whom are Muslims, of marginalisation and of a curtailment of religious freedoms, have driven their grievances against the Chinese state. This was underscored by a recent ban on students and state employees to fast during the Islamic holy month of Ramadan.

While these Uighur refugees may arrive in Southeast Asia with grievances towards China’s treatment, there is the danger that some of them may be clandestinely using Southeast Asia as a gateway to travel to Syria and Iraq. As evidence, in January 2015, China detained nine terror suspects who were Uighurs, and ten Turkish nationals accused of helping them in an attempt to travel to Syria. In July 2013, Chinese official media reported that a Uighur militant who studied in Istanbul and fought with the Free Syrian Army (FSA) in Aleppo had returned to Xinjiang and was arrested for planning to carry out “violent attacks” in China.

Within this group, there are also a handful of Uighur militants who come to the region with the deliberate intention to link up with Southeast Asian militants. Recently, an Indonesian court sentenced three men from China’s Uighur Muslim community to six years in prison on charges of conspiring with Indonesian militant Islamists: Ahmet Mahmut, aged 20, Altinci Bayram aged 29, and Tuzer Abdul Basit, aged 23 were arrested in September 2014 in Sulawesi for using fake Turkish passports. The Uighur immigrants planned to meet with Santoso, the leader of a terrorist group known as the Eastern Indonesia Mujahideen, better known as Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT).

Notably, MIT is one of the few groups in Indonesia that has pledged allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria (ISIS). This incident supports China’s claims that Uighurs have crossed the Turkish border into Syria and Iraq to fight for the transnational jihadist movement ISIS, on the pretext of being native Turkish citizens.

The existence of jihadist transnational networks, particularly linked to ISIS, highlights the potential for these refugees – given their political resentment – to become co-opted and radicalised by Islamist militant groups seeking to recruit and expand their networks across the region.

Thailand is home to many displaced persons including the Rohingya from Myanmar. Thailand will bear an increasing burden to provide refuge for a growing number of refugees. This will lead to deteriorating living conditions for the refugees, which will serve to aggravate their resentment and may cause them to turn to militancy and terrorism to vent their anger and frustrations. The Uighurs have expressed fear to return to China because of the repercussions they may face due to their leaving their home country. In addition, the longer the Uighur refugees are left in shelters, the greater their risks of contracting communicable diseases, which may also expose the local population in Thailand to public health risks.

Mitigating challenges of the Uighur refugee Issue

In light of these security implications, there is a need to improve socio-economic conditions, including the camps of these Uighur refugees, so as to safeguard them against becoming radicalised by militants and terrorist groups.

For its part China has much convincing to do to deal with international criticisms of its treatment of the Uighur Muslims. It will need to reassure the international community, that its treatment of Uighur Muslims is not a source for driving Uighur Muslims out of the country.

There needs to be more enhanced security co-operation between Thailand and other Southeast Asian states, particularly those affected by the threat of terrorism and militancy, including Indonesia, which serves as a breeding ground for jihadist militancy in the region.

Finally, enhanced cooperation and collaboration in the area of counter-terrorism between China and the affected Southeast Asian countries, will serve to deter terrorists from expanding their manpower by radicalising refugees, prevent the flow of militants travelling from Southeast Asian countries to Turkey and then on to Syria, and thereby ameliorate the situation posed by the influx of increasing numbers of Uighur refugees into this region.

*Stefanie Kam Li Yee is an Associate Research Fellow at the International Center for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR) at S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.


Nuclear Deal And US Rebalancing: Not A Strategy For Peace – Analysis

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By Roberto Iannuzzi

While a historic and highly controversial nuclear deal awaits final approval by the U.S. Congress, a debate on its regional and international fallout is raging across the globe. The agreement is indeed a huge gamble. Will it hold? Will it ease Middle East tensions, or will it further destabilize the region?

Inevitably, this is as much a debate on US foreign policy under President Barack Obama.

The foundations of Obama’s foreign policy crystallized mainly during his first term, when he had to contend with his predecessor’s calamitous legacy. Two catastrophic wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the 2008 financial collapse (the worst economic disaster since the Great Depression), were a terrible burden on the US economy and military capabilities.

Even today, the United States is “at a point where our national aspirations are at risk of exceeding our available resources,” Gen. Martin Dempsey, the outgoing chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recently said at a Senate subcommittee hearing.

It is this unprecedented crisis that has been shaping Obama’s foreign policy, including the nuclear negotiations with Iran.

Asia Pivot and a New “Cold War”

The White House chose therefore to redefine its top foreign policy priorities according to a “realist strategy” that, while not relinquishing Washington’s hegemonic role, would take into account its declining resources.

Accordingly, after the controversial “Afghan surge” of 2009, Obama tried to end US combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. At the same time, he proclaimed his intention to strengthen America’s presence in the Asia-Pacific region, where the chances of an impending strategic rivalry between Beijing and Washington were growing.

However, China – unlike Washington’s previous rival, the Soviet Union – is fully integrated into the international economic order. For this reason, according to several US strategists, the only way to contain it is through the creation of two giant regional trade agreements excluding Beijing (and Moscow) – the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).

While the hotly-debated TTIP between the United States and the European Union should become a sort of “economic NATO,” the equally controversial TPP embodies the “economic arm” of Washington’s rebalance to Asia. The latter, in turn, has also a military dimension represented by the U.S. commitment to put 60 percent of its naval forces in the Pacific by 2020.

The so-called “pivot to Asia” was officially announced by Obama in November 2011. Although it has been frequently derided by several American commentators, it is in fact alive and well.

Furthermore, the confrontational approach adopted by Washington against both Russia and China has largely contributed to the materializing of a new “Cold War” in a chaotically emerging multipolar world. The Ukraine crisis, in particular, has only strengthened the U.S. rebalance toward Asia and Europe, and away from the Middle East, in turn fostering a new closeness between Moscow and Beijing.

As Dmitri Trenin rightly observed, this crisis “was not just about Ukraine, or even Europe. It was about the global order, which promises a long competition with a yet-unforeseen result. Crucially, it is part of a pattern of changing relationships among the world’s powers, with the U.S. struggling to preserve its dominance.”

The U.S. and Iran: From Conflict to the Negotiating Table

With a significant part of the defense budget devoted to deterring Moscow and Beijing, Obama could not afford an armed conflict with Iran. Moreover, such a conflict, while possibly setting the region ablaze, would have delayed Iran’s nuclear program by only a few years, according to U.S. defense experts.

Nevertheless, the idea of a negotiated settlement of the nuclear dispute only dawned at a certain point in Obama’s Middle East strategy, being the result of a series of policy adjustments starting from a state of “undeclared war” against Iran. The nuclear talks offered both parties an opportunity to break this dangerous deadlock.

Contrary to widely held beliefs, however, Tehran’s position at the negotiating table was not weak. Although its economy was suffering heavily under sanctions, it was not on the brink of collapse. Meanwhile, Tehran had become a nuclear threshold state fully mastering the uranium enrichment process, and possessing several facilities across the country and a vast infrastructure for research and development.

Since US pressure had failed to stop Iran’s nuclear program, “legalizing” it was the only way left to contain it. This is why Washington’s negotiators focused on monitoring this program, constraining its enrichment capacity and delaying its industrial-scale development, rather than trying to dismantle it.

While Iran has always denied any intent to build nuclear weapons, many of those thinking that it might sometime do exactly that nonetheless recognize that the nuclear agreement buys needed time (probably more than a decade) to ward off such a contingency.

Iran, on the other hand, has chosen to constrain its nuclear program in the short term in order to obtain its long-term legitimation at the international level – together with Tehran’s reinsertion into the global economy. Consequently, Iranian negotiators too made several compromises with the aim of getting a deal. In the end, the final agreement reflects concessions by both sides.

Nonetheless, the nuclear talks have been a drawn-out and exhausting process. At heart, in fact, they were about Tehran’s challenge to US hegemony in the Middle East, rather than the Iranian nuclear program per se. And this is why they have aroused so much heated debate among Washington’s politicians.

Untangling the U.S. From Middle East Crises

The United States became the dominant power in the region following the collapse of the Soviet Union. US hegemony was based on two flawed principles: “dual containment” of the two revisionist powers (Saddam Hussein’s Iraq and the Islamic Republic of Iran), and cooperation with Arab authoritarian regimes in preserving the Middle East order (under the pretext that, at any rate, it was impossible to democratize them – a notion which came to be known as “Arab exceptionalism”).

Predictably, this regional order began to collapse, at first when the U.S. abandoned containment for “regime change” by toppling Saddam in 2003, and then when popular uprisings shook Arab regimes across the Middle East starting from the end of 2010.

Being mainly a U.S.-led regional order, however, its unraveling meant a huge strategic loss for Washington, dramatically adding up to the 2008 financial crisis and failed US wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The Middle Eastern earthquake placed Obama in front of unsolvable strategic dilemmas. Nonetheless, while being on the verge of getting sucked once again into the regional conflicts – particularly in Syria – in the end he stuck to his declared pivot to Asia.

The Obama administration has been involved in training Syrian rebel fighters and even procuring weapons for them. Apparently, it has also “green-lighted” a recent – mainly jihadist – offensive on Syrian Idlib province supported by Turkey, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia. But it has stopped short of committing massive American “boots on the ground,” both in Syria and Iraq.

Against the so-called “Islamic State” (IS), the White House has adopted a strategy of limited direct involvement, combining US airstrikes and local ground troops – mainly Kurdish and Shiite fighters, and Syrian rebels.

For Obama, the Iran deal represents yet another effort to extricate Washington from wasteful regional struggles. At the same time – maintains a recent report by the Center for a New American Security, one of the Obama administration’s favorite think tanks – Washington will use the nuclear deal to refocus on Asia and Europe, thus increasing US leverage with Russia and China.

Offshore Balancing

Actually, the White House doesn’t want an outright U.S. pullout from the Middle East. Rather, it has adopted an “offshore balancing” strategy there, which means leveraging the regional competitions to American ends, without deploying large numbers of ground troops.

According to Brookings’ Jeremy Shapiro, Obama “seeks to re-establish the United States as a balancer in the region, rather than as a direct participant in its endless civil wars.” A balancer, writes Shapiro, “has no friends or enemies—it is able and willing to, say, support Iranian goals in Iraq while it supports Iranian opponents in Yemen.”

Offshore balancing is neither isolationism nor a strategy for regional peace. Rather, it is a stealthier model of intervention, involving training and equipping of other countries’ military troops, and combining special forces, drones and cyber operations.

Obama is not interested in changing the region’s established political structures. Consequently, the nuclear deal will not lead Washington and Tehran to become allies, but at best to work together when their tactical interests converge.

There are several internal and external obstacles preventing a broader U.S. engagement with Tehran. Domestically, the Israeli lobby as well as the security establishment and the defense industry – always interested in treating Iran as an enemy in order to sell weapons to U.S. Arab allies – will stand in the way. At the regional level, Iranian and American interests are still mostly incompatible, as Tehran’s rising clout clashes with Washington’s hegemonic status.

At the same time, US rebalancing imposes a price tag on those Arab countries taking Washington’s support for granted. Removing the main Iranian threat to American interests, the nuclear deal allows the White House to insist that the Gulf monarchies assume greater responsibility for their own security.

In Shapiro’s and Sokolosky’s words, the U.S. “long-term goal is not to get into bed with Iran. Rather, it is to use the relationship with Iran to get out of bed with Saudi Arabia.”

Therefore, many in Washington consider as positive signs both the Arab League’s (probably doomed) decision to form a joint Arab military force, and Riyadh’s willingness to seek its own disastrous military solution in Yemen.

More Diplomacy Needed

The Yemeni conflict, however, is just one front in a Saudi-Iranian “proxy war” raging across the entire Middle East. Riyadh’s political and military activism is spurred by the very perception of Washington’s disengagement from the region.

Though denied by the Obama administration, such disengagement is being taken for granted by regional allies that are growing increasingly suspicious of Washington’s real intentions. These countries nonetheless remain almost entirely dependent on the U.S. for their security, at least for now.

In May, Obama invited the Gulf monarchs to Camp David essentially promising them more weapons. Recently, he gave similar pledges to Israel. This policy, while failing to bridge the gap of mistrust between Washington and its allies, is stocking already high tensions between them and Iran.

The Saudi war in Yemen, a recent Saudi-Turkish-Qatari offensive against the Syrian regime, and Washington’s half-hearted fight against IS, are fueling Tehran’s anxieties. Absent a diplomatic process focusing on regional disputes, the warning that Tehran could use at least part of the financial windfall it will gain from the nuclear deal to fund its regional allies and proxy wars might turn into a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Finally, there is another unknown further complicating the already troubled regional prospects. Obama’s Middle East policy is not only despised by American allies like Israel and Saudi Arabia, but is harshly contested at home. While his “rebalancing” doesn’t imply abdicating the US regional role, there are political circles in Washington that consider it a sign of weakness, as they strive for even more direct US involvement in the regional conflicts.

The Congress is unlikely to block the nuclear deal. Nonetheless, the United States might again get entangled in Middle East crises once Obama’s successor enters the White House.

The Middle East, however, needs diplomacy rather than more military efforts. Reinserting an energy-rich country of almost 80 million people into the world economy, the nuclear deal is potentially a game-changer for the long-term balance of power in the region. Even assuming that it holds, the agreement will exacerbate rather than ease tensions if it doesn’t usher in a wider negotiation addressing regional crises.

Should Washington use the deal to simply refocus on other dangerous standoffs in Asia and Europe, while acting as a mere balancer in the Middle East according to its own interests, peace will become even more elusive at both regional and international levels.

This is part of a series of editorials exploring the far-ranging impacts of the Iran nuclear deal. This article was published by Geopolitical Monitor.com

Leading American Writer Abulhawa Denied Entry To Palestine – OpEd

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By Annie Robbins*

Susan Abulhawa, the renowned Palestinian American novelist and political commentator, was denied entry to Palestine yesterday at the Allenby Bridge entry from Jordan. Her wrath is on full display:

Imagine being there, as Israeli peons denied this queen of Palestinian story her rightful entry to her homeland: 

Her: Why are you here? Me: visiting family, friends and opening ceremonies for playgrounds. Her: where is your family? Me: Jerusalem Her: what is the relation? Me: cousin Her: (clearly agitated with me) no aunts uncles? Me: no Her: where are you staying in Jerusalem? Me: my cousin Her: what is his name? Me: (gave his name) Her: other cousins. Me: you want the names of all my cousins? Her: yes Me: there’s hundreds of them. It’s a big family. I don’t get what you’re asking. Her:(slams her hand down on desk) who are you staying with? Me: My cousin Adel, whose name and number I just gave you, along with every other official who asked. Her: (now very angry) I am asking the questions. Me: … Her: (slams hand again on table) who else lives with your cousin? So I just screamed at them. Thieves, occupiers I called them. You wish you had the same roots as I do, I screamed. You should be the one to leave, not me. I’m a daughter of this land. Then they took me to my luggage and sent me in the bus. I regret walking and not making them carry me.

 And what were her plans in Palestine? To build two more playgrounds, visit new sites, hang with family and friends.” This is just a heads up. We’ve got to assume Abulhawa will write about it herself, if not in real time perhaps in a future novel. There’s more on her twitter feed. American citizenship is effectively worthless for Palestinians:

Abulhawa relates that the US Embassy in Amman is not doing anything for her, and she politely suggests that friends apply pressure.

>US Embassy in Amman would not even let me in the door. Nor would they even take my name or allow me to lodge a complaint at reception. At a minimum these representatives of the US State Dept should be compiling statistics on the systematic humiliations and denial of entry to US citizens. Israel is the biggest recipient of US handouts in the world. I was told told that another person in front of me “a real American” according to the receptionist, who was denied entry at the Jisr [bridge], and as far as I can tell, they didn’t take his information either. If any of you are inclined, please write/call or tweet to the embassy. http://jordan.usembassy.gov/contact.html

What a disgrace!!!

Recently Abulhawa has been coursing through my bloodstream on a daily basis — because I’m smack dab in the middle of The Blue Between Sky and Water (and yes I will be reviewing it here). Anyone who’s ever come in contact with Susie knows what a passionate person she is, leaving no stone unturned, her lyrical incisiveness swoons and slays. Calculating, breathtaking in her depictions of violence and cruelty, her novels take a reader on a roller coaster of beauty and devastation. Not a person I’d want to piss off, that’s for sure.

About the author:
*Annie Robbins is Editor at Large for Mondoweiss, a mother, a human rights activist and a ceramic artist. She lives in the SF bay area. Follow her on Twitter @anniefofani

This article was published by Mondoweiss.net

Iran Nuclear Deal And Future Prospects – OpEd

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The historic deal between Iran and the P5+1 (US, UK, France, Russia, China and Germany has finally signed. The deal is a multilateral accord and giving Tehran sanctions’ relief in exchange for limits on its nuclear program. The US-Iran nuclear deal is the most significant breakthrough in their bilateral relationship; certainly it is the positive development between both countries since the 1979 Iranian revolution that shattered their relations.

However the assumption on expected better relations between both states is arguable in view of the few statements. Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, recently told Iranians, “Our policy regarding the arrogant US government will not change.”

US Secretary of State John Kerry had earlier assured allies: “Nothing in the Iran deal is based on trust.”

However, Obama deserves the credit that notwithstanding all the pressure from Israel, as well as from Saudi Arabia and its Gulf allies, he peacefully and steadily pursued the diplomatic path to handle and resolve the nuclear tensions with Iran. And after the deal has been signed, Iran has also agreed to stop pursuing its goal to acquire nuclear weapon for the next 10 to 15 years.

The assurance that Iran is fulfilling the deal’s obligation will be given through a highly intrusive UN inspection and surveillance regime under the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This will lengthen the time for Iran to make an atomic bomb for at least 10 to 15 years as the scope to deceit inspections will be minimal.

Evidently, all this is not going to be that easily and smoothly. Israel’s Prime Minister, Netanyahu, is still doing his maximum efforts to break the deal. Israel, of course, is awfully disappointed. Netanyahu has called it a “historic mistake”, which will turn Iran into a “terrorist nuclear superpower”.

Israel has serious reservations over deal despite the fact that Israel is already a nuclear state with an estimated 200 nuclear bombs. A while back, when Netanyahu was invited to address the US Congress on the Iran deal subject, he as expected spoke against it and he is continuing to do that. But after the substantial endeavors on the deal for the last twenty months, the Obama administration is determined to pass it through Congress.

President Obama has said that he would veto any rejection by US Congress that has to review the accord within sixty days. Although, the Congress can out veto the president by a two-thirds majority, but it appears that Obama’s opponents might not be able to assemble this majority. If the happenings take place in this way then the nuclear accord with Iran is a done deal, especially after its adoption by the UN Security Council (UNSC).

