Opening Remarks for Conference on Banking Supervision and Regulation

By Mitsuhiro Furusawa, IMF Deputy Managing Director

Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. I’m delighted to welcome you to the second Conference on Banking Supervision and Regulation, where we highlight key lessons from the IMF’s technical assistance program in Asia.

This conference comes at an important moment. As you know, this region has been the focus of considerable attention in recent weeks. Concerns in the markets about the Asia’s economic prospects have given new focus to public servants who work hard to keep uncertainty at bay. It is our responsibility to ensure that financial sectors continue to support this region’s great economic achievements. That places a premium on the issues we are addressing today.

JSA

It is important that we are meeting in Japan because so much of our TA work has been made possible through generous Japanese support. TA to promote financial stability through effective banking supervision receives funding from the Japan Administered Account for Selected IMF Activities. Until recently, as a Vice Minister for Finance, I was on the funding side of this effort. Now I am happy to sit across the table and put this money to use in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond.

Through the JSA Japan has become the single-largest contributor to the IMF’s capacity building activities worldwide. In dollar terms, Japan now accounts for almost 40 percent of our donor-funded TA. As we speak, the JSA is funding the placement of long-term resident advisors in three countries in this region. So please allow me to express our deep gratitude to Japan’s Ministry of Finance for its continued support, including for this event.

We are organizing this conference to learn from the experience of TA recipients some of whom have kindly agreed to speak. We also have speakers from the Japan FSA; South Korea’s Financial Services Commission; Reserve Bank of India, and the China Banking Regulatory Commission. They will present their views on key issues highlighted by the global financial crisis related to bank governance and supervision, particularly pertaining to cross-border and consolidated banking.

Asian Banking Sector

Let me set the stage for today’s discussion.

Over the last two decades, Asia has been the fastest-growing region in the world, now making up around 30 percent of the world’s GDP. Reflecting this growth, Asian banking sectors have become bigger, more complex, and closely intertwined. The region comprises advanced economies, international financial centers, and emerging and developing economies; and is home to systemically important global institutions.

In this environment, the role of bank regulators is paramount—to ensure that the operations of financial institutions do not pose risks for stability and growth. While significant regulatory reforms have been adopted since the global financial crisis to address systemic risk, these initiatives are likely to challenge bank supervisors and regulators.

Corporate Governance

One crucial challenge is corporate governance. While most countries tend to have regulatory frameworks in place, many do not have the supervisory practices to support these frameworks. Thus, a core purpose of JSA-funded TA in the region is to enhance financial stability by building effective banking supervision to ensure strong corporate governance.

Among the beneficiaries are Bangladesh, Cambodia, India, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Maldives, Myanmar, Nepal, and Philippines. These initiatives have been multi-year projects, focusing on enhancing institutional capacity and regulation to promote financial stability. These efforts tailor international best practices to country circumstances.

Strengthened corporate governance at commercial banks is certainly an important component of these supervisory standards. The Fund’s experience with banking crises highlights the enormous negative consequences of poor governance.

Risk management, is at the heart of bank corporate governance. It is important for their own activities and for the whole financial sector. In this context, the Basel Committee has updated its guidance on corporate governance. It has developed principles describing a bank board’s responsibility for risk appetite, implementation of a risk management framework consistent with the bank’s risk profile, and the alignment of compensation with long-term objectives. It also requires that supervisors assess bank corporate governance. I look forward the discussion of governance and its application in the Asian banking context.

Consolidated Supervision

A second challenge is to devise an effective framework for consolidated supervision. Our assessments of financial systems suggest that most countries have problems identifying and dealing with risks posed by the financial institutions and activities that span sectors and cross borders. Our Spring 2015 Global Financial Stability Report analyzed Asian banks’ geographical allocation of assets. The share of regional assets rose from about 10 percent to close to 20 percent of total assets after 2008. This partly reflected the internationalization of Chinese banks. Cross-border bank flows to Asian economies (excluding Japan and Australia) increased by about 80 percent between 2007 and the first quarter of 2015.

While cross-border banking brings diversification, risk-sharing, and investment benefits to home and host countries, stronger regional linkages also bring the potential of greater vulnerability to cross-border shocks. This is particularly important within corporate groups as affiliates in different jurisdictions increase the risk of contagion. The failure of a group or its affiliates can threaten financial stability in multiple jurisdictions. We saw this during the global crisis when shocks moved rapidly from the U.S. housing market to global markets.

This creates challenges involving bank supervision and regulation, and crisis resolution. Financial reforms that help strengthen the soundness of parent banks can help limit the transmission of negative shocks by foreign affiliates. A pragmatic approach involves information sharing, harmonized institutional and regulatory frameworks to ensure consistent implementation of regulatory standards, and compatible arrangements for cross-border resolution. These shared objectives, combined with stronger cooperation and coordination among regulators and supervisors, can ensure the benefits of globalized banking while limiting the risks to financial stability.

Future Challenges

Looking ahead, it is clear that Asian financial systems will continue growing in size and complexity. They have the potential to enhance innovation, integration and inclusion. More interconnected financial systems can allow households and pension funds, among others, to diversify; ideally, reducing risk. They can provide new sources of corporate financing to drive the next stage of Asia’s remarkable growth.

But as financial integration grows, the role of regulators and regulatory cooperation becomes ever more important. This is how we can keep one country’s problems from becoming systemic. The IMF can work with this region’s regulators and supervisors to help ensure the safety of this process. This conference is one small step to enhance this collaboration.

Let me conclude by thanking all of you for being here, and for your constructive contributions to these important deliberations. I wish all of you a very pleasant stay in my hometown and very productive discussions.

Thank you.

By Wren Greaney

On June 25, a former Panamanian Notary Public filed a complaint with Panama’s federal prosecutor’s office against the shareholders of one of the most valuable properties in the country.[1] Mario Velásquez Chizmar was the notary who had validated the will of multimillionaire Wilson Lucom, and then subsequently fell victim to personal attacks and prosecution, as powerful figures in Panama sought to invalidate the will’s stipulations to gain control of the estate. Corrupt practices rampant in the Panamanian government and the country’s legal system have allowed such greed to dominate over legality. In this case, greed and power have conflicted with potentially immense benefits to Panama’s citizens and its economy. There are numerous instances that illustrate the injustices resulting from the country’s system, and the case of Lucom’s Last Will and Testament is of particular interest to the Washington, D.C.—based Council on Hemispheric Affairs (COHA).

The case originated in 2006 when Floridian millionaire Wilson Charles Lucom, an American expatriate living in Panama, died. As COHA discussed in a 2010 report, Lucom specified in his will that shares of his Panama estate, Hacienda Santa Monica, be sold, with the proceeds going to the Wilson C. Lucom Foundation. The value of such proceeds totaled about $50 million USD, an amount that has since vaulted to over $145 million USD, according to a Panamanian Probate Court appraisal.[2] The foundation was to be used to provide funds to purchase meals and other supplies for impoverished school children dwelling in the country, where over 16 percent of the population under the age of five suffer from malnutrition, and 85 percent of those children are designated as being poor, according to the World Bank.[3] Lucom, who never had any children of his own, attempted to address this need through his bequest meant to address impoverished children.

The will also allocated to Lucom’s third wife, Hilda Piza Lucom, a monthly allowance of $20,000 USD. Her children (Wilson Lucom’s step-children) were each bequeathed a one-time sum of $50,000 USD.[4] These amounts might be seen as being more than negligible, but given the magnitude of the estate’s value, Hilda Piza and her children were surprised and vexed at what they saw as the relatively small size of the inheritance left to them.

In order to effectively manage and distribute the inheritance to Lucom’s family members and the charitable foundation that had been set up, his American lawyer of 31 years and long-time friend, a highly respected tax-specialist, Richard S. Lehman, was named as the will’s executor.[5]

Panama’s High Level of Judicial Corruption Deprives Charity of Funding

Controversy around the disposition of funds began to occur almost immediately after Piza took the will’s validity to court. The Probate Court approved the will but illegally suspended Lehman’s rights as Executor to manage the funds, and an appellate court hearing again approved the will as valid and Lehman as the bon a fide Executor.[6] In August 2010, Piza and her lawyers appealed the case in Panama’s Supreme Court.[7] The panel of Supreme Court justices that addressed the case came forth with an absurd and contradictory decision to accept the will’s technical validity but to allocate the proceeds of the estate to Piza rather than to Lucom’s foundation.[8] Commentators on Panamanian law have stated that this decision was born out of the country’s endemic corruption rather than sound legal practice.

Hilda Piza was not necessarily the main driver behind this campaign to illegally expropriate the assets, but rather was swept along in the wave of collusion and fraud that has plagued Panamanian institutions in one authoritative regime after another in recent years. At that point Piza, at 85 years of age, may not have been an effective decision-maker regarding her estate. In fact, according to a lawsuit filed with the Panamanian Public Prosecutor, several of her signatures on documents involved in the case were of questionable validity. A case file submitted to the FBI indicates that “Hilda was used as the vehicle to steal the Estate.”[9] It appears that Hilda’s legal team and others may have manipulated Piza as well as her case in order to appropriate access to the funds.

This approach readily awakened a new round of of corruption among some of Panama’s Supreme Court justices, which led several of them to comply with Piza’s lawyers’ questionable efforts. The manner in which the 2010 decision was made is a key example of the irrational and duplicitous process with which Panama’s Supreme Court has operated in recent years. Three justices, Oyden Ortega, Alberto Cigarruista, and Harley Mitchell, issued the decision. Panama’s Supreme Court was allowed to accept the decision of a three-member panel that unanimously agreed.[10] Though the decision later required approval by all nine Justices of the Panama Supreme Court, this needed validation never occurred. As COHA mentioned in 2010, Justice Harley Mitchell met with Hilda’s lawyer in at least one private lunch in a connection that many have stated contributed to a case of bribery.[11] In fact, a lawyer who was an advisor to the Panamanian Congress at the time filed an affidavit in a criminal complaint to the Public Prosecutor regarding the controversial nature of the decision. The affidavit stated that the attorney saw a report written by the Panamanian Financial Police, the Financial Analysis Unit (UAF), that stated that at there were “banking movements in [the three justices’] personal bank accounts at the time the succession of Wilson Charles Lucom (R.I.P.) was decided.” The decision to transfer control of the assets to Piza involved a process that bypassed the clear stipulation of the will, which was supposed to be a legally binding document. This was an unfortunate continuation of Panama’s ubiquitous pattern of malfeasance.[12]

Appropriation Followed by Tax Evasion

Soon after the tainted Supreme Court opinion was issued, Lucom’s inheritance was transferred to Hilda, who died soon thereafter leaving an executor to manage her estate and the assets she had acquired by challenging the will. Piza had held U.S. citizenship and, therefore, U.S. taxes were owed on her already sizeable estate as well as on the inheritance from Lucom. A Whistleblower action was filed with the U.S. Internal Revenue Service advising the U.S. tax-collecting agency of the size of Hilda’s estate as well as the belief that much of the inheritance was never reported to the U.S. tax authorities and that the U.S. federal estate tax had been avoided. Hilda’s estate was instead transferred to an anonymous Panamanian Foundation shortly after her death. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) is now investigating the possible failure to pay U.S. estate taxes.[13]

The United States federal government should take note of this aspect in the narrative surrounding Lucom’s estate. According to the Whistleblower action, the estate tax due from Hilda’s estate is approximately $50 million USD.[14] This is hardly a small sum, and given the current pattern of corruption of the legal system in Panama, it is in the interest of the U.S. authorities to be diligent in continuing to remain alert to the IRS investigation and in being sure to take whatever actions are necessary to obtain the millions owed to the authorities. The question is whether the investigation will find a conspiracy to injure the United States, potentially giving the IRS a basis to collect a sizable amount of funds owed. In this manner, the United States may rightfully solicit significant revenue and at least achieve justice at some level.

Grabbing for Hacienda Santa Monica Property

In 2005, a year before his death, Wilson Lucom signed a purchase agreement with a company owned by Americans called Grand Panama International, Ltd. (GPI), in which both parties agreed that GPI would purchase all of the shares of Hacienda Santa Monica.[15] This agreement has not been honored due to the continued contention over who owns the estate and who possesses the authority to complete the sale. This legal knot ultimately prevents the sale that would provide funds required for Lucom’s charitable foundation. If GPI’s deal were to be completed, Panama would be one significant step closer to alleviating the charitable needs of Panamanian impoverished children.

The deal with the GPI development company was halted in part because of yet another fraudulent incident. According to the principals in GPI, after Lucom’s death, his property valued at $145,000,000 USD was purchased in 2012. However, the property was reappraised for this purchase at only $14 million USD rather than the $145 million USD at which it was previously valued.[16] The property, however, has remained undeveloped under this ownership because of continued legal sparring. Although the estate, since the fraudulent purchase, has delivered some sports equipment and school supplies to local schoolchildren, these donations confer only a small fraction of the impact that would be made by consistent meals that Lucom planned to provide via the foundation.

Corrupt Politics Prevent Economic Development

Again, according to the principals of GPI, former Panamanian President Martinelli, who departed office in 2014 as an outbreak of corruption allegations began, acquired a portion of the Hacienda Santa Monica property through these dubious dealings. This type of maneuvering was typical of the chicanery that took place during Martinelli’s time in office. In 2012, the then-president appointed Alejandro Moncada Luna, whose corruption and sentencing COHA recently discussed, to Panama’s Supreme Court.[17] Moncada Luna’s first action in the Supreme Court was to ignore a Panamanian law that required Lucom’s case to be reviewed by all of the court’s sitting justices. By removing Lucom’s will from the Supreme Court docket and transferring the case back to the lower level Probate Court, Moncada Luna made the property accessible for purchase at as little as ten cents on the dollar. As GPI claims, Martinelli then received ownership of part of the property from the buyer, with whom he had a political arrangement.

Not only would the agreed-upon sale to GPI have had the potential to allow funds to filter into the Lucom Foundation for use by impoverished children, but GPI’s plans to develop the property into a waterfront resort community would have allowed some economic and recreational development to take place in the area. The plans include golf courses, yachting marinas and boating facilities, retail space, casinos, spas, and other vacation-oriented destinations, as well as areas for both luxury housing and residences accessible for working-class families in the area. [18] If the company had been allowed to complete the purchase and initiate construction as originally planned, by now the property may have been fully developed, bringing significant cash flow to the region. However, existing residents of the area do not necessarily need the development. Eric Jackson, a highly regarded independent journalist, is amongst skeptics of such development projects as they often generate money laundering rather than true economic benefits to locals.

