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All India Muslim Majlis: Its Current Relevance – Analysis

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By R.Upadhyay

The All India Muslim-Majlis-e-Mushawarat had lost its relevance in Muslim politics within a few years of its formation. A revival is being noticed now after the golden Jubilee celebration on August 31 this year on the initiative of Syed Sahabuddin.

Background of Mushawarat:

To understand the Mushawarat which claims to be an apolitical body, we should look to its background and history to understand the organisation.

One would have thought that the identity politics which was encouraged by the British would die a natural death after partition and emergence of two countries. However what happened in India was that the minority community which was given special constitutional protection continued to seek a separate identity that was encouraged by political parties for their own benefit.

Post Chinese aggression in 1962 when the charisma of Prime Minister Nehru had taken a beating, there was a spurt in communal violence on a large scale in a number of states like Bihar, Madhya Pradesh and West Bengal.

Concerned with the increasing communal divide resulting from the riots and the widening gap of mistrust between the two major religious communities, the Muslim leaders including members of Parliament and representatives of almost all the Islamic organisations assembled under the leadership of Dr. Sayed Mahmood who was known to be a disgruntled Congress leader in a conference at Lucknow (8-9 August 1964). After detailed deliberations, they felt the need for coexistence of all communities and thus emerged the All India Muslim Majlis-e-Mushawarat as an umbrella organisation of various Muslim organisations.

The Mushawarat was then a federation of various Muslim organisations in the country which included Indian Union Muslim League (IUML), Jamiat-ul-Ulama-e-Hind (JUH), Jamaat-e-Islami Hind (JEIH), Tamir-i-Millat, All India Muslim Majlis-e- Ittehad-ul-Musalmeen, Ahl-e-Hadith, Muslim members of Parliament, representative of Barelwi school, representative of Shia community and some prominent Muslim dignitaries (Muslims in Free India by Moin Shakir, 1972, page 56).

Objectives of Mushawarat made out in the First Conference:

The objectives of the movement were:

1. To enable Muslims to live in accordance with the ‘lofty ideals of Islam’ and make them participate in the national life in a manner commensurate with their status being the Khar-e-Ummat (Welfare of Muslims),

2. to forge unity among all sections of Muslims,

3. to make all out efforts to eradicate communal and other petty prejudices and to promote an atmosphere of mutual amity and understanding,

4. to promote goodwill and integrity among different communities and groups in India, and to help the aggressed and the oppressed,

5. to lend support to all attempts at retaining and promoting the secular character of the state,

6. to promote Muslims to unhesitatingly contribute to the solution of various national problems. (Ibid. 57)

These were lofty ideals worthy of implementation and the Mushawarat—a federation of both the radical and ‘liberal’ Muslim organisations—generated a ray of hope that at last there could emerge a decommunalised society.

It had the blessings of the then Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri, Union Home Minister Gulzari Lal Nanda and a host of non-Muslim leaders like JayaPrakash Narayan, R.R.Diwakar among others.

The First Objective was a double-edged sword:

However, the very first objective of the organisation was a double-edged sword capable of being interpreted both in a benign and in a communal way. In a strict sense there is nothing wrong in following the lofty ideals of Islam and at the same time work for the welfare of the community- but it turned out that this very clause was used to seek a separate identity.

The Mushawarat held its extended meeting in September 1964 which was also attended by both the Muslim and Hindu leaders like Abul Lais of Jamaat-e-Islami Hind (JeIH), Maulana Asad Madani of Jamiyat-Ulema-e-Hind (JUH), and Jaiprakash Narayan.

Both the Muslim and the Hindu leaders while making joint efforts to resolve the communal problem drafted a joint appeal for communal harmony and decided that the leaders of both the communities would undertake tours to appeal for integrity and solidarity of the nation.

The Negative Role of JeIH:

Sensing the positive response of the people irrespective of their faith, the fundamentalists within Mushawarat particularly the JeIH expressed reservations against the participation of other leaders in a predominantly Muslim platform.

Accordingly, Abul Lais issued a signed statement in reference to the joint appeal drafted in the meeting. He declared: ‘I would like to take the first opportunity to declare that the portion of the appeal which speaks of a joint platform of leaders belonging to different religions is contrary to the principles and policies of the Jamaat. (Indian Muslims, H. E. Hasnain, 1968, page 75-76).

There was then a general feeling among the ‘liberal’ Muslim intelligentsia that from the very beginning of its formation Mushawarat came under the stranglehold of the JeIH, which did not favour the status of equality between Muslims and the Hindus. It was only favouring the status of a protected minority for the Muslims.

Prof A.A.K.Soze in his article in Radiance, an organ of JeIH observed: ‘To me at least it seems that the conditions of Indian Muslims will be much better if they are treated as a protected minority (Ibid. Page 85).

Hasnain, however, observed: ‘Under the evil influence of the JeIH, the Mushawarat has tried to solve many issues in such a wrong way that far from solving the issues, it has only led to a deterioration of the communal situation instead of helping to improve it (Ibid. Page 90). While a majority thought that the Mushawarat by giving equal berths to all communities would help solve the communal divide, the JeIH thought other wise that their community would need special protection!

Some sinister Statements of the leaders of Mushawarat:

Dr. Sayed Mahmood, despite his less affectionate attitude towards Hindus, was projected in the media as a nationalist Muslim. He was convinced that Hindus were not capable of ruling India. After the Chinese aggression in 1962, Hamid Dalwai, a noted secular Muslim writer held an interview with Mahmood and the latter said, ‘It is quite well known that Hindus are incapable of ruling a country. This is what History has proved adequately. We are going down the drain as a nation because Muslims in this country have no share in power. Muslims should develop initiative and participate in the government of this nation. Only Muslims can save this nation from doom’ (Muslim Politics in India by Hamid Dalwai, Page 63).

Another ‘nationalist Muslim’, Maulana Hussain Asad Madani was of the view that ‘if Dara had triumphed, Muslims would have stayed in India but not Islam. Since Aurangazeb triumphed, both Muslims and Islam were here to stay’ (Ibid.). Such medieval attitude, which the so-called nationalist Muslim leaders had inherited since the collapse of Islamic power suggests that they too were obsessed with a dream to restore their lost political identity, and this in turn I suspect prevented most of community from modernisation.

Khalilullah Husaini, the then chief of Tamir-e-Millat, a constituent of Mushawarat remarked in his write up in Irshad (November 1963) following the Chinese aggression of 1962: ‘This defeat has proved that our present rulers have no capacity to rule! The only alternative this nation has is to hand over all powers to those who ruled this country for one thousand years.’(Ibid.)

Abul Hasan Nadvi alias Ali Mian, another prominent leader of Mushawarat stated: ‘The main programme of Mushawarat is to carry the message of Allah to all the people boldly’ (Muslims in Free India by Moin Shakir, Page 70).

These statements also suggest that there was much uniformity in the attitudes of Dr. Sayed Mahmood, Asad Madni, Ali Mian and the leaders of the JeIH or Tamir-e-Millat. This was not as much a coincidence as one would like to make it!

Mushawarat Ignored to Examine the Causes of Communal Riots:

The immediate causes of communal riots in India are often linked with issues like festivals, eve teasing, personal enmities, cow slaughter, desecration of places of worship, processions passing through the roads near temple or mosque and dispute over cemetery grounds. Similarly, suspicion against Indian Muslims for their alleged loyalty to Pakistan, their attitude towards Article 370 of Indian constitution and infiltration from Bangladesh were also sparks that ignited communal hostilities.

One would have expected the Mushawarat to discuss these relevant issues that endangered communal harmony and work out solutions. After all, these were its objectives. Instead of discussing ways to diffuse tensions that led to communal confrontation, the self-serving leaders of the Mushawarat joined hands with the exploitative political leadership as well as the media to blow up issues out of proportion the differences and thus added fuel to the fire.

It is said that Dr Mahmood was known to be very close to Nehru, but when he did not get any share in the power structure of the country, he became a disgruntled Congress leader and floated the Mushawarat only to defeat Congress in elections. Similarly, Madani was more interested for sharing power than to guide the fellow members of his community in joining the national mainstream.

Chasing for Identity and Ignoring the original objectives:

Thus, deviating from the main issue to resolve communal ism, the Mushawarat diverted its energies in the 1967 general election to defeat the Congress. It prepared a manifesto in July 1966 for this election that aimed at the restoration of the political status of Muslims in British India. Some points in the manifesto would reveal the true intentions of the leaders of the Mushawarat.

1.Reform of the educational system: They did not discuss modernisation of madrasas.

2. System of proportional representation in Legislative Assemblies and Parliament: It was a repetition of the pre-partition demand of the Muslim League.

3. Personal Law of different communities should not be interfered with by the state;

5. Urdu should be the second official language in U.P., Bihar, M.P., Rajasthan, Delhi, Andhra Pradesh and Mysore;

6. Minority Boards should be established to look after the interest of the minorities in the country;

7. Minority character of institutions in the country should not be disturbed;

8. Religious trusts should be managed solely by the members of the respective religious communities without any interference of the government, etc.

The manifesto however, did not mention anything about the mechanism for preventing communal confrontation in the country. Strangely after all these efforts, the Mushawarat did not field its candidates in the 1967 general election, but appealed to the community to vote only for the candidates, who subscribed to the viewpoints raised in its manifesto. By and large the community voted against the Congress, which helped the opposition.

Mushawarat in Wilderness:

In the absence of a positive guidance from any effective secular leader in their community, the Indian Muslims continued to look upon Mushawarat just as a collective platform and a monolithic political body for them to voice their real problems. Despite being the representative body of all political Muslim organisations, it soon developed into a body that had no interest in resolving the communal conflicts. They used the Mushawarat only to bargain with the ruling party for sharing political power. What started as a body with the lofty objective of de-communalising, it soon degenerated into one that was bent upon continuing the communal divide. Their attempts were to perpetuate a separate identity quite different from the ideals for which the organisation was started. The ideological burden of ‘ Umma’ (Pan- Islam) soon overtook and destroyed whatever good intentions the sponsors of the organisation had in the beginning.

It is conceded that there is no easy solution to the communal problems in India. Mushawarat by itself could not have solved the problem but could have been the precursor to social and other religious organisations to continue with the lofty ideals with which the organisation was created. There was only one way- that, both the Hindus and the Muslims have to sit together and shed their selfish design if they have the common welfare of the Indian society at heart. The majority community should also take the blame for not dealing with it seriously.

But the attitude of the JeIH within the Mushawarat had shown that bringing communal harmony is not an easy task! . Some of the members of the Mushawarat were more interested in hijacking the organisation to promote the Mawdoodi version of Islam which favoured a subordinate status to nonMuslims.

The Mushawarat failed to formulate any coherent national political philosophy due to inherent contradictions among its leaders. Its biggest flaw was that it wanted Islamic solution to the communal problem in a non-Muslim majority Indian society, which is committed to democracy, socialism and secularism.

Syed Sahabuddin revives Mushawarat:

When Mushawarat became irrelevant for a few decades in the contemporary politics, Syed Sahabuddin, a prominent ‘Muslim Indian’ of academic brilliance claims to have revived it in June 2002. His argument was based on the premise that Mushawarat was conceived as a deliberative body among Muslim leaders on matters of common concern and for protection of the religious identity of the Muslim community. He overlooked the focus of the objectives which included eradication of communal and other petty prejudices, promotion of goodwill and integrity among different communities and groups in India. He may claim that Mushawarat was not a political organization, but its manifesto issued on the eve of 1967 election exposed the political intention of its leaders. He perhaps ignored the background of Mushawarat, which was formed for de-communalisation of Indian society and not for the cause of Muslim identity. For a rational thinker every individual has his distinct identity within the broader frame of identities like national, religious, sectarian, linguistic and regional.

The two-nation theory enunciated by Iqbal and executed by Jinnah has no relevance for Indian Muslims after the creation of Pakistan. But the ghost of that theory is still haunting the Islamists of India. Indian Muslim society therefore needs a leadership to face the challenge of religious orthodoxy in collaboration with other liberal forces within Indian society. The Indian (non Muslim) society has a long list of effective liberal leaders, who believed in secular nationalism but ‘the only leadership Indian Muslims have is basically communalist’(Muslim Politics in secular India by Hamid Delwai).

Give up the mind set of Shah Waliullah:

In fact liberal Muslim leaders like former President A.P.J.Kalam had no place in Indian Muslim society which is still under the command of the followers of Shah Waliullah. For them Kalam was ‘more a Hindu than a Muslim’. Maulana Wahiduddin Khan, a widely known Islamic scholar observed, ‘If there is any danger to Muslims in this country (India), it is only from our so-called leadership buoyed up as it is by paranoid journalism. There is no other real danger to Muslims (Indian Muslims : The need for a positive outlook by Maulana Wahiduddin Khan, 2000, page 89’).

The Indian Muslim society does not face any challenge to its identity but needs a leader of enlightened liberal intellect with persuasive powers who can destroy the hold of the Islamic orthodoxy over the masses.

Since Sahabuddin has revived Mushawarat, he may perhaps go back to the principles and the reasons for which Mushawarat was founded. He could work sincerely and make some positive contribution to the society if he decides to follow the objectives declared in their first conference.

If he does so, it will be a lasting contribution not only to his community but to the nation as well.


Kashmir: Years Of Violence Take Psychological Toll

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By Umar Shah

For the past 10 years, 43-year-old Haleema has been a regular patient at Kashmir’s only psychiatric hospital.

She was seven months pregnant when her husband left for Pakistan to become a “freedom fighter.” But he was killed soon after his return in a clash with security forces.

Haleema was left widowed with a baby boy to raise. But soon after her husband’s death she began complaining of sleeplessness and started behaving very oddly, her brother Mohammad Shafi Khan told ucanews.com.

“She kept saying that her husband often visited her. Initially we thought she was possessed by some evil spirit,” Khan said.

When prayers failed to help, the family took her to the psychiatric hospital in the state capital, Srinagar, where Haleema was diagnosed with having post-traumatic stress disorder, or PTSD, he said.

“My agony is that I never saw my husband’s body. He was killed near the border and buried almost immediately. I only learned of his death several months after he was killed,” Haleema said.

“Now, I have a son who keeps asking me about his father and I don’t know what to tell him.”

Two decades of violence in Jammu and Kashmir waged by separatists seeking to end Indian rule in the country’s only Muslim-majority state have killed at least 43,000 people, according to government figures.

The majority of those killed were husbands, sons and fathers.

Their deaths have resulted in many more victims — the loved ones they left behind.

Impacts

For many women like Haleema, the loss of husbands, sons and fathers has left a major psychological impact. This has resulted in a steady increase in the number of people, especially women, seeking psychiatric treatment.

