By Kyle Lawrence Mullin

Burma’s minimum wage was raised to 3,600 kyat (US$2.80) for an eight-hour work day at the end of August, a move that may attract more investors and further legitimize the Southeast Asian nation’s long maligned garment industry.

Reuters reported that this new wage standardization in Burma (Myanmar) comes after nearly two years of “acrimonious” negotiations between workers’ unions, employees and the government.

The article adds that a minimum wage of 3,600 kyat or $2.80 per day would amount to $67 a month, making Burma highly competitive in a region where rival nations have set salaries far higher, such as the $90 to $128 minimum range in nearby Cambodia and Vietnam. This could mark a sharp reversal of fortune in Burma,, whose formerly robust garment industry stalled in recent years due to American economic sanctions.

However, the announcement was by no means met with unanimous praise. On July 17 Radio Free Asia reported that 160 business owners and 20 labor groups objected to the then proposed minimum wage. The article noted that this new wage standardization resulted in a salary increase of 50 cents. Those critics said the wage hike would make their businesses unsustainable.

Some workers, adversely, have argued the new minimum wage is not high enough. AFP reported that some employees were calling for a 4,000 kyat ($3.10) daily wage by staging protests outside of factories, leading many of them to be arrested.

The new minimum wage will take effect on Sept. 1, becoming another economic milestone in a country that is projected to have a GDP expansion of 8 percent by the fiscal year’s end. It also marks another major reform in the weeks ahead of general elections this November.

Brazil is welcoming the refugees from the Middle East and North Africa with “open arms” amid the migrant crisis, President Dilma Rousseff said in a speech.

“I would like to take this opportunity to reiterate the position of our government in receiving individuals who have been expelled from their respective countries,” Rousseff said in a televised address Monday, as quoted by the TeleSUR television network.

According to the media outlet, Brazil has welcomed over 1,700 Syrian refugees since 2013, which is more than any other country in the region.

The world is currently struggling with an unprecedented migrant crisis, with hundreds of thousands of people attempting to flee conflict torn regions of the Middle East and North Africa.

Many countries, including the European Union states and Australia, pledged to take in more refugees from Syria, mired in civil war since 2011.

By Cecilia Remón

Bolivia was the last Andean country to present its Coca Crop Monitoring Survey 2014. The Bolivian government jointly with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) reported on Aug. 17 that for the fourth consecutive year the amount of land cultivated with coca decreased to 20,400 hectares, 11 percent less than that registered in 2013.

According to UNODC, last year Bolivia produced a total of 33.1 tons of coca leaf, of which 60 percent (19.1 tons) was legally marketed in the only two formal markets that exist for this purpose. Although Antonino di Leo, UNODC representative in Bolivia, admitted that information is not available on what happened to the other 40 percent. Felipe Cáceres, Bolivian Vice-Minister for Controlled Substances, said in a press conference that part of these plantings not sold on the legal market “are, unfortunately, used for cocaine.”

On July 15, Peru enthusiastically presented its Coca Crop Monitoring Survey 2014, prepared jointly by the National Commission for Development and Life without Drugs (DEVIDA), the Peruvian government’s anti-drug agency, and UNODC.

Flavio Mirella, the UNODC representative for Ecuador and Peru, announced that there is an almost 14 percent reduction of the area of coca cultivation compared to 2013, down from 49,800 hectares to 42,900 hectares.

“This is the lowest since 1998,” said Mirella. “Since 2012 there has been a permanent reduction. Between 2012 and 2014 there has been a 30 percent reduction.”

According to Mirella, this is due to the government’s decision to increase the target goal of manual eradication by the so-called Special Project for Control and Eradication of Illegal Crops in the Upper Huallaga (CORAH), under the Ministry of Interior, and the decision of DEVIDA to reduce and minimize social conflicts and implement alternative development programs in the principal coca cultivation zones destined for drug-trafficking.

Alberto Otárola, executive president of DEVIDA, highlighted that 2014 “has been the most successful year in the fight against drug trafficking,” adding that the alternative development programs are comprehensive and include health and education programs for the coca growers and the improvement in road infrastructure that allows the alternative crops access to markets.

Crops increase in Colombia

With these statistics, Mirella and Otárola agree that Peru is no longer the largest producer of coca leaf in the world. That place is now occupied by Colombia which has experienced an increase of 21,000 hectares of coca leaf production, increasing from 48,000 in 2013 to 69,000 last year, a variation of 44 percent, according to its Coca Crop Monitoring Survey 2014, released in Colombia on July 2.

However, the data presented by Bolivia and Peru does not contain production statistics for cocaine hydrochloride, which is calculated into the Colombia report.

The Bolivian government has stated that “its legal code does not permit it to do this study,” although UNODC considers that “a study on the coca-cocaine efficiency would facilitate knowledge of the potential cocaine production in Bolivia” and that “it is necessary to find the legal means to allow this to be done.”

Otárola specified to Latinamerica Press, that Peru does not use the same conversion tables as Colombia because “they should be standardized” and he calculates that the “actual cocaine production in Peru is not more than 200 tons according to the verification tools” which he did not specify.

“Peru is not the principal producer of cocaine, nor the principal producer of coca in the world,” insisted Otárola.

Ricardo Soberón, Peruvian expert on drugs and drugtrafficking and former executive president of DEVIDA, warned that “since 2012 the reports monitoring the coca cultivation do not mention the quantity of cocaine produced in the country because they contend that the study on conversion of coca into cocaine has not been completed.” In 2011, the last year that this statistic was included, it registered at annual production of 310 tons of cocaine.

Colombia has experienced an increase of 52 percent in potential production of cocaine, increasing from 290 tons in 2013 to 442 tons last year, reported Bo Mathiasen, UNODC representative in Colombia. According to the report, this is due, on one hand, to the expectations of peasants and community organizations that cultivate coca to better dialogue with the government, and, on the other hand, an increase in coca leaf crops in strategic regions “in addition to a reduction of areas affected by spraying and manual eradication; in other words, less cost of production and better sale prices for the primary producers.”

Interdiction policies

For Soberón, the interdiction policies do not have any impact since the prices for coca leaf, cocaine paste and cocaine hydrochloride continue increasing in the farm. Also, the reduction in the cultivation of coca does not mean less production in cocaine. The technologies allow more harvests of the plant and higher yield in the same amount of time, he added.

Experts such as Chilean Ibán de Rementería calculate that the annual demand for cocaine in the world market is around 850 tons. UNODC statistics for 2013 indicate that cocaine production among the three countries is 1,000 tons.

Last year seizures of cocaine hydrochloride reached 189 tons: Bolivia 4 tons, Colombia 166.7 tons and Peru 18.7 tons. In the case of Colombia, it constituted 26 percent of total production of the narcotic, which would mean that 327 tons going to satisfy the consumer market. The remaining 523 tons of cocaine are being provided by Bolivia and Peru.

Numerous experts agree that while the war on drugs continues to be fought on the supply side there will be not advances. Mirella and Otárola defend the principle of shared responsibility with the consumption countries and the importance of development in the production regions, but also that this is not enough because drug trafficking has infiltrated into different sectors of society and the State.

“A wider view of the anti-drug war in Peru shows us the gross deficiencies: the unfinished reforms of the criminal procedure reform, the extended police corruption that points to the detention of users (51 percent of the total arrests, in spite of not being a crime) and the lack of investigation of the large criminal organizations (in spite of the existing law 30077 against organized crime that has not been funded), poor development of a control system of chemical inputs [to produce cocaine] and the weakness of the system to control money laundering (responsibility of the United of Financial Intelligence of the Superintendence of Banks and Insurance),” commented Soberón.

By Dr Subhash Kapila

Australian Defence Minister Kevin Andrews visit to India September 1-3 2015 was loaded heavily with significant endorsements of Australia-Indian strategic convergences on Indian Ocean and South China Sea security and additionally cemented the strategic contents of the Australia-India Framework for Security Cooperation Agreement of November 2014.

It would be recalled from my last year’s paper that this path-breaking Agreement quoted above was arrived at by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Australian Prime Minister Abbott during the former’s visit to Australia in November 2014.

To set the tone of analysing the significance of the Australian Defence Minister’s first visit to India and Australia’s geostrategic perceptions of India, it would be appropriate to quote his statements verbatim as made during this visit:

• “India is the emerging democratic superpower in Asia. It is therefore sensible that the relationship between India and Australia be developed and strengthened.”
• “There is scope for greater cooperation on global issues as India is a strategic partner.”
• ‘Australia recognises India’s critical role in supporting the security, stability and prosperity of the Indian Ocean Region and the stability of a wider rules-based global order.”
• Commenting on his dialogue with the Indian Defence Minister, he said that “The dialogue provides an opportunity for Defence Minister Parrikar and I to set the direction of our bilateral defence engagement in line with the expectations of the Frame work.”

The direction seems to have been set in terms of joint naval exercise AUSINDEX this month, Australian invitation to Indian Air Force for participation in Ex PITCH BLACK in Australia, possibly some joint Army exercises, and greater exchange between Australia and Indian DRDO. India and Australia have a commonality and inter-operability of US-origin Air Force transport aircraft and Naval maritime surveillance aircraft like the C-17, C-130 and the P-8.

Of much significance to India is the decision of Australia to cooperate and coordinate with India on Jihadi terrorism threats information and counter-terrorism strategies especially in relation to ISIS where reports suggest that over one hundred persons of Australian citizenship have joined the ISIS.

Australia-India strategic reachout to each other holds special geopolitical significance in the context of any maritime threats arising to Indian Ocean security and convergences in maintaining stability. These Australia-India maritime security convergences extend also to security and stability in the South China Sea.

In the above context, the Australian Defence Minister, stating that Australia while it does not consider China as a threat to Australian security, but implicit in the statement quoted ahead was the fact that Australia was critical of China’s stances on South China Sea and maritime security overall when he asserted that “At the same time we believe that the best way to maintain the integrity of the global trading system is to abide by international rules-based system. So we have said this publicly and privately to China that this is what Australia believes.”

Reinforcing Australian strong stand on China’s aggressive brinkmanship in the South China Sea the Australian Defence Minister firmly stated that “Australia strongly opposes the use of intimidation, aggression and coercion to advance any country’s claims or militarily alter the status quo. We are particularly concerned about the possible militarisation of features in the South China Sea.”

The Australian Defence Minister besides dialogue with the Indian Defence Minister also had meetings with the Indian External Affairs Minister, National Security Adviser and the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. His India visit also included a visit to India’s Western Naval Command Headquarters in Mumbai signifying the importance Australia attaches to India’s maritime importance.

The Chinese and Pakistani media only had terse reports of the Australian Defence Minister’s visit to India. So far, no comments have emanated from China on the assertive statements made by the Australian Defence Minister during his India-visit on the South China Sea.

It needs to be emphasised that Australia-India strategic reachout and partnership is a significant one and it is upto India now to walk the talk on adding substance to the Australian strategic reachout to India and it recognising India’s emerging roles as a power of significance. Rarely, has one seen any foreign dignitary as the Australian Defence Minister make strategic endorsements of India and also do a bit of ‘plain-speaking’ on China’s maritime brinkmanship.

Concluding thought that one wishes to emphasise is that if India wishes to retain the Indian Ocean as “Indian” then it must shed its erstwhile delusional “Strategic-Non Alignment” fixations and reach out actively for and reactivate the “US-Japan-India-Australia Quadrilateral” so that the Navies of these four nations pursue an integrated naval strategy for maintenance of Indian Ocean security and stability.

By Daniel J. Smith, Kelley Jeter, and Odin Westgaard

Since the establishment of the center of gravity (COG) concept as a fundamental planning factor in joint military doctrine, its proper identification has been considered crucial in successful attainment of desired objectives. Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, states, “This process cannot be taken lightly, since a faulty conclusion resulting from a poor or hasty analysis can have very serious consequences, such as the inability to achieve strategic and operational objectives at an acceptable cost.”1

Since its inception as a core planning tenet, the process for determining COGs has been a point of contention and debate. Currently, the definition of center of gravity and the process for determining it are outlined in joint doctrine, specifically in Joint Publication (JP) 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, JP 3-0, Joint Operations, and JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, as encompassed in the Joint Operation Planning Process (JOPP) within those publications. Speculation on proper COG determination has given rise to other COG methodologies, which have both questioned and challenged established doctrine for COG determination. Therefore, the objective of this article is to compare and contrast different COG determination methodologies to reveal strengths and weaknesses of each and ultimately to make recommendations for changes to joint doctrine. To accomplish this objective, three different COG methodologies are applied to the current Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)² problem set: Dale C. Eikmeier’s COG determination method, James P. Butler’s Godzilla COG methodology, and the Critical Factors Analysis, outlined in the JOPP.³ Findings of the analyses will be critically compared to produce recommendations for changes in joint doctrine COG determination.

When ISIL initiated large-scale offensive operations into Iraq in early June 2014, it propelled itself onto the global stage. While other contemporary Islamic militant groups have stated similar objectives for establishing an Islamic caliphate,⁴ ISIL is unique in that it has made significant progress in pursuit of that goal by seizing control of large amounts of territory in Iraq and Syria. With manning estimated at around 20,000 to 31,500,⁵ ISIL has been forcefully seizing territory in a conventional military fashion (while still sometimes employing contemporary insurgency-type tactics). In doing so, ISIL has been acquiring more supplies and sources of revenue to fuel its operations. The following COG methodologies will not only explicate each one’s structured processes, but also reveal other essential variables in detail.

The Eikmeier COG Methodology

Joint Publication 5-0 defines center of gravity as “a source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act.”⁶ Eikmeier’s proposed COG definition states that “the center of gravity is the primary entity that possesses the inherent capability to achieve the objective.”⁷ With this COG specificity, Eikmeier’s method is comprised of six steps:⁸

• Identify the desired ends or objectives.
• Identify the ways to achieve the ends, and select the one that evidence suggests is most likely to work. (Ways are actions, so they are expressed as verbs.) Then select the most elemental or essential action—that selection is the critical capability. The ways are critical actions that will achieve the endstate. Critical capabilities (CC) are the same verbs expressed in the ways; therefore, ways equal critical capabilities.
• List the means (critical requirements) needed to enable and execute the ways (critical capabilities).
• Select from the list of means the entity (noun) that possesses the innate way (CC) to tangibly achieve the end. This selection is the center of gravity.
• From the remaining items on the list, select those that are critical for the execution of the critical capability, which are the critical requirements.
• Complete the process by identifying those critical requirements vulnerable to adversary actions.

