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India And United Arab Emirates Joint Statement

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Prime Minister of India Shri Narendra Modi visited the United Arab Emirates from 16-17 August 2015 at the invitation of His Highness Crown Prince Mohamed Bin Zayed AI Nahyan.

The visit of an Indian Prime Minister to UAE after 34 years marks the beginning of a new and comprehensive strategic partnership between India and UAE in a world of multiple transitions and changing opportunities and challenges.

In recent decades, UAE’s economic progress has been one of the global success stories, transforming the Nation into a regional leader and a thriving international centre that attracts people and business from across the world. India has emerged as one of the major world powers, contributing to the advancement of global peace and stability. India’s rapid growth and modernization, along with its talented human resources and large markets, make it one of the anchors of the global economy. The dynamism of the two countries have translated into a rapidly expanding economic partnership, making India UAE’s second largest trading partner; and UAE not only India’s third largest trading partner, but also India’s gateway to the region and beyond.

India and UAE share centuries-old ties of commerce, culture and kinship. Today, the Indian community of over 2.5 million is a major part of UAE’s vibrant society and its economic success. It also makes a significant economic contribution to India and constitutes an indelible human bond of friendship between the two Nations.

An extensive framework of agreements, including economic, defence, security, law enforcement, culture, consular and people-to-people contacts constitute solid bedrock for elevating bilateral cooperation across the full spectrum of our relationship.

Today, as India accelerates economic reforms and improves its investment and business environment, and UAE becomes an increasingly advanced and diversified economy, the two countries have the potential to build a transformative economic partnership, not only for sustained prosperity of their two countries, but to also advance progress in the region and help realise the vision of an Asian Century.

Yet, their common vision of progress and prosperity faces challenges from many shared threats to peace, stability and security in the region. A shared endeavour to address these challenges, based on common ideals and convergent interests, is vital for the future of the two countries and their region.

UAE is at the heart of the Gulf and West Asia region and its major economic hub. India, with seven million citizens in the Gulf, also has major energy, trade and investment interests in the region. The two Nations also share a commitment to openness, peaceful coexistence and social harmony that are based on their cultural traditions, spiritual values and shared heritage. UAE is a shining example of a multi-cultural society. India is a Nation of unparalleled diversity, religious pluralism and a composite culture.

The two Nations reject extremism and any link between religion and terrorism. They condemn efforts, including by states, to use religion to justify, support and sponsor terrorism against other countries. They also deplore efforts by countries to give religious and sectarian colour to political issues and disputes, including in West and South Asia, and use terrorism to pursue their aims.

Proximity, history, cultural affinity, strong links between people, natural synergies, shared aspirations and common challenges create boundless potential for a natural strategic partnership between India and UAE. Yet, in the past, relations between the two governments have not kept pace with the exponential growth in relations between their people or the promise of this partnership. However, the need for a close strategic partnership between UAE and India has never been stronger or more urgent, and its prospects more rewarding, than in these uncertain times.

Today, in Abu Dhabi, His Highness Crown Prince Mohamed Bin Zayed AI Nahyan and Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi agreed to seize this historic moment of opportunity and shared responsibility to chart a new course in their partnership for the 21st century. The leaders agreed on the following:

I. Elevate the India-UAE relationship to a comprehensive strategic partnership.

II. Coordinate efforts to counter radicalization and misuse of religion by groups and countries for inciting hatred, perpetrating and justifying terrorism or pursuing political aims. The two sides will facilitate regular exchanges of religious scholars and intellectuals and organise conferences and seminars to promote the values of peace, tolerance, inclusiveness and welfare that is inherent in all religions.

III. Denounce and oppose terrorism in all forms and manifestations, wherever committed and by whomever, calling on all states to reject and abandon the use of terrorism against other countries, dismantle terrorism infrastructures where they exist, and bring perpetrators of terrorism to justice.

IV. Enhance cooperation in counter-terrorism operations, intelligence sharing and capacity building.

V. Work together for the adoption of India’s proposed Comprehensive convention on International Terrorism in the United Nations.

VI. Work together to control, regulate and share information on flow of funds that could have a bearing on radicalization activities and cooperate in interdicting illegal flows and take action against concerned individuals and organizations.

VII. Strengthen cooperation in law enforcement, anti-money laundering, drug trafficking, other trans-national crimes, extradition arrangements, as well as police training.

VIII. Promote cooperation in cyber security, including prevention on use of cyber for terrorism, radicalization and disturbing social harmony.

IX. Establish a dialogue between their National Security Advisors and National Security Councils. The National Security Advisors, together with other high level representatives for security from both Nations, will meet every six months. The two sides will also establish points of contact between their security agencies to further improve operational cooperation.

X. Cooperate to strengthen maritime security in the Gulf and the Indian Ocean region, which is vital for the security and prosperity of both countries.

XI. Promote collaboration and inter-operability for humanitarian assistance and evacuation in natural disasters and conflict situations.

XII. Strengthen defence relations, including through regular exercises and training of naval, air, land and Special Forces, and in coastal defence. India warmly welcomed UAE’s decision to participate in International Fleet Review in India in February 2016.

XIII. Cooperate in manufacture of defence equipment in India.

XIV. Work together to promote peace, reconciliation, stability, inclusiveness and cooperation in the wider South Asia, Gulf and West Asia region.

XV. Support efforts for peaceful resolution of conflicts and promote adherence to the principles of sovereignty and non-interference in the conduct of relations between Nations and settlement of disputes.

XVI. Call on all Nations to fully respect and sincerely implement their commitments to resolve disputes bilaterally and peacefully, without resorting to violence and terrorism.

XVII. Establish a Strategic Security Dialogue between the two governments.

XVIII. Recognising that India is emerging as the new frontier of investment opportunities, especially with the new initiatives by the Government to facilitate trade and investment, encourage the investment institutions of UAE to raise their investments in India, including through the establishment of UAE-India Infrastructure Investment Fund, with the aim of reaching a target of USD 75 billion to support investment in India’s plans for rapid expansion of next generation infrastructure, especially in railways, ports, roads, airports and industrial corridors and parks.

XIX. Facilitate participation of Indian companies in infrastructure development in UAE.

XX. Promote strategic partnership in the energy sector, including through UAE’s participation in India in the development of strategic petroleum reserves, upstream and downstream petroleum sectors, and collaboration in third countries.

XXI. Further promote trade between the two countries, and use their respective locations and infrastructure for expanding trade in the region and beyond; and, with the target of increasing trade by 60% in the next five years.

XXII. Tap India’s expertise in Small and Medium Enterprises to create a vibrant industrial base in UAE, which could also be of benefit to Indian enterprises.

XXIII. Strengthen cooperation between UAE’s increasingly sophisticated educational institutions and India’s universities and higher research institutions. Promote scientific collaboration, including in the areas of renewable energy, sustainable development, arid agriculture, desert ecology, urban development and advanced healthcare.

XXIV. Promote cooperation in Space, including in joint development and launch of satellites, ground-based infrastructure and space application. Prime Minister Modi welcomed UAE’s plan to set up the West Asia’s first Space Research Centre at AI Ain and plans to launch a Mars Mission in 2021.

XXV. Cooperate in peaceful uses of nuclear energy including in areas like safety, health, agriculture and science and technology.

XXVI. The 70th anniversary of the United Nations is an occasion to press for early reforms of the United Nations, and that the Inter-Governmental Negotiations on the reforms of the UN Security Council should be concluded expeditiously. Prime Minister thanked UAE for its support for India’s candidature for permanent membership of a reformed United Nations Security Council.

XXVII. The finalization of the post-2015 Development Agenda with elimination of poverty by 2030 as its core objective was a welcome development.

XXVIII. The International Conference on Climate Change in Paris in December 2015 should produce an effective agreement, which includes provision of means and technologies to developing countries to transition to clean energy.

XXIX. The overwhelming global response to the International Day of Yoga was a reflection of global community’s ability to come together to seek a peaceful, more balanced, healthier and sustainable future for the world. Prime Minister thanked UAE for its strong support to the International Day of Yoga on June 21 this year.

XXX. India and UAE were shining examples of open and multicultural societies, which should work together to promote these values for a peaceful and inclusive global community. India and UAE will also enhance cultural and sports exchanges in each other’s countries.

XXXI. People-to-people were at the heart of India-UAE relations and both governments will continue to nurture these relations and ensure the welfare of their citizens, especially the workers, in each other’s country, as also work together to prevent human trafficking.

Prime Minister thanked His Highness the Crown Prince for his decision to allot land for construction of a temple in Abu Dhabi.

His Highness the Crown Prince and the Prime Minister resolved to maintain regular summits, high level ministerial dialogue and meetings of bilateral mechanisms to realize their vision of a strong comprehensive strategic partnership. They are confident that it would play a defining role in securing a future of sustained prosperity for their people and shaping the course of their region, and also contribute to a peaceful, stable, sustainable and prosperous Asia and the world.


China’s Second Aircraft Carrier Base In Hainan: What It Means For India? – Analysis

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By D. S. Rajan*

It is a known fact that the first aircraft carrier base of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is located at Dalian, in Liaoning province; the carrier ‘Liaoning’ was commissioned into China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy on September 25, 2012.

Open information emanating from China now confirms the completion of construction of a second aircraft carrier base at Sanya, off Hainan Island. These events need examination from a broader perspective as they have potentials to generate questions of geo-political importance as in the following – how to contextualize the events in terms of changes happening in China’s naval strategy? What could be the likely implications of such changes for the military situation in the Asia- Pacific region which remains affected by an acute territorial contest between China and other nations in South and East China seas? How these changes will impact on India’s sphere of influence, especially the Indian Ocean Region ? What follows is an attempt to find answers to these questions.

At the outset, it would be necessary to flag key aspects already noticed on the Sanya base. Catching attention is a revealing signed article (August 4, 2015) in the flagship news paper of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the People’s Daily. Entitled “The reasons behind China’s decision to build Second aircraft carrier base in Hainan”[1] , it quoted the Chinese language Kanwa Defense Review of Canada as saying (July 2015) that the construction of the 700 meters long base, marking the longest carrier berths in the world, was completed in November 2014 and that it can dock large ships on both sides. From this, one gets a sense that the Sanya base at the same time can accommodate two carriers.

The article reproduced three reasons given by a scholar in China for the decision of authorities to build the country’s second aircraft carrier base in Hainan Island- Hainan’s strategic location, its defense facilities and the effectiveness of deploying guided missile nuclear submarines. Explaining the first, the scholar pointed out that Hainan navy base is comparatively close to the three strategically important straits — Malacca Strait, Lombok Strait and Sunda Strait, making it easier for composition of China’s naval fleet and that the base can protect China’s comparatively weak oil passage to ensure its economic development. Should Japan and the United States blockade the “first island chain” (stretching from Okinawa to Taiwan), China’s ships could still reach the Indian Ocean and southern Pacific via the South China Sea. Preserving access to the South China Sea thus allows China to protect its “weak” transportation channels for imported oil. A base at Hainan thus lets China concentrate its naval forces at a strategically important location where U.S. military force is relatively weak.

On the second, the scholar said that Hainan Island has quite advanced defense facilities created after years of development, providing enough support to the naval base. In particular, Hainan houses J-11B fighter jets, which can respond to U.S. P8-A surveillance flights over the South China Sea.

On the third, the scholar stated that Hainan base is good for the effectiveness of navy’s nuclear force in operating in China’s deeper waters and wider rims. That was why China has in recent years has deployed guided missile nuclear submarines in the South China Sea (separate reports[2]mentioned that the Hainan base is close to the existing Yulin nuclear submarine base. At least one Type-093 Shang-class nuclear submarine is reportedly based in Yulin). He added that nuclear submarines require protection from anti-submarine warfare; the geography of the Hainan base provides good cover. Because Hainan is a geographically desirable base for nuclear submarines, it makes sense to place a carrier base nearby to provide additional protection from anti-submarine warfare.

Building of two aircraft carrier bases should be correlated to the current changes in the PRC’s naval strategy. The document “China’s Military Strategy” (May 26, 2015) (hereinafter called the Document) signified these changes by observing that the “the traditional mentality that land outweighs sea must be abandoned, and great importance has to be attached to managing the seas and oceans and protecting maritime rights and interests. It is necessary for China to develop a modern maritime military force structure commensurate with its national security and development interests.” It envisaged ‘gradual’ shift of China’s naval focus from “offshore waters defense” to the combination of “offshore waters defense” and “open seas protection” and stressed on building a ‘modern maritime military force structure commensurate with the country’s national security and development interests’ and on preparing for a Maritime Military Struggle (Maritime PMS) .

In elaboration, Chinese officials[3] are arguing that “ as China continues to rise, it has enormous interests around the globe that need protection, including investments, trade, energy, imports and the surging presence of Chinese living abroad and that “ Open Seas Protection” is a sign of China’s spreading economic and diplomatic footprint abroad. The Document alleged that “some external countries” for “meddling in South China Sea”, implying that China’s naval strategy will concentrate on resisting US naval domination in the region.

South China Sea is not the only area of naval priority for the PRC. Its objectives are broader. China’s intentions to abandon its long held policies and project its naval power projection far from its coast line, say Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean, are clearly discernible in the Document. One can see China’s desire in its measures already taken to artificially create islands in the South China Sea, negotiate for a naval base in Djibouti and undertake anti-piracy naval missions in the Gulf of Aden and dispatch of naval vessels to Yemen, to evacuate stranded Chinese and other foreign nationals.

To realize its intentions, China is increasing its naval capabilities. It is upgrading its destroyers and frigates to range further; it has tested 056 stealth frigates and brought into service of China’s first air craft carrier; the second one is now coming up in Sanya base. It is developing Anti- Ship Ballistic Missiles, Anti-Ship cruise missiles, submarines, both conventional and nuclear, amphibious ships, and maritime surveillance capabilities.