A recent University of Kashmir study revealed about 700 women were treated for psychological disorders in 1985 before the violence erupted. By 2013, that number had shot up to 100,000.

According to statistics compiled by Srinagar’s Psychiatric Diseases Hospital, some 15 percent of women in Kashmir suffer from stress or some kind of prolonged trauma.

Of these, 70-80 percent suffer from depression, while some 16 percent suffer from the effects of PTSD, such as nightmares or periodic feelings of intense distress.

Psychiatrist Mushtaq Margoob says many women are suffering from an acute sense of insecurity after having lost loved ones.

“The trauma can be seen on their faces. Women continue to bear the brunt of this conflict of attrition. The traumatic experience of violence can have long-lasting and deep-rooted psychological consequences,” Margoob said.

Nasreena, 61, is still struggling to come to terms with the loss of her only son nearly a decade ago.

He joined a separatist group in 2005 and was killed two years later. Ever since then, Nasreena often locks herself in a room and starts screaming and sobbing loudly.

“It was a shock for her to see the body of her 19-year-old son. She never even tried to reconcile with that incident. During the initial days, she kept staring at a picture of her son,” said her husband, Ghulam Qadir.

He said Nasreena has been getting treatment for acute depression for the past eight years.

Widows

The majority of widows in Kashmir live a miserable life as the government and other agencies do not pay them adequate attention, says Asima Hassan, who has conducted research on the impact the Kashmir conflict has had on people in the state.

“An ever-increasing number of widows has been one of the byproducts of the armed conflict in Kashmir. Many women witness the worst socioeconomic conditions as the only family breadwinners have either been killed, injured or have mysteriously disappeared,” she added.

Asha Begum became a PTSD victim after her husband, a tourist guide, “disappeared” 18 years ago.

“I have three daughters. We have little money and we are struggling to survive,” Begum said.

“I really want to die as there is no purpose in this world,” Begum said as she waited at the psychiatric hospital.

She needs to take medication regularly, but doesn’t have enough money to buy medicine, she said.

Arshad Hussain, a prominent psychiatrist in Kashmir, says even after a decrease in violence in recent years, the number of people suffering from mental illnesses continues to rise.

“People are increasingly seeking medical treatment to recover. Before, mental illnesses were stigmatized here, particularly among women, and usually it was kept hidden,” Hussain said.

Sometimes, entire families seek treatment for depression.

Rahti Begum’s son was killed by militants 12 years ago.

“They fired several bullets into his chest. My son died before my eyes and I could not save him,” Rahti said. Her other two children also witnessed the brutal killing and are on medication now.

“I fainted and when I regained consciousness. Hundreds of people were in my house. The moment my son died will never be erased from my memory,” Begum said.

As the state has no comprehensive program to help such people, nongovernmental organizations like ActionAid India have stepped in.

 Tanveer Ahmad, project manager for ActionAid in Kashmir, told ucanews.com that the formation of village level committees is an integral part of a project that is acting as a catalyst of change at the community level.

Workshops are organized to raise awareness on various psychosocial issues, he said.

The committees also organize health camps, which help determine which people need psychological care. People who need help are referred to government-run district hospitals, where psychiatrists are available.

ActionAid has also been introducing livelihood programs.

“Such programs not only help generate income for those suffering stress and poverty, but also work as an occupational therapy, enabling them cope with their mental issues and develop social dignity with a sense of empowerment,” Tanveer said.

Nepal Earthquake Recovery Efforts Boosted Through Regional UN Dialogue

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The ongoing earthquake recovery and reconstruction effort in Nepal received a boost this week, when the region’s experts gathered at a United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) led forum in Kathmandu to share experiences and innovation in disaster recovery.

Innovative retrofitting technologies to protect cultural sites, low-cost housing, and new techniques to help rebuild settlements and infrastructure in mountainous areas were some of the key strategies highlighted at the regional earthquake recovery dialogue for ‘building back better,’ by experts from India, Iran and Pakistan who have all experienced mega earthquakes in recent years.

Organized by ESCAP in partnership with the Disaster Management Centre of South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation and the National Planning Commission of the Government of Nepal, the regional dialogue provided a platform for experts to share good practices with those involved in the recovery efforts of the Nepal Gorkha earthquake in April.

Ms. Shamika Sirimanne, Director of the ICT and Disaster Risk Reduction Division of ESCAP emphasized that enhancing disaster preparedness for effective response and promoting the ‘build back better’ approach in recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction are key priorities of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030, the global agenda for achieving a substantial reduction of disaster risk in the next 15 years.

“After recovering from several mega earthquakes, our region has acquired a vast amount of knowledge on ‘building back better,’ especially with innovative solutions for low cost housing, protecting cultural sites, and rebuilding in difficult terrain. It is time to share this experience and knowledge with Nepal,” said Ms. Sirimanne.

In his opening remarks, Honorable Govind Raj Pokharel, Vice-chairperson of the National Planning Commission of Nepal said: “This regional earthquake recovery dialogue will provide good opportunities for Nepalese policymakers and practitioners to enhance their understanding and capacity in recovery and reconstruction work.”

Outcomes of the regional dialogue held in Kathmandu, Nepal from 1 to 2 October, provided valuable input into the recovery and reconstruction strategy of Nepal, which will also be followed up by the Asian and Pacific Centre for Development of Information Management, a specialized regional institution of ESCAP based in Tehran, the Islamic Republic of Iran.

India’s Growing Closeness With North Korea – Analysis

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By Aniket Bhavthankar*

On April 13-14, 2015, North Korea’s foreign minister Ri Su Yong paid a very rare visit to New Delhi and had a meeting with his Indian counterpart Sushma Swaraj. This was the first visit by North Korean foreign minister to India in the last 25 years. India responded positively to Yong’s request for supply of wheat and other grains. North Korea’s positive relations with China and Pakistan were major impediments in its relations with India. Especially, transfer of nuclear technology between Pakistan and North Korea during 1990’s was a cause of concern for New Delhi. On September 9, 2015, India’s Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) nominated Minister of State for Home Affairs Kiren Rijiju to participate in an event celebrating North Korean Independence Day at their embassy in New Delhi. India has indicated that there are some positive developments in its bilateral relations with Pyongyang and that it is willing to play a role in the Korean peninsula. We have to understand these developments through the lens of major geopolitical changes on the global level and India’s domestic requirements.

During the Korean crisis in 1950, the then Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru mediated between China and United States. Due to China’s ever increasing influence over North Korea, India took a back seat from active diplomacy in this region. India and North Korea had established embassies in 1973 but their diplomatic engagement was reduced to mere formality. In 2011, when North Korea faced crop failure, India sent emergency food supplies and $1 million under United Nations World Food Program. However, bilateral relations did not go beyond this. In 2012, no Indian officer from Foreign Service was ready to take up the position of ambassador to North Korea. India has sent the most experienced stenographer of MEA, Ajay Kumar Sharma to represent as ambassador, whose previous diplomatic experience was as a counsellor in Fiji. It seems in last three years he infused positive sentiments in India’s relations with North Korea.

Instability in the Korean Peninsula may trigger tensions beyond the Asia-Pacific. North Korea is considered a pariah state and suspicions around its intentions never seem to die down. In fact, for its long-time supporter China too, the over-ambitious North Korean nuclear programme has become a headache. Besides, China wants to enlarge its opportunities and looking for lucrative market in South Korea. This has not been received well by North Korea and the feeling of betrayal is on the rise. Presence of Rijiju, who hails from Arunachal Pradesh, at the event hoisted to celebrate Independence Day hints that India wants to take advantage of the growing rift between North Korea and China.

Since the dawn of the 21st century, India has taken keen interest in the geopolitics of the Asia-Pacific region. To consolidate its position in this region, Modi government has given fillip to ‘Act East’ policy. It is reported that Yong also requested India to widen its focus and consider North Korea under its ‘Act East’ policy. India is keen to seize this rare opportunity.

It is believed that Yong discussed issues of nuclear programme and regional stability with Swaraj and conveyed to her the North Korean view point. All important powers in the world have already expressed concerns about nuclear program. In the past, India was not a part of the six party (North and South Korea, US, China, Russia and Japan) talks held to discuss North Korea’s nuclear program. However, those talks were fruitless and North Korea is not willing to discuss this issue on any international forum. In the last few years, India’s presence in this region has significantly increased. South Korea and Japan are important trading partners of India. If Yong has really communicated about the nuclear program to India, then it should consider forwarding this information to all the interested stakeholders. India’s likely entry may generate prospects for discussion on North Korean Nuclear program. Many experts and diplomats have expressed that recent developments signify that India-North Korea relations may undergo dramatic changes. It is important to note that Rijiju said bilateral ties were “going to change.” The US has welcomed growing ties between India and North Korea. For them, India is at the linchpin of its Asia’s pivot policy. South Korea has recognized Indian view point and not indicated any alarming signals. To balance between both Koreas, India sent its railway minister Suresh Prabhu to Seoul.

Recently BBC declared that it will soon start a service focusing on North Korea. BBC’s announcement shows that world is desperate to reach out to Pyongyang. Due to many international economic sanctions against it, North Korea is yet to become a part of the global economy. North Korea has vast reserves of minerals and rare earth elements (REEs). Till now, China is its largest partner in minerals and other resources. North Korea wants to reduce its dependence on China and is in search of new options. They are looking towards Vietnam and Magnolia for the same purpose. North Korea feels that they can enter into Indian market, thanks to its resources and hence may have extended hand of friendship. India also wants to fulfill its dream of ‘Digital India’ and for that it’s electronic and IT industries have huge requirements of REEs and North Korea is one of the alternatives.

This new found love for North Korea in western capitals is hidden in these reserves of REEs.

India’s overtures to North Korea should be contextualized in its willingness to play the role of a leading power rather than balancing power in the Asia-Pacific. Obviously there will be many obstacles on India’s path to this goal. China took note of foreign minister Yong’s India visit and Rijiju’s attendance during its Independence Day celebrations. Myanmar freed itself from over comprehensive Chinese influence. It is moving on path of democratization. China doesn’t want to repeat same history in North Korea and will try everything to keep it under its influence. Next month, Chinese think tank is organizing a talk to push North Korea for discussion. Officials from six parties are invited and Chinese foreign minister will attend the talk. If India really wants to be part of active diplomacy in the region then it has take both the Koreas, US, Japan and Russia into confidence.

Recently, the South Korean ambassador to India Lee Joon-Gyu noted that India with its democratic set-up and policy of neutrality can play a significant role in the process of re-unification of both Koreas. The border issue of the 38 parallel line is a very complex one and India needs to craft its policy very carefully. By reaching out to North Korea, India took a very courageous step; it will test India’s leadership qualities. If India succeeds in proving its positive orientation on the Korean issue, it will enhance India’s stature on the world’s stage.

*Aniket Bhavthankar is a Research Associate at the Society for Policy Studies. He can be reached at aniketb@spsindia.in

Text Of Morocco’s King Mohammed VI UN Speech

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HM King Mohammed VI has addressed a speech to the 70th session of the UN General Assembly

The speech was read out by HRH Prince Moulay Rachid

Praise be to God, May peace and blessings be upon the Prophet, His Kith and Kin

Mr. Chairman,

Mr. Secretary-General,

Your Majesties,

Your Excellencies,

Your Highnesses,

Ladies and Gentlemen,

The current session of the United Nations General Assembly is particularly important as it will see the adoption of the “post-2015 sustainable development agenda”.

It is an opportunity to reiterate our collective commitment to achieving the lofty objectives called for by the United Nations’ Charter and fulfill the aspirations of peoples around the world.

The current session also coincides with the celebration of the United Nations’ 70th anniversary, at a time when the international community is facing serious, unprecedented global challenges requiring joint, efficient and integrated action.

The Kingdom of Morocco’s position regarding these challenges as well as various regional and international conflicts and issues will be laid out at the General Assembly’s committee meetings and during the ministerial discussions which will take place on the sidelines of the General Assembly.

Mr. Chairman,

Ladies and Gentlemen,

The preparation of the development agenda for the coming 15 years must be based on an objective assessment of what we have achieved since 2000.

Have we managed to change the day-to-day life of the poor? Are the results achieved solid and sustainable enough to withstand tensions, wars and social and economic crises?

A review of the achievements made under the Millennium Development Goals indicates significant progress between 1990 and 2015. However, gaps between regions around the world and inside certain countries are still a legitimate cause for concern.

This situation, which tarnishes the image of international cooperation and casts doubt on our collective action within the United Nations, does not necessarily mean that we have failed.

In fact, it should induce stakeholders to ponder on the best means to promote development and address the malfunctions affecting international cooperation.

In this respect, the Kingdom of Morocco hopes the Sustainable Development Goals will help develop an ambitious agenda to change the situation at all levels – domestically, regionally and globally.

No matter how relevant and promising the sustainable development agenda is, its credibility will hinge on the resources to be raised to finance its implementation.

International cooperation therefore has to adapt to global facts on the ground and not only shake off the legacy of the past, but also avoid geo-political calculations and refrain from imposing near-impossible conditions to access aid.

Regardless of the usual expressions of solidarity, the Ebola crisis showed that international aid to affected countries was insufficient, not to say clearly inadequate, considering the level of mobilization and commitment required by that alarming situation.

Mr. Chairman,

Development cannot be achieved through bureaucratic decisions or ready-made technical reports that have no credibility.

To fulfil people’s aspirations and to address their real concerns, it is necessary to fully understand the reality of their situation and their characteristic features, make an objective assessment of their living conditions and carry out serious work on the ground.

I am very familiar with the situation in Africa and I think I know what I am talking about. As a matter of fact, many Africans are facing extremely harsh conditions. And the reality is much bleaker and far more bitter than reports by some international governmental and non-governmental organizations suggest.

These African people’s lives are a never-ending struggle, full of daily challenges. They have to face harsh conditions and can only rely on scant resources. However, they live with dignity, are true patriots and hope for a better tomorrow.

To address such a situation, an inclusive, coordinated and multi-dimensional medium-term approach needs to be adopted.

Urgent, practical initiatives are also required because deteriorating conditions and the people’s daily pressing needs cannot be put on hold until international bureaucracy wakes up and makes the necessary decisions.

Seen from this perspective, Africa must be at the heart of international cooperation for development in order to help the continent rid itself of its colonial past and unlock its potential.

For this reason, Morocco is calling on the United Nations Organization and on regional and international financial institutions to draw up an action plan for economic transformation in Africa and provide steady resources to finance it.

Despite qualifications and skills, Africa stands at a crossroads today.

Without substantial and tangible international support, Africa will experience glaring disparities between countries. There will be nations engaged in the pursuit of development and progress, while others will be desperately seeking to address their problems and will sink further into poverty, ignorance and instability.