Once these steps are complete, the results of the COG analysis must pass the “does/uses” test; that is, the center of gravity is the means (critical requirement) that has the intrinsic force necessary, which “does” the action (critical capability), but it “uses” or requires other resources (means) to “do” the action. An example is the game of football. (For simplicity’s sake, the example focuses only on offense.)

• Step one: identify ends. The grand strategic objective is to win a championship. Other strategic objectives are winning games or winning a division. Operational objectives are to score touchdowns. Tactical objectives are scoring first downs.
• Step two: the ways (critical capabilities) to achieve the endstate, which are expressed as verbs. Strategically, they would include assembling a winning team, recruiting/retaining the right players, emplacing/substituting the right players, calling the right plays, and making the right calls. Strategically, the types of offense that coaches employ and their decisionmaking both determine operationally who will run, pass/catch, block, kick, and so forth.
• Step three: means (critical requirements) required to accomplish the ways. Strategically, coaches and their supporting staffs are the means necessary to manage, organize, train, and supply a football team. Operationally, the means are, but are not limited to, adequate equipment, practices, physical training facilities, morale, and the players themselves.
• Step four: entity (noun) from the list of means that intrinsically possesses the capabilities to achieve the ends. From the list, only the players can run, pass, catch, and execute plays—they are the operational COG. The coaches possess the inherent capability to decide which players will play (run, pass, and so forth); therefore, they are the strategic COG.
• Step five: critical requirements essential for the centers of gravity to reach the ends. These include recruiting, player placement, practices, fitness facilities/programs, and morale. While these requirements are essential, they are not centers of gravity. Coaches choose/insert players, and players win games.

Now that we understand this methodology, we apply it to determine ISIL’s center of gravity (figure 1).Step One: Identifying ISIL’s Ends. The group’s identified strategic objective since 2014 has been the establishment of an Islamic caliphate in which it possesses authority over Muslims worldwide and aims to bring most Muslim-inhabited regions of the world under its political control, beginning with the Levant region, which generally includes Syria, Jordan, Israel, Palestine, Lebanon, Cyprus, and part of southern Turkey.⁹ On June 29, 2014, ISIL declared the establishment of a caliphate. Its current leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who has renamed himself Amir al-Mu’minin Caliph Ibrahim, was named as caliph.¹⁰

To accomplish this strategic objective, the following operational objectives must be successfully completed: Opposition in Syria and Iraq (military and civilian) must be neutralized or destroyed.¹¹ Land must be seized and secured within Syria and Iraq.¹² Governance must be established in conquered areas.¹³ Sharia law must be established in conquered territory (this is implied as a caliphate requirement). Adequate revenue to establish sufficient commerce for governance and funding must be gained and maintained (with oil as the main resource).¹⁴

Step Two: Ways (CCs) Necessary for ISIL to Accomplish Objectives.

• Maneuver to conduct offensive operations
• destroy/neutralize opposition
• ability to seize territory
• ability to occupy seized lands
• enforce sharia law
• govern provinces, cities, and territory
• fund operations and new governance
• lead, direct, and organize ISIL
• motivate and influence ISIL recruit and maintain capable forces.¹⁵

Step Three: Means or Critical Requirements Necessary to Execute Ways (Critical Capabilities).

• Adequate fighter strength: ISIL fighters are estimated to number around 20,000–31,500.¹⁶
• Military equipment: ISIL has attained large amounts of assault rifles, machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades, surface-to-air missiles, other antiarmor weapons, artillery, tanks, light vehicles, armored personnel carriers, antiaircraft weaponry, and various other rocket-launcher systems.¹⁷
• Leadership and leadership structure: ISIL has a clear leader with a well-structured cabinet and subordinate leadership. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi is the declared caliph, and he has a cabinet of advisors that includes two deputy leaders, one for Iraq and one for Syria. There are also 12 local governors with supporting staffs.¹⁸
• Fighter morale/will to fight: Islamic ideology is one morale factor that ISIL leadership uses for recruitment and for exploiting common demographics and psychosociological factors found in many members of terrorist organizations.¹⁹ However, ISIL leadership also lures recruits with pay/housing incentives and protection. Some recruits are thrill-seekers, while some join only for personal gain. Smaller insurgent groups join ISIL as a merger of convenience. Tribes that have surrendered to ISIL are often compelled to join the organization or face the threat of severe consequences.²⁰
• Funding: ISIL funds itself through the seizure of assets in conquered territory, the sale of oil on the black market, extortion, and external support.²¹

Step Four: Entities That Possess Distinctive Ways to Achieve Operational and Strategic Ends. These selections are the respective centers of gravity. The critical requirement that possesses the capability to accomplish the identified objectives is the ISIL fighters themselves; therefore, this army is ISIL’s operational center of gravity. However, it took significant effort to mobilize the ISIL army. ISIL leadership “does” the work of recruiting, organizing, governing, and continually motivating ISIL fighters and “uses” them to maneuver, defeat, seize, occupy, and enforce as necessary for ISIL to accomplish its objectives. Therefore, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and his inner circle are the strategic center of gravity.

Step Five: Further Validates COG Selection. From the remaining items on the critical requirement list that are vital for the execution of the critical capabilities, the fighters “do” the operational work by “using” the other critical requirements necessary, which were mostly seized by the fighters in the first place. The fighters themselves seized more weapons and equipment for use and did not attain enhanced capabilities as a result of prior government issuing. Furthermore, although ISIL has gained greater capabilities, its fighters—infantrymen—are ISIL’s core strength. Military equipment, money, and other resources cannot be employed, seized, or exploited without ISIL fighters.

ISIL leadership “does” the work to create, maintain, and lead its army, and “uses” this army to accomplish its objectives. If ISIL were already a state actor with an established government, military, and economy, its current leadership would not qualify as the strategic center of gravity, according to Eikmeier.²² However, ISIL is not a state actor. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi took the helm of the moderately effective Islamic State in Iraq in 2010 and developed it into the formidable force that it is today.²³ As a kingdom requires a king, a caliphate requires a caliph, and al-Baghdadi established himself as the first caliph. It is one thing to need or employ an existing force; it is another thing to create it first. If ISIL becomes more firmly established and continues to be successful, the strategic center of gravity likely will shift toward its revenue sources. Removing a key leader from a securely established entity probably would not cause it to collapse, as a new leader would move in to take his place; however, as of now, ISIL is still a nascent organization that requires astute leadership to hold it together.²⁴

The process concludes by identifying those critical requirements vulnerable to adversary actions. As the ISIL fighters are the operational COG, various factors contribute to the filling of ISIL’s fighter ranks. The mergers of convenience (personal/group survival and protection) indicate that if more ideal options became available, fighters might consider renouncing ISIL. Disruption in revenue could hinder incentives to fight for ISIL, inciting reconsiderations of convictions.²⁵ Events such as these could also potentially increase friction and distrust in leadership. Exploitation of these vulnerabilities could significantly damage ISIL’s centers of gravity.

Eikmeier’s COG determination methodology provides tangible centers of gravity, which are determined through a testable “does/uses” criteria. For the operational COG, identification of this criterion is a more objective process than with identification of the strategic COG, but it is still testable under the criteria. If the methodology is followed correctly, COG identification likely would be more consistent with its results, regardless of who applies the technique.

Godzilla COG Methodology

Another alternative methodology that possesses testable criteria is Butler’s Godzilla COG determination approach. The Godzilla methodology is relatively simple. Butler essentially determines the overall strategic goal of the force to be examined—friendly or enemy—and examines the objective that must be met to achieve that goal. Once the operational objective has been determined, the critical strengths for achieving that objective are identified. Next, these strengths are removed and examined one at a time. The Godzilla methodology posits that one of these critical strengths is the center of gravity. To identify that center, as a critical strength is removed, the question then asked is: can the objective still be achieved without this strength? If the answer is yes, that strength is not the center of gravity. The strength is replaced and another is removed, asking the same question. Once we find the sole strength—the removal of which precludes the accomplishment of the objective—the center of gravity has been identified (see figure 2).²⁶Butler uses Milan Vego’s definitions to best describe critical strengths as the “primary sources of physical or moral potential/power or elements that integrate, protect, and sustain specific sources of combat potential/power.”²⁷ Strengths are therefore considered critical if they “affect or potentially affect achievement of the objective.”²⁸

To get to that point with ISIL, we must examine its stated strategic objective and means for achieving it. ISIL has declared an Islamic caliphate, and its strategic objective is to expand the borders and influence of that caliphate as far as possible, governing all its citizens under strict sharia law. With this as its stated strategic objective, what must ISIL accomplish to make this goal a reality?

First and foremost, what ISIL has so far accomplished is what sets it apart from other Islamic extremist groups. It has seized land, controls a large population, and currently governs as the declared caliphate. Therefore, controlling land and people to spread its sphere of governance is the decisive operational objective that defines the caliphate. Accomplishing these advances has taken several critical strengths unique to ISIL: capable and charismatic leadership, an army of 20,000 to 31,500 armed members, large amounts of equipment, and highly lucrative funding sources. This army has been critical in seizing much of the previously mentioned equipment and revenue. Using the Godzilla methodology, these strengths are next removed one at a time to identify the indispensable strength that is the center of gravity.

Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s leadership and will to expand territory and govern people are key elements that set ISIL apart from its contemporaries. Removing that leadership in the early days of the movement might have completely derailed its progress and dispersed its followers. But the momentum of the organization, as it currently is, has grown beyond just the influence of one man, and removing al-Baghdadi might even promote him to martyr status and galvanize his followers behind his replacement. The replacement might not be as effective a leader, but there is no guarantee that removing this strength would prevent ISIL from attaining its objectives. Therefore, it does not follow at this point that al-Baghdadi is the center of gravity.

The army ISIL has amassed is a motivated group that has obeyed the orders to seize territory and subjugate citizens throughout its territory in Iraq and Syria. They are well armed, trained, brutal, and, from all outward appearances, motivated and highly capable of conquering, holding, and governing the territories and people they are charged with dominating. ISIL is well armed largely because of the sizeable amounts of military hardware it has captured through progressive victories. Through these victories, ISIL also has seized valuable sources of revenue, notably oil fields, to continue funding its operations.

Large quantities of newly acquired weapons, while critical, cannot exclusively accomplish ISIL’s objectives; someone must wield them. Impeding money and resources could prove critical in suppressing ISIL, but its fighters intrinsically retain the capability to seize territory, subjugate citizens, and hold territory. Removing these militants from the equation would render the leadership of ISIL relatively impotent. Declaring a caliphate will fall on deaf ears if the means for enforcing it and growing it are taken away. Therefore, based on the COG identification criteria outlined by the Godzilla method, the substantial army that ISIL has amassed is its center of gravity.

Critical Factors Analysis COG Methodology

Now that nondoctrinal COG methodologies have been applied to the current ISIL problem set, the Critical Factors Analysis COG determination methodology outlined in the JOPP is applied to ISIL. Joint Publication 5-0 states that the first step in COG analysis is to identify the desired objectives.²⁹ Upon examination of ISIL from various open sources, its main strategic objective is to create an Islamic state across Sunni areas of Iraq and in Syria.³⁰ Al-Baghdadi is ISIL’s self-declared leader and seeks authority over all Muslims.

Nested with this strategic objective, operational objectives are to control Sunni areas in Iraq, recruit more fighters, and continue to gain funding. As the JOPP COG methodology next outlines, critical strengths, critical weaknesses, centers of gravity, critical capabilities, critical requirements, and critical vulnerabilities must be identified. Finally, decisive points are identified (see figure 3). Below, these variables are outlined with the JOPP process.³¹

1a. Strategic Objective(s)

1. creation of an Islamic State
2. uniting all Muslims
3. defeating U.S. and Western allies.

1b. Operational Objective(s)

1. control of Sunni areas in Iraq and Syria
2. recruit more fighters
3. gain funding to support efforts.

2a. Critical Strengths

1. large following of personnel willing to fight for the cause
2. weapons seized from captured areas in Iraq and Syria
3. financially gain from seized equipment, oil fields, and trafficking operations
4. rule by terror to subjugate inhabitants.

2b. Critical Weakness(s)

1. nonstate actor (seeking to become legitimized state)
2. no international endorsement (further delegitimizes ISIL)
3. rule by terror (could espouse uprising)
4. radical followers’ loyalty is tied to religious and ideological beliefs of leader.

3a. Strategic Center of Gravity: radical
ISIL ideology.

3b. Operational Center of Gravity: ISIL forces.

4. Critical Capabilities

1. ability to recruit followers
2. ability to garner support for ideology
3. command and control of forces across wide areas of terrain.³²

5. Critical Requirements

1. legitimacy
2. sustainment
3. fighters.

6. Critical Vulnerabilities

1. no cohesive acceptance of Islamic ideology (that is, Sunni versus Shia) in disputed area
2. extreme violence could reduce willingness of fighters.

7. Decisive Points

1. control of towns and villages within Iraq and Syria
2. terrorist activity is a backup to overt rule in Iraq and Syria and will contribute to overall objectives of ISIL.

Based on analysis of the identified critical factors, the conclusion we reach is that the ISIL movement appears reliant on the continuation of popular support for the radical Sunni ISIL ideology, that is, the strategic COG. If belief in the strategic COG followed by al-Baghdadi and his immediate supporters wavers, or if other Islamic ideological variants garner more support, the ISIL movement likely will fall apart.

