Achievement of the nuclear agreement, which was a direct result of Iran’s interactive approach and a major diplomatic breakthrough for our country, led to resolution of one of the biggest fake, but difficult and critical cases. Of course, this agreement was not achieved easily, but differences and challenges that faced negotiating teams and existence of unresolved issues were the “Achilles’ heel” that prolonged the negotiations. However, this problem was finally solved on the basis of the negotiation strategy and the tactic of simplifying solution of the problem by dealing with unresolved issues. It seems that after going through this difficult process, another unresolved issue still remains on the way of realizing the goals and implementing the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). That issue is establishment of regional relations on the basis of confidence building with special focus on the existing considerations in Iran-Saudi Arabia relations, which can have regional and international repercussions. Therefore, both sides are needed to examine this issue and find logical and mutually acceptable solutions for it.
Without a doubt, regional confidence building and delineation of bright horizons in this field can play an effective role in eliminating grounds for the Israel’s opportunism, which has been always seeking to foment crises by taking advantage of the existing differences and tensions. Such a measure will also work as an important element to provide needed grounds for more extensive confidence building. In line with the large-scale ideas of the Islamic Republic and under these conditions, and also following relative relief from the nuclear issue, Iran’s foreign minister has put on his agenda the implementation of a new regional approach. This new approach includes pursuit of active diplomacy through various means, including public diplomacy (publishing articles in widely circulating Arabic periodicals) and direct consultations with some important regional countries on the basis of the initiative to promote regional dialogue, and by changing Iran’s priority to improving relations with neighboring states on the basis of good neighborhood principles. Of course, due to tense and challenging background of regional relations, especially in the past years, the general course of this dialogue is characterized by many ups and downs because tensions that existed during the period of stalemate in Iran’s regional relations still overshadow this process and have obliterated opportunities for the improvement of regional ties one after the other.
Undoubtedly, gaps that were created among regional countries in the period of tension will show themselves during any new possible dialogue in the form of unresolved issues, or in other words, ambiguous, but controversial issues that are of concern to all involved sides and regional actors. Therefore, finding effective options in an interactive context for transition through the status quo by making new models based on the successful nuclear negotiations to do away with unresolved issues can help all sides to achieve a maximum degree of success with regard to issues that will be subject of talks among regional countries with the final goal of establishment and bolstering of balanced relations.
In this model of dialogue, removing unresolved issues would be an important focus in order to provide grounds for regional interaction between Iran and Saudi Arabia because if the existing unresolved issues between the two countries continue, they will play a powerful inhibitory role in preventing establishment of any new regional order on the basis of understanding as well as cooperation and convergence among regional powers. In other words, as long as a suitable solution for the elimination of this unresolved issue – that is, relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia – has not been found, there cannot be much hope in reaching understanding and establishment of effective regional cooperation. This is true because in case of lack of understanding, each side of this equation will try to form new alliances by attracting allies at regional and international levels and will follow their own rival and challenging interests, the result of which will be intensification of tension across the region. This is of special importance because although Iran and Saudi Arabia stand on different levels of power, both of them enjoy enough potential and capacity to go their own different way.
According to this assumption, resolving the big unresolved issue (the challenge in Iran’s relations with Saudi Arabia) as the main element preventing establishment of any new regional system based on understanding, would require elimination of secondary, but important unresolved issues that are directly related to the two countries’ political, economic, security and religious ties. Of course, this does not mean that one issue should be eliminated in favor of the other, but it means that the two countries should start thinking to find new fields of interaction while sticking to principles that are accepted by both sides. During recent years, Iran and Saudi Arabia have faced basic challenges with regard to a wide spectrum of international, regional and even bilateral issues and, at times, there have been streaks of hostility in their rivalry. In addition to causing problems in bilateral relations, such tense relations had destructive effects on various areas of cooperation in the region and across the Islamic world. In addition, these tense relations enjoyed vast political, economic and religious dimensions, which paved the way for the growth of extremist groups which embarked on terrorist operations to fan the flames of religious war. Meanwhile, extra-regional elements also tried to take advantage of this opportunity and meet their interests by encouraging religious sedition, and in doing so, they have been able to make tangible gains.
Iran and Saudi Arabia, as two big and powerful regional countries, have enough potentials and capacities to enable them to identify their differences and their undeniable rivalry away from media hype, and discuss them through negotiations and direct dialogue in order to find a way out of the current situation. This potential for negotiation and dialogue can provide a ground for discussion and finally elimination of unresolved issues in bilateral relations. The sole alternative to dialogue is continuation of the status quo, which undoubtedly will lead to escalation of tensions and its harmful effects will not only affect these two countries, but also influence other countries in the region and the Islamic world as well as the entire international system.
*Hossein Sadeghi, Islamic Republic of Iran’s Ambassador to Saudi Arabia
Similarly to Sisyphus — condemned to push a rock up a mountain, only to see it roll down time and again to the starting point as soon as the top was reached — Guinea- Bissau also appears doomed to repeatedly and everlastingly return to a state of institutional instability.
The reasons keep shifting according to circumstances, yet the crisis reoccurs cyclically, with profound negative consequences as regards to institutional stability and governability in Guinea-Bissau.
The recurring failure in managing and steering political differences through dialogue certainly has multifarious explanations, namely of a cultural and sociological nature. That said, we can add an additional one of political nature: the semi-presidential system which, in an adverse context such as in Guinea-Bissau, also contributes to fostering and exacerbating conflict.
Semi-presidentialism establishes two power centers, both of which are democratically legitimized by direct, secret and periodic universal suffrage. In absence of a solid capacity for dialogue and a consolidated democrat- ic regime, political conflict between the president and the prime-minister is almost inevitable.
To the long list of deep and difficult reforms in Guinea- Bissau’s agenda one should add yet one more: a review of the constitution towards adopting a presidential regime. This will not solve every single problem in Guinea-Bissau, but it will certainly help prevent and palliate some of them.
About the author:
*Paulo Gorjão, Researcher at Portuguese Institute of International Relations and Security (IPRIS)
Source:
Article published in Diário Económico (14 August 2015) and IPRIS as IPRIS Viewpoints 178 (PDF)
Macedonia’s main opposition party says it will not be provoked into quitting talks on the EU-brokered crisis deal by the recent court ruling about tapes of officials’ conversations.
The Social Democrats’ vice-president, Radmila Shekerinska, said Monday’s ruling of the Skopje Criminal Court, which said tapes provided by the opposition cannot be used as evidence in court, was a provocation aimed at forcing them to quit talks on the EU-brokered crisis deal signed in June.
She said Macdonia’s main ruling party was the real actor behind the court decision.
“VMRO DPMNE is making this move… to force the opposition to leave the process while at the same time they won’t be held responsible for it. We will not give them a cheap exit from the negotiations,” she told Telma TV.
The inter-party talks are supposed to iron out the details about implementing the deal brokered by European Commissioner Johannes Hahn. As part of the deal, the opposition on Tuesday returned to parliament, ending a 15-month boycott.
Shekerinska said the first real test of whether the VMRO DPMNE party of Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski was sincere about fulfilling the crisis deal would be the election of a new special prosecutor with authority to investigate claims about illegal interceptions of communications.
The deadline for the appointment has been set at September 15.
“Our goal is to do everything possible by September 15 to get a real special prosecutor, autonomous, strong, with instruments and power, who can independently conduct investigations. If that does not happen, there will be no dilemma that the government is the one responsible for it… Then, everyone will conclude that this deal cannot be put in effect because of VMRO DPMNE’s refusal,” she said.
Shekerinska said that, in that case, “all options are open,” referring to the party’s recent statement that the opposition won’t hesitate to resume the publication of more tapes and even leave parliament again if there is no deal on the prosecutor.
The Skopje Criminal Court ruling came just two weeks before the deadline for the new prosecutor’s appointment.
It said the tapes of officials’ conversations released by the opposition were invalid as court evidence because they were “illegally obtained”.
The tapes, which the opposition have been releasing since February, appeared to reveal the government’s direct involvement in election fraud and abuse of the justice system and media.
They suggested the Prime Minister’s involvement in illegal purchase of construction land among other wrongdoings and also suggested the authorities covered up the murder of a young man by a police officer.
The Social Democrats say the tapes show that Gruevski and his cousin, former secret police chief Saso Mijalkov, were behind the illegal surveillance of some 20,000 people, including government ministers.
Gruevski, who has been in power since 2006, has insisted that the compromising tapes in question were “created” by unnamed foreign intelligence services and given to the opposition to destabilise the country.
The crisis agreement also stipulated the appointment of new Interior and Labour ministers from the ranks of the opposition as well as resignation of Gruevski in mid-December, 100 days before the snap elections set for April.
Other outstanding issues envisaged by the agreement include a revision of the electoral law and measures to ensure unbiased media reporting of the campaign.
Discernible in China since January 2015, is a trend pointing towards increasing concerns of the central leadership over corrupt, undisciplined and reforms-wary cadres, particularly at senior levels. Confirming it are important speeches being given by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping on different occasions, certain official documents and comments regularly appearing in the party and state controlled media.
The trend became prominent when Xi Jinping himself heavily stressed (at the 5th Plenary Session of the Central Disciplinary Inspection Commission-CDIC , January 13, 2015) on the need for Party members to “follow the constitution as well as political discipline and rules”. Targeting corrupt cadres, he said that his campaign against them will be “arduous and complicated” and demanded that the cadres should “align with the authority of the CCP Central Committee in deed and thought, at all times and in any situation and ensure unity in the party” (http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2015-01/13/c_133916942.htm). He vowed to maintain the intensity of the anti-corruption campaign and urged cadres to abide by both “written and unwritten party rules, respecting traditions and working practices that had accumulated in the party’s history”. A communiqué issued after the session warned senior Party officials against breaking Party rules and conspiring together for private interests. It asserted that the CCP will not tolerate cronyism nor allow fakery and sycophancy (http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2015-01/15/c_133922246.htm).
Important are also Xi’s two subsequent speeches. The one given at politburo collective session (June 26, 2015) stressed that anti-corruption campaign will not stop despite some skeptical views in Chinese society. These words could be in response to some reservations on the campaign which surfaced in China. Firstly, Chinese party and state-controlled media (Cai Xin, March 11,2015 ) themselves admitted the existence of viewpoints in China that anti-corruption work will hamper the country’s economic development and damage reputation and image of the government. Secondly, three essays which appeared in the CDIC website (People’s Daily, June 10,2015) criticized a small number of Party disciplinary officials, accusing them of violating procedures, punishing cadres before establishing guilt and unduly pressuring those senior to them; they also gave a warning that the CDIC should not become an “independent fiefdom, besides describing “Anti-corruption as a double-edged sword: while it strikes Party cadres who violate discipline and the law, it hurts the Party organization, and damages the image of the Party.” (Hu Ping, http://chinachange.org/2015/06/15/has-xi-jinpings-anti-corruption-campaign-been-derailed/ , June 15, 2015). Also notable is the leader’s subsequent call (at 94th CCP anniversary, July 1,2015) directly to leading cadres – who he termed as “the key minority” – to get on board and steamed up in order to accomplish a variety of tasks, from promoting the rule of law to strengthening national defense and the military (http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2015/07/21/understanding-xi-jinpings-key-minority/ ).
On problems relating to party cadres, deserving attention is Xi’s identification of the following activities as examples of the violation of party rules, in his book (in Chinese ) on “ building the party and government and carrying out struggle against corruption”, published by the CDIC Publicity Department in January 2015: “forming factions, cabals and mountain strongholds within the party”; “vacillations regarding matters of principle and issues of right and wrong;” “openly expressing views that are opposed to major political questions regarding the party’s theory, guidelines and policies;” and “feigning compliance with but actually going against the party’s goals and policies” (习近平关于党风廉政建设和反腐败斗争论述摘编》出版发行, Xinhua, January 11,2015, http://fanfu.people.com.cn/n/2015/0111/c64371-26363681.html).
The significance of criticism of late against overreach by retired cadres should not be missed. People’s Daily (Chinese language edition), the CCP mouthpiece , carried a signed commentary on August 10, 2015, which alleged that “some retired leading cadres” , while they were in office, put their “cronies” in key positions, so that they can interfere in the work of their original organizations and wield influence in the future. This is making new leaders feel that unnecessary concerns affect their work as their “hands and feet” are being fettered”. Contributed by Gu Bochong, a Deputy chief in the General Political Department of China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and a member of the CCP-managed China Writers Association, the write up caught the attention of China watchers in the world in order to find out whether there is any political meaning in what has been said in it. Quite a few analysts have traced in the article a veiled attack against the former party strongman Jiang Zemin, now 89 years old, but still said to be influential( http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2015/0810/c1001-27436119.htm).
Is resistance to reforms a cadre problem? This question assumes relevance considering a commentary entitled “Ferociousness of Forces Opposing Reforms can Exceed Imagination” which appeared in the Chinese language website (http://www.guancha.cn ) of the Shanghai-based Spring-Autumn (Chun Qiu) Institute of Development and Strategic Studies, (http://news.163.com/15/0820/19/B1G18JQA0001124J.html, August 20, 2015) . According to Guancha, its writer “Guo Ping”, represents a batch of politically strong and professionally able web commentators belonging to the main stream media like the People’s Daily and Xinhua, thus attracting serious attention in the country as it is engaged in attending to important matters, ‘with a high degree of unity with centre’s policies and measures’.
The commentary made a central point – the reforms in China are at a critical stage and they are encountering great difficulties, affecting the interests of various groups. The scale of the resistance to reforms is unimaginable. Coming from commentators, being described as close to the Centre, in other words to Xi Jinping, the opinions in the write-up assume great amount of economic and political significance. Who are resisting the reforms in China? The commentary does not answer this question. Media reports have quoted Xu Yaotong, a political science professor at the Chinese Academy of Governance, as saying that the resistance could be from any of three powerful groups: retired leaders who wanted to exert influence, cadres whose power had been weakened and civil servants unhappy with austerity rules.
Resistance to reforms has also been hinted at another commentary (People’s Daily, Chinese, and August 20, 2015). It urged cadres to get behind the leadership’s reform push and have results showing they are carrying it forward. It added that “performance reviews and any job promotions would depend on their commitment to reforms and the crucial point is personnel management”. It attacked the “shallow” and even “fake” changes being implemented by officials and argued that “changes should bring solutions to problems in reality and that in-depth reforms should attack the problems in the reform itself.” It complained that in some places cadres gave “empty slogans about inviting private investment and cutting executives’ salaries” and that “public patience for the reforms is starting to wear thin in the absence of obvious results”. It however remarked that more time was needed during the current transition phase, expressing at the same time expectations that after holding soon of a central meeting on in-depth reform, there can be handful of powerful, practical, and realistic reform plans on State-Owned Enterprises ( http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/1851605/no-promotion-slackers-reform-agenda-chinas-state-media, August 21,2015).
According to another authoritative article (Li Jiming, Red Flag Manuscript, Chinese, August 24, 2015) , cadre problems should be approached through a dialectical thinking. It demanded a deep personnel system reform, in accordance with Xi Jinping’s call to leading cadres to learn to master the scientific and dialectic ways of thinking while implementing reforms. Quoting Article 36 of the CCP constitution, it cautioned that “leading cadres at all levels, whether they are democratically elected, or appointed by the leading organs, should realize that their positions are not for life and that they can be transferred or discharged.” It complained that since the reform and opening up, some of the party members and cadres consciously or unconsciously, remain influenced by “once official, lifelong official” idea and resist leaving posts. Managing leading cadres can be guaranteed by regulatory incentives, rewards and punishments, and other systems of accountability. In this connection, it referred to the central government’s introduction of a “number of provisions on the promotion of the leading cadres”.
Another official write-up (captioned “Democratization: Paradox and Reflection”, Red Flag Manuscript, Chinese, August 24, 2015) by implication cautioned cadres against getting influenced by Western democratic ideas. It laid stress on the need for a comprehensive and objective comparative analysis of different political systems in the world, so that ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’ can be developed.
From what has been said above, it becomes clear that the CCP under Xi Jinping has come to face the following main cadre problems – the policies of central leadership are not being obeyed, factions within the party are being formed, interference in party work is being indulged by retried cadres, pursuance of reforms is not sincere and the influence of Western ideas on cadres persist. To tackle these problems, the CCP is strengthening its system on personnel management including promotions of cadres.
The most important measure being taken by the Xi Jinping regime to tackle cadre problems, concerns the ongoing anti-corruption campaign. It has led to the purge of the ‘tigers’ like Zhou Yongkang, a former member of the powerful CCP politburo standing committee and the former security chief of the country; Xu Caihou (now deceased), former Vice-Chairman of the Central Military Commission and Ling Jihua, former head of the CCP General Office. The three, along with already disgraced and sentenced Bo Xilai, former Chongqing party chief, considered once as a potential member of the politburo standing committee, are now being called by some in China as the new ‘gang of four’ (Mao’s wife Jiang Qing and three others were known as ‘gang of four’and purged in the 70s). Other ‘tigers’ who have come under graft charges include Guo Boxiung, former politburo member and former Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission and Su Rong, former Vice Chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference and a Zhou Yongkang loyalist; Yang Weize, former Nanjing party boss ; Qiu He, former Yunnan Deputy party chief and Zhang Kunsheng, former assistant Foreign Minister of China. Zeng Qinghong, former Vice-President of China, could be under probe, taking into account a historically allegorical article in the CDIC website (25.2.2015) attacking him. Zeng is believed to have been portrayed in the article as Prince Qing Yiguang who gave mahjong lessons to Empress Dowager Cixi (standing in for Jiang Zemin).
It cannot be denied that there are fault lines with regard to Xi’s anti-corruption campaign. As all affected are close to the former party supremo Jiang Zemin(89) who still enjoys political clout, its targeting is being seen as selective. Secondly, it remains to be seen whether the campaign can maintain its momentum at a time when there seems to be a widespread feeling in China that the drive, though popular among the people, is causing hesitancy on the part of the authorities to make decisions, leading to a policy paralysis. A third aspect relates to the apprehension within the body spearheading the campaign, the CDIC, about a negative impact of the anti-corruption drive on the unity of the party, as already mentioned above.
The present time looks inopportune for the Chinese leadership. The Chinese economy is slowing down. The stock crash and devaluation of Yuan seems to have given rise to a piquant situation for the government under Xi, which has been giving importance to the role of the market forces in the country’s economy. In such a situation, the persisting cadre problems add to the pressures being faced by the CCP. A top party plenum is scheduled for October 2015 by which time Xi is required to further settle his political equations. Personnel changes and finalization of 13th Five Year plan are likely to be the main agenda for the occasion. It will be interesting to watch political developments in China in the run-up to holding of the plenum.