The Indian Ocean Region (IOR) is crucial for 70% of world petroleum shipments. It accounts for half the world’s container traffic. More than three quarters of China’s oil transits through the IOR. China is evolving its perceptions on the IOR accordingly, which needs a careful analysis, particularly against the background of the newly allotted “open seas protection” for the Chinese Navy. It has to be admitted that till now China’s focus continues to be on the Pacific and not on the IOR. But changes in the perceptions of Beijing on the IOR are gradually unfolding at a time when the need to protect the Sea Lanes of Communications (SLOCS) along the Indian Ocean, providing for the country’s energy imports, is becoming vital for the PRC. The current thinking at various levels in China is that (a) the peace and stability of the IOR should be maintained through carrying out ‘maritime security cooperation’ with the navies of various countries, especially seeking to establish a maritime security ‘code of conduct’ between them (Chinese delegate’s speech, Galle, Sri Lanka, December 13, 2012), (b) its interests will be driven only by commercial, and not military, objectives (Blue Book of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, released in June 2013), (c) China cannot afford to challenge either the United States or India in the IOR [4] and (d) China recognizes India’s special role in stabilizing the strategic Indian Ocean region, but region is not India’s “backyard”.[5]

Under these perceptions, China is pursuing an aggressive soft power diplomacy, which has begun to also shape the IOR strategic environment. The PRC has extended to IOR nations large loans on generous repayment terms and invested in major infrastructure projects such as the building of roads, dams, ports, power plants, and railways, besides offering military assistance; this has led to its gaining influence in the IOR littorals. In strategic terms, China’s main aim in the IOR is to effectively secure the SLOCS with choke points such as the Malacca Straits in view, for which its policy now is to rely on naval support. A relevant subject in this regard is the much talked about “String of Pearls” strategy of China aiming to build a network of base agreements with countries along the SLOCS from Hainan Island to Africa: Bangladesh, Maldives, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. There were some unconfirmed reports[6] in the past about China’s plans to form a separate Indian Ocean fleet with Sanya as headquarters in addition to the three existing ones (the North Sea, East Sea, and South Sea Fleets), so that it can project naval power into the surrounding IOR. This may need further watch.

The developing China’s IOR strategy should be of great interest to India. It would be very much essential for India to note and act on China’s plans to involve its Navy in “open seas protection”. The IOR is certain to emerge as one of the key areas for China’s securing of its ‘overseas interests’; it already figures prominently in President Xi JInping’s Maritime Silk Road (MSR) initiative which looks to address China’s quest for energy security and regional integration. New Delhi already seems to have become skeptical about the MSR initiative which it views of facilitating China’s strategic reach to the IOR nations; especially it disapproves the proposal for China-Pakistan Economic corridor, which passes through Pakistan Occupied Kashmir. Also India may not miss the strategic implication to it of China’s operation of naval vessels including submarines in the IOR. The submarine issue has already received India’s attention.[7] India has predicted intense rivalry between the Indian and Chinese navies as the “implicit focus” of the Chinese Navy appears to be on undermining the Indian Navy’s edge “to control highly sensitive sea lines of communication”. Potentials for an India-China rivalry in the IOR look therefore substantial.

India should also recognize the negative fallout from the PLA Navy’s “open seas protection” role with respect to its Act East policy. The rising tensions in South China Sea (SCS) may not be conducive to India’s promotion of its economic interests in the SCS region. India has only a limited capacity to directly influence events in that region; moreover, Beijing is wary of any pro-active role by India in that region. New Delhi may therefore have to rely on its diplomatic options to bring down tensions in the SCS.

*The writer, D.S.Rajan, is Distinguished Fellow, Chennai Centre for China Studies, Chennai, India. Email: dsrajan@gmail.com

[1] Rong Liu, “The reasons behind China’s decision to build 2nd aircraft carrier base in Hainan”, August 4, 2015, http://en.people.cn/n/2015/0804/c90000-8930629.html
[2] Want China Times, Taiwan, “Nearly complete Hainan naval base can dock two carriers”, July 29, 2015; http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?id=20150729000116&cid=

And the Diplomat magazine, “Why China will base an aircraft carrier near the South China Sea”, August 7,2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/why-china-will-base-an-aircraft-carrier-n…
[3] Andrew Jacobs, New York Times, May 26,2015, “ China updating military strategy, puts focus on projecting naval power”, quoting Xu Guangyu, a retired major general and now a senior counselor with the China Arms Control and Disarmament Association. http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/27/world/asia/china-updating-military-str…

[4] “Power Politics in the Indian Ocean: Don’t Exaggerate the China Threat”, 24 October 2013, Chun Hao Lou, Assistant Director at the Institute of Maritime Studies, China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations – CICIR, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/10/24/power-politics-in-the-indian-ocean).
[5] http://www.businessinsider.com/china-the-indian-ocean-cant-be-indias-backyard-2015-7#ixzz3ilF7Iycq, July 2 2015
[6] Franz-Stefan Gady, “China’s Ghost Fleet in the Indian Ocean”, http://thediplomat.com/2015/02/chinas-ghost-fleet-in-the-indian-ocean/, February 7,2015
[7] Document, titled ‘Indian Navy: Perceived Threats to Subsurface Deterrent Capability and Preparedness’, prepared by the Integrated Defence Staff in New Delhi and “ China’s submarines in Indian Ocean worry Indian Navy”, Alfred Wilhelm Meier, China Daily Mail , 7 April 2013, http://chinadailymail.com/2013/04/07/chinas-submarines-in-indian-ocean-w…)

Afghanistan Stability 2015 And The Pakistan-US-China Triangle – Analysis

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By Dr Subhash Kapila

Afghanistan’s stability in 2015 is far from the offing despite the Pakistan-United States-China triangle’s flawed convergence of interests in co-opting the Taliban for Afghan reconciliation post-US military involvement exit from Afghanistan, oblivious to the reality that the Taliban is not part of the solution but the major problem itself.

The United States is the odd-man out and can be faulted for being a part of an unholy trinity where Pakistan and China have not only constantly destabilised this region but also worked directly against and undermined American strategic interests in Greater South West Asia.

In a recent article published on August 15, 2015, noted US expert on South Asia aptly observed that “The United States must get over the idea that Pakistan can be a force for good in this region when the preponderance of evidence speaks to the contrary. Once the United States rids itself of this preposterous notion, perhaps it can get down to the real business of crafting policies that will contain the multifarious threats that Pakistan poses to United States interests in South Asia and beyond.” Christine Fair also rightly observed that with every change of Pakistan Army Chief “Unfortunately, Americans are constantly looking for signs that Pakistan has turned a new leaf.”

Surely, the United States has a wealth of astute policy makers/advisers both within the State Department and the profusion of think-tanks in Washington who are conscious of the past mistakes that the United States made and repeated in Afghanistan catering to Pakistan Army generals and their sensitivities.

Pakistan has a vested interest in imparting renewed political legitimacy to the Taliban having ‘fathered the Taliban’ in the first instance, followed by proxy take-over of Afghanistan using the Taliban instrument, and thereafter under United States duress ditching the Taliban regime in Kabul but as a follow-up strategy Pakistan Army providing sanctuaries within Pakistan to Taliban to shield them from the American wrath.

Pakistan’s sequential moves outlined above are understandable as it provides Pakistan Army’s strategic control of Afghanistan. But what is not understandable and defies logic is as to how the United States and China have allowed themselves to be sucked-in into a flawed triangular configuration with Pakistan to perpetuate Taliban’s continuance as the major factor in the Afghanistan- stability calculus.

China can be forgiven as it has no independent position or standing on Afghanistan affairs. China’s stances on Afghanistan are determined by its adherence to Pakistan Army’s sensitivities and priorities in Afghanistan. China subscribes to the proposition that it is only the Pakistan Army and the Taliban that can provide the type of stability in Afghanistan that is in consonance with China’s strategic interests in Afghanistan.

But what beats all strategic logic and strategic prudence is the United States propensity despite Pakistan Army’s treachery with United States over Afghanistan, to continue giving prominence to Pakistan Army’s strategic objectives in Afghanistan through once again proxy use of Taliban. The United States has been more than active in not only promoting Taliban’s centrality in Afghanistan reconciliation process but also opening direct talks with Taliban.

The Pakistan-United States-China triangle while pursuing their convergent designs to keep Taliban’s centrality in Afghanistan stability discussions , however, seem grossly oblivious to the Afghanistan Government, Afghanistan National Army and the Afghan people’s utter contempt and dislike of the Taliban

The Afghan people historically have long memories and they are unlikely to forget the decade of medieval brutalisation of the Afghan society by the Taliban and the Pak-installed Taliban Government in Kabul. Such was the Afghan hatred for the Pakistani imposed Taliban on Afghanistan that they facilitated the United States Forces march to Kabul during the 2001 military intervention, riding on the shoulders of the Northern Alliance militias.

Media reports indicate that President Ghani, the incumbent Afghan President is strongly opposed to the ongoing Taliban appeasement by the United States and China. There may be some scattered Afghan people’s support in Southern Afghanistan contiguous to Pakistan but it would be a misnomer to give credence that the Taliban enjoy widespread support in Afghanistan. Kabul and Northern Afghanistan deeply oppose re-imposition of the Taliban in Afghanistan by the Pakistan-United States-China triangle.

Long term stability in Afghanistan cannot be ensured or assured by the Pakistan-United States-China triangle strategies premised as they are on political and strategic expediency rather than a realistic reading of the ground realities in Afghanistan contributory to Afghanistan’s long term stability.

The hollowness of the Pakistan-United States-China triangular postulations on Taliban’s inclusion as a pressing imperative in any ongoing Afghan reconciliation process stands exposed by the fact that all three of these well-wishers of Afghanistan were complicit in keeping in shrouds the demise of the Afghan Shura leader Mullah Omar in a Pakistani hospital three years back.

The fissures in the Taliban hierarchy ae now coming into the open in terms of succession to the leadership and the follow-up consequential fissures in the Pakistan-United States-China triangle surfacing is now only a matter of time. Fissures within the Taliban which Pakistan is unlikely to contain effectively may soon lead to differing perceptions on Taliban’s relevance and utility in the Afghanistan reconciliation process.

The biggest loser in the ongoing game is going to be the United States as by ceding strategic space to China in Afghanistan affairs, which is in cahoots with the Pakistan Army, the United States has not only marginalised India which had legitimate security interests in Afghanistan and supplemented American ‘hard power’ in Afghanistan with India’s ‘soft power’, but the United States by doing so has harmed United States security interests in Central Asia.

Concluding, it needs to be stressed that Pakistan and China by its Pakistan- complicity, are not perceived by the Afghan people as benign stakeholders in stability and peaceful development of Afghanistan. Further, every triangle in strategic geometry generates an equal and opposite triangle. Can emergence of a Russia-India-Iran triangle on Afghanistan be ruled out?

India: Modi’s Government Seems To Have Lost Its Mojo – OpEd

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By Manoj Joshi*

Prime Minister Narendra Modi is learning first-hand just how messed up this country is.

Unfortunately for us, it is clear from his 2015 Independence Day address that he does not seem to have a measure of our problems, leave alone a schematic plan for resolving them.

There were some new buzzwords, a reiteration of some tired old ones, but little beyond that.

Absent was the energy and expectations that marked his 2014 Independence Day address.

But the most important failing was a measure of introspection of his term as the country’s CEO in the past year, or the state of play of his key projects to make India into a major economic and industrial hub.

A measure of the failure was the manner in which the occasion was derailed by the One Rank One Pension (OROP) issue.

Governments, both the UPA and the NDA, have mishandled it to a point where we today have the military stepping dangerously close to the political ground, albeit through the ranks of its ex-service personnel.

This is not a healthy development and we must reflect on this.

The real grouse

The retired service personnel have had a grouse which has been accentuated by the manner in which the other sections of the Central government employees have been dealt with. Jawans retire at the age of 48 and officers from 54 onwards. Civil servants retire at the age of 60 and 62.

Over the years civil servants have expanded their power and pelf through direct and indirect means.

An uncomfortably large number of Central government employees make money through bribes and favours, and those who are relatively honest manage to use the network of regulatory and supervisory bodies that virtually guarantees a job for all senior retired government officers needing one.

The military, by and large, is clean on this count and the soldier depends on his pension like no other in the government.

OROP can have dangerous fiscal implications, even though the claimed outgo at this juncture is Rs 8,000 crore.

But it can only be resolved through a larger reform which equalises the remuneration of Central government employees and deals with the cancer of corruption in the system.

One way, suggested by the fifth pay commission was to reduce the size of the government by 30 per cent.

Another good suggestion was to have jawans serve for seven years and, thereafter, move them to the paramilitary forces where retirement age is between 57 to 60 years.

Since the paramilitary serve till 58 to 60 years, the pension bill would come down and the paramilitary would have a set of welltrained recruits.

But babus and politicians blocked these proposals.

The only rational way in which OROP can be implemented is if it is part of a wider reform of the Central government employee system.

We need not detain ourselves with the relative merits of the ‘brave veterans’ versus ‘civilians’.

These are emotive terms, the fact is that India has a volunteer military and no one joins because they are especially dedicated nationalists or brave, but because it is like other Central government jobs and provides good employment and social mobility.

The speech this year must also be looked at through the filter of performance.

To be polite, this has been mixed. Instead of reform, we have a minister trying to undermine IITs and place RSS functionaries in several prestigious educational institutes; and others trying to stifle dissent.

Modi may have declared that he will not tolerate casteism and communalism, but the facts on the ground are that communal violence has shown a dangerous uptick under his prime ministership.

Low-hanging fruit

The Modi government has picked up some of the low hanging fruit – the scheme to give most Indians a bank account, the insurance schemes, the surrender of gas subsidies and the construction of toilets in most Indian schools – but not as completely as they would have us believe.

Skill development and ‘Make in India’ were the more important themes of his 2014 speech.

And one of the more heartening sub-themes was the need to protect women and give their girl child her due.

These have been largely marked by their absence this year.

New buzzwords

But we do have new buzzwords – ‘Team India’, ‘start-up India’, and ‘vikas ka pyramid’.

As for corruption, no charges may have surfaced at the top, but at all other levels it is business as usual and there is little that the Modi government is doing anything about it.

It is difficult to avoid the impression that the Modi government has lost its mojo.

The main reason for this is that instead of overhauling a machine that had gone bust, it remains committed to using babus to keep that old machine going somehow or the other.

So, the government has adopted a firefighting approach to douse the fires as they come up.

The ex-servicemen have learnt this and have, therefore, taken to the streets to air their grievance.

*The writer is a Distinguished Fellow at Observer Research Foundation and a Contributing Editor, Mail Today

Courtesy: Mail Today, August 16, 2015

Ralph Nader: Why the Future Doesn’t Need Us—Revisited – OpEd

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When the stunning article “Why the Future Doesn’t Need Us” by Bill Joy, chief scientist for Sun Microsystems, made the cover of Wired Magazine in April 2000, it created quite a rumble in high-tech circles. Its argument was that “our most powerful 21st century technologies—robotics, genetic engineering, and nanotech—are threatening to make humans an endangered species.”