Comparison Findings

Eikmeier’s COG application identified ISIL leadership as the strategic center of gravity, with the ISIL fighters as the operational center of gravity. The Godzilla methodology determined that the ISIL fighters are the COG. The JOPP method identified the ISIL ideology as the strategic COG, with the ISIL fighters as the operational COG. As evident, all three methods yielded similar results for the ISIL fighters as a COG, with differences in the identification of the strategic COG. With the Eikmeier application, the ISIL ideology is identified as a critical requirement (means) that its leadership shapes and uses to recruit, motivate, and influence ISIL fighters to accomplish its objectives. Leadership in this JOPP application is not specifically identified as a critical factor but is inherently implied within other outlined critical factors; it is also implied as necessary in the JOPP method conclusion statement.

For argument’s sake, whether identified as a COG or a critical requirement, understanding all variables that contribute to the effectiveness of ISIL ideology in recruiting and motivating is essential if planning is focused on countering the ideology. To plan operations centered on the neutralization of an ideology means to focus on the people it is influencing. In addition to the ISIL recruitment base described earlier, much research conducted on ideology-driven terrorist organizations indicates that most terrorists are social solidarity seekers. They search for social acceptance, with a majority of members being poor, unmarried, rejected socially, or dislocated from their native lands.³³ Recent studies on al Qaeda, Fatah, Hamas, Hezbollah, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Turkish terrorists have revealed that a key reason for joining was that a friend or relative was already a member, a conclusion consistent with prior research on many other terrorist groups.³⁴ Much terrorism research tends to gravitate toward ideological causation but fails to address consistent socioeconomic and demographic variables that are prevalent within terrorist organizations. ISIL is no exception to this phenomenon.

The COGs identified with the JOPP method are not testable under this process. As different people apply the JOPP process, varying results are inevitable and often become subject to debate. All three methods provide structured processes for identifying critical COG variables. Objectives (ends), critical capabilities (ways), critical requirements (means), and other critical variables are inherent in all three methods. The primary difference is that the Eikmeier and Godzilla applications provide testable criteria for COG determination, whereas the JOPP process lacks a definitive COG qualifying procedure, making it more subjective in nature and thus more susceptible to biases, preferences, or dominant personalities.

With the analyses and findings of these methodologies, current joint doctrine for center of gravity determination should be revised. A new methodology does not necessarily need to directly mirror Eikmeier’s or Butler’s COG methodologies, but it does need to make joint doctrine COG determination a testable process. Whether it is deliberate elimination symbolized by a mythical creature, a “does/uses” criterion, which singles out a distinctive relationship between two variables, or a hybrid of both, joint doctrine COG determination should be testable. With qualifying standards, COGs are less likely to be misidentified.

Source:
This article was published in the Joint Force Quarterly 78 which is published by the National Defense University.

Notes:

1. Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, Joint Operation Planning (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, August 11, 2011), III-23.
2. On May 14, 2014, the Department of State officially stated that the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) will be the terrorist organization’s primary name. Department of State, “Terrorist Designations of Groups Operating in Syria,” available at <www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/05/226067.htm>.
3. Dale C. Eikmeier, “Redefining the Center of Gravity,” Joint Force Quarterly 59 (4^th Quarter 2010); James P. Butler, “Godzilla Methodology: Means for Determining Center of Gravity,” Joint Force Quarterly 72 (1^st Quarter 2014); Joint Operation Planning Process (JOPP) Workbook, Naval War College Joint Military Operations Department (Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College, January 21, 2008), appendix C.
4. “ISIS Rebels Declare “Islamic State” in Iraq and Syria,” BBC News, June 30, 2014, available at <www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-28082962>; “What is ISIS? The Short Answer,” Wall Street Journal, June 12, 2014, available at <http://blogs.wsj.com/briefly/2014/06/12/islamic-state-of-iraq-and-al-sham-the-short-answer/>.
5. Jim Sciutto, Jamie Crawford, and Chelsea J. Carter, “ISIS Can “muster” Between 20,000 and 31,500 Fighters, CIA Says,” CNN.com, September 12, 2014, available at <www.cnn.com/2014/09/11/world/meast/isis-syria-iraq>.
6. JP 5-0, III-22.
7. Eikmeier references that the use of the word primary is attributed to Joe Strange, Centers of Gravity and Critical Vulnerabilities: Building the Clausewitzian Foundation So That We Can All Speak the Same Language, Perspectives on Warfighting, no. 4, 2^nd ed. (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Association, 1996), ix.
8. Eikmeier, “Redefining the Center of Gravity.”
9. “Daash Announce the Establishment of the Caliphate State and Renamed the ‘Islamic State’ Only without Iraq, Syria,” ArabicCNN.com, June 29, 2014, available at <http://arabic.cnn.com/middleeast/2014/06/29/urgent-isis-declares-caliphate>; Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Abu Mohammad, letter dated 9 July 2005,” 2, available at <https://web.archive.org/web/20110522153638/http:/www.dni.gov/press_releases/letter_in_english.pdf>.
10. Adam Withnall, “Iraq Crisis: ISIS Changes Name and Declares Its Territories a New Islamic State with ‘Restoration of Caliphate’ in Middle East,” The Independent (London), June 29, 2014.
11. Laura Smith-Spark, “Iraqi Yazidi Lawmaker: ‘Hundreds of My People Are Being Slaughtered,’” CNN.com, August 6, 2014, available at <http://edition.cnn.com/2014/08/06/world/meast/iraq-crisis-minority-persecution/index.html?hpt=hp_t3>.
12. Tim Arango and Michael R. Gordon, “Iraqi Insurgents Secure Control of Border Posts,” New York Times, June 23, 2014.
13. Bill Roggio, “The Rump Islamic Emirate of Iraq,” The Long War Journal, October 16, 2006, available at <www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2006/10/the_rump_islamic_emi.php>.
14. Max Fisher, “How ISIS Is Exploiting the Economics of Syria’s Civil War,” Vox.com, June 12, 2014, available at <www.vox.com/2014/6/12/5802824/how-isis-is-exploiting-the-economics-of-syrias-civil-war>; Terrence McCoy, “ISIS Just Stole $425 Million, Iraqi Governor Says, and Became the ‘World’s Richest Terrorist Group,’” Washington Post, June 12, 2014.
15. J.M. Berger, “How ISIS Games Twitter,” The Atlantic, June 16, 2014, available at <www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/06/isis-iraq-twitter-social-media-strategy/372856/>; Harleen K. Gambhir, Dabiq: The Strategic Messaging of the Islamic State, Backgrounder (Washington, DC: Institute for the Study of War, August 15, 2014), available at <www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/dabiq-strategic-messaging-islamic-state>.
16. Sciutto, Crawford, and Carter.
17. ISIL has obtained weapons from Saddam Hussein’s stockpiles, the Syrian civil war, and U.S. involvement in Operation Iraqi Freedom. See John Ismay, “Insight into How Insurgents Fought in Iraq,” New York Times, October 17, 2013, available at <http://atwar.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/10/17/insight-into-how-insurgents-fought-in-iraq/?_r=1>; Charles Lister, “Not Just Iraq: The Islamic State Is Also on the March in Syria,” The Huffington Post, August 7, 2014, available at <www.huffingtonpost.com/charles-lister/not-just-iraq-the-islamic_b_5658048.html?utm_hp_ref=tw>; Thomas Gibbons-Neff, “ISIS Propaganda Videos Show Their Weapons, Skills in Iraq,” Washington Post, June 18, 2014, available at <www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2014/06/18/isis-propaganda-videos-show-their-weapons-skills-in-iraq/>.
18. Nick Thompson and Atika Shubert, “The Anatomy of ISIS: How the ‘Islamic State’ Is Run, from Oil to Beheadings,” CNN.com, September 18, 2014, available at <http://edition.cnn.com/2014/09/18/world/meast/isis-syria-iraq-hierarchy/index.html?hpt=hp_t1>.
19. ISIL’s foundation is based on al Qaeda’s ideology and follows well-known jihadist principles. This form of Islam is anti-Western and uses violence against those who do not agree with their views. This branch of Islam seeks to return to original thoughts and condemns new ideas, which are believed to be corrupt. See Michael Glint, Can a War With ISIS Be Won? ISIL/Islamic State/Daesh (ebook, Conceptual Kings, 2014), 5; Violent Extremism Smartcard Compendium, TRADOC Culture Center first draft, September 2012, 45–52.
20. “Islamic State: An Assessment of Capabilities and the Effectiveness of International Intervention,” IHS Jane’s Intelligence Briefing, October 30, 2014.
21. Over the past 6 months, since the group began sweeping across eastern Syria and into Iraq, experts estimate that its leaders have gained access to 1.2 billion pounds in cash—more than the most recent recorded annual military expenditure of Ireland. ISIL is developing in a vital oil, gas, and trade area of the world. It can grab as it expands. It might earn up to 5 million pounds a month through extortion of local businesses. In the past year, it has been estimated that ISIL has made 40 million pounds from taking hostages, with each foreign hostage thought to be worth 3 million pounds. See Harriet Alexander and Alastair Beach, “How ISIL is Funded, Trained and Operating in Iraq and Syria,” The Telegraph (London), August 23, 2014, available at <www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews /worldnews/middleeast/iraq/11052919/How-Isil-is-funded-trained-and-operating-in-Iraq-and-Syria.html>.
22. Eikmeier argued that leaders in World War II were not centers of gravity but were critical requirements as leaders for their respective nations and enablers for the actual centers of gravity. In a modernized military, Eikmeier would not identify soldiers as the operational COG. Depending on the military force, the COG could be armor formations, air forces, or some other component—whichever capability is critical for accomplishing the objectives. See Dale C. Eikmeier, “Center of Gravity Analysis,” Military Review (July–August 2004), 2–5.
23. “ISIS Fast Facts,” CNN.com, October 9, 2014, available at <www.cnn.com/2014/08/08/world/isis-fast-facts>.
24. “Islamic State.”
25. Ibid.
26. Butler, 29.
27. Milan Vego, Joint Operational Warfare: Theory and Practice (Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College, 2009), VII-16.
28. Butler, 27.
29. JOPP Workbook.
30. “ISIS Fast Facts.”
31. JOPP Workbook.
32. “ISIL Brings More than Just Brutality to the Battlefield,” AmericanAljazeera.com, November 2, 2014.
33. Max Abrahms, “What Terrorists Really Want: Terrorist Motives and Counterterrorism Strategy,” International Security 32, no. 4 (Spring 2008), 97.
34. Ibid., 104.

The United Nations says Europe must offer guaranteed relocation for Syrian refugees.

The UN refugee agency (UNHCR) says around one million migrants should reach Europe by the end of 2016.

Some 30,000 refugees and migrants are on Greek islands now, including 20,000 on Lesbos.

Record numbers are crossing from Greece into the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia from where many people board trains heading for Serbia.

The UNHCR said that reception centres must be set up in countries including Greece and Hungary to deal with the influx of people.

Hundreds of people wait in this reception area under the watchful eye of Hungarian police. It’s become a bottleneck for migrants and refugees who have travelled from Greece through the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Serbia before reaching Hungary.

Hungary has refused offers of help from the United Nations refugee agency.

Its holding area is an ill-equipped open corn-field where newcomers, will sleep before taken to already overcrowded transit camps.

Original article

College of William & Mary Professor and Ron Paul Institute Academic Board Member Lawrence Wilkerson frankly assesses that former United States General and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director David Petraeus’ proposal that the US support al-Qaeda to fight the Islamic State (ISIS) is a “crazy idea” that creates a blowback danger for Americans. Wilkerson declared this assessment in an interview Thursday with RT host Thom Hartman.

In the interview, Wilkerson, a former US Army colonel and chief of staff for Secretary of State Colin Powell, elaborates on his conclusion by warning:

I would point out that this is just the kind of thing we do that gives us this enormous blowback later. There is a direct line between our support for the mujahideen — the training and arming of al-Qaeda in particular in Afghanistan — and 9-11. And there will be a line, I assure you, between any support we give al-Qaeda or al-Qaeda-like elements in Syria and any future attack on the United States overseas, or here, by them. It’s just something that happens, and it’s extremely dangerous to be playing with this sort of thing.

The wide-ranging interview also contains Wilkerson’s frank insights regarding several other matters, including the paid lobbyists in America for the Mojahedin-e-Khalq (MEK) — “one of the most brutal terrorist organizations in the world,” the Saudi Arabia government — or some elements of it — “financing and supporting” ISIS, and former Vice President Dick Cheney who Wilkerson calls “an obscene blemish on the American reputation” who “ought to be in jail for war crimes.”

Watch the complete 12-minute interview at the beginning of Thom Hartman’s show here:

On June 30, RPI Chairman Ron Paul and Executive Director Daniel McAdams discussed on the Ron Paul Liberty Report some earlier advocacy for the US government to overtly supporting al-Qaeda in the Middle East. Watch their discussion here:

This article was published by RonPaul Institute.

Three soldiers loyal to the General National Congress (GNC) – the authority recognized by the international community – were killed in an ambush claimed by the Islamic State (IS) near Benghazi. According to the Lana news agency, close to the GNC, another 4 soldiers were injured in the attack that targeted a checkpoint around 8km from the city, capital of Cyrenaica.

Benghazi, epicenter of the revolt that led to the fall of Muammar Gaddafi, has been theater to over a year of violent fighting between armed groups for control over the oil-rich region. Among these also Ansar al Sharia fighters, close to al Qaeda and IS, which imposed control over Sirte, 450km east of Tripoli.

Meanwhile, the delicate peace talks mediated by the UN envoy Bernardino Leon continue in Geneva. The mediators and international community hope for a deal by September 20 for the formation of a unity government to restore stability in the nation.

By Asanga Abeyagoonasekera*

“Don’t think the enemies are weak as there are pro-Eelam forces on one hand while forces belonging to the last regime are also waiting to sabotage the destiny of the national government,” Sri Lankan President Maithripala Sirisena.

One of the largest catastrophes in modern human history is unfolding in Syria owing to the meteoric rise of the Islamic State (IS) that is now in control of more than half of the Syrian territory. According UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, the country has lost the equivalent of four decades of human development.

The suffering of the Syrians running from the IS trouble and a picture of a lifeless Syrian boy on the beach has caught the attention of the entire world. According to reports, one of every five Syrians lives in poverty. The Syrian nation is in chaos, thus leaving no choice but to flee. It is time international communities collaborate in crushing the root cause, which is the IS. With Western and Middle Eastern political will, the IS infrastructure can be dismantled and by building international partnerships, global harmony can be restored.

Meanwhile, Sri Lanka was going through its own political transition. After the January 2015 presidential election which overthrew the Rajapaksa regime, Sri Lankans reaffirmed their verdict in the recent August 2015 parliamentary election, defeating Rajapaksa yet again. This secured a clear victory for the United National Front for Good Governance (UNFGG) that took 106 seats while the opposition could secure only 95. The new government with the leadership of the new Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe will be ready to introduce good governance and fight corruption to bring economic prosperity. It is time he executes the promises made while electioneering, with the right kind of cabinet ministers. Sri Lanka is seen by the outside world as a shining example of democratic peaceful elections and political transition. The democratic values in our society are far superior to an individual politician.

R. Sampanthan, a minority party leader was appointed opposition leader. 48 Cabinet Ministers were elected from the two main parties, the UNFGG and United People’s Freedom Alliance (UPFA). For the first time, Sri Lanka’s opposition leader, who should have been according to the people’s mandate of more than 4 million UPFA voters, has been moved to a minority regional party due to the MoU to create a national government. This move garnered both positive and negative reactions but at this critical juncture, with the upcoming decision on Sri Lanka at the UNHCR and the absence of a clear majority government, this was the best option chosen, because the people had not given enough votes to form a majority government.

However, the Sri Lankan government, under UNSC Resolution 1373, proscribed 15 Liberation Tigers of the Tamil Eelam fronts with effect from 1 April 2014. The order enabled funds, assets, and economic resources belonging to the listed persons and entities to remain frozen until the removal of their names from the designated list. It is important to continue the ban and to not review it this point because these fronts still could be a threat to our national security.

In the next few days, some members of the Tamil National Alliance will leave for Geneva to pressure for an international investigation. Sustaining the national government model will be the next challenge as we know what the capabilities of some of our politicians are and how fast they move from one side to another. For a country that has gone through peaceful political transition, it is now important to quickly move towards the nation-building process to double our per capita income by 2020. To this end, two important factors need to be considered:

First we need to move as a nation to a higher collective outcome. The four-time prime minister who understands and knows most politicians in his political sphere would have to find the art of moving away from playing prisoner’s dilemma as he needs to get everyone to cooperate and move forward instead of stagnating.

“If you and I were to change our ways together, we could both get to a better place. However, if I was to change and you were not, I’d be much worse off. And because I can’t be sure that you will move, I won’t make the move either,” Lutfey Siddiqi, Adjunct Professor, National University of Singapore.

These words demonstrate a classic ‘prisoner’s dilemma’ where groups of people settle for a sub-optimal outcome because they cannot ensure coordinated action that could take them all to a better outcome. Great leadership, especially in the context of national leadership is about orchestrating coordinated movement away from the prisoners’ dilemma to a higher collective outcome.

We need to introduce meritocracy into our system, which, in essence is appointing suitable and qualified individuals for the job and ensuring strong government appointments to strengthen our institutions. All appointments will go through a recommendation committee of president and prime minister – a brilliant move to screen the most appropriate person for the job, in the absence of which one will witness ad hoc appointments by some ministers. Chairpersons, directors and all executives’ political appointments need to be carefully decided as they are the key individuals who will work in the ministries and developing the institutions that run losses.

As a nation, we have underwent a lot of pain, firstly during the independence struggle and then fighting terrorism for nearly three decades, and secondly through the youth insurrections and the many political transitions over the past several decades. It is important to develop a national plan by all political parties for the next several decades to take our nation towards prosperity.

* Asanga Abeyagoonasekera
Executive Director, LKIIRSS, Sri Lanka

By Sanjeev Ahluwalia*

Onions comprise less than 1% by value of India’s agricultural production. The average Indian consumes less than 800 grams of the stuff per month. The onion is a seasonal fruit. Supply traditionally dips during July to September as only the stored winter crop, harvested around March, is available for consumption.

India is the second largest producer of onions after China. We produce more than we need and export around 10% of production unless weather events adversely impact the crop. This year unseasonal rain, during harvesting, damaged the winter crop.

Demand is relatively inelastic. Why don’t consumers say no when prices increase? First, onions are to palates in the North, Central and Western parts of India, what fish is to Bengal and curry patta and coconut is to the South. Food, chips even Uttapams taste better with onions. Onion, like Garlic, is also valued for its therapeutic value. Second, onions give a big bang for the buck. An average family spends around Rs 100 per month on the stuff. If price doubles, the burden is irksome but not a killer. Just economizing on pre-paid phone calls can make up the difference. But onion is the key savory for low income households.

It’s the politics stupid!

The fuss about onions is more about politics than economics. The political footprint of onions was established in the 1980 elections. Mrs. Indira Gandhi, on her comeback trail, after her post-emergency election debacle, shrewdly used the price rise in onions to drive home how uncaring of the ordinary person and how incompetent, the government of then Prime Minister Chaudhary Charan Singh had become. This clicked. The Congress won 67% of the Lok Sabha seats. In 1998, a sharp price rise in onions, dethroned the BJP government of Chief Minister, Madanlal Khurana in Delhi thereby establishing a new metric for good governance – the price of onions.

Delhi Chief Minister Arvind Kejriwal has fingered the Union government for failing to control hoarding and speculation leading to the current price rise. Delhi government flooded Delhi markets in mid-August with onions at Rs 30 per kg. It plans to hold the price line just below Rs 40 per kg through public sector retail supply versus a market retail price of Rs 70 to 80 per kg.

Union government on the back foot

But the Union government claims this is too little and too late. More nimble footwork by the state government could have prevented the steep rise in onion prices in Delhi. The Union government had made available a Price Stabilization Fund of Rs 500 crore in April 2015 which state governments could use by contributing an equal amount to buy onions for retail supply at reasonable rates.

On July 2, when wholesale prices were still around Rs 20 per kg in Lasalgaon, Maharashtra-India’s largest onion mandi, the Union government brought onion under the Essential Commodities Act, thereby enabling stock limits to be enforced on wholesale agencies. It also enforced a Minimum Export Price of Rs 30 per kg to discourage exports.

In today’s intensely adversarial, no-holds-barred competitive politics no government can ignore a public challenge. The traditionally business friendly BJP government, at the center, is particular sensitive when “hoarders” are fingered for the price rise. Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat, Haryana, Andhra Pradesh and Punjab- all BJP/allies governed states – account for more than 60% of national onion production.

Per a NCAER 2014 paper selected productivity enhancement can boost roduction. Three big onion producing states- Maharashtra, MP and AP- account for 50% of production but produce less than 17 kilo gram per Hectare against 27 and 21.5 kg/Ha in Gujarat and Punjab respectively. Again all three are ruled by BJP/NDP. Increasing productivity in just these three states can boost production by 20% ensuring sustained exports and no domestic shortages. Doing more on reducing the trade margin (better storage, faster transportation, lower market fees) can also leave more of the money with farmers whilst lowering domestic prices.

Clearly the government needs an effective and transparent mechanism, which provides the right price signals and rationalizes expectations for both farmers and consumers.

Killing export or killing farmers

Increasing the Minimum Export Price, as the government has done again this year, is the standard response. But such intervention in the market, even as it helps consumers by diverting supply to the domestic market, robs farmers of the gains from export. It also disrupts any attempt to develop export markets. Similarly, importing onions to keep consumer price low reduces the incentives for farmers to grow onions.

But both these options are less intrusive than using the public procurement and subsidized retail supply template used for food grain. Such publicly managed mechanisms are invariably highly inefficient and ineffective with cascading losses in procurement, storage, transportation, distribution and retail sale. Sometimes inept government managed imports flood the market after the seasonal supply dip has passed and just as the new crop arrives- with disastrous impact on farmers’ incomes.

Can private distribution agencies do better?

Why not appoint a private trading agency for marginal but politically sensitive food crops, mandated to import, export or arrange for domestic distribution to balance market led demand and supply and keeping retail prices within a pre-defined retail trading band, which meets the twin needs of both farmers and consumers. This is what the RBI does for our currency to avoid excessive volatility.

Private trading agencies would charge a hefty commission for their services but it would be considerably less than the cost of direct administrative action to purchase, stock and supply onions along the Food Corporation of India model.

Alternatively, use onions as a vehicle for building bridges with our neighbours – particularly Pakistan, which loves the stuff almost as much Punjabis. Why not negotiate a stand- by, bilateral onion supply agreement to meet onion deficits in either country on preferential terms? A similar arrangement is possible with our larger northern neighbor- China whose onion productivity exceeds ours’s. Onions can add a savory flavor to Track 1.5 – B2B- diplomacy.

Isn’t it high time the government bit the political bullet and said no to being bullied about the price of onions? They are not a necessity, which the sovereign is obliged to supply. The Jains don’t even touch the stuff.

To show that onions are dispensable, the entire cabinet should voluntarily say no to fresh onions during the lean period. PM Modi could launch a social media campaign to entreat well-off folks to substitute fresh onions with dried ones or switch to other seasonings, during the lean period. This can reduce demand and hence prices for those, to whom onions are the only savory they can afford other than salt and chilies.

The core of sustainable living is to adapt to what is seasonally available locally, rather than store, pack, can or transport food compulsively to cater to a menu plan made universally available but at a high cost to the environment.

Politics trumps economics hands down

But the catch is that Bihar is a big consumer of onions. People are unlikely to be amused if they can’t get their daily fix of onion, before they go to vote in November. This is one election the BJP needs to win. Visible, strong, centrally managed administrative action to lower retail prices is therefore likely to win over better options – after all the metric of good governance has to be met.

*The writer is a Distinguished Fellow at Observer Research Foundation, Delhi. This article is adapted from the authors article in Asian Age August 31)

Deliberate and repeated insurgent attacks, endemic corruption within the governing polity, a shrinking ‘formal’ economy, the end of a development boom as a more than decade long international war draws to a close that in turn has created unemployment levels of 35 to 40 percent and a deteriorating security situation has the year-old Government scrambling to keep Afghanistan afloat.

Proxy wars and external powers’ political manoeuvring are returning to the country—history is repeating itself. Historically Afghanistan has always been at the mercy of the great powers of the day, its geographic position making it strategically critical as a tool to be used to extend the influence and interests of one ‘Empire’ against the other. Afghanistan was the buffer zone in the ‘The Great Game’, the rivalry between the British and Russian Empires in the 19th and early 20th centuries, and more recently in the aftermath of the Soviet occupation in the 1980s, the country has become the political battleground of regional and international power play.

A Foreign Policy Vacuum

Afghanistan was recognised as a state on 19 August 1919 and has ever since been aligned to one or the other great power to ensure its stability. Accordingly, its foreign policy has always remained ambiguous in an effort to be aligned with the benefactor of the time. However the current Government, under President Ashraf Ghani and CEO Abdullah Abdullah, realises that the future of Afghanistan is intimately intertwined with its foreign policy and that its alignment with other powers determines the stability of the nation.

Foreign policy of a nation is enshrined through smart diplomacy focused on ensuring national interests. Political scientists argue and agree that small and fragile states need not have a declared foreign policy since they do not have the economic, political or military means to pursue and ensure their policy interests.

It is believed that foreign policy of such nations will always be shaped by external forces, and will mostly be beyond their control. It is indeed true that in the prevailing international system, fragile states have no control over their future. While not always being fragile, Afghanistan has had very little control of its foreign policy because of the geopolitical games played by other nations. In the 18th and 19th centuries the sparring between British India and Tsarist Russia was played out in Afghanistan and after World War II, the Cold War imperatives impacted on all foreign policy issues of the nation. After the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001 and more than a decade of conflict later, today Afghanistan continues to be in the unenviable position of having no clear policy direction and suffering from a long-term policy vacuum. The situation is exacerbated by the lack of consensus within the Afghan political elite regarding the direction that would lead the country to stability.

As and when a tangible foreign policy is crafted it will have to take into account the fundamental factors of the prevailing geopolitical situation and the national economy. It is within this context that President Ghani’s foreign policy initiative to stabilise the nation must be analysed.

The Geopolitical Situation

Afghanistan is riddled with geopolitical challenges and has become a safe haven for al Qaeda and other global jihadist groups, the latest in this list being the Islamic State (IS), which is clearly trying to establish a foothold. The lack of strategic direction and purpose that the Government has displayed and their inability to implement Government decisions for the past decade has made it impossible to prosecute these groups effectively. This weakness in governance has been a boon for regional militants who have set up camp in Afghanistan. The probability of cross-border terrorism into its territory has made Pakistan feel threatened, especially when it is undertaking a military campaign in their tribal areas that share a common border with Afghanistan. China is also increasingly worried about the support that their Uighur insurgency could receive from the transnational terrorist groups settling into Afghanistan.

On coming to power, President Ghani made a concerted attempt to improve relations with Pakistan, whom he views as being critical to ensuring stability. In doing so he went against the common belief in Afghanistan that Pakistan was fundamentally responsible for the terrorist activities that destabilised the country. The Afghan Taliban operates out of the safe havens in Pakistan where they are supported by the military intelligence arm of the Pakistan Army, the ISI.

Even as the President was making his overtures to Pakistan, the Taliban carried out a series of back-to-back suicide bombings in August this year and followed up by perpetuating a number of attacks in Afghanistan. Ghani has directly blamed Pakistan for these attacks and asked that the Taliban safe havens in Pakistan be closed down. In this confused scenario, the IS has made gradual inroads with the intention of weaning disgruntled Taliban and al Qaeda operatives to its flag.

For South and Central Asia the importance of Afghanistan is based on two factors—it has substantial and as yet unexplored mineral reserves and it straddles the energy transit route between the two parts of Asia. China particularly is concerned with the continuing violence that threatens the viability of their growing investment in Central Asia and its efforts at expanding its footprint in the Afghan mineral sector.