*The writer, D.S.Rajan, is Distinguished Fellow, Chennai Centre for China Studies, Chennai, India. Contributing date- September 3, 2015. Email: dsrajan@gmail.com
Serbia today is a member-State of United Nations (U.N.), after the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was split into several nations during the early 1990’s when war broke out between Serbian General Milosevic and neighboring nations. After partition, Serbia is still the most powerful “state” of the former Yugoslavia.
“Kosovo”, the term used for the territory of southern Serbia, is de-jure recognised as a “state” by over 110+ “states”, but is not a “state” itself, as per the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (1933), and is not a “state” at the U.N. where 2/3rd positive vote is required by the U.N. General Assembly for “statehood”.
Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (1933) requires that a “state” must have the “capacity to enter into relations with other states” and be a “government”. The entity of the self-termed “government of Kosovo” has neither. The “Declaration of Independence” of “Kosovo” was upheld by an “advisory opinion” at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 2010, but an ICJ “advisory opinion” is not legally binding upon any member-State.
ICJ “advisory opinion” on “Kosovo” expressly states that the Court has not made any determination on whether “Kosovo” is a “state”, within the definition of international law or at the U.N., as stated in paragraphs 49-56 of the ICJ advisory opinion.
Furthermore, a “Declaration of Independence” does not mean that the entity has legal rights to exercise control over the territory it claims or even the self-termed “Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan”, or the Afghan Taliban’s “Declaration of Independence” would be valid for control of the nation today, since the U.N. General Assembly passed a resolution to assist the Afghan Taliban in 1992, for state-building, when they were controlling Afghanistan.
Since “Kosovo” is not a “state” at the U.N. as it does not have the required 2/3rd majority diplomatic recognition, it is in direct violation of Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Conventions (1949), Article 8 (b) (viii) of the Rome Statute (2002), as well as Article 85 (4) of the Additional Protocol I (1977) since Serbia is a “state” and “Kosovo” is conducting:
“The transfer, directly or indirectly, by the Occupying Power of parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies, or the deportation or transfer of all or parts of the population of the occupied territory within or outside this territory”
Therefore, the self-termed “government of Kosovo” is not a “government” for the purpose of being a “state” as per the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (1933), but an “Occupying power” of Serbia. The entity of “Kosovo” does not have the “capacity to enter into relations with other states” as only “governments” do, in most cases.
Key word here proving that “Kosovo” does not meet the qualifications for a “state” as per the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (1933), as mentioned in Article 1 is it mentions “other states”, implying that “Kosovo” must be a “state” itself to enter into relations with “other states”.
“Kosovo” is not allowed to sign any international treaties and conventions, due to the fact that an entity needs to be a “state”, so they have not even signed the Geneva Conventions (1949); one of the most basic conventions of international law, since it is based on many other conventions which preceded in relation to international humanitarian law (IHL) from the 1800’s.
Nevertheless, the entity of “Kosovo” was established by a U.N. Military Observers including the U.N. Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in 1991, U.N. Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES), etc, which were tasked with restoring peace, as well as law and order, without hindering “political independence” in the former Yugoslavia.
The principle of “political independence” was mentioned in one of the first U.N. Peacekeeping Resolutions in 1991 for the former Yugoslavia, as the U.N. Security Council Resolution which “dispatched small group of personnel (Croatia)” stated that:
“…the people of peoples of Yugoslavia to decide upon and to construct their future Yugoslavia, in liaison with the International Committee of the Red Cross”.”
The Geneva Conventions (1949) were in large, drafted by members of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which “Kosovo” is not a signatory to, as it cannot sign without “statehood”.
Since Serbia is a member-State of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and “Kosovo” is not a “state”, as per international law; Serbia may file a complaint against the “Occupying power” of “Kosovo” by a “Referral of a situation by a State Party” allowed via Article 14 of the Rome Statute (2002), referring to the “situation” of the war crime of illegal occupation of southern Serbia.
The war crime of illegal occupation is being aided and abetted, in violation of Article 25 of the Rome Statute (2002), by the military alliance of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) division for “Kosovo”, also committing the “crime of aggression” since it does not have any U.N. Authorisation to be in Serbia.
This division is called “NATO-KFOR”, which is composed of mostly of United States (U.S.) Armed Forces which are to be prosecuted in an International Criminal Tribunal for the United States of America for crimes against humanity, war crimes, violations of the Geneva Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948), violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (1997), as well as other serious violations of international law in the near future, as it committed these violations on its own territory as well as territories of many other nations, and where Israel, Canada, including nations are complicit in these violations.
Despite the fact that the ICC has jurisdiction on crimes from 2002 onwards, the bombings by NATO in the 1990’s against civilian targets are not to be taken lightly and can be introduced as evidence, if it is relevant to NATO-KFOR’s war crimes in Serbia today.
Serbia also has the option of charging these individuals at the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which is not a criminal court to issue arrest warrants, but can issue an order for the illegal war criminals of the war criminal entity of the “government of Kosovo”, the Occupying power, to evacuate the war criminal entity of the “government of Kosovo” of what is considered Serbia for all legal purposes.
This is a comparatively easy case, since the area “Kosovo” is claiming, is still part of southern Serbia. In addition, “Kosovo” has self-admitted to committing “crimes against humanity” as part of an “ethnic cleansing” campaign of Serbians, so many of the belligerent “Kosovo Liberation Army” officials are to face trial in a European Union (E.U.) Tribunal for the same.
Self-admission of “ethnic cleansing” by “Kosovo” only leads us to the human rights violations being committed in southern Serbia today, such as the continuing of the “genocide” against Serbians since there are attacks including disappearances with “discriminatory intent” against Serbians by this war criminal entity; which Serbia can also prosecute at the ICC, as documented by human rights organisations such as Amnesty International.
“Discriminatory intent” is the main criteria distinguishing “crimes against humanity” from “genocide”, and this mens rea or mindstate is easier to prove when there is continuing occurrences of these crimes, especially if it is part of a “policy”.
The ICC is “complimentary” to other national courts, so cases can proceed against this entity at the European Courts and the ICC at the same time, for the same crimes, such as the “ethnic cleansing” against Serbians; a watered-down term for “genocide” against Serbians, for which a case can be made for, against “Kosovo”, at the ICC.
Kosovo is not depicted as a separate “state” on the U.N. World Map (Today), issued by the U.N. Secretariat, nor the U.N. Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO)’s yearly “World Heritage Maps”. Since Kosovo is not a “state” under international law, “Kosovo” is an Occupying power, committing the war crime of illegal occupation against a “state”; Serbia, as per international law.
Superpower alliance of BRICS (Brasil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) and most of its allies do not recognise this war criminal entity.
Despite the fact it is the prerogative of states to recognise other states, it can be argued that the “other states” that have recognised this illegal war criminal entity, have done so under false pretext, thinking it was a “state” as per the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (1933).
Once there is “knowledge”, as stated in the Rome Statute (2002), of a war crime, those who continue to supply arms or defence equipment, etc, are “aiding and abetting” those war crimes so therefore; can be held for complicity for the same crime as per Article 25 of the Rome Statute (2002).
Those who recognise “Kosovo” as a separate entity can also be held accountable under Article 25 (3) (d) (i) (ii) since recognition can be considered as an act to:
Be made with the aim of furthering the criminal activity or criminal purpose of the group, where such activity or purpose involves the commission of a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court;
Be made in the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit the crime;
The presence of NATO-KFOR in “Kosovo”, which consists of mostly U.S. Armed Forces, with the knowledge war crimes are occurring, makes the contingent complicit if it goes to trial at the ICC.
“Kosovo” is a rouge regime committing the war crime of illegal occupation can be prosecuted at the ICC, and should be brought to the attention of the public as well as the concerned, so no further recognitions or aid can be given to the war criminals; “the government of Kosovo” and “NATO-KFOR”, in the absence of any legal authorisation from the U.N. or a bi-lateral treaty with the “state”, which is required to be in southern Serbia, as per international law.
These persons will not be able to travel to any other member-State of the ICC, which is most of Europe, South America, and Africa, or they will be arrested for extradition, for prosecution at the ICC.
The E.U. insisting on Serbia recognising Kosovo as a separate “state”, as a pre-condition for membership, will have to retract this pre-condition, as it is requesting Serbia to recognise war criminals.
If this “situation” is referred to the ICC, Serbia will be able to regain its land back, hold war criminals accountable for serious violations of international human rights law against Serbians, and join the E.U. on new terms.
*Dr. Parasaran Rangarajan is the President of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation in Law’s Mission to the United Nations (SAARCLAW-UN). First President in history representing the governments of 9 nations in South Asia — 30% of the world’s population — in international law and to the United Nations. Counsellor [Sixth Committee] for the Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations, Consultant for SAAG, Editor-in-chief for the International Law Journal of London.
In Cameroon, the rise of Christian revivalist (born again) and Muslim fundamentalist movements is rapidly changing the religious landscape and paving the way for religious intolerance. Fundamentalist groups’ emergence, combined with communal tensions, creates a specific risk in the North and increases competition for leadership of the Muslim community: such competition has already led to local conflicts.
Moreover, the various religious groups have negative perceptions of each other. The state and the mainstream religious organisations’ response to the emerging radicalism is limited to the Boko Haram threat and therefore inadequate, and in some cases carries risk. A coherent and comprehensive response has to be implemented by the government and religious organisations to preserve religious tolerance and to avoid the kind of religious violence seen in neighbouring Nigeria and the Central African Republic.
Unlike these two countries, Cameroon has never experienced significant sectarian violence. However, the emergence of radical religious groups risks destabilising its climate of religious tolerance. Traditional Sufi Islam is increasingly challenged by the rise of more rigorist Islamic ideology, mostly Wahhabism. The current transformation is mainly promoted by young Cameroonian Muslims from the South, whereas the Sufi Islam of the North, dominated by the Fulani, seems on the decline. These southern youths speak Arabic, are often educated in Sudan and the Gulf countries, and are opposed both to Fulani control of the Muslim community and to the ageing religious establishment. Disagreements between Sufi leaders, traditional spiritual leaders and these newcomers are not only theological: the conflict between “ancients” and “moderns” is also a matter of economic and political influence within the Muslim community.
These changes have divided Muslim communities and already degenerated into localised clashes between Islamic groups. Fundamentalist groups’ growth in the North, combined with local communal tensions, is a potential source of conflict. In the South, the competition between Sufi members and Wahhabi-inspired groups over leadership of the Muslim community will increase and could lead to localised violence.
Within Christian communities, the rise of Revivalist Churches has ended the monopoly of Catholic and Protestant Churches. Most Revivalist Churches have no legal status and are poorly-regarded by Catholics. Born again pastors often preach religious intolerance, stay away from interreligious dialogue and are kept out of official religious spheres, although they mostly support the regime.
In the face of these new forms of religious intolerance, interreligious dialogue initiatives are weak, dispersed and only reach a small fraction of the population. Yet, the religious changes are not perceived as problematic by Cameroonian political and religious authorities. They underestimate their conflict potential as their attention is focused only on Boko Haram. It was only after Boko Haram launched attacks in the Far North that the government launched awareness initiatives, but they were late and ineffective, as seen in the harassment and stigmatisation of Kanuri populations from border villages, as well as arrests and arbitrary detentions by the security forces. The religious developments are worrying in the present regional environment as both Central African Republic and Nigeria are experiencing conflicts with religious dimensions, and the consequences are having impact on Cameroon.
The struggle against the threat of religious radicalism in Cameroon requires a coherent and comprehensive strategy including a better understanding of the current religious changes, support for a charter on religious tolerance, the creation of representative bodies for the Muslim communities and Revivalist Churches, and the economic and social development of fragile regions. More immediately, the government must improve its monitoring of fundamental proselytisation, support interreligious dialogue and improve communities’ awareness of the dangers of radicalism.
Recommendations:
To combat the threat of religious radicalism
To the government of Cameroon:
1. Promote socio-economic development by allocating a third of the triennial emergency program to the development of the North and by coordinating with the other countries of the Lake Chad Basin to request donors support.
2. Improve populations’ awareness by:
a) Assessing interreligious dialogue initiatives and funding the most effective ones;
b) Avoiding stigmatisation, arbitrary detentions, acts of torture and other human rights violations, of populations living close to the border with Nigeria; and
c) Involving organisations of Muslim and Christian women in awareness initiatives.
3. Create a local certification for imams and ulama trained abroad; make sure that only imams with officially recognised training teach in Quranic schools and preach in the mosques; and monitor foreign preachers within the country.
4. Monitor the financing of religious associations and ensure they do not receive funds from fundamentalist organisations.
5. Monitor fundamentalist proselytism sites, including in social media, refugee camps and the Maroua prison in the Far North.
6. Create research programs on religious changes in Cameroon.
To religious leaders and the leadership of religious associations, both Christian and Muslim:
7. Adopt a community approach for religious tolerance with a focus on outreach and communication, as well as further coordinate awareness and interreligious dialogue activities.
To the donors:
8. Support development projects in Northern Cameroon and the coordinated initiatives of the regional countries to develop the Lake Chad area.
9. Assess Cameroonian associations promoting interreligious dialogue initiatives, and support the most effective among them.
To reduce divisions within religious communities
To the government of Cameroon:
10. Engage in dialogue with religious leaders and the leadership of religious associations in order to create consensual representative bodies for Revivalist Churches and Muslim communities. Each body should elect its own national representative for a non-extendable one-year term to interact with the authorities.
11. Encourage Muslim and Christian representative bodies to elaborate a religious tolerance charter and have it accepted by all Cameroonian religious groups.
12. Implement a one-year moratorium to enable unauthorised Revivalist Churches to register legally and, once it ends, close unregistered churches and those that have not adhered to the charter for tolerance.
To religious leaders and the leadership of religious associations:
13. Work for a more inclusive Islam by reinforcing dialogue within the Muslim community and by supporting a better representation of the various Islamic and ethnic groups, as well as youth, within the associations, and the implementation of development projects in all the Muslim areas without any preference.
14. Involve Revivalist Churches and the various Islamic groups in interreligious dialogue activities.
National Security Agency whistleblower Edward Snowden said that Hillary Clinton’s use of a private email server while serving as secretary of state jeopardized national security secrets. He said Clinton’s claims to the contrary “is completely ridiculous.”
Snowden’s remarks were taken from an interview with Al Jazeera English, excerpts of which were made available on Thursday, and were in response to a reminder that a year ago it was Clinton who accused Snowden of helping terrorists by leaking details of the NSA’s surveillance programs.
“When the unclassified systems of the United States government, which has a full-time information security staff, regularly gets hacked, the idea that someone keeping a private server in the renovated bathroom of a server farm in Colorado is more secure is completely ridiculous,” Snowden told Mehdi Hasan in the debut episode of UpFront, a weekly talk show which will air on Friday.
Snowden said that anyone with the clearances of the secretary of state, or the director of any top level agency, knows how classified information should be handled.
Snowden was an NSA contractor when he blew the whistle on the agency’s programs conducting mass surveillance on Americans and foreigners alike, handing over an archive of documents to journalist Glenn Greenwald and the Guardian in Hong Kong.
Clinton has argued that the information in her emails was not classified at the time, and the State Department confirmed in an August 31 press conference that 125 email contained “confidential” information but were “not marked ‘classified’ at the time the emails were sent.”
The FBI is investigating who at the State Department sent the information to Clinton’s private email account. The Justice Department has also begun an investigation into the use of a private email server for government communication.
“If an ordinary worker at the state department or the Central Intelligence Agency […] were sending details about the security of embassies, which is alleged to be in her email, meetings with private government officials, foreign government officials and the statements that were made to them in confidence over unclassified email systems, they would not only lose their jobs and lose their clearance, they would very likely face prosecution for it,” Snowden added.
Snowden spoke from Moscow, where he has been granted temporary asylum following the NSA exposures.
A federal criminal complaint was filed against Snowden in June 2013, charging him with three felony violations of the Espionage Act for turning over the government documents to journalists. Each count can carry a penalty of up to 10 years in prison.
Snowden’s lawyers said the whistleblower wanted to return to the US and was working with a team of German and American lawyers to see if he could receive a fair trial and access to a “public interest defense.”
Pakistan’s Deep State finds its stock of terror assets depleted in the last few years. The first to go was Osama Bin Laden sheltered in Pakistan for 10 years while Pakistan pretended to ‘co-operate’ with the US in his hunt. Nasiruddin, the powerful Haqqani Network’s money-bags and brother of Jalaluddin was shot dead in Islamabad in November 2013. Jalaluddin had died in 2014 but this was disclosed only this year.
Mullah Omar, nursed by the Pakistanis for two decades, died in a Karachi hospital on April 23, 2013 but this too was disclosed in July this year. The next to be terminated with extreme prejudice was the sectarian mafia leader Malik Ishaq along with his accomplices in a mysterious encounter a few months ago. The last to go was the Dean of Pakistan Army’s Jihadi Corps, Lt Gen Hamid Gul. The good General had spent the winter of his life in the warmth of ultra-right radicals like Hafiz Saeed, Samiul Haq, Maulana Ludhianvi and others.
The acknowledgement that Mullah Omar was irrevocably dead and the postponement of the next round of Pakistan-owned talks were followed by what was obviously Pak-inspired terrorism in Kabul. The Haqqani group unleashed a string of attacks in early August and President Ghani’s ten-month old peace overture to Pakistan died a quick death as he angrily accused Pakistan of fomenting terror.
At one time it suited all those involved to keep the news about Omar under wraps. The Americans did not want a new alignment just short of their departure; the Pakistanis naturally were unwilling to lose control of the movement and their interests in Afghanistan while they worked on a new amenable line-up in the Taliban. The Afghan government did not want a new headache and the Taliban preferred silence till they sorted out their hierarchical line up.
It is difficult to accept that the Americans were blissfully ignorant about Mullah Omar’s death unless there was a failure of both intelligence and imagination. This was a failure to imagine that, having once hidden the truth from them about Osama bin Laden, Pakistan would repeat this subterfuge. It was a failure to accept that Pakistan would not change its policy on Afghanistan (or any other delinquency) and invite only some gentle rebukes. This reflects a consistent American unwillingness to distinguish between friend and foe.
