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Syrian Rebel Leader Subhi Al-Refai On US Relations With Ahrar Al-Sham – OpEd

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By Aron Lund, editor of Syria in Crisis*

Subhi al-Refai is a leader of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), a coalition of Syrian revolutionary factions formed in December 2014. He has been kind enough to provide me with the following statement, presenting his personal analysis of a question that is on the mind of many in both Syria and the United States at this moment.

Former U.S. Ambassador to Syria Robert Ford recently penned a piece for the Middle East Institute, a Washington-based think tank, together with the Beirut-based Middle East analyst Ali El Yassir. In the text, they argued that the U.S. needs to overcome its resistance to working with Ahrar al-Sham, one of Syria’s largest Sunni rebel factions.

The first foundations of Ahrar al-Sham, whose full name is now “the Ahrar al-Sham Islamic Movement,” were laid in 2011, after the start of the Syrian uprising. Most of its founders and leaders were former political prisoners who had been jailed for advocating Islamist causes or for involvement with the Sunni insurgency in Iraq. Having formed networks and built trust among each other in the Seidnaia prison north of Damascus, where Islamist prisoners were assembled in a special section, they were released on presidential amnesty in the early months of the uprising and promptly went underground to create militant cells. The groups they formed to fight President Assad’s regime were gradually expanded and connected to each other, first in the Idleb-Hama region, which remains the group’s main stronghold. Ahrar al-Sham then grew through clever alliance-building among the Syrian rebels until it reached its present size and shape. (As a legacy of the latest of those coalitions, Ahrar al-Sham also operates under the “Islamic Front” brand, which refers to a now essentially defunct coalition in which Ahrar al-Sham gradually absorbed most of the minor members.)

Often characterized as a salafi group, it is an ideologically committed Islamist organization that seeks a Sunni religious state in Syria. It has proven itself militarily strong and hardy and has survived years of fighting, and—no less impressive—has held together through the merciless backbiting and internal rivalries of Syrian rebel politics. In September 2014, most of Ahrar al-Sham’s leadership was wiped out in a mysterious explosion, but the group defied expectations and managed to survive this setback, electing new leaders and carrying on the struggle. Most powerful in northern Syria, it has established what appears to be a strong working relationship with the Turkish AKP government of Recep Tayyip Erdogan and recently endorsed the Turkish-American bid for a ”safe zone” in northern Syria.

The question of whether or not the U.S. should work with Ahrar al-Sham in its bid to put pessure on Bashar al-Assad’s government is controversial, not least because some members of the group have been connected to global anti-American jihadi factions including al-Qaeda. Ahrar al-Sham itself claims to be a fully independent group and it does not engage in armed action outside Syria. It has at times been critical of al-Qaeda and its Syrian affiliate, the Nusra Front, but—like many other rebel factions, particularly the Islamist groups—it works closely with the Nusra Front on the battlefield.

Recently, the Ahrar al-Sham leadership has been on a charm offensive, pushing back against Western views of it as a dangerous jihadi faction. Its foreign relations official Labib al-Nahhas, alias Abu Ezzeddin al-Souri (who I interviewed here, before his group merged into Ahrar al-Sham), recently penned editorials in The Washington Post and The Daily Telegraph arguing that his group should be considered a moderate and centrist faction in the uprising and is deserving of international support and acceptance.

But the group still remains committed to its ideology and the idea of a Sunni theocracy in Syria, and it continues to play to Islamist opinion in ways that are clearly at odds with U.S. strategy (whether one agrees with that strategy or not). For example, Ahrar al-Sham recently released a public euology of Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar that included praise for the Taliban movement’s fourteen-year long war against the U.S. army in Afghanistan, as well as Ahrar al-Sham’s best wishes for his successor, described as “the Mujahed Brother Mullah Akhtar Mansour.” I’m sure that played well within the group and among its Islamist allies in Syria and abroad, but I can’t imagine it will do much to improve Ahrar al-Sham’s image in Washington.

That Robert Ford, as a former ambassador and policymaker on Syria, has taken such a strong position in favor of working with Ahrar al-Sham has of course drawn attention both in the U.S. and among Syrian rebels. Now, the RCC leader Subhi al-Refai—who is not a member of Ahrar al-Sham, although the group is involved with the RCC—joins this debate with his own analysis of the chances of a collaborative relationship between the American government and Ahrar al-Sham.

What follows is the statement provided to me by Subhi al-Refai, in my own translation from the original Arabic.

–Aron Lund, editor of Syria in Crisis


Analysis of Mr. Robert Ford’s comments about the Ahrar al-Sham Islamic Movement

An initial analysis of Mr Robert Ford’s positive view of the Ahrar al-Sham faction, and of the necessity of opening relations with it, points to the existence of a significant school of thought inside the White House that pushes for working with the movement.

However, I believe that this is an attempt to widen the gulf between the two differing schools of thought that exists within Ahrar al-Sham, in order to destroy it from within.

The first of these schools is striving to be more open towards the West and to restore the Umma Project to the National Project, as expressed by the late Abu Yazen.

The second school of thought remains committed to the Umma Project, which transcends Syria’s borders, and it views the Free Syrian Army as a Western project that they must refrain from trusting or working with.

Of course, it is possible that I am wrong in my analysis! But what could it be that has encouraged the American government to move towards working with a faction that is so forcefully supported by parties whose goals completely contradict its own? In particular, we must consider that taking this route would complicate relations with these other parties even more than today. In addition, the chances for success of this new relationship are very slim, for two reasons.

The first reason is that Ahrar al-Sham is incapable of taking a decision to open up new relations that could harm the interests of a fundamental ally of the movement.

The second reason is the strength and control that the school of thought opposed to relations with the USA exercises within the movement. In addition, a not-insignificant proportion of the movement’s components lean towards the ideology of Jabhat al-Nusra, a fact that stands between the leadership of the movement and this (adventurous) step in the direction of the Americans.

Therefore, we find that, for the most part, Ahrar al-Sham’s foreign policy takes the path of hidden relations, in so far as these relations concern the West generally or the United States in particular.

Perhaps some serious thinking on how to change the politico-military map of northern Syria has finally begun!

Subhi al-Refai

President of the Executive Office
Revolutionary Command Council
Syria

Notes by Aron Lund:

The Umma Project, Mashrou’ al-Umma, is a slogan that has been used by Ahrar al-Sham to describe its ideological and political foundations. The word Umma can be translated as ”nation,” but in this context it specifically refers to the Islamic nation, i.e. the global community of Muslims inside and outside Syria. In contrast to Umma, the term Watan— which can be translated as ”nation,” ”homeland,” or ”country”—signifies a more narrow focus on Syria and Syrian interests.

Abu Yazen al-Shami was an influential leader and religious ideologue within Ahrar al-Sham, who was killed alongside most of the rest of the group’s historical leadership on September 9, 2014. He has posthumously been identified as a leading light among the ”reformers” in Ahrar al-Sham, who were shocked into a reappraisal of politico-religious principles by the rise of the Islamic State. Before his death, he had begun to argue against hardline jihadi purism in favor of a more pragmatic albeit still unambiguously Islamist stance.

READ ALSO:

For an interview with Mohammed Talal Bazerbashi, alias Abu Abderrahman al-Souri, a leading member and co-founder of Ahrar al-Sham, click here.

For a previous interview of mine with the RCC’s Subhi al-Refai, click here.


Iran: Two Provinces On Alert After Earthquakes

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After an earthquake shook the provincial borders of Tehran and Semnan, the head of Red Crescent Rescue Operations announced that both provinces are in a state of alert.

ILNA reports that according to Nasser Charkhsaz, an earthquake measuring 4.1 on the Richter scale at a depth of 13 kilometres hit the border regions of Tehran and Semnan.

He added that as a result, Tehran is now under orange alert and Semnan under yellow alert.

He said three earthquakes measured at 3.1, 4.1 and 3.4 on the Richter scale have been registered in this region.

Tehran is located on 12 major fault lines and several minor ones, creating the possibility of a major earthquake. Reports indicate that eight million Tehran residents live in very dangerous zones in the eventuality of an earthquake.

Historical data reveal that an earthquake occurs in the Tehran region about every 158 years, and the last time the region was hit was in 1830, when the earthquake was measured at 7.2 on the Richter scale.

Saudi Arabia: Local Haj Likely To Get 40% Cheaper

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Prices for local Haj packages are expected to drop between 30 and 40 percent this year, according to an official at the Ministry of Haj.

Most local Haj operators have begun to change their packages after the ministry announced the launch of the online portal for local pilgrims.

According to the source, the portal will help curb the incidence of fake Haj campaigns, ensure the security of pilgrims, combat exceedingly high prices and guarantee the rights of all parties.

Hussain Al-Shareef, deputy minister for Haj affairs, said the portal will allow residents and citizens to easily access licensed Haj companies, as well as obtain clear and transparent information about services provided.

Starting next week, individuals can access the site and register in order to identify services without visiting the company.

He said the ministry has sought to unify the types of services provided in order to assure equality and ensure no companies are overpricing their services.

Prices for local Haj packages under the new system vary between SR5,893 and SR8,146 per person, depending on the group and level, as well as on the form of transportation included. Last year, prices varied between SR8,500 and SR14,500, and often went as high as SR20,000 per person.

According to Osama Al-Filani, president of the National Committee for Haj, the portal includes a number of positive benefits, as it will reduce prices by at least 40 percent this year.

He said it would also allow the ministry to monitor and tighten control over all services provided to pilgrims to ensure there are no violations of regulations and Haj instructions, as well as achieve transparency in the disclosure of prices and eliminate fake offices.

“But the system may contribute to the reduction of competitiveness and development in the sector,” he said, noting that VIP packages do not constitute more than 1 percent of the total allocated places for local pilgrims.

He called for an assessment of the situation and a re-evaluation of the system following the pilgrimage season.

Russian Economy Approaching ‘Perfect Storm’– OpEd

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Vladislav Zhukovsky, an economist known for predicting disasters in the Russian economy and for then turning out to be right, says that the situation is more dire than almost anyone imagines because oil is heading to 25 US dollars a barrel, the ruble to 125 to the US dollar, and inflation to 30 percent.

He attracted widespread attention earlier this week for an appearance on RBK, but the analyst for the Rikom Group gave more detailed answers to the URA.ru news agency. If he is even partially correct, Russia faces not a “black Monday” or a “black September” but a “black” and bleak future (pda.ura.ru/articles/1036265585).

Indeed, Zhukovsky argues, the combination of falling oil prices, the collapse of the ruble exchange rate, and rising inflation means that Russia is entering what might be described as “a perfect storm,” one with the capacity to destroy much of the country’s economy this year and next.

And this situation is made worse by the fact that many at the top of the Russian economic pyramid are behaving as they did in 1998, betting on an ever weaker ruble by buying hard currency and then planning to get back into the Russian market later at firesale prices and thus improving their position but not the country’s.

tThese people, Zhukovsky says, “have their families, portfolios and property abroad. They are interested in having the situation in Russia be as bad as possible and the ruble to fall as far as possible so that they will be able to sell their apartments there and buy them here on the cheap.”

In 1998, at the time of defauls, the Russian stock market fell 80 percent, the ruble fell 84 percent, “and all our bureaucrats … took the money they had and converted it into hard currency. “When the market collapsed, they bought shares at three cents on the dollar. The very same thing is happening now.”

Moreover, Zhukovsky adds, after the coming collapse “the American, European or Chinese investors will come.” They too will take advantage of the low prices just as they did in 1992 and 1993

Unless the government changes course, the ruble has no prospects even at the current price of oil, and oil prices are going to continue to fall, the economist says. Eleven of Russia’s 14 oil processing firms are now operating at a deficit; and consequently, “what we see today is just the quiet before a very strong storm.”

Russian officials are in denial about all of this, and their projections are not predictions of the usual kind: they are issued only to convince people that things will somehow turn out all right. The numbers don’t lie, but officials do. None of their predictions about the ruble exchange rate, prices for oil and inflation have ever been confirmed by events.

The Russian economy has not reached its bottom, he says; indeed, it doesn’t have one “because the economy has no limited given that it is in a state of disintegration and is constructed on crude aligarchic raw materials capital.” Thus the ruble could fall to 75 to the dollar by the end of the year and more than 125 per dollar sometime in 2016.

Even if oil prices were to rise to 70 dollars a barrel, that would not be enough to prevent a further decline in the Russian economy. And given that the actual price will be much lower, that decline will be very steep indeed. As prices fall to 40 dollars a barrel, Zhukovsky says, Rsusia will discover “a third bottom” and then “a fourth” and so on.

Russians need to recognize that the low oil prices are not the product of “a conspiracy of the US and the Arabs against Russia.” Instead, they are the result of an Arab effort to drive down the price so that the latest technological innovations in extraction technology the Americans have will not be profitable.

Russia isn’t part of the equation for either, Zhukovsky says, but this also means, the basic trend won’t change anytime soon. Moreover, if Russia sits and does not make fundamental change, the new oil extraction technologies will in fact be “a death sentence” for the Russian economy.

Russia’s only change to “move forward” is to focus on scientific and technical progress, to behave as the Chinese have done gradually shifting into ever higher tech areas rather than relying on the sale of natural resources or minimally processed goods. But that is not what the Russian government is doing.

As a result, Zhukovsky says, the middle class in Russia is being liquidated. Several years ago, it formed 19-20 percent of the population. Now, it is falling toward six percent. One measure of this: In 2013, 18 to 20 percent of Russians said they could by a car; in 2014, that figure had fallen to 12014 percent; and now, it is 8 to 9 percent.

What must happen, the economist argues, is that Russians must invest in their own development, not reduce spending on food or especially on the education of their children because the latter “are the only hope for the future in this country with its destroyed pension system and economic crisis.”

Obama: Continuing Work To Improve Community Policing – Transcript

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In this week’s address, US President Barack Obama spoke about the work the Administration is doing to enhance trust between communities and law enforcement in the year since the death of Michael Brown in Ferguson. In May, the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing released their final report setting out concrete proposals to build trust and enhance public safety. And across America local leaders are working to put these ideas into action in their communities. The President noted that while progress is being made, these issues go beyond policing, which is why the Administration is committed to achieving broader reforms to the criminal justice system and to making new investments in our children and their future.

Remarks of President Barack Obama
Weekly Address
The White House
August 15, 2015

Hi everybody. It’s now been a year since the tragic death of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri. His death—along with the events in Cleveland, Staten Island, Baltimore, Cincinnati, and other communities—sparked protests and soul searching all across our country. Over the past year, we’ve come to see, more clearly than ever, the frustration in many communities of color and the feeling that our laws can be applied unevenly.

After Ferguson, I said that we had to face these issues squarely. I convened a task force on community policing to find commonsense steps that can help us drive down crime and build up trust and cooperation between communities and police, who put their lives on the line every single day to help keep us safe. And I’ve met personally with rank and file officers to hear their ideas.

In May, this task force made up of police officers, activists and academics proposed 59 recommendations – everything from how we can make better use of data and technology, to how we train police officers, to how law enforcement engages with our schools. And we’ve been working with communities across America to put these ideas into action.

Dozens of police departments are now sharing more data with the public, including on citations, stops and searches, and shootings involving law enforcement. We’ve brought together leaders from across the country to explore alternatives to incarceration. The Justice Department has begun pilot programs to help police use body cameras and collect data on the use of force. This fall, the department will award more than $160 million in grants to support law enforcement and community organizations that are working to improve policing. And all across the country – from states like Illinois and Ohio, to cities like Philadelphia, Boston, and Nashville – local leaders are working to implement the task force recommendations in a way that works for their communities.

So we’ve made progress. And we’ll keep at it. But let’s be clear: the issues raised over the past year aren’t new, and they won’t be solved by policing alone. We simply can’t ask our police to contain and control issues that the rest of us aren’t willing to address—as a society. That starts with reforming a criminal justice system that too often is a pipeline from inadequate schools to overcrowded jails, wreaking havoc on communities and families all across the country. So we need Congress to reform our federal sentencing laws for non-violent drug offenders. We need to keep working to help more prisoners take steps to turn their lives around so they can contribute to their communities after they’ve served their time.

More broadly, we need to truly invest in our children and our communities so that more young people see a better path for their lives. That means investing in early childhood education, job training, pathways to college. It means dealing honestly with issues of race, poverty, and class that leave too many communities feeling isolated and segregated from greater opportunity. It means expanding that opportunity to every American willing to work for it, no matter what zip code they were born into.

Because, in the end, that’s always been the promise of America. And that’s what I’ll keep working for every single day that I’m President. Thanks everybody, and have a great weekend.

China’s Victory Day – OpEd

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In the United States, World War II began with the surprise attack of the Imperial Japanese Navy against Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. From the viewpoint of Western Europe, the significant date was September 1, 1939, when Nazi Germany invaded Poland.

In China and Asia, the nightmare began years before, on September 18, 1931. That’s when the Kwantung Army of Imperial Japan invaded Manchuria, which resulted in a puppet state and an occupation that would endure through the entire war.

It was the appeasement of the Imperial Japan in the West that crushed the credibility of the League of Nations. This, too, led Hitler, Mussolini and Franco to conclude that aggression could reap rewards.

China, the ‘forgotten ally’

More than 35 million Chinese were killed or injured during the years of anti-Japanese resistance and war. In the 1937 Nanjing Massacre alone, Japanese troops slaughtered an estimated 300,000 Chinese.

It is this triumph of Chinese resistance that, in February 2014, led China’s legislature to pass a resolution creating two new national observances. “Victory Day” on September 3 will commemorate Japan’s surrender in World War II; and December 13, for the Nanjing Massacre. As President Xi Jinping said recently: “The great contributions made by the Chinese people to the world anti-Fascist war should be remembered.”

During the “July 7 Incident” in 1937, Japanese troops attacked the Lugou Bridge, a critical access point to Beijing, marking Imperial Japan’s full-scale invasion and the beginning of the full-scale war of resistance of the Chinese people against the Japanese aggression (1937-45).

However, history is written by the victors. And until recently, conventional wisdom about WWII was based on a Western narrative dictated by the geopolitical exigencies of the Cold War rather than wartime realities. Essentially, that narrative sprang from Washington’s question: “Who lost China (to Communism)?”

However, the real question should be: Why did the West look the other way when Japan invaded China and thus undermined its own peace and future?
It is a sad fact that, in the major advanced nations, the massive Chinese sacrifice is barely known, often ignored and generally downplayed.