The National Economy

The Afghan economy is fully dependent on foreign aid and military contracts. However, this was always not the case. Prior to the country descending into the current crisis, its economy was based on tourism, and the export of lapis lazuli, dried fruits, and carpets. Subsistence farming was also practiced although the country has never been self-sufficient in food. The growth rate now is only 1.5 per cent and from an economic perspective the country is a failed state with a dismal image.

However, Afghanistan has vast quantities of natural resources and minerals that can be extracted to make the nation economically viable. Optimal exploitation of these resources would require technical and financial capital, which is currently unavailable to the government. Any initiative to revive the economy must have a long-term plan that in turn requires an enormous amount of political will, institutional capacity for implementation and overarching and sound policy directives backed by foreign investment on a gigantic scale. Sadly, none of these ingredients to success are currently on display in Afghanistan.

Transitory Peace Talks and Mullah Omar’s Death Announcement

In early July, the Afghan Taliban had been coerced into attending peace talks held in Murree, Pakistan, which was orchestrated and sponsored by the US, China and Pakistan although one faction of the Taliban which runs the Qatar political office boycotted the meeting. However, the revelation, after the first round of talks, of Mullah Omar’s death in Karachi more than two years ago negated the possibility of further negotiations. In any case, the only agreement that was reached in the first round of talks was the intent to meet again. Since the announcement of Mullah Omar’s death on 29 July, the Taliban has backed away from the promised second round of peace talks. The entire peace process is now ‘on hold’, with no visible future schedule.

The manner and timing of the announcement of Mullah Omar’s death makes one pause to analyse the motives behind it. The initial news was given out by a splinter Taliban faction of limited influence known as Fidai Mahaj and was almost immediately confirmed by both the Afghan Government and the US. It is interesting that Pakistan did not deny it, while not also confirming it. Mullah Omar while he was alive was demonstrably averse to any negotiations with the ‘un-Islamic’ democratically elected government. The Taliban cadre had vested some sort of a mystic divinity around the personae of Mullah Omar and stood united purely on the strength of this belief. Since Mullah Omar was notoriously reclusive and the entire cadre was actually being run by his Deputy Mullah Akhtar Mansoor, it suited Pakistan to keep his death secret, to further entrench Mansoor’s hold over the group.

There has always been a strong and enduring relationship between Mullah Mansoor and the ISI who was instrumental in installing him as the Deputy. Mansoor headed the Quetta Shura and has for long operated out of Pakistan’s Baluchistan Province with the full support of the ISI. It is also reported that he was educated in a madrasa (an Islamic seminary) in Jalozi village located in Naushera district of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province of Pakistan. His loyalty to the ISI runs very deep. However, Mansoor had only a very tenuous control over the Qatar faction who stayed within the fold only because of their reverential attitude towards Mullah Omar.

The revelation of Mullah Omar’s death, full two years after the event in a Karachi hospital at this juncture, can therefore be considered to be an ISI sponsored act of necessity to ensure Pakistan’s strategic stake in Afghanistan. Since early 2015, Pakistan has been informing the international community that it is willing to give up its interest in Afghanistan if the Taliban were to be accommodated in the emerging power structure of the country. If this was to be achieved, then Pakistan would become the custodians of the peace in Afghanistan and the puppet masters of the Taliban under Mansoor. However, it seems that something went wrong in this calculation and therefore the ISI now wants to sideline the Taliban factions that are inimical to its interests so that it can institute Pakistan’s own policy goals in Afghanistan.

Mullah Omar’s death is shrouded in mystery and there are rumours already floating that he was poisoned. The Taliban cadre have started to question the motive and the authority behind keeping his death secret for so long. The death announcement has definitely accentuated long standing schisms within the Taliban and effectively closed the chances of a negotiated settlement in Afghanistan. It also opens the doors to leadership challenges since Mullah Omar was the only unifying factor within the group. Almost immediately on the announcement of his death rifts became visible in the Taliban. Mullah Mansoor, supported by the ISI, claims the leadership but is not universally accepted as the leader. The brother of Mullah Omar, Mullah Abdul Manan and his son Muhammad Yaqoob maintain that the successor should be from the same clan. The tensions regarding the succession have reached a point wherein the Taliban political chief in Qatar, Tayyeb Agha, has resigned.

Pakistan’s Duplicity

In this emerging imbroglio, it is difficult to fathom Pakistan’s game plan and intentions. Pakistan is under pressure from the US to check the Taliban activities in Afghanistan and China also has indicated that it would not want a Taliban takeover in the country. Pakistan is also realising that with the announcement of the death of Mullah Omar, their overarching control over the Taliban is reduced. Their control over Mullah Mansoor now does not translate to influence over the entire Taliban, which was supposed deliver strategic control of Afghanistan to ensure stability—the one carrot that was being offered to the Ghani Government.

Mullah Mansoor is not accepted by all the factions of Taliban and lacks legitimacy to enforce his will. There are indications that the rifts—both tribal and ideological—that had so far been papered over by loyalty to Mullah Omar, have come out as open divisions. That this situation will derail any meaningful progress in the peace process is a foregone conclusion. The current situation provides a window of opportunity for the Afghan Government to create an opening to stabilise the nation, although it may be something of a gamble.

At the moment Mullah Mansoor cannot sell the peace process to all Taliban factions, especially the radical groupings. The gamble would be for the Government to push Mansoor, with Pakistan’s assistance, into a peace deal although such a process will undoubtedly split the Taliban with the high possibility of the splinter groups joining the IS. This scenario could perhaps not be counted as a success and in any case is dependent on the willingness of Pakistan to pressure Mullah Mansoor to come to the negotiating table.

Pakistan’s efforts at the moment will be focused on ensuring that the Afghan Taliban remains a single entity since a split will further destabilise the security situation within Pakistan where the domestic Taliban have started to pledge support to the IS. Therefore, the future of the peace talks is fully dependent on Mullah Mansoor’s ability to persuade the entire Afghan Taliban to accept him as the single supreme leader, which is highly unlikely to happen. At this juncture in Afghanistan it would seem that even the chance of arriving at a settlement with one half of the Taliban is a gamble worth taking.

Pakistan is currently in a bind. The strategy of proxy wars and negotiations that it had orchestrated is unravelling rapidly. At the same time the Afghan Government in Kabul is asking them to step up the pressure on the Taliban to stop the terror bombings and restart the peace talks.

However, Pakistan’s control over the Taliban is now not that strong, especially when factional struggles are on-going. Further, the Qatar faction of Taliban is critical to the future of Afghanistan, but is anti-Pakistan. It is possible that this faction is being supported by the Middle-Eastern Gulf powers and being developed as an antidote to Pakistan’s overwhelming influence, with the tacit approval of the Afghan Government. It is obvious that Pakistan underestimated the challenge of controlling Afghanistan through proxies and pursued a misconceived approach to achieving it. The ultimate paradox in this complex performance is the Afghan Government seeking Pakistan’s ‘co-operation’ to deal with the terrorist activities of the Taliban that have been unleashed by Pakistan itself.

There is no indication that Pakistan in trying to reign in its terrorist proxies or attempting to abandon its quest for strategic control of Afghanistan. On the other hand there is mounting evidence of Pakistan’s deceitful attitude towards all negotiations with Afghanistan. It continues to use terrorism as the primary instrument of state policy to destabilise all its neighbours. However, the joker in the pack is the IS and its claims to a Caliphate that is slowly taking root domestically and which is likely to change the game in Pakistan. Pakistan is playing with fire, with not a care to its own safety.

Afghanistan – Fledgling Steps to Nationhood

Afghanistan today is in a state of exasperation, staring at an uncertain security situation and an unpredictable future. Its domestic imperatives always trump foreign policy requirements and its internal stability is intertwined with its relations with regional powers—not an ideal formula for stability. The National Unity Government (NUG) has been in power for almost a year and the nation still harbours cautious optimism based on an understanding that after decades of conflict and confusion the path towards peace is long and progress normally slow.

The NUG is an uneasy power sharing arrangement, primarily between President Ghani and the CEO Abdullah Abdullah, made necessary in order to assuage the two major ethnic communities in the country—the Pashtuns and the Tajiks. The Hazaras form the third major group, although there are 14 ethnic groups in the country, each supported by a different regional nation.

Afghanistan has been ruled by the Pashtuns for the past two centuries and therefore they are averse to change, even in terms of alterations to their accustomed lifestyle. The Tajiks and the Hazaras are better educated and have always formed the administrative and bureaucratic backbone of the nation.

Their greater literacy makes them amenable to change and adoption of moderate approaches to social and cultural issues. However, they have very limited understanding or experience of wielding power. Although sectarian conflict is very rare in Afghanistan, the inherent diversity of ethnicity, language, and culture directly and adversely impacts the cohesive development of a national consciousness that could surpasses narrow parochialism.

The Government is focused on furthering the peace process; and so it should be. However, the diarchy of power sharing and dual control of the government machinery are not conducive to smooth functioning, especially when such an arrangement often leads to mundane personality issues overriding other more serious considerations. Further, there are rifts within the Government with the National Security Directorate (NSD) considering the Taliban a terrorist organisation, while the President is attempting to negotiate with them. The NSD does not want a power sharing arrangement with the Taliban, who in turn aspires to return to power in the country that they ruled before being ousted in 2001 by the NATO-led coalition. The Taliban have a long term vision and appropriate strategies in place to achieve this objective.

In Afghanistan there was scepticism regarding President Ghani’s peace initiative with Pakistan, which has turned into active questioning of Pakistan’s credibility in furthering the process after the recent wave of terrorist bombings attributed to its proxies. It is reliably reported that about 4100 Afghan soldiers and police have been killed and almost double that number injured in the first six months of this year, a 50 per cent increase in comparison to the same period last year. It seems that the ISI is pursuing its own agenda, playing a different game keeping Pakistan’s own domestic agenda as the highest priority, with the Pakistan Government unable to control it. That too is nothing new, the ISI has been a law unto itself for several years now. The possibility of a split in the Taliban could make the ISI change its tactics, but the policy of employing terrorism as a strategic weapon will not change.

India, the other regional player in the game, is visibly concerned with President Ghani’s attempt at reorientating Afghan foreign policy through negotiations with the Taliban under the aegis of Pakistan and China. It feels sidelined, especially after it has played an important role in funding and assisting in reconstruction efforts towards infrastructural, educational and capacity-building projects in Afghanistan. There are strong cultural links between India and Afghanistan and Afghanistan government has openly acknowledged India’s assistance in providing higher education facilities to its people. However, the current initiative does not include India, which is perturbed by its being kept out of the core dealings in the peace process.

There are some facts that must be stated before a broad solution to the challenge of Afghanistan can be contemplated. First, Kabul by itself will not be able to contain the Taliban, even in its splintered form. Second, co-opting the Taliban for peace talks is not conducive to progress since they are part of the problem and cannot be an integral part of the possible solution. Third, the Pakistan Army wants strategic control of Afghanistan and therefore continues to foster the Taliban as a major factor in the stability calculus—a retrograde step in the long-term stability equation. Fourth, a preponderance of evidence is now available to clearly label Pakistan as a force that is bent on destabilising the greater South Asian region who should be kept out of any involvement in the Afghan peace process.

The US military withdrawal weakens the Afghan Government’s position in negotiations and the recent ISI sponsored terrorist attacks undermine its credibility with regard to providing basic security for its citizens. From Afghanistan’s perspective, the nation is on a route of enduring troubles leading to a complex and tortuous future. However, a strategy to create stability based on pragmatism and reality is unfortunately nowhere in sight. International support to the embattled nation is now critical to achieving tangible progress in stabilising the volatile situation.

Even a semi-permanent solution to Afghanistan’s deepening woes can only be achieved with international and regional participation, committed to keeping Afghan interests at the highest priority without bias. If an enduring peace leading to long-term stability is not achieved through sustainable reconciliation, the Afghan challenge will embroil the entire South Asia in a tumultuous turmoil. The future, at least in this devastated part of the world, is predictable.

First published in the blog www.sanukay.com on 8 September 2015

By Martin Tillier

As traders, investors and pundits, we all like to think that what we do is akin to a science. We believe that by working harder and being smarter we can give ourselves an edge, that enough research will reveal to us the next move, either a long term trend or an intraday blip on a chart, and that we can profit from that knowledge. Usually, especially over longer time spans, we are correct in that assumption. Sometimes, however, no amount of fundamental or technical analysis will help.

Over the last week or so we have seen some violent swings in the price of oil, swings that in many ways defy logic. At times like these we have to rely on the art, rather than science, of trading and reading markets. That is not to say that traders and investors at home should be simply making wild guesses, it is just that right now, the oil markets are trading on factors other than the fundamental influences that we are used to. It is hard to chart fear and panic.

Panic may seem like a strong word to many, but having been a denizen of a dealing room for most of my working life I can assure you that that is what many have been feeling. The level of overreaction that we have been seeing to every scrap of news over the last couple of weeks is hard to justify in any other way. It is at times like this that some degree of basic technical analysis, a simple identification of support and resistance, becomes all we have to fall back on. To that extent the science of reading these markets is still intact, but once the significant levels have been identified, assessing in what way they are significant is more of an art.

In terms of the benchmark U.S. oil, West Texas Intermediate (WTI), at least now we have some parameters to work in. The drop halted at around $37 and the surge back up that followed itself turned around at just below $50, so, for now at least, that marks the new range. If we accept that, then anybody with even the most basic knowledge of trading will know that, at current levels in the high $40s, a bias towards a short position offers a better risk reward ratio with a closer, logical stop loss level. There are, moreover, a few more subtle, psychological factors amongst market participants that make it most likely that the next move will be downwards and therefore that a short bias is preferable to long.

First and foremost, once new, significant levels have been found, re-testing them is almost irresistible to traders and, in historic terms, the lows of the current range are much more significant than the highs. That traders want to see what happens if they get to a seemingly arbitrary level again may seem like a ridiculous reason for a market that affects the livelihood of millions and the wealth of many nations to move, but such concerns won’t bother floor traders or hedge fund managers. For them, pushing back below $40 is more of an intellectual exercise than anything and if it can be forced there and the level breaks, large fortunes can be made.

Of course, all of this goes out of the window if there is a significant shift in fundamentals, either on the demand or supply side. If decent Chinese economic data is released, for example, or if OPEC announces real production cuts, or if the U.S. rig count drops drastically, then traders’ games won’t matter at all, oil will be headed higher. Until there is any major news, though, it is a question of anticipating what that news will be, or rather the tone of it. Given what has happened since the middle of last year you cannot blame traders for making the assumption that, on balance, any news is more likely to be negative for oil than positive.

It seems, therefore, that all other things being equal, the default path for WTI in the short term is back downwards, to have another crack at the high $30s. There is no real fundamental reason why that should be the case. If anything recent data suggest that when all is said and done, oil trading below where it was in the depths of the last recession is not justified. A recovery at least to around $60 must come soon. Fundamental, scientific analysis like that doesn’t matter at the moment though; what matters is the art of reading the collective mind of the market, and from that perspective oil looks destined for one more push down before sanity returns.

Martin has recently started a mentorship program for a small group of motivated subscribers, find out more here.

Source: http://oilprice.com/Energy/Oil-Prices/The-Default-Next-Move-For-Oil-Is-Downwards-And-Heres-Why.html

The European Parliament (EP) in a vote on Tuesday beefed up the Commission’s initial proposal to ban animal cloning to include the cloning of all farm animals, their descendants and products derived from them, including imports into the European Union.

“The technique of cloning is not fully mature, and in fact, no further progress has been made with it. The mortality rate remains equally high. Many of the animals which are born alive die in the first few weeks, and they die painfully. Should we allow that?” said the environment committee co-rapporteur, Renate Sommer (EPP, DE).

The legislative report was adopted by 529 votes to 120, with 57 abstentions.

“Up to now, we have been able to import reproductive material from third countries. We are washing our hands letting others do the dirty work. We want to ban comprehensively. Not just the use of cloning techniques but the imports of reproductive material, clones and their descendants. Traceability is possible. There are pedigree books, breeding books, stock books available. I’d like to ask the European Commission to rethink this whole thing. Sometimes, politics have to set the limits,” said Ms Sommer.

“We need to take into account the impact on animal health, but also on human health,” said the agriculture committee co-rapporteur, Giulia Moi (EFDD, IT). “This reports sends the message to our trade partners that we are not willing to put our own health, our families’ health, and future generations’ health at stake using products of dubious quality of this nature,” she said. “Our farmers are currently faced with major competitive pressure from Asia particularly, due to certain practices, including cloning. But Europe is based on values and that includes quality. We want to be sure that we don’t go down a path from which there is no return,” she added.

While animal welfare would be respected for the descendants of cloned animals born by means of conventional sexual reproduction, the high mortality rates at all development stages of cloning their progenitor raise significant animal welfare and ethical concerns, says Parliament. It therefore extended the ban to cover the germinal products of animal clones, descendants of animal clones and products derived from them.

The ban should also cover animals which are already derived from clones in certain third countries, says the EP. It says imports into the EU should only be allowed if the import certificates show that animals are not animal clones or their descendents. The ban should also apply to imports of animal germinal products and food and feed of animal origin.

High mortality rates and abnormalities

The EP points to findings by the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) from 2008 that the health and welfare of clones are adversely affected, often severely and with a fatal outcome. The resulting low efficiency rates in cloning (6 to 15% for bovine and 6% for porcine species) make it necessary to implant embryo clones into several dams to obtain one cloned animal. Furthermore, clone abnormalities and unusually large offspring result in difficult births and neonatal deaths.

MEPs also refer to consumer research findings indicating that a majority of EU citizens strongly oppose the consumption of food from animal clones or from their descendants and that a majority also disapprove of the use of cloning for farming purposes, on animal welfare and general ethical grounds.

The amended text converts the legal act into a regulation, which has to be applied directly in all member states, rather than a directive, which would require further national legislation. Parliament also extended the ban’s scope to cover all species of animals kept and reproduced for farming purposes and not only bovine, porcine, ovine, caprine and equine species as proposed by the Commission.

The co-rapporteurs will now start negotiations with the Council of the EU on the final shape of the law.

Kim Davis, a county clerk in Kentucky, has made the news by refusing to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples. She’s now in jail for contempt of court, because she has refused to uphold the recent court decision giving same-sex couples the right to marry.

I have some sympathy for Davis, because when she took the job, issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples wasn’t a part of it. Now that the court has ruled it is, she objects to this extension of her job description on religious grounds. She should not be forced to violate her religious convictions.

But, she also should not remain in a government job in which she is unwilling to do what the job legally requires. So, let her follow her religious convictions, free her from jail, and fire her from a job that, on religious grounds, she doesn’t want to do.

My guess is this story would have generated much less controversy if the person involved was Muslim and didn’t want to carry out some activity that would violate sharia law. But, I don’t see a difference here. A person who refuses to do the job should be fired. Government employees should carry out the responsibilities assigned to them by government law.

Note the difference between this case and the cases where private businesses make choices based on their religious convictions, whether it is to not decorate cakes in ways that offend them, or not offer certain health care services to their employees on religious grounds. Private businesses should be allowed to make their own policies, and the situation parallel to the Davis case would be that people who disagree (customers or employees) should not be forced to interact with those businesses.

I’m not defending the government’s laws here. I’m saying that employees who don’t want to do what is required by their employers should be fired from their jobs. If the job description changes, as it did in the Davis case, the employee is no longer a good fit for that job.

This article first appeared on The Beacon

There is a strong case for saying that Palestine is a lost cause. And it, the case, can be summarised as follows.

• The nuclear-armed Zionist (not Jewish) state of Israel is the regional superpower and not remotely interested in peace on terms the Palestinians could accept. The vast majority of its Jews have been brainwashed by Zionist propaganda and as a consequence are not open to rational and reasoned discussion about justice for the Palestinians. And that leaves Israel’s leaders free to continue the policy of taking (stealing) for keeps the maximum amount of Palestinian land with the minimum number of Arabs on it.
• As things are the major world powers are not going to use the leverage they have to cause (or try to cause) Israel to end its defiance of international law and denial of justice for the Palestinians.
• The regimes of a corrupt, authoritarian and divided Arab Order have no interest in any kind of confrontation with Israel; and they do not have the will to use the leverage they have to press the major powers, the one in Washington D.C. especially, to oblige Israel to be serious about peace on the basis of justice for the Palestinians and security for all.
• The occupied and oppressed Palestinians have no credible leadership. (And that reality won’t be changed simply by Mahmoud Abbas standing down to make way for another “President”).

The idea for this article was triggered by an analysis written for Al-Shabaka, The Palestinian Policy Network, by Palestinian professor Tariq Dana. The title of his policy briefing paper was Corruption in Palestine: A Self-Enforcing System.

Dana is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Hebron University. (Established in 1971 it was the first educational institution for university education in Palestine).

Al-Shabaka, which means The Network, was created in 2009 and is registered in California. It brings together some of the best and brightest Palestinian writers and thinkers around the world and describes itself as “a think-tank without borders and walls.” Its mission, drawing off the experience of the Palestinian people, is “to engage the broadest spectrum of perspectives in debate on policy and strategy”, and, “to communicate ideas and strategies on resolving the Palestinian-Israel conflict to Palestinian communities as well as to Arab and other policy communities and interested parties worldwide.”

The Overview to Dana’s policy briefing paper noted that according to a recent survey 81% of the occupied and oppressed Palestinians believe the Palestine Authority (PA) is corrupt.

Dana then put some flesh on the bone of corruption with this statement.

Corruption in Palestinian Authority (PA) institutions should not be perceived as merely a matter of administrative and financial wrongdoing committed by irresponsible individuals whose behaviour is driven by greed and personal interests. The scandals that Palestinians hotly debate from time to time – such as embezzlement of public funds, misappropriation of resources, and nepotism – are an outcome of longstanding corruption embedded in the underlying power structure that governs the Palestinian political system and that were rooted in the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) prior to the Oslo process.

If I was in dialogue with Dana I would ask him this question. Isn’t the real point that the PA has become just like all other Arab governments? I imagine he would say “Yes.”

From conversations many years ago I know that Arafat and the other founding fathers of Fatah and the authentic PLO didn’t want that to happen. They really did want their state to be democratic (which was one of the reasons why the Arab regimes feared and even loathed the authentic PLO). I can recall, for example, what was said to me by Khalad Hassan, a founding father of Fatah and its intellectual giant on the right. “We have to be democratic. If we become just another Arab regime we will fail.”

Dana also offered this observation.

Corruption has been a major contributing factor to the Palestinian national movement’s inability to achieve its objectives and now also serves the objectives of Israel’s occupation.

My way of putting it is to say that corruption helped to guarantee that the PA became, by default but effectively, a Zionist collaborator.

Dana’s conclusion was this (my emphasis added).

Corruption will remain endemic within the PA as long as the Palestinians themselves do not begin restructuring their national institutions according to democratic principles and standards of accountability, as part of a broader strategy to pursue self-determination and Palestinian national rights, including freedom from occupation.

That call for restructuring Palestinian institutions echoed one made by Osamah Khalil, a co-founder of Al-Shabaka, in March 2013. (He is Assistant Professor of History of the U.S. in the World at Syracuse University). In a briefing paper with the headline “Who Are You?” The PLO and the Limits of Representation, his conclusion was the following (my emphasis added).

If Palestinians want a representative body, national unity, an end to factional differences and to a corrupt and illegitimate leadership, they will need to build that movement themselves from scratch. They will also need to make the previous body and its leaders – regardless of their revolutionary origins and rhetoric, titles, symbolism, and emotional ties – obsolete and irrelevant. With a past marked by failure, Palestinians must imagine and work toward a very different future. Otherwise there will be little hope of finding a successful strategy or vehicle to achieve Palestinian rights.

Given that liberation was the goal the Palestinian past is indeed “marked by failure” as Khalil states but complete understanding of it has to take account of two most important facts.

The first is that Arafat risked everything – his credibility with his leadership colleagues and his life – to prepare the ground on the Palestinian side for peace on terms which a rational government in Israel would have accepted with relief. (Israel’s response was to invade Lebanon all the way to Beirut with the objective of liquidating the entire PLO leadership and destroying the organization’s infrastructure). If the major powers led by America had backed Arafat after he secured support for his policy of politics and unthinkable compromise in the shape of a two-state solution, peace would have been there for the taking if Israel’s leaders had wanted it.

The second is that the occupied and oppressed Palestinian people have not failed. Israel’s policy was and is to make life hell for them in the hope that they will abandon their struggle and either surrender on Zionism’s terms or, preferably, pack their bags and leave to start a new life in Arab and other countries. The steadfastness of the occupied and oppressed Palestinian people (not their leaders) is a success not a failure.

In my analysis the process of building a new Palestine liberation movement “from scratch” would have to begin with something I have been advocating for several years – the dissolution of the PA and handing back to Israel complete responsibility for its occupation of the West Bank.

As I have noted in previous articles, that would impose significant burdens – economic, security and other – on Israel. But with complete responsibility for occupation would come full accountability.

How might that benefit the Palestinians?

Israel’s racism, oppression and on-going colonization of the West Bank (ethnic cleansing slowly and by stealth) would be exposed, fully naked, for the whole world to see, and that could assist the mobilization of public opinion everywhere for pressure on governments to use the leverage they have to cause (or try to cause) Israel to end its defiance of international law and denial of justice for the Palestinians.

I think it can be assumed that Israel would prevent the Palestinians under its control engaging in activities to rebuild their liberation movement on democratic foundations. So how, actually, could the rebuilding be done?

In my view it could only happen if the incredible, almost superhuman steadfastness of the occupied and oppressed Palestinians was supplemented by practical and co-ordinated Palestinian diaspora action.

The composition of the Palestinian diaspora by countries and numbers of Palestinians resident in them is roughly the following. Jordan – 2,900,000; Israel – 1,600,000; Syria – 800,000; Chile – 500,000; Lebanon – 490,000; Saudi Arabia – 280,245; Egypt – 270,245; United States – 270,000; Honduras – 250,000; Venezuela – 245,120; United Arab Emirates – 170,000; Germany – 159,000; Mexico – 158,000; Qatar – 100,000; Kuwait – 70,000; El Salvador – 70,000; Brazil – 59,000; Iraq – 57,000; Yemen – 55,000; Canada – 50,975; Australia – 45,000; Libya – 44,000; Denmark – 32,152; United Kingdom – 30,000; Sweden – 25,500; Peru – 20,000; Columbia – 20,000; Spain – 12,000; Pakistan – 10,500; Netherlands – 9,000; Greece – 7,500; Norway – 7,000; France – 5,000; Guatemala – 3,500; Austria – 3,000; Switzerland – 2,000; Turkey – 1,000; and India – 300.

In the past I have advocated that Palestinians in the diaspora should take the lead in bringing the side-lined Palestinian parliament-in-exile, formerly known as the Palestine National Council (PNC), back to life, refreshed and re-invigorated by elections to it in every country where Palestinians live. But… On reflection as I write this article I think that idea needs to be modified.

I still believe there needs to be a new institution elected by Palestinians everywhere with the prime task of debating and determining Palestinianpolicy and then representing it by speaking to power with one voice, but I think it should not style or present itself as a Palestinian parliament-in-exile.

In reality there’s something almost absurd about having a parliament for a state that does not exist. And if an institution elected by Palestinians everywhere did pose as a parliament-in-exile, its American representatives and those who are residents and citizens of other countries could be accused of having dual loyalty.

The B-I-G question is this.

Are there enough diaspora Palestinians who care enough to become politically engaged to rebuild their national institutions on democratic principles and standards of accountability?

It isn’t a question of resources because there are many very wealthy diaspora Palestinians. It’s a matter of will.

If the answer is “Yes” there could be a new beginning for the Palestine liberation movement.

If the answer is “No” it can’t and won’t happen. Then, when Israel’s leaders conclude that they can’t force the occupied and oppressed Palestinians to abandon their struggle for an acceptable amount of justice, the most likely endgame will be a final Zionist ethnic cleansing of Palestine.

If such an obscenity is allowed to happen I think future honest historians will conclude that the Palestinian diaspora was complicit by default.

(EurActiv) — Romanian Prime Minister Victor Ponta said that his country will request admission to the EU’s Schengen borderless area if mandatory quotas to accept refugees are decided by the Union.

For many years now, Romania has fulfilled all the criteria required to join Schengen, but has been prevented by older member states that link its accession to progress in fighting corruption and improving the country’s law-enforcement system.

Like Bulgaria, Romania was admitted to the EU in 2007 on the condition that a so-called “Mechanism of Cooperation and Verification” set up by the European Commission monitors its progress until deficiencies are removed (see background).

“Solidarity means both rights and obligations, so if they want us to have the same obligations, they have to give us the same rights,” Ponta told reporters in Bucharest yesterday (7 September). “Romania has suffered an injustice over the Schengen issue. The countries that are now asking for our solidarity are the same countries that keep postponing our Schengen entry.”

Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker is to unveil an ambitious plan on Wednesday (9 September) in response to the refugee crisis overwhelming Europe. 160,000 refugees are expected to be relocated from Italy, Greece and Hungary.

A Reuters report disclosed that Romania will be asked to accept 6,351 of them, while Germany will take in more than 40,000 and France 30,000.

Romania can accommodate as many as 1,500 refugees in existing facilities, Ponta said.

Bulgaria is in a similar situation to Romania with respect to Schengen. Bulgarian newspapers report that Ponta has spoken on the phone with Prime Minister Boyko Borissov, and that the issue discussed was the refugee crisis.

The Bulgarian government press service rejected allegations that the refugee crisis has been linked to the two countries’ admission to Schengen.

By Elise Harris

In a reformed marriage annulment process Pope Francis has made some significant changes, giving more of a role to the local bishop, dropping automatic appeals, and declaring the process free of charge.

Announced Tuesday, the new process is aimed at streamlining the system for granting annulments out of concern “for the salvation of souls” while affirming the longstanding Catholic teaching on marriage indissolubility.

The changes were published in two motu proprio, “Mitis Iudex Dominus Iesus” (The Lord Jesus, a meek judge), which deals with modifications in the Latin Rite’s Code of Canon Law, and “Mitis et misericors Iesus” (Jesus, meek and merciful), which outlines changes for Eastern Churches who, although in full communion with Rome, have historically had a different process.

Both documents reflect many of the same changes, however instead of bishops, “Mitis et misericors Iesu” refers to patriarchs and eparchies.

In a brief introduction, Pope Francis stressed that his adjustments “do not favor the nullifying of marriages but the promptness of the processes.”

He said that he decided to make the changes in line with his the desire of his brother bishops, who during last year’s extraordinary synod on the family called for the process to be “faster and more accessible.”

Many have criticized the current process of obtaining an annulment for being long, complex and in some places, too expensive.

Reform was also required due to “the enormous number of faithful who…too often are diverted from juridical structures of the Church due to physical or moral distance,” the Pope said, adding that “charity and mercy” require the Church as mother to draw close to her children who consider themselves far off.

Among the more significant changes the Pope made were dropping the automatic appeal needed after a decision on nullity has been reached, as well as allowing local bishops to make their own judgements on “evident” cases of marriage nullity.

Until now once an annulment was issued it was automatically appealed by another, a practice many have blamed for unnecessary delays in the process.

With Francis’ new changes only one judgement will be needed. However, in the case that it is appealed , the Pope decided appeals can be done in nearest metropolitan diocese, rather than needing to go to Rome.

He also decided that each diocese throughout the world will have the responsibility to name a judge or tribunal to process incoming cases.

The bishop can be the only judge, or he can establish 3-member tribunal. If a 3-member tribunal is established, it must have at least one cleric, while the other two members can be laypersons.

Francis has also declared that the annulment process will be free of charge. Although the practice is already in place in many dioceses around the world, the new change makes it universal.

In his introduction, the Pope recognized that the streamlined process, particularly the new procedures surrounding the decisions made by bishops, could raise concern over the Church’s teaching on the indissolubility of marriage.

“It has not escaped me how an abbreviated judgment might put the principle of indissolubility of marriage at risk,” he said.

“Indeed, because of this I wanted that in this process the judge would be composed of the bishop, so that the strength of his pastoral office is, with Peter, the best guarantee of Catholic unity in faith and discipline.”

The Pope also explained that he wanted to offer the new process to bishops so it can be “applied in cases in which the accused nullity of the marriage is sustained by particularly evident arguments.”

Among those presenting the documents were several members of a special commission Pope Francis established a year ago to study the reform of the annulment process.

Speakers included Msgr. Pio Vito Pinto, dean of the Roman Rota; Cardinal Francesco Coccopalmerio, president of the Pontifical Council for Legislative Texts; Bishop Dimitrios Salachas, Greek Catholic Apostolic Exarch of Greece; Archbishop Luis Ladaria Ferrer, secretary of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith; Msgr. Alejandro Bunge, prelate auditor of the Roman Rota; and Fr. Nikolaus Schoch, substitute promoter of justice at the Apostolic Signatura.

The changes were signed by the Pope Aug. 15, the feast of the Assumption of Mary into heaven, and are set to go into effect Dec. 8, a day marking the feast of the Immaculate Conception as well as the opening day of the Jubilee for Mercy and the 50th anniversary of the closing of the Second Vatican Council.

By Michael Lelyveld

Nearly a month after China’s devaluation rattled world markets, doubts about the country’s currency policy remain unresolved.

On Aug. 11, the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) caught investors off guard with a 1.83-percent devaluation of the yuan against the U.S. dollar, pushing the currency to its largest one-day drop since 1994.

The PBOC explained the move as a “one-off” adjustment to bring its central parity rate closer to market trading, promising that its daily fixings would be more “market oriented” from now on.

Under China’s foreign exchange policy, the central bank has allowed the yuan’s value to vary in onshore trading from a daily fixing within a 2-percent band, but the market had been pulling the currency toward the weak side of the corridor for months.

The sudden policy shift upset foreign markets and sparked warnings of a global currency war, but it won praise from some economists who saw it as an attempt to loosen controls and give the market more scope in China’s foreign exchange.

The step was also seen as a bid for global acceptance of the yuan by increasing its eligibility for inclusion in the International Monetary Fund’s currency basket for Special Drawing Rights (SDR), a virtual denomination for lending based on the dollar, the euro, Britain’s pound and the Japanese yen.

On Aug. 12, the IMF called China’s currency move “a welcome step as it should allow market forces to have a greater role in determining the exchange rate.”

The positive comment was largely drowned out by concerns that the devaluation was part of plan to boost exports by making them cheaper abroad.

One argument in support of that view is that the devaluation came just three days after the General Administration of Customs (GAC) announced that exports fell 0.9 percent in yuan terms in the first seven months of the year with an 8.9-percent plunge in July, the steepest in memory.

In new trade figures for August announced today, exports have continued to slump, sliding 6.1 percent from a year earlier. The dip in exports so far this year deepened to 1.6 percent as August imports fell 14.3 percent. Year-to-date imports were down 14.6 percent.

True state of China’s economy

The debate over motives for the devaluation grew louder as the yuan continued to fall in trading after Aug. 11, suggesting that the “one-off” adjustment would be more than a one-day event.

Worries turned quickly from motives to concerns that the moves were a measure of the true state of China’s economy, which is suspected as being weaker than the official 7-percent growth of gross domestic product (GDP).

“The yuan’s devaluation was certainly a catalyst as it aggravated concerns about China’s weakening economy,” Chaoping Zhu, an economist at UOB Kay Hian Holdings in Singapore, told The Wall Street Journal on Aug. 25, a day when the Shanghai Composite Index fell 7.6 percent.

Fears that the economy is weaker than reported have had an echo effect, since they add pressure on the yuan in market trading while suggesting that the PBOC also wants it to come down, but at a more controlled pace.

In the first week, the PBOC pushed back against the market with interventions after devaluation topped 4 percent, trimming the adjustment to less than 3 percent.

On Aug. 25, Premier Li Keqiang tried to send a reassuring signal that “there exists no basis for continued depreciation,” state media reported. But trading within the band kept dragging the yuan down, pressuring the PBOC to prop it up with dollar sales, costing U.S. $93.9 billion last month.

Following Li’s statement, the yuan’s value in daily fixings continued to fall for two days, raising further questions about the government’s credibility and its policy role. On the third trading day, the PBOC strengthened the daily guidance rate, catching markets off guard.

In subsequent sessions, the yuan has gradually gained amid speculation that President Xi Jinping may have sought to avoid arguments over currency manipulation before his visit to the United States this month.

On Sept. 1, the PBOC also issued new rules to discourage speculation on the yuan’s future value by trading in instruments known as currency forwards, to take effect on Oct. 15.

Defending the yuan

The PBOC has spent heavily to defend the yuan since Li’s statement. On Monday, the central bank said that its foreign exchange reserves fell by U.S. $93.9 billion last month to U.S. $3.56 trillion.

But in the 15-day period between the pre-devaluation market session of Aug. 10 and Li’s statement, the yuan central parity rate dropped by about 4.4 percent.

While larger than the initial “one-off” devaluation, the relatively modest change has been cited as evidence that the PBOC never intended its policy reform to be part of an export promotion plan.

In one of several postings at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, China economist Nicholas Lardy argued that devaluation would have to be much greater to give exports a kick.

“Depreciation is not likely to buy much growth unless it exceeds 10 percent on a sustained basis,” he said.

Lardy used the reasoning as part of a larger response to doubts about China’s economic growth claims, arguing that “skeptics of China’s GDP growth have not made their case.”

“Why didn’t the authorities devalue by a much larger amount?” he asked, concluding that the PBOC move was designed to meet IMF recommendations, not to boost exports or GDP.

Gary Jefferson, a China specialist and Brandeis University professor of trade and finance, agrees that “a 4-percent devaluation is not going to make much of a difference.”

On the other hand, Jefferson said in an interview, China’s leaders might not have made the decision to devalue even that much if they had foreseen how much reaction it caused.

“The disruption to the global economy clearly is going to be more depressing with respect to China’s export performance had they not enabled the depreciation of the currency,” he said.

In the end, the devaluation failed to achieve either objective.

Leaving the basket unchanged

On Aug. 19, the IMF said it would leave its SDR basket unchanged until at least Sept. 30, 2016, a decision reflecting the judgment that the yuan is still not a freely traded currency.

But battles over confidence in China’s currency, its stock market, its economy and its statistics continued to rage as the government turned from exchange rates to monetary measures with cuts in interest rates and the reserve requirement ratio for banks on Aug. 25.

The differences played out the next day in the pages of The New York Times as Lardy argued in an op-ed that there was “little evidence that China’s economy is slowing significantly” from the official 7-percent growth rate.

“Nobody believes China’s official statistics anyway,” economics columnist Eduardo Porter wrote in the paper’s business section on the same day as Shanghai stocks continued to fall.

While China-watchers have had these debates for years, world attention came suddenly into focus after the Dow Jones Industrial Average dropped more than 10 percent in four days and losses spread through global markets.

The sudden rise in doubts about China provided the spark for the stampede, but there is still little agreement on the state of China’s economy, its regulatory responses or their adequacy to maintain stability.

Also, there has been little consensus on the reasons for China’s measures and whether they will be repeated.

Although the rate cuts were widely seen as aimed at encouraging the stock market, some analysts note that the move was driven by the devaluation, which led to a short-term liquidity squeeze.

“The PBOC’s reserve requirement ratio cut cannot make up for the loss of liquidity resulting from the yuan’s depreciation,” China Woon Khien, a portfolio manager at Nikko Asset Management in Shanghai, told Bloomberg News.

A distinction may also be drawn between the results of China’s measures and the motivations.

Yukon Huang, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and a former World Bank country director for China, said the devaluation was meant to reflect the IMF recommendation and narrow the gap with other Asian currencies that had already depreciated by larger amounts.

But it was also promoted as an export remedy “to secure senior leadership’s approval,” Huang said in an email message.

In any case, “exchange rate changes have a limited impact when the problem is stagnant global demand,” he said.

“Thus, even a larger change will not have an impact on export volumes, but exporting firms will experience improvements in profitability,” Huang said.

For all the fuss about the devaluation, there could still be more to come over time under the new market-driven policy for daily adjustments.

“It may yet turn out to be a 10-percent or larger devaluation,” said Jefferson.

Although the yuan has firmed and stabilized in recent sessions, some economists expect depreciation to resume after Xi’s visit.

On Friday, PBOC Deputy Governor Yi Gang voiced confidence that the currency “will be more or less stable around the equilibrium level,” Bloomberg reported. But a Reuters survey found that economists believe the yuan will fall by another 2 percent over the next six months.

If there is an effect on exports, China’s exporters might not feel it until next year.

“I would imagine something closer to six months than six weeks would be needed in order for a change to become apparent,” Jefferson said.

The current episode of haze is the first after Indonesia ratified the ASEAN agreement to tackle haze pollution in 2014. It is also the first after Singapore’s Transboundary Haze Pollution Act 2014 came into effect. The region’s new battle plan against transboundary haze pollution is being put to the test.

By Margareth Sembiring*

With the onset of the El Nino season, forest fires in some Sumatran and Kalimantan provinces of Indonesia have generated thick clouds of haze across the Malacca Strait. Just within the past week, thick haze has paralysed airports in Pekanbaru, Batam, Kualanamu (Medan), Aceh, and Jambi, with incoming and outgoing flights getting delayed for hours or cancelled altogether.

Schools were also closed for days to allow school children to stay at home and minimise their exposure to the smog. Concurrently, the PSI readings in Singapore have worsened over the past few days. The recurrence of haze is expected although by no means acceptable. Haze incurs hefty costs on health and the economy, and it often strains Singapore-Indonesia relations.
Recurrence despite troubleshooting

For years, numerous efforts have been taken to address forest fires issues in Indonesia’s affected provinces. Among other initiatives, Indonesia has put land and/or areas prone to forest fires under surveillance; collected data and information relating to hotspots and the spread of haze; mapped burnt areas; and used the Fire Danger Rating System (FDRS) to monitor forest fires risk.

Additionally, Indonesia has developed standard operating procedures in preventing and suppressing land and/or forest fires; strengthened and raised community awareness through public education; introduced early prevention activities or trainings; strengthened the institutions and legislations that support zero burning policy; and coordinated law enforcement across different agencies, including the Corruption Eradication Committee (KPK) and the National Police.

Forest fires in Riau Province which severely enveloped Singapore and parts of Malaysia in mid-2013 were even regarded as a national emergency during which time the National Agency for Disaster Management (BNPB) was called upon to suppress the fires.

To complement its domestic efforts, Indonesia forged bilateral cooperation with Singapore and Malaysia to build local capacity in dealing with forest fires in Jambi and Riau provinces respectively. Indonesia also takes part in the ASEAN Peatland Management Strategy (2006 – 2020), a regional initiative aimed at managing community livelihood on peatland thereby preventing forest fires.

Despite these continuing efforts, the haze has recurred. Myriad factors can explain this. They include deep-seated economic interests in slash-and-burn techniques; lack of fire suppression systems deep in the forests; and the sheer size of fire-prone areas and limited capacity to access and protect them. Overlapping land claims add on to the complexity of forest fires and resultant haze problem.

What’s new?

Just before former President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono ended his term in October 2014, the Indonesian Parliament finally ratified the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution. The ratification generated mixed reactions, with some perceiving it as a positive development after 12 years of waiting, while others regarded it as nothing more than signing a non-enforceable agreement.

His successor President Joko Widodo merged the ministries handling the environment and forestry with the hope of improving bureaucratic coordination and improving efficiency in responding to environmental and forestry issues including forest fires and the haze pollution triggered. A coalition of environmental groups in Indonesia, however, has cautioned that such merger would only further complicate inter-sectoral coordination.

During the same period, the Singapore parliament passed the Transboundary Haze Pollution Act 2014. The Act aims to deter companies or entities operating in or outside Singapore from taking part in activities that contribute to transboundary haze affecting Singapore.

Critics, however, have pointed out that the effectiveness of the new law would largely depend on the ability to accurately identify errant companies or entities, as well as on law enforcement and cooperation from the Indonesian counterparts. Indonesia’s overlapping concession maps have often been cited as one of the main reasons that hinder law enforcement efforts in affected areas.

In December 2014, Indonesia launched the much anticipated One Map of National Thematic Geospatial Information. It put into effect the One Map Policy which was mandated in an Act on Geospatial Information three years earlier. As the One Map attempts to create one reference, one standard, one database, and one portal for otherwise various and often overlapping maps, the One Map is expected to provide a better avenue for stronger cooperation and coordination for national development including responses to forest fires and the resulting haze.

How different would things be?

The current episode of haze, therefore, is the first to occur after these major measures were taken in Indonesia and Singapore. How different would things be now?

Criticisms have been levelled against the new initiatives when they were first introduced. With the fast thickening smog in Singapore and parts of Indonesia’s Sumatran and Kalimantan provinces, it is timely for both governments to prove that their policies do work. Ultimately, bringing the real culprits before justice, suppressing the fires quickly, minimising future occurrences of forest fires, and making the region haze-free are the real indicators of success of those measures.

*Margareth Sembiring is a Senior Analyst at the Centre for Non-Traditional Security (NTS) Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.

The prosecution of a Swedish national accused of terrorist activities in Syria has collapsed at the Old Bailey after it became clear Britain’s security and intelligence agencies would have been deeply embarrassed had a trial gone ahead, the Guardian reported.

Bherlin Gildo was due to stand trial at London’s Old Bailey accused of attending a terrorist training camp between 2012 and 2013 and possessing information likely to be useful to a terrorist. But the case against him was dropped and he was cleared of the charges after a wrangle between lawyers and the British and Swedish security services.

On 1^st June 2015, writes Seumas Milne the trial in London of a Swedish man, Bherlin Gildo, accused of terrorism in Syria, collapsed after it became clear British intelligence had been arming the same rebel groups the defendant was charged with supporting.

The prosecution abandoned the case, apparently to avoid embarrassing the intelligence services. The defence argued that going ahead with the trial would have been an “affront to justice” when there was plenty of evidence the British state was itself providing “extensive support” to the armed Syrian opposition. That didn’t only include the “non-lethal assistance” boasted of by the government (including body armour and military vehicles), but training, logistical support and the secret supply of “arms on a massive scale”.

Reports were cited that MI6 had cooperated with the CIA on a “rat line” of arms transfers from Libyan stockpiles to the Syrian rebels in 2012 after the fall of the Gaddafi regime.

Interestingly, a recently declassified secret US intelligence report, written in August 2012, uncannily predicts – and effectively welcomes – the prospect of a “Salafist principality” in eastern Syria and an al-Qaida-controlled Islamic state in Syria and Iraq. In stark contrast to western claims at the time, the Defense Intelligence Agency document identifies al-Qaida in Iraq (which became Isis) and fellow Salafists as the “major forces driving the insurgency in Syria” – and states that “western countries, the Gulf states and Turkey” were supporting the opposition’s efforts to take control of eastern Syria.

Raising the “possibility of establishing a declared or undeclared Salafist principality”, the Pentagon report goes on, “this is exactly what the supporting powers to the opposition want, in order to isolate the Syrian regime, which is considered the strategic depth of the Shia expansion (Iraq and Iran)”.

However this is only the latest in a string of such cases.

Psychological Warfare – How MI6 Controls ISIS

For months it was in the news that 400 Britons had joined the jihadis in Syria. Foreign Secretary William Hague himself said so. However, the number of these British jihadis is much larger and it has been revealed that some of them were trained to be Sunni jihadists by a jihad-seeking Saudi mullah in a British mosque under the watchful eyes of the MI6.

The Independent in June 2014 reported Birmingham MP Khalid Mahmood saying at least 1,500 Britons, if not more, have joined the terrorist-led jihad in Syria and Iraq, rejecting the 400 figure handed out by Hague, and 500 such jihadis referred to by U.K.’s anti-terror chief Sir Peter Fahy. “I imagine 1,500 certainly would be the lower end. If you look across the whole of the country, there’s been a number of people going across,” Mahmood said.

What is even more revealing is the report that some of these jihadis were trained by a Saudi preacher operating from within a Cardiff mosque.

The Daily Mail in June 2104 pointed to Mohammed al-Arifi, who has called for holy war to overthrow Bashar al-Assad’s regime, spoke at the Al Manar center in Cardiff, Wales. Although banned from entering Switzerland because of his extremist views, al-Arifi has visited the U.K. several times. A Sunni Muslim, he has been accused of stirring up tensions with Shi’a Muslims, reportedly calling it evil and accusing adherents of kidnapping, cooking and skinning children. A source close to the Yemeni community in Cardiff told Mail Online:

“These boys were groomed [at Al Manar] to fight the Shi’as, fight these people, fight those that’s where it started. The teaching [at Al Manar] helped the people recruiting. If someone tried to recruit me, I wouldn’t go unless I’m convinced. But once they’re groomed, all it takes is someone to say ‘come and I’ll take you.’”

This reminds us of the teenage jihadist schoolboy from Coventry ‘fighting alongside ISIS terrorists in Iraq and Syria’ dubbed ‘Osama Bin Bieber‘.

Last year German officials in an operation raided two containers passing through Hamburg Port and seized 14,000 documents establishing that Osama bin Laden was funded by UK Queen’s bank Coutts, which is part of the Royal Bank of Scotland.

Following the accusations, Daily Mail in it’s 23 June 2014 report titled Queen’s bank forced to deny that Osama Bin Laden had an account there after 14,000 documents seized from Cayman Islands branch reports that the Queen’s bank has denied claims in European newspapers that Osama Bin Laden ever held an account with the organisation.

In 2012, Coutts was fined £8.75million for ‘serious and systematic’ failings when handling money from suspected criminals or foreign despots.

ISIS Leader a Psychological Operation

Hamid Dawud Mohamed Khalil al Zawi, most commonly known as Abu Abdullah al-Rashid al-Baghdadi was the leader of umbrella organizations composed of eight groups and its successor organisation, the Islamic State of Iraq – ISIS. However, in July 2007, the U.S. military reported that al-Baghdadi never actually existed. The detainee identified as Khaled al-Mashhadani, a self-proclaimed intermediary to Osama bin Laden, claimed that al-Baghdadi was a fictional character created to give an Iraqi face to a foreign-run terror group, and that statements attributed to al-Baghdadi were actually read by an Iraqi actor.

According to Brigadier General Kevin Bergner, Abdullah Rashid al-Baghdadi never existed and was actually a fictional character whose audio-taped declarations were provided by an elderly actor named Abu Adullah al-Naima as a form of psychological warfare as reported in the New York Times. Brigadier General Kevin Bergner currently serves with the National Security Council staff as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Iraq. Prior to this assignment, he served as the Deputy Commanding General for Multi-National Forces in Mosul, Iraq. He also served as the Director for Political-Military Affairs (Middle East) on the The Joint Staff in the Department of Defense.

What about the ISIS threat to India?

At the Indo-UK Counter Terrorism Joint Working Group meeting held in London on January 15-16 this year the British officials warned their Indian counterparts of a possible terror attack by ISIS on Indian soil.

Then on July 28, USA Today revealed the end-of-days as according to the Islamic State (ISIS). The newspaper sourced a 32-page doomsday document to some “Pakistani citizen with connections inside the Pakistani Taliban.”

An investigative story published by the USA Today and reported by American Media Institute refers to a 32- page Urdu document obtained from a Pakistani citizen with connections inside the Pakistani Taliban.

“The document warns that ‘preparations’ for an attack in India are underway and predicts that an attack will provoke an apocalyptic confrontation with America,” the report said. The document, according to the report, was independently translated into English by a Harvard scholar and verified by several serving and retired intelligence official.

The document was reviewed by three US intelligence officials, who said they believe the document is authentic based on its unique markings and the fact that language used to describe leaders, the writing style and religious wording match other documents from the ISIS, USA Today added.

However, India’s Ministry of Home Affairs termed “rubbish” the alleged ISIS document which hinted that the terror group was preparing to attack India to provoke confrontation with the US. “It’s rubbish,” Joint Secretary, Internal Security-I, MA Ganapathy told reporters said.

If indeed the document was a fraud it raises serious questions given the MI6 and CIA links to ISIS; considering that the doomsday threat and the attack plan both emanated from the same source that is alleged to have created the threat in the first place. However, no explanation was provided by the Home Ministry as to why they chose to term it ‘rubbish’ nor an explanation sought from the western governments, intelligence agencies or the media for publishing such a sensitive and false report that took the entire global media in a whirl.

On the other hand last month, India’s Home Ministry announced it was working on a national anti-ISIS strategy. Many intelligence inputs followed after the publication of those reports and arrests made all across India. Reportedly, the appeal of ISIS radicalism had ramped up in ten Indian states.

Last month a British doctor was arrested in Jammu & Kashmir for planting IEDs. Police said Baba who is a physiotherapist has lived in London since 2006. He returned to the valley three months ago.

Why is it that from Al Qaeda to ISIS to terrorists in J&K, all links end up in Britain? More importantly, why such leads are not pursued by Indian Intelligence Agencies? Surprisingly enough even the intelligence inputs we so actively act upon are also provided by the same countries. How could we formulate a strategy to orient our security agencies to counter a threat that we choose to ignore or do not even attempt to understand?

As is the case with any of the terrorist group many of these groups are controlled not only by the states that sponsor terrorism but by the nations that sponsor the states that sponsor terrorism too. So though all evidence eventually leads to North Western frontier of India, we do not attempt to learn about who instigates these groups, their actions, their mode of acting and the previous track record that should guide us in doing what we as third neutral sovereign country should do. We totally ignored this angle and even the most rudimentary of forensic investigation in our approach to the Mumbai Train Blasts (a sequel to Spanish Train Bombings and the beginning of the 26/11 Mumbai Attacks). We hope we do a beginning in this new direction.

By the later years of the Reagan regime, a preferred nomenclature suited to U.S. interests became standardized for the Third World. In the case of nations to be rolled back (e.g., Nicaragua), governments were called terrorist and the insurgents were labeled democratic. In the case of countries to be supported against “communist” insurgencies (e.g., El Salvador and the Philippines), the governments were called democratic and the insurgents were labeled terrorists. “

– from the book Rollback by Thomas Bodenheimer and Robert Gould

One recent phenomenon emerging since dissolution of soviet era is, if there is more than one geo-political player involved in any target nation say Nigeria or Indonesia or India; then the turf war between the geo-political players is spilling in to the target countries. Just like in case of East India Companies whenever their parent countries (England, France, Holland etc) went to war in Europe, their representatives in African and Indian colonies also went to war. So whenever one geo-political player feels their turf is violated in any target countries then they do not hesitate to eliminate the others or their supporters in the target countries.

Depending on the theatre of concern these sabotage operations are called by various names and many governments in order to prevent them do various preventive actions. Unfortunately in India there is no comprehensive study of terrorism keeping the above perspective. Our excessive determination and focus on Islamic or Jihad terrorism though suits our emotional need it only comprises of less than one fourth of terrorist acts perpetuated on the soil of India since more than three decades. Subversion, sabotage, assassinations, abductions, facility bombings, symbolic target bombings though done by all terrorist groups we are confined and concerned only about Jihadi terrorism which is making our response to over all terrorism and its prevalence in India ineffective.

Seumas Milne writes this western habit of playing with jihadi groups, which then come back to bite them, goes back at least to the 1980s war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, which fostered the original al-Qaida under CIA tutelage. Infact, it’s not just a western habit and it dates far back than 1980s since before World War I where the roots to using modern fundamentalism as a tool of warfare lay. We will be divulging deep on this subject in further reports.

In the above wake Great Game India(GGI) will be publishing a series of articles with various case studies to throw a comprehensive light on the issue of terrorism India is facing and will face along with a broad citizen based response to the emerging issues of global terror.

The first article of the series published in the Jul-Sept issue of GreatGameIndia could be read here: Globalized Terror In A Liberalized World – Need for new orientation in National Security