I also call for making peace and stability top priorities to prevent conflicts, confront extremism and terrorism and address the migration problem using an approach that takes into account the dignity of migrants, preserves their basic rights and tackles the root causes of the migration phenomenon.

Mr. Chairman,

The National Human Development Initiative we have launched in our country, and whose tenth anniversary we are celebrating this year, has contributed not only to reducing poverty, vulnerability and exclusion, but has also helped reduce inter-regional disparities.

It also enabled Morocco to achieve the first of the Millennium Development Goals as early as 2013.

For this reason, of the top five countries in the world with the best public welfare programs and initiatives, international organizations put Morocco in third place.

We are ready to put our experience in this field at the disposal of our partners, especially in Africa.

Given its geographical location as well as its strategic policy choices, Morocco has been actively engaged in addressing various global issues and concerns.

Whether it is migration and human rights, climate change and sustainable development, or the fight against terrorism, Morocco has come up with quality national responses that contribute to international efforts to rise to these unprecedented global challenges.

Morocco’s commitment to help address these global issues is especially reflected in the fight against climate change, which is one of the greatest threats to mankind.

Since we participated in the Rio Summit in 1992, Morocco has worked hard to develop a national environmental policy that rallies all the stakeholders concerned, while ensuring proper use of the financial resources earmarked for issues relating to climate change.

Thus, for instance, the National Charter for the Environment was adopted, the Green Morocco Plan was launched, and the ambitious solar and wind renewable energy program, which aims to cover 42% of Morocco’s energy needs by 2020, was also adopted.

In 2015, fulfilling its obligations in the field of environmental protection, the Kingdom of Morocco officially presented its “Intended Nationally Determined Contribution”, which includes strong, ambitious commitments designed to contribute to the establishment of an equitable, solidarity-based international environmental system.

In this respect, Morocco is proposing that Marrakech host the 22nd Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.

I should like to take this opportunity to reiterate our support for France’s efforts to achieve a global, comprehensive, sustainable, balanced and legally binding agreement at the Paris COP21.

For this reason, we view the Paris and Marrakech Conferences as two complementary milestones in our attempts to achieve a qualitative transition in the fight against climate change and avoid failures which, in the past, were the result of poor stakeholder coordination and cooperation.

Hence the importance of the “Tangier Call” I launched on September 20, together with His Excellency President François Hollande, for collective and decisive, solidarity-based international action on climate change.

The fact that Morocco was chosen to launch this joint initiative was not incidental; rather, it is a recognition of the active involvement of Morocco, a country that has been at the forefront of African nations which have adopted an efficient national plan in the field of renewable energy.

Consistent with a longstanding solidarity-based policy, Morocco will spare no effort to make Africa’s concerns known and its voice heard, together with those of developing small island states, which are the most vulnerable to climate change.

Mr. Chairman,

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Celebrating its seventieth anniversary, the United Nations Organization has reached the age of maturity, wisdom and responsibility.

Those same principles and values should govern the action of the international community to resolve regional disputes.

The Organization’s work must not be a destabilizing factor for countries that contribute to multilateral cooperation and action.

In view of the above, Morocco will reject any irresponsible or risky course of action in connection with the regional dispute over the Moroccan Sahara.

Indeed, many influential international powers fully realize that deceitful proposals and unrealistic plans developed inside offices cannot but represent a threat to the situation in the region.

I hope the United Nations Organization will press ahead with its efforts to resolve disputes through peaceful means and will remain committed to upholding the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states so that peoples’ aspirations for peace, security and stability may be fulfilled.

Thank you.

Wassalamu alaikum warahmatullah wabarakatuh.

US-Iran Handshakes: Then And Now – OpEd

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As expected, the news of President Obama’s “accidental” encounter and handshake with Iran’s foreign minister Javad Zarif on Monday in the UN hallways has triggered a small political firestorm inside Iran, with several hard-line lawmakers calling on Zarif to recant or face impeachment.

Despite such criticisms, Zarif is unlikely to apologize or be forced out of office, as was the case with Mehdi Bazargan, a former prime minister who met and shook hands with the the then US national security advisor, Zbignew Brzezinski in Algiers in November, 1979. Bazargan was quickly ousted after the US embassy takeover that was partly triggered by the picture of Bazargan-Brzezhinski handshake — that was interpreted in post-revolutionary Iran as a bridge too far.

But, fortunately this cannot be said about the (hitherto unconfirmed) Obama-Zarif handshake, which to many ordinary Iranians can only be interpreted as a sign of good will by both sides.

Incidentally, this reminds me of another “accidental” near-encounter between President Clinton and Iran’s President Khatami at the 2001 UN General Assembly summit. Back then I wrote about that episode and how it was organized by Giandomenico Picco, the UN Secretary-General’s Special Envoy on Dialogue Among Civilizations, with a minor participation by this author (http://www.payvand.com/news/01/mar/1108.html). As I recall, that was to be managed through last minute improvization, and at the last minute the cautious Khatami opted not to take the risk at home and (perhaps wisely) avoided Clinton, although Picco was somewhat more successful by luring Madeleine Albright who was the US Secretary of State to a Khatami-led panel on dialogue at a UN hall. That was the first time that a high-level US official was attending a speech by an Iranian leader, thus raising hopes that a mini-breakthrough in the troubled US-Iran relations was imminent.

Yet, fourteen years later, that breakthrough has not yet happened, despite the solid progress in nuclear negotiations between Iran and world powers, thus warranting a mixed feeling regarding the prospects for the improvement of US-Iran ties. In this context, symbolic handshakes have the measured utility of serving as a barometer of warming relations.

The big question is, of course, why Zarif will likely survive the political ramifications of his handshake Obama when Bazargan was ousted? The answer lies in Iran’s political evolution and maturity since the early days of the revolution, when the fear of an Americanist restoration of the ancien regime ran supreme and turned the moderate Bazargan into a helpless prey of radicals, who shortly thereafter took over the US embassy in Iran.

Times are definitely changing and it is to the credit of nuclear diplomacy that the taboo of direct US-Iran talks has been broken, in light of the numerous bilateral meetings between U.S. and Iranian officials. Thus, although Zarif took some heat for strolling in the European streets with Secretary of State John Kerry, in the end he was able to survive the backlash by the conservatives, which may have emboldened Zarif to take a calculated risk.

It is therefore rather instructive to put one’s foot in Zarif’s shoe and view the various pros and cons of the “risky” handshake, which has prompted heated criticisms by Iran’s hard-liners. One big difference with the Bazargan era that stands out is, of course, the political institutionalization of the regime, which is no longer unstable and without the necessary confidence that it can assert itself and survive. This evolutionary process has resulted in a qualitative improvement in the national confidence, as a result of which the taboo of direct dialogue with the “Great Satan” has been broken.

Another key difference in favor of Zarif is that there is now a big nuclear agreement in place that will require sustained US-Iran dialogue and, therefore, the handshake can be legitimately interpreted as a sign of good will that complements the negotiated nuclear settlement. However symbolic, the Obama-Zarif handshake conveys the impression of incremental improvement in US-Iran relations at a delicate time when such important issues as Syria and Iraq and Afghanistan are on the two nations’ plate and require serious “smart diplomacy.” On Iran’s part, this was also important because of the recent intelligence-sharing agreement between Iran, Russia, and Iraq, which has unsettled Washington to some extent. A little extra step by Iran toward Washington reflected in Zarif’s willingness to meet Obama and shake hands with him was a balancing act that will definitely need other actions to solidify it, in order to avoid a pro-Russia tilt in Iran’s foreign policy.

From Iran’s vantage, US needs to come on board any Syria policy in order to be successful. Concerning Syria, at a private session with US pundits, President Rouhani admitted that the government of Syria has lost control over two thirds of its territory and “only a few cities” remain under the government’s control.

There is, in other words, a real sense of urgency about Syria, which is why Iran has unveiled a four point peace plan and is in dialogue with a number of regional countries on how to bring the bloody conflict to an acceptable peace?

So far, however, US and Iran have not been able to hold direct talks on Syria because of direct order from the Supreme Leader to limit to the nuclear issue, as a result of which such a dialogue has been transpiring through the European interlocutors. Rouhani and the French President Hollonde had a constructive meeting on the sideline of UN summit and according to Rouhani his French counterpart expressed some agreement with Iran’s postion on the priority of combatting terrorism in Syria. Rouhani has been invited to visit Paris and Iran-French relations are on the path of rapid improvement, this while the US-Iran relations remains in a state of perpetual limbo for various historical and political reasons or obstacles.

In turn, this recalls an astute observation by Mr. Picco back then, when President Khatami backed away from the opportunity to shake President Clinton’s hand through a “planned chance encounter” at the UN hallways.

“US-Iran relations is like Waiting for the Godot — except that Godot never arrives,” Picco once said in 2001. The Zarif-Obama handshake might however be considered as a minor tremor in this truism, breaking a small ice that, hopefully, will not backfire by creating new ice due to the internal heat in Iran it has generated. If so, then in historical retrospective, Zarif’s bold move may be seen by future historians as a bold and timely move that was a step in the right direction by a self-proclaimed government of “moderation and prudence.”

The Promise Of Ballot: Electoral Reforms In Afghanistan – Analysis

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By Chayanika Saxena*

Inaugurated after a series of bitterly fought battles, the formation of Afghanistan’s National Unity Government (NUG) was seen as a moment of relief by the international spectators and the domestic constituencies alike. The first democratic transition that took place sans the internationally beefed security, the countless allegations of electoral rigging had cast dark clouds of doubt on the prospects of political stability in Afghanistan. Yet, defeating the many predictions that were made about its collapse, the transition could take place successfully even as it was, and continues to be, attended by a lot of drama.

Opening with much revelry, it did not take much time before the fissures of rivalry became apparent again. What was expected to be a step in the direction of forging consensus in a country where ethnic chasms exist, the charm of this alliance between a Pashtun president and a Tajik (and Pashtun) Chief Executive Officer was gradually lost to stark inefficiency, corruption and political and popular disaffection.

Added to this are the diverging ideologies and styles of political management of those who preside over the network of administrative and political institutions and practices in Afghanistan. On the one hand where those in the Meli Shura (National Assembly) are often not on the same page with the executive, the twin heads of the government too do not have a good track record of coordination and cooperation to boast. Rather, the persistence of differences between the many organs of the government in Afghanistan has given birth to both political stagnancy and proliferation of parallel centers of power. Thus, where the many vacant berths in the cabinet of the NUG are evidence of the discord that continues to affect governance through ‘formal’ institutions in Afghanistan, the proliferation of the shadowy and the not-so-shadowy centers of parallel governance throughout the country is becoming a major concern for the country.

In the backdrop of such political and administrative deadlock, dwindling economic resources, deteriorating security situation and a resurgent Taliban, the introduction and acceptance (if only partial) of electoral reforms appears to be an attempt to set the things in motion once again. While it comes almost a year late and approved by way of a decree — which it seems is becoming the most favored tool in discharging ‘democratic’ duties, it is expected that seven of the 11 reforms that have been accepted will resuscitate the stagnating mechanisms of formal governance in Afghanistan.

Having arrived at the scene a little too late, the genesis of the electoral reforms has been a story of inordinate delays and quarrels. Stuck in a political quagmire that has since the inauguration of the NUG become the unfortunate political reality of Afghanistan, the electoral reforms that were touted as the most major commitment of those who came to power could not be effected until now. In fact, the very inception of the Electoral Reforms Commission took almost five months to pass through the Presidential Palace since the Ashraf Ghani-led government assumed charge.

Even after its institutionalization, the Electoral Reforms Commission was far from being in operation. From the date when the decree was given force on March 2, 2015, it had taken it almost three months to start gathering steam. Considering that the length of this Commission was not meant to be more than four months (excluding extension which had taken place subsequently), the fact that there was little (or no) activity on the front for which it was formed reinforced the dismal views that the performance of governance under NUG has gathered.

Affected by intense political acrimony, the composition of the now 15 member-strong Commission witnessed turf battles between the President and the CEO — a matter which is becoming (dangerously) usual in the politics of Afghanistan. Constituted by seven members chosen by each of the two political heads, the 15th member was appointed by the United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA). While the decision on representation was drawn largely on the lines of proportionality — with an equal number of seats being distributed between the two heads — it was the position at the apex of the body that became the source of feud within this setup. The climax of this struggle came with the nomination and subsequent ouster of Shukria Barakzai from the position of chairperson of the Commission. Having her affiliations with the Ghani camp, the decision to have her appointed at the helm of affairs of the Electoral Reforms Commission did not go down well with the CEO, who, as many reports have suggested was not even consulted before the decision was made. At present, the Electoral Reforms Commission is led by Shah Sultan Akefi.

Drumming up the authority issues further, the constitution of the Commission mandates that the accountability of its functioning and the proposals it furnishes will be with the CEO, with the final authority of upending and approving of provisions resting with the president. A seemingly apparent inequality between the twin heads of the NUG became another tipping point to which the functioning of the Commission was held at ransom for long.

As proportionality in representation degenerated into partisan participation in the Commission, the efficacy of its functioning was further dented by the responsibilities it was made to assume. These were to: (1) review the legislation related to elections, including the Electoral Law, the Structure, Authority and Duties of the Electoral Bodies Law (SAD Law), regulations and procedures; (2) review the structure and authorities of the electoral bodies and their terms of reference and (other) authority; (3) proposing solutions and policies with the purpose of creating transparency and stability in Afghanistan’s electoral system. What appeared to be many as largely advisory in nature, the role of the Commission was equated to blunt claws — there, but of hardly any use.

Held back on multiple counts of sheer political expediency, it was believed that the underlying factor which prevented the timely inception, operation and proposal of reforms was an overarching desire on the part of many in the political class to delay the conduct of elections to the Wolesi Jirga (Lower House of National Assembly). Uncertain and unpredictable, the politics of Afghanistan evades prescient descriptions, making even the strongest proponents of the electoral reforms — the Abdullah Abdullah camp — shy away from stressing on them even as they ordinarily stand the chance to benefit from it.

Despite these circumstances, the fact that the reforms could be proposed, and of which seven could muster the support of the president is certainly a big feat. These reforms include, (1) cancellation of the previously issued voting cards, (2) alteration in voting system where ballots could not be transferred into the parallel system, (3) establishment of transparency committee to review major fraud cases and complaints against the election organizers, (4) enforcement of new conditions for the membership of electoral commission, (5) allotting of one-third of parliament’s 250 seats to political parties, (6) the restructuring of (7) smaller delimitation of constituencies for effective balloting and representation.