It is questionable that why Iran signed the deal? The reasons for doing so are strategic and economic. Firstly, if Iran has signed the deal that does not mean that Iran can never produce a nuclear weapon. In fact, Iran can still choose to go nuclear at an appropriate time in the distant future when the trust between itself and the rest of the world has been established.

Secondly, and perhaps most significantly, the rationale behind signing this deal comes from a deep longing to restore the domestic economy in Iran. Decades of sanctions have ended up hurting the local population and Iranian political setup ushered into power through popular mandate so that some damage can be controlled. With sanctions lifted, Iran’s economic potential will open up all sorts of opportunities not only for Iran but also for the region and beyond. Iran will get access to its frozen funds, estimated at $ 100 billion.

For Iran, the agreement will directly translate into increased influence in the Middle East. Years of sanctions have failed to limit Iran’s significance in the Middle East, but, in the future, Iran will be able to jump in the regional politics so openly and legitimately as an important stakeholder.

Significantly, the deal will have some instant and log-term impact both on global and regional level. At the global level, the deal will bring out Iran from international isolation. On the regional level as Obama told a press conference:

“The bottom line is this: this nuclear deal meets the national security interests of the US and our allies. It prevents the most serious threat — Iran obtaining a nuclear weapon, which would make the other problems that Iran may cause even worse.”

And he went on, “Without a deal, we risk even more war in the Middle East, and other countries in the region would feel compelled to pursue their own nuclear program, threatening a nuclear arms race in the most volatile region in the world.” While Kerry, opined, “This agreement makes the region safer.” Surely, he means for Assad and Iran.

However another perspective has been presented by Torbjorn Soltvedt, an analyst with the Maplecroft group, which tells “Iran will remain in conflict with Saudi Arabia in Syria and Yemen in particular.”

The economic implications of the deal will assure the six major powers to secure the sanctity of the Strait of Hormuz to get a steady and cheap supply of oil from the Gulf. However, Iran will have to wait for almost a year to harvest the financial gains of the deal; the six major world powers will reap the benefits of the lower cost of oil perhaps immediately. In South Asian region, both Pakistan and India will also be benefited from Iran nuclear deal. Pakistan will be finally completing the Iran-Pakistan pipeline, with the prospect of sanctions on Iran lifting in the near future.

While India will again import oil from Iran, which has been traditionally India’s second-largest supplier of crude oil, and ramp up cooperation on the development of the Chabahar deep-water port. India is developing the Iranian port of Chabahar with likely US encouragement in the aftermath of Iranian Nuclear Deal as Silk-2 route; a kind of competitor to Silk Route Gwadar – Kashghar. Thus Iran nuclear deal has wider global and regional implications and has the capacity to alter the regional geopolitical landscape in future.

*The writer is a member of an Islamabad based think-tank, Strategic Vision Institute (SVI) and can be reached at maimuna.svi@gmail.com

Diagnosing Somalian Piracy: Symptom Or Disease? – Analysis

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By Prerna Bakshi

While history recounts the plunderous eras when pirates reigned over high seas, sabotaged trade and caused anarchy on land, Somalian piracy materialises this into the grim reality of the 21st century.

What started off in the war torn region of Somalia as a local effort by fishermen to protect their coastline, soon evolved into one of the deadliest installations of modern day maritime piracy with pirates infesting waters as far as 1000 nautical miles off the coast of Somalia into the Indian Ocean and as strategic for global trade as the Gulf of Aden.[1]

More than 30,000 vessels annually transit the Gulf of Aden (GOA) and more than 20% of global trade moves through this route.[2] With nearly 4000 crewmembers of 125 different nationalities captured by 2012, 150 ships reportedly ransomed for an estimated $US385 million, and insurance premiums increased by almost 10 fold for ships transiting this route,[3] Somalian piracy exerts its influence on world trade, international relations and global politics and has assumed a ‘pandemic’ status worldwide.

Certainly, this malady of the seas has not gone unnoticed by the international community. In 2009, the United States Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT) created the ‘Combined Task Force 151’ with naval forces of multifarious countries including the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Italy, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. In addition, NATO sent two missions in 2008 and EU launched ‘Operation Atalanta’ in 2009, to aid in the difficult issue of tackling pirate activity.[4]

However, these missions seemingly proved ineffective as Somalian piracy levels shot to an all time high in 2011, attributed to over 200 attacks, 700 hostages and 30 boats held in the year. [5] It wasn’t until late 2012 that piracy levels began to wane and were finally brought under control by 2013. This multifaceted episode triggers numerous questions. For instance, did the International community play a role in abetting Somalian Piracy? What role did it play in curbing piracy? Why did the various missions meet with initial failure? Can the era of Somalian piracy really be deemed as over?

In my paper, I attempt to address Somalian piracy with regard to these questions, and analyse whether Somalian piracy is an independent ‘disease’ or merely a symptom of the real ailment on-shore.

Lennox[6] categorises Somalian Piracy into two phases, each of which have a correlation to socio-political events in the country. It is no coincidence that the first phase of Somalian Piracy surfaced in 1991, immediately following the fall of Somalia’s government and supplant of Barre’s regime by clan-based warlords.

The second phase, from 2005 onwards, saw an escalation of piracy in terms of quantity, value and ransom demanded.

This phase correlates to the 2004-2006 famine that scorched Somalia aggravating poverty, limiting access to essential resources and stimulating further clan based conflict. It is evident that the off-shore problem of piracy has on-shore roots, however there is need to analyse the current cause-effect relationship between the two. Piracy is certainly the result of a larger problem in Somalia: of poverty, complete state failure, lack of government and inter-clan conflict.

However, piracy has evolved into and additionally functions as an aggravating factor for its on-shore problem. According to a UNSOM report, pirates and pirate financiers advance and finance other criminal activities as well and have built significant paramilitary capacities on land. They thus possess the potential, resources and motivations to destabilise the region and have effectively been doing so.[7] Hence, given the current scenario, piracy has forged a complex relationship with its roots in Somalia. It not only stems from these roots but has evolved to further cultivate them. Viewing piracy independently as a disease has always been a fallacy; it can more accurately be classified as a symptom that has dangerously metastasised. Treating Somalia’s state failure or Somalian piracy exclusively rather than mutually has limited potential in eradicating either problem.

While the relationship between piracy and civil conflict in Somalia is evident and direct, indirect factors play a substantial role in the creation of this situation. Falling under the purview of global governance, the situation in Somalia can be greatly attributed to several macro factors. In essence, it can be considered representative of neglect, exploitation and poor global governance by the international community.

In 2002, Abdiqassim Salad Hassan, the president of the Transitional National Government, expressed deep disappointment at the lack of support from the international community for rehabilitation in Somalia. During a press conference in Mogadishu, he said if the international community “keeps neglecting us”, Somalia could become “a safe-haven” for local terrorists who collaborate with international terrorists.[8] His concerns were certainly not unfounded as following the 9/11 attacks Somalia was viewed as a breeding ground for transnational terrorism.

Even after, the restoration of a Somali government became part of a counterterrorism strategy, rather than a way to deal with the root causes of state collapse and conflict. Policies of big players have also been criticised as having played a role in creating the conditions that led to a famine in Somalia in 2011.[9] ‘Al-Shabaab’, the clan based organisation controlling majority of Somalia, withheld aid from local populations and worked primarily towards their own economic and politic motive.

On the other hand, aid agencies were banned from providing assistance in areas where supplies or money might end up in the hands of Al-Shabaab operatives. This effectively created a vacuum where both sides neglected the people of Somalia. Although, it is well established that civil conflict has transnational repercussions, this truth was ignored by the international community for a prolonged period of time. While Wilson,[10] postulates that the stabilisation of Somalia would be the first step to overcoming piracy, Menkhaus,[11] cautions that delayed external action to revive and support failing states only compounds the difficulty of state building later; this is exactly what happened in the case of Somalia.

Neglect is not the only adverse contribution of the international community towards the situation in Somalia. Illegal fishing and toxic waste dumping are accused of provoking piracy by inducing local fishermen to protect their coastline at all costs. The United Nations estimated that illegal fishing companies from Europe and Asia rob Somali coastlines of over $300 million a year.

In addition to this stimulus, a private British company, Hart Security, provided military training to Somali fisherman in the 1990’s in an effort to create a “Fisheries Protection Agency”[12].The bulk of training was dedicated towards “how to handle weapons and board boats at high sea”[13] – the exact tactics currently used by Somali pirates.

In fact, Somali pirates are so conditioned that they portray themselves as the nation’s unofficial coast guard, fighting against illegal fishing and waste dumping by foreign corporations. Somalian pirates are also abetted by international sponsors; Somali refugees as far as Canada and the United States contribute money to the cause, in addition to financial backing from sources in Saudi Arabia, Dubai, Yemen and Al Qaeda.[14]

The political structure operational in Somalia also has its roots in foreign intervention. Wais Kassim H. Dahir[15] notes that the militarisation of Somalian government can be attributed to Soviet Union’s post cold war support. He also points out that when the cold war ended, superpowers left behind large amounts of weapons that turned Somalia into an armed camp. Subsequently, every household had more arms than food which kept the civil war going. Thus, it is once again apparent with the case of Somalia that civil conflict is both influenced by and influences the international sphere, re-emphasising the need for good global governance.

Having established the role foreign factors have played in indirectly encouraging piracy, it follows to question why their direct efforts to eradicate the same met with initial failure. One of the major reasons for the growth of piracy despite multinational counter-efforts was the purely naval nature of foreign response.

The initial strategy to tackle piracy seems to be based on the assumption that piracy was the ‘disease’ to be independently remedied and not the ‘symptom’ that it more rightly is. Causes of piracy may have started with grievance and shifted to greed, but the roots of the problem, including poverty and conflict, cannot be addressed with a naval response.[16] It is important to consider that waning pirate attacks in 2012 and 2013 could, in part, be related to the establishment of a government in Somalia.[17] However, spending on capacity-building in Somalia is still only equivalent to 1.5% of piracy’s annual cost.

The need of the hour is for nations to realise that their trade revenue interests go hand in hand with capacity building in Somalia.[18] While Somalian piracy has fallen sharply in the recent years, this may well be a suppression of the problem than its complete eradication. If Somali piracy is going to be combated using solely sea-based tactics it will require a critical mass of warships and air assets to maintain a constant presence in the region.

However, it would be wishful thinking to expect this sort of a presence to continue for any prolonged period given the cost of modern naval deployments.

The GOA is a large body of water, and warships are not a long-term cost effective method of providing commercial vessels with protection from Somali piracy. Without a two-pronged approach it is only a matter of time till the naval forces move out of Somalian waters and Somalia’s poverty and conflict find global expression through piracy or other internationally detrimental means.

The efficacy of a two-pronged approach is implicitly outlined in the UNSOM 2013 report. Among other capacity building initiatives, the report mentions the Security Council’s decision that UNSOM support the Federal Government of Somalia on governance, security sector reform, the rule of law, the disengagement of combatants, maritime security and mine action. It also states the agenda to strengthen the fisheries sector, by creating strong institutions and developing the policy and legal frameworks. In this context, extensive work is being carried out by rehabilitating feeder roads, clearing land for agriculture, and constructing water catchments in Somalia. These efforts are indicative of the dawning realisation for a more comprehensive strategy to address the complex issue.

The complete impact of recent and ongoing capacity building efforts on piracy remains unclear and difficult to determine due to its nascent nature. Conversely, the present situation in Somalia strongly suggests one hard truth. The naval forces may have successfully suppressed piracy but cannot provide a long-term solution. Hence, by no means can 2013 be regarded as the end of Somalian piracy. While the two-pronged approach will prove to be a panacea in the long run, a shift in scope to include targeting not only the perpetrators but also the enablers will help the strategy gain momentum. In addition, it is crucial to establish a sound judicial system to set the foundation of stability. Blanket amnesty, punishment and lustration are all possible ways of addressing such issues, which once dealt with will make the road ahead smoother.

Notes:
[1] ICC International Maritime Bureau. Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships: Annual Report 2009. London: IMB, 2009. Print.
[2] Johnson, La’Nita M. “The Consequences of Somali Piracy on International Trade.” Global Tides 8.1 (2014): 5.
[3] Do, Quy-Toan. The pirates of Somalia: ending the threat, rebuilding a nation. Washington DC: World Bank, 2013.
[4] Blanchard, Christopher M., et al. “Piracy off the Horn of Africa.” Washington: Congressional Research Service (2009).
[5] Malm, Sarah. “European Court Chides France Over Somali Pirate Arrests.” Mail Online. N.p., 2014. Web. 10 Jan. 2015.
[6] Lennox, Patrick. Contemporary piracy off the Horn of Africa. Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute, 2008.
[7] United Nations Assisted Mission in Somalia. Secretary-General’s Report On Piracy And Armed Robbery At Sea Off The Coast Of Somalia. New York: United Nations, 2013. Web. 7 Jan. 2015.
[8] IRINnews.“SOMALIA: President Disappointed At Lack Of International Support.” N.p., 2002. Web. 14 Jan. 2015.
[9]Bradbury, Mark. “How Do You Solve A Problem Like Somalia?” Newint.org. N.p., 2012. Web. 13 Jan. 2015.
[10] Wilson, Brian. “Effectively confronting a regional threat: Somali piracy.” Conflict trends 1 (2009): 11-18.
[11] Menkhaus, Ken. “Governance without government in Somalia: spoilers, state building, and the politics of coping.” (2007).
[12] Al Jazeera, English. “Firms Reap Somali Piracy Profits – Africa.”Al Jazeera English. 9 Sept. 2009. Web. 15 Jan 2015
[13] ibid
[14] Kellerman, Miles G. “Somali Piracy: Causes and Consequences.” Student Pulse 3.09 (2011).
[15]Dahir, Wais Kassim. “Learning The Lessons: The Root Causes Of The Somali Conflict.” Somaliland Times 2002. Web. 12 Jan. 2015.
[16] Hall, Andrea. “Piracy And The Experience Of Somali Women.” Canadian Military History. N.p., 2013. Web. 11 Jan. 2015.
[17] ibid
[18]Oceans Beyond Piracy. Latest Oceans Beyond Piracy Report. 2014. Web. 7 Jan. 2015.

South Sudan: Nothing But Violence – OpEd

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Four years have passed since South Sudan seceded from Sudan, and the only thing it has earned so far is violence and internal crisis that seems to have no end in sight. The international community has stood by South Sudan’s side, but the new country has repeatedly let everyone down.

The ongoing violence and civil war in South Sudan has killed and displaced millions of innocent civilians. This young country, carved forcibly out of Africa’s largest nation (erstwhile undivided Sudan), is a living example of a failed state.

But that is not all: recently, South Sudan decided to expel UN officials from its territory, out of fear that cases of human rights violations might reach the rest of the world. Calls to reconsider the decision went unheard, and the United Nations Security Council was forced to impose travel bans and sanctions in response.

The Issue At Hand

One might wonder: why has South Sudan failed to get its act together?

The answer is simple: South Sudan, by all means, is just not meant to be a separate state. Undivided Sudan is what should be existing in its place, and this forced partition has only made matters worse. South Sudan is unable to function as a cohesive unit, simply because it lacks all the basic ingredients that are required for nation-building.

However, even though South Sudan should probably not have been created, now that it is a reality, why can it not exist in peace? Well, to begin with, the Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) is not a freedom outfit. Instead, it is a regional terror organization, that just sought to destroy Sudan and carve a territory of its own that could be ruled with the help of military junta. With Western help, SPLM/A succeeded, and the rest is evident.

As such, the SPLM/A lacks any vision for nation-building, nor does it have a roadmap for the future of South Sudan. All it can offer is a mechanism that crushes civilians with the help of military power, and helps a handful of capitalist overlords in their bid to exploit the natural resources of South Sudan. This is precisely why things keep getting worse in South Sudan: the number of casualties and refugees is ever on the rise!

Stalemate?

Of course, attempts have been made to foster reconciliation and help South Sudan survive. There exists no other option: pro-secession pundits in the West were projecting South Sudan as the new cradle of democracy in Africa, and now that their dreams have fallen flat, every attempt is being made to somehow keep South Sudan in existence.

But none of that helps. Agreements are signed, and forgotten. President Kiir and rebel leader Machar refuse to give up. And to be very frank, neither of them can be blamed. Both are just puppets, and both wish to be the apex puppet — Machar accuses Kiir of having ambitions that are too big to swallow, whereas Kiir claims Machar wishes to oust his government.

Conclusion

So, is there any way South Sudan can survive?

To be very honest, the best way forward would be to rid South Sudan of these incompetent puppets, and head towards a merger with Sudan.

South Sudan is nothing more than a blunder, and the longer this joke of a country stays in existence, the worse things will get for its inhabitants. At the end of the day, in any civil war and social unrest, the civilians are the ones that suffer the most, and South Sudan’s case is no exception. As such, efforts should be made to reconcile and merge South Sudan with Sudan.

Just in case ego prevails over sanity and a merger is not acceptable, the next best route would be to initiate the peace process with Sudan as a mediator. Like it or not: Sudan knows South Sudan better than anyone else, be it UK, USA, Russia, China, or even its own African neighbors. As such, any body that is created to sort out the crisis in South Sudan should include Sudan as a member.

That said, the time to act is now. In the past four years, South Sudan has witnessed nothing but violence, and any further delay might prove disastrous for this failed state.

Tunisia: State Of Emergency Extended For Two Months

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Tunisia has extended by two months a state of emergency it imposed following a terror attack on foreign tourists in the Mediterranean resort of Port El Kantaoui last month.

“After consultations with the prime minister and the speaker, the president has decided to extend the state of emergency in force nationwide for two months from August 3,” President Beji Caid Essebsi’s office said in a statement on Friday.

On June 26, a Tunisian student used an MK-47 assault rifle to kill tourists at a hotel in Port El Kantaoui, near the city of Sousse, to the south of the capital, Tunis.

Eyewitnesses said the gunman was mowing down screaming tourists as they ran for their lives. The gunman, who was ultimately shot dead by police, reportedly yelled to locals to stay away, saying, “I didn’t come for you.”

Among the 38 victims were tourists from Germany, Belgium, and Portugal; however, most of the tourists killed were from the UK.

Essebsi ordered the state of emergency on July 4 for an initial 30 days.

Back in March, 22 people, mainly foreigners, were killed after militants attacked Bardo Museum in Tunis.

Both attacks were claimed by Daesh, which has overrun huge swathes of territory in Syria and Iraq.

On July 24, Tunisia’s parliament pproved a new anti-terrorism law, which promised death penalty for several terrorism-related offenses in a country that has not carried out an execution since 1991. It also allowed the detention of terrorism suspects for 15 days without having access to lawyers.

