Drug syndicates are struggling to create a foothold in China. It’s time to fight back.

If you like to take long walks in Shanghai, this may have been the first summer when you detected something new in the air: the scent of marijuana. It is a sad experience that leaves one apprehensive.

The metropolises of the advanced economies offer abundant warning examples.

Despite billions of dollars spent on the war against drugs annually, drug cartels have distribution networks in over 200 US cities.

Today, America is struggling with one of the worst heroine epidemics in its history. Between 2002 and 2012, the number of heroin users doubled and today there are an estimated 1.5 million chronic heroin users in the country.

If you have lived in major American or European cities, you know only too well that what starts with “just marijuana” tends to end with meth and heroine.

The writing is on the wall. Recently, Shanghai Daily reported about the arrest of suspected members of an armed drug ring in Guilin City of the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region as well as the seizure of drugs in Guangdong; and the sentencing of actor Zhang Lin for providing venues for drug users.

The illicit drug business seems to be expanding. Last February, in the biggest drug bust in recent history, Shanghai police smashed a gang operating in the city and Guangdong Province, while seizing some 2.4 tons of methamphetamine.

More addicts

According to China’s National Narcotics Control Commission 2014 Annual Report on Drug Control in China, heroin is today the most abused drug on the mainland, followed by synthetic drugs such as ketamine, methamphetamines and other amphetamine-type stimulants.

In the past, drug abuse was the curse of the unemployed, the self-employed, farmers and migrants.

Today, as the 2014 report states, it is spreading to the new urban class; employees of enterprises and institutions, freelancers, people in the entertainment sector, and even civil servants.

Since 2010, Shanghai police have reportedly busted an increasing number of drug cases. Nevertheless, the number of drug addicts in the city has soared by 30 percent in the same time period.

As economic growth has waned in Europe and North America, growth markets are shifting to Asia — including the market for drugs.

Historical shadows

To Chinese people, increasing prosperity means better living standards. To criminal syndicates, it means a cynical opportunity to turn a human dream into a hellish nightmare.

Since living standards are likely to double in China during the ongoing decade, the curse of drugs is not to be under-estimated. Today, domestic criminal groups reportedly control many large-scale drug and precursor chemical criminal activities in China. Meanwhile, a large and increasing number of transnational criminal organizations seek to establish a foothold in the mainland.

In China, the drug threat has a particularly ominous shadow.

Grown in Indian plantations owned by the British East India Company and transported by traders to coastal cities in Guangdong, opium was smuggled to Chinese middlemen who retailed the drug in the mainland.

Some 170 years ago, opium paved the way to colonial wars and a century of humiliation.

The only effective way to avoid a similar fate in contemporary China is a zero tolerance approach to drugs.

This article appeared at Shanghai Daily and is reprinted with permission.

The Libyan public prosecutor’s office announced an investigation into a video allegedly showing the torture by prison guards of Saadi Gaddafi, the son of late dictator Colonel Muammar Gaddafi who fled abroad during Libya’s revolution.

The torture apparently occurred at the al-Hadba prison, currently under control of Tripoli authorities, not recognized internationally. The prison is headed by the former deputy defence miniser of the same government, Khalid Sharif.

Always according to the Libya Herald, it remains unclear whether the person in the video is actually Saadi, or a fake attempting to spark a reaction.

Melinda Taylor, an international criminal court defense lawyer representing Saadi Gaddafi, told Russia Today that she recognized her client in the footage. The “immediate” opening of an investigation into the video disclosed August 2 was also demanded by Human Rights Watch.

Spanish restaurant El Celler de Can Roca regained its title as the world’s best restaurant on Monday, fending off previous winner Noma, with which it has alternated the top honor in recent years.

The Copenhagen restaurant dropped two places to No. 3, knocking chef-owner Rene Redzepi off the top spot he had held last year and for three previous years at the annual fine dining ceremony held in London’s Guildhall.

El Celler de Can Roca, run by three brothers in Girona, Spain since 1986, was described as “hospitality at its finest” by organizers and took second place in 2014 after knocking Noma from the top perch in 2013.

Italy’s Osteria Francescana in Modena was the near winner this year, moving up one place to No. 2, while Central in Lima climbed 11 places to settle in at No. 4, pushing New York’s Eleven Madison Park to fifth place. The top 10 was rounded off by Mugaritz in San Sebastian, Spain, London’s Dinner by Heston Blumenthal, Narisawa in Tokyo, D.O.M in Sao Paulo and Gaggan in Bangkok.

European restaurants dominated the top 50, taking 18 of the remaining 25 places for popular locations in Spain and France, along with White Rabbit, a new entry from Russia. Surprisingly McDonald’s was not on this list – little bit of sarcasm doesn’t hurt.

Other notable winners include Helene Darroze at her eponymous Paris restaurant and at the Connaught in London, named the World’s Best female chef, and French chef Daniel Boulud, best known for the New York-based Daniel, who picked up this year’s Lifetime Achievement Award.

The awards, now in their 14th edition, have become a coveted honour for high-end restaurants around the world, rivalling the longstanding Michelin guides. But this year’s ceremony arrived amid recent criticism over its voting process.

The list, organized by trade publication Restaurant magazine since 2002, is based on the personal experiences of more than 1,000 chefs, restaurateurs and food experts, rather than according to a pre-determined criteria. A French group called Occupy 50 Best launched a petition in protest, accusing organizers of sexism, bias and a lack of transparency in the judging system.

Ahead of the countdown, Group Editor William Drew said that organizers had brought in consultancy firm Deloitte this year as an independent adjudicator to oversee the voting process. It was also announced that in 2016, the awards will be held in New York City, the first time it will be staged outside of Britain.

World Bank Managing Director and Chief Operating Officer Sri Mulyani Indrawati on Tuesday underlined the importance of deepening Pakistan’s reforms and investments in priority development areas so that the country can achieve a higher level of economic growth to reduce extreme poverty and increase shared prosperity.

Concluding her three-day visit to Pakistan, Indrawati called on Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, met with his economic team led by Federal Minister for Finance Ishaq Dar, and heard updates on the progress of economic reforms being implemented by the government.

“I have been impressed with the government’s success at stabilizing the economy under difficult circumstances, and I support its aim to accelerate sustainable and equitable growth to lift more people out of poverty,” said Indrawati. “The priorities that we discussed include initiatives to improve people’s everyday lives, such as energy, health, education, and the social safety net—as well as expanding the tax base and strengthening governance and capacity of key institutions to support these services.”

She pointed to the youth bulge as a potential asset for Pakistan’s development, but to benefit from this would require improvements in education and training, including for girls and women. “Increasing numbers of young people in Pakistan mean job creation is a priority, and this will require improvements in the business and investment climate, privatization, and tapping the potential of regional integration,” said Indrawati.

Indrawati started her visit in Lahore at the Badshahi Mosque and a beneficiary registration center for the Benazir Income Support Program (BISP). She was encouraged by the joint effort of the Federal and Provincial Government to expand the BISP through conditional cash transfers for education outcomes. She met with Punjab Chief Minister Shahbaz Sharif and learned about province-level reform efforts and development projects under implementation and preparation with World Bank Group support.

Indrawati emphasized the importance of the private sector’s contributions to the growth and development of Pakistan during her visit with representatives of academia, think-tanks, private sector, civil society, diplomatic missions, and development agencies.

She addressed members of faculty and students from 80 universities all over Pakistan through video link from the Higher Education Commission auditorium in Islamabad.

Indrawati was apprised of women’s participation and the community led approach in development projects being administered by the Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) for Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Federally Administered Tribal Areas, and Balochistan. She met with the MDTF project beneficiaries and expressed a keen interest in women’s participation in the design and implementation of projects.

She was accompanied by Annette Dixon, Vice President for the South Asia Region of the World Bank during the visit.

On Monday, at a special meeting of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in Qatar, an important step toward reconciliation with Iran emerged in the form of a joint statement that endorsed, albeit cautiously, the recent Iran nuclear agreement.

Credited to a large measure to the efforts of U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, who attended the meeting, the GCC’s official announcement stands in sharp contrast to the strong objections of Israel, whose Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu increasingly find himself isolated both abroad and at home, in light of a major statement by a formidable group of former officials questioning the government’s negative stance vis-a-vis a deal that they terms as “fait accompli.”

Perhaps the GCC officials have reached the same conclusion, thus setting aside some of their earlier hesitations in favor of a more explicit endorsement of a deal — that is bound to impact the Persian Gulf’s strategic environment.

Henceforth, assuming that the deal will survive a Congressional review and gets implemented by both sides without a major hitch, the long-standing rift between Iran and the GCC states led by Saudi Arabia will likely start to heal, depending of course on political will by both sides.

The GCC’s endorsement is also partially due to Iran’s proactive regional diplomacy that is spearheaded by the resourceful Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, who toured the region recently and has been constantly hammering the point on the need for greater regional cooperation on the common goods, e.g., joint efforts against the menace of terrorism.

As a result, the Rouhani administration can now legitimately boast about the tangible dividend of the nuclear deal, that has raised some questions at home with respect to its implications for Iran’s national security. An emerging thaw in Iran-Saudi relations, nested in the above-mentioned GCC statement, will likely be deepened in the coming weeks and months, barring unforeseen developments.

