Faced with ever greater economic problems at home and isolation abroad, Vladimir Putin needs to freeze the conflict in the Donbas in such a way that Russians won’t begin asking questions about why he went there in the first place, Aleksandr Rabinovich says. And consequently, he is turning up the heat in Syria.

Many commentators have speculated about the links between Ukraine and Syria with most suggesting that the Kremlin leader, convinced he can act with impunity, is simply exploiting another possibility to project Russian power and further divide the West in the process.

But Rabinovich suggests that the relationship between Syria and Ukraine may be both closer and more complicated and that Putin has an obvious incentive to intensify the Syrian crisis further in order to keep his declared support among Russians at its current stratospheric levels (apostrophe.com.ua/article/world/ex-ussr/2015-09-19/voynyi-putina-i-dengi-yanukovicha/2288).

According to the financial analyst, “the Russian economy cannot withstand Crimea, the Donbas or Syria, but that is a matter of indifference to Putin. He is not engaged with the economy. He is occupied with the intoxication of the [Russian] population in order to preserve his power.”

And because he has to “freeze the conflict in the Donbas” in order to end or at least reduce sanctions, the Kremlin leader had to come up with a way that would “not reduce the level of intoxication of the population.” The answer was his decision to expand Russian support for Syria’s Asad and set Russia on a new collision course with the West.

In the short term, Putin’s strategy will work: “the people will sober up” only in 12 to 18 months, Rabinovich suggests. But he has this working for him. “The Russian economy is very primitive and therefore it can hold out somewhat longer than some whose brains are not so primitive think.”

Obviously, Putin is acting in Syria for other reasons as well, including backing a fellow dictator, sparking the flood of refugees into Europe, potentially disrupting oil supplies and driving the price back up, and setting the stage for a “grand bargain” in which the West might accept Putin’s claims on Ukraine in return for Putin’s “assistance” in the Middle East.

But to the extent that the factor Rabinovich points to plays a role, that suggests Putin may engage in ever more threatening behavior precisely because he has an eye on his domestic situation – something that will likely make him even more dangerous in the coming days — precisely because such considerations highlight his vulnerability.

Despite the economic crisis, per capita spending on education in Spain has shot up by 37 percent since 2007. That fact comes from a report published by Barclaycard and IESE — a barometer of consumer spending in Spain. Consumer spending has also increased on utilities (water, gas, electricity and telephone), by 21 percent, and on health services, by 13 percent.

The study, which analyzes how Spanish consumers have changed their habits since 2007, also shows that overall per capita spending fell by 8.6 percent over this period.

The categories in which spending fell the most over the eight years analyzed were jewelry (-58 percent), furniture and household supplies (-37 percent), clothing and footwear (-29 percent), restaurants (-24 percent), flights and hotels (-17 percent), beauty and personal care (-10 percent), and food and beverages (-3 percent).

Signs of Life in 2014

After the prolonged economic crisis that started in the second half of 2008, Spain’s GDP finally returned to consistent positive growth rates in 2014. That year, per capita spending also increased 0.8 percent, as consumer spending is an important motor of GDP growth.

Which categories saw the most positive growth in 2014? Health services experienced the biggest annual boost, with an increase of more than 11 percent, followed by flights and hotels (+5.7 percent), restaurants (+4.5 percent), beauty and personal care (+3.5 percent), education (+3.2 percent), and then clothing and footwear (+2.9 percent). Still losing ground were jewelry (-10.6 percent), furniture and household supplies (-5.1 percent), fuels and lubricants (-3.2 percent), utilities (-2.8 percent), and food and beverages (-0.8 percent).

The Bulk of the Budget: Food and Beverages

The barometer — with data for each autonomous community from Spain’s National Institute for Statistics (INE) — has also parsed how citizens spend depending on the particular situations of each household (i.e., the age of the main breadwinner, net income level and family structure).

It turns out that for all age groups, buying food and beverages takes the heaviest toll on the household budget: It takes up 33 percent of the budget when the main breadwinner is 65 or older; 26 percent when that person is between 31 and 64, and 22 percent when that person is 30 or younger.

In the case of spending on restaurants, the age situation is reversed: dining out takes up 19 percent of household spending for under-30 year-olds, compared with just 9.6 percent in 65-plus group.

Clothing and footwear has a similar weighting in the two younger age groups — about 10 percent — falling to 7 percent in households where the main breadwinner is 65 or older. The youngest are the biggest spenders, percentage-wise, on both fuels and travel, while spending over 65 is higher on health services and utilities.

Looking at the budgets of households with children, the barometer finds they are bigger spenders on clothing and footwear (11 percent of spending), fuel (10 percent) and on education (4 percent) and relatively frugal when it comes to health services (6 percent of spending), compared to the budgets of their childless peers.

Spending by Geographic Area

The average person in Spain spent 10,759 euros in 2014. Drilling down, Spain’s autonomous communities with the highest per capita spending that year were Basque Country (13,313 euros), Navarra (12,599 euros) and Madrid (12,558 euros). Meanwhile, the three that spent the least were the Canary Islands (8,906 euros), Extremadura (9,194 euros) and Andalusia (9,237 euros). At the same time, the populations of Catalonia, Madrid and Andalusia together accounted for approximately 50 percent of national consumption. In other words, three communities consumed about as much as the other 14 communities combined.

The communities that curtailed their consumption the most between 2007 and 2014 were the Balearic Islands (-16 percent), the Canary Islands (-15 percent) and Murcia (-15 percent). Those communities that appeared the least affected by the crisis were Extremadura (-0.4 percent), Aragon (-0.5 percent) and Basque Country (-1 percent).

Cash or Charge?

Cash remains king in Spain. Studies indicate that about 84 percent of Spain’s payments are made with cash. Using data from MasterCard Advisors’ Cashless Journey Spotlight, the remaining 16 percent can be divided into three categories: bank transfers and direct debits (8 percent), credit and debit cards (7 percent) and checks (1 percent). It is worth noting that card transactions grew more than other means of payments over the course of the study.

The average card transaction value has been gradually shrinking since 2007 and was about 42 euros in 2014, according to data from the Banco de España. This trend reflects the growing adoption of contactless technology, the study notes — a trend also seen in the United Kingdom and elsewhere.

According to data obtained from an analysis of Barclaycard clients, supermarkets are where Spanish consumers spend the most with their credit cards, followed by big-box stores and then clothing and shoe shops.

With records of subjective wellbeing going back less than half a century, this column asks if we can know the impact of key past events on the happiness of our ancestors. It presents a new historical index that draws on millions of digitised books in the Google Books corpus of words using sentiment analysis. The index – which goes back to the 1776 US Declaration of Independence, 200 years earlier than any other index of happiness – makes it possible to analyse the historical drivers of happiness in France, Germany, Italy, Spain, the UK and the US.

By Thomas Hills, Eugenio Proto and Daniel Sgroi*

Calls from UK Prime Minister David Cameron, the United Nations’ World Happiness Report, the OECD’s Better Life Index, along with psychologists and economists, all reflect on the need to develop a better understanding of subjective wellbeing (‘happiness’). Though many contemporary economies have tracked crime, education and economic production for the best part of a century, subjective wellbeing only began to become a staple of world economic indicators in the 1970s.

Unlike national income accounting, which initiated the collection of GDP in the 1930s, subjective wellbeing is a rather young indicator. Though there have been successful projects to roll back GDP (e.g. Bolt and van Zanden 2014, Broadberry 2015), attempts to construct historical series for wellbeing have been notably lacking. Without such a series, we are left wondering how wellbeing responds to key historical events, such as expansionary monetary policies, education and longevity.

But if constructing historical series for wellbeing makes sense, how can we extend existing measures when direct survey evidence was only initiated in the 1970s? The key insight in our new research paper (Hills et al. 2015) is that language conveys sentiment, and that the growing availability of digitised text provides unprecedented resources to construct a quantitative history of wellbeing based on historical language use.

In particular, the foundation of our work involves combining multiple large collections of texts of natural language going back two centuries with state-of-the-art methods for deriving public mood (i.e. sentiment) from language. The recent digitisation of books, newspapers and other sources of natural language – such as the Google Books Ngram database – represent historically unprecedented amounts of data (‘big data’) on what people thought and wrote over the past few centuries (see Michel 2011). These databases have already proved fruitful in detecting large-scale changes in language, which in turn correlate with social and demographic change, for instance in Hills and Adelman (2015).

These data offer the capacity to infer public mood using sentiment analysis. Deriving sentiment from large collections of written text represents a growing scientific endeavour. Examples include recovering large-scale opinions about political candidates, predicting stock market trends, understanding diurnal and seasonal mood variation, detecting the social spread of collective emotions, and understanding the impact of events with the potential for large-scale social impact such as celebrity deaths, earthquakes and economic bailouts (e.g. Pang and Lee 2008). Applying the same methods to historical text we can begin to produce more quantitative accounts of national happiness.

In the approach we take, sentiment measures are based on valence norms for thousands of words. These already exist in the literature and are collected from a large group of individuals who are asked to rate a list of words on how those words make them feel (e.g. Gilbert 2007). In the present case, valence norms based on the affective norms for English words have already been collected for five languages: English, French, Spanish, Italian, and German.

We applied these norms to the Google Books corpus for each of these languages, allowing us to derive a new index for subjective wellbeing going back to 1776, which we tentatively call the HPS index. An initial comparison with subjective wellbeing collected with survey data is shown in Figure 1. The data reflect the residuals after controlling for country fixed effects and clearly show a strong and significant correlation with our measure based on historical language.

Figure 1. Comparison between survey measures of life satisfaction and residuals (after controlling for country fixed effects) for our measure based on sentiment from historical text.

Rolling the text-derived measures of subjective wellbeing back to 1776 reveals a quantitative picture of how public sentiment has changed across the six countries we considered: France, Germany, Italy, Spain, the UK and the US. Though we make clear in our research that we need to exercise caution when examining very long-run trends (as language itself has evolved so much), it is nonetheless clear in Figure 2 that short-term events, such as the exuberance of the 1920s, the Depression era, and World Wars I and II show clear and distinguishable influences on subjective wellbeing.

Figure 2. The average valences over the period 1776-2000.

Why is a quantitative history of wellbeing important?

The fledgling state of wellbeing data has limited our collective ability to understand how wellbeing responds to different historical events. This has in turn limited the use of wellbeing in public policy, health initiatives and financial decision-making. In practice, if subjective wellbeing is to become a key factor in guiding our collective behaviour, then we need accounts of wellbeing on a par with those of GDP.