Original article

India A Net Gainer In Iran Accord – Analysis

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By Sudip Talukdar*

The reverberations of the historic nuclear accord with Iran will be felt long after it has been signed with the Big Five plus One. The deal is almost as momentous as the one that the US inked with China in 1972, to halt the mighty Soviet juggernaut and end the former’s isolation on the world stage. If president Richard Nixon took credit for the unprecedented initiative which catalysed a tectonic shift in geopolitics, then the current achievement on Barack Obama’s part could be trumpeted as his most spectacular contribution to the cause of global peace and harmony.

The accord marks a paradigm shift in statecraft which would help address some of the most volatile issues vexing humankind today. The deal could not have come at a more opportune moment, bearing directly on vital strategic requirements of India. Marginalized by Saudi Arabia’s fundamentalist politics, US-led sanctions and Pakistan’s duplicity, Iran now takes centre stage as a counterweight to virulent Wahabi radicalization, which has razed vast swathes of Iraq, Yemen and Syria, including world heritage sites and priceless cultural artefacts. Daily, Shias are battling the brutal ISIS for sheer survival in the cauldron of sectarian politics.

The latest outcome may not at all be to the liking of Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, two of the world’s most regressive states, which have always been inimical to Iran, one of the world’s largest oil producers with huge gas reserves. According to the latest WikiLeaks documents, the Sunni kingdom, known for open hostility towards the Shia state, minutely monitored its most feared adversary’s every move, besides investing billions of dollars to export a puritanical version of Islam that is wantonly destructive of civilized values.

The two US proxies also wield disproportionate power and influence with the State Department’s blessings, either because of vast oil reserves or as a perceived frontline ally in the so-called war on terror. One whose seed the trio had unwittingly planted on Afghan soil to fight Russians in 1979, but which mutated into an unstoppable Frankenstein fast devouring everything in its way. The world is either clueless or comes up with half hearted responses, blundering from one ignominy to another in its dealings with the ISIS.

India may find welcome breathing space where contrary pressures and pulls of Western blocks constrained its actions, which it could ill afford as a budding superpower. India’s nuclear accord with the US severely hampered its dealings with Iran and even inveigled it into acting against its own interests. For instance, sanctions prevented India from depositing dollars or euros in foreign banks as payment for oil to a sorely cash-strapped Iran. When India wanted to utilize Turkey for the purpose in February 2013, Western obduracy blocked it, forcing it to route rupees in part payment, not a readily acceptable currency.

It is doubtful whether the proposed Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline would ever materialize, despite the hype surrounding it, given the turbulence in our Western neighbourhood and its deep distrust of all things Indian. However, the Chabahar-Dilaram land route from Iran to Afghanistan has enormous implications for an energy deficit India, which it is jointly developing with Iran. The project will bypass Pakistan completely, opening up lucrative markets for India in Afghanistan and Central Asia.

One could not agree more with Iran’s ambassador to India, Gholamreza Ansari, who pertinently pointed out that the port of Chabahar “is central to India’s efforts to circumvent arch-rival Pakistan and open up a route to landlocked Afghanistan where it has developed close security ties and economic interests”. India, in all its wisdom, did not allow US-led sanctions to derail its close ties with Iran, but had to slash oil imports by half to 2,20,000 barrels per day.

Fortunately, both the countries share ancient cultural links and a rare convergence of outlook on troubled Afghanistan. Both have reasons to be extremely wary of the Taliban, whose presence hangs like the Sword of Damocles over the landlocked state. The mullahs dream of converting it into a medieval fiefdom. China and Pakistan also have sights firmly set on its vast mineral resources, compounding India’s problems. However, India may have to deploy all its diplomatic skills to mollify a dependable ally like Israel, which might not be such an insurmountable task, after all.

Aditi Malhotra, doctoral candidate at the Graduate School of Politics (GraSP), University of Münster, Germany, pointed out how “the United States will probably be more willing to regard Iran as an important stakeholder in the future of Afghanistan. Such a development would imply minimum opposition from Western powers to India-Iran cooperation towards a stable Afghanistan”. The accord is likely to encourage increased engagement with Iran and ensure progress on suspended projects, besides boosting our economy and easing oil imports.

Post sanctions, an Indian consortium can resume development of the Farsi block, where it had struck natural gas with known reserves of 22 trillion cubic feet (tcf) of which more than half is recoverable. If some of this can reach India, then it will pave the way for a more level playing field for consuming countries. It would be a far cry from what the West did to discourage India from importing even a drop of oil from Iran in March 2015.

Decks may be cleared for finalization of the Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) deal between India and Iran signed in 2005, permitting an yearly import of nearly five million tonnes, which would go some way in addressing India’s energy needs.

The accord has materialized like a twist of fate, a great leveller which could deflate Pakistan’s bloated sense of self worth and show it its proper place in the global space, something which decades of staid Indian diplomacy could not do. Conversely, India stands to gain in stature, acquiring a greater say in the neighbourhood. All of this could leave Pakistan fretting and fuming and reflecting on the futility of its vow to bleed India to death. It could be poetic justice for India, at long last.

*Sudip Talukdar is a senior journalist, author and columnist. He can be reached at editor@spsindia.in


Erdogan Launches War In Attempt To Become Turkey’s Supreme Leader – OpEd

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Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan lost his bid to become Turkey’s supreme leader in last month’s elections. So he’s taken the country to war to increase his popularity and improve his chances of victory in snap elections in November.

Turkish bombers continued to pound Kurdish positions in Northern Iraq early Thursday after killing an estimated 100 Kurds a day earlier. Erdogan broke off peace talks with the Kurdish militias and launched this latest assault after failing to win enough seats in Parliament to change the constitution. The ambitious Erdogan needed 330 deputies to make sweeping changes to the constitution that would give the president unlimited executive power making Erdogan de facto emperor of Turkey. His plan was frustrated by the pro-Kurdish People’s Democratic Party (HDP) that won an unprecedented 13 percent of the vote. The HDP is determined to prevent Erdogan from realizing his dream of becoming Turkey’s imperial sultan . The current war against the Kurds in Syria and Iraq is designed to whip up nationalist sentiment in order to put Erdogan “over the top” in elections that could come as early as this Fall.

Here’s more from Huffington Post:

“Last month, only after losing his party’s parliamentary majority, President Erdogan realized that there are dangerous terrorists in neighboring Syria who are a threat to Turkey’s security … Rather than intending to fight ISIS terrorists or cooperate with United States military operations in Syria and Iraq, Erdogan’s real purpose is to consolidate his own hold on power and accomplish the following self-serving objectives:

1) Turkey’s President realizes that should his ruling party fail to form a coalition government by the end of August, he would be obliged to call a new round of parliamentary elections in November. Therefore, by taking bold actions against ISIS and Kurdish fighters, Erdogan hopes that Turkish voters would give his party the few extra seats needed to regain a majority in Parliament.

…The Turkish President’s self-serving fake war against terrorism could have the tragic consequence of escalating the violence throughout Turkey and neighboring countries. If Ankara is truly interested in countering the Jihadists, it should have done that long ago, instead of arming and abetting ISIS and other terror groups.” (Erdogan Is Pursuing Turkish Self-Interests, Under the Guise of Fighting ISIS, Harut Sassounian, Huffington Post)

Here’s more from Columbia University’s Institute for the Study of Human Rights, David L. Phillips:

“Erdogan is angling for new elections. He is trying to discredit the People’s Democratic Party (HDP), a pro-Kurdish party which received 13.1% of the votes and will be seated in parliament for the first time. Erdogan is furious with the HDP for its strong showing, which denied the AKP enough support to change the constitution and establish an executive imperial presidency. In retaliation, Erdogan is threatening to lift the parliamentary immunity of HDP legislators. He’s even intimated at closing the HDP for supporting the PKK.” (Turkey’s Dark Future, David L. Phillips, Huffington Post)

Are we saying that Erdogan has started a war with the Kurds with the sole intention of enhancing his own political power?

Yes, that’s exactly what we’re saying. This is a story about a power-hungry megalomaniac, not a struggle against Kurdish militias and certainly not a war against ISIS. In fact, Erdogan has been ISIS greatest friend as this blurb from the UK Independent points out:

“There is no doubt that ability to move backwards and forwards across the 550-mile long Syrian-Turkish border has been crucial to the growth of the jihadi movements in Syria since 2011. The thousands of foreign volunteers who have flooded into Syria have almost all come from Turkey. Even those unable to speak Turkish or Arabic have had little difficulty in making their way across. In many respects, Turkey has provided a safe sanctuary for Isis and Jabhat al-Nusra, playing a similar role as Pakistan does in support of providing safe haven for the Taliban in Afghanistan.” “A Syrian rebel offensive led by Jabhat al-Nusra was allegedly masterminded from an operational headquarters inside Turkey and was the outcome of a closer understanding between Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar.” (Suruc suicide attack: Bombing shows Turkey is being sucked into the violence in Syria, Patrick Cockburn, Independent)

And then there’s this from the Front Page:

“Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu’s claim that “Turkey and AKP governments have never had any direct or indirect connection with any terrorist organization” flies in the face of last November’s report from the U.N. Security Council’s Analytical Support and Monitoring Team, which identifies Turkey as the primary route for weaponry smuggled to ISIL and the Al-Nusrah Front.

The State Department’s briefing at the beginning of June also stated Turkey is the main route for more than 22,000 fighters who have flocked to Syria to join extremist organizations, mainly ISIL. There are numerous other sources” (Turkey into the Abyss, Robert Ellis, Front Page)

Erdogan has pulled out all the stops in his attempt to consolidate his power and become Turkey’s supreme leader, which is why he’s trying to have pro-Kurdish members of parliament (HDP) stripped of immunity and prosecuted as criminals under Turkey’s stringent terrorism laws. (So far, more than 1,300 mostly Kurdish nationalist supporters and leftists have been swept up in a massive government dragnet since the bombing in Suruc two weeks ago. None of these people have yet been charged with a crime. The government has dropped all pretense that it is carrying out a war on ISIS. The roundup is clearly politically motivated.)

In an article that appeared in the Turkish daily, Hurriyet, statistician Emer Deliveli asks “Is Erdoğan warmongering for political power?” Here’s what he says:

“After showing that “political stability indicators at an all-time low”, Deliveli says, “my analyses showed that, indeed, support for the AKP (Erdogan’s party) increased after episodes of rising political violence.”… “one cannot prove that President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is warmongering for political power … However, both conspiracy theories are in fact variants of the same theme- Erdoğan doing all it takes to become an all-powerful president. And when evidence piles up like this, one cannot help but think, “what if.” (Is Erdoğan warmongering for political power?, Hurriyet)

Erdogan wouldn’t be the first leader to start a war to boost his popularity at home, or the last. But it’s a risky strategy all the same, especially since his erratic and self-serving policies have already alienated a broad cross-section of the electorate that used to comprise his base. Check out this blurb from Foreign Policy magazine:

“Erdogan’s weakness in perceiving and acting on the militant Islamist threat has not won him extra friends on the security-first right. His autocratic Islamist style is losing him support on the left. And as for the Kurdish vote, well, he can just forget about it. History has also shown that seemingly invincible leaders can be forced to go gently — or not so gently — into that good night. The mighty Ottomans, after all, did not last forever. There’s no reason why a neo-Ottoman would either.” (The Sultan of Swing’s Dangerous Gamble, Leela Jacinto, Foreign Policy)

The biggest threat facing Erdogan in the short-term is that the Turkish people will see what he’s up to and cast their ballots accordingly in the November elections. But that will require restraint on the part of the Kurdish militias who will have to silence their guns to win the support of the people.

The only way the Kurds can beat a power-drunk, right-wing fanatic like Erdogan, is by giving peace a chance. Until the votes are counted, that is.

The Rajapakse ‘Coup’ And Upcoming Parliamentary Election In Sri Lanka – Analysis

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By Smruti S Pattanaik*

No other news attracted so much limelight and generated as strong a reaction as the nomination of Mahinda Rajapakse as the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) candidate to the Kurungella seat for the forthcoming Parliamentary election. The Sri Lankan media as well as the 49 political, social and other civil society organisations that had supported Maithripala Sirisena in the game-changing January 8, 2015 Presidential election were shocked to hear that Rajapakse’s nomination was actually endorsed by the President himself. Although Sirisena subsequently stated that he “will not breach the trust and faith of nearly 6.3 million people who voted for me”, it is not clear how he will be able to keep their faith if the SLFP were to gain a majority in the upcoming Parliamentary election and Rajapakse emerge as the Prime Minister. Indeed, Rajapakse has been addressing election rallies as if he were an official Prime Ministerial candidate. Protesting the decision to nominate Rajapakse and to ensure that the SLFP does not gain a majority, the Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU), Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) and even some senior members of the SLFP have joined the United National Party (UNP)-led United National Front for Good Governance (UNFGG) coalition to contest the August 17 Parliamentary election on a common platform.

Sensing the deep-seated disillusionment among a cross section of the political spectrum and the electorate, Sirisena, in a statement to the media on 14 July, clarified many of the misgivings that Rajapakse’s nomination had generated. Perhaps, this was one of the more significant statements that Sirisena has made since January. His silence until then had earned him the tags of ‘villain’ and ‘traitor’. In the statement, Sirisena referred to the tremendous pressure under which he has been working since assuming power. For one, the transition of the SLFP party leadership from Rajapakse was not a voluntary affair.1 Thereafter, Rajapakse began to work to undermine Sirisena; in the President’s own words, “he [Rajapakse] started pulling my leg after two weeks.”2 Sirisena also stated that, by taking over the Presidency of the SLFP and of the United People’s Freedom Alliance (UPFA), he had prevented Rajapakse from derailing the reform process, mainly the dilution of the powers of the Executive Presidency, strengthening Parliament and establishing independent commissions. In this regard, he noted that the UNP, headed by Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe, had the support of only 47 Members of Parliament (MPs) in a house of 225. And without the support of a majority of SLFP members, it would have been difficult to pilot the 19th Amendment bill, which reduced the tenures of both the President and Parliament to five years, re-introduced the two-term limit that a person can serve as President, altered the President’s power to dissolve Parliament from after just one year to four years, reduced the power of the Executive Presidency and transferred some of these powers to Parliament3 and, most significantly, established a Constitutional Council to appoint independent commissions. 4 With Rajapakse at the helm of the SLFP, this would not have been possible. Sirisena also categorically said that his opposition to Rajapakse has not changed. He assured that he would remain neutral in the Parliamentary election and work to carry out the mandate of 8 January irrespective of which party wins the election.5

Scripting the Comeback: The Rajapakse Coup

Parliament, dominated by supporters of the old regime, has made the task of political reform challenging since Sirisena’s assumption of the presidency. The SLFP has remained a divided house, with Rajapakse’s supporters dominating the Central Committee with their strong presence. Soon after his defeat in the Presidential election, Rajapakse planned his comeback agenda with the support of those MPs from the SLFP who had benefitted immensely during his regime. His supporters were encouraged to paralyse the party from within. Accordingly, they offered their support for the 19th amendment only after being promised that the 20th amendment – to increase the number of seats in Parliament to 255, introduce two types of voting systems (first past the post system and proportional representation) and establish the delimitation commission – would be introduced before Parliament was dissolved. Subsequently, they proposed many changes to the 20th amendment in order to delay the process for two reasons. First, delay would mean that the parliamentary election would be postponed to September 2015 by when the United Nations Human Rights Commission (UNHRC) would have unveiled its report on Sri Lanka. The report was actually scheduled for discussion at the March 2015 UNHRC meeting, but was postponed after the newly elected government requested for time.6 Any adverse remark in the report about Sri Lanka’s conduct during the last phase of the war could be used to appeal to Sinhala voters to save the nation by voting for Rajapakse. Second, as was revealed by Sirisena in his statement to the media, Rajapakse supporters were planning to nominate the former president to Parliament on the national list. For that they were in the process of asking one of the MPs to vacate a seat. According to this plan, the SLFP, which had the majority in Parliament, would have passed a no-confidence motion against Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe who was heading a minority government and replace him with Rajapakse. Sirisena foiled this design by dissolving Parliament.

Rajapakse has, however, been carefully scripting his comeback. In a show of strength, a series of rallies was organised between February and June in Nugegoda, Kandy, Ratnapura (with the theme “victory achieved at stake”), Kurunegala and Matara by Rajapakse supporters with a call to “bring back Mahinda”. Sensing the resurgence of the old regime, many SLFP members, in spite of Sirisena’s warning, attended these rallies. On 1 July, Rajapakse announced from his hometown Medamulana that he would contest the 17 August Parliamentary election as a Prime Ministerial candidate since “[p]eople’s requests asking me to contest cannot be ignored.”7 And he further said that “[t]he current government, including the Prime Minister, is acting the way they did during the time they signed agreements with the LTTE terrorists… They have removed the Army from the North and are nurturing terrorists.”8 It is important to note here that Rajapakse’s supporters9 from the UPFA10 were present during this announcement.

After Sirisena made it clear that Rajapakse does not have a place in reinstating good governance (Yahapalanaya), the latter’s supporters, popularly known as Abhayaramaya cabal,11 rallied around their leader. One of them announced “If all the party seniors agree that Rajapaksa must be appointed, then the President has to agree to it as well.”12 In an interview to an Indian website, Rajapakse said, “I will be contesting the parliamentary election with a view to forming the next government”,13 thus removing any doubts about his intentions. According to Article 42(4) of the Constitution, “The President shall appoint as Prime Minister the Member of Parliament, who, in the President’s opinion, is most likely to command the confidence of Parliament.” The repercussions of Rajapakse’s comeback bid can be assessed from the words of Ven. Sobitha Thero who played a pivotal role in the 8 January election: “You are fighting to try and protect your party. But remember this… the rest of us will have to battle to save our lives.”14

The UPFA has appointed Rajapaksa as the Chief of Elections Operations Committee (EOC) of the SLFP-led coalition against the wishes of Sirisena. To prevent the UPFA from undermining his leadership, Sirisena has obtained a court order to prevent the Central Committee of the party from meeting without his approval and has appointed four new electorate organisers from the party. With the battle lines drawn between Sirisena and Rajapakse, one could witness a division within the SLFP and a split in its vote bank.

Here, it is important to note that that Rajapakse, who removed all constitutional hurdles to become President for the third time, is unlikely to remain satisfied with being a mere MP. Becoming Prime Minister would be an insurance against a number of corruption and bribery charges against him and his family that are currently being investigated. Although Sirisena and Wickremesinghe have chosen not to press corruption charges against Rajapakse since January,15 some of these could be opened up if the UNP-led coalition were to come back to power.