Bill Joy was writing about out of control, self-replicating technologies that, once the stuff of science fiction, were now on the way in decades if not years. Tens of thousands of scientists, engineers, mathematicians, and systems analysts are working in countries all over the world churning out theories and specialized applications without much consideration of their overall impacts.

The funding has been coming from various governments’ military budgets, heavily contracted out to industrial corporations and, now increasingly, from the commercial pursuits of global corporations. The rate of knowledge production has been exponential as computers become faster and are programmed to become more self-reliant.

Seventy percent of the volume of stock trading in the U.S. is now driven by computers and their algorithms—a mere glimmer of the future pictured by Mr. Joy.

The worries among sensitive futurists are both the intended and unintended consequences. Autonomous weaponry, for example, may be intended for certain purposes by government militaries, but then emerge as more dreaded unintended consequences where, for example, these weapons decide themselves when and whom to strike.

Last month, astrophysicist Stephen Hawking, Apple co-founder Steve Wozniak and Elon Musk of Tesla Motors were some of many specialists who signed an open letter that called for a ban on autonomous weapons. The letter says, “If any major military power pushes ahead with artificial intelligence weapons, a global arms race is virtually inevitable,” adding that “unlike nuclear weapons, they require no costly or hard-to-obtain raw materials, so they will become ubiquitous and cheap for all significant military powers to mass-produce.”

Artificial intelligence (AI) or “thinking machines” are worrying far more of the serious scientists/technologists than those few who speak out publically.

Last December, in an interview with the BBC, Stephen Hawking, through his computer-generated voice, warned that “the development of full artificial intelligence could spell the end of the human race… It would take off on its own, and re-design itself at an ever increasing rate.” Hawking, a big thinker, noted that “humans, who are limited by slow biological evolution, couldn’t compete, and would be superseded.”

Self-restraint is not a characteristic of the companies developing robotics for businesses that want to replace tens of millions of both white collar and blue collar jobs. Look at the latest factories, refineries and warehouses to illustrate what is coming fast. Even the work of lawyers is being automated.

But the warnings coming from people like Nassim Taleb, author of the runaway best-seller Black Swan and Stuart Russell, a computer scientist at the University of California, Berkeley, co-author of the textbook on artificial intelligence who writes about “risks that could lead to human extinction,” need to reach wider audiences.

Complex systems can be very fragile in ways not foreseen until they happen! That is why Bill Joy saw all three of these technologies—nanotechnology, genetic engineering and artificial intelligence—as interwoven systems expanding over the globe beyond human control.

In a recent interview (July 17, 2015) by Science magazine, Professor Russell was asked “what do you see as a likely path from artificial intelligence (AI) to disaster?” He replied: “the routes could be varied and complex—corporations seeking a super-technological advantage, countries trying to build AI systems before their enemies, or a slow-boiled frog kind of evolution leading to dependence and enfeeblement not unlike E.M. Forster’s The Machine Stops.”

He told Science that he “is not aware of any large movement calling for regulation either inside or outside AI, because we don’t know how to write such regulation.” Such, he noted, is the “bewildering variety of software.”

In the meantime, Congress is oblivious to these grim scenarios. The Republicans in charge have no interest in holding educational public hearings, because the corporations who own them have no such interest. Meanwhile, the myopic Democrats are too busy dialing for commercial campaign dollars to grease their campaigns so as to retake the Congress in 2016.

Some of these Democrats know better. They championed the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), an arm of Congress established to research and advise members of Congress about such matters. When Congressman Newt Gingrich toppled the Democrats in 1994, one of his first acts was to defund and shut down OTA.

Congress has played ostrich ever since. The American people will surely pay the price unless a tiny few, including leaders of the scientific community, organize and demand that Congress reinstate this technical warning system that OTA provided. With a tiny annual budget of $22 million, OTA saved far more in prevented boondoggles that were circulating on Capitol Hill.

None of this domestic inaction should preclude international efforts to expand the Geneva Conventions against chemical and biological warfare to cover these latest mass destruction weapons against humanity. This initiative would constitute an updated declaration of profound human rights.

Why We May Need To Do Away With The ICC – OpEd

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By Ashina Mtsumi

Despite accepting that we do not live in a perfect world, the realities of just how depraved the world can get are profoundly disturbing. The fact is: even with the benefit of hindsight and having well established laws for the protection of the sanctity of life and dignity, there are people in the world who treat them like mere inconveniences to be swatted away in the pursuit of power or misguided vendettas.

The statistics for the number of people murdered, displaced, tortured and raped in the days leading up to and during conflicts continues to be a sobering reminder that we need to have adequate structures to prosecute perpetrators of international crimes while ensuring justice for the victims.

It would be unconscionable to allow this to go on unabated; and it would be equally unacceptable for the international community to remain silent in the face of such horrors; more so in this day and age, where it is possible for the entire world to get very up close and candid with the events in a remote area as long as at least one person there has a smart phone.

The best way for the international community to take a definitive stand against the heinous crimes in some countries is to follow through with the pursuit of justice for the victims who cannot pursue it for themselves, for whatever reason. The significance of the ICC therefore remains. We need an international body to prosecute those suspected of culpability. If this is the case, we then we must rally together to make the ICC more effective.

Shutting down the ICC would be a very retrogressive admission of defeat; dictators everywhere will dance on its grave. Instead, serious efforts need to be made to improve the efficacy and efficiency of the ICC. Cases should not take up to six years to be decided as was seen in the Thomas Lubaga case.[1] Cases need to be handled expeditiously.

However, for the world to collectively move closer to realising the promise of universal justice, there must be a concerted effort, a multifaceted approach towards this end. Municipal justice systems must be strengthened and regional self-regulation encouraged, even before the ICC is reinforced.

Importance of the Municipal Justice System

International Law cannot function without the support of Municipal Law. Article 17 of the Rome Statute of the ICC governs admissibility of cases before the Court. Cases are only correctly before the Court if the State is “unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution.” This embodies the principle of complementarity which is based on respect for the primary jurisdiction of States and on considerations of efficiency and effectiveness.[2] In order to strengthen municipal justice systems the local judicial systems and police service will have to be developed.

Some scholars are of the opinion that the ICC should be shut down completely and the funds be redirected to strengthening local courts.[3] There is some merit to this suggestion. If local courts can be effective then cases would never get to the ICC anyway, by virtue of Article 17 of the Rome Statute and the Principle of Complementarity. Issues of sovereignty and capacity to enforce the courts orders would never arise. The courts would have ready access to the evidence and witnesses. Justice would be served swiftly for the victims. For this to become a reality, independence of the judiciary is essential, as is adequate capacity and motivation. Corruption must be dealt with comprehensively and conclusively. The rule of law must be upheld.

Crucial for the effectiveness of the pursuit of justice is the role played by the police service. Investigation, handling evidence, getting witnesses, witness protection, enforcement of court orders all fall within the purview of the police service, and all are crucial for the ends of justice. The police must be independent and free of political interference. With this comes the need for capacity to carry out thorough investigations and apprehend suspects without fear or favour.

Regional Self-Regulation

Countries within a region should be able to ensure respect for rule of law in all member states. For example, the East African states should intervene and not allow the crisis in Burundi to escalate to the level of international crimes. For this to be legitimate, the countries will need to have the moral authority to act as checks for each other. They need to have a spotless human rights record too. Countries in the same region should be willing to arrest and try persons within their jurisdiction.

Admittedly, this has not worked very well so far, but this may be because African states are uniting against what is perceived as a greater common enemy – the ICC. When they are enforcing their own standards of justice we might see a greater respect for human rights and the rule of law as Africa instead unites against impunity and works together to end it.

In fact, plans have been underway to establish an African criminal court through the Draft Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights.[4] However, questions have been raised over the feasibility of this court, considering the AU is already struggling financially, will it really have the capacity to establish and run a criminal court and achieve justice. How will this court coordinate with the ICC? Concern has been raised that the court may only end up slowing down the wheels of justice and ‘frustrat[ing] efforts at accountability.’[5]

The crimes under the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court are crimes against all of humanity, not because against those individuals alone the crime would not be significant enough, but because as a community we cannot condone such atrocities. Local and regional capacity to handle international crimes should definitely be bolstered. Nevertheless this does not negate the utility and necessity of the ICC, albeit a smaller, more affordable more effective version.

[1] http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/situation%20icc%200104/related%20cases/icc%200104%200106/pages/democratic%20republic%20of%20the%20congo.aspx
[2]‘The Principle of Complementarity in Practice’, Informal Expert Paper, ICC-OTP, 2003, at 3.
[3] Dave Davenport, International Criminal Court: 12 Years, $1 Billion, 2 Convictions, ‘Forbes’http://www.forbes.com/sites/daviddavenport/2014/03/12/international-criminal-court-12-years-1-billion-2-convictions-2/
[4] https://www.iccnow.org/documents/African_Court_Protocol_-_July_2014.pdf
[5]Analysis: How close is an African criminal court? 13 June 2012, Integrated Regional Information Networks, http://www.irinnews.org/report/95633/analysis-how-close-is-an-african-criminal-court

India’s Call Of The Gulf – Analysis

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By C. Raja Mohan*

One of the long-term outcomes from Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s two-day visit to the United Arab Emirates is the prospect that India might actively contribute to the balance of power in the Gulf. It was the British Raj that provided security to the small and vulnerable Arab kingdoms of the eastern Gulf from the early 19th to the mid-20th century.

The relationship of the Raj with the Sheikhdoms of the eastern Arabian Peninsula was not too different from that with the Indian princely states. The Raj provided security guarantees to the Gulf regimes and guided their external relations while leaving them with considerable internal autonomy. The memory of this expansive Indian role had largely faded from New Delhi’s strategic consciousness after independence. There was nothing in the worldview of our first PM, Jawaharlal Nehru, which prevented India from undertaking a significant security role in Asia and the Indian Ocean. Nehru certainly accepted the responsibilities he inherited from the Raj for protecting the Himalayan kingdoms. He also sought to build military strategic partnerships with such important post-colonial nations as Egypt and Indonesia.

As Britain chose to withdraw from the east of Suez in the late-1960s, the Americans took charge of the Gulf and the Indian Ocean. Yet, many in the region sought to re-establish their special security partnerships with India. Oman’s Sultan Qaboos, for example, signed a defence pact with India in 1972. Delhi’s reluctance to build on the agreement underlined the general decline of emphasis on defence diplomacy in India’s foreign policy.

In the Gulf, Delhi’s focus remained riveted on coping with the challenges of growing energy dependence on the region and managing the export of its expatriate labour.

Pakistan, however, played an important role is sustaining the security legacy of the Raj in the region. Pakistan’s armed forces contributed actively to the internal and external security of the regimes in the region. Pakistan’s deepening security ties with the region put India on the political defensive.

But a number of factors are now transforming the security environment in the Gulf. Among these are the Arab Spring and its consequences for the internal stability of many regimes, the rise of Iranian power, the growing sectarian tensions between the Shia and the Sunni, the rapid growth of the Islamic State, the fall in oil prices and the prospects for a political reconciliation between America and Iran. As a result, the Gulf kingdoms have begun to rethink many of their past assumptions. For one, they have begun to look east. They recognise that China and India have emerged as the largest customers for the region’s oil as the US dependence on Gulf oil declines.

Although the US will remain the most powerful external military power in the Gulf for the foreseeable future, the Arab regimes have begun to spread their political risk by diversifying their security and political partnerships. This allows India to boldly re-imagine its role in the region. In the early 2000s, the government of Atal Bihari Vajpayee stepped up military exchanges with key countries in the Gulf. But India’s defence diplomacy in the Gulf has remained far too tentative.

Political ambivalence and bureaucratic indifference in the ministry of defence during the UPA years has meant that Delhi could not take full advantage of the new eagerness in the region for strategic partnerships with India. A significant role for Delhi in regional security is inherent in India’s size, geographic location, potential to drive collective economic growth, and strategic capabilities. As India’s comprehensive national power grew since the early 2000s, so has the demand for India’s military contributions, at both bilateral and multilateral levels, in securing the balance of power in Asia and the Indian Ocean.

Unlike the UPA government, Modi is less inhibited in acknowledging and acting on India’s new possibilities in shaping the regional balance of power. Defence and security cooperation have become quite integral to Modi’s engagement with the East Asian states and the island states of the Indian Ocean. They have also figured at the top of the PM’s agenda during his recent visit to the five Central Asian states.

But most observers would think an Indian security role in the Gulf is a bridge too far for Delhi. But the rapidly changing security environment of the Gulf and the region’s sharpening internal contradictions are likely to make India an increasingly attractive strategic partner for many kingdoms.

Although India may have forgotten its strategic past, the developments in the Gulf could nudge Delhi towards reclaiming its historic role there, a lot sooner than many think.

*The writer is a Distinguished Fellow at Observer Research Foundation, Delhi and a Consulting Editor on foreign affairs for ‘The Indian Express’

Concerns Islamic State Using Chemical Weapons

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The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) on Monday voiced “serious concern” over reports that the Islamic State (ISIS) group has used chemical weapons in Iraq.

“Recent reports of possible use of chemical weapons in Iraq by non-State actors are a matter of serious concern,” The Hague-based OPCW said in a statement quoted by the AFP news agency.

German officials said last week that Kurdish fighters had been attacked on Tuesday with chemical weapons, possibly chlorine or mustard gas, in northern Iraq, leaving many peshmerga suffering from “respiratory irritation”.

The allegations, deemed “plausible” by an American official, follow claims in March by the autonomous Kurdish government in northern Iraq which said it had evidence that the jihadist group used chlorine in a car bomb attack on January 23.

The Wall Street Journal last week cited US officials as saying they believe last week’s attack used mustard gas, which may have come from stockpiles of banned poisons that Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad was forced to get rid of after joining the OPCW in 2013.

Officials who spoke to CNN late last week said that the United States government has test results from an ISIS attack in Hasakah, Syria, that confirm the terror group used a mustard agent as a weapon. The Iraq attack was still being investigated, they said.

The OPCW said it was in contact with the Iraqi government and “will examine any substantive reports it receives”, according to AFP.

Along with the January attack, the Conflict Armament Research group and Sahan Research group said last month that ISIS had also targeted peshmerga with a projectile filled with an unknown chemical agent on June 21 or 22.

The chemical used had characteristics and clinical effects “consistent with a chlorine chemical agent”, the groups said.