Dissensions exist within the Taliban between those who favour a dialogue with Kabul and the hardcore who prefer militancy; between supporters of Mansoor and Yakub, Mullah Omar’s son, vying for the Taliban throne. There are differences between the Quetta, Miran Shah and Peshawar Shuras of the Taliban. Other ambitious tribal leaders hope to succeed Mullah Omar. Various warlords wish to control provinces like Helmand, the richest opium growing province. However, the Taliban are expected to continue their campaign in parts of Afghanistan, and Kabul will remain vulnerable.
There is now increasing reference to the presence of the ISIS in the region setting the stage for a possible battle between two Caliphates — of Abu Bakr Baghdadi and Mullah Omar. Western maps and assessment have been showing ISIS and Jamat-ut Dawa presence in Kunar and Nangarhar provinces. The JuD also seeks Caliphates and these Battle of the Caliphates could be bloody.
A few days before the death of Omar was announced, the ISIS released an audio statement claiming that Mullah Omar was dead and accusing the Taliban of fighting for Pakistan’s ISI. This was followed by another audio statement challenging the ‘puppet government’ in Kabul.
A worried Pakistan has banned ISIS amidst reports about it had won over five senior Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan members, a faction of Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and various Taliban fighters. It would not be surprising if sections of the Haqqani Network, which Admiral Mullen had once described as a veritable arm of the ISI, are won over by the ISIS.
Latest reports from Kabul are that the Uzbek warlord and present Vice President Abdur Rashid Dostum had a show of strength to counter the growing influence of the ISIS, the Haqqanis and the Taliban. He arrived in Kabul and described Pakistan as the enemy of Afghanistan. Meanwhile, Atta Mohammed Noor, the acting governor of Balkh province declared that he would lead his own forces against the insurgent forces if Kabul were unable to counter them.
The takeaways from this are apparent. Afghanistan and India will continue to deal with a predatory neighbour who will change tactics and strategy but not policy. The US will continue its policy of profound ambivalence on matters terrorism (and even nuclear) when they concern Pakistan.
*The writer is an Advisor to Observer Research Foundation, Delhi and a former chief of Research and Analysis Wing
Despite progress since 2005 when more than half of working-age Russian men died before reaching retirement, 30 percent of 18-year-old Russian men today will still die before then, three times the rate of men in Muslim Albania and a trend that may be reversed by Moscow’s mistaken policies on alcohol prices and taxes.
Despite this progress, Russia had and has a very high rate of morality among working-age males compared to other countries, largely as a result of alcohol consumption, according to Andrey Korotayev, a demographer at the Russian Academy of Economics and State Service (polit.ru/article/2015/09/03/utro_02_09/).
The demographer points out noted that Albania, whose Muslim population has no tradition of drinking, has very low mortality among its working-age population. Only about 10 percent of its adult males die between 18 and 65 while somewhere around 30 percent of working-age Russian men still do.
Russia’s progress over the last decade, Korotayev says, has been “colossal,” an achievement he said had been possible thanks to increasing restrictions on alcohol consumption. But that in turn means that any loosening of those restrictions threatens to send adult male mortality rates back up.
He predicts that “mortality among the working-age population should increase” because the government chose not to raise taxes on alcohol and because since these taxes are not adjusted for inflation, price rises mean that the impact of taxes on overall alcohol prices and thus on consumption in fact is falling. The more inflation there is, the greater the impact of this factor.
Korotayev also says that some of the year-to-year progress the health ministry reported was a statistical quirk reflecting changes in alcohol policies last year. If one looks month by month, he says, mortality from alcohol-related causes went up two percent in February, 7.5 percent in May, “but in July there was a certain reduction which gave the not bad figures.”
If one plugs all these figures into existing models and if there are no policy changes, then, “working-age mortality especially among men will stop its decline” and by the end of the year, “one can expect that mortality will be higher than it was a year ago.”
There are ways to prevent that, he says. Indexing alcohol taxes to inflation rather than tying them to alcohol volume as now and eliminating the government’s recent reduction in the minimum price for alcohol would all have positive effects. But “if these measures aren’t taken,” mortality rates are going to go back up, particularly among working-age Russian men.
Rosneft and Indian ONGC Videsh Limited during the Eastern Economic Forum signed an agreement of sale and purchase of 15% in Vankorneft and an shareholders agreement in regard of the enterprise management. The document was signed by the Chairman of Rosneft Management Board Igor Sechin and Managing Director of ONGC Videsh Limited Narendra Verma.
The parties intend to complete the transaction upon getting necessary regulatory and other approvals.
ONGC Videsh will have two places in the Board of Directors of Vankorneft. Rosneft will create an operator company that will allow more efficient management of both Vankor field and other Company’s licenses in this region.
The agreements on considering acquisition of minority share in Vankorneft by ONGC Videsh were reached on July 8, 2015 during the meeting between the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin and Prime Minister of the Republic of India Narendra Modi in Ufa.
Commenting on the signed document Igor Sechin said, “Collaboration in such a large-scale project will allow establishinga brand new level of strategic cooperation between Rosneft and ONGC Videsh. This will accelerate the development of our partnership, in other large-scale oil and gas upstream projects in the region. Such a short time between reaching the agreements and signing the document testifies to the high level of credibility between us and the Indian partners which guarantees efficient joint work.”
Vankorneft, Rosneft subsidiary, was established in 2004 for development of Vankor oil and gas condensate field – the largest of the fields, discovered and put into operation in Russia in the last 25 years. The field is situated in the Turukhansky district of Krasnoyarsk Territory, 142 km away from the city of Igarka. The initial recoverable reserves of the Vankor field by the January 1st 2015 are estimated at 476 mln. tons of oil and condensate and 173 bln. cubic meters of gas. The acreage of the field is 447 square km.
In 2014 Vankor produced 22 mln tons of oil which exceeds the results of 2013 by more than 3%. The daily output is more than 60, 000 tons. Thanks to implemented technological solutions, oil recovery factor at Vankor is one of the highest in Russia. The field is drilled with the inclined- and production- injection wells with horizontal ending which provides high well flow rates. The process of oil production is fully automated.
Ali Shukri Amin is 17-years old, a minor under American law, yet he was just sentenced to eleven years in federal prison. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced as an adult for providing material support for terrorists. This is a crime defined in any way the government wants it to be. Amin had a twitter account, @amreekiwitness, devoted to the group Islamic State, ISIS. He also helped a friend travel to Syria in hopes of joining ISIS. That is the substance of his crime, online opinion and facilitating travel.
The crime of providing material support for terrorists only came into existence with the Patriot Act passed in the aftermath of the September 11th attacks. There are now people serving very long prison terms for providing humanitarian aid, translating documents, sending money abroad, or expressing views in support of nations or groups the United States classifies as terrorist. These crimes are vaguely defined and are often of little consequence to ISIS or any other organization the federal government designates as an enemy.
The prosecutions of Amin and others are meant to make the case for continuing the “war on terror.” This is actually a war of American terror used to justify endless interventions around the world. The Department of Justice would have us believe that a teenager tweeting about making donations to ISIS via bitcoin posed a serious threat. Of course, the United States government is the biggest threat to life in the world. It is the most violent organization with the largest number of kills.
The application of the material support for terror statute is used to capture innocent or harmless people. Some are hoodwinked by agent provocateurs or, like Amin, pose little or no danger. Most importantly, ISIS would not be a credible force in Syria or Libya were it not for American machinations. The United States created the monster and now wants to punish anyone who interacts with it.
At one point Amin, who lived in a Virginia suburb of Washington, DC, had over 4,000 twitter followers who conversed about a variety of issues, including protests in Ferguson, Missouri.
“They cower in fear of us whilst they massacre and oppress you! It’s time to strike fear into the hearts of the oppressors. #FergusonUnderIS”
“May be time to organize Muslims in America upon haqq and mobilize to #Ferguson. Defend the oppressed, start jihad here.”
While Amin and thousands of others expressed their outrage about deadly police brutality, the State Department actually engaged in online debates with the teenager. A bizarre social media program called Think Again, Turn Away is a useless attempt to influence young Muslims who want to fight imperialism through jihad. Aside from having a name reminiscent of a love song title, the effort allowed Amin to engage in argument with and troll the State Department. When the would-be jihad deprogrammers pointed out that ISIS “slaughters innocent people,” Amin had a ready and accurate retort:
“slaughter innocents? You mean like AbdurRahman al-Awlaki, the 16 year old boy not involved with any militants? or what about the thousands killed in drone strikes weekly that make the news? The thousands that don’t? you are nothing more than criminals who betray the Muslims you claim to defend across the globe, butchering them 1.7 million in Iraq, hundreds of thousands in Afghanistan, left, right, everywhere. only an ignoramus who knows nothing about American foreign policy or any Muslim country could accept your lies.”
A few months after these embarrassing interactions, Amin’s mother and his imam unwisely reported him to the FBI in an effort to stop his online involvement with ISIS. He would not have been discovered otherwise.
Killer cops roam the streets with no fear of federal prosecution, but a confused teenager is sent to prison because he holds and expresses opinions contrary to those of the government. Prosecutors use children to make names for themselves and climb the ladder in a corrupt system. American terror is not just carried out abroad with drone strikes and invasions, but it is carried out on a daily basis by the criminal injustice system.
While the Saudis, Israelis and their allies use American money and arms to target civilians for death, anyone who crosses over the thin line of expression is at risk of prosecution and many years in prison. The hypocrisy is stunning but not really surprising. This system will use a child to make its point clear. We live in a police state and anyone who dares to speak up against it is at risk of being made an example.
The federal government does not operate any juvenile facilities. Ali Shukri Amin is now in custody in an adult facility. One need not be a follower of ISIS to see that this is a gross injustice unworthy of a country which claims to be a democracy.
Saudi Arabia’s Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques King Salman is holding historic talks with American President Barack Obama that could ensure significant headway in bringing peace to the troubled Middle East, the Royal Court said in a statement on Thursday.
King Salman and Obama will discuss a range of bilateral, regional and international issues, with the king aiming to push for more support to counter Iran after it agreed to a nuclear deal, the statement said.
Despite the Gulf Cooperation Council’s disappointment with Obama’s push for a nuclear deal with Iran and his lack of direct action in Syria, the role of the United States in Riyadh’s war in Yemen shows Washington remains the Kingdom’s core strategic partner.
The statement added that King Salman’s visit is part of his broader diplomatic initiative that calls for talks with world leaders “to safeguard the interests of the Saudi people and the Islamic world, and to reaffirm the bonds of friendship between the Kingdom and the United States.” Foreign Minister Adel Al-Jubeir and his counterpart John Kerry met in Washington on Wednesday to review preparations for the royal visit.
Commenting on the visit, Zuhair Al-Harthi, a member of the foreign affairs committee at the Shoura Council, said that “the summit talks between King Salman and Obama come at a time when the region is in political turmoil.” He said that Saudi Arabia “believes in direct dialogue and meetings and, therefore, the king’s visit and his meetings with leaders of that influential country will have deeper repercussions.”
Al-Harthi hoped that the leaders would find “solutions for pending problems, notably those related to Syria, Yemen, Iran, and terrorism.” He said the forthcoming summit would play a pivotal role in shoring up relations between the two countries to push Washington into re-shaping its policies and priorities, and therefore ensure security and stability in the Middle East.
Palestinian Ambassador to Riyadh Basim Al-Agha described the visit of King Salman and his upcoming meeting with Obama as “important in terms of timing and meaning.” He hoped that King Salman would discuss the Palestinian issue with the American leaders.
Ben Rhodes, United States deputy national security adviser, said that “this is an important visit at an important time with the many developments in the region; where we have a shared interest.”
“Even as we work together to tackle challenges in the region — security and stability — we also have, of course, a very longstanding, long-established collaboration across a whole range of issues, including education, commerce, health, energy and other issues,” said another White House official.
“And we expect the two leaders will discuss ways to continue to promote security in the region, coordinating more closely to address Iran’s destabilizing activities in the region, as well as the broader threat from extremism and terrorism in the region,” he said.
A transcript of the press call released by the United States embassy in Riyadh said that “the US is going to focus on discussing with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf partners how we can build more effective capabilities and cooperation to counter that Iranian activity.” To this end, the White House officials said that “we need to ensure that we’re doing everything we can to counter Iran’s destabilizing activities in the region.”
On other regional issues, Rhodes said that the leaders would have “a very significant set of discussions on conflicts such as Syria and Yemen where we would support and share many of the objectives that Saudi Arabia has.” “At the same time, we want to make sure that we’re pursuing both military and political strategies in both of those cases, and that we are both committing the humanitarian assistance necessary to deal with grave situations in again both Syria and Yemen,” he said.
On Iraq, Rhodes said that Saudi Arabia has significant relationships in Iraq that can be utilized to support the ongoing effort against Daesh. “We’ve been very focused, for instance, on Anbar Province and deepening our support with the community, including Sunni tribal communities.” He said “Saudi Arabia can be a constructive voice in encouraging cooperation across different Iraqi communities.”
Climate change is real, it is being driven by human activity, and it is happening right now—and nowhere is that more apparent than in Alaska, which is warming twice as fast as the continental United States, the White House said this week.
In a FactSheet released, the White House said that in Arctic Alaska, villages are being damaged by powerful storm surges, which once held at bay by sea ice, are battering the barrier islands where those villages sit. Alaska Native traditions that have set the rhythm of life in Alaska for thousands of years are being upended by decreasing sea-ice cover and changing seasonal patterns. Permafrost is melting, opening up sinkholes and causing damage to homes and infrastructure.
According to the White House, President Obama is committed to leading the fight against climate change by curbing the carbon pollution that is driving global warming, building resilience in American communities to the climate impacts we can no longer avoid, and driving progress on the international stage.
Obama announces robust package of new commitments to respond to the unique challenges facing remote Alaskan communities by:
Building resilience to climate impacts
Addressing high energy costs by incentivizing clean energy and energy-efficiency solutions
Releasing new climate data, maps, and tools to help communities understand and prepare for future climate change
Building Climate Resilience In Remote Alaskan Communities:
Announcing a Federal coordinator for building climate resilience in Alaska. The White House will announce that the Denali Commission will play a lead coordination role for Federal, State and Tribal resources to assist communities in developing and implementing both short- and long-term solutions to address the impacts of climate change, including coastal erosion, flooding, and permafrost degradation. The Denali Commission will serve as a one-stop-shop for matters relating to coastal resilience in Alaska as appropriate. The Commission, an independent federal agency, was established in 1998 to provide critical utilities, infrastructure, and economic support throughout Alaska with a focus on Alaska’s remote communities. The Commission will collaborate with the State of Alaska local and Tribal agencies to facilitate coordination of federal engagement in efforts to protect communities, and conduct voluntary relocation or other managed retreat efforts. The Arctic Executive Steering Committee (AESC), established by President Obama in January 2015, will provide guidance and support these efforts as appropriate, as part of its mission to enhance coordination of U.S. government activities in the Arctic, help set priorities across diverse missions and programs, and provide the basis for a whole-of-government approach to the future of the Arctic.
Beyond the broader mitigation and resilience work of the Denali Commission, the Commission will announce today that it is committing $2 million to support voluntary relocation efforts, where appropriate, and other resilience strategies for vulnerable rural Alaskan communities.
These steps build on the Administration’s support to date for the Denali Commission. The President’s FY 2016 Budget requested $14 million for the Denali Commission, and the President calls on Congress to provide sufficient funding for the Commission’s critical activities and looks forward to working with Congress, the Commission, Alaska elected officials and stakeholders to further enhance the Commission’s effectiveness and impact for rural Alaskan communities.
Announcing Department of Agriculture (USDA) grants to improve rural Alaska water systems. Responding to a key recommendation of the Alaska Native Tribal Health Consortium, USDA will finalize a rule that revises definitions and eligibility of the Rural Alaska Villages Grant Program so that in certain circumstances water system conditions do not have to be “dire” before assistance can be provided. As a result, vulnerable Alaskan villages will not have to wait until disaster strikes to improve critical water infrastructure. This unlocks significant resources for resilience planning. To that end, today, USDA will announce that it will provide $15.9 million in new grants for 17 projects as part of the Rural Alaska Villages Grant Program, which helps remote Alaskan villages provide safe, reliable drinking water and waste-disposal systems for households and businesses. Separately, EPA’s programs will provide resources for the construction of new or improved drinking water and wastewater systems in Native and rural communities, and for training and technical assistance on Operations & Maintenance (O&M) for these systems. USDA planning and construction grants will be awarded to the following communities:
Alaska Native Tribal Health Consortium: $425,000
Adak: $1,269,750
Angoon: $52,500
Diomede: $183,750
False Pass: $45,000
Grayling: $52,500
Kaltag: $37,500
Kasaan: $37,500
Kiana: $273,750
Kotzebue: $56,250
Nunam Iqua: $112,800
Old Harbor: $18,750
South Naknek: $60,000
Eek: $4,290,600
State of Alaska: $425,000
Kwethluk: $2,218,500
Akiachak: $6,378,750
Releasing a compendium of Federal resilience programs for Alaskan communities. Today, the AESC will release a catalog of programs and funding resources that may assist Arctic coastal communities in addressing resilience needs. While a variety of programs and authorities are available for villages and communities to prepare for and respond to coastal erosion issues, no compendium of available sources of assistance existed that is tailored to the needs of Arctic communities. To fill that gap, Federal agencies, through the AESC, have collaborated to develop this catalog, which is available through the Denali Commission and on the U.S. Climate Resilience Toolkit.
Investing in capacity in remote tribal communities. USDA intends to sign cooperative agreements totaling $240,000 with four Native nonprofit organizations in western Alaska, charged with extending the reach of USDA staff and improving access of hard-to-reach populations to USDA Rural Development programs—including housing, community facilities, wastewater systems, and broadband. Cooperative agreements will be made with each of the following regions:
Northwest Arctic Region: Maniilaq Association, headquartered in Kotzebue – $37,000
Bering Straits Region: Kawerak Inc, headquartered in Nome – $46,000
Yukon Kuskokwim Delta Region: Association of Village council Presidents, headquartered in Bethel- $120,000
Bristol Bay Region: Bristol Bay Native Association, headquartered in Dillingham – $37,000
Launching Resilience AmeriCorps in Alaska. The Corporation for National and Community Service (CNCS), the Department of Energy (DOE), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) have partnered with The Rockefeller Foundation and Cities of Service to launch Resilience AmeriCorps, a pilot program that will recruit, train, and embed AmeriCorps VISTA members in 10 communities throughout the United States. Among the communities selected for the 2-year pilot program is Anchorage, AK. Resilience AmeriCorps responds to a recommendation made by the President’s State, Local, and Tribal Leaders Task Force on Climate Preparedness and Resilience to assist vulnerable communities that lack the capacity to address climate-resilience planning and implementation.