Old Politics, Old Agenda

Rajapakse has outlined three issues that he would focus upon during his campaign – “putting the economy back on track, dismantling the Police State apparatus, and restoring democracy and dealing with threats to our sovereignty and national security that have arisen since January this year” [emphasis added].16 At the same time, he is attempting to mobilise the electorate on three issues. The first of these is the exploitation of the Sinhalese fear of a possible re-emergence of the LTTE due to various decisions and measures taken by the current government.17 This will help emphasise how he, the saviour of the nation who brought thirty years of war to an end, is unlike Wickremesinghe who had concluded a peace-deal in 2002 with the terrorists to satisfy foreign countries. Rajapakse emphasised this in the 15 July Anuradhapura election rally: “I never betrayed the motherland like other politicians, I never struck secret pacts.” To consolidate the Sinhala vote bank, which provided him 48.2 percent of votes, mostly from the South,18 the fear of LTTE re-emergence would be of great value. Second, saving the country’s sovereignty would be a familiar issue in Rajapakse’s campaign. Soon after his defeat he had said “what happened to me was not a defeat since it was the result of a conspiracy” and accused the Americans, Norwegians, Europeans and Indians of having worked against him.19 He is likely to cite the UN investigation as an intrusion on Sri Lanka’s sovereignty and contend that he is the only leader who would not allow the international community to humiliate the war heroes for defeating terrorism by putting them on trial for war crimes. This would make him a champion of the country’s sovereignty against an international conspiracy. The third issue that he is likely to base his campaign upon is the Rajapakse model of ‘development’, which emphasised upon the building of railways and roads, mega ports, airports etc. to make Sri Lanka the ‘emerging wonder in Asia’.20 However, this development model, which emphasises upon economic development to address political grievances, has been rejected by the Tamils.

China and the Politics of Development

Rajapakse’s defeat in the January 2015 election was perceived as a loss for China,21 which had invested $5 billion in the last five years and was instrumental in operationalising the Rajapakse model of economic development.22 The new UNP government made a fresh assessment of Chinese projects and highlighted their massive cost23 as well as financial irregularities. In an interview to CNN Money, Ravi Karunanayake, the current Finance Minister, said, “[t]he Chinese companies used the opportunity of a corrupt regime to crowd out other companies coming in…. There was no even playing field. It was basically anybody who achieved their objective, to get money in their pockets”.24 As a result of these concerns, the Colombo port city project was stalled.25 In addition, concerns have been expressed about loan repayments,26 a sentiment captured by Sirisena in the run-up to the January presidential election thus: “Sri Lanka is a country with excessive state debt and a dangerous ratio with regard to loan payment and state revenue”.27

Rajapakse wants to cash in on government inquiries into the China-financed projects by portraying them as aimed at appeasing the West and India, which are opposed to China. To emphasise the benefits of the economic partnership with China, he has evoked the memories of how China stood by Sri Lanka during the war and later voted against the West-sponsored UNHRC resolution to protect Sri Lanka’s sovereignty and continues to “resolutely oppose any move by any country to interfere in Sri Lanka’s internal affairs”.28 Thus, in his first public appearance in the Anuradhapura election rally after his nomination, Rajapakse noted that ‘development’ has suffered during the last six months – an indirect reference to the stalling of Chinese projects.29

According to a media report, the Chinese Embassy in Colombo is also engaged in a public relations exercise to counter the negative publicity that Chinese projects have received in Sri Lanka. It has sent mobile text messages to businessmen and journalists, highlighting how Chinese projects have generated employment opportunities and resulted in transfer of technology.30 The Chinese have also started a campaign in favour of the port city and have hired a Sri Lankan advertising agency. Now one can find stickers on three wheelers that read “We support Colombo port city project”. It appears that China is expecting that a Rajapakse victory will help it turn the tide with respect to its economic engagement in Sri Lanka where it has indeed acquired a large stake during the Rajapakse years.31

Sovereignty Debate and the India Factor

India has reservations about Chinese intentions since Beijing pursues a balance India strategy in South Asia. Taking cognizance of Indian reservations with regard to Sri Lanka’s support for the Maritime Silk Route, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said (during Sri Lankan Foreign Minister Mangala Samaraweera’s visit to China) that “China is open to a triangular cooperative relationship” involving India and Sri Lanka. For his part, Rajapakse has also realised the importance of addressing India’s suspicions about his close relations with China. He reflected this during his interview with Nitin Gokhale by stating that he would serve as a bridge between India and China. India, however, well knows that Rajapakse is not a man who keeps his promises.

For India, which is now trying to put in place an Indian Ocean strategy with the successful visit of Prime Minister Modi to the Indian Ocean countries, any reversal of the January 8 mandate would re-create a space for China at India’s cost. It is closely watching the evolving political situation in Sri Lanka.

In the past, India witnessed how Rajapakse played the China card by allowing the docking of two Chinese nuclear submarines in Colombo port despite India conveying its concerns. The Rajapakse government also repeatedly emphasised India’s training to the LTTE during the 1980s while at the same time deliberately played down its diplomatic and intelligence support during the last days of the civil war. This went hand in hand with the lavish praise heaped on China and Pakistan. There are other not so positive experiences as well. Sri Lanka under Rajapakse deliberately delayed communicating the list of beneficiaries for the Indian Housing project. It threatened to take back the oil depot from Indian Oil Corporation after India voted against Sri Lanka at the UNHRC. It sponsored a protest by businessmen to derail the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement that India wanted to conclude. It had almost prepared to abolish the 13th Amendment in July 2013 when the Provincial Councils were encouraged to vote against that Amendment. In addition, India is also concerned about Rajapakse’s divisive politics and denial of devolution to the Tamils, which will only keep the neighbourhood embroiled in instability and pose security implications for India.

Conclusion

The 8 January election was a decisive anti-Rajapakse vote in spite of Rajapakse’s claim to the contrary. Notwithstanding that, as Sri Lanka prepares for parliamentary elections in August, two fundamental issues are at stake: democratisation of the political system, which regressed during Rajapakse’s rule, and national reconciliation. Rajapakse’s victory in the forthcoming elections would not only be a reversal of the January 8 mandate but his divisive politics based on Sinhala chauvinism will not be conducive for national reconciliation – a prerequisite for long term peace and stability of the country. A UNP victory is predicted given the dissension within the SLFP and voter uncertainty about a Rajapakse return. Unlike the Presidential election, local politics and local issues would influence the voters. People have not forgotten the Rajapakse decade, which epitomised corruption with his family directly controlling Rs. 1.2 billion of the Rs. 1.7 billion national budget. His development model has few takers in the rural south. It has not generated the employment that they were looking for as many of the projects have become economically unviable. People are aware of the massive corruption in which both the Rajapakse family and his close allies were involved. Given his past policies, the SLFP is also unlikely to get the votes of the minorities.

It appears that Sri Lanka’s chances of reverting to the period of “Monarchy” – as Sirisena characterised the Rajapakse years – is slim. Sri Lanka’s journey towards greater democratisation that began on 8 January will surely reach its destination with Yahapalnaya at its core. Moreover, Sirisena continues to enjoy substantial power under the Constitution. If the UPFA manages to get the majority and Rajapakse is nominated as Prime Minister, he can exercise his powers only in concurrence with the President. Sirisena’s momentous speech exposing the anti-reform agenda of the UPFA and the intrigues of the senior leaders who conspired to undermine the mandate of 8 January would influence the voters to make a cautious choice. While a SLFP defeat will end Rajapakse’s political career, it would pave the way for Sri Lanka to implement the aspirational politics that the 8 January mandate epitomised. For the people of Sri Lanka the choice is clear – between de-democratisation represented by Rajapakse and his supporters and democratisation represented by President Sirisena and his political allies.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India

Notes:
1. When the SLFP met to elect Sirisena as the new chairman, Mahinda Rajapakse held a parallel Central Committee meeting of the party.

3. Draft of the 19th Amendment. Hearing a petition on the 19th amendment, the Supreme Court ordered that Articles 42(3), 43(1), 43(3), 44(2), 44(3) and 44(5) would require a referendum as per Article 123 of the Constitution. As a result, these proposed articles were withdrawn from the 19th amendment. See.

4. The independent Commissions are: Election Commission, (b) Public Service Commission, (c) National Police Commission, (d) Audit Service Commission, (e) Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka, (f) Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption, (g) Finance Commission, (h) Delimitation Commission, and (i) National Procurement Commission. Earlier, the President made appointments to important constitutional positions like the Bribery Commission, Election Commission, Chief of Police, Chief Justice of Supreme Court, etc. The 17th amendment had introduced Constitutional Commissions. Now, the President has to consult the Constitutional Commission. The Supreme Court also held that the requirement for the President to act on the ‘advise’ of the Prime Minister does not require a referendum. It further clarified that constituting a constitution commission does not require a referendum.

6. UN rights chief Zeid Ra’ad al-Hussein said “the changing context in Sri Lanka, and the possibility that important new information may emerge which will strengthen the report.” See, “UN postpones key Sri Lanka war crimes report,” Al Jazeera, 17 February 2015.

7. MR Enters the Fray,” Lanka Herald, 1 July 2015.

8. “I Am Coming: Mahinda Declares,” Ceylon Today, 2 July 2015.

9. Dullas Alahapperuma, Salinda Dissanayake, Prasanna Ranatunga, Bandula Gunawardene, Keheliya Rambukwella, Nishantha Muthuhettigama, Kumara Welgama and Wimal Weerwansa.

10 Constituent parties of the UPFA are: Sri Lanka Freedom Party, Sri Lanka Mahajana Pakshaya, Sri Lanka Muslim Congress, All Ceylon Muslim Congress, Ceylon Workers’ Congress, Communist Party of Sri Lanka, Desha Vimukthi Janatha Pakshaya, Eelam People’s Democratic Party, Eelavar Democratic Front, Lanka Sama Samaja Party, Liberal Party of Sri Lanka, Mahajana Eksath Peramuna, National Freedom Front, Sinhalaye Mahasammatha Bhoomiputra Pakshaya, Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal, Up-Country People’s Front, Sri-TELO (Pararajasingham Uthayarasa alias Uthayan Faction).  Some of these constituent parties did not support Mahinda Rajapakse’s candidacy, for example, the SLMC and Up Country People’s Front.

11 The group used to meet in Abhayaramaya temple in Narahenpita in Colombo.

12 “Susil Rebuts Maithri,” Ceylon Today, 16 July 2015.

13 Rajapakse’s Interview to Nitin Gokhale, “Sri Lanka Will Never Pose a Threat to India,” Rediff.com, 4 July 2015.

14   Darisha Bastians, “Revolution Betrayed?,” Financial Times, 10 July 2015.

15 The JVP filed bribery and misuse of power cases against Rajapakse and his family and cronies on 15 January. Adarerana.lk (accessed on 27 July 2015). Rajapakse supporters protested in Parliament as well as in front of the Bribery Commission against the Ex-President being summoned before the commission. They organised a signature campaign and requested the Speaker, Chamal Rajapakse, who is Mahinda Rajapakse’s brother, to intervene. As a result the speaker summoned the Director General of the Bribery Commission and asked her to meet the Ex-President in his residence for further investigation into bribery charges. Some Rajapakse supporters also threatened that if corruption charges were pressed against him they will not support the political reforms that the government intended to carry out. “Sri Lanka’s ex-president faces anti-graft probe,” Daily Mail, 20April 2015. Further, Ranil Wickremesinghe did not allow Gotabaya Rajapakse to be arrested. See, “Exclusive: Attorney General’s Recommendations On Gota Arrest: Full Text,” Colombo Telegraph, 27 April 2015.

16 Rajapakse’s Interview to Nitin Gokhale, “Sri Lanka Will Never Pose a Threat to India,” Rediff.com, 4 July 2015.

17 The reference is to the Government’s decision to return to the Tamils 1000 acres land that was under the military’s occupation, allowing Tamils to sing the national anthem in Tamil, closing down of the military check point in Omanthai for the people travelling to the north and celebrating the victory day in a low-key manner. In this context, Rajapakse would cite the genocide resolution passed by the Northern Provincial council on 10 February soon after the new regime took over power in Colombo (“Full Text: NPC’s Resolution On Genocide Of Sri Lankan Tamil,” 11 February 2015, Colombo Telegraph) and a recent proposal by Minister for Rehabilitation, D.M. Swaminathan, to provide compensation to families whose members were killed during the last phase of war, as indicators of the government compensating terrorists (Udaya P. Gammanpila, “Appeasement of tigers,” Ceylon Today, 20 June 2015). Already, Foreign Minister Mangala Samaraweera’s meeting with the GTF in London has drawn criticism from Sinhala nationalists as an appeasement of the diaspora and their foreign patrons. TNA National list MP Sumanthiran and former Norwegian Peace Envoy Erik Solheim were also present at the London meeting. For details of the meeting, see Sulochana Ramiah Mohan, “GTF London Meet: Solheim shared his experience,” Ceylon Today, 16 June 2015.

18 Rajapakse got a majority of votes in Hambantota, Moneragala, Matara, Ratnapura, Galle, Anuradhapura, Kurunegala, Kalutara, Kegalle and Matale, ranging between 63.02 and 51.41 per cent. In all these districts the voter turnout was high.

19 “Rajapaksa: RAW not government conspired against me,” The Hindu, 13 March 2015. He also said Bodu Bala Sena (BBS) was a Western-backed conspiracy to alienate minority Muslims and defeat his government. “BBS Is A Western Conspiracy: Mahinda Rajapaksa,” 24 April 2015. Also, see “‘Gnanasara ruined me’ – ex-president,”.

20 Mahinda Chintana of 2005 reads, “The objective of our next massive leap forward is to transform Sri Lanka into a strategically important economic centre of the world. My determination therefore, is to transform Sri Lanka to be the Pearl of the Asian Silk Route once again, in modern terms. Using our strategic geographical location effectively, I will develop our motherland as a Naval, Aviation, Commercial, Energy and Knowledge Hub, serving as a key link between the East and the West”.   See, This is mentioned in Mahinda Chintana of 2010, p. 99. Also see pp.109-110 for details of infrastructure projects.

21 Debashish Roy Chowdhury, “Passive investor to partner in crime: How China lost the plot in Sri Lanka,” South China Morning Post, 29 March 2015; Bruce Einhorn, “Sri Lanka’s President Loses an Election—and China Loses an Ally,” Bloomberg, 9 January 2015; Miles Yu, “China stung by Sri Lanka’s election,” Washington Times, 22 January 2015.

22 Smruti S Pattanaik, “Chinese Investment in Sri Lanka, East Asia Forum, 5 June 2015

23. Ibid.

24 Andrew Steven, “Did China profit from corrupt Sri Lanka deals?,” CNN Money, 2 April 2015.

25 China, which is still awaiting a green signal to build the Colombo port city, has warned that suspension of the project would mean that the GoSL have to pay Rs. 40 billion as compensation. See, Sulochana Ramiah Mohan, “If China’s Colombo Port City project terminates… Government compelled to pay Rs 40B damages,” Ceylon Today. The Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying said Beijing expects Colombo to “preserve Chinese companies confidence to invest in Sri Lanka in the overall interests of China-Sri Lanka friendliness and the fundamental interests of Sri Lanka’s national development.” China, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying’s Regular Press Conference,” 5 March 2015. The Colombo-Katunayake Expressway, which was found to be the most expensive highway ever built in terms of cost per kilometre, with the government spending Rs. 1.8 billion per km on the 26 km expressway linking Colombo to the Bandaranaike International Airport.

26 The government, according to another news report, spends Rs. 250 million monthly for repayment of loan taken for Chinese built Mahinda Rajapakse International airport and another Rs. 250 million for its maintenance. See, Dharama C Abeyaratne, “Sri Lanka to pay Rs 250 m monthly for loan obtained,” Daily News, 16 May 2015. Similarly, Minister of Port and Shipping reported that the loss from the Hambantota port was Rs. 678 million in 2012 and it was maintained from the profit made by the Colombo port. See, “Loss incurred by Hambantota Harbour in 2012 is 678 million rupees,” 10 April 2015, ITN News Network.

27 “Full Text Of Maithripala Sirisena’s Election Manifesto”, Asian Mirror, 19 December 2014.

28 Xi Jinping, “Let us Become Partners in Pursuit of our Dreams,” Daily News, 16 September 2015.

29 In an interview to South China Morning Post, Rajapakse said, “But I would urge China not to take it personally. It’s me they are after. They are only using China to get me. China should not feel hurt and stop helping Sri Lanka.” Debashish Roy Chowdhury, “Sri Lanka should thank China, not attack it, ex-president Rajapaksa says”, South China Morning Post, 12 March 2015.

30 “Chinese Embassy Washed Mud off Rajapakse!,” Lankanewsweb, 9 July 2015. According to Chen Chuan, Spokesman for China Chamber of Commerce in Sri Lanka, “Chinese-funded projects created 100,000 job opportunities in Sri Lanka in the past five years; 90% of workers in Chinese-funded projects are Sri Lankans.” Cited in “Suspension of Chinese projects; Loss is for Lanka,” The Independent, 4 July 2015.

31 Interviewing Rajapakse after his January defeat, Debashish Roy Chowdhury, correspondent for South China Morning Post, wrote, “If he can hold that smile for another six months, Beijing could yet have the last laugh.” Debashish Roy Chowdhury, “Sri Lanka should thank China, not attack it, ex-president Rajapaksa says”, South China Morning Post, 12 March 2015.

Originally published by Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (www.idsa.in) at http://www.idsa.in/issuebrief/TheRajapakseCoupandUpcomingParliamentaryElection_sspattanaik_280714.html

Bleeding Heart Liberals Are Social Hypocrites – OpEd

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By Sanjeev Ahluwalia*

Yasmina Reza’s God of Carnage – playing in Mumbai and Delhi – makes us laugh at ourselves by stripping bare the self-serving hypocrisy underlying socially acceptable roles. Bleeding-heart Indian social liberals would do well to see themselves in the mirror via this play.

Admittedly, we humans must get beyond our basically brutish nature. But the first step to doing this is not to be in denial about the brute within us. Narendra Modi baiters are particularly delusional about themselves.

For them Mr Modi is forever damned because of the Gujarat riots in 2002 and because he refuses to atone at the altar of “secularism” that Indira Gandhi embedded in the Constitution in 1976 along with the subsidiary altar of “socialism”.

We have, since 1990, correctly turned a Nelson’s eye to the latter as has the rest of the world. But liberals fear that both the right (Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, Bharatiya Janata Party) and the left (communists), are so committed to their own political “ideology” that they aim to substitute liberal democracy with state authoritarianism.