Using wellbeing as a measure to guide behaviour, however, takes more than the desire to simply improve wellbeing. As noted by Gilbert (2007), people have problems understanding so-called ‘affective forecasting’ – the ability to understand how one will feel in the future – and with this also comes a limited capacity to understand how prior events and decisions influenced our past happiness.

To overcome this, especially at the government level, we must develop our capacity to predict how wellbeing responds to both deliberate and unexpected events. Better predicting economic fortunes was the motivation of the national income accounting, which later became GDP, following the Depression in the 1930s. Of course, now numerous decisions are based on GDP, despite a near global acceptance that, in the words of John F Kennedy, “it measures everything in short, except that which makes life worthwhile” (Presidential Library and Museum, North Dakota).

Thus, as with GDP, governments and other agencies recognise the importance of this additional ‘emotional accounting’ and, by all accounts, they want to understand how better to use it to improve future wellbeing. But to do that we need historical informed accounts of what this means, and our index represents a first attempt.

*About the authors:
Thomas Hills, Professor of Psychology, University of Warwick

Eugenio Proto, Associate Professor, Warwick University; Research Fellow, IZA, CESifo and CAGE

Daniel Sgroi, Associate Professor of Economics, University of Warwick

References:
Bolt, J and van Zanden, J L (2014), “The Maddison Project: Collaborative Research on Historical National Accounts”, The Economic History Review 67(3): 627–651.

Broadberry, S, Campbell, B, Klein, A, Overton, M and van Leeuwen, B (2015), British Economic Growth, 1270-1870. Cambridge University Press.

Hills, T T, Proto, E and Sgroi, D (2015), “Historical Analysis of National Subjective Wellbeing using Millions of Digitized Books”, IZA Discussion Paper No. 9195.

Michel, J-B, Shen, Y K, Aiden, A P, Veres, A, Gray, M K, Pickett, J P, et al. (2011), “Quantitative Analysis of Culture using Millions of Digitized Books”, Science 331 (6014): 176–182.

Hills, T T and Adelman, J S (2015), “Recent Evolution of Learnability in American English from 1800 to 2000”, Cognition 143, 87–92.

Pang, B and Lee, L (2008), “Opinion Mining and Sentiment Analysis”, Foundations and Trends in Information Retrieval 2(1-2): 1–135.

Warriner, A B, Kuperman, V and Brysbaert, M (2013), “Norms of Valence, Arousal, and 21 Dominance for 13,915 English Lemmas”, Behavior Research Methods 45 (4), 1191–1207.

Gilbert, D (2007), Stumbling on Happiness. Random House.

By Zachary Fillingham

Against a backdrop of protests on the streets of Tokyo and in the embassies of various East Asian nations, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has taken a big step towards Japan’s “normalization” in international relations. It took hundreds of hours of debate and even a few scuffles on the floor of parliament, but his landmark security law has passed and Japanese forces can now be deployed overseas for the first time since World War II.

The law establishes three specific preconditions for such a deployment to take place: (1) in the event of an attack on Japan or its close ally that threatens Japan’s survival and poses a danger to its people; (2) when there are no other appropriate means available to repel the attack and ensure the survival and protection of Japan’s people; and (3) the use of force must be kept to a necessary minimum.

The opposition’s main contention with these three preconditions is immediately evident: they’re incredibly vague. In particular, one could imagine the need to “protect Japan’s people from danger” being stretched to cover terrorism or even hypothetical threats that may arise in the future – the now familiar concept of a pre-emptive war.

But these are considerations for the distant future. Pacifism runs deep in Japan, having served as one of the main pillars of its post-war constitution for 70 years. Its legacy is apparent in the protests surrounding the security law’s passage last week and the drawn out legal challenges that are sure to follow. If Abe’s endgame is in fact a constitutional amendment and a sea change in how the Japanese people view their country, it’s going to be a long and contentious process, and no one knows that more than he does.

In this sense, the law may have glided comfortably through parliament on the wings of the Liberal Democratic Party’s large majority, but it is just an opening volley in a much wider struggle to define the very essence of modern Japan. The next big “X” on the combatants’ calendars will be upcoming upper house elections in 2016, when opposition groups will make a stand against Abe’s reinterpretation at the ballot box.

Those inclined towards skepticism could be forgiven for wondering whether the law was set up to fail a legal challenge on its constitutionality. This would frame the constitution itself as the problem, allowing Abe to target the golden goose of his rehabilitation project: an amendment of Article 9 of the Japanese constitution, which foregoes war as a tool for settling international disputes. Either way it’s possible that we’ll see a constitutional amendment appear as a central issue in next year’s elections.

A Game-changer in East Asia?

It’s obvious at this point that Prime Minister Abe is willing to stake a great deal of his own political capital on “rehabilitating” Japan as a normal international actor, one that participates in peacekeeping operations and pursues its own national interests with a full political and military toolbox. He envisions a Japan that is able to take a more assertive role in regional security matters such as the ongoing dispute in the South China Sea. Some countries like the Philippines, Australia, India, and even Vietnam would welcome Japan’s entry into the dispute because it would serve as a balance against China and add a powerful proponent of a multilateral solution (as opposed to Beijing’s preferred bilateral approach). The new law would also allow for closer military cooperation with India, another country that is worried about China’s growing military clout.

For those wondering how the new law would justify such a deployment, here’s a little taste of the semantic gymnastics coming soon to the floor of the Diet: Japan is an island, sea-faring nation that depends on the free flow of trade for its very survival. A small deterrent force would be the minimum response required to guarantee this free flow of strategic imports such as oil, food, etc. And voila, Japan can dive headfirst into tumultuous waters of the South China Sea.

Another key impact of the law pertains to the US-Japan security treaty. Tokyo’s response to the growing Chinese military footprint in the region has been to go all-in with Washington to ensure its security. In this the law is just a reflection of the shifting military balance in the region: before the US qualitative military advantage was so vast that it could guarantee Japan’s defense without incurring catastrophic costs; now the playing field is more level and allies are being asked to contribute more to their own security. This phenomenon is not limited to US-Japan relations. It’s playing out throughout the post-Cold War “hub-spoke” alliance system as it transitions towards the “networked alliance” approach of multilateral security.

In other words, it’s no longer a one-sided relationship where it is only the United States’ job to offer assistance to Japan. The new law foresees scenarios like US forces in Guam coming under attack which, though not occurring on Japanese territory, would still have direct repercussions on Japan’s security. It’s also a situation where Japanese military support – based as it is far more proximate to Guam than US assets that are further afield – could have a timely and decisive impact on the outcome of the fight.

There is of course an economic element to Japan’s rehabilitation as well. A previous ban on the export of military technology was relaxed in April, freeing the way for Japan’s entry into international arms markets. Though Tokyo has only sold missile parts to the United States so far, it’s only a matter of time until it secures a larger contract for one of Japan’s more advanced weapon platforms.

Regional Response

The regional response to the security bill has been predictable. The most vocal detractor has been China, a country that bore the brunt of Japan’s aggression in World War II. The Chinese defense ministry released a statement saying Japan should learn the “profound lessons from history” and the talking points are portraying Tokyo as a disruptive interloper in the South China Sea. There are two lenses through which to view Beijing’s protests. First the historical one, which views the new security law as a dangerous step from an unrepentant Japan towards militarization and renewed aggression in East Asia. This is more a case of playing to the nationalist base than voicing an existential threat given Japan’s current budgetary and demographic constraints. Then there are the more tangible consequences of further complicating China’s consolidation of the South China Sea and increasing the early survivability of US forces in the event of a conflict – these are real reasons why Beijing prefers a pacifist neighbor.

South Korea, another victim of Japanese war-time aggression, issued a statement urging Japan to abide by the spirit of its post-war constitution and pursue a transparent defense policy that contributes to regional peace and security.

The Philippines issued a positive statement in one case of immediate geopolitical considerations trumping Japan’s wartime legacy. Relations between the two countries have been warming over the past few years, and Manila needs all of the outside help it can get in its territorial dispute with Beijing over shoals in the South China Sea.

Vietnam is another country that would welcome any Japanese foray into the South China Sea dispute. Japan-Vietnamese relations have also been improving steadily due to a convergence of interests on many fronts: security, technology, aid, and investment to name a few. Vietnamese Communist Party Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong recently visited Japan in a trip that saw a flurry of new announcements, including a Japanese pledge of $832 million in infrastructure aid and new ships for Vietnam’s coast guard.

Abe’s Japan is already very different from the one he inherited in 2012, and his path to normalization will continue to ripple through an East Asia security landscape that is already in flux. But Abe can’t celebrate yet. Pacifism runs much deeper than the law’s easy passage would suggest, and the fight for Japan’s soul might only be getting started.

This article was published by Geopolitical Monitor.com

By Pramod Jaiswal*

On September 17, 2015, amidst the curfew and violence that erupted in southern Nepal due to protests organised by the Tharu and Madhesi ethnic communities against Nepal’s constitution, the members of the country’s Constituent Assembly (CA) voted in favour of the new statute. All is set for President Ram Baran Yadav to promulgate the new constitution on 20 September 2015 in a ceremony that will be attended by the members of parliament, cabinet members, members of constitutional bodies, high-ranking officers of Nepal’s security forces, and members of the diplomatic community.

The long wait for the finalisation of the new constitution is over, but it has raised some pertinent questions: How long will this constitution last for? Does it truly reflect the aspirations of the people? Or will it be a catalyst for fresh rounds of violence and conflict in the country? Is the new constitution an inclusive charter like the democratically elected CA or is it just an elitist exclusive document?

Making of Constitution

The historical journey till the promulgation of the new constitution has not been easy. Nepal has had seven constitutions (including the interim constitution) in the past six decades, but this is the first time a constitution has been passed by a properly elected CA. It was one of the demands of the Maoists, who had waged the decade-long armed struggle against the state, for joining the peace process. The first CA was elected in 2008 was dissolved in 2012 as it failed to deliver the constitution despite several postponements due to bitter differences among political parties on matters of federalism, government, judiciary and elections.

The second CA was elected in 2013 and political parties pledged to deliver the constitution in one year. Federalism remained the bone of contention but the 16 point agreement was a breakthrough, resulting in the present constitution. In the 16 point agreement, top leaders of the major political parties represented in the CA – the Nepali Congress, the Communist Party of Nepal – Unified Marxist Leninist, the Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) and the Madhesi People’s Rights Forum (Democratic) – agreed to federate the country into eight provinces and promulgate a constitution. The issue of names was left to be decided later by a two-third majority in the state assemblies of the respective provinces. Likewise, leaders agreed to form a Federal Commission, which will have six months to delineate the boundaries of the federal provinces.