Developing equitable and responsible principles for relocation. In response to the recommendations of the State, Local, and Tribal Leaders Task Force on Climate Change Preparedness and Resilience, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) is developing a set of cross-agency principles for climate-related relocation and managed retreat from high-risk areas in the United States. These principles will strengthen the consideration of equity and other issues when using HUD funds for voluntary relocation of communities. Additionally, as part of outreach for this effort, HUD, in compliance with its Tribal Government-to-Government Consultation Policy, will engage with Arctic coastal villages as a model for fostering future collaboration with other regions, and will engage in an ongoing dialogue with the Environmental Justice Interagency Working Group on the process.
Enhancing community-based monitoring. NOAA contributed nearly $300,000 for a project to foster adaptation in Alaska Native coastal communities to maintain or improve their health and vitality over time by anticipating and adapting to change. The project, Resilient Alaska Native Coastal Communities: Integrated Social-ecological Monitoring and Assessment Supporting Adaptation Decisions, will continue for two years in partnership with the Alaska Institute for Justice, Alaska Native Science Commission, University of Alaska, the Alaska Native Tribal Health Consortium, and the University of Victoria. In August, the Alaska Institute for Justice began designing a community-based social-ecological monitoring and assessment methodology that will be used and implemented by Alaska Native communities.
Providing guidance for tribal disaster declarations. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) will soon commence consultation on pilot guidance for tribes to request Stafford Act declarations. The pilot guidance is intended to reflect the unique circumstances that impact tribal communities. In order to reflect tribal sovereignty, the Sandy Recovery Improvement Act of 2013 amended the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act to provide Federally-recognized Tribal governments the option to request a Presidential emergency or major disaster declaration. FEMA will utilize lessons learned and feedback received during the consultation period to inform the final pilot guidance.
Recommending how to reduce vulnerabilities in Tribal energy systems. DOE’s Office of Indian Energy is releasing a report on Tribal Energy System Vulnerabilities to Climate Change, which focuses on impacts to energy systems that support Tribal communities. This report furthers the President’s and the Secretary’s goals of preparing the United States and Tribal Nations for the impacts of climate change by building stronger and safer communities through awareness and education. The report includes a focus on Alaskan communities.
Engaging Tribal youth in climate solutions. The EPA’s Indian Environmental General Assistance Program (IGAP) and the Arctic Council, through a grant provided to the Alaska Native Tribal Health Consortium, is releasing a Local Environmental Observer (LEO) App, which will allow observers to share photos and text from the field, complete with GPS locations. The LEO Network provides a model for engaging communities and connecting with technical experts and resources to allow communities to monitor, respond to, and adapt to new impacts and health effects. LEO experts apply local and traditional knowledge, western science and modern technology to record and share observations and to raise awareness about the conditions in the circumpolar north.
Additionally, today the Bureau of Indian Affairs’ (BIA) Tribal Climate Resilience Program will award $1.38 million to support internships for tribal youth working on projects or performing research directly related to climate change impacts. The Program will support internships and research related to climate change mitigation, adaptation, and ocean and coastal management.
Additional Nonfederal Actions:
Partnering at the forefront of community resilience in Southeast Alaska. The Sustainable Southeast Partnership (SSP) is announcing over $5 million in private sector commitments. SSP is a new partnership that approaches community and economic development by supporting projects and businesses that improve the economy, social structures of the communities, and well-being of the environment. Southeast Alaska communities face issues around environmental changes, high unemployment rates, sustainable resource management, energy independence, and food security. The partners will use the private funds in conjunction with public funding to support large-scale community forest and fisheries projects, new workforce development initiatives, a business development competition and a revolving loan fund–all rooted in environmental sustainability. SSP is comprised of Alaska Native tribes and corporations, regional economic development entities, conservation organizations, and local municipalities. Lead partners include Haa Aani, LLC., the Alaska Conservation Foundation, Southeast Conference, Sealaska, and The Nature Conservancy.
Understanding impacts to health in Alaska due to climate change. The University of Alaska Anchorage’s Institute for Circumpolar Health Studies (ICHS) today will release a report describing significant associations between unusual climatic conditions and increased incidence of injuries and respiratory problems in Alaska, and received $149,990 from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) to work with community partners to promote adaptations that reduce adverse health outcomes associated with climate change in rural and remote communities in the state. The ICHS, with funding from the CDC, has conducted two rounds of community-based sentinel surveillance of the health effects of climate change in Alaska.
Building Resilient Communities in the Tongass National Forest. Sealaska Native Corporation, the State of Alaska, Sustainable Southeast Partnership, U.S. Forest Service, Haa Aani’ Community Development Fund LLC, and several Native Village Corporations are announcing a new $9 million collaboration to focus on shared goals of community resilience. Communities, businesses, Native interests and conservation NGOs are leaving behind past conflicts over old growth logging on the Tongass National Forest and are working together to develop workforce and entrepreneurial capacity while accomplishing sustainable forest management into the future. These efforts will be supported by significant private and public sector support with more than $5 million in private funding and another $4 million in federal and state funding flowing into the region.
Expanding Access To Clean Energy Solutions:
Launching a remote Alaskan Communities Energy Efficiency Competition. Today, the Department of Energy is announcing that it will launch a new $4 million initiative to significantly accelerate efforts by remote Alaskan communities to adopt sustainable energy strategies, through a competitive effort to elicit the best approaches. The $4 million competition will empower Alaskan communities to develop solutions that can effectively advance the use of reliable, affordable, clean-energy and energy-efficient solutions that can be replicated throughout Alaska and potentially in other Arctic regions as well.
The initiative will support community efforts to adopt culturally and climate-appropriate energy-efficiency measures by evaluating community energy use; developing long-term, sustainable, and replicable energy-efficiency plans; and supporting the implementation of proposed plans.
Launching Clean Energy Solutions for Remote Communities (CESRC). On Tuesday, Dr. Holdren and Governor Walker hosted a roundtable including the Denali Commission, the Alaska Energy Authority, and The Renewable Energy Alaska Project as part of the launch of Climate Solutions for Remote Communities. Building on the Clean Energy Investment Initiative announced earlier this year, CESRC will focus on expanding investment in climate solutions for remote communities, including: (1) identifying the technological, financial, and logistical challenges and opportunities particular to clean energy innovation addressing the needs and unique circumstances of remote communities and (2) catalyzing the private-sector through a call to action to substantially increase investment to develop climate solutions addressing the unique issues facing remote communities. The Department of Energy will provide technical expertise to achieve these goals.
Energy costs are among the most significant expenses in remote communities, many of which rely on costly diesel generators to provide power and heat. Over the past decade, Alaska has focused on bringing cleaner, cheaper energy to our many isolated rural communities, where residents pay up to 50 percent of their household income on energy. Sustainably reducing energy costs, reducing carbon pollution, and improving the energy efficiency of homes and other buildings will require designing and deploying clean energy technologies and microgrids that are suited for remote communities. In June, the White House announced $4 billion of independent commitments by major foundations, institutional investors, and other long-term investors to fund climate change solutions, including innovative technologies with breakthrough potential to reduce carbon pollution, as part of the Clean Energy Investment Initiative.
Deploying clean energy and energy efficiency projects on Indian Lands. In support of the Obama Administration’s commitment to strengthening partnerships with Tribal Nations and to support tribal energy development, the Department of Energy today will announce up to $6 million to deploy clean energy projects and energy efficiency projects on Indian lands, reducing reliance on fossil fuel and promoting economic development. Through this Funding Opportunity Announcement, the Department’s Office of Indian Energy is soliciting applications from Indian tribes (including Alaska Native regional corporations and village corporations) and Tribal Energy Resource Development Organizations to install (1) facility-scale clean energy and energy efficiency projects and (2) community-scale clean energy projects on Indian lands. Tribal lands comprise nearly two percent of U.S. land, but contain about five percent of all the country’s renewable energy resources. With more than 9 million megawatts of potential installed renewable energy capacity on tribal lands, these tribal communities are well positioned to capitalize on their energy resources for local economic growth.
Lowering energy costs through High Energy Cost Grants in rural Alaska. USDA will award approximately $8 million in High Energy Cost grants, which assist power providers in lowering energy costs for families and individuals in areas with extremely high per-household energy costs. The Rural Utilities Service (RUS) High Energy Cost Grant program has provided over $48 million in grants for villages in rural Alaska since 2009. Among this year’s awards, RUS will provide $1.5 million to the Denali Commission to assist its partners in improving electric infrastructure in rural and remote villages in Alaska. Additionally, USDA RUS will release the 2015 Notice of Solicitation of Applications (NOSA), making available an additional $10 million in new grant funds.
Announcing Denali Commission grants in rural Alaska. The Denali Commission will announce approximately $15.5 million in grants to support bulk fuel facilities and rural power system upgrades/power generation across rural Alaska. Funds will be provided from the Denali Commission’s programmatic funds as well as the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Liability Fund (TAPL). Projects include:
Pilot Station community bulk fuel tank farm, a $4.7M total project cost ($3.8M in Denali Commission FY2015 TAPL funds and $900K in State of Alaska cost share match)
Togiak Power plant project, $7.8M total project cost ($4.2M in Denali Commission FY2015 Base funds, $1.4M in awardee cost share match, $2.2M RUS FY14 funds)
Koliganek Power plant project, $3.3M total project cost ($2.4M in Denali Commission FY2015 Base funds, $600K in State of Alaska cost share match, plus $300K from a prior year Commission grant for design)
Additional Nonfederal Actions:
Investing in biomimic clean energy. A partnership between The Village of Igiugig, Caltech, Stanford, and the University of Alaska will undertake tests of new wind turbines and has attracted $2 million in funding from the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation. The partners are exploring a new approach to vertical axis wind power, using large sets of small and simple turbines, arrayed to mimic schooling fish. The biology-inspired engineering may provide wind solutions for the many areas globally where large turbines are not feasible. The project is just another example of how this small village in Bristol Bay is leading on issues of sustainability, climate change, and emerging clean energy technology. Igiugig has also partnered with Ocean Renewable Power Company to test fish-friendly, hydrokinetic power on the Kvichak River—the river is home to vast runs of wild sockeye salmon that have sustained the people of the region for thousands of years. Emerging technologies like these have the potential to meet community electricity demands in remote villages like Igiugig, where the cost of electricity ranges from 50 to 90 cents per kilowatt-hour.
Investing in LED technology in Anchorage. The Anchorage Mayor’s office is announcing a $4-6 million dollar plan to install LED roadway lighting across parking lots, roadways, garages, trails, and other outdoor lighting installations. In 2008, the city was the first in the world to replace over one quarter of its roadway lighting with LED technologies, saving the city $260,000 dollars a year and reducing energy consumption by nearly 60%. This effort made the city of Anchorage a model for other cities across the globe on how to finance and implement this breakthrough in outdoor lighting efficiency. Saving both energy and taxpayer dollars, the new lighting will also require less ongoing maintenance and reduce Sky-Glow.”
Announcing a public-private partnership to achieve 99.7 percent clean energy. In the coming days, Kodiak Island will begin testing a renewable-energy-powered shipping crane in a $3 million public-private partnership that will enable the island to become the first in the world to put flywheel and battery energy storage together to stabilize its variable electric power from wind turbines. The nation’s second largest island recently achieved 99.7 percent renewable-powered electricity from wind, hydro and now augmented by flywheels. The City of Kodiak, Matson, Inc. and Kodiak Electric Association (KEA), a nonprofit member-owned rural electric cooperative, combined efforts to finance this renewable power source for a newly-arrived shipping crane that is replacing the current diesel-powered crane. KEA completed a conversion to 99.7 percent renewable electricity by adding the energy storage to 9 MW of wind that complements the utility’s hydropower plant. Wind is now supplying approximately 20 percent of KEA’s load, displacing more than 2 million gallons of diesel every year. This conversion from fossil fuels has been supported by the State of Alaska’s Renewable Energy Fund, managed by the Alaska Energy Authority, in conjunction with strong local leadership from the Kodiak Electric Association.
Announcing a Clean Power Forum. In October 2015, the Alaska Center for the Environment will host a Clean Power forum, designed to kick off a series of conversations about how Alaska can reduce emissions, increase renewable energy production and energy efficiency measures, and become a true leader addressing climate change.
Releasing New Climate Data And Tools:
Mapping Alaska and the Arctic. Much of Alaska and the Arctic lack modern, reliable maps needed to support capabilities and activities including ground and air transportation, safe recreation, land management, sustainable development, and scientific studies. The Federal Government is taking action to meet this need:
The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), and NSF are collaborating with the University of Minnesota’s Polar Geospatial Center and, the private sector to create the first-ever publicly available, high-resolution, satellite-based elevation map of Alaska by mid-2016, and of the entire Arctic by the end of the U.S. Chairmanship of the Arctic Council (mid-2017). These Digital Elevation Models (DEMs), derived from NGA-sponsored Digital Globe commercial imagery, will support informed land management, sustainable development, safe recreation, and scientific studies, as well as domain-specific challenges inherent to the aviation, transportation, and defense industries. In addition, the DEM will serve as a benchmark against which future landscape changes (due to, for instance, erosion, extreme events, or climate change) can be measured.
DOI/USGS, in partnership with the State of Alaska, is leading efforts to fly the Alaskan Arctic with new sensors, generating Interferometric Synthetic Aperature Radar (IfSAR) data that will complement Alaska and Arctic DEMs, improving maps and elevation models of these regions to unprecedented levels of accuracy.
NGA has developed and is making available in both hard-copy and explorable-digital formats the most comprehensive pan-Arctic map ever published by the U.S. Government. The map will include layers such as Arctic Routes, Arctic Currents, Oil Production Sites, Gas Production Sites, Oil Drilling Areas, Oil and Gas Reserves, Airfields and Ports, Bathymetric Data, Digital Terrain Elevation Data, and Natural Earth (including rivers, railroads, and populated places). The map will be easily accessible on the NGA’s website, along with links to Alaska DEMs, the NGA’s 28 nautical charts for the Arctic region, a collection of Arctic sailing directions, and links to other Arctic websites and resources.
Nonfederal entities are also stepping up to meet this challenge:
Esri is committing to deploy and provide easy access to DEMs as they are released, along with supporting maps and climate data, tools, and applications to improve climate resilience for citizens, communities, and companies in Alaska and the Arctic. Esri will also release newly developed tools for exploring and visualizing the new elevation data, including tools for generating on-the-fly renderings of various terrain properties and tools that help communicate the scale of glacial retreat.
As the DEMs are publicly released, Google will load these datasets into the Google Earth Engine platform and make them available to scientific partners who are monitoring the Earth’s changing environment. This will help researchers and other users analyze landcover change, predict coastal erosion, monitor changes in glaciers, and more accurately characterize water supplies, among other applications.
Expanding access to Arctic data and tools. The Administration is expanding its Climate Data Initiative (CDI) and Climate Resilience Toolkit (CRT) to include a new “Arctic” theme. The Arctic theme will encompass more than 250 Arctic-related datasets (32 of which are being made available for the first time), and more than 40 maps, tools, and other resources designed to support climate-resilience efforts in Alaska and the Arctic, including 10 “Taking Action” case studies in key areas of climate-change risks and vulnerability for Alaska and the Arctic. The Administration also recently expanded the CRT to include a new “Tribal Nations” theme, comprised of more than 40 resources—with more to be added in the future—to assist Tribal nations in climate-change planning, adaptation, and mitigation. Resources include a comprehensive Tribal Climate Change Adaptation Planning Toolkit, and a set of guidelines for considering traditional knowledge in climate change initiatives. These datasets and resources are now cataloged on, respectively, climate.data.gov and toolkit.climate.gov, making them easier for innovators, decision makers, and interested members of the public to find and use. In addition, the Administration is engaging the private sector around the CDI and CRT to help accelerate the development and deployment of products, tools, and applications powered by open Arctic data to help Alaskan and other northern communities better understand their vulnerability to, and prepare for, the impacts of climate change.
Sri Lanka’s Speaker Karu Jayasuriya informed Parliament that leader of Tamil National Alliance (TNA), Mr Rajavarothyam Sampanthan was recognized as opposition leader in parliament.
The TNA is the third largest party in Sri Lanka’s Parliament with 16 seats.
The two main parties, the UNP and the UPFA agreed to form a National Government.
The number of unemployed registered with the Public Employment Services rose by 21,679 in August, 0.54% up on the previous month. Over the last eight years, unemployment has increased by an average of 50,564 in the month of August.
However, in seasonally-adjusted terms, recorded unemployment fell by 5,723 in August. Seasonally-adjusted unemployment has fallen in 26 of the last 28 months.
Recorded unemployment has fallen by 359,975 over the last 12 months, the largest reduction since current records began in a month of August. The year-on-year fall in unemployment stands at 8.1%.
Following this reduction, the total number of unemployed now stands at 4,067,955.
Unemployment among the under-25s fell once again in August, and by 51,902 year-on-year, at a rate of decline of 13.4%.
Recorded unemployment has fallen among those who most recently worked in the agriculture sector by 5,964 (down 2.98%). It has increased among those from the construction sector by 4,643 (up 1.02%), from the industrial sector by 5,802 (up 1.49%) and from the services sector by 22,876 (up 0.87%). Unemployment among first-time job-seekers fell by 5,678 (down 1.59%).
Recorded unemployment fell in six autonomous regions, particularly in Galicia (down 2,639), the Canary Islands (down 1,257) and Asturias (down 1,057). In contrast, it rose in 11 regions, headed up by the Region of Valencia (7,614) and Catalonia (4,521).
Permanent full-time employment rose by 16.4% in the year to date.
A total of 1,248,146 new employment contracts were signed in August, an increase of 9.96% on the same month in 2014.
Permanent full-time employment was the form of employment to rise most on August 2014, with an increase of 10.96%.
In the first eight months of the year, permanent employment grew by 14 % on the same period last year, while permanent full-time employment grew by 16.41%.
The improvement in the job market is structural.
The State Secretary for Employment, Juan Pablo Riesgo, stressed that the figures published on Wednesday “confirm the improvement in the Spanish labour market”, and show that “unemployment continues to fall, if the seasonal element is disregarded and that the strong rate of falling unemployment over the last year is being maintained”.