The left has made itself redundant in India, so the real threat to liberalism is from the Modi government. The examples used to illustrate the increasingly “heavy hand” of the state are the clamp down on NGOs – Teesta Setalvad and Greenpeace; the attempt by the executive to reclaim the power to appoint higher judiciary; and current administrative practices like the “gag order” by home minister Rajnath Singh on officials hobnobbing with the press.

Are, then, Prime Minister Modi’s intentions subversive?

First, let’s consider the alleged attempt to misuse official authority to muzzle NGO critics.

Misuse of authority can only be assessed in two ways – either via the judicial process or via loss of public support, as happened resoundingly in 1977. Indira Gandhi was damned by the judicial process before being damned by the electorate post-Emergency.

In Mr Modi’s case, no adverse judicial outcome taints him. His significant popular mandate is likely to be re-endorsed in the Bihar state elections later this year. The Opposition has a majority in the Rajya Sabha and the judiciary remains generously tolerant towards public interest litigants. Both checks are working well. With respect to the “gag order”, post the RTI legislation, access to public information is institutionalised. Yes, news hounds can no longer get “breaking news” easily, but that is no great loss.

Second, when was India ever a social, liberal democracy? Mahatma Gandhi was a social liberal, like Jawaharlal Nehru and Muhammad Ali Jinnah, but the tactics he used show that the country was not. That is why he mobilised the majority via religious means – bhajans and kirtans.

By preferring Nehru as the de facto Congress leader to Jinnah (who was never much of a hard-core Muslim), the Mahatma bowed to his political assessment that the Hindu majority would not accept anyone except a co-religionist as their leader. This was good realpolitik and has been the broad political trend since Independence.

After Independence, none of the national parties – the Congress, the Janata Dal, leave alone the BJP – have ever had anyone other than a Hindu as their supreme political leader. The only recent exception is Sonia Gandhi of the Congress. But even her links into politics are exceptionally pucca, upper caste Hindu. The Communist Party of India (Marxist), which is meant to be areligious, has had only one non-Hindu – a Sikh, Harkishan Singh Surjeet – as its general secretary from 1992 to 2005.

Indians feel comfortable being led by those who are from their own social group. For national issues religion and caste are the bonding factors. For state level elections, caste is the major factor; at the village level it is sub-caste or clan. This is hardly a characteristic of a liberal democracy.

The liberal political elite do a great disservice by spinning the myth of a liberal India. A more honest assessment would be of India as a seething cauldron of competing social groups held in balance by quasi-colonial state power. Recognising oneself, as I said earlier, is the first step to reconciliation and reform.

In a democracy, numbers count. To protect itself, minorities either have to increase their numbers, as the Hispanics and blacks are doing in the US, or they have to stay below the radar while aligning broadly with the majority goals. The US, a land of immigrants, has no qualms about requiring everyone to be American – in language and in culture, such as it is. France is even less tolerant of cultural or linguistic deviance. In comparison, India adjusts to linguistic, religious and cultural diversity. But till the Hindu population is in a majority they shall dictate the music to be played, as they have done since 1947.

India has remained an “administered” democracy of the colonial style – the spirit is scarce but bells and whistles abound – albeit better administered than it was pre-Independence. Prime Minister Modi’s moves are merely a muscular rendition of what all directly elected Prime Ministers did prior to 1989. Thereafter, coalition governments diminished the stature of the Prime Minister, who, in terms of formal powers, is more powerful than the American President. Those who have been socialised only during the last two decades of “coalition dharma”, when listless governance was the norm, need not be alarmed at the vigorous use of the available constitutional powers.

Any real democracy merely reflects the norms and aspirations of the people. This is the central conundrum of the Arab Spring that ended up fanning radical Islam instead of modernising North Africa and West Asia.

Urban folks worry too much about the seeming frailty of Indian democracy. They also exaggerate the role played by the media, civil society and intelligentsia as the bulwarks against its demise. The real custodians of democracy are the enormous variety of vertically and horizontally arrayed social groups, each negotiating to safeguard its own special interests and societal norms. By their very presence they illustrate that there is a competitive market for political power in India.

Unsurprisingly, as in any market, bargaining power in a democracy is with the majority. But every market has to be regulated to be efficient and equitable. That is what Parliament and the judiciary are expected to do in our system. If democracy ever dies, it is these two institutions which will be responsible, not the executive or the people of India.

*The writer is an Advisor to Observer Research Foundation, Delhi

Courtesy: Asian Age, July 29, 2015

Bangladesh Politics: A New Fledgling Waiting To Emerge? – Analysis

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By Swadesh Roy*

Hit by political upheavals, Bangladesh is now peaceful. The cautious people of the country and many foreign diplomats are now convinced, Bangladesh has entered a nonviolent political chapter. In this chapter, road agitations, deadly violent politics, will gradually become history. Some pessimistic intellectuals and foreign diplomats in Bangladesh however do not agree with this. In their opinion, this is a deep silence before the storm. However, on any socio-political issue, difference in thinking is a reality; pessimists and optimists will be divided in two pools. This is the character of any society, and Bangladesh is no different.

The naysayers are thinking, the present government of Bangladesh has destroyed the opposition’s political agitation ruthlessly using the administration, but not the politics; and that the government has shifted from a democratic one to authoritarian. People of Bangladesh have never liked an authoritarian government – which is like a black hole through which the snake will enter into the brides-room at any time. If we look at it through the naysayers’ eyes, it is correct because no political movement should be checked by the administration. Political problems should be tackled by politics. It is true what happened in the name of politics in the beginning of this year in Bangladesh, was all dealt a tough blow by the administration.

The pessimists would be right – if what occurred in Bangladesh can be termed politics. For those, who are terming it as politics, a big question is why they are saying this. Did they fail to differentiate between politics and terrorism, or are they doing this purposefully? In Bangladesh, an Islamic fundamental opposition ally called for a political programme but none of the common people came on to the streets to make it succeed. Fundamentalists were successful in unleashing horrific deadly violence. It was totally a copy of the programme of the Islamic States (IS). They indulged in that type of violence, showing highest brutality – which is the way of IS. Their policy is, through the horrific brutality to making the society disturbed. In Bangladesh, under the leadership of Khaleda Zia the Islamic terrorists did it. They did burn to death 150 people and about 500 people are still fighting with death, besides they hacked to death some intellectuals. Though it took three months but the present government controlled it successfully; and former prime minister Khaleda Zia is now the Abu Bakr al Baghdadi of Bangladesh.

Despite the horrific violence, the present government of Bangladesh is going to act against them through a special tribunal. Khaleda, the Baghdadi of Bangladesh, which she has become, should be punished in any way. But the government is going to set up special tribunal for trial Khaleda and other Islamic terrorists. That shows, the government of Bangladesh is going to destroy the Islamic terrorists by the legal process, not the gun. For what the Baghdadi of Bangladesh has done, the government could take any action against her, but they are instead going through the legal process to punish her. Despite the negative criticism, the present government of Bangladesh is so politically powerful that they are going to destroy the Islamic terrorism by the legal way, not the gun. This absolute political power has made Bangladesh a politically stable country and it is going to enter a new stable political chapter. For this reason, it is the time in Bangladesh that politics is in shape and has to wait to see what baby bird will emerge from the egg.

A new political baby will come very soon in Bangladesh because the heat of the incubator is in the last stage for breaking the egg. So, now the question is what type of baby will come and how quickly the nestling will learn to fly? The pessimists say that if the era of Khaleda Zia is ended, the new baby will be a risky Islamic terrorist group. People and analysts can then ask, how much more dangerous can the face of the Islamic fundamentalist be, than what Khaleda already has? For what Khaleda did, she is not only the Baghdadi of Bangladesh, rather more than Baghdadi. Besides that, they have to keep it in mind that the Muslims of Bangladesh are different from the Muslims of the world. When all the religious blindness is emerging in the world, including in Bangladesh, still the majority Muslim’s life in Bangladesh is driven by their nation’s inherent culture. It is also proved that in Bangladesh, in social life and in the politics, religion has never won; ultimately culture takes the driver’s seat. Despite all the obstacles, Sheikh Hasina will win, because her weapon is culture not religion.

The party and ally of Sheikh Hasina is the nation’s culture base and her economic policy is social welfare. Now a big stakeholder of Bangladesh is the business environment. Hasina is trying to convert her party from populist to business friendly. She is trying, but will not go to the optimum pro-business goal. Her party structure and supporters will not support her to give up the populist character. That is why, in Bangladesh, now the opposition of Hasina is the Islamic fundamentalist, who is not supported by the huge majority. They are merely a gang of Islamic terrorists. So the space for the pro-business politics is still vacant. The new baby of politics will emerge in this pro-business space. After it emerges, the politics will take a proper shape. It will be like the Liberal and Conservative politics in UK.

However, without doubt – breaking of the egg, emergence of the fledgling and its learning to fly, all will be created naturally. But every incident has to acknowledge the present situation. In this global village, nothing is out of the world’s concern. So, the democratic world, including India, the biggest parliamentary democracy that is also a neighbor – has to play a role. If the democratic world can play the role correctly, obviously under the leadership of Sheikh Hasina, Bangladesh will enter a new chapter of politics. The violent, Islamist politics will then be history here. Then Bangladesh will be a truly democratic country.

*Swadesh Roy, Executive Editor, the Daily Janakantha, Dhaka, Bangladesh. He can be reached at swadeshroy@gmail.com

Need To Revisit NCTC – OpEd

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On early hours of 27th July, a police station in Indian town of Gurdaspur situated in the western border state of Punjab was attacked by three terrorists. All three terrorists were gunned down after a battle of ten hours and Indian side suffered ten casualties including a senior police officer. This attack was different than previous terrorist attacks in two aspects. Choice of the target was not any major financial or political centre but rather a border town. And secondly, it was the first time that terrorists attacked state police and not an army establishment. Gurdaspur attack was a major terror incident in Punjab in over a decade. This incident is significant because Punjab once had a separatist movement for the formation of separate state of ‘Khalistan’. Khalistanis were supported by Pakistan’s ISI from across the border and had killed India’s Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in 1984.

This was also the first major terror attack since May 2014, when a new government had come to power in Delhi. Current Prime Minister Modi of right wing Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) had criticised previous government’s weak and soft approach regarding Pakistan and terrorism. He had argued for more hardline policy and muscular response in his campaign speeches. But as of now, Modi’s government has not clearly defined its approach to Pakistan. This government has sent mixed signals to Pakistan. It has canceled Foreign Secretary level talks in last August. And same government changing its stance requested a meeting of two Prime Ministers now after almost a year on the sidelines of SCO summit in Ufa. In that meeting it was decided to continue the dialogue. Both sides agreed, first time, for talks between their National Security Advisors as well. India has declared that notwithstanding this attack, talks will continue though it canceled cricket matches.

This attack was overshadowed by the news coverage of the death of India’s former President ‘Missile Man’ Dr. APJ Abdul Kalam on the same day. As the nation was preparing to bid adieu to its beloved late President, news reports emerged in the American press that Islamic State has decided to target India. In the same week, another news dominated Indian press i.e. hanging of Yakub Memon, accused in 1993 Bombay blasts. Whether he is guilty or not, whether he deserved to be hanged or not, was he being targeted because he belonged to a minority Muslim community or not were some of the issues involved. These questions have salience in future as fundamentalist Islamic State plans to target India. It is also interesting to note that this attack comes in less than a month after Afghan government and Talibani representatives had held talks in Muree in Pakistan.

If taken the news of Gurdaspur attack, IS plan and Yakub Memon hanging together, a clear picture emerges of a state having problems while dealing with the issue of terrorism and its aftermath. Whether it was the government of Manmohan Singh or Narendra Modi, whether India talks to Pakistan or does not talk, terrorist attacks do not stop. India failed to prevent attack from happening in spite of having celebrated super spy and terror expert like Mr. Ajit Doval as its National Security Advisor. Indian agencies also failed to catch terrorists alive which shows that perhaps lessons are not learnt from such previous incidents. Immediately after the attack, fingers were pointed towards Pakistani involvement. This blame gaming could have avoided till the substantial evidence was gathered. Similar loose talk was on display after the cross border raid in Myanmar on India’s eastern front in retaliation to a strike on an army column in June. It is not clear as of now what action Indian government is contemplating but it must be noted here that Indian forces had carried out cross border raids in the past without fanfare though.

Mr. Modi, while he was Chief Minister of Gujarat. had opposed the creation of a National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) modelled on the American NCTC and British Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre. This was supposed to be the single agency for counter terror operations and collection, analysis and dissemination of data related to terrorism. It was considered that NCTC will weaken India’s federal structure. But in light of such terror incidents and growing challenge from Islamic State it would be a good idea to revisit the opposition to NCTC.

*Sankalp Gurjar, Dept. of International Relations, Faculty of Social Sciences South Asian University (University established by SAARC Nations) Akbar Bhawan Campus, Chanakyapuri, New Delhi, India.

Maldives: Land Ownership Bill, New Cause For Indian Concern – Analysis

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By N. Sathiya Moorthy*

For a tiny Indian Ocean nation priding itself as the only one in the South Asian neighbourhood not to have been colonised by European powers, Maldives now has a fast-tracked constitutional amendment conferring land ownership on big-time foreign investors becoming an overnight cause for additional concern.

The constitutional amendment, only the second for the 2008 ‘democracy statute’ was passed by an overwhelming 70 members in the 85-seat People’s Majlis, or Parliament, voting in favour, just a day after the ruling Progressive Party of Maldives (PPM) of President Abdulla Yameen had moved the Bill in this regard.

The constitutional amendment came on the eve of the Golden Jubilee celebrations of Independence, falling on July 26.

Apart from 54 MPs belonging to the Progressive Party of Maldives (PPM)-led coalition, of which the Maldivian Democratic Alliance (MDA) party is a partner, a total of 19 opposition members, comprising 10 from the main opposition Maldivian Democratic Party (MDP) and nine of the Jumhooree Party (JP), also voted for the bill.

While 14 MDP parliamentarians, including ranking members like group leader Ibrahim ‘Ibu’ Solih, Mariya Didi and Eva Abdulla, voted against the bill, the lone member of the religious-centric Adhaalath Party (AP) under-scored the shortage of time available for any meaningful debate. Among the notable supporters for the amendment was former Speaker, Abdulla Shahid, now in the MDP, whose strong views on ‘sovereignty’ issues are otherwise well known. JP’s businessman-founder, Gasim Ibrahim, since coming out of increased government pressure on imminent repayment of $90 million in revenue dues, expectedly backed the bill, claiming that it would bring in a lot of benefits in an ‘inter-linked world’.

That the opposition was divided over the vote and could have been on the verge of a break-up became clear when the MDP in particular and the JP, desisted from issuing a whip for the vote. This contrasts with the more recent practice of the MDP issuing a three-line whip for party MPs to vote with the Government on the equally controversial First Amendment only days earlier, pertaining to the law on the impeachment of Vice-President Mohammed Jameel Ahmed.

The MDP and the JP also voted on the impeachment motion subsequently, which again was fast-tracked. However, unlike the surprise element attending on the new land law, rumours about Vice-President Jameel’s impeachment and his replacement by Tourism Minister Ahmed Adeeb had been doing the rounds for weeks now. Adeeb has since been sworn in, after parliament passed another motion in between, fixing a time-limit for debating his nomination, when made.

Gayoom seeks referendum

In a none-too-unexpected move, former president Gayoom, half-brother of President Yameen and founder-president of the ruling PPM, wrote to the latter and also tweeted ahead of the parliamentary vote, asking him to consider the public concern before giving his assent to the controversial law. While Yameen did not react to Gayoom’s suggestion – conveyed through a personal letter to the president, and also with the people through a tweet – a government spokesman clarified that it was the former’s decision, and it stood.

According to the Minivan News, Gayoom urged President Yameen to “hold a public referendum on the issue, noting the amendments were proposed without public debate. He also stated that previous governments did not sell any part of Maldivian territory to prevent foreign influence over the country’s independence, sovereignty, and resources”.

Incidentally, this is possibly for the first time that President Gayoom has come out in the open on an issue of controversy and concern to the nation as a whole. Only days earlier, he had denied rumours over differences with President Yameen on the decision to impeach Vice-President Jameel and also on the latter’s choice for replacement. At the time, Gayoom tweeted that the president should have freedom to choose a vice-president of his choice.

Though Gayoom was not more specific on what he thought was the cause for public concern over the current law, PPM members – all of whom taking a pro-government line — in Parliament confined mostly to putting his argument on its head, and submitting that despite 80-90 per cent of the 112 luxury resorts in the country being foreign-owned, there had been no such problem. Majority leader Ahmed Nihan assured the public that the ruling party would not compromise Islam or Maldivian traditions and sovereignty.

Nihan, the Minivan News reported, “stressed that the amendments only apply to newly-reclaimed land and that the government was not planning to sell existing natural islands or reclaimed land”. However, it remains to be seen how far would such promises hold, considering that China is also funding the prestigious Male-Hulumale sea-bridge project and a host of others, and President Yameen had already said that almost all Maldivians could be housed in Hulumale island, in the Maldivian suburb.

GMR deal

Coming as it does on the footsteps of the earlier SEZ law, passed with equal force by the PPM-combine controlled parliament, the new land law confers ownership with transfer rights on foreign investors putting in a minimum of $1 billion on the purchase of land, of which 70 per cent should have also been reclaimed from the sea. This by itself should be a surprise in a nation, where the ownership of most, if not all lands rests in the state.

Suffice is to point out that in the case of Maldives, one of the strong arguments against the by-now-aborted ‘GMR deal’ with the Indian infrastructure major was that the contract put the possession, though not ownership, of the nation’s only international airport, with facilities for the possible landing of large air force transporters and the like, in the hands of a ‘foreign entity’. What went unmentioned in the process was the successful landing of wide-bodied, Indian Air Force (IAF) aircraft with armed personnel, at the height of the ‘Operation Cactus’ rescue operation, after mercenaries laid siege to the Maldivian capital of Male, in 1988, when president Gayoom was in power.

It is not unlikely that the current amendment is aimed at making FDI under the SEZ law more attractive than already. Months after the Yameen government, including then tourism minister Adeeb, now Vice-President, heading the SEZ clearance panel, had promised imminent big time investments, nothing much seems to be in the pipeline. It may have more to do with the inherent inadequacies of the Maldivian economy, where geography and demography have conspired against the nation having a strong manufacturing base.

It is anybody’s guess how and why the nation has not followed up on the currently felt limitations of resort tourism with a big time entry into the financial sector, like Singapore and Dubai, both not far away, but should be focussing on what seems to be non-financial services sector, if not outright manufacturing, for which, land, water, electricity and transportation and labour costs would all prove uneconomical. It is another matter that Maldives has yet to take labour law reforms, as prescribed under international codes, seriously and the state and status of low-end migrant labour continues to be appalling.