Information regarding the use of mustard gas by ISIS is relatively new. US intelligence agencies have said in the past they believed the group has used chlorine gas in attacks in Iraq, though chlorine is not a banned chemical agent.

Original article


Morocco: 62 Anniversary Of The Revolution Of The King And The People – OpEd

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On August 20 Moroccans will celebrate the 62th anniversary of the “Revolution of the King and the People”. in fact it commemorates the anniversary of the 1953 event that sparked a new stage in Morocco’s struggle for independence, which came two years later.

Exactly 62 years ago, the French Protectorate authorities decided to depose then-Sultan Mohamed V. He and his family were sent into exile, first to Corsica, then to Madagascar. The installation of a puppet sultan only further inflamed nationalist passions, and Mohamed V continued to militate for independence. His return to Morocco in 1955 announced the end of both the French and Spanish Protectorates.

62 years later and in a context of turmoil and instability post Arab Spring, Morocco continues to precipitate historic changes throughout the Maghreb. The culmination of nearly years of major constitutional transition Morocco has made toward democratization. A major political process that should serve as a model for other North African states as they attempt to evolve into true democracies.

The potential for economic development between many African states and Morocco and the opportunities now open for. Both economic and political intra-government decision-making might now benefit many countries in the region.

Other states in the Maghreb have much to learn from the Morocco experience, and can benefit by the example of King Mohammed’s political, economic, and religious reforms, which can provide new impetus to the whole region while improving opportunities for economic development and political reform.

Morocco is totally focused on economic development, job creation, educational reforms, and better living conditions for the Moroccans.

Finally, the list is far from exhaustive. This means that the road is still long and the battle is not over yet. The fight continues. Morocco has voiced its firm determination to tackle all sensitive issues that in the past were taboo. This is the real will of change and reform that has been initiated over the last 15 years. Morocco pledged to go ahead with key reforms not forgetting economic growth. Morocco has put forward an ambitious road map to attract more world investments. Highways, high speed trains, new ports and airports all are built and some are still under construction in order to boost investments and make Morocco an attractive investment hub.

King Mohammed IV recognizes that there are still serious challenges ahead, mostly economic but with his world acknowledged commitment and good will, he continues to tour the country (cities, towns and villages) to be close to the Moroccans and to listen directly to their demands. This has gained him the respect and esteem of many leaders in Africa and around the globe.

In a Royal message to the participants in the Crans Montana Forum held in Dakhla from March 12-14, King Mohammed VI stressed that, “Morocco’s African policy is based on a comprehensive, integrated and inclusive approach designed to promote peace and stability, encourage sustainable human development and safeguard the cultural and spiritual identity of our populations, while respecting the universal values of human rights.”

“Morocco has been working untiringly to help forge a modern, bold, entrepreneurial and open Africa; an African continent which is proud of its identity, which derives its vibrancy from its cultural heritage and which is capable of transcending outdated ideologies,” he said.

The King acknowledged that “the borders inherited from colonization often continue to be a major source of tension and conflict,” and that “Africa is a continent with growing and unsettling security issues”; but he stressed that “Africa’s tremendous human and natural resources should, instead, be a powerful catalyst for regional integration,” and urged that “It is up to us — Africans — to innovate in order to turn them into open spaces where fruitful exchange and interaction can flourish between African states.”

Now Morocco has become one of the world potential investments hubs but a lot of work is still need to be done. Many acknowledge that with a reform-minded leader Morocco can win the bet of becoming a well developed nation. The King Mohammed VI came to the throne with new ideas and the will to make of Morocco an example for the rest of the Arab world when it comes to human rights, openness, individual freedom and reforms. So the revolution of the King and People will proceed calmly to reach a better future.

Putin Can Rescue Hillary From Email Scandal – OpEd

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Putin should offer Hillary Clinton political asylum. It would certainly boost his international popularity.

He could really save her neck.

  • She’s facing the intense scrutiny of an FBI investigation now underway.
  • The issue is her alleged misuse of government emails and possible exposure of national security information.
  • This is serious business. It could lead to a nasty criminal prosecution and possibly the misery of jail time.
  • What a humiliating prospect for someone of her stature! The criminal threat is highly politicized. It’s hard to say which way the case might go. It could turn on a dime. A political dime.

Putin could readily rescue Hillary from all that by offering asylum. He gave shelter to Snowdon over a different security scandal. Why not Hillary now?

But how’s that going to boost Putin’s popularity in the West?

Putin would come to be seen as a hero — no matter which side of the Clinton scandal any American might favor.

Those with low opinions of Clinton would be really glad to see her go. Really glad. And her considerable number of protective supporters would be relieved that she wouldn’t have to face the jeopardy that the FBI investigation portends.

Putin couldn’t lose.

There’s one hitch, though. Hillary and Putin haven’t exactly been friends.

In early 2014 she compared Putin’s alleged activity in Ukraine to “actions taken by Nazi leader Adolf Hitler outside Germany in the run-up to World War II,” according to the Washington Post.

That must have smarted.

Putin shot back: “Ms. Clinton has never been too subtle in her statements,” suggesting her strong invective was a sign of her own weakness.

But there’s more. Last February a group of Clintonites issued a report titled “Preserving Ukraine’s Independence, Resisting Russian Aggression: What the United States and NATO Must Do.”

It commends a new strategy to Obama and Congress: They should send $2 billion to Ukraine over the next two fiscal years to upgrade military defense capabilities right up against Russia’s border.

Even if Putin tried hard, I don’t think he’d find a constructive angle to that one.

It’s puzzling how Hillary’s cronies could have dreamt their strategy could help.

  • Ukraine is virtually a bankrupt nation, one plagued by powerful private militias operating outside of government control with agendas of their own.
  • The idea of giving that political-disaster-of-a-state $2 billion for equipping it to stand up to Russia and its nuclear might can’t make sense to any sober person. Can it?
  • Ukraine is internationally rated as being very corrupt, on par with Uganda. Who knows where the money would end up?

How could the Clintonites seriously put forth that strategy? The most flattering explanation I can think of is that they were stone drunk when they wrote their report. Otherwise it seems like sheer fanatical nonsense.

Nonetheless, Putin clearly remains in an international reputational rut.

The latest Gallup poll of Americans places Putin’s unfavorability rating at a high of 63 percent. I predict if Clinton is given political asylum, Putin’s unfavorability in America will drop so much that it will be less than Obama’s.

That’s not saying much, however. Gallup’s recent word on Obama placed his unfavorability at 52 percent. There aren’t many more Americans thinking unfavorably toward Putin than toward Obama.

Potentially Putin could close that gap and really outshine Obama. Back in 2002 Putin’s unfavorability with Americans was way down to 18 percent. Obama’s best score, ironically 18 percent, too, was immediately before he even became president.

It’s quite a coincidence that they share the number 18 as their lowest unfavorability record. Could this commonality be a springboard for a more rational and productive relationship? I recommend they meet jointly with an expert numerologist to seek insight into this.

Putin’s lowest unfavorability point came right after 9/11. He had been the first world leader to call Washington with condolences and an offer of cooperation. Americans greatly appreciated the gesture. That showed itself in the Gallup poll.

I’m sure a magnanimous gesture of asylum for Hillary would be much appreciated as well.

But Hillary’s pride might stand in the way of all this. What if she’s in denial of the jeopardy she’s truly in? That could be a barrier to this scheme to boost Putin’s popularity in the West.

He may have to use a carrot to attract her to his asylum offer.

Unlikely as this may sound, a means for doing that may already have been articulated by a late archenemy of Putin’s. That’s Boris Berezovsky I’m talking about.

While he was hiding-out in London from criminal prosecution back home, he expressed his vision for Russia’s future. Berezovsky wanted to institute a monarchy in Russia. This is no joke. It’s a plan he really put forth publically.

I think that’s an idea whose time has come: Offer Hillary Russian royalty status along with political asylum.

Putin would probably have to grant her Russian citizenship, too. A precedent has already been set with actor Gerard Depardieu when he wanted out of France for his own reasons.

Bill Clinton could be included in this royalty deal, too.

The new Russian monarchs wouldn’t have to have any real authority or responsibility. They wouldn’t be in a position to cause harm.

Some say that deep down Hillary really doesn’t want the headache of the American presidency, anyway. Creating the historic legacy of being the first married pair to be president is what’s really driving her, they speculate.

But if instead of going to the White House she perceives herself at risk of going to jail, she might be willing to trade her presidential ambition for a royal Russian outcome. That would surely create a notable legacy.

So, some day when you least expect it, Russian president Vladimir Putin might be heard announcing, “Ladies and gentlemen, may I present to you Bill and Hillary Clinton, the new King and Queen of all Russia.”

Applause!

An Election Crisis In Democratic Republic Of Congo Could Mean War – Analysis

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By Neil Thompson

Back in January, the capital of Kinshasa and other cities were rocked by widespread protests when Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) President Joseph Kabila’s regime tried to pass a law requiring a national census to be held before future elections. The opposition reacted furiously, accusing the president, who has been in power since 2001, of seeking to prolong his term in office. Eventually the census proposal was dropped and the government backed off, announcing that presidential elections would be held in November 2016. That clock is now ticking, and there are few indications the government is seriously preparing for a post-Kabila future. On the contrary, events in neighboring Burundi may be encouraging some people around the president to think again.

As electoral norms spread through sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s, a number of strongmen emerged who rigged elections to keep themselves in power indefinitely. Term limits were introduced into the constitutions of countries like Burundi or the Congo precisely to prevent the emergence of such an electoral dictatorship. Alas from Russia to Turkey to eastern Africa, in the twenty-first century elected autocrats have learned to manipulate constitutions and exploit weak judicial systems to their advantage. Now the apparent success of Burundi’s Pierre Nkurunziza in side-stepping constitutional term limits in Burundi shows how the spirit of the law can still be evaded if a legal pretext can be patched together by the party in power.

The politics of Burundi, Rwanda, and the Democratic Republic of Congo have all been tragically tied together by conflict and instability spreading from one to the other, so Burundi’s example does not auger well for its fragile neighbours’ future stability and good governance. President Nkurunziza’s claim that his first term in office should not be counted because he had not been elected has a certain plausibility but was grossly irresponsible in a fragile and ethnically divided polity. At the first sign of a serious backlash a statesman would have dropped his bid and allowed a caretaker government to oversee a proper election. Instead, after stacking the constitutional court with his supporters, Nkurunziza is accused of pressuring it to rule in his favor so he could stand for a third term behind a façade of judicial approval.

He had to ride out violent opposition protests and a coup attempt that together cost dozens of lives, but he has managed to secure himself an extra few years in power.

Few people believe the Burundian president’s claims to respect legal and constitutional restraints on his power and prerogatives. In an unprecedented rebuff, Nkurunziza’s re-election was not even observed by the African Union. Alas, in the bear-pits of his neighbors’ politics many leaders will be keen to follow his recent example. For example, there are no doubts that the fourteen year-old regime of Joseph Kabila next door is any less devious in protecting its monopoly on executive power. With the right court rulings and parliamentary maneuvering, the DRC’s own term limit issue could be circumvented. Mr Kabila could swap chair whilst remaining in power simply by stripping the presidency of its powers whilst increasing those of another power center such as the prime minister’s office. As the reaction on the streets of Kinshasa in January showed however, there are few signs it could be done without bloodshed.

Sadly the present Kinshasa regime has precious little democratic traditions to restrain its maneuverings. The current president inherited his position from his father when the latter was assassinated. The presidential incumbent before that was another Joseph, the infamous Mobutu, who looted the DRC for thirty years and murdered or exiled any political opposition. Four years prior to the present drama in Burundi, the DRC’s 2011 election results had already brought opposition accusations that the Congo’s Supreme Court had not examined electoral results thoroughly enough when it awarded the victory to the incumbent Kabila administration. How much truth there is in this matters less than the fact that many in the Congolese opposition are likely to believe the judiciary is biased against them. If the DRC’s Court became an actor in any kind of constitutional crisis in the run up to next year’s elections it would not be seen as a neutral institution but as a tool of the ruling Kinshasa clique.

In the African Great Lakes region contests for power within states are always nerve-wracking moments for their neighbors because of the ease with which instability in one can spread to the others. The Second Congo War is a prime example of this transmission of instability from one part of the Great Lakes region through porous borders to another. The conflict was triggered in aftermath of the Rwandan genocide when ‘Hutu power’ extremists fled from their country into eastern Congo following their defeat at the hands of Tutsi forces. Since the eastern DRC was home to previous waves of Hutu and Tutsi refugees from both Burundi and Rwanda and their descendants, the Rwandan Hutu militias swiftly added to eastern Congo’s own swirling bush wars, and brought their genocidal ideology with them. A much wider war was sparked when Kinshasa prevaricated and seemed unable or unwilling to control the situation in the east. Rwanda and Uganda promptly invaded and placed Joseph Kabila’s father Laurent in power, trigging a region-wide struggle involving nine African states. Millions died across the DRC and peace has only sporadically returned since then.

The weakness of the DRC to armed incursions from its neighbors is reason to be concerned when those states start to look fragile themselves. The peace between the DRC, Rwanda, and Burundi remains extremely brittle. In the east of the Congo the remnants of the Rwandan Hutu militias, local Mai-Mai militants, and assorted other armed groups still pose a threat to civilians, if not to Kinshasa. Meanwhile in May, as tensions in Burundi escalated, the Rwandan government seemed to be preparing the diplomatic ground for an armed intervention if ethnic killings broke out there. Fortunately the Burundi situation has been resolved for now without escalating into inter-ethnic fighting, both because President Nkurunziza’s re-election bid was opposed by many members of his own Hutu ethnic group, and because he successfully seems to have bought off some of the opposition, splitting it politically.

Much money, time, and energy has been spent by the international community in Burundi, Rwanda, and the DRC trying to prevent a return to the tidal wave of blood that soaked all three countries between the mid-1990s and the mid-2000s. That may all be at risk if the Kabila regime takes a leaf from President Nkurunziza’s book. Repeated rebellions against Kinshasa, some of them backed from neighboring Rwanda and Uganda, have rocked the DRC since the end of the Second Congo War, which ran from 1997 to about 2003. It is a testament both to the weakness of the Congo’s central government and the susceptibility of the DRC’s east to its neighbors that the embers of Rwandan-linked revolts were not fully stamped out until 2013, and that the Kabila regime needed repeated international intercessions to do so.