Although the decree has a long way to go before it is promulgated as a law, but the groundwork for it has been set — if the Commission and the Presidential Palace are to be believed. And, while there are bound to be shortcomings in the approaches whose formulation took less number of months than the number spent in just getting the Commission institutionalized, these electoral reforms are expected to pave way for the conduct of parliamentary elections. Equally crucially, or perhaps more, the fate of the NUG too rests on the timely implementation of the proposed reforms, for its (official) expiration date too is not far in time anymore.

*Chayanika Saxena is a Research Associate at the Society for Policy Studies. She can be reached at chayanika.saxena@spsindia.in

Philippines: Children Risk Death Digging And Diving For Gold, Says HRW

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The Philippine government is failing to protect children who dig and dive for gold in dangerous small-scale mines, Human Rights Watch said today in a new report and video, released ahead of Children’s Month in the Philippines.

The 39-page report, “What…if Something Went Wrong: Hazardous Child Labor in Small-Scale Gold Mining in the Philippines” documents how thousands of Filipino children – some just 9 years old – work in illegal, small-scale gold mines, mostly financed by local businessmen. Children work in unstable 25-meter-deep pits or underwater along the coastal shore or in rivers, and process gold with mercury, a toxic metal. In September 2014, a 17-year-old boy suffocated in an underground mine because there was no machine providing oxygen. The Philippine government should act on its public commitment to end child labor in mining, Human Rights Watch said.

“Filipino children are working in absolutely terrifying conditions in small-scale gold mines,” said Juliane Kippenberg, associate children’s rights director at Human Rights Watch and author of the report. “The Philippine government prohibits dangerous child labor, but has done very little to enforce the law.”

Human Rights Watch conducted field research in Camarines Norte and Masbate provinces in 2014 and 2015. More than 135 people were interviewed, including 65 child miners between the ages of 9 and 17. Beyond the fears of mine collapses and drowning, the children complained of numerous health problems, including back and body pain, skin infections, fevers, and spasms.

In underground mines, children risk injury from falling rocks and wood beams, pit collapse, and lack of oxygen.

Underwater mining for gold, locally known as “compressor mining,” puts adult and child miners at risk of drowning, decompression sickness, and bacterial skin infections. Staying underwater for several hours at a time in 10-meter-deep shafts, the miners receive air from a tube attached to an air compressor at the surface. This work is carried out by adolescent boys and – mostly – adult men. Several boys described moments of fear when they dived for the first time. Fourteen-year-old “Dennis” said: “I was 13 the first time [I dived]. I felt scared because it’s dark and deep.” If the diesel-powered compressor stops working, the miner can drown or get “the bends” coming up too quickly. “Sometimes you have to make it up fast, especially if you have no air in your hose,” said “Joseph,” 16. “It’s a normal thing. It’s happened to me.”

The Philippine government in recent years has taken some important steps to ensure education for all, but the number of out-of-school children in the country remains high. Children, mostly from impoverished households, skip school because of their mining work and sometimes drop out altogether.

“Lots of children in Masbate and Camarines Norte are dropping out of school to work in gold mining,” Kippenberg said. “In order to tackle the root causes of child labor, the government needs to assist the poorest families financially and ensure their children are able to attend and stay in school.”

Children also work with mercury, a readily available toxic metal that is commonly used to process gold. Children are particularly susceptible to mercury, which attacks the central nervous system and can cause brain damage and even death. Unaware of the health risks, children use their bare hands to mix mercury with gold ore and create an amalgam. When they burn off the mercury to retrieve the raw gold, they breathe in toxic fumes.

In the mining village of Malaya, Camarines Norte, Human Rights Watch observed the unrestricted flow of light-grey, mercury-contaminated tailings from gold processing into the nearby river, where children play, swim, and pan for gold. Several children in Malaya complained of tremors, symptoms that could be signs of mercury poisoning. The Philippine government should be introducing mercury-free gold processing, such as is practiced in Benguet province, to reduce the threat to all children, Human Rights Watch said.

The Philippines has signed but not ratified the Minamata Convention on Mercury of 2013, which sets out steps to reduce mercury exposure. The government should promptly ratify the Minamata Convention and test for mercury exposure among residents in mining areas.

In March 2015, the government banned the use of mercury in mining as well as compressor mining, but little has been done to implement this regulation so far.

The Philippines is the world’s 20th largest gold producer. An estimated 200,000 to 300,000 people work in the country’s small-scale gold mines. Large and small-scale mines combined produced about 18 tons of gold in 2014, at a market value of over US$700 million, according to official statistics. The country’s central bank is the official buying agent for gold from small-scale mining and exports it. However, the bank has no process in place to check the conditions in which the gold has been mined. Other gold is smuggled out of the country.

“Small-scale mining provides a vital livelihood for many Filipinos,” Kippenberg said. “But the government needs to take urgent steps to ensure a safe and child-labor-free mining sector so that families can earn an income without putting their children at risk.”


Are Boko Haram, Islamic State Preparing Attacks Against Vatican? – OpEd

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The African nation of Nigeria has warned the United States and European Union nations that the Islamist group Boko Haram deployed hundreds of jihadists to Libyan cities, including Benghazi, to offer aid to the Nigerian group’s ally, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).

The influx of Nigerian jihadists is expected to escalate an effort to take control of the Arab country that’s been in a shambles since the overthrow and execution of Libya’s dictator Col. Moammar Gaddafi.

Even more frightening to many are the reports that Boko Haram and ISIS are threatening that once they are in control of Libya and that nation’s resources including weapons, they will likely launch attacks on the Vatican in Italy.

Boko Haram, — which means “Western education is a sin” — has dispatched at least 200 Nigerian jihadists who possess advanced weaponry to bolster the already increasing numbers of ISIS forces in Africa. The current intelligence appears to prove the statements of those who are claiming there is a growing alliance between the two merciless groups are accurate statements.

Originally Boko Haram had sworn allegiance to what’s now known as “core al-Qaida,” especially its Yemeni-based offshoot known as al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). But with the ISIS victories in Iraq, Syria and other locations, it wasn’t surprising to intelligence agents when Boko Haram decided it was time to join up with ISIS, according to Jeff Pierce, a former police department counterterrorism unit commander.

ISIS fighters, who continue their battles in the Middle East, are now fighting to take control of Libya — which has been in the midst of a bloody civil war — because the jihadists believe it is an excellent location from which to initiate an invasion of a European city.

With the new jihadists pouring into Libya to help ISIS fighters, according to former police counterterrorism unit commander Vincent Pollard, ISIS leaders are bragging on social media websites that they will use their victory in that African nation in order to launch an invasion of Italy, perhaps attacking the home of the Roman Catholic Pope in the Vatican.

“There are been threats made against Europe before, but now ISIS leaders and their associates have taken to identifying their prized target: the Holy City in Rome,” said Pollard. “ISIS has also created a series of illustrations and messages for the Internet including one that shows the black flag of ISIS above the Vatican and the Catholic symbols replaced with Muslim designs and artwork,” Pollard noted.

A man claiming to be a soldier of Allah, Abu el Gandal Barkawi, told ISIS supporters in a message to “go to Rome through Libya.”. The man also wrote: “The weapons of the Ottomans were launched and have surrounded Rome after conquering Libya to the south of Italy. Who wants to take Rome and Andalusia has to start from Libya.”

According to a number of news stories, ISIS has sought the strengthening of its ties with Boko Haram in recent months amid signs that its overstretched forces are beginning to be beaten back across the Middle East. In June ISIS declared territory seized by Boko Haram in Nigeria as its West African province

Nigerian counterterrorism expert Jacob Zenn told the news media in Africa that between 80 to 200 of the Boko Haram Islamists are currently fighting alongside ISIS jihadists in the Libyan city of Sirte, which ISIS claims is its capital in North Africa. The Nigerian government’s press office added: “There have been reports in recent times of some Nigerians departing to join terrorist groups especially in the Middle East and North Africa.”

Why The Washington Post’s Attack On Bernie Sanders Is Bunk – OpEd

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The Washington Post just ran an attack on Bernie Sanders that distorts not only what he’s saying and seeking but also the basic choices that lie before the nation.  Sanders, writes the Post’s David Fahrenthold, “is not just a big-spending liberal. And his agenda is not just about money. It’s also about control.”

Fahrenthold claims Sanders’s plan for paying for college with a tax on Wall Street trades would mean “colleges would run by government rules.”

Apparently Fahrenthold is unaware that three-quarters of college students today attend public universities financed largely by state governments. And even those who attend elite private universities benefit from federal tax subsidies flowing to wealthy donors. (Meg Whitman’s recent $30 million donation to Princeton, for example, is really $20 million from her plus an estimated $10 million she deducted from her taxable income.) Notwithstanding all this government largesse, colleges aren’t “run by government rules.”

The real problem is too many young people still can’t afford a college education. The move toward free public higher education that began in the 1950s with the G.I. Bill and was extended in the 1960s by leading public universities was reversed starting in the 1980s because of shrinking state budgets. Tuition has skyrocketed in recent years as states slashed education spending. It’s time to resurrect that earlier goal.

Besides, the biggest threats to academic freedom these days aren’t coming from government. They’re coming as conditions attached to funding from billionaires and big corporations that’s increasing as public funding drops.

When the Charles Koch Foundation pledged $1.5 million to Florida State University’s economics department, for example, it stipulated that a Koch-appointed advisory committee would select professors and undertake annual evaluations.  The Koch brothers now fund 350 programs at over 250 colleges and universities across America. You can bet that funding doesn’t underwrite research on inequality and environmental justice.

Fahrenthold similarly claims Sanders’s plan for a single-payer system would put healthcare under the “control” of government.

But health care is already largely financed through government subsidies – only they’re flowing to private for-profit health insurers that are now busily consolidating into corporate laviathans. Anthem purchase of giant insurer Cigna will make it the largest health insurer in America; Aetna is buying Humana, creating the second-largest, with 33 million members.

Why should anyone suppose these for-profit corporate giants will be less “controlling” than government?

What we do know is they’re far more expensive than a single-payer system. Fahrenthold repeats the charge that Sanders’s healthcare plan would cost $15 trillion over ten years. But single-payer systems in other rich nations have proven cheaper than private for-profit health insurers because they don’t spend huge sums on advertising, marketing, executive pay, and billing.

So even if the Sanders single-payer plan would cost $15 trillion over ten years, Americans as a whole would save more than that.

Fahrenthold trusts the “market” more than he does the government but he overlooks the fact that government sets the rules by which the market runs (such as whether health insurers should be allowed to consolidate even further, or how much of a “charitable” tax deduction wealthy donors to private universities should receive, and whether they should get the deduction if they attach partisan conditions to their donations).

The real choice isn’t between government and the “market.” It’s between a system responsive to the needs of most Americans, or one more responsive to the demands of the super-rich, big business, and Wall Street – whose economic and political power have grown dramatically over the last three decades.

This is why the logic of Sanders’s ideas depends on the political changes he seeks. Fahrenthold says a President Sanders couldn’t get any of his ideas implemented anyway because Congress would reject them. But if Bernie Sanders is elected president, American politics will have been altered, reducing the moneyed interests’ chokehold over the public agenda.

Fahrenthold may not see the populism that’s fueling Bernie’s campaign, but it is gaining strength and conviction. Other politicians, as well as political reporters, ignore this upsurge at their peril.

Disentangling Data On Planned Parenthood Affiliates’ Abortion Services – OpEd

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By Jamie Bryan Hall and Roger Severino*

Planned Parenthood Federation of America claims that the 665 clinics run by its affiliates[1] provide a “wide range” of health care as justification for taxpayers providing more than 40 percent of their funding, and that abortion is a small proportion of their services.[2] Yet, data show that Planned Parenthood Federation of America is the country’s largest abortion provider with affiliates performing more than 300,000 abortions per year, which amounts to approximately one out of every three in the country.[3]

How Does Planned Parenthood Calculate Its Claims About Its Abortion Services?

Although Planned Parenthood Federation of America reportedly requires all affiliates to have at least one clinic that performs abortions,[4] Planned Parenthood’s annual report does not identify the number of affiliated clinics that provide abortion services or how much of Planned Parenthood’s total revenue results from abortions. Instead, the report claims that abortions account for only 3 percent of the medical services Planned Parenthood affiliates provide.[5]

How does the Planned Parenthood annual report arrive at the 3 percent figure? The calculation counts each “discrete clinical interaction” as a separate “medical service,” meaning simple tests or routine provision of birth control are given the same weight as surgical or chemical abortions.[6] For example, if a woman in the course of a year receives a free condom, a pregnancy test, a sexually transmitted infection (STI) test, and an abortion, Planned Parenthood would say abortion was only 25 percent of the services provided.

Even with Planned Parenthood’s broad definition of “medical service,” data reported in the organization’s annual report suggest that roughly 12 percent of people who received a service from Planned Parenthood affiliates received an abortion during the reporting year.[7]

Despite a nearly 20 percent decline in the number of abortions in the country between 2000 and 2011,[8] the number of abortions Planned Parenthood performed during that time increased from 197,070 to 333,964, thereby more than doubling its share of the abortion market from 15 percent in 2000 to 32 percent in 2011,[9] the latest year for which national data are available.

Planned Parenthood affiliates perform about 20 abortions for every prenatal care visit and about 200 abortions for every adoption referral based on the approximately 300,000 abortions they perform each year.[10]

Planned Parenthood Federation of America’s Government Subsidies

Combined federal, state, and local government funding has increased from $203 million (30 percent of Planned Parenthood’s consolidated revenue) during its fiscal year 2000–2001 to $528 million (41 percent of revenue) during 2013–2014.[11] Planned Parenthood’s annual report does not provide a breakdown of federal versus state funding or the exact government grants, contracts, and reimbursements it receives.

A Congressional Budget Office (CBO) analysis released in September 2015, however, shows that the organization’s affiliates received approximately $60 million of taxpayer money under Title X of the Public Health Services Act, and $390 million through federal payments under Medicaid in 2013.[12] The federal government generally provides reimbursement for 90 percent of the cost of “family planning services” and products covered under Medicaid, while states provide the remaining 10 percent.[13]

Under Title X grants, abortion providers are able to prorate expenses such as staff and waiting rooms, covering a portion of the fixed costs of the abortion-related staff and facilities. According to the Guttmacher Institute,

Because Title X grants offer up-front funding to providers (rather than payment after-the-fact, as with Medicaid or private insurance), the program provides essential infrastructure support that allows health centers providing family planning services to keep their doors open for clients. Up-front funding helps supply a cash-flow cushion for providers who are often operating on tight and uncertain budgets.[14]

In addition, federal regulations require that “[e]ach project supported under [Title X] must…[n]ot provide abortion as a method of family planning,” but also “must”:

(i) Offer pregnant women the opportunity to be provided information and counseling regarding each of the following options:

(A) Prenatal care and delivery;

(B) Infant care, foster care, or adoption; and

(C) Pregnancy termination.