Chinese military base

According to local media reports, MPs opposed to the new law “expressed concern over possible Chinese military expansion in the Maldives, and the lack of time to review the amendments”. As they pointed out, the bill was pushed through parliament in such haste that the House committee evaluated the contents the day it was presented and cleared it instantly, for full House vote the very next day.

The critics may have a point. Not very long ago, the Maldivian government leased out an island in the Laamu Atoll to a Chinese player, for the development of a tourist resort for near-exclusive use by the large number of budget travellers from that country. Expanding the international practice of donor/creditor nations converting part of the aid into originating goods and services, Chinese investors, as has been the norm, also import infrastructure and casual labour from that country. This has ensured greater exclusivity in terms at project sites, with host nations at times feeling extremely uncomfortable about their real purpose and presence.

Speaking during the final debate on the amendment, Minivan News quoted MDP parliamentarian Eva Abdulla as saying that a Chinese Yuan class 335 submarine has passed through Maldivian waters and docked at the Karachi port on May 22, adding that Indian media called it “China’s deadliest attack submarine”. MP Eva has already submitted a demand for summoning Defence Minister, Maj Gen Moosa Ali Jaleel (retd) to the House, for seeking an explanation on the Chinese naval presence of the kind in Maldivian territorial waters.

Maldivian foreign and domestic policies should be based on ensuring Indian Ocean regional security as “Maldives is not in the South China Sea”, she said. Maldives is a “front line state” in the new Cold War and should not be a catalyst for conflict, Minivan News quoted the MP as saying further. The MDP as a “centre-right party” supports free market policies and the principle of private land ownership, but could not support “selling land for China to build military bases” in the country, Eva Abdulla added.

According to Minivan News, ruling PPM parliamentarian Ali Arif conceded that the Maldives as a small nation is always vulnerable to influence from powerful nations. He said the House committee addressed the concerns over sovereignty during its review process and added a clause to the bill stating that the Maldivian state will exercise complete authority over the territory designated for projects.

Be it as it may, it is anybody’s guess how a nation in near-eternal debt to its international creditors and successive political leaderships lacking the will to plug deliberate and organised leakage of government revenue and forex earnings could ever bring itself around to challenge foreign investors, state or non-state actors, on ‘sovereignty’ issues or ‘transfer rights’, if it were to be accompanied by instant repayment of massive dues, as is the case in the GMR arbitration case.

Larger issues

China was known to have proposed a massive atoll-centric tourism facility for its budget travellers when MDP’s jailed president Mohammed Nasheed was in office. At the time, too, security concerns came to be expressed, given the possibilities and also the inevitability of such an exercise forcing Maldives into a geo-strategic situation where it would have little choice or say. The reference was possibly also to the US military base in Diego Garcia, not very far away, whose 50-year lease would come up for review and renewal in 2016.

The concerns of the larger Indian neighbour in this context should come not only from the increasing presence of adversarial China, whose controversial and at times suspicious ‘Maritime Silk Route’ (MSR) has attracted smaller neighbours like Maldives and Sri Lanka, for reasons that do not always justify the decision. India was equally perturbed when the US, near-unilaterally approached the government of then Maldivian president, Mohammed Waheed Hassan Manik, for upgrading the existing ACSA (Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement) to SOFA (Status of Forces Agreement), providing for US military personnel on foreign territory to carry weapons and be governed by American, and not local laws.

Any excessive presence of Chinese or other nationals in the Indian Ocean neighbourhood, especially of particular nations, could only add to the concerns of India, which is not known to have drafted any cohesive, comprehensive and decisive approach to handle situations of the kind. This time round, there is more credible information about increasing Chinese presence and interest in Maldives than during the days of president Gayoom, when unsubstantiated rumours – at times manufactured with an intent and motive – made ill-informed sections of the Indian strategic community, dizzy.

More importantly, the Indian policy maker and political leadership may need to confer greater and continuous attention to the immediate neighbourhood than already – including the imaginative initiative of Prime Minister Narendra Modi inviting all neighbourhood Heads of Government for his inauguration, and following it up with whistle-stop visits to most of their capitals. Maldives was excluded from PM Modi’s three-nation Indian Ocean neighbourhood tour, which covered Seychelles, Mauritius and Sri Lanka, thanks to the evolving, explosive situation nearer home, followed the arrest and trial of former president Nasheed in the ‘Judge Abdulla abduction case’.

*N. Sathiya Moorthy is Director, Chennai Chapter of the Observer Research Foundation. He can be reached at sathiyam54@gmail.com

Qatar’s Quagmire: Existential Fears And Missed Opportunities – Analysis

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Walking around Qatar’s monumental Aspire Dome sports academy, coach Fred Engh noticed kids playing soccer on an indoor field big enough to accommodate four teams simultaneously during a break in an annual gathering of hundreds of sports leaders designed to project the Gulf state as an innovative, socially responsible global sports hub.

Mr. Engh’s initial impression that the government was catering to the whole of its population, a majority of whom are poorly paid migrant workers whose restrictive labour and working conditions have become a focal point of criticism since Qatar won the hosting rights for the 2022 World Cup were however quickly dashed.

“It looked great and I was happy to see that the Qatar people cared enough to allow kids to come in and play in this magnificent facility. I was wrong. Not every local kid was allowed. It was open to only those that had money,” Mr. Engh said in a recent Huffington Post column.

Chatting with a group of nearby migrant workers recruited to keep Aspire Dome clean, Mr. Engh quickly discovered that neither they nor their children had access to the soccer field. In response to Mr. Engh’s question whether any of their children were among those, the workers “looked at me as if I were some kind of world-class comedian trying my best to humour them,” he wrote. Asked what facilities were available for poor kids, the workers replied: “Nowhere.”

Nobody seemed bothered by Qatar’s segregation of rich and poor and marginalization of a majority of the population when Mr. Engh recited his experience during one of the gathering’s many sessions that are often geared to projecting Qatar’s support for the disadvantaged. It was, he wrote, “Business as usual. The haves and the have-nots, Qatar style.”

Mr. Engh’s encounter with the workers happened three years ago. Qatar has since announced lofty standards for the working and living conditions of migrant workers, including the construction of seven new cities to accommodate those working on World Cup-related construction sight. It has also said that reforms of its controversial kafala or sponsorship system that puts workers at the mercy of their employers would be enshrined in law by the end of this year.

For now, Qatar’s promises remain just that, promises. Credibility Qatar built in recent years by announcing the standards in for a conservative, autocratic Gulf state unprecedented collaboration with human rights and labour activists has been thoroughly wasted.

Qatar’s credibility has been undermined by its failure to take meaningful steps that would have enhanced confidence even if in some instances they would have broached the existential issues underlying Qatari resistance to change or addressed material concerns. It was further jeopardized by seeming Qatari backtracking on baby steps that held out the promise of change, and its repeated detention of foreign journalists seeking to report independently and unfettered on the plight of migrant workers.

At the core of Qatari resistance, is the fear of the Gulf state’s citizenry, who account for a mere 12 percent of the population, that granting foreigners any rights risks opening a Pandora’s Box that could lead to non-Qataris gaining political rights and easier access to citizenship. Similarly, many Qataris are anxious that engagement with the non-Qatari majority that could give it a stake in society would amount to acknowledging that their multi-ethnic, multi-religious demography is in fact a multicultural society in more than just a slogan – a step that would threaten to delude the Gulf state’s conservative, tribal, mono-culture.

Mr. Engh put his finger on the problem but appears to have overlooked these real life issues underlying effective segregation at the Aspire Dome. His observations did however put a hole in Qatari rhetoric of the value it attributes to foreigner that are helping it build a state-of-the art infrastructure.

They highlighted the fact that Qatar like other Gulf states at best views foreigners as guests obliged to leave when their professional contracts expire. Rather than adhering to universally accepted concept of a guest who is made to feel at home, Qatari policy is designed to ensure that non-Qataris do not develop ties that could persuade them to want to make Qatar their permanent home.

To be fair, Qatar is not unique in this. Even traditional immigration societies like Australia appear hostile to migrants and the mood in Europe has soured as tens of thousands of refugees from conflicts in the Middle East and repressive regimes in Africa force their way onto the continent. Yet Qatar in line with all Gulf states has preferred to fund aid to the refugees rather than open its own doors.

Nonetheless, Qatar two years ago appeared to be tinkering with its non-integration policy when it organized its first ever tournament for soccer teams of foreign workers in which 16 teams participated. Qatari officials at the time said they were considering a competition in which foreign worker teams would play their Qatari counterpart.

The plan never materialized and the chances of foreign workers and their kids being allowed to play in the Aspire Dome are without a demonstration of political will to introduce real reform virtually zero. Qatar’s credibility was further damaged by its crude efforts in the last year to fill stadia during international matches by bussing in foreign workers who were paid to attend a match rather than given the opportunity and access that spectators would expect to have.

An announcement earlier this month by California-based big data software company Sysorex that it had concluded a contract to deploy in Qatar a mobile “worker locationing and asset management platform” that would track migrant workers in their living quarters as well as in living quarters, recreation, healthcare, and retail facilities that they frequent sparked criticism from human rights and labour activists.

They denounced the move despite Sysorex’s effort to project the platform as a tool that would provide “insight into how residents flow through the community, which facilities are most popular, and where improvements can be made” as well as a technology that would improve first response in cases of emergency.

Citing the multiple problems with the sponsorship system, Human Rights Watch’s Nicholas McGeehan quipped: “Passport confiscation, recruitment fees, sponsorship-based employment, the prohibition of trade unions, and absence of grievance mechanisms combine to a toxic effect in Qatar. The last thing we need is yet another control mechanism.”


30 Years Of Assam Accord: An Era Of Historic Failure – Analysis

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By Uddipta Ranjan Boruah*

What one may expect to read in the following paragraphs is an analysis of one of the popular people’s movements in South Asia. The article talks of the Assam movement in India, which roughly spans from 1979-1985. Assam, a peripheral state situated eastward of New Delhi, constitutes one of the “Seven Sister” states which collectively are branded as the northeast. The region as a whole has stayed veiled in secrecy for most of the time in history due to its distance from mainland India. The Assam movement, despite superficially being very much regional in its essence, has had repercussions throughout a better part of South Asia. The event, so to say, has been able to leave an imprint on the South Asian consciousness given the fact that it directly concerns two of the South Asian nation states – India and Bangladesh. If one is to write a book on shared South Asian history, the Assam movement hopefully will find a special mention in it.

It has been 30 years now and much water has flown down the Brahmaputra, washing away many of the memories of the movement but its spectre continues to haunt. Here arises a need today to look back and count the successes and failures of the movement and the Assam Accord.

The Movement: A Brief glance.

The Assam movement refers to the popular agitation led by a considerable size of the Assamese population through the period from 1979 to1985. The movement culminated with the signing of the Assam Accord on August 15, 1985 by the Indian government and representatives of the Assam movement, primarily the leaders of the All Assam Students Union (AASU) and the All Assam Gana Sangram Parishad (AAGSP). It is widely accepted that the immediate cause of the agitation was the discrepancies in electoral rolls, first visible in the Mongoldoi Lok Sabha constituency in Assam. At that time in 1978, the untimely death of the sitting Member of Parliament from the Mongoldoi parliamentary constituency, Hiralal Patwari, created the ground for a Lok Sabha by-election. In 1979, while preparing for the by-elections, it was for the first time, discovered that the number of voters in the constituency had grown phenomenally. It was presented and widely accepted then, that such phenomenal rise accrued mostly due to illegal migration from Bangladesh and the erstwhile East Pakistan. In its aftermath, the All Assam Students Union (AASU) demanded a boycott of the polls until the names of the foreign nationals were detected and deleted. This briefly marked the beginning of the movement which lasted for six long years. The primary concern around which the movement revolved was the detection and deportation of illegal immigrants, but it would be utterly unfair to brand it as the ‘only’ motivating factor. The ‘grievance’ paradigm played an equally crucial role in motivating the agitators.

Thus, another considerable objective of the movement was to stand up against the step-motherly attitude of the Indian state towards this peripheral land, or in terms of Professor Tilottoma Misra – the “colonial hinterland”. The Assamese population for a considerable period had been crying for greater rights over the resources of the region while at the same time seeking the deserved attention of the Indian state towards their genuine grievances. The attempts of New Delhi to keep the region obscured from the imagination of mainland India by claiming the region as “disturbed” ever since the nation came into being had been humiliating the population at large.

The regional intelligentsia and media had been reporting for a considerable time about the reckless plunder of the rich natural resources of the region by forces rooted in New Delhi. The fact that was bothering the Assamese population for decades was the lack of infrastructure and employment opportunities in the region despite being extraordinarily endowed with the bounty of nature. Several successive policies of New Delhi appeared humiliating to the region, one of them to be mentioned was the construction of the Barauni Refinery in Bihar with a capacity of 3mmtpa to process the crude extracted mostly from Assam. Many concerned voices of the time avowed the situation of Assam to be nothing better than a colony wherein the economic mechanism used to be – extraction of the raw materials from the “peripheries” at cheap prices, taking them away to the industrial centre for processing and re-imposing the final products back.

Assam Accord: A Clever Play of Words

Foreigner Issue

The Assam Accord, signed on August 15, 1985 was considered to be the greatest achievement of the six-year long movement and rejoiced by the negotiators and the greater Assamese populace. A close introspection unveils the bitter truth that the accord in itself has numerous loopholes. The irony is that the accord failed to address the very issue around which the movement had its roots, i.e. the issue of deporting illegal migrants. Regarding the issue of illegal migrants, the following provisions of the accord requires mention –

“5.1 For purposes of detection and deletion of foreigners, 1.1.1966 shall be the base date and year.

5.2 All persons who came to Assam prior to 1.1.1966, including those amongst them whose names appeared on the electoral rolls used in the 1967 elections, shall be regularised.

5.3 Foreigners who came to Assam after 1.1.1966 (inclusive) and upto 24th March 1971 shall be detected in accordance with the provisions of the Foreigners Act, 1946 and the Foreigners (Tribunals) Order 1946.

5.4 Names of foreigners so detected will be deleted from the electoral rolls in force. Such persons will be required to register themselves before the Registration Officers of the respective districts in accordance with the provisions of the Registration of Foreigners Act, 1939 and the Registration of Foreigners Rules, 1939.

5.5 For this purpose, Govt. of India will undertake suitable strengthening of the governmental machinery.

5.6 On the expiry of a period of ten years following the date of detection, the names of all such persons which have been deleted from the electoral rolls shall be restored…”

Thus, it was agreed to, that the people who migrated to Assam prior to January 1, 1966 from East Pakistan would be considered as Indians in all aspects and shall be regularized. On the other hand, the people who migrated to India between January 1, 1966 (inclusive) and March 24,1971 (inclusive) were considered as “foreigners”. The fact that requires consideration here is that, once the people migrating between 1966 and 1971 were considered “foreigners” they should have been expelled from the country unconditionally. On the contrary, the Assam accord provided that the names of such foreigners entering Assam either legally or illegally shall be deleted from the electoral rolls for a period of 10 years. The accord however nowhere mentions that the foreigners whose names were deleted shall be expelled from Assam. The Accord also remains silent in terms of other democratic rights and facilities provided to such foreigners by the Indian constitution. Thus, at the end of the six-year long struggle and sacrifice all that could be achieved was the mere deletion of the names of the foreigners from the electoral rolls, while the foreigners continued to enjoy the rights over land, rights to carry commerce and trade, right to get employed and all other possible rights endowed by the Indian constitution to its own citizens.

Provision 5.6 of the Accord adds further salt to the wound when it states that the names of the foreigners that were deleted shall be re-entered into the electoral rolls after a period of ten years and all such foreigners shall be fully regularized as Indian citizens, provided they registered themselves before the Registration Officers of the respective districts in accordance with the provisions of the Registration of Foreigners Act 1939 and the Registration of Foreigners Rules 1939 at the time of deletion.

As per Article 6 of the Indian Constitution, any person migrating from Pakistan prior to July 19, 1948 shall be considered an Indian citizen. As it seemed impossible for every individual to prove his migration before the said date, it was agreed to that those people whose names appeared in the population census of 1951 shall be full-fledged Indian citizens. Hence, 1951 came as a base year for determining the status of foreigners. In this regard, the people migrating to Assam from East Pakistan post 1951 should have been considered foreigners and expelled. That unfortunately could not happen because the Assam Accord fixed 1966 as the base year.

Other Issues:

The Assam Accord has appeared to be a two-edged sword for Assam. On one side there have been serious flaws in the language of the draft and on the other side there has been a shameless dereliction in implementation of the provisions for three decades. Various political parties, students’ organizations and pressure groups have been indulging in the blame game, pushing the ball to each other’s court. The accord has failed at the level of implementation of several provisions and to mention one of them is the provision 9.1.

“9.1. The international border shall be made secure against future infiltration by erection of physical barriers like walls, barbed wire fencing and other obstacles at appropriate places. Patrolling by security forces on land and riverine routes all along the international border shall be adequately intensified. In order to further strengthen the security arrangements, to prevent effectively future infiltration, an adequate number of check posts shall be set up.”

Thirty years now and what stands as facts are rickety fences and large swathes of riverine patches which can’t be fenced. Large swathes of riverine border and rapid change in course by the rivers have rendered the idea of fencing ineffective. The fact that the drafts were made in air-conditioned chambers in urban centres away from the ground reality is the reason behind such apocryphal provisions. In an area prone to severe floods, every year hundreds of people get displaced and a considerable section of the population in the border areas live a nomadic life shifting from one place to another in search of higher lands. Given such strategic terrain it becomes difficult or rather impossible to keep track of the population movements.

*Uddipta Ranjan Boruah is Student,Dept. of International Relations, South Asian University. He can be reached at editor@spsindia.in

Experts, Politicians Speak In Favor Of Preserving US-Russian INF Treaty – Analysis

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The situation with the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty signed by Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan on December 8, 1987, remains questionable as tensions between the two nuclear powers remain.

Both sides still have unresolved concerns towards each other over the document. In particular, in the 2015 US State Department report on adherence to and compliance with arms control agreements once again accused Russia of developing a ground-launched cruise missile that violates the treaty, repeating the points listed in the 2014 report almost word for word.

“The United States has determined that in 2014, the Russian Federation continued to be in violation of its obligations under the INF Treaty not to possess, produce, or flight-test a ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) with a range capability of 500 km to 5,500 km, or to possess or produce launchers of such missiles,” reads the document published in June 2015.

However, Rose Gottemoeller, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, denied the theory proposed by some experts that these claims hint at the Russian R-500 missiles for Iskander-K launchers, and expressed her belief that “the Russian government is aware of the missile to which we are referring.”