With disagreements from the Madhesi parties, they agreed to demarcate the boundaries of the federal provinces. Surprisingly, they formed six provinces that were later increased to seven. Yet, it failed to satisfy the Tharus and the Madhesis. In fact, it instigated violent protests around the country that claimed over 40 lives in few weeks.

The new constitution embraces the principles of republicanism, federalism and secularism. However, commentators like CK Lal challenge the secular flavour of the new constitution. Lal says, “Nepal’s Constituent Assembly claims that it will remain a secular state, but also admits that ‘secularism means protection of Sanatana Dharma’. Hence, Nepal has become a Hindu State through the backdoor.” At he same time, Madhesis reject the new Constitution as being non-inclusive.

According to the new constitution, Nepal will have a parliamentary form of government with a president elected by collegia of central legislative houses, the Legislative Parliament and the National Assembly, as well as the provincial legislative bodies. The prime minister will be elected by the Legislative Parliament, based on a majority. The Constitutional Council will nominate the Chief Justice, heads, and members of the Constitutional Commissions. The Judicial Council nominates the judges of the Supreme, High, and District Courts, thus making the judicial system is an integrated one.

Challenges in Implementation

Promulgating the Constitution was a herculean task by the CA and the implementation will be equally challenging. The core aim of formulating the new constitution via the CA was to undo the concentrations of power — political, social and economic — to make the Nepalese society inclusive and democratic in the widest sense. However, the Madheshi, the Janajatis, women and the marginalised communities have outright refused to accept the new constitution.

The Madheshi and Tharus are demanding provisions for proportionate inclusion of under-represented groups in the state organs, constituency delimitation on the basis of population to ensure political representation of the Tarai, and the revision of federal boundaries. Women representative groups perceive the new Constitution as regressive, for it adopts discriminatory citizenship laws. Simultaneously, there is an emerging voice towards the demand for an autonomous Limbuwan province by the Janajatis of Eastern Nepal.

The process that was already challenged by the splinter groups of Maoists has received the support of the Tharus, the Madhesi and women representatives. Interestingly, the only Madhesi party that was initially a signatory of the 16 point agreement also withdrew its support.

Therefore, Nepal’s new constitution fails to arouse the enthusiasm it could have otherwise generated had it had been promulgated with the support of all the major stakeholders. It is not wrong to posit that it might in fact trigger a fresh round of protests by the Tharus, the Madeshi and the other ethnic groups who have been demanding provinces based on identity.

* Pramod Jaiswal
Independent Analyst on South Asian affairs, and Nepal expert

By Almigdad Mojalli and Joe Dyke

Suddenly everyone knows about Syria as hundreds of thousands of refugees flee across Europe. But further south, another Middle Eastern country is also imploding, arguably at an even faster rate. Will refugees from Yemen now also start to flee to Europe?

The ticket office in Sana’a is crowded with people, bustling to get to the front of the queue. These are Yemen’s upper- and middle- classes, jostling for a spot on the next plane out of the country.

There is only one commercial route open: a once-daily flight to the Jordanian capital Amman. If you book today, the earliest you’ll be able to leave will be in six weeks.

The UN’s refugee agency, UNHCR, says more than 100,000 people have fled Yemen since a Saudi Arabian-led coalition began bombing the country in March to drive pro-Iranian Houthi rebels from power.

Of these, only around 40,000 are Yemenis. The rest are foreign nationals, mostly from the Horn of Africa, who have returned home.

UNHCR spokesman Andreas Needham told IRIN the actual number may be higher as the refugee agency and the Yemeni authorities only have figures for those people who approach them for assistance.

Within the country, 1.5 million people have had to flee their homes. The head of the international Red Cross said the intensity of the conflict in just five months had left Yemen looking like Syria after five years.

At the ticket office, few people wanted to stay in Jordan once they got there. The United States, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Malaysia were among a jumble of countries mentioned as desirable destinations.

Osama Nabil, a 32-year-old engineer, wanted to reach the UAE with his wife and child.

“I lost my job in a telecommunications company, and the Saudi coalition targeted our neighbourhood in Sana’a and reached our village in Ibb Governorate. So I have to leave the country and try to find a safe place to protect my family.”

Ameen Mohammed said his young son was in need of urgent medical treatment, but preferred not to give further details. He was at the office of Yemenia Airways hoping to be on the next flight out. He was told to come back in a month and a half.

The European route

Will Yemenis, then, become the next wave of migrants heading for Europe’s shores? The short answer is probably not yet.

There are a number of reasons why.

The first is visas. Getting a European visa is nigh-on impossible for Yemenis. And, unlike Syrians, they don’t get automatic visas to Turkey – from where the majority of refugees and migrants travelling to Europe leave. So, for them just to get to the beginning of the illegal smuggling route is extremely difficult. The Greek coastguard says there have been only 94 Yemeni arrivals so far this year. Another alternative would be the far more dangerous Libyan route. But again, even getting there is a challenge, not to mention the perilous crossing of the Mediterranean once you do.

Yemen is also a lot poorer than Syria and the costs of flights are out of reach for most people. Yemenia sales officer Naif Mohammed explained that the price of a ticket to Amman is just under $700 per person, a figure only the very richest can afford. Another travel agent explained an added difficulty. They now only accept payment in dollars, which can be almost impossible to find in the country.

Kareem Jamal, 34, sold most of what he owned to pay for the tickets for his family-of-three. “It is very difficult to get a loan from anyone nowadays, so I took to selling my car and bought the tickets as I did not have any other option.”

Even for those not seeking to fly, costs are high. Hanibal Abiy Worku, who runs the Norwegian Refugee Council’s operations in Yemen, told IRIN that even the rickety boats to Djibouti – often repurposed cattle boats – are too expensive for all but the wealthiest.

“To a large extent, Yemenis are trapped – few have the resources to leave and, just owing to sheer geography, the trip to Europe is far more difficult than it would be for, say, a Syrian or a Libyan,” said Adam Baron, a visiting fellow and Yemen expert at the European Council on Foreign Relations. “That being said, a number of Yemenis I know are at least pondering making the journey on a theoretical level.”

Others are leaving overland, particularly through the northern border to Saudi Arabia, but they are unlikely to try to get to Europe from there, as that would mean going through Syria.

Mohammed Nassar, 45, said he was travelling with his mother, wife and three kids to live with his brother in Saudi Arabia. “My country is completely destroyed and I know that it will be impossible that it will be rebuilt for decades, and there won’t be education, job opportunities or a good economy. So it’s better to leave now and start a new life in a safe country to raise our kids properly.”

Abiy Worku, from the Norwegian Refugee Council, said he was worried about the level of desperation. “The reason why people are not moving is because they can’t. If there were safe routes, they definitely would,” he said, adding that once a few more Yemenis made it to Europe the floodgates might open.

“Up to now, we don’t have a group of people who have made it to Europe. Once people hear these stories – a group of people who have made it – that will be encouragement for others.

“It can happen any day. If this news arrives back home people will start taking that route.”

New research presented at this year’s annual meeting of the European Association for the Study of Diabetes (EASD) shows that daytime sleepiness and taking long naps during the day are both associated with an increased risk of type 2 diabetes. The research is by Dr Tomohide Yamada, University of Tokyo, Japan.

Sleep is an important component of a healthy life, along with a good diet and appropriate physical activity. Excessive daytime sleepiness is widely prevalent around the world, as is the habit of taking short sleeps or “napping”. Daytime naps are usually brief, but can range from a few minutes to a few hours. The frequency varies from taking an occasional nap to planned rest periods several times daily for habitual nappers. Some individuals take a nap because they are excessively sleepy during the daytime as a result of a sleep disorder.

In this new study, the authors did a meta-analysis to investigate the association between daytime sleepiness or napping and the risk of type 2 diabetes. They searched Medline, the Cochrane Library, and Web of Science for articles published up to November 2014 using the keywords daytime sleepiness, nap, and diabetes. Among 683 studies initially identified, a total of 10 were deemed of good quaility and included 261,365 Asian and Western subjects.

The studies came from Sweden, Spain, Finland, and Germany (daytime sleepiness) and the USA, China and Germany (napping). Excessive daytime sleepiness was defined as answering yes to questions like “Do you have a problem with sleepiness during the daytime?”. Daytime napping was defiened on the basis of answering yes to questions such as “Do you take a daytime nap?” or “Do you sleep during the day?”.

Excessive daytime sleepiness was found to increase the risk of diabetes by 56%, while a longer daytime nap of 60 minutes or more increased the risk by 46%. In contrast, a shorter nap (60 mins or less per day) did not increase the risk of diabetes. The analysis showed there was no effect of napping up to about 40 minutes per day, after which risk began to increase sharply.

The authors conclude: “Excessive daytime sleepiness and taking longer naps were associated with increased risk of type 2 diabetes, with a short nap not increasing this risk.”

They add: “Daytime napping might be a consequence of night-time sleep disturbance such as obstructive sleep aponea (OSA). Epidemiological studies have shown that obstructive sleep apnoea is independently linked to blockages (ischaemia) of heart arteries, stroke, fatal and non-fatal cardiovascular events, and all-cause mortality. ”

They explain further: “Several studies have demonstrated the beneficial effects of taking short naps less than 30 minutes in duration, which help to increase alertness and motor skills. A short nap finishes before the onset of deep slow-wave sleep. Entering deep slow-wave sleep and then failing to complete the normal sleep cycle can result in a phenomenon known as sleep inertia, in which a person feels groggy, disoriented, and even sleepier than before napping. Although the mechanisms by which a short nap might decrease the risk of diabetes are still unclear, such duration-dependent differences in the effects of sleep might partly explain our findings.”

How the brain progresses from mild cognitive impairment (MCI) to Alzheimer’s-type dementia has been an enigma for the scientific community. However, a recent study by the team of Dr. Sylvie Belleville, PhD, Director of the Research Centre at the Institut universitaire de gériatrie de Montréal (Montreal Geriatric Institute) and Professor of Psychology at Université de Montréal, has shed light on this progression by showing the typical patterns of the brain’s progression to dementia.

For the study, the team compared changes that occurred over many years in people with stable MCI with changes in people for whom MCI progressed to a diagnosis of Alzheimer’s. Dr. Belleville worked with doctoral student Simon Cloutier and a team of clinician researchers from Montreal. This study was funded by the Canadian Institutes of Health Research (CIHR) and was published in the Journal of Alzheimer’s Disease.

The study showed that different cognitive areas (language, inhibition, visuo-spatial processing, working memory, executive functions, etc.) do not change in a uniform way. Cognitive decline does not occur in a linear fashion; instead, the path to dementia is complex and may sometimes be characterized by periods of stability followed by accelerated decline one or two years before diagnosis.

“We’ve identified a profile of changes that characterizes people who progress towards dementia. In reality, a quick decline in episodic and working memory associated with language problems appears to be the typical profile of people who have a high risk of developing dementia within a short amount of time,” the researcher explained.

Instead of seeing this as bad news, Dr. Belleville views these results as hope for seniors who are worried about their memories. “Many people complain about their memories. However, the presence of a change is what determines the risk of progression. This study has let us characterize the parameters of decline in people who will eventually develop Alzheimer’s, which means we can better identify both benign symptoms and those that warrant particular attention. Rapid memory decline suggests that the onset of symptoms is probably due to a loss of the brain’s compensatory mechanisms.”

Alzheimer’s disease is diagnosed late in its progression and sometimes up to fifteen years after its first effects on the brain. It is important to identify the early indicators so that patients can receive treatment as soon as possible.

By Eldar Mamadov*

Just three months ago, Azerbaijan was playing host to the inaugural European Games. These days, it seems as though Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev’s administration is prepared to make a break with the European Union.

Over the past few days, Azerbaijan’s relationship with the EU has taken a nosedive. On September 10, the European Parliament adopted a resolution that condemned Baku for “unprecedented repression” against domestic civil activists. The resolution also urged EU authorities “to conduct a thorough investigation into the corruption allegations against President Aliyev and members of his family” and consider “targeted sanctions and visa bans on all politicians, officials and judges involved in the political persecutions.”

The response of the Azerbaijani side was swift and trenchant: Baku cancelled a high-level visit by the European External Action Service (EEAS); announced the withdrawal of Azerbaijan from the Euronest Parliamentary Assembly; and issued a threat to impose counter-sanctions on the members of the European Parliament.

For good measure, President Aliyev during a public appearance September 15 assailed the EU over its treatment of asylum seekers from Syria and elsewhere, implying that Brussels maintains double standards when it comes to basic rights.

“Where is your tolerance and kindness, generosity; where are your values?” the Contact.az news agency quoted Aliyev as saying in reference to the EU policies concerning the ongoing refugee crisis.

This flare-up is just another symptom of a dysfunctional relationship in which Brussels and Baku have been bogged down for some time now. The current problems are rooted in mismatched assumptions and objectives on both sides. Brussels sees Azerbaijan as a post-Soviet state that, via a partnership arrangement, ought to be integrated into a broader European order governed by the rule of law, democracy and human rights. Azerbaijan, on the other hand, buoyed by its oil wealth, already sees itself as an equal to the EU. Azerbaijani leaders, therefore, seek engagement on different terms. This is why Baku shows zero interest in an association agreement with the EU of the sort signed by Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova. Baku instead seeks a strategic partnership with the EU.

EU has rightly refused to countenance such a strategic partnership with Azerbaijan. Baku’s economic and diplomatic clout simply does not put it in the same league as the EU’s generally recognized strategic partners – India, South Korea or, prior to the Ukraine crisis, Russia.

The areas where the EU and Azerbaijan have overlapping interests – in particular energy trade – are well covered without a strategic partnership. And geostrategically speaking, Azerbaijan’s importance seems set to decline in light of the nuclear deal with Iran, as Baku may no longer be needed by the international community to serve as a bulwark against Iranian mischief. Thus, in essence, a strategic partnership with the EU would be mostly a matter of prestige for the Azerbaijani leadership.

So, what the EU can do other than just muddle through what is increasingly a purely transactional relationship without even a pretense of any common values and goals? The answer is: not much.

The EU is often criticized for issuing statements of “concern” each time an Azerbaijani activist or human rights defender is locked up on trumped-up charges. But it is not obvious that Brussels can do much more to influence the Aliyev administration’s behavior.

EU officials could move ahead with targeted sanctions against individuals determined to be human rights violators, like in the case of Belarus. The European Parliament asked for this on several occasions. Such sanctions would send a powerful message, but, as the examples of Belarus, Iran and Cuba show, sanctions rarely improve the lot of political prisoners and overall human rights situation in a country concerned. Besides, it could be difficult to get all EU member states to agree on sanctions, as some have close bilateral ties with Baku.

There are other ways in which the EU could show its disapproval. One would be to differentiate how it engages with reform-minded governments, such as Georgia, and those that are lagging, like Azerbaijan. For example, Donald Tusk, the president of the Council of the EU, perhaps should not have visited Baku after he was in Tbilisi at the end of July this year. Such a diplomatic snub could potentially have an impact on Azerbaijani leaders, who clearly care about their country’s international image.

Another thing the EU could do is support independent media outlets that cover Azerbaijan – independent from both the government and the opposition.

The lack of clear and effective options is sure to dishearten those hoping to promote civil society in Azerbaijan. But history is rarely linear. It is full of examples of unpredictable, unexpected, unstoppable change. In Azerbaijan, for all the seeming political apathy of its people, spontaneous riots have erupted over abuses in Guba and Ismailly and, more recently, over a suspicious death in prison in Mingechavir.

Such outbursts are not necessarily harbingers of an impending revolt against the Aliyev administration. But the EU should be attentive to the internal processes in Azerbaijani society and ready to extend a generous hand of diplomatic and economic support, if and when a democratic change seems possible. The EU and all other international actors must realize, however, that creating the conditions for change is a task that befalls the Azerbaijanis themselves.

*Eldar Mamadov is a political adviser to the Socialists & Democrats Group in the European Parliament. He writes in his personal capacity.

By Patrick Tibke

U.S. President Barack Obama has slammed Burma (Myanmar) for failing to combat illicit drug production in its northern border states, as Washington names and shames its weaker allies in the global war on drugs.

In a report released to Congress on Monday, Burma was among 22 countries that have “failed demonstrably in the past 12 months to make any meaningful effort to adhere to their obligations under international counter-narcotics agreements,” according to the U.S. State Department.

Every year, as part of the U.S. Foreign Relations Authorization Act (FRAA), the president must submit to Congress a report detailing the “major illicit drug producing countries” or “major drug-transit countries that significantly affect the United States”.

This year, Burma was one of just five Asian countries to make the list, along with Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, and Laos.

In a speech to Congress earlier this week, Obama said that “countering illegal drug cultivation in Burma and Laos will require strengthening of state institutions and sustainable economic development,” adding that the fight against illicit drug production in the Golden Triangle is “vital to the national interests of the United States”.

Since 2006, Burma’s illicit opium crop has tripled to almost 150,000 acres, whereas Afghanistan’s opium crop, by far the largest in the world, is thought to be around 550,000 acres.

In addition, Burma is thought to be the largest producer of methamphetamine in Asia, supplying most of the Southeast Asian mainland, as well as Bangladesh, India, and China. In 2013, almost 85 percent of China’s seizures of methamphetamine took place in Yunnan province, which shares its long, mountainous border with Burma’s notorious Shan states. Laboratory testing carried out by China’s National Narcotics Control Commission (NNCC) later confirmed that 90 per cent of methamphetamine tablets seized nationwide in 2013 originated from Burma.

Burma’s status as Asia’s most prolific meth lab poses an enormous challenges to regional security, economic stability, and public health. But such trends are of less concern for the U.S., where Mexican cartels are thought to control around 90 percent of the domestic methamphetamine market.

Until recently, the U.S. and Burmese governments did not see eye-to-eye. But with democratic reforms slowly taking shape, and with Obama’s “pivot to Asia” looking to counter Chinese influence in the region, the two countries have re-established ties.

In 1988, the U.S. broke off all economic and diplomatic relations with Burma following the military crackdown on student protestors in Yangon, which led to between 3,000 to 10,000 deaths.

In 2008, however, Burma’s ruling junta, the State Peace and Development Council (SDPC), inaugurated a new constitution as part of its “roadmap to democracy,” whereby civilian politicians would be entitled to hold up 75 per cent of seats in parliament.

Sensing a genuine willingness for democratic reform, the U.S. scaled up humanitarian aid to Burma in 2011, and removed restrictions on World Bank and IMF assistance to the new government. A year later, the U.S. removed restrictions on foreign direct investment in Burma, and named its first ambassador to Burma in over 22 years.

Burma’s once stagnant and isolated economy has prospered tremendously in recent years, growing by 7.8 percent in 2013 and 8.5 percent in 2014. But its problems with illegal drug production have worsened.

Ethnic rebels in the north of Burma, such as the Kachin Independence Army (KLA) and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), have accused the Burmese government of actively participating in the drug trade, whilst at the same time claiming to be cracking down on it.

The government’s new model of drug production, according to the rebels, is to broker ceasefires with rebel groups, and then enlist former rebel soldiers as members of ad hoc, pro-government militias, who are then given free rein to produce and traffic drugs in territories under their control.

An excellent documentary by journalist Chris Veits, released this July by Journeyman Pictures, depicts this very phenomenon, as TNLA soldiers intercept huge hauls of heroin and methamphetamine headed for pro-government soldiers.

As of 2014, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has stepped in to try and stem the flow of illegal drugs from Burma, particularly heroin driven by Burma’s opium crop. But it faces an uphill battle due to ongoing conflict between rebel groups and the Burmese military.

Last year, the UNODC began a new pilot scheme which aims to promote coffee as an ideal substitute for Burma’s poppy farmers. A small group of poppy farmers in southern Shan State have already agreed to substitute at least part of their opium crop for coffee beans, raising hopes that, should the program be successful, other farmers will follow suit.

As part of the new program, the UNODC is supplying free fertiliser, free coffee seeds and other assistance to 450 poppy farmers across “a handful of villages.”

Jochen Wiese, the UNODC’s chief technical advisor for alternative development in Burma, believes that the high altitude of Burma’s northern provinces will produce high yields of quality coffee suitable for export.

See the UNODC’s crop substitution scheme in action in a short film by the New York Times, below, beautifully produced by NYT’s China correspondent, Jonah Kessel:

By Luis Ángel Saavedra

The Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE) led a new national uprising this past August and plans to continue again mid-September. Although the leadership of the main Ecuadorian indigenous organization considered it a success, this demonstration against various governmental measures did not achieve the political impact of the uprisings in the 1990s (from which this movement emerged) which succeeded in stopping the advance of the neoliberal model in Ecuador and bringing down two Presidents.

On Aug. 2, campesino and indigenous organizations of the southern Amazon, led by Salvador Quishpe, prefect of Zamora, launched the indigenous protest with a march of more than 800 kilometers that brought them to Quito, the capital, in ten days. The march faced the continuous harassment of the Police and small groups of government sympathizers that attempted to stop them without success; to the contrary, there were more groups that encouraged the marchers than those opposing. In cities such as Cuenca, Saraguro and Latacunga, the march was received by massive gatherings of more than 20,000 people in each place.

The demonstrations in the provinces made it possible to predict the size of what would happen in Quito. In effect, on Aug. 13 more than 200,000 people demanded President Rafael Correa not to run for reelection modifying the Constitution, and to shelve definitely the laws regulating water and land that harm peasants because they impose an administrative system foreign to the communal systems established by traditions. Also, they demanded the repeal of Decree 16 which granted the government political control of social organizations.

According to Carlos Pérez, president of the Kichwa Confederation of Ecuador (ECUARUNARI), the main indigenous organization of the Ecuadorian highlands, the size of the demonstrations against Correa’s policies implies that the fear to the criminalization of social protest and government persecution of social leaders has been lost.

“We have lost fear, Mr. President; if we have to return to jail, from the jail we will resist. This uprising demonstrates that we are no longer afraid of you,” affirmed Pérez in Quito, upon welcoming the march that arrived to the capital on Aug. 12. Pérez has been imprisoned on three occasions during this government.

State of exception

At the same time of the march to Quito, in various Ecuadorian cities in the highlands and the Amazon, there were road closures and confrontations with the policy and military personnel. The military assumed control of public order by a questionable decree on Aug. 17 establishing a state of exception in all the country, justifying it due to the danger of a possible eruption of the Cotopaxi volcano, in the central mountain range.

“We know that this decree is against us, against our uprising, but this will not stop us,” warned Quishpe.

The main points of conflict occurred with the Kichwa Saraguro people, in the province of Loja, in the southern highland, and with the Shuar nation, in the province of Morona Santiago, in the southern Amazon area. CONAIE reported that there were wounded and abuses of power in these confrontations. A large part of the people wounded and mistreated were women, while President Correa accused CONAIE of using women and children as human shields, intending to justify the aggression.

On Aug. 21, the uprising was suspended to be able to attend to the legal needs of the detained people and gain strength to return on Sep. 16. This decision was also due to the lack of support from the urban sectors, especially from the unions, that had committed to support the actions of the indigenous movements.

Correa adopted three strategies to confront the indigenous uprising: first, introduce a discourse in which indigenous people were branded as violent and allied with the right; then he called upon his followers to defend the streets, and finally he mobilized indigenous sectors who are his sympathizers to declare against the uprising and against the CONAIE leaders.

Correa’s call to defend the streets was not heeded by his supporters and only a few people could be seen waving the flags of the governing party, Alianza País, while the demonstrators were passing by. Instead, the discourse of violence and alliances with the right was insistently repeated in the governmental media and assumed as own by the indigenous leaders that support the government.

In Zamora, the government, acting through Euclides Sarango, an indigenous leader who was political lieutenant in the Chicaña parish, attempted to start a process to revoke the term of office of Quishpe.

“We are going to coordinate with all the organizations and present to the Provincial Electoral Council a Plan for the Revocation of the Mandate because it is not possible that the prefect has a sixty day leave,” said Sarango upon making public the request for permission to participate in the indigenous march by Salvador Quishpe.

Sarango also denounced the supposed blackmail to force people to support the indigenous uprising. “Blackmail by the prefect, Salvador Quishpe, and indigenous leaders happens. Our brothers Kichwas and Saraguros were forced with threat of cutting off their water to participate in the failed march.”

Rejection of Correa’s allies

Sarango’s statements were refuted by the Saraguro people who all travelled to the city of Loja to defend the 26 men and women of this community who were detained and wounded during the uprising.

The government also sought international condemnation of the indigenous uprising. One of the main allies of President Correa was the President of Bolivia, Evo Morales. “I wish to say to brother indigenous of Ecuador that they shouldn’t let themselves be used against the Ecuadorian government,” stated Morales on Aug. 11 from the Bolivian city of Tarija.

Blanca Chancoso, historic leader of the indigenous movement, disputed the declarations of the Bolivian leader.

“If [President Morales] does not understand the current struggle that we carry on against this neoliberal government of Ecuador, we ask him to respect the historical struggle we wage as we have respected and supported the Bolivian process in spite of the critical reports that reach us. If President Evo Morales is not capable of respecting us, he can honor with his silence the friendship that he has had with our movement, from which, in a time, he also learned to recognize himself as indigenous,” wrote Chancoso in an open letter to the Bolivian president, published on Aug. 26.

Leaving aside consideration of what will happen after Sep. 16, the success of the indigenous movement is to have recovered its role in national politics which had been coopted by the right, and having brought together social sectors that had distanced themselves from its organizational structure.

However, the cost was very high. According to the indigenous lawyer, Verónica Yuquilema, of the Regional Foundation for Human Rights (INREDH), the repression carried out by forces of public order has resulted in imprisonment of 130 people, principally indigenous, judicial cases have been initiated against 111 for aggression and resisting authority, closing of public space and sabotage, and 62 have been sentenced to preventative prison for 30 days.

CONAIE, for its part, has reported that 201 people have been arrested of which 30 remain in prison.

By Mehdi Sepahvand

Iran is an indispensable part to the process of tackling the problems prevailing the region, Foreign Minister of the Netherlands Bert Koenders said.

Koenders made the remarks during a press conference with his Iranian counterpart Mohammad Javad Zarif, Trend correspondent reported from Tehran September 20.

“We have to find peace and stability for the region,” he asserted, adding, “I welcome the efforts by the Iranian government to engage in productive talks on topics which we will be discussing in the United Nations in a few weeks; issues like Syria, Yemen, Lebanon, and others.”

Koenders added that he and other Iranian officials will discuss regional issues such as human rights, drug smuggling, and human trafficking later in the day.

Commenting on efforts to strengthen ties between the Netherlands and Iran, he said his country is committed to engage in close cooperation with Iran, especially in the areas of gas, oil, maritime industries, as well as agriculture.

This is an exceptional moment for Iran and the Netherlands with over 90 years of diplomatic relations and the talks today followed the deepening of equitable relations in all political, economic, and cultural areas, Koenders pointed to his country’s plans to strengthen ties with Iran in the post-sanctions era.

He said the nuclear conclusion between Iran and world powers has been “a victory for multinational diplomacy and the policy of engagement”.

“The task now is to put the JCPOA into practice, which will be a priority for the Dutch government,” he underlined.

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action was made between Iran and the group 5+1 (the US, UK, France, Russia,China, and Germany) on July 14. It lifts economic sanctions on Iran in return for curbing the country’s nuclear program.

Iraqi government-backed militias carried out widespread destruction of homes and shops around the city of Tikrit in March and April 2015 in violation of the laws of war, Human Rights Watch said in a report released today. Militiamen deliberately destroyed several hundred civilian buildings with no apparent military reason after the withdrawal of the extremist armed group Islamic State, also known as ISIS, from the area.

The 60-page report, “Ruinous Aftermath: Militia Abuses Following Iraq’s Recapture of Tikrit,” uses satellite imagery to corroborate accounts of witnesses that the damage to homes and shops in Tikrit, and the towns of al-Bu ‘Ajil, al-Alam, and al-Dur covered entire neighborhoods. After ISIS fled, Hizbollah Battalions and League of Righteous forces, two of the largely Shia pro-government militias, abducted more than 200 Sunni residents, including children, near al-Dur, south of Tikrit. At least 160 of those abducted remain unaccounted for.

“Iraqi authorities need to discipline and hold accountable the out-of-control militias laying waste to Sunni homes and shops after driving ISIS out,” said Joe Stork, deputy Middle East director. “Abusive militias and their commanders acting with impunity undermine the campaign against ISIS and put all civilians at greater risk.”

Ahead of the campaign, Shia militia leaders had promised revenge for the June 2014 massacre by ISIS of at least 770 Shia military cadets from the Camp Speicher facility, near Tikrit. In videos of home demolitions, Shia militiamen curse Sunni residents and invoke Shia slogans.

The militias are part of the Popular Mobilization Forces, consisting of several dozen Shia militias, which the government created in response to the rapid ISIS advance across Nineveh and Salah al-Din provinces in June 2014.

The militias receive government salaries and weaponry but act in loose coordination with one another and with the Iraqi army and other security forces. On April 7, the Iraqi cabinet recognized the Popular Mobilization Forces as a distinct security force under Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi’s command.

Satellite imagery corroborated witness accounts that destruction of buildings occurred primarily after pro-government forces had routed ISIS and the Iraqi army left the area to militia control. Damage from government and US-led coalition airstrikes and artillery or by ISIS during its nine-month rule prior to March was limited.

In one example, Iraqi troops and Shia militias recaptured al-Dur, a town of about 120,000 people 20 kilometers south of Tikrit, without a major battle on March 6, residents told Human Rights Watch. The army withdrew a day later, leaving the town in the hands of the militias. Almost all residents had fled under ISIS or shortly before government forces retook the town. On March 8, Al-Ittijah Channel broadcast footage of Hizbollah Battalions entering the town and defusing ISIS-planted explosive devices and showing al-Dur’s main street, roundabout, and other locations largely intact.

But when local policemen returned to duty in early April they compiled a list of over 600 torched or exploded homes and shops. Satellite imagery taken in May shows large swathes of al-Dur residential areas destroyed. Sheikh Malik Shahhab, a prominent businessman and brother of al-Dur’s mayor, told Human Rights Watch that a member of the Popular Mobilization Forces boasted, “We burned and destroyed al-Dur, because they [the residents] are ISIS and Baathists.”

On March 8, Shia militias and local volunteer fighters retook the town of al-Alam, about 12 kilometers northeast of Tikrit, with a population of about 60,000. Human Rights Watch collected photographs and witness accounts for 28 buildings torched or blown up after the recapture of al-Alam. Some of this destruction is visible on satellite imagery, which shows 45 buildings that had been destroyed in March and April after militia forces captured al-Alam. Local Sunni volunteer fighters who had opposed ISIS control and who were operating under Shia militia protection were responsible for the destruction in al-Alam.

The battle for the city of Tikrit, 180 kilometers north of Baghdad with a peacetime population of about 150,000, lasted from early March until April 1, when Prime Minister al-Abadi declared victory, although sporadic fighting continued. Residents told Human Rights Watch that heavy fighting was largely restricted to the northern Qadisiyya neighborhood, where several hundred homes had been destroyed after militias had routed ISIS.

In Tikrit, militias also engaged in significant looting. Muhammad Jasim, a businessman who runs a large appliance store, showed Human Rights Watch photographs of militias looting and torching his store. In one video, shot on March 31, a white truck is visible in front of Jasim’s store while men in fatigues load up appliances.

Witnesses said Shia militias also carried out apparent extrajudicial killings in Tikrit. A local policeman said that when he patrolled an area of the Qadisiyya neighborhood in early April, he saw two dozen ISIS fighters surrender to Badr Brigades, another Shiite militia, and the League of the Righteous because they were out of ammunition and food. The policeman said he then saw militia members execute some ISIS prisoners on the street. On April 3, Reuters correspondents reporting from Tikrit said they witnessed Federal Police officers stabbing to death a suspected ISIS fighter.

As the biggest contributors to Iraq’s military and security forces, the US and Iran should speak out against militia abuses and make clear that the government is responsible for stopping these abuses and holding those responsible accountable, regardless of rank, Human Rights Watch said. All countries providing military assistance to Iraq should strengthen end-use monitoring of equipment and human rights vetting of recipients, including by publicly reporting on investigations into misuse of assistance and steps taken to address it. These states should support establishing centralized command and control with civilian oversight over the militias and hold those responsible for laws of war violations accountable. Failure by Iraq to do so within one year should lead to suspensions of assistance commensurate with Iraq’s failure to comply.

“Revenge and collective punishment shouldn’t be seen as any part of the strategy for defeating ISIS,” Stork said. “Iraq needs to ensure individual accountability for crimes, whether by Sunni extremists or Shia militiamen.”

By Abdul Hanna Tago

An estimated 50,000 animals are expected to be slaughtered in the capital as part of the Eid Al-Adha sacrificial rites on Thursday.

There are about seven slaughterhouses in various localities of the city. Riyadh municipality said these places are ready to receive sacrificial animals during the days of sacrifice.

Last year, the Municipality seized since day one of Eid Al-Adha festival more than 25 open slaughterhouses that were operating illegally under unhygienic conditions despite the facilities provided by the municipality.

The authority has cautioned the public against offering sacrifices under unhygienic conditions, since they pose health hazards to the consumers.

Licensed slaughterhouses this year include Riyadh Automated, Aziziyah and Al-Arieja neighborhood (west of Riyadh) in addition to Al-Morooj district, north of Riyadh, and Saadah district (east of Riyadh).

Some 300 to 800 animals can be sacrificed in one hour at most of these slaughter houses, said a municipality spokesman.

According to the official, 12 temporary sites for sale, receipt and delivery of sacrificial animals in different parts in Riyadh have been identified to serve the largest segment of population in an orderly and organized manner to ensure their health and safety.

All the sites earmarked for the purchase of sacrificial animals have been equipped with sufficient manpower and also the mechanism to monitor the implementation of the operational plan.

The Vatican has confirmed that Pope Francis and former Cuban president Fidel Castro held a brief meeting after Sunday Mass and the Angelus today.

Pope Francis, accompanied by a few other Vatican representatives including Apostolic Nuncio to Cuba, Archbishop Giorgio Lingua, traveled to Fidel Castro’s home where the two talked about the environment and “the great problems of the contemporary world.”

“Naturally, the themes of the conversation were about the dramatic themes of today and about the environment,” Vatican Press secretary, Fr. Federico Lombardi told journalists in Havana Sept. 20.

The two exchanged a few books, since during his 2012 visit, Pope Benedict XVI told Castro that he would “send him some interesting books to read.”

Pope Francis gave a copy of his works, “Laudato Si” and “Evangelii Gaudium” as well as a book on happiness and the spiritual life by Italian priest Fr. Alexandro Pronzato.

Most notable, however, was the collection of writings and homilies by Spanish-born Jesuit priest Fr. Amando Llorente that Pope Francis gave him. A former tutor to Castro in his youth, the priest was later exiled from Cuba in 1961 under Castro’s regime.

In turn, Castro gave the Holy Father a copy of his book, “Fidel and Religion” – a synopsis of the former president’s meeting with Pope-emeritus Benedict. In the front cover he wrote, “For Pope Francis, on the occasion of your fraternal visit to Cuba, with the admiration and respect of the Cuban people. Fidel.”

“It’s interesting, he reflects a lot on the great questions of today and tomorrow and he was interested in speaking to the Pope about this,” Fr. Lombardi said of Castro. “In this sense, Laudato Si’ is very important evidently because it contains the Pope’s thoughts on these great themes.”

Their 30 to 40 minute meeting had a casual atmosphere, Fr. Lombardi said, with Castro’s wife, children and nieces and nephews in attendance.

Out of respect for the informality of the meeting, the Vatican press office said that no pictures were taken.

Alan Holdren contributed to this report.

By Felix K. Chang*

The enactment of Japan’s new national security bills was a long time in the making.  The bills, already passed by the lower house of the Japanese Diet in July, were approved by its upper house last week.  But ever since Shinzō Abe became Japan’s prime minister in 2012, he had sought legislation that would enable Japan to engage in “collective self-defense,” the ability to aid friendly countries under attack.  While that may seem routine in most countries, it has been anything but in Japan.  Many were unhappy with the legislation’s passage.  Those who opposed it feared that it would lead the country into war; and even some of those who supported it grumbled that it did not go far enough to make Japan a truly “normal” country, one where the use of force is considered as a legitimate tool of international politics.

Unsurprisingly, China was quick to condemn the legislation’s passage.  China’s Ministry of National Defense declared that Japan’s new security laws ran “counter to the trend of the times that upholds peace, development and cooperation.”  The ministry chastised “Japan’s war mentality, its reinforcement of military alliances and attempts to send more troops abroad.”  Chinese media was less charitable.  Xinhua carried the headlines: “China Voice: Is Japan bound up to battle chariot?” and “News Analysis: Japan’s pacifist ideals stripped as Abe steps closer to resurrecting old war machine.”  One commentator at The People’s Daily blamed the “unyielding spirit of militarism” of Japanese leaders who were “breaking [Japan’s] pacifist promise and getting ready to send its troops to battles again.”[1]

Of course, China rarely passes up an opportunity to remind Japan of its imperial aggression.  Thirty-six years of Japanese economic aid to China—now nearly $1.2 billion per year—has yet to restrain its reflex.  In part, that is because the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has often used anti-Japanese sentiment to buttress its own political legitimacy.  (Only recently did the CCP even credit its longtime Chinese rival, the Kuomintang on Taiwan, for its contribution—arguably larger than the CCP’s—to resisting Japan in World War II.)

That it took so long for Japan to pass this sort of legislation is a testament to the strength of Japan’s postwar pacifist sentiment.  While militarist elements may still lurk in Japan, most Japanese are decidedly uncomfortable with the use of force in international politics.  That was clear during Japan’s negotiations with Russia over the Northern Territories (or southern Kuril Islands in Russia) in the 1990s.  Though Japan had already begun its long economic stagnation, its military and political might was still near its peak.  In contrast, Russia, following the fall of the Soviet Union, was at its nadir.  Things were so bad in the Russian Far East that it was questionable whether Moscow could provide enough food or heat for its population on Sakhalin Island, let alone defend it.

Yet, Japan did not try to use its military or political capital to pressure Russia into a settlement.  Rather, Japan solely relied on the persuasive power of its economic assistance.  That tactic ultimately came to nothing.  After Russia’s economy recovered, Japan’s window of opportunity to settle the dispute on favorable terms closed.  Today, Russian leaders act without concern over Japanese reaction.  They cavalierly flout Japanese interests.  This year, a series of senior Russian officials visited the four disputed islands, despite repeated protests from Tokyo.  Russian Prime Minister Dmitry even toured one of them in August.  While there, he underlined that the Kuril Islands “are part of Russia… That is how it is and how it will be.”[2]

Japan’s self-imposed limitation on its use of force has also impacted its ability to secure its place in a changing East Asian geopolitical environment.  China’s economic rise has drawn other Asian countries closer to its orbit, while its seemingly relentless military rise has upset the regional balance of power.  Without the ability to form true security partnerships, Japan has risked becoming isolated.  Hence, Abe has eagerly cultivated new political and economic ties across the Asia-Pacific, from Australia and India to the countries of Southeast Asia.  Japan has certainly become more sensitive to changes in Asia’s geopolitical balance.  Last year, after Thailand’s relations with the United States soured, offering China an opening, Tokyo leapt into the breach with pledges of economic engagement with Bangkok.

Surely, the most immediate beneficiary of Japan’s new security laws is the United States.  For the past half century, the United States has borne the entire security burden of the alliance between the two countries—if Japan is attacked, the United States is obligated to defend Japan; but if the United States is attacked, Japan has no such reciprocal obligation.  Even during the Cold War, that uneven arrangement rankled some Americans.  To make it more equitable, Japan accepted the lion’s share of the financial burden to host American forces in Japan.  But with the end of the Cold War and the withdrawal of a substantial portion of American forces from Japan (to Guam and elsewhere), the relationship was about to tilt again.  Thus, it was hardly surprising that Washington welcomed the legislation’s passage.

But beyond the United States, the legislation also enables Japan to more effectively cooperate with other countries on security matters.  If Japan’s relationships with Australia, India, the Philippines, and recently Vietnam mature into security partnerships, those countries can now count on Japan as a full partner.  In fact, in the days before the upper house vote on the national security bills, Abe met with Vietnam’s communist party secretary to discuss stronger security ties, in light of Vietnam’s dispute with China in the South China Sea.  Abe pledged more patrol boats for Vietnam.  Such promises is partly what worries Japanese opponents of the bills.  Getting Japan entangled in the disputes of other countries could pull it into a conflict, perhaps with China.  On the other hand, the possibility of facing a regional network of security partners might restrain China’s aggressiveness.  After all, China’s own economic prosperity (tenuous as it has become this year) requires peace and stability.

Even with the enactment of its new national security bills, Japan seems unlikely to seek the active use of military force far from home.  After all, Japan’s debt-laden government is in no position to rapidly expand its self-defense forces without hurting its still-weak economy.  Moreover, the conditions under which Japan can use force to support American expeditionary efforts abroad are still narrowly circumscribed.  The new legislation may be a step toward a Japan that is more comfortable with the idea of the use of force.  But the road to an actual use of force remains a long one.  Ironically, China may be the one country that could propel Japan faster down that road.

About the author:
*Felix K. Chang is a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. He is also the Chief Strategy Officer of DecisionQ, a predictive analytics company in the national security and healthcare industries. He has worked with a number of digital, consumer services, and renewable energy entrepreneurs for years. He was previously a consultant in Booz Allen Hamilton’s Strategy and Organization practice; among his clients were the U.S. Department of Energy, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Department of the Treasury, and other agencies. Earlier, he served as a senior planner and an intelligence officer in the U.S. Department of Defense and a business advisor at Mobil Oil Corporation, where he dealt with strategic planning for upstream and midstream investments throughout Asia and Africa.

Source:
This article was published by FPRI.

Notes:
[1] “China Voice: Is Japan bound up to battle chariot?” Xinhua, Sep. 19, 2015; “News Analysis: Japan’s pacifist ideals stripped as Abe steps closer to resurrecting old war machine,” Xinhua, Sep. 19, 2015; “Japan’s new security bills against trend of the times: defense ministry,” Xinhua, Sep. 19, 2015; Wen Zongduo, “Abe’s win is Japan’s loss,” Chinadaily.com, Sep. 19, 2015.
[2] “Moscow officials ‘have always and will continue to’ visit Russian Kuril Islands – PM,” RT.com, Aug. 23, 2015.

By Andrea Gagliarducci

On Thursday Pope Francis will become the first Bishop of Rome to address a joint session of the US Senate and House of Representatives. During his speech he will tackle the misinterpretation of his words on economics and politics.

That expectation is according to a source who saw the first drafts of the speech, and who spoke with CNA Sept. 18.

“Pope Francis will likely use the speech to Congress to clarify his position on economics and politics, thus indirectly responding to the misinterpretation of his words,” the source maintained.

According to the source, the speech will also include a mention of the market: “Pope Francis will clarify that he never said he wants to abolish the market, but that he said the market needs a purification.”

The American audience made much of Pope Francis’ criticism of capitalist systems which he made during his South American trip this summer.

During a July 9 address at the World Meeting of Popular Movements in Santa Cruz de la Sierra, Bolivia, he said that “the stench of what Basil of Caesarea – one of the first theologians of the Church – called ‘the dung of the devil’” lies behind global capitalism’s indifference to the poor and the planet.”

“An unfettered pursuit of money rules,” the Pope continued. “This is the ‘dung of the devil’ … Once capital becomes an idol and guides people’s decisions, once greed for money presides over the entire socioeconomic system, it ruins society, it condemns and enslaves men and women, it destroys human fraternity, it sets people against one another and, as we clearly see, it even puts at risk our common home, sister and mother earth.”

Pope Francis added that “in this subtle dictatorship” capital has become and idol, and called for a “real change, structural change” to solve the situation.

However, his speech to Congress will be addressed particularly to the American audience – and it will not be linked to his speech the following day to the United Nations in New York, the source maintained.

Migration will also likely be a core issue in the papal speech, with the Pope would praising the United States for their multicultural composition, while also calling for a wider welcoming of immigrants.

“Pope Francis has already given a sign of what he would like the US to do in terms of immigration. When he took part to the ABC show 20/20, he directly addressed Sr. Norma Pimentel, the director of Catholic Charities in Rio Grande, who manages a welcoming center for immigrants who are left at the border. That’s the kind of welcoming he thinks about,” the source maintained.

Unfortunately, not every congressman will hear the Pope’s message.

Rep. Paul Gosar (R-Ariz.) – who is himself Catholic – announced on Friday that he would boycott Pope Francis’ speech, in protest of the Roman Pontiff’s views on climate change.

Gosar claimed that he would be joined in his protest by at least one other legislator, while declining to name that person.

Other lawmakers are more open to lending an ear to the Pope.

Rep. Carlos Curbelo (R-Fla.), said, “I’m sure I’ll disagree with something the Pope says,” according to The Hill. “But I still embrace my religion. It’s literally a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to sit here and listen to the Holy Father.”

And Marco Rubio, a Florida Senator of Cuban descent who is running for the Republican nomination for United States President, wrote in an opinion piece at CNN that he hopes the Pope’s visit to Cuba “will remind all the Cuban citizens that they possess dignity and fundamental rights that come from God and that the Castro regime has no claim on changing what is 100% God-given.”

Rubio had contrasted the state of freedoms – religious and otherwise – enjoyed by citizens of the United State and of Cuba.

“I pray the Pope can use his moral authority to inspire true religious freedom, and bring us closer to the day when freedom can finally take root on the island country; because only then will the people of Cuba prosper and have the opportunity to live out God’s plan,” he wrote.

“Please join me in welcoming Pope Francis to the United States, and helping him to spread peace and prosperity to people around the world.”

The Macedonian police have verbally and physically abused migrants and asylum seekers at the border and in detention, Human Rights Watch said in a report released today. Macedonia is a key transit country along the Western Balkans migration route into the European Union, with thousands of asylum seekers and migrants –many of them from Syria, Afghanistan, or Somalia – entering the country every day.

The 59-page report, “‘As Though We Are Not Human Beings’: Police Brutality against Migrants and Asylum Seekers in Macedonia,” documents physical and verbal abuse at the hands of Macedonian officials at the border with Greece, ill-treatment by police guards in the Gazi Baba detention center between June 2014 and July 2015, and the failure of the authorities to investigate or hold those responsible to account. Human Rights Watch also documented arbitrary detention of migrants and asylum seekers in inhuman and degrading conditions in Gazi Baba.

“It’s plain to see that Macedonia has a problem with police violence against asylum seekers and migrants,” said Emina Ćerimović, Koenig fellow at Human Rights Watch. “That’s not going to change unless the Macedonia authorities start thoroughly investigating allegations of police ill-treatment of migrants and asylum seekers, and holding anyone responsible to account.”

Human Rights Watch interviewed 64 asylum seekers and migrants, including 7 children, in various locations in Serbia and Macedonia. Seven of the interviews were conducted by phone. Many of those interviewed, including three children, had experienced abuse at the hands of Macedonian police, particularly at the border with Greece and in Gazi Baba. People described being beaten with police batons, punched, kicked, and verbally abused when police apprehended them. In some cases, migrants and asylum seekers were forced to run a gantlet between rows of police officers, who struck them with police batons on their backs, shoulders, and heads.

Ayesha, a 16-year-old girl from Afghanistan, said that Macedonian police hit her and that she twice saw police beat her father and 17-year-old brother. The first time, in early January, Ayesha said the family had gone to a police station near the border with Greece to ask for asylum. Instead, police took them back to the border and ordered them to leave the country. Ayesha’s father protested.

“A police officer [then] approached my father and hit him with a police baton on his back and his arm. Another police officer hit my brother with a police baton on his shoulders and third police officer hit me with a police baton on my arms,” she said. The second time, also at the border, her father and brother were among a group of men forced to run the gantlet while police hit the men with batons.

Until July, migrants and asylum seekers were also detained arbitrarily in the Reception Center for Foreigners, a detention facility in Skopje. It is known as Gazi Baba after the municipality where it is located. Macedonian authorities detained people, without any meaningful ability to challenge the detention, to ensure their availability to testify in criminal proceedings against people suspected of migrant smuggling, Human Rights Watch found.

Guards routinely ill-treated the detainees, including physical and verbal abuse, and conditions in the center were inhuman and degrading, Human Rights Watch said. Some of the women detainees experienced gender-based violence by guards.

In July, the Macedonian authorities shut down the center, which has since been refurbished. Macedonia is not currently routinely detaining migrants and asylum seekers, instead allowing them to pass through the country. But, in light of the fast-paced developments related to the flows of asylum seekers and migrants, Human Rights Watch is concerned that if routine detention is resumed, the abuses could also resume, unless Macedonian authorities act to prevent them.

Macedonian authorities told Human Rights Watch that they have initiated disciplinary proceedings against five Gazi Baba police guards and suspended one person. No specific investigation or disciplinary proceedings have been initiated against individual border police.

Authorities in Macedonia have a clear obligation under national and international law to protect migrants and asylum seekers from ill-treatment, to ensure they are not arbitrarily detained in degrading conditions, and to investigate and prosecute ill-treatment by the police. Children and their families should never be detained solely for immigration control reasons. This is particularly crucial as thousands of migrants and asylum seekers enter Macedonia every day, Human Rights Watch said.

More concrete steps are necessary to prevent and punish police abuses against migrants and asylum seekers. Macedonia, formally the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, is a candidate for EU membership. To qualify for EU membership, the country needs to fulfill certain membership criteria, which includes bringing its law and practice on asylum and treatment of migrants into line with EU standards.

“While Macedonia has stopped routinely detaining migrants and asylum seekers in degrading conditions, its asylum and migration practices still fall short of its obligations under national, EU, and international law,” Ćerimović said. “The European Union should press Skopje to tackle its problem of police abuse against migrants and asylum seekers through training and accountability.”

By Dr. S. Chandrasekharan

As scheduled, President Ram Baran Yadav formally and officially promulgated the new constitution on 20 September, 2015.

The Government declared both 20th and 21st September as holidays to enable the people to celebrate the ushering in of the new constitution. Kathmandu was generally in a festive mood and some formal celebrations have been planned both by the Prime Minister as well as by the Party leaders. Both the Nepali Congress and the UML had urged the people to celebrate the occasion as a “Diwali”

With the promulgation of the new constitution, the interim assembly will convert itself into a regular legislature under Article 296 of the old constitution. Nepal would get a new set of leaders at the top. As agreed to informally by the three top political parties who are running the show, the UML will select one of its leaders as Prime Minister. K. P.Oli who is waiting to become the Prime Minister will have to wait for some more time until current PM Sushil Koirala returns from New York after attending the UNGA anniversary meeting.

The Nepali Congress would choose its President ( most likely the current PM Sushil Koirala) and the Speaker’s post will go to the Maoists.