(ii) If requested to provide such information and counseling, provide neutral, factual information and nondirective counseling on each of the options, and referral upon request, except with respect to any option(s) about which the pregnant woman indicates she does not wish to receive such information and counseling.[15]

Planned Parenthood affiliates therefore must offer every pregnant woman they serve under a Title X grant the opportunity to receive information about abortion. If any pregnant woman requests an abortion referral, the affiliate must provide such a referral, thereby using tax dollars to help grow or sustain the abortion industry.

Redirect Funding for Planned Parenthood to Other Health Care Centers

To ensure that taxpayers are not forced to subsidize America’s number one abortion provider, Congress should make Planned Parenthood affiliates ineligible to receive either Medicaid reimbursements or Title X grants if they continue to perform abortions. Taxpayer money from these programs should instead be redirected to the more than 9,000 federally qualified health center sites throughout the country that provide comprehensive primary health care for those in need without entanglement in abortion.

*About the authors:
Jamie Bryan Hall is a Senior Policy Analyst in the Center for Data Analysis, of the Institute for Economic Freedom and Opportunity, at The Heritage Foundation. Roger T. Severino is Director of the DeVos Center for Religion and Civil Society, in the Institute for Family, Community, and Opportunity, at The Heritage Foundation.

Source:
This article was published by The Heritage Foundation.

Notes:
[1] Alliance Defending Freedom, “Women Have Real Choices,” https://adflegal.blob.core.windows.net/web-content-dev/site-assets/final-national-map-1.png (accessed September 24, 2015).

[2] Planned Parenthood Federation of America, “Who We Are,” http://www.plannedparenthood.org/about-us/who-we-are/ (accessed September 24, 2015). Planned Parenthood Federation of America notes that it “has 59 independent local affiliates that operate approximately 700 health centers throughout the United States.” Planned Parenthood Federation of America, “Planned Parenthood at a Glance,” http://www.plannedparenthood.org/about-us/who-we-are/planned-parenthood-at-a-glance (accessed September 24, 2015).

[3] Americans United for Life, “The New Leviathan: The Mega-Center Report—How Planned Parenthood has Become Abortion, Inc.,” 2015, http://www.aul.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/AUL-Mega-Center-Report-06-24-2015.pdf (accessed September 24, 2015).

[4] M. Alex Johnson, “Abortion Mandate Costs Planned Parenthood a Few Affiliates,” NBC News, December 6, 2012, http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/12/06/15702142-abortion-mandate-costs-planned-parenthood-a-few-affiliates (accessed September 24, 2015).

[5] Planned Parenthood, 2013–2014 Annual Report, pp. 17–18, http://issuu.com/actionfund/docs/annual_report_final_proof_12.16.14_/0.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Author calculation based on dividing the total number of “abortion procedures,” 327,653, by the number of “patients,” 2.7 million, reported by Planned Parenthood Federation of America in its latest annual report. Ibid. This calculation does not take into account the possibility of some women having had more than one abortion at Planned Parenthood clinics in the same reporting year; the Guttmacher Institute, however, reports that the “average, or mean, time span between abortions reported on the 2002 NSFG [National Survey of Family Growth] was 44 months.” Guttmacher Institute, “Repeat Abortion in the United States,” November 2006, https://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/2006/11/21/or29.pdf (accessed September 24, 2015).

[8] Rachel K. Jones and Jenna Jerman, “Abortion Incidence and Service Availability in the United States, 2011,” Perspectives on Sexual and Reproductive Health, Vol. 46, No. 1 (March 2014), Table 1 (reporting 1.31 million abortions in America in 2000 and 1.05 million abortions in 2011, which amounts to almost a 20 percent decline over that time period), http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/journals/psrh.46e0414.pdf (accessed November 29, 2015).

[9] Planned Parenthood reports that its affiliated clinics performed 197,070 abortions in 2000 and 333,964 abortions in 2011. Planned Parenthood, 2000–2001 Annual Report, p. 9, http://www.centerformedicalprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/2000_-_2001.pdf (accessed September 29, 2015), and Planned Parenthood, Annual Report 2011–2012, p. 5, http://www.plannedparenthood.org/files/4913/9620/1413/PPFA_AR_2012_121812_vF.pdf (accessed September 29, 2015).

[10] Planned Parenthood, 2013–2014 Annual Report, p. 18, http://issuu.com/actionfund/docs/annual_report_final_proof_12.16.14_/0”.

[11] Planned Parenthood, 2000–2001 Annual Report, p. 19, and Planned Parenthood, 2013–2014 Annual Report, pp. 20–21.

[12] Congressional Budget Office, “Budgetary Effects of Legislation That Would Permanently Prohibit the Availability of Federal Funds to Planned Parenthood,” September 22, 2015, https://www.cbo.gov/publication/50833 (accessed September 29, 2015).

[13] 42 U.S. Code § 1396b(a)(5). Other sources of federal money totaling approximately $1 million include Medicare and the Children’s Health Insurance Program.

[14] Adam Sonfield, Kinsey Hasstedt, and Rachel Benson Gold, “Moving Forward: Family Planning in the Era of Health Reform,” Guttmacher Institute, p. 13, http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/family-planning-and-health-reform.pdf (accessed September 24, 2015).

[15] 42 CFR 59.5(a)(5), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2007-title42-vol1/pdf/CFR-2007-title42-vol1-sec59-5.pdf (accessed September 29, 2015).

The Impact Of Islamic State On Global Salafism And South Asian Jihad – Analysis

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By Thomas F. Lynch III*

This paper defines the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) Caliphate, including its distinctive features as a Salafi-jihadist group. It also highlights ISIS’ challenge to al-Qaeda’s longstanding leadership of the global jihad, and its impact on jihad in South Asia. It develops conclusions based on classic literature pertaining to the inception and sustainment of terrorist groups, as well as from media sources and outlets throughout the Middle East and South Asia.1

The paper offers several conclusions about ISIS. First, ISIS’ declaration of a caliphate has caused a significant rupture in the global Salafi jihadist constellation, directly challenging al-Qaeda’s longstanding dominance. Second, ISIS will remain a dangerous security problem for the Middle East as long as it retains a critical mass of support from Sunni tribal leaders and the former Baathist military personnel in Iraq who have played a leading role in its ascent. Third, ISIS’ support is fragile; the persistent brutalization of Iraqi and Syrian Sunnis by its many foreign fighters is certain to erode its viability. Fourth, ISIS’ rapid rise has sparked a major backlash, both from the surrounding states and from within the Salafi jihadist community. Finally, ISIS’ appeal has generated an uneven response: it has resonated more with individuals than with groups, more with newly evolving Salafi jihadist outfits than with longstanding ones, and far more in Europe, North Africa and Central Asia than in South Asia. The reasons associated with ISIS’ relative underperformance in South Asia tell us a lot about ISIS’ innate weakness as a serious challenger to al-Qaeda.

ISIS as a Phenomenon of Salafi Jihadist Fragmentation

Beginning in 2011, the Syrian civil War became a lawless, ungoverned incubator for radicals and revolutionaries. By late 2011, ISIS’ self-proclaimed caliph, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, was sending hundreds of Iraqi jihadists into Syria to advise and assist the many Sunni groups joining the fight against Syrian President Bashar Assad.2 Many of these fighters were veterans of al-Qaeda in Iraq and had fought under the infamous Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. As a result, they knew the dynamics of insurgency and attracted foreign fighters who traveled to Syria to fight against Assad. This force grew alongside other Sunni jihadist anti-Assad revolutionary groups—including ones strongly aligned with al-Qaeda’s core leadership in South Asia—while maintaining its independence.

As ISIS expanded in Syria, it began to dominate the scene; before long, scores of western Iraqi Sunni tribal leaders and former Iraqi Baathists who had grown disdainful of Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s sectarianism took up with ISIS. The seeds were sown for a resurgence of Salafi jihadism in Iraq and Syria with aspirations that went beyond the al-Qaeda vision for global Salafi jihad.
Open competition soon broke out between Baghdadi’s ISIS and al-Qaeda’s groups in Syria. In particular, tensions between ISIS and the al-Qaeda endorsed al-Nusra Front turned into a full-blown feud.3 Although there are many important dimensions to the rupture between al-Qaeda and ISIS, they all hinge on four major disagreements.4 First, al-Qaeda contends that the West must first be driven from Muslim lands to enable a vanguard of expert jihadists to plot and plan catastrophic attacks in the West. ISIS does not share this view and instead focuses first on attacks against local foes and opposition groups.5

Second, ISIS believes in indiscriminate, unbridled, and graphic violence as an imperative for jihad and is unwilling to temper that violence in order to achieve other goals.6 By contrast, al-Qaeda believes in selective violence, since indiscriminate killings might cause the Sunni Muslim Umma to reject it.7 Third, and relatedly, al-Qaeda sees risk in battling its many enemies simultaneously and so prefers instead to focus on driving off foreign infidels and then toppling apostate Sunni Muslim governments before moving on to other objectives. By contrast, ISIS indiscriminately challenges a multitude of enemies, taking on all adversaries at once, irrespective the risk.8 Fourth, al-Qaeda has talked of a wider Muslim caliphate stretching from Spain to the Philippines evolving over generations and built upon the fusion of al-Qaeda supported regional Salafi jihadist affiliates that have already fought and won Islamist emirates. ISIS explicitly rejects a bottom-up, lengthy process of caliphate formation. Instead, less than two months after it captured Mosul in Iraq, ISIS declared itself on June 29, 2014 to be the Islamic State Caliphate with Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as its caliph. The leadership then announced its aims to expand and extend the Caliphate through a wider network of wayilats (regions) across the Muslim world; and, declared that it would pursue a 5-year plan to topple standing governments and unify these locations under one, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi-led caliphate.9

So while ISIS poses a serious security and sovereignty challenge to Iraq and Syria, it also raises existential questions relating to global jihad and al-Qaeda. Baghdadi’s June 2014 declaration of a Salafist caliphate elevated a dormant schism into an open rupture in the Salafi jihadist community.10 ISIS has established an alternate vision for the future of Salafi jihadism and introduced a formal competition into the jihadist space that is being played out across several important dimensions. ISIS formalized the competition with an appeal to all jihadist groups to declare loyalty to ISIS instead of al-Qaeda.11 The question is whether the al-Qaeda vision of strategic violence tied to major operations will remain ascendant, or if the approach of ISIS will displace that of al-Qaeda.

ISIS’ Caliphate and the Challenge of Durability

ISIS’ prospects for becoming a durable leader of global Salafi jihadist terrorist movement remain dubious. In fact, the very successes that have marked ISIS’ rapid ascent also make it highly vulnerable to an equally rapid fall.

For one, ISIS has enemies on all of its borders. As of late November 2014, the U.S.-organized anti-ISIS coalition included 62 member countries, with the U.S. carrying the bulk of the military burden.12 Additional states have joined the anti-ISIS coalition since then, including Sweden in April 2015, pushing the coalition to an estimated 64 member countries.13 Although not a member of the coalition, Iran has also made substantial contributions of material and manpower toward defeating ISIS, reportedly including two brigades of volunteer Revolutionary Guards units and a large number of Guards officer leadership cadre. No major jihadist outfit has inspired such a comprehensive set of encircling adversaries in such a short period of time.

Coordinated anti-ISIS coalition military and political activities have taken a measurable physical toll on ISIS. Despite some limited turf gains in parts of Iraq and Syria in early 2015, independent assessments confirm that ISIS lost almost 10 percent of its territory in the first six months of 2015.14 Beginning in late 2014, ISIS was pushed out of the Syrian town of Kobane by Kurdish fighters and American airpower; run out of the Iraqi Sunni stronghold of Tikrit by a combination of Iraqi army units, Shia militias and Iranian military units and senior generals; and, put under the gun by rival Salafist units within Syria conducting guerilla attacks and assassinations against ISIS foreign fighters. Compared to its peak in the early fall of 2014, ISIS-held territory had shrunk by at least 25 percent.15 As Dan Byman and Jennifer Williams, two top terrorism experts, summarize:

The Islamic State’s fate is tied to Iraq and Syria, and reversals on the battlefield—more likely now that the United States and its allies are more engaged—could erode its appeal. Like its predecessor organization in Iraq, the Islamic State may also find that its brutality repels more than it attracts, diminishing its luster among potential supporters and making it vulnerable when the people suddenly turn against it.16

Moreover, ISIS’ feud with al-Qaeda has made it a pariah among global jihadists, sparking a number of direct clashes over manpower, financing and other resources, including overt confrontations pertaining to jihadist affiliates, individual recruits, jihadist financing, and jihadist multi-media and social media. Each of these areas of confrontation merits evaluation.

ISIS’ appeals for other jihadist groups to pledge allegiance to it has received splashy media attention. The response from the jihadist groups, however, has been uneven. As of August 2015, ISIS claimed a relationship with forty-two separate jihadist groups. However, only thirty of these groups have pledged formal affiliation while twelve others have made a lesser pledge of support. With the recent exceptions of the Islamic Movement of Uzbedistan (IMU) and Hezbi-e-Islami (HiG)—the Afghan Taliban group led by the erratic Gulbiddin Hekmatyar—those Salafi jihadist outfits pledging mere “support” for ISIS tend to be far more established and with ongoing or past affiliations with al-Qaeda.

Moreover, the jihadist outfits pledging affiliation are generally those with little to no pedigree and are experiencing severe organizational problems. Still others have been shunned by al-Qaeda for showing too little discipline to be included in the al-Qaeda network. In contrast, those pledging mere support for ISIS tend to be more established jihadist outfits with ongoing or past affiliations with al-Qaeda. These include Saudi Arabia’s Islamic State in the Land of the Two Holy Mosques, Libya’s Islamic Youth Shura, Pakistan’s Jundullah, and the Abu Sayyaf Group in the Philippines. In an apparent attempt to hedge their bets, these groups are unwilling to formally sever ties with the al-Qaeda network.

