By Ihsan Bal

In his latest statement, world-renowned theoretical physicist Stephen Hawking claimed that it is not a foregone conclusion for physical material and energy absorbed into a black hole to be trapped there forever as previously thought. Then, perhaps we can talk of a similarly possible exit from the Kurdish issue, which has gradually morphed into the black hole of Turkish politics amid heated debates regarding whether we are going back to the turmoil of the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s? Even though the answer to this question looks negative at first glance considering the spiral of violence in which our country is currently engulfed, in reality we are not doomed to such a vicious cycle. Ideals like the rule of law, democracy, and social consensus cannot be deemed unattainable in Turkey’s case. Those who believe in the feasibility of resolving all disputes by the force of arms can never crush each and every dissident into submission.

Notwithstanding its excessively volatile nature on the surface, there are certain themes underlying Turkey’s agenda that are rather enduring and have yet to be altered. Problematic areas concerning democratization, legal restrictions, economic problems, and violence appear at various levels in various forms and infect the society as a whole. To our regret, the Kurdish issue, which has become chronic since the 1980s, still remains Turkey’s number one position among all these persistent agenda items. A series of terrorist attacks carried out by the outlawed PKK in the immediate aftermath of the June 7 elections rendered this bitterly painful problem all the more tangible.

The pro-Kurdish HDP, receiving 13% of the votes in the election in question, was only beginning to be seen as the long-awaited hope for bringing a non-violent solution to the colossal problem with which we are confronted. Through a one-year electoral campaign, it largely managed to rid the Kurdish political movement from its persistent defects – an ethnic orientation and a propensity for violence. Having taken an assertive step in the direction of assuming an essentially national quality, the HDP could potentially serve as an important window of opportunity for Turkish politics by communicating the widespread concerns and emotions of Turkey’s eastern regions to the country’s west. All that happened afterwards coincided with such a popularly hope-inspiring process.

The potential of HDP politics

The call by Selahattin Demirtaş, the co-chairman of the HDP, for immediate peace, and “peace alone, without any objections, exceptions, conditions, excuses, or suspensions” was remarkable. Such a strong and clear message against the terrorist group surely rests in the HDP’s quest for consolidating the autonomous and legitimate sphere of politics, holding on to 6 million votes, and satisfying people’s demands within the boundaries of democratic processes.

In a way, Demirtaş is virtually trying to alter the rules of the game. He is saying that solutions to Turkey’s persistent problems, with the Kurdish issue first and foremost, should no longer be sought at gunpoint. This call is compatible with the nature and spirit of politics. It reflects the self-execution of democratic politics in a manner that adheres to the moral code of a civilian political leader’s job and renounces pro-violence rhetoric.

However, as George Orwell rightfully suggests, people tend to hate those who remind them of the truth as they further lose touch with reality. Likewise, the PKK leadership gets all the more angry with the HDP because the party reminds the PKK of the truth. The attitude assumed by the PKK leadership in response to Demirtaş’s call suggests the intention to bring the HDP into line and narrow its elbowroom:

The HDP failed to perform creatively and successfully enough in politics. They make calls to others, but what have they actually succeeded at yet? They need to be a little more realistic. They need to be able to represent peoples, particularly the Kurdish people, to the fullest extent. They need to focus on why they couldn’t operate the national assembly.

Indeed, the PKK leadership’s statement was not at all unexpected. The headquarters wishes to preserve its priority position, but the essentially problematic part of its hardline stance has deeper roots in the PKK’s philosophy that strictly disapproves of civilian politics. The ideal objective of the solution process was to suppress this very hunger and appetite for violence.

In that regard, the actual mindset, which has revered violence as a sacred means to reach an end and deemed all sorts of violent attacks legitimate for years, should be diagnosed and remedied. For instance, as Ahmet İnsel said in the right way and at the right time, the speech made by Murat Bütün, the HPG (PKK) militant who carried out a suicide attack against the Karakulak guard post in Doğubeyazıt on August 2, was thought provoking.

According to Bütün, Kurds have to choose between two alternative options: Either “betraying themselves” or “resisting the policy of extermination and denial.” For him, the latter option means Kurdish people taking revenge on the enemy, and joining the ranks of the PKK can best fulfill such a desire for revenge.

Far from being motivated solely by personal or periodic circumstances, Bütün’s words reflect the fundamental mentality that has shaped the PKK’s operational philosophy since its foundation. Such philosophy comprises the main driving force behind the spiral of violence in which our country is currently engulfed. What we have here is rage, revenge, “us vs. others,” antagonists, and enemies. In sum, there are those who must be exterminated.

Is violence the only way?

As a matter of fact, this and similar statements serve as arguments that bring up the nightmare of violence to Turkey’s agenda. In a way, these arguments are nothing but memorized rhetoric that presents armed conflict as an inevitable ending, indeed our destiny, and places guns at the center of our shared past. We will be reliving the same day and time unless we can find a way to alter this very mentality and find an escape from this self-fulfilling prophecy. Within these constraints, we will be stuck in the past, unable to catch up to the present, and far from building our own future based on new parameters and values.

It is not easy to escape the state of surrender, break the vicious cycle, or stand up against such an outburst of violence and rage. Indeed, isn’t it the real challenge to ask for a change in the existing conditions? Isn’t it such an attitude that requires genuine courage?

The current situation of the HDP looks like the embodiment of such willpower. The HDP doesn’t believe Kurds will gain anything by the burning of settlements, the blockading and detonation of roads, the destruction of construction equipment, the abduction of workers, and agitation over death tolls.

Unsurprisingly, the ruling party and the state also get their share of HDP’s criticism. Such criticism is not a new thing for the Kurdish political movement. What can be deemed novel is the newly-shaped opposition by the HDP to the power circles under the tutelage of which all pro-Kurdish parties felt obliged to operate so far. That is, the HDP’s objections to the PKK and its leadership is unprecedented.

When the PKK asked the HDP what it truly succeeded in, the PKK leadership is actually pointing at a much more fundamental subject that we all need to think about. The underlying message is implicit: We have managed to secure Kurdish people’s rights via armed struggle, and the same method will be used to preserve and advance these rights in the following processes. In other words, this message means that “the armed phase has yet to fulfill its mission.”

Not only was this claim unable to accurately reflect the actual state of affairs in the past but it also exposes the PKK’s call to arms as invalid and unjustified under today’s circumstances. Contrary to this claim, the most important steps in the direction of democratization, the extension of liberties, and the consolidation of the rule of law were taken when civilian politics was granted the necessary radius of action, and not in times of escalating violence. Dozens of legal and constitutional reform bills (known in Turkish as “judicial reform packages”) were introduced only in the 2000s, i.e. in a period when, in contrast to the PKK’s fundamental claim, gunshots were rarely heard.

The real irony here is that, without exception, all the major PKK attacks throughout this period somehow coincided with promising steps forward; it was as if the terrorist group was shouting “Don’t you dare forget me!” For instance, there is still no plausible explanation for why the PKK took up arms against the government and how its actions served the Kurdish people’s interests in the periods between 2004-2005 and 2007-2008. These things occurred during the time in which the EU-accession process had picked up its pace and hopes were high as far as democratization, liberties, and human rights were concerned.

Quite a few intellectuals are asking the same question today. On what grounds the PKK leadership declared an end to the ceasefire in the immediate aftermath of the HDP’s electoral triumph on June 7 – indeed even before the party’s MPs set their foot in Ankara – remains a mystery. Are the answers to this and several other similar questions left unanswered due to some processes between the PKK and certain power circles – apart from the terrorist group’s ethnic-Kurdish grassroots – with which the PKK has covert ties? This is another subject that deserves closer scrutiny.

Stepping on the same banana peel time and again or repeatedly experiencing the same historical cycle does not have to be Turkey’s destiny. There is certainly a way out. The most salient exit sign is, rather than insisting on the previous failed methods and means, altering them instead. The new mindset that is required to lay the groundwork for such genuine change will be able to blossom depending on the current and future performance of the Kurdish political movement, which has its roots in the Kurdish street and has long argued for assuming a truly inclusive, nationally-valid political quality in rhetoric, yet to no avail in practice.

The secret power of this success lies in the HDP’s ability to raise its voice strongly and more convincingly with each passing day and secure a larger political radius of action in the face of violent attacks that inflict pain on society. There is no doubt that the liberation of Kurdish politics from the tutelage of armed groups over the Kurdish street by cutting the Gordian knot is easier said than done. Otherwise, if this cannot be done, the movement will end up with nothing but a rehearsal of the outmoded reflexes and vicious cycles associated with the “old Turkey,” eventually leaving its legitimate sphere of action, surrendering to the shadow of the mountains, and being stuck once again under the seemingly inescapable restraint of terrorism.

The whistleblowers and government secrets revealers Julian Assange, Chelsea Manning, and Edward Snowden are not free to travel. But, this week — in the form of a sculpture including their life-size bronze statues — they are standing in a Geneva, Switzerland plaza near the European headquarters of the United Nations. The sculpture’s message is antiwar, says its Italian sculptor Davide Dormino.

“The statue pays homage to three who said no to war, to the lies that lead to war and to the intrusion into private life that helps to perpetuate war,” Dormino explained when the sculpture, which is on tour, had its original unveiling in a Berlin, Germany plaza in May.

Assange has stayed since June of 2012 in the Ecuador embassy in London to prevent his extradition for prosecution by the United States government. Snowden left America in May of 2013 for Hong Kong and has, since a month later, stayed in Russia, also to avoid US prosecution. Manning, convicted in a US military court in July of 2013, is serving a 35-year prison sentence at Fort Leavenworth in Kansas. Says Dormino, “They have lost their freedom for the truth, so they remind us how important it is to know the truth.”

The sculpture features four chairs, with Assange, Manning, and Snowden standing on each of three chairs. The fourth chair is empty, available for anyone to stand on and say what he chooses. Thus the sculpture’s title “Anything to Say?”

Watch here a six-minute video of the previous installation, unveiling, and display of the sculpture in Berlin:

This article was published by the RonPaul Institute.

By Clint Watts*

The 2016 Presidential campaigns have swung into full gear and tough talk about countering the Islamic State grows by the day.  All of the candidates seem to embrace calls for kicking the Islamic State off of social media.  Hillary Clinton was one of the first to endorse this tactic back in July noting, “we have got to shut down their Internet presence, which is posing the principal threat to us.”  And who wouldn’t want to kick the Islamic State off the Internet?  Here are a couple things to consider.

First, fighting the Islamic State online will be the easiest policy for candidates to get behind–a position with almost no costs and some marginal benefits.  Fighting jihadists online is far more preferable to fighting jihadists on the ground and allows a candidate to call for action without actually having to put any Americans in harm’s way. Battling extremists on social mediaplays well with American audiences, too. Most Americans understand Facebook and Twitter far better than they do the geopolitics of the Middle East.  Lastly, American policy makers can actually create action on this policy since Facebook, Twitter, Google, and other social media companies predominately reside in the U.S. and can feel discomfort from government tough talk.  As a policy position, “Kicking The Islamic State Of Twitter!” sells.

A second point to consider, however, is fighting the Islamic State online but not on the ground represents nothing more than contending with a symptom while ignoring the disease. Long before the rise of the Islamic State, al Shabaab in Somalia became the first prolific and successful jihadi group to leverage social media.  As J.M. Berger noted, repeated Twitter shutdowns of Al Shabaab did diminish the group’s online prowess.  But these shutdowns occurred concurrently with Shabaab’s decline in Somalia.  Shabaab supporters not only lost access to Shabaab’s propaganda, they lost interest in a group clearly on the wane.

Undermining access to the Islamic State without eroding affinity for the group’s successes will lead online supporters to innovate and evolve online rather than recede–a dangerous consequence of a tactic that seems so straight forward on the surface.  The Islamic State’s innovation online has been a critical component of their success and a large reason for their overtaking an al Qaeda who failed to adapt to and harness mainstream social media. The Islamic State’s persistent incorporation of new media methods has attracted a band of tech savvy followers.  Resistance from the West on social media has likely led these Islamic State fanboys with computer skills to innovate even further to get out the message and retaliate on the cyber battlefield.

Today, Islamic State supporters often employ automated bots on Twitter to sidestep attempts to curb their reach.  As they’ve been pushed from mainstream social media sites, the Islamic State has developed and deployed their own apps that provide downloads to their supporters as a way to avoid Twitter’s spam detection algorithms.  Growing support online has also led to the emergence of Islamic State affiliated hackers who during last week’s September 11 Anniversary threatened attacks on the financial system and government websites. Islamic State affiliated hackers have allegedly posted personal information of U.S. military members as well.

Countering the Islamic State’s presence online rather than undermining affinity for the group’s success and resulting message may ultimately lead to policies that make the group temporarily weaker and yet ultimately more resilient.  Kicking extremists off Twitter is fine, but it should not be the first, nor will it be the most essential part of the U.S. strategy to counter the Islamic State.  We should be asking for a lot more from our Presidential candidates who will likely continue to put forth the easiest and least controversial counterterrorism proposals.

About the author:
*Clint Watts is a Fox Fellow in FPRI’s Program on the Middle East as well as a Senior Fellow with its Program on National Security. He serves the President of Miburo Solutions, Inc. Wartts’ research focuses on analyzing transnational threat groups operating in local environments on a global scale. Before starting Miburo Solutions, he served as a U.S. Army infantry officer, a FBI Special Agent on a Joint Terrorism Task Force, and as the Executive Officer of the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point (CTC).

Source:
This article was published by FPRI.

Senator Bernie Sanders taped a PBS show at the University of Virginia on Monday. I had corresponded with the host Doug Blackmon beforehand, and offered him ideas for questions on military spending and war, questions like these:

1. People want to tax the rich and cut military spending, which is 54% of federal discretionary spending according to National Priorities Project, but you only ever mention taxing the rich. Why not do both? What — give or take $100 billion — is an appropriate level of military spending?

2. Do you agree with Eisenhower that military spending creates wars?

3. Can you possibly be serious about wanting to keep the wars going but have Saudi Arabia play a bigger role? Do you approve of Saudi Arabia dropping U.S. cluster bombs on Yemen?

4. Would you approve of John Kerry promising Israel $45 billion of free weapons over the next decade?

5. Jeremy Corbyn was just elected leader of the Labour Party. He wants to pull out of NATO. Do you? He wants to unilaterally disarm of nuclear weapons? Do you? He wants to end drone murders and wars. Do you? Are you both socialists?

Blackmon at the very end asked Sanders to say something about foreign policy. Sanders replied with the 2002 Iraq vote. Then Blackmon mentioned Saudi Arabia, including its slaughter in Yemen, but rambled on until it became an unrelated softball. Sanders nonetheless brought it back to Saudi Arabia and insisted that Saudi Arabia should “get their hands dirty” and take a much bigger role in a war against ISIS and generally lead the wars with U.S. support.

Who has dirtier hands than Saudi Arabia? Is this some kind of a sick joke?

After the taping of the show, a member of the audience asked “But how will you pay for it?” What the “it” was went unstated, but presumably it wasn’t the military which is considered cost-free in such discussions. Sanders answered with progressive taxation. No mention of the military.

Later in the audience Q&A, Sanders brought up Eisenhower without mentioning the military.

Here are tips for future interviewers of Bernie Sanders:

As you know, Bernie Sanders focuses on money issues, taxing the rich, spending on the poor, but has thus far been permitted to engage in the general practice of speaking only about the 46% of federal discretionary spending that it not military.

Nobody has asked him about the 54% that by the calculation of National Priorities Project is military. Nobody has asked him if Eisenhower was right that military spending produces wars. Here are 25,000 people who want to know whether and how much Sanders would want to cut military spending.

He’s silent on the public support for two, not one, great sources of revenue: taxing the rich (which he’s all over) and cutting the military (which he avoids).

When he is asked about wars and says Saudi Arabia should pay for and lead them, nobody has followed up by asking whether the wars are themselves good or not or how the theocratic murderous regime in Saudi Arabia which openly seeks to overthrow other governments and is dropping US cluster bombs on Yemen will transform the wars into forces for good. Since when is THAT “socialism”?

If you go to Bernie’s website and click on ISSUES and search for foreign policy it’s just not there. He recently added the Iran agreement, after the fact, in which statement he says that war should “always be on the table” even though the U.N. Charter ban on threatening war makes no exception for candidate websites.

If Senator Sanders were to add anything about war in general to his website, judging by his standard response when asked, it would be this:

The military wastes money and its contractors routinely engage in fraud. The Department of Defense should be audited. Some weapons that I won’t name should be eliminated. Some cuts that I won’t even vaguely estimate should be made. All the wars in the Middle East should continue, but Saudi Arabia should lead the way with the U.S. assisting, because Saudi Arabia has plenty of weapons — and if Saudi Arabia has murdered lots of its own citizens and countless little babies in Yemen and has the goal of overthrowing a number of governments and slaughtering people of the wrong sect and dominating the area for the ideology of its fanatical dictatorial regime, who cares, better that than the U.S. funding all the wars, and the idea of actually ending any wars should be effectively brushed aside by changing the subject to how unfair it is for Saudi Arabia not to carry more of the militarized man’s burden. Oh, and veterans, U.S. veterans, are owed the deepest gratitude imaginable for the generous and beneficial service they have performed by killing so many people in the wars I’ve voted against and the ones I’ve voted for alike.

He’s silent on how much he’d cut the military, even within a range of $100 billion. He’s silent on alternatives to war. He’s usually silent on U.S. subservience to Israel. (Does he favor $45 billion in more free weapons for Israel paid for by the U.S. public whom he usually wants to spare lesser expenses than that?)

Jeremy Corbyn just won leadership of the Labour Party in England by promoting socialism at home and actively opposing wars and seeking peace. What is Bernie afraid of?

Argentine soldiers were subjected to abuse and torture, including freezing, food deprivation and mock executions, inflicted by their own superiors during the Malvinas/Falklands War against Britain, as revealed by files released by Argentina’s armed forces 33 years later.

The testimonies of the violence and humiliations were analyzed by the National Human Rights and International Law Department. The content of the documents will now be handed over to the Federal Court of Rio Grande, as part of a case filed by a War Veterans Association.

The documents also reveal that after defeat, the Argentinean military commanders attempted to cover up the evidence of the abuse.

Puerto Rico lacks the means to pay its debt that has risen to US$73 million and represents 70 percent of its gross domestic product. On Aug. 1, the island should have paid $58 million, but only paid the interest which grew to $628,000, therefore falling into arrears.

Governor Alejandro García Padilla admitted in a message to the nation on July 29 that “the public debt, considering the level of current economic activity, is unpayable. But, also, the size of this debt impedes us from getting out of the cycle of recession and contraction.”

García Padilla quoted a report prepared by Anne O. Kreuger, Ranjit Teja and Andrew Wolfe, former officials of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB), in which they recommend a series of structural reforms to deal with a “decade of stagnation, emigration and debt.”

Since the beginning of its four-year term in 2013, García Padilla’s administration applied a series of measures to deal with the crisis which included an increase of the sales tax from 7 percent to 11.5 percent, pension reform and reducing public expenditures, but these have not been sufficient. The above report recommends structural reforms such as a gradual reduction of labor costs to promote employment, lowering the high costs of electricity and transportation, and elimination of the obstacles for those who wish to do business, among others. The report also suggested fiscal and institutional reforms.

However, García Padilla pointed out that he does not agree with all the report’s recommendations. “I will not support, for example, seeing education as a cost rather than an investment, nor will I support reductions in the minimum wage for workers, among other reservations. Also, I will defend jobs as the main goal in this process,” he said.

The Governor proposed a plan to restructure the economy whose “first step, the most important, will be to re-establish economic growth. Although more fiscal adjustments will be necessary, it is clear that without strong growth of production in Puerto Rico, we will never get out of this vicious cycle of contraction, emigration, austerity and taxes. The economic agenda that we have introduced since the beginning of my administration has had some success in improving jobs, manufacturing, agriculture, aerospace industry, health services, and research and development; and we see results reflected in the reduction of unemployment, but, again, we need to do more, we need to do much more.”

No light at the end of the tunnel

But the solution is not around the corner. The unemployment rate grew to 12.4 percent and migration to the United States has accelerated. Puerto Rico actually has 3.7 million inhabitants; only in 2014 around 140,000 residents abandoned the island.

Also, Puerto Rico, as a US commonwealth, does not receive the same benefits as other states in the United States, which upon declaring themselves bankrupt receive legal protection from their creditors and are permitted to restructure their debts. The island cannot make unilateral decisions, can only use the US Merchant Marine to transport products to and from the island, and cannot establish bilateral relations with other countries.

García Padilla has stated that his government cannot continue requesting credit to deal with its budget deficit while demanding that the Puerto Rican people assume the major burden with increased taxes and pension reductions.

Investment funds that took advantage of fiscal privileges to acquire bonds and that control one-third of the Puerto Rican debt have proposed the firing of teachers, cuts in health services and a reduction of subsidies to higher education.

In September García Padilla must submit a plan to restructure the debt to the US Congress that should approve it. Although the White House has announced that it does not foresee a financial rescue of the Puerto Rican government, President Barak Obama formed a commission to coordinate assistance to the island without violating federal laws.

“We will not permit the heavy burden of the inherited debt force us to kneel,” proclaimed García Padilla. “We cannot allow anyone to force us to choose between paying police, teachers and nurses, or pay the debt. Another way is possible. We need to act now, together. We have to share responsibility and sacrifice in order to share the benefits of a growing Puerto Rican economy.”

The Ecumenical and Inter-Religious Coalition of Puerto Rico released a statement published on Aug. 31 expressing its concern for the “the debt, the non-payment, the proposals to reduce salaries, possible layoffs of workers, reduction of workers benefits and cuts in health services. Austerity measures cannot be allowed to adversely affect the poorest and neediest in Puerto Rico.”

“The [US] Federal Reserve has the capacity to restructure our debt, mitigate the austerity policies and insure debt relief without conditions which are harmful and onerous,” added the statement.

(EurActiv) — The European Court of Justice (ECJ) on Tuesday (15 September) ruled that a country can withhold basic benefits from EU migrants if they travel from another member country with no intention of finding a new job.

The ruling was hailed as a victory by Britain’s Conservatives, in their quest to halt “benefits tourism”.

Nazifa Alimanovic, a Swede, took Germany to court after she and her family had their benefits cut off, desite the fact Alimanovic and her eldest daughter had stopped working.

The ECJ said that the same benefits could be granted to nationals who had decided to not work. The ruling would not break the principle of equal treatment, the court said, despite the fact that it very clearly privileges national benefits rights over those of migrants.

In Germany, job-seeking EU citizens who have worked for less than one year retain the right to social assistance for six months. Once the period has elapsed, benefits can be refused.

The ECJ verdict is based on a decision made last November. The Court had already ruled that EU citizens in Germany are not entitled to social assistance if they do not actively search for employment.

‘Huge implications’ for the UK

Shortly after the ruling, British members of the European Parliament were quick in relating the court ruling to the current EU reform negotiations with the UK.

“This judgement has huge implications for the current EU debate in the UK. It confirms that jobseekers from elsewhere in the EU are not automatically entitled to claim benefits,” said MEP Catherine Bearder (ALDE).

“I hope the myth of benefit tourism will now be put firmly to bed, so we can focus instead on the many real and significant challenges facing the EU,” she continued.

British premier David Cameron is campaigning to “reform” EU freedom of movement as part of his attempt to rewrite the terms of the UK’s EU membership. One of the issues that is concerning, according to Cameron, is that EU migrants “flock” into his country to secure better welfare payments.

Ruling seen strengthening Cameron’s hand

According to Anthea McIntyre, an MEP from Cameron’s European Conservative and Reformists (ECR) group, the court ruling came as a boost to the UK’s renegotiation strategy.

“This is a major endorsement of our stance on benefit tourism and our views on free movement,” McIntyre said in a statement. “Increasingly the rest of Europe is seeing things our way. It bodes well for one of our key areas of renegotiation. Previously, most EU case law has strongly opposed any differentiation between EU migrants and nationals. I believe this is a sign that the pendulum is swinging our way. There is a clear view that freedom of movement to work is not the same a freedom to claim benefits,” she said.

The conservative politician said that while Britain has no problem with people coming to work and contribute to society, British taxpayers do not want to see their welfare system abused. She said that the issue would remain part of Cameron’s reform negotiations.

“I believe this ruling strengthens his hand,” McIntyre stressed.

By Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi

Liwa Thuwar al-Raqqa (the Raqqa Revolutionaries Brigade) was initially formed in September 2012 as a merger of several local rebel groups in Raqqa province following on from the Assad regime’s loss of the northern border town of Tel Abyad, at a time when the regime was forced to pull back from large swathes of northern Syrian border areas to focus on defending more vital areas- in particular the provincial capitals. Liwa Thuwar al-Raqqa declared its loyalty to a “Revolutionary Military Council” in Raqqa province, a loose umbrella similar to other early nationalist rebel structures like the FSA Military Council of Col. Oqaidi in Aleppo province. Some declared components of Liwa Thuwar al-Raqqa at the time included [Kata’ib] al-Jihad fi Sabil Allah, al-Nasir Salah al-Din, al-Haq,  Shuhada’ al-Raqqa, Saraya al-Furat and Ahrar al-Furat.

Over the subsequent months, some new local formations were announced and added to Liwa Thuwar al-Raqqa’s ranks. Thus, in December 2012, the Katiba al-Risala of the village of al-Sheikh Hassan in the north Raqqa countryside, the Katiba Suqur al-Jazira operating in the western Raqqa countryside, and the Katiba Usud al-Tawheed operating in Raqqa city area were announced as affiliates of Liwa Thuwar al-Raqqa. The rhetorical focus in these videos is on driving the Assad regime presence out of Raqqa province, rather than laying out an ideological vision for a post-Assad Syria. This is so despite its original emblem that ostensibly conveyed a distinctly Islamist orientation.