It is therefore difficult to see how Kinshasa can extended Joseph Kabila’s term of office as neatly as Pierre Nkurunziza has in Burundi. The DRC is a much larger country than its neighbors and there are simply too many armed groups beyond the control of the security forces. Meanwhile the army itself is divided and weak, full of former rebel fighters and widely distrusted for its corruption and brutality. Any bid by Kinshasa to stay in power using a legalistic fig-leaf would almost certainly trigger a new revolt in the east and possibility other parts of the DRC and if Kabila’s actions were to spark another uprising against his regime it is debatable if the West would intervene to save him.

However it would also be difficult for neighboring governments in Burundi, Uganda and Rwanda to overlook the security and financial incentives of meddling in the DRC’s factional politics. If one country starts to back an armed movement, the others will follow suit, threatening a return to regional instability. Despite the dangers, the temptation for Kabila to stay on somehow will be strong, as will the pressure on him from members of his inner circle. The DRC’s best hope is that President Kabila has learned from his father and his namesake’s mistakes and does not try to outstay his welcome as President Nkurunziza has done in Burundi. Peace in the Great Lakes region could soon depend on the Congo not following in its neighbor’s footsteps.

This article was published at Geopolitical Monitor.com

Thailand: Bangkok Blast Aftermath, Counter-Measures And Uncertainty

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Investigations are underway and security measures and controls have been heightened in some districts of the far south, theater to secessionist insurgencies by Muslim popular groups linguistically and culturally close to the Malaysians. Security has also been stepped up in the northern and eastern areas, strongholds of the ‘Red Shirts’ movement and generally opposers of the traditional elite in power with strong military influence.

A day after the bomb attack against the Hindu shrine of Erawan in downtown Bangkok, 22 people have been confirmed dead and 125 injured, of which many in critical condition.

The bomb, reportedly containing 5kg of TNT, was apparently left on a bench in the compound of the shrine by a man, who from the security camera footage appeared to have Mid-Eastern features, though no identification has been made due to the poor quality of the images.

Bangkok police spokesman, Prawut Thavonsiri, confirmed also this morning that “the blast aimed to kill as many people as possible, given that the area is usually crowded at that time”. The attack targeted the shrine, dedicated to the Hindu Lord Brahma and a known tourist attraction for people of all faiths, in fact devastated the holy site and busy intersection in the Ratchaprasong district. The area is home to luxurious shops, hotels and businesses, but also a central front of the Red Shirts struggle to bring back to power the former premier Thaksin Shinawatra, ousting the traditional elite. A crackdown in the area in fact left dozens dead after an almost 3-months occupation, clashes and violence. There was also the sporadic use of explosives, but of far lower intensity in respect to yesterday.

The modalities of yesterday’s attack were also very different from those carried out in the southern provinces bordering with Malaysia by groups opposed to what they see as colonial occupation by the Thai Buddhists, who target military objectives, administration buildings, schools, monks or who they deem collaborators.

So far official identifications of the dead include 5 Thais, 2 Chinese, 2 Hong Kong nationals, 2 Malaysians and one Singaporean. While among the injured are 42 Thais, 28 Chinese and others from the Philippines, Japan, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Maldives, Oman and Singapore

Authorities have tightened security around tourist areas both in the capital and nationwide, in the certainty expressed yesterday by the Defence minister that tourism, a key business for the nation’s economy, was the main objective of the attackers. Thailand currently counts a large number of tourists from China and India, after a gradual decrease of Japanese, Americans and Europeans. Alert levels were heightened in all Thai airports.

Hong Kong’s authorities have advised their citizens to avoid unnecessary travel to Thailand and similar warnings are expected also from other countries.

Tension mounted further this morning after low-intensity explosive device, possibly a hand-bomb, was thrown from the Thaksin bridge over the Chao Phraya River. The blast targeted the wharf crowded with vessels carrying commuters, without however causing any casualties.

A Setback For The Prospect Of UN Security Council Reform – Analysis

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By Yeshi Choedon*

The reform of UN Security Council is long overdue and serious effort towards it started officially in 1992. The first phase of the effort culminated in the World Summit of 2005, when the high hope of reaching a decision on reforming the Council was shattered mainly due to the divergence of interests among developing countries. A new phase of the initiative for expanding the Council was started by the President of General Assembly in 2007 through the establishment of a new mechanism of Intergovernmental Negotiation (IGN) on Security Council reform. After intense discussions, the IGN came out with a framework text which could be the basis of negotiations to reform the Security Council. This text was introduced in the General Assembly by its president Sam Kutesa on August 1, 2015. However, the prospect of fruitful negotiation and positive outcome in the 70th Anniversary of the United Nations received a shocking blow when the United States, China and Russia came out against it.

The demand for reform arose in the context of the Council’s post-Cold War adoption of an activist role involving the deepening and broadening of its task. In this reactivated and expanded role of the Security Council, the P-5 began to frequently meet in closed-door consultations with the aim of increasing unanimity among them, thus leading to more decisions than ever before. But this process did not involve the effective participation of the Council’s non-permanent members. Many countries, especially in the developing world, expressed their deep dissatisfaction with the Council’s unrepresentative character and the P-5’s arrogant exercise of power 5. This set the stage for member states to demand reforms that would make the Council a more representative and transparent organ reflecting the changed power configuration.

The Nonalignment Movement’s Summit of September 1992 took the issue of Security Council reform as one of its central concerns. It expressed concern “over the tendency of some states to dominate the Council” and also observed that “the veto which guarantee an exclusive and dominant role for the permanent members of the Council are contrary to the aim of democratizing the United Nations and must, therefore, be reviewed.” Nonaligned countries were determined to play a leading role in the revitalization of the UN and pressed hard to get the Council’s membership reflect the increased membership of the UN as a whole. At the same time, the demand for reform gathered greater momentum when the United States showed interest in the inclusion of Germany and Japan as permanent members of the Council, mainly for burden-sharing purposes.

Reforming the UN Security Council involved two issues:

  • Expansion of membership, which required a formal amendment to the UN Charter; and
  • A change in working procedure, which could be carried out without a formal amendment of the Charter.

For the last more than two decades, the issue of expansion of the Security Council membership has proved to be most controversial because it is concerned with the status and power of states in the international system. The five permanent members do not want to share or dilute their clout by including new permanent members. At the same time, some countries are intent upon preventing their regional rivals from gaining the coveted permanent seat at the high table of the most powerful global political institution. Indeed, any talk of including new permanent members has the instant ability to make regional rivalries flare up.

Because of the vast diversity of views among member states, the General Assembly established on December 3, 1993 an Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) to consider all aspects of the question. Discussions in the OEWG indicated general agreement on the need for expanding the membership of the UN Security Council. However, there was considerable disagreement on almost every aspect of the issue involved such as the future size of the Council, the categories of membership, the criteria of membership, and veto power.

The High-Level Panel to examine the whole gamut of UN reforms established in 2004 proposed the A and B models for enlargement, both of which suggested expanding the Council to 24 members. Model A proposed adding six new permanent seats, but with no veto power, and three new two-year term elected seats. Model B created a new category of eight seats, renewable every four years, and one new two-year non-renewable seat. The Secretary General had urged the members of the panel to consider the two options and take a decision on this important issue before the summit in September 2005.These alternative Models and the deadline for decision generated heated debate and further sharpened the polarization among member states. Two groups emerged, fiercely contesting each other’s position. Japan, India, Brazil and Germany came together as the Group of Four (G-4) and put forward their own proposal of reform. Initially, the G-4 proposal had favoured permanent membership with veto power. But later, it dropped the demand for veto in order to gain wider support for its proposal in the General Assembly.

The G-4’s regional rivals, informally known as the Coffee Club and later as the “Uniting for Consensus” (UfC) Group, tried to derail the G-4 proposal. They put forward a proposal favouring an increase of only the non-permanent seats. Their draft resolution called for the addition of 10 non-permanent seats and no new permanent members. Although the African group decided to oppose the veto in principle, it strongly felt that the veto should be extended to all permanent members ‘so long as it exists’. The African Union put forward its own proposal, which sought six new veto-wielding permanent members with two of these from Africa and five additional non-permanent members with again two from Africa. In total, the African Union sought a 26 member Council.

In the end, none of the three proposals was put to a vote since none had the prospect of getting passed. Thus, the high hope of reaching a decision on the expansion of the UN Security Council at the World Summit in 2005 was shattered mainly due to the divergence of interests among developing countries.

A new initiative on the expansion of the Security Council was again started by the President of the General Assembly in 2007, when she appointed five facilitators to gauge the views of member states. The facilitators suggested an interim transitional measure to bridge the gap between the proposals of the G4 and UfC. While some G4 members such as Germany and Brazil were ready to consider an interim transitional measure, India rejected it outright on the ground that any reform without expansion of permanent members is no reform. Thereafter, the discussion moved towards the need for embarking on negotiation rather than mere discussion. Under India’s leadership, the L69 group (consisting of developing countries including Brazil, Nigeria and South Africa) put forward a proposal towards the end of the 61st session of the General Assembly. The main contents of this proposal initially were:

  • Expansion in both permanent and non-permanent categories.
  • Greater representation of developing countries, including island and small States.
  • Representation of developed countries and those with transition economies reflective of the contemporary world realities.
  • Comprehensive improvement in the working methods of the Security Council.
  • Equitable geographical distribution.
  • Provision for a review.

According to the Indian representative, the main purpose behind the L69 proposal was to generate ‘some momentum’ to an otherwise painfully slow process. The proposal met with a strong reaction and generated acrimonious exchanges among members. As a result, the L69 proposal of 2007 was withdrawn without being put to a vote. But it achieved its purpose as the General Assembly established a new mechanism of Intergovernmental Negotiation (IGN) on Security Council Reform. With that, the theatre of activity shifted from the OEW to IGN. On 25 September 2014, the G-4 Foreign Ministers said in New York that the reform process “should not be seen as an endless exercise” and appealed to all members to make the 70th anniversary of the United Nations in 2015 as the target date for reform.

Many UN member states are of the view that text-based negotiation is the best way to take the process forward. Consequently, after long and intense discussions within the IGN, the General Assembly President Sam Kutesa achieved a breakthrough of sorts by circulating a text to members that will form the basis for the negotiations. However, the prospect of smooth sailing for the reform efforts received a rude shock when Kutesa also circulated letters containing the positions of various groups and Member States. These indicated that the United States, Russia and China do not wish their own proposals to be included in the body of the negotiating text.

It is not yet a forgone conclusion that this position of the three of the five members of the P-5 would derail the prospect of fruitful negotiation in the 70th Anniversary of the United Nations. Nor is it a setback only for India, since the proposal advocates inclusion of other members as well and it is desired by other members also. The only question at the moment is whether the sponsors of the framework proposal are confident enough to insist on proceeding further with negotiations and putting the proposal to a vote. If they proceed further, that itself would be a forward movement. The concurrence of the P-5 is required only at the ratification stage. According to the UN Charter, amendments on the composition of the Security Council require the approval of two-thirds of the membership present and voting in the General Assembly. The existing permanent members of the Security Council could block it only at the stage of ratification as the Charter stipulates that any amendments have to be ratified by two-thirds of the membership, including the five permanent members, before they come into effect. Once the proposal for the expansion of the Security Council is passed in the General Assembly with an absolute majority, blocking it would involve high political cost for any member of the P-5. Doing so would mean going against the expressed desire of the majority of the members of the United Nations. Even if some members of the P-5 were to block the proposal from taking effect, the process itself would make it clear who is in which side. That would be better than endless discussion and consultation.

*Dr. Yeshi Choedon is Associate Professor, Centre for International Politics, Organization and Disarmament, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.

Originally published by Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (www.idsa.in) at http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/ASetbackfortheProspectofUNSecurityCouncilReform_YeshiChoedon_170815.html

Wikimedia Responds: Despite Headlines, Frequent Edits Don’t Cause Inaccuracy – Statement

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By and for Wikimedia Foundation.

Wikipedia is the encyclopedia anyone can edit. This open, collaborative model is what makes it one of the world’s most popular sources of information. It is also what makes Wikipedia reliable and accurate, as everyone can review changes and additions to its articles. Although vandalism and inaccuracies can occur, its community of volunteer editors has established mechanisms to ensure that the vast majority of inaccurate content is addressed within minutes.

Last week, a study was published in the open-access journal PLOS One: “Content Volatility of Scientific Topics in Wikipedia: A Cautionary Tale.” The study prompted a flurry of discussion around the accuracy of scientific articles on Wikipedia. The Wikimedia community has longstanding support for academic research about Wikipedia. However, the media coverage of this particular study has drawn some questionable conclusions.

According to the study, articles on politically controversial scientific articles on English Wikipedia tend to receive higher edit rates than scientific articles considered to be politically uncontroversial. The authors cite three topics they identified as politically controversial (acid rain, global warming, and evolution) and four they identified as politically uncontroversial (heliocentrism, general relativity, continental drift, and the standard model in physics).*

It didn’t surprise us to learn that articles considered to be controversial are frequently edited. The nature of controversy, after all, is that it generates discussion and public attention. For example, while the properties of water (H2O) have been well established, the causes of the Arctic sea ice decline are the subject of ongoing scientific inquiry and political debate.

Unfortunately, the study also jumped to conclusions about what this means for Wikipedia’s reliability, overstating findings and inferring facts not in evidence. Much of the press about the study has repeated the assertion that controversial articles are also more likely to be inaccurate, despite a lack of strong supporting evidence: the study only references a handful of anecdotal examples of inaccuracies. Instead, the study simply seems to confirm that the articles chosen as controversial are, in fact, controversial and thus frequently edited. One of the authors has since responded that they intended no claim about a relationship between higher edit rates and lower accuracy.

In fact, several prior studies have found the opposite to be true, demonstrating that more edits are correlated with higher quality articles. For example, a 2007 study published in the peer-reviewed journal First Monday found “a strong correlation between number of edits, number of distinct editors, and article quality in Wikipedia.” Similarly, in 2013 researchers observed that the number of contributions to high-quality articles is about one order of magnitude higher than that of low-quality articles, according to the book Confidentiality and Integrity in Crowdsourcing Systems.

In addition, the study covered a very small sample size: just seven articles on English Wikipedia out of the 35 million articles available across Wikipedia’s many languages.

Wikipedia’s community of volunteer editors take the commitment to accuracy very seriously. Many of them have personal academic or data science interests. In fact, a robust discussion critiquing the methodology of this study has taken place publicly on Wikipedia.

The aim of Wikipedia is to make the sum of all knowledge available to every person in the world. External research and observation are critical to helping Wikipedia grow and improve. But in true Wikipedian spirit, we believe any research should be assessed and reported with rigor and care. It is the same approach Wikipedia editors use to keep building Wikipedia as a reliable, accurate, and neutral resource for all.

*(We’ll note that we found the inclusion of heliocentrism in the category of politically uncontroversial amusing. Hundreds of years later, we hope Galileo would appreciate the nod.)

*About the authors:

Saudi Arabia And Iran: Volatile Political Geography Of Oil And Minorities – Analysis

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Discontent is bubbling over among the majority Shiite population in Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province, home to the kingdom’s major oil fields and petrochemical industry. Disgruntlement is no less in the Iranian province of Khuzestan where up to 90 percent of Iran’s oil reserves are located. Iranian Arabs, who account for approximately half of the four million inhabitants of Khuzestan, chafe at perceived cultural and ethnic abuse and repression.

The fact that dissatisfied minorities populate the oil-rich regions of Iran and Saudi Arabia creates an ironic parallel in which in the rivalry between two of the Middle East’s larger powers often amounts to the pot calling the kettle black. Rather than recognising that protests and mounting incidents of violence are the result of government failure to address legitimate grievances, both Iran and Saudi Arabia have blamed each other for the unrest in their strategic backyards.

Pinpointing the kingdom’s vulnerability

It’s often hard to distinguish fact from fiction in the murky world of Middle Eastern politics. There is however little doubt that Saudi Arabia and Iran have an interest in kindling unrest in each other’s backyard. By the same token, discriminatory policies against and repression of minorities in both countries are at the core of discontent that could spiral out of control at any moment. Similarly, both Iran and Saudi Arabia could effectively prevent foreign meddling by adopting policies that ensure that their minorities are fully integrated as equals rather than treated as potential fifth columns.

Integrative policies would also weaken the ability of jihadist groups like Islamic State from exploiting the sectarian divide. That is particularly true in predominantly Sunni Saudi Arabia where the group that controls a swathe of Syria and Iraq has thrice bombed Shiite mosques in the last eight months. Two attacks in May that killed some 25 people prompted the kingdom’s minority that constitutes 10-15 percent of the kingdom’s population to form a civil defence.

IS has since also targeted Saudi security forces to aggravate tension and demonstrate the kingdom’s vulnerability. The group boasted it was responsible for the bombing of a mosque inside a headquarters of the Saudi special forces.

The Shiite civil defence groups reflect a widespread sentiment among Saudi Shiites that the government has failed to protect its minority population. That sentiment is reinforced by prominent Saudi religious leaders depicting the Saudi air war in Yemen against the Shiite Houthis as a just war and the government’s projection of its military campaign as an assault on an Iranian proxy.

Shiites feeling exposed

The Saudi Shiite sense of exposure is exacerbated by the fact that a protest movement that started in 2011 at the beginning of the Arab popular revolts, has largely been weakened by a harsh government response that led to the shooting by security forces of some 25 Shiite youths and the sentencing to death of a prominent Shiite cleric, Nimr al-Nimr. Not to mention, the Saudi-backed crushing of a predominantly Shiite popular revolt in 2011 in neighbouring Bahrain.

Multiple checkpoints in predominantly Shiite towns like Qatif, designed to pre-empt the eruption of protests, as opposed to relaxed security at Shiite mosques in mixed Sunni-Shiite cities in the Eastern Province, suggest to many Shiites that the government is more concerned about securing the survival of the Saudi regime than ensuring the security of its Shiite minority.

The government’s failure to act against hate speech, as well as the framing of its struggle with Iran for regional dominance in often anti-Shiite terms, further calls into question what stake Shiite Saudis have in a kingdom dominated by Wahhabism, a puritan, anti-Shiite interpretation of Islam. Wahhabism has meant that Shiite Saudis are barred from serving in the military and security forces or working in the interior ministry while school books describe Shiites as rejecting core principles of Islam. Moreover, a Shiite has yet to be elevated to a Cabinet position and has only once in the kingdom’s diplomatic history been appointed as an ambassador.

Sitting in glass houses

In contrast to Saudi Arabia, Iran has been careful not to couch its regional battles or approach to minorities in sectarian terms. But rhetoric aside, Sunni Muslim grievances in Khuzestan constitute a mirror image of those of Shiites in the Eastern Province. Iranian Arabs have long complained that the government has failed to reinvest oil profits to raise the region’s standards of living. The World Health Organization (WHO) identified Ahwaz in 2013 as Iran’s most polluted city.

The shadowy Movement for the Liberation of Al Ahwaz has claimed responsibility for a series of attacks on Iranian security forces and other government symbols in recent months. Soccer brawls have quickly morphed into anti-regime protests. Emulating the 2011 self-immolation of Tarek al-Tayeb Mohamed Bouazizi, the Tunisian fruit and vegetable seller who sparked the Arab revolts, an Iranian Arab vendor, Younes al-Asakirah, set himself on fire earlier this year to protest the allegedly unlawful confiscation of his wares. The incident sparked a wave of protest that were squashed by security forces.

Given their political geographies, Iran and Saudi Arabia resemble two opponents sitting in glass houses throwing stones at one another. Disgruntled minorities and intermittent violence in their resource-rich provinces highlight their vulnerability. Their pursuit of discriminatory and repressive policies that are at the root of the Middle East’s multiple conflicts, and have turned inevitable political transition into a bloody, destructive process, undermine their claims of legitimacy in the struggle for regional dominance.

This article was published by RSIS


Nuclear Negotiations Demonstrated US-Iran Respectful Engagement – Interview

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Since 2002 when the United States first accused Iran of developing nuclear weapons, there was barely a day when one couldn’t find a headline on the press about Iran’s nuclear program. Literally thousands of news stories, reports, articles and commentaries as well as video footage were released about Iran’s “dangerous ambitions” for manufacturing weapons of mass destruction and violating the terms of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

During these years, the climate of Iran’s relations with the international community was more or less gloomy, and tensions marred Iran’s ties with the European Union and aggravated it’s already contentious relations with the United States. Sanctions were being slapped on Iran one after the other and the possibility of a military confrontation, as George W. Bush repeatedly vowed not to take any option “off the table” in dealing with Iran, had worried everybody caring for global peace and the stability of a volatile Middle East.

However, even though few people at that time predicted that the nuclear controversy could be settled diplomatically and peacefully at some point, on July 14, 2015, which should be remembered as a glorious day for global diplomacy and nuclear non-proliferation, Iran and the P5+1 signed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action to settle the nuclear conflict.

The agreement has been publicly described as a milestone and diplomatic victory, and there is widespread debate across the world about its implications, the condition of its enforcement and its contribution to the strengthening of Iran’s economy and diplomatic influence.

Suzanne DiMaggio joined Iran Review in an interview to discuss the different aspects of the deal and how it would contribute to a future reconciliation between Iran and the United States.

Ms. DiMaggio is a Senior Fellow and the Director of the Iran Initiative at the New America Foundation. A political scientist by practice, she has recently served as the Vice President of Global Policy Programs at the Asia Society. Previously, she was the Vice President of Policy Studies at the United Nations Association of the USA (UNA-USA). Suzanne DiMaggio specifically studies the U.S. relations with Iran and has written a dozen of essays and articles about Iran’s nuclear program and its impacts on the Tehran-Washington ties.

Suzanne DiMaggio told Iran Review that the Iranian and American negotiators should be given credit for the high degree of respect and professionalism they showed during the nuclear talks. She believes that Iran and the United States must build on the momentum of this landmark agreement and pave the way for bettering their relations and addressing their common concerns in Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere.

Q: President Obama has said the comprehensive nuclear deal with Iran is not based on trust, but on verification. He made the remarks only a few minutes following the announcement of the conclusion of nuclear talks in Vienna. Isn’t President Obama weakening the chances of continued diplomacy by maintaining that the United States does not trust Iran?

A: As a result of nearly four decades of hostile relations, a great deal of mistrust exists between the governments of Iran and the United States. Given this deficit of trust, it logically follows that President Obama would emphasize verification as a core basis of the nuclear deal reached in Vienna. To address that deficit, the agreement sets a path for establishing the most extensive inspections regime ever negotiated. This has helped to persuade skeptics in the U.S. because it places the onus directly on Iran’s shoulders to verify every step of the way that it is in compliance with all aspects of the deal. Now, if all of the parties involved implement the deal in good faith, the agreement itself would become a confidence-building measure. It would provide a way to help build trust, particularly between Iran and the United States.

Q: Only a few days following the announcement of the nuclear agreement and the conclusion of the talks, the Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter said that the conclusion of this agreement would not preclude the option of military confrontation with Iran and that the administration will not take any option off the table to prevent Iran from getting nuclear weapons. Don’t you think that such statements and war threats would violate the spirit of the agreement and undermine the chances of a future reconciliation with Iran, especially given that they could unquestionably demoralize President Rouhani’s administration who tried to overcome the domestic criticism and seal this agreement?

A: We all know that the atmosphere in Washington is very contentious right now, with some in Congress voicing strong opposition to the deal. And it appears that proponents of the nuclear deal in Iran are facing a similar situation. When President Obama and members of his administration state that “all options remain on the table,” they say it partially to reassure those who are concerned that Iran will not abide by its commitments. In the same way, we hear hostile rhetoric by various people coming out of Tehran, including the continued use of “Death to America.” My personal point of view is it’s unfortunate that the language of force and hostility is used so readily, but we have to keep in mind that the level of mistrust that has been accumulated over 36 years of non-relations is going to take time to overcome. I think those of us who closely follow U.S.-Iran relations recognize that such language is often used as a way to mollify domestic audiences who oppose any improvement in the relationship. I do hope that we seize this moment to temper the use of hostile rhetoric and move beyond the language of force. We now have before us a real opportunity to build on the momentum of the landmark nuclear deal and attempt to pursue a less contentious relationship between the United States and Iran.

Q: It was apparently the aim of the negotiations with Iran to prevent it from developing nuclear weapons, although Iranians had always said that they didn’t have any intention or plans for pursuing a military nuclear program. So, this goal would be met through the strict limitations on Iran’s nuclear program as stipulated by the JCPOA and also the intrusive inspection regime. With this major achievement, why are the Congress Republicans and even some Democrats still opposed to the agreement and have warned that they would not endorse or would actually block it? Are there further goals which would not be met through this nuclear agreement, including capping Iran’s regional economic and military influence?

A: Some members of Congress, particularly on the Republican side, believe that a better deal could have been reached. My own view is that the JCPOA is an exceedingly strong non-proliferation agreement — it is our best option and it has received global support. It has achieved exactly what the United States had set out to do and that is to ensure that Iran is not able to obtain a nuclear weapon in exchange for sanctions relief. At the same time, because this key objective was accomplished through principled and pragmatic diplomacy, we have likely averted another military conflict in the Middle East. The Obama administration and others are focused on making a strong case to critics in our Congress and the broader public that the deal advances the interests of the United States and its partners. It is a very difficult environment, and it’s still unclear whether a resolution of disapproval will pass through the House and the Senate.

A key concern we are hearing from opponents to the deal relates to how Iran will use the billions of dollars it stands to receive in unfrozen assets and oil revenues. Will it lead Iran to increase its support to groups in the region whose activities undermine the interests of the U.S. and its allies? Some in Congress and elsewhere have criticized the JCPOA because it doesn’t address any of those issues. But I would maintain that this is a non-proliferation agreement, and it is not a “Let’s Transform Iran” agreement. Now, here is where I think Iran can do things to help persuade those who are skeptical. First and foremost, it would be helpful if the leadership of Iran indicated what steps they are willing to take to help bring about stability in the region. The four-point plan for a political settlement in Syria put forward by Foreign Minister Javad Zarif is a constructive starting point. Such concrete proposals can help to send a signal that Iran is serious about engaging in discussions to help resolve issues where we share common concerns. We need to move beyond words to concrete action as a matter of urgency.

Q: Right; just a quick follow-up on the Congressional action. It seems to many observers that the Republicans in the U.S. Congress, both in Senate and in the House of Representatives, were totally opposed to any kind of diplomatic settlement of the nuclear controversy and simply wished to push for a military confrontation with Iran in order to first crush Iran’s nuclear facilities and then to prevent it from rising as a regional power and finding a better position in the community of nations. Everybody can now understand that this nuclear agreement will give Iran a diplomatic leeway and increased economic opportunities and also new openings with the West, further interaction with the European Union and the rest of the world. So, don’t you think that the Republicans in the Congress didn’t want this issue to be settled diplomatically so that Iran could be always kept under pressure and maybe be prevented from rising again as an influential regional actor?

A: There are some in Congress who are opposed to any agreement that falls short of total dismantlement of Iran’s nuclear program. The Obama administration came to the conclusion, like the Bush administration did before it, that ultimately such a deal was not possible — and I happen to agree with that assessment. Instead, they pursued a realistic deal that places verifiable constraints on Iran’s enrichment capacity. We must give credit to the Iranian and American negotiators who — after decades of non-relations and not having the experience of sitting together at a table — carried out the negotiations with a high degree of respect and professionalism. Both sides achieved their objectives and in that sense it is an absolute “win-win.” Principled and pragmatic diplomacy prevailed to peacefully resolve a very contentious issue, opening up the possibility of extending engagement to other areas where we face common threats. A question on everyone’s mind is whether the deal will result in a more aggressive Iran or a more moderate Iran. I think the answer will depend to a large extent on how Iran reacts to the policies of other powers in the region including the [Persian] Gulf nations as well as the United States. At the same time, Iran’s leadership could help assuage concerns by clarifying their intentions. President Rouhani and his team have indicated an intention to focus on reintegrating Iran into the global economy and increasing interactions with the world and that has been helpful.

Q: What’s your personal prediction for the role the Congress will be playing in the implementation of the comprehensive nuclear agreement? It is going to give the deal a green light eventually or is it going to kill the JCPOA by voting in rejection, which will be surely followed by a veto by President Obama? At the next step, there needs to be a vote by a two-third majority of the Congress members for overriding President Obama’s veto, and if there’s such a vote, we’ll have to mark the demise of this major diplomatic achievement. How is the Congress going to contend with the agreement? Is it going to be convinced by the administration that the deal will protect the United States’ interests and also make the region and the whole world safer and more peaceful, or are they going to insist that this deal is not a good product and should be rejected?

A: Congress is expected to convey approval or disapproval of the deal by September 17th. As things currently stand, the anticipated outcome is still unclear. If a resolution of disapproval is passed, I am fairly confident that President Obama will have enough support to sustain a veto. The administration is working very hard to engage those in Congress who are still unsure which way they will vote. Beyond the efforts of the president and his team, various civil society organizations, leading scientists, former diplomats, university professors, national security experts, religious leaders, Iranian-Americans, and others are voicing their support of the JCPOA. Many are engaged in activities to educate those in Congress and in the broader general public about the benefits of this deal and how it will advance the interests of the United States as well as our friends and partners in the region.

Q: The nuclear controversy with Iran has come to an end after some 12 years and apparently there shouldn’t be much apology for continued tensions and animosity between Iran and the West, although the differences in many areas still exist. However, the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office has lifted its warning against the British citizens for traveling to Iran, citing “decreased hostility” under the government of President Rouhani. Is there any determination on the side of the U.S. government to perhaps similarly reduce the hostilities and tensions and work for more understanding with Iran?

A: There are reasons for cautious optimism. Negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program have finally reached a successful conclusion and if all sides proceed with the full implementation of the deal, it would create an opening to pursue closer relations between our countries. We already are building on an important track record — the interim nuclear agreement, which came into effect in January 2014, has proven to be a success. All of the parties involved have implemented the agreement to the letter and that have helped to build some confidence. We need to maintain the momentum of such steps. There have been some discussions about the re-establishment of direct flights between the U.S. and Iran, as well as the possibility of the United States opening an interests section in Tehran to facilitate the issuance of visas. I think both would convey to the people of Iran and the United States that our governments are ready to begin breaking down the barriers between our countries. Such steps cannot happen immediately, but they represent goals to strive toward. We have witnessed important developments in our government-to-government relations over the past two to three years. We also should find ways to promote people-to-people exchanges, which in my mind are equally important. Now, we have an opportunity to restore these ties, particularly through the promotion of exchanges involving Iranian and American artists, scientists, athletes, religious leaders, entrepreneurs, and students, among others. We have been disconnected for too long, and we should think creatively about how we can rebuild those relationships.

Q: Well, you referred to the intercultural, societal relations and exchanges between Iran and the United States, and you personally have been active in promoting dialog between the two countries and also between the United States and its adversaries including North Korea, Myanmar and Iran as the three countries with which Washington has maintained the lowest level of diplomatic relations. However, I think the U.S. relations with Iran have been way more complicated and worthy of consideration especially given Iran’s geo-political significance and its role in the region. Have you made any achievements in facilitating the Iranian-American dialog and melting the ice of diplomatic relations between the two countries, for example, through your advocacy efforts in the New America Foundation and other initiatives?

A: Some dismiss people-to-people exchanges as being frivolous, but they actually offer an important way to develop and to solidify relationships on an informal level. U.S.-Iran societal ties have been severed over these past decades and they will take some to rebuild, but I don’t think that should stop us from pursuing them as a priority. My work involves what we call “Track II dialogue” – informal and unofficial discussions, and my professional interest has been focused on creating opportunities for dialogue particularly with those countries where the U.S. has limited official relations. When I look back at my experiences over nearly twenty years, one of the great lessons I have learned is that even in the digital age that we live in, nothing can take the place of face-to-face interaction. Unless we sit down with each other at the same table on a sustained basis and engage in dialog, we cannot begin to understand each other’s perspectives or work to resolve the problems that divide us. Even though there have been limited multilateral negotiations on the nuclear issue at an official level over the past 12 years, it was the direct bilateral interaction between the United States and Iran that happened during the past two years or so that brought about a successful outcome. We see the benefits of such face-to-face engagement — we have an agreement that is very strong and will serve both our countries’ interests. With a solid nuclear accord in hand, we now have the basis to move forward and engage in dialog on other carefully selected issues.

Q: Great, and I’ve got a concluding question. You know that there are several instances of conflict and unrest in our region; the rise of the Islamic State, tensions between Turkey and the Kurds, the continued civil war in Syria, Saudis’ military intervention in Yemen, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, etc. All of these problems indicate that the region needs fundamental and workable solutions. What approach could the U.S. government adopt in order to calm down the tensions and play a constructive role instead of contributing to the deterioration of the situation? In particular, we can think of the possible cooperation between the United States and Iran in addressing these problems. What’s your take on that?

A: The raging civil war in Syria and instability in Iraq are major concerns. It’s very clear that we are facing a long haul in the battle against ISIS. In the new atmosphere brought about by the nuclear agreement, Iran and the United States should be thinking very seriously about how to address these issues. One of the overarching objectives that we hold in common is to stand against violent extremism and contain and remove ISIS. In view of the mounting security and governance problems in both Iraq and Syria, Iran and the U.S. should now turn their attention to exploring how they might bring about a more stable environment. There of course are other parties involved and it will take a major diplomatic effort to bring them all together in an attempt to reach long-term, durable solutions. In addition to these priority issues, I also see the situation in Afghanistan as one where the United States and Iran should be pursuing some discussions now. Both Washington and Tehran have a strong common interest in helping to stabilize the unity government in Kabul. Other shared interests in Afghanistan include combating terrorism, countering narco-trafficking, promoting economic development, advancing the rights of women and girls, and so forth. These are areas where our two countries could coordinate, but we also need to be realistic. Given the profound differences that still exist between our governments, we should approach next steps carefully and select issues where the common interests are clear. The nuclear negotiations have demonstrated that the U.S. and Iran can engage in a respectful and constructive manner, and we now have a hard-won opportunity to explore other areas.

Maxim Finskiy Seeks Relief In Court From Russian State-Sponsored Corporate Raid

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Russian businessman Maxim Finskiy has initiated civil legal proceedings in the British Virgin Islands (“BVI”) and Canada in response to what he asserts was a Russian state-sponsored corporate raid that forced him to relinquish his ownership interest and management role in publicly-traded gold mining company White Tiger Gold Ltd. (“White Tiger”) in 2013.

The same legal proceedings are also directed at clearing Finskiy’s name after Sergey Yanchukov (“Yanchukov”) – an investor in White Tiger with alleged financial connections to an unnamed high-level Russian government official, and the perpetrator of the alleged raid – subsequently caused a baseless criminal investigation to be commenced against Finskiy in Russia.

Finskiy, the founder and former Executive Chairman of White Tiger, was detained and placed under house arrest in Moscow in March 2015 after Yanchukov made various allegations of financial fraud that Finskiy will show were demonstrably false, according to representatives. Having escaped Russia, Finskiy has now sued Yanchukov and two of his companies in the BVI, where Yanchukov’s companies are located, for an adjudication of the true facts. Separately, Finskiy has initiated legal proceedings against Yanchukov and his companies in Canada for money damages, a jurisdiction in which Yanchukov agreed to resolve any disputes surrounding the sale of Finskiy’s White Tiger shares to Yanchukov, alleging that Yanchukov intentionally depressed the value of White Tiger stock and forced Finskiy to sell out to Yanchukov at a discount.

“It is time to shine the light of truth on the false persecution of our client, and to separate fact from fiction,” said Robert Amsterdam, co-counsel hired by Finskiy to defend his rights. “Mr. Finskiy’s case is a classic example of Russian-style asset theft. Moreover, Mr. Yanchukov was apparently not satisfied with pressuring Mr. Finskiy to transfer his stake in White Tiger at a huge markdown, because, as we have alleged, he later threatened to have Mr. Finskiy murdered unless he agreed to pay Mr. Yanchukov an additional $150 million,” Amsterdam noted.

According to Finskiy’s lawyers, Finskiy has filed civil proceedings in both Canada and the BVI in order to preserve Finskiy’s rights and to recover substantial money damages, and because it is clear that there is jurisdiction over aspects of the dispute in both locations. In addition to a request for an adjudication of the true facts, the civil proceedings pray for damages of $185 million for breach of contract and conspiracy, and they seek to bar Yanchukov from suing Finskiy in any other forum based on the same facts.

Finskiy is also represented by Harold E. Patricoff, Jr. of Shutts & Bowen LLP in Miami, a Florida-based law firm with approximately 250 attorneys in eight offices. Mr. Patricoff is Chairman of the firm’s International Dispute Resolution Practice Group and a veteran of numerous cross-border disputes around the world.

Amsterdam & Partners LLP is an international law firm with offices in London and Washington DC, specializing in political advocacy and cross-border disputes. Founded by Robert R. Amsterdam, legal counsel to former Yukos head Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the firm’s list of client notables includes Russian State Duma Deputy Ilya Ponomarev, Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra of Thailand, and Zambia’s President Rupiah Banda, among others.

War Begets War Refugees: The Moral Bankruptcy Of Italy And NATO – OpEd

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On April 26, 2011, a meeting that can only be described as sinister took place between the then Italian Prime Minister, Silvio Berlusconi, and French President, Nicolas Sarkozy. The most pressing issue discussed at the meeting in Rome was how to deal with African immigrants.

Sarkozy, who was under pressure from his right-wing and far-right constituencies to halt immigration originating from North Africa (resulting from the Tunisian uprising), desired to strike a deal with the opportunistic Italian leader. In exchange for an Italian agreement to join a French initiative aimed at tightening border control (Italy being accused of allowing immigrants to cross through its borders to the rest of Europe), France, in turn, would resolve major disputes involving a series of takeovers, involving French and Italian companies. Moreover, Italy would then secure French support for a bid by Italian Economist and Banker, Mario Draghi, to become the Head of the European Central Bank.

Another point on the French agenda was active Italian participation in the war on Libya, initially spearheaded by France, Britain and the United States, and later championed by NATO.

Initially, Berlusconi hesitated to take part in the war, although certainly not for any moral reasons: for example, because the war was deliberately based on a misconstrued interpretation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 of March 17, 2011. The Resolution called for an ‘immediate ceasefire’, the establishment of a ‘no-fly zone’ and using all means, except foreign occupation, to ‘protect civilians’. The war, however, achieved entirely different objectives from the ones stated in the Resolution. It achieved a regime change, the bloody capture and murder of Libyan leader, Muammar al-Qaddafi, and resulted in a bloodbath in which thousands of civilians were killed, and continue to die, due to the chaos and civil war that has gripped Libya since then.

Berlusconi’s change of heart had little to do with common sense and much to do with oil and gas. He was walking a tight rope. On one hand, about a quarter of Italy’s oil was imported from Libya, in addition to nearly 10 percent of the country’s natural gas. Destabilizing Libya could interrupt the flow of Libyan energy supplies, at a time when Italy was desperately attempting to recover from its deep economic recession.

On the other hand, having France (which seemed to be in the mood for intervention because, following the Libya war, France marched on to Mali) hold all the cards in Libya could be devastating for Italy. “The Franco-Italian spat over immigration follows sharp differences over Libya, where Rome has been dragged into a war it would rather avoid, fearing a Paris-Benghazi nexus will freeze out its substantial interests in Libyan oil and gas,” the Financial Times reported at the time.

The successful meeting between the two leaders paved the way for Italian intervention, which took part in earnest in the war on Libya on April 28. Meanwhile, France kept its part of the bargain, and on November 1 of that same year, Mario Draghi succeeded Jean-Claude Trichet as the President of the European Central Bank.

Both countries benefited, albeit Libya was destroyed.

It is difficult to imagine that Berlusconi, a repulsive and corrupt politician even by the low standards of Italian politics, operated on the basis of any moral standards, aside from personal gains and self-interest. Indeed, neither his ‘friendship’ with Libyan long-time ruler, Qaddafi, nor the many perks and massive profits he received from Libya were enough to honor his commitment not to participate in a war that was clearly not aimed at saving lives, but maintaining access to Libya’s energy supplies.

Equally interesting is the fact that UNSC Resolution 1973 was promoted by its supporters as one aimed at protecting civilians from an imminent massacre about to be carried by the Libyan Army in Benghazi. Regardless of what Qaddafi’s intentions were, the NATO war resulted in untold suffering among Libyan civilians on three different fronts:

First, thousands of Libyans were killed and wounded as a direct result of NATO’s intervention; second, the war turned Libya into warring fiefdoms, armed and supported by regional and international powers. The hundreds of militias that exist in Libya today have deprived Libyans of any sense of security, and exposed the civilian population to a war reality that, seemingly, has no end in sight. Third, thousands of Libyans, or Africans who once called Libya home, found themselves fleeing the war using every means of transport possible. Tens of thousands of them sought refuge in Europe, while thousands died trying.

Few in the Italian Government would care to remember their country’s role in the war on Libya which, despite early hesitation, was embraced with utmost enthusiasm. The refugees who are lucky enough to make it to Italy’s shores are constantly demonized by Italian media and perceived as a burden on the still-struggling Italian economy. What they forget is that, thanks to Libya’s reasonably-priced and cheaply transported oil and gas, the Italian economy was kept afloat for years. The poor refugees are not as much of a burden on Italy’s economy as Italy was a burden on Libya; in fact, on the whole of Africa.

Libya was colonized by Italy from 1911 to 1943, and was driven out along with its German Nazi partners by local resistance and eventually by the Allies in World War II. It was not until 1998 that Italy apologized for the sins of colonizing the country, which came at a terribly high price of death and destruction. Yet, eleven years later, the supposedly remorseful Italy was bombing Libya once more to ensure the flow of cheap oil and to keep African immigrants and refugees at bay.

Neither was the bloody 2011 war an exception. Four years after that war, Italy once more began calling for another war on Libya for, clearly, the desired objectives of the first war have not been met: immigrants and refugees, despite high risks and a mounting death toll, continued to pour into Italy and the flow of oil and gas has been disrupted by a civil war among Libya’s NATO allies. But there is another factor, according to Marianne Arens: “The sabre-rattling over Libya also serves to divert attention from the growing domestic social and political tensions” in Italy itself.

The relationship between war and the rising challenge of refugees, immigrants and asylum seekers cannot be overstated. It is both ironic and sad that the many thousands of war refugees are seeking shelter in the same European and NATO countries that either directly (as in Libya, Iraq, Afghanistan) or indirectly (as in Syria) contributed to the destruction and destabilization of their countries.

Even Greece, which is displaying little patience or regard for humanitarian laws in its treatment of the many thousands of refugees coming from Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan, via Turkey, took part, although in a minor role, in the war in Libya (2011) and provided assistance to the US-led war on Iraq (2003).

While one strongly sympathizes with Greece as it stands on the verge of bankruptcy and having just reached a deal with the EU that could keep the impoverished country solvent for the coming months, one cannot fathom the mistreatment of innocent Syrians and Iraqis as they brave the sea to escape the hellish wars back home. The Greeks, who suffered terrible wars in the past, should know this more than anyone else. The scenes from the islands of Lesbos and Kos are heartbreaking, to say the least.

However, the countries that should be confronted most about their moral responsibility towards war refugees are those who ignited these wars in the first place. While Libya continues to descend into chaos, and Syria and Iraq subsist in a state of bedlam, both France and Britain discuss the problem of refugees attempting to cross into both countries as if the refugees are swarms of locusts, not innocent people who were victimized mostly by US-European wars. Meanwhile, the US, geographically removed from the refugee crisis, seems unconcerned by the chaotic scenes of desperate refugees, capsizing boats, and pleading families.

Those who wage war should, at least, shoulder part of the moral responsibility of addressing the horrible consequences that armed conflict inflicts upon innocent people. The Italian example shows how economic interests trump morality, and not a single NATO country, Turkey included, is innocent.

Now that the refugee crisis is worsening, it behooves NATO to deal with the problem, at least with a degree of humanity and – dare one say – with the same enthusiasm that led it to several devastating wars in recent years.

Khamenei Accuses US Of Using Nuclear Deal To Influence Iran

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Iran’s Supreme Leader has once again emphasized his anti-American stance, saying he will not allow the United States to use the nuclear agreement to spread its influence in the country.

Ayatollah Khamenei said on Monday August 17 that the U.S. is trying to use the nuclear agreement to spread its influence in Iran and the Middle East, and that Islamic Republic will use “all its might” to stop it.

He added that the fate of the nuclear agreement remains under question, saying: “It is not certain whether it would be approved here [in Iran] or there [in the U.S.]”.

The opponents of the nuclear agreement in Iran are insisting that the agreement needs approval from Parliament, while the administration has resisted taking the agreement to Parliament.

Ayatollah Khamenei stressed: “We will not allow U.S. economic, political or cultural influence in the country.”

He added that the Islamic Republic will persist in its policies in the region; it will resist against dissolution of Iraq and Syria and support “those who fight against Israel”.

The Nuclear Challenge: 70 Years After Hiroshima And Nagasaki – OpEd

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By Richard Falk*

[Prefatory Note: I have been preoccupied for many years with the multiple challenges posed by nuclear weapons, initially from the perspective of international law and morality, later with regard to prudence diplomacy and political survival in international relations, and in all instances, with an eye favoring deep denuclearization associated in my mind with an abiding abhorrence over the use of atomic bombs against the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki at the end of World War II and with the avoidance of any future use of nuclear weaponry or even threatened use. The annual observance of these terrible events encourages reflection and commentary on this darkest of legacies. Zero nuclear weapons is the unconditional goal that I affirm, achieved in a manner that creates as much public confidence as possible that the eliminations of weaponry and enriched uranium stockpiles are being faithfully carried out.

In this spirit, I want to call attention to a notable volume on the continuing menace posed by nuclear weapons that has just been published under the editorship of Geoffrey Darnton, bearing the title Nuclear Weapons and International Law, and available via Amazon or the bookseller Ingrams. The book contains the entire text of the judgment issued by the London Nuclear Warfare Tribunal (1985), a civil society initiative presided over by four judges, three of whom were Nobel Prize winners, the great dissenting opinion of C.G. Weeramantry in the Advisory Opinion on The Legality of Nuclear Weapons issued in 1996 by the International Court of Justice, and other documents and texts discussing the continuing imperative of nuclear disarmament. I recommend the book highly to all those who seek a broad understanding of why the citizen pilgrims of the world should unite in an urgent effort to create a climate of public awareness that pushes governments to make a genuine effort to fulfill by way of a practical disarming process the often articulated and affirmed vision of a world without nuclear weaponry. What is crucial is to shift the discourse from affirming the elimination of nuclear weaponry as an ultimate goal to the adoption of nuclear disarmament as a programmatic goal of practical politics, especially in the nine nuclear weapons states. Whether this entails a simultaneous partial disarmament of conventional weaponry by some states, especially the United States, is a further issue to consider.

At the invitation of Geoffrey Darnton, David Krieger, President of the Nuclear Age Foundation (NAPF), and I contributed a jointly authored foreword to the volume as well as a dialogue on nuclear weapons and international law. Krieger, a lifelong advocate of a zero nuclear world, as well as a poet whose poems are often responsive to his humane concerns, has devoted his professional life to the attainment of this goal, traveling throughout around the globe to reach diverse audiences and take part in a variety of NGO anti-nuclear efforts. The NAPF heads a coalition of civil society support for the historic Marshall Islands legal initiative currently under consideration in the International Court of Justice and in American federal courts that demands fulfillment of the nuclear disarmament provisions of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. More information about the NAPF and the Marshall Islands litigation can be found at the NAPF website. A second post will contain our foreword together with David’s poem, “A Short History Lesson” that raises in the most pointed form the moral tensions and civilizational hypocrisies that related the atomic bombing to the Nuremberg Judgment that held surviving Nazi leaders accountable for their complicity in state crime.]

There are many reasons why nuclear weapons have been retained and acquired by sovereign states, and it is an instructive insight into the workings of the war system at the core of state-centric world order that the first five nuclear weapons states happened to be the five states given preeminent status in the United Nations by being made permanent members of the Security Council with a right of veto. Because of the devastating potentialities of nuclear weaponry to destroy the human future there was from the start of ‘the nuclear age’ a public outcry against their retention and widespread revulsion about dropping atomic bombs on densely populated Japanese cities. This dialectic between hard power maximization and public canons of sensitivity to state-sanctioned atrocity has been evident ever since 1945. The outcome has been the retention and development of the weaponry with related efforts to limit access to the extent possible (the ethos of nonproliferation) and vague affirmations of a commitment to seek nuclear disarmament as a matter of policy and even law. This asymmetry of goals has given us the situation pertaining to the weaponry that haunts the future of humanity. It is epitomized by the geopolitical energies devoted to implementing the nonproliferation provisions of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) (1970; 190 states), as evidenced by making the feared apprehension of future acquisition a casus belli in Iraq (2003) and with respect to Iran, hopefully a second nonproliferation war being averted by the Iranian willingness to limit their nuclear program in such a way as to minimize any prospect of acquiring ‘the bomb.’ In contrast, the nuclear disarmament provision, Article VI, of the NPT is treated by the nuclear weapons states as pure window dressing, having the outward appearance of being a bargain reached between nuclear and non-nuclear weapons states, but in reality a commitment by the latter to forego the weaponry in exchange for an empty promise that has been discredited by the absence of credible efforts at implementation over a period of almost half a century. Part of this reality is the unwillingness of the non-nuclear states to raise their voices in concerted opposition to the one-sided implementation of the NPT, exhibiting their reality as states but without geopolitical leverage.

The liberal version of this deceptive Faustian Bargain is the claim that the NPT and nuclear disarmament are complementary to one another, and should be linked in thought and action. The statist reasoning that offers a rationale stresses the desirability of limiting the number of nuclear weapons states while efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament move forward. Among the world’s most astute commentators on nuclear weapons policy is Ramesh Thakur, who heads the Secretariat on the Asia Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament. In a recent article in The Japan Times [“Link Nuclear Disarmament and Nonproliferation Efforts,” Aug. 12, 2015] Thakur tells us that “there is an inalienable and symbiotic link between nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament.” He regards “[t]he key challenge..is to how to protect the political gains and security benefits of the NPT, while also working around it to impart momentum into the disarmament process leading to the total abolition of all nuclear weapons.” From this perspective, Thakur laments the failures of the nuclear weapons states to embrace this linkage in a credible manner, and worries that non-nuclear states are threatening to disrupt the benevolent NPT regime that he credits with greatly restricted the number of states possessing the bomb and has helped avoid any recourse to the weaponry over the 68 years that have elapsed since Nagasaki: “Globally, more and more countries are coming around to the conclusion that the NPT is being used cynically by the nuclear powers not to advance but to frustrate disarmament.”

What is surprising is that it has taken so long for the non-nuclear governments to reach this conclusion, or at least to acknowledge their disaffection in a public space. The mind game played so well by the nuclear weapons states, above all, the United States, rests on the proposition that the main threat posed by the existence and possession of the weaponry is its spread to additional states, not the weaponry itself, and certainly not the nuclear weapons states themselves. This inversion of the real priorities has shifted the policy focus away from disarmament for decades and put the spotlight on proliferation dangers where it doesn’t belong, Iran being the current preoccupation resulting from this way of thinking. The geopolitical discriminatory nature of this mind game is further revealed by the treatment of Israel, what Thakur calls “The global double standards” that are “reinforced by regional hypocrisy, in which all sides stayed studiously silent on Israel’s bombs.”

Sanctions and war threats directed at Iran, silence and denial conferred on Israel.

My disagreement with Thakur rests on his central assertion of linkage. In my view, the NPT regime has been posited for its own sake (operationalizing the sensible global consensus that the fewer nuclear weapons states, the better) but even more robustly, and here is the unacknowledged rub, as a long-term alternative to nuclear disarmament. In other words, while it is theoretically possible that the NPT regime could have been established as a holding operation to give time for a nuclear disarmament process to be negotiated and acted upon, it has been obvious from an early stage that the government bureaucracies of the leading nuclear powers had no intention of accepting an arrangement that would deprive themselves of the bomb. What the Faustian Bargain imposed was the false pretension that nuclear disarmament was integral to the policy agenda of the nuclear weapons states. From time to time political leaders, usually with sincerity, express their commitment to nuclear disarmament. At various times, several American presidents, including even Ronald Reagan, have affirmed their dedication to such a nuclear free future, most recently Barack Obama at his Prague speech in 2009, but after a flourish of attention, nothing happens.

Understanding why nothing happens is the real challenge facing the global disarmament movement. It is here that attention should be given to the ideologies of realist geopolitics that shapes the worldview of the policy elites that control the formation government policies and the supportive self-interested bureaucracies deeply entrenched in the media, think tanks, weapons labs, and private sector (the phenomenon Eisenhower flagged as ‘the military-industrial-complex’ in his Jan. 17, 1961 Farewell Address). It is these ideological and structural factors that explain why nothing happens, and is never allowed to happen. In what should have been treated as a startling confirmation of this disheartening assessment occurred when four former top government officials with impeccable hard power realist credentials decided a couple of years ago that the only way to uphold U.S. security dominance in the future was to abolish nuclear weapons, even their eminence did not prevent their hard power arguments for nuclear disarmament being shunted to one side by the nuclear weapons establishment. [See George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger, and Sam Nunn, “A World Free of Nuclear Weapons,” Wall Street Journal, Jan. 4, 2007; see also Shultz et al., “Deterrence in the Age of Nuclear Proliferation,”Wall Street Journal, March 7, 2011.]

Winning the mind game is a process that needs periodic diversions from the actuality of the global apartheid approach to nuclear weaponry that has never been seriously challenged, but is deeply antithetical to Western professed repudiation of genocidal tactics and ethos. When fears mounted of a breakdown in the bipolar standoff during the Cold War there did take place a popular mobilization of opposition to nuclearism. The anti-nuclear movement reached peaks in Europe after the scares of the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 and in response to some of the weapons deployment decisions by NATO. (Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, CND). The main ground of anti-nuclear opposition was fear, although the most articulate leader of CND, E.P. Thompson expressed antipathy to nuclear weapons and doctrine on essentially ethical grounds. Thompson argued on the basis of an illuminating analysis that the culture that embraced the then prevailing policies of mutual deterrence was already an active accomplice of Satan by its announced willingness to annihilate tens of millions of innocent people should its will to survive as a state be tested by an unacceptable enemy provocation. [See “Notes on Exterminism: The Last Stage of Civilization,” New Left Review I/121 , May-June 1980] It is indicative that the governments of the nuclear weapons states, and here most notably again the United States was most adamant, never were unequivocally willing to commit themselves to ‘no first use policies’ even in relation to non-nuclear adversaries. In other words, nuclear weapons were treated as instrumental to foreign policy contingencies, and not tainted with illegitimacy based on the supposed ‘nuclear taboo.’

Nonproliferation was the most brilliant of all diversions from the transparent acknowledgement that, whatever rhetoric was used to the contrary, the lead states never accepted nuclear disarmament as a genuine goal of their foreign policy. Quite the contrary. All moves to manage the arms race, including reductions in the size of nuclear arsenals and arrangements about communications during times of crisis, were also designed to reduce public fears of nuclear war and thereby weaken anti-nuclear movements—first, through the message that steps were being taken to minimize risks of an unintended or accidental nuclear war, and secondly, that these steps were steps on a path leading to eventual nuclear disarmament.

This double coded message providing the policy rationale for arms control. Militarists contributors to this process, raising their doubts about whether risks were in fact being reduced if military options were being constrained by arms control measures. But it was the second element in the arms control approach that enjoyed tacit and sometimes explicit bipartisan support in the United States where this kind of debate mainly took place. The entire spectrum of policymaking elites agreed that the enactment of nuclear disarmament was both unrealistic and dangerous, and if a visionary president allowed his moral enthusiasm to get the better of him the backlash was swift and decisive as even Reagan found out after informally agreeing with Mikhail Gorbachev at their Reykjavik summit in 1986 on a treaty framework that was premised on getting to zero. In reaction, even liberal democrats in the political establishment chided Reagan for being naïve and insufficiently informed when he was blamed for mindlessly stepping across the invisible but rigorously enforced red line that separates managerial arms control from transformational nuclear disarmament. The lesson was learned, as the next presidential administration headed by George H.W. Bush, adopted as a cautionary internal slogan ‘no more Reykjaviks.’ The ‘No’ of the American establishment to nuclear disarmament could not be clearer, nor could the belligerent ‘Yes’ to upholding by war if necessary the NPT regime.

With such an understanding, my disagreement with Ramesh Thakur becomes clear and fundamental, and to make it unmistakable, I would conclude by saying the time is now ripe for the total de-linkage of nonproliferation from disarmament with respect to nuclear weapons policy. Without such a de-linkage false consciousness and confusion are unavoidable. It is time to generate populist impatience with the refusal of decades by government establishment to act on the basis of reason, ethics, and prudence: this requires the adoption of policies truly committed to the total abolition of nuclear weaponry in a period of not more than seven years.

*Richard Falk is Albert G Milbank Professor Emeritus of International Law at Princeton University and Research Fellow, Orfalea Center of Global Studies. He is also the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Palestinian human rights. Visit his blog.

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