“We are well aware that there remains a lot more to be done because over four million people are still looking for a job but cannot find one”, said Juan Pablo Riesgo. He went on to add that the Government of Spain “is working extremely hard for there to be more jobs of ever-increasing quality”.
The Australian-British Rio Tinto Mining & Exploration Ltd. (Rio Tinto) has completed the second phase of exploration work on the promising Gava area (Namangan region of Uzbekistan), the State Committee for Geology and Mineral Resources (Goskomgeo) of Uzbekistan told Trend Sept. 3.
The results of exploration will be analyzed before late 2015, and after that Rio Tinto will make a decision on its further work in Uzbekistan, according to the source.
The source did not disclose the parameters of the drilling, but said that the company fulfills all the financial obligations provided by the license agreement.
It was previously reported that the Uzbek State Committee for Geology and Mineral Resources issued a license to the Rio Tinto in December 2012 for geological survey at the Gava area, which is promising in terms of copper deposits.
The license was granted for five years. The searches are carried out under the terms of business risk.
The operator company Gava Exploration LLC (a wholly owned subsidiary of the Rio Tinto) was established for operations in Uzbekistan. Rio Tinto held preliminary geological exploration in June 2013 in the Gava area.
The three-year exploration program of Rio Tinto, designed for 2013-2015, was estimated at $3 million, and in 2015 – at $1 million.
Earlier, representatives of Rio Tinto said that in the case of positive results, the company can invest in geological exploration for copper in Uzbekistan up to $100 million.
Earlier, the Rio Tinto representatives said that if there were positive results, the company would invest up to $100 million in the exploration for copper in Uzbekistan.
At present, there are about 900 Uzbekistan ore occurance and copper deposits, but only three fields of them are commissioned, which are concentrated in the Almalyk Tashkent region.
Almalyk MMC is the only copper producer in Uzbekistan and one of the largest producers of nonferrous metals in the Central Asian region.
Why aren’t there more lions? That was what puzzled McGill PhD student Ian Hatton, when he started looking at the proportion of predators to prey across dozens of parks in East and Southern Africa.
In this case, the answer had nothing to do with isolated human hunters. The parks were teeming with potentially tasty treats for the lions. So one might imagine that the population of lions in each park would increase to match the available prey. Instead, what Hatton and the McGill-led team discovered was that, in a very systematic way, in crowded settings, prey reproduced less than they did in settings where their numbers were smaller. Moreover, they found this same pattern in a whole range of different ecosystems.
It’s a surprising finding that suggests a level of organizational structure and function in ecosystems that had not previously been recognized. Although biologists have long known of very regular mathematical laws governing functions in the body like metabolism and growth, no study has ever shown that similar kinds of laws may exist at a whole other level: that of ecosystems globally. Some scientists are already suggesting that it may well be the discovery of a new law of nature.
It came about by chance.
High school holidays
“I went to high school in Zimbabwe and spent vacations in the National parks there,” said Hatton, the lead author of the study that was just published in Science. “When I began my PhD in biology at McGill, I wanted to go back and compare whole communities of African animals across protected ecosystems to see how the numbers of carnivores are related to their herbivore prey at the scale of whole landscapes. So I gathered all the animal census data I could for parks in east and southern Africa.”
When Hatton and his colleagues then started putting it all together and crunching the numbers, summing up all the carnivores (lion, hyena, leopard, etc.) and herbivores (buffalo, zebra, impala, etc.) in these parks, they found a very unexpected and regular pattern. In every park they looked at, there seemed to be a very consistent relationship of predator to prey. But not in the simple pattern they might have expected to find.
Some surprising calculations
“Until now, the assumption has been that when there is a lot more prey, you’d expect correspondingly more predators,” said Hatton. “But as we looked at the numbers, we discovered instead, that in the lushest ecosystems, no matter where they are in the world, the ratio of predators to their prey is greatly reduced. This is because with greater crowding, prey species have fewer offspring for every individual. In effect, the prey’s rates of reproduction are limited, which limits the abundance of predators.”
Once they observed this pattern in one setting, the researchers then began analyzing data about food pyramids, and the relationship between predators and prey in ecosystems as varied as the Indian Ocean, the Canadian Arctic and the tropical rainforests. Over the course of the next few years they analyzed data gathered about both plants and animals from more than 1000 studies done over the past 50 years covering a range of grassland, lake, forest and ocean ecosystems around the world.
In all these different settings, they found a surprising consistency in the relation of predators to prey, and confirmation that rather than the numbers of predators increasing to match the available prey, predator populations are limited by the rate at which prey reproduce.
“We kept being astonished,” said Kevin McCann, of Guelph University’s Department of Integrated Biology, one of the study’s co-authors. “This is just an amazing pattern.”
A new law of nature?
What the researchers also found intriguing was that the growth patterns they saw across whole ecosystems, where large numbers of prey seemed naturally to reproduce less, were very similar to the patterns of growth in individuals. “Physiologists have long known that the speed of growth declines with size,” said co-author Jonathan Davies from McGill’s Dept. of Biology. “The cells in an elephant grow more than 100 times more slowly than those of a mouse.”
“The discovery of ecosystem-level scaling laws is particularly exciting,” added co-author Michel Loreau, adjunct professor in McGill’s Biology Dept. and currently at the Centre national de recherché scientifique (CNRS) in France. “Their most intriguing aspect is that they recur across levels of organization, from individuals to ecosystems, and yet ecosystem-level scaling laws cannot be explained by their individual-level counterparts. It seems that some basic processes reemerge across levels of organization, but we do not yet fully understand which ones and why.”
The research was funded by the National Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada (NSERC)
First published in Europe in 1947 by Marcia Brown after World War II, many children have grown up reading a classic story titled “Stone Soup.” Most of us are probably familiar with this tale, based on French folklore, of three hungry and tired soldiers approaching a village where the peasants hid their meager rations of food upon learning of their approach. In a wily and enterprising solution, the soldiers begin boiling a large pot of water in the town square as they profess to make soup from three small stones. The people of the village, impressed by this notion, begin contributing bits and pieces of meat and vegetables to create a meal for everyone, thus highlighting the power and importance of cooperation and what small contributions by all can produce for the greater good.
The overarching theme of this story still resonates today, particularly among North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries. During the 50th anniversary of the Munich Security Conference on February 1, 2014, then–Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel outlined “renewed and enhanced” partnership and cooperation with NATO as a fundamental component of our National Security Strategy:
In reviewing U.S. defense priorities, tempered by our fiscal realities, it’s clear that our military must place an even greater strategic emphasis on working with our allies and partners around the world. . . . The United States will engage European allies to collaborate more closely, especially in helping build the capabilities of other global partners. We’re developing strategies to address global threats as we build more joint capacity, joint capacity with European militaries. In the face of budget constraints here on this continent, as well as in the United States, we must all invest more strategically to protect military capability and readiness. The question is not just how much we spend, but how we spend together. It’s not just about burdens we share, but opportunities, as well.1
This idea not only sustains the marriage of cooperation the United States has developed for the past 12 years with the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, but also provides an endorsing reminder for Smart Defense outlined by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen at the 2011 Munich Security Conference. During his keynote address, aptly titled “Building Security in an Age of Austerity,” the Secretary General invoked the Alliance to recognize Smart Defense—“how NATO can help nations to build greater security with fewer resources but more coordination and coherence”—as a means to prudently maintain and improve our collective security in a resource constrained environment.2
One year later the Secretary General identified the Connected Forces Initiative (CFI) as a critical component and example of Smart Defense:
Smart Defence is about acquiring the necessary capabilities. Connectivity is about making these capabilities work together most effectively. The Connected Forces Initiative mobilises all of NATO’s resources to strengthen the Allies’ ability to work together in a truly connected way. This is particularly important as we wind down our combat operations in Afghanistan at the end of 2014. I see three areas to focus our efforts in the coming years: expanded education and training; increased exercises, especially with the NATO Response Force; and better use of technology.3
These three important focus areas of CFI are complementary to Secretary Hagel’s defense priorities of collaboration and building joint capacity with our European Allies.
These three focus areas are also manifested within the U.S. Army Chief of Staff Strategic Priorities. These tenets of developing “Adaptive Army Leaders for a Complex World,” sustaining “A Globally Responsive and Regionally Engaged Army,” and maintaining “A Ready and Modern Army” provide nested and necessary guide posts for future operations and engagements, particularly for a Combat Training Center (CTC).4 To that end, the leaders and Soldiers of the U.S. Joint Multinational Training Command (JMTC) headquartered at Grafenwoehr, Germany, to include the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) at Hohenfels, have worked tirelessly to “make soup” with these “three stones” that comprise the CFI and advance the intent of our Army and national defense leadership.
Education and Training
The JMTC, especially throughout the past decade, has been instrumental in preparing U.S. and multinational units for service abroad in operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Kosovo. The state-of-the-art facilities and equipment, maneuver area, and most importantly its proximity to allied and partner nations in Europe have made the JMTC an affordable, accessible, and economical location of choice to train, validate, and certify coalition units to enable their operational success.
Proximity does not directly equal access, however, so the JMTC uses the “3P” approach to developing partnership—persistence, patience, and presence. Once trust, confidence, sincerity, and respect are achieved at all levels of engagement, the access we acquire enables effective training and presents more training opportunities. This access promotes mutual understanding and greater interoperability among soldiers and leaders. Brigadier General Walter Piatt, the JMTC commander, likes to remind us that “Nations do not have relationships, people do. We gain credibility through shared hardship.”5
Global challenges have offered ample occasions to share hardship, but as the United States and NATO prepared to conclude the ISAF mission at the end of 2014, the Alliance is expected to shift its emphasis from operational engagement to operational preparedness. This presents an unprecedented opportunity for education and training with our European partners at JMTC. We can continue to capitalize on the relationships and sustain the partnerships established during a time of war, but with latitude to shift from an operational environment–specific “readiness exercise” to a decisive action “leadership laboratory” with first-class, realistic training against a near-peer competitor tailored to specific objectives and desired outcomes.
While a majority of partnered education and training occurs at JMTC, a tremendous amount of this effort occurs on the home soil of our allied and partner nations. Enabled by geographical proximity, a majority of our senior experienced trainers travel to various countries to conduct leader training programs, specialty training, training center development, and military-to-military cooperation events. This expeditionary capability and ability to export our training expertise has greatly strengthened our partnership with other nations, both reinforcing the U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) and U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) key task of Theater Security Cooperation and, perhaps demonstrated more tangibly, enabled U.S. and multinational units to “enter the box” at a higher level of training readiness when operating together in the field.
An increased level of training readiness obviously contributes to a more successful outcome. More important, completion of a capstone training event that complements home-station training and offers an opportunity to work with other Alliance or partner nations allows units to demonstrate their national capabilities while increasing interoperability, readiness, and collective security. A premier manner to accomplish all of these objectives is through participation in a multinational and multi-echelon named exercise.
Exercises
Exercises in Europe and the JMTC are nothing new—they have been successfully executed for many years under such auspices as the Joint Chiefs of Staff exercise program. What is unique—and enabled by geographical proximity and personal partnership in Europe—is JMTC’s eagerness and initiative to use an exercise construct to increase multinational interoperability and mission command, which are vital components of NATO’s vision of Smart Defense and CFI in achieving enhanced collective security.
In November 2013, the JMTC conducted Exercise Combined Resolve, which was designed as a proof of principle for the European Rotation Force and focused on improving NATO interoperability (nine different nations) by integrating warfighting functions, personnel, and doctrine, while integrating the USEUCOM Army Contingency Response Force company to demonstrate our ability to rapidly mobilize and integrate our forces across a theater of operations to support our allies with a responsive combat force.
Following Army Chief of Staff guidance to Combat Training Centers as a design framework, Combined Resolve also established a standard for future exercises at JMRC. Leader development was paramount as we transitioned from assessing readiness to a focus on leaders at all levels training their subordinate commands. Special operations forces (SOF)–conventional force interdependence was not only maintained, but the inclusion of multinational SOF from France also demonstrated the interoperability required for coalition warfare. JMTC inculcated an expeditionary mindset as the forces from all countries operated out of tactical assembly areas in the austere German winter environment, while leveraging force structure challenges of working with nonorganic enablers such as National Guard engineers, U.S. Close Combat Aviation, and fires provided by Czech Republic Artillery while receiving support from a limited logistics footprint. Finally, the entire exercise scenario exemplified a dynamic operational environment as forces trained in force-on-force missions ranging from combined arms maneuver to wide area security.6
Adding to the complexity of the operational environment, the active participation of our multinational partners during Combined Resolve demonstrated a positive example of the benefits of CFI and fulfilled the NATO Secretary General’s goal of bringing together “modern, tightly connected forces, equipped, trained, exercised, and commanded so that they can operate together, and with partners, in any environment.”7
Given the unparalleled success of this exercise, JMTC began the process of planning Combined Resolve II for May 2014. This exercise, focusing on Army Chief of Staff guidance to support development of responsive forces, will continue as a multinational training event that expands upon the interoperability lessons learned during Combined Resolve I. This iteration will include live-fire gunnery and more force-on-force training days to truly test the rigors of multinational brigade operations and sustainment in a decisive action environment. Fifteen countries and over 3,000 personnel—including the European Response Force from Fort Hood, Texas, as well as numerous joint, multinational, and National Guard partner states—are scheduled to participate in this exercise, making it one of the largest multinational exercise events ever to be hosted at JMTC.
Technology
Given the strong interest and recognized value in conducting multinational exercises, JMTC is working to use technology to expand these training events beyond JMTC to allow multi-echelon training across a connected domain throughout Europe. There are many aspects of technology that drive interoperability and Smart Defense, many of which are beyond the JMTC sphere of influence. Relative to our focus within CFI, however, is leveraging technology to build on our dedication to realistic training and increased exercises that stress enhanced interoperability and NATO compliance. Accordingly, JMTC is developing an initiative to harness network and simulation technology to enable “Connected Training.”
Currently, JMTC supports individual training to collective training, soldiers to brigades, in exercises that blend live, virtual, and constructive events. At the division level and three-star headquarters, JMTC events focus on using both virtual and constructive realms. Technology enables JMTC to conduct exercises that integrate allied forces based in various global locations and has been demonstrated in numerous named regional exercises such as Saber Strike, Saber Guardian, and Saber Junction. Under the auspice of Connected Training, JMTC is now pursuing the capability to conduct simultaneous live exercises that are distributed among partner CTCs throughout Europe.
A majority of USEUCOM and USAREUR partner nations have established fully operational and capable Combat Training Centers with live, virtual, and constructive capabilities. These national CTCs have a unique range of capabilities to host sizable simulated command post exercises with maneuver space to support company- to battalion- level training, as they are modeled and equipped similar to JMTC. They are also an excellent way to minimize training costs as they allow many countries to train at home station or in a neighboring country. This dramatically cuts the costs associated with travel and shipment of large pieces of military equipment as it is cheaper to “push electrons” within a Connected Training network.
Reduced costs for training will undoubtedly lead to continued expansion of the network and larger exercises in support of CFI. Building on years of security cooperation and numerous military-to-military partnership-training events, USAREUR and USEUCOM now have the ability and the capacity to integrate or “connect” a larger number of our allied forces into their training exercises. Furthermore, the opportunity to connect regionally in a distributed environment is no longer limited to the tactical level. We have the capability to connect the tactical to operational level command with a corps headquarters, establishing a joint operations center at the Joint Multinational Simulations Center in Grafenwoehr to control and “fight” the distributed exercise. At the JMRC in Hohenfels, a multinational brigade headquarters conducts a live exercise with subordinate battalions, companies, or adjacent brigade headquarters located at JMTC partner CTCs throughout Europe.
During the post-ISAF environment paradigm shift of emphasis from operational engagement to operational preparedness, the timing and opportunity are right to fully implement and explore the capability of Connected Training. This could serve as an ideal training model for NATO and Allied Land Command as it looks to train its nine NATO Rapid Deployment Corps and the contributing nations of the NATO Response Force, allowing the Alliance to further enhance responsible readiness and collective security. Vigorous exploration and application of Connected Training will build on the success of previous training and exercises while sustaining multinational partnerships and interoperability with our Allies, which will ultimately fulfill the intent defined by Smart Defense and the CFI.
Stirring the Pot
None of this will be easy. In his successful book Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, John Nagl begins by addressing T.E. Lawrence’s aphorism that “Making war upon insurgents is messy and slow, like eating soup with a knife. . . . It is difficult to fully appreciate until you have done it,” he writes in the foreword, “Intellectually grasping the concept . . . is a different thing from implementing the measures required to do it.”8 The same can be said for JMTC partnership and the CFI.
Over the past year, however, the JMTC has fully committed its time, energy, and resources to achieving success “soup” with the three “stone” focus areas of education and training, exercises, and technology. There is more to be accomplished as we expand partnership and pursue technology to fully enable Connected Training, but we are on glide path to achieve irreversible momentum toward realizing the full potential of the CFI and its implications for Smart Defense. The associated gains in collective security for the Alliance with interoperability and increased readiness to face future contingencies and challenges to that security make it all worthwhile.
With NATO CFI as a desired endstate—or waypoint—our ability to move forward will continue to depend on a willingness to apply “blood and treasure” to JMTC. With only two U.S. Brigade Combat Teams in Europe, there may be a natural disposition to assume a robust training center is not required on this continent. However, as long as policy developers and decisionmakers view JMTC as a strategic capability within Europe, with a scope that extends beyond the training and readiness of our own U.S. forces, then a convincing argument can be made that JMTC is a notable “stone soup” that Alliance partners can season. In a resource-constrained environment in particular, the Connected Training opportunities that are afforded by JMTC, with prime proximity and years of productive partnership, are a viable and prudent direction to pursue.
As then-Secretary Hagel noted in Munich, “The challenges and choices before us will demand leadership that reaches into the future without stumbling over the present.”9 While no one can accurately predict the region, type, or scope of the next conflict, most can agree that agile and adaptive readiness is essential for collective security. If we clearly identify with the vision set out by the former Secretary of Defense in maintaining NATO as “the centerpiece of our transatlantic defense partnership,” then the present JMTC initiatives contributing to CFI will continue to extend our security reach for generations to come.
Chuck Hagel, Remarks at the 2014 Munich Security Conference, Munich, Germany, February 1, 2014.
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, Keynote Address at the 2011 Munich Security Conference, Munich, Germany, February 4, 2011.
NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, Remarks at the Allied Command Transformation Seminar, Munich, Washington DC, February 28, 2012.
General Raymond T. Odierno, Chief of Staff of the Army, “Waypoint #2,” February 21, 2014.
Brigadier General Walter Piatt, USA, commander, U.S. Joint Multinational Training Command, Combined Resolve Final Brigade Combat Team After Action Report Notes, November 25, 2013.
Raymond T. Odierno, “Transformation of the Combat Training Centers,” September 4, 2013.
NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, Remarks at the NATO Defence Ministers Meeting, Brussels, Belgium, October 22, 2013.
John A. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), xi–xvi.
Laws prohibiting women from serving in air and naval combat units were repealed in the early 1990s. However, until recently, it has been Department of Defense (DOD) policy to restrict women from certain combat-related units and military occupations, especially ground combat units. Despite the official policies barring women from ground combat positions, many female servicemembers have served in combat environments for much of the recent history of the U.S. military. In the past two decades of conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan, the lines between combat and noncombat roles have become increasingly blurred and as a result DOD’s exclusion policies have been called into question.
As of April 2015, 161 women have lost their lives and 1,015 had been wounded in action as part of Global War on Terror (GWOT) operations (See Table 1).1 In addition, in modern combat operations, over 9,000 women have received Army Combat Action Badges for “actively engaging or being engaged by the enemy,” and two have received Silver Stars for “gallantry in action against an enemy of the United States.”2
Table 1. Female Casualties in the Global War on Terror
On January 24, 2013, the Secretary of Defense rescinded all ground combat restrictions for women and directed the military departments to implement the new policy no later than January 1, 2016.3 For DOD, implementation may require adjustments to recruiting, assignment, physical standards, and other personnel policies. As directed by the Secretary of Defense, the military departments have been conducting a series of reviews and studies to assess what changes or exceptions may need prior to the implementation deadline.4
Those in favor of keeping restrictions cite physiological differences between men and women that could potentially affect military readiness and unit effectiveness. Some also argue that social and cultural barriers exist to the successful integration of women into combat occupations and all-male units.
Those who advocate for opening all military occupations to women emphasize equal rights and argue it is more difficult for servicemembers to advance to top-ranking positions in the armed services without combat experience. In their view, modern weapons have equalized the potential for women in combat since wars are less likely to be fought on a hand-to-hand basis. In this regard, properly trained women would be able to perform successfully in combat and exempting them from serving in combat is unfair to men.
The military departments are required by law (10 U.S.C. §652) to notify Congress of changes that would alter occupational standards or open any new military career designators to women. Congress then has a 30-day (continuous in-session) review period upon receiving notification of the changes before DOD can implement them. Congress has authority to make changes in these matters and may consider additional issues including equal opportunity, equal responsibility (such as selective service registration), readiness and cohesion, and the overall manpower needs of the military.5
Background
While DOD policy has only recently opened combat roles to female servicemembers, women have been recognized for military service in combat since the American Revolutionary War. In 1776, Margaret Cochran Corbin became the first woman to receive a military pension from Congress for an injury sustained while helping to defend Fort Washington against British troops.6
However, for most of the history of the U.S. military, women’s roles were primarily clerical in nature or in support of military medical services. Women did not serve formally in the military until Congress established the Army Nurse Corps as a permanent organization within the Medical Department under the Army Reorganization Act of 1901.7 In 1908 Congress enacted language which led to the creation of the Navy Nurse Corps.8
World War II and the Women’s Armed Services Integration Act
In the earlier part of the twentieth century, the idea of enlisting women into the armed services was met with broad opposition from military commanders, Congress, and the public. However, the upsurge in manpower needs of World War II compelled Congress to open more service roles to women. In 1942, Congress opened the Naval Reserve to women9 and also created the Women’s Army Auxiliary Corps for the purpose of
noncombatant service with the Army of the United States for the purpose of making available to the national defense when needed the knowledge, skill, and special training of the women of this Nation.10
In 1943, Congress established the Marine Corps Women’s Reserve and made the Women’s Army Corps (WAC) a part of the regular Army on a temporary basis.11 By the end of the war nearly 400,000 women had served in armed services as members of the Army and Navy Nurse Corps, Women’s Army Corps (WAC), Navy (WAVES), Coast Guard (SPARs) and Marine Corps Women’s Reserves or with partner organizations like the American Red Cross, the United Services Organization (USO), and the Civil Air Patrol.12 Approximately 543 military women died in the line of duty during World War II and 84 others were held as prisoners of war (POWs).13
Following World War II, Congress made women a permanent part of the military through the Women’s Armed Services Integration Act of 1948.14 This legislation included two exclusionary statutes prohibiting assignment of female members to duty in aircraft engaged in combat and to vessels engaged in, or likely to be engaged in combat missions.15 The legislation also limited the proportion of women in the military to 2% of the enlisted force and 10% of officers.
The All-Volunteer Force and Social Change
In the 1960s and 1970s, two major factors led to the expansion of the role of women in the armed forces. First, after the end of the draft and the beginning of the All-Volunteer Force in December 1973, the armed services had difficulty in recruiting and retaining enough qualified males, thereby turning attention to recruiting women.16 Second, the movement for equal rights for women led to demands for equal opportunity in all occupational fields, including national defense.
The limit on the percentage of women in the military was eventually repealed in 1967 and the number of women serving continued to grow through the next three decades.17 While the number of women in the military increased, various pieces of legislation in the 1970s also broadened the opportunities for female servicemembers. In 1974, the age requirement for women enlisting without parental consent was made the same as for men.18 In the next year, legislation was enacted that allowed women to be admitted to the three service academies, and the first women were admitted in the summer of 1976.19 In 1977, Congress directed the Secretary of Defense to submit to Congress a definition of the term “combat” and recommendations for expanding job classifications for female members of the armed forces.20 By 1978, women were permitted to be assigned permanent duty on noncombatant Navy ships, and up to six months of temporary duty on other ships.21
As women became more integrated into the military, the question was raised as to whether women should be required to register for the Selective Service. In 1979, when considering the reinstitution of Selective Service registration, the Senate Armed Services Committee cited legal and policy restrictions on women in combat as one of the reasons for differential treatment of men and women by Selective Service. In addition, the committee stated
The committee feels strongly that it is not in the best interest of our national defense to register women for the Military Selective Service Act, which would provide needed military personnel upon mobilization or in the event of a peacetime draft for the armed forces.22
As the percentage of women in service increased and they became more integrated into units serving in combat zones, there was a general lack of clarity on what role women could play in support of combat units and combat operations. One early example of this was during Operation Urgent Fury on October 25, 1983 when U.S. service personnel were sent for an evacuation of noncombatant American citizens on the island nation of Grenada. Four U.S. military police women arrived in Grenada shortly after the invasion and were promptly sent back to Fort Bragg, N.C.23 At Fort Bragg, Major General Edward Trobaugh, then-commander of the 82nd Airborne Division had removed all the females from the invasion Task Force. Following an intervention by Lieutenant General Jack Mackmull, then-commander of XVIII Airborne Corps, women were reattached to the unit and finally deployed to Barbados on November 2, 1983, to serve with the lead element of the Task Force while the rest of the Task Force deployed to Grenada the same day.24
The “Risk Rule” for Assignment of Women
In January 1988, the Department of Defense Task Force on Women in the Military noted that the varying definitions of a “combat mission” had led to inconsistencies between the military departments in the assignment of women.25 In response to the task force findings, DOD adopted a “risk rule” that excluded women from noncombat units or missions if the risks of exposure to direct combat, hostile fire, or capture were equal to or greater than the risks in the combat units they support. In this regard, the policy prohibited the colocation of women with combat units. For example, a female medic could be assigned to a noncombat support unit; however, if that unit was called on to provided support to a combat unit, the risk to the medical support unit would have to be less than the risk to the combat unit for the female servicemember to be assigned.
Also in 1988, the General Accounting Office (now the Government Accountability Office, GAO) noted a primary barrier to the expansion of the number of women in the armed services was that women were not allowed in most combat jobs, and were also barred from many combat-related jobs.26 The GAO reported approximately 15% of active duty positions were closed to women. Of the closed positions 41% were closed due to the risk rule’s collocation policy and 46% were classified as direct ground combat positions.27 The GAO’s report also noted that the primary rationale for excluding women from direct ground combat occupations included, lack of public and congressional support, lack of support by servicewomen, and lack of need given that there were an adequate number of men available to fill those positions.
During Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm in Iraq and Kuwait, women played a more prominent role than in previous conflicts. Approximately 16 women were killed during the conflict and two women were taken prisoner, becoming the first female POWs since World War II.28 Then-Major Rhonda Cornum, an Army flight surgeon, was captured when her helicopter was shot down during a search and rescue mission. During her captivity, she was sexually assaulted, which again raised public concern about the roles of women in combat and the risks that they faced.29
Following Operation Desert Storm, efforts to expand the assignment of women were renewed by civil rights and women’s advocacy groups. Legislation enacted in 1991 called for the repeal of the statutory limitations on the assignment of women in the armed forces to combat aircraft and naval vessels and the establishment of a Presidential Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces.30 On November 15, 1992, the commission issued its report. Some key recommendations were the following:
DOD should establish a policy to ensure that no person who is best qualified is denied access on the basis of gender to an assignment that is open to both men and women. As far as it is compatible with the above policy, the Secretary of Defense should retain discretion to set goals that encourage the recruitment and optimize the utilization of women in the armed services, allowing for the requirements of each military department.
Military readiness should be the driving concern regarding assignment policies; there are circumstances under which women might be assigned to combat positions.
Women should be excluded from direct land combat units and positions. Furthermore the commission recommends that the existing service policies concerning direct land combat exclusion be codified. Service Secretaries shall recommend to the Congress which units and positions should fall under the land combat exclusions.
Current DOD and Service policies with regard to Army, Air Force and Navy aircraft on combat missions should be retained and codified by means of the reenactment of Section 8549 of Title 10, U.S. Code which was repealed by P.L. 102-190, Section 531 for the Air Force, and reenactment of the provisions of 10 U.S.C. Section 6015 prohibiting women from assignment to duty on aircraft engaged in combat missions, which was repealed by P.L. 102-190 for the Navy, and codification of Army policy.
Existing laws and Service policies prohibiting servicewomen from service on combatant vessels should be repealed or modified, except for those applying to submarines and amphibious vessels.
DOD should retain the risk rule [as explained above] as currently implemented. Navy policies which implement the risk rule should be modified to reflect the changes made [in the above recommendation].31
In addition, the commission recommended retaining the current policies prohibiting the assignment of women in special operations forces.32
Repeal of the “Risk Rule” and a New Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule
On April 28, 1993, then-Secretary of Defense Les Aspin released a memorandum directing the military departments to open more positions to women and establishing an implementation committee to review and make recommendations on such implementation issues.
Several months later, as part of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY1994 (P.L. 103- 160), Congress enacted language that
repealed the prohibition on women serving on combatant vessels and aircraft,
required the Secretary of Defense to ensure occupational performance standards were gender-neutral, and
required the Secretary of Defense to notify the House and Senate Armed Services Committees 90 days before any policy changes were to be made concerning the assignment of women to ground combat roles, and, required the Secretary of Defense to notify these committees 30 days prior to the opening of any “combatant unit, class of combatant vessel, or type of combat platform” to women.33
In 1994, Secretary Aspin officially rescinded the “risk rule” and approved a new Direct Ground Combat and Assignment Rule, sometimes called the Direct Combat Exclusion Rule:
A. Rule. Service members are eligible to be assigned to all positions for which they are qualified, except that women shall be excluded from assignment to units below the brigade34 level whose primary mission is to engage in direct combat on the ground, as defined below. B. Definition. Direct ground combat is engaging an enemy on the ground with individual or crew served weapons, while being exposed to hostile fire and to a high probability of direct physical contact with the hostile force’s personnel. Direct ground combat takes place well forward on the battlefield while locating and closing with the enemy to defeat them by fire, maneuver, or shock effect.35
Secretary Aspin further specified that these assignment policies and regulations may include restrictions on the assignment of women:
where the Service Secretary attests that the cost of appropriate berthing and privacy arrangements are prohibitive;
where units and positions doctrinally required to physically collocate and remain with direct combat units that are closed to women;
where units are engaged in long range reconnaissance operations and Special Operations Forces missions; and
where job related physical requirements would necessarily exclude the vast majority of women Servicemembers.36
Supporters of these changes noted that they would open more opportunities for women in the armed services. Critics saw these changes as putting women at greater risk since they removed the “substantial risk” of being captured from the definition of ground combat.
Women in Combat Zones: Iraq and Afghanistan
In the first decade of the 21st century, several situations evolved that highlighted the disparity between the policy prohibiting women from assignment to direct ground combat units and the roles actually performed by women. Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in 2001 and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) in 2003 were the first large-scale mobilizations of U.S. troops since Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm in the early 1990s. The nonlinear battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan blurred the distinctions between forward and rear operating areas, often placing support units in the proximity of active engagements. The public debate over the assignment of women was reinvigorated when three Army women were captured by enemy forces in Iraq and sustained injuries following the ambush of their unit.37 The women were assigned to Army’s 507th Maintenance Company which provided logistic support to ground units, and thus not a unit whose primary mission was to engage in direct combat on the ground.
Also, in 2005 the Army started moving towards a “Modular Redesign” for rotation, training, and readiness reasons.38 Under this concept, the Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) served as the basic large tactical combat unit of the Army.
These BCTs were supported by Multi-Functional Support Brigades. These support brigades were often collocated with the BCTs included noncombat personnel, many of whom were women. Such collocation appeared to some to be at odds with the 1994 policies on the assignment of women.
Because of the nonlinear and irregular nature of the battle in Iraq and Afghanistan, the definition of “direct ground combat” in the 1994 policy became less useful: what did “well forward” mean on a nonlinear battlefield, and how useful was the “primary mission” criteria when noncombat units regularly engage in direct combat to carry out their mission? In this environment, the Army and Marine Corps utilized women to search Iraqi females for weapons, and to patrol with foot soldiers, usually in door-to-door-type operations.39 Also, women were increasingly involved in convoy escort missions that came under fire40 and were embedded with special operations forces (SOF) in Cultural Support Teams that helped units deal with local Afghani females while operating in Afghan villages.41 In 2005, Sergeant Leigh Ann Hester, an Army soldier, became the first female soldier to be awarded the Silver Star since World War II and the first to be cited for close combat action.42
Concerns over the collocation and forward deployment of support units resulted in language being included in the House version of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006. Under this law, if the Secretary of Defense proposed to make any change to the 1994 ground combat exclusion policy, or open or close military career fields that had been in effect since May 18, 2005, the Secretary must first notify Congress and then wait 30 days (while Congress is in session) before implementing any such change.43 In addition, the Secretary of Defense was directed to submit a report concerning the Secretary’s review of the current and future implementation of the policy regarding the assignment of women with particular attention to the Army’s unit modularization efforts and associated assignment policies.
In a 2007 report, the RAND Corporation noted while the Army was complying with the DOD assignment policy, it may not have been complying with the separate Army assignment policy.44 Further, the report stated
[w]e find considerable evidence that support units are collocated with direct combat units if the definition of collocation is based purely on proximity. However, if the definition of collocation is based on interdependency and proximity, the evidence is inconclusive.45
The report noted that hundreds of female Army members had received a Combat Action Badge, suggesting that the Army has recognized the combat service of women regardless of whether the women had been assigned in compliance with policy.46 While the RAND report stopped short of recommending that more assignments be open to women, the authors did recommend that assignment policies for women be redrafted to “conform—and clarify how it conforms—to the nature of warfare today and in the future.”47
Women on Submarines
While women have been allowed by law to serve on surface combatants in the Navy since the early 1990s, women have been barred by policy from assignments on submarines until just recently. The early arguments for not assigning women to submarine duty in were not related to the dangers of combat, but instead related to privacy and habitability issues in cramped spaces and cost concerns for retrofitting submarines to accommodate both men and women.48 As early as 2000, based on recommendations by the Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services (DACOWITS), efforts were made by the Pentagon to open up assignments for women on submarines.49 However, these recommendations met with some opposition from senior Navy officials and Members of Congress who cited cost concerns for berthing modifications, privacy concerns, the possibility of sexual misconduct affecting unit cohesion and effectiveness.50
As a result, language was contained in the Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (P.L. 106-398) that seemingly halted the Pentagon’s efforts. Essentially, this language prohibited the Navy from assigning women to submarines from May 10, 2000 forward until the Secretary of Defense submits to Congress written notice of such a proposed change and following a period of 30 days of “continuous session of Congress (excluding any day on which either the House of Congress is not in session)….”51
It was not until February 23, 2010, that Secretary of Defense Robert Gates notified Congress of a decision by the Navy to allow women to serve on nuclear submarines.52 In 2011, the Navy began assigning female officers to submarines.
In 2015 the Navy began accepting applications for assignment of enlisted women to submarines, and on June 22, 2015, announced a list of 38 female enlisted sailors that will begin training to convert to a submarine rating.53
Military Leadership Diversity Commission
The Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 200954 contained language establishing the Military Leadership Diversity Commission. Among its duties, the commission was to conduct a study and file a report regarding diversity issues in the Armed Forces with attention to the “establishment and maintenance of fair promotion and command opportunities for ethnic- and gender-specific members of the Armed Forces at the O-555 grade level and above.” In March, 2011, the commission released its report, From Representation to Inclusion: Diversity Leadership and the 21st-Century Military.56 Three of its recommendations were particularly relevant to the issue of women and combat.
Recommendation 9:
DOD and the Services should eliminate the “combat exclusion policies” (discussed later in this report) for women, including the removal of barriers and inconsistencies, to create a level playing field for all qualified servicemembers. The Commission recommends a time-phased approach:
Women in career fields/specialties currently open to them should be immediately able to be assigned to any unit that requires that career field/specialty, consistent with current operational environment.
DOD and the Services should take deliberate steps in a phased approach to open additional career fields and units involved in “direct ground combat” to qualified women.
DOD and the Services should report to Congress the process and timeline for removing barriers that inhibit women from achieving senior leadership positions.
Recommendation 18:
As part of the accountability reviews, the Services, in conjunction with the Chief Diversity Officer (established in Recommendation 15), should conduct annual “barrier analyses” to review demographic diversity patterns across the military life cycle, starting with accessions….