The ground work has been slowly paved for a future Zarif visit to Riyadh and, should that happen, we can safely assume a forward movement on a host of regional issues, including Yemen and Syria.

Of course, it is perfectly possible that in their complicated web of relations, Tehran and Riyadh might not reach a common understanding of the on-going regional conflicts and tensions, which involve a host of other players singing to their own tunes, but there is no alternative to dialogue and candid exploration of options.

With respect to Syria, the nuclear deal has been followed by a new U.S.-Turkey agreement that allows the U.S. use of Turkish bases for attacking the ISIS bases inside Syria, i.e., welcome news as far as Tehran is concerned, given the shrinking territory held by the government of Bashar al-Assad, which has applauded the nuclear deal — for good reasons, e.g., it changes the region’s security calculations to the detriment of ISIS and Al-Qaeda (affiliates).

As for the strictly Persian Gulf affairs, the stage is now set for meaningful future security dialogue between Iran and the GCC, which might also directly involve Iraq in such formats as a new pan-Gulf security forum. In other words, we may be on the verge of witnessing the emergence of a new regional format that would in turn facilitate greater inter-regional select cooperation — on terrorism, narco-traffic, smuggling, piracy, environmental security, and the like. Concrete confidence-building measures would need to be implemented and the magnitude of bilateral and multilateral interactions enhanced over time before the existing gaps between the GCC bloc and Ira would be completely removed. Nevertheless, the Monday announcement was a good start forward toward renewed Iran-GCC ties that include important economic and trade dimensions as well.

Optimistically speaking then, the ties of interdependence between the two sides will grow again after a temporary hiatus caused by the Iran sanctions, thus setting into motion a new dynamic chapter in good-neighborly relations between Iran and its conservative Arab neighbors. The narrative for the dawn of a new regional diplomacy has now been turned explicit by the GCC’s endorsement of the nuclear deal, which in essence is tantamount to their declaration of intent to reset their relations with their Persian neighbor.

The accelerating deterioration of Venezuela’s political crisis is cause for growing concern. The collapse in 2014 of an incipient dialogue between government and opposition ushered in growing political instability.

With legislative elections due in December, there are fears of renewed violence. But there is a less widely appreciated side of the drama. A sharp fall in real incomes, major shortages of essential foods, medicines and other basic goods and breakdown of the health service are elements of a looming social crisis. If not tackled decisively and soon, it will become a humanitarian disaster with a seismic impact on domestic politics and society, and on Venezuela’s neighbours. This situation results from poor policy choices, incompetence and corruption; however, its gravest consequences can still be avoided. This will not happen unless the political deadlock is overcome and a fresh consensus forged, which in turn requires strong engagement of foreign governments and multilateral bodies.

As the 12th largest oil producer in the world, with the largest reserves, and a beneficiary of the most sustained oil price boom in history, Venezuela ought to be well placed to ride out the recent collapse of the international price of crude. The oil boom, combined in the early years at least with the government’s redistribution policies, produced a significant decrease in poverty under the administration (1999-2013) of the late Hugo Chávez.

The economy was showing signs of strain, however, well before the 50 per cent fall in prices at the end of 2014, a year in which GDP shrank by more than 4 per cent and inflation rose to 62 per cent. Expropriations of private land and businesses, stringent price and exchange controls and inefficient, often corruptly-run state enterprises undermined the nation’s production of basic goods and services. Having incurred massive debts, spent most of its international reserves and emptied a stabilisation fund set up for such contingencies, the government faces a critical shortage of hard currency and the prospect of triple-digit inflation this year and can no longer afford to make up domestic shortfalls of consumer goods with imports.

The impact has naturally been felt most keenly by the poor, who rely on increasingly scarce supplies of price-controlled food, medicines and other basic goods for which they must often queue for hours, with no guarantee of success. Those with ailments such as cancer, HIV-AIDS or cardiovascular disease can go months without medicines they require to survive. Hospitals and even private clinics cannot maintain stocks of medicines and other basic supplies, including spare parts to repair equipment. The hospital crisis is exacerbated by government failure to complete a rebuilding program begun in 2007 or fulfil promises to construct new facilities. Thousands of doctors and other medical personnel have resigned due to low wages and unsafe working conditions. Surgery waiting lists are growing, and staff vacancies go unfilled.

Some economists predict a sudden collapse in food consumption and widespread hunger, and public health specialists already say that some surveys are showing chronic malnutrition, although the country is not yet on the verge of famine. The collapse of the health service, however, can have pernicious short-term effects, including uncontrolled spread of communicable diseases and thousands of preventable deaths.

Aside from purely humanitarian concerns, Venezuela’s neighbours and the wider international community have pragmatic reasons for acting. If a solid institutional and social welfare framework can be restored through a negotiated settlement, and economic measures taken to deal with inflation and scarcity, a humanitarian crisis can be averted. If not, the collapse of the health and welfare infrastructure is likely to make political conflict harder to manage and could lead to a further erosion of democracy and an increasing likelihood of violence.

This in turn would have an impact beyond Venezuela’s borders. Potential risks include large-scale migration, the spread of disease and a wider foothold for organised crime. Without a change of economic policy, the country is heading for a chaotic foreign debt default, probably in 2016. An unstable Venezuela unable to meet its international commitments could destabilise other countries in the region, particularly Caribbean nations that have come to rely on subsidised energy from Caracas. It would also have a direct impact in Colombia, along a border already under multiple threats.

This briefing is the product of research conducted between April and July 2015, which included field trips to Zulia state and the greater Caracas area. Among a wide variety of sources consulted were many grassroots sympathisers of the government and several mid-ranking officials. Unfortunately, the ministers of food and health did not answer requests for interviews.

To forestall the severe consequences of a humanitarian crisis in Venezuela:

• The government must acknowledge the problem. Concealing true statistics and harassing those who publish or demand access to data must cease.

• Any political dialogue or agreement must prioritise concerted action to guarantee supplies of scarce goods, including medicines, medical supplies and basic foodstuffs, for the neediest, and a social safety net without partisan intervention or manipulation that incorporates as providers non-governmental actors, including the Catholic Church and humanitarian organisations.

• The current unworkable system of price and exchange controls that fosters corruption, smuggling and the black market and fuels inflation and scarcity needs to be carefully dismantled and replaced with mechanisms that provide a safety net for the poor without stifling production.

• The government should seek broad support for an emergency program that restores economic equilibrium and protects the most vulnerable from the consequences of the necessary adjustment, rather than blaming the opposition and foreign governments for an imaginary “economic war”.

• The opposition should resist the temptation to score political points, acknowledge there is no painless solution and present a clear economic and social reform agenda.

• Venezuela’s neighbours and the broader international community must abandon their reluctance to act, and explicitly press for restoration of the rule of law and of institutional checks and balances, beginning with close oversight of the December parliamentary elections.

• They should also help alleviate the social costs of the current crisis by offering food and medical aid and helping Venezuela cope with and control existing epidemics and prevent future ones.

The reopening of Embassies and establishment of diplomatic relations between Cuba and the US after 54 years marks the start of a new chapter in relations. Diplomatic engagement opens another road towards resolving many issues that have bedeviled relations between these two neighbours. The development has been widely welcomed and opens up new possibilities

President Obama had indicated his intention to improve relations with Cuba as long back as 2005. But the opposition of hard-line Cuban Americans and their representatives in the Congress, and the imprisonment of USAID worker Alan Gross in 2009 stalled progress.

The recent thaw began with the release of Alan Gross from Cuban prison in exchange for the release of five Cubans imprisoned in the US since 1998 for spying. Gross’s release by the Cubans resulted in the Jewish lobby supporting détente with Cuba. A New Cuba-PAC has been set up to press for normalizing relations with Cuba. The success on this front encouraged President Obama and President Raul Castro to move further, and led to the decision to resume full diplomatic relations, broken off in 1961.

Cuban US relations have remained troubled since 1902, when Cuba gained independence but was put under US administration. The US Congress passed the Platt amendment under which the US ended its occupation of Cuba in return for Cuba’s acceptance of certain conditions in a treaty, including the US right to intervene in Cuba’s internal affairs. Since then the US has played a dominant role in Cuba’s internal affairs, including several military interventions.

In 1952, the US engineered a coup by Gen Fulgencio Batista who became president and led to a complete dominance of Cuba’s economy by US interests. The 1952 coup sparked the rebellion by Fidel Castro and his supporters, who ultimately ousted Batista in 1959. The revolutionary government was opposed by the US administration and Cuba turned increasingly to the USSR, and in January 1961 diplomatic relations were severed. In April 1961, the CIA sponsored an unsuccessful effort to land armed forces at the Bay of Pigs in Cuba to start a rebellion against Castro’s government. In 1962 the Cuban missile crisis further worsened ties, and the US further tightened economic sanctions against Cuba. In 1965 the Cuban Communist party (PCC) was formally established and became Cuba’s sole legitimate party in 1975.

Since 1961, US-Cuban relations have been trapped in a vicious circle of mutual hostility despite some efforts to improve relations by Presidents Johnson and Carter.

Nevertheless, cooperation on maritime boundary and migration issues led to some positive results. The collapse of the USSR, Cuba’s main economic and political supporter in 1991 greatly weakened Cuba, heightened US expectations of a regime change, and led to renewed US efforts to change the regime. In response, the regime became increasingly suspicious of political dissidents and cracked down on them. The shadows of the past continue to haunt US Cuba relations even today.