Ultimately, corruption has cheated the company out of an agreed-upon deal. On July 20, GPI filed a formal complaint in Panama regarding the losses the development company has accrued because its ill-timed purchase agreement has not been honored. GPI has claimed damages in the amount of six hundred million dollars ($600,000,000) in lost profits. This complaint is important in the mission of keeping Panamanian courts’ attention on the issue of Hacienda Santa Monica shareholders’ illicit dealings.

The FBI Gets Involved

Several months ago, a private investigator turned in a case file to the FBI with information on the individuals’ fraudulent activities relating to Lucom’s will and estate. COHA has been told by the private investigator that the FBI now has opened an investigation that may look into fraud, conspiracy, money laundering, and with this case’s standing relationship with the matter of fraud and attendant U.S. taxes, it could fit well with the FBI’s current interest in multi-jurisdictional cases. Investigators will likely initially approach the case by looking at public corruption in Panama, and then by investigating individuals thought to be involved.

Among the topics included in the case that demonstrate the illicit and disingenuous nature of Hacienda Santa Monica shareholders and others, is a bundle of human rights abuses that are being leveled against Richard Lehman—the original executor to Lucom’s will and the lawyer who is attempting to return the estate to its rightful beneficiaries, the country’s poor children. Initially, the Probate Court suspended Lehman’s ability to use the funds in Lucom’s accounts in order to defend the will in court; this represented an illegal suspension of executors’ rights, forcing Lehman to use more of his own funds to defend the integrity of the will. After he refused a bribe to abandon the chase for justice for the inheritance funds, Hilda Piza’s attorneys absurdly accused Lehman of murdering Lucom, as well as portraying him as intending to steal proceeds from the liquidation of the estate for his own personal use. All of these far-fetched charges were overturned by the Panama courts, but managed to motivate officials to falsely arrest Lehman and remove him from an airplane to place him in an airport jail cell on two occasions. The abuse of Lehman did not stop in Panama. According to an affidavit filed by a principal in GPI in the Florida courts, one of Piza’s lawyers confirmed that fraudulent Panamanian orders were filed in the Florida Court system in order to discredit Lehman and stop him from continuing to defend Lucom’s will. His fears of crossing Panama’s borders due to these types of persecution indicates both the extent of the shareholders’ willingness to defend their stake in the estate radically and the need for in-depth investigation into the role of the individuals involved.

If the FBI investigation advances in a timely manner and finds information that the bureau deems useful, many of those who have been involved in appropriating property and funds from Lucom’s estate may be prosecuted and their assets frozen. This FBI involvement appears similar to the IRS investigation into tax fraud, in that it may be important in bringing justice against the powerful individuals in Panama who were complicit in appropriating assets from Lucom’s foundation, preventing Grand Panama International, Ltd. from building its planned city, and harassing Lehman with maltreatment and false accusations. Given the fact that the FBI investigation has only recently begun, those looking to the FBI for rescue from the sharks pursuing the Lucom fortune may be overestimating the ability of the federal agency to quickly come to their rescue. The investigation is one addition to the mounting explorations into Panamanian corruption.

Implications for Justice and Panama

Hilda’s son, Gilberto, has argued that “fifty million dollars isn’t going to solve poverty in Panama.”[19] Such an argument is irrelevant to the question of legal accountability. Whether or not the Wilson C. Lucom Foundation would actually improve Panama’s poverty in the way that Lucom envisioned (and non-profit leaders argue that it would indeed significantly help the situation) does not affect the fact that Wilson assigned these assets to the fund in a fully legal document. It is absurd to assume that this legal document should not be followed simply because some affected parties, including Gilberto as represented by his self-interested statement, do not agree that the funds will be effective in achieving Lucom’s intentions.

The injustices and discrepancies that have riddled Lucom’s estate and the intended beneficiaries, as well as impoverished children in Panama, may be righted. In order for some of the perpetrators to be condemned, for the planned city to be built or its company to be repaid for losses, and in order for Panamanian children to receive basic food allotments to alleviate their persistent desperation, the pathways that seek justice must be supported. These mechanisms include Panama’s federal prosecutors’ office and the courts honoring Mario Chizmar’s complaint by seizing Hacienda Santa Monica’s shares and questioning the shareholders, honoring the complaint by GPI against perpetrators of the appropriation of the property, and the IRS and FBI investigations acting swiftly to address all of the possibly relevant corrupt individuals.

Each plausible solution in some way requires a shift in Panamanian legal accountability. Many hope that the country’s new president, Juan Varela, will demand such accountability from legal institutions and live up to his campaign theme of anti-corruption. Some steps have been taken to begin an advance against corrupt figures, such as the recent sentencing of former Supreme Court Justice Moncada Luna and the flight from the country of former President Martinelli. However, it is possible that more radical actions must be taken, such as constitutional changes to shift the structures that have allowed former President Martinelli, a number of senior juridical officials, and other elite individuals to horde control over wealth, including the Lucom fortune. Such actions cannot be tolerated in any society that claims to be constitutionally based. Further prosecutions and continued pressure on Panama’s current legal system will be important in resolving the Lucom case and in determining whether the country’s institutions will open to a new wave of testing its legality and honestly.

*Wren Greaney, Research Associate at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs

Notes:
[1] http://laestrella.com.pa/panama/nacional/piden-citar-accionistas-santa-monica/23876113

[2] Probate Court Appraisal

[3] http://www.coha.org/hungry-for-justice-corrupt-courts-in-panama-deny-starving-children-50-million-in-inheritance/ ; http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTPOVERTY/EXTPA/0,,contentMDK:20207841~menuPK:443285~pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:430367,00.html

[4] http://www.forbes.com/sites/trialandheirs/2011/10/03/150-million-trust-fund-stolen-from-poor-children-in-panama-lawsuit-claims/ ; http://www.coha.org/hungry-for-justice-corrupt-courts-in-panama-deny-starving-children-50-million-in-inheritance/

[5] http://www.coha.org/a-legacy-of-corruption-marches-on-new-insight-into-panamas-infamous-lucom-case/

[6] http://www.forbes.com/sites/trialandheirs/2011/10/03/150-million-trust-fund-stolen-from-poor-children-in-panama-lawsuit-claims/

[7] http://www.forbes.com/sites/trialandheirs/2011/10/03/150-million-trust-fund-stolen-from-poor-children-in-panama-lawsuit-claims/2/ ; http://www.coha.org/a-legacy-of-corruption-marches-on-new-insight-into-panamas-infamous-lucom-case/

[8] http://trialandheirs.com/blog/probate-court/panama-court-throws-out-will-that-left-millions-to-poor-children

[9]Case File submitted to the FBI

[10] http://www.panama-guide.com/article.php/20101018095140546

[11] http://www.coha.org/hungry-for-justice-corrupt-courts-in-panama-deny-starving-children-50-million-in-inheritance/

[12] http://www.coha.org/humiliating-corruption-charges-against-the-martinelli-administration-in-panama-coha-calls-for-international-condemnation/

[13] Communication from IRS Whistleblower Office

[14] “Fact Sheet – The Estate of Hilda Lucom”

[15] http://mypanamalawyer.blogspot.com/2013/09/juan-hombron-and-lucom-estate-dispute.html ; “First ‘Branded City’ Planned for Panama Gold Coast”

[16] Probate Court Appraisal

[17] http://www.coha.org/humiliating-corruption-charges-against-the-martinelli-administration-in-panama-coha-calls-for-international-condemnation/

[18] “First ‘Branded City’ Planned for Panama Gold Coast” ; Grand Panama map plan

[19] http://www.newsroompanama.com/news/panama/panama%E2%80%99s-poor-kids-cut-out-of-millionaire%E2%80%99s-will

By John Zaw

Cardinal Charles Maung Bo of Yangon has urged Myanmar’s president to review a set of controversial laws that could target religious minorities, saying the legislation will fragment “the dream of a united Myanmar”.

In a written appeal Sept. 10, the cardinal condemned a package of legislation known as the race and religion laws. Rights groups and faith leaders fear the laws will be used to persecute religious minorities in the Buddhist-majority country.

“Parliament was coerced by a fringe group of religious elite to enact four black laws, virtually fragmenting the dream of a united Myanmar,” the outspoken cardinal said in a strongly worded statement. “That these four bills were conceived not by the elected representatives of the Myanmar people, but by an extra-constitutional fringe element … is a dangerous portend for the fledgling democracy.”

Myanmar President Thein Sein signed into law the last of the four divisive bills on Aug. 31. The restrictive legislation had been championed by hard-line Buddhist monks from a group known as Ma Ba Tha, or the Committee for the Protection of Race and Religion.

The laws include a population control bill imposing mandatory “birth spacing” between a woman’s pregnancies; a monogamy law setting punishments for people with more than one spouse; an interfaith marriage law requiring Buddhist women to register their marriages in advance if they want to wed a non-Buddhist man; and a law regulating religious conversions.

Taken together, rights groups and faith leaders fear the laws are a barely concealed attempt to target Myanmar’s Muslim minority, particularly the often persecuted Muslim Rohingya.

‘We need peace’

In his statement, Cardinal Bo said the restrictive laws represent a major step back for a country that has only recently begun to emerge from decades of isolation amid military rule.

“We need peace. We need reconciliation. We need a shared and confident identity as citizens of a nation of hope,” Cardinal Bo said. “But these four laws seemed to have rung a death knell to that hope.”

The prelate said the Buddhist teachings of universal compassion and mercy for all were being threatened by “peddlers of hatred”.

“Any effort to dilute the pristine image of Buddhism and its message of universal love needs to be resisted by all people of our nation,” he said.

Cardinal Bo then appealed to Myanmar’s president to review the laws.

“The four laws are a result of … hatred,” he said. “We urge our rulers and elected representatives to review these laws, which can turn out to be a toxic recipe for more decades of conflict.”

The cardinal’s appeal comes as political parties in Myanmar begin campaigning ahead of long-awaited national elections on Nov. 8. Many observers see the poll as a test of Myanmar’s democratic reforms.

Yet the election itself has been tainted by issues of race. Before the campaign began, the country’s election commission disqualified most of the candidates running for a predominantly Rohingya party. And a prominent Rohingya parliamentarian who previously won a seat with the military-backed ruling party was also barred from running.

By Scott Nicholas Romaniuk and Joshua K. Wasylciw

The years running-up to the biggest migrant crisis Europe has faced since World War II saw increasing numbers of migrants from conflict-torn counties. 2014 and 2015 were the backdrops for the high pitch of European migration, with record numbers of people showing up on Europe’s doorstep with the aim of seeking a new life in and among European states.

Most migrants opt for the crème-de-la-crème of Europe: Germany, Sweden, or the United Kingdom (UK). Internal political strife has led to deep and probably lasting divisions among European Union (EU) member states. Although a meta-division has put Europe’s west and east in opposition to one another, the EU now has open-door immigration. It is unlikely to end its open-door policy in the near future. The biggest problem with this policy is the message it sends to future migrants from places like Syria, Afghanistan, Eritrea, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Gambia, Somalia, and Bangladesh.

The Great Wave

Middle East countries like Jordan have taken in an immense number of migrants relative to the size and wealth of the country. Even the most basic services are difficult to provide to the over one million migrants now living in Jordan, which itself has a population of just 6.5 million. Migrants see Europe as a place of wealth and the EU appears as a bloc of rich states able and willing to provide a life free of violence and insecurity. Roughly 100 migrants reach Germany every hour. About 350,000 migrants have been registered in Europe since the beginning of 2015. Those numbers are expected to rise as Europe’s migrant crisis is expected to play out over a long period.

Herein lies the second problem associated with the EU’s open door policy: the sheer number of migrants that could come. Syria has a population of roughly 22 million, Iraq 33 million, Bangladesh 156 million, Afghanistan 30 million, and Somalia 10 million. Thus, there’s a seemingly unlimited supply of migrants able to come to Europe.

Different Attitudes in the Middle East

A third problem concerns the rationale behind Europe’s migrant policy. A driving logic behind migrant acceptance is the core principles and values of the EU. Each member state’s moral and legal obligations are frequently cited as reason to open the floodgates. Argumentation in along this line has also led to the attempted establishment of forced migrant quotas. Gulf States are strongly opposed to accepting migrants the way the EU does. Why? Despite their oil riches, states in the Middle East say that they are not suitable destinations for migrants “precisely because of their often deceptive cultural closeness to most of the Syrians fleeing the conflict.”

Some have taken a different approach, especially given their size and populations demographics. The United Arab Emirates (UAE), for instance, prefers to pay to maintain refugee camps in and around Syria. Refugee camps have proven to be remarkably successful alternatives to policies such as the one implemented by the EU. One such example is found in Kenya. Dadaab is the world’s largest refugee camp, which was originally built to accommodate 90,000 people but is now home to 350,000 people who enjoy peace and security on a daily basis. Other Gulf States have wrestled with the challenge of sectarian differences. Trouble in this field has already made its way to the fore in several Muslim countries where ethnic and religious balance is a major concern.

Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu made no attempt to conceal his unease over the idea of accepting migrants from an “enemy” state. Israel and Syria have been engaged in numerous conflicts, some of which involved dangerous non-state actors (NSAs) like the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) operating from within Syrian borders. The most recent high point of hostilities was during the 2000s, which centered on Palestinian militants inside Syria.

Since 2006, Syria has been in an alliance with Israel’s biggest enemy, Iran. Benny Gantz, the Israel Defense Force’s (IDF) Chief of Staff said that Israel was willing to accept Alawite refugees during the Syrian civil war. Amid the growing migrant crisis, Israel’s Public Security Minister, Gilad Erdan, warned that illegal immigrants could be recruits of the Islamic State (IS). “It is not unrealistic that [IS] and other terrorist groups operating in Sinai,” stated Erdan, “would take advantage of [migrants’] distress to recruit them […] The procedure according to which illegal migrants who enter Israel are taken to Immigration Authority and the police must be changed. This must be treated as a security issue that requires a solution.”

Terrorist Threat: From Europe to North America

An enormous influx of migrants to Europe ought to raise concerns for the United States not to mention its Middle East ally, Israel. The US government is also at “war” in Syria and Iraq, albeit in the form of a multifaceted conflict, but this is still war.

Martin O’Malley, Governor of Maryland, has called for the US to accept up to 65,000 Syrian migrants, saying that, “if Germany – a country with one-fourth our population – can accept 800,000 refugees this year, certainly we – the nation of immigrants and refugees – can do more” (Cable News Network [CNN], 2015).

Opening the door to the U.S. when military operations are currently being conducted against a nation in which IS and other dangerous extremist groups operate would be like opening the door to Afghani migrants while the US is at war with the Taliban. Members of the Taliban could simply find their way to the U.S. and carry out terrorist acts within US borders.

The possibility of IS militants hiding among migrants is not unsubstantiated. Earlier this year IS openly threatened to send 500,000 migrants to Europe, stating that it would be a “psychological weapon.” The head of the EU’s judicial cooperation agency Eurojust, Michèle Coninsx, reflected on the migrant crisis as a security concern, stating in July that IS terrorists arriving in Europe could be making their way quite easily by hiding among migrants making the journey across the Mediterranean. Trafficked migrants who aren’t terrorists are fulfilling a vital role for IS by financing its extremist cause. “It is an alarming situation,” said Coninsx, “because we see obviously that these smugglings are meant to sometimes finance terrorism and that these smugglings are used sometimes to have and ensure infiltrations by members of the Islamic State.”

This article was published by Geopolitical Monitor.com

By JS Tissainayagam

At the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) in Geneva next week, the US is to sponsor a resolution on war crimes in Sri Lanka, in collaboration with the Colombo government. This is despite wide recognition that Sri Lankan leaders are implicated in these war crimes.

The resolution is said to ask for a domestic process of accountability with ‘international technical assistance,’ which essentially means Sri Lanka will investigate itself. On a visit to Sri Lanka with colleague Tom Malinowski, Assistant Secretary Nisha Biswal said, “We fundamentally support efforts to create a credible domestic process for accountability and reconciliation.”

Washington’s enthusiastic embrace of Colombo is a replay of its fervent support of Naypyidaw as soon as Burma (Myanmar) announced moves to restore democracy and human rights following the 2010 elections. Today the U.S. is criticised for its premature approval of Burma’s so-called transition to democracy.

Backing a domestic process of accountability in Sri Lanka is a reversal of the stand taken by the US government in March 2014. Then, in deference to international opinion and demands by Tamil victims of the mass atrocities perpetrated by both government troops and Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) rebels, the U.S. agreed on a UNHRC resolution calling for an international process of accountability.

So why has the US’s stance changed?

Washington’s stand on dealing with Colombo began undergoing a transformation following the presidential elections of January 8. In that election, Mahinda Rajapakse who is accused of war crimes and crimes against humanity by a UN panel of experts, suffered a shock defeat by Maithripala Sirisena.

On August 17, Rajapakse made a bid to return to power by contesting elections to parliament through the United Peoples’ Freedom Alliance (UPFA), but his party failed to secure a majority. The electorate voted instead for the United National Front for Good Governance (UNFGG), whose pro-U.S. leader Ranil Wickremesinghe is now prime minister. Following this, a ‘national government’ was formed comprising the UNFGG and a group of UPFA members of parliament.

But the U.S. and the international community are misguided in believing that the two elections and a national government have brought about enduring change that merits Washington to collaborate with Colombo on the forthcoming resolution at the UNHRC. This is because despite regime change there is little evidence that the new government has either the capacity or the political will to domestically investigate, try and punish perpetrators of international crimes.

This inadequacy is best seen in examining important institutions of state that will be vital in determining if the process of accountability effectively delivers justice to the victims: the military and the justice system.

Even as he campaigned for the presidency, Sirisena, who has admitted being acting minister of defence “when most of the LTTE leaders were killed,” was insistent that Rajapakse and the military leaders implicated in mass atrocities against Tamils would not be brought before an international tribunal for war crimes.

Installed in power, the Sirisena government intervened directly to protect the status of those in the military implicated in war crimes.

In 2013, a military Court of Inquiry (CoI) investigated the conduct of the military and exonerated its personnel of any war crimes. Despite human rights activists condemning an accused institution investigating itself, Sirisena appointed the man who headed the military’s COI, Lieutenant General Crishantha Silva, as commander of the Sri Lanka Army in February this year. In May Sirisena appointed Major General Jagath Dias as chief of staff of the Army. Dias is accused of war crimes and had to ignominiously leave Sri Lanka’s mission in Berlin as he faced charges in Europe.

Wickremesinghe has been no less emphatic in expressing similar reservations on an international investigation. The parties forming the national government in parliament which he heads are expected formally agree to a common position on “protecting the rights of war heroes who were responsible for liberating the country.” This is expected before the UNHRC meeting later this month.

A further display of a lack of political will of both Sirisena and Wickremesinghe is the failure of the government professing to uphold the rule of law to prevent systematic torture and rape of Tamils by the police and military. Violations during the Sirisena presidency are recorded by International Centre for Truth and Justice Project (ITJP) and Freedom from Torture.

Sri Lanka’s justice system, which is vital if effective remedial justice is to be delivered to the victims, is not neutral when prosecuting government officials accused of human rights violations against the Tamils. The Attorney General’s Department has repeatedly been criticised for this. The Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) continues to be on the statute books despite successive governments claiming terrorism in Sri Lanka was eradicated in 2009 with the defeat of the LTTE. Its draconian provisions continue to permit torture and allow the illegal detention of political prisoners thereby condoning impunity of the police and military.

Second, not only has Sri Lanka been reluctant to prosecute errant military and police personnel accused of abuses against Tamils, it has also failed in cases involving the military’s violations overseas. The standout example is 108 Sri Lankan peacekeepers in Haiti accused of rape in 2007. Despite Colombo giving the international community an undertaking that the perpetrators would be punished they remain free.

If the U.S.’s model of a domestic process of accountability is to have acceptable international legal standards and institutions to deliver meaningful justice to the victims, it would need a systematic reform of the justice system. That is hard to envisage in Sri Lanka’s judicial and legal culture today.

Whoever might be convinced by U.S. officials, Tamil victims of mass atrocities are not among them. Their acts of protest against a domestic process of accountability include a mass signature campaign. Unsurprisingly the police stopped this perfectly democratic act of defiance.

Among Tamil political formations, the Tamil National Alliance (TNA), the largest party in parliament was equivocal in its call for international accountability: its election manifesto is silent about it. Facing the wrath of the electorate it is now at sixes and sevens, with some leaders saying the international investigation is over, others that they will call for one if the report is “hard-hitting”, while another said they will accept the domestic mechanism with international experts and still others joined the mass signature campaign denouncing domestic accountability.

As in the case of Burma, in Sri Lanka too the U.S. is applauding superficial gains in democracy and human rights to cover up more substantive advantages it has in geopolitics and commerce. In Burma there was a release of political prisoners and some liberalisation of press laws, while in Sri Lanka there have been mild gestures to Tamil sentiments such as releasing of some land held by the military and the appointment of a civilian governor over a military one in the Tamil-majority Northern Province.

But accountability for war crimes and crimes against humanity goes deeper than gestures. It deals with fundamentals on how those enjoying state power are going to deliver justice to a group traditionally seen as the ‘other’. In the minds of the victims unless there is scrutiny by the international community of the process, it will be perverted. And the U.S. by its endorsement of a domestic accountability process over an international one has laid the cornerstone for the perversion of international justice.

1: 14 years have passed since 9/11. Why has American public opinion never raised serious questions about the main cause of the incident?

Whether or not al-Qaeda and Bin Laden were the real architects of 9/11 remains disputed. The unwillingness to carry out a full investigation of 9/11 is inexcusable, and contributes to the uncertainty about who was behind the attacks. In a 2008 World Public Opinion poll, about half the world believe the official version of al-Qaeda carrying out the 9/11 attacks, a quarter don’t know, and a quarter believe it was a conspiracy by some combination of the US, Israel and other Arabs.

People in the Middle East were especially likely to name a perpetrator other than al-Qaeda. Not surprisingly, Israel is seen as a likely perpetrator among Egyptians (43%), Jordanians (31%), and Palestinians (19%). The US government was named by 36% of Turks and 27% of Palestinians. Among Europeans only Germans (23%) and Italians (15%) accuse the US government, and almost no one accuses Israel.
Among Americans, according to a YouGov poll in 2013, 40% believe the official explanation, 38% “have some doubts”, 12% are unsure, and 10% “do not believe it at all.” In yet another poll,2 11% of Americans believe it was actually the US government.

By factoring in the don’t knows, we can say roughly speaking that half the people around the world believe the official story attributing 9/11 solely to al-Qaeda (apart from Egyptians and Jordanians), about a quarter believe it was some complex conspiracy using Arab patsies manipulated by the US and/or Israel, and a quarter don’t know.

If some secret faction within the US and Israel governments was the active instigator, that would indeed account for the stonewalling in the investigation, but it is hard to believe that in the era of Wikileaks and brave whistleblowers such as Edward Snowden and Preston Manning, that some concrete evidence has not been made public. Whistleblowers point to ignored FBI and CIA warnings, but this evidence, and memoirs by such as CIA head George Tenet and White House counterterrorism czar Richard Clarke, tend to undermine claims of wilful conspiracy by US government leaders. The only possibility is that a “deep state” faction of the US-Israeli elite carried it out, miraculously avoiding any leaks.

2: What is the most important document which points to Israel and the US?

Available evidence, and the many contradictions and inconsistencies surrounding the official 9/11 story, suggest that at least some US, Saudi, Pakistani and Israeli officials were aware that a major attack was in the offing in the US on 9 September 2001 using al-Qaeda operatives.

Officially the 19 Arab youth (15 of them Saudi), were operating under their al-Qaeda mentors (notably, Osama bin Laden, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed3 and Yusuf bin al-Shibh4). While ‘deep state’ conspiracies and false-flag attacks by the CIA and Mossad5 do take place, this event seems just too complicated to conceive of as a ‘deep state’ conspiracy, though that possibility remains until convincing answers to the many discrepancies in the official explanation are given.

Evidence censored from the Joint Intelligence Committee Inquiry of 9/11 (2002)—the 28 redacted pages— was leaked to the US press by ex-Senator Bob Graham, pointing to Saudi officials’ involvement in 9/11 and suggesting a scenario involving Pakistan’s ISI and rogue (?) Saudis. Some of the actors revealed in the 28 pages (so states Graham, who is among the significantly few officials who have actually seen the pages) include Pakistani and Saudi officials and nationals, including Pakistanis Lieutenant General Mahmud Ahmed and Saudi officials Omar al- Bayoumi, Osama Basnan, Princess Haifa (wife of Saudi US ambassador Prince Bandar), and Saudi businessman Abdulaziz al-Hijji. They all had repeated, direct contact with those directly involved in the hijackings.

Consider Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Director General Mahmud Ahmed, who was ‘retired’ on 8 October 2001 by Pakistani dictator Pervez Musharraf. The reason? The next day, The Times of India reported that, “US authorities [FBI] sought his removal after confirming the fact that $100,000 were wired to WTC hijacker Mohamed Atta from Pakistan [in fact, the UAE] by British-Pakistani Ahmed Omar Sheikh at the insistence of General Mahmud”. Mahmud Ahmed is now working for the Tablighi Jamaat dawa society, proselytizing Islam. The 9/11 Commission’s Final Report states that the source of the funds “remains unknown”.

Ahmed Omar Sheikh—who transferred the $100,000 to Atta several weeks before 9/11 and received approximately $8,000 (the unspent funds) from Atta a few days before 9/11—was arrested by Pakistani police in February 2002 for the Daniel Pearl kidnapping, sentenced to death, and has spent the subsequent 11 years incommunicado. It appears now that he was not Pearl’s murderer (Khalid Sheikh Mohammed confessed to this after his arrest), but Pakistan refuses to permit his extradition to the US in connection with Pearl or 9/11, presumably because he could implicate senior Pakistani officials.

Ex-Senator Graham, who chaired the Joint Inquiry in 2002, told IBTimes in 2013: “The Saudi government without question was supporting the hijackers who lived in San Diego. You can’t have 19 people living in the United States for, in some cases, almost two years, taking flight lessons and other preparations, without someone paying for it. But I think it goes much broader than that. The agencies from CIA and FBI have suppressed that information so American people don’t have the facts.”

Whether or not the legendary 28 redacted pages are made public, the pieces of the puzzle are falling into place. Pakistan’s ISI and rogue (?) Saudis were directly involved in planning and financing 9/11. The idea was/is a Saudi-led hegemony in the Muslim world, where Pakistan would preside in Central Asia. The Pentagon, CIA and FBI lied to the 9/11 Commission, not only to protect their links to their own duplicitous agents, but—more importantly—to prevent the whole Saudi/ Pakistani/ US alliance from collapsing in a real Islamic revolution, a la Iran. (This is what was beginning to happen with the rise to power of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, which the Saudis sabotaged with US support.)

3. Given the current developments in the middle east, can it still be said that the event happened for the benefit of the US?

On the surface, the western project to forcibly reform the Muslim world to meet the needs of imperialism—the ongoing ‘Great Game’—received a Godsend in 9/11. It was as if Bin Laden, the supposed perpetrator of the collapse of the World Trade Center, was in cahoots with the US neocon political establishment, and had provided them on demand with the pretext for a war on Islam.

US president Bush quickly moved to take advantage of the situation, invading Afghanstan and Iraq, creating chaos in the middle east, blind to the repercussions of invading countries. The deaths of US soldiers pales in comparison to suffering of those nations, but the huge costs of the invasions financially and the tens of thousands of US military casualties puts a huge burden on the US, leaving its imperialist plans unfulfilled and unacceptable by other nations, even the staunchest allies of the US.

4. Would you say the rise of extremist, terrorist groups including ISIL in the region is a result of the 9/11 attacks?

Destroying Afghanistan as a base for al-Qaeda and finally killing Bin Laden did not end the threat of terrorist acts, but transformed their context. Disabled as a centralized organization with the ability to function around the world, now the new generation of self-styled jihadists, calling themselves al-Qaeda and now ISIL, carry forward its long term plan for the region, ‘managing savagery’, without any direct relation with the remaining members of Bin Laden’s original organization. All the causes of the rise of terrorism from the 1970s on—extreme poverty and endemic unemployment, in the face of humiliation by US-Israeli hegemony in the region—are still valid, more so since the 2013 coup in Egypt. In light of this, we are caught in the “intervention trap” (invasions and bombings merely give further cause to rebels), and the cycle of violence will continue.

Source: http://kayhan.ir/fa/issue/527/12

Reports that the official unemployment rate has fallen to 5.1 percent may appear to vindicate the policies of easy money, corporate bailouts, and increased government spending. However, even the mainstream media has acknowledged that the official numbers understate the true unemployment rate. This is because the government’s unemployment figures do not include the 94 million Americans who have given up looking for work or who have settled for part-time employment. John Williams of Shadow Government Statistics estimates the real unemployment rate is between 23 and 24 percent.

Disappointingly, but not surprisingly, few in Washington, DC acknowledge that America’s economic future is endangered by excessive spending, borrowing, taxing, and inflating. Instead, Congress continues to waste taxpayer money on futile attempts to run the economy, run our lives, and run the world.

For example, Congress spent the majority of last week trying to void the Iranian nuclear agreement. This effort was spearheaded by those who think the US should waste trillions of dollars on another no-win Middle East war. Congressional war hawks ignore how America’s hyper-interventionist foreign policy feeds the growing rebellion against the dollar’s world reserve currency status. Of course, the main reason many are seeking an alternative to the dollar is their concern that, unless Congress stops creating — and the Federal Reserve stops monetizing — massive deficits, the US will experience a Greek-like economic crisis.

Despite the clear need to reduce federal spending, many Republicans are trying to cut a deal with the Democrats to increase spending. These alleged conservatives are willing to lift the “sequestration” limits on welfare spending if President Obama and congressional democrats support lifting the “sequestration” limits on warfare spending. Even sequestration’s miniscule, and largely phony, cuts are unbearable for the military-industrial complex and the rest of the special interests that control our government.

The only positive step toward addressing our economic crisis that the Senate may take this year is finally holding a roll call vote on the Audit the Fed legislation. Even if the audit legislation lacks sufficient support to overcome an expected presidential veto, just having a Senate vote will be a major step forward.

Passage of the Audit the Fed bill would finally allow the American people to know the full truth about the Fed’s operations, including its deals with foreign central banks and Wall Street firms. Revealing the full truth about the Fed will likely increase the number of Americans demanding that Congress end the Fed’s monetary monopoly. This suspicion is confirmed by the hysterical attacks on and outright lies about the audit legislation spread by the Fed and its apologists.

Every day, the American people see evidence that, despite the phony statistics and propaganda emanating from Washington, high unemployment and rising inflation plague the economy. Economic anxiety has led many Americans to support an avowed socialist’s presidential campaign. Perhaps more disturbingly, many other Americans are supporting the campaign of an authoritarian crony capitalist. If there is a major economic collapse, many more Americans — perhaps even a majority — will embrace authoritarianism. An economic crisis could also lead to mob violence and widespread civil unrest, which will be used to justify new police state measures and crackdowns on civil liberties.

Unless the people demand an end to the warfare state, the welfare state, and fiat money, our economy will continue to deteriorate until we are faced with a major crisis. This crisis can only be avoided by rejecting the warfare state, the welfare state, and fiat money. Those of us who know the truth must redouble our efforts to spread the ideas of liberty.

This article was published by the RonPaul Institute.

Egyptian security forces accidentally killed 12 Egyptian and Mexican members of a tour group in the Western Desert after mistaking them for terrorists, the interior ministry said on Monday.

Ten people were injured in the attack, the interior ministry said without elaborating on the details of the attack.

The Egyptian prosecution confirmed that seven of the 12 dead were Mexican nationals and that the other bodies were still at the site of the incident pending inspection, al-Ahram’s Arabic news website reported.

Tourism Minister Khaled Ramy stated that one of those injured was American, according to al-Ahram Arabic website.

The prosecution also said that the bodies’ features were burned, adding that two of the injured were Egyptian officers from the security forces that shot at the victims.

According to a source at the touristic company responsible for the tour group’s trip, four Egyptians were killed and two were injured. The source declined to be named.

Officials cite lack of permit

“A joint police and army force were chasing terrorist elements in the Western Desert area of al-Wahat and they engaged by mistake with four 4-wheel drives belonging to Mexican tourists who were present in a restricted area,” a statement from Egypt’s interior ministry read.

“An inspection team was formed to identify what happened and why the tourist convoy was present in the aforementioned restricted area,” the interior ministry statement added.

The group of tourists and their local guides were staying at a hotel in the touristic area of Bahariya Oasis, around 350km southwest of Cairo. The area is a popular site for camping, safari trips, and hiking.

The resort is located in the vast Western Desert, which occupies much of the western part of Egypt.

The desert, which runs along Egypt’s western borders, has been exploited by Islamist militants due to its proximity to volatile and lawless Libya.

At least 21 Egyptian soldiers were killed in July 2014 when gunmen attacked a military checkpoint in the New Valley Governorate, in the Western Desert.

Rasha Azazi, a spokesperson for the Egyptian Ministry of Tourism, told AP that the tour company involved “did not have permits and did not inform authorities.”

She also said that visits to the Farafra area in the White Desert, near to Bahariya Oasis, need to be cleared by officials first.

“They were not supposed to be there,” she said, but could not provide further information on the circumstances of the shooting.

However, the source working at the touristic company which organised the trip, Windows of Egypt, told Ahram Online that the group did have a permit.

“We already had a permit from the tourism police [for the tour] and the group had a police officer accompanying it,” said the source, adding that entering the desert zone does not require an additional military permit.

“All the tourists were Mexicans and they were accompanied by six Egyptians: four drivers and a guide, as well one police officer from the tourism police,” the company source told Ahram Online.

The company source said four Egyptians died and two survived. “One of the drivers and the police officer survived,” he said.

According to a leaked programme, which the source said was accurate, the group travelled from Cairo to Bahariya Oasis, arriving at 8am; once at the oasis they were scheduled to stay at El-Bawity Hotel for a total of two nights. The incident occurred on the afternoon of their first day in the area.

Mexican reaction

Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto condemned the killings and called upon the Egyptian government to conduct thorough investigations into the incident.

In a phone call with his Mexican counterpart Claudia Ruis Massieu on Monday, Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry expressed his condolences for the death of the Mexican tourists.

Shoukry explained to Massieu the circumstances behind the shooting, adding that that the Mexican tourists were present in a restricted area, according to an official statement by the spokesperson for Egypt’s foreign ministry, Ahmed Abo Zeid.

Shoukry told his Mexican counterpart that the Egyptian interior ministry will conduct all necessary investigations to find out the full details of the accident, adding that the Egyptian government will provide all support and medical care for the injured.

Jorge Alvarez Fuentes, Mexico’s ambassador to Egypt, and consular representatives were at the Dar el-Fouad Hospital in suburban Cairo where the injured were transferred, and Alvarez had interviewed five survivors, according to a statement by the Mexican foreign ministry.

Ruiz Massieu is scheduled to give a press conference about the incident on Monday at 1245 GMT, according to AFP.

The minister dispatched to Egypt the director of her ministry’s office for the protection of Mexicans abroad, as well as personnel from other embassies in the region.

By Zeinab El-Gundy, Hana Afifi, Hatem Maher

Original article

Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina of Bangladesh has been announced as one of the winners of the United Nations Champions of the Earth award in recognition of her country’s initiatives to address climate change.

“Serving as Prime Minister of Bangladesh – one of the world’s least-developed countries – Sheikh Hasina has proven that investing in climate change is conducive to achieving social and economic development,” said the announcement issued by the UN Environment Programme (UNEP), which confers the awards.

UNEP noted that Bangladesh is one of the world’s most populated countries, with over 159 million people. It is also one of the most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. Cyclones, floods and droughts have long been part of the country’s history, but they have intensified in recent years.

“Through a number of forward-looking policy initiatives and investments, Bangladesh has placed confronting the challenge of climate change at the core of its development,” said UNEP Executive Director Achim Steiner.

“These initiatives, from climate change adaptation measures to ecosystem preservation legislation, mean that current and future generations of Bangladeshis are better prepared to address climate change risks and reverse the impacts of environmental degradation.”

He added that Sheikh Hasina has demonstrated “leadership and vision” in both making climate change an issue of national priority and advocating for an ambitious global response.

“As an early adopter and advocate of climate change adaptation policy, she continues to be an example to follow as world leaders seek to take action on climate change as part of the Sustainable Development Goals and the Paris climate conference in December.”

The award cites, among other initiatives, the progressive Bangladesh Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan of 2009, which made the South Asian nation the first developing country to frame such a coordinated action plan. Bangladesh is also the first country to set up its own Climate Change Trust Fund, supported by nearly $300 million of domestic resources from 2009-2012.

Also noted is the fact that the Government currently earmarks 6 to 7 per cent of its annual budget – some $1 billion – on climate change adaptation, with only 25 per cent of this coming from international donors. In addition, under her leadership, the Bangladesh Constitution was amended in 2011 to include a constitutional directive to the State to protect the environment and natural resources for current and future generations.

“As one of the most disaster-prone countries in the world, Bangladesh understands the importance of addressing the impact of climate change. The country is already experiencing its detrimental effects, and it is often the poorest and marginalised who feel it most,” said Robert Watkins, UN Resident Coordinator in Bangladesh.

He noted that by 2050 it is estimated that one in every seven people in Bangladesh is likely to be displaced by climate change, and they are also likely to move to urban centres already burdened with meeting the needs of a dense population.

“I congratulate the Government of Bangladesh for being proactive in tackling climate change as a priority of the country. It is also a clarion call for the global community to take action today, and to realise that climate change is not a problem of the future, it is already happening in our lifetime.”

The awards will be handed out at a special ceremony on 27 September in New York at the close of the Sustainable Development Summit. In addition to Sheikh Hasina, the other winners announced so far are the National Geographic Society (Science and Innovation); Brazilian cosmetics firm Natura (Entrepreneurial Vision); and South Africa’s Black Mamba Anti-Poaching Unit (Inspiration and Action).

In an era of great hope for social, economical and educational transformation from 1947 to 2015, India committed itself to create an integrated school system free from the issues of equity, equality and social justice in education, but this commitment has not bring the expected change even after 67 years of independence. There still exist sharp disparities across social and economic groups; there is a negative relationship between girls’ enrollment and retention in schools and the household income and social status of families.

It has been estimated that at the current rate of progress, India will attain universal literacy only until 2060, the 2011 census reveals an effective literacy rate for men at 82.14%, whereas for women it is 65.46%, and the overall literacy rate stands at 74.04 %. Though there has been a substantial increase in the number of literate women, and this gap is narrowing, it still persists and is more visible in the rural areas.

In India there are almost forty percent of girls/women who are not literate and most of them have never been to school (the majority of them belong to socially backward communities). In fact there are numerous hurdles prohibiting girls from actually getting an education in rural areas, figures show that a very small percentage of girls, as well as women are attending schools and this enrollment is hardly sustained as the poorest and the most disadvantaged among them drop out. Therefore the major concern for both the government and the civil society must be to realize the goal of universal educational access for girls and women.

Needless to mention, to bring an improvement in girl’s education India passed the 93rd Constitution Amendment Act in 2005 which makes education for all children aged 6-14 a fundamental right (Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan) and for promoting enrollment of girls in the age group of 14-18 at secondary stage the Centrally Sponsored Scheme called National Scheme of Incentives to Girls for Secondary Education launched in May, 2008. While, all the government programs are committed to bridge the gender-gap, the focus is often lost while implementing them. These programs have not been successful in bringing any big change; this is evident from the survey reports that came after the total literacy campaign. It is indeed the literacy rate of the country that counts as basic indicator of economic growth and the level of development achieved by a society.

Therefore the prerequisite, to actualize education for girls and their participation in national development should be making a gender specific curriculum that can help in increasing their levels of literacy. Some basic hidden facts responsible for the low levels of access to education, healthcare, maternal mortality, and economic, social, and political opportunities for girls are the prejudices that families have about girls; considering them as slow learners, as not rational and to be confined to domestic work. Therefore, what is required today is to overlook the impact of macro-level factors and discuss education for girls as a social aspect at the micro-level, using the phenomenological and ethno-methodological prism.

Policies and Programs for Education of Girls in India

The persistent gender gap in education reflects poorly on Indian policies. The educational policies are somewhat distant from serious or meaningful gender concerns. The First Five Year Plan (1951-56) in India gave attention to women as a subject of welfare. The National Committee on Women’s Education (1956) was set up to scrutinize the special problems of women’s education, on the one hand emphasized the need to bridge the gap between the education of men and women and on the other reiterated the traditional gender roles in society. The report of the committee on the status of women, in 1974 also provided a broader perspective which led to a shift from a welfare approach to making women active partners in the development process.

Though the Fifth Five Year Plan (1974-79) talked of women’s education, it did not stress the need for any planned programs to ensure women’s participation in science or technology.

The Sixth Plan (1980-85), for the first time included a chapter on “Women and Development,” but there was neglect on the issue of equity in access to higher education.

The Seventh and Eighth Five Year Plan (1985-90) documents recognized that national developmental and demographic goals cannot be achieved unless women’s education is taken up on a priority basis. The National Policy on Education (1986, revised in 1992) is the most lucid document on Women’s education. The chapter titled “Education for Women’s Equality” states: “Education will be used as an agent of basic change in the status of women. It will foster the development of new values through redesigned curricula, textbooks, the training and orientation of teachers, decision-makers and administrators, and the active involvement of educational institutions. The other national initiative to promote basic education, with a focus on greater participation of girls and women is Operation Blackboard (1987) that focused on construction of school buildings and appointment of a second teacher in single teacher schools.” Unfortunately these key policy recommendations have remained unimplemented or half implemented and despite well-intentioned policies and plans, girls from disadvantaged groups and communities are not able to access quality education that can enable them to break out of existing stereotypes.

Major Issues with Education of Girls

It would not be wrong to mention that India lacks a larger perspective with respect to the education of girls; the major hindrance that affects the education of girls is social, economic and cultural deprivation. Schools can act as agents of progressive social transformation.

Not surprisingly, there is a large presence of girls from disadvantaged groups and communities in government schools of India, but many such schools are dysfunctional with unstable management conditions, inappropriate or lack of leadership, lack of vision, an unhealthy school climate and culture, and low staff and learner morale. Besides, the education policies have faced multiple accidents in the case of its implementation due to a lack of political will, human resources, human expertise, funding and spending.

Although the government of India has a well-established system for monitoring policies and programs by submitting regular reports to State Assemblies and the Parliament, successful monitoring is not just about generating information. It is also about creating an institutional mechanism through which monitoring can inform development and implementation of policy. The problem is that there are crisis with the policy framework and background which has meant a lack of being materialized to basic realities and success has not materialized in larger perspectives. Further, overall public opinion has not been mobilized nor has a gender specific curriculum been framed, and public discourses on the policies with regard to the education of girls has been the victim of political discourses.

Additionally, women’s confidence in state-led reforms has been diminished further with centralized educational planning in India that does not allow for the comparing of diverse perspectives. The reach out programs towards girls is not autonomous and reaching out to masses by the government is missing, government reports show only quantitative improvements ignoring the qualitative changes. The invisibility of women still persists and they feel that the educational structure or apparatus does not satisfy them.

In India the commitments to gender mainstreaming is missing, there is more politicization in the mainstream of women education. The fact remains that even after 67 years of independence there is very little representation of women on the ground and they are still not emancipated — to make women emancipated there is a dire need for a change in the perspective.

A perfect example to prove this point is the state of Meghalaya in the North East of India. Meghalaya, which separated from Assam on the grounds of being a Matriarchal society, only has one female Member of Parliament out of the 128 MPs in the state Assembly. When such is the situation of a Matriarchal society then forget about the ground realities of a Patriarchal society that exists in the major states of India.

Conclusion

Since independence the Indian Government has been trying to improve the situation of girls. But what the government fails to realize is that the policies with respect to the education of girls cannot be seen in isolation. Instead, this issue and policies must be seen in a larger perspective with larger inclusivity and in totality.

In India the main factor responsible for lack of education for girls is social, economic and cultural deprivation and not a lack of proper infrastructure facilities in schools. The problem of generality is proving to be the biggest curse in India, which follows a single model of education, whereas the country has diverse socio-economic issues. The 29 states in India have 29 cultures, with every state being a distinct world in itself. What India need is multiple policies with multiple implementations, especially with respect to policies for the education of girls. Unfortunately there are few signals of a serious effort to implement this vision or to have a holistic planning process. The Indian government has to rethink the overall gender justice perspectives and policies that are currently in place.

French President François Hollande will pay a working and friendly visit to Tangier (north of Morocco) on September 19 at the invitation of King Mohammed VI. This visit will be a convenient venue to highlight the longstanding friendship between Morocco and France , underpinned by strong political, economic, defense and people-to-people cooperation.

President Hollande’s visit is a landmark event and is expected to provide a fresh impetus to the existing excellent bilateral relations between the two countries. A dominant theme of this visit will be the spelling out by the two leaders of a joint vision of their relationship for the next decade. It will provide a roadmap for enhancing the partnership between the two countries to qualitatively new levels. It will have a strong focus on redefining the economic partnership between Morocco and France.

The two countries enjoy today what we call a special and strategic partnership. France is known as a close friend and key ally of Morocco. This has been strengthened considerably over decades in important and diverse areas.

This year witnessed the powerful bilateral relations between France and Morocco and confirmed the continuity of their agreement on major world issues. The quality of the dialogue maintained at the highest level and the shared desire to put their exemplary partnership on a more ambitious trajectory will be the focus of the upcoming state visit of the French President François Hollande to Tangier. In fact the two countries have witnessed not only in statements but through commitments, agreements and common road map for the future, the strength of their multifaceted ties, their reciprocal commitments to move forward.

President Hollande has always reaffirmed France’s commitment to the friendship with Morocco and has always emphasized its uniqueness through the many links between the two countries.

On many occasions the head of the French government welcomed the process of democratic reform, economic and social progress in the Kingdom at the initiative of HM King Mohammed VI and solemnly declared that France stands for the excellent ties with Morocco and congratulates it for choosing the path economic modernization and the consolidation of rule of law.

King has also always commended the quality of the strategic partnership between Morocco and France that has benefited not only the two nations but the whole region.

As for the political aspect, this presidential visit is expected to continue in a spirit of cooperation and convergence of views on key world issues.

Undoubtedly, this upcoming President Hollande working visit will reinforce the strategic dialogue and will benefit the economy of both countries. Many observers are looking forward to the outcome of this visit especially on international issues where both countries have shown a full coordination and convergence of views. So concretely speaking what are the actions and initiatives that both countries will take in an effort to resolve key and pending international conflicts either in subsahran Africa or the Middle East.

A panel in Doha of religious scholars, officials of Qatar’s government-sponsored human rights committee, and international labour activists has called on Qatar to radically alter its controversial labour policies. The call serves to support Qatari government promises of labour reform in response to World Cup-related international criticism and increases moral pressures on Gulf states to significantly improve the plight of their millions of migrant workers.

By justifying the call on theological grounds and drawing on a parable of Omar Ibn al-Khattab, one of the 7th century’s first four successors of the Prophet Mohammed, widely viewed by even the most conservative or militant Muslims as the righteous caliphs, Sheikh Ali Al Qaradaghi made it more difficult for Qatar and other Gulf states to justify evading radical labour reforms.

That is true despite the fact that Mr. Qaradaghi serves as secretary general of the International Union of Muslim Scholars (IUMS), a group headed by Sheikh Yusuf Qaradawi, one of the most popular religious leaders in the Muslim world. The IUMS is widely viewed as close to the Muslim Brotherhood and has been proscribed as a terrorist organization by the United Arab Emirates which takes a tough stance against any expression of political Islam.

Egypt, which like the UAE has banned the Brotherhood as a terrorist organization and has since brutally cracked down on the group by killing many of its members and imprisoning many more, sentenced Mr. Qaradawi in absentia and other Brotherhood leaders to death in June.

In a separate case, Egyptian prosecutors earlier this month referred Mr. Qaradawi, an Egyptian-born Qatari national with close ties to the Brotherhood who resides in Doha, to a military court on charges of murder. Egypt recently rejected an offer by Qatar, which supports the Brotherhood, to mediate with the Islamist group.

The panellists’ call came days after Qatar’s cabinet declared its support for draft legislation that, according to a government statement, would regulate the entry, exit and residency of foreigners.

Qatar has been under severe pressure since it won almost five years ago the right to host the 2022 World Cup to reform, if not abolish, its controversial kafala or sponsorship system that puts workers at the mercy of their employers.

Migrant works’ labour and housing conditions in the Gulf have long been condemned by governments, international NGOs and activists, some of whom have described the conditions as modern-day slavery. Opponents within world soccer body FIFA to Qatar’s hosting of the World Cup have used the labour issue to argue in favour of withdrawing the tournament from the Gulf state.

Qatar Foundation together with the 2022 Supreme Committee for Delivery & Legacy of the World Cup has issued standards for migrant workers’ labour and housing conditions that go a far way in meeting demands by international human rights and labour activists. The foundation has been funding efforts to create an Islamic legal base for labour reform.

Human rights groups like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have worked with Qatar in conceptualizing reforms but have been frustrated by the Gulf state’s failure to move quickly on implementation. The Qatari pledges for reform have forced virtually all Gulf states to tinker with their labour regimes.

The UAE like Qatar has been in the firing line of activists over labour conditions at constructions sites for an Abu Dhabi campus of New York University and a Guggenheim and other world famous museums on the emirate’s Saadiyat Island as well as in advance of Dubai’s hosting of the 2020 World Cup. The UAE, in contrast to Qatar, has refused to engage with its critics, either jailing them or barring them entry to the country and has rejected all criticism.

Speaking at the Research Centre for Islamic Legislation and Ethics (CILE) of Hamad Bin Khalifa University’s Qatar Faculty of Islamic Studies, Mr. Qaradaghi said: “We see (migrants) working for us … But there is no appreciation. There is no love dedicated to those people. The earth was made for all creatures, all human beings, not one category of people… Arab and Muslim countries ought to take care of those who provide long periods of service and participate in the building of these countries. We need to take care of these people.”

Mr. Qaradaghi called further for paying migrant workers, who account for a majority of the Qatari population, a living wage that was related to the cost of living in the Gulf. He said that a monthly wage of “QR 1,000 (USD 275), for example, in this country cannot be good enough,” according to Doha News.

Mr. Qaradaghi recounted an encounter between Omar Ibn al-Khattab and an elderly Jew who was begging. In response to the caliph’s question why he was begging, the man said that despite working for half a century he was unable to make ends meet. The caliph instructed his aides to give the man money on the grounds that he had not been treated fairly. Mr. Qaradaghi said the caliph’s gesture should serve as an inspiration for Gulf rulers and employers.

Mr. Qaradaghi’s Islamic theme was picked up by Latife Reda, a consultant of the International Labour Organization (ILO), who argued that the rights of workers, including the right to decent living and working conditions, were basic to Islamic tradition.

Ms. Reda highlighted imbalances in Qatar’s agreements with labour supplying states, many of which are in Asia, that stipulate different wage levels for different nationalities. She also focused on the vulnerability of domestic workers who in Qatar and other Gulf states are not covered by local labour laws.

Migrant-Rights.org, an online advocacy group, cautiously praised Kuwait, which recently passed some of the Gulf’s first legislation governing the recruitment and employment of domestic labour but took the Gulf state to task for not adopting effective enforcement mechanisms.

Mr. Qaradaghi and Ms. Reda’s theme was echoed by Jabir Al Howaiel of Qatar’s government-appointed National Human Rights Committee. “Respect and dignity of humans should be part of our culture so every human can live with dignity and liberate himself from fear in an environment that is conducive to security and development. Workers ought not to lose their freedom for a piece of bread. They need to live with dignity,” Mr. Al Howaiel.

The calls by Messrs Qaradaghi and Al Howaiel as well as Ms. Reda serve the government to counter resistance to labour reform from Qatar’s citizenry who account for a mere 12 percent of the country’s population.

Many Qataris fear that granting any rights to foreigners risks opening a Pandora’s Box that ultimately could lead to them losing controls of their society and culture. Islamic justification for reform makes opposition not only in Qatar but also in other Gulf states morally more difficult to defend.

Once, Tamils were more Sri Lankan (or rather Ceylonese) than the Sinhalese. When the Kandyan National Assembly and Bandaranaike were demanding a federal setup in Sri Lanka, resistance came from Tamil leaders. Although, G. G. Ponnampalam’s 50-50 demand entailed an unfair equation it was still a Colombo-centric formula. Even today, Tamil political leadership is extremely Colombo oriented and spends more time in Colombo than in their electorates in the North and East. Lack of power and opportunities in the center immensely contributed to the Tamil demand for separation. Accommodating minorities including the Tamils at the center and at the national level certainly could be one of the ways to promote national integration.

Therefore, Tamil National Alliance (TNA) leader R. Sambandan’s appointment as the Leader of the Opposition (LOTO) has the potential to strengthen goodwill among communities; that is if handled carefully by parties involved. That perhaps was one reason why President Sirisena conceded the position to Sambandan.

This does not mean that Sambandan deserved to be the LOTO, even if his party does not qualify to be the main opposition party. In other words, the LOTO position does not have to be a charity or a gift to the TNA. Opponents of Sambandan as the LOTO, think or argue that the position was gifted to Sambandan for political reasons. Their argument is unfounded and in a way crooked. The criticism, unsurprisingly, comes from Mahinda Rajapaksa loyalists and sympathizers. The racist elements in their arguments are too obvious and even the ones who argued that their objection was not motivated by ethnicity or ethnic factors could not hide it too much. These are the people who have extensively used racist slogan to win the general election, without much success.

Some of them argued that the TNA polled only six percent of the total votes. Therefore, it cannot be the main opposition party as there were other parties, for example the United People’s Freedom Alliance (UPFA) and the Janatha Vimukthi Prramuna (JVP) that polled more votes. They argued that this violates the sovereignty of the Sinhala people. Rationalists have already pointed out that in parliament, votes do not count. It is the seats that count in there. The TNA presently has more seats in the opposition.

Another commentator pointed out that Sambandan should thank Rajapaksa for the appointment, because President Sirisena “appointed” Sambandan as the LOTO in order to checkmate Rajapaksa. Rajapaksa was not interested in the LOTO position. He was clear about that from the beginning. Rajapaksa’s interests are served well as an ordinary member of parliament. Now, he does not have to challenge Sirisena or the government, which could instigate a backlash against his family members and friends who stand accused of abuse and corruption. The parliamentary seat allows him to be in the midst of and contact with powerful people. In fact, Rajapaksa seems to be increasingly using soft-power to protect his interest. Therefore, Sirisena does not have to worry about Rajapaksa for at least about five years. This commentator’s criticism also had the embedded notion that Sambandan is an illegitimate LOTO.

However, the notion that the UPFA should be the main opposition party and one of its members (Kumara Welgama?) should be appointed as the LOTO, deserves attention. The UPFA probably created a world history by sitting in the government and the opposition at the same time from January to August 2015.The TNA did not challenge the paradox probably due to the anticipated announcement of the election. The irony probably was also evident to the UPFA leadership, which could have also led to the decision not to challenge Sambanda’s claim this time.

It is the SLFP that has signed an agreement with the UNF and has become part of the government. Therefore, the SLFP cannot be part of the opposition. This is obvious to everyone except die-hard supporters of Rajapaksa. The argument that UPFA should be the main opposition becomes legitimate if one could separate the UPFA from the SLFP. The UPFA (minus SLFP) is not part of the government.

Therefore, they have all the reasons to stake a claim for the LOTO seat. The pertinent question here is whether the UPFA (minus SLFP) has more than 16 seats in parliament. It is reported that 85 percent of the UPFA parliamentarians are from the SLFP. This puts the UPFA (minus SLFP) seats roughly at 14; two seats shorter than the TNA members in parliament. This is exactly why the UPFA (minus SLFP) should prove their numbers to the speaker if they are keen on the position of the LOTO.

On the other hand, if the UPFA (minus SLFP) could prove to the speaker that they have more than 16 seats and officially inform the speaker that they will operate as an independent group in parliament, then their nominee should be recognized as the LOTO. This logic should also be applied to the illusive 56 member list so many people are suggesting.