The annual analyses should include:
accession demographics;
retention, command selection, and promotion rates by race/ethnicity and gender;
analysis of assignment patterns by race/ethnicity and gender;
analysis of attitudinal survey data by race/ethnicity and gender;
identification of persistent, group-specific deviations from overall averages and plans to investigate underlying causes; and
summaries of progress made on previous actions.
Recommendation 20:
… Congress should revise Title 10, Section 113, to require the Secretary of Defense to report annually an assessment of the available pool of qualified racial/ethnic minority and female candidates for the 3- and 4-star flag/general officer positions.
The Secretary of Defense must ensure that all qualified candidates (including racial/ethnic minorities and women) have been considered for nomination of every 3- and 4-star position. If there were no qualified racial/ethnic minority and/or female candidates, then a statement of explanation should be made in the package submitted to the Senate for the confirmation hearings.57
This last recommendation flows from the commission’s finding that the combat exclusion policy limits women’s opportunities to attain the highest ranks in the military. Retired Air Force General Lester L. Lyles who chaired the commission stated, “We know that [the exclusion] hinders women from promotion. [ … ] they’re not getting credit for being in combat arms, [and] that’s important for their considerations for the most senior flag ranks.”58
DOD Review of Combat Exclusion Policies
The concern for equal opportunities for women in military leadership motivated a further review of the DOD’s combat exclusion policies. Section 535 of the Ike Skelton National Defense Act for Fiscal Year 201159 mandated this review, stating
(a) REVIEW REQUIRED—The Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretaries of the military departments, shall conduct a review of laws, policies, and regulations, including the collocation policy,60 that may restrict the service of female members of the Armed Forces to determine whether changes in such laws, policies, and regulations are needed to ensure that female members have equitable opportunities to compete and excel in the Armed Forces.
(b) SUBMISSION OF RESULTS—Not later than April 15, 2011, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report containing the results of the review.
In February 2012, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) released its report. Some of the findings were that there was no indication that females had “less than equitable opportunities to compete and excel under current assignment policy,” and there were “serious practical barriers” to the full elimination of gender assignment policies. The report also acknowledged that, given the nature the modern battlespace, the collocation policy had become irrelevant.61 In the conclusion, it stated
The Department intends to:
1. Eliminate the collocation exclusion from the 1994 policy;
2. As an exception to policy, allow Military Department Secretaries to assign women in open occupational specialties to select units and positions at the battalion level (for Army, Navy, and Marine Corps) whose primary mission is to engage in direct combat on the ground;
3. Based on the exception to the policy, assess the suitability and relevance of the direct ground combat unit assignment prohibition to inform policy decisions; and
4. Pursue the development of gender-neutral physical standards for occupational specialties closed due to physical requirements.62
This statement served as the DOD’s official notification to Congress of the removal of the collocation restriction and the intent to implement exceptions to the Direct Combat Exclusion Rule.63 The revised policy allowed commanders to collocate support units with women assigned (i.e., in open occupational specialties) with ground combat units. The report suggested that these changes might have the benefit of expanding career opportunities for women, while increasing flexibility for field commanders to meet combat support mission requirements, and potentially reducing the operational tempo for men assigned to collocated support units by increasing the number of personnel available for assignment.
The Repeal of the Direct Combat Exclusion Rule and Recent Developments
By 2013, the military departments had opened 14,325 positions to women under the new exceptions to the exclusion rule.64 Currently women account for 16.8% of the active duty officer corps and 15.0% of the enlisted corps across all DOD.65 The percentage of women varies across services (see Table 2). The Marine Corps and Army have a lower percentage of women in the service than the Navy and Air Force, but also have a higher number of combat arms positions that have historically been closed to women. For example, in 2013 the Army reported that approximately 237,000 positions were closed to women, with over 105,000 positions in artillery, infantry and armor occupations. The Air Force, on the other hand reported less than 5,000 closed positions.66
Table 2. Females as a Percentage of Active Duty Personnel
On January 24, 2013, then-Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta announced DOD was rescinding the Direct Combat Exclusion Rule on women serving in previously restricted occupations (i.e., combat). This policy change opened two categories of positions, previously closed combat arms occupational specialties and non-combat specialties assigned to combat units (e.g., a medic serving in an infantry company). The implementation of this policy change was to be guided by the following principles:67
Ensure the success of our nation’s warfighting forces by preserving unit readiness, cohesion, and morale.
Ensure all service men and women are given the opportunity to succeed and are set up for success with viable career paths.
Retain the trust and confidence of the American people to defend this nation by promoting policies that maintain the best quality and most qualified people.
Validate occupational performance standards, both physical and mental, for all military occupational specialties (MOS), specifically those that remain closed to women. Eligibility for training and development within designated occupational fields should consist of qualitative and quantifiable standards reflecting the knowledge, skills, and abilities necessary for each occupation.
For occupational specialties open to women, the occupational performance standards must be gender-neutral as required by P.L. 103-160, Section 542 (sic) (1993).
Ensure that a sufficient cadre of midgrade/senior women enlisted and officers are assigned to commands at the point of introduction to ensure success in the long run. This may require an adjustment to recruiting efforts, assignment processes, and personnel policies. Assimilation of women into heretofore “closed units” will be informed by continual in-stride assessments and pilot efforts.
The Secretary of Defense directed the military departments to develop implementation plans for the review of service-level policies and standards and to expeditiously move forward in the integration of women into previously closed positions.
As per the Secretary’s instruction, any recommendations to keep an occupational specialty closed to women will require approval by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and the Secretary of Defense. The opening of these positions will likely have the largest impact on the Army, Marine Corps, and the Special Operations community where infantry, armor, artillery and other specialized combat positions were previously closed to women under the Direct Combat Exclusion Rule. The military departments are expected to complete their reviews and to notify Congress of their plans for integrating women into combat roles by January 1, 2016.
Key Issues for Congress
Any changes proposed by the DOD will likely be subjected to congressional scrutiny. Congress may accept any proposed changes or seek to subject such changes to certain modifications. Two key legislative issues that may arise are the validation and implementation of gender-neutral occupational standards, and laws requiring registration for Selective Service. Among the additional issues Congress may consider are equal opportunity, unit readiness and cohesion, and force structure and manpower needs.
“Gender-Neutral” Standards
One of the issues for Congress to consider with the opening of combat roles to women is how the definition of gender-neutral standards will be applied and how the standards will be validated. The military departments, in their respective women in the service implementation plans, have indicated that they will conduct research and reviews to validate the physical standards for all occupations (opened and closed). Congress has the authority to review the proposed changes, provide oversight for implementation, and to amend the definition of gender-neutral occupational performance standards as needed.
Definitions and Requirements
In the National Defense Authorization Act for FY1994 (P.L. 103-160 §543, as amended by P.L. 113-66 §523), Congress established requirements for gender-neutral occupational performance standards:
(1) GENDER-NEUTRAL OCCUPATIONAL STANDARD. The term “gender-neutral occupational standard”, with respect to a military career designator, means that all members of the Armed Forces serving in or assigned to the military career designator must meet the same performance outcome-based standards for the successful accomplishment of the necessary and required specific tasks associated with the qualifications and duties performed while serving in or assigned to the military career designator.
SEC. 543. GENDER-NEUTRAL OCCUPATIONAL PERFORMANCE STANDARDS.
(a) GENDER NEUTRALITY REQUIREMENT. In the case of any military career designator that is open to both male and female members of the Armed Forces, the Secretary of Defense
(1) shall ensure that qualification of members of the Armed Forces for, and continuance of members of the Armed Forces in, that occupational career field is evaluated on the basis of an occupational standard, without differential standards of evaluation on the basis of gender;
(2) may not use any gender quota, goal, or ceiling except as specifically authorized by law; and
(3) may not change an occupational performance standard for the purpose of increasing or decreasing the number of women in that occupational career field.
(b) REQUIREMENTS RELATING TO USE OF SPECIFIC PHYSICAL REQUIREMENTS.
(1) For any military career designator for which the Secretary of Defense determines that specific physical requirements for muscular strength and endurance and cardiovascular capacity are essential to the performance of duties, the Secretary shall prescribe specific physical requirements as part of the gender-neutral occupational standard for members in that career designator and shall ensure (in the case of a career designator that is open to both male and female members of the Armed Forces) that those requirements are applied on a gender-neutral basis.
(2) Whenever the Secretary establishes or revises a physical requirement for a military career designator, a member serving in that military career designator when the new requirement becomes effective, who is otherwise considered to be a satisfactory performer, shall be provided a reasonable period, as determined under regulations prescribed by the Secretary, to meet the standard established by the new requirement. During that period, the new physical requirement may not be used to disqualify the member from continued service in that military career designator.
Review and Validation
All of the military departments establish testable minimum physical fitness standards for their personnel regardless of the military occupational specialty or career designator.68 These physical fitness tests are administered upon entry and annually thereafter and are intended to encourage a minimum standard of physical fitness and health across the military forces. The standards and scoring table vary by both age and gender to account for physiological differences. For example, a 22-year old male is required to run 2 miles in a maximum time of 17:30 in order to pass the Army Physical Fitness Test (PFT). The maximum time for a 22-year-old female is 20:36. In both instances, the individuals who achieve a passing time on the run receive the same score. The scoring tables differ under the principle that a women who is able to run 2 miles in 17:30 is, on average, more physically fit (in terms of muscular strength and endurance, and cardiovascular capacity) than a man of the same age who is able to complete the run in the same time.
While all servicemembers must maintain basic physical fitness standards, the military departments also establish additional standards for entry into certain occupational fields based on the capabilities needed to complete tasks associated with that occupation. (See sample Marine Corps infantry squad assessment tasks in the below box.) Whereas basic physical standards described above are used as a mechanism to measure the servicemember’s fitness, occupational standards are used to measure the ability to meet job requirements. A basic interpretation of Section 543(1)(b) regarding physical requirements suggests there will only be a common outcome-based standard for each occupational career field and that men and women would be required to meet the same physical standards in order to be similarly assigned. It follows, for example, that if the occupation requires the servicemember to run 2 miles in 17:30 minutes, both men and women must meet that standard regardless of relative fitness levels.
Some have expressed concerns that the physical occupational standards and testing for certain career fields do not accurately reflect the actual job requirements and may be unnecessarily high, creating artificial barriers to women’s entry into some career fields. In the Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 (P.L. 113-291 §524), Congress gave further direction to the Secretaries of the military departments regarding the development and validation of gender-neutral occupational standards, requiring that the standards
(1) accurately predict performance of actual, regular, and recurring duties of a military occupation; and
(2) are applied equitably to measure individual capabilities.69
The first validation criteria would require evidence that the tested standard is predictive of the actual task required to serve in that occupational field. For example, one occupational requirement might be the ability to rappel down a rope from a helicopter in a certain amount of time. For practical reasons (i.e., cost, risk of injury, resource availability) it may not be in the best interest of the services to test servicemembers in a live environment. However, the number of pull-ups a servicemember can achieve may be predictive of their performance in rappelling. Under the criteria above, the services would be required to demonstrate both that rappelling from a helicopter is a regular requirement for the occupational specialty, and that the pull-up standard is an accurate measure of a servicemember’s ability to achieve that task regardless of gender.
Sample Marine Corps Infantry Squad Assessment Tasks
While the focus for validating these requirements is on the military career occupations previously closed to women, the services are also evaluating whether standards should differ for other occupational specialties. Comments from General Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff suggested that in validating requirements, they will be taking into account these issues70
as we look at the requirements for a spectrum of conflict, not just COIN, counterinsurgency, we really need to have standards that apply across all of those. Importantly, though, if we do decide that a particular standard is so high that a woman couldn’t make it, the burden is now on the service to come back and explain to the secretary, why is it that high? Does it really have to be that high?
The military departments are in the process of reviewing and validating performance standards and expect to have initial results by September of 2015. In addition to other review efforts, the Marine Corps and the Army have been conducting assessments of women’s performance in their elite infantry training schools. In 2012, the U.S. Marine Corps temporarily opened its Infantry Officer Course (IOC) and its enlisted Infantry Training Battalion (ITB) to female volunteers. As of May 2015, the end of the Marine Corps experiment, 29 female officers had attempted the course but none had graduated.71 The pass rate for women in the enlisted Marine Corps Infantry Training Battalion (ITB), which is regarded as a less strenuous course than the IOC, has been 35% over the testing period compared with a 98% pass rate for males entering the course.72
Likewise, the Army in 2015 opened its Ranger School to women for the first time for a one-time integrated assessment of female performance in the school. Of the 113 women who tried to qualify for the school, only 20 qualified, and 19 started the course.73 Of all those who start the course, the historical graduation rate at Ranger School is about 40%.74 As of May 2015, 8 of the 19 women had made it through the first assessment (Ranger Assessment Phase or “RAP week”) but did not pass the Darby Phase75 to qualify for the next step of training. Three of the eight women were invited to restart the Ranger School from day one in June 2015. On August 17, 2015, the Army announced that two women would be the first female soldiers to graduate from the Ranger School. The female graduates will be eligible to wear the Ranger tab on their uniforms signifying their achievement; however, they are not yet eligible to serve in combat occupations in the 75th Ranger Regiment.76
Implementation Concerns
Whether the standards are changed or stay the same as a result of the DOD’s review, many have concerns about the implementation. Although there are women who can meet and exceed the existing physical standards for males, forcing women to meet higher standards has been found in some cases to increase their injury and attrition rates.77 In the Canadian experience in which women were recruited for a 16-week infantry training course that was identical to the men’s course, the outcome was described as the “high cost of recruiting women that yielded poor results.”78 Additionally, a recent study of women in close ground combat from the United Kingdom Ministry of Defense (MoD) found that in initial military training, women have twice as much risk of musculoskeletal injury as men, and 15% to 20% higher rates of non-battle injuries in recent operations.79 However, this MoD report also acknowledged that women who would be capable of passing the close ground combat training might be more physically fit and less prone to injury than a cohort of women entering initial basic training.
Some are concerned that any change in standards would affect readiness and unit cohesion. Others argue that changing the current physical standards to account for male-female physiological differences would reduce unit effectiveness and ability to meet certain battlefield challenges. Some believe that even if the validation process shows that current standards for certain occupational series are inappropriate or unnecessarily high, any changes at this particular time would be perceived as a lowering of standards solely for the purpose of including women. For example, some are concerned that unit morale or cohesion might be affected if the integration of women under new standards creates the perception that the woman has not “earned” her place or that she is potentially replacing a more capable male soldier.80
Options for Congress
Women’s advocacy groups and other military and veterans’ groups are likely to closely monitor DOD’s review process and announcement for occupational standards. By law (P.L. 103-160 §543), DOD must notify Congress of changes to occupational standards that affect women’s entry into previously closed military career designators prior to implementing the standards:
(c) NOTICE TO CONGRESS OF CHANGES- Whenever the Secretary of Defense proposes to implement changes to the gender-neutral occupational standards for a military career designator that are expected to result in an increase, or in a decrease, of at least 10 percent in the number of female members of the Armed Forces who enter, or are assigned to, that military career designator, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to Congress a report providing notice of the change and the justification and rationale for the change. Such changes may then be implemented only after the end of the 60-day period beginning on the date on which such report is submitted.81
Congress may then postpone implementation, request further studies, reviews or justification, or allow the changes go into effect.
Selective Service
Many of those who emphasize equal rights say it is more difficult for servicemembers to advance to top-ranking positions in the armed services without combat experience. The inability of women to serve in combat roles is thus seen as a barrier to equal opportunity for promotion and selection for leadership roles.82 Some carry the argument further to say women cannot be equal in society as long as they are barred from full participation in all levels of the national security system.83 In their view, modern weapons have equalized the potential for women in combat since wars are less likely to be fought on a hand-to-hand basis. In this regard, properly trained women would be able to perform successfully in combat and exempting them from serving in combat is unfair to men.
This leads some to argue that equal access to combat jobs also obliges women to take equal responsibility for registering for selective service and being subject to the draft.84 Women are divided on this issue with some saying they should be allowed in combat but many saying they should not be forced into combat.85 Critics contend it would be unfair to permit women a choice that is not available to men and to make the choice available to both men and women would make it difficult for the services to function, especially in the event of war or national emergency. Given this argument, Congress may consider not only whether women who want to serve in combat roles are allowed to, but if women should be required to serve in combat roles.
Options for Congress
The question of whether women should be required to register for Selective Service under current law was previously decided by the Supreme Court in the 1981 majority decision in Rostker v. Goldberg. In the majority opinion, Justice William Rehnquist wrote:
[t]he existence of the combat restrictions clearly indicates the basis for Congress’ decision to exempt women from registration. The purpose of registration was to prepare for a draft of combat troops. Since women are excluded from combat, Congress concluded that they would not be needed in the event of a draft, and therefore decided not to register them.86
Congress has a number of options in addressing this issue. Congress has the authority to change draft registration laws (that currently pertain only to males) to include women.87 It has also been suggested that this issue can be made moot by terminating Selective Service registration. Another option for Congress might be to keep the draft registration laws unchanged, only requiring males to register. However, if Congress keeps the status quo, it is also possible Rostker v. Goldberg could be overturned in a future court ruling.
Other Concerns Regarding Women in Combat
Supporters of opening more occupational specialties and units to women note that women are already serving, fighting, and dying in combat. Others argue that opening more roles to women will result in a bigger pool of eligible recruits to compete for occupational assignments and could result in higher performing units. Some contend that unless all military roles are opened to women, women will not have equal career leadership opportunities.
Those opposed to changing restrictions on women in combat roles argue that a lack of combat experience does not adversely affect career advancement and promotions for women. They argue further that the progress of women is not the most important issue at hand, and contend that military readiness and national security has been and would further be weakened due to the presence of women in combat units.88 Those opposed note that close combat situations have and continue to exist and, on average, an all-male unit would be higher-performing in those types of engagements due to physical differences.
Both those in favor and opposed to women in combat acknowledge that there are likely social, cultural, and administrative barriers that would need to be overcome in order to implement full integration of women into combat units. Some of these administrative barriers (such as barrack/berthing assignments and separate toilet/shower facilities) have been overcome in the past as women were integrated into other occupational specialties and units.
In past gender integration efforts, the services have sought to assign senior female officers and non-commissioned to units prior to the assignment of more junior enlisted and attempted to avoid assigning only one women to a unit.89 Developing appropriate assignment policies may be more challenging as the number of women qualifying for combat roles may initially be very small as a percentage of the total force. For example, in the Marine Corps, where women account for only 7.7% of the total force, an infantry squad might consist of only one or two women out of twelve Marines, while other squads might have no women at all assigned.90
In terms of cultural adaptation, individuals who are accustomed to being in all-male units may offer some resistance to change. Some are also concerned that in small unit settings male-female relationships might develop that could affect unit cohesion and morale and result in reduced unit performance. Others note that women have been integrated into units for extended deployment periods with close-quarter environments for much of the recent history of the military. They also point to other factors, beyond gender homogeneity, that contribute to positive unit cohesion such as shared experiences, leadership, and command climate. Some also note that some of the same arguments about social cohesion were historically used by those opposed to the integration of other minority groups in the military (e.g., racial minorities and homosexuals) and that there is little or no evidence that unit effectiveness was reduced as a result of that integration.
Outlook for Congress
The military departments, as part of their women in combat implementation plans, are studying some of these social cohesion and morale concerns to understand the possible impact of change and to develop potential mitigation strategies. All DOD reviews and studies are expected to be completed by September 2015. The military departments are expected to present their results and findings to the Secretary of Defense for approval authority and the Secretary is required to notify Congress of DOD’s plans for integrating women into combat roles no later than January 1, 2016.
About the author: *Kristy N. Kamarck, Analyst in Military Manpower
Source:
This article was published by the Congressional Research Service and may be accessed here (PDF)
Notes:
1 Defense Manpower Data Center, Defense Casualty Analysis System. GWOT includes Operation Enduring Freedom, Operation Iraqi Freedom, and Operation New Dawn.
2 Bensahel, Nora, David Barno, and Katherine Kidder, et al., Battlefields and Boardrooms; Women’s Leadership in the Military and the Private Sector, Center for New American Security, January 2015, p. 9. The Silver Star Medal is the third-highest military decoration for valor to be awarded to members of the uniformed services.
3 Department of Defense, Defense Department Rescinds Direct Combat Exclusion Rule; Services to Expand Integration of Women into Previously Restricted Occupations and Units, Press Release, January 24, 2013.
4 The military departments were required to submit “Women in the Services Review (WISR) Implementation Plans” to the Secretary of Defense to outline their plans for opening closed occupations and positions to women by the 2016 deadline. The WISR implementation plans for the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force and U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) can be found at http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=16102.
5 Congress has the authority “To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces.” U.S. Constitution, Article 1, Section 8, clause 14.
6 James, Edward T., Janet Wilson James, and Paul S. Boyer, et al., Notable American Women 1607-1950: A Biographical Dictionary, vol. 2, pp. 385-386.
7 31 Stat. 753; February 2, 1901.
8 P.L. 115; 35 Stat. 146; May 13, 1908.
9 P.L. 689; 56 Stat. 730; July 30, 1942. 10 P.L. 554, 56 Stat. 278, May 14, 1942.
11 “That there is hereby established in the Army of the United States, for the period of the present war and for six months thereafter or for such shorter period as the Congress by concurrent resolution or the President by proclamation shall prescribe, a component to be known as the ‘Women’s Army Corps’.” P.L. 110; 57 Stat. 371; July 1, 1943.
12 Women in the Military Service for America Memorial Foundation, Inc., see http://www.womensmemorial.org/H&C/ History/wwii.html.
13 Ibid.; Sixty-seven Army nurses and 11 Navy nurses were captured in the Philippines and held by the Japanese for nearly 3 years. Five Navy nurses were captured on the island of Guam were held as POWs for four months. One Army flight nurse was aboard an aircraft that was shot down behind enemy lines in Germany in 1944 and was held as a POW for four months.
14 P.L. 625; 62 Stat. 356; June 12, 1948: “Women’s Armed Services Integration Act of 1948.” 15 This legislation did not bar women from ground combat roles.
16 Janowitz, Morris, and Charles C. Moskos, Five Years of the All-Volunteer Force: 1973-1978, Armed Forces and Society, V, February 1979: 171-218.
17 P.L. 90-130; 81 Stat. 374; November 8, 1967.
18 P.L. 93-290; 88 Stat. 173; May 24, 1974. Prior to enacting this law, males who were not less than 17 years of age could enlist, while females were required to be at least 18 years of age.
19 P.L. 94-106; 89 Stat. 537; October 7, 1975. Women had already been admitted to the Coast Guard and Merchant Marine Academies by administrative action. Women had also participated in the Air Force Reserve Officer Training Course (ROTC) as a source of commissioning between 1954 through 1958, but it was not until 1969 that women were again allowed into the Air Force Program, and in 1972 the Army and Navy opened ROTC as a commissioning source for women.
20 P.L. 95-97; 91 Stat. 327; July 30, 1977.
21 P.L. 95-485; 92 Stat. 1623; October 20, 1978.
22 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Requiring Reinstitution of Registration for Certain Persons under the Military Selective Service Act, and For Other Reasons, Rept. 96-226, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., June 19, 1979.
23 U.S. Army Women’s Museum, available at http://www.history.army.mil/html/museums/showcase/women/ awm_text.html.
24 Raines, Edgar F., Jr., The Rucksack War: U.S. Army Operational Logistics in Grenada, 1983, Center of Military History: Washington, DC, 2010: 494.
25 Department of Defense, Report of the Task Force on Women in the Military, January 1988, p.10.
26 Combat jobs include those that directly confront and engage the enemy, such as infantry; combat-related jobs include those that support combat units in the field, such as those in support positions with combat engineers, as well as infantry and tank support units, including units that transport fuel, ordinance and ammunition.
27 The remaining positions were closed due to prohibitive living arrangements (12%) and special operations assignments (2%). The GAO’s study did not look at how this affected women’s advancement or promotion opportunities. U.S. General Accounting Office, Information on DOD’s Assignment Policy and Direct Ground Combat Definition, GAO/NSIAD-99-7, October 1988: 4. See also U.S. General Accounting Office, Women in the Military Impact of Proposed Legislation to Open More Combat Support Position and Units to Women, GAO/NSIAD-88- 197BR, July 1988.
28 Women in the Military Service for America Memorial Foundation, Inc., see http://www.womensmemorial.org/H&C/ History/wwii.html.
29 Sciolino, Elaine, “Female P.O.W. Is Abused, Kindling Debate,” New York Times, June 29, 1992.
30 P.L. 102-190; 105 Stat. 1365; December 5, 1991.
31 Presidential Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces, Report to the President, November 15,
1992.
32 For more information on special operations forces, please see CRS Report RS21048, U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress, by Andrew Feickert.
33 P.L. 103-160; 107 Stat. 1659 et seq.; November 30, 1993.
34 A brigade or its equivalent is a unit of approximately 3,000-5,000 persons.
35 Department of Defense, Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule, January 13, 1994. 36 Department of Defense, Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule, January 13, 1994.
37 Specialist Lori Piestewa became the first woman to be killed in the 2003 invasion of Iraq from injuries sustained in the attack. However, much of the attention focused on PFC Jessica Lynch after various conflicting accounts of her actions were published and reports suggested that certain injuries she sustained were the result of sexual assault while in captivity. Some pointed to this as an argument against women in combat roles. See U.S. Congress, House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Misleading Information From the Battlefield: The Tillman and Lynch Episodes, First Report, 110th Cong., 2nd sess., September 16, 2008, H.Rept. 110-858 (Washington: GPO, 2008).
38 For more information see CRS Report RL32476, U.S. Army’s Modular Redesign: Issues for Congress, by Andrew Feickert.
39 Perry, Tony, “Women on Iraq’s Front Lines,” Los Angeles Times, November 13, 2008.
40 Wood, Sara, “Woman Soldier Receives Silver Star for Valor in Iraq,” DOD News, June 16, 2005.
41 Cronk, Terry M., “Cultural Support Team Women Serve with Distinction,” DOD News, April 30, 2015. 42 Fainaru, Steve, “Silver Stars Affirm One Unit’s Mettle,” Washington Post, June 26, 2005.
43 P.L. 109-163; 119 Stat. 3251; January 6, 2006. As described in this law, “such a change may then be implemented only after the end of a period of 30 days of continuous session of Congress (excluding any day on which either House of Congress is not in session) following the date on which the report is received.”
44 The Army policy defines direct combat to include the closing with the enemy in order to “destroy or capture the enemy, or while repelling the enemy’s assault by fire, close combat, or counterattack.” [Emphasis added.] Headquarter, U.S. Department of the Army, 1992, p. 5.
45 Harrell, Margaret C., et al., Assessing the Assignment Policy for Army Women, RAND, National Defense Research Institute, 2007: xvii.
46 The Combat Action Badge recognizes soldiers who have engaged the enemy, or were engaged by the enemy during combat operation. See http://www.army.mil/symbols/CombatBadges/action.html.
47 Harrell, Margaret C., et al., Assessing the Assignment Policy for Army Women, RAND, National Defense Research Institute, 2007: xxi.
48 Lorber, Janie, “Quiet Resistance to Women on Subs,” New York Times, May 12, 2010. 49 “Pentagon Panel Says Women Should Serve on Subs,” CNN U.S., May 26, 2000.
50 “Lawmaker moves to bar women from subs,” Washington Times, May 5, 2000.
51 P.L. 106-398; 114 Stat. 1654 A-136; October 30, 2000.
52 “Pentagon OKs Lifting the Ban on Women in Submarines,” Reuters, February 23, 2010.
53 Faram, Mark D., “First Enlisted Female Sub Selectees Announced,” Navy Times, June 22, 2015.
54 P.L. 110-417; 122 Stat. 4476; October 14, 2008; see §596.
55 Lieutenant Colonel for Army, Marine Corps and Air Force, and Commander for Navy and Coast Guard.
56 Military Leadership Diversity Commission, 1851 South Bell Street, Arlington, VA, 22202. Although the Final Report was issued on-line on March 7, 2011, the routing letter from the Chairman to the President and Congress was dated March 15, 2011.
57 Military Leadership Diversity Commission, Final Report, pp. 127, 129 and 130.
58 Daniel, Lisa, “Panel says Rescind Policy on Women in Combat,” American Forces Press Service, March 8, 2011. 59 P.L. 111-383; 214 Stat. 4217; January 7, 2011.
60 “At present, DOD’s Direct Combat assignment Rule (DGCAR) policy states that women can be assigned to all positions for which they are qualified, except within units below the brigade level whose primary mission is to engage in direct combat on the ground. The Army collocation assignment restriction further states that women can serve in any officer or enlisted specialty or position, except in those specialties, positions or units (battalion size or smaller) which are assigned a routine mission to engage in direct combat, or which collocated routinely with units assigned a direct combat mission.” http://www.armyg1.army.mil/hr/wita/.
61 Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (P&R), Report to Congress on the Reviews of Laws, Policies and Regulations Restricting the Service of Female Members in the U.S. Armed Forces, February, 2012, p. 4.
62 Department of Defense, Report to Congress on the Reviews of Laws, Policies and Regulations Restricting the Service of Female Members in the U.S. Armed Forces, February 2012, p. 4.
63 The report also stated that DOD gave notice of the changes commencing the congressional review timeline required in 10 U.S.C.§652, which means these changes became policy since Congress did not act on them.
64 Department of Defense, Memo from the Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense on Women in the Service Implementation Plan, January 9, 2013.
65 Defense Manpower Data Center as of January 2015.
66 Roulo, Claudette, “Defense Department Expands Women’s Combat Role,” DOD News, January 2013.
67 Department of Defense, Memo from the Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense on Women in the Service Implementation Plan, January 9, 2013.
68 Some occupational specialties require servicemembers to meet additional physical standards. 69 P.L. 113-291; 128 Stat. 1919; September 19, 2014.
70 Winn, Pete, “Gen. Dempsey: If Women Can’t Meet Military Standard, Pentagon Will Ask ‘Does it Really Have to Be That High,” cnsnews.com, January 25, 2013.
71 Seck, Hope H., “Last IOC in Marine Infantry Experiment Drops Female Officers,” Marine Corps Times, April 8, 2015.
72 Data provided to CRS by the U.S. Marine Corps in March 2015.
73 Mulrine, Anna, “Breaking Military’s Ultimate Glass Ceiling? Women start Ranger Training.,” The Christian Science
Monitor, April 30, 2015.
74 Lamothe, Dan, “Will the Army Open its Elite Ranger Regiment to Women? A Controversial Decision Awaits,”
Washington Post, August 11, 2015.
75 The Darby Phase is 15 days of intensive squad training and operations in a field environment that includes an
advanced obstacle course, airborne training, and a series of student-let and cadre-led patrols.
76 The 75th Ranger Regiment is a light infantry special operations unit specializing in a range of missions including direct action and personnel recovery. The Army has not yet announced whether it will allow women to apply for positions in this regiment or whether it will request a waiver to keep these positions closed.
77 Scarborough, Rowan, “Army may Train Women for Rigor of Front Lines, Studies Predict Injury, Attrition,” Washington Times, July 30, 2012.
78 Moore, Molly, Canada Puts Women on Front Line, Los Angeles Times, November 23, 1989.
79 United Kingdom Ministry of Defense, Women in ground close combat (GCC) review paper, December 1, 2014, p. B1, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/women-in-ground-close-combat-gcc-review-paper.
80 In studies of mixed gender units, some servicemembers attributed unit cohesion issues to differential standards between men and women. See for example Harrell, Margaret C. and Laura L. Miller, New Opportunities for Military Women; Effects Upon Readiness, Cohesion, and Morale, Santa Monica, CA, January 1997, p. 78.
81 Given that there are currently zero women in some career designators, an increase of one woman would be an increase of over 10%.
82 Bacon, Lance M., “We Need Their Talent,” Army Times, October 24, 2011. Odierno: “This is about managing talent. We have incredibly talented females who should be in those positions. We have work to do within the [Department of Defense] to get them to recognize and change.”
83 In July 2015 a teenage girl from New Jersey brought a federal class action suit against the Selective Service claiming the refusal to allow women to register is discriminatory now that women are eligible for combat roles.
84 Mulrine, Anna, “With U.S. Women Soon Eligible for Combat, the Draft Could be Next,” The Christian Science Monitor, October 28, 2014.
85 Lafond, Nicole, “Poll: Most Women Believe They Should Not Be Forced Into Combat,” The Daily Caller, February 7, 2013.
86 Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981). 87 50 U.S.C.§453.
88 See for example Center for Military Readiness, “Problematic Proposals in National Defense Authorization Act for 2015 (NDAA),” at http://www.cmrlink.org/content/women-in-combat/37616/ problematic_proposals_in_national_defense_authorization_act_for_2015_ndaa.
89 See for example the Navy’s policy on assignment of women to surface vessels (OPNAVINST 1300.17B, May 27, 2001) which requires a minimum of two female officers to be assigned (when no female enlisted are assigned) and a minimum of one female officer and one female Chief Petty Officer to be assigned to all gender integrated ships.
90 Seck, Hope Hodge, “All-Female Marine Grunt Team Gets Innovative During Combat Tests,” Marine Corps Times, May 2015.
Saudi Arabia’s Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques King Salman is on a crucially important visit to the United States. The trip comes at a time when, it could be argued, the Middle East has never faced so many serious challenges.
The king’s three-day high-profile visit includes talks at the White House with President Barack Obama. It is clear that high on the agenda will be joint security and counterterrorism. The discussions are also expected to encompass other key issues. One is the pending Iran nuclear deal, for which Obama now seems to have garnered enough support in Congress, to push through. The Kingdom has always wanted to improve relations with Iran. It therefore welcomes Iran’s commitment to adjust its nuclear program to rule out any chance that it could be weaponized. But at the same time Riyadh wants Tehran to stop meddling in the internal affairs of Gulf countries.
Saudi Arabia also has legitimate concerns about too early a removal of sanctions. It has been the economic pain and disruption caused by sanctions that have brought Iran to the negotiating table. Iran’s interference in the affairs of its neighbors has caused concerns throughout the region. The curbing of such behavior was not folded into the nuclear deal. Saudi Arabia had urged Washington that the agreement should be wider than merely the nuclear issue.
That it was not may yet prove to be a mistake.
Iranian meddling in Iraq and Yemen, along with its continuing support for the beleaguered Assad government in Syria are all issues of the greatest concern. Tehran has fostered dissension in GCC countries.
The removal of sanctions over the nuclear program must not free the Iranian government to increase its evil campaigns.
In this respect, the decisive Saudi-led operation in Yemen will also be a key discussion between King Salman and Obama. The Kingdom’s refusal to let Iranian-backed Houthi rebels overthrow Yemen’s legitimate government has enjoyed US support from the outset. The two leaders will be looking at the next stage in the campaign and how it can be brought to a successful conclusion.
Saudi Arabia and the United States have long enjoyed a strong strategic partnership. Even so, in recent times, there have been occasions when that seemed to have weakened. The Kingdom urged an early US engagement in Syria. Washington did not listen. As a result the Middle East is witnessing one of the greatest human tragedies of modern times. And tens of thousands of Syrian refugees are washing up on the shores of Europe and Libya, some of them drowned.
It is expected that this White House meeting will help clear the air. It will put the relationship between the two countries back on the same sure footing that has existed between them since 1933.
King Salman’s visit will also include the business of business. His presence in Washington coincides with the biggest US-Saudi trade and investment events ever mounted. The Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority (SAGIA) working with the Council of Saudi Chambers (CSC) and the US-Saudi Business Council is hosting the US-Saudi Investment Forum today.
This event has attracted widespread interest from the US business community. The pace of the Kingdom’s extraordinary infrastructural expansion shows no sign of slackening. In the next decade strategic spending and development initiatives will be receiving hundreds of billions of dollars-worth of funding.
The fresh opportunities for American corporations are underpinned by recent figures on US commercial relations with the Kingdom. In the last ten years, Saudi-US trade rose from $26 billion to $74 billion. US exports to the Kingdom surged 76 percent. In 2009 they stood at $11 billion. Last year they had reached $18 billion.
Alongside the forum there is an “Invest Saudi” exhibition. Here both public and private sector organizations are showcasing the many opportunities in all sectors, but particularly health, transport, mining and information and communications technology.
Overall, the next two days seem set to be a highly significant marker in Saudi-US friendship. Washington will be reminded that Saudi Arabia possesses substantial insights into the Middle East. The Kingdom is prepared, when necessary, to act with an iron fist, as in Yemen. But equally it has conducted years of quiet, patient and often highly effective diplomacy. This has earned respect around the world.
In any healthy relationship, there will be differences of emphasis, if not opinion. But genuine partners with strong strategic links are able to overcome such moments.