In return, Moscow replied that the US officials are unable to provide any concrete proof of the case and refer to “reliable sources” which authenticity is impossible to verify.

Moreover, Russia expressed concerns over the plans to install missile defense systems in Romania and Poland that could potentially be used to launch missiles banned under the INF treaty, as well as the use of combat unmanned aerial vehicles (drones) that fit under the description of ground-based cruise missiles.

“It would appear as if the main goal of the US propaganda campaign over the INF Treaty is to discredit Russia and at the same time to divert public attention from US activities which are based on a very loose interpretation of the INF Treaty provisions where they prevent the US from creating weapon systems that are important for Washington,” reads the comment of the Russian Foreign Ministry.

Moreover, the decision to deploy elements of the missile defense system in Poland and Romania poses a threat to these countries, as this immediately makes them strategic objectives for Russia, stated Evgeny Lukyanov, Deputy Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation.

International experts and politicians continue stressing the importance of preserving the INF treaty, as denouncing it would once again plunge the parties in the Cold War, while ignoring its provisions would cause a new arms trade with further escalation of tensions worldwide.

“Abandoning the treaty […] would trigger harsh criticism [against the US] from the international community (just like in the case of the abandonment of the ABM Treaty) – especially under an administration which has so vehemently advocated for nuclear disarmament and moving towards global zero. […] Besides, the US does not need ground-based intermediate range missiles for its national security and for the reassurance of its allies, therefore there is no real benefit of withdrawing from the agreement,” Anna Peczeli, research fellow for the Centre for Strategic and Defence Studies at the Corvinus University of Budapest commented on the situation.

In her opinion, an open confrontation between the parties would threaten the interests of both Russia and the US.

“For both sides, arms control regimes are still essential to provide some level of transparency and trust,” the expert added.

From her point of view, resolving the escalated issue would require the parties to review the technical details of their allegations and make a clear statement of their intentions to abide by the INF treaty in the future.

“If additional countries could accede to the INF Treaty, that would further strengthen the regime and erase many of the national security concerns of the parties,” Anna Peczeli suggested.

Vera Flasarova, head of the International Politics and Security Department at the central committee of the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia, added that those issues are particularly important at present times, with new conflicts frequently flaring up on the world map.

“The issue of using short and medium-range missiles becomes more and more topical, as these missiles can be successfully utilized for high-precision strikes in regional conflicts,” the politician stressed.

In an attempt to protect their own strategic interests or their allies, many countries choose to cross the boundaries set by international agreements, she added.

“Representatives of both parties sitting down at the negotiation table in efforts to gradually reach an agreement would help observing the INF treaty and de-escalation of the situation. However, the possibility of that is little in the currently tense situation,” said the member of Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia.

In his turn, Steven Pifer, former United States Ambassador to Ukraine (1998-2000), ex-Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, director of the Arms Control Initiative at the Brookings Institution, pointed out that the two parties may have to negotiate a compromise if they indeed seek resolution for the problem.

“The Russian government has expressed concern that the SM-3 missile interceptor installations in Romania this year and in Poland three years ago could hold a ground-launched cruise missile. One thought that occurs to me is that the United States might offer some transparency, allowing the Russians to confirm that they do not hold and could not hold a ground-launched cruise missile, in return for Russia demonstrating some transparency with regards to American concerns about the Russian ground-launched cruise missile tests,” he explained in an interview to “PenzaNews” agency.

If the US or Russia abandon the treaty, the countries of Europe and Asia will also suffer, Steven Pifer thinks.

“First of all, to go back and look at 1987, the reasons that the United States and the Soviet Union decided to sign the Treaty is they concluded that having intermediate-range ground-launched cruise and ground-launched ballistic missiles were not in their security interests. If the Russia were to abandon the treaty, and face a possibility that the American missiles return to Europe: I don’t think that would be in the Russian interests, just as I don’t think the possibility of Russian missiles targeting American allies in Europe and Asia is in the US interests,” said the former US Ambassador to Ukraine.

Moreover, he said he fully believes that Moscow had indeed conducted the tests of a prohibited land-based cruise missile, although he could not tell exactly which.

“The specifics had not been named publicly. I had been told by American officials that they hit the Russian government with sufficient information so that the Russian government could identify the missile test in question,” Steven Pifer added.

At the same time, the ex-Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs said the concerns of the Russian side “are of lesser importance” and questioned the accusations that the use of combat drones by the US military violates the INF treaty.

“The definition of a ground-launched cruise missile in the INF treaty basically says: ‘A missile that goes from point A to point B and is destroyed to attack the target.’ A drone goes from point A to point B, it may fire a small rocket, but then it returns back to point A. That clearly is different from a ground-launched cruise missile, and my guess is that the Russian military, which is working to develop armed drones of its own, as soon as it acquires that capability, it will no longer make the claim that these kinds of drones are a violation of the INF treaty,” the interviewee suggested.

However, Said Aminov, military expert and editor of “Vestnik PVO” web-based media, disagreed with that opinion.

“Armed long-range unmanned drones, contrary to intelligence-gathering ones, constitute a violation of the INF treaty,” he said, stressing that the Russian projects are designed for intelligence-gathering purposes.

From his point of view, the current situation calls for an international legislation to ban unregulated use of military drones, as they tend to cause great numbers of civilian casualties on the battlefield.

“But I think that would be a very difficult thing to do while there are so many local conflicts nowadays, especially if the US is concerned in the issue,” the expert stated.

Discussing potential means of US influence on Russia over the INF treaty issue, he said he fully believes Washington to have nothing with which to hinder the Russian advance in military technology.

“I think it will have more to do with political pressure, with sanctions. However, as you can see, even the North Korea and Iran that are or were targets of large-scale international isolation, an economy and technology blockade, still create their own space missile tech,” Said Aminov noted.

From his point of view, Russia follows all provisions of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces treaty.

“All projects are fully compliant with these range limitations, including joint ventures such as ‘BrahMos’ with India,” the expert said.

In his opinion, Moscow and Washington should continue working on the treaty in spite of currently tense relations due to the Ukrainian conflict, the situation with Crimea and the expansion of the missile defense system in the Eastern Europe.

“It is vital to preserve the treaty and follow it, as this has real effect on global international stability. […] This can help prevent the emergence of such rockets or restrict their numbers in other regions – in the Middle East and the Southeast Asia,” Said Aminov noted.

Jessi Lintl, Member of Austrian Parliament, foreign affairs spokesperson for Team Stronach party, expressed a similar point of view.

“It is fundamental to preserve and possibly even expand the already signed disarmament and arms limitation treaties. There is no doubt that a choice of any one side to exit the treaty would not be a wise decision and may cause a new nuclear arms race. That must be avoided by all means,” the politician explained.

She believes that the current international situation requires immediate action to re-establish constructive dialogue with Russia – not only by Washington, but by the European Union as well.

“In my opinion, improving the atmosphere for talks between Europe and Russia requires lifting the European financial sanctions against Russia and, at the same time, the Russian counter-sanctions against the European Union. As a neutral state, Austria must take any measures on the EU level to have the sanctions lifted, with the previous history of good relations with Russia in mind,” the Austrian MP added.

Discussing the current state of the US-Russian talks, Jessi Lintl noted that the present atmosphere of secrecy does not allow to make any definite conclusion on the alleged INF treaty violations.

“The bilateral dialogue practically has ground to a stalemate. With that in mind, I would say the concerns of both sides are indeed justified,” said the spokesperson of Team Stronach.

At the same time, Tobias Pflueger, deputy chairman of the Left Party of Germany (Die Linke), former member of the European Parliament, stated that no side should leave the INF treaty as that would be a de-facto declaration of a new Cold War.

“I hope that no side really will cancel the treaty because the treaty is a very important historic moment: it ended a long time of terrible ever-growing arms race,” the politician noted.

From his point of view, Moscow and Washington should place emphasis on diplomacy with a possible third party in the talks, like China, and temporarily suspend the arsenal modernization projects that might cause negative reaction on the opposite side of the Earth, if they indeed seek to de-escalate the current situation.

“I think what both sides should do is not modernize their nuclear arms. I know that, for example, the United States is doing this at the moment. […] My main call would be that the States should not modernize their nuclear weapons,” added the deputy chairman of the Left Party of Germany.

He also pointed out that the current situation with application of military drones is alarming.

“At the moment, it totally changed the war situation. Take a look, for example, at Pakistan. There are daily attacks using drones from the US on the people there, and [there is] a lot of so-called ‘friendly fire’ and ‘collateral damage.’ In my opinion, the drones and the use of drones is something that should be also banned in an international treaty,” Tobias Pflueger stressed.

Meanwhile, Mario Abou Zeid, expert on Middle East politics at Carnegie Middle East Center, pointed out that the INF treaty is largely outdated and must be modernized as soon as possible, adding that many world powers like China are currently developing their own cruise and ballistic missiles.

“The way that the [US President Barack] Obama administration is perceiving, the biggest threat comes from the Pacific, which is the Chinese new-developed missiles technology that is booming. They have been implementing a tremendous project and a very ambitious program in developing ballistic missiles and ground-based cruise missiles,” the analyst recalled.

He suggested that the calls of some US politicians and activists to do away with the INF treaty altogether is caused by the intention to break free of its limitations and put an end to the Chinese threat, and noted that the Ukrainian crisis and the situation with Crimea may be used as a pretext.

However, Mario Abou Zeid said that such a step would provoke a new Caribbean crisis on an international scale.

“Don’t forget that the INF treaty helped end the Cold War, which practically was a complete arms race between the US and the Soviet Union. If they abandon this important bilateral agreement, that had created the basis of the nuclear disarmament globally, this will launch directly an arms race that could leave towards the scenario [of the Cuban missile crisis],” the expert said.

From his point of view, Moscow and Washington must learn from their history and establish mutual dialogue as soon as possible to preserve international peace.

“There is no alternative but to have a direct dialogue between the Obama administration and the current Russian administration in terms of the treaty in order to improve it and to have better access to such facilities that could be a potential threat perceived by the other parties,” Mario Abou Zeid concluded.

Source: Penza News

The Power Of Geopolitical Discourse – Analysis

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Geopolitics, as a discursive practice, should be taken seriously. Unfortunately, sometimes we are so busy with our daily activities and work that we tend to ignore the fact that the media can, indeed, spatialize and geopoliticize a conflict by ‘labeling’ and ‘identifying’, thus creating a sense of ‘pertinence’ amongst us, the ‘audience’; in other words, creating a binary world between ‘us’ and ‘them, the ‘other.’ This said, in order to understand the power of words and images in geopolitics, we must look back and understand how geopolitical knowledge was originally produced and thought of.

Although at first glance, while difficult to prove, the true origin of geopolitical theory may revolve around Darwinism and the rules of nature—I will not delineate the rules of nature according to Darwin but rather I will keep my argument in line with that of geopolitics and discourse. For instance, Friedrich Ratzel (a notable geographer, ethnographer and biologist), the creator of Lebensraum (the need of living space), theorized and compared the state to that of a living organism, in search of augmenting its space to support the carrying capacity of its species under its physical environment. By the same token, Rudolf Kjellen—who was actually the first political scientist to coin the term ‘geopolitics’—viewed the state in a similar manner as Ratzel: as an organic living being, with its own limbs and personality, drawing his metaphors from poetry and prose.

Friedrich Ratzel (1844-1904) and Rudolf Kjellen (1864-1922), who were the creators of the German geopolitical school of thought, had something in common: they grew up between the transition of a pre-industrial society (1750-1850) and the beginning of a new industrial society in continental Europe. Eventually, the story is widely known: their theories, alongside Mackinder’s, influenced the aggressive expansionist policies of the Nazis, pushed by Major General Karl Haushofer. (from Machtpolitik to Weltpolitik).

Likewise, another important player and influencer (Sir Halford Mackinder) was born in the 19th century, and meanwhile in 1904 published the most famous geopolitical theory of all, The Geographical Pivot of History; a theory that was taken particularly serious by the Nazi political and military elite and diffused via Haushofer’s understanding of the world. And a theory that, to this day, has been explained and argued in modern-day world affairs books, such as Robert D. Kaplan’s The Revenge of Geography and the likes. Without further expanding into academic theoretical grounds, we can conclude as so: Geopolitics had a common European heritage, pioneered by Mackinder, Ratzel and Kjellen, through their biological, geographical, and civilization interpretations of European power-relations of their time.

In that sense, how was geopolitical thought diffused and brought into the Western hemisphere, specifically into the United States, the world latest superpower?

In 1890, Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan, while stationed in Lima, Peru, published one of the most influential books in the American Naval military psyche: The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783. It advocated why it was imperative for the American navy to reach total hegemony and control over the seas and oceans of the world. Another important American geographer and advisor to Woodrow Wilson was Isaiah Bowman, whose push for free trade policies vis-a-vis the creation of international institutions, would also become influential in the American neoliberalism and exceptionalism ethos.

Nevertheless, although Bowman and Rear Admiral Mahan were important figures in the American geopolitical mindset, if there was any truly prominent figure in the realm of American foreign policy, it would be Yale’s Nicholas J. Spykman. His influence in shaping the American foreign policy attitude continues to maintain a foothold in the political and military establishments to this day. Amongst many of Spykman’s arguments, he claimed that geography was a leading influencer in international politics—i.e. country size and region location, climate, topography, resources, population, frontiers, and so forth—and that the exertion of power should be the true goal of the American foreign policy apparatus, whose best example is his Rimland concept of the Eurasian landmass; and needless to add, George Kennan’s The Sources of Soviet Conduct and the impact it had on US containment policy.

But under which geographical and political parameters and assumptions did Spykman, Mahan, Bowman, and Kennan view geopolitics? The answer is simple: from a European perception and understanding. All from the continent which, by a vivid expression of the MD Board Chairman prof. Bajrektarevic, “…exhorts its well-off status quo by notoriously exporting its transformative powers of free trade dogma and human rights stigma–a modified continuation of colonial legacy when the European conquerors, with fire and sword, spread commerce, Christianity and civilization overseas.”

Let’s connect the dots. Mahan’s ideas and analogies aroused from the British Royal Navy’s control of maritime commerce, which catapulted them to become one of the most powerful empires in the world; Bowman’s American exceptionalism—egalitarianism, republicanism, democracy, and individualism—ideals, can be traced in the form of Franco-British (e.g. Alexis de Tocqueville and Adam Smith) political and economic thinking; Spykman, whose origin was Dutch, based his Rimland theory out of Sir. Halford Mackinder’s, hence, we could say that, overall, he had a British influence on his geopolitical thinking; and Kennan, who prior to embarking on his Soviet adventure, was trained and educated in a pre-World War II setting, which at the time often involved the diffusion of the German geopolitical school of thought at the University of Berlin Oriental Institute, perhaps influencing the ideas of Kennan concerning the Soviet Union’s territorial expansionism. Henceforth, something is clear: modern-day geopolitical discourse, vision, and imagination was gradually diffused and transferred into the American foreign policy and military elite by European-clouted scholars. Nevertheless, the American geopolitical rationale would evolve rather drastically as opposed to their European counterparts because of their location and place in the world.

Let’s bring it back to the 21st century now. It was the year 2002, a year after one of the most devastating terrorist attacks on US soil. But also, it was the year when then-president George W. Bush, during his famous State of the Union Address, would label and identify the new “axis of evil” according to America’s world view; simply put, America’s new enemies—Iraq, Iran and North Korea. Was this speech a true act of geopolitical spatialization and the creation of a more rigid and tougher, binary world, resembling to the US—vs—Soviet Union days? “What we have found in Afghanistan confirms that, far from ending there, our war against terror is only beginning,” George W. Bush said as he addressed the entire world. Indeed, we have noticed that during the last decade—and the beginning of this decade—the war against terror has been substantially expanded from Pakistan to the Sahel and from the Sahel to Somalia. Going back to the 2002 State of the Union address, we have observed the urge to spatialize, label, and create a ‘sense of belonging’ amongst different civilizations in the world, which leads to the question: How often does the media spatialize an ongoing conflict, more precisely by further polarizing and transforming the world into an are-you-with-us-or-against-us type of discourse? Is Samuel Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations more valid than ever before? How often are we indirectly influenced by popular culture, regardless of our nationalities (i.e. television series, books, images, media channels)? Moreover, what are the foundational geographical and political assumptions behind our elites? This the main reason why critical geopolitics is so important in today’s multipolar world.

Leading geographers and critical geopolitics scholars, John Agnew and Gerard Toal, in their superstar essay Practical Geopolitical Reasoning in American Foreign Policy, suggested that the definition of geopolitics should be ‘re-conceptualized’ as a “ discursive practice by which intellectuals of statecraft ‘spatialize’ in such a way as to represent it as a ‘world’ characterized by particular types of places, peoples, and dramas.” Also, according to Agnew and Toal’s understanding, “geopolitics is the spatialization of international politics by core powers and hegemonic states.” As a result, when we think of the George W. Bush’s ‘Axis of Evil’ classification, the definition by Agnew and Toal seems more relevant than ever before.

Furthermore, what about the movies and television series we often see for entertainment purposes? For instance, if we take note of the evolution of Liam Neeson’s hit movie Taken, we can remark that he is always fighting an enemy from the Eastern hemisphere. During the first two films, the ex-CIA SAD (Special Activity Division) retired operations officer, Bryan Mills, was fighting the Tropoja-native, northern Albanian criminal organization in Paris, which is a ‘Western’ city. And, who ends up fighting some sort of rich Arab Sheikh—an enemy from the East, moreover, the Islamic world. Also, in the second movie, Bryan Mills, once again, ends up fighting the patriarch’s northern Albanian criminal organization, however, the landscape changes when he is fighting them in an Islamic city: Istanbul. Even if there are many ways to interpret this, in my personal view, I would interpret it as how the Albanian criminal organizations will be the new antagonist stereotype across mainstream Hollywood-made action movies, replacing the Italian criminal organization, and the brave and tough ‘Western’ action hero beating the ‘unknown’ enemies from the ‘East.’ It seems that in accordance to Hollywood’s geographic imagination, the Italian criminal organizations, have been replaced by tougher groups originating in the ‘East’—in this case, more precisely from the Balkans and of Islamic affiliation (at the beginning of Taken 2, we notice an Islamic burial, somewhere around the Albanian alps-type of setting).

As a last observation, what type of antagonist does Bryan Mills battle in his latest movie, Taken 3? Again, an enemy from the Eastern hemisphere: The Russians, though this time, battling a domestic enemy as well (for those that have not seen the movie, I shall stop here). Whatever our personal interpretations might be, we all can conclude with the following statement: The media plays a bigger role in geopolitics than we can imagine, purely by labeling, identifying, and creating the ‘other’.

How much influence does popular culture (e.g. books, televisions series, movies, newspapers, news channels) hold in our geographic imagination and the creation of the ‘other’? When we think of popular American televisions series, such as Homeland, House of Cards, or movies depicting ‘anti-Western’ dictators like The Last King of Scotland and The Interview, in addition to your typical war movies (e.g. Black Hawk Down, We Were Soldiers, American Sniper, Lone Survivor), to what extent can these movies and series further geopoliticize a group of people, moreover, an entire nation? For instance, in the case of Somalia, when we see movies like Captain Phillips, how much do we associate a whole country or diaspora as a group of either pirates or Al-Shaabab supporters? And as a last example, jumping to the other end of the spectrum, in the case of Venezuela’s media networks which are supportive of government repression like Noticias 24, Telesur and Venezolana de Television (VTV), by constantly creating stories about the big, bad and distrustful ‘American Empire’ who is, apparently, plotting a coup d’état against the Maduro regime. In reality, the pro-government Venezuelan media networks are failing to inform the population about the economic crisis and rampant insecurity common Venezuelans are experimenting in the streets of cities like Caracas, Maracaibo and Valencia, thereby just like Hollywood creates the ‘other,’ the same can be said about Venezuela and other authoritarian regimes. No matter what ideological principles a pro-Western or anti-Western government holds, each elite will abide by the same process: to label a group, to identify with a similar group, and to create an ‘us’ and ‘them’ discourse.

As a final remark, in order to geopoliticize through words and images, there must be a radically different entity (the ‘other’); put precisely, the creation of an ‘enemy’; an entity, that does not think the same way or hold the same values and ideals like ‘us.’ For the Romans, the ‘others’ were the barbarians; For the Persians, it was the Arabs; for the British medieval kingdoms, it was the Vikings; For the Chinese, it was the Xiognu nomadic tribes; for the Austro-Hungarian empire it was the Ottomans; for the European colonial empires it was the Native Amerindians and African tribes; for the Americans, it was the Soviets; and nowadays the new Mongolian hordes of the 21st century are non-state actors like ISIS and similar groups for the rest of the civilized world. The whole point of this article was to show, how in actuality, words and images can be powerful weapons to geopoliticize entire nations, whilst additionally grasping how the political and geographical assumptions, aroused from a European mindset; when, in turn, geopolitical thinking and reasoning was nothing other than the ‘vision’ that scholars like Mackinder, Kjellen and Haushofer had in mind for the securing vital strategic resources in accordance to their countries’ needs at the time. Consequently, we can firmly state that Western identity and geopolitical discourse have a European legacy.

In his last book, World Order, one of the most influential Europeans in the US, Henry Kissinger quotes an old excerpt of French Travel-writer, Marquis de Custine, who describes Czarist Russia as, “a monstrous compound of the petty refinements of Byzantium, and the ferocity of the desert horde, a struggle between the etiquette of the Lower Byzantine Empire, and the savage virtues of Asia, have produced the mighty state which Europe now beholds, and the influence of which she will probably feel hereafter, without being able to understand its operation.” Now, dear reader, it is up to you to be the judge of Marquis de Custine’s words. Or in popular geopolitical terms, as rapper Eminem would say, “My words are my weapons…”

*Diego Solis, Global South Advocate, Founder and chair of Geopolitical Explorers Consulting Group.

Interview With President Of Pakistan’s ECO Chamber Of Commerce & Industry

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At present Muhammad Adrees is President of ECO Chamber of Commerce & Industry, as well as President of the Federation of Pakistan Chambers of Commerce & Industry (FPCCI). He is Chief Executive Officer of Sitara Chemical Industries Ltd – the largest Chlor-Alkali Chemical Complex of Pakistan. He is a distinguished name in the business community at national and regional levels. He belongs to a well-known business group ‘Sitara’ engaged in the business of Chemicals, Textiles, Energy and Real Estate. Under his leadership, production capacity was grown to 610 tons/day in 2015 from 30 tons/day in 1984. He graduated from Punjab University and then went to England in 1982 for higher Business Management Studies. He also has innumerable professional qualifications at his credit from LUMS, Pakistan Institute of Management and Leadership course from Montreal Canada.

First of all tell us briefly about transition from RCD to ECO.

Muhammad Adrees
Muhammad Adrees

Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD) was a multi-governmental organization which was originally established in 1964 by Iran, Pakistan and Turkey, which were also the regional members of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), to allow socio-economic development of the member states. Although, the organization continued on a rather slower pace, it didn’t accrue the much desired results. After twelve unsatisfactory years, the three regional Heads of State held a summit in Izmir on 22 April 1976, making amendments to the 1964 declaration. The Treaty of Izmir was signed in 1977 as the legal framework for RCD. However, before the amended framework could be put into action, due to the Islamic revolution in Iran in the late 70s and the reservations of the new government in Iran, the organization was dissolved in 1979. It was many years later in 1985, that a new organization by the name of Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) was formed by Iran, Pakistan and Turkey.

Since you have assumed the charge of President ECO what initiatives have been taken to ensure closer economic cooperation among the member countries?

ECO-CCI Presidency and Secretariat was shifted in Pakistan in September 2014 for three years. After viewing the three years performance it will be decided that in which country ECO CCI permanent headquarter should be located. The aim of ECO CCI is to promote the trade and investment among the member countries in order to improve the socio-economic development. To execute and identify areas where ECO can flourish and overcome its socio-economic lacking, FPCCI is preparing a comprehensive Action-Plan for the next three years. FPCCI has developed full-fledged secretariat for performing the duties of ECO-CCI which will provide a platform to private sector of Pakistan for strengthening economic ties and establishing business activities with member countries on a wide spectrum of industries for advancing trade-led economic growth as well as enhancing ECO intra-trade and investment. FPCCI also has a strong Research department which will provide policy advocacy for promotion of trade and investment among the ECO region. Moreover, FPCCI has Business Councils with all ECO members’ countries which are pro-active in the promotion of bilateral trade.

What sort of progress was achieved when RCD existed?

The aim behind the establishment of RCD was economic development of the region through increased cooperation by promoting intra-regional trade. Despite strong cooperation, the region did not establish any significant relationship. Practically; no major economic development took place in the region. There was neither improved intra-regional trade nor there was harmonization of economic policies.

What were the key hurdles obstructing closer integration of the economies of the RCD members?

In late 70’s, major political changes took place in Iran and Pakistan. The monarchy of shah of Iran was overthrown via Islamic revolution and in Pakistan martial law was proclaimed. The new governments had different priorities and policies; therefore in 1979 RCD became a practically defunct organization. In 1985, the organization was revived with a new name ECO. It came about as preferential trade agreement between Iran, Pakistan and Turkey. In 1987, the member countries signed Izmir treaty and gave ECO a formal organizational foundation.

What was the objective behind adding Afghanistan and Central Asian Countries?

The break-up of the former Soviet Union led to the independence of Republics of Central Asia and Caucasus. In their bid to open up to the outside world and as a manifestation of their urge to revive their historic affinities with the peoples of Iran, Pakistan and Turkey, six of these Republics; namely Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan along with Afghanistan sought the membership of ECO and were admitted into the organization. They have interconnected trade routes and mobilization of goods and services and the factors of production. Migration of labor and businesses among these countries was a common phenomenon in centuries old history of the region. The connectivity, cultural adoptability and migration of the peoples among these countries have established similarities in the culture, languages, and traditions in these countries. With its expansion ECO gained a new dimension and new role.

Most of the ECO member countries are rich in energy reserves but continue to suffer from inadequate supplies that affect their economic growth. What are key hurdles hindering utilization of these reserves?

ECO region particularly Central Asian is rich in energy reserves due to presence of hydrocarbons, crude oil and natural gas reserves. ECO region contains 11.62 % of the total crude oil of the world and 20.15 % of the world’s natural gas. The presence of significant amount of world fuel has attracted the attention of world powers in the region and the central Asian region of ECO has become the battle ground for new great game of oil politics. The large reserves of oil and gas can fulfill the huge requirement of ECO, but is adequate to export to other nations. Out of ten, seven countries of ECO region are landlocked and they depend upon other countries for the export of their oil and gas reserves. At present, the fuel is exported through Russia which is very expensive and lengthy route. The only cheap and feasible route is through Southern countries like Pakistan and Iran. Pakistan is facing problem of infrastructural bottlenecks and lack of interest while political sanctions on Iran don’t allow us to get the benefits of energy reserves.

What economic benefits were perceived prior to the expansion?

To begin with, geographical proximity, shared social and cultural characteristics, and diversity in economic structures all combine to make up a strong case for promoting regional economic integration in the ECO region. The member countries have diverse production structures with Turkey, Iran and Pakistan having strong manufacturing and services sectors and the Central Asian Republics in the process of transformation from centrally planned economies to market based systems. Liberal trade policies can result in trade creation among the member countries entailing several benefits including lower prices, more product variety and quality, and improved incentives for innovation. The benefits of regional economic integration can go far beyond trade creation.

Tell us about three major economic benefits that has been realized?

The ECO region too offers significant potential for a broader level of cooperation that is based not just on trade and investment but also on other avenues including infrastructure, information and communications technology, and exchange of technical personnel. The ECO member countries are at different stages of development with different infrastructure needs. Pakistan, Turkey and Iran are relatively more developed countries in the region whereas other regional countries are in the process of upgrading and modernizing their infrastructure. The construction and infrastructure projects offer opportunities for mutually undertaking such projects in the ECO region. The member countries can develop important partnerships by pooling their financial resources as well as sharing technical expertise in construction and infrastructure development. Such technical cooperation can be an effective vehicle for greater development and prosperity of the region.

Has the teething problems emerging from the expansion been overcome?

The region is facing problems of infrastructure bottlenecks, lack of institutions, language, low human capital formation, lack of technological advancement which created problems in the development of the region. Moreover, intra-region trade is very low compared to other regions. In this respect, the ECO member states should have to make efforts to promote intra-ECO trade and to take steps for improvement of regulatory frameworks and removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers in the region, as the intra-ECO trade situation is, however, far from satisfactory.

What are the most contentious issues facing the member countries?

ECO region are badly facing the severe consequences of terrorism. The types, causes and origins of the terrorism in this region are varied: sectarian, ethnic, or political. Regardless the causes of terrorist activities, the adverse effects hamper their economies in serious ways. Moreover, lack of investment in science and technological activities hampers the economic development of the ECO region.

Indo-Bhutan Hydro Relations: Between Economic Well Being And Environmental Sustainability – Analysis

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One strand of the debate on non-traditional security issues is that future wars will be fought over water. History stands evident of the fact that since the beginning of human civilization man has been settling beside rivers and many of the mighty wars have been fought for water. Water being one of the essential preconditions for life on the earth has been one of the earliest and most pervasive sources of human conflict. There is absolutely no role of politics as long as rivers flow freely without bothering about political boundaries of nation states. But, as such a phenomenon is rare to happen; complications on river water sharing are obvious to stay between countries.

The issue of river water sharing is far more contentious in South Asia given the immense geographical proximity of the countries. South Asia as a region shares two of the major river systems of the world, the Indus system and the Ganga-Brahmaputra system. The countries in this part of the world have been witnessing constant antagonism amongst each other on issues relating to river water sharing. This in turn has made way for several agreements on water sharing among the states which have proved to be successful as well as unsuccessful at various occasions.

The Curious Case of Bhutan

Bhutan is a nation rich in water resources with per capita availability of 75,000 cubic meters per year which is one of the highest in the region. The case of Bhutan is curious, given the fact that the nation is entangled in an uncomfortable paradox: a situation of water scarcity amidst the highest endowment of water resources in the region.i

The four main rivers in Bhutan are:

i. Manas or Gongri River
ii. Mo Chu or Sankosh River
iii. Wang Chu or Raidak River
iv. Amo Chu or Torsa River

The major rivers in Bhutan flow in the north-south direction and carry an estimated potential of 30,000 MW of hydro-power.ii A World Bank assisted Master Plan shows that the four major rivers alone have a potential of generating around 20,000 MW of hydroelectricity.iii Given the marginal size of its domestic economy, Bhutan has been mostly unable to exploit much of its hydropower potential on its own. Thus, Bhutan has been looking up to assistance and aid from foreign countries and agencies for its hydro-projects. India has been the most stable and trusted partner amongst all. With the external aid and assistance, Bhutan has been successful in producing surplus hydro-power which in turn is exported to the supporting states, mostly India. The residential sector in Bhutan consumes about 48-50 percent of the energy produced and the surplus is rightly available for export. Since the country’s electricity generation is significantly higher than the maximum domestic demand, Bhutan is a net exporter (mostly to India), thus making hydro-power a ‘win-win’ condition for both sides.

Indo-Bhutan Relations: Water as a Catalyst for Ties

Indian Prime Minister, Narendra Modi’s strategy of taking up Bhutan as the first destination of foreign visit after taking charge of the new government was greatly welcomed by Bhutan. The move makes it apparent that India acknowledges its solid friendship with Bhutan. It has infused fresh blood to the already existing arteries between the two countries. Cutting across regime lines on both sides, the relationship between the two countries have been all weather. In absence of any strategic divergence between the two nations and given the interdependence between the two sides at economic levels, the bonding is expected to strengthen further in coming days.

Unlike with other neighbors, India has mostly had a peaceful and stress-free overall relationship with Bhutan. India’s investments in hydropower projects in Bhutan since 1960s have undoubtedly been an arena providing impetus to the cordial bonding. Indo-Bhutan hydropower cooperation began in 1961 with the signing of the Jaldhaka agreement. The Jaldhaka project is situated on the Indian side of Indo-Bhutan border in West Bengal. The major part of power produced at Jaldhaka hydropower plant was exported to the southern part of Bhutan. Thus, the benefit of cross-border energy trade has encouraged Bhutan to seek Indian investments in setting up hydropower plants. India has since then been reciprocating by constantly aiding and assisting hydropower projects in Bhutan.

Both the countries have inked several power (electricity) sharing agreements till date. Although India has had bitter relationships with Bangladesh, Nepal and Pakistan at some point of time in terms of river water sharing, but, in case of Bhutan the success of one project has made way for other projects based on confidence, economic viability and shared benefits.

Two of the major hydro-power projects in Bhutan

Chukha Hydropower Project:

A landmark development in the history of Indo-Bhutan hydro-relations came in 1987 with the commissioning of the 336 MW Chukha Hydropower Project. Bhutan‟s first mega power project, Chukha, was fully funded by the Government of India with 60 percent grant and 40 percent loan at the interest rate of 5 percent payable over a period of 15 years after commissioning. The project was inaugurated by the then Indian president R.Venketaraman. The project generates approximately 1,800 MU every year and most of the generated energy (around 75%) is exported to India.

Tala Hydroelectric Project:

The resounding success and economic wellbeing brought by the Chukha project made way for newer projects. The 1,020 MW Tala hydroelectric Project is the biggest joint project between India and Bhutan so far. Tala was wholly financed by the Government of India, 60 per cent by grant and 40 per cent by loan. Three 440kV transmission lines stress to the Indian border since the power is being entirely supplied to India.

Other Projects under Construction

In his last visit to Bhutan, Prime Minister Narendra Modi laid the foundation stone of the 600 MW Kholongchu hydro-electric project, a joint venture between India and Bhutan. The 600 MW Kholongchu hydro project, to be developed by SJVN along with Druk Green Power Corp, is estimated to cost more than Rs 3,868 crores to be contributed in the ratio of 50:50 by both the JV partners. Three more Hydro Electric Projects- Punatsangchu I (1200 MW), Punatsangchu II (1020 MW) and Mangdechu (720 MW) are under construction. They are scheduled to be commissioned in 2017-18. iv

Power deficit India finds her interests perfectly fulfilled by leaning on Bhutan and Bhutan in turn finds an opportunity to optimize its national income through power exports to India. This win-win situation for both sides makes the relationship between the two nations strong and long lasting. A striking aspect of Bhutan’s power generation is the very low construction cost per kilowatt. The minimal cost of production as compared to producing electricity domestically has been pushing India to indulge even more with Bhutan.

Dilemma of Dams

The optimism of the hydro-cooperation and construction of large multipurpose projects seem to be very win-win for New Delhi and Bhutan. But, there has been a considerable amount of voice coming up from the environmentalists who critique the viability of big dams. The issue has been raised frequently in the northeastern part of India which shares direct land border with Bhutan. The construction of mega hydropower projects in Bhutan would have adverse impact on the lives and livelihood of the people living in downstream areas in Assam and other states in the northeastern parts of India. Thus, there has been this dilemma of having or not having big dams. “Built on the logic of “development”, big dams have wreaked havoc on indigenous communities in Assam and Arunachal Pradesh with regular flooding. By pursuing predatory development the central and state governments are equally culpable of visiting disaster on the region”.v

In addition to the risk of devastating floods and earthquakes, the risk of drop in soil productivity and depth and probable serious changes to Assam’s floodplain agriculture needs to be considered. The Baksa and Barpeta districts of Assam witnessed flood havoc in August 2004 due to rise of water level in the Beki, a distributary of the Manas River. The rise in Beki was due to release of water from the reservoir of Kurichhu Hydropower Project. The dam of Kurichhu Project is located merely about 100kms upstream from the Manas National Park, Assam thus making the local ecology and environment much more vulnerable. For a number of years, unprecedented floods have ravaged the Barpeta district of Assam in the west with rivers descending from Bhutan overflowing their banks.

Such environmental concerns regarding large hydro projects involving construction of big dams and reservoirs in a way impede the bonding and cooperation between the two nations. The need of the hour is effective impact assessment of such projects and necessary environmental studies. The thirst for growth should in no ways contradict the wellbeing and sustainability of the environment and the human race at large.

*Uddipta Ranjan Boruah, Student of International Relations, South Asian University, New Delhi

Notes:
i. Gyamtsho, T., 2013. Watershed Management Policies and Programs in Bhutan: Empowering the Powerless. In A. Prakash, S. Singh, C.G. Goodrich & S. Janakarajan, eds. Water Resources Policies in South Asia. New Delhi: Routledge.
ii. IDSA, 2010. WATER SECURITY FOR INDIA: The External Dynamics. IDSA Task Force Report. New Delhi: IDSA Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses.
iii. Serchan, B.M., 2000. Hydro-Power. Nepali Times, 30 August – 5 September. p.3.
iv. PTI, 16 June 2014. The Economic Times. [Online] Available at: http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2014-06-16/news/50624112_1_druk-green-power-corporation-hydropower-projects-bhutan [Accessed 19 April 2015].
v. Gohain, H., 2008. Big Dams, Big Floods: On Predatory Development. Economic and Political Weekly, July 26- August 1. pp.19-21 available at (http://www.jstor.org/stable/40277761).

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