Establishment of diplomatic relations is a welcome development for the entire region and the world. The US blockade of Cuba and extraterritorial application of its laws had led to US disputes with third countries such as Canada, the EU others. The entire edifice of the blockade built up of layers of legislation over the years will need to be demolished. This requires the approval of the US Congress and overcoming the resistance of die hard opponents, especially a few well known Cuban-American legislators. On the positive side, many US states and businesses are keen to do normal business with Cuba, in sectors such as agriculture, food, tourism, logistics, pharma and biotech products, and oil and gas. They argue that such business would provide jobs and growth in many US states.

Politically, Cuban American votes have played a critical role in US Presidential elections in swing states like Florida, but this factor has declined in recent times. The new generation of Cuban Americans wants to relax travel restrictions, while the larger Hispanic American community generally supports normalization of relations.

The Cuban regime has also been careful to give the impression of being reasonable on human rights issues, and has involved Catholic Church in this effort. Cuba’s one party system led by the Cuban Communist Party (PCC) permits some choice of candidates at local level but not for the central parliament, which elects the Council of State headed by the President. The media and judiciary are also controlled by the PCC. A system of internal security based on local Committees for the Defence of the Revolution (CDR) ensures that any tendencies against the regime are nipped in the bud. The PCC controls the mass organizations such as labour unions, women’s and youth organizations, and enterprise level bodies. Poliical reforms in Cuba are likely to be slow and measured, largely within the ambit of the present one party system, as in China. The US is committed to achieving change to a multiparty democracy in Cuba, and will continue to promote this.

Cuba has made remarkable advances in health, education and sports. Its health indicators are among the best in the world, while it sends out competent medical personnel and medical brigades to other countries such as fighting AIDS in Haiti, Ebola in West Africa, etc. However, the inefficient state controlled system has been unable to make optimal use of Cuba’s agricultural potential and its high quality human resources remain underutilized, while entrepreneurship has been stifled.

Inevitably corruption has crept into state structures. The economy has become dependent on sugar and tobacco production while food security has suffered.

The state system of providing subsidized or free rations has proved impossible to maintain. The welfare state system of free education, housing and guaranteed employment, but at very low salary levels, is also under pressure. The government led by Raul Castro has gone in for economic reforms following the model of China and Vietnam and a limited opening for the private sector. The liftng of US economic blockade will lead to new opportunities for Cuban and foreign business and open more doors for Cuban Americans, flow of investments into the economy, revival of tourism and external trade, and small business growth.

Difficult issues remain to be resolved. Cuba wishes to get Guantanamo back and terminate what it sees as an illegally acquires lease over it. The US has claims for nationalized assets, while Cuba has claims for damages caused by the economic blockade and assets frozen by the US. Cuba wishes the US to end hostile propaganda, radio broadcasts, and social media aimed at changing the regime.

The US is pressing for greater human rights, release of political prisoners, and political changes. There is plenty of work ahead for diplomats from both sides.

Opponents of normalization argue that Cuba is now weakened due to problems in Venezuela, its important economic and political ally and could be pushed to a collapse.

However, continued economic pressure may lead Cuba to increase its dependence on China and Russia, which would be against US strategic interests.

A dramatic collapse of the Cuban regime would also not be in US interests, leading to a wave of migration across the Florida straits. The Obama administration’s policy makes sense therefore, and serves to meet US long term interests, while helping the Cuban people, and opens up new possibilities.

*Dr. Bhaskar Balakrishnan is a former Ambassador to Cuba

Japan’s controversial security bills signal its move away from pacifism. However, Shinzo Abe needs to show pragmatism to avoid aggravating fraught relations with its East Asian neighbours.

By Tan Ming Hui*

Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has managed to push two controversial security bills through the lower house of the parliament, in spite of overwhelming public disapproval and several large-scale protests. The proposed legislation, if passed, would expand the Japan Self Defence Forces’ range of activities, including the ability to send troops overseas for “collective defence”.

The new security legislation is likely to pass despite enormous public dissatisfaction. A rejection or inaction from the upper house within 60 days would return the bills to the lower house, where the bills can be enacted by the LDP-led coalition, which holds a comfortable two-thirds majority.

Impact on regional relations

The Japanese cabinet has insisted that the bills are defensive in nature and that illegal pre-emptive strikes would not be permitted. They cited the changing geopolitical environment and increasing security challenges, such as the rise of non-state actors, cyber risks, and terrorism, as justifications. The opposition parties, however, are not convinced. They assert that the conditions for the JSDF’s expanded roles have been deliberately left vague, allowing the current and future governments too much freedom to interpret them at their own discretion.

Consequently, Abe and his team are accused of violating the country’s pacifist constitution, particularly Article 9. The Japanese public is also concerned that the new legislation may drag Japan into distant U.S.-led wars, such as in the Middle East. The security bills cast a dark cloud over the already chilly relations in the region.

East Asian regionalism has been impeded by two factors. First, the presence of several bilateral security alliances with the United States, a legacy of its Cold War containment policy, has led to a preference for a bilateral “hub and spokes” system in the region. Japan has also been hesitant to participate in regional initiatives without the involvement of the US. The new legislation suggests a deepening of the US-Japan alliance as it would also remove the prohibition on Japan’s right to exercise collective self-defence, meaning that the JSDF could possibly go to the defence of the US military.

Second, East Asian relations have been characterised by mutual economic interdependence, but inhibited by mutual distrust over security issues. The deeply rooted memories of Japanese wartime aggressions have spawned criticism towards any inclination or movement by Japanese leaders to the right. Not unexpectedly, the new security bills are viewed with suspicion by Japan’s neighbours. China’sstate news agency, Xinhua, reported the Chinese defence minister Chang Wanquan’s concern over the bills, warning that they will have a “complicated influence on regional security and strategic stability”.

“Normalising” Japan’s status

On the other hand, Article 9’s reinterpretation could also mark the beginning of Japan’s autonomy over its own security. The change reflects Abe’s desire for Japan to “normalise” its status from its defeat in the Second World War, play a more prominent role in international and regional affairs and become a “proactive contributor to peace”. The country has relied on the US to maintain its peace and security in the last 70 years.

However, the US’ commitment and interests in the region may not be permanent. With the unpredictability of North Korea’s belligerence and the rise of Chinese assertiveness, it is not surprising that Japan would seek to develop its own reliable deterrence. Japan has also learned the hard way during the 1990-91 Persian Gulf War that chequebook diplomacy does very little to gain international status and respect.

Potential conflicts on the Korean Peninsula and over disputed islands in the East Sea put the region in great need of multilateral solutions. This would first require the cooperation of the two regional giants. In recent months, the extremely chilly relations between Japan and China have shown signs of thawing. Abe and China’s President Xi Jinping have met on the sidelines of multilateral meetings and in March, their foreign ministries held their first security meeting since 2011.

There are also hints of a possible bilateral summit in September this year. However, Chinese negative reactions to the security bills suggest that Abe’s bold move may impair the success or even delay the possibility of the summit.

Pragmatism over personal convictions

For Japan to successfully reinvent itself as a “proactive contributor to peace”, Abe needs to be more persuasive that the new legislation is a pragmatic, rather than a revisionist, move. In fact, he can blame his own rash conduct and right-leaning opinions for prompting suspicion and criticism from external watchers. Actions, such as his attempt to file for a revision of the 1996 UN report on comfort women and his visit to the Yasukuni Shrine in 2013, have helped fuel heavy criticism from Tokyo’s neighbours and unfavourable portrayal in the foreign media.

To cushion the negative impact of the security bills on regional relations, Abe should put aside his personal convictions and increase his diplomatic outreach towards China and South Korea. The upcoming statement to mark the 70th anniversary of Japan’s surrender in World War II presents an opportunity for Abe to re-establish himself as a pragmatist and to initiate a momentum for reconciliation over historical issues.

He needs to issue a new apology that includes essential keywords like “colonial rule” and “aggression” in his statement – both key features of the 1995 Murayama statement and the 2005 Koizumi statement. Merely expressing gratitude to the international community for Japan’s re-acceptance would inevitably incur the ire of China and South Korea. Also, a satisfactory resolution of the comfort women issue with South Korea would provide less ground for China and South Korea to continue their harsh censure of Japan.

To be sure, even if Japan is willing to make a peace offering, China may not be ready to bury the hatchet. The Chinese government has had the tendency to capitalise on anti-Japanese rhetoric to distract its increasingly restive public from internal issues and to bolster nationalism to maintain its popular support. For the sake of regional peace and stability, however, China needs to be pragmatic as well and accept the olive branch, if extended.

Still, it remains a possibility that Abe’s statement will not extend beyond his usual “remorse”. Along with the controversial security bills, these actions may seriously reverse any recent progress in regional relations. The long overdue bilateral summit may still occur, but at the expense of concrete results.

*Tan Ming Hui is an Associate Research Fellow at the Centre for Multilateralism Studies (CMS) at S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.

The number of National Insurance contributors continued to rise in July with an additional 58,792 (up 0.34%). The total now stands at 17,315,188, which is an increase of 568,085 over the last 12 months (up 3.39%), according to the Spanish government.