While celebrations are going on in the north, the southern Terai Madhes area had decided to observe 20th September as a “black day.” The TMDP of Mahant Thakur, the FSFN of Upendra Yadav, the Terai Sadhbhavana Party of Mahendra Yadav as well as Rajendra Mahatao have joined together to continue the agitation. Disenchanted Maoist members led by Matrika Yadav are also joining into a fresh alliance to continue the agitation. The Tharus who had kept a distance with the other Madhesis have also joined.

For while, it was thought that Gachhadar will go back to the join the top three parties and there were also indications that a four point agreement was being hammered out just before the promulgation. Yet it fell through and it is said that it was only because of the arrogance shown by the top three in pushing through the constitution though Gachhadar was too eager to join them!

Violence continued in the Terai particularly in Birgunj and Janakpur. One person was killed and two more seriously injured with bullet wounds in Birgunj in the Police firing. Janakpur is to hold a massive rally today. One more succumbed to the injuries in the Bhairawa firing.

There seems to be no end to the violent agitations in Terai Madhes. Over forty people have died and there seems to be no end. It is time the Madhesi leaders review their strategy to prevent unnecessary loss of lives.

A desperate bid by the Indian Foreign Secretary who had carried a personal message from PM Modi was politely listened to, given a lecture in return and sent back without backing out from the decision to promulgate the new constitution without any further dialogue.

The Indian Foreign Secretary said that India wished to see that the new constitution incorporates concerns of all the stake holders through dialogue and flexibility. The Indian PM’s concern was about the unrest in Terai districts, the spill over effect of the unrest in the Indian side particularly when elections are due in that State. But this had no effect!

A week earlier, there was a long article by the President’s Press Advisor, in the Republika claiming that Nepal is proud of its democratic constitution and of their leaders and is not to be fooled by “absurd ideas.” It was a direct indictment of the Indian position and of the Prime Minister Modi on the current crisis. This could not have come out without specific clearance from Prime Minister Sushil Koirala.

My view was that the Indian Foreign Secretary should not have gone at all only to be rebuffed when it was clear that the leaders of the top three were determined to go ahead with the promulgation and were in no mood to listen to any advice.

It is a pity that the constitution that is supposed to unite the people has resulted in disunity. To claim that ninety percent voted for the constitution is statistically right but everyone knows that the Madhesis and most of the janjathi communities are unhappy with the new constitution.

There is still time for a dialogue.

By Tushar Ranjan Mohanty*

At least 43 persons, including 14 terrorists, were killed as the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) base at Inqalab Road in Badaber area of Peshawar, the provincial capital of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, came under attack by the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in the early morning of September 18, 2015. The Badaber camp used to be an operational Air Force base, but is now a PAF training centre.

Fourteen terrorists in the uniforms of the Constabulary stormed the mosque at the Airbase at 05:00 and dispersed into two groups, one of which went towards the administrative area, while the other headed for the technical section of the airbase. The Director-General (DG) Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR) Major General Asim Bajwa disclosed, “Terrorists busted the main gate with grenades and split into two groups. One group then targeted worshipers during morning prayers. The commandos and other security personnel surrounded the terrorists, contained them within 50 meters of the infiltration and killed 14 militants.”

As they entered the Base, the militants killed three PAF technicians in the Guard Room, and then went on to kill 16 PAF soldiers who were praying at a mosque. Another seven PAF soldiers were killed in a barrack near the mosque. Army Captain Asfand Yar and two soldiers were killed in the counter-attack against the raiders. 10 soldiers were injured during exchange of fire with the terrorists, of whom two were officers. Some 15 persons were arrested during subsequent search operations.

DG Bajwa alleged, “The attackers came from Afghanistan and the whole foul play was planned in the neighbouring country. This attack was being executed through direct coordination from Afghanistan as well.”

Meanwhile, TTP spokesperson Muhammad Khurasani claimed responsibility for the attack in an email sent to journalists.

The Badaber PAF base attack has several major precedents. Just a year earlier, on August 14, 2015, at least 12 terrorists wearing suicide vests and armed with RPGs and automatic weapons were killed, and 11 Security Force (SF) personnel were injured in an 11-hour gun battle near Khalid Aviation Airbase and Samungli Airbase in Quetta, The provincial capital of Balochistan. The TTP Ghalib Mehsud faction claimed responsibility for the attack on the Airbases in Quetta. Ghalib Mehsud is the leader of Fidayeen-e-Islam, TTP’s suicide wing. TTP spokesperson Azam Tariq had announced that the attack was in retaliation for Operation Zarb-e-Azb in the North Waziristan Agency of Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).

On September 6, 2014, terrorists planned to hijack Navy frigate PNS Zulfiqar at the West Wharf of the Karachi Dockyard. Naval Commandos of PNS Iqbal rushed to the scene and a gun battle ensued. One Naval officer was killed and seven were injured. Two attackers, including Owais Jakherani, a former Navy sailor, were killed, and four were captured alive.

August 16, 2012: Nine terrorists and two security personnel were killed when SFs foiled an attack on the Minhas PAF base at Kamra in the Attock District of Punjab. The Minhas Air Force base is believed to be one of the centres where Pakistan has stockpiled its nuclear arsenal. TTP ‘spokesperson’ Ehsanullah Ehsan claimed that four suicide bombers had carried out the attack to take revenge for the killings of the then TTP chief Baitullah Mehsud, and al Qaeda founder Osama bin Laden.

May 22, 2011: At least 10 SF personnel and five TTP militants were killed while nine SF personnel were injured in a TTP attack on the Pakistan Naval Station (PNS) Mehran within the Faisal Naval Airbase in Karachi. Two US made surveillance aircraft were damaged in the attack. Claiming responsibility for the attack, TTP spokesman Ehsanullah Ehsan declared, “We had already warned after Osama’s martyrdom that we will carry out even bigger attacks”.

October 10, 2009: Twelve Army personnel, including a Brigadier and a Lieutenant Colonel, were killed and five others were seriously injured when militants clad in Army uniforms attacked the General Headquarters (GHQ) of the Army in Rawalpindi. A splinter faction of the TTP claimed responsibility for the attack.

Despite the Government’s claims of success of Operation Zarb-e-Azb in North Waziristan, the campaign is far from finished. Operation Zarb-e-Azb was launched on June 15, 2014, in the aftermath of the attack at the Jinnah International Airport, Karachi, on June 8-9, 2014. At least 33 persons, including all 10 attackers, were killed in the attack.

According to partial data (Data till September 20, 2015) compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), Operation Zarb-e-Azb has, thus far, killed more than 2,130 ‘terrorists’ and 226 soldiers (no independent verification of fatalities or identities of those killed is available, as media access to the areas of conflict is severely limited).

Significantly, on June 12, 2015, Major General Bajwa claimed that 347 officers and soldiers of the Pakistan Army had lost their lives, and 2,763 terrorists had been killed in the Operation. Up to 90 per cent of the North Waziristan was declared ‘free from terrorists’, while their central command and control apparatus, along with their communication systems, had been ‘destroyed’. 9,000 intelligence operations had been conducted, as a result of which 218 wanted terrorists were killed, while thousands of extremists were taken for interrogation. 837 terrorist hideouts had been destroyed, while 253 tons of explosives were recovered during the ongoing operation. The Badaber base attack, however, demonstrates the audacity of the terrorist formations, despite numerous reverses.

Further, the National Action Plan (NAP) is making very slow progress. NAP was initiated on December 24, 2014, in the aftermath of the Peshawar Army Public School attack in which 148 persons, including 135 children, were killed. The ‘20-point Plan’ on counter-terrorism was announced by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in a televised address to the nation in the night of December 24, 2014, and incorporated in the Constitution by the 21st Constitutional Amendment on January 7, 2015. A handout issued by the Federal Ministry of Interior on July 4, 2015, claimed that some 54,376 ‘combing operations’ had been carried out under NAP, which came into effect on January 7, 2015, resulting in 60,420 arrests. 3,019 intelligence-based operations were also carried out, while 1,388 pieces of intelligence were shared. Some 97.9 million mobile SIM cards have been verified using bio-metric technology, while 5.1 million SIM cards have been blocked, under NAP.

Astonishingly, documents obtained by The News and reported on July 30, 2015, claimed that more than 20,000 terrorists had been killed by July 13, 2015, under NAP, an incredible number that does not reconcile with any estimates by official or non-Governmental monitoring agencies. Further, if such a large number has been killed, and terrorism still flourishes, what is the total strength of the terrorists in Pakistan? The documents also claimed that 3,148 terrorists had been apprehended across Pakistan while 1,799 persons had also been held under charges for ‘hate speech’. 3,446 persons were identified as having links with banned outfits, and more than 100 madrassahs had been shut down, the documents claimed.

However, on September 10, 2015, Prime Minister Sharif lamented that provincial administrations were yet to implement a major portion of NAP to counter terrorism and extremism in the country. While some elements had been implemented, Sharif argued, it was necessary that each and every aspect of the anti-terrorism plan be implemented.

There is a visible element of deception here, as Pakistan projects its counter-terrorism ‘successes’ to secure as much as possible from the Coalition Support Fund (CSF) of United States in the name of Operations in its tribal areas. On September 13, 2015, Jonathan Carpenter, Special Representative of the US for Afghanistan and Pakistan, while appreciating Pakistan’s war against terrorism, had thus observed that, as a result of Zarb-e-Azb, Waziristan and the Khyber Agency had become safer. Carpenter also confirmed that provision of CSF to Pakistan would continue for the current fiscal. Carpenter justified this decision on the basis of his talks with Prime Minister Sharif and the Government of Pakistan, who had assured him that an indiscriminate operation against all terrorist groups was under way.

The continued and free operation of a large number of ‘friendly’ terrorist formations in and from Pakistan – most prominently including the (Afghan) Taliban and a multiplicity of India-directed groups including the Lashkar-e-Taiba – gives the lie to Pakistan’s claims of such an ‘indiscriminate’ operation. Indeed, it remains the case that anti-state formations such as TTP continue to flourish in Pakistan precisely because the state continues to provide spaces to a number of its own terrorist ‘assets’, as well as to the entire spectrum of Islamist extremist and sectarian political formations.

Pakistan continues on its trajectory to ruin, even as the ‘international community’, led by the US, continues to subsidize its many derelictions and to reward its enduring malfeasance. The terrorist attack at Badaber is just another reminder, the latest in an unending succession of disasters, that Pakistan’s duplicity will eventually inflict a cost on the country itself, far beyond any calculus of gain its current masters may imagine.

* Tushar Ranjan Mohanty
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management