Within the Middle East and North Africa, ISIS has established loose links with multiple Salafi jihadist groups that ISIS’ leadership identifies as “governates” or “wilayats.”17 A majority of these declarations have been from relatively new jihadist groups without prior allegiance to al-Qaeda, and only those in North Africa can claim responsibility for a high level of violence to date. ISIS’ declared North African affiliates—from Algeria to Egypt to Sudan—number a dozen and include several very active groups, such as Ansar al-Sharia in Libya, the Okba Ibn Nafaa Battalion in Tunisia, and Ansar Beit al-Maqdis in the Egyptian Sinai.18 By affiliating with ISIS, these groups have received a certain amount of prestige. In return, they have facilitated the flow of jihadist fighters into Syria, revitalizing the lines of infiltration that plagued Iraq last decade.19

In a nod to these affiliates, ISIS has claimed responsibility for several terrorist strikes in the Maghreb, including the March 2015 armed assault on the Bardo Museum and the June 2015 attack against international tourists at the Imperial Marhaba beach hotel, both in Tunisia.20 Tunisian officials, however, remain uncertain of the link between ISIS and either attack, noting that the Algerian who orchestrated the attack was with the Okba Ibn Nafaa Group, which had previously only declared support for, but not an affiliation with, ISIS.21

ISIS also has signaled its goal to cultivate groups in Saudi Arabia and Yemen.22 Two groups in Yemen and one in Saudi Arabia have pledged themselves to ISIS. However, there is little evidence that meaningful ISIS group formation has taken place in either country, let alone that such a group has overtaken al-Qaeda’s affiliates there. For example, the March 20, 2015 suicide attack that killed 137 worshipers at a Shi’ite mosque in Sanaa, Yemen was claimed by ISIS, but American and Western officials stated that there was no clear operational link between the bombers and ISIS’ leadership in Iraq and Syria.23 Despite a vigorous counter-intelligence campaign by authorities in Saudi Arabia, early 2015 witnessed claims of a growing ISIS presence capitalizing on wider Wahhabi sympathies for Salafists in Syria and Iraq.24 ISIS claimed to be the inspiration for a May bombing at a Shiite mosque that killed 21 people and wounded another 120; and, to be behind suicide bombing plots against a large mosque in eastern Saudi Arabia thwarted by Interior Ministry troops in July.25 ISIS also claimed responsibility for a June 2015 suicide bomber attack on a Shiite mosque in Kuwait that killed 27 bystanders, an attack that Kuwaiti authorities attributed to a single individual inspired by a small cell of ISIS adherents.26 In each case of ISIS-claimed violence in the Gulf, Shiite groups were the targets and the sectarian focus of the attackers. Although worrisome, the low quality of these attacks, coupled with the stern government responses against them, stands in stark contrast to the other major Salafi jihadist outfits across the Gulf States and North Africa. When compared to the Salafi jihadist groups in the Middle East and the Gulf that remain affiliated with al-Qaeda, including al-Qaeda of the Arabian Peninsula, al-Qaeda of the Islamic Maghreb, and al-Shabaab, it is hard to argue that al-Qaeda has lost significant ground to ISIS in the region.

ISIS’ year long quest for serious jihadist affiliates outside of North Africa and the Middle East has fared little better, and arguably even worse. In Yemen, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, ISIS has attracted a hodge-podge of minor splinter groups, including: Mujahideen of Yemen; Tehreek-e-Khilafat, consisting of ten disgruntled Teh-rik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) affiliates re-branded as Leaders of the Mujahid in Khorasan and Jundallah; and, the al-Tawheed Brigade in Khorasan and Heroes of Islam Brigade in Khorasan (ISK).27

In July 2015, Hezb-e-Islami’s mercurial leader, Gulbiddin Hekmatyar, called for his group to support ISIS in battles against the Afghan Taliban; however, Hekmatyar’s history of allegiance reversals during the many wars in Afghanistan makes this pledge less than solid.28 These groups have supported the flow of some fighters to Syria and Iraq, but relatively few compared to other Muslim regions. Small in number, with inspiration but no direct material support from ISIS in Iraq or Syria, and with grievances and agendas matching Pashtun sub-tribal interests that are consistent over decades, these self-proclaimed Afghanistan-Pakistan affiliates of ISIS have engaged in territorial battles with traditional Afghan Taliban outfits in Nangarhar, Kunar and Farah provinces without any clear pathway to victory.29 To date, these re-made terrorist entities have not generated any viable counter-weight to dozens of Salafi jihadist outfits in the region with solid ties to al-Qaeda, including Harakat-al-Mujihadeen, the Pakistan Taliban, the Afghan Taliban, Jaish-e-Muhammed, and Jamaat-e-Mukharat. In fact, the top U.S. Army officer in Afghanistan, General John Campbell, recently testified before Congress that the presence of ISIS in Afghanistan represented the rebranding of a few marginalized Taliban.30

In Central Asia and Russia, ISIS began acquiring affiliates and support far earlier than in other regions. At least four minor jihadist groups and group fragments based in Dagestan, Russia and the Caucasus declared themselves supporters of, or in allegiance with, ISIS from late 2013 through March 2014, before even the declaration of the ISIS Caliphate. Then, in September 2014, ISIS garnered a major declaration of support that conveyed immediate operational impact. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), with leadership lodged in Afghanistan and Pakistan, declared itself in support of ISIS. After the July 2015 announcement of the death of Mullah Omar, IMU formally upgraded its affiliation to that of “allegiance” toward ISIS. These sequential declarations came after several years of increasing duress for this Central Asian jihadist movement in its longtime safe-haven along the Afghan-Pakistan border. A serious target of ongoing Pakistani counter- terrorism operations as well as NATO-ISAF and Afghan military forces, IMU was eager to build new partnerships abroad. IMU’s pledge of support was followed by increased flows of skilled fighters into Syria and Iraq from IMU recruiting nodes in Central Asia and its training bases in South Asia. These IMU cadres added to a steady stream of fighters from a half-dozen other smaller jihadist groups already joining ISIS, thereby thickening the Central Asian ISIS contingent. The International Centre for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence (ICSR) estimates that over 2,500 jihadist fighters from IMU and other jihadist outfits from Central Asia and Russia traveled to Syria during 2014 and early 2015.

In Southeast Asia, ISIS has attracted jihadist groups with little capability and waning relevance, including Abu Sayyaf, the Bangsamoro Islamic Movement, and the Mujahideen Indonesia Timor. By the time of their declaration in late 2014, these groups were basically shells of themselves after a decade of decline and fragmentation under relentless pressure from government intelligence and paramilitary units. They have brought little in the way of true support for ISIS, and critics suggest that they made their declarations in the hope that ISIS’ aura of success might somehow infuse them with relevance once more.

In Nigeria, the early 2015 pledge of affiliation by Boko Haram is the exception that confirms the rule of this pattern of less-than-substantive jihadist groups affiliating with ISIS.31 A large and resoundingly ruthless jihadist group with control of territory in northern Nigeria and Cameroon, Boko Haram is a notoriously autonomous and erratic outfit. Al-Qaeda leaders declined Boko Haram’s pledges of affiliation for several years before acquiescing to Boko Haram’s public claim in late 2011 that it had joined al-Qaeda. Osama bin Laden feared that al-Qaeda stood to gain little from Boko Haram, yet risked a great deal in formally associating with it.32

Recently, Boko Haram has suffered a precipitous decline in its fortunes: a multi-national military offensive has retaken 80 percent of Boko Haram’s territory and cost the militant group almost 3,000 fighters.33 In response, Boko Haram has begun conducting desperate and unpopular high-profile tactics, such as suicide bombings using young children, kidnappings to gain recruits, livestock as shields when fighting authorities, and brutal public executions.34

The group lacks funding that could benefit ISIS, and its role in providing fighters to ISIS is unlikely to amount to much because the group’s ethnic profile is a conspicuous mismatch for the Arab states its fighters must transit en route to Syria, Iraq or the Levant. More- over, even if Nigerians did make it to Syria or Iraq, they would struggle to fit in with the dominant Arab, Central Asian and Middle Eastern makeup of ISIS’ foreign fighters. Ultimately, therefore, Boko Haram’s pledge of allegiance to ISIS appears to be little more than symbolism, devoid of any meaningful exchange of fighters, funding or enhanced training. In fact, it may actually represent Boko Haram’s desperation as it copes with a large-scale military setback.35

Assessed closely, most of the international groups declaring support for, or out- right affiliation with, ISIS have tended to be of low quality: either minor splinters from standing affiliates with al-Qaeda or downright problematic groups. These are jihadist outfits deemed by al-Qaeda to be too undisciplined or broken by counter-terrorism operations. With the exceptions of IMU, HiG and Boko Haram, none are really mainstream groups within the global Salafi jihadist movement. In contrast, al-Qaeda retains very tight affiliations with three dozen Salafi jihadist outfits possessing name brand cache and substantive capabilities in their regions of operation.

At the same time, ISIS has undertaken a broad, multi-media campaign to recruit and employ jihadist fighters from the Muslim diaspora of Western and non- Muslim states. These efforts have been substantive and produced measurable, worrisome results. ICSR estimates that ISIS’ massive and broadly aimed recruiting campaign at this target audience has induced some 20,000 foreign fighters to join in jihad and jihad support activities over the past two years. These jihadists hail most prominently from North Africa, Western Europe, the Gulf, and Australasia.

For the most part, recruits gained through ISIS’ individually-targeted social media messaging arrive as an undisciplined and largely untrained rabble that is addicted to multi-media activities.36 They are mostly suited for support activities and martyrdom operations, including suicide bombings. As this fate is reported on social media, the allure of ISIS for naive young adventure seekers is sure to wane, and even more so as ISIS’ image as an invincible force is punctured.37 Confronted with reports that ISIS is losing, instead of gaining ground in Iraq and Syria, international recruits must now confront both personal dangers and a declining aura of invincibility as they contemplate joining the ISIS Caliphate.

In addition, the flow of foreign fighters has begun to produce antibodies in both Iraq and Syria. In Iraq, tensions between foreign fighters and local Iraqi Sunni militias began to show up in early 2015, with a growing incidence of guerilla attacks against foreign fighters.38 In Syria, ISIS lost significant ground in the north to Kurdish forces backed by coalition air strikes, reportedly losing control of 215 villages and over 1,000 militants killed in hard fighting with Kurdish and other Syrian rebel forces during January alone. Civil rights groups working in Syria began reporting in February that ISIS’ foreign fighters are being killed by rival groups and that ISIS had executed suspected defectors from their own ranks.39

ISIS also has encouraged violence against non-believers in secular Western countries. As an example, in September 2014, Sheikh Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, the Islamic State’s chief spokesman, called on Muslims in France and Canada to find an infidel and “smash his head with a rock,” poison him, run him over with a car, or “destroy his crops.”40 This exhortation was proximate to a horrific attack on two members of the Canadian military and occurred during the planning stages of the Charlie Hebdo attack. These horrific and unscrupulous actions have mobilized Western governments, making it increasingly difficult for ISIS to sustain its messaging. In combination, these challenges point to a looming crisis for ISIS.

Another major issue is ISIS financing. ISIS constructed its financial position on regional and local sources of funding in Syria and, even more so, Iraq. Initially, ISIS’ ability to ruthlessly poach funds and material from rival Syrian jihadist groups, from collapsing Syrian Army units, and from other participants in the Syrian civil war proved critical to its finances. Then, ISIS’ collaboration with and subsequent cooption of Iraqi Sunni smuggling networks and the graft-riven activities of former Iraqi Baathists set up a short-term windfall. ISIS built-up its position by exploiting oil, ransoming foreign hostages, and toppling multiple financial institutions in western Iraq. Independent research establishes that ISIS built up some $2 billion in fixed assets seized during 2014 conquests in Iraq ($875 million in assets from the capture of Mosul, $500 million from state-owned Iraq banks and $600 million from extortion and taxation in western Iraq during late 2014).41

However, ISIS funding sources are not durable and will be insufficient to sustain the Caliphate in the future.42 Durable sources of funding from reliable smuggling networks, from diaspora contributions, and from other wide-ranging money-making activities are necessary to sustain terrorist activities. 43 ISIS has not established itself in any of these areas, and is facing active resistance from al-Qaeda and al-Qaeda’s supporters.

Surrounded by enemy governments, ISIS’ hydrocarbon production facilities and smuggling operations are under serious duress. Anti-ISIS military operations by U.S. and coalition aircraft and on-the-ground actions in late 2014 and early 2015 have destroyed dozens of ISIS-held oil and gas production, refinery and transit facilities across western Iraq and northern Syria, severely constraining ISIS finances.44 Adding to ISIS struggles, coalition participants, along with other national governments, have agreed to end ransom payments for hostages.45 ISIS’ brutal treatment of minorities and infidels, which it actively publicizes, has turned off many sympathizers and contributors. Virtually all surrounding countries and bordering sub-state actors have condemned the Caliphate and refuse to do business with it. One-time sympathetic government and religious leaders in wealthy donor countries like Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait and the UAE have banned all transactions with ISIS, including charitable contributions, severely constraining the group.46
ISIS’ feud with al-Qaeda has placed it in a spot where it cannot compete for traditional sources of Salafi charitable and covert funding.47 Taken together, ISIS current finances will rapidly become a severe constraint on its abilities to govern or check counter-attacks. In March 2015, some analysts reported that ISIS may have already lost up to 75 percent of its revenues, causing it to begin an accelerated draw-down of its 2014 financial reserves and making it increasingly hard for the group to provide sufficient goods and services to the nearly eight million people living in the Caliphate.48

ISIS’ clash with its neighboring states and its schism with al-Qaeda has made it a pariah to a degree never before witnessed in jihadist circles. Al-Qaeda’s affiliates in Syria, including the Nusra Front, have begun organizing military activities to target ISIS’ leadership and its territorial strongholds.49 In addition, appalled by ISIS’ barbaric tactics and recklessness, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have quietly encouraged, to the point of direct sponsorship, long-time Salafi jihadists who are willing to denounce ISIS and organize fighting groups against it. In the summer of 2014, Jordan cut a deal with two longtime enemies of the Hashemite dynasty: Abu Muhammad al Maqdisi, Zarqawi’s former spiritual mentor, and Mahamad Shalabi, the leader of Jordan’s banned Salafi jihadist movement.50 Maqdisi was freed from prison and Shalabi had his prosecution for terrorism stayed after each declared ISIS illegitimate. Later, they were reported to be organ- izing jihadist outfits to confront ISIS in Syria, doubtlessly under the watchful eye of Jordan’s intelligence service, the GID.51

For its part, Saudi Arabia has steadily increased support to a Syrian Sunni Salafist group, Jaish al-Islam, to counter ISIS from within. Heavily tied to Saudi Wahabbist mosques through its founder Sheikh Zahran Abdullah Alloush—and certainly penetrated by Saudi Mukhabarat Intelligence to guard against any jihadist blowback in the Kingdom—the group was badly mauled by ISIS in early 2014.52 Since late 2014, the Saudis, with some assistance from the Kuwaitis, have been steadily increasing support to reconstitute Jaish al-Islam as an entity to strike ISIS inside Syria.53

ISIS has also indiscriminately recruited and lacked discipline in its messaging on social media. This has allowed it to seem spectacularly successful in the short run, but also makes it susceptible to penetration by outside intelligence agencies and law enforcement. By carefully combing its social media, foreign governments have learned much about ISIS’ organization, structure and aims, enabling more precise and effective targeting. Indeed, social media is a double-edged sword for ISIS, especially as it discovers the counterintelligence challenges associated with it.54 Moreover, its reliance on radical violence in its messaging has left it with little empathy from the international diaspora, something which has proven vital to terrorist groups in the past.55

Perhaps most importantly, by its own temporal declarations, the ISIS Caliphate must grow and grow robustly across the Middle East and the wider Islamic world to fulfill its five year plan promise. However, it has stopped growing in Iraq and Syria, and its claims of group affiliate attacks have yet to produce demonstrable territorial gains elsewhere. Its most enthusiastic supporters are congenitally impatient, demanding that ISIS could only legitimize itself by holding and growing territory and threatening to turn against ISIS should it fail to meet ambitious territorial growth timelines.56

All of these factors indicate that the ISIS’ Caliphate is Icarus of Greek legend: it is burning brightly because it has flown too close to the sun, which in turn assures it of its own dramatic fall. For all of the attention ISIS has garnered, U.S. military and American intelligence activity suggests that Washington views it as a serious regional menace but not as a group capable of carrying out large-scale international terrorism. As evidence, American airstrikes into Syria have been at least as heavily focused on the al-Qaeda affiliated Khorasan Group, an organization known for its sophisticated bomb making.57 The Caliphate poses no such comparable global catastrophic terrorism threat.

ISIS’ Impact on South Asia

ISIS’ impact on South Asia has been most interesting and highly illustrative of the degree to which ISIS represents a rupture with al-Qaeda for leadership of the international jihadist space. Al-Qaeda’s response to the ISIS challenge in South Asia has been both vigorous and important. The limited appeal of ISIS for long established South Asian jihadist outfits is also indicative of the inherent strengths of al-Qaeda and the weakness of ISIS in the broader struggle for Salafi jihadist supremacy.

Al-Qaeda’s response to the ISIS challenge was most vigorous in South Asia. On September 4, 2014, al-Qaeda Emir Ayman al-Zawahiri formally announced the formation of al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS).58 In his message, Zawahiri cleverly focused on the wide array of Salafi jihadist groups and radically-inclined Muslims on the subcontinent. Zawahiri reminded the jihadist faithful that al-Qaeda understood its issues in South Asia and was prioritizing jihad to resolve these issues. He appealed to the faithful to ignore distractions and focus their jihad against the infidels and apostates in Afghanistan, where they could exploit circumstances following the expected departure of Western military forces. He also criticized the civilian government of Pakistan as apostate and as a target for the mujahideen in the region. Finally, he emphasized al-Qaeda’s dedication to jihadist causes in Bangladesh, Muslim India, and the Royhinga Muslims in Burma. In each of these messaging components, Zawahiri made it clear that South Asia was al-Qaeda’s jihadist space, where ISIS was not welcome, and that al-Qaeda would vigorously pursue a hands off policy vis-à-vis ISIS in South Asia.

Just over nine months later, Zawahiri’s message seems to have resonated, al- though not without some challenges in Afghanistan after the July 2015 announcement that longstanding Afghan Taliban leader and al-Qaeda supplicant, Mullah Omar, died in 2013 without any acknowledgement at the time. By reinforcing several other trends of Islamist exceptionalism in South Asia, the AQIS declaration seems to have blunted most of ISIS’ appeal. Although present in a loose way due to the labeling choices by some fragmentary jihadist groups in Afghanistan, ISIS’ impact in South Asia has been conspicuously less than in other regions in general and especially on a Muslim per-capita basis.

Even more than in other parts of the world, ISIS’ appeal for affiliate groups to join it in establishing what it calls “Khorasan” has not generated a response from quality regional jihadist outfits. Three splinter groups in Afghanistan along with the more established, yet very mercurial, Hekmatyar, and handfuls of disgruntled Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) commanders and the Jundallah terrorist group in Pakistan have pledged allegiance, or in the case of Jundallah, support, to ISIS since mid-2014. Dozens of other longstanding jihadist outfits in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Bangladesh remain firmly with al-Qaeda; in the case of Lashkar-e-Tayyiban in Pakistan, it remains tied to the nationalist-Islamist aims of the security and intelligence services. Disgruntled Pashtun tribal subgroups and affiliates on both sides of the border have loosely combined under the banner of ISIS-Khorasan (or ISIS-K) and engaged in battles against established Afghan Taliban elements in the northeast and south-central parts of Afghanistan.

Despite some noisy claims of territorial conquest, the rebranded Pashtun jihadists have yet to demonstrate staying power or broad appeal. As mentioned earlier, ISIS-K self-declared leaders were reportedly killed by Afghan and U.S.-led coalition forces in the summer of 2015, and ISIS-K sub-tribal elements were reportedly wiped out in Afghanistan’s Farah province and pushed back in spring/summer 2015 battles in Nuristan and Nangarhar provinces.59 These inauspicious results suggest that ISIS affiliated groups in Afghanistan are in for a tough go, just like they would be if they were still understood as merely Taliban splinters or aggravated jihadist sub-tribes.

ISIS’ pull on individual fighters from South Asia has been equally lukewarm. The ICSR and the private Soufan Group estimate that no more than several dozen fighters from Afghanistan, 500 from Pakistan and at most a handful from India and Bangladesh have moved from South Asia to Syria in response to ISIS’ appeal. Given these estimates, the entirety of South Asia jihadists reported going to the ISIS fight is actually less than those from the UK, Germany, and dramatically less than those recruited from North Africa or Central Asia. On a per capita basis, even Australasia has a greater participation rate than all of South Asia.

This conspicuously underwhelming South Asian response to ISIS’ intense global appeal seems paradoxical. Precise reasons for this South Asian exceptionalism merit more detailed study. However, there are at least four important hypotheses that, when taken together, help explain why South Asia remains mostly unaffected by the ISIS appeal for leadership of the global jihad.

First, al-Qaeda’s senior leadership remains in the region and has vigorously defended its space against encroachment. Zawahiri’s September 2014 declaration of AQIS was keenly calibrated to brush back ISIS from an area al-Qaeda considers its own. The message spoke to the specific grievances of Muslims in South Asia, many of whom are frustrated by their local governments. The faithful were urged to join the fight in Afghanistan and told their regional grievances and issues would be those of AQIS, isolating ISIS as an outsider with no real understanding of Muslim aims in South Asia. Although Zawahiri’s credibility was challenged by the sudden July 2015 announcement that Mullah Omar had died in 2013, Zawahiri’s August 1, 2015 message swearing an oath to Afghan Taliban succes- sor leader Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansour appears to have re-established al-Qaeda’s bona fides and primacy in a fractious jihadist landscape where ISIS remains a distinct outsider.60

Second, South Asia already features a robust array of options for those prepared for jihad—options tolerated by certain regional states and ineffectively countered by others. Unlike jihadists in North Africa, Australasia, Central Asia, and Western Europe who are often alienated from their home societies, jihadist groups in Bangladesh, Afghanistan and Pakistan offer places where radicalized Sunni Muslim groups or individuals can go to pursue jihad. Zawahiri’s message to jihadists reinforced this by providing a superstructure in AQIS.

Third, India, with the region’s largest Muslim population, uniquely benefits from a history of pluralism and tolerance toward its Muslim citizens. This is not to minimize the communal tensions and violence that have afflicted India over the years, including in the present. However, unlike Muslims in other settings who often feel ostracized, misunderstood or alienated by their own governments, Indian Muslims continue to be a group with a generally positive relationship with their government. India’s liberal democracy has reinforced a culture of social and political inclusion for individual Muslims and Muslim families.61 As a result, only a handful of Indian Muslim youth have made the trek to the Middle East to join ISIS.62 Many of those who have gone often return disillusioned, even admitting to shame in having dishonored their Indian Muslim heritage by succumbing to ISIS’ social media propaganda.63

India may have the most to fear from Muslim youth retweeting and forwarding ISIS’ propaganda as a form of coreligionist thrill seeking.64 Addressing that problem may be tricky, but it is not on the same scale of difficulty as confronting a swarm of ISIS recruits preparing to leave the subcontinent.

Finally, there may be a significant impact from the fact that the Gulf Arab states have sworn to destroy ISIS and prevent any blowback into their own countries. As part of their anti-ISIS campaign, these Arab governments have signaled that Muslim immigrant workers from places across South and Southeast Asia will be carefully scrutinized and banned from economic opportunities if they, or any members of their families, are determined to be ISIS-aligned jihadists.65 This threat could have a major impact, considering that over 20 million migrant workers and their families across South Asia send some $12 billion in remittances home annually.

Combined, these four hypotheses appear to explain a lot about the uniqueness of South Asia when it comes to the pursuit of jihad. They emphasize that longstanding patterns of Muslim inclusivity in India coupled with three decades of established jihadists place unique barriers on ISIS’ appeal within the region.

No state in South Asia should be comfortable that it may not suffer a greater penetration from ISIS in the coming few months—therefore mandating vigilance. Indeed, the convoluted July 2015 announcement of Mullah Omar’s 2013 death will certainly reverberate in the South Asian jihadist landscape for months to come—impacting some allegiances and affiliations—and might make ISIS’ largely alien brand of jihad more appealing for a time. Yet the most salient factors in play across South Asia suggest that this region will remain mostly dominated by al-Qaeda’s version of global jihad. In turn, the priorities established by Zawahiri for jihad in his September 2014 message should remain the primary concern for South Asia policymakers. These remain the jihad on behalf of the Taliban in Afghanistan, support for the Tehrik-e-Taliban campaign in Pakistan, and support for persecuted Muslims in Bangladesh and Burma.

ISIS’ use of social media for a broad array of purposes, from radicalization to recruiting to resourcing, is unique to South Asia over the past decade. ISIS has even promulgated a significant number of original messages in Hindi, a language seldom if ever used in al-Qaeda jihadist propaganda. Thus, it behooves regional governments to up their game in terms of social media monitoring of ISIS messages. It will also be especially important for India’s Home Ministry to work closely with the Gulf Arab States. New Delhi can best slow radicalized Indian youth from tran- siting to the Gulf States en route to jihad in Syria or Iraq by sharing intelligence and cooperating.

Conclusion

Since early 2014, the fight has been on the Salafi jihadist global space. Like Icarus, ISIS has burned brightly in the early going by employing a brash and high risk strategy that has exposed it to existential dangers, including many new enemies.

It is still early, but the intra-jihadist struggle increasingly pits the long-established global entity of al-Qaeda with a clear and disciplined approach to terror against an incredibly active and seemingly reckless ISIS. Nowhere are ISIS’ issues more visible than in South Asia, where ISIS has made minimal inroads against al-Qaeda’s ascendance despite the fact that countries like Pakistan, Afghanistan and Bangladesh are hotbeds of Islamic radicalism ripe with recruits. A curious combination of pre-established pathways for those aspiring to jihad, a relatively unreceptive Muslim community in India, and cunning al-Qaeda messaging has combined to stifle ISIS.

Could this be a pattern that is repeated in other regions of the world as the novelty and the momentum of ISIS in Syria and Iraq slows? The struggle between ISIS and al-Qaeda will continue for a lot longer before the results become clear.

About the author:
*Thomas F. Lynch III is a Distinguished Research Fellow for South Asia and the Near East at the National Defense University’s Institute for National Strategic Studies.

Source
This article was published by the Hudson Institute in CURRENT TRENDS IN ISLAMIST IDEOLOGY / VOL. 19, pages 85-107 (PDF)

Notes:
1. Dr. Lynch thanks research assistant Graham Vickowski for his expert canvassing of hundreds of international and regional monographs and newspapers, cataloguing the impact of ISIS on Salafi jihadist outfits and individuals over a year-long period. The opinions expressed in this commentary represent Dr. Lynch’s own views and are not those of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense or the United States Government.
2. Aaron Y. Zelin, “Al-Qaeda in Syria: A Closer Look at ISIS (Part I),” The Washington Institute Pol- icy Analysis, September 10, 2013, available at http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy- analysis/view/al-qaeda-in-syria-a-closer-look-at-isis-part-i; Joby Warrick, “ISIS, with gains in Iraq, closes in on founder Zarqawi’s violent vision,” The Washington Post, June 14, 2014, avail- able at http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/isiss-gains-in-iraq-fulfill- founders-violent-vision/2014/06/14/921ff6d2-f3b5-11e3-914c-1fbd0614e2d4_story.html.
3. In addition to other issues with the al-Nusra Front, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi had a major hang- up with the fact that the Front’s commander, Sheikh Abu Mohammed al-Golani, had been sent by Baghdadi to Syria to organize for the ISIS organization before setting out on his own to create al-Nusra. Radwan Mortada, “Syria: ISIS Orphans al-Nusra Front, Cutting Its Fund- ing,” Alakhbar, October, 10, 2013, available at http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/17291.
4. Daniel Byman and Jennifer Williams, “ISIS vs. Al Qaeda: Jihadism’s Global Civil War,” The National Interest, February 24, 2015, available at http://nationalinterest.org/feature/isis-vs- al-qaeda-jihadism%E2%80%99s-global-civil-war-12304.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. A 2007 Pew Global Attitudes survey found that support for al-Qaeda dropped in a number of Muslim countries because of suicide bombings and the numbers of fellow Muslims killed. Recognizing this, bin Laden and Zawahiri responded with a request to all affiliates for more judgment in committing violence. “A Survey of al-Qaeda: The Self-Destructive Gene,” The
Economist, July 17, 2008, available at http://www.economist.com/node/11701267.
8. Daniel Byman and Jennifer Williams, “ISIS vs. Al Qaeda: Jihadism’s Global Civil War,” The National Interest, February 24, 2015, available at http://nationalinterest.org/feature/isis-vs-al-qaeda-jihadism%E2%80%99s-global-civil-war-12304.
9. Jack Moore, “ISIS Master Plan Revealed: Islamic ‘Caliphate’ Will Rule Spain, China and Balkans,” International Business Times (UK), September 3, 2014, available at http://www.ib- times.co.uk/isis-master-plan-revealed-islamic-caliphate-will-rule-spain-china-balkans- 1463782.
10. Daniel Byman and Jennifer Williams, “ISIS vs. Al Qaeda: Jihadism’s Global Civil War,” The National Interest, February 24, 2015, available at http://nationalinterest.org/feature/isis-vs- al-qaeda-jihadism%E2%80%99s-global-civil-war-12304.
11. Thomas Joscelyn, “Zawahiri makes another attempt at reconciliation in Syria,” The Long War Journal, May 2, 2014, available at http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/05/za- wahiri_makes_anoth.php.
12. Justine Drennan, “Who has Contributed What in the Coalition Against the Islamic State,” Foreign Policy, November 12, 2014, available at http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/11/12/who- has-contributed-what-in-the-coalition-against-the-islamic-state/.
13. “Sweden to join US-led coalition against Islamic State,” Agence France Press (AFP), April 9, 2015 available at http://news.yahoo.com/sweden-join-us-led-coalition-against-islamic-state- 113012973.html.
14. Columb Strack, “Islamic State territory shrinks by 9.4% in first six months of 2015,” IHS Jane’s Intelligence Review, July 27, 2015, available at http://www.janes.com/article/53239/is- lamic-state-territory-shrinks-by-9-4-in-first-six-months-of-2015#.VbeipB_weRs.twitter.
15. “The war against the Islamic State: The caliphate cracks,” The Economist, March 21, 2015, available at http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21646750-though-islamic-state-still- spreading-terror-its-weaknesses-are-becoming-apparent.
16. Daniel Byman and Jennifer Williams, “ISIS vs. Al Qaeda: Jihadism’s Global Civil War,” The National Interest, February 24, 2015, available at http://nationalinterest.org/feature/isis-vs- al-qaeda-jihadism%E2%80%99s-global-civil-war-12304.
17. For terminology summary see Harleee Gambhir, “ISIS Global Intsum,” Institute for the Study of War, January 7 – February 18, 2015, p. 2, available at http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/file/INTSUM_Summary_update.pdf.
18. While low-grade militancy in northern Sinai has been simmering for years, it flared as the country’s new authorities freed Islamist prisoners and allowed militant exiles to return after the 2011 uprising. The army takeover and the arrest of Mr. Morsi in 2013 further radicalized many locals. The Egyptian army, deployed en masse to the peninsula as internal security forces collapsed, has been greeted with frequent ambushes and roadside bombs. It has lost hundreds of men in this campaign, analysts and diplomats estimate. Yaroslav Trofimov, “Islamic State Offshoots Spring Up in Egypt, Other Countries,” The Wall Street Journal, Jan- uary 28, 2015, available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/islamic-states-sway-spreads-in-middle-east-north-africa-1422483739.
19. Bill Roggio, “ISIS praises slain commander who fought in Iraq, Libya and Syria,” The Long War Journal, November 27, 2013, available at http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/11/isis_praised_slain_c.php; Brian Fishman & Joseph Felter, “Al-Qa’ida’s Foreign Fighters in Iraq: A First Look at the Sinjar Records,” Combatting Terrorism Center Report, January 2008, available at https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp- content/uploads/2010/06/aqs-foreign-fighters-in-iraq.pdf.
20. Rishi Iyengar, “A Militant Group with Ties to ISIS Says It Orchestrated the Tunisia Museum Attack,” Time, April 1, 2015, available at http://time.com/3766562/tunisia-museum-attack- jund-al-khilafah-isis-responsibility/; Matthew Weaver, “Tunisia beach attack: witnesses say more than one gunman involved,” The Guardian (UK), June 30, 2015, available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/30/tunisia-beach-attack-sousse-witnesses-say-more-than-one-gunman-involved.
21. “Tunisia says senior militant commander killed in raid,” Reuters, March 29, 2015, available at http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/03/29/uk-tunisia-security-raid-idUKKBN0MP0A420150329. 22. Harleee Gambhir, “ISIS Global Intsum,” Institute for the Study of War, January 7 – February 18, 2015, p. 2-4, available at http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/INTSUM_Sum-
mary_update.pdf.
23. Mohammed Ghobari and Mohammed Mukhashaf, “Suicide bombers kill 137 in Yemen mosque attacks,” Reuters, March 20, 2015, available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/03/20/us-yemen-attack-bomb-idUSKBN0MG11J20150320. 24. There is no denying that many Saudis, especially those in the Wahhabi clerical elite in the Kingdom, sympathize with the plight of persecuted Sunni Muslims in Iraq and Syria. They have welcomed and funded groups organizing defensive jihad against the Assad and Maliki regimes. Fouad Ibrahim, “Why ISIS is a threat to Saudi Arabia: Wahhabism’s deferred promise,” Al-Akhbar, August 22, 2014, available at http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/21234. But, the Kingdom’s leadership, mindful of the blowback from Iraq it suffered with indigenous terrorist groups from 2003-2007, has been very careful to combat any blowback from Salafi ji- hadist organizations in the country. They have done this by leveraging multiple financial, policy, intelligence, and security tools. Richard Spencer, “Saudi Arabia Is Building A 600-Mil ‘Great Wall’ to Shield Itself From ISIS,” Business Insider, January 14, 2015, available at http://www.businessinsider.com/saudi-arabia-is-building-a-600-mile-great-wall-to-shield- from-isis-2015-1; Kokab Farshori, “Saudi-Pakistan Military Ties Getting Stronger,” Voice of
America News, February 19, 2015, available at http://www.voanews.com/content/saudi-pakistan-military-ties-getting-stronger/1855116.html. 25. See David D. Kirkpatrick, “ISIS Claims Responsibility for Bombing at Saudi Mosque,” New York Times, May 22, 2015, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/23/world/mid- dleeast/suicide-bombing-saudi-arabia-shiites-sunnis-yemen-mosque.html?_r=0; Abdullah al- Shihri and Qassim Abdul-Zahra, “Saudi Arabia says it stopped Islamic State attacks,” The
Associate Press, July 18, 2015, available at http://bigstory.ap.org/article/a4c3c998e5c34c60ade43ea80b7625ca/iraqi-speaker-says-at- tack-diyala-marketplace-sectarian.
26. Callum Paton, “ISIS: Kuwait declares war on Islamic State following Ramadan Shia mosque massacre,” International Business Times (UK), June 30, 2015, available at http://www.ib- times.co.uk/isis-kuwait-declares-war-islamic-state-following-ramadan-shia-mosque-mas- sacre-1508686.
27. The individual appointed in January 2015 as ISK’s leader is Hafiz Khan Saeed, a former Tehrik-i-Taliban (TTP) commander responsible for that group’s operations in Orakzai, an agency in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Saeed aspired to become leader of TTP after the death of Hakimullah Meshud, but that position went to Maulana Fa- zlullah in November 2013. Hence the defection with other TTP leaders to ISIS in October 2014. Don Rassler, “Situating the Emergence of the Islamic State of Khorasan,” Combating Terrorism Center Report, Vol 8, no. 3, March 2015, p. 7-11, available at https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/CTCSentinel-Vol8Issue322.pdf.
28. Carlo Munoz, “Afghan Terrorist Group to Back ISIS Against Taliban,” Stars and Stripes, July 7, 2015, available at http://www.military.com/daily-news/2015/07/07/afghan-terrorist-group- to-back-isis-against-taliban.html.
29. Hamid Shalizi, “Exclusive: In turf war with Afghan Taliban, Islamic State loyalists gain ground,” Reuters, June 29, 2015, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/06/29/us- afghanistan-islamic-state-idUSKCN0P91EN20150629; Bill Roggio, “Afghan intelligence claims US killed Islamic State’s emir for Khorasan province,” The Long War Journal, July 11, 2015, available at http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2015/07/afghan-intelligence- claims-us-killed-islamic-states-emir-for-khorasan-province.php.
30. Richard Sisk, “Ghani Warns US Congress of Emerging ISIS Threat in Afghanistan,” Mili- tary.com, March 25, 2015, available at http://www.military.com/daily-news/2015/03/25/ghani-warns-us-congress-of-emerging-isis- threat-in-afghanistan.html; Nathan Hodge and Qasim Nauman, “Islamic State Offshoot Poses New Security Threat in Afghanistan,” Wall Street Journal, April 19, 2015, available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/islamic-state-offshoot-poses-new-security-threat-in-afghanistan- 1429474070.
.31 “Boko Haram pledges allegiance to ISIL, reports say,” Al Jazeera , March 8, 2015, available at http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/03/nigeria-boko-haram-pledges-allegiance-isil-150307201614660.html; “ISIL accepts Boko Haram’s pledge of allegiance,” Al Jazeera, March 12, 2015, available at http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/03/isil-accepts-boko- haram-pledge-allegiance-150312201038730.html.
32. Jacob Zenn, “A biography of Boko Haram and the Bay’a to al-Baghdadi,“ Combating Terror- ism Center, Vol 8, no. 3, March 2015, p. 20, available at https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp- content/uploads/2015/03/CTCSentinel-Vol8Issue322.pdf.
33. Apparently, the successful anti-Boko Haram offensive was abetted by the assistance of hundreds of high-caliber South African and Russian mercenary soldiers provided by a South African private military firm, Executive Outcomes. Ed Cropley and David Lewis, “Nigeria drafts in foreign mercenaries to take on Boko Haram,” Reuters, March 12, 2015, available at http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/03/12/uk-nigeria-violence-mercenariesidUKKBN0M80V- T20150312; “Nigeria acknowledges presence of foreign mercenaries,” Al Jazeera, March 14, 2014, available at http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2015/03/nigeria-foreign-mercenar- ies-boko-haram-150313122039403.html; “Nigeria says 36 towns now retaken from Boko Haram,” E-News Africa, March 11, 2015, available at http://www.enca.com/africa/nigeria-says-36-towns-now-retaken-boko-haram; “Security Re- view: A Turning Point in the Insurgency?” Global Initiative Analysis, University of South Florida, March 19, 2015, available at http://www.usfglobalinitiative.org/newsletter/security- insurgency-turning-point/; Jacob Zenn, “A biography of Boko Haram and the Bay’a to al- Baghdadi,“ Combating Terrorism Center, Vol 8, no. 3, March 2015, p. 20, available at https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/CTCSentinel-Vol8Issue322.pdf.
34. Martin Ewi, “Africa: What does the Boko Haram-ISIS Alliance Mean for Terrorism in Africa,” Institute for Security Studies, March 17, 2015, available at http://allafrica.com/stories/201503180465.html.
35. “Analysis: Boko Haram’s Declaration of Allegiance to Islamic State,” Global Initiative Analy- sis, University of South Florida, March 19, 2015, available at http://www.usfglobalinitia- tive.org/newsletter/analysis-boko-harams-declaration-of-allegiance-to-islamic-state/.
36 Jessica Stern and J.M. Berger, ISIS: The State of Terror (New York: Harper Collins, 2015).
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51. Kirk H. Sowell, “Jordanian Salafism and the Jihad in Syria,” Current Trends in Islamist Ideol- ogy, March 12, 2015, available at http://www.hudson.org/research/11131-jordanian-salafism- and-the-jihad-in-syria.
52. Mohammad Nemr, “Jaish al-Islam mimics Islamic State practices,” Al Monitor, November 20, 2014, available at http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/security/2014/11/army-of-islam- fighting-regime.html#; “Jaysh al-Islam led by Zahran Alloush,” Pakistan Defence Forum, November 14, 2013, available at http://defence.pk/threads/jaysh-al-islam-led-by-zahran-alloush.287295/; “ISIS Attacks Rebel Base in Aleppo,” Syrian National Coalition of Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces, Feb- ruary 1, 2014, available at http://www.etilaf.org/en/press/isis-attacks-rebel-base-in-aleppo.html.
53. Abdallah Suleiman Ali, “Jaysh al-Islam confronts Islamic State in Arsal,” Al Monitor, Febru- ary 5, 2015, available at http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/security/2015/02/jaysh-al-islam- qalamoun-syria-arsal-lebanon.html#.
54. Daniel Byman and Jeremy Shapiro, “We shouldn’t stop terrorists from tweeting,” The Wash- ington Post, October 9, 2014, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/we- shouldnt-stop-terrorists-from-tweeting/2014/10/09/106939b6-4d9f-11e4-8c24-487e92bc99 7b_story.html.
55. Liz Sly and Hugh Naylor, “Muslim outrage grows against Islamic State but questions linger over next steps in fight,” The Washington Post, February 4, 2015, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/muslim-outrage-grows-against-islamic- stateas-leaders-denounce-evil-violation-of-faith/2015/02/04/2ebd195e-ac64-11e4-ad717b9eba- 0f87d6_story.html; Thomas F. Lynch III, “Sources of Terrorism & Rational Counters,” TRENDS Research and
Advisory Report, January 2015, available athttp://trendsinstitution.org/?p=892. 56. Graeme Wood, “What ISIS Really Wants,” The Atlantic, March 2015, available at
http://www.theatlantic.com/features/archive/2015/02/what-isis-really-wants/384980/.
57. Lizzie Dearden, “Syria air strikes: US targeted Khorasan terrorist group to stop ‘imminent at-
tack,’” The Independent, September 23, 2014, available at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/syria-air-strikes-us-targeted-kho- rasan-terrorist-group-to-stop-imminent-attack-9750060.html; U.S. bombs al-Qaeda group for third time in Syria,” Agence France Presse, November 14, 2014, available at http://eng- lish.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2014/11/14/U-S-bombs-Al-Qaeda-offshoot-Kho- rasan-for-third-time.html; Jeryl Bier, “Coalition Bombs Khorasan Group in Syria ‘Plotting External Attacks Against’ US, Allies,” The Weekly Standard, March 10, 2014, available at http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/coalition-bombs-khorasan-group-syria-plotting-ex- ternal-attacks-against-us-allies_881847.html.
58. Praveen Swami: “Al-Qaeda Chief Ayman al-Zawahari Announces New Front to Wage War on India,” The Daily Express, September 4, 2014, available at https://www.opensource.gov/por- tal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS_0_0_200_0_0_43/content/Display/SAR2014090415037228?re turnFrame=true.
59. Carlo Munoz, “Afghan Terrorist Group to Back ISIS Against Taliban,” Stars and Stripes, July 7, 2015, available at http://www.military.com/daily-news/2015/07/07/afghan-terrorist-group- to-back-isis-against-taliban.html; Hamid Shalizi, “Exclusive: In turf war with Afghan Tal- iban, Islamic State loyalists gain ground,” Reuters, June 29, 2015, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/06/29/us-afghanistan-islamic-state-idUSKCN0P 91EN20150629; Bill Roggio, “Afghan intelligence claims US killed Islamic State’s emir for Khorasan province,” The Long War Journal, July 11, 2015, available at
h t t p : // w w w. l o n g w a r j o u r n a l . o r g /a r c h i v e s / 2 0 1 5 / 0 7 /a f g h a n – i n t e l l i g e n c e – c l a i m s – u s – k i l l e d – i s –
lamic-states-emir-for-khorasan-province.php.
60. Thomas Joscelyn, “Ayman al Zawahiri pledges allegiance to the Taliban’s new emir,” The
Long War Journal, August 13, 2015, available at http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2015/08/ayman-al-zawahiri-pledges-allegiance-to- