By Art Berman

The party is over for tight oil.

Despite brash statements by U.S. producers and misleading analysis by Raymond James, low oil prices are killing tight oil companies.

Reports this week from IEA and EIA paint a bleak picture for oil prices as the world production surplus continues.

EIA said that U.S. production will fall by 1 million barrels per day over the next year and that, “expected crude oil production declines from May 2015 through mid-2016 are largely attributable to unattractive economic returns.”

IEA made the point more strongly.

“..the latest price rout could stop US growth in its tracks.”

In other words, outside of the very best areas of the Eagle Ford, Bakken and Permian, the tight oil party is over because companies will lose money at forecasted oil prices for the next year.

Global Supply and Demand Fundamentals Continue to Worsen

IEA data shows that the current second-quarter 2015 production surplus of 2.6 million barrels per day is the greatest since the oil-price collapse began in 2014 (Figure 1).

EIA monthly data for August also indicates a 2.6 million barrel per day production surplus, an increase of 270,000 barrels per day compared to July (Figure 2).

It further suggests that the August production surplus is because of both a production (supply) increase of 85,000 barrels per day and a consumption (demand) decrease of 182,000 barrels per day compared to July.

The world oil demand growth picture is discouraging despite an increase in U.S. gasoline consumption (Figure 3).

World liquids year-over-year demand growth has fallen by almost half from 2.3 percent in September 2014 to 1.2 percent in August 2015. This is part of overall weak demand in a global economy that has been severely weakened by debt.

The news from both IEA and EIA is, of course, terrible for those hoping for an increase in oil prices.

U.S. production has fallen 510,000 barrels of crude oil per day since April 2015 while OPEC production has increased 1.2 million barrels per day since the beginning of the year (Figure 4). U.S. production increases in the first quarter of 2015 were partly because of an oil-price rally that ended badly this summer, and because of new projects coming on-line in the Gulf of Mexico.

It appears that OPEC is winning the contest with U.S. tight oil producers to see which can continue to over-produce oil at low prices. IEA ended its September Oil Monthly Report saying,”On the face of it, the Saudi-led OPEC strategy to defend market share regardless of price appears to be having the intended effect of driving out costly, “inefficient” production.”

In other words, tight oil and oil sands production.

With Iran poised in early 2016 to add almost as much oil as the amount of the U.S. production decline to date, the outlook for tight oil producers could not be worse. And yet, the sell-side analysts and investment bank research groups continue to chant the refrain of logic-defying hope for tight oil producers in the face of crushingly low oil prices.

Party On, Dude!

This week, Raymond James joined the chorus with its bewildering “Energy Stat: U.S. Operators’ Response to Low Oil Prices? Get More Efficient!”

The message is all about rig productivity and drilling efficiencies. I showed in my post last week that these measures are nothing but red herrings to distract from the unavoidable truth that all tight oil companies are losing money at current oil prices.

I would like to say that Raymond James is simply repeating the shop-worn and illogical cliché that “We’re losing money but making it up on volume” but it’s much worse than that.

There is no mention of money in the report. There is not a single dollar sign ($) in the text or figures nor are there are there any costs, prices or cash flows mentioned. That seems odd since Raymond James is, after all, a financial advisory company.

Raymond James presents 30-day IP (initial production rate) data to show that everything is fine and getting better in the tight oil patch.

Really guys? Is that why oil companies are laying off staff, cutting budgets and selling assets?

Besides, everyone knows that IPs are a practically meaningless predictor of EUR or profitability, and something that producers often manipulate to create press releases in order to satisfy investors.

Nonetheless, they forecast “2015 to be a banner year for both oil/gas well productivity gains.” Interesting but irrelevant since it’s going to be an atrocious year for profits.

Here is my table from last week’s post for the best of the tight oil companies in the best parts of the plays.

EOG, Pioneer and Continental lost between $10 and $24 per barrel in the first half of 2015 but Raymond James says, “Never mind and party on, Dude!”

This report by Raymond James is both misleading and clearly out-of-touch with the price and investment environment that the International Energy Agency and the Energy Information Administration describe.

Conclusions

ExxonMobil CEO Rex Tillerson summarized the situation this week in an interview with Energy Intelligence:

“It [tight oil] will compete. Will all of it compete at all pricing? No.”

For the next year or so, tight oil wells will not be commercial except in the best parts of the best plays. Tight oil companies will lose money. For the most part, the efficiency gains are behind us.

Until market fundamentals of supply and demand come into balance, prices will remain low. Goldman Sachs predicted yesterday that U.S. oil prices through the first quarter of 2016 will be “low enough to discourage investment in new oil production and shrink the global glut of crude.”

Clearly for now, the party is over for tight oil.

Article Source: http://oilprice.com/Energy/Crude-Oil/The-Shale-Delusion-Why-The-Partys-Over-For-US-Tight-Oil.html

By Sriparna Pathak Raimedhi*

China’s devaluation of the Yuan on August 11 has sent panic waves across global financial markets and brought back memories of the Asian financial crisis of 1998 when similar situations prevailed. The biggest fear was this adding to the uncertainty in global financial markets. Additionally, China’s manufacturing data released in August further dampened the sentiments, triggering a fear of certain collapse across global markets. Data released in September showed that factory output in China grew by 6.1 per cent from the year before. This is well below the forecasts of 6.4 per cent. Growth in fixed asset investment slowed to 10.9 per cent for the year to date. This is a 15-year low. Other indications of the slow down include falling car sales and lower imports and inflation. Growth rates were revised recently for 2014- from 7.4 per cent to 7.3 per cent. This is the weakest in nearly 25 years. Given the prevailing conditions in the economy which are seen as signs of a slowdown, currency devaluation is being analysed as a desperate effort by the Chinese government to shore up its declining stock market and managing the slowing economy. A cheaper Yuan definitely means bolstering exports, as it makes exports cheaper and thus more competitive.

The reason given officially for the devaluation is that the People’s Bank of China wants a more market driven exchange rate, and the intersection of demand and supply have now made the Yuan cheaper than what it was before. Demands for the revaluation of the Yuan had been prevalent for quite some time. However, now that the Yuan has depreciated global concerns over currency wars are high. Republican senator and former U.S. trade representative Rob Portman has even accused China of attempting to gain an unfair trade advantage over the U.S. through “currency manipulation”. The devaluation is definitely a symbol of the inherent weaknesses in the Chinese economy. However, if the attempt through devaluation is to increase exports, then what needs to be factored in is that unlike the scenario in the past there are not enough consumers now to buy Chinese goods as global consumers have been affected negatively themselves.

For India, the devaluation means bad news as well as good news. The negative is that Indian exports will come under further strain as China and India compete for several export items such as gems and jewellery, textiles etc. Additionally, a slowdown in China which is one of the top five countries itself for Indian exports is not good news. Fears also exist that the sharp depreciation will aid in more dumping of Chinese goods into the Indian market, hurting domestic manufacturers, which is definitely not something that would help the ‘Make in India’ campaign in any way. India already has a trade deficit of US$ 48 billion with China, and this has increased about 34 per cent from what it was in 2014-15.

The sharp fall in the Indian rupee has already rattled stock markets and if it continues to fall, imports will becoming further more expensive, adding to inflation. The positive is that the slowdown in China has hit global commodity markets as well due to a decline in Chinese demand. Oil and gold prices have fallen, and India which is am importer of oil and gold can seek some relief through lower oil and gold prices which will help the current account deficit. Lower oil prices additionally mean lower inflation rates.

In case there is further depreciation of the Yuan, greater scrambles to seize the lion’s share of global consumer demand will definitely occur. Policy makers in India need to realise that India currently needs to encourage more foreign direct investment into the country. This would require increasing attractions for foreign business ventures to set shop in India. This would definitely add to India’s capabilities for manufacturing and aid exports in case Chinese exports become more competitive, or the Chinese economy spirals downwards into a massive slowdown. Taxation policies also require a rethink in a way that more investors are lured into making investments and not the other way round. The currency devaluation actually is a delicate situation and only time can tell as to how a “restructured” Chinese economy affects the global market. In the meanwhile, India needs to prepare itself to capitalise on the opportunities that emerge and be prepared for the causalities as well.

*The author is an Associate Fellow at Observer Research Foundation, Kolkata

By Deasy Simandjuntak*

On 22 June 2015, an Indonesian administrative court rejected French national Serge Atlaoui’s final appeal against the death sentence, making him the latest foreigner to face execution for drug trafficking.1 Atlaoui had been granted last-minute reprieve and was left out of last April’s execution of 8 convicts, to allow him to appeal against a rejection of clemency by Indonesian President Joko Widodo.2

Earlier in June in an open letter published by The Lancet (a leading UK-based medical journal), prominent Indonesian academics and experts called on the government to rethink its current punitive policy on drug-related offences, voicing serious concerns that unreliable data had been used to legitimize the policy.3 According to them, the methods of the studies leading to such data were not publicly inaccessible and an unorthodox method had been used to indirectly estimate drug-related mortality. In various media articles prior to the second group of executions of drug convicts, many of whom were foreign nationals, President Joko Widodo had repeatedly cited such data gained from the National Narcotics Board (BNN), which estimated that there were as many as 50 deaths per day due to drug-related causes.4 These data became one of the main arguments for the recent executions.

Meanwhile, a survey found that 84.6% of Indonesians support the death penalty for drug offences; 60.8% citing that drugs “destroy the young generation” and 23.7% that the punishment has a deterrent effect.5 The minority who oppose the death penalty do so based on human-rights considerations (28.4%) and maintain that there are alternative ways for punishing the offenders (36.2%).6 At first glance, this reflects the worldwide debate on the deterrent effect of the death penalty.7 However, in the Indonesian case, 86.3% of death penalty supporters maintain that this punishment has to be conducted despite the threat from other countries to limit diplomatic and trade relations.8 This indicates that the ensuing media reports has made many in Indonesia to consider the issue of death penalty mainly as part of the country’s struggle to fight off “foreign pressure”.

Notably, six months into his presidency, the popularity of President Jokowi has decreased to around 44% due to various policy problems.9 Amid the international protests and the domestic polemics on whether or not the death penalty is a relevant penal instrument for drug-related offences, little has been said about the political function of capital punishment for a government that is facing multiple policy problems. The article does not purport to assess whether or not death penalty is necessary, yet observe how this punishment, or rather, the spectacle of it, may be used to politically consolidate and boost the government’s waning popularity at home.

RECENT EXECUTIONS OF DRUG CONVICTS

On 29 April 2015, amid massive international outcry,10 the Indonesian government executed eight convicted drug smugglers at a high-security prison in West Java. This was the second in the series of group executions of drug-related convicts this year: the first one was done on 18 January, which resulted in the Netherlands and Brazil recalling their ambassadors. The second execution unsurprisingly harvested a much bigger uproar, partly due to the prolonged legal process and the massive polemics in the media. Among the eight convicts who were executed in April were two Australians, Andrew Chan and Myuran Sukumaran, ringleaders of the so- called “Bali Nine” drug-smugglers who drew significant public attention due to the series of protests launched by the Australian government. As lawyers prepared their last clemency pleas in the beginning of the year, Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbot’s controversial statement reminding Indonesia of Australia’s 2004 tsunami aid of A$1bn (US$0.78bn) irritated many Indonesians. The President himself repeatedly maintained that Indonesia has sovereignty to implement its law, and that he would not grant clemency to death-row drug convicts.

Meanwhile, Mary Jane Veloso, a young Filipina who had also been on death-row, drew media attention due to the complications in her case.11 The fact that she was a poor migrant-worker and a possible victim of human trafficking struck a chord with Indonesians, who are familiar with horror stories of the mistreatment of Indonesian migrant workers abroad, many of whom are on death-row in Saudi Arabia for killing their employers in self-defence.12 Veloso managed to get a last-minute temporary reprieve upon the request by the Philippines’ government who was working on the legal case against her alleged trafficker currently in custody in Manila.

THE DEATH PENALTY, THE MEDIA AND POLITICS

Scholars argue that public support for the death penalty is based on the assumption that it is a relevant punishment (as a retribution and/or for its deterrent effect) or as a symbolic attitude.13

In general, a retentionist (pro death penalty) policy is made legitimate by the assumption of deterrence. One of the most prominent retentionist countries is the US, where there have been 1,411 executions since 1976.14 The number of sentences has decreased significantly, from 279 in 1999 to 73 in 2014, which coincided with a drop in the national murder rate, and which subsequently led many to believe that capital punishment did not deter murderers.15 However, others consider this argument to be faulty—the number of death sentences may be currently decreasing, but that does not mean that potential murders have not been deterred by past implementation of that penalty.16

Studies in the US also show that citizens’ support of the death penalty is more a reflection of their basic values (religion, political ideology, etc.) and less of their specific concern about crime.17 Consequently, people do not change their views about the death penalty even when they receive new information that contradict those views.

In penal history, the communicative quality of corporal and capital punishment was used to serve a political function.18 The public display of punishment was designed for its deterrent effect. Foucault referred to this as the “spectacle of the scaffold”:19 while the offender may seem to be the target of the punishment, in reality, the main objective of the execution was the effect on the public. The act of public punishment was an opportunity for the state to display its power and emphasize the asymmetry between the individual and the State. Similarly, according to Garland, “Penal law […] reinforces these claims by coercive sanctions as well as symbolic displays.”20 In this manner, the purpose of simple deterrence from repeating the offense became the deterrence from challenging the authority of the State. In modern times, although executions are no longer done in public, extensive media coverage can produce societal effects similar to those of public punishments in the past.

While both deterrence and symbolic motives are relevant in the Indonesian case, the role of media exposure is crucial in distributing the “message” of death sentence, and in the making of public opinion on capital punishment.

Government and parliament leaders reportedly cited data used by the President to show support for the death penalty.21 Moreover, the support sought, and granted him, by the President on this issue from Indonesia’s largest Muslim organizations, the NU and Muhammadiyah, also legitimized the death penalty from a religious perspective.22 It is claimed that it was as a result of this, that as many as 86% of the aforementioned survey respondents expressed their support for capital punishment.23

BRIEF HISTORY ON THE DEATH PENALTY IN INDONESIA

Indonesia inherited the death penalty from its former colonial master, the Netherlands.24 It was abolished in the Netherlands in 1870 yet it has continued to be practiced in the colonies.

Currently in Indonesia, the following crime examples may invoke the death penalty as a discretionary punishment: premeditated murder,25 terrorism,26 drug-trafficking,27 some acts of corruption,28 treason,29 espionage,30 some military offences,31 war crimes (crimes against humanity and genocide),32 and usage of chemical weapons.33 In practice, however, the crimes for which death sentences were passed had been limited to murder, terrorism, drug-trafficking and treason (subversion) under President Soekarno (1945-1967) and Soeharto (1967-1998).34 During the Soekarno era, three executions were due to the attempted assassination of the President, while during the Soeharto era, in 1975-1998, there were 41 executions: 22 due to the alleged communist coup, 6 due to Islamic terrorism, and only 1 related to drugs.35 In the reform era, in 1998-2013, there were 27 executions: 17 due to murder, 3 due to the 2002 Bali bombing and 7 related to drugs.36 In comparison with other retentionist countries, such as the United States, Indonesia’s use of the death penalty is considerably less: in 2011 alone, the US carried out 43 executions37 in comparison with Indonesia’s 27 executions in 1998-2013.

Contrary to the general perception, Indonesia does not have a mandatory death penalty, and reports and legislations indicate that criminal laws permit judicial discretion.38 In relation to drug offences, there have been two cases in which a death penalty sentence was commuted to a term of imprisonment. The first case involved Hanky Gunawan, an Indonesian national whose death sentence in 2006 was commuted to 15 years’ imprisonment after the Supreme Court ruled that the death sentence was unconstitutional because the Indonesian Constitution provides an absolute right to life,39 as do Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“Everyone has the right to life…”) and Indonesia’s Human Rights Law.40 The Supreme Court also commuted the death sentence of Nigerian national Hillary Chimezie to 12 years’ imprisonment on the same grounds.41

These cases show that the death penalty has been non-mandatory. However, as a civil law country, Indonesia is not bound to a system of precedent or sentencing consistency.42 Although Indonesia ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) in 2006, the Constitutional Court in 2007 drew on article 6(2) of the ICCPR which allows death penalty for “the most serious crime”, and argued that narcotic offences fall under this category because they affected “the economic, cultural and political foundations of society and carried “danger of incalculable gravity.”43 A similar claim was made by the President to legitimize the current war on drugs.

THE POLITICAL FUNCTION OF DEATH PENALTY IN INDONESIA

To gain a “deterrent effect”, the death penalty relies on the exposure of the media. However, in the Indonesian case, the aggravated media exposure may serve more (political) functions than mere deterrence:

Firstly, it may serve as a means to show coherence in Indonesia’s weakening rule of law. The issue of the death penalty was heightened amidst other serious policy problems in Indonesia, for example, the inconsistency of the government’s stance against corruption. The demonstration of the strong position against the death penalty, therefore, may have been to compensate for the weakness of the rule of law in other policy areas.

Secondly, it may be aimed at showing Indonesia’s political strength to Indonesians. The extensive media coverage on death-row convicts who were mostly foreign-nationals, as well as government’s statements preceding the execution seemed to lead the public to think of drugs as a problem originated “outside” of Indonesia and brought into the country by “foreigners”, in the process portraying Indonesian youths as victims of foreign perpetrators.44 Such a portrayal of the death penalty as a struggle against foreign influence seemed to have helped in consolidating support for capital punishment among Indonesians. The usage of the aforementioned statistics, as well as statements like “war against drugs”45 have emphasized the premise of “foreign negative influence”, a strategy that never fails to entice support from Indonesians. The presumed existence of “foreign” pressure was indicated in, for example, the President’s statement on “the sovereignty of our law”46, and the statement of the Home Affairs Minister that the UN and foreign governments would not be able to stop the execution.47 In addition, media coverage of the President’s seeking guidance from the largest Muslim’s organizations further legitimized the death penalty based on Indonesian religious and societal perspectives.48 Less exposed to media attention was the domestic pressure against the death penalty which came mostly from Indonesian human rights NGOs such as Kontras and the Coalition Against Death Penalty (consisting of 11 human rights organizations).49

In the Indonesian case, death penalty may have become a means to demonstrate state power, while the legal aspect of death penalty itself, including the lack of clear categorization of different levels of accountability and the non-mandatory nature of the punishment – which had led to the commutation of punishment in several cases – was given much less attention. In the heightened media coverage, the death penalty may have become a “spectacle” that diverts the public attention from other crucially aggravated issues such as policy problems and corruption, and portrays an image of a coherent legal sovereignty at a time when the rule of law is in fact weakening.

About the author:
* Deasy Simandjuntak is Visiting Fellow attached to the Indonesia Studies Programme at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. Email: deasy_simandjuntak@iseas.edu.sg

Source:
This article was published by ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute as ISEAS Persepective 2015 Number 46 (PDF)

Notes:
1 “French convict on Indonesian death row loses clemency appeal”
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/06/22/us-indonesia-executions-france-idUSKBN0P20A220150622
(accessed 26 June 2015).
2 “Indonesia rejects French death row convict Serge Atlaoui clemency” http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-33220239 (accessed 26 June 2015).
3 “Evidence-informed response to illicit drugs in Indonesia”, The Lancet 385, June 6 (2015). 2249-2250, http://www.thelancet.com/pdfs/journals/lancet/PIIS0140-6736(15)61058-3.pdf (accessed 10 June 2015).
4 “Jokowi: Setiap hari 50 orang mati karena narkoba” http://nasional.tempo.co/read/news/2015/02/04/078639866/Jokowi-Setiap-Hari-50-Orang-Mati-karena-Narkoba (accessed 6 June 2015).
5 “Survei: Mayoritas masyarakat dukung Jokowi eksekusi mati tahap II” http://news.liputan6.com/read/2221660/survei-mayoritas-masyarakat-dukung-jokowi-eksekusi-mati-tahap-ii (accessed 6 June 2015).
6 Ibid.
7 See for example, Carol S. Steiker, “No, Capital Punishment Is Not Morally Required: Deterrence, Deontology, and The Death Penalty” Stanford Law Review (2005) 751-759. Paolo G. Carozza, “My Friend is a Stranger”: The Death Penalty and the Global Ius Commune of Human Rights”, Scholarly Works. Paper 536 (2003).
http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/law_faculty_scholarship/536; James H. Wyman, “Vengeance Is Whose: The Death
Penalty and Cultural Relativism in International Law.” Journal of Transnational Law & Policy 6 (1996): 543.
8 Survei: Mayoritas masyarakat dukung Jokowi eksekusi mati tahap II. http://news.liputan6.com/read/2221660/survei-mayoritas-masyarakat-dukung-jokowi-eksekusi-mati-tahap-ii (accessed 6 June 2015).
9 “6 bulan pemerintahan, tingkat kepuasan publik atas Jokowi-JK masih rendah”
http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2015/04/19/14323621/6.Bulan.Pemerintahan.Tingkat.Kepuasan.Publik.atas.Jo kowi-JK.Masih.Rendah (accessed 3 July 2015).
10 UN Secretary Ban Ki Moon was among those who expressed concern on Indonesia’s death sentences. “U.N. chief appeals to Indonesia to stop death row executions.”http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/02/14/us- indonesia-executions-un-idUSKBN0LH2IT20150214 (accessed 19 July 2015).
11 “Who is the woman behind Filipina Mary Jane Veloso’s last minute reprieve from execution?”
http://www.straitstimes.com/news/asia/south-east-asia/story/who-the-woman-behind-filipina-mary-jane- velosos-last-minute-reprieve (accessed 30 May 2015).
12 “Mary Jane Veloso: Why was she spared in the Indonesian executions?” http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/30/indonesian-executions-why-was-mary-jane-veloso-spared (accessed 10 June 2015).
13 Tom R. Tyler, and Renee Weber. “Support for the death penalty; instrumental response to crime, or symbolic attitude?” in Law and Society Review (1982): 21-45.
14 http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/FactSheet.pdf. Lethal injection is the most common method, and is used almost exclusively for aggravated murder. The US had a four-year moratorium in 1972-1976, following the death sentence overturn in the case of Furman vs Georgia. The offender Furman was given death sentence due to the murder of the owner of the house that he robbed. However, the murder was later proven to be accidental.
15 Thom Brooks, Punishment, Routledge, 2012, pp.163-164; http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/FactSheet.pdf 16 Brooks, 2012, pp.163-164.
17 Tyler and Weber, 1982.
18 Druzin, Bryan H. “The Theatre of Punishment: Case Studies in the Political Function of Corporal and Capital Punishment” in Washington University Global Studies Law Review 14 (2015).
19 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (New York: Vintage, 1977) pp.32-72.
20 David Garland, Punishment and Modern Society (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1990). P.123.
21 “Indonesia darurat narkoba, ketua MPR dukung hukuman mati”
http://www.tribunnews.com/nasional/2015/04/28/indonesia-darurat-narkoba-ketua-mpr-dukung-hukuman-mati
(accessed 20 July 2015); “Menhan dukung eksekusi mati gembong narkoba”
http://www.republika.co.id/berita/nasional/hukum/15/03/19/nlfqpb-menhan-dukung-eksekusi-mati-gembong- narkoba (accessed 20 July 2015).
22 “NU dan Muhammadiyah dukung hukuman mati untuk pengedar narkoba” http://www.aktualita.co/nu-dan- muhammadiyah-dukung-hukuman-mati-untuk-pengedar-narkoba/1533/ (accessed 1 July 2015).
23 “Survei: 86% rakyat dukung hukuman mati pengedar narkoba” http://www.beritasatu.com/nasional/268928- survei-86-rakyat-dukung-hukuman-mati-pengedar-narkoba.html (accessed 6 June 2015).
24 See Robert Cribb, “Legal Pluralism and Criminal Law in the Dutch Colonial Order.” Indonesia (2010): 47-66. 25 Penal Code of Indonesia, art.340, 1915, as amended through to February 27, 1982.
26 Penal Code of Indonesia, art.438-441, 444, 479, 1915, as amended through to February 27, 1982.
27 Indonesia Law on Psychotropic Substances, Law. No.5/1997, Indonesia Narcotics Law; Law No. 22/1997, articles 80-82.
28 Indonesia Law on the Eradication of Corruption, Law. No.31/1999 as amended by Law No.20/2001 article 2(2).
29 Penal Code of Indonesia articles 104, 111(2), 124(3), 140(3), 1915, as amended through to February 27, 1982. 30 Law No. 31/PNPS/1964 articles 22, 23. Cited in Death Penalty Worldwide: Indonesia, Cornell University. http://www.deathpenaltyworldwide.org/country-search-post.cfm?country=Indonesia (accessed 6 June 2015).
31 Indonesian Military Penal Code. Cited in Death Penalty Worldwide: Indonesia.
32 Indonesian Law on Human Rights Courts Law No.26/2000 articles 8, 9, 37, 38,
33 Law No. 9/2008 articles 14, 27.
34 Daniel Pascoe “Three Coming Legal Challenges to Indonesia’s Death Penalty Regime”. Indonesian Journal of International & Comparative Law 2 (2015): 239-280.
35 Daniel Pascoe, 2015.
36 Pascoe, 2015.
37 Dave McRae. “A Key Domino? Indonesia’s Death Penalty Politics.” Lowy Institute for International Policy (2012).
38 Death Penalty Worldwide: Indonesia.
39 Indonesian 1945 Constitution article 28A states that “Each person has the right to live and the right to defend his life and existence.
40 Indonesia’s Human Rights Law, Law No. 9/1999 article 9 stated that:
(1) Everyone has the right to life, to sustain life, and to improve his or her standard of living.
(2) Everyone has the right to peace, happiness, and well-being.
(3) Everyone has the right to an adequate and healthy environment.
41 Simon Butt, “Asia-pacific: Judicial responses to the death penalty in Indonesia.” Alternative Law Journal 39.2 (2014): 134-135.
42 In May 2015, a Yogyakarta court gave a life-sentence to a female drug-convict (instead of the death-sentence requested by the prosecution) due to the consideration that she was pregnant. “Kurir sabu-sabu lolos dari hukuman mati karena hamil” http://www.jpnn.com/read/2015/05/30/306793/Kurir-Sabu-sabu-Lolos-dari- Hukuman-Mati-karena-Hamil (accessed 27 July 2015).
43 Simon Butt, 2014.
44“Jokowi dengan suara meninggi: Tulis! 18 ribu anak muda Indonesia meninggal karena narkoba”
http://m.tribunnews.com/nasional/2015/04/27/jokowi-dengan-suara-meninggi-tulis-18-ribu-anak-muda- indonesia-meninggal-karena-narkoba (accessed 21 July 2015); “Hukuman mati, presiden diminta tidak takut intervensi asing” http://rri.co.id/post/berita/160868/nasional/hukuman_mati_presiden_diminta_tidak_takut_intervensi_asing.html (accessed 21 July 2015).
45 “Presiden nyatakan perang terhadap narkoba” http://www.antaranews.com/berita/503644/presiden-nyatakan- perang-terhadap-narkoba; “Jokowi tegaskan perang terhadap narkoba” http://nasional.kontan.co.id/news/jokowi-tegaskan-perang-terhadap-narkoba (accessed 1 July 2015).
46 “Eksekusi mati gembong narkoba, Jokowi tak peduli tekanan internasional” http://www.beritasatu.com/nasional/256505-eksekusi-mati-gembong-narkoba-jokowi-tak-peduli-tekanan- internasional.html (accessed 1 July 2015).
47 “Mendagri tegaskan tekanan asing tidak pengaruhi eksekusi mati”
http://www.antaranews.com/berita/482904/mendagri-tegaskan-tekanan-asing-tidak-pengaruhi-eksekusi-mati
(accessed 1 July 2015).
48 “NU dan Muhammadiyah dukung hukman mati untuk pengedar narkoba” http://www.aktualita.co/nu-dan- muhammadiyah-dukung-hukuman-mati-untuk-pengedar-narkoba/1533/ (accessed 1 July 2015).
49 “Koalisi masyarakat sipil anti hukuman mati desak Presiden hentikan rencana eksekusi 10 terpidana mati” http://icjr.or.id/koalisi-masyarakat-sipil-anti-hukuman-mati-desak-presiden-hentikan-rencana-eksekusi-10- terpidana-mati/

By Sydney Letsholo and Steven Gruzd *

The sudden cancellation of an Extraordinary Summit on the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) raises serious concerns about the future of this important home-grown African governance and accountability tool. Nairobi was scheduled to host the APRM Forum of Heads of State and Government on 10-11 September 2015.

The meeting would have addressed critical challenges facing the APRM system, including funding, leadership and waning political will. Invitations were sent, press conferences were held, and delegations from the 35 member states of the APRM were preparing to travel to Kenya’s capital. But the Summit was aborted just four days before it was meant to start, for reasons yet to be officially explained.

The postponement at the eleventh hour took everyone by surprise, considering the commendable groundwork that had been done by the NEPAD Kenya office and the continental APRM Secretariat based in Midrand, South Africa. Large billboards at Jomo Kenyatta International Airport welcomed delegates with the beaming face of President Uhuru Kenyatta, the newly-elected Chairperson of the APRM Forum. And other marketing and logistical activities had already taken place at a large scale.

Most importantly, the postponement was a bitter disappointment to civil society organisations (CSOs) from various African states that had hoped that the Summit – the initiative of President Kenyatta – would finally help revive the flagging fortunes of the APRM and rejuvenate frank debate about good governance on the continent. Some CSOs that had already gathered in Nairobi were not convinced by the statement from State House Spokesperson Manoah Esipisu, who said that the event had been ‘postponed’ until January 2016, and relocated to Addis Ababa (where regular APRM Forum meetings happen on the margin of the African Union Summit every year) to allow non-APRM countries to participate. Speculation on why the plug was pulled ranged from President Kenyatta’s visit to Italy that week, to the likelihood that not enough heads of state would have attended. There are no statements on either the APRM or NEPAD Kenya websites, and officials from both organisations approached for comment declined to do so.

The cancelled Summit should have gone towards addressing the APRM’s grave existential challenges. It is cash-strapped, as most member states are not paying their annual subscriptions of a minimum of $100,000. A review mission to Djibouti had to be postponed due to funding issues earlier this year, and donor support has dropped off alarmingly. The Secretariat has not had a permanent chief executive officer since 2008, has many vacant senior posts, and has not published a Country Review Report since January 2013. No country has yet completed a second review, a dozen years after the APRM was launched in 2003. Attendance at Forum meetings by heads of state has been pitiful for years. So it was hoped that Nairobi would turn this ship around. The Extraordinary Summit would have allowed the heads of state dedicated time to focus on the APRM, which is often not possible on the side-lines of regular AU meetings.

CSOs issued a strong statement and held a press conference on 10 September to express their disappointment and call for much-needed reforms of the APRM. It urges the chairperson of the APRM Forum to urgently convene the Extraordinary Summit, address the issues of non-payment, suspend states that have joined the APRM but have not progressed in producing the required reports, and appoint a competent, permanent CEO. It also notes that for a system that strives to promote good governance, the lack of serious attention to the internal governance procedures of the APRM structures has not served the mechanism well.

The CSOs also demanded better engagement with civil society on APRM issues – they have routinely faced problems in receiving accreditation for open meetings. The space for civil society in a country like Ethiopia is severely restricted, with Kenya being far more open and tolerant of the views of non-state actors. There were fears that moving the meeting to Addis Ababa would serve to stifle frank exchanges.

In the end, it boils down to political will, and the cancellation of the Summit sends the wrong signal. It is up to Africa’s leaders to decide whether the APRM can be retooled into an instrument that really sparks reform and accountability, or whether it will continue to limp along, merely going through the motions. Africa is asking – does President Kenyatta have the vision and the vibrancy to deliver?

*About the authors:
Sydney Letsholo is the programme officer on the Governance and APRM Programme at the South African Institute of International Affairs, and Steven Gruzd is the programme head. Both were in Nairobi to attend the cancelled Summit, and they helped to craft the CSO statement.

Source:
SAIIA

The board of trustees overseeing the Kilton Public Library in West Lebanon, New Hampshire, on Tuesday decided, despite pushback from the United States Department of Homeland Security, to reinstate a Tor relay the board had approved in an effort to enhance privacy on the Internet. The library board drew the attention of Homeland Security when the board decided in June to make the Kilton Public Library the first library in America to install a Tor relay. After Homeland Security promptly responded by telling state and local government officials that the Tor relay may aid criminals, the board had suspended the relay.

Vocal support in the community aided the library board in its decision to reinstate the Tor relay. Nora Doyle-Burr reports in the Concord Monitor that “a full room of about 50 residents and other interested members of the public expressed their support for Lebanon’s participation in the [Tor] system” at the board’s Tuesday meeting.

Similarly, vocal public support buttressed local California politicians in the Bay Area and Davis in their efforts to reject armored vehicles the US government provides to local police. And vocal public support has been key for state and local governments across America moving away from participating in the war on marijuana.

While Americans may often feel there is no hope against oppressive government, occurrences such as with the Kilton Public Library this week show that determined local action can successfully counter the US government leviathan.

This article was published by the RonPaul Institute.

Huge numbers of people have fled the Syrian conflict, which is now entering its fifth year, with many arriving in Jordan. Although the Jordanian government is making significant efforts to respond to the refugee crisis, it has a funding shortfall, with almost 30 billion USD estimated to be required over 2015.

By Adam Leake*

The conflict in Syria is now entering its fifth year and the number of people fleeing from violence continues to grow, with approximately 7.6 million people displaced internally and 4 million people seeking refuge in neighbouring countries. This has placed a growing strain on both the Syrian refugees and the communities hosting them. In Jordan, although the rate at which refugees entering the country has decreased, there is still a constant flow of new arrivals; the Syrian refugee population is estimated at upwards of 646,700, accounting for 10% of the Jordanian population.

During times of conflict, populations that are forced to flee their homes are often the most vulnerable, finding themselves reliant on the host country which they enter. In Jordan, despite the country making significant efforts to aid families and communities fleeing the conflict, authorities are tasked with managing the increased pressure the rising population is placing on the country’s infrastructure, while facilitating cooperation between the host and refugee communities in order to mitigate potential conflict.

The Zaatari refugee camp, the first official camp built by the Jordanian government in July 2012, has a population of over 80,000, making it one of the largest population centres in the country. The rapid growth of what was designed to be a temporary settlement comes with an array of challenges. The Jordanian authorities must ensure that people are provided with access to housing, water, sanitation, health and educational services, as well as deal with societal challenges such as maintaining order and cooperation between inhabitants and warding against criminality, violence, and extremism. Although the United Nation High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) takes a leading role in providing many of the necessities within the camps, they must do so while performing a balancing act: ensuring that they do not remove people’s agency and ability to self-govern while preventing others within the camp from exerting a dangerous influence over those most vulnerable.

Of the total number of refugees, it is estimated by the government that 85 per cent live outside purpose-built refugee camps. This creates its own problems. Many cities and towns in Jordan are already struggling with a scarcity of water, limited employment opportunities and access to health and education services, and the shortage of adequate housing.

As the population grows with the addition of refugees, the pressure on resources and city infrastructures is reaching breaking point. Amid such conditions, it is feared that tensions between the Jordanian host and Syrian refugee communities may escalate. For example, with regard to employment, it is often highlighted that the refugee community is willing to work illegally for less pay, resulting in wages being driven down. This could result in a violent spiral of blame, reduce the interaction between the communities, and lead to a hostile situation of ‘us vs. them’.

Although the Jordanian government is making significant efforts to respond to the refugee crisis, it has a funding shortfall, with almost 30 billion USD estimated to be required over 2015. Although the strategy set out by the Jordanian government in its 2015 Jordanian Response Plan (produced by the Jordanian Response Platform) is much needed to tackle the strained relationship between refugee and host communities, it also comes with significant risks if plans are implemented from the top down. If plans are put into place in coordination with International Non-Governmental Organisations such as the UNHCR, but without coordination with community-based governance and municipal governance, it could result in unsustainable projects, tensions between communities, and the loss of people’s capacity to self-govern, increasing tensions and the potential for conflict.

In order to foster a harmonious relationship between the Jordanians and the refugee population, the right balance must be struck when addressing the range of problems faced. Assistance cannot simply be forced through without proper consultation and engagement with those that it will affect.

*Adam Leake has worked as a Research Assistant at the Terrorism and Political Violence Association at Leeds University, supporting the preparation of a recent textbook on terrorism, Terrorism and Political Violence.

This article was originally published by Insight on Conflict and is available by clicking here.

Global gasoline demand in the first half of 2015 was higher than expected, at a time when crude oil prices were falling, which contributed to very strong refinery wholesale gasoline margins. However, EIA does not project the same pattern to continue next year.

The Short-Term Energy Outlook (STEO), which was released on September 9, forecasts slowing gasoline demand growth. While gasoline margins are projected to show their typical seasonal trend, falling from their 2015 peak to a low point at the end of the year, then rising through spring 2016, next year’s forecast margins are closer to those experienced over the 2011-14 period than to the higher wholesale margins in 2015. In addition to lower expected gasoline demand growth, the outlook for lower margins reflects a forecast rise in Brent crude oil prices during 2016 and the expectation that refinery outages in 2016 will not be as significant for gasoline markets as those experienced in 2015.

The most recent data from the U.S. Federal Highway Administration show Americans drove a record 1.54 trillion miles during the first half of 2015, compared with the previous high of 1.50 trillion miles driven in the first half of 2007, contributing to higher demand for gasoline in the United States. Monthly data show gasoline consumption in the United States increased by 3% during the first half of 2015 compared with the first half of 2014.

U.S. motor gasoline consumption, which rose by 80,000 b/d in 2014, is projected to increase by 210,000 b/d (2.3%) in 2015 as the effects of employment growth and lower gasoline prices outweigh increases in vehicle fleet efficiency. However, gasoline consumption is forecast to remain flat in 2016, as a long-term trend toward vehicles that are more fuel-efficient offsets the effects of other factors.

The spurt in domestic consumption in 2015 and strong demand from abroad contributed to high refinery wholesale gasoline margins (the difference between the wholesale price of gasoline and the price of Brent crude oil). U.S. average wholesale gasoline margins averaged 65 cents per gallon (gal) in August, 31 cents/gal higher than in August 2014 and 34 cents/gal higher than the five-year average (2010-14) for August (Figure 1).

Refinery outages in the Midwest and on the West Coast have contributed to gasoline prices in those regions rising by more than the U.S. average over the past few months, and have resulted in significant price fluctuations. In Petroleum Administration for Defense District (PADD) 2 (Midwest), retail regular gasoline prices rose by 32 cents/gal during the week of August 17 to an average of $2.79/gal, 7 cents/gal higher than the U.S. average, following a temporary unplanned refinery outage at BP’s Whiting, Indiana, refinery. The outage at Whiting, caused by leaks within the larger of two crude distillation units, has since ended, and PADD 2 retail gasoline prices fell to $2.28/gal on September 14, 10 cents/gal below the U.S. average. After reaching a 2015 peak of $3.60/gal on July 20, regular gasoline prices in PADD 5 (West Coast) have since fallen to $2.99/gal as of September 14, but remain 62 cents/gal above the U.S. average as a result of tight gasoline supplies that reflect the ongoing outage at the fluid catalytic cracking unit at ExxonMobil’s Torrance, California refinery (Figure 2).

In August, U.S. retail regular gasoline prices averaged $2.64/gal. EIA expects monthly average prices to decline in the coming months as refineries continue to produce high levels of gasoline, as demand begins to decrease following the peak in the summer driving season, and as the market transitions to lower-cost winter-grade gasoline. EIA projects regular gasoline retail prices to average $2.11/gal in the fourth quarter of 2015.

The U.S. regular gasoline retail price, which averaged $3.36/gal in 2014, is projected to average $2.41/gal in 2015 and $2.38/gal in 2016. The 2015 forecast is unchanged from the August STEO, and the 2016 forecast is 2 cents/gal lower.

U.S. average retail regular gasoline and diesel fuel prices decrease

The U.S. average retail price for regular gasoline decreased six cents from the previous week to $2.38 per gallon as of September 14, 2015, $1.03 per gallon lower than at the same time last year. The West Coast price fell 10 cents to $2.99 per gallon. The Midwest price decreased seven cents to $2.28 per gallon. The East Coast, Gulf Coast, and Rocky Mountain prices each declined five cents, to $2.26 per gallon, $2.09 per gallon, and $2.68 per gallon, respectively.

Propane inventories gain

U.S. propane stocks increased by 1.1 million barrels last week to 97.7 million barrels as of September 11, 2015, 20.3 million barrels (26.2%) higher than a year ago. East Coast, Midwest and Rocky Mountain/West Coast inventories each increased by 0.3 million barrels. Gulf Coast inventory increased by 0.2 million barrels. Propylene non-fuel-use inventories represented 4.5% of total propane inventories.

By Alessandro Bruno

Refugees are not the problem; war is. If the war in Syria doesn’t stop, the flow of refugees will only continue. The refugee wave, marked by the dramatic image of tens of thousands of Syrians trying to reach Germany from Hungary, is a phenomenon that until very recently has been confused, perhaps deliberately, with mass migration. There is an important difference: migrations are frequently driven by financial or social exclusion. What is happening now in Europe is the inevitable consequence of unresolved crises in Syria, Iraq, Libya, Yemen, and Afghanistan – all related to the collapse of these countries’ respective states, the result of wars for which the West bears much responsibility.

Many of the Syrian refugees are ethnic Kurds. Most are escaping from Ayn al-Arab, located near the Syria-Turkey border. Kobane is another popular source. Both have been under attack or siege by Islamic State as the group tries to secure a ‘corridor’ between the area it controls and Turkish territory, which provides a source of fresh recruits and an outlet for oil extracted from Syrian fields. Recently, Turkey has changed its refugee strategy, now preferring to turn them away. Turkey has even blocked Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga fighters who want to assist Kobane’s residents in defending the city, implying a de-facto, if not de-jure, collusion between Ankara and the Islamic State. Meanwhile, the majority of refugees stranded in Hungary are Syrians and while the Islamic State’s brutality has forced them to seek refuge in Europe, Western governments’ insistence on refusing to deal with the Syrian government of President Bashar al-Assad, instead demanding its collapse, has prolonged the Syrian crisis.

Just as the European Union confronts the Syrian influx and the related problem of quotas for its member states, many of which have already absorbed tens of thousands of refugees from other wars and troubled regions, it seems to be ignoring the root causes of their suffering. Bluntly, the cause is a Middle East in disarray, a state for which the West has its own share of responsibility (Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria), contributing to the rise of groups fighting proxy battles for regional players such as Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the Emirates. The latter have sponsored rebels in various guises with weapons and money rather than encouraging peace building and some kind of a negotiated peace in Syria, one that includes rather than excludes the current government. The images of Aylan, the little boy who was found dead on a Turkish beach, seem to have suddenly woken up the world, as if tens of thousands of children had not already died in Syria during these four and a half years of war. And what to make of the many deaths in Iraq since 2003? Meanwhile, the Middle East threatens to explode, producing refugees not in the hundreds of thousands but in the tens of millions, threatening Europe’s own survival – and the world’s.

A colder and more analytical approach to the Syrian refugee crisis reveals that the Balkan route, leading to its Hungarian critical point, is no more than a year old. Like the African route that has Libya as its final destination before the sea trek toward Malta and Italy, the Balkan route has become well frequented over a relatively short period. The war in Syria broke out in 2011 and turned almost immediately into a proxy war between states in the region. The West has encouraged the influx of foreign fighters from the Turkish border, in apparent agreement with its Sunni allies – Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar – to overthrow the Assad government, only to later be reminded of the folly of this policy by the rise of Islamic State. The deliberate destabilization of the Assad regime has produced a boomerang effect, creating radicals and refugees – and it does not take many radicals, posing as refugees, to cross borders and bring a little taste of that destabilization to Europe. The West has learned little from the experience with the Mujahedeen, which the United States armed and organized to fight the Red Army in Afghanistan. The rise of Islamic State has generated over 200,000 refugees, including Christians and Yazidis, in northern Iraq alone. Now there are two million Syrian refugees in Turkey, and one million in Lebanon – which was already dealing with its own delicate political and ethnic balance. A million Syrians have crossed the border into Jordan – not a country with many resources – adding considerable political pressure on the Kingdom. Europe has started to absorb more refugees as Turkey’s initial generous hospitality proved a strategic move to facilitate the elimination of Assad and his allies. Yet, Assad and the Alawi dominated Ba’ath Party are still there and thanks to the Iran nuclear deal, the regime’s demise looks rather unlikely. Turkey’s primary interest now is less stopping the Caliphate and more slowing the rising Kurdish tide just outside borders, which threatens to incite Kurdish nationalism within them.

Indeed, Ankara’s policy on Islamic State has been ambiguous at best. It was reluctant to challenge the self-proclaimed jihadists from Islamic State, facilitating its growth by encouraging – or willfully ignoring – the entry of fighters into Syria and Iraq through its borders. This has certainly allowed the war to continue and flourish. Moreover, President Erdogan and the AKP Party, which has already suffered a blow losing its parliamentary majority, face an uncertain political future as Turks prepare to vote again this fall with the Kurdish parties expected to win even more votes than last spring’s election. Therefore, Turkey has many problems at home and does not intend to confront Islamic State in the interests of stopping the war in Syria, except where it can defeat its real enemy, which is the Kurdish PKK, the paramilitary organization which aspires to an independent state of Kurdistan.

The sudden flow of refugees to Europe could be considered as Turkey’s retribution for having been ‘persuaded’ to accommodate US drones and fighter jets at its Incirlik air base – even if Turkey is an important NATO member. Up until this past year, Turkey had managed to keep its borders sealed to prevent the very wave of migration to Europe which has allowed the refugee crisis to reach its current point point. Because Turkey no longer needs the Syrians, they have been allowed to proceed to Greece. New refugees from Syria are avoiding the Turkish borders altogether, preferring to make the short crossing to the Greek island of Kos, in what has been a very recent phenomenon. This has perhaps started to persuade some in the Obama administration – Obama himself may have reached this conclusion earlier – that Syria cannot be stabilized, which means breaking the jihadist tide – without the support of the very regime which has ruled the country for decades. Among evaluation errors, ambiguities, contradictions, and sudden policy changes, European leaders must now explain an emergency in which migrants are the last link in a chain of high-profile geopolitical mistakes made since the very start of the Syrian revolt in March 2011.

This article was published by Geopolitical Monitor.com

By Frank Konieczny, Lt Col Eric Trias and Col Nevin J. Taylor*

Today’s media is flooded with stories of cyber attacks prompting a loss of public confidence, resignations by senior officials, and a significant near- and long-term impact on our nation. Most of these breaches stem from known vulnerabilities in existing network security architecture, presenting a distinct danger to our vital national interests. These vulnerabilities, which vary in sophistication, could be as simple as using weak passwords (e.g., default value, simple number strings, or the word password itself). Slightly more sophisticated attacks leverage phishing attempts through e-mail or social engineering, designed to elicit unsafe action or information that would allow adversaries unauthorized access.

The notion of “defense in depth” has been touted by leading security organizations (which rely on the National Institute of Standards) as the basis upon which a security framework can be developed to safeguard our networks. The depth includes both physical security protections (walls, gates, locks, guards, and computer cages) and logical security measures (network firewall and intrusion detection). However, no matter how many layers of network perimeter protection are employed, adversaries continue to overcome defenses through using a variety of countermoves or by exploiting poor cybersecurity practices.

Furthermore, successful cyber attacks highlight the fact that disciplined cyber hygiene is necessary but not sufficient to prevent all potential attacks. Systems are simply too complex to defer application and data security to the supporting network’s defense appliances and infrastructure. Therefore, we propose that, from their inception, applications must be designed to protect themselves as stand-alone entities with security built-in and with minimal security dependence on network security appliances (e.g., firewalls).

As Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter proclaimed during a speech at Stanford University, to keep systems secure, we must build “a single security architecture that’s more easily defendable and able to adapt and evolve to mitigate current and future cyber threats.”1 We propose that this next evolution be a “designer” security package at the application level: the security-encapsulated application and data enclave (SEADE) architecture composed of a virtual application data center (VADC) and enterprise-level security (ELS). SEADE will redirect the responsibility for an enterprise- level network security perimeter to each application. It will act as a separately secured virtual container that offers users enhanced data access and produces an application package that is exceedingly difficult to penetrate and easy to port; furthermore, SEADE requires little maintenance.

Insufficient Network Perimeter Defense

In the past, strategic endeavors in this area have focused on safeguarding the in- formation that resides within our networks by building higher and thicker walls around our crown jewels, posting gate guards that interrogate everyone entering or leaving, and establishing multiple checkpoints. These efforts attempt to mitigate accessibility, the very capability our modern networks have been designed to provide. Clearly, this has been a losing proposition because the cost to safeguard these networks far exceeds that associated with attacking and penetrating them. Critically, it also impedes unobstructed and timely access by our forces to the information they so critically need.

The current network enclave defense model parallels these classic perimeter defenses by restricting accessibility to apparently valid users or transactions. However, it does little to define the purpose behind the effort. Thus, without a clear understanding of what is to be defended, we are left with the daunting task of defending everything in our “house/fort” without having any opportunity to prioritize a specific effort, such as those that will likely have the greatest impact on our ability to accomplish the mission.

It is imperative to note that our traditional approach to protection using only network boundaries is rendered useless when an adversary is already inside the network. Based on recent events and given current levels of network complexity, it is unlikely that adversaries will appear via concentrated denial-of-service attacks as was once the case. Rather, we would be well advised to conclude that such enemies already exist within our networks. More realistically, they are striving to hide their presence in order to harvest information that represents the lifeblood of our companies, plans, and/or intellectual property. Consequently, the three core considerations that must be governed by security measures are (1) accessibility, (2) confidentiality (including the determination that data is correct and has not been altered), and (3) integrity (which relates to the essence of our trust in and reliance on information used in the decision-making process). The complexity of recent cyber attacks has indeed in- creased. Although they were once focused on pilfering or manipulating data, such attacks now seek not only to steal critical data but also to undermine its use within operational command and control centers. Indeed, threats that have remained dormant until triggered by a specific event (e.g., zero-day attacks) can have devastating consequences at the most inopportune times during military operations. Therefore, we must elevate our awareness of such threats and manage the associated risk by determining what must be defended, how such defenses will be carried out, what objective will be fulfilled, and why it is important. Ultimately, networks that continue to offer unfettered accessibility (albeit a worthwhile quality) will fail to secure the intellectual property that populates today’s information environment.

Clearly, then, we must take a step back and ask ourselves what we should defend. Should we protect the roads and highways (i.e., the network) leveraged by users and adversaries alike? Or should we protect the data and intellectual property inside?

Current State of Enterprise Defense

Today’s perimeter defenses are instrumented for network-traffic-based analysis that assumes nothing bad will happen to applications/data if those defenses prevent malware transactions at the entrance. The solution—based on consistent, quick recognition of these rogue transactions—works well if one knows and understands all of the acceptable transactions so that the complement can be characterized as unacceptable (i.e., blacklisting undesirable network traffic).

Another defensive approach entails isolating the application from external access channels, but business requirements mandate access to areas inside the perimeter for collaboration (data sharing), interaction (web services), mobile/remote access (virtual private network), and business-to-business links. Hence, it is extremely difficult to determine which traffic to block because of multiple exceptions that must be accommodated for the business to function. Blacklisting has become slow and unwieldy to maintain and does not scale well, especially with the increasing adoption of IPv6.2 Whitelisting at the perimeter level has become unmanageable due to the thousands of entries to maintain. The fact that the walls have to allow a superset of all of these exceptions creates a porous perimeter. Moreover, adding new or removing existing exceptions may cause unintended effects on other applications, typically discovered only after implementation. Further complicating the situation is the continuing maintenance requirement—for example, obsolete exceptions persist in configurations because of a failure to notify administrators to make the updates.

Compounding the situation is the scaling of network defenses to billions of trans- actions. The usual response to keeping pace with performance demands has been to increase the sophistication and scale of network defense appliances.

Unfortunately, these “improvements” exert more overhead and cause greater latency (despite appearing faster or more robust) and do not always produce more effective systems.

There has to be a better way. To better defend our information, not only do we need to recognize that fact and account for the adversaries among us, but also we must continue to operate within this contested environment. Since our cyber adversaries have made their presence known, we must find novel ways to defend the vital information (today’s crown jewels) that enables us to maintain our competitive edge, all the while accepting the idea that we will be operating in a contested environment. As we focus on protecting our property and establishing tighter security perimeters, we will also develop the ability to scale our approaches quickly and over- come continually increasing threats.

In the past, isolated enclave architecture was the initial design of the network— each group had its own enclave with no outside connectivity. The desire to share information led to connecting these enclaves, which generated some concern, but a trust agreement existed between them. As enclaves became increasingly interconnected, the level of trust degraded further, especially when control was lost and anonymity became pervasive within the World Wide Web. Regaining this trust involved employing enterprise perimeter defenses to control access to information and restricting data availability to maintain some degree of confidentiality.

Although this problem has long been recognized and many alternatives have been proposed, only a modicum of success has been achieved in safeguarding intellectual property. The obvious alternative is to construct multiple layers of network perimeter defenses that provide adequate confidentiality of strategic data. However, this approach requires that different settings, configurations, or tool sets be established at each point in the layered defense. Ultimately, such an action increases the maintenance burden and produces delays in transaction flow, the combination of which impedes timely dissemination of vital information.

Incident Identification/Reaction

Considering that network perimeter defenses are generating logs/alerts to billions of transactions in a large organization, how does one analyze these into a coherent picture? Even more desirable, how can one detect in “real time” that malware is present and that an incident can be prevented? This problem is difficult because little information exists to determine which application a specific transaction belongs to unless additional network defenses are placed in multiple locations in the enterprise, usually near data centers, to record and analyze all network traffic. Of course, this scenario generates even more data for analysis, and one winds up looking for the proverbial needle in a stack of needles. An obvious solution involves using special-purpose “big data” analysis tools such as predictive analysis techniques, cross-correlation analysis, and so forth, with plenty of storage for historical transactions. Obviously, this analysis overhead further adds costs and resources to defense efforts. There has to be a better way.

A Better Way

Since attacks continue despite our best network perimeter defenses, what if we begin with the assumption that adversaries are already on our networks? Consequently, we must adjust our threat model and think differently to protect our data and intellectual properties. What if we decrease the attack surface down to the application or data level with the same security capabilities currently used for perimeter defense but specialized for the particular application or data? This vision lies at the heart of the SEADE concept, which defuses the overall attack surface from gateways guarding the enterprise network perimeter to thousands of individual, specialized security enclaves. The multitude of enclaves, consisting of multiple products and specialized configurations, will force the attacker to increase his effort to penetrate a single application. Since each security enclave is specialized to a specific application, the attacker must customize attacks per application rather than focus on penetrating the perimeter to expose the entire network. Thus, it will no longer be possible for adversaries to exist unchallenged inside our networks.

SEADE—Virtual Application Data Center

Virtualization technology, available in the cloud or virtual data centers (VDC), has made possible the virtual application data center concept. A VDC is a software-defined data center that supports “infrastructure as a service” for applications. It is a commodity readily available in many commercial and government cloud data centers. We utilize a VDC to define a VADC. Essentially, one VADC is dedicated to only one application, which is supported by a platform as a service (PaaS). It consists of virtualized network monitoring and defense capabilities like firewalls and deep-packet inspection along with its associated web access point, database firewall, and traditional PaaS components of web servers, application servers, and database servers. SEADE-VADC extends this concept for each application.

A significant security benefit of this architecture is that network traffic can remain encrypted until it enters the VADC. Only after packets enter the VADC are they decrypted and inspected. Within each VADC, the application developer has tailored the network inspection defenses, which were “baked in” from the design phase, to the specific ports/protocols, transaction size/format, parameter range, and so forth, for that single application.3 For instance, some applications may be tuned to support deep-packet inspection with abnormalities reported to the appropriate computer network defense service provider (CNDSP). Individual application risk management will drive the tailoring requirements. The VADC will improve the levels of accessibility and confidentiality by recognizing specific threats immediately and preventing an incident from occurring.

SEADE—Enterprise-Level Security

ELS is a dynamic attribute-based access-control system developed to reduce overall security risks by automating the access process, based on authoritative, related attribute information.4 Today, each application has a uniquely configured access-control scheme maintained by system administrators, primarily based on users and groups, which can be quite labor intensive. In the Air Force, the process is further burdened by a form-based, administrative-access approval process. As a new paradigm, ELS automates the authorization maintenance process; validates preconditions for access, such as training, security clearance, rank, and so forth; and allows a person access when an application-owner-defined set of conditions is met.

Accessibility to data is controlled by claims, based on a person’s (or an entity’s) attributes, dynamically generated and propagated when attributes change.5 Claims can be additions, deprecations, or modifications to existing access rights. They are transmitted via encrypted channels, based on user-access requests in a security as- sertion markup language (SAML) token. A standard handler evaluates and validates the token (content, timing, and authentication) and passes the claim for access to the application. Logging occurs for every access request, and erroneous access information is sent to the appropriate CNDSP. A standard handler ensures that SAML validation and access logging are performed correctly, further freeing the applica- tion developer from producing similar capability.

ELS will improve the levels of integrity and confidentiality by preventing unauthorized data access. As shown in the figure below, SEADE combines both concepts (VADC and ELS) and is delivered as two VDCs—one for the application (VADC) and the other for the ELS claims engine (which includes the secure token service, enterprise attribute store, and generated SAML claims).

Benefits of SEADE

Employing SEADE throughout a large enterprise-level operation generates the following benefits:

• Enables application portability. SEADE promotes such portability by enabling applications to be hosted in any virtualized environment. Thus, owners have the freedom to maneuver applications where they are needed to meet operational and resiliency requirements.
• Expedites application deployment. Multiple SEADEs employed throughout the enterprise will significantly decrease the manpower associated with developing and fielding an application. Since network and application defenses are included in the standard PaaS environment, the application itself remains just the logic of the program as it inherits all of the security controls of the PaaS. This architecture has demonstrably decreased the time to production from months to weeks. Since a standard ELS handler may be used for the SAML token, the application developer need only code to the ELS handler’s application program interface, further decreasing deployment time.
• Facilitates accreditation. Since applications are encapsulated with their own security functions, porting them into new hosting environments will be minimal, including justification of security measures to meet the accreditation process.
• Eliminates individual access requests. Dependence on form-based administrative processes will be eliminated, and system administrators’ access-management burden will be significantly reduced. There will no longer be user and group permissions to maintain per application, drastically reducing the man-hours required to perform this basic system-administration function.
• Provides immediate user access. Users will have immediate access to applications and data, based on their attributes (e.g., position, training, duty location, and so forth). As soon as the authoritative data source is updated with their personnel information—say, to a new assignment—then users will be granted access accordingly.
• Includes “baked-in” security. Application development will change fundamen- tally by baking in security from the start. Developers will integrate network de- fense configurations (e.g., whitelisting) into their VADC. Further, they will have more options and stronger security-related capabilities by having various net- work appliances at their disposal. Developers must now think holistically and produce applications to respond to and interact only with defined, valid, and recognized inputs.
• Focuses incident reports. Instead of having cyber war fighters look at streams of network transactions, trying to determine an abnormality, incident reporting is narrowed to the actual application with detailed information, based on the application’s tailored security profile. The CNDSP will be alerted only when thresholds are triggered.
• Reduces the number of network administrators. Network security operators will no longer have to make network appliance configuration changes (e.g., firewalls, proxies, and intrusion detection systems) to “allow only” legitimate traffic and block known, bad traffic. Additionally, less time will be spent on configuration-management meetings to approve mundane changes to network appliances.
• Provides operational resiliency. Since the VADC is composed solely of virtual components, if an abnormality is detected, the application can be dynamically reloaded from a previously known good image, or snapshot, to continue processing. As an added resiliency measure, SEADE instances can be spawned at multiple locations and numerous environments to attain heightened redundancy and increased mission assurance.
• Enables continuity of operations (COOP) and agility. By leveraging virtualization, one can provision applications in multiple environments, as well as COOP to another data center, provided that data has been streamed to the COOP site. This capability of provisioning anywhere further decreases the time for provisioning and provides significant mission agility.
• Reduces insider threat. This new paradigm enables creative approaches to data protection. Vulnerability to an insider threat will be reduced since ELS will block unauthorized access and track all access to applications or data. This information can be used to detect or predict abnormal activities. With appropriate data-access tagging, exfiltrated data will be unreadable outside an environment without SEADE.
• Improves confidentiality, integrity, and availability. The SEADE combination of ELS and VADC capabilities significantly increases the confidentiality and integrity of the data by preventing unwarranted access and availability of the application (and data) by dynamic analysis and elimination of threats to the application itself.
• Maintains CNDSP. The current CNDSP framework does not have to change. Alerts within each SEADE can be sent to the appropriate CNDSP unit, which will continue to triage alerts accordingly.

Trade-Offs

The primary trade-off with employing SEADE is that instead of relying on and deferring to network perimeter security, application developers now will be responsible for considering application security and ELS controls during design, test, and development. The developers must become intimately familiar with their application to address issues for both expected and unknown stimuli. This will undoubtedly increase the initial cost of system development, but it will ultimately save innumerable man-hours and will improve data protection. Developers will be responsible for ensuring that security is incorporated from the onset rather than waiting for operators to address the need retroactively.

Another trade-off is the building of a supporting environment for SEADE services. Application and functional owners must define and govern attributes required to provide the granularity necessary for applications to have the correct level of access-control fidelity. These attributes must come from known, authoritative data sources that have to be identified and integrated into enterprise attribute store for ELS’s use.

Air Force Consolidated Enterprise Information Technology Baselines

Today, technology moves so quickly that one will never reach a 100 percent best solution in a reasonable amount of time. Agile solution delivery is the best approach to a problem via focused sprints and spiral development so one can adjust as the available technology changes. This affords the ability to capitalize on and garner strategic advantage from nimble actions and innovative solutions.

Unfortunately, this paradigm shift unsettles many people who expect predefined requirements with predestined end points. However, this traditional approach only wastes resources as the environment and requirement change in their midst. As the cheese constantly moves in technology and cyberspace, we must be adaptable and decide to venture out to embrace the changes—lest we risk starvation.6 We must harness and guide this spirit of innovation and provide a framework for inserting new technology—methodically and expediently—into our environment.

Accordingly, it is in this vein that the Air Force chief technology officer established and manages the Consolidated Enterprise Information Technology Baselines (CEIT-B) framework to purposely shape, adopt, and deliver a standard information technology environment. This disciplined effort conforms to the agile paradigm as the future target baseline is developed.7 SEADE is a substantial component of CEIT-B that addresses security, portability, and efficiency requirements. Additionally, the Air Force, through CEIT-B, is addressing and informing the joint information environment (JIE) requirements for Department of Defense–level enterprise requirements.

Conclusion

The Air Force, as a service, emerged from technology. We must continue to harness the same innovative spirit for cyberspace that has enabled us to dominate air and space. Innovation is the fuel for future success, and we must keep striving to embrace new ways of solving our difficult problems. SEADE, comprised of a VADC and ELS, is a fundamentally different paradigm that will change the way systems are developed, deployed, and defended. By providing a separate security enclave for applications in a VADC, enabled by ELS dynamic access control, we can protect our most important treasure—the data within—as we continue to operate in a contested environment. The SEADE architecture will increase the speed of both user access and application delivery to the mission, decrease day-to-day management of the network and applications, and counter the futility of network perimeter security.

*About the authors:
Mr. Frank Konieczny (BS, MS, University of Illinois–Chicago; MAS, University of Alabama– Huntsville), a senior-level executive, is the Air Force chief technology officer, Office of Information Dominance, and chief information officer, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, Pentagon, Washington DC. Prior to assuming his current responsibilities, he acquired extensive experience in industry, where he worked as a systems analyst, chief programmer, project manager, and business unit manager, including positions as chief scientist and chief technology officer.

Lt Col Eric D. Trias, PhD, USAF (BS, University of California–Davis; MS, Air Force Institute of Technology [AFIT]; PhD, University of New Mexico) is the acting chief, Air Force Enterprise Architecture Division, Cyberspace Strategy and Policy Directorate, Secretary of the Air Force, Office of Information Dominance and Chief Information Officer, Pentagon, Washington, DC. Charged with governing, developing, and maintaining the Air Force enterprise architecture, he also serves as the Air Force deputy chief technology officer, helping evaluate and define future information technology standards and implementation constraints for the Air Force information technology enterprise infrastructure. Lieutenant Colonel Trias has served as an assistant professor at AFIT, commander of a large detachment, and deployed squadron deputy commander. He has held various leadership positions in a base communication squadron, exercise control squadron, and combat communications squadron.

Col Nevin J. Taylor, USAFR (BS, University of the State of New York; MS, Capella University) is the individual mobilization augmentee (IMA) to the director of cyberspace strategy and policy, deputy chief technology officer for special programs, and chair of the Cyber Task Force’s Strategic Advisory Board in the Office of Information Dominance and Chief Information Officer, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, Pentagon, Wash- ington, DC. He is a 10-year space and 20-year cyber professional with over a decade of command experience and a plethora of unique, diverse operational expertise, including combat, fixed and space communications, mission support, acquisitions, policy, strategy, planning, cyber, and space. Colonel Taylor’s joint assignments include director of Component Reserves, Joint Functional Component Command for Space, US Strategic Command; senior military assistant to the deputy undersecretary of defense for policy integration; and chief of staff as well as IMA to the undersecretary of Department of Defense policy in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Source:
This article was originally published in the Air and Space Power Journal Volume 29, Issue 5, Sept – Oct 2015.

Notes:
1. Cheryl Pellerin, “Carter Unveils New DoD Cyber Strategy in Silicon Valley,” US Department of Defense, 23 April 2015, http://preview.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=128659.
2. IPv6 (Internet Protocol version 6) is the latest Internet standard protocol that uses 128 bits ver- sus the current IPv4’s 32 bits. The new version has capacity for every person on Earth to have billions of Internet addresses personally allocated. Therefore, blocking by individual address or range of ad- dresses will no longer be effective or efficient.
3. “Baked in” refers to integrating desired security features at the initial stage of design and devel- opment as opposed to adding them on (i.e., “bolted on”) after the product has been released.
4. Vincent Hu, Adam Schnitzer, and Ken Sandlin, “Attribute Based Access Control Definition and Considerations,” National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-162, n.d., http://csrc.nist.gov/projects/abac/july2013_workshop/july2013_abac_workshop_abac-sp.pdf.
5. Coimbatore S. Chandersekaran and William R. Simpson, “A Uniform Claims-Based Access Con- trol for the Enterprise,” International Journal of Scientific Computing 6, no. 2 (December 2012): 1–23.
6. Spencer Johnson, Who Moved My Cheese? An Amazing Way to Deal with Change in Your Work (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1998).
7. SAF/CIO A6 CTO, CIET-B, Target Baseline 2.0, 2015, https://intelshare.intelink.gov/sites/afceit /TB/default.aspx.

At least 45 people lost their lives late Wednesday in Syrian regime barrel bomb attacks in Aleppo, Syrian Civil Defense officials told Anadolu Agency.

Civil Defense teams rushed to al-Mashhad neighborhood in Aleppo to look for victims stuck under collapsed buildings. The injured were taken to field hospitals for treatment.

Aleppo’s opposition-held neighborhoods have been targeted by regime air forces, damaging infrastructure and leaving many residents without water and electricity.

The Syria conflict began in 2011 when the regime of Bashar al-Assad responded with unexpected ferocity to popular protests that erupted as part of the Arab Spring uprisings.

More than four years of intense fighting has left the country divided between pro-Assad forces and a number of heavily armed opposition factions, which are often at odds among themselves.

Roughly half of the country’s population has been displaced by the violence, with over four million Syrians now seeking refuge in neighboring countries, especially Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq.

More than 250,000 people have died in the Syrian conflict, and millions more have been displaced, according to the UN.

Original article

By Dr. S.Chandrasekharan

Amidst intensified violence in the Terai-Madhes, with the continuing crackdown by Police and mobilization by the Army, the Constituent Assembly has begun voting on the various clauses of the new constitution. This followed the decision of the three top political parties- the Nepali Congress, the UML and the Maoists- UCPN (M) to go ahead despite the protests.

The Chairman of the 601 strong interim Constitutional Assembly Subash Nembang has indicated that the new constitution will be promulgated formally by the President on 20th September at 5 P.M.. The steps toward promulgation will include

• Clause by clause voting of the draft constitution that will be over in a day or two.
• This will be followed by the Constituent Assembly voting in bulk the entire constitution.
• The law makers (Parliamentarians) will first sign the constitution followed by the Chairman certifying the bill.
• The certified bill will be handed over to the President for promulgation.

There was a pause of two days on 12th and 13 in constitution making, to enable the leaders from Terai to visit Kathmandu informally and start the talks. Accordingly, Upendra Yadav, Rajendra Mahatao and Mahendra Yadav travelled to Kathmandu for day on 12th and returned to Terai the next day.

No progress could be made and therefore the ‘top three’ decided to go ahead with the constitution making. The reason given by Dahal the Maoist leader for going ahead with the constitution with the other two parties appeared to be a bit strange. He said that though he did not agree with some of the provisions in the new constitution, he decided to go along to prevent conspiracies being hatched by outsiders to scuttle the constitution!

It is very painful to go through all the main incidents that have resulted in loss of life and property in Terai. A visitor to the area said that 20 of the 22 Terai districts look like war zones. Vehicles are stranded everywhere. Nine of the districts are under curfew but the protestors do not seem to follow the curfew resulting in avoidable deaths.

The districts of Siraha, Mahottari, Dhanusha, Bara, Sunsari ( this district is not to be added to the Terai in the new dispensation) and even Rautahat appear to be badly affected.

Death toll is said to be 34, but could be more as there have been many firing incidents in the last two days.

82 parliamentarians from the Madhes centred parties have formally withdrawn from constitution making proces. Many of those elected from the Terai in the top three parties are also said to be putting pressure on the leaders to go slow and find a solution before promulgation. But it is too late now.

The top three leaders are seen to be determined to go ahead with the promulgation despite violence and boycott of Madhes-based parties. Not one of them, in this month long agitation has visited the south to explain to the people why a new constitution is urgently necessary and how accommodation could be made on the controversial portions in the constitution even after promulgation. Their lack of vision and intemperate statements have only exacerbated the situation. The conspiracy theory put forward by the Maoists is nothing but rubbish.

India while welcoming the progress in constitution making has urged for “flexibility” on the part of all the political parties. This is a wise stand and it is hoped all the stake holders will review their positions, though it may be too late now. Heavens will not fall if the constitution is delayed a little more.

By Adam MacDonald*

With the end of the Cold War and the softening of a geopolitical lensing of the region, a new political paradigm emerged in the Arctic, based upon institutional frameworks supporting and facilitating cooperation on mutual interests and challenges.1 However, over the past decade, the Arctic potentially is once again at an inflection point with the pendulum swinging back towards a more strategic-military orientation. This is most evident by the augmenting presence, capability development, and employment of military forces by all Arctic-Five (A-5) states;2 a phenomenon characterized by some commentators as the ‘militarization’ of the Arctic.3 These analyses, however, are more of a detailed description and cataloguing of military activities, and they stop short of intensively investigating their underlying explanatory components. Instead, there is a simple narrative made that militarization stems from an emerging perception in the region that relations are becoming more confrontational and hostile, specifically over contested maritime exclusion zone claims. Opening accessibility and resource potential in the region, it is commonly argued, is driving the latest (and last) great scramble for sovereign control in the world.

The presence of military forces does not in and of itself necessarily signal a shift to more adversarial approaches in diplomacy. Moving beyond descriptive accounts, examination of the use and intentionality of military power in Arctic affairs reveals three distinct trends impacting the regional landscape. First, the increasing training, capability development, stationing and employment of military forces in the North are an emerging reality. Second, the current discourse with respect to the militarization of the Arctic exaggerates both the military build-up and the intentional underpinning of it. Power projection capabilities of the A-5 states remain limited beyond their own borders, and most training and exercise scenarios are focused within national boundaries developing a broad base of competencies. Furthermore, certain capability developments, although residing within the Arctic, have extra-regional causes. Third, as has been demonstrated by past events, the introduction of military forces into Arctic issues (regardless of their rationales) may alter relations onto a more competitive stance. In this respect, the larger geopolitical relationship between Russia and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) – of which the other four A-5 states are members – must be carefully addressed to ensure military developments do not become a distraction to the continued functioning of the Arctic regional regime. This is particularly relevant within the context of degrading military relations between Moscow and NATO following Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and ongoing turmoil in Eastern Ukraine, issues which may produce negative ripple effects impacting Arctic diplomacy and co-operation.4

In addressing these issues, forums, either within existing institutions or in new venues, need to be established. Their purpose is not to dissuade the use of military forces in the Arctic, as they are legitimate power resources, but to explain their political underpinnings and deter employment in regional disagreements. Managing the selective inclusion, not complete exclusion, of military aspects into the Arctic regime is warranted to support and not derail efforts that address the complex challenges confronting the region.

Emerging Reality

The Arctic is an augmenting strategic priority for the A-5 states. Over the last decade, all of them have promulgated multi-dimensional strategies that explicitly state that their primary (although not only) interest is exercising sovereignty over their northern territories and achieving other national security interests, including a stable regional order. Furthermore, some, such as the United States and Russia, have created Arctic-specific defence policies. It is evident from these documents that the military emphasis in the region will increase, although there is careful consideration to portray their presence and employment in non-confrontational terms.

Canada’s Northern Strategy, published in 2009, promises to put “…more boots on the Arctic Tundra, more ships in the water, and a better eye in the sky.”5 Recent Danish defence policies focus upon the changing geo-strategic significance of the Arctic and promulgate the establishment of a new Arctic military command headquartered in Nuuk, Greenland.6 Norway’s 2007 Soria Moria Declaration asserted that the Arctic is their strategic priority in national defence and led to the associated redeployment of most military headquarters from the south to the north of the country.7 Russia’s Arctic strategy emphasizes the region as the country’s primary area for natural resources by 2020, and the concomitant need for a strong regional military component.8 Finally, the United States, over the past year, has revamped both its Arctic and Arctic Defense policies with plans to become more active and to modernize certain capabilities, such as ice breakers.9

Stemming from these policy declarations, all A-5 states have increased their military training, capability development, and employment regionally. Of these, Russia has been the most active, resuming regional naval surface and air patrols in 2007-2008. Furthermore, the planting of the Russian flag at the bottom of the North Pole in 2007 not only stirred sensitivities over ownership of the Arctic, but it demonstrated Moscow’s capability advantages vice those of their neighbours. Russia conducted the region’s first ever amphibious assault as part of a larger military exercise in 2012 involving over 20,000 soldiers.10 In September 2013, a ten-ship naval armada made the 2000 nautical-mile journey via the Northern Sea Route from Severomorsk (home to the Russian Northern Fleet) east to the New Siberian Islands in support of refurbishing and opening old military facilities. Furthermore, there are plans to expand these projects to Russia’s other northern islands, including Franz Joseph Land and Novaya Zemlya. These developments signal a particular focus upon combat readiness and mobilization.11

Canada has been active on a number of fronts to augment its military presence and experience in the region as well. Since 2007, Canada has conducted annually Operation Nanook, a multi-service training exercise designed to protect and to exercise capabilities within its Arctic national borders. The continued development of the Arctic Offshore Patrol Ships, although somewhat uncertain of particulars, is a new region-specific capability for the Canadian Navy.12 Plans for new surveillance systems, including satellites and underwater aspects, further demonstrate Ottawa’s determination to increase its monitoring of Arctic movements in its waters.13

Also contributing to the regional trend, Denmark has been building its capabilities in the construction and use of naval platforms. The Thetis, Absalon, and Ivar Huitfeldt class frigates are combat capable vessels which are increasingly being used to patrol Greenland’s waters. F-16 fighters have also been redeployed to Greenland, a first for the Danish military.14 Likewise, Norway has built a number of offshore vessels and frigates capable of being equipped with advanced combat systems, such as the American designed Aegis air-defence system on their Fridtjof Nansen class frigates. Oslo also hosts the bi-annual Exercise Cold Response, aimed at increasing operational and survival knowledge in the Arctic. The least active of these countries is the United States, which has largely avoided Arctic specific capability development, but the continued basing of F-22 aircraft in Alaska, and the ice breaking capable Seawolf and Virginia class nuclear attack submarines, provides Washington options in the region.15
Current Exaggeration of Arctic Militarization

The actual extent of capabilities and operations of military forces in the Arctic, while growing, is still limited largely to within the A-5 state borders.16 Even the much-hyped Russian armada in September 2013 occurred during ideal weather conditions, and close to shore.17 Furthermore, many military exercises, such as Nanook and Cold Response, occur in the summer months, due to the difficulties of conducting them in the weather extremes, which characterize much of the year.

Procurement and financing issues in building and maintaining such capabilities are also a limitation for some Arctic states. Developing regional expertise and experiences with respect to equipping, training, and stationing forces is a major challenge, and they compete with other military and spending priorities. For example, despite its triumphant tone, some of the procurement and military aspects outlined in Canada’s Northern Defence Strategy have not come to fruition, such as the building of a refueling station in Nanisivik. The Arctic offshore patrol vessels (AOPS) are running over time and budget, most likely implying a smaller number will be completed than originally forecasted, and with fewer capabilities,18 (although a contract was signed with Irving Shipbuilding in January 2015 to manufacture five-to-six AOPS at a total cost of $3.5 Billion – Ed.). Such budgetary restraints have been explicitly stated within the United States’ Arctic Defense Strategy, acknowledging that the current state of fiscal austerity combined with the American military ‘pivot’ to East Asia may derail their renewed strategic approach in the region.19 Even Russia, with steadily increasing military budgets, is faced with decades of infrastructure development in some of its harshest and neglected regions.20

Beyond capability gaps and challenges, militarization implies that military developments have come to dominate the regional discourse, driven by changing and augmenting threat perceptions that the future security environment will become more hostile. Such analyses give a parsimonious, mono-casual picture of the forces behind these issues, which are, in reality, varied and interlinked. The growing military focus upon the region by some A-5 states has more to do with the geographic positioning of the country than with an increasingly pessimistic view with respect to future regional cooperation. Norway and Russia have large portions of their states, including ample natural resources, residing in the Arctic, and thus it makes sense in part why they place military emphasis therein. Concerns remain on the part of Norway regarding Russian posturing in the region, but the 2010 agreement by the two settling their dispute over the Barents Sea demonstrates that positive political and legal action and compromise is possible, even in an environment where strategic suspicions exist.21

Further, the nature of some military exercises are not simply oriented towards developing combat capable forces, but in building and strengthening governmental capacities within these remote areas. For example, with respect to Canada, Operation Nanook conducted in 2013 was devoted to non-warfare scenarios, including evacuations due to natural disasters, coordinating missing person searches, and aviation disaster response. In these, the military operated in a largely constabulary and support role to other domestic agencies. Furthermore, the inclusion of other A-5 states in such exercises, the United States and Denmark in Operation Nanook, and numerous NATO countries in Cold Response, demonstrate a desire to coordinate Arctic knowledge and to develop common operating procedures.

Finally, some military developments in the Arctic are based upon larger, extra-regional factors. Having the United States and Russia in the region, given their wider strategic relationship, blurs the lines between developments which are Arctic specific vice those of a more global nature. For example, the placement of interceptor missiles in Alaska by Washington is not designed to counter some Arctic threat, but that of North Korea’s expanding nuclear missile arsenal. The rebuilding of Russia’s Northern Fleet, particularly its nuclear ballistic submarine component, while conducting operations in the Arctic is designed to upgrade Moscow’s largest Fleet for global operations and to shore up its nuclear deterrent.22 Also, the use of multi-role combat naval ships in the region by the smaller A-5 states – Canada, Denmark and Norway – may not be driven by an augmented security posture as much as by necessity, due to the limited availability of platforms. These nations do not have the luxury of regionally defined fleets, leading them to build and use multi-purpose vessels in a variety of global operational theatres.

A Detrimental Distraction

The only territorial dispute (not to be confused with maritime zone claims) ongoing in the Arctic is that of Hans Island between Canada and Denmark. For years, the debate over this barren rocky island with no population or economic resources was low key and non-threatening. All this changed in 2003 with the introduction of naval vessels by both sides to the island, alongside planting national flags and visits by senior government officials, which stifled relations and greatly antagonized the issue onto a zero-sum geopolitical grounding.23 A 2005 agreement was reached by Ottawa and Copenhagen in New York to cease the regular military visits to the island and to return to the status-quo: one of dispute, but now of low political importance.24 This is perhaps the greatest demonstration of the manner in which the introduction of military forces, regardless of the underlying intent, can generate hostility and tensions, creating a chain reaction of ‘tit-for-tat’ uses of military power greatly inflaming what was historically a non-issue between the two nations. Therefore, with the increasing presence of military forces in the region, the potential remains for them to become a detrimental distraction away from the needed regional cooperation and engagement to tackle the plethora of real and complex challenges at hand.

All A-5 states must continue to clearly define their rationale for the employment of military forces to the North, but it is the lack of clarity regarding Russia’s geopolitical perception which generates the most concern. A 2013 study by the International Institute for Strategic Studies concluded the Russian military was not prepared to ‘repel aggression’ in the region.25 The unclear threat in this circumstance was further clouded when, a day after Canada submitted its official United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) exclusion zone claim (including the North Pole), President Putin ordered the Russian military to redouble its efforts in the Arctic, making the region a military priority.26 As a result of the timings of such a move, it is uncertain how Russia will incorporate and utilize its growing military power in the Arctic. Will it be employed for exercising authority and defence within its territories, or for supporting regional political and economic claims, perhaps in a confrontational manner?

Russian perceptions, however, also stem from their wider relationship with the United States and NATO. Moscow is concerned with respect to NATO’s growing interest in the region, especially since the other A-5 states are all alliance members. Therefore, individual, uncoordinated, and national specific military actions by them may be interpreted as a larger, intentional NATO strategy, altering the balance of power at the expense of Russia.27 NATO and its Arctic members must be mindful and empathetic to such strategic suspicion. Russia is an outlier in Arctic military cooperation, as the other A-5 members are increasingly working together via military exercises. In particular, Canada and Denmark, in the wake of the early-2000s flare-up over Hans Island, have developed a strong military connection with regular exercises, exchanges, and port visits between their navies and coast guard forces. However, even within NATO, there is disagreement with respect to the organization’s future involvement. Norway advocates it would positively contribute to regional security, but Canada is wary that non-Arctic members in the alliance would get an unfair voice in the region at the expense of the Arctic states.28

Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and ongoing unrest in the Ukraine has cast a chill in military and strategic relations between Moscow and NATO, which threatens to spill over into the Arctic region. NATO states have committed military forces to Europe for training and ‘presence operation’ purposes, shoring up support for NATO’s Eastern European members wary of a more assertive and potentially militarily aggressive Russia. However, due to the geopolitical realities of European dependence upon Russia for natural gas, the intensity and commitment of these responses varies by NATO states, with Germany and France remaining largely mute on the matter, but Canada being the most vocally critical of the Putin regime. Further, NATO members are trying to determine whether territorial aggrandizement in Crimea is a product of regional specific factors, or a new direction in Russian foreign policy which may impact how Moscow conducts its Arctic affairs. Norway, for example, is increasingly calling upon NATO to focus and establish an alliance regional presence to counteract such a potentiality, but Canada remains concerned with respect to any NATO role in the region, coincidently congruent (but for different reasons) with Russia’s position. However, tensions in Canada-Russia relations may motivate Ottawa to reconsider such a stance.29

So far, the ‘ripple effect’ in strategic relations with Moscow has not dramatically impacted the Arctic regional regime, with member states publicly stating their desire to keep regional relations separate from others around the world. That said, Ottawa’s boycott of the April 2014 Arctic Council meeting in Moscow demonstrates how the region is not hermetically sealed from disputes and tensions with respect to other aspects of the Arctic states’ relations.30 It also remains unclear whether a NATO presence in the Arctic would stabilize or inflame relations, placing the region on a more confrontational military setting with extra-regional issues increasingly influencing Arctic policies and diplomacy.

The potential for security dilemmas and arms races in the Arctic is not only an academic observation, but one explicitly acknowledged by some of the regional actors, including the United States and Canada. In Washington’s Arctic Defense Strategy, for example, it states: “Being too aggressive in taking steps to address anticipated future security risks may create the conditions of mistrust and miscommunication under which such risks could materialize.”31 The universal agreement by the A-5 states that security matters exist in the region, and that military forces can be employed in part to address them, must be balanced by the challenges of how to use them in a manner which does not in and of itself cause unnecessary hostility and tensions, ultimately inhibiting the ability to address the issues they were originally designed to combat.

Inclusion, not Exclusion, of Military Issues

These military developments exist within an Arctic regime populated by institutional frameworks which have been emerging since the 1990s. Of these, the Arctic Council is the premier institute, bringing together all eight Arctic countries (the A-5 states plus Iceland, Finland and Sweden) along with a number of northern community groups, in establishing forums to address a number of transnational issues, such as: increasing economic activity and shipping; indigenous communities; mapping and surveying; and the overall sources and impact of climate change to the region. Security matters- specifically those pertaining to military developments – are barred from the institution’s mandate.32 However, the A-5 states have constructed other avenues over the past number of years to address some of these concerns.

The 2008 Ilusissat Declaration signed by all A-5 states proclaims the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) as the legal framework of the region and the instrument through which their conflicting exclusion zone claims shall be concluded and governed. Over the past decade, maritime disputes – including exclusion zone claims and the legal status of major transport routes – have augmented in priority for the A-5 states as the increasing accessibility and potential resource profitability motivates them to secure access and control to the furthest extent. As a result, competitive arenas, largely absent in the 1990s, are beginning to emerge. This is not surprising or unexpected, but the manner in which these competitions, including those conducted between close allies such as Canada and the United States over the status of the Northwest Passage unfold will have major ramifications to the wider regional relationship, especially since final adjudication on many of these issues will not be forthcoming any time soon.

The creation of the annual meeting of Northern Defence Chiefs in 2012, attended by senior military officers of the Arctic states, has to date been the most substantive endeavour to include military issues into the regional framework. However, these meetings, while discussing common security interests and solutions, avoid raising matters that are contested between the aforementioned states. There remains, therefore, the need to include, not just senior military officers, but political and defence officials to discuss the strategic and political dimensions driving their current policies and actions. Reforming existing or establishing new venues to create this diplomatic space would assist in easing misunderstandings and also create mechanisms to address tensions and uncertainties. Allowing members to voice strategic concerns, for example, Russian concern with respect to a greater NATO interest in the region, would contribute towards providing meaningful levels of security to all Arctic states.

Conclusion

The Arctic regional regime and its membership must create room for the inclusion, not exclusion, of military matters. Military forces are a valid and needed resource, particularly as they are possibly the only government organization with the capability to operate in the harsh regional environment and to provide services such as search and rescue and human and natural disaster assistance. The stationing and establishing of military units and centres may also be useful as logistics and transportation hubs, and could create much needed regional infrastructure which can be used for other purposes, such as for shipping.33

The inability or unwillingness to include and address military matters permits the danger that the augmenting use of military power, regardless of its original purpose, leads to the militarization of the region. To that end, the reasons for their employment changes from addressing national and transnational issues – search and rescue, maritime and aviation disasters, and possibly illegal activities, such as smuggling and terrorism – to that of responding to the military designs and initiatives of each other. It is not clear that it is changing threat perceptions which are driving current military developments, but it is accurate to predict that their increasing presence may result in changing threat perceptions if they are not addressed in an open, transparent, and reciprocal manner.

Explaining the presence of combat capable forces in the region, acknowledging extra-regional influences upon military developments, and deterring any use of naval and air patrols over contested exclusion zone claims are the most immediate military-diplomatic challenges which confront regional leaders. In the end, the overarching objective is to ensure that the regional security discourse is not dominated by traditional balance of power calculations, the territorialisation of the Arctic Ocean, and boasts of sovereign pride compromising the cooperative and multilateral approaches that have been established to address transnational issues, which demand a coordinated, region-wide response.

About the author:
*Adam P. MacDonald is an independent academic regularly getting published in Canadian and international journals. His research interests include Canadian foreign and defence policy with respect to the Arctic and East Asia; political developments in Myanmar specifically pertaining to the military; and Chinese naval modernization. He lives and works in Halifax.

Source:
This article was published in the Canadian Military Journal Vol. 15, No 3.

Notes:

1. Adan P. MacDonald, “Deep Freeze or Warm Peace? Canada’s Arctic Strategy in a Changing Regional Regime,” in Canadian Naval Review, Winter 2012, Vol. 7, No. 4, pp. 4-9.
2. The Arctic-Five (A-5) states are those which border the Arctic Ocean: Canada, Denmark (via Greenland), Norway, Russia, and the United States. These nations are the most active in the region in terms of military developments, and when combined with the various maritime dispute claims between them in the Arctic Ocean, these elements shall constitute the focus of this article. The three other Arctic countries – Iceland, Finland, and Sweden – that are full members of the Arctic Council (for they reside in part north of the Arctic Circle) do not border the Arctic Ocean and have no outstanding claims with any other Arctic state.
3. Michael J. Cole, “Militarization of the Arctic Heats Up, Russia Takes the Lead,” in The Diplomat, 06 December 2013. Available at www.thediplomat.com/2013/12/militarization-of-the-arctic-heats-up-russia-takes-the-lead. Accessed 10 January 2014; Abhijit Singh, “The Creeping Militarization of the Arctic,” in The Diplomat, 16 October 2013. Available at www.thediplomat.com/2013/10/the-creeping-militarization-of-the-arctic . Accessed 10 January 2014.
4. Libby Leyden-Sussler, “Canada’s Arctic Council Protest: Ripple Effect?” in World Policy Journal, 07 May 2014. Available at http://www.worldpolicy.org/blog/2014/05/07/canadas-arctic-council-protest-ripple-effect . Accessed 10 July 2014.
5. Our North, Our Heritage, Our Future: Canada’s Northern Strategy, Department of Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, 2009, p. 13.
6. Siemon T Wezeman, “Military Capabilities in the Arctic,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, March 2012, p. 5. Available at http://books.sipri.org/files/misc/SIPRIBP1203.pdf. Accessed 09 January 2014.
7. Soria Moria Declaration on International Policy, Office of the Prime Minister of Norway, 02 February 2007. Available at www.regjeringen.no/en/archive/Stoltenbergs-2nd-Government/Office-of-the-Prime-Minister/rapporter-og-planer/rapporter/2005/the-soria-moria-declaration-on-internati.html?id=438515. Accessed 09 January 2014.
8. John Drennan, “Russia’s Persistent Ambition,” in The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2013. Available at www.iiss.org/en/militarybalanceblog/blogsections/2013-1ec0/december-e71c/russia-in-the-arctic-b038 . Accessed 10 January 2014.
9. Wezeman, p. 11.
10. Singh.
11. Drennan.
12. Rob Huebert, “The Newly Emerging Arctic Security Environment,” The Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, March 2010, p. 7. Available at https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/cdfai/pages/41/attachments/original/1413661956/
    The_Newly_Emerging_Arctic_Security_Environment.pdf?1413661956. Accessed 10 January 2014.
13. Adam Lajeunesse, and Bill Carruthers, “The Ice Has Ears,” in Canadian Naval Review, Winter 2013, Vol.9, No.3, pp. 4-9; Wezeman, p. 3.
14. Wezeman, p. 5.
15. Huebert, pp. 10-19.
16. Katarzyna Zysk, “The Evolving Arctic Security Environment: An Assessment,” in Russia in the Arctic, Stephen J. Blank (ed.), pp. 91-138. Available at www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=131240. Accessed 10 January 2014; Wezeman.
17. Drennan.
18. Eric Lerhe, “The National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy: An update,” Canadian International Council, 2013, p. 5. Available at https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/cdfai/pages/95/attachments/original/1413683798/ The_National_Shipbuilding_Procurement_Strategy_-_An_Update.pdf?1413683798 Accessed 09 January 2014.
19. Arctic Strategy, United States Department of Defense, November 2013, p. 12.
20. Drennan.
21. Tore Henriksen and Geir Ulfstein, “Maritime Delimitation in the Arctic: The Barents Sea Treaty,” in Ocean Development & International Law, 2011, Vol.42, No.1, pp. 1-21.
22. Huebert, p. 5; Wezeman, p. 14.
23. Huebert, p. 11.
24. “Canada, Denmark Agree to Resolve Dispute Over Arctic Island,” CBC News, 19 September 2005.
25. Drennan.
26. Stephan Blank, “Russia’s Arctic Policy: Between Commercialization and Militarization,” in Eurasia Daily Monitor , 2013, Vol. 10, No. 225; Thomas Grove, Russia’s Putin orders military complete Arctic plan by year end,” Reuters, 10 December 2013.
27. Zysk, pp. 109-111; Nigel Chamberlain, “Increasing Military Activity in The Arctic,” in NATO Watch, 2013, Briefing Paper No. 32. Available at www.natowatch.org/node/901 . Accessed 10 January 2014.
28. Luke Coffey, “NATO in The Arctic: Challenges and Opportunities,” The Heritage Foundation, 22 July 2012. Available at www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/06/nato-in-the-arctic-challenges-and-opportunities. Accessed 09 January 2014.
29. John Ivison, “Crimea forcing Harper to rethink NATO, Arctic defence,” in The National Post, 17 March 2014. Available at http://fullcomment.nationalpost.com/2014/03/17/john-ivison-crimea-crisis-forcing-harper-to-rethink-nato-arctic-defence/. Accessed 10 July 2014.
30. Leyden-Sussler.
31. Arctic Strategy, United States Department of Defense, p. 13.
32. “Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council,” The Arctic Council, 19 September 1996, p. 1. Available at www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/document-archive/category/4-founding-documents# . Accessed 10 January 2014.
33. Zysk, p. 110.

The Moroccan Press Agency (MAP) reported that “King Mohammed VI, Chairman of Al Quds Committee, an offshoot of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), held phone talks with HM King Abdullah II Ibn Al Hussein of Jordan, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, Emir of the State of Qatar, and Mahmoud Abbas, President of the State of Palestine.

These talks were an opportunity to consult on the illegal violations that have been committed recently by Israeli occupation forces against the blessed Al Aqsa Mosque and the city of Al Quds, the King’s Office said in a statement.

During these talks, the leaders of these countries reiterated their condemnation of these violations, notably the intrusion into the Al Aqsa Mosque and its esplanades, the destruction of parts of its facilities and the evacuation of the faithful and officials, while assaulting and prosecuting them, the statement said, adding that these violations are aimed at implementing the Israeli plan to divide the Al Aqsa Mosque, in time and space, and occupy it.

In this context, it was agreed to instruct the foreign ministers of these countries to coordinate the measures aimed at facing Israel’s intransigence and its obstinacy in continuing its flagrant violations of the resolutions of international legality, the statement concluded. ”

In fact those violent clashes between Palestinians and Israeli police at Jerusalem’s most sensitive holy site prompted that phone conversation between King Mohammed VI and the three Arab leaders. King Mohammed VI as President of Jerusalem Fund expressed his denunciation of the violence at the holy site. It is well known that unfortunately this site is a frequent flashpoint and its fate is a core issue at the heart of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The director of Al-Aqsa Mosque, Omar Kiswani, said dozens of people had stayed at the mosque overnight. He said police “stormed” the area on Monday morning, firing tear gas and stun grenades and making several arrests.

U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon commented the latest violence escalation at the holy site saying : “once again underscored the importance of reaching a final status agreement through negotiations on all issues, including arrangements for the holy sites that are acceptable to all.”

In Washington, State Department spokesman John Kirby said the U.S. is “deeply concerned by the recent violence and escalating tensions” surrounding the Jerusalem holy site and called on all sides to “exercise restraint, refrain from provocative actions and rhetoric and preserve unchanged historic status quo” at the.

As the President of Jerusalem Committee, King Mohammed never ceases to deploy great efforts to iniate a series of social, educational projects in Jerusalem for the benefit of Muslim and christian Palestinians.

Also and for all the Holocaust denying and minimizing in the Arab world, there is one leader in the Arab world who speaks out unabashedly about the horrors of the Holocaust, writes the chairman of the U.S. Commission for the Preservation of America’s Heritage Abroad, in the Philadelphia Inquirer: “The leader of an Arab Muslim nation made some remarkable statements about the Holocaust – remarkable for their courage and respect for historical truth. In a largely unreported speech at the Royal Palace in Fez in 2009, Morocco’s King Mohammed VI called the Holocaust “one of the blots, one of the most tragic chapters in modern history.” The king added, “Amnesia has no bearing on my perception of the Holocaust, or on that of my people.”

Enjoying a wide credibility of the main conflicting parties in the Middle East, Morocco can be a major broker in the frozen peace process. Now the two main protagonists should show a total commitment to reach a comprehensive, just and lasting peace that would allow both Palestinians and Israelis to live side by side safely and in harmony. In the meantime, unnecessary provocation should stop and restraint should prevail.

By Sasa Dragojlo

The Serbian Progressive Party on Wednesday said the five US Congressmen who wrote to Vice-President Joseph Biden on the eve of Aleksandar Vucic’s visit to the US were all members of a “Bosnian caucus” that was hostile to Serbia.

The letter, which BIRN published, said the Serbian leader was linked to strategic company takeovers and was undermining media freedom.

The Progressives meanwhile accused the opposition Democratic Party and businessman Miroslav Miskovic of using the letter to “mock the state and diminish the reputation of Serbia.

“It is good that the citizens of Serbia know that the Democratic Party supports the initiative of the Bosnian Caucus in the US,” the party said, accusing the five Congress members, “together with Miroslav Miskovic, of lobbying against the interests of Serbia”.

In the letter to Biden, the Congress members expressed concern about media rights in Serbia, the lack of progress in resolving the Bytiqy case and Serbia’s joint military actions with Russia.

The Bytiqi case, concerning the murder of three Kosovo American-Albanian brothers in Serbia in 1999, remains a bilateral problem between the two countries.

It also allege that a group of people led by Vucic’s brother, Andrej, and two of his close friends, Nikola Petrovic and Zoran Korac, had “consolidated their influence and interest in energy, telecommunications, infrastructure and all major businesses in Serbia”.

The letter was signed by Congressmen Edie Bernice Johnson, Carlos Curbelo, Scott Perry, Adam Kinzinger and Zoe Lofgren.

Press offices of the Congressmen declined to comment further on the details of the letter.

Vucic met Biden, the US Vice-President, on Tuesday for talks that he described as successful.

He said Biden showed respect for Serbia’s political and economic reforms.

Someone very rightly said that: “Imprudence is a moral failing of sorts, but alas it ranks low as a dreamtime concern”.

Once again, recent reports uncritically parrot the view that the Pakistan government’s nuclear position as dangerous, giving the impression to readers that Pakistan’s claims lack any basis. So, do we smell a conspiracy here too? The logic presented is full of loop holes and there exist no obvious solutions to the problem, as the problem presented in the reports is not the real cause of concern as the overlooking Pakistan’s security perception vis-à-vis India.

Since Pakistan successfully became a nuclear weapon state, it has been a continuous target of such propaganda in the media, sometimes containing a nature of euphemism or dysphemism.

Today, we know the situation is even worse, as not only Pakistan, but almost every other nuclear weapon state in the world now has big enough arsenals to be triggered. Yet, the difference still persists, with all attention focusing towards Pakistan.

Nuclear weapons are definitely absolute weapons. There is no need for Pakistan to balance India quantitatively. Thus, Pakistan has no intention to get into any arms race with India. All we need is the stability in the region, which our weapons have successfully accomplished.

One of the five points proposed to Pakistan is to “Separate civilian and military nuclear facilities”.

Regarding the sale to Pakistan of nuclear reactors by China, it should be noted that this deal is based on the Sept. 1986 civil nuclear deal that provides for a comprehensive civil nuclear cooperation framework under IAEA safeguards. As such, the IAEA must be notified that all the Chinese sales of power reactors to Pakistan comply with the full safeguards of international standards and are governed by the 1986 agreement — which was before China joined the NPT (1992) and the NSG (2004).

While, theoretically, it can be possible to suggest theories that nuclear power reactors can be used to produce weapons-grade plutonium, practically and economically such a procedure would be very disastrous as it needs a very large enrichment facilities such as which are only available in NSG countries.

Needless to say, using civilian power reactor plants to fulfill viable energy needs can be Pakistan’s policy, but nuclear power for weapons purposes has never been our practice. Meanwhile, the country has been steadfast in the implementation of all its international commitments and safeguard agreements for its civilian nuclear facilities.

The history over the past decades has proven that Pakistan is only reacting to the nuclear threat from a larger adversary and has no aggressive or hegemonic designs. Pakistan has been actively following international standards of safety and security. Despite Pakistan complying with the international standard it is still not accepted by the main stream. As such, this demonstrates that it is the international community that is failing, and not Pakistan.

For any nation, there is no interest supreme to its own national interest. So it is clearly in Pakistan’s interest, keeping in view its challenges, to retain its nuclear weapons capability. “How much is enough?” is a relative statement that encompasses many variables. Hence, it is beneficial for the international community to accept and appreciate Pakistan as a nuclear state after witnessing decades of its remarkable journey as a nuclear weapon state despite all the odds.

Lastly, the solutions presented by the experts are still not a guarantee that after even Pakistan accepts them, it will not be treated discriminately with respect to India. As per Real Politik, why will Pakistan sign the FMCT only to gain the moral support, while ignoring what its counterpart in the region is doing? Let’s suppose if Pakistan is bound by the FMCT, then what about the major Indian warfare advancements that are affecting the deterrence in the region — especially if we look at the 2005, Indo-US agreement-123 for civil nuclear energy, which is also known as Indo-US nuclear deal. Through this deal India can enhance the quantity and quality of nuclear weapons. It seems to be an altogether hypocritical policy. Both parties must gain some benefits only then it’s a win-win situation.

External interventions and reports will not give Pakistan nuclear stability nor security since the problem lies within the South Asian security structure that still needs to be understood.

Trade delegations rush to Iran; if its nuclear ambitions are not contained, restoring sanctions won’t be easy.

By Jamsheed K. Choksy and Carol E. B. Choksy*

Around the world, businesses act overwhelmingly in favor of not only removing all sanctions on Iran, but keeping them off irrespective of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action’s success or failure. Yet as Iran gets re-hooked into the global system, the need for trade may not necessarily keep its government on the straight and narrow.

The plan of action adopted by international powers to curb the Iranian nuclear program in exchange for lifting sanctions has yet to be implemented, but a stampede is underway by countries to resume trading with Iran. As global industrial leaders rush to the Iranian El Dorado, many fear that Tehran will have less compulsion to keep its ambitions in check.

Germany’s Economic Minister Sigmar Gabriel led a delegation including executives from chemical manufacturer BASF and industrial gases producer Linde to Tehran just five days after the plan of action was inked on July 14. Eurogate, that nation’s largest port operator, agreed to resume shipping with its Iranian counterpart Sina Port and Marine. Austria hosted the Iran-EU Conference on Trade and Investment four days later, expecting its trade with Tehran to reach €315 million by year’s end. Switzerland lifted its ban on trade in precious metals with Iranian state organizations. Spain’s Bester Generation lined up multinational projects with Iran’s state-run Power and Water Equipment and Service Export Company in Mexico and Chile.

In August, Italian Industry Minister Federica Guidi announced that FATA SpA had signed a €500 million contract to build an electric power plant for Iran’s Ghadir Investment Co. – identified by the US Treasury as a subsidiary of the $100 billion SETAD organization, with executives appointed by Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Italy’s Deputy Minister of Justice Cosimo Ferri met with Iranian Minister of Industry, Mines and Trade Mohammad Reza Nematzadeh at the Expo Milan for 64 agreements on energy, engineering and food supplies. Iran’s Mahan Air began flying Airbuses, obtained after circumventing US sanctions, from Milan’s airport through Tehran to Shanghai.

Russia’s Sberbank Leasing has offered to finance up to 50 Superjet SSJ100 passenger aircraft, well aware that the Iranian commercial aviation sector needs to renovate its fleets by investing at least $20 billion. Two other Russian companies have negotiated deployment of satellite systems in Iran. A Romanian company sold three Boeing 737 aircraft to Tehran-based Caspian Airlines for routes to Ukraine, Armenia and Turkey.

Japan, once a major trade partner, sent Daishiro Yamagiwa, minister of Economy, Trade and Industry, to Tehran, seeking a “durable and continued process for the expansion of cooperation.” The delegation included executives from Toyota, Honda, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo and Mitsui. Yoo Il-ho, Korean minister of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, even apologized for his country leaving Iran under sanctions pressure, adding “the issues will be redressed.” Leaders of Daewoo, Hyundai and the national Korea Export-Import Bank were part of that 30-person trade delegation. China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation, Asia’s largest refiner, announced its interest in up to 40 million barrels of crude oil stored on Iranian tankers in the Persian Gulf. Not wanting to be left behind, Britain’s Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Philip Hammond reopened his country’s embassy in August. His delegation included the treasury minister plus senior executives from the British Bankers’ Association and energy infrastructure corporations.

The Netanyahu government is likely to keep sanctions in place, reining in Israeli businesses. Despite regional rivalries, Saudi imports from Iran totaled $120 million in 2013 and will likely rise.

Iran’s government has long been planning for re-entry into the global markets. In 2002 its majles, or parliament, passed the Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Act which allows 100 percent ownership and transfer of profits by non-Iranian companies. Gradually, the Islamic Republic has also accepted world intellectual property and copyright conventions and treaties. On August 11, Iran’s Monetary Council and Central Bank issued regulations permitting global banking in free trade zones at Kish, Qeshm and Chabahar.

Estimates suggest the government in Tehran could allocate an additional $4.8 billion from new revenues toward its defense budget. American and Israeli analysts and politicians fear that flush with new cash the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps would further deploy its overseas clout through military and terrorist actions. Still entangled in regional wars, the IRGC seems to be planning business ventures with foreign corporations which may temper its violence. The IRGC has even put the Telecommunication Company of Iran up for sale through its Etemad-e Mobin investment arm. The US Treasury will maintain sanctions on the IRGC, so international investors will still have to exercise due diligence. Rouhani and his allies are said to be pushing for less military involvement in Middle East conflicts.

Additionally, not all of the estimated $150 billion available to Iran after both UN and US economic sanctions are fully lifted will go to Tehran as hard currency or quickly. India owes Iran between $6.5 and $8.8 billion for oil purchases of which 55 percent will be repatriated in euros, the rest in rupees, with payments in installments over several years. China holds approximately $22 billion of Tehran’s funds. Yet a substantial portion of those assets serve as collateral for Chinese projects in Iran. In its own economic downturn, Beijing wants Tehran to barter remaining funds for goods and services rather than receive cash transfers.

Iranian Minister of Economic Affairs and Finance Ali Tayyeb Nia stresses that most of the frozen funds belong to the Central Bank of Iran and will be allocated for much-needed domestic development. Indeed, Iran’s economic needs may prove to be the dominant driver shaping not only that nation’s future implementation of the agreement but also other geopolitical actions. Addressing fellow Iranians and the global community on July 14, Iran’s President Hassan Rouhani conceded: “When we started negotiations, economic growth was well under zero percent… [now we have] a better future for our youth, a more rapid movement toward development.”

The ultimate test is Iran’s behavior. Even now the country continues to buttress the Assad regime, Hezbollah and Hamas while denouncing Israel and the United States.

Aware of possible backsliding, when announcing the joint plan of action, US President Barack Obama emphasized: “If Iran violates the deal, all of these sanctions will snap back into place.” Certain multinational corporations, such as British Petroleum, are hesitant to rush back into Iran fearing sanctions could be reintroduced by Washington. BP suggests it is “monitoring the situation and will look for opportunities.”

As Iran’s economy and society revive, its ambition as a regional power will likely grow, for Rouhani has declared: “Iran’s power is your power, we know security in the region as our security; we assume our stability [is] the stability of the region; now we will want more cooperation and more harmony.” Those words may have struck rivals like Saudi Arabia and Israel as both ominous and prognostic.

Prosthetics are on a roll lately. At the end of last year, CORDIS reported how NEBIAS, an EU-funded project, had developed the world’s most advanced bionic hand – capable of detecting information about touch and sending it real time to the patient thanks to a neuro-interface. Now, on the other side of the Atlantic, DARPA presented a prosthetic hand relaying different sensations of pressure through neural pathways in the spinal cord. The scientists behind the new device speak of a ‘near-natural’ sense of touch.

“We’ve completed the circuit,” DARPA program manager Justin Sanchez said. “Prosthetic limbs that can be controlled by thoughts are showing great promise, but without feedback from signals traveling back to the brain it can be difficult to achieve the level of control needed to perform precise movements. By wiring a sense of touch from a mechanical hand directly into the brain, this work shows the potential for seamless bio-technological restoration of near-natural function.”

The prosthetic hand was tested on a 28-year-old man who had been paralyzed for over a decade following a spinal cord injury, to see if it was possible to help him feel physical sensations again. Scientists at the Applied Physics Laboratory (APL), Johns Hopkins University first wired the prosthesis to his brain and blindfolded him. Then they pressed different fingers of the artificial hand to find out if the volunteer could feel anything.

DARPA reports that while wearing the prosthetic hand the patient was able not only to ‘feel’ when the hand was being touched, but also to tell precisely which finger was touched.

“At one point, instead of pressing one finger, the team decided to press two of them without telling him. He responded in jest asking whether somebody was trying to play a trick on him. That is when we knew that the feelings he was perceiving through the robotic hand were near-natural,” said Sanchez.

The prosthesis control system consists of two chips embedded in the patient’s brain, connected to pressure-sensitive torque sensors placed in the artificial hand. The 1mm wide chips contain several electrodes and are placed in both the motor cortex, which controls arm and hand movements, and the sensory cortex which receives and identifies signals resulting from tactile sensations. Every time the prosthetic hand touches something, the sensors send electrical signals via wires to the chips in the brain – making the wearer feel near-natural contact.

The new technology was presented at the Wait, What? A Future Technology Forum on September 10. Sanchez and his team are still awaiting peer review and publication in a scientific journal.

Source: CORDIS

Letting off General Motors — this homicidal fugitive from justice — once again desecrates the memory of over 100 victims and counting of General Motors criminality.

U.S. Attorney Preet Bharara and Attorney General Loretta Lynch have engaged in reverse malicious prosecution to inoculate General Motors and its culpable officials up and down the company hierarchy.

In particular, the exoneration of all GM personnel gives new meaning to the surrender of federal law enforcement that remains impervious to the preventable hundreds of thousands of deaths and injuries resulting from documented corporate criminal negligence or outright criminality throughout our country every year.

If the federal cops on the corporate crime beat — namely Lynch and Bharara — are going to continue to go AWOL, they should resign and President Obama should put in charge corporate law and order officials to deal with an ongoing media-reported corporate crime wave washing over the country.

This GM non enforcement debacle provides another reason why the Senate and the House should insert criminal penalties for willful and knowing violations of safety standards in the pending highway bill.

For more information contact Ralph Nader at (202) 387-8030 or info@csrl.org

(Civil.Ge) — Ex-mayor of Tbilisi, Gigi Ugulava, was released from 14-month pretrial detention late on Thursday night, a day after the Constitutional Court ruled that keeping an accused person in detention beyond 9-month limitation is unconstitutional.

Ugulava was freed from a courtroom after a motion by his defense lawyers was heard by a three-judge panel of the Tbilisi City Court – a proceeding, which was viewed largely as a formality, because, according to legal experts, the court had no other option but to take decision in line with the Constitutional Court ruling and release Ugulava. But the hearing lasted for almost five hours two of which were allocated for prosecutors, who requested time to study the Constitutional Court’s ruling.

Courtroom, packed with Ugulava’s supporters, erupted in applause as the presiding judge was announcing decision; his and UNM opposition party supporters were also gathered outside the court building, who met the ex-mayor with chanting his name.

Ugulava, who is one of the leaders of the UNM party, said shortly after he was released that the defeat of the Georgian Dream ruling coalition in the next parliamentary elections, scheduled for October 2016, is “inevitable.”

“They have billions in their hands, they have power in their hands, but they will have a defeat in their hands too; I promise it to them and it will happen very soon,” Ugulava said.

“Elections are coming. We will win early elections, if there are early elections; we will win the elections if they are in October 2016 [as scheduled]. We will win anyway even if they don’t change the electoral system. Their defeat is inevitable. Our victory and the victory of all the pro-European forces is inevitable,” he said.

“[Bidzina] Ivanishvili does not care about anything except of maintaining power,” Ugulava said, referring to ex-Prime Minister. “We will go to elections; important is to reach elections calmly and peacefully and we will see this man [Ivanishvili] off and put an end to nightmare brought by him upon the country… I hold no grudge, because I do not want to be like Ivanishvili, who is driven only by grudge.”

Georgia’s ex-president Mikheil Saakashvili, who is now governor of Odessa region in Ukraine and formally also remains chairman of UNM party, welcomed Ugulava’s release through posts on his Facebook and Twitter accounts.

“I welcome release of innocent Gigi Ugulava, the end of 14-month absurd and the beginning of the end of Russian oligarch’s regime,” Saakashvili wrote, using a term – “Russian oligarch”, which UNM politicians usually use in reference to ex-PM Ivanishvili.

Speaking to Rustavi 2 TV shortly after being released, Ugulava also said that he considers more than 14 months that he had to spend in pre-trial detention as a “gain” and “not as a waste of time.”

“It was an opportunity for me to test myself and to look at life from other side… This is a huge experience for me,” he said.

“If he [Ivanishvili] again gives me such an opportunity, he will of course have to pay a political price,” Ugulava added.

He was alluding to a possibility of being re-arrested. Ugulava is facing multiple criminal charges in several separate cases, which he denies as politically motivated. Trials in those cases are still ongoing and one of them is already in its final phase; if he is found guilty and convicted, Ugulava will be arrested to serve a prison term.

First set of criminal charges against Ugulava were filed in February, 2013 – at the time he was Tbilisi mayor; charges involved alleged misspending and embezzlement of large amount of public funds and money laundering into two separate cases.

Additional charges were filed against Ugulava in December, 2013 involving alleged misspending of GEL 48.18 million of public money in 2011-2012. In connection to these charges court at the time turned down prosecution’s motion for Ugulava’s pre-trial detention, but ruled in favor of a request to suspend Ugulava from Tbilisi mayor’s office. In May, 2014 the Constitutional Court ruled that Ugulava’s suspension from office was unconstitutional.

Separate set of criminal charges were filed against him in July, 2014, when Ugulava was chief of UNM’s campaign for local elections. Charges involved alleged money laundering scheme through which, the prosecution claims, he was financing UNM’s election campaign. The court ordered his pre-trial detention in connection to this case.

Ugulava was in pre-trial detention, when in July, 2014 prosecutorsfiled new set of charges involving exceeding of official authorities, stemming from breaking up of the November 7, 2007 anti-government protests, as well as raid on and “seizure” of Imedi TV station and other assets owned at the time by tycoon Badri Patarkatsishvili, who died in February, 2008. Ex-President Mikheil Saakashvili and some other former senior officials were also charged in connection to the same case.

When the original 9-month pre-trial detention for Ugulava was nearing its end and he was about to be released, prosecutors re-qualified in March, 2015 one of the criminal charges against him, which gave the prosecution ground for asking the court to remand the ex-mayor in custody.

Although the Georgian constitution explicitly says that the term of pre-trial detention of an accused should not exceed 9 months, one of the clauses in the criminal procedure code, which was adopted in 2010 when the UNM was in power, was allowing detention beyond 9-month limitation if new set of charges were filed against the same person.

When in March, 2015 Ugulava’s pre-trial detention was extended beyond 9 months, he denounced it at a court hearing as a “rape of the constitution”.

In late April his lawyers took the case to the Constitutional Court, which ruled on September 16 that holding of an accused person in pre-trial detention beyond 9-month limitation is unconstitutional.

The US House of Representatives today approved legislation sponsored by Congressman Peter DeFazio that would strengthen the tribal authority and expand the land rights of three Southwestern Oregon federally-recognized tribes.

Rep. DeFazio’s bill, the Western Oregon Tribal Fairness Act (H.R. 2791) provides land in trust to the Cow Creek Band of Umpqua Tribe of Indians and to the Confederated Tribes of the Coos, Lower Umpqua and Siuslaw Indians. Currently, the Cow Creek Band of Umpqua Tribe Indians and the Confederated tribes of the Coos, Lower Umpqua, and Siuslaw Indians do not hold any land in trust. The increase in tribal lands will spur job development and economic growth for both tribes.

The bill also restores the Coquille Indian Tribe’s sovereignty over the Coquille Forest. Unlike any other tribe in the United States, the Coquille Tribe must function under a legal anomaly with regard to managing its forest.

“These tribes have waited for Congress to make good on a deal made decades ago, and today they are finally gaining some of the recognition they deserve,” said Congressman Peter DeFazio. “Due to an embarrassing chapter in our nation’s history, these tribes have been unable to govern themselves as the sovereign nations that they are. While there is still much work to be done, the passage of the Western Oregon Tribal Fairness Act is a move towards progress. I urge my colleagues in the Senate to pass this legislation quickly.”

“We are thrilled by the passage of H.R. 2791,” said Chairman Mark Ingersoll of the Coos, Lower Umpqua, and Siuslaw Indians. “Representatives DeFazio and Walden have helped their colleagues take a big step toward making jobs and justice a reality for the Tribe and for western Oregon.”

“Today is a great step forward toward restoring the integrity of our Treaty with the federal government for a permanent reservation for the Cow Creek people,” said Cow Creek Chairman Dan Courtney. “We are grateful for the tremendous personal effort given by Congressman DeFazio and the whole Oregon delegation in moving our bill through the House of Representatives.”

“This legislation is critical to sustain the Coquille Tribe’s environmentally responsible forest management, which produces jobs and supplies vital logs to Oregon’s struggling mills,” said Coquille Indian Tribe Chairperson Brenda Meade. “We applaud Congressman DeFazio for his tireless work to help Oregon with this legislation.”

The bill now heads to the Senate for further consideration.