As far as this author knows, the UPFA (minus SLFP) has not officially informed the speaker that it will operate as an independent group. This also means that UPFA should sever its relations with the SLFP because it cannot continue to keep the alliance with the SLFP and operate as an independent group. An interesting aspect of the UPFA faction that opposes Sambanda as the LOTO is that it sent the letter claiming the position to Sirisena; not the speaker. So, they still recognize Sirisena as their leader. If the UPFA wants the position it should renounce the SLFP and Sirisena’s leadership.

Would the UPFA do this? That is doubtful. The small parties of the UPFA for example Mahajana Eksath Peramuna and Jathika Nidahas Peramuna know that they can hardly win a single seat without the SLFP. Therefore, they would probably stick with the SLFP while criticizing the appointment of Sambandan as the LOTO. Through this program they are trying to cater to the nationalist faction of the Sinhala voters. In other words, the UPFA’s opposition to Sambandan is nothing but ethnic politics.

Meanwhile, from the TNA’s perspective it is important to recognize the fact that the appointment might be temporary. Right now the agreement between the UNF and the SLFP is effective for two years. If the coalition ends in two years, the SLFP will return to the opposition. Then Sambandan has to vacate his position. The agreement also states that it could be extended beyond two years. However, it probably will not last for five years because prior to the next general election, the SLFP as one entity or its members will start quitting the government. This would also threaten Sambandan’s position.

Therefore, Sambandan needs to operate with the understanding that he, as the LOTO, could be toppled any time. Also, without merely occupying the seat, he should work with an agenda and strategy to maximize the value of the position for the country and the community within a limited period of time. This would be his primary challenge. The question whether he could fulfil his responsibilities effectively could gain significance due to his age and the limited support he enjoys within the opposition ranks.

By Sanjay Pulipaka and Payal Ghosh*

This year, foreign policy issues have not yet been at the centre-stage of the US presidential election campaigns. While the Iran nuclear deal did grab headlines, domestic political matters such as race relations, responses to economic inequity, the US Supreme Court judgments on same-sex marriage and health care reform seem to be engaging the voters.

More than a dozen candidates have announced their plan to be the Grand Old Party’s (GOP)/Republican Party’s candidate in the US Presidential elections. In spite of the numbers, there seems to be very little diversity in their foreign policy positions. Many of them have been calling for an aggressive foreign policy posture, which is routine during an election campaign. It is assumed that for an effective political communication, nuance needs to be discarded and muscular foreign policy posture tends to attract the voters. It should be noted that the GOP candidates are calling for interventionist policies, even when the memory of US engagement in Iraq and Afghanistan is still fresh in the minds of the many. There could be two reasons for this: first, the GOP candidates think that there is a sizeable constituency which is calling for a proactive foreign policy; and second, at least some components of the hawkish rhetoric are in consonance with the candidates’ world views.

For many GOP candidates, US-centered unipolarity defines the structure of the international politics and in spite of less than successful interventions in the recent past, the US continues to possess capabilities to shape the political events happening across the world. Jeb Bush succinctly summed up this understanding when he said, “the United States has an undiminished ability to shape events and build alliances of free people….We can project power and enforce peaceful stability in far-off areas of the globe.” To enhance the US capacity to project power, Chris Christie has been calling for increased military spending.

The GOP candidates are of the opinion that President Obama is undermining the alliance/friendship networks built over the decades. As Ben Carson opined, Ukraine gave up its nuclear weapons with an understanding that the US would back them and therefore, it becomes imperative for the US to help Ukraine with all that is necessary to maintain its sovereignty. The Obama administration, according to Ben Carson, has fallen short on its commitments to its friends. Similarly, Carly Fiorina referring to Arab allies, Jordan, Egypt, and Turkey stated: “there are a whole set of things we’ve been asked to do by our allies who know this is their fight, and we’re not doing any of them.”

According to the GOP candidates, the US response to the Ukraine crisis and the recent Iran nuclear deal demonstrate that the Obama administration is not standing up for American allies. The GOP candidates feel that the collapse of trust between the US and its allies will undermine US capacity to project power in various parts of the world. However, there are challenges with an unqualified support to the allies and arming various groups to fight the adversaries. There is a possibility of getting entrapped in conflicts that are in the interests of allies but not in the interests of the US. There is no certainty that the weapons distributed to friends/allies will not fall into wrong hands. For instance, Rick Perry also expressed his dismay at the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) using the American tanks. Similarly, Rand Paul noted, “ISIS exists and grew stronger because of the hawks in our party, who gave arms indiscriminately, and most of those arms were snatched up by ISIS.”

Reports of China’s cyber espionage activities have agitated many GOP candidates. Terming cyber attacks as akin to a military attack on US military installations, Mike Huckabee called for immediate retaliatory cyber strikes on cell phones and bank accounts of Chinese officials. Referring to Chinese activities in the South China Sea, Donald Trump indulged in his usual sensationalist rhetoric by stating, “you have a problem with the ISIS, you have a bigger problem with China.” For Marco Rubio, promotion of human rights in China is an equally important task and therefore, it becomes imperative to demand that ‘China allow true freedom for its 1.3 billion people.’

Incidentally, Marco Rubio terms India, the world’s largest democracy, as a key partner of the US in the coming decades. In an op-ed written last year, Rubio identified three areas to strengthen India-US relations viz., deepening security cooperation; encouraging greater Indian involvement in Afghanistan, the Middle East and East Asia; and upgrading the economic relations through Bilateral Investment Treaty. As the campaigns gain momentum, it is distinctly possible that the other GOP candidates will occasionally articulate similar sentiments, though India has rarely been an election issue.

Among the Democratic Party’s candidates, Hillary Clinton, because of her stint as a Secretary of State, comes with robust foreign policy credentials. On the other hand, the GOP candidates have some catching up to do. Overall, it appears that the GOP candidates are approaching various foreign policy issues as though they can be dealt with in water-tight compartments. As a consequence, their foreign policy statements tend to give the impression that there is a need for simultaneous aggressive actions to cripple the ISIS, contain Russia, respond to the rise of China, promote human rights and completely destroy Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. However, many of these issues are inter-related, and a grand strategy to address these questions simultaneously needs to be articulated. Instead of issue-oriented responses, articulation of a ‘grand-strategy’ might find greater resonance with American voters.

*Sanjay Pulipaka is a Consultant and Payal Ghosh is an Intern at ICRIER, Delhi.

Courtesy: ORF US Election Monitor

By Alireza Noori*

Although there is nothing new about Russia’s military assistance to Syria, raising the level of this assistance under present circumstances has elicited a host of reactions and sensitivities, and some people have even described it as a measure, which can turn Moscow from “part of the solution” to Syria’s problem to “part of the problem.”

In the meantime, the Kremlin has confirmed its decision to transfer new military equipment and trainers to Syria though it is “very unlikely” that Moscow would conduct real military operations on the ground in the Arab country. Basically, bolstering Moscow’s military interaction with Damascus takes place in line with the Kremlin’s unwavering policy of recent years to support the Syrian government, and is also a result of the necessities that stem from Syria’s special importance for Russia. This issue has caused Moscow to take the “risk” of bolstering Damascus’ military stamina while being aware of regional and international sensitivities that such a measure may cause.

The first aspect of this importance is to preserve the sole “geopolitical positioning point” of Russia in the Middle East and along the shores of the Mediterranean. Apart from Syria, Russia has no secure geopolitical foothold in any other regional country, and in view of changing conditions in the region, Moscow is trying to remind the world of the importance of this issue by boosting military assistance to Damascus. By preserving this position, Russia is trying to prevent geopolitical balance in the region to tilt in favor of the West. Therefore, Syria plays a very important role as the country hosting the sole “geopolitical positioning point” of Russia in the region and as a major balancing weight in geopolitical equations between Moscow and the West, and this is why the Kremlin is ready to incur “high-risk costs” in order to preserve this point.

On the other hand, Russia pursues direct resistance against the West in Syria as part of its strategy for opposing the West’s aggressive expansionist approach in international arena. By doing this, Moscow is showing that it is opposed to the Western idea of “dominating everything even by force,” and does not accept the West’s destabilizing expansionism.

From the viewpoint of leaders in the Kremlin, if Russia “backed down” in such arena as Syria, the West would not suffice to that, but would adopt an even “more aggressive” approach and Moscow would be forced to give concessions in other arenas as well. This is why Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has noted that the reason for increasing military assistance to Syria is to prevent repetition of the “Libya scenario,” which in fact is an effort to block further advance of the West’s hegemonic ambitions.

Due to this reason, Moscow does not believe that its “innovative resistance” in Syria is totally a “cost,” and even by increasing military assistance to the Arab country it is trying to not only maintain the value of the “Syria trump card” in the face of the West’s various games in Syria, across the region, and with regard to other issues, but also increase the value of this card. Under these circumstances, the West and its regional allies cannot ignore Russia’s “role” when designing new plots in these spheres and will have to incur a “cost” and give more “concessions” in order to defuse attempts made by this actor or enter into a deal with it.

It goes without saying that the most important reason that has prompted Damascus to turn to Moscow is “lack of choice” and “bottlenecks” that this country is facing for dealing with domestic and foreign threats. Syria has done its best to prove itself as a stable host for the sole “geopolitical positioning point” of Russia in the Middle East and along the shores of the Mediterranean in order to avail itself of Russia’s political and military support. It seems that this deal has been so far profitable for both sides. Under present circumstances, Damascus by emphasizing its willingness to host this point, on the one side, and Moscow by continuing its military assistance to Damascus, on the other side, are assuring themselves as well as regional and international actors that they are still committed to this “deal” and consider it as mutually beneficial.

In the meantime, ISIS terrorist group has been playing a role as a secondary factor, which has prompted Moscow to boost its military assistance to Damascus in order to tackle this group in a more effective manner. Moscow has frequently declared its concern about further strengthening of ISIS and possible spread of its asymmetrical measures into the Russian soil while, at the same time, emphasizing inefficiency of the Western anti-ISIS coalition and introducing the Syrian army as the most effective force to fight this group. Therefore, although the main reason for military interactions between Russia and Syria should be sought among geopolitical goals pursued by Moscow, weakening ISIS and reducing the risk of the spread of its threat to Russian territory can be also considered as secondary goals of these interactions.

Under these conditions, although some people believe that the measure taken by Moscow is a “mistake,” and US President Barack Obama has also opined that it is “doomed to failure,” it seems that Kremlin believes through its own calculations that bolstering military cooperation with Syria, including by sending more arms to the Arab country – and not through military operations on the ground – would entail more “advantages” than “disadvantages” under “present conditions.”

However, given the ever-changing conditions in Syria and across the region, Moscow will not give up caution when expanding military cooperation with Syria and also when assessing objective outcomes of this cooperation. Current trends attest to domination of a pragmatic approach in Russia’s policy in the Middle East and in Syria, which means that this country may change its tactics as a function of change in other variables.

Within framework of its “conservative pragmatism,” and despite theoretical and practical differences with the West and its regional allies on Syria, Moscow has always tried to avoid further escalation of the existing situation and has kept the door open to cooperation through topical differentiation among various issues.

The Kremlin is well aware of the risks that uncalculated development of military cooperation with Syria, especially when it comes to field operations, will have for its troops, which will be viewed with high sensitivity not only by the Syrian opposition, but also by the West and regional countries. Moscow knows that due to complicated relations that it has with regional countries and the West, any uncalculated measure can cause Moscow suffer unnecessary costs not only in Syria, but also in other places.

Therefore, the scope of military interactions between Moscow and Damascus should not be unduly overstated and change in these interactions is quite possible as a function of change in other variables. As a result, despite speculations about possible military operations by Russia in Syria, it is “very unlikely” that Moscow would put this option on its agenda. This is true because under the existing conditions, Russia can move toward realization of its goals by continuing and increasing military assistance to the government in Damascus, taking into account that there is basically no need for Russian military personnel to engage in operations on the ground in Syria.

*Alireza Noori
Ph.D. Candidate, Saint Petersburg State University & Expert on Russian Affairs

Russian President Vladimir Putin arrived Monday in Dushanbe, Tajikistan to attend another session of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO).

According to the Kremlin, the discussion at the CSTO summit will focus on the main areas of allied cooperation and ways of enhancing it. Special attention will be given to ensuring an effective response to the most pressing military and political challenges, including the increased activity of terrorist and extremist groups and destabilization of the situation near CSTO borders.

Within this context, the heads of CSTO member states will consider, among other things, the results of the CSTO states’ armed forces exercises and joint events organized by law enforcement agencies, the Kremlin said.

Putin will also have a separate meeting with Tajikistan President Emomali Rahmon and a number of other bilateral contacts.

Recent protests in Beirut against government corruption and incompetence highlight a growing revival of non-violent dissent across the Middle East and North Africa. Protesters in Egypt, Iraq as well as Lebanon have been taking to the streets demanding improvement in basic public services such as waste management, accountability and transparency and an end to corruption.

The protests in several Arab countries, although focussed on social and economic demands, fundamentally have the same objectives as popular uprisings four years ago that toppled four autocratic regimes: dignity, social justice, and greater freedom. The series of mass demonstrations have challenged the notion that brutal crackdowns and military interventions have quelled popular willingness on the part of citizens to stand up for their rights in the MENA region.

Renewed uprisings

For many observers, the civil wars in Libya and Syria, Saudi military intervention in Bahrain and Yemen, the Gulf-backed military coup in Egypt, and the rise of Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, have sounded the death knell for a democratic transition in the Middle East and North Africa. They argue that the struggle against jihadist extremism and the brutal crackdowns by counterrevolutionary forces had buried any likelihood of renewed civic and political protests.

However, as the Lebanese protests show, there is a renewed upheaval of popular protests against the brutal suppression of dissent and systemic corruption, and a total lack of transparency and accountability, across the Arab world.

The Lebanese protests go even further: they show that the autocratic rulers have manufactured the sectarian divides between Sunni and Shiite Muslims in their countries, often at the expense of non-Muslim minorities, to ensure the survival of their regimes. Members of the 18 sects that make up the Lebanese mosaic suffer equally from the pungent smell of uncollected garbage and associated health hazards. Alleged efforts by Shiite militants, the country’s foremost political force, to instigate violence to undermine the cross-sectarian nature of the protests, have so far failed.

Anger trumps sectarianism

Similarly in Iraq, hundreds of thousands of demonstrators, Sunni and Shiite, have taken to the streets of Baghdad and southern cities like Basra every Friday to protest corruption and demand an improvement in basic public services. The Iraqi protests were fuelled by the killing of a young protester Muntather Al Halfi, by security forces in Basra last July. Rejecting claims by politicians that these were due to religious divisions, the protesters chanted “Sectarianism is dead” and “Stop stealing from us in the name of religion”.

The country has lost a significant swathe of territory to Islamic State which represents the most brutal expression of sectarian hatred, after 10 years of shaping of the country by sectarian policies which have seen its minorities brutalised and forced to leave by the thousands.

Syria and Libya have been engulfed by civil wars between rival militias, in Syria between Alawites and Sunnis, in Libya between different tribal militias of Sunnis, which have given rise to Al Qaeda offshoots of different shades, Jabhat Al Nusra and Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. Unlike Lebanon and Iraq, Egypt has undergone two rounds of popular uprisings, in 2011 and 2013, before the military takeover by General Abdel Fattah Al Sisi.

Even the police are fed up

With a largely homogeneous society and a Coptic minority that has largely been supportive of the repressive regime of the general-turned-president political protests have been generally suppressed. Nonetheless, militant soccer fans and students have staged 800 anti-government protests between October of last year and June of this year, according to Democracy Index.

Even more startling is that the fans’ and students’ nemesis, the feared and despised police force, has joined the fray. Security forces were called upon to squash protests by low-ranking police officers in several Egyptian governorates, including Cairo, in support of demands for better employment benefits and bonus payments.

The Interior Ministry accused the policemen, the bottom of the heap of the 1.7 million strong Egyptian security forces, of being supporters of the outlawed Muslim Brotherhood, who’s democratically elected president was removed from office by Al Sisi; they were charged with endangering Egyptian security at a time that the country was confronting a jihadist insurgency.

The message is clear

Leaders in Lebanon and Iraq have responded in more conciliatory terms to the mass protests. Iraqi Prime Minister Haidar al Abadi promised to root out corruption and streamline his government. Lebanon’s cabinet put its paralysis on full display when it met to discuss the crisis. Rather than announcing immediate steps to rid Beirut of its garbage it referred the issue to a ministerial committee.

The renewed protests may not immediately topple regimes like they did in 2011 but they do reflect fundamental change in the Middle East and North Africa with anger and frustration over corruption and incompetent and repressive government bubbling at the surface. They also suggest that the largely short-lived success of the 2011 revolts has not extinguished a desire for change and a willingness to take to the streets to demand it.

The peaceful protests and extremist jihadism are two sides of the same coin: they are expressions of deep-seated discontent among restless populations that no longer are willing to subject themselves to inefficient, corrupt and arbitrary rule. The likes of Islamic State can only be truly defeated if as much effort is invested in addressing the region’s political and social governance issues as is put into security crackdowns and military repression.

This article was published by RSIS

By Fakir Mohan Pradhan*

On September 10, 2015, a Police constable was injured when a pressure bomb laid by Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) exploded in Bijapur Valley, some five kilometres from Bijapur town towards Bhopalpattanam, as a squad of Security Force (SF) personnel was patrolling an under-construction road. Following the blast, the Maoists also opened fire on the SF personnel.

On August 23, 2015, an assistant platoon commander of the Chhattisgarh Special Task Force (STF), K.P. Singh, was killed and a constable, Santosh Yadav, was injured, when Maoists ambushed an STF patrol team deployed to secure a stretch of the newly laid National Highway 30 in the Darbha region of Bastar District. After the ambush, the Maoists damaged the highway and traffic was affected.

Earlier, on May 29, 2015, a day before Union Home Minister (UHM) Rajnath Singh’s visit to Chhattisgarh, one trooper of the Chhattisgarh Armed Force (CAF) was killed and another two were critically injured in an IED blast triggered by the Maoists in Sukma District. The CAF personnel were deployed on duty for protection of workers at a construction site near Dharampenta village at Kistaram.

The Maoists are using every tactic in the book to put speed breakers in the construction of roads in areas under their disruptive dominance. According to South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), Maoists in Chhattisgarh have attacked a construction site or SFs deployed to provide security to road construction activities at least seven times in 2015, and had done so at least six times in 2014; on five occasions in 2013; nine in 2012; and at least three in 2011. In the worst such attack on March 11, 2014, 15 SF personnel were killed in an ambush by Maoists in the Darbha Valley area of Bastar District, where Maoists had earlier killed Mahendra Karma and others (part of a Congress Party convoy) on May 25, 2013. The team was engaged in an area domination exercise to sanitise the area for troop movements and also to provide security to road construction workers.

Not surprisingly, the performance of the Road Requirement Plan (RRP) in Chhattisgarh is the worst among all Maoist-affected States. RRP is now being mostly referred to as RRP phase one, with the Union Government coming up with a second phase. RRP-I was approved in February, 2009 for improvement of road connectivity in 34 extremely Left Wing Extremism (LWE)-affected Districts in 8 States: Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Odisha and Uttar Pradesh. RRP-I envisaged the development of 1,126 kilometres of National Highways and 4,351 kilometres of State Roads (total 5,477 kilometres), at a cost of INR 7,300 crore by March 2015. As of July 31, 2015, only 3,765 kilometres of road under the Plan had been completed. Chhattisgarh has been the worst performer under the plan, completing under 49 per cent of the 2,019 kilometres sanctioned. The delay has primarily been ascribed to Maoist violence. According to the Ministry of State for Road Transport & Highways (MORTH), RRP–I is likely to be substantially completed by March 2016, with the exception of about 500 kilometres, which are yet to be awarded in the States of Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand.

On August 7, 2015, Chief Minister Raman Singh stated that Naxalism (Left Wing Extremism) was putting a huge dent into Chhattisgarh’s GDP, as the Government had to spend a huge amount of money towards rebuilding infrastructure and inducting Police personnel:

Naxal problem left a huge impact on our GDP. When I took over as the CM, there were around 23,000 policemen in our force. We had to invest a huge amount in recruiting new force, which now stands at around 67,000 personnel… In Chhattisgarh, it is a monumental task for us to build infrastructure (due to Naxalism). For example, to build a 17-kilometre long road, it took two years and lives of five jawans [troopers]. It takes too much of money to rebuild roads and bridges, which Naxals frequently blow up.

Given the security situation in Chhattisgarh, it is nobody’s case that road construction is not difficult. The difficulty levels, however, are not the same in all areas where roads are to be constructed. The Comptroller and Auditor General’s (CAG’s) report released on July 26, 2015, notes that the Public Works Department (PWD) of Chhattisgarh [RRP is implemented by MORTH through PWDs of respective States], had completed only 31per cent of the work undertaken between 2009-14 under RRP [till March 2014, not to be confused with MORTH data as it is till July 31, 2015]. Under this special programme, 53 works comprising length of 2021.73 kilometres were sanctioned for 2897.09 crore in Chhattisgarh during 2009-14. The development of the roads under the programme was scheduled to be completed by March 2015. However, till March 2014, the physical progress was 618.34 km (31 per cent) and financial progress was 805.04 crore (27 per cent). The works under RRP were divided into three categories: Category-I: Roads where the agencies may be able to carry out the construction without much security arrangement; Category-II: Roads where agencies may face some sort of problem and need some protection for carrying out the work; Category-III: Roads where there is high risk of security and execution activities need special protection from the State Government.

Regarding the slow pace of work on the project, CAG observed:

…out of total number of 19 road works selected under Category-I, only 12 works could be completed by the department. Balance seven works which were to be completed by 2011-12 remained incomplete even after two-three years of commencement. The percentage of progress of these seven works ranged between 21 and 97 per cent.

Out of these, in two works (Wadrafnagar-Janakpur-Balangi road and Bishunpur-Surajpur-Odgi road) the delay was due to slow progress by the contractor, in one case (Balarampur-Chando-Samri Road) the slow progress was due to burning of plant and machinery by the Naxalites and in case of other work (High level bridge at Balrampur-Chando-Samri road) work order was issued in March 2014, which was 40 months after receipt of sanction (November 2010), as the finalisation of tender could be done after twelve bids. No specific reason for delay could be ascertained in remaining three works.

In Category-II, out of nine road works, two road works were completed and seven works are under progress. These seven works were to be completed by 2012-13, however, the progress as of March 2014 ranged between 16 and 48 per cent. The reason for slow progress in respect of three works was due to burning of plant and machinery by Naxalites. In one case (Chotebetia­Rengawahi-Tarawaki Road) the delay was due to pending forest clearance. Out of remaining three, in case of two roads the delay was due to slow progress by the contractor and in one case (Jagdalpur-Konta Road, New NH-30 Jeeram­Tongpal) no reason for delay could be ascertained from the records.

In Category-III road works, the progress in respect of nine roads ranged from five to 51 per cent and progress of two other roads was more than 80 per cent. Eleven works were at the tender stage as no agency participated in the bidding process even after issue of several bids and in respect of three other road works, the tenders was not yet finalised.

Thus, the department could not complete the roads selected under Category-I and II within the stipulated period of contract even though security perception was not of higher risk. The progress of Category-III road works was slow, which resulted in failure to improve connectivity in the LWE affected areas.

Officials in Chhattisgarh, however, insist that things are likely to change for better. R.K. Vij, Additional Director-General of Police (Anti-Maoist Operations), disclosed, “We are now deploying our companies only to provide dedicated security to road construction. That wasn’t so earlier.” In the most sensitive zones, where private contractors or public works department officials may fear to take up projects, the security forces will themselves do most of the construction under the supervision of government engineers, sources added. Thus, it is the Police who will be building an all-weather road connecting Injaram with Bhejji and Chintagupha in the rebel heartland of Sukma. News reports indicate that camps housing one company each have been set up every 5 kilometres along the 56 kilometre Dornapal-Chintalnar-Jagargunda route. The Sukma-Konta stretch of NH221 is to have the heaviest deployment – one company every two or three kilometres, to patrol the area and oversee the completion of the road.

Among other infrastructure development projects, Chhattisgarh is set to complete the process of constructing 50 ‘fortified’ Police Stations in the Bastar region by December this year, out of the total of 75 such Police Stations sanctioned in Chhattisgarh. The State Police Housing Corporation Managing Director, D.M. Awasthy, on August 30, 2015, disclosed that work on 25 fortified Police Stations had been completed, while 15 Police Stations were nearing completion.

Further, to strengthen the communication network in Maoist areas, the Union Telecom Ministry has approved 497 mobile towers for Naxalite-affected areas. According to State Chief Secretary Vivek Dhand, 465 mobile towers have already been erected out of which 415 have also started operating, while the installation of the remaining 32 towers is in progress, and would be completed by November 2015.

As the campaign against the Maoists continues, the development and protection of critical infrastructure, especially road connectivity and communications, is of vital importance, both for the viability of anti-Naxalite operations and to bridge the development gap with other regions. Chhattisgarh has lagged behind for too long. The current reversals that the Maoists have suffered are an unprecedented opportunity to address the gigantic security and developmental deficits in the areas worst afflicted by the Left Wing insurgency in India.

*Fakir Mohan Pradhan
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management

By Elise Harris

In a new, wide-ranging interview Pope Francis spoke at length of the European refugee crisis – saying that incoming migrants are now filling the void left by a sterile continent that refuses to have children.

“The migrant phenomenon is a reality…when there is an empty space, people look to fill it. If a country doesn’t have children, migrants come to occupy that place,” the Pope said in a recent interview with Portugal-based Radio Renascença (Renaissance).

He referred to the staggeringly low number of births in countries such as Italy, Portugal and Spain, where the current number of births falls, he said, at “almost zero percent.”

Francis said he is no stranger to the phenomenon of not wanting to have children, and that he encountered it in his own family when some years ago his Italian cousins said they preferred to travel or buy property rather than have children.

“So, if there are no children, there are open spaces,” he said. For him personally, the societal refusal to have children is part of a “culture of ‘well-being,’” in which the assurance that one’s personal needs and wants will be taken care of is emphasized to an exaggerated degree.

Published Sept. 14, the interview was conducted by Vatican journalist Aura Miguel Sept. 8, and touched on a wide variety of themes such as the current refugee crisis, youth unemployment and how often the Pope goes to confession.

In the many questions surrounding the current refugee crisis hitting Europe by the thousands each day, the Pope said that what we’re seeing is just “the tip of the iceberg.”

“We see these refugees, these poor people that are escaping from war, escaping from hunger, but that’s the tip of the iceberg,” he said. In his view, the crux of the problem is an unjust socioeconomic system that removes the human being from the center.

Today’s dominant economic system “removes the person from the center, and at the center is the god of money, it’s the god in fashion today,” the Pope said, noting that this also affects both the political and ecological systems.

No matter where the migrants come from, the criteria spurring them to move are the same, Francis continued, saying that one has to go to the causes of the problems to find solutions.

“Where the causes are hunger, bringing jobs, investments. Where the cause is war, looking for peace, the work for peace.”

One recent phenomenon that deeply pained him was the plight of the “Rohingya” people, an Indo-Aryan ethnic group largely from the Rakhine state of Burma, in west Myanmar.

Since clashes began in 2012 between the state’s Buddhist community and the long-oppressed Rohingya Muslim minority, more than 100,000 Rohingya’s have fled Myanmar by sea, according to the U.N.

In order to escape forced segregation from the rest of the population inside rural ghettos, many of the Rohingya – who are not recognized by the government as a legitimate ethnic group or as citizens or Myanmar – have made the perilous journey at sea in hopes of evading persecution.

In May a number of Rohingya people – estimated to be in the thousands – were stranded at sea in boats with dwindling supplies while Southeastern nations such as Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia refused to take them in. On Aug. 7, Pope Francis told a group of youth that this “is called killing. It’s true. If I have a conflict with you and I kill you, it’s war.”

In the interview, Francis lamented how countries would allow the Rohingya to land, give them food and water, and then send them back out to sea. “They don’t welcome them,” he said, adding that today “humanity lacks the ability to welcome.”

As a grandson of Italian immigrants who came to Argentina in 1929 along with a wave of other Italian, Spanish and Portuguese migrants starting in 1884, the Pope said that “I know what immigration is.”

However, he also acknowledged that migrants bring various safety concerns with them, and noted that Rome is not “immune” to infiltration from threats such as guerilla groups active near Sicily.

But despite our concerns, Francis said that refugees still have to be welcomed because it’s commanded in the Bible, and turned to Moses’ commission to his people not to “mistreat or oppress a foreigner, for you were foreigners in Egypt.”

When asked about the response to his appeal during his Sept. 6 Sunday Angelus address for every parish, shrine, religious community and monastery in Europe to welcome a family of refugees has gotten, the Pope said that there have been many.

He said he specifically asked them to take in a family rather than a person because “a family gives more safety,” and the risk of “infiltrations” is lower.

Pope Francis clarified that when he asked for a family to be welcomed, he’s not necessarily asking that they be welcomed into the parish or community house, but that the parish or community finds “a place, a corner of a school to make a ‘small apartment.”

“Or, in the worst case, rent a modest apartment for the family, but that they have a ceiling, to be welcomed, and that they are integrated into the community.”

Many convents are “almost empty,” the Pope observed, and recalled that when he made a similar appeal soon after his election just over two years ago, there were only four responses, one of them being the Jesuits.

This, he said, “is serious,” and noted that the temptation of “the god of money” is also present in this situation when he hears some congregations say “No, now that this convent is empty, we’re going to make a hotel, and we can receive people, and with this we’ll sustain ourselves or earn money.”

If a community wants to do this it’s fine, but “pay taxes,” he said, explaining that a religious school has the title “religious” since religious institutions are exempt from taxes, “but if it works like a hotel then pay taxes like everybody else. Otherwise the business isn’t very healthy.”

Francis was also asked about the two Vatican parishes who were also asked to welcome refugee families, which, he said, have already been found thanks to Cardinal Angelo Comastri, Vicar General for the Vatican, and the papal Almoner Bishop Konrad Krajewski.

He said he didn’t know how long the families would stay, but that they would be there “until the Lord wants.”

“No one knows this, how it’s going to end, right? Anyway, I want to say that Europe became conscious, eh? And I thank them, I thank the European countries who have become conscious of this.”

By Nijeesh N*

At least five militants of the Khaplang faction of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN-K) and three civilians were killed when troops of 23 Assam Rifles (AR) and 21 Para (Special Forces) Commandos reportedly laid an ambush along the Pangsha International Trade Centre, bordering Myanmar, in Tuensang District of Nagaland on August 28, 2015. NSCN-K later confirmed that among those killed were ‘captain’ Medoneizo Nakhro (Medo), ‘lieutenant’ Joseph Sumi, ‘Chaplin’ Robin Sumi, ‘sergeant’ Seipu Kuki, and ‘under secretary of the civil wing’, Kukhavi Sumi. The three civilians killed in the incident were identified as Tokani, wife of ‘lieutenant’ Joseph Sumi; Enso Konyak and Anten Konyak, both from Yongkhao village in Mon District of Nagaland. They were accompanying the group. Two women and an Army trooper were also injured in the incident. According to unconfirmed reports, one of the injured women was the wife of the new ‘finance secretary’ of the NSCN-K, Isak Sumi. The AR Public Relations Officer (PRO) claimed that the militants were from the NSCN-K camp located at Ponyu Village inside Myanmar and belonged to the group headed by the ‘military commander’ and head of NSCN-K’s armed wing, ‘lieutenant general’ Niki Sumi.

Earlier, on August 13, two NSCN-K militants, identified as Azheto Sumi and Khekato Chophy, were killed in an encounter with 31 AR personnel in the Tamatai area near Longsa village in the Mokokchung District of Nagaland. The SFs recovered one AK-56 rifle along with 42 live rounds; one .22 pistol (country made) and one live round; three Chinese grenades; as well as other items from the possession of the slain militants.

On July 21, 2015, a NSCN-K militant, identified as ‘2nd lieutenant’ Tokihe Yepthomi was killed in the jungle of Puliebadze in the Kohima District of Nagaland. The Security Forces (SFs) recovered a 9mm sub-machine-carbine, one .32 pistol, four assorted gun & pistol magazines, 81 rounds of assorted ammunition, three Chinese grenades, two Improvised Explosive Device (IED) and two Military Grade Anti-Tank (AT) Mines from the incident site.

On June 9, 2015, in retaliation to the June 4, 2015, Chandel attack, Indian troops carried out surgical strike ‘inside’ Myanmar, inflicting ‘significant damage and casualties’ to militant outfits, purportedly the NSCN-K. Though no official figure was released about the number of militants killed in the operation, credible media reports put the number anywhere between seven and 18 (though some of the more fanciful suggest 100 militant fatalities in the operation).

The NSCN-K along with the Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup (KYKL) and Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP) had claimed the June 4, 2015, Chandel attack, the worst single attack targeting SFs, in terms of fatalities, in the entire Northeast region since 1982. In the June 4 attack, 18 Army personnel were killed and another 11 were injured when militants ambushed a convoy of 46 troopers of the 6 Dogra Regiment of the Army, at Moltuk, near the India-Myanmar border, in the Paralong area of the Chandel District of Manipur.

The SFs launched an offensive against the NSCN-K soon after the June 4, 2015, Chandel attack. Since then, according to partial data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), SFs have killed at least 12 NSCN-K militants (all data till September 13, 2015), excluding the indeterminate number killed during the June 9 operation ‘inside Myanmar’. Among those neutralized were ‘captain’ Wangchuk and ‘2nd lieutenant’ Tokihe Yepthomi. SFs also arrested 16 NSCN-K militants, including ‘health minister-cum-political advisor’ Ngamsinlung Panmei and ‘captain’ Atoka alias Kughahoto Sema.

The NSCN-K militants have, however, failed to inflict a single casualty among SFs since the launch of the offensive, although they have carried out 10 attacks on SF personnel. However, the outfit was responsible for the killing of 27 SF personnel between March 27, 2015, when the outfit unilaterally withdrew from the 2001 ceasefire, and June 4, 2015. The worst attack targeting SFs during this period, on May 3, 2015, was the twin ambush by NSCN-K militants resulted in the death of eight SF personnel – seven of them from the ‘C’ company of 23 AR and another from the 164 Naga Territorial Army (TA) Battalion – about three kilometres from Changlangshu village in the Tobu Subdivision, near the India-Myanmar border, in the Mon District of Nagaland. Another nine troopers were injured in the incident.

Although the outfit has not been involved in any incident of killing of civilian population since the abrogation of the ceasefire in March 27, 2015, it was reported that two school students were killed in crossfire between AR and NSCN-K cadres at Phor village in Meluri subdivision in the Phek District of Nagaland on July 16, 2015.

The NSCN-K along with the Isak-Muivah faction of National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN-IM) was formed on April 30, 1988, when the principle split within the parent National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) took place. Clannish divisions among the Nagas (Konyak and Tangkhul) were the primary reason behind the split. The Konyak and Pangmei (Naga tribes largely found in Myanmar) formed the NSCN-K under the leadership of Khole Konyak and ‘Chairman’ S.S. Khaplang. NSCN-IM constituted the mainly Tangkhul faction, and was led by ‘president’ Isak Chisi Swu and T. Muivah. Other leaders of the undivided NSCN-K were ‘general secretary’ N. Kitovi Zhimomi and ‘publicity secretary’ Akaho Asumi. The NSCN-K split further in 2011 when two senior founding leaders of the outfit N. Kitovi Zhimoni, the Ato Kilonser (Prime Minister) and Khole Konyak, broke away to form a new group called Khole-Kitovi faction of NSCN (NSCN-KK).

On April 28, 2001, NSCN-K had signed a ceasefire with the Government of India (GoI). The NSCN-KK signed a ceasefire agreement with GoI on April 27, 2012 and on April 27, 2015, this was extended for another year.

Significantly, on March 27, 2015, NSCN-K unilaterally exited the ceasefire, declaring that “any ‘meaningful peace and political interaction’ between the two entities (NSCN-K and GoI) should be premised on the concept that Nagas were sovereign people”. Soon after, the Reformation faction of NSCN (NSCN-R) was formed on April 6, 2015, by two senior ‘kilonsers’ (ministers), Wangtin Konyak, also known as Y. Wangtin Naga, and T. Tikhak. The duo had attended the ceasefire supervisory board (CFSB) meeting at Chumukedima (Dimapur) on March 27, 2015, defying S.S. Khaplang’s diktat and was consequently ‘expelled’. A ceasefire agreement with NSCN-R was signed on April 27, 2015.

The ceasefire with NSCN-K, which was only enforceable within Nagaland, had hardly been peaceful. According to partial data compiled by SATP, the outfit was involved in at least 282 fatalities (25 civilian, eight SF personnel and 249 militants) between April 28, 2001, (the date of signing of the ceasefire agreement) and March 27, 2015, (the date of abrogation of the ceasefire) in Nagaland, Assam, Manipur, and Arunachal Pradesh.

Though SFs have succeeded in minimizing the immediate threat from NSCN-K, the danger remains very much alive. Indeed, almost all the fatalities and arrests since March 27, 2015, have been reported from three northeastern States: Nagaland, Manipur and Arunachal Pradesh (barring the fatalities in the June 9 operation which was reportedly carried out inside Myanmar territory). These three states border Myanmar, where the top NSCN-K leadership and overwhelming proportion of cadres are reported to have taken shelter.

On April 9, 2012, NSCN-K had signed a ceasefire agreement with the Myanmar Government. The agreement provided NSCN-K members with the freedom to move ‘unarmed’ across the country. On July 22, 2015, Union Minister of State for Home Affairs Kiren Rijiju told Rajya Sabha, “As per inputs received, NSCN (K) has stationed small groups of its cadres at various strategic locations in Nagaland and Arunachal Pradesh. Most of these groups have sneaked into Indian Territory from across the Indo-Myanmar Border.” The present strength of NSCN-K is estimated at about 1,500. According to reports, around 1,000 of these cadres are in Myanmar. In a worrying development, an AR communiqué stated that 15 youths from Phek District in Nagaland were forcefully taken away by cadres of NSCN-K’s ‘Mobile-V’ group. The group operates between Phek in Nagaland and Tsera in Myanmar, under ‘brigadier’ Kurichu Pochury. The AR PRO stated, “These youths have been taken to Tsera camp in Myanmar, from where they are being sent to Ngiakching camp (Myanmar) for basic military training.”

Significantly, on July 16, during the first India-Myanmar Joint Consultative Commission (JCC) Meeting held in New Delhi, India reportedly asked Myanmar to hand over four top NSCN-K leaders, including its chief S.S. Khaplang, ‘military commander’ Niki Sumi, ‘brigadier’ Kurichu Pochury, and ‘kilonser’ Y. Asang. Meanwhile, on September 10, 2015, the National Investigation Agency (NIA) investigating the June 4, 2015, Chandel attack, announced a cash reward of INR 700,000 and INR one million for any information about the whereabouts of S.S. Khaplang and Niki Sumi respectively.

Moreover, NSCN-K has joined hands with three of the most active terror outfits in the Northeast: the United Liberation Front of Asom-Independent (ULFA-I); IK Songbijit faction of the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB-IKS); and Kamtapur Liberation Organisation (KLO), to form the United National Liberation Front of Western South East Asia (UNLFWESEA). The Front, created on April 17, 2015, and headed by S. S. Khaplang, was formed with the aim to set up a ‘northeast government-in-exile’, reportedly to be based in Myanmar.

Worryingly, just two days after the August 28, 2015, Pangsha incident, NSCN-K’s ‘ministry of information and publicity (MIP)’ had warned that “’August 28 Pangsha massacre’ of unarmed NSCN/GPRN [Government of People’s Republic of Nagaland] members and ‘innocent civilians’ by Indian Army shall bear testimony before the world for generations to come” and warned the “enemy agents that the worst fate awaits them to face judgments and NSCN-K would leave no stones unturned to prosecute them under anti-national act (sic).” According to a September 10, 2015, report, intelligence agencies have issued an alert that 48 highly trained NSCN-K militants, led by Chailai Pansa and Bopa Wangnao, were presently camping in the Lahu village of Tirap District in Arunachal Pradesh to carry out attacks on Indian Forces in retaliation against the August 28, 2015, Pangsha incident. An AR medical team was fired upon by NSCN-K militants on September 10, 2015, on the way to organizing medical camps at Pongkhungri and Avangkhu in the Phek District of Nagaland. The team escaped unharmed.

The situation is compounded by a measure of ambiguity in the Government’s strategy to deal with the NSCN-K. On July 11, 2015, Union Home Minister Rajnath Singh had categorically dismissed any move to re-initiate negotiation with the group, declaring, “The Government will not talk to criminal groups… It was not the Government but the [NSCN-K] which had unilaterally withdrawn itself from the ceasefire. It was unfortunate. It should not have done so. Now the Government is doing what is required to do (sic).” However, on August 21, 2015, Union Minister of State for Home Affairs Kiren Rijiju stated, “Some other groups also requested the Centre and me that they may be permitted to go to Myanmar to talk to the NSCN (K). We said if there are efforts being made from the civil society to impress upon any militant group, including the NSCN (K), to cease violence, we have no objection.” Finally, a delegation of Naga Mothers’ Association (NMA) met with the top leaders of NSCN-K on August 31, 2015, at an NSCN-K camp situated a few kilometres inside Myanmar and appealed to NSCN-K leaders to renew the cease fire. According to NMA, NSCN-K responded ‘positively’, saying they were not averse to the resumption of the ceasefire.

An early stabilization of the situation is, however, unlikely. The peace accord signed between GoI and NSCN-IM on August 3, 2015, has unsettled long-established equations of power between the various Naga militant formations, and the Government has failed to project a formulation that could bring the NSCN-K back to the table with the prominence that its leadership believes it deserves. Escalating violence and seeking to bring diverse extremist formations in the Northeast under a single umbrella are initiatives evidently intended to improve the NSCN-K’s negotiating strength. Further, since the organisation’s principle infrastructure and cadre base lies in safe havens in Myanmar and is under no urgent threat – notwithstanding the showcasing of the June 9 operation ‘inside Myanmar’, a few kilometers beyond a non-existent border – the incentive to intensify the spiral of violence certainly remains.

* Nijeesh N
Research Assistant, Institute for Conflict Management