In one history of China’s role in the World War II, 1937-1945, Oxford historian Rana Mitter argues that even “those who are aware of China’s involvement often dismiss it as a secondary theater.” Perhaps that’s why he entitled his work Forgotten Ally.

Instead of a decisive response against Japanese aggression, international community opted for the policy of appeasement.

Unresolved legacies and historical revisionism

It was silence that paved the way for many Nazi and Japanese crimes against humanity.

This included biological and chemical warfare Japan undertook through the notorious Unit 731 that experimented with germ warfare attacks, frostbite testing, rape, syphilis and forced pregnancies, weapons testing (flame throwers on humans) and biological warfare. Like their Nazi counterparts, the Japanese “doctors” effectively de-humanized their victims who were subjected to vivisection – removal of organs, including parts of the brain, lungs, and liver – without anesthesia.

Some of the butchers of the Unit 731 and other units were prosecuted by the Soviets, but many were granted immunity by the U.S. They were not the only war criminals to be whitewashed, as documented by Eric Lichtbau’s The Nazis Next Door. In the decades following the end of World War II, the U.S. became safe haven for over 1,000 Nazis who were regarded as “assets.”

It all was only part of the far broader policy reversal in which WWII memories were suspended in the name of the Cold War; China became America’s “forgotten ally” and Japan provided an American foothold in Asia.

The message did not go unnoticed. For decades, Japan’s political leaders have visited the Yasukuni Shrine commemorating those who died in service of the Japanese Empire. In addition to 2.5 million men, women and children, the shrine honors almost 1,100 recognized war criminals, including an A-Class illegitimate elite.

Today these visits are a part of domestic politics, as evidenced by the campaign of Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi in 2001, and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in 2013.

In contemporary Europe, such actions would be unthinkable. Imagine how England and France would respond if Chancellor Angela Merkel would court German nationalists by visiting SS and Nazi cemeteries, in the name of patriotism and remembrance?

In the past, historical revisionism in Japan reflected fringe politics. Today, it is about to go mainstream, even though most Japanese do not support it. In July, Prime Minister Abe’s government overrode objections from opposition parties to pass legislation permitting collective self-defense, which is part of efforts to dismantle the postwar settlement.

It reflects the eclipse of Japan’s “Peace Constitution,” an attempt to reverse previous war apologies; and a rebuttal of the forced prostitution of “comfort women” by the Imperial Army.

However, the government’s military revisionism risks undermining Japan’s economic progress and escalating regional tension.

Amnesia not an option

However, what if the Western powers had responded to Japan’s aggression in 1931? What if, instead of appeasement, they had upheld their supposed ideals? What if they had taken steps to punish aggression against China?

Perhaps the world might have avoided at least a part of a global nightmare.
Historical counterfactuals are always wisdom about hindsight. Nevertheless, these “what if” questions can make us more attuned to the missed opportunities of history.

Appeasement should never again be an option.

This article appeared at China.org.cn and is reprinted with permission.

Libya: Islamic State Beheads 12 As Battle For Sirte Continues

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Islamic State extremists have beheaded 12 people and hung them on crosses during a battle for the coastal Libyan city of Sirte, AFP reported on Saturday.

According to Libya’s national news agency LANA, the 12 victims were local gunmen who had been battling Daesh militants in a district known as “neighborhood three”.

The agency also reported the extremists had executed another 22 Sirte residents, all of whom had taken up arms against the group as they lay wounded in a city hospital, AFP reported.

LANA said the extremists also set the hospital on fire.

Daesh has been battling for control of Sirte since Tuesday after the group assassinated an influential imam from the al-Farjan tribe, AFP reported.

Libya’s ambassador to France, Chibani Abuhamoud, told AFP Friday that fighting in Sirte had left between 150 and 200 dead.

Original article

1MDB And Consolidation Of Power: Challenges To Najib-Led Government – Analysis

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Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak’s recent moves at managing criticism over the “1MDB scandal” run the risk of appearing motivated solely by political self-preservation; this could negatively impact public confidence in his government.

By Saleena Saleem and David Han Guo Xiong*

The Najib-led government has a difficult job managing public calls for transparency over the 1MDB issue and upholding its credibility in an increasingly critical public domain. Recent strong-armed moves by the government that include the suppression of the media, sacking of dissenters within the cabinet, and implementing changes that have stalled the official investigations, not only give the perception of governmental interference over the 1MDB issue; they also heighten other challenges that the government will have to contend with: protests by civil society groups demanding transparency and accountability, and the potential for factional splits within UMNO.

Calls for more transparency over recent allegations that tarnish Najib’s credibility have largely not been met. Instead, the government has responded to the increased public scrutiny with the temporary suspension of printing permits in Malaysia of two print publications by The Edge and an online blocking of the London-based Sarawak Report.

Impeding transparency

Unfortunately, these moves have been perceived as impeding transparency over 1MDB. This may further tarnish Najib’s credibility, and by extension, his government. Civil society groups in Malaysia have criticised the government of trying to curb public debate via social media, instead of being more transparent in its investigation.

The Malaysian authorities have also issued an arrest warrant for Clare Rewcastle Brown, the founder of Sarawak Report. Ostensibly, the government is seeking to deter further negative speculations on the 1MDB issue. Ironically, the attempt to remove the messenger without rebutting the message with a clear and unambiguous response may be counterproductive, as it could trigger unnecessary public attention to the content of the Sarawak Report.

It is also a futile attempt as Internet-savvy users have the technical know-how to access blocked websites through proxy servers. Such actions by the government reinforce a public perception that there is an element of truth to the scandal, and gives the impression that the government is withholding facts from the public.

Indeed, this 1MDB saga and how it is played out reflects the ongoing tensions between Barisan Nasional’s (BN) “Old Politics” of communal-based, money politics characterised by authoritarian restrictions and coercive laws, versus the “New Politics” which advocates good governance and pluralistic democratic participation based on social justice and multi-ethnicity. By holding on to the practices of “Old Politics” in handling the 1MDB debacle, the Najib-led government is going against the tide of public opinion that has called for more accountability and transparency in governance.

Public displeasure against the government has grown, not abated. The opposition and civil activists will continue to mount their criticism of Najib and his government. The upcoming Bersih 4.0 rally at the end of this month could amplify the increasingly negative public sentiments.

Consolidating political leadership

By removing dissenters within the government, including his deputy prime minister Muhyiddin Yassin, Najib has consolidated his political leadership, for now. Initial speculations that Muhyiddin, who remains UMNO deputy president and commands overwhelming support in his home state of Johor, would lead an UMNO factional break-out appeared to have fizzled out after he expressed solidarity with the party. With the majority of UMNO divisions rallied behind him, Najib appears to have the unified front he was seeking.

The recent official explanation from the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC) that the funds transferred to Najib’s personal bank accounts was a political donation, and not from 1MDB offers a plausible enough counter-narrative for Najib supporters today compared to a month ago where none was forthcoming at all. Now that there is something tangible to coalesce around, and given the shift in power dynamics, it may be in UMNO members’ collective interests to close ranks.

However, UMNO’s show of solidarity for Najib may be tenuous and conditional. Najib’s move has served to sharpen lines within the party. One indication of this divide is that even after his ouster and proclamation of party support, Muhyiddin has continued to highlight the worry that negative public perception is a serious enough issue that if left unaddressed would lead to BN’s fall at the next general election. Support can be shifted from Najib to the faction within UMNO sharing Muhyiddin’s sentiments, should there be damaging revelations in the future.

Further, Najib’s co-option of Public Accounts Committee (PAC) members into his cabinet, and replacement of the special taskforce’s head have indefinitely frozen the 1MDB probes by these groups, whose function was to secure government accountability. Notably, MACC’s explanation about the money transfers into Najib’s account came only after the move to stall the probes. Even so, the MACC itself was not immune from change – senior officers who accused the police of harassment were abruptly transferred out, only to be re-instated after a public outcry. The nature of these changes and their outcomes can feed into a perception of governmental interference into the 1MDB investigation.

Erosion of public confidence

Public perception of political leaders is a barometer by which the overall trustworthiness of a government is judged. Government trustworthiness is related to perceptions of policy effectiveness, transparency of information and public accountability. As a political leader, Najib falls under public scrutiny, not only because the debt-ridden 1MDB was his brain-child, but also because he concurrently holds the prime minister and finance minister posts and is the chairman of 1MDB’s advisory board. Therefore, public accountability over 1MDB’s troubles falls heavily on Najib’s shoulders.

While Najib has continuously maintained that 1MDB funds were not misappropriated, and the allegations are political sabotage, his government’s recent actions appear to have created a public perception of silencing criticism and impeding further official probing into 1MDB. Such actions potentially create information gaps that can only fuel public distrust.

Short of a massive governmental crackdown, local news outlets and online social media are likely to continue to magnify criticisms on the Najib-led government’s handling of 1MDB, and to push for more transparency. Governmental moves that reinforce negative perceptions lead to an erosion of public confidence in the long-run, and the consequent oppositional challenges runs contrary to the political stability Najib ultimately seeks.

*Saleena Saleem is an Associate Research Fellow and David Han Guo Xiong is a Research Analyst with the Malaysia Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore


Turkey, Islamic State, US And Syria – Analysis

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By K. P. Fabian

There is a sudden and dramatic change in Turkey’s policy towards the Islamic State (IS). For long, Turkey has permitted, and even facilitated, the flow of young men and women from various countries to Syria to join the IS. It has bought oil from the IS and even permitted the shipment of arms into Syria meant for the IS. But, on July 24, Turkey started bombing IS targets in Syria and agreed to the pending US request for use of the Incirlik air base for bombing operations against the IS.

What is the reason for Turkey’s change of policy and what might be the calculations behind it? The official explanation, endorsed by the majority of the Turkish media, is that the July 20 attack carried out by an IS suicide bomber in Suruc, a town hardly 10 kms from the Syrian border, resulting in the death of 33 with over a 100 wounded, left Turkey with no choice but to hit back at the IS. The victims of the attack were young Kurds whom both Turkey and IS hate for different reasons. In Turkey’s view, Kurdish youth support autonomy/independence for their people. For its part, the IS viewed the youth assembled at the centre as planning to help re-construct Kobane, a town in Iraqi Kurdistan which the Kurdish fighters recently prevented the IS from capturing.

While a majority of the Turkish media and even the international media have concluded that the young man who carried out the attack was sent by the IS, there are reasons to suspend judgment until more evidence comes in. The Turkish government interrupted the Twitter service temporarily and forbade publication of photos or videos of the attack for a while. IS, normally prompt in acknowledging and boasting about such operations, has not yet made any claim for the attack. Some observers in Turkey believe that Turkish intelligence might have been behind the attack.

Apart from a change in policy towards IS, there was change in Turkish policy towards the PKK (Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan, Kurdistan Workers Party) as well. PKK, founded in 1978 by Abdullah Ocalan, has conducted, since its inception but with interruptions from time to time, an armed struggle in Turkey seeking autonomy/independence for the Kurds. There are 14.5 million Kurds in Turkey according to the CIA Fact Book. In fact, Turkey accounts for 50 per cent of Kurds in the region, with Iran and Iraq accounting for six million each and Syria for two million. (Population figures for Kurds are much contested and the CIA estimates might be reliable.) Ocalan has been in jail since 1999. He was apprehended while on a visit to Nairobi. Kenya, under pressure from the US, extradited him to Turkey. Ocalan was tried and sentenced to death but, in order to qualify for EU membership, Turkey abolished the death penalty. Turkey has been conducting negotiations with Ocalan and in March 2013 Ocalan announced the end of the armed struggle, a cease fire, and peace talks.

That was the time Prime Minister Erdogan was preparing the country for his candidature in the 2014 Presidential election. The agreement with Ocalan helped project Erdogan as a leader with vision who can put an end to the Kurdish revolt, which has cost about 40,000 lives. Erdogan won the 2014 election in the first round itself with 51.79 per cent of votes. But the parliamentary election in June 2015 upset Erdogan’s plans for changing the law to enhance the powers of the presidency. His Justice and Development Party (AKP, Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi) lost its majority for the first time since 2002, winning only 258 out of the total of 550 seats. Subsequently, the AKP also found to its chagrin that other parties were not keen to form a coalition government with it. There was one more reason for Erdogan to be upset with the parliamentary election result. HDP (Halkarin Demokratik Partisi, People’s Democratic Party), which advocates reconciliation with Kurds and supports their aspirations for equal treatment, won 80 seats. Till now afraid of falling below the qualifying threshold of 10 per cent of the popular vote, the party had put up only independents. But this time it gained 13 per cent of the popular vote.

With the AKP finding itself in a difficult situation, Erdogan concluded that it was necessary to change the country’s political situation. He wanted to create a situation where other parties might feel compelled to join an AKP-led coalition in view of the perceived threat to national security from IS and PKK. If f that does not work out, fresh elections can be called, thus making it possible for the AKP to win a proper majority. As of now, AKP’s efforts to form a coalition have not succeeded and Turkey might have fresh elections. Erdogan’s hope of winning a majority for his party might or might not be realized.

Immediately after the Suruc attack, tension mounted between the government and PKK, leading to violent incidents. On July 24 Turkey started bombing not only IS but also PKK targets in Iraq. In fact, there have been more strikes on PKK than on IS. Turkey has proposed, and the US appears to have agreed to, the establishment of a ‘safe zone’ about 60 km long and 40 km wide in Syria near the border with Turkey. This has been a Turkish proposal for a long time. Turkey has said that it could transfer the 1.7 million Syrian refugees in its territory to this zone. The proposed zone is now controlled mainly by the IS and the YPG (Yekineyen Parastina Gel, People’s Protection Force) – an affiliate of PKK. Turkey is worried that an independent or autonomous Kurdistan in Syria will embolden the Kurds in Turkey and that eventually an autonomous or independent Kurdistan would be formed within its territory as well. The ‘safe zone’ idea is a work in progress and we cannot say what shape it might assume or even whether it will materialise. Incidentally, Jordan with 625,000 refugees from Syria, has been signalling that it might establish a similar zone in the south along the Syrian border. The only difference is that Jordan might do so in consultation with President Assad.

This brings us to the question of Assad’s diminishing hold on Syria. According to some reasonably reliable estimates, he holds only one-sixth of Syria. For months, he has been losing territory and facing manpower shortages. In a televised interview on July 26, Assad admitted that it might be necessary to pull out from some territories that are difficult to hold and concentrate available military power to tightly hold the Damascus-Homs-Hama-Latakia coastal belt. As of now, IS holds half of Syrian territory, though much of it is desert. The rest is held by the Al Qaeda-linked Al Nusra, the Kurds, the ‘moderates’ fighting Assad, and others. In short, Syria no longer exists; it is already dismembered into a number of fiefdoms.

How long will the IS last? On September 10, 2014, President Obama said “We Will Degrade and Ultimately Destroy ISIL”. As a matter of fact, IS has been hardly ‘degraded’ and the bombings carried out by the US and its allies for nearly a year have not seriously crippled it. General Robert Neller, head of operations against IS, has told the Senate Armed Forces Committee that there is a “stalemate’ in the war between US and IS. US plans for training 5,000 Syrians to fight against Assad, announced a year ago, have failed miserably. So far only 60 Syrians are being trained.

Turkey’s new policy will make it difficult for IS to get new recruits, but it claims to now have 20,000 fighters from 100 countries. There might be a degree of exaggeration for propaganda purposes in the claim. But the fact remains that IS has attracted thousands of young people from all over the world already, and with the closure of the Turkish border those who want to leave might find it difficult or impossible to do so. IS treats women mainly as sexual objects and its strict imposition of the Sharia will alienate many, if such alienation has not already taken place. But IS leaders are dedicated to their cause and are prepared to die for it. There is no possibility of sending a sufficiently large ground troop contingent as of now and air action can only inflict damage but not bring down the regime. Meanwhile, IS has started acting like a state by issuing fishing licenses and identity cards. As of now, it is not possible to determine the life-expectancy of IS.

For its part, a virtually dismembered Syria might see a cease-fire agreed to by the exhausted, if the external powers pumping in money, weapons, and fighters come to the conclusion that there is a real stalemate. In any case, sooner or later, sooner rather than later, the external donors fuelling the conflict – Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Iran, Russia and US, to mention only the more prominent – will have to sit down and talk with or without the UN as a facilitator.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India

Originally published by Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (www.idsa.in) at http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/TurkeyISUSSyria_kpfabian_140815.html

Yemen In Meltdown: Domestic And Regional Competitions And Destruction Of Nationhood – Analysis

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By Talmiz Ahmad*

In the third week of July 2015, the port, airport and presidential palace in Aden, the historic city at the mouth of the Red Sea, fell into the hands of forces representing the ousted Yemeni president, Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi, marking the first success in the counter-assault mounted by Saudi-led forces against the Houthis, which had begun at the end of March 2015. In this period, Yemen, described  as the poorest country in the Arab world, has witnessed some extraordinary violence and wanton destruction in which 4,000 people have been killed, major cities have been severely damaged, over a million people have been displaced, and six million face famine conditions. Yemen, described by ancient historians as Arabia Felix [Happy Arabia] on account of its natural riches, fertile soil and verdant hills, is now in meltdown.

The roots of this parlous situation go back to the origins of the republic. Not enjoying the oil revenues that transformed its neighbours’ lives, Yemen generally led an obscure life for much of the last century. It did capture world attention for a while when it experienced the republican overthrow of its old ruling imamate in 1962 and the attendant six-year civil war in which the forces of revolution, backed by Egypt, fought the forces of status quo, supported by Saudi Arabia. The republicans won the war at great cost: at least 25,000 Egyptian soldiers lie buried in the soil of Yemen.

But the civil war gave leadership in North Yemen to a band of modern, educated, reformers who inculcated in their people a sense of shared nationhood that superseded traditional tribal, religious and sectarian affiliations. For a few decades at least, when the modernists led the nation, the republican ideal retained its appeal and obtained grudging acceptance from tribal chiefs, and religious and sectarian leaders. In South Yemen, on the other hand, at the end of colonial rule in 1968, leadership went into the hands of the local communist party, which remained in power till unification of the two Yemens in 1990.

The national ideal in North Yemen got corroded through the 1980s because of two main reasons. First, there was the natural attrition pertaining to the first generation of leaders and the accompanying reluctance of younger educated Yemenis to return to their country to replace them. The American authority on Yemen, Asher Orkaby, has noted that in 2014 at least 30,000 educated Yemenis were working abroad.1 This was mainly due to the second contributory factor: the 33-year rule of President Ali Abdullah Saleh, first, from 1978 over North Yemen, and then from 1990 over united Yemen, after a short military campaign in which the communist forces were defeated.

Saleh sustained his long reign through a patronage network based on the appeasement of different power blocs – tribal, religious, sectarian and regional – what he himself described as “dancing on the heads of a thousand snakes.”2 The national wealth was freely distributed among these interest groups, while the bulk of the population remained mired in unemployment and poverty, and national institutions remained fragile and powerless. Hence, as Orkaby has noted, “tribal, religious and regional divisions (began) to overshadow the nationalism of previous decades.”3 The Houthis have emerged from this breakdown in national cohesion.

Breakdown of national unity

Before unification, North Yemen was dominated by the Zaydi community, a Shia community that accepts Zayd bin Ali as the fifth imam; hence, the Zaydis are also referred to as “Fivers”, to be distinguished from those who accept all twelve imams and are called “Twelvers” and who are predominant in Iran. The Zaydis are doctrinally believed to be closest to the Sunnis, it being said of them that they are ‘Shias among Sunnis and Sunnis among Shias’. North Yemen was ruled by a Zaydi imamate that traced its lineage to Prophet Mohammed for nearly a thousand years until it was overthrown in the civil war of the 1960s.

In the civil war, the royalists were supported by a Zaydi clan called Houthi. The Houthis shared in the royal defeat and retreated to their mountain fastness in the northern Saada province on the Saudi border. Over the next two decades, they felt victimised by two policies pursued by President Saleh: the systematic neglect of the northern provinces and the steady marginalisation of the Zaydi community in terms of the distribution of political power and economic benefits in an order that clearly privileged the Sunni community, particularly after unification when the Sunnis constituted about 60 per cent of the population.

In the mid-1990s, the clan leader, Hussain Badr al Deen al Houthi, who had been much-inspired by the Islamic Revolution in Iran as a youth, headed a student group to revive Zaydism. Called Al Shabaab al Monineen [“Believing Youth”], the group, at its peak, had about 20,000 members. This movement confronted the spread of Wahhabi influence both culturally and politically. However, at the turn of the century, Hussain came to believe that the serious challenges facing the community needed to be confronted through a more radical approach; he is quoted by a contemporary associate as saying: “You can’t change society through a cultural movement. You have to have an extremely radicalised group, built on revolutionary and military discipline.”4

Besides the Houthi movement, the breakdown of national unity has also given rise to two other movements, the separatist movement in the south, referred to as Al Hirak, and the Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula [AQAP]. Al Hirak has its origins in the coming together of disgruntled government and army officers in south Yemen, who were retired from service after the defeat of the separatist forces in the civil war of 1994 and were demanding reinstatement in service. In response to Saleh’s harsh measures against them, they evolved into a secessionist movement.

Al Hirak is, however, not cohesive, and has different strands which turn to different patrons for support: one of its key leaders, Ali Salem al Beidh, a senior politician from the south, was once suspected of close links with Iran and even Hezbollah.5 Later, there were reports that al Beidh had had several meetings with the Houthis, inspiring speculation that they were discussing a possible division of the country into a Houthi-dominated north and an Al Hirak-controlled south.6 As the conflict in Yemen has escalated, other local and regional players have tried to co-opt Al Hirak to their side, including Saleh, Hadi, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).7

AQAP was established in Yemen in January 2009, representing the coming together of Al Qaeda’s branches in Yemen and Saudi Arabia. With several hundred members, it is said to be the most active and dangerous of Al Qaeda’s franchises, having been associated with:

  • the attack on the then Saudi deputy interior minister [now crown prince], Prince Mohammed bin Naif, in August 2009;
  • the “underwear bomber” Umar Farouk Abdulmuttallab in December 2009; the cargo plane bomb plot of October 2010;
  • the suicide attack on Yemeni soldiers in May 2012 in which 120 people were killed;
  • the December 2013 attack on the Yemeni defence ministry;
  • and recently, in January 2015, the Charlie Hebdo killings in France.

In early 2011, AQAP is said to have re-named itself Ansar al Sharia in Yemen, and taken control of Yemeni territories in the Abyan province and other parts of the south.

Thus, as competitions and conflicts emerged in Yemen in the wake of the Arab Spring in 2011, disgruntled elements lurking beneath the surface took advantage of the widespread demands for reform and replacement of the Saleh regime and asserted their claims for: greater participation in the national political and economic order (the Houthis); freedom from northern oppression (Al Hirak), and greater doctrinal purity and destruction of ‘near’ and ‘far’ enemies (AQAP). In this boiling cauldron of domestic contention, two regional nations have been active role-players – Saudi Arabia and Iran.

Saudi-Iran competition in Yemen

The British scholar Peter Salisbury has described Saudi policy in Yemen as “containment and maintenance” in terms of which the Kingdom has supported the ruling regime and the various power centres while at the same time ensuring a continued level of “state dysfunction”.8 Thus, though Riyadh had backed the imamate in the civil war, after the republican triumph it became, in Salisbury’s words, “a direct patron of both the Yemeni government and tribal and military leaders in the 1980s, paying them monthly stipends for much of the thirty years of the Saleh regime’s existence.”9

Saudi Arabia also supported the expansion of Salafi influence by placing Saudi clerics in Zaydi mosques in order to undermine the influence of Zaydi leaders. As a result, “a number of republican military officers and tribal leaders of Zaydi heritage convert[ed] to Sunni Islam” in order to benefit from Saudi largesse.10 Saudi funding also came to dominate the area of religious education. Under the leadership of the Sunni cleric, Sheikh Abdul Majid al Zindani, a number of so-called “scientific institutes” were set up across North Yemen where Wahhabi-Salafi teachings were imparted. Several students of these schools later participated in the Afghan jihad.

Saudi Arabia became an influential role-player in Yemeni politics through its sponsorship of the Islah party. Set up in 1990, Islah remains a conglomerate of several interest groups, including tribal chiefs, Salafi sheikhs and doctrinaire Muslim Brotherhood elements. The party’s diverse membership has made it quite pragmatic in terms of its programme: while advocating reform of all aspects of national life on the basis of Islamic principles, it is at the same time content to support a “gradual approach”.11 Again, though its core tenets are Sunni, its leadership has included Zaydi tribal chiefs such as Sheikh Abdullah bin Hussain Al Ahmar who, until his death in 2007, was the head of the Hashid tribal confederation, the largest Zaydi tribal grouping in north Yemen.

Unlike the overt Saudi involvement with various aspects of Yemeni politics, the role of Iran has been quite low-key and frequently founded on speculation rather than hard information. But it is an article of faith for Saudi policy-makers and the Western media that Iran has been the principal force behind the Houthi phenomenon.12 The Arab writer Abdel Wahab Badrakhan reflects the Saudi view when he says that Tehran is seeking to tighten “its grip on Yemen through Ansar Allah (a reference to the Houthi militia)”.13 In this regard, he recalls longstanding religious and military ties between the Houthis and Hezbollah, and the massive shipments of arms to Saada from Iran. He also blames Iranian influence for the Houthis’ rejection of the Gulf Initiative of 2011.

However, research conducted by Peter Salisbury in Yemen in late 2014 revealed the general view among Yemeni and foreign observers that the Iranian role vis-à-vis the Houthis has largely been in the area of “capacity-building” rather than funding or military supplies and training. This is reflected in the fact that the Houthis have “cohesive internal management of security and administration” as compared to, say, Al Hirak.14 Salisbury also pointed out that the Houthis would have had little difficulty in obtaining arms locally given that Yemeni towns are awash with weaponry. Later, of course, as the conflict progressed, Saleh’s armouries and personnel would have been available to the Houthis.

On the same lines, though the Iranian commander of the Al Quds Force, Major General Qassem Soleimani, saw in the early Houthi successes the spread of the “Islamic Revolution”, Orkaby has noted the significant doctrinal differences between Iran and the Houthis, and emphasises “the very domestic nature of the Houthi movement” emerging from the steady debilitation of the national ethos and its replacement by tribal and sectarian identities. The Houthis, Orkaby concludes, have been a significant part of Yemeni history and culture for several centuries; they should not be viewed as “a conquering force commissioned by the Iranians”, but simply as “a local tribal alliance seeking to overturn a secular republic that had marginalised the northern regions for decades.”15

The Houthis in Sanaa and beyond

The events of 9/11 and the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 inspired Hussain al Houthi to pursue the path of radical politics, which included use of slogans such as: “Death to America! Death to Israel! Damn the Jews! Victory to Islam!” President Saleh saw such political activism as a challenge to his authority and commenced a military crackdown on the Houthis. In 2004, his forces tracked the Houthis to their mountain hideout of Marran in Saada province, where Hussain al Houthi was killed after a two-month siege. For his followers, this death echoed the martyrdom of Imam Hussain at Kerbala.16

The leadership of the Houthis now passed on to Hussain’s younger brother, Abdelmalik al Houthi, who mobilised the community into a militia calling itself Ansarullah. Between 2004 and 2010, the new militia fought six “wars” against the Yemeni national army, consolidating its presence in the provinces of Saada and Al Jawf, and later Al Hajjah, on the route to the capital, Sanaa. By mid-2014, Houthi forces took Amran, the heart of the Hashid tribe and of the Al Ahmar clan, and also gained access to the sea.

On 21 September 2014, the Houthi militia launched an attack on Sanaa, which they captured with little resistance. It now became clear that former president Saleh, in a dramatic turn-around, had allied himself with the Houthis along with sections of the national army loyal to him. Saleh said that he did this to “reclaim stability”. He also rejected his overthrow in the context of the Arab Spring, describing the revolutions as a “tool for weakening armies, spreading chaos and destroying economies.”17

In January 2015, the Houthis took the presidential palace, placed Hadi under house arrest, dissolved parliament, and vested all political authority in a Supreme Revolutionary Committee. On 21 February, Hadi escaped to Aden and set up his “government” there with the support of the GCC countries. The Houthi militia then swept southwards, capturing Taiz and then Aden. In the face of the Houthi onslaught, Hadi fled to Riyadh on 25 March.

In power in Sanaa, the Houthis soon displayed their sectarian and authoritarian approach: demonstrations were suppressed, activists and journalists kidnapped, Brotherhood activists arrested and their party dissolved, and, in retaliation for Wahhabi actions several years earlier, Sunni mosques were converted into Zaydi mosques.18

In March, Houthi armed activity took place both in the south where it met with considerable success with the capture of Aden on the 25th of the month, and in the north where, at the Saudi border, Houthi militants conducted major military exercises. These were viewed as provocative by the Saudis, whose forces had been bested in skirmishes with the Houthis in late 2009 and in the process lost a few hundred soldiers. The Saudi-led military campaign against the Houthis, named “Operation Decisive Storm”, commenced on March 26, with 185 aircraft attacking Yemen’s air defences, air bases at Al Dailami and Al Anad, weapons stores, and camps of armed personnel loyal to Saleh.19 By early July, the attacks had become what an Arab observer described as a “toxic routine” consisting of daily assaults even when no military targets were left and without any sign of surrender by the Houthis. At that time, the UN declared a “Level-3” humanitarian crisis in Yemen, noting that famine conditions were widespread in the country and hardly any assistance was getting in due to the air and sea blockade maintained by the GCC forces.

An attempt by the UN to bring Yemen’s rivals to a peace conference in Geneva on 14-18 June ended in failure, with the Hadi side insisting on his immediate restoration. The Houthis however saw no advantage in the revival of GCC domination over Yemen’s affairs; they demanded an end to the attacks and substantial compensation for the damage inflicted on their country in return for their withdrawal from some parts of the south, while retaining the right to return.20 While the talks at Geneva were still on, the Houthis launched cross-border attacks on Saudi Arabia with militants and missiles, suggesting, in the words of an observer, that even if they did not occupy Saudi territory, they would make the border a “bleeding wound”.21

Taking advantage of the ongoing conflict, in early April AQAP forces took the southern town of Mukalla, the capital of the oil-rich Hadhramaut province. Mukalla is the fifth largest Yemeni city and the second largest port on the Indian Ocean after Aden. AQAP soon faced competition from the forces of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria [ISIS]. ISIS carried out its first attack on a Zaydi mosque in March in which 142 people were killed. It followed this up with two more attacks in May and June. ISIS thus joined Al Qaeda and Saudi Arabia in Yemen’s lethal sectarian binary.

To complicate the picture, ISIS militants have been attacking targets in Saudi Arabia as well, the latest being the 6 August attack on a mosque in an interior ministry compound in Abha, in the Assir province, bordering Yemen. The new ISIS branch, calling itself “Hijaz Province of the Islamic State”, referred to its target as “the monument of the apostate”,22 exposing the deep divide at the heart of the Sunni coalition.

As the Saudi air attacks significantly degraded the capabilities of the Houthis and their allies, the tide of war turned against them from mid-June when forces ranged against them, made up of pro-Hadi elements from the army and members of the Southern Resistance militia, gradually expanded their control over Aden and its environs. The vice president and prime minister in Hadi’s government, Khalid Bahah, paid a symbolic visit to Aden with some of his cabinet colleagues on 1 August, after which there have been reports of the capture of the Al Anad air base on the road to Taiz. Since then there are reports of hundreds of GCC troops with heavy armour having landed in Aden and moving northwards to consolidate the recent victories.

Factions in conflict in Yemen

Media reports on the ongoing Yemen conflict have adopted rather simple terms to describe the contending parties, such as “Iran-backed Houthis” versus “pro-Hadi forces” or “Hadi loyalists”, reflecting the view that the Yemen conflict is one more front in the sectarian proxy war raging between Saudi Arabia and Iran across several theatres in West Asia. However, these terms hardly do justice to the complex forces that are in contention in Yemen. On the Houthi side, while there are elements from the national army that have split from the main force and are Saleh loyalists, there is still little evidence of an active Iranian role on behalf of the Houthis.23 The support of the Saleh forces for the Houthis can also not be taken for granted: the loss of Aden was largely due to the surrender of Saleh’s 39th Armoured Brigade.24

The position in regard to the so-called “pro-Hadi forces” or “Hadi loyalists” is even more complex, particularly since these catchall phrases include several elements that are not pro-Hadi and are not fighting for his return to power.25 Thus, those fighting the Houthis include elements of:

  • the Southern Resistance, the militia supportive of sections of the secessionist Al Hirak, and seeking to reverse the outcome of the 1994 civil war when they were defeated; most of them have no wish to be part of a national army to which they have been invited by Hadi as they struggle to revive “the South Yemen state”;26
  • tribes from provinces in the east and centre of Yemen, centred at oil-rich Mareb, which have come together to fight the Houthis to preserve their “tribal ethos of self-rule”;27 and,
  • elements of Al Qaeda: there are reports that Al Qaeda militants, already well-established in the south, fought for the liberation of Aden alongside Saudi-backed tribal militia and special forces sent from GCC countries.28

Obviously, the Yemen conflict, resulting from domestic developments, has now become the playground for a wide variety forces in contention at different fronts. The Lebanese writer Amin Qammouriyyeh has captured the complexity of the scenario thus:
Each battle [in Yemen] has its own peculiar character, reasons, forces, background and circumstances. In one location, the fighting is between pro-Houthi rebel military units and loyalist pro-Hadi defence committees… In certain locations, al Qaeda is fighting against Zaydi rebels, while Shafii [i.e., Sunni] tribes are fighting extremist salafis and mujahedeen… But, what we have mostly are tribes fighting it out with other tribes, sometimes in the name of Arab nationalism, sometimes in the name of Yemeni patriotism, and many times in the name of religion and sectarianism.29

After the fall of Aden, Houthi leaders and Saleh have vowed to continue the battle. Abdelmalik al Houthi felt that the Saudis and their allies had expended considerable resources on the effort but “gained a limited achievement”. He called for an internal Yemeni political solution. Saleh called Hadi a traitor and “an enemy of all Yemenis” who should be tried for war crimes.  He also criticised the new Saudi leadership for abandoning the “wise policies” of late king Abdullah.30

Implications of the Yemen Conflict

Saudi Arabia’s perception of the regional scenario is entirely structured on a sectarian basis, and it is on this basis that it measures the threats posed to its interests and the basis on which it mobilises its counterattacks. Thus, from the Saudi perspective, the ascendancy of the Houthis in Yemen is merely one more manifestation of the assertion of Iranian influence in an Arab country and one more example of Iranian “interference” in the domestic politics of Arab countries. Earlier, the Kingdom had viewed the popular demand for reform in Bahrain, whose background was entirely anchored in domestic Bahraini politics going back several years, in exactly the same light and used its armed forces in March 2011 to quell popular aspirations in that neighbouring GCC member-country. The Saudi fear at that time was that reform in Bahrain would inevitably empower the majority Shia population and unleash similar demands for reform among the discriminated Shia community in the Kingdom itself.

The possibility of a Shia community enjoying power in Yemen is viewed in the Kingdom with the same degree of alarm. Badrakhan, quoted earlier, sees the Houthis as puppets of Iran and the instrument of Iranian power and influence at the Kingdom’s southern border. Even the liberal Saudi writer, Jamal Khashoggi, exalts “Operation Decisive Storm” as an example of Saudi policy “combining diplomacy and war to stop Iranian influence (and) then push it out of Syria and Iraq.”31 He then becomes quite bellicose:

The kingdom will not allow an Iranian foothold in Yemen… The Houthis can live however they want inside their country, but they will never be considered a prevailing authority as the government is bound to be pluralist and participatory… Iran should know that Saudi Arabia will not draw back from what it has started, and will continue till complete victory… Washington will get introduced the hard way to the Houthis, who learned well from the Iranians in terms of lying, procrastinating and dodging… Victory to the Yemeni Popular Resistance can only be achieved by war, or by the Saudi threat of a bigger war. … a just war is necessary sometimes to achieve peace.32 [Emphasis added]

Such intemperate sentiments reflect the strong existential threat the present Saudi leadership senses from Iran and the ruthlessness with which it is willing to fight Iran in the proxy wars in which it has engaged itself. Hardly has any Saudi commentator over the last two to three months referred to the thousands of bombing raids his country’s armed forces have carried out on the hapless Yemeni population, the death and destruction they have wreaked, the serious humanitarian disaster they have caused, and the succour they have denied their Arab brethren by the blockades enforced by them against aid and assistance.

Nor has there been a discussion in the Saudi media about the extraordinary compromises with their own principles that their leaders have made in recent times to buttress their firepower against what they see as the encroachment of Iran in their strategic space: the accommodation of Al Qaeda in their “Sunni” alliance and the outreach to the Muslim Brotherhood.

The AQAP has been in control of the city of Al Mukalla and much of its oil-rich province of Hadhramaut, Yemen’s largest province, since April 2015. After presenting a soft face in the early days of the occupation of this territory, AQAP now enforces harsh rules relating to personal conduct, along with the destruction of Sufi shrines. Surprisingly, while the United States continues to carry out its drone attacks on Al Qaeda targets, not once has the Saudi-led coalition forces attacked the AQAP, in sharp contrast to the bombings being inflicted on all other Yemeni provinces. In fact, as noted above, there are reports that AQAP cadres may have participated in the capture of Aden.33

Various explanations have been offered by commentators for the Saudi accommodation of its sworn enemy, the obvious one being that the Kingdom sees Al Qaeda as a sectarian ally in its war on the Shia. Another explains the burgeoning ties in geopolitical terms in that, the Kingdom wants a quasi-independent Hadhramaut province since, at some stage, it may seek to annex Hadhramaut to obtain direct access to the Indian Ocean and as an outlet for its oil pipelines.34

The distinguished Pakistani authority on jihad, Ahmed Rashid, has pointed out that, in the face of the challenges posed by ISIS and Al Qaeda, the Saudi-led Arab countries have opted in favour of the latter. This is primarily because the Al Qaeda-affiliated Jabhat Nusra in Syria and AQAP in Yemen share Riyadh’s declared aims, i.e., the removal of the Assad regime in Syria and resistance to the Houthis and elimination of Iranian influence in Yemen. In both cases, in order to justify these opportunistic alliances, Al Qaeda has been portrayed by the Arabs (and echoed by Rashid) as evolving toward moderation.35

In Syria, Jabhat Nusra is being projected as a largely Syrian militia, promoting, in Rashid’s words, “nationalist jihadism” rather than global jihad, and pursuing moderate policies instead of the harsh hudood doctrines generally associated with jihadi groups. Rashid has also noted the remarks of Nusra leader, Abu Mohammed al Jolani, that his group will not be attacking Western targets (though he took a tough position on the Shia). In support of AQAP’s supposed “moderation”, Rashid has referred to its “tame” occupation of Mukalla, its refusal to exercise power directly and its emphasis on governance and extension of services to the populace. Rashid also noted that for now, Nusra and AQAP “seem to be avoiding anti-Shia fanaticism, viewing it as impediment to gaining more territory”, and Nusra and AQAP were “gaining capacity for local governance and state-building” and overall are “less threatening than … the Islamic State”.36

Sadly, this valiant effort to project Nusra and AQAP in new, more acceptable, incarnations has been thoroughly discredited by ground realities. In Syria, the new Saudi-sponsored and Nusra-dominated jihadi group, Jaish al Fatah, has killed 20 Druze villagers and affirmed its ties to Al Qaeda, while in Hadhramaut, AQAP has introduced harsh rules relating to personal conduct.37 Again, the inclusion of Al Qaeda in the Saudi strategic calculus does not seem to have had any moderating effect on AQAP itself: it has released two messages calling on its members to carry out “lone-wolf” attacks on Western targets, on the lines of the Charlie Hebdo attacks, with US targets being a priority.38

In a subsequent article, Rashid has been more candid in explaining Saudi motivations in seeking the alliance with AQAP. Simply stated, the Arab states concerned “consider Iran as a larger national security threat than AQAP,”39 leading to the ironical scenario in which, in Yemen, the US is conducting a robust drone war on AQAP while its leading regional ally is working closely with AQAP against Iran, and, in Syria, the same ally is funding and arming an Al Qaeda affiliate whose leader carries a USD 25 million reward from the US government for information leading to his capture! Whatever gloss may be put on the situation, the clear conclusion is that Saudi Arabia’s visceral animosity for Iran has encouraged it to seek the help of its sectarian allies for short term advantage, without taking into account the fact that newly empowered Al Qaeda will only attract more Saudi nationals toward jihad, encourage more and increasingly lethal attacks on Shia across the region, and assaults on state targets following crack downs by security forces.40

The Saudi outreach to the Brotherhood is equally opportunistic and reverses the robust hostility to this Islamist group, which the Kingdom’s leaders have seen as a political rival and subversive influence for at least 25 years and which they declared a terrorist organisation in March 2014, along with Egypt and several other GCC states. Here again, the Kingdom is motivated by both sectarian and pragmatic considerations, i.e., the need to oppose the Houthis by reaching out to forces that are hostile to them: in the political arena, the Islah party meets this requirement. As noted above, though Islah has been affiliated with the Brotherhood, its membership has been sufficiently eclectic as to include the Zaydi tribal chief of the Hashid confederation, now represented by General Ali Mohsen Al Ahmar – a founder-member of Islah, who has been close to Saudi Arabia, is presently living in exile in the Kingdom, and is a longstanding rival of former president Saleh.41 He is now seen as a key role-player in a political settlement in Yemen that diminishes if not eliminates the Houthis as participants in the post-war political scenario. In line with its outreach to the Brotherhood in Yemen, Saudi Arabia hosted the visit of the Islah leader, Abdul Majid al Zindani, a long-time protégé of the Kingdom and beneficiary of its largesse over several decades.

This Saudi initiative has occurred at the expense of its ties with General Abdel Fattah al Sisi of Egypt who sees these overtures to the Brotherhood as a threat to the political order headed by him, leading to a divide between the Saudi and Egyptian positions on Yemen. The Egyptian government’s mouthpiece, Al Ahram, has referred to Yemen as a “bone of contention” between the two countries. The Saudi commentator, Khalid al Dakheel, rejected any attempt to exclude the Brotherhood in any country’s political process as it was a domestic matter for the country concerned.42

Conclusion

Saudi Arabia initiated military action in Yemen to push back the Houthis and assert its primacy in that neighbouring state in the face of perceived challenges from Houthi power and the expanding arc of Iranian influence. Now, four months after the commencement of the Saudi air assault, the endgame in Yemen remains unclear. On 21 April, Saudi leaders had announced that their military aims had been achieved and changed the name of their operation to “Restoration of Hope”. But neither was there any let-up in the bombings, nor any extension of humanitarian assistance to the beleaguered people caught in the contentions and conflicts generated by the breakdown of their state order and the resurrection of sectarian feuds that create cohorts among most unlikely participants.
The confusion relating to the endgame is largely due to the fact that Saudi Arabia has never defined its war aims beyond the simplistic demand for the restoration of the “legitimate” Hadi government. Though the Yemen war is being conducted on this basis, the demand itself has such inherent defects that it is difficult to see under what circumstances it could be realised. Hadi has so little personal credibility in the country that hardly any group is fighting to get him back, certainly not the local forces which have temporarily coalesced to retake Aden.43

One possible Saudi aim could be to consolidate the anti-Houthi forces in the south and restore a Hadi- or Khalid Bahah-led interim administration in Aden. This would secure the cherished Saudi desire to break up Yemen into its north-south territories, with a Sunni-led government in position in the south. This plan is fraught with considerable uncertainty: the Southern Resistance and Al Hirak are unlikely to be Saudi puppets. More importantly, AQAP will not be denied its own aspirations to expand its own space in the south as a prelude to a later spread northwards. Finally, there is the mysterious but lethal presence of the ISIS in Yemen and even in Saudi Arabia itself; even without much territory under its control, the group has been able to inflict considerable damage to the self-esteem, morale and national integrity of both Yemen and the Kingdom itself.

It is possible that Saudi Arabia may now moderate its position and seek a political order in united Yemen in which both the Houthis and Islah can participate: al Dakheel, quoted earlier, mentions the Saudi acceptance of (unarmed) Houthis being part of Yemen’s politics if the people so wish. But, any suggestion of moderation on the Saudi side brings up the larger question of its perception of Iran’s role in the region and its own ties with the Islamic Republic, a matter that has got more complicated with Iran ending its political isolation through the nuclear agreement. In short, the resolution of the Yemen imbroglio is directly linked to how the Islamic giants shape their bilateral ties. Here, as of now, there is not much cause for optimism.

The Kingdom’s sense of an existential threat from Iran has been aggravated by the concern that the US has also reviewed its role in West Asia and might not provide the Kingdom with the ballast it needs to balance Iran’s already substantial strategic advantages in the region. Linked with this are the Kingdom’s domestic factors in terms of which the leadership of King Salman and his son, Prince Mohammed bin Salman, has come to be associated with the aggressive, sect-based posture against Iran, on the basis of which the two royals have neutralised all demand for domestic reform and gained considerable personal popularity. The price they have paid has been quite high, for they have unleashed their country’s war machine on their hapless fellow Arabs, have reached out to their rivals in the Islamist fold, the Brotherhood, and have set up alliances with their most barbarous of enemies, Al Qaeda. These actions and affiliations demand not diplomatic accommodation but total victory.

As Yemen breaks apart and Saudi Arabia’s southern border does become a “bleeding wound”, even as jihadis unleash their toxic malevolence, the ageing king and the ambitious prince may find that they no longer have the ability, the tools or the friends to stem the haemorrhage that afflicts their kingdom.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.

Originally published by Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (www.idsa.in) at http://www.idsa.in/specialfeature/YemeninMeltdown_talmizahmad120815.html

Notes:
1 Asher Orkaby, “A passing Generation of Yemeni Politics,” Middle East Brief, No. 90 (Crown Center for Middle East Studies, Brandeis University, March 2015), p.5

2 Ibid, p. 5.

3 Ibid.

4 Ghaith Abdul-Ahad, “Diary: In Sanaa”, London Review of Books, 21 May, 2015, p. 6, available at www.lrb.co.uk/v37/n10/ghaith-abdul-ahad/diary (accessed 15 June 2015).

5 Peter Salisbury, “Yemen and the Saudi-Iran ‘Cold War’,” Research Paper, (Chatham House, February 2015), pp. 7-8 (accessed 2 August 2015).

6 Asher Orkaby, “Houthi Who? A History of Unlikely Alliances in Yemen,” Foreign Affairs, 25 March, 2015 (accessed 2 August 2015).

7 Ibid.

8 Peter Salisbury, “Yemen and the Saudi-Iran ‘Cold War’,” Research Paper, (Chatham House, February 2015), p. 3 (accessed 2 August 2015).

9 Ibid, p. 4.

10 Ibid.

11 Leslie Campbell, “Yemen: The Tribal Islamists,” p. 2 (accessed 2 August 2015).

12 Salisbury, “Yemen and the Saudi-Iran ‘Cold War’,” p. 7.

13 Abdel Wahab Badrakhan, “Decisive Storm: An Assessment,” The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research [ECSSR], Abu Dhabi, 16 April 2015 (accessed 2 August 2015).

14 Salisbury, “Yemen and the Saudi-Iran ‘Cold War’,” p. 7.

15 Orkaby, “Houthi Who?” pp. 3, 5.

16 Abdul-Ahad, “Diary: In Sanaa”, p. 7.

17 Campbell, “Yemen: The Tribal Islamists,” p. 6.

18 Abdul-Ahad, “Diary: In Sanaa”, p. 8. On 5 August, Houthi militants arrested in Taiz the human rights activist Dr. Abdel Qadir al Junaid.

19 Farea Al Muslimi, “Saudi Airstrikes Against Yemen a First,” Carnegie Middle East Center, 2 April, 2015 (accessed 2 August 2015).

20 Rai al Youm and www.alaraby.co.uk, translation in Mideast Mirror, 12 June 2015.

21 Bruce Riedel, “A bleeding wound on the Saudi border: Why Yemen peace talks are unlikely to make progress,” Brookings, 15 June 2015 (accessed 17 June 2015).

22 “Saudi Arabia suffers deadliest terrorism attack in years,” Associated Press, 6 August 2015, (accessed 8 August 2015).

23   In response to the suggestion that Iran may be supporting the Houthi and Saleh forces, West Asia specialist James Spencer says: “I have seen no evidence of improved weapons or tactics that would support such a claim… [After the capture of Sanaa by the Houthis] Iran may have supplied spare parts and training to the Houthis for their newly captured SCUD missiles … [Iran may also have tried] to smuggle SAMs to the Houthis … MANPADS (Man-portable air-defence-systems) are also available in Yemeni arms suqs.” [Private email, 2 August 2015]

24 James Spencer has speculated that Saleh may have been subjected to pressure from some GCC sources with the threat that his funds in GCC institutions might be confiscated! Or, he might wish to weaken the Houthi forces so that he is better placed when eventually there is a confrontation between them. [Private email dated 21 July 2015.]

25 Perhaps, due to this, some writers now use the more neutral term “Popular Resistance” to include all anti-Houthi and anti-Saleh fighters.

26 “Yemen resistance divided over joining Hadi’s army,” Gulf News, Dubai, 6 August 2015, p. 9.

27 Suzanne Dahlgren and Anne-Linda Amira Augustin, “The Multiple Wars in Yemen,” 18 June 2015 (accessed 22 June 2015).

28 David B.  Ottaway, “Saudi Arabia’s “Terrorist” Allies in Yemen,” Viewpoints, No. 81, Wilson Center, August 2015, (accessed 8 August 2015).

29 Amin Qammouriyyeh, Al Nahar, translation in Mideast Mirror, 16 June 2015.

30 Bruce Riedel, “Yemen: the rebels defy the king,” Brookings, 4 August 2015 (accessed 6 August 2015).

31 Jamal Khashoggi, “Saudi Arabia and Iran heading to war?” 8 June 2015, (accessed 6 August 2015).

32 Ibid.

33 Ottaway has noted that the first indication of Saudi link with AQAP came when the Hadi delegation at the Geneva peace talks included Abdel Wahab Humayqani, who is a “specially designated global terrorist” since 2013 as an AQAP recruiter and financier. Since March 26, US drones in 10 strikes have killed 41 AQAP militants, including its leader, Nasir al Wuhayshi. Ottoway “Saudi Arabia’s “Terrorist” Allies in Yemen.”

34 Bruce Riedel, “Al Qaida’s Hadhramawt emirate,” Brookings, 12 July 2015. This Saudi accommodation of AQAP in Yemen is echoed in Syria with the Kingdom’s sponsorship of a new jihadi group, Jaish al Fatah, which includes the Al Qaeda-affiliated Jabhat Nusra as its principal constituent. See, Talmiz Ahmad, “Turmoil in West Asia: Shaping an Indian Role to Address Regional Security issues,” CASS Journal, Vol 2, No. 3, July-September 2015, pp. 63-64.

35 Ahmed Rashid, “Why We Need al-Qaeda,” NYR Blog, 15 June 2015, (accessed 7 August 2015).

36 Ibid.

37 Said K., “A report from an al Qaeda-controlled city in Yemen,” 21 July 2015 (7 August 2015).

38 Louisa Loveluck, “Al Qaeda in Yemen urges followers to carry out lone wolf attacks in West,” The Telegraph, 6 August 2015 (accessed 6 August 2015).

39 Ahmed Rashid, “The enemy’s enemy: how Arab states have turned to al-Qaeda,” The Spectator, 18 July 2015 (accessed 7 August 2015).

40 Lori Plotkin Boghardt has recently noted that all the GCC states see ISIS and Al Qaeda as “serious domestic security threats”, with pervasive concerns relating to the increasing involvement of their citizens in these bodies abroad, which could lead to anti-state activities at home. She concludes: “Although some Gulf officials recognise the perils of these policies, anxiety about Iran’s destabilising activities in the Arab world is trumping other security concerns.” See, “Battling ISIS and Beyond in the Gulf,” The Washington Institute, 6 August 2015 (accessed 8 August 2015).

41 Ottaway, “Saudi Arabia’s “Terrorist” Allies in Yemen.”

42 Khalid al Dakheel, “Real Differences”, Al Hayat, translation in Mideast Mirror, 8 June 2015.

43 Kareem Shaheen says: “It is increasingly apparent that Hadi, sheltered by the Saudis, is unlikely to ever return as Yemen’s president, and a political solution to the war is unlikely to be reached unless Riyadh alters its goals of reinstating him, largely given that all the Houthis need to “win” the conflict is to survive.” See his “Jihadis likely winners of Saudi Arabia’s futile war on Yemen’s Houthi rebels,” The Guardian, 8 July 2015.

Detangling The Web: A Screenshot Of US Government Cyber Activity – Analysis

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By G. Alexander Crowther and Shaheen Ghori*

The world must collectively recognize the challenges posed by malevolent actors’ entry into cyberspace, and update and strengthen our national and international policies accordingly. Activities undertaken in cyberspace have consequences for our lives in physical space, and we must work towards building the rule of law, to prevent the risks of logging on from outweighing its benefits. —- U.S. International Strategy for Cyberspace, May 2011

Blackouts. School testing. Electrical grids. Insurance. These all have one major thing in common: they have all been targets for cyber attacks in a period of two weeks during March 2015. The United States faces thousands of cyber assaults every day. States, state-sponsored organizations, other groups and individuals all combine to incessantly probe, spy on, and attack public and private organizations as well as denizens of the United States. These ongoing problems require a U.S. Government response, so it adopted a bureaucratic approach that has resulted in a complex system that is constantly evolving as new problems are recognized. This article provides a comprehensive look at how the United States has organized to address these challenges. Although U.S. Government efforts seem sizable, private use of the Internet dwarfs government usage.1

Policies and Strategies

The U.S. Government articulates its cyber policy through a series of initiatives, policy decisions, and published strategies. The foundational document of the U.S. Government’s approach to cyber policy is National Security Policy Decision 38, The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, dated July 7, 2004. Since its publication, a number of new policies and strategies have appeared that refine the government’s approach. A short list includes:

  • Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative, March 2, 2010
  • Clarifying Cybersecurity Responsibilities and Activities of the Executive Office of the President and the Department of Homeland Security, July 6, 2010
  • International Strategy for Cyberspace, May 2011
  • Presidential Policy Directive (PPD) 20, U.S. Cyber Operations Policy, October 16, 2012
  • National Cybersecurity Protection Act of 2014, December 18, 2014
  • Executive Order 13691, Promoting Private Sector Cybersecurity Information Sharing, February 13, 2015.

The capstone document is the 2015 National Security Strategy, which states:

Our economy, safety, and health are linked through a networked infrastructure that is targeted by malicious government, criminal, and individual actors who try to avoid attribution. Drawing on the voluntary cybersecurity framework, we are securing Federal networks and working with the private sector, civil society, and other stakeholders to strengthen the security and resilience of U.S. critical infrastructure.2

The President has further refined the document and identified his five priorities for cyber issues:3

  • protecting the country’s critical infrastructure—our most important information systems—from cyber threats
  • improving the public- and private-sector abilities to identify and report cyber incidents to enable responses in a timely manner
  • engaging with international partners to promote Internet freedom and build support for open, interoperable, secure, and reliable cyberspace
  • securing Federal networks by setting clear security targets and holding agencies accountable for meeting targets
  • shaping a cyber-savvy workforce and moving beyond passwords in partnership with the private sector.

Cyber Legislation

The Executive Branch’s approach to the U.S. Government’s cyber posture has yet to be mirrored in legislation affecting the private sector. There are four major problems. First is the sheer size and complexity of the U.S. infosphere, still the largest national component of the global system. The second involves conflicting political aims—the desire to provide effective information-sharing to identify potential threats versus the deeply ingrained national desire for personal privacy and suspicion of government overreach. The size and nature of the U.S. economy poses a third challenge. Private companies fear that information-sharing will lead to exposure to potential prosecution, the loss of proprietary information to competitors, and a loss of faith by their customers. A fourth challenge is the free-rider problem, with many participants in information-sharing schemes absorbing more information than they contribute, and with many participants treating information-sharing as marketing opportunities for their own security solutions.4

Legislation has fallen short for these reasons as well as the challenges of operating in a highly polarized partisan environment. The last major cyber legislation dates to 2002. Congress came close to passing comprehensive cyber security legislation in 2012 and 2013.5 Efforts failed in 2012 because business balked at the prescriptive nature of proposed legislation, while the 2013 proposed legislation was overcome by political maneuvering leading up to the closing of the U.S. Government. Congress did pass the National Cybersecurity Protection Act,6 Federal Information Security Modernization Act,7 and Department of Homeland Security Cybersecurity Workforce Recruitment and Retention Act8 in December 2014, which address various aspects of cyber security in the United States. Congress is currently working on comprehensive cyber legislation designed to address indemnity and liability with the goal of passing the legislation in the summer of 2015.

At the level of implementing the national-level policies and strategies, the boundaries between the various Federal agencies have also evolved. Today, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Department of Justice, and Department of Defense (DOD) share prominence but play discrete roles in countering the cyber threat.

Department of Homeland Security

DHS coordinates the national protection, prevention, and mitigation of and recovery from cyber incidents; disseminates domestic cyber threat and vulnerability analysis; protects critical infrastructure; secures Federal civilian systems (the dot.gov domain); and investigates cyber crimes under its jurisdiction.

The DHS vision is to ensure a homeland that is safe, secure, and resilient against terrorism and other hazards.9 One of the five core missions of DHS is to safeguard and secure cyberspace, which involves the following components:

  • strengthen the security and resilience of critical infrastructure
  • secure the Federal civilian government information technology enterprise
  • advance law enforcement, incident response, and reporting capabilities
  • strengthen the (cyber) ecosystem.10

DHS essentially sees itself as facilitating the cyber neighborhood watch for the United States.11 The core division of DHS that addresses cyber threats is the National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD), whose primary goal is to reduce the risks of homeland threats and make the physical and digital infrastructure of the U.S. Government more resilient and secure.12 Within the NPPD, the most prominent cyber security offices are the Office of Cybersecurity and Communication (CS&C), Office of Infrastructure Protection, and Office of Cyber and Infrastructure Analysis. Outside of the NPPD, cyber security operations also take place within U.S. Immigrations and Custom Enforcement and the U.S. Secret Service.

CS&C works to prevent or minimize disruptions to critical information networks to protect the public, economy, and government services. It also leads efforts to protect the Federal dot.gov domain of civilian government networks and collaborate with the private sector—the dot.com domain—to increase the security of critical networks.13 CS&C carries out its mission through its five divisions:

  • The Office of Emergency Communications
  • The National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center
  • Stakeholder Engagement and Cyber Infrastructure Resilience
  • Federal Network Resilience
  • Network Security Deployment.

The CS&C Stakeholder Engagement and Cyber Infrastructure Resilience (SECIR) division is the primary DHS point of engagement and coordination for national security/emergency preparedness (NS/EP) communications and cybersecurity initiatives for both government and industry partners, and is the Executive Secretariat for the Joint Program Office for the NS/EP Communications Executive Committee. CS&C relies on SECIR to streamline coordination and engagement with external partners, while leveraging capabilities and significant subject matter expertise to meet stakeholder requirements.14

The National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC) serves as a focal point for coordinating cyber security information-sharing with the private sector; provides technical assistance, onsite analysis, mitigation support, and assessment assistance to cyber attack victims, as well as situational awareness capability that includes integrated, actionable information about emerging trends, imminent threats, and the status of incidents that may impact critical infrastructure; and coordinates the national response to significant cyber incidents affecting critical infrastructure.15 Under the National Infrastructure Protection Plan framework, the collaborative activity of the NCCIC blends together the interdependent missions of the National Coordinating Center for Telecommunications, U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT), DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis, and National Cyber Security Center.16 The NCCIC mission is to reduce the likelihood and severity of incidents against the Nation’s critical technology and communications networks17 and to build capacity and resilience in other organizations18 through its four branches: the NCCIC Operations and Integration, US-CERT, Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team (ICS-CERT), and National Coordination Center for Communications (NCC).

US-CERT provides a single accountable focal point to improve the Nation’s cyber security posture, coordinate cyber information-sharing, and proactively manage cyber risks to the Nation while protecting the constitutional rights of Americans.19 Additionally, US-CERT collaborates with Federal agencies; the private sector; the research community; academia; state, local, and tribal governments; and international partners. Through coordination with various national security incident centers in responding to potential security events and threats on both classified and unclassified networks, US-CERT disseminates cyber security information to the public.20

ICS-CERT operates cyber security operations centers that focus on responding to and analyzing control systems–related incidents; conducting vulnerability, malware, and digital media analysis; providing onsite incident response services; providing situational awareness in the form of actionable intelligence; coordinating the responsible disclosure of vulnerabilities and associated mitigations; and sharing and coordinating vulnerability information and threat analysis through information products and alerts.21

The NCC continuously monitors national and international incidents and events that may impact emergency communications. NCC works with both US-CERT and ICS-CERT to monitor and resolve issues impacting cyber and communications during an emergency.22

The Office of Infrastructure Protection leads the coordinated national effort to reduce risk to critical U.S. infrastructure and to help respond and quickly recover in case of terrorist attacks, natural disasters, or other emergencies. The office conducts and facilitates vulnerability and consequence assessments to help critical infrastructure owners and operators, as well as state, local, tribal, and territorial partners understand and address risks.23 The office is the sector-specific agency for six of the critical infrastructure sectors: chemical, commercial facilities, critical manufacturing, dams, emergency services, and nuclear.

The Office of Cyber and Infrastructure Analysis implements PPD 21, which calls for integrated analysis of critical infrastructure, and Executive Order 13636, which identifies critical infrastructure where cyber incidents could have catastrophic impacts to public health and safety, the economy, and national security. The mission is to support efforts to protect the Nation’s critical infrastructure by providing analytic support to DHS leadership, operational components, and field personnel during steady-state operations and crises on emerging threats and incidents; assessing and informing national risk management strategies on the likelihood and consequence of emerging and future risks; and developing and enhancing capabilities to support crisis actions by identifying and prioritizing infrastructure through the use of analytic tools and modeling capabilities.24

Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) operates the Cyber Crime Center (C3), which is responsible for providing domestic and international training and the support, coordination, and deconfliction of cyber investigations related to online economic crime, digital theft of export-controlled data, digital theft of intellectual property, and online child exploitation investigations. This state-of-the-art center offers cyber crime support and training to Federal, state, local, and international law enforcement agencies.25 The most important sector of the C3 in dealing with cyber security is the Cyber Crimes Unit, which provides the management and oversight of the agency’s cyber-related investigations by focusing on the transnational criminal organizations that use cyber capabilities to further their capital enterprise. This unit provides training, investigative support, and guidance to HSI field offices in emerging cyber technologies as well as subject matter expertise in cyber-related investigations related to identity and benefit document fraud, money-laundering, financial fraud, commercial fraud, counterproliferation investigations, narcotics-trafficking, and illegal exports.26

The Secret Service leads a network of electronic crimes task forces to bring together Federal, state, and local law enforcement, prosecutors, private industry, and academia for the common purpose of preventing, detecting, mitigating, and investigating various forms of malicious cyber activity. The Secret Service also runs the National Computer Forensics Institute, a training center dedicated to providing state and local law enforcement and legal and judicial professionals a free, comprehensive education on current cyber crime trends, investigative, methods, and prosecutorial and judicial challenges.27

Department of Justice

The Department of Justice investigates, attributes, disrupts, and prosecutes cyber crimes; has the lead for domestic national security operations; conducts domestic collection, analysis, and dissemination of cyber threat intelligence; supports the national protection, prevention, mitigation of, and recovery from cyber incidents; and coordinates cyber threat investigations.

Justice developed its 2014–2018 strategy to include priorities and programs that address the President’s priorities.28 Its number one goal is to “prevent terrorism and promote the nation’s security consistent with the rule of law,” and it aligns cyber efforts under that goal. It intends to combat cyber-based threats and attacks through the use of all available tools, strong public-private partnerships, and the investigation and prosecution of cyber threat actors.29 Its cyber strategy involves an all-tools approach including both investigation and prosecution, with a focus on the disruption of the threat.30

The Federal Bureau of investigation (FBI) leads the national effort to investigate high-tech crimes, including cyber-based terrorism, espionage, computer intrusions, and major cyber fraud by gathering and sharing information and intelligence with public- and private-sector partners worldwide.31 It has developed a number of initiatives to perform these missions. Internally, the headquarters now contains the Cyber Division to bring together various FBI cyber initiatives and missions and has placed cyber task forces in all 56 field offices to focus exclusively on cyber security threats and synchronize domestic cyber threat investigations in the local community.32

The Cyber Action Team (CAT) is the FBI Cyber Division’s investigative rapid response team that can be on scene within 48 hours. The CAT mission is to deploy globally at the direction of FBI Cyber Division to bring in-depth cyber intrusion expertise and specialized investigative skills to initiatives, cases, and emergencies deemed critical and significant. When deployed, CAT objectives are to provide support to the local field office to make the case move as quickly and effectively as possible and to provide detailed intrusion analysis using a blend of FBI investigative techniques.

Today, the National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force (NCIJTF) is the focal point for government agencies to coordinate, integrate, and share information related to domestic cyber threat investigations. The FBI is the executive agent for the joint task force and partners with the National Security Agency (NSA), Central Intelligence Agency, Secret Service, DHS, and United States Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM). Its five mission areas include coordinating whole-of-government campaigns against known cyber threats, exploiting valuable cyber data, analyzing and reporting on that data, applying traditional financial investigative approaches to the cyber domain, and maintaining an around-the-clock cyber incident management watch. Because task force members represent many state, Federal, and international jurisdictions, collaboration at the NCIJTF is critical to ensuring that all legal means and resources available are used to track, attribute, and take action against these cyber threats and to ultimately place international cyber criminals behind bars and off our global networks.

Other examples of cyber collaboration fostered by the FBI are:

  • InfraGard, an association of persons who represent businesses, academic institutions, state and local law enforcement agencies, and other participants dedicated to sharing information and intelligence to prevent hostile acts against the United States.
  • The National Cyber-Forensics and Training Alliance, which has become an international model for bringing together law enforcement, private industry, and academia to share information to stop emerging cyber threats and mitigate existing ones.33
  • The Strategic Alliance Cyber Crime Working Group, started at FBI headquarters in September 2006, which consists of cyber law enforcement bodies from Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States.34

The Justice Department’s National Security Division and Criminal Division each concentrates on its own cyber issues. The division deals with cyber-based threats to the national security.35 It created the National Security Cyber Specialist network that is a new tool in the government’s cyber toolkit and a critical part of the department’s efforts to better address cyber intrusions and attacks carried out by nation-states or terrorist organizations.36

The Criminal Division contains the Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section (CCIPS), which implements Justice’s national strategies in combating computer and intellectual property crimes worldwide. CCIPS prevents, investigates, and prosecutes computer crimes by working with other government agencies, the private sector, academic institutions, and foreign counterparts. In pursuing all these goals, CCIPS attorneys regularly run complex investigations; resolve unique legal and investigative issues raised by emerging computer and telecommunications technologies; litigate cases; provide litigation support to other prosecutors; train Federal, state, and local law enforcement personnel; comment on and propose legislation; and initiate and participate in international efforts to combat computer and intellectual property crime.37

The Offices of the U.S. Attorneys is the last major part of Justice that works cyber issues. One of their 10 priority areas is cyber crime.38 Their three areas of concentration are Internet stalking, computer hacking, intellectual property rights and forensics. They also assist the National Computer Forensics Institute.

Department of Defense

The DOD mission is to secure the Nation’s freedom of action in cyberspace and help mitigate risks to national security resulting from America’s growing dependence on cyberspace. Specific mission sets include directing, securing, and defending DOD Information Network (DODIN) operations (including the dot.mil domain); maintaining freedom of maneuver in cyberspace; executing full-spectrum military cyberspace operations; providing shared situational awareness of cyberspace operations, including indications and warning; and providing support to civil authorities and international partners.39

DOD articulates its cyber policy through the DOD Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace, dated July 2011, and Joint Publication 3-12, Cyberspace Operations, dated February 5, 2013. DOD’s operations are designed to achieve and maintain cyberspace superiority, defined as “the degree of dominance in cyberspace by one force that permits the secure, reliable conduct of operations by that force, and its related land, air, maritime, and space forces at a given time and place without prohibitive interference by an adversary.”40 DOD organizations are allowed to perform defensive cyber operations; however, full-spectrum cyber operations (including offensive cyber operations) are approved by the President and directed by the Secretary of Defense.41

Combatant Commands (CCMDs) provide operations instructions and command and control to the Armed Forces and have a significant impact on how they are organized, trained, and resourced—areas over which Congress has constitutional authority.42 CCMDs share cyber information largely through USCYBERCOM and their own joint cyber centers, but various personnel also meet periodically to share information in collaboration sessions.43

The National Security Agency is the Nation’s cryptologic organization that coordinates, directs, and performs highly specialized activities to protect U.S. information systems and to produce foreign signals intelligence information. It supports military customers, national policymakers, and the counterterrorism and counterintelligence communities, as well as key international allies. The NSA also shares information about software vulnerabilities with vendors and users in any commercial product or system (not just software) used by the United States and its allies, with an emphasis on risk mitigation and defense.44

The Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) provides, operates, and assures command and control, information-sharing capabilities, and a globally accessible enterprise information infrastructure in direct support to joint warfighters, national-level leaders, and other mission and coalition partners across the full spectrum of operations. They are overall responsible for DODIN. Each Service also has its own equivalent to DISA that operates its part of DODIN.

The Defense Cyber Crime Center delivers superior digital forensics and multimedia laboratory services, cyber technical training, research, development, testing and evaluation, and cyber analysis capabilities supporting cyber counterintelligence and counterterrorism, criminal investigations, intrusion forensics, law enforcement, the Intelligence Community, critical infrastructure partners, and information operations for DOD.45

USCYBERCOM was formed in 2010 by consolidating two U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) subordinate organizations: the Joint Functional Component Command–Network Warfare and Joint Task Force–Global Network Operations.46 It is a subunified command under USSTRATCOM. USCYBERCOM plans, coordinates, integrates, synchronizes, and conducts activities to direct the operations and defense of specified DODIN. It also prepares, when directed, to conduct full-spectrum military cyberspace operations to enable actions in all domains, ensure U.S./allied freedom of action in cyberspace and deny the same to adversaries.47

USCYBERCOM’s main instrument of power consists of the Cyber National Mission Force, which conducts cyberspace operations to disrupt and deny adversary attacks against national critical infrastructure. It is the U.S. military’s first joint tactical command with a dedicated mission focused on cyberspace operations. It plans to create 133 cyber mission teams by the end of fiscal year 2016, which will consist of National Mission Teams, which perform full-spectrum cyber operations; National Support Teams, which provide direct support to the National Missions Teams; and National Cyber Protection Teams, which protect whomever they are assigned to.

Combat Mission Forces are similar to the National Mission Teams but rather than serving at the national level, they conduct cyberspace operations to achieve combatant commanders’ objectives and are geographically and functionally aligned under one of four Joint Force Headquarters–Cyber (JFHQ-C) in direct support of geographic and functional CCMDs:

  • JFHQ-C Washington supports U.S. Special Operations Command, U.S. Pacific Command, and U.S. Southern Command.
  • JFHQ-C Georgia supports U.S. Central Command, U.S. Africa Command, and U.S. Northern Command.
  • JFHQ-C Texas supports U.S. European Command, USSTRATCOM, and U.S. Transportation Command.48
  • JFHQ-DODIN defends DOD information networks at USCYBERCOM.49

The Services and Cyber. The Service chiefs will provide cyber operations capabilities for deployment/support to CCMDs as directed by the Secretary of Defense and remain responsible for compliance with USSTRATCOM’s direction for operation and defense of the DODIN.50 In addition to the joint strategy and doctrine, each Service also has its own doctrine to deal with cyber issues:

  • The Army publishes Field Manual 3-38, Cyber Electromagnetic Activities, and is currently developing a new Cyber Branch and Military Occupational Specialty to facilitate the development of its cyber workforce.
  • The Navy has a set of approaches including the Department of the Navy Cybersecurity/Information Assurance Workforce Management, Oversight and Compliance; the Navy Information Dominance Corps Human Capital Strategy 2012–2017; Navy Cyber Power 2020; the U.S. Navy Information Dominance Roadmap 2013–2028; and the Navy Strategy for Achieving Information Dominance 2013–2017. The Service created the Information Dominance Corps, a unified body that produces precise, timely warfighting decisions51 by bringing together the intelligence, information professional, information warfare, meteorology and oceanography communities, and members of the space cadre.
  • The Marine Corps has Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1-0, Marine Corps Operations. The Service recognizes five types of cyber operations: network operations, defensive and offensive cyber operations, computer network exploitation, and information assurance.
  • The Air Force codified its cyber doctrine in Air Force Doctrine Document 3-12, Cyberspace Operations, published in 2010 and updated in 2011.52 It has also created its own cyber branch by carving out part of the Air Force communications community.

Each of the Services also has its own cyber organizations. Under their Title 10 role as force providers to the combatant commanders, the Services recruit, train, educate, and retain the military cyber force. These are U.S. Army Cyber Command/2nd U.S. Army, U.S. Fleet Cyber Command/U.S. 10th Fleet, 24th Air Force, and U.S. Marine Corps Forces Cyber Command.53

Service-Specific Structure. U.S. Army Cyber Command or 2nd U.S. Army is the single information technology provider for all network communications and is responsible for the Army section of the DODIN.54 The U.S. Intelligence and Security Command conducts intelligence, security, and information operations for military commanders and national decisionmakers.55 The command is also responsible for the Joint Forces Headquarters Cyber in Georgia.

U.S. Fleet Cyber Command (FCC) and 10th Fleet compose combined headquarters at Fort Meade, Maryland. FCC is the staff organization to organize forces, and 10th Fleet is the operational staff that provides command and control.56 FCC has a mission set similar to the other Services: direct cyberspace operations globally to deter and defeat aggression and to ensure freedom of action to achieve military objectives in and through cyberspace; organize and direct cryptologic operations worldwide and support information operations and space planning and operations, as directed; execute cyber missions as directed; direct, operate, maintain, secure, and defend the Navy’s portion of the DODIN; deliver integrated cyber, information operations, cryptologic, and space capabilities; deliver global cyber network operational requirements; assess cyber readiness; and manage, man, train, and equip functions associated with Navy Component Commander and Service Cryptologic Commander responsibilities.57 The mission of 10th Fleet is to serve as the Numbered Fleet for Fleet Cyber Command and exercise operational control of assigned forces and to coordinate with other naval, coalition, and joint task forces to execute the full spectrum of cyber, electronic warfare, information operations, and signal intelligence capabilities and missions across the cyber, electromagnetic, and space domains.58

Marine Corps Forces Cyber Command has two subordinate elements: the Marine Corps Network Operations and Security Center and L Company of the Marine Corps Support Battalion.59 It has also been innovative in its deployment of cyber forces, with the Marine Air-Ground Task Force Cyberspace and Electronic Warfare Coordination Cell being embedded into the Marine Expeditionary Unit onboard ships where it provides support directly to deployed forces.

Air Forces Cyber or the 24th Air Force is self-described as an “Operational war-fighting organization that executes full spectrum cyberspace operations to ensure friendly forces maintain a warfighting advantage.”60 It has several subordinate elements:

  • 624th Operations Center serves as the cyber operations center for the Air Force.
  • 67th Cyberspace Wing operates the Air Force Information Network, which is the Air Force section of DODIN.
  • 688th Cyberspace Wing delivers proven information operations engineering and infrastructure capabilities.
  • 5th Combat Communications Group delivers expeditionary communications, information systems, engineering and installation, air traffic control, and weather services to the President, Secretary of Defense, and combatant commanders.61

Conclusion

The United States both benefits from and is challenged by a wide variety of Federal Government actors in the cyber realm. The benefit comes from pursuing multiple responses simultaneously, leading to agility and greater defense in-depth. However, this same approach is far more expensive and may lead to confusion with private-sector stakeholders and an increased level of competition for limited skilled resources. The abundance of Federal Government actors was not a planned response. Many of these organizations were created as the result of bottom-up initiatives from within the various departments seeking to respond to an emerging, ill-defined threat area. Executive branch decision memoranda, policy statements, and strategies are beginning to bring some organization to the interdepartmental effort; however, a statutory blueprint (with corresponding budgetary guidance) has yet to be approved by Congress. Whether it is wise to prune the Federal Government’s response to the cyber threat is a policy decision yet to be made, but the current state of affairs clearly requires a map to understand its full scale and scope. This article has looked at the structure that exists in 2015. No doubt the structure, roles, and missions will continue to change as the cyber realm itself matures.

Source:
This article was published in the Joint Force Quarterly 78 which is published by the National Defense University.

Notes:

  1. Interview with Brigadier General Greg Touhill, USAF (Ret.), Deputy Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security, Cyber Security Operations Program, March 27, 2015.
  2. National Security Strategy (Washington, DC: The White House, February 2015), 12–13, available at <www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy.pdf>.
  3. “Cybersecurity,” The White House, March 18, 2015, available at <www.whitehouse.gov/issues/foreign-policy/cybersecurity>.
  4. Testimony of Steven R. Chabinsky before the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, “Strengthening Public-Private Partnerships to Reduce Cyber Risks to our Nation’s Critical Infrastructure,” Washington, DC, March 26, 2014.
  5. The authors would like to thank Thomas Wingfield, Esq., for providing his thoughts on cyber legislation.
  6. “S.2519—National Cybersecurity Protection Act of 2014,” U.S. Congress, December, 18, 2014, available at <www.congress.gov/113/bills/s2519/BILLS-113s2519enr.pdf>.
  7. “S.2521—Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014,” U.S. Congress, December 18, 2014, available at <www.congress.gov/113/bills/s2521/BILLS-113s2521enr.pdf>.
  8. “S.2354—DHS Cybersecurity Workforce and Recruitment and Retention Act of 2014,” U.S. Congress, July 14, 2014, available at <www.congress.gov/113/bills/s2354/BILLS-113s2354rs.pdf>.
  9. “Our Mission,” Department of Homeland Security (DHS), available at <www.dhs.gov/our-mission>.
  10. “The 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review,” DHS, June 18, 2014, 78, available at <www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/2014-qhsr-final-508.pdf>.
  11. Touhill interview.
  12. Touhill interview; and “NPPD at a Glance,” DHS, available at <www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/nppd-at-a-glance-071614.pdf>.
  13. Touhill interview; and “Office of Cybersecurity and Communications,” DHS, available at <www.dhs.gov/office-cybersecurity-and-communications>.
  14. “Stakeholder Engagement and Cyber Infrastructure Resilience,” DHS, available at <www.dhs.gov/stakeholder-engagement-and-cyber-infrastructure-resilience>.
  15. “The 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review.”
  16. “Cybersecurity: DHS’s Role, Federal Efforts, and National Policy,” U.S. Government Printing Office (GPO), June 16, 2010, 12, available at <www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111hhrg64697/pdf/CHRG-111hhrg64697.pdf>.
  17. “National Cybersecurity Communications Integration Center,” DHS, available at <www.dhs.gov/about-national-cybersecurity-communications-integration-center>.
  18. Touhill interview.
  19. “About Us,” U.S. Computer Emergency Response Team, available at <www.us-cert.gov/about-us>.
  20. “Cybersecurity: DHS’s Role, Federal Efforts, and National Policy,” GPO, June 16, 2010, 15, available at <www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111hhrg64697/pdf/CHRG-111hhrg64697.pdf>.
  21. “About the Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team,” Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team, available at <https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/About-Industrial-Control-Systems-Cyber-Emergency-Response-Team>.
  22. “National Coordinating Center for Communications,” DHS, available at <www.dhs.gov/national-coordinating-center-communications#>.
  23. “Office of Infrastructure Protection Strategic Plan: 2012–2016,” DHS, available at <www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/IP-Strategic-Plan-FINAL-508.pdf>.
  24. “Office of Cyber and Infrastructure Analysis,” DHS, available at <www.dhs.gov/office-cyber-infrastructure-analysis>.
  25. “Cyber Crimes Center,” U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, available at <www.ice.gov/cyber-crimes>.
  26. Ibid.
  27. “About,” National Computer Forensics Institute, available at <www.ncfi.usss.gov/ncfi/pages/about.jsf>.
  28. “Strategic Plan Fiscal Years 2014–2018,” U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), available at <www.justice.gov/about/strategic-plan-fiscal-years-2014-2018>.
  29. Ibid., 10.
  30. Ibid., 19.
  31. “Cyber Crime,” Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), available at <www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/cyber>.
  32. “Cyber Task Forces: Building Alliances to Improve the Nation’s Cybersecurity,” FBI, available at <www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/cyber/cyber-task-forces-building-alliances-to-improve-the-nations-cybersecurity-1>.
  33. “The NCFTA: Combating Force to Fight Cyber Crime,” FBI, September 16, 2011, available at <www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2011/september/cyber_091611>.
  34. “Cyber Solidarity: Five Nations, One Mission,” FBI, March 18, 2008, available at <www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2008/march/cybergroup_031708>.
  35. “Combatting National Security Cyber Threats,” DOJ, available at <www.justice.gov/nsd/about-division-0>.
  36. “New Network Takes Aim at Cyber Threats to National Security,” DOJ, November 14, 2012, available at <www.justice.gov/opa/blog/new-network-takes-aim-cyber-threats-national-security>.
  37. “Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section,” DOJ, available at <www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/>.
  38. “Cyber Crime,” Offices of the U.S. Attorneys, available at <www.justice.gov/usao/priority-areas/cyber-crime>.
  39. Vice Admiral Michael S. Rogers, USN, Nominee for Commander, U.S. Cyber Command, Congressional Testimony, March 11, 2014.
  40. Joint Publication (JP) 3-12(R), Cyberspace Operations (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, February 5, 2013), GL-4, available at <www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_12R.pdf>.
  41. Rogers Congressional Testimony, March 11, 2014.
  42. Andrew Feickert, “The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands: Background and Issues for Congress,” R42077 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, January 3, 2013), available at <http://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42077.pdf>.
  43. Rita Boland, “Command’s Cybersecurity Crosses Domains, Directorates,” Signal, June 1, 2013, available at <www.afcea.org/content/?q=command%E2%80%99s-cybersecurity%E2%80%A8-crosses-domains-directorates>.
  44. Rogers Congressional Testimony, March 11, 2014.
  45. “Mission,” Defense Cyber Crime Center, available at <www.dc3.mil/index/mission>.
  46. U.S. Cyber Command’s Web site is available at <www.jtfgno.mil>.
  47. “Mission Statement,” U.S. Cyber Command, available at <www.jtfgno.mil/default.aspx>.
  48. “Advance Questions for Vice Admiral Michael S. Rogers,” Senate Armed Services Committee, March 11, 2014, available at <http://fas.org:8080/irp/congress/2014_hr/031114rogers-q.pdf>.
  49. “Statement of Admiral Michael S. Rogers,” Senate Armed Services Committee, March 19, 2015, available at <http://fas.org:8080/irp/congress/2015_hr/031915rogers.pdf>.
  50. JP 3-12(R), ix.
  51. “Navy Information Dominance Corps Human Capital Strategy 2012–2017,” U.S. Navy, iv, available at <www.public.navy.mil/fcc-c10f/Strategies/Navy_Information_Dominance_Corps_Human_Capital_Strategy.pdf>.
  52. Air Force Doctrine Document 3-12, Cyberspace Operations, U.S. Air Force, July 15, 2010 (updated November 30, 2011).
  53. “DOD Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace,” DOD, July 2011, available at <www.defense.gov/news/d20110714cyber.pdf>.
  54. “NETCOM,” U.S. Army Cyber Command, available at <www.arcyber.army.mil/org-netcom.html>; and <www.army.mil/info/organization/unitsandcommands/commandstructure/netcom/>.
  55. “INSCOM,” U.S. Army Cyber Command, available at <www.arcyber.army.mil/org-inscom.html>; and <www.inscom.army.mil/>.
  56. Email from CAPT Stephanie Keck, Division Director, Information Dominance Corps and Foreign Area Officer Assignments, Navy Personnel Command.
  57. “U.S. Fleet Cyber Command Mission and Vision,” U.S. Fleet Cyber Command, available at <www.fcc.navy.mil/>.
  58. “U.S. Tenth Fleet Mission,” U.S. Fleet Cyber Command, available at <www.fcc.navy.mil/>.
  59. Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1-0, Marine Corps Operations (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, August 9, 2011), 2-17 and 2-18.
  60. “24th Air Force Fact Sheet,” 24th Air Force, available at <http://newpreview.afnews.af.mil/24af/library/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=15663>.
  61. “24th Air Force Units,” 24th Air Force, available at <www.24af.af.mil/units/index.asp>.

Perfect Opportunity To Advance US-Georgian Defense Relationship – Analysis

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By Luke Coffey*

US Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter will meet with his Georgian counterpart, Tinatin Khidasheli, the week of August 17. Having recently been appointed as defense minister (and the first female defense minister in Georgia’s history), this will be Khidasheli’s first meeting at the Pentagon in her new role. Georgia has been a steadfast ally of the United States, and Khidasheli has been a leading voice inside Georgia for closer ties with the U.S. and NATO. Thousands of Georgian troops have served alongside U.S. troops in Afghanistan and Iraq. Dozens have been wounded. In Afghanistan alone, 30 Georgian soldiers have made the ultimate sacrifice.

This meeting offers an opportunity for Secretary Carter to thank Georgia for its continued contribution in Afghanistan, congratulate Georgia on its military reforms, and lay the groundwork for deeper bilateral cooperation.

Georgia: One of America’s Best Allies in Europe

Few countries in the Euro-Atlantic region express as much enthusiasm for NATO as Georgia—even though it is not yet a member of the Alliance. The NATO–Georgian relationship has never been closer. During the last NATO summit, the Alliance endorsed the NATO–Georgia Package that will strengthen Georgia’s defense and interoperability capabilities with the Alliance. Georgia is contributing a light infantry company to the NATO Response Force in 2015 and 2016. The NATO–Georgia Joint Training and Evaluation Center is opening later this year at the Vaziani training area located outside the capital city Tbilisi. Last month, Georgia hosted NATO’s Agile Spirit command post exercise, which included 250 soldiers from Bulgaria, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Romania.

Georgia also welcomes the regular presence of U.S. forces. In May, more than 600 American and Georgian soldiers completed exercise Noble Partner, the largest U.S.–Georgian military training exercise to date. Elements of the U.S. Marine Corps Black Sea Rotational Force and U.S. National Guard and reserve units often visit Georgia for joint training missions.

At the time of the 2008 Russian invasion, Georgia had the second-largest number of troops in Iraq after the U.S. In 2012, when many NATO countries, such as France, were rushing for the door in Afghanistan, Georgia added more troops to the mission. Today, Georgia has 885 troops in Afghanistan, making it the second-largest troop contributor to the NATO training mission after the U.S.

Russia’s Continued Aggression

Russia views the South Caucasus as being in its natural sphere of influence and stands ready to exert its influence in the region by force if necessary. In August 2008, Russia invaded Georgia, coming as close as 15 miles to Tbilisi. Seven years later, several thousand Russian troops continue to occupy the two Georgian regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia—accounting for 20 percent of Georgia’s territory.

Since July 16, 2015, Moscow-backed security forces have been moving the administrative boundary fence dividing the Russian-occupied region of South Ossetia and the rest of Georgia—thereby placing more Georgian territory under Russian control. The most recent incident of this kind took place on August 10. Russia’s actions now place its administrative boundary fence within 550 yards of Georgia’s E60 highway, which is the main road linking the Black Sea to Azerbaijan. The new fence also places a one-mile segment of the BP-operated Baku-Supsa pipeline inside Russian-occupied territory.

Earlier this year, Russia signed so-called integration treaties with South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Among other things, these treaties call for a coordinated foreign policy, the creation of a common security and defense space, and the implementation of a streamlined process for Abkhazians and South Ossetians to receive Russian citizenship. The Georgian Foreign Ministry criticized the treaty as a step toward the “annexation of Georgia’s occupied territories.”[1]

The Long Road to NATO

Georgia was promised eventual membership at the NATO summit in Bucharest in 2008. Since then, not all members of the Alliance have been supportive. This is especially true of those countries inside NATO that have an uncomfortably close relationship with Russia.

Some NATO members are concerned that Georgia’s entry into NATO would trigger an automatic war with Russia over South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Georgian officials say that they are happy to accept a NATO membership arrangement or compromise that excludes the two occupied territories from NATO’s Article 5 security guarantee until the matter is resolved peacefully with the Russians. To demonstrate its commitment, Georgia made a “non-use of force” pledge regarding the occupied territories, which Russia has failed to do.

During the two most recent NATO summits (2012 in Chicago, and 2014 in Wales), Georgia had hoped to receive a Membership Action Plan (MAP) but did not. MAP is a NATO program that offers assistance and practical support tailored to the individual needs of countries wishing to join. MAP was first used in 1999, but there is no requirement for a candidate country to either receive or complete a MAP before joining the Alliance. Even though Georgia does not need a MAP to someday join the Alliance, Russia uses the repeated failure of Georgia to receive a MAP from NATO as a propaganda victory.

Helping Georgia Along the Transatlantic Path

The U.S. should use Khidasheli’s upcoming visit to recognize the important contribution to transatlantic security made by Georgia. The U.S. should:

  • Help the Georgians defend themselves. Every country has the inherent right to self-defense. The U.S. should sell defensive anti-tank weapons—such as the FGM-148 Javelin “fire and forget” anti-tank missile—and anti-aircraft weaponry to Georgia. The Georgians live under the constant threat of further Russian aggression.
  • Publicly state that a Membership Action Plan is not required to join the Alliance. Before the next NATO Summit in Poland in July 2016, President Barack Obama, Secretary of State John Kerry, and Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter should publicly state that Georgia does not need a MAP to join NATO.
  • Be clear about Georgia’s future membership. In 2008, Georgia was promised eventual membership by the Alliance. This has been reaffirmed at every NATO summit since. The U.S. should make clear that Georgia’s political commitment to the transatlantic community, its successful completion of subsequent Annual National Programs, and the NATO–Georgia Commission, will help bring Georgia closer to ultimate membership.
  • Increase multilateral and bilateral training inside Georgia. The more that U.S. and NATO flags fly in Georgia, the more committed the Georgian people will be to remaining on a path toward transatlantic integration. Military training exercises are the most visible sign of America’s and NATO’s support.
  • Call the Russian military presence an occupation. The U.S. should continue issuing high-level statements calling the presence of several thousand Russian troops in South Ossetia and Abkhazia what it is: an occupation. Also, the U.S. should encourage more European countries to do so, as many have failed to publicly acknowledge this reality.
  • Increase targeted economic sanctions if either Abkhazia or South Ossetia is annexed by Russia. The U.S. should make it very clear to Russia that annexation of either of the breakaway provinces will trigger stronger economic sanctions that target key Russian officials. The U.S. should start now to develop a strategy with its European partners to prepare for this eventuality.

A Great Opportunity

Georgia is a staunch ally of the U.S. and NATO. It is located in a dangerous neighborhood, and Russia poses a constant threat. Nevertheless, Georgia has been able to implement serious defense reforms and continues to participate in security operations at a rate much higher than many NATO members. The Georgian defense minister’s upcoming visit provides Washington a perfect opportunity to strengthen the bilateral relationship with Tbilisi.

About the author:
*Luke Coffey
is Margaret Thatcher Fellow in the Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom, of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy, at The Heritage Foundation.

Source:
This article was published by The Heritage Foundation.

Notes:
[1] “Tbilisi Condemns Russia’s Move to Sign New Treaty with Sokhumi,” Civil Georgia, November 22, 2014, http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=27842 (accessed August 11, 2015).

The Iran Nuclear Agreement: Implications For South Asia And World – Analysis

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While the fine print of the latest multilateral agreement on the Iranian nuclear question has been projected by US President Barack Obama in quite modest terms of stopping Tehran in its tracks of making the atom bomb, the author envisions a possible regional scenario of economic benefits for Iran as well as Pakistan, Afghanistan and India.

By Shahid Javed Burki*

In reporting on the agreement between Iran and six leading powers on 14 July 2015, The New York Times found a parallel between what the United States President Barack Obama had achieved in 2015 and what President Richard Nixon was able to do 40 years earlier. For both, their actions represented giant leaps of faith. Nixon’s travel to Beijing and his meeting with Chairman Mao Zedong brought China out of the closed wall it had erected around itself. Mao died a few years after the Nixon visit and was later succeeded by the reformist Deng Xiaoping, who succeeded in initiating economic growth at an unprecedented pace in human history. In about four decades, the Chinese economy has increased 35-fold. By late-2014, according to International Monetary Fund, China had overtaken the United States and become the world’s largest economy. President Nixon could not have imagined that his one action would bring about such a revolution in the structure of the global economy.

If the initiative taken by President Obama is Nixonian in scope and impact, what would be its result? The first thing that will undoubtedly happen is that it would end Iran’s forced isolation. In that respect there is a parallel between “Nixon in China” and “Obama with Iran”. The initial phase of isolation of Iran was self-imposed. The Muslim clerics who founded the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979 believed that, to protect their revolution, they had to keep their country and society away from the rest of the world. This isolation was reinforced when the Western powers imposed stiff sanctions on Iran to force it to abandon its perceived plans to acquire nuclear weapons. The sanctions worked.

The Deal

The heavy toll they took on the Iranian economy and the sufferings the citizenry has had to bear persuaded the Islamic regime to sign this agreement with the United States and its negotiating partners. Tehran has accepted conditions which will make it impossible for it to develop nuclear bombs for the next ten years – the period during which time it will not be able to purify uranium to the weapons-grade level. Nor will it be able to use plutonium for making nuclear bombs. The agreement has ensured that what is called the “break-out” period – the time taken to make a bomb once the decision is made to go that route – is at least one-year long. That will be the case if Iran decides to walk out of the agreement.

What is the content of the deal? The number of centrifuges Iran has installed and has been operating round the clock to refine uranium will now be reduced by two-thirds to 5,060; the uranium stockpile will be almost totally eliminated; enrichment levels are to be capped at 3.7 percent, very far from bomb-grade; the potential route to weapons-grade plutonium at Arak will be disabled; international inspection will be doubled, and in President Obama’s words, will be extended “where necessary,” “when necessary”. In return for all this, Iran gets a phased elimination of most sanctions, the large inflow of its capital that has been frozen in foreign bank accounts, and the end to its pariah status.

The Reaction

In the months to come, especially after the deal has worked its way through the US Congress, there will be debate – some informed, some emotional – about the longer-term consequences of the historic argument with Iran. As expected Israel – in particular Benjamin Netanyahu, the country’s Prime Minister – came out hitting hard even before the ink was dry after the parties had signed the long document. It had taken the group P5+1, meaning the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (Britain, China, France, Russia and United States) and Germany, 20 months to negotiate the deal. Netanyahu called it a “stunning historical mistake”. A minister in the Netanyahu cabinet went further and called the day of the deal “one of the darkest days in world history”. Prince Bandar bin Sultan, who until 2005 was the Saudi Arabia’s Ambassador in Washington, said the deal would wreak havoc in the Middle East, and he accused President Obama of knowingly making a bad agreement. Even the Republican candidates for the US presidency invoked memories of British leader Chamberlain in Munich and the Second World War; Jeb Bush called this Iran deal an appeasement.

That Israel was worried about the impact of the Iran deal was conceded by President Obama at a news conference at the White House on 16 July 16, two days after the Vienna agreement was reached. “You have [in Iran] a large country with a significant military, that has proclaimed that Israel shouldn’t exist, that has denied the Holocaust, that has financed Hezbollah”, he acknowledged. “There are very good reasons why Israelis are nervous about Iran’s position in the world generally”. But the president insisted that “those threats are compounded if Iran gets nuclear bombs”. He chastised the Israeli leadership for ignoring the facts of the deal and for failing to offer alternatives. He should also have mentioned – something I do at the end of this piece – that the deal will unleash a new dynamic that will alter the Middle Eastern and Asian landscape.

In fact, alternatives were offered, some of them implicit in the statements made by the critics. Israel, under Netanyahu, had all along favoured the military option. At one point it threatened that it could go alone even if the Americans were not prepared to lend it support. Then there were those who argued that harsh sanctions had brought Iran to the negotiating table; making the sanctions harsher would have elicited more favourable responses. These critics – several of them in the Sunni part of the Arab world – agreed with the Obama administration that a well-thought-out regime of inspections was the only way to prevent Iran from going nuclear. In their view, the inspection protocol now agreed upon is not rigorous enough. In that context, Obama’s civil exchange with King Salman of Saudi Arabia provides some insights into what the United States and Saudi Arabia have in mind about the deal.

The statement issued by the White House after Obama’s conversation with the Saudi monarch on 16 July said that the president shared “details of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) regarding Iran’s nuclear program agreed with the P5+1, the European Union and Iran…The president affirmed that it will verifiably prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon by cutting off all the potential pathways to a bomb while ensuring the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear [programme] going forward. The president underscored that the United States is committed as ever to working with our Gulf partners to counter Iran’s destabilizing activities in the region and promote stability as well a resolution of the region’s crises. Consistent with the productive discussion the president conducted with the Gulf cooperation Council (GCC) members at Camp David in May, he reiterated the U.S. support in building the capabilities of our regional partners”. The Camp David meeting with the GCC members was called by Obama, anticipating an Iran deal, but some of the more important heads of state, including the Saudi king, had chosen not to attend. Those who were absent did not want to be talked into accepting the gamble that the American president seemed bent on making.

The Saudi embassy in Washington issued its own statement after the Obama-Salman conversation. “The Kingdom has always been in favor of an agreement between P5+1 group and Iran that would prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. The agreement must include a specific, strict and sustainable inspection regime of all Iranian sites, including military sites, as well as mechanism to swiftly re-impose effective sanctions in the event that Iran violates the agreement…[S]ince Iran is a neighboring country, the Kingdom is looking forward to build the best of relations in all fields on the principle of good neighborliness and non-interference in the affairs of others”.

From the scores of commentaries that appeared soon after the 14 July agreement was signed, two provide good indication of the diversity of opinion about President Obama’s initiative. According to Daniel Twinning who served in the US Secretary of State’s policy planning staff under President George W Bush and was foreign policy advisor to Senator John McCain, “Obama and his team believe that a nuclear deal with Iran will allow the U.S. to focus its diplomatic and strategic energies on Asia, a region that will do more to determine the history of this century than the morass in the Middle East. But if the deal liberates Iran to cause more regional mayhem, the U.S. will have less time and energy, not more, to manage its intensifying strategic competition with China in Asia. Japan, India, and other regional states will take note, and will make their own arrangements – just as America’s allies in the Middle East are now doing. The results may produce exactly the proliferation, proxy wars and great power conflicts that the Iran deal is designed to prevent”.2

But Roger Cohen, a columnist of The New York Times, expressed an entirely different point of view. “If implemented, the agreement constitutes the most remarkable American diplomatic achievement since the Dayton Accords put an end to the Bosnian war two decades ago. It increases the distance between Iran and a bomb as it reduces the distance between Iran and the world. It makes the Middle East less dangerous by forestalling proliferation. In a cacophonous age of short termism, it offers a lesson of stubborn leadership in pursuit of a long-term goal”.3

Iran and Shiite World

The full impact of the deal with Iran cannot be understood unless we bring into the discussion the place and role of the Shiite community in Asia and the Middle East. Estimates vary, but it would be safe to say that the world has 225 million people who follow the Shiite faith of Islam. This is about 14 percent of the global Muslim population. What makes this group different from mainstream Islam is its geographic concentration. Iran is the hub of the sect; it has almost 37 percent of world’s Shiite people. Including its neighbours, Pakistan, Iraq, Turkey, Afghanistan and Azerbaijan – the share of the Shiite population in Iran and its immediate neighbourhood is almost 70 percent of the total. Also, the remaining large Shiite communities are not very distant from Iran. In other words, the Sunni-Shiite conflict is in essence a Middle East and West Asia problem. (See the Table below.)

The policies adopted by the Iranian regime led by the clerics who have administered Iran since the 1979 revolution have exacerbated the Shiite-Sunni divide, but Tehran is not entirely responsible for the confrontation between the two largest sects of Islam. Saudi Arabia has also been deeply involved. This conflict has been around from the days of the founding of Islam as a religion.

However, its present form can be traced back to the emergence of the Wahabi Islam in Saudi Arabia. It has promoted an extremely conservative version of the religion; indeed treating the Shiite sect as heretics. After the riches that arrived in the Kingdom following the several-fold increase in the price of oil, the Saudis began to use their wealth to promote Wahabism in other parts of the Muslim world. They targeted in particular the countries around Iran. The war against the Soviet Union’s occupation of Afghanistan in 1979, and the strategy crafted by the United States to push Moscow out, provided Saudi Arabia with an opportunity to flex its religious muscle. It used the Afghan conflict as a way of extending its influence in the world around Iran. Pakistan was ripe for the success of such an effort. It was then governed by President Ziaul Haq, a military ruler and a devout Sunni Muslim. He had already begun to Islamise Pakistan, and the war against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan offered him an opportunity to further his cause. Pakistan helped create half a dozen groups of mujahideen (Islamic fighters) who, after a decade-long hard work, succeeded in pushing the Soviet Union out of Afghanistan. They also established extremist Islam as the preferred faith in several parts of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Especially affected were the tribal belts on both sides of the border. In both Afghanistan and Pakistan, the Shiite communities came under attack by the forces of Sunni extremism.

The mix of politics and economics is almost always the reason behind most deep conflicts. At this time, in the western part of Muslim world – the parts that include the Arab world and West-, Central- and South-Asia – two sets of youth are alienated from the systems in which they live. One group is troubled by the authoritarian regimes in many areas in this part of the Muslim world. They were behind the Arab Spring of 2011 that toppled four long-enduring regimes – in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and Yemen. They also launched the revolt against the repressive and authoritarian regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria. It was the entry of Iran into the conflict that brought the Sunni-Shiite conflict into play, but that did not mark the beginning of the entry of religion into the politics of conflict or induce the Sunni youth to revolt. This second process of radicalisation of the Arab youth started with the recent American invasion of Iraq, when the “viceroy” Washington put in place in Baghdad took a number of actions that eventually led to the emergence of the Islamic State (IS) as a potent political force. The Sunni-dominated Baath Party was banned, and the Sunni-dominated military was disbanded. The final nail in the Sunni political coffin was driven by the American-encouraged rise of a committed Shiite political leader, Prime Minister Nuri al Maliki. He used the power of the state to curb the Sunnis in his country. The stage was thus set for the arrival of the Islamic Caliphate in Iraq and Syria which openly and effectively recruited the young alienated by Iraq’s Shiite regime.

Table: World’s ten largest Shiite communities. Source: ISAS
Table: World’s ten largest Shiite communities. Source: ISAS

The Outcome

Most analysts agree that it will take 10 to 15 years before the impact of the 14 July deal with Iran becomes fully apparent. The sceptics paint a dark picture. They are of the view that once the period of vigilant and intrusive inspection is over, Iran will go quickly nuclear, acquire several weapons and the systems to deliver them, and begin brandishing the new weaponry to have its way in the region. It would thus become a dominant player in the region, but its rise will be challenged by the Sunni governments. Not only that. Israel, perhaps supported by the Sunni monarchies, could opt for a military approach to contain Iran.

Militarisation of the area, already underway, will pick up pace. The July agreement could, therefore, lose the ‘bite’ to influence Tehran. A bit more tightening of the sanctions-screw could have yielded more rewards – the objective should have been to eliminate altogether any probability of Iran going nuclear, not just postponing it. So runs this argument.

It is interesting that, in the long interview President Obama gave to the journalist Thomas L Freidman to explain why he had used so much of his political capital to sign the deal with Iran, he focused entirely on the impact it would have on curtailing Tehran’s nuclear ambitions. He brushed aside the belief that the deal would have consequences beyond the nuclear field. He limited the scope of the impact, in order to focus on the criticism that he had not negotiated an airtight agreement. “Don’t judge me on whether this deal transforms Iran, ends Iran’s aggressive behavior toward some of its Arab neighbors or leads to detente between and Shiites and Sunnis. Judge me on one thing: Does this deal prevent Iran from breaking out with a nuclear weapon for the next 10 years and is a better outcome for America, Israel, and our Arab allies than any other alternative on the table?” 4

Iran is a complex country located right in the middle of a highly complex world. It is the world’s largest Shiite nation surrounded by a number of Sunni states, some of them openly hostile to it. It has reacted to the sanctions imposed on it by the West and the United Nations by supporting a number of militias, including the Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Mehdi Army in Iraq. It is also a strong supporter of the beleaguered regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria. While the Sunni monarchies of the Gulf, in particular Saudi Arabia, were openly suspicious of Iran’s intentions in the region, they found themselves on the same side as Tehran in dealing with the rise of the extremist Islamic Caliphate, also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).

On its eastern and southern borders are Afghanistan and Pakistan; the former highly unstable, the latter on the verge of becoming one. Both have large Shiite populations. Pakistan, after Iran, is the second largest Shiite nation. Afghanistan has sizeable Shiite minorities, living in the areas bordering Iran and Central Asia. In both these countries, the Shiite sect had co-existed with the majority Sunni community before the Saudis found a way of supporting Sunni extremism in both cases.

Islamabad came under considerable pressure from these states to join their campaign against the rebels in Yemen. Pakistan’s response was clever and well thought-through. The matter was put before the National Assembly that turned down the request. This drew an angry response from the leaders of the Gulf States; one of them – a minister from the United Arab Emirates – threatened to take unspecified action against Pakistan. His statement drew an angry response from the authorities in Pakistan.

How will the Arab monarchies react to the agreement? They may decide to aid the forces of Sunni extremism in some of the countries in which they have influence. Pakistan is one such country. There are numerous madrassahs in Pakistan that receive funds from the Arab states. Several of these are involved in sponsoring extremist activities in Pakistan. That this was happening was recognised by the Pakistani authorities when they drafted the National Action Plan to counter terrorism. However, because of stiff opposition from some of those in the Islamic community who were benefitting from the flow of money from the Arab world, the government was slow to act; it did not take the promised action.

But the positive impact of the deal on Pakistan will far outweigh some of the negative consequences. With the deal in place, Pakistan should be able to move forward with the construction of Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline. Iran has in place a pipeline up to its border with Pakistan. However, Islamabad was reluctant to move on its side of the border because of the fear of American retaliation. Now that Tehran has been promised the easing of sanctions, that fear is gone. In fact, it is possible that India may also join the project. It too is desperate to receive a regular and reliable flow of gas.

With Iran gradually re-joining the international economic system, Pakistan can once again begin to think of creating a regional association that would include the non-Arab Muslim states such as Afghanistan, Turkey and the Central Asian nations. The Chinese will be receptive to the idea; they have already committed large sums of money to Pakistan to construct the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. A system of roads linking this region to the CPEC should become not only possible but economically attractive. In short, the Iran deal may prove to be a game-changer for the Middle East and Central Asia and South Asia, too.

I visualise an outcome of the deal that is more far-reaching than the one suggested by President Obama in his Friedman interview. Let us speculate what could result from the deal 15 years hence, by the year 2030. That will be the time by when the restrictions imposed by the deal on Iran would have run their course, and the country will be required to abide only by the framework which it had agreed to when it signed the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT). By that time, Iran would have fully established itself as a responsible and political regional power. The economy would have revived; it would not only have overcome the slack resulting from years of sanctions, but also begun to make full use of its enormous energy resources and human resource potential. Growing at an average of 10 percent a year – up from the depressed growth rate of only 3.0 per cent at this time – its economy would have quadrupled in size, reaching total output of US$ 1.75 trillion at today’s prices. It would have added another 22 million to its population, reaching over 100 million. Per capita income would have reached US$ 17,500. By 2015, the rate of unemployment had reached the worrying level of 20 percent, affecting especially women (20.3 per cent unemployed) and youth (24 per cent unemployed). Economic growth and restructuring of the economy will bring down the unemployment rate to 5 percent. It was the high rate of unemployment that no doubt persuaded the regime to agree to the terms of 2015 deal with P5+1.

Although Iran has the second largest reserves of natural gas and the fourth largest oil reserves, it would have diversified its exports away from energy products to manufacturing and modern services. Nonetheless, it will become the central hub of intra-continental gas and oil pipelines, linking not only its own energy fields but also with those of Central Asia, China, India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. The Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline, now confined to the cold-storage, would have been revived and linked with the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor.

Four non-Arab Muslim states – Iran, Turkey, Pakistan and Afghanistan – will probably establish a sub-regional economic and trading arrangement.
In all likelihood, the power of the Iranian clerics would have declined, with the youth becoming politically and economically more assertive. Religion will no longer be the basis of foreign relations; in fact, Tehran and Ankara would probably work together to overcome the Islamic extremists in the Levant. Iran by then could become a close partner with the United States; Tehran and Washington could work to lead the present-day restive Middle East, Central Asia, Afghanistan and Pakistan towards relative stability.

In 2030, historians will look back and credit Barack Obama for being bold and politically astute to have used negotiations rather than persistent warfare to stabilise an area that had not known peace or sustained economic development for more than a century. Over the first six years of his presidency he had given a number of public statements which, taken together, could be interpreted as spelling out the Obama doctrine. Having succeeded a president who was quick to throw his country’s forces in harm’s way to solve difficult problems, Obama had a strong a preference for negotiations. He and his administration negotiated hard to bring Tehran to the negotiating table and then work out a deal to delay by at least a decade the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran. With Iran inducted back into the global system, there may be little reason for it to go nuclear. The deal, in other words, will have many consequences, most of them overwhelmingly positive. The reason President Obama was not willing to make the prediction that his deal with Iran could lead to a host of positive outcomes was calculated to win support for a game-changing agreement with a power that that, for decades, had come to be treated with a great deal of suspicion. He is perhaps of the view that history should be the final judge of his bold move; to make such a claim himself would serve little purpose.

About the author:
* 1. Mr Shahid Javed Burki
is Visiting Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS), an autonomous research institute at the National University of Singapore. He can be contacted at sjburki@gmail.com. The author, not the ISAS, is responsible for the facts cited and opinions expressed in this paper. During a professional career spanning over half a century, Mr Burki has held a number of senior positions in Pakistan and at the World Bank. He was the Director of China Operations at the World Bank from 1987 to 1994, and the Vice President of Latin America and the Caribbean Region at the World Bank from 1994 to 1999. On leave of absence from the Bank, he was Pakistan’s Finance Minister, 1996-1997.

Source:
This article was published by ISAS as Special Report 27 (PDF).

Notes:
2. Daniel Twinning, “Iran deal could undercut US pivot to Asia,” Nikkei Asian Review, July 16, 2015. 3. Roger Cohen, “The door to Iran opens,” The New York Times, July 16, 2015.
4. Thomas L. Friedman, “Obama makes his case on Iran Nuclear deal”, The New York Times, July 14, 2015

Resurgence Of Taliban In Afghanistan And Effect On Iran’s Foreign Policy – Analysis

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By Seyyedeh Motahhareh Hosseini*

At present, the activities of radical groups in Afghanistan have hit the headlines because of the operations carried out by the Taliban and ISIS, as the Taliban have started a new and serious phase of their activities in the war-torn country. Before the resurgence of this group’s activities and as a result of efforts made by the Afghan government, the Taliban had for the first time entered into talks with the government in Kabul, which was a very positive development for an ideological group that excommunicates others on religious grounds.

The Islamic Republic of Iran, as a regional partner, which has long borders with Afghanistan, has been and still is exposed to the threat of Islamic fundamentalism. Some reports have alleged that the Islamic Republic’s secret services have met with the leaders of the Taliban and the Islamic government of Afghanistan in Tehran in a bid to control radical groups whose activities are against stability and security in the region and in order to prod both sides to follow their negotiations more diligently.

In the meantime, the activities of the Taliban have continued along southern and northern borders of the country, including through bomb attacks in the city of Kandahar, which climaxed in the recent huge bomb blast that devastated state buildings in capital, Kabul, and killed tens of people in an unprecedented manner.

There is a mentality among Oriental people that when they hear such news and reports, they usually ascribe these activities to foreign sources that organize, guide and take instrumental advantage of such radical groups whose common characteristic is usually ignorance and profound poverty of their members.

Therefore, some circles have noted that due to the high degree of instability in Tajikistan as a result of the government’s opposition to Islamist groups, and in view of the shaky stability in Uzbekistan, which has been brought about through suppression of Islamist groups, there are fertile grounds for the spillover of unrest from northern part of Afghanistan to Central Asia, in which case, the region will become a focus of insecurity close to borders of both China and Russia.

However, reports circulating inside Afghanistan have correctly pointed an incriminating finger toward Pakistan as the main culprit that has been instigating the Taliban to give up negotiations with the Afghan government. They believe that this is why Mullah Akhtar Mansour, the new leader of the Taliban, has announced that his group will not cease its fight against the government of Afghanistan until an Islamic state takes its place. Therefore, it is obvious that Pakistan is taking advantage of radical fundamentalists as a tool in its foreign policy.

At present, the Islamic Republic is critical of instability that stems from political interpretations of religion in the region and considers itself a victim of the turmoil in its neighboring countries. It seems that insecurity in these countries is not supposed to reach its end. Despite sanctions, being neighbor to generally poor countries afflicted with domestic tension, and major wars in the region, Iran has been able to maintain its economic structure, relative stability inside the country, and security along its borders while its foreign policy apparatus has been smartly able to prevent the country from getting dragging into the vortex of regional conflicts in the past decades.

Therefore, Tehran considers any form of religious war at domestic and regional levels against its national interests. Obviously, domestic conditions in Iran, especially following the forthcoming parliamentary elections that are due in the winter and in view of the recent agreement reached over the country’s nuclear issue, will direct the Islamic Republic toward certain reforms both within and without.

In terms of foreign relations, despite widespread military conflicts in the Middle East region and Turkey’s involvement in the Syria war, Iran would possibly move toward mending fences with global powers, though it will also maintain its relations with regional powers relatively within the previous limits. This issue would depend on the approach taken by powers that are involved in the Middle East, especially the United States and the European Union, and would allow Iran to decide how to take advantage of the opportunities it has been offered.

Up to the present time, it has been proven that the foreign policy of Iran follows a resilient logic, which has been founded and proceeds on the basis of the opportunities and aims to avert threats ahead. Therefore, the type of the interaction that the global powers will choose to have with Iran will enable the Islamic Republic to redefine its policy in the region, especially along its eastern borders.

As a result of the new situation in Afghanistan – which has been created due to resurgence of the Taliban and proclaimed presence of ISIS terrorist group in that country – Iran must increase its sensitivity and adopt suitable policies to counter this situation. In view of all regional leverage that Iran has in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Tajikistan, it should react to the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in this region with an eye on future regional coalitions.

Such a reaction can be similar to the limited cooperation that Iran had with the United States in the war with the Taliban – by making its airspace available, relaxing its strict control of land borders, exchange of intelligence, and border control to collect the Taliban forces for occasional swap or submission to the other side – or take on a harder and more confrontational form. There is no doubt that the type of interaction that the NATO and US forces will have with Iran and existence of a true determination on the part of Pakistan to fight destabilizing terrorism, will have very important effects on Iran’s future policies in this regard.

* Seyyedeh Motahhareh Hosseini
Assistant Professor of Political Science & Expert on Central Asia and Caucasus Affairs

China: Excommunicated Bishops Ordain New Priests

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Two excommunicated illicit bishops in China have ordained priests in separate ceremonies during the past two months.

Catholic leaders expressed concern over the ordinations, saying it was yet another example of the Communist government tightening its control over the Church.

Father Joseph Yue Fusheng of Heilongjiang, who was excommunicated by the Vatican in 2012, ordained three priests in an Aug. 6 Mass at Sacred Heart of Jesus Church in Harbin. The ceremony was concelebrated by 31 priests and attended by about 500 Catholics.

On June 29, Father Lei Shiyin, an illicit bishop excommunicated by the Vatican in 2011, ordained a new priest and presided over the vow-taking ceremony for two nuns during a ceremony in the newly built Sacred Heart Cathedral in Leshan city.

Security was tight in Harbin; participants needed an official pass to enter the church, according to a local witness.

Bishop Joseph Wei Jingyi of Qiqihar, the only Vatican-approved bishop in Heilongjiang province, told ucanews.com that “whoever consecrates or is being consecrated, their status is grave”.

“Yue Fusheng is an illicit bishop that the Holy See openly declared excommunicated. Whoever agreed to be ordained by him has ignored Yue’s illegitimacy and openly disobeys the Holy See,” the bishop said.

Another Catholic leader who spoke on condition of anonymity also said the young priests who defied the Vatican are putting themselves in a grave position. “The faithful will not accept them. I wonder what their future will be,” he said.

“If similar incidents continue to happen, I also would suspect the government of increasing its control on the Church, turning the Church into a tool of the state to fulfill its political agenda,” he said.

At the June 29 Mass, Fr. Lei was joined by 18 concelebrants and more than 1,000 Catholics, including government officials.

“I have no intention to challenge the authority of the Holy See. I would not engage in any argument. But the China Church has to pursue inculturation,” Fr. Lei told ucanews.com.

“If we mind every word that people say, it would hinder the development of our diocese,” he added.

The Vatican has excommunicated three of the eight illicit bishops in China.

This was the second ordination Mass presided by Fr. Lei since being excommunicated. He ordained four new priests on June 29, 2012, the first anniversary of his illicit ordination.


Mercedes-Benz Adds A Coupé To Its C-Class Family

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Mercedes-Benz is adding a Coupé to its C-Class family, which is slated to arrive in December 2015.

Billed as being athletic and sporty, the vivid, the company claims that the sensual design of the new Coupé cuts a fine figure on the road and embodies modern luxury.

At the same time, Mercedes-Benz said that the new Coupé’s interior raises elegance and style to a sporty level.

A dynamically configured chassis, with optional air suspension, forms the basis for a high level of suspension comfort, low road roar and tire vibration, agile handling, and driving pleasure. Lightweight construction to reduce weight, excellent aerodynamics and high-performance yet efficient engines likewise contribute to this, the company said.

“Our new C-Class Coupé continues the philosophy of our exciting coupés. It combines thrilling design with agile sportiness and modern luxury. The C-Class Coupé therefore clearly pledges itself to stylish driving enjoyment,” said Prof. Dr. Thomas Weber, member of the Board of Management of Daimler AG and responsible for Group Research and Mercedes-Benz Cars Development.

Mercedes-Benz claims that as the sportiest variant of the C-Class, the Coupé displays its driving enjoyment-oriented character in an emotive and at the same time formally distinct design.

The new Coupé is 60 millimetres longer than its predecessor between the firewall and front axle alone. Clean lines and sensually arranged surfaces structure the side sections into vivid light and shadow effects.

One particular highlight is the long drawn-out dropping line typical of a coupé. In contrast to the C-Class Saloon, the dropping line extends further past the rear wheel arch. To underscore the Coupé’s sporty disposition, the suspension is 15 millimetres lower than that of the Saloon, making it a very sporty proposition when combined with the standard 17-inch tires.

Plant Hormone Crystals Grow Larger And Stronger Fruits

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Wanting to produce large and juicy fruits without losing their texture and maintain all their nutrients, PhD Eleazar Máximo Escamilla Silva developed a bioprocess for the production of phytohormones (plant hormones) that is 60 percent cheaper than the material used today.

The project was developed at the Technological Institute of Celaya (ITC) in Mexico, and consists in the production of various gibberellins, including gibberellic acid the most active known to date, a growth hormone that is added to the cultures.

This hormone helps fruit increase their size and antioxidant activity and become more resistant and juicy. For example, it gives refinements to apples, strawberries and citrus. It also has an application in the winemaking industry, floriculture, brewing and vegetables, among others.

The specialist explains that gibberellin is not toxic because it is a growth hormone already present in plants and in charge of promoting the progress of the fruit, hence the need for a production method and application for different crops that do not have optimal development features.

The innovation features the production of gibberellin crystals from the fermentation process of the Gibberella fujikuroi fungus that grows and develops within a culture, which secretes phytohormones in a liquid form.

Later the mold is removed and the liquid containing the gibberellin is separated to convert it into crystals, which are diluted in water and spread on the crops. The production process takes about 20 days.

The specialist in biotechnology says he currently seeks to regulate the pH conditions of gibberellin to obtain it in liquid form without having to convert it into crystals and avoid degradation by being in the water for more than seven days.

The new bioprocess shows great effectiveness in crops of strawberries, lemon and grape, where larger, colorful and stronger fruits are obtained, as well as more flowering. For example, in the beer brewing industry they have reduced to three days the process of preparing malt that without the gibberellin would take seven days. In addition the plant hormone increases the thickness and height of the sugarcane.

Escamilla Silva explains that the gibberellin used in Mexico is imported from China, England and the United States at a price of 70 dollars per gram, while the bioprocess of the ITC, currently under production, will have a cost of only 20 dollars per gram, which means savings of over 60 percent.

The project, which has been developed for over 13 years, is in the process of patent registration to be marketed in Mexico with support from the National Council for Science and Technology (CONACYT) and the National Technological Institute of Mexico.

Source: Agencia ID

Sri Lanka Sets Up Special Unit For Election Complaints

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The Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka (HRCSL) has set up a special unit to record complaints related to incidents of fundamental rights violations on Monday, the day of the election.

According to Secretary and media spokesman of the HRCSL, Nimal Punchihewa the HRCSL has decided to set up a special unit to prevent election related fundamental rights violations while casting votes.

The unit will be set up in the HRCSL head office consisting of 10 members. The unit will be supervised by a Commissioner and the Secretary of the HRCSL.

According to Punchihewa, people can access the unit through their general line or the hotline 1996 to lodge any complaint related to human rights violations while casting votes. He added that if the HRCSL sees a necessity for the unit to continue after the election, they will take measures to make it functional to take up post-election complaints on fundamental rights violations.

This special body will function until 4p.m. on the day of the election.

Azerbaijan: Top Footballer Among Six Arrested After Journalist Killed

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By Afgan Mukhtarli*

Well-known Azerbaijani footballer Javid Huseynov has been arrested in connection with the death of a journalist who criticised him and was then attacked. Rasim Aliyev died of his injuries in hospital on August 9.

Huseynov, who has played for the Azerbaijani national squad as well as his own team, Gabala FK, was one of six people arrested on August 11.

Aliyev, who worked for the Ann.az news website, posted a Facebook message criticising the footballer for his behaviour during Gabala FK’s Europa League qualifier against Cypriot team Apollon. After his team won, Huseynov carried a Turkish flag onto the field, and when asked about this anti-Cyprus statement at a post-match press conference, made what looked like rude hand gesture.

“I don’t want a footballer who is ignorant, unethical and unable to behave himself to represent my country in Europe,” Aliyev commented.

He received abusive messages in response, but he believed the matter had come to a close after Huseynov himself telephoned him and said he had merely been trying to express Azerbaijani solidarity with Turkey.

Aliyev said he subsequently received another phone call, this time from someone who said he was Huseynov’s cousin and who arranged for him to meet the footballer over a cup of tea.

“I got out of the car and there was someone standing there. I stretched out a hand to greet him and suddenly several people attacked me and started kicking and punching me,” he said, interviewed while in hospital.

He was taken to hospital the same day, August 8, and operated on overnight when his breathing worsened. He had four broken ribs and other injuries, but doctors said the main problem was massive internal bleeding. He died later on August 9.

Relatives claimed that if doctors had treated the injured man sooner, they would have noticed and stopped the bleeding.

After hearing the news, Gabala FK immediately suspended Huseynov from the squad and sent its condolences to Aliyev’s family.

Police arrested five individuals identified from CCTV footage of the crime scene, and charged them with “grievous bodily harm resulting in accidental death”. Huseynov was accused of “covering up a serious crime”.

Azerbaijan’s president, Ilham Aliyev, described the journalist’s murder as a threat to freedom of expression and to media independence. His political advisor Ali Hasanov said the president was taking a close interest in the case and would ensure the culprits were caught and punished.

Rasim Aliyev (no relation of the president) is the fourth journalist to be attacked and killed in Azerbaijan in recent years. Elmar Huseynov, editor of the Monitor magazine, was shot dead in 2005, photojournalist Alim Kazimli died shortly after being beaten up by police officers the same year, and Rafiq Tagi, accused of criticising Islam, died of a stab wound in 2011. Many more have been seriously injured because of their line of work.

“So many journalists have been the victims of violence and murder,” journalist Ayten Farhadova said. “And not one of the culprits has been found. Their identities have remained unknown and the cases unsolved. I am hoping that Rasim’s killers will receive just punishment.

Aliyev’s death prompted an international outcry from media rights groups and others. The European Union’s external affairs office called for a “full and transparent investigation of this case”.

“The EU supports the principles of freedom of expression and freedom of the media, which are fundamental elements of a democratic society. Azerbaijan needs to promote a safe environment for journalists and other media representatives, enabling them to carry out their work without fear of violence or persecution,” the statement said.

*Afgan Mukhtarli is an Azerbaijani journalist living abroad. This article was published at IWPR’s CRS Issue 787

Brazil: Umbanda, Religion And Resistance

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By Paolo Moiola*

Above the front door, on the green wall, the inscription: “Umbanda São Jorge Store” is written. Inside, the shelves are filled with incense and natural products for all kinds of purposes (from love to money), and statues of various sizes with the features of Catholic saints or other individuals.

In Floriano, a small town in the state of Piauí, in the northeast, there are two shops that sell items for Umbanda. However, according to official data or even the answers of people, the followers of this religion in Brazil would be very few.

Nor is it easy to identify a terreiro, where the Umbanda ceremonies are held. Ademar José Soares, a 76-year-old man with more energy than that expected for his age, organizes the Bumba-meu-boi, a notable festival from old tradition, in his home located a few meters from the shore of the Paranaíba river. Soares is a pai-de-santo, responsible for an Umbanda terreiro.

A syncretic religion par excellence, the Umbanda faith is considered monotheistic — God is called Olurum or Zâmbi —, even though the belief in orixás (of African origin) and the elements of nature (inherited from indigenous pantheism) might suggest otherwise. They sing Our Father and Hail Mary prayers. Umbanda even has a founding date and place: 1908 in Rio de Janeiro.

Religious prejudice

Either because of the special rituals or the type of followers, or even because of misinterpreted historical legacies — slavery, in particular —, Umbanda and Afro-Brazilian religions in general are still viewed with suspicion. Or even with hatred by some Christian denominations.

“For being trance religions, of the cult of spirits and in some cases of animal sacrifices, they have been associated with stereotypes, such as ‘black magic’, superstitions of ignorant people, evil practices,” wrote historian Alessandra Amaral Soares Nascimento in the article “Candomble and Umbanda: religious practices of black identities in Brazil,” published in the Brazilian Sociology of Emotion Magazine in December 2010.

African cults were brought to this Latin American country by slaves during a period of over 300 years. In Brazil, the practice of slavery lasted, at least officially, from 1559 to 1888.

As Soares Nascimento says, “the slave had to be baptized within a maximum of five years after his arrival in Brazil.” It was essentially the practical application of “Cuius regio, eius religio,” that is, the obligation of the slave to conform to the master’s religion.

Form of resistance

Afro-Brazilian religions developed as a form of “resistance” to the impositions of the white masters and as an affirmation of their own identity. Umbanda is an evolution in light of the pride of “being Brazilian,” a mixture of white, black and indigenous.

According to Reginaldo Prandi, another scholar and specialist in Afro-Brazilian religions, “silently, today we are part of a real slaughter of Afro-Brazilian religions.” A very serious matter, says the professor at the University of São Paulo, because the religions’ contribution “to the various areas of Brazilian culture is very rich.”

Apart from the thoughts of scholars, it is worth remembering the words of Gilberto Gil, one of the most notable Brazilian musicians, who writes in the verse of a song: “When the peoples of Africa arrived here / they did not have freedom of religion. / They adopted the Lord of Bonfim / both as resistance and as surrender.”

*In collaboration with bio-pedagogist Rosa Maria Duarte Veloso.

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