Also in December 2012, Liwa Thuwar al-Raqqa joined the Raqqa Liberation Front coalition, alongside similarly aligned groups including the familiar Ahfad al-Rasul (a brand of Western-backed brigades that went into sharp decline in 2013, including expulsion from Raqqa city by ISIS in August of that year), Liwa al-Muntasir bi-Allah and Liwa Isar al-Shamal (both of which, like Liwa Thuwar al-Raqqa, identified as part of the same Revolutionary Military Council) and Liwa Rayat al-Nasr (which eventually joined the Salafi grouping Ahrar al-Sham). As has often been the case in the Syrian civil war with the various coalitions announced and dissolved, the Raqqa Liberation Front coalition never led to a real merger of these groups.

Raqqa city fell in March 2013 to a combination of these brigades, Ahrar al-Sham and Jabhat al-Nusra. The following month, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi announced the creation of ISIS, demanding the subsuming of Jabhat al-Nusra under this structure. Most of the Jabhat al-Nusra contingents in Raqqa province accepted Baghdadi’s argument and defected, though a group under Abu Sa’ad al-Hadhrami broke away from ISIS in Raqqa city and temporarily took refuge in the city of Tabqa to the west of Raqqa city in mid-summer of 2013. Meanwhile, Liwa Thuwar al-Raqqa continued to operate as part of the rebels’ wider bid to take the remaining regime bases in Raqqa province- Division 17, Brigade 93 and Tabqa military airport.

Thus on 20 June, Liwa Thuwar al-Raqqa’s leader Abu Eisa denied claims he had been killed by regime forces. It is also notable that Liwa Thuwar al-Raqqa appeared to adapt somewhat to the ISIS presence in Raqqa, not only by adding the definite adjective ‘al-Islami’ (Islamic) to its name but also by using the same flag as ISIS in at least one video, as per below from July 2013, in which the group claims coordination with a number of formations, including ISIS, Jabhat al-Nusra and Ahrar al-Sham, Liwa Ahfad al-Rasul and Liwa al-Muntasir bi-Allah, in attacking a convoy that came from Brigade 93.

Despite the apparent military cooperation, tensions became increasingly apparent in a number of ways. As ISIS’ presence in Raqqa city grew with its da’wa office that set up numerous billboards throughout the city, it began detaining members of other groups, such as the leader of Liwa Amana’ al-Raqqa (another of the independent, nationalist brigades), and moved decisively to expel Ahfad al-Rasul in August, despite cooperating with the same group on the Latakia front where an offensive had been launched to push towards Assad’s ancestral village of al-Qardaha. This does not mean tensions solely revolved around disputes between ISIS on one side versus the rest of the factions on the other. There were also tensions between Liwa al-Nasir Salah al-Din (another independent group at this point) and Ahrar al-Sham as they arrested each other’s members, and Liwa Thuwar al-Raqqa reportedly had its own disputes with Ahrar al-Sham as well. Even so, all-out warfare between the various factions had not yet broken out, and the civilian local council continued to operate.

In September 2013, Jabhat al-Nusra announced its ‘return’ to Raqqa city. Some of the smaller brigades saw in Jabhat al-Nusra the chance to protect themselves from the growth of ISIS, and accordingly pledged allegiance in some form. This included Liwa Thuwar al-Raqqa, though the exact terms of the allegiance are disputed. It appears Jabhat al-Nusra had hoped to integrate Liwa Thuwar al-Raqqa through Shari’a sessions, but regardless of whether or not this was actually agreed upon, it is therefore clear that Liwa Thuwar al-Raqqa was not properly integrated into Jabhat al-Nusra’s ranks. This may have hindered the fight against ISIS when wider infighting broke out in January 2014.  Components of other actors saw a stronger horse in ISIS (which detained and eventually killed Abu Sa’ad al-Hadhrami) and thus joined its ranks, a case-in-point being part of the Liwa al-Nasir Salah al-Din.

As infighting spread between rebel forces and ISIS, Liwa Thuwar al-Raqqa appears to have taken the lead in fighting ISIS inside Raqqa city in January 2014, at which point it had broken off from Jabhat al-Nusra. However, ISIS did not suffer the same problem as elsewhere (e.g. in Idlib province) of being thinly spread out and was able to consolidate control of Raqqa city, expelling Jabhat al-Nusra, Ahrar al-Sham, Liwa Thuwar al-Raqqa etc. It would appear that the rebel side conversely suffered from problems of poor coordination in their efforts. Liwa Thuwar al-Raqqa then withdrew into the Raqqa countryside up to the Kobani enclave, seeking refuge with the Kurdish YPG. As the Liwa Thuwar al-Raqqa break-off from Jabhat al-Nusra had not been officially announced at the time, this was the origin of the ISIS narrative that Jabhat al-Nusra had entered into an alliance with the YPG. In April 2014 came Jabhat al-Nusra’s announcement of the break between itself and Liwa Thuwar al-Raqqa.

As the months continued, Liwa Thuwar al-Raqqa claimed occasional low-scale sabotage attacks and clashes with ISIS in Raqqa province, usually in coordination with another brigade that also took refuge in the Kobani canton: Liwa al-Jihad fi Sabil Allah, aligned with the opposition-in-exile. Thus on 9 June 2014, the two groups claimed to have attacked an ISIS bridge and checkpoint installation near Raqqa city. They also sent a message of solidarity to the rebels in Deir az-Zor province as ISIS continued its advance and threatened to overrun the entire province. Liwa Thuwar al-Raqqa also claimed a prisoner exchange with ISIS, in which the former released 3 ISIS operatives in exchange for 13 prisoners held by ISIS.

In September 2014, Liwa Thuwar al-Raqqa along with a number of rebel groups in the Kobani area joined the Burkan al-Furat (‘Euphrates Volcano’) coalition led by the YPG, and participated in the battle of Kobani as well as the subsequent push eastwards following the failure of the Islamic State to take the city. Liwa Thuwar al-Raqqa appears to have been the main rebel auxiliary force alongside the Kata’ib Shams al-Shamal formation of the Dawn of Freedom Brigades, which unlike Liwa Thuwar al-Raqqa draws its membership mainly from rebel groups (e.g. Liwa al-Tawheed) that existed in north-eastern Aleppo province localities such as Manbij.

As the Islamic State was driven back towards Tel Abyad, a clarification was broadcast that only Liwa Thuwar al-Raqqa would be allowed to enter Arab localities. In an interview with Orient News, it was affirmed that “the door of repentance is open. God is forgiving, merciful.” This ostensibly parallels one of the Islamic State’s own methods of securing control over a new area it takes: offering the chance for repentance. However, it was also made clear that the hand of mercy would only be extended to those whose hands were not stained “with the blood of Syrians. As for those whose hands are stained with the blood of Syrians, there is no mercy for them except killing, by God’s permission.” Abu Eisa also denied allegations that Burkan al-Furat had engaged in ethnic cleansing of Arabs in areas retaken from the Islamic State. Reflecting its political agenda more clearly, Liwa Thuwar al-Raqqa uses this logo now (see right).

At the present time, Liwa Thuwar al-Raqqa appears to be the primary rebel actor responsible for outreach to the Arab tribes in northern Raqqa province (e.g. photo to right), also claiming administration over the Ain Issa area to the south of Tel Abyad.

The group is hoping to push further south to Raqqa city, though the prospects of such an assault being successful are slim now and for the near future at least, as the Islamic State has deployed its special Jaysh al-Khilafa division to solidify the defence of Raqqa city. In the long-run, the alliance with the YPG in the Burkan al-Furat coalition seems problematic, as Liwa Thuwar al-Raqqa and the YPG/PYD have different political visions. Liwa Thuwar al-Raqqa is committed, like most rebel forces, to the concept of a unified Syria that suspects any Kurdish autonomous administration projects as working towards taqsim Souriya (‘division of Syria’). Liwa Thuwar al-Raqqa has already alluded to these issues somewhat obliquely in a recent statement denying rumours that Tel Abyad would be subsumed administratively to the PYD’s Kobani canton:

“The Tel Abyad area will wholly remain administratively with Raqqa governorate and we do not accept modification of the administrative borders for Raqqa governorate and changing the affiliation of any area under the name of any entity. What is being circulated in suggestion about the affiliation of the Tel Abyad area in administration is not within the special powers of the local council or any other council or committee. This matter requires a law and legislative committee to decide on that. And we are in an exceptional state of affairs. It is not possible to adopt any decision to change the administrative borders or affiliation of any area.”

One should also note the reference to a ‘local council’ here: on 26 August, Liwa Thuwar al-Raqqa issued an invitation for participation in a conference for the election of the local council for Raqqa province, particularly calling on members of the nominal electoral committee to participate. This conference was supposed to take place on 28 August in the Turkish city of Urfa, but as the Arabic outlet al-Aan notes, it failed to lead to the election of a local council. Out of 107 members of the electoral committee, only 4 showed up alongside representatives of the opposition-in-exile government. It would appear that the majority of those from Raqqa province in exile do not see it as worthwhile to elect a local council to provide civilian support to Liwa Thuwar al-Raqqa, recognizing that the Islamic State still controls most of the province and the PYD is the true administrator of the important town of Tel Abyad, for which the PYD has already formed its own local and seniors councils.

This is why, as I have emphasized before, it is highly misleading to go by Thomas van Linge’s maps that portray Tel Abyad and similar areas as somehow jointly controlled by the YPG and the ‘FSA’, driven as Thomas van Linge is by an ideological agenda to hype supposed Kurdish-rebel unity. Yes, it may be that the PYD takes into account for the time being local Arab and Turkmen objections to incorporating Tel Abyad into Kobani, and certainly it has little interest in pushing further south to Raqqa city and thus delegates an area like Ain Issa to Liwa Thuwar al-Raqqa. Yet the playing up of ‘YPG-FSA’ cooperation tends to ignore the fact that the YPG has done the bulk of the fighting, sustained the bulk of the casualties, and as a result its political wing the PYD has come to be the administrator of the vast majority of localities retaken from the Islamic State.

Corroborating this point for the Tel Abyad area in particular is an order from the PYD’s Asayish police division forbidding travel between Tel Abyad and Raqqa, as well as importation of various goods from Raqqa to Tel Abyad, including building materials, fuels and electrical and manufacturing apparatuses. While these decisions are understandable in that the PYD worries that bombs may be smuggled in amid the imported goods and wants to cut off as many revenue sources as possible for the Islamic State in so far as the continued cash flow between non-Islamic State and Islamic State-held areas is key for Islamic State revenue via taxation, it is clear there was no consultation here with the rebel groups in Burkan al-Furat.

To sum up, we have traced the evolution of the rise, fall and re-emergence of Liwa Thuwar al-Raqqa from 2012 to the present day, first as one of a number of indigenous, nationalist rebel groups in Raqqa province, to a non-ideological Jabhat al-Nusra affiliate, and finally to an uneasy, junior partner of the YPG. To shed further light on these issues, below is an interview I conducted recently with the director of Liwa Thuwar al-Raqqa’s media office.

Interview

Q: Where was Liwa Thuwar al-Raqqa established and from where are most of the members of Liwa Thuwar al-Raqqa (i.e. Raqqa, Ayn Issa)?

A: It was in the north Raqqa countryside in the border town of Tel Abyad. Most members are from Raqqa, some from Raqqa, others from the countryside.

Q: Jabhat al-Nusra says you gave bay’a [allegiance] but you deny you gave bay’a to them? You mean it was just a military alliance?

A: Yes an alliance to expel the Dawla organization from Raqqa.

Q: And when did the alliance end?

A: It ended because of their lack of support for us during our battle with Da’esh and they withdrew from Raqqa without informing us of that.

Q: In their statement on the end of the alliance they say that you had agreed on Shari’a sessions. True or not?

A: No, not true.

Q: After Raqqa fell to Da’esh’s hand, did most of their [Liwa Thuwar al-Raqqa] members go to Kobani?

A: Yes.

Q: How many martyrs do you have from the battles in Kobani, Tel Abyad and Ain Issa?

A: I am not sure but approximately 30.

Q: Many of the factions say the PYD wants taqsim Souria [division of Syria]. Do you agree?

A: Yes. They had a plan of division but amid our opposition to the matter of joining Tel Abyad to Kobani [canton] our opinion was taken into account.

Q: Is Liwa Thuwar al-Raqqa administering any areas?

A: Currently only the locality of Ain Issa.

Q: I heard that you are trying to establish relations with the tribes in the north Raqqa countryside. What are the names of these tribes?

A: Many names: al-Mashhura, Albu Assaf, Albu Khamees, Jais, Albu Shamis, Albu Jarad, Albu Issa

Q: Do you want a civil or Islamic state?

A: Civil democratic state.

Q: With regards to the other battalions in Burkan al-Furat are they administering liberated areas or do they only have a military presence? That is, if I understand correctly, Kata’ib Shams al-Shamal for example wants to recover Jarabulus and Manbij?

A: Yes, they want to recover Jarabulus and Manbij and administer them.

Q: When do you expect that you will try to recover Raqqa city?

A: When we are given sufficient support we will recover Raqqa city soon, but if things remain as they are the time to liberate it will be delayed a lot.

Q: Do you have relations with the Syrian opposition in Turkey or are you independent?

A: No, we are independent.

By Graham MacPhee*

It may be difficult to appreciate from afar just how significant Jeremy Corbyn’s election as leader of the Labor Party, the main opposition party in Britain, really is. After all, Corbyn as yet holds no state office — only a North London parliamentary seat — and any prospect of his leading a UK government is years away.

But make no mistake: His victory is a political bombshell, and this mild-mannered, soft-spoken left-wing MP is packing political dynamite.

The key to understanding the importance of Corbyn’s victory lies in the role that former prime minister Tony Blair’s “New Labor” movement played in transforming the political landscape — not only in Britain, but across Europe.

In the decades following World War II, Labor forged a cross-party consensus around a broadly social democratic program. Focusing economic policy on full employment, it built the National Health Service and a welfare state that dramatically reduced social inequality and expanded economic and social democratization. But when Margaret Thatcher’s government tore up the postwar consensus and began deindustrializing Britain and dismantling the country’s social safety net, Blair managed to present the New Labor project — that is, a sweeping and calculated tack to the political center — as a smart and modern alternative to Thatcherism’s neoliberal agenda.

But it wasn’t an alternative at all.

Behind the hype, New Labor amounted simply to the abandonment of social democracy and capitulation to both the style and substance of the corporate takeover of democratic politics. Not only could all public assets be privatized at knockdown prices, but all policy U-turns could be packaged and spun to an ever-shrinking section of the electorate — the “floating voters” of a notional “middle England.”

The War on Hope

Despite a run of electoral success during the Blair era, over the long term this program has proven economically, socially, and politically disastrous.

While high-paying jobs are shipped overseas and the UK economy is subordinated to the short-term profit drive of the financial sector, inequality and social exclusion have mushroomed, forcing impoverished families to feed their children at food banks and charity kitchens. Yet the new neoliberal consensus nonetheless established an extraordinary sense of its own inevitability and endurance, even as the country lurched into an illegal war in Iraq and the global economy hurtled into the deepest recession since World War II. The political doctrine of both Thatcherism and New Labor is simply that “there is no alternative.”

This sense of disempowerment is a result of the profound damage that neoliberalism has inflicted on democratic politics. It’s not simply that the New Labor “brand” has become toxic through its association with the slick and empty messaging it borrowed from corporate PR — it’s that politics itself has been discredited as the preserve of elites with little or no regard for popular concerns. As electoral participation has ebbed, popular disenchantment has tended to benefit ultra-nationalist, xenophobic, and racist currents, since neoliberalism’s doctrine of inevitability leaves little room except for resignation and the politics of hatred.

Against the elite’s apparently unshakeable stranglehold on politics, Corbyn’s election as Labor leader comes as an earthquake. But there were earlier tremors.

In fact, neoliberalism’s electoral invincibility has been crumbling for some time, most notably in the extraordinary popular mobilization around last year’s Scottish independence referendum and the subsequent obliteration of New Labor in Scotland. What the collapse of the Labor vote in Scotland showed was that a community of purpose across broad sections of society could be translated into real political outcomes, even in the teeth of overwhelming hostility from the media and elite opinion.

The popular movement that propelled Corbyn’s victory shows that ordinary people understood this lesson in a way that completely escaped the political class.

That Corbyn’s victory is a bombshell for received political wisdom does not mean, however, that his program is particularly radical or “hard left,” as mainstream media in both the United States and the United Kingdom have begun to paint it. In fact, Corbyn’s proposals are modest and practical. They include shifting some of the burden of the financial downturn from people to corporations and providing a sensible measure of economic stimulus, while restoring valuable social safeguards like rent control and collective bargaining rights.

Nor does it mean that Corbyn’s future success is guaranteed, or that Labor’s political fortunes will be transformed overnight. The return of even a moderate social democratic program in Britain has a whole host of mountains to climb, starting with the vast majority of Labor MPs who, over a period of decades now, have been carefully selected for their compliance with the New Labor agenda.

The point of Corbyn’s victory is that such a return is at least practically possible, if a sufficient coalition of forces can be brought together. Finally, after all this time, there is an alternative.

Horizons of Possibility

Without downplaying the huge difficulties facing the reemergence of a workable social democratic alternative in Britain, it’s worth considering its potential impacts across Europe and globally to understand the stakes involved.

New Labor led the line in the transformation of social democratic parties into robotically reliable instruments of the neoliberal takeover. For a time, the Labor Party provided what appeared to be an electorally successful model while pushing corporate interests in the name of “social justice.” In Britain, this somersault was sold through a muscular faith in the “free market” policies of the U.S., and by extension its foreign policy. In continental Europe, the evisceration of social democracy was promulgated instead under the rubric of EU integration and the relentless progress to an “ever closer union“ that almost no one desired and even fewer voted for.

As the promise of a “social Europe” proved to be a mirage, all that was left was the free movement of capital and the ability of corporations to dodge taxes on a pan-European scale. This identification with the supranational agendas of foreign corporate and political elites has made the former social democratic parties virtually unelectable, while letting conservative and Christian democratic parties off the hook and able to present themselves as at least financially “realistic.”

Despite their electoral decline, the former social democratic parties continue to play a significant role in propelling the EU austerity regime. This damaging role was most graphically illustrated in the brutal and utterly counterproductive punishment meted out to Greece following Syriza’s abortive attempt to challenge neoliberal austerity. According to the Financial Times, the paper of record for global elites, Greek attempts to negotiate a solution could be dismissed out of hand because they failed to gain the support of the German Social Democratic Party or the French Socialists. Yet as the same paper notes, the German Social Democrats’ electoral weakness has emboldened the right wing of Chancellor Angela Merkel’s Christian Democrats, shifting the political center ever further to the right.

While the compliance of the former social democratic parties has worked to justify the EU austerity agenda and shift discussion to the right, resistance has been left to newly formed or previously marginalized political movements in smaller economies such as Ireland, Portugal, and of course Greece. Greek opposition to austerity could be so easily steamrollered because of the country’s political and economic weakness, and its harsh treatment was designed to send a warning signal to insurgent movements such as Podemos in Spain.

But an anti-austerity alliance led by a party from a major European economy with experience in government and international institution-building would shift the balance of power significantly. As the Financial Times warns, “Podemos in Spain and Syriza in Greece are scrappy young parties that define themselves against the mainstream,” while in Corbyn’s case the “sudden transformation of an established party is more shocking than the eruption of a new one.”

Transatlantic Relations

If a resurgence of social democracy in Britain could begin to challenge the continued imposition of austerity in Europe, it could also raise questions about Britain’s stalwart subservience to the United States.

At the very least, a Corbyn leadership will allow (rather than stifle) discussion of the anti-democratic TTIP, or Transatlantic Trade and Industry Partnership — a corporate-favored “free trade” agreement between the United States and the European Union following close on the heels the Trans-Pacific Partnership currently being negotiated in secret by the U.S. and 11 other Pacific Rim states.

More headline-grabbing is Corbyn’s commitment to ending British involvement in the apparently endless procession of U.S. military interventions.

Labor’s track record with regard to Britain’s neo-imperial role was never edifying, even before Tony Blair. Indeed, the postwar nationalized economy and the welfare state were built around a conception of national community that hid its dependence on the extension of the empire into the 1960s, at a particularly bloody cost. Equally, this imperial extension was predicated on Britain assuming a subordinate role in support of the new global hegemon, the United States.

But current geopolitical reality for European states is dominated by the fallout from Washington’s catastrophic destabilization of the Middle East, a fallout from which Americans are largely insulated. Many in Europe have little appetite left for the hopelessly ill-conceived “war on terror,” and Prime Minister David Cameron has already indicated that Labor’s refusal to support airstrikes in Syria would effectively veto British military action.

Nonetheless, the political calculation on the right is that even though enthusiasm for military intervention is declining, the sense of crisis and threat generated by this period of destabilization will be enough to keep “national security” viable as a powerful stick to beat a resurgent Labor Party. Corbyn’s opposition to replacing Trident, the costly nuclear weapons system leased by Britain but controlled by the United States, and his skepticism about the continuing value of the Cold War alliance NATO will doubtless feature relentlessly in this attack plan.

Of course, all of these possibilities remain to be played out, and it is far too early to begin speculating about the prospects of a Corbyn-led Labor Party at the next general election in 2020. Indeed, it remains to be seen whether the 66 year-old Corbyn will still be party leader by then.

But the election of an avowed socialist and longtime peace campaigner to the leadership of one of the main political parties in Europe, and in a nation-state that plays an important geopolitical role, doesn’t happen every day. That such credentials have been unthinkable in a Labor leader for three decades is an indication both of the drastic narrowing of political possibility over that time and of the extraordinary break with the recent past that Jeremy Corbyn’s victory represents.

*Graham MacPhee is a professor of English at West Chester University. He is the author of Postwar British Literature and Postcolonial Studies (Edinburgh University Press, 2011) and co-editor of Empire and After: Englishness in Postcolonial Perspective (Berghahn, 2007).

As the U.S. and Central American governments continue to discuss how to curb the number of people leaving Central American countries for the U.S. border, a new research paper from the Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR) finds that Honduras’ agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) may prolong Honduras’ economic problems, which include high poverty, unemployment and high inequality.

The paper, “Honduras: IMF Austerity, Macroeconomic Policy, and Foreign Investment,” by CEPR Research Assistant Stephan Lefebvre, notes that the agreement, which provides Honduras with $189 million in financing over three years, includes many austerity measures, despite the weak labor market and growing poverty, and provides almost no protections for the most vulnerable sectors of society. As a condition of the deal, Honduran authorities agreed to implement fiscal consolidation amounting to 6.5 percent of GDP over four years, in addition to so-called “structural reforms” including privatizations, pension reforms and public sector layoffs.

“Thousands of people fled Honduras for the U.S. last year due to widespread crime, broken institutions, and a deteriorating economy,” CEPR Co-Director Mark Weisbrot noted. “Yet the IMF’s prescriptions are likely to weaken the economy further and worsen Honduras’ problems.

“Honduran labor markets have yet to return to their pre-global-recession level and both poverty and inequality remain too high, with little sign of improvement,” Weisbrot said. “Following a program of austerity—which the IMF itself seems to recognize will be highly unpopular—is likely to cause further deterioration.”

The paper notes:

• The broadest measure of unemployment and underemployment increased from 35.5 percent of the labor force in 2008 to 56.4 percent in 2013. It is highly probable that pursuing austerity measures in this context will make the situation worse.
• The timing and composition of fiscal consolidation means that costs will likely fall disproportionately on the country’s poor majority. Spending cuts target public sector workers, capital spending and local governments.
• A significant portion of the spending cuts target the government wage bill, expected to decrease by 1.7 percent of GDP by 2017. If fully implemented, the IMF plan will radically reshape the public sector in Honduras through austerity measures and a sweeping reform program that effectively privatizes important parts of the economy.
• Fiscal consolidation is frontloaded, with more than three-quarters of the four-year consolidation goal achieved by 2015. The agreement notes the possibility of “strong resistance” to these austerity measures and explicitly mentions making these policy changes well ahead of the 2017 general election.
• The plan contains only one provision designed to protect the impoverished majority in Honduras: a floor on social spending of 1.6 percent of GDP that is insufficient in both size and scope.
• The IMF plan for dealing with large and persistent current account deficits relies heavily on Honduras continuing to receive large net inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI).

“The foreign investment-dependent strategy that the IMF favors is fraught with risk, because FDI flows can be fickle and exhibit high volatility,” Lefebvre said. “This macroeconomic plan is also an important driver of some dubious projects intended to attract foreign investment, such as so-called ‘model,’ or ‘charter cities.’”

By Michael Lelyveld

As doubts about China’s economy mount, the government has turned to confidence-building statements and questionable data to make its case for official growth rates.

On Sunday, the government released a series of disappointing figures for August, undercutting assurances given by Premier Li Keqiang at a World Economic Forum meeting last week.

At the conference in the port city of Dalian, Li told investors that “positive factors in economic growth (are) increasing and (the) economic index has started to pick up after previously falling,” according to the official English- language China Daily.

But three days later, the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) reported relatively slow growth in key industry and investment indicators that fell short of consensus forecasts compiled by Reuters and The Wall Street Journal.

Industrial output rose 6.1 percent, up slightly from 6 percent in July but below forecasts of 6.4-6.6 percent.

Growth in fixed-asset investment in the first eight months dropped to 10.9 percent, the weakest in 15 years, Reuters reported, with property investment up only 3.5 percent.

Qu Hongbin, chief economist at HSBC in Hong Kong, said the numbers “fell below general market expectations,” the official Xinhua news agency reported.

Last week, Xinhua said its consumer confidence index fell for the third month a row due to stock market fluctuations and losses in personal wealth.

But the glum news was coupled with the release of a reform plan for state-owned enterprises (SOEs), timed to brighten the outlook for investment in the lagging industrial sector.

Little market enthusiasm

The guideline issued by the Communist Party Central Committee and the State Council, or cabinet, will promote “for-profit entities” among SOEs and “boost the economy,” Xinhua said.

China’s stock markets showed little enthusiasm Monday after the SOE plan “turned out to be less far-reaching than many hoped,” the Financial Times reported. The Shanghai Composite Index fell 2.6 percent and other indexes lost about 7 percent.

But the attempt to pair good and bad news followed a pattern in recent weeks as the government tries to persuade markets not to overreact negative reports.

In an unusual move on Aug. 30, the nation’s top planning agency released partial figures for the month on power use and rail tonnage, both showing “better-than-forecast” results, according to Xinhua.

The National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) said power consumption between Aug. 1 and Aug. 28 rose 2.97 percent while railway cargoes in July gained 5.8 percent from the year-earlier periods.

In a news analysis, Xinhua was frank about the reason for the early release of the electricity data on a Sunday before the end of the month and the stock market opening on Monday, saying the figures were announced “ahead of schedule to reassure markets.”

But the preemptive publication of positive numbers only prompted more questions about China’s economic performance and the reliability of official reports.

China watchers said the NDRC announcement of partial and selective monthly figures was rare, if not unprecedented.

“Both the timing and the numbers are plainly suspicious,” said Derek Scissors, a China economist and resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington.

Instead of building confidence, the move raised doubts about why the NDRC decided it was necessary.

The release came within hours of a statement by the Ministry of Public Security that it had punished 197 people for spreading rumors that “caused panic, misled the public and resulted in disorders in (the) stock market or society.”

The penalties were aimed at a broad range of reactions to sensitive events including market movements, the Tianjin explosions and the Sept. 3 ceremonies marking the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II, Xinhua said.

In one prominent case, a journalist at Caijing business magazine was arrested for reporting that the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) was seeking to withdraw funds from the stock market, according to Western media.

A CSRC official and four executives of CITIC Securities faced punishments for insider trading and other violations, Xinhua reported.

Chilling effect

The penalties were seen as having a chilling effect on the Chinese market and investment.

The Shanghai index dropped 3 percent in morning trading the next day before recovering to close with a slight gain.

“The crackdown smacks of desperation,” The New York Times said in an editorial, adding that “jailing might scare journalists and social media users …, but it won’t help the broader economy or the financial markets.”

The NDRC’s “good news” appeared aimed at counteracting effects of the crackdown, but the rosy numbers may have only heightened concerns that China’s gross domestic product (GDP) has been growing at less than the official 7-percent rate.

There have been few signs before or since the NDRC announcement to support the optimistic view that it tried to promote with selective data.

“This is an odd story, as everything else points to GDP growth significantly lower than 7 percent,” said Philip Andrews-Speed, a China energy expert at National University of Singapore.

A week after the NDRC release of partial figures, the agency cited a report from the State Grid for the full month of August, showing that power consumption rose 2.47 percent, a half of a percentage point less than the previous growth claim.

Even the smaller increase may be open to doubt. On Sunday, the NBS reported that power generation last month rose only 1 percent.

While the reported gain in electricity use would be slight by China’s historical standards, it would still represent a turnaround from the 1.3-percent decline in July and the 0.8- percent growth rate reported for the first seven months of the year.

The rail tonnage increase of 5.8 percent seems even more unlikely in light of the 10.1-percent plunge in cargoes reported by the NDRC in July for the first half.

The agency argued that rail traffic during the partial August period continued to rise by 1.2-percent “as the need for coal, steel and oil stabilized.”

That view was undercut two days later when the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) released its official manufacturing purchasing managers’ index (PMI) for August with a rating of 49.7, marking the steepest slump for the indicator of industrial output in three years.

The news triggered a renewed selloff on world markets as the Dow Jones Industrial Average plummeted 2.8 percent after a week of seesawing over China reports. Any PMI reading below 50 is a sign of contraction.

On Sept. 6, also a Sunday, Xinhua released another optimistic CSRC statement, saying that the “stock market has stabilized and risks have been released to some extent.”

But the next day, the Shanghai average fell 2.5 percent after the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) said it had spent U.S. $93.9 billion from its foreign exchange reserves last month in efforts to prop up the yuan.

The episodes may soon be forgotten in the clamor of daily volatility, but the government’s attempts to sway the markets with cherry-picked data have added to doubts about the validity of its reports.

China has struggled for over a decade to improve the reliability of NBS economic reporting, famously derided as “man-made” and “for reference only” by Premier Li Keqiang, when he was Communist Party chief of northeastern Liaoning province in 2007.

The agency has pursued a series of reforms to stop localities from fictionalizing production figures and to keep provincial GDP claims from topping national totals.

Data inflation in China mattered little to world markets, as long as investors could assume the economy was expanding and see the evidence in indicators like power consumption and commodities like coal, oil and gas.

But drops in the indicators to single digits and negative growth have coincided with China’s increased influence on world markets, triggering sharp investor reactions and sudden disillusionment with official GDP reports.

Beyond the NBS problems, analysts face disorganization of economic data with production and consumption figures coming from other agencies like the NDRC, the National Energy Administration (NEA) and industry groups. These are often elliptical, unexplained or at odds.

The NDRC statement on Aug. 30, for example, implied that electricity use in July fell 2 percent, magnifying the August recovery, after the NEA reported a July drop of 1.3 percent.

Such differences matter less than the bigger gaps between power consumption rates and official GDP and arguments over whether electricity use should be seen an indicator of actual economic growth at all.

Power consumption as economic measure

In postings at the Peterson Institute for International Economics in Washington, China economist Nicholas Lardy has taken issue with doubters of the official GDP data, arguing that they ignore the country’s transition to a service and consumption-led economy that uses less electricity than in the past.

“Assuming that electric power growth is a good proxy for China’s overall economic expansion is like trying to drive a car by looking in the rearview mirror,” Lardy wrote in a New York Times op-ed last month.

But in releasing its selected data, the NDRC has made its own case for citing power consumption as a “key economic indicator.”

“Power use and rail freight are two advanced indicators for the economy, and their rise suggests more rapid growth in industrial output and a rising trend in the broader economy,” Xinhua said in its report.

In one sense, arguments over indicators and actual economic growth rates may be overshadowed if markets continue to react to doubtful data from China, causing investors and consumers to pull in their horns.

Further tests of the reactions are likely to come in the next month as the NBS and other agencies unveil their sequence of September reports and what may be a moment of truth with the official GDP estimate for the third quarter.

If the government sticks with a 7-percent growth rate that portrays the economy on an unfaltering course, it may suffer a greater loss of credibility unless a broader range of indicators appear in support.

The lessons and knowledge accumulated from Transnistria and Northern Cyprus should be a valuable asset when tackling another emerging frozen conflict in Europe – the Ukrainian Donbass.

By Anastasiya Marchuk*

Transnistria, a secessionist region of the Republic of Moldova, is often compared to Northern Cyprus. Both share many common features – aspirations for independence and non-recognition by the international community, over-involvement of external actors or ‘guarantors’, a history of violence which preceded establishment of the current status quo, strong self-identity and cultural differences, presence of foreign military forces and disadvantaged conditions for trade and movement of people in comparison with the opponent.

At the same time, the Cyprus conflict is aggravated by a number of factors, including strong religious and ethnic contrasts and existence of minorities, who are severely underrepresented. A certain level of ‘demonization’ and misinterpretation of past events have led to the formation of strong feelings of hostility between the two communities. As in the case of Transnistria, international efforts brought little comfort, if any, and are often strongly rejected by at least one of the parties, feeling that the proposed measures are one-sided and biased. Indeed, the only feasible plan which had a chance to succeed was the ‘Annan Plan‘, that can be compared to the ‘Kozak’s Memorandum’ for Transnistria. Paradoxically, the attempt to reach settlement through consultations not with elites but the population, through two separate referenda, yielded unwanted results. As in any conflict, radical segments of the political arena – those from the South calling for ‘Enosis’ and those from the North promoting ‘Taksim’ – took advantage of the situation to launch propagandistic campaigns and influence the public opinion, which had been already very much divided.

These lessons and knowledge accumulated through mistakes and failures should be a valuable asset when tackling another emerging frozen conflict in Europe – the Ukrainian Donbass. Clearly, at present it is going through the phase of active violent confrontation, but it will most likely transform into a frozen condition when all sides acknowledge the impossibility to gain a clean victory without full physical destruction of the opponent.

The factors – objective or generated artificially – which divide the communities, are already apparent and they will prevent reunification of the population far more successfully than any borders or armed soldiers. Different interpretation of historical events, creation of myths about atrocities committed by both sides, deliberate or unconscious maintaining of a behavioral paradigm ‘us’ vs ‘them’ – these are the primary topics which should be addressed within the process of conflict transformation.

The reconciliation strategy must be comprehensive and consistent, since it will be severely challenged in both communities, and for different reasons. First, the chaos of war creates high incentives for flourishing of organized crime. Second, it leaves much room for corruption and financial jiggery-pokery in the area of military procurement and such. Finally, there are certain segments of the population that find it honorable, inevitable or even exciting to continue fighting.

With the beginning of protests in November 2013 in Kiev and subsequent escalation of violence caused by inadequate reaction from the Government, the society of Ukraine has started the process of its conversion. Young men and women picked-up wooden shields and clubs, to be later replaced with rifles and body armor. Wearing clothes with camouflage patterns and balaclavas became fashionable. Youth self-organized itself into semi-military formations and started duplicating the work of the police, protecting public order. At times they even attempted executing ‘justice’ the way they see it, as seen in the recent Mukachevo incident, although the motives of the ‘Right Sector’ activists remain to be verified. Distrust in state institutions, nurtured by decades of corruption and loyalty to only certain groups in power, and active dissemination of firearms across the country pose a great threat to the fragile balance in the country and bode ill for any peace-building initiatives.

The experience shows that prior to offering any settlement proposals, there is an obvious need to build trust between the two communities, ideally with recognition and involvement of existing minorities. Any agreements reached at the level of the leaders will fail if they are not backed up by the population. Confidence building measures and technical initiatives which benefit all people should precede all settlement efforts. The area for interaction could include creation of favorable conditions for commerce, education, sports, culture, women’s rights. Building bridges between minds is no less important than building them across rivers.

Anastasiya Marchuk works for the EU Border Assistance Mission to the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine in the field of conflict analysis, with focus on the Transnistrian settlement process. Her favorite research topic is frozen conflicts and their transformation.

By Vijay Shankar*

Pakistan’s use of terror organisations as a tool of State policy to wage unconventional war against India (Christine Fair, Fighting to the End) has perverse consequences that link sub-conventional warfare with nuclear escalation. This bizarre correlation, Pakistan will have the world believe, comes to play if and when India chooses to respond with conventional forces to a terror strike puppeteered by their “Deep State.”

Notwithstanding the reality of inter-State relations that finds expression in a byzantine system of the larger un-codified international relations, common ground exists in the challenges that threaten the very existence of the State. Military power, economics, politics, religion and the dynamics of change provide very convincing provinces within which to fix challenges, yet it is the hazard of mass destruction that, without debate, presents itself as the “emperor-of-challenges.” Willingness of the Deep State in Pakistan to catalyse such a scenario, keeping that country always “on the brink” in order to preserve the position of the army, the ISI and the jihadis as upholders of the State, is the peril of our times. And yet if this be the substance then it must equally be true that willfully enabling a nuclear exchange carries the immanence that will finish the Deep State. Keeping the nation persistently on the edge has left Pakistan’s internals in a state of violent turmoil, as several interest networks such as the elites that drive military autonomy, the security apparatus, enfeebled political groups and the fractured jihadis battle for supremacy. The circumstances are fraught since the fallout is demise of (already impoverished) democratic institutions and the wasted idea of a unified Pakistan. In this milieu the cracks in control of nuclear weapons are apparent. After all, the internals may, in the extreme, catalyse the use of nuclear weapons in a plot that begins with a terror strike on India.

The question of motivating Pakistan to demobilise anti-India terrorist groups and thus defuse the reason for escalation of conflict is the most pressing strategic imperative. China, in this frame of reference, though cognate, is a more distant strategic intimidation. Relations between India and China have been stable and improving, save for occasional flares on account of a border that has denied definition. There have not been sustained hostilities since 1962 nor has there been a predilection to reach, even in rhetoric, for nuclear weapons. Deterrence between the two large States has also been relatively stable, since the Chinese nuclear doctrine founded on NFU and minimality finds accord with India’s doctrine and neither country is seeking to change the status quo by exploring space below the nuclear threshold. India’s nuclear deterrent is not country-specific; its credibility will remain an abstraction in the mind of the potential adversary, while minimality is magnitude in the mind of the deterrer (India in this case). On the other hand, Pakistan and India have experienced four wars, two of which were initiated and waged in concert with non-State actors. The two States have also confronted two major crises initiated by terror attacks in India. To strategic planners in India, Pakistani use of jihadi groups as an instrument of State policy is a factor that is always considered when mapping a conventional riposte. Despite successes in recent history, it is equally clear that that sub-conventional warfare can only be beaten by State policy on both sides coupled with conventional forces. The clamping down on terror activities from Pakistan post operation “Parakram” (the military standoff between India and Pakistan between December 2001 and October 2002 following jihadi assault on the Indian Parliament on 13 December 2001) that resulted in the massing of troops on either side of the border and along the Line of Control in Kashmir. One of the positive outcomes of the mobilisation and coercive threat of military action was President Musharraf’s policy statement of 12 January 2002 not to permit Pakistan soil to be used for launch of terror activities. Significantly, on ground, the declaration held till 2008. This aftermath stands in testimony as to what works.

Evolving Nuclear Context

The link between sub-conventional warfare and nuclear war fighting is at best a tenuous one. Conceptually, no amount of tinkering or reconstitution of nuclear policy can deter terror attacks. Such a notion would appear farfetched because of the very nature of the weapon involved. Clearly it is the policy that harbours terror groups as instruments of State policy that has to be targeted. Pakistan has today inducted tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) into its arsenal with the stated purpose of countering an Indian response to a terror strike. Almost as if to suggest that they control the levers of nuclear escalation. This an odd proposition since India does not differentiate between tactical and strategic nuclear weapons, (this is not only stated by most scholars in the know, but is also the bed rock of a nuclear deterrent relationship). Also, TNWs involve decentralisation and dispersal, both of which dilute command and control and multiply the risk of the weapon falling into the wrong hands. In the end analysis, the use of nuclear weapons introduces a new and uncontrollable dimension. Logically, if a Pak-sponsored terror attack is the triggering event of a sequence of reactions, then it must equally be clear that their nuclear red lines give space for a conventional response. After all, the premise that a terror attack is seamlessly backed by nuclear weapons is not only ludicrous but is not even the Pakistani case. For, when dealing with the threat of use of nuclear weapons, to suggest that ambiguity and first use provide options, is to suggest that nuclear war-fighting almost in conventional terms is an option. This, by most, is denial of the nature of nuclear weapons, characterised by mass destruction and uncontrollability.

There is a suggestion in some scholarly quarters, that there was little or no Pakistan sponsored terror activity before nuclear umbrellas were raised in the sub-continent. This is repudiation of history (whether at partition in 1947-48, in 1965 or in the 1980s to 90s). Unfortunately this mistaken assumption has led the narrative on a quest to seek answers to sub-conventional warfare in nuclear weapons and their deterrent effect, increasing in turn the dangers of early use. This does not serve the interest of deterrent stability. Yet, as with the conventional military options, some experts and former military officials in India, echoed by western analysts, have begun to question whether India should alter its approach to nuclear deterrence in ways that would affect Pakistan’s calculus. The relationship between nuclear deterrence and sub conventional aggression – what has been colourfully described as “jihad under the nuclear umbrella” – is not a new phenomenon in South Asia. But since 2008, and especially after Pakistan tested a new short-range missile in 2011 and declared it part of a policy of “full spectrum” deterrence, Indian strategists have begun to question more vocally whether New Delhi’s approach to nuclear deterrence should more directly confront this challenge through the induction of TNWs. Nuclear weapons in any nuclear weapon State, barring Pakistan, are today a political tool. So why there is a contrary belief is, least to say, inexplicable. To advocate that deterrence success has been achieved by Pakistan because it was able to indulge in terror activities since 2008 is also to suggest that India’s nuclear weapons were made to deter jihadist – this is quaint! Analogous would be that Pakistan achieved deterrence success over the US since it harboured Osama bin Laden till 2011 or Mullah Omar till 2013!

Pakistan has suggested that the induction of TNWs into its nuclear arsenal is in response to India’s Cold Start doctrine. It must be noted that the Cold Start is a conventional war fighting strategy that aims at overcoming the ponderous mobilisation process. Remember, it is a reactive conventional artifice that clutches in, should the need arise to take rapid military action across the border. Its pre-emption does not lie in a nuclear response but in reining in terror activities. For Pakistan to turn to TNWs and varyingly call them “full spectrum deterrence” or “shoot and scoot” options, one wonders if the lessons of the Cold War have sunk home or, where they intend to scoot.

Some scholars question India’s nuclear doctrine as an emerging contest between “policy and strategy,” presumably that is to imply military control over a slice of the nuclear arsenal limited by yield, vector and purpose; that is, provide the military with a limited nuclear war fighting alternative (LNWA). This option, for reasons that have been laboured upon earlier is characterised by the absence of escalatory control, a denial of political oversight and ambiguity between controller and custodian of the nuclear arsenal. To the Indian strategic planner there is no such thing as LNWA since the absence of escalatory control negates any notional gains that it may bestow. Retaliation that is either punitive or proportional implies a nuclear war fighting strategy; this is anathema to Indian strategic thought. As far as the correlation of policy and strategy is concerned, it remains the influence of policy on military strategy with a clear demarcation between conventional military resources and control over all nuclear forces.

The Perverse Nuclear Chain of Events and Capabilities

The nuclear scenario and the chain of events that currently finds articulation may in essence be outlined as follows: Pakistan promotes a militant strike and in order to counter conventional retaliation uses TNWs and then in order to degrade a massive retaliatory second strike launches a full blown counter force/counter value strike. This is perverse for by this logic even a bolt from the blue strike is in the realm of possibilities and for Pakistan to launch a nuclear strike it does not even need a nuclear adversary at all! The use of nuclear weapons releases restraints on retaliation. It is compelling to note that the Kargil conflict of 1999 was brought to closure because both military and economic pressures were becoming intolerable for Pakistan. Of equal significance is that it did not reach for the nuclear trigger but capitulated.

Western sources have in recent times has been quick to point out that India has either fallen behind in quality, technology or quantity of nuclear weapons. It need hardly be underscored that the 4th and 5th of the 1998 tests were low-yield warheads. India’s nuclear doctrine, NFU policy, minimalistic approach to its arsenal size and the current quest for strategic nuclear stability is more swayed by China than Pakistan. Doubts that have also been cast on the technical capabilities and yields of the nuclear weapon programme based on the words of one disengaged member of the Indian scientific community, these are misplaced. Yields that have been operationalised are far in excess of 25kt, they include thermonuclear devices. Numbers are adequate. The ability to reconstitute to low yield weapons also exists.

Seeking Escalation Dominance

For India to emulate Pakistan’s nuclear policies i.e. FU and TNWs, runs counter to every logic that has so far been propounded. To promote that the solution to nuclear deterrence asymmetry is escalation dominance is not to state the entire theorem, which is, that the corollary is nuclear war fighting, which most scholars agree is a rather flaky concept. LNWA and proportionality of nuclear response are all sub-texts to the same. To transpose conventional strategy on nuclear policy can prove disastrous more so when dealing with a State controlled by its military and intelligence apparatus. Once again the logic of orderly nuclear escalation is fallacious. Deterrence in essence is a mind game that does not brook any logic other than total escalation when confronted by a nuclear strike. The three options before India in response to a TNW strike are LNWA, punitive nuclear strike or doctrinal massive retaliation. The former two may sound reasonable on paper but notions of counter force strikes, flexible response, LNWA etc. do not make sense in the face of total escalation.

A Conclusion: One Answer to Jihadist Aggression

Conventional forces are different by nature from nuclear forces. The former is susceptible to control, escalation, geographic spread, and indeed to economic pressures. The latter is not. Tolerance to conventional forces is the rub; where their limits lie is the question that planners must answer. India’s incentive to keep below the nuclear threshold is as pressing as it is for Pakistan. This is deterrence at play. The conclusion that nuclear weapons do not deter sub-conventional warfare is appropriate. At the same time conventional forces can and do suppress the use of jihadists and if this policy is brought to bear in concert with anti-terror policy answers may be found to jihadist violence.

* Vijay Shankar
Former Commander-in-Chief, Strategic Forces Command of India

Singapore’s immediate neighbour, Malaysia, has been making its investment presence in Africa felt and could play a significant role in the emerging ASEAN-Africa nexus. Kuala Lumpur is set to capitalise on the next wave of opportunities led by Islamic finance and halal business.

By Robert MacPherson*

With an increasingly heavy investment footprint spanning the length and breadth of the African continent, Malaysia is establishing itself as an important dynamic in the emerging ASEAN-Africa nexus.

In the run-up to the recent Bandung Asia-Africa Summit in Indonesia this past April, statements from Prime Minister Najib Razak’s office suggested a long-range view for enhancing relationships on the continent. Driven by “commitment in strengthening cooperation” and achieving “prosperity through South-South cooperation,” Malaysia is expressing great enthusiasm and commitment to exploring opportunities in Africa.

Africa’s growing attraction

Indeed, the continent could find itself playing a central role as part of Malaysia’s effort to develop a latticework of political and trade relationships with developing nations. Since the 1990s, Singapore’s northern neighbour has undertaken a sustained effort to build partnerships across the developing world as part of its vision to achieve greater resiliency on the global stage through political and economic diversification. In the wake of the recent financial crisis, this aspiration has all but certainly been renewed.

Taking note of Africa’s burgeoning investment opportunities, which have delivered some of the highest returns globally in recent years, Malaysia has responded with ever larger amounts of foreign direct investment that have blazed a trajectory of consistent 20%+ year-on-year growth over the past decade. These FDI flows culminated at a whopping US$19.3 billion in 2011, eclipsing those of both China and India on the continent, and following behind only the United States and France as the third largest international investor that year.

Malaysian firms can now be found operating in a wide range of sectors across the continent, from resource extraction, hotel and leisure, shopping, and financial services. The diversity of undertakings reflect Malaysia’s own recent transformation into a more multi-sectored and dynamic economy and indicate the private sector’s appetite to establish meaningful in-roads into frontier markets well beyond the ASEAN region.

Malaysian company Probase Manufacturing Sdn. Bhd., for example, completed its first road development project in Kenya this past June, which leveraged new soil technology to cut the expected price tag of such a project by more than half, while in the process pricking the interests of Rwanda and Swaziland to undertake similar pilot projects worth $3 million each in their countries. Other companies, like Pacific Inter-Link, are already long established with a well-entrenched presence on the continent with regional offices in markets like Ethiopia, Nigeria and Ghana, among others, that are engaged in manufacturing and commodities trading.

Next wave of opportunities

While Africa may not be reciprocating in terms of FDI, the relationship is nonetheless a two-way street of growing awareness and integration. Preceding the 2011 investment surge, 2010 was marked by an equally rapid increase in the number of African students enrolling in Malaysian universities. According to official UNESCO figures, Malaysia welcomed 120% more African student enrolments in 2010, reaching 11,825 from 5,373 in the previous year.

This number has only continued to rise thereafter. Political engagement has also been two-way, with the Malaysian agenda driven by a robust network of diplomatic missions on the continent that is comparatively larger than many of its ASEAN counterparts.

This current rhythm of engagement is priming the Malaysia-Africa corridor to take advantage of the next wave of opportunity. According to the Malaysia International Islamic Financial Centre, there are increasingly attractive and feasible possibilities for linking Kuala Lumpur’s bustling Islamic finance community to address substantial investment needs for critical African infrastructure projects.

Several African nations have already successfully turned to the global sukuk (Islamic bond) market for funding. When considering the on-going USD$31 billion per year funding gap for infrastructure on the continent, Malaysian underwriting could play a relevant role in advancing the continent’s broader economic development agenda. With Africa currently accounting for less than 3% of global Islamic banking assets, this is the next frontier for Islamic finance.

Similarly, the halal industry presents Malaysia with excellent opportunities for joint-entries into Africa with ASEAN regional partners in Singapore and Indonesia. Halal players in food, travel and lifestyle products should begin incorporating Africa into their global expansion strategy, if they have not already, with a view to tapping into the fastest growing middle class in the world, dense urban centres and a nearly 30% Muslim population.
Smart partnerships

Through smart partnerships, the risk and complexity associated with first market entry can be reduced, enabling companies to increase the probability of success in securing a strategic foothold while Africa’s competition barriers are still low.

As the largest exporter of halal goods in the world already, with exports reaching to around $11 billion in 2013, Malaysia is well positioned to lead such a charge into Africa. The global halal market is rapidly expanding beyond the traditional confines of the food and beverage space, to include products such as cosmetics, tourism and health products, becoming a more holistic concept.

Although Africa currently represents only 15% of this global market, the continent’s population is expected to double to about 1.9 billion by 2050, with the Muslim population growing at a rate of 170% — both highly favourable growth drivers ahead for halal.

While the ASEAN-Africa nexus is still in nascent stages, Malaysia is standing out as a trail-blazer for new markets and industries. Africa is rising and its nations are turning to Asia for partners in development. With Malaysia on track to achieve first-world status by 2020, it is a development showcase for what this once mislabelled “hopeless” continent is set to achieve in its own right in the coming decades.

*Robert MacPherson is an adjunct researcher at the NTU-SBF Centre for African Studies (CAS), established by the Nanyang Technological University and the Singapore Business Federation. He is also Vice President at Reciprocus International, a global M&A advisory boutique headquartered in Singapore. An earlier version of this appeared in The New Straits Times.

European Union needs long-term policies on refugees, with no end in sight for suffering in Middle East or Africa.

By Chris Miller*

One of the great accomplishments of European integration – the passport-free movement of people across borders – is now exacerbating a crisis that threatens the core of the European project. European states are announcing tighter border members this week as the continent struggles to cope with tens of thousands of refugees, with more expected daily.

The European Union is racing to devise a solution to the crisis, the centerpiece of which is a plan by which all member countries will share the refugee burden. The crisis has illustrated broader challenges that Europe must address if it is to devise a long-term solution.

Though politicians fret about the cost of refugees, the crisis is more political than economic. Housing and feeding one or even two million refugees would cost billions of dollars but the member states of the European Union, which constitutes the world’s largest economy, could easily foot the bill. The EU spends more than $50 billion per year on farm subsidies alone, and if leaders wanted, to, they could find similar sums for refugees.

Indeed, once refugees were allowed to find jobs and earn an income, their cost to society will decline rapidly. Though voters often fear that outsiders will steal their jobs or drive down their wages, much economic evidence suggests otherwise. Economist David Card, for example, collected data about Miami’s labor market in 1980, after a rapid influx of Cuban refugees increased the area’s labor market by a whopping 7 percent.

Crunching the numbers also revealed that the refugees had little long-term effect on other workers. Unemployment did not increase nor did the increased supply of workers depress wages, even among low-skilled native workers who were ostensibly competing with the refugees for work. It turned out that businesses’ demand for workers was sufficiently elastic to accommodate a rapid increase in the size of the workforce.

There is little reason to think that the refugees now seeking to enter Europe are much different than the Cubans who reached Miami. Those who succeed in the harrowing journey across the Mediterranean or Aegean are probably on average wealthier and more entrepreneurial than others from their country of origin, so they may do better upon reaching Europe. And even the largest estimates for the scale of refugee flows suggest that they will constitute a far smaller a share of Europe’s labor force of more than 200 million than were Cubans in Miami.

Indeed, over the long term, Europe might greatly benefit from an influx of new workers. Many of its biggest countries, Germany above all, report low fertility rates and aging populations. On average, German women have fewer than 1.5 children. Without immigration, the population will age rapidly, putting pressure on public services – pensions above all – that are funded by current workers. And Germany is not alone. Many of the largest EU countries, including Poland, Italy and Spain, have similarly low fertility rates, and could rely on immigrants to replenish working age labor force.

An uncontrolled influx of refugees from Syria, Eritrea, Libya and elsewhere is no one’s idea of an optimal response to the economic problems posed by aging and low fertility rates. But at the very least, the potential long-term benefits to migrant inflows suggest that the crisis posed by refugees is not primarily economic. The challenge is politics. The refugee crisis has revealed three key policy failings that the EU should address if it’s to regain control over its borders.

The first is the problem of coordination. The EU faces a constant struggle to coordinate policies among its member states as demonstrated by new border controls – Germany with Austria; Austria, Slovakia and the Netherlands; Hungary’s fence, each contradicting EU’s free movement Schengen policy. All European nations want to experience the benefits of a single-market, visa-free travel and a shared currency, but none are eager to pay the costs. Hungary, for example, is threatening to take no migrants, blocking their travel or encouraging them to leave. Europe faces the threat of free riders – those who let others enact and fund policies – in nearly every problem it confronts. Gaining unanimous support often requires long negotiations and unsavory bargains. Politicians like Hungary’s Viktor Orban grandstand for domestic audiences by standing up to the EU’s unpopular demands, and that makes it harder for the EU to take collective decisions.

The second challenge highlighted by the refugee crisis is in foreign policy. Europe is literally surrounded by disasters and failed states. In Ukraine, a smoldering war with Russia has destroyed the country’s economy and degraded its government. The fighting has displaced well over a million people from their homes, though most have moved to other parts of Ukraine. In Turkey, the renewal of conflict between the government and the Kurdish separatist militants has destabilized the political system even as the country struggles to cope with two million refugees from neighboring Syria’s civil war.

Libya, just across the Mediterranean, is also riven by a civil war raging since the 2011 revolt against former ruler Muammar Gaddafi. That war, too, has sent refugees fleeing northward. Further south, from Nigeria to Mali to Eritrea, insurgencies and government brutality have sent thousands more fleeing their lands.

Europe has failed to devise a coherent response to its surrounding ring of crises. It intervened militarily in Libya in 2011 to prevent Gaddafi’s government from massacring opponents around the city of Benghazi, but then failed to help Libyans establish a functional central government after militias ousted the dictator. In Syria, the EU watched impotently as a revolt against the tyrannical government turned into a proxy struggle among regional powers and religious factions and gave rise to the barbarism of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. It is a mark of how dire Europe’s borderlands remain that Ukraine’s current semi-frozen conflict is a relative success story.

Few European politicians have even tried to formulate a coherent response. Some suggest bombing the boats owned by human traffickers who transport migrants across the Mediterranean, while others propose striking at ISIS in Syria. Neither tactic would address the root of migrant flows or the failed states that ring Europe’s borders.

Developing a coherent policy toward its border regions would help Europe address the third, longer-term challenge brought forth by the current crisis. Europe not only needs a policy toward today’s migrants, but also a long-term policy too. Even as Europe’s native-born population declines in the coming decades, Africa’s is beginning what will likely be a long boom. Nigeria alone may add 100 million people over the next generation. According to United Nations projections, Africa will account for half of world population growth through 2050.

It is unlikely that all of these people will remain in Africa, especially as European wages will be much higher. During the second half of the 20th century, most of the world’s population growth occurred in Asia, thousands of miles from Europe. Over the next half century, there will be many more potential migrants much closer to Europe’s borders. But with far-right parties rising across the continent on the backs of anti-immigrant sentiment, European leaders have little domestic political room for maneuver. Above all, other political issues, immigration draws voters’ ire. The limitations of domestic politics may prove the deciding factor as the continent’s leaders consider not only how to resolve today’s crisis but how to prevent tomorrow’s.

*Chris Miller is associate director of the Grand Strategy Program at Yale and a fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. He is currently finishing a book manuscript on Russian-Chinese relations.

Apple mania has soared to new heights since last week’s bumper product unveiling, and the iPhone 6S is already on course to outsell its predecessor at launch, Digital Spy reports.

The Cupertino firm said that its latest handsets are close to smashing the iPhone 6S and 6 Plus’s first-weekend sales record of 10 million pre-orders.

“Customer response to iPhone 6S and iPhone 6S Plus has been extremely positive and pre-orders this weekend were very strong around the world,” said Apple in a statement.

“We are on pace to beat last year’s 10 million unit first-weekend record when the new iPhones go on sale September 25.”

The news follows reports that the iPhone 6S Plus has already sold out in the UK, pushing availability back by up to several weeks.

“As many customers noticed, the online demand for iPhone 6S Plus has been exceptionally strong and exceeded our own forecasts for the pre-order period,” the firm added.

“We are working to catch up as quickly as we can, and we will have iPhone 6S Plus as well as iPhone 6S units available at Apple retail stores when they open next Friday.”

The rose gold model of the iPhone 6S has also proven popular and is expected to be subject to the same shipping delays as the larger handset.

The saying “It never rains but it pours” is truer than ever in Scotland, says new research into how our climate is changing

New research at the University of Warwick with colleagues from the London School of Economics has identified changes in the shape of rainfall across Europe; changes in the amount of drizzle compared with downpours and everything in-between.

Professor Sandra Chapman of the University of Warwick and co-authors Professor Nicholas Watkins and Dr David Stainforth from the London School of Economics have today published new research demonstrating how the variability in the way it rains makes it intrinsically difficult to identify the character of local climate change. Difficult but not impossible. In places such as Scotland, the Dordogne, Tuscany and the Low Countries, changes are evident despite the variability. The research team have looked at 63 years’ worth of European rainfall data and found location-specific changes in the character of rainfall that are sometimes big enough to pick out directly from the local observations.

Sandra Chapman from the University of Warwick said, “We have found that in many places in Scotland the rain on heavy rainfall days has increased by over 50%. However, in some places in the Highlands this rain has shifted from light rain days so overall it’s not much wetter but when it does rain it is more intense. In other Scottish locations the change reflects an increase in the total amount of rain and snow overall. For all these areas of Scotland the old adage “It never rains but it pours” has become truer than ever.”

“We have also found related results across Europe. In south west France it is drier with less rain on all types of rainy days but in Tuscany it is drier with heavy rainfall in particular being reduced.”

Nicholas Watkins from the London School of Economics and the University of Warwick added: “Knowing the change in average rainfall is not enough to understand the change in intense rainfall. In fact changes in variability often have a greater impact on extremes.”

“The research demonstrates how rainfall variability – in particular what is known as the “long tail” of rainfall distributions – makes it hard to identify changes just by looking at local observations. Even when we create data where changes are known to exist they can sometimes be impossible to identify because there aren’t many days in a season. So just looking out your window – even if you do it every day and keep a careful log – can create a misleading impression about local climate change. Our method quantities this uncertainty directly from the observations; we can identify when we know things are changing, when we know things are not changing, and when we know that the data cannot tell us whether things are changing or not.

David Stainforth from the London School of Economics said, “This work demonstrates how the impacts of climate change are complicated and local. As a consequence it is likely that individuals will have different perspectives on anthropogenic climate change if their views are based mainly on personal experiences of weather rather than on the underlying fundamental science.”

“This study, and an earlier related one on temperature differences by the same team, provides a new source of information to support local decisions made in the context of climate change; decisions relating to flood protection, insurance, water provision, agricultural planning or even just what will grow best in your garden.”

The research is presented in the paper Limits to the quantification of local climate change, by S. C. Chapman, D. A. Stainforth, and N. W. Watkins published in the journal Environmental Research Letters on 16th September 2015.

“Palestinians have no reliable friends Abu Ammar! This summer proved it!  Where are the worthless Arabs? Only some foreign implanted “Resistance” elements that for their own hegemonic political purposes want to play the Palestinian card and wear your keffiyeh and pose for photos making the V for Victory sign! This disgusts me Abu Ammar! Palestinians must rely only on themselves. The PLO must return to “Revolution until Victory!”  You should postpone your exit from Lebanon and you must protect the camps. Without the gun to protect them what does Reagan’s olive branch “we will give you back most of Palestine if you leave Beirut” convey? Nothing worth anything in my opinion”!

Thus was the plea to PLO leader Yassir Arafat, made 33 years ago by a distraught and prescient American journalist and Palestinian advocate from Atlanta, Georgia named Janet Lee Stevens. At the time she was four floors underground in Arafat’s Fakhani South Beirut bunker across from Arab University. She and her colleagues were secure from American bombs that rained down 12 hours that day from Zionist aggressors as she made her case.

The Palestinian leadership was preparing to “flee” Lebanon, (Janet’s word for the planned PLO “evacuation with dignity”) Janet emphatically opposed the PLO departure from Lebanon in the summer of 1982 insisting that it would allow a reign of terror against the hundreds of thousands of Palestinians who had no option but to remain behind, deeply mired in the camps. Janet’s appeal was made in the presence of this observer and the late Imad Mughniyeh, 19 years old at the time, and a few others.

Mughniyeh  had joined the Palestine revolution at the age of 14, and according to author Kai Bird may had received military training  from the CIA as part of a US initiative to “Professionalize” Arafat’s security unit. He had been given a job two years earlier with the PLO Force 17 whose mandate included a unit of Arafat bodyguards. After 1982, and disillusioned with the PLO, Imad affiliated with the pre-Hezbollah Islamic Amal.

Like many others, Mughniyeh owed his job to his friend and mentor, the PLO’s “”Red Prince” Ali Hassan Salameh who was assassinated on his way to his nieces’ birthday party at 4 p.m. on January 24, 1979 on Beka Street in the Verdun neighborhood of Beirut.

A German woman, Erika Chambers, posing as an artist and pro-Palestinian activist, but in reality a Mossad agent now living in Israel on a handsome US funded Mossad pension, watched Salameh’s car as it passed under her 8^th floor balcony, pushed a button and detonated a parked explosive-rigged Volkswagen Beetle.

Janet’s words to PLO Chairman Arafat were prophetic and are as true today as when she spoke them eight months before her death on April 18, 1983.

There is not a lot of hope in Lebanon’s Palestinian camps this week as foreigners arrive in solidarity, as many do annually; and pay tribute to the more than 3000 victims of the September 1982 Israeli facilitated Sabra-Shatila Massacre.

​On 9/15/2015 the first of three days of commemorative events at Shatla camp in tribute to the victims of the September 16-18 Massacre at Sabra-Shatila. (Photo credit: the Sabra-Shatila Scholarship Program (SSSP)

This past year the Syrian crisis has exported to Lebanon enormous unforeseen demographic and economic pressures on Lebanon and on each of the dozen Palestinian camps and nearly two dozen “gatherings.” Recent UN and EU studies document what virtually all quality-of-life social-economic indexes make plain which is that the approximate quarter million Palestinians actually living in Lebanon are continuing to sink ever deeper into a dark abyss.

The Palestinian camp populations here are not exempt from the politics and violence arriving from Syria. Some of the militia and Islamist movements warring next door are enticing and pressuring camp residents to take up arms and join various religious and secular militias.

It is true that some foreign powers are seeking to influence events in Syria and Lebanon with cash, weapons, and ideology. But as increasingly is being heard in Syria and elsewhere, “Da’sih (ISIS) has many mothers.” Meaning that it is a gross oversimplification and a bit inane to insist that the creation and appeal of Islamist groups and the “terrorist-takfires” is yet another conspiracy  by the Saudi’s, Iranians, Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)Turks, and/or Americans, EU, NATO or others. It is far more complicated than what the bewildering assortment of water carriers for various paymasters asserts. Indeed, as Iran’s President Rohani repeated last week, some of the funders, too clever by half, are experiencing shock to learn that the evil being spread by groups they may have aided-hoping for sundry positive results—are now targeting and planning to destroy them.

Al Qaeda affiliated groups have been analogized to opportunistic bacteria or virus.  They may be dormant and unnoticed for long periods. But if they receive a certain amount of light, some oxygen, and warm temperature, something to feed on and perhaps attach themselves to they may quickly grow and metastasize as they acquire and with time perfect their deadly capabilities.

Causative of some of these groups that are attracting youngsters and others in Lebanon’s camps are the same factors suffered for decades in this region, and recently they have intensified. Some examples, among others, are lack of jobs, widespread and deepening poverty, feelings of hopelessness and lack of control over one’s life and future, corrupt politicians who do not deliver public services while enriching themselves, abuse by security services and heavy-handed police and armed forces widely believed to be selectively deployed for political purposes.

Particularly deadly in Lebanon’s camps is the growing poisonous Sunni-Shia and ethno-nationalist sectarianism. Adding to these problems, Lebanon’s Palestinian camps often have tap water that is dirty and salty, surface sewage, and electricity cuts on the average of ten times a day. There are generally no street lights, only a few paved roads with many of the dwellings increasingly showing signs of crumbling. Crime, drug-use, infectious and communicable diseases, child respiratory diseases, domestic violence, school dropouts and teenage pregnancies are all increasing.

The current and long overdue upswing in civil activism across Lebanon, seen in the camps as a breadth of fresh air, with its calls for deep change and intifada are in tandem with the spreading rejection of what are considered the Lebanon’s unsalvageably corrupt politicians.  Many of these former warlords, now political lords thanks to  their self-granted amnesty without which many could be in prison for life, appear daily on the TV “news” bulletins and  regurgitate rubbish. This as they work to deepen sectarian divides to keep their particular “wasta sects” docile.

This includes the intensifying Sunni-Shia religious war that is beginning to spread inside the camps. A recent survey by the “You Stink” activist group which seeks to oust corrupt politicians found that approximately 90% of Lebanon’s population surveyed want all the current leaders replaced and believe that massive civil disobedience may be required to get rid of them. Many refugees in the camps want to capitalize on the recently revealed civic activist energy of the new groups to realize their own political rights.

The danger to the Palestinian camps such as Ein el-Helwe is the rising violence.  Two days ago (9/11/2015) eight grenades were thrown in different neighborhoods of the camps. Several gunmen also opened fire, seemingly out of nowhere according to eye-witnesses. Several people were killed last month during Fatah Movement, Jund al Sham and Fatah el Islam gunmen fought. Situated near the city of Sidon, Ein al-Helweh is home to approximately 80,000 Palestinian refugees, including an estimated 10,000 who fled the seemingly endless civil war in Syria, according to camp officials. The Joint Palestinian Security Force (JPSF) set up in 2014 to police Ein al_Helweh is anemic and so far largely ineffective.

Cynically playing the Palestinian card while conspiring to grind down, humiliate, disparage, provoke, marginalize, and deprive Palestinians in Lebanon of their anchored-in-international humanitarian law most elementary civil rights to work and purchase a home is the equivalent of Lebanon’s “leaders” picnicking on Mt. Vesuvius. And what happened  back in AD 79 at  Pompeii and Herculaneum may well happen here as the Takfiris slip into the camps.  An overdue reckoning may explode.

The political “leaders” in Lebanon who are wringing their hands and lamenting the growing number of “Terrorist-Takfiris” working to convince Palestinian refugees to join the “sacred Islamic cause of liberating Palestine” are well advised to reflect on the past five years in this region as well as the  nearly 67 years of repression of Palestinians in Lebanon.

The pressure inside Lebanon’s camps is building as the political temperature rises daily. Those who bleat that Palestine is their bloodstream issue and who circulate  selfies of themselves, wearing the keffiyeh as some  politicians here do, can help avoid an approaching catastrophe on the order of what continues in Syria.

One way is to stop blocking the election of a President and convening Lebanon’s Parliament. And when the MP’s assemble to cut up the legislative agenda pies, put its members to work earning a part of their hefty salaries.  In just 90 minutes the Parliament of Lebanon can repeal the racist 2001 law that outlaws home ownership for Palestinians and after nearly seven decades, grant the third generation of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon he same right to work and home ownership that every reader of these words is granted the moment her or his foot touches Lebanese soil or the tarmac at Beirut airport.

Lebanon’s politicians generally do not want this and neither does Da’ish (ISIS).  Both groups seek to keep the Palestinian’s in Lebanon oppressed for their own political advantage.

Denying justice and blocking elementary civil rights for Palestinians in Lebanon is subverting peace in this region and the “terrorist-takfiri” elements are manipulating this reality to establish bases in Lebanon’s camps.

This, as jihadists prepare an  “Intifada”  appealing for “Revolution until Victory” on this 33^rd anniversary of the Zionist encouraged massacre at Sabra-Shatila.

In the United States it is considered fashionable to maintain a steadfast ignorance of rejected peace offers, and to believe that all the wars launched by the U.S. government are matters of “last resort.” Our schools still don’t teach that Spain wanted the matter of the Maine to go to international arbitration, that Japan wanted peace before Hiroshima, that the Soviet Union proposed peace negotiations before the Korean War, or that the U.S. sabotaged peace proposals for Vietnam from the Vietnamese, the Soviets, and the French. When a Spanish newspaper reported that Saddam Hussein had offered to leave Iraq before the 2003 invasion, U.S. media took little interest. When British media reported that the Taliban was willing to have Osama bin Laden put on trial before the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan, U.S. journalists yawned. Iran’s 2003 offer to negotiate ending its nuclear energy program wasn’t mentioned much during this year’s debate over an agreement with Iran — which was itself nearly rejected as an impediment to war.

The Guardian reported on Tuesday that the former Finnish president and Nobel peace prize laureate Martti Ahtisaari, who had been involved in negotiations in 2012, said that in 2012 Russia had proposed a process of peace settlement between the Syrian government and its opponents that would have included President Bashar al-Assad stepping down. But, according to Ahtisaari, the United States was so confident that Assad would soon be violently overthrown that it rejected the proposal.

The catastrophic Syrian civil war since 2012 has followed U.S. adherence to actual U.S. policy in which peaceful compromise is usually the last resort. Does the U.S. government believe violence tends to produce better results? The record shows otherwise. More likely it believes that violence will lead to greater U.S.-control, while satisfying the war industry. The record on the first part of that is mixed at best.

Supreme Allied Commander Europe of NATO from 1997 to 2000 Wesley Clark claims that in 2001, Secretary of War Donald Rumsfeld put out a memo proposing to take over seven countries in five years: Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, and Iran. The basic outline of this plan was confirmed by none other than former British Prime Minister Tony Blair, who in 2010 pinned it on former Vice President Dick Cheney:

“Cheney wanted forcible ‘regime change’ in all Middle Eastern countries that he considered hostile to U.S. interests, according to Blair. ‘He would have worked through the whole lot, Iraq, Syria, Iran, dealing with all their surrogates in the course of it — Hezbollah, Hamas, etc.,’ Blair wrote. ‘In other words, he [Cheney] thought the world had to be made anew, and that after 11 September, it had to be done by force and with urgency. So he was for hard, hard power. No ifs, no buts, no maybes.'”

U.S. State Department cables released by WikiLeaks trace U.S. efforts in Syria to undermine the government back to at least 2006. In 2013, the White House went public with plans to lob some unspecified number of missiles into Syria, which was in the midst of a horrible civil war already fueled in part by U.S. arms and training camps, as well as by wealthy U.S. allies in the region and fighters emerging from other U.S.-created disasters in the region.

The excuse for the missiles was an alleged killing of civilians, including children, with chemical weapons — a crime that President Barack Obama claimed to have certain proof had been committed by the Syrian government. Watch the videos of the dead children, the President said, and support that horror or support my missile strikes. Those were the only choices, supposedly. It wasn’t a soft sell, but it wasn’t a powerful or successful one either.

The “proof” of responsibility for that use of chemical weapons fell apart, and public opposition to what we later learned would have been a massive bombing campaign succeeded. Public opposition succeeded without knowing about the rejected proposal for peace of 2012. But it succeeded without follow-through. No new effort was made for peace, and the U.S. went right ahead inching its way into the war with trainers and weapons and drones.

In January 2015, a scholarly study found that the U.S. public believes that whenever the U.S. government proposes a war, it has already exhausted all other possibilities. When a sample group was asked if they supported a particular war, and a second group was asked if they supported that particular war after being told that all alternatives were no good, and a third group was asked if they supported that war even though there were good alternatives, the first two groups registered the same level of support, while support for war dropped off significantly in the third group. This led the researchers to the conclusion that if alternatives are not mentioned, people don’t assume they exist — rather, people assume they’ve already been tried. So, if you mention that there is a serious alternative, the game is up. You’ll have to get your war on later.

Based on the record of past wars, engaged in and avoided, as it dribbles out in the years that follow, the general assumption should always be that peace has been carefully avoided at every turn.

By Elise Harris

While Pope Francis is in Cuba next week chances are high that he will meet with former president Fidel Castro, though no specific time has been set, Vatican spokesman Fr. Federico Lombardi has announced.

Anticipating questions on whether a meeting between the Pope and the former Cuban president would happen, Fr. Lombardi said that “in all likelihood it’s very predictable that it will happen, clearly during the day in Havana.”

However, he stressed that it hasn’t put in the schedule at a specific time, “so we have to see when is easier, or when it’s possible to organize it. But it’s very likely that it will happen.”

“The desire has also been expressed by the State, also when President Raul Castro came here to Rome, so it’s quite normal.”

Fr. Lombardi made his comments during a Sept. 15 press briefing on the Pope’s upcoming trip to Cuba and the United States.

Pope Francis will arrive at the Cuban capital of Havana this Saturday, Sept. 19, where he will receive an official welcome. The next morning he is set to meet with Raul Castro, current Cuban president and younger brother to Fidel, leader of Cuba’s communist revolution.

He will travel to Holguín Sept. 21, where he will celebrate Mass and bless the city before flying to Santiago that evening. He departs from Santiago at 12:30 p.m. on the 22nd, and is scheduled to land in Washington D.C. at 4 p.m. local time.

Raul Castro met with Francis at the Vatican May 10, where the two spoke about the Pope’s role in bettering relations between Cuba and the United States. They also spoke of Francis’ visit to Cuba, which falls directly ahead of his week-long trip to the United States.

Last fall Pope Francis helped to broker improved relations between Cuba and the United States, culminating in the full restoration of diplomatic ties after 50 years of strained relations.

After their May meeting, Castro thanked the Pope “for his active role in the development of the improvement of relations between Cuba and the United States of America.”

He also suggested he could return to the Church in the future. “I will start praying again and return to the Church” if the Pope continues what he has been doing, Raul Castro said.

Fr. Lombardi also announced during the press briefing that Pope Francis will administer First Communion to five children during Sunday’s Mass in Havana’s Plaza de la Revolución.

The Pope giving First Communions is a first for him on a trip abroad, the spokesman said, noting that it serves as a sign “of hope and growth” for Church in Cuba.

Lombardi also noted how the Pope’s visit Monday to Santiago’s shrine for Our Lady of Charity falls during the 100th anniversary of the letter sent to Pope Benedict XV by veterans of the Cuban war for independence, asking him to declare her Patroness of Cuba. This detail, he said, makes the visit more significant for the Cuban people.

A press conference during the 3.5 hour flight from Cuba to the United States is also a possibility, he said, but stressed that it will be done only if it’s possible, and if the Pope agrees.

Pope Francis lands in Washington D.C. the evening of Sept. 23, where he will be welcomed by President Obama, the First Lady and likely their two children. He will speak to them and U.S. authorities in English the next morning.

Following his private meeting with the president, Francis will speak with the more than 400 bishops of the U.S., giving them a general speech before heading to the National Shrine of the Immaculate Conception, where he will canonize Bl. Junipero Serra.

Francis will address the U.S. Congress Sept. 24 around 10a.m. in English, which Fr. Lombardi said will be an opportunity for him to speak to all U.S. citizens, “not just the Catholics.”

The Pope’s visit to the headquarters of the United Nations in New York the following morning will take place in Spanish, the spokesman said, and will be followed by an interreligious gathering at Ground Zero.

Pope Francis’ visit to the site of the Sept. 11, 2001 terror attacks will be different than that of Benedict XVI when he went in 2008, he said, because since then the memorial and museum have been finished.

Fr. Lombardi stressed that the fundamental character of the Pope’s visit to Ground Zero is the interreligious encounter set to take place there, adding that “the ecumenical, interreligious moment of the trip is at Ground Zero.”

Pope Francis’ visit to the U.S. will culminate with his participation in the Philadelphia World Meeting of Families, which is expected to draw large crowds, especially for Francis’ closing Mass Sept. 27.