The State Secretary for the Social Security System, Tomás Burgos, said that “the number of people contributing to the system continues to rise at a sound and constant pace, leading to a recovery of over one third of those people who lost their jobs during the crisis (1,164,441). This trend is strengthening the fundamental pillars of the Social Security system – employment and the implementation of administrative reforms – and making it a factor for stability and certainty in our economic future. Each new contributor represents additional security for the future of the system”.

The number of people registered under the General Regime, the core of the system, rose by 59,847 (0.43%) in the last month. Specifically, the most dynamic sectors were the Hospitality Industry (up 51,849); Healthcare Activities and Social Services (44,954); Trade and Repair of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles (42,802); Administrative Activities and Ancillary Services (16,531); and the Manufacturing Industry (13,243). In contrast and as to be expected in this month, negative performance was posted by Education (-91,788) and Public and Defence Administration; Compulsory Social Security (-9,017).

In turn, the Special System for Agricultural Workers posted a decrease of 38,198 workers (-5.01%) to stand at 724,282. This coincides with the end of the strawberry and raspberry season (particularly affecting Huelva and Almeria). Due to the end of the academic year, the Special System for Domestic Workers shrank by 2,784 (-0.64%) to a total of 430,578.

3,178,352 contributors were registered under the Regime for Self-Employed Workers, following a decrease of 2,734 (-0.09%). 1,663 more people were registered under the Regime for Seamen (2.65%), increasing to 64,491, particularly boosted by the octopus and anchovy season. Finally, the Regime for Coal Workers has an average of 3,769 contributors – up by 16 people (0.42%).

Balance when compared with 2014

In year-on-year terms, the rate increased by 3.39% or 568,085 more jobs in the system. The majority of this growth corresponds to the General Regime, with an increase of 509,756 (3.76%). This is more than twice the figure last year (247,966).

It should be noted that the rate rose by 1.89% under the Special Regime for Self-Employed Workers, which translates into an increase of 58,920 contributors. The Regime for Seamen shrank by -0.15% (-98), while the Regime for Coal Workers fell by 493 people (-11.58%).

The Broadlands Hydro power plant is a significant milestone in the generation of renewable Energy in Sri Lanka, according to the government.

The hydro power plant to be constructed at Kithulgala, about 90 km north-east of Colombo, will add 35 megawatt to the national grid. Once the project is completed it expects to generate 137 GWh of electrical energy annually.

The project which is a run-of-river type project planned to be built on the Kelani River is the last of the series of hydro power plants of Laxapana and it has been stalled for 25 years due to environmental concerns.

The 24-meter high and 114-meter long dam will be constructed across the Kelani River in Kithulgala in the Nuwara Eliya District and the power plant will be established in Yatiyanthota in Kegalle district. The tunnel of the complex will be 3.5 kilometers long and 5.4 meters in diameter.

The required funding to commence construction work of the project has been obtained from the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) and the required insurance coverage for the said loan has been taken from the China Export and Credit Insurance Corporation.

Accordingly, the Cabinet of the Ministers has approved the proposal made by the Minister of Power and Energy to accept the above Insurance Corporation as a combined lender of the loan.

By Osama Al Sharif

The resumption of strategic dialogue between Egypt and the United States this week, after a six-year hiatus, signals an important shift in US policy toward Cairo and its regime.

Washington looked the other way as millions of Egyptians rallied at Tahrir Square at the end of 2010 calling for the downfall of Hosni Mubarak, a close ally of the US for three decades, in the midst of what was called the Arab Spring. President Barack Obama urged the beleaguered president to respond to his people and leave. And when he did the US watched, as Egypt’s Islamists slowly took over the country’s leadership for the first time in more than eight decades. It was a central transformation in Washington’s Middle East policy.

The US administration believed then that the Islamists were about to assume control of a number of countries in the region.

But Egypt changed that view dramatically. The military intervened to cut short the term of the country’s first freely elected president. The debate continues on whether former Gen. Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi’s removal of President Muhammad Mursi was in fact a military coup or a response to a second popular movement by the people who came out in millions to protest the failure of the Muslim Brotherhood in running the country.

The US rejected the dismissal of Mursi and relations between Washington and Cairo dipped to their lowest level in years. Military cooperation was suspended and delivery of fighter jets was halted. The new Egyptian president sought to increase cooperation with Russia and Europe and depended heavily on the financial backing of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

For decades Washington had considered Egypt a major regional player and a linchpin in its Middle East policy, especially in terms of safeguarding Israel’s interests. Egypt was a close ally that relied on US economic and military aid. But rarely did the US criticize Mubarak’s human rights record and the corruption that was associated with his long rule.

With the resumption of a strategic dialogue, a symbolic but highly vital move, the US has finally closed the book on the events of the last few years. Its position on the Muslim Brotherhood and the deposing of Mursi no longer matters. It had moved forward because of two important regional developments.

The first is the recent conclusion of a historic agreement between the international community and Iran over the latter’s controversial nuclear program.

Washington’s Arab allies continue to view with suspicion that deal and Tehran’s regional ambitions. Their concerns are genuine, taking into account Iran’s obvious involvement in the affairs of a number of Arab countries including Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Lebanon and Bahrain.

The nuclear agreement will lift economic sanctions and give Tehran unprecedented mobility in the region. The Obama administration has taken a number of steps to reassure its Arab allies, especially in the Gulf, that its agreement with Iran will not be at the expense of their security and stability. But that is not the main reason Washington has decided to restore its strategic relations with Cairo. The main driver behind this is the clear and present danger that the Daesh is posing to the region and indeed the world.

The militants are now active in Syria, Iraq, Libya and Egypt and have carried out terrorist attacks in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Cairo’s main security challenge is coming from extremists fighting under Daesh banner in Sinai. That campaign has proved to be long, costly and unpredictable for President Al-Sisi.

Egypt is also concerned that instability in Libya will give the militants room to expand and pose a bigger threat to the entire region. To confront the militants Cairo needs US help and support, and in return Washington realizes that Egypt is an important regional player whose stability and active role in the fight against extremists goes beyond the immediate military objectives.

The Daesh militancy is today the number one danger to the region and indeed the world. The militant group has used the chaos and instability in Iraq and Syria to expand at a phenomenal level. The US-led coalition against the Daesh group has made important gains but few believe that aerial bombings alone will do the job. Egypt’s war against extremists in Sinai and elsewhere will be an important chapter in the long fight against Daesh. A stronger US-Egyptian relationship will act as a counter balance to Iran’s slow rehabilitation from a pariah state.

It will reassure Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries who are worried about a possible US-Iran détente following the nuclear deal. Moreover, a strong and stable Egypt will restore that country’s regional influence and should have a direct effect on the possible resolution of controversial conflicts including the war in Syria.

The strategic dialogue should also pave the way to shed light again on the region’s endemic problems, on top of which is the Palestinian-Israeli conflict which has been neglected during the past few years. America’s re-engagement in this key issue remains the only way to salvage the two-state solution.

President Barack Obama has warned that without the Iran nuclear deal, there will be another war in the Middle East. He said that those who voted for the War in Iraq are now opposing diplomacy with Iran.

“Many of the same people who argued for the war in Iraq are now making the case against the Iran nuclear deal,” the President noted.

The president argued that the deal with Iran is the best way to prevent the country from acquiring a nuclear weapon and to prevent war, and that the deal being rejected by Congress would be bad for the security of the United States.

“Now, when I ran for president eight years ago as a candidate who had opposed the decision to go to war in Iraq. I said then that America didn’t just have to end that war, we had to end the mindset that got us there in the first place.” the President said. “Those calling for war labelled themselves strong and decisive, while dismissing those who disagreed as weak – even appeasers of a malevolent adversary.”

Obama said that walking away from the deal is “fantasy” due it being a delicate international agreement between many sovereign states, not just the US and Iran, and that those other partners would not support a stricter deal.

“Those who say we can walk away from this deal and maintain sanctions are selling a fantasy. Instead of strengthening our position, as some have suggested, Congress’s rejection would almost certainly result in multilateral sanctions unraveling.”

The President added that unilateral sanctions not only wouldn’t work, but that they could lead to detrimental effects on the United States itself.

“We would have to cut off China from the American financial system. And since they happen to be major purchasers of our debt, such actions could trigger severe disruptions in our own economy, and by the way, raise questions internationally about the dollar’s role as the world’s reserve currency.”

Israel is one of the only countries that publicly denounced the Iran deal, and this disapproval was noted in Obama’s Wednesday speech. The President noted that he took the concerns of Israel seriously and reminded the audience of his administration’s strong partnership with the country.

“But the fact is, partly due to American military and intelligence assistance, which my administration has provided on unprecedented levels, Israel can defend itself against any conventional danger, whether from Iran directly or from its proxies. On the other hand, a nuclear armed Iran changes that equation. And that’s why this deal ultimately must be judged by what it achieves on the central goal of preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon.”

President Obama also channeled President John F. Kennedy, who presided over the Cuban missile crisis and called for diplomatic solutions to control nuclear weapons during the height of the Cold War and delivered a similar speech 52 years ago.

Kennedy’s plan for peace worked, according to Obama. “We created the time and space to win the cold war without firing a shot at the Soviets. The agreement now reached with the Islamic Republic of Iran builds on this tradition of strong, principled diplomacy.”

The Wednesday address comes just one day after Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell announced that the Senate would debate the Iran nuclear deal in September, following a five-week summer recess.

Under legislation passed earlier this year, the Senate can take up a resolution of disapproval, approval, or to do nothing.

Many Republicans have said that they do not support the deal, including House Speaker John Boehner. Meanwhile, the majority of Senate Democrats are heading into the recess publicly undecided.

McConnell has warned Democrats not to block a vote.

Under the deal, Iran accepted limits to its nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief.

By Wasbir Hussain*

The signing of the ‘framework agreement’ between the Government of India and the National Socialist Council of Nagaland’s Isak-Muivah faction (NSCN-IM) in New Delhi on 3 August 2015 is certainly a landmark development because it has confirmed that the two sides have succeeded in narrowing down their differences and are on the verge of reaching a Peace Accord. The government of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi can, of course, take credit for having been able to break the logjam with the NSCN-IM and reaching a point from where a solution to the six-decade-old Naga insurrection looks bright. After all, peace talks between the two sides have been ongoing for the past 18 years in India and abroad, ever since the NSCN-IM entered into a ceasefire with New Delhi in July 1997.

If the Modi government, led by its astute Naga peace interlocutor R. N. Ravi, could achieve this breakthrough, it was because it recognised the ‘unique history of the Nagas’, and agreed to pursue a ‘relationship of equals’. Right from the time of the legendary Naga rebel leader Angami Zapu Phizo, the Nagas have been insisting that they be left alone once the British leave India. The Nagas’ ground was that they have been an independent race and, therefore, wanted to stay outside after India attains freedom. That was not to be and the Nagas continued with their fight for an independent homeland. In this backdrop, the NSCN-IM and R. N. Ravi, who is otherwise the Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee, also deliberated on the Naga ‘sovereignty’ issue as also the toned down demand for integration of all Naga-inhabited areas in the Northeast into the state of Nagaland. A compromise has been reached on this and a ‘formula’ worked out which is going to be reflected in the final Accord. It is possible the Nagas living in areas outside the state of Nagaland (for instance, in Manipur, Assam and Arunachal Pradesh) could also benefit from the Naga Peace Accord although existing state boundaries are not going to be re-drawn.

That the incumbent Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government has chosen to emphasise on the ‘equality’ issue insofar as the relationship with the Nagas is concerned gives rise to the question as to whether ‘sovereign power’ could be shared. When the Accord is actually worked out in a couple of months’ time, one won’t be surprised if Nagaland comes to have a Jammu & Kashmir-type of a status where there could be a separate flag and so on. This may be symbolic but for the Nagas or the NSCN-IM it could mean restoration of their pride, something New Delhi is not against conceding. For instance, The Nagaland Post quoted R.N. Ravi as saying, “Nagas have suffered all these years because of lack of understanding. Their dignity and pride has to be restored. Their uniqueness will be reflected in all the competencies.”

The liberal tone with which Prime Minister Modi addressed the gathering on the occasion at his official residence demonstrated the confidence and spirit of accommodation with which he and his government has been able to tackle the issue. After the agreement was signed, Modi said “Today’s agreement is a shining example of what we can achieve when we deal with each other in a spirit of equality and respect, trust and confidence; when we seek to understand concerns and try to address aspirations; when we leave the path of dispute and take the high road of dialogue.”

Despite these positive signals, one significant aspect of the over 80 rounds of peace talks between New Delhi and the NSCN-IM, spanning 18 years, has been its secretive nature. Therefore, when the ‘framework agreement’ was signed in the presence of Prime Minister Modi, Home Minister Rajnath Singh, National Security Adviser Ajit Doval, R. N. Ravi and the top NSCN-IM leaders led by its general secretary Thuingaleng Muivah, everybody was caught by surprise, including people in Nagaland.

That means, the NSCN-IM, too, did not give any inkling to the Naga civil society that the ‘framework agreement’ was actually going to be signed on 3 August. This has led to a huge amount of scepticism among the Naga civil society and others who are eager to know if New Delhi or the NSCN-IM would ever consult them when the final accord is reached.

One would argue that the cause for euphoria at the clinching of this ‘framework agreement’ with the NSCN-IM is just not there because there are other Naga rebel factions, particularly the Khaplang-faction of the NSCN or the NSCN-K that is now outside the purview of the peace process. The NSCN-K had abrogated its 14-year-long ceasefire with New Delhi in April 2015 and has since carried out the biggest attack on the Indian army in two decades when it ambushed and killed 18 soldiers of the Dogra Regiment in Manipur’s Chandel district on 4 June 2015. The NSCN-K could now try and strike in a bid to demonstrate its presence and relevance, and that is precisely the reason why the Naga civil society is stressing on the need to once again try and get the outfit back on the road to peace.

There is a belief that the agreement with the NSCN-IM could impact on the insurgent groups in states like Assam, Meghalaya or Manipur and encourage them to shun violence and join the peace bandwagon, but that will turn into reality only if the final deal with the Isak-Muivah faction is reached fast. That, of course, may not happen as fast as one might tend to believe.

* Wasbir Hussain
Executive Director, CDPS, Guwahati, and Visiting Fellow, IPCS

Is the traditional dominance of the Atlantic region by the US and Western Europe starting to erode? Johanna Mendelson Forman believes so. What’s emerging in its place is a ‘wider Atlantic’ that accounts for the growing influence of Latin America, the Caribbean and other areas.

By Johanna Mendelson Forman*

The notion that the Atlantic Ocean connects North America to Europe is ingrained in the geographic DNA of most Americans by the time they finish grade school. Certainly for a generation of baby boomers who saw their security tied to a coalition of states in Western Europe that symbolized the post-war liberal international order, these are connections that unite. Today, many Americans do not think twice about crossing the pond to what appears to be a place where we find continuity of culture and historical roots. Europe is where the rule of law, open markets, and respect for human rights is a shared heritage.

However, what if you are citizen of a ‘rising democracy’ in the Global South? If you are a Brazilian, for example, the Atlantic has other connotations – such as the country’s status as a rising global power. And what about other emerging powers? South Africa undoubtedly holds a different view of its growing importance on the global stage. So, just as the rise of US sea power in the early 20^th century turned the Atlantic into an “American lake,” the 21^st century has potentially laid the foundations for a new geopolitical space – a ‘wider Atlantic’ that better reflects the multipolarity of the contemporary international system.

Rethinking the Atlantic

North America and Western Europe are certainly aware that their combined influence over the Atlantic is changing. In 2010, for example, the then-President of the European Commission Jose Durao Barroso noted that “global events today force us to go beyond traditional Atlanticism”. Such comments have provided the foundations for a “New Atlanticism” that seeks to maintain the Euro-Atlantic’s influence through increased cooperation with the ‘South’, especially when it comes to trade and economic development. Accordingly, the New Atlanticism is also a reflection of how northern countries see their future role as guarantors of the liberal international order.

However, the South Atlantic appears to have greeted this reconceptualization of trans-Atlantic relations with a degree of skepticism. To some, the New Atlanticism is nothing more than a reaction to the growing independence of the region and an attempt by the Euro-Atlantic zone to bolster its influence over regional affairs. These criticisms also reflect the South Atlantic’s growing confidence to withhold its involvement in contentious foreign policy and security issues that are not on their doorstep, most notably the Ukraine crisis. Indeed, as the German Marshall Fund’s Ian Lesser reminds us, states like Brazil and South Africa have long had foreign policy traditions that emphasize a philosophical distance from the United States and Europe.

As a result, the concept of a “wider Atlantic” starts by emphasizing the increasingly significant contributions that Latin America, the Caribbean and West Africa make to the politics and security of the Atlantic (and indeed beyond). From there, the growing economic interests of external actors like China, India and Japan are also acknowledged. In doing so, the idea of a “wider Atlantic” further underlines the South’s determination to distance itself from the interests of the United States and European Union, and to shape economic, foreign and security policy agendas on its own terms.

The South Atlantic as a Security Actor…

If this happens on a regular basis, then we should expect initiatives like the South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone (ZOPACAS) to become increasingly important on the world stage. Formed in 1986, ZOPACAS has helped to connect South America and West Africa via a network of institutions and mutual interests. While originally created as a mechanism to prevent regional nuclear proliferation, its mission today is much broader. Indeed, as Brazilian scholar Adriana Abdeneur notes, ZOPACAS is now contributing to the reframing of south Atlantic security, particularly when it comes to transnational challenges like trafficking and weak governance.

While the potential of this organization is still in its early stages, it’s nevertheless thought that ZOPACAS will eventually provide the lion’s share of solutions for the countless geostrategic challenges that await the South Atlantic…and maybe beyond. The main regional beneficiary of this development would be Brazil, a country that was instrumental in the formation of ZOPACAS and the creation of a nuclear-free zone in the South Atlantic. Brazil’s growing power and influence is plain to see. It’s now a bona fide sea power with sufficient naval assets to protect its sea lanes, trading routes and energy reserves in the Amazon and its territorial waters. To say that Brazil will play an important part in the wider Atlantic security debate in the years ahead is an understatement, to say the least.

…And an Energy Zone

Brazil is also likely to make its presence increasingly felt in the global energy marketplace. The recent discovery of new and extensive sources of fossil fuels in the South Atlantic has prompted some observers to label the region the new arc of energy for the 21^st century. In this respect, the Atlantic’s combined retreat from the traditional suppliers of the Middle East is also plain to see. Not only are the United States and Canada increasingly relying domestic shale resources, they’re also looking to oil produced by Mexico and Venezuela to plug the gaps in supply and demand.

The South Atlantic is also poised to grow as a reliable source of renewable energy. Lower costs for wind and solar power will help make the Caribbean less dependent on fossil fuel, while also changing its political dependency on cheap Venezuelan oil that arose at the beginning of the 21^st century. Cuba’s return to the international fold might also help the country’s sugar industry to convert some of its product into ethanol. The end goal of this would be the export of this low carbon product to the United States to blend with fossil fuels. And let’s not forget that West Africa’s oil reserves could also make an increasingly important contribution to the South Atlantic’s prosperity and energy security – if managed fairly and equitably.

Down…but Not Out

Yet, while the future looks good for the South Atlantic, it would be naïve to think that the United States, Western Europe and, indeed, the concept of New Atlanticism will slide even further into geopolitical obscurity. Take, for example, the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). Much like the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) that united Canada, the United States, and Mexico 20 years ago, this new agreement might also consolidate a robust transatlantic trading area that would be difficult to ignore and, indeed, to resist. Indeed, the TTIP might one day succeed where the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) failed – that is, linking the far-flung corners of the Atlantic.

That said, the resource-hungry markets of Asia are likely to pose challenges that could lessen the importance of the TTIP to the South Atlantic. Latin America and the Caribbean remain one of the world’s most valuable sources of raw materials. These include soy, wheat and other edible grains – which are being shipped to Asia via the South Atlantic to meet rising demands for a more varied diet in the East. As a result, China has now overtaken the United States as the leading importer of Brazilian soy and other commodities. It’s also entirely possible that the South Atlantic and its Asian partners could become major guarantors of food security in the years to come.

Looking Ahead

There can be no denying that policymakers who have been weaned on a North Atlantic approach to foreign and security policy that has paid scant attention to the emerging actors of the south are now confronting a new set of arrangements that are challenging and dynamic. From the revitalization of ZOPACAS to the growing contributions made to United Nations peace operations (witness Brazil’s leading role in MINUSTAH), the South Atlantic is increasingly becoming a mature and significant actor on the world stage. In addition, the region’s growing contribution to global energy and food supplies effectively means that the traditional east-west dominance of the Atlantic is at an end. The north-south connections are as (if not more) important as the ties between the United States and Europe.

However, there’s still one area where the North Atlantic maintains the upper hand. The instability plaguing the Sahel and West Africa looks set to fuel even more violent extremism in several South Atlantic states. Even with Brazil’s growing military might, that’s still a phenomenon that an organization like ZOPACAS cannot fight without the support of NATO. Moreover, the North’s major trading partnerships with the region also suggest that the message behind New Atlanticism remains credible and persuasive – even if the unipolar moment has now passed. Consequently, the overall efficacy of the concept of the Wider Atlantic will only be determined by the South Atlantic’s ability to move even further away from the political and security arrangements that dominated the 20^th century.

*Johanna Mendelson Forman is a Senior Advisor at the Stimson Center’s Managing Across Boundaries program and a Scholar-in-Residence at American University’s School of International Service in Washington, D.C.

Remember when then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton was so intent on a US attack on Libya that she disregarded the US Intelligence Community, the Pentagon, and even her colleagues in the Obama Administration to force her “humanitarian intervention”? Clinton was so distrusted by the Pentagon that they opened up their own lines of communication with Libyan officials — they knew she was feeding them and the State Department boldfaced lies.

Even members of Hillary’s own party in Congress were skeptical of her claims.

Gaddafi’s son and presumed heir, Saif, told then-Rep. Dennis Kucinich (an RPI Board Member) that Hillary was using false information to justify the coming US attack on his country. (Thankfully, Mr. Kucinich understood his Constitutional obligation to act as member of an equal branch of government and did his own investigation of Hillary’s claims.)

Saif told Kucinich that Hillary’s “information” about Libya was:

[L]ike the WMDs in Iraq. It was based on a false report. Libyan airplanes bombing demonstrators, Libyan airplanes bombing districts in Tripoli, Libyan army killed thousands, etc., etc., and now the whole world found there is no single evidence that such things happened in Libya.

Hillary’s rebels, according to Saif were, as a Washington Times article reports, “not freedom fighters” but rather jihadists whom he described as “gangsters and terrorists.”

Hillary got her war. The Washington Post, ever the lickspittle in the service of the US regime, shortly after the attack praised Hillary’s great foresight in forcing the US war on Libya:

Seven months later, with longtime U.S. nemesis Moammar Gaddafi dead and Libya’s onetime rebels now in charge, the coalition air campaign has emerged as a foreign policy success for the Obama administration and its most famous Cabinet member, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton.

What a success! Libya is now in the hands of ISIS and various Islamist terror gangs. The population is devastated. Saif was right: they were a bunch of terrorist jihadists.

Gaddafi’s other son, Saadi, is currently being held by “Libyan Dawn,” an al-Qaeda group that has emerged since the US “liberation” and has taken control of key parts of Libya. This week we see in a new video that Hillary’s humanitarian freedom fighters have taken to torturing Saadi Gaddafi in the must un-humanitarian manner (warning, graphic). Hillary’s humanitarians are a bunch of torturing thugs, and it’s all there on the tape. Will she be challenged on this? Don’t bet on it.

Meanwhile, another group of Hillary’s extremists have sentenced Saif to death in a mass trial with scores of others from the previous government. The trials were so bad they were even condemned by the International Criminal Court, which would also like to get its hands on Saif. The defendants had little access to legal council in what was a textbook show trial.

Hillary Clinton squealed with joy when Muammar Gaddafi was sodomized with a knife and murdered by her rebels. Is she likewise giggling somewhere as Gaddafi’s son has his feet beaten to a pulp with a metal rod while he is bound and slapped in the face and his other son is sentenced to death in a trial with no semblance to actual rule of law?

This is human rights, Hillary-style.

This article was published by the RonPaul Institute.

Direct assaults on democracy are easy to identify and easy to denounce, if not always easy to counter. But indirect ones – or perhaps one could call them “hybrid” attacks – are less so in all three regards, even if it has long been a principle in the West that elections must not be used to end the possibility of future ones.

The dangers of such attacks are especially high when they occur outside capital cities because then there are not typically the journalistic or diplomatic resources and because many outsiders are inclined to dismiss any reports of moves in this direction as only of “local” interest and concern.

A particularly egregious case in Karelia, however, compels attention as an example of this “hybrid” attack on democracy, in which the Kremlin and its agents in place are using nominally democratic procedures to overturn the popular will as expressed in democratic elections.

Today the pro-Putin majority in the Petrozavodsk city council voted to overturn the veto the city’s mayor, Galina Shirshina, had cast on their earlier vote to do away with mayoral elections. As a result, the city charter will be changed, and the mayor will be chosen not by the people but by the city council members (kommersant.ru/doc/2782466).

Shirshina, an independent politician has been in the crosshairs of the Kremlin and the Karelian government since her victory over Nikolay Levin, the United Russia candidate who had been mayor up to that point. She won 41.9 percent of the vote, while he garnered only 28.9 percent.

In the intervening period her supporters have been accused of violating Russian law, calling for the dismemberment of the Russian Federation, and arrested for taking part in demonstrations against the republic government and by extension its backers in the Russian capital.

This latest twist must not be the end of the story or the chances for the survival of democracy in her city and elsewhere in the Russian Federation will be diminished, with the Kremlin having employed nominally “democratic” procedures in order by “hybrid” fashion to destroy democracy in fact.

Iranian President Hassan Rohani says the achievement of his administration in resolving the nuclear issue has been beyond initial expectations.

President Rohani said he did not mean to exaggerate, but believed that what was achieved at the end of the negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 group of countries was beyond what was initially expected.

President Rohani said that the end results of the negotiations were a win-win. He said the opposite side had said it was pursuing an objective of preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. Iran never intended to build atomic bombs, the president said; so, ‘if the other side in the negotiations thinks it has achieved that goal of preventing an Iranian bomb, let this be a victory for it.’

The Islamic Republic, however, had three goals in the talks, all of which were achieved, President Rohani said.

The Iranian president said the fact that an interim agreement between Iran and the P5+1 has stood over the past nearly two years could be a sign that the comprehensive agreement reached between the two sides on July 14 could also be assumed as capable of standing.

We cannot say we have 100% trust in the partners to the agreement, but we can devise a mechanism under which no side would face a loss if the other breached the agreement, the president said.

He said Iran has never sought weapons of mass destruction.

It did not opt for the manufacturing of such weapons even when it faced an Iraqi war back in the 1980s, the president said.

“Iranian people are noble; even when fighting, they fight nobly, they don’t seek weapons of mass destruction,” he said.

Referring to certain concerns about inspections under the JCPOA, the president said there is no reason to worry at all as what Iran has agreed to under the JCPOA is nothing extraordinary.

“No one in the world would trade its national security… and its secrets,” he said, reassuring that Iran’s military capabilities will by no means be depleted.

Regarding the economic impacts of the anti-Iran sanctions that his administration sought to have removed as a result of the agreement, President Rohani said his cabinet has been successful in containing or countering such economic woes as a high inflation rate and stagflation.

“Sanctions cannot be successful, ever; but they can have impacts,” he said, adding that as a result of the success of the negotiations, the doors of international business opened to Iran.

No country can be found that is not happy about the conclusion of the agreement between Iran and the P5+1, but a handful of warmongers and Zionists, President Rohani said.

About concerns that potential increased trade activity as a result of the removal of the sanctions against Iran would result in imports of foreign goods to the country, President Rouhani said such concerns are valid.

He said Iran would welcome foreign investment, but not increased imports. The Iranian president said he has directed his economic men about the issue.

Iran should work hard toward employment for the youth, the Iranian president said.

He said, by the end of his administration’s term in office, the inflation rate in the country will be down to a single-digit figure.

Regarding the potential acts of mischief by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the UN agency that has been tasked with carrying out the technical specifications of the JCPOA. President Rouhani said the country should be very vigilant that such mischief does not occur, both in terms of security issues as well as technicalities.

The Iranian president also said that the impacts of the removal of sanctions under the JCPOA will not be felt overnight.

He said the “sapling” that has been planted will take some time to bear fruits, emphasizing, however, that his administration will try to have such impacts come sooner.

Iran’s foreign minister has also warned against efforts likely to cause destabilization throughout the Middle East, saying such instability would affect all countries in the region.

“Iran’s priority has, from the beginning, been having good and strong relations with its neighbors,” Mohammad Javad Zarif said.

Iran cannot remain indifferent towards the profound destruction around it, he stated, adding, “Experience tells us that instability and unrest know no boundaries.”

Citing a case in point, the senior Iranian diplomat said extremist and violent groups such as the ISIL cannot be rooted out in Iraq while they are effectively expanding in Yemen and Syria.

Zarif reiterated Iran’s proposed four-point plan for the resolution of the crisis in Yemen, which calls for an immediate ceasefire, delivery of humanitarian aid to Yemeni civilians, facilitation of dialogue among the groups inside the country, and finally creation of a broad-based national unity government.

“A similar plan was proposed two years ago by the Islamic Republic following consultation with some neighbors and other regional actors for the restoration of peace and stability to Syria,” he said.

Zarif also hailed the conclusion in the Austrian capital Vienna last month of marathon nuclear negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 group of countries — the United States, Britain, France, China, Russia and Germany.

The development, he said, “was a necessary start for the region, and not only is not against the interests of any of our neighbors, but is an achievement for the entire region as it ended an unnecessary and 12-year-long tension, which threatened our region more than anywhere else.”

Here’s your US foreign policy puzzler for the day:  When is regime change not regime change?

When the regime stays in power but loses its ability to rule. This is the current objective of US policy in Syria, to undermine Syrian President Bashar al Assad’s ability to govern the country without physically removing him from office. The idea is simple: Deploy US-backed  “jihadi” proxies to capture-and-hold vast sections of the country thereby making it impossible for the central government to control the state. This is how the Obama administration plans to deal with Assad, by making him irrelevant.  The strategy is explained in great detail in a piece by Michael E. O’Hanlon at the Brookings Institute titled “Deconstructing Syria: A new strategy for America’s most hopeless war”. Here’s an excerpt:

“…the only realistic path forward may be a plan that in effect deconstructs Syria….the international community should work to create pockets with more viable security and governance within Syria over time… The idea would be to help moderate elements establish reliable safe zones within Syria once they were able. American, as well as Saudi and Turkish and British and Jordanian and other Arab forces would act in support, not only from the air but eventually on the ground via special forces. The approach would benefit from Syria’s open desert terrain which could allow creation of buffer zones that could be monitored for possible signs of enemy attack. Western forces themselves would remain in more secure positions in general—within the safe zones but back from the front lines—at least until the reliability of such defenses, and also local allied forces, made it practical to deploy and live in more forward locations.

Creation of these sanctuaries would produce autonomous zones that would never again have to face the prospect of rule by either Assad or ISIL….

The interim goal might be a confederal Syria, with several highly autonomous zones… The confederation would likely require support from an international peacekeeping force….to make these zones defensible and governable, to help provide relief for populations within them, and to train and equip more recruits so that the zones could be stabilized and then gradually expanded.”

(“Deconstructing Syria: A new strategy for America’s most hopeless war“, Michael E. O’Hanlon, Brookings Institute)

Isn’t this the basic gameplan that is unfolding in Syria today?

Notice how O’ Hanlon never considers the moral implications of obliterating a sovereign nation, killing tens of thousands of civilians, and displacing millions of others. Those kinds of things simply don’t matter to the pundits who concoct these imperial strategies. It’s just grist for the mill.  Notice, also, how the author refers to “buffer zones and “safe zones”, the same terms which have been used repeatedly in relation to Turkey’s agreement with the US for the use of Turkey’s Incirlik air base. Turkey wants the US to assist in the creation of these safe zones along Syria’s northern border to protect it from attack and to create a sanctuary for the training so called “moderate” militants to be used in the war against ISIS. As it happens, these prospective safe zones are a vital part of O’Hanlon’s broader plan to break the state into a million disconnected enclaves ruled by armed mercenaries, al Qaida affiliates, and local warlords. This is Obama’s dream of a “liberated Syria”, an anarchic failed state sprinkled with US military bases where massive resource extraction can take place unimpeded.  What Obama wants to avoid at all costs, is another embarrassment like Iraq where the removal of Saddam created a  security vacuum that led to a violent and protracted revolt that cost the US dearly in terms of blood, treasure and international credibility. That’s why he’s settled on the present strategy which he thinks is a smarter way to achieve the same objectives. In other words, the goals haven’t changed. The only difference is the methods.  Here’s more from O’Hanlon:

“The plan would be directed not only against ISIL but in part against Assad as well. In a bow to reality, however, it would not explicitly seek to overthrow him, so much as deny him control of territory that he might still aspire to govern again. The autonomous zones would be liberated with the clear understanding that there was no going back to rule by Assad or a successor. In any case, Assad would not be a military target under this concept, but areas he currently controls (and cruelly bombs) would be. And if Assad delayed too long in accepting a deal for exile, he could inevitably face direct dangers to his rule and even his person.”

(“Deconstructing Syria: A new strategy for America’s most hopeless war”, Michael E. O’Hanlon, Brookings Institute)

What does this mean?

It means that Syria is going to be the testing ground for O’Hanlon’s new regime change strategy, a strategy in which Assad is going to be the number one guinea pig.  And just so there isn’t any misunderstanding about the real aim of the operation, O’ Hanlon makes this rather stunning admission:

“This plan would differ from current strategy in three main ways. First, the idea would be plainly stated as the avowed goal of the United States….. It would also help dispel the lurking suspicion that Washington was content to tolerate the Assad government now as the lesser of two evils.”

(“Deconstructing Syria: A new strategy for America’s most hopeless war”, Michael E. O’Hanlon, Brookings Institute)

So the administration should abandon the pretense that the US is conducting a war on ISIS and just admit openly that ‘Assad’s got to go.’  According to O’ Hanlon that would help to smooth things over with other members of coalition who are confused about Washington’s real intentions.  Here’s more from O’ Hanlon:

“…multilateral support teams, grounded in special forces detachments and air-defense capabilities as needed, would be prepared for deployment into parts of Syria once opposition elements were able to seize and reliably hold strong points…..This last part would of course be the most challenging, and the actual deployment of any such teams the most fraught. It need not be rushed….But it’s a necessary part of the effort.” (“Deconstructing Syria: A new strategy for America’s most hopeless war”, Michael E. O’Hanlon, Brookings Institute)

Translation: There’s going to be US boots on the ground in Syria. You can bet on it. While it’s okay to deploy the jihadi cannon fodder to lead the charge and “soften up” the enemy; eventually, you have to send in the A Team to seal the deal. That means special forces,  a countrywide no-fly zone, forward operating bases, and a ginned-up propaganda campaign aimed at convincing the sheeple that Syria must be destroyed in order to defend US national security.  All of this will unfold in Phase 2 of the Syria war fiasco which is about to intensify by many orders of magnitude.

Finally, here’s O’ Hanlon making one last spirited pitch for his spanking-new regime change strategy:

“This type of plan may be the only realistic path forward… Moreover, while it is not without risks for the United States, the scale of military involvement envisioned is not substantially greater than what we have been doing the last year or so in Afghanistan. President Obama…. should not view Syria as a problem to hand to his successor, but rather a crisis that demands his attention and a new strategy now.”

So there you have it; the plan to rip Syria to shreds, precipitate an even bigger humanitarian crisis, and topple Assad without physically removing him from office.  All that carnage and destruction in one-short 1,100 word essay.  How’s that for brevity?

Do you ever wonder if these policy brainiacs, like O’ Hanlon, ever think about the suffering they cause with their grand strategies, or does it even matter to them?

After the hysteria stirred up by the Islamic State lopping off a few heads in a faraway land, including those of a very small number of Americans, Republicans running for president fell all over themselves in beating the drums of war. That response was predictable, given public opinion polls that showed Americans, horrified from media stories about the beheadings, wanted something to be done about the group—as long as it didn’t involve heavy costs in blood and lives, a la Afghanistan or Iraq. Never mind that beheadings have also occurred in the U.S.-friendly countries of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, President Obama read the same polls and sent U.S. air power over Syria and sent air and ground forces back into Iraq to battle the group without any congressional approval, as the Constitution requires.

Yet the Republican narrative of criticism, of course, has been that Obama somehow caused the rise of ISIS by doing too little rather than doing too much. In their minds, Obama should have enmeshed the United States earlier in the Syrian civil war by aiding “moderate” Syrian rebels and negotiated with then Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki to leave a small number of U.S. troops in Iraq—even though George W. Bush also was unable to do so with an Iraqi leader dealing with his own population that was fed up with eight years of foreign occupation. Republicans love to forget that the Islamic State group sprang from al Qaeda in Iraq, which in turn had been created to fight George W. Bush’s idiotic invasion of Iraq. (This misadventure bore a striking similarity to U.S. military assistance to the Afghan mujahideen during the 1980s, which inadvertently led Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan to eventually give us Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda.) And providing arms and training to indigenous forces in the Middle East hasn’t gone well recently. The U.S.-trained Iraqi army fled the battlefield with the Islamic State on two major occasions, allowing the group to capture much sophisticated U.S. weaponry, Furthermore, the Pentagon trained a whopping 60 “moderate” rebel fighters in Syria and the CIA a few more, only to have both groups debilitated by an attack from al Nusra, the al Qaeda in affiliate in Syria.

With a track record of gross military incompetence during the two most recent presidential administrations of both parties, one would think politicians would be more leery of pulling the military trigger and making the Islamist jihadist threat worse, as the track record indicates has occurred. Unfortunately, the worse the American military does in combat, the more militarized American society becomes in singing the praises of a sclerotic and unimaginative bureaucracy. The country’s founders—most of whom were cognizant of America’s uniquely safe strategic position away from the world’s conflict zones and who were squeamish about even having a standing army in a republic—would be shocked and dismayed at modern day America’s conception of “patriotism.”

Republicans always cite the founders’ vision much more than Democrats, but they usually omit the founders’ distaste of standing militaries and needless overseas wars. The one Republican candidate who did mention such niggling issues had been Rand Paul, but he then became so enamored with expanding his appeal that he started dancing with the many hawks in the party. He signed Senator Tom Cotton’s letter to Iran interfering with and undermining the president’s constitutional responsibility to negotiate treaties with foreign countries and proposed a hefty hike in defense spending in exchange for cuts in U.S. foreign aid.

The latter proposal should be especially troubling for Paul’s libertarian base but often isn’t distressing enough for many libertarians. As an excuse for Paul’s proposed largesse, some libertarians will often cite the provision of national defense as one of the few legitimate enumerated federal functions—after all, it is one of today’s few federal roles that is actually in the Constitution. However, the problem is that since its origin just after World War II, the Department of Defense should have really been called the Department of Offense or the Department of the Defense of Other Countries. As Americans saw on 9/11, but seemed to ignore, the department was not really very good at actually defending the country. And in fact, as noted earlier, the United States unintentionally helped create al Qaeda, and then after that, inadvertently motivated the group to attack the United States in retaliation for numerous and needless U.S. military and covert interventions in the Middle East. Rand Paul’s father, Ron Paul, in previous presidential cycles, was courageous enough to point this out to fellow Republicans.

And although foreign aid should be cut because it is usually used to secure foreign military bases and other goodies abroad for the U.S. government—instead of being used for humanitarian purposes—the savings should be returned to the taxpayer and not given to the most bloated and inefficient government department (the Department of Defense is the only government department that cannot pass a financial audit). An intrinsically secure country—even Islamist terrorism kills only two to four people per year—the United States splurges on “defense” what the next nine highest spending countries combined spend. Rand Paul’s proposed increased defense budgets merely further encourage irresponsible lamentations similar to those made by Bill Clinton’s Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell about not being able to use the United States’ big, wonderful military. When all you have is a hammer, every foreign problem looks like a nail.

Libertarians, many of them migrating from the right end of the political spectrum, are often squishy on the military spending issue—as is demonstrated by Rand Paul’s significant deviation. Yet war is the biggest cause of expanding government in U.S. and world history. For example, even non-defense spending and governmental regulation of the economy grow during wars—for example, Social Security, the income tax, the estate tax, and central banking (what is now the Federal Reserve) all grew out of war. To have fewer wars and less government, the means of waging non-defensive imperial wars need to be taken away from the usually irresponsible politicians, not augmented.

Rand Paul, being eclipsed by the media attention given to Donald Trump, and realizing that in a crowded Republican field, he could do very well in the primary season by just reconnecting with his disaffected libertarian base. In the campaign debates, he may very well reverse his tilt toward the hawks and again be the only one to talk about a restrained foreign policy. It would be high time, but he also needs to back away from what would then be a disingenuous position on defense spending increases. The nation cannot have a wise foreign policy of strategic restraint and independence if it still has a globe-girdling offensive military power projection force. The defense budget must be cut, not increased, in what is really still a fairly low-threat environment, or future politicians will be tempted to run the same activist foreign policy that has made us unsafe at home and helped rack up $18 trillion of national public debt.

This article was published at Huffington Post and reprinted with permission.

By C. Raja Mohan*

The “killing” of Mullah Omar last week, more than two years after he died, will only add to the mystery surrounding the reclusive leader of the Taliban who seemed to dominate the Afghan landscape for nearly two decades. But the sudden death of the man, in whose name the Taliban leadership issued Eid greetings just days before, reminds us that Pakistan remains the most important external player in Afghanistan. It also tells us how effortlessly Pakistan can change the international storyline on Afghanistan.

The carefully constructed myth of Mullah Omar attributed political charisma, religious wisdom and great leadership skills to a man who was hardly literate. However, some of Pakistan’s opponents in Afghanistan have long insisted that Mullah Omar and the Taliban were mere creatures of Rawalpindi’s invention.

Although the truth about Mullah Omar and his movement might be a long time coming, no one denies the intimate relationship between Pakistan and the Taliban, ever since the organisation came into public view two decades ago. Some say Pakistan has pulled the plug on Mullah Omar because Rawalpindi is now deeply committed to peace in Afghanistan. Others counter by arguing that Pakistan was finding it hard to sustain the deception that the one-eyed Mullah Omar was alive and leading the Taliban. They suggest Pakistan has had to reboot the Taliban amid emerging internal divisions within the organisation and external pressures, especially from the US and China, to support political reconciliation within Afghanistan. Pakistan found that Mullah Omar had outlived his utility, and that it now needs to revamp the organisation and prepare it to regain power in Kabul and international legitimacy.

But this is where the story gets a bit complicated. Within hours after announcing the death of Mullah Omar, a new leader, Akhtar Mohammad Mansour was proclaimed as the new Amirul Momineen, or the commander of the faithful. But mobilising loyalty to the new leader has not been easy. Many, including Mullah Omar’s brother, Mullah Abdul Manan, and son Yacoub, have challenged Mansour’s “selection” by a small clique as the new leader of the Taliban.

Pakistan will certainly want to stamp out dissidence and make sure that potential breakaway factions are small and ineffective. That the talks scheduled for this week between Kabul and the Taliban had to be postponed suggests that Pakistan has much work to do. An audio statement issued in the name of Mansour over the weekend promised to continue the jihad until Islamic rule is brought to Afghanistan and urged the Taliban to stay united. While some were hailing Mansour as the new champion of engagement with Kabul, the audio statement rubbished the peace process as a “propaganda campaign by the enemy”.

The peace credentials of the new leadership are also undermined by the installation of Sirajuddin Haqqani as one of the two new deputy commanders of the Taliban. Sirajuddin heads the Haqqani network, arguably the most violent Pashtun group. Based in Pakistan, the Haqqani network has conducted attacks on the US and Indian diplomatic missions in Afghanistan and is affiliated to al-Qaeda. More importantly, as the seniormost US military officer in 2011, Admiral Mike Mullen, told the US Congress, the Haqqani network is a “veritable arm of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence agency”.

There is no question that Pakistan’s Afghan strategy is evolving. If the Taliban seemed inflexible about negotiations in the past, Pakistan is promising to make it more reasonable. Many in the West and China are ready to accept, at least for now, Pakistan’s claim that a new and moderate Taliban is at hand. Not everyone in Afghanistan is convinced, however. Even if Pakistan succeeds in getting the new Taliban leadership to negotiate peace with Kabul, there will be enough Afghan elements on both sides challenging the terms of settlement.

Meanwhile, the world will deal with the new Taliban with a much weaker hand, thanks to the precipitous decline in the Western military and economic footprint in Afghanistan. But Pakistan has its own historic handicap in Afghanistan. Like the British Raj, Pakistan believes dominance over Afghanistan is critical for its national security. As the successor to the Raj on the Durand Line, Pakistan wants a say in who runs Kabul, and how. Geography – physical, political and ethnic – has given it the power to disrupt any regime in Afghanistan. Pakistan has demonstrated that capability beyond doubt since the mid-1970s.

Yet, the Pakistan army may not have either the material resources or the political vision to construct an inclusive and durable state structure in Kabul. The gap between Pakistan’s strategic ambition in Afghanistan and its national capability might inevitably set the stage for the next round of blood-letting on India’s northwestern frontiers.

*The writer is a Distinguished Fellow at Observer Research Foundation, Delhi, and contributing editor for ‘The Indian Express’

Courtesy: The Indian Express, August 4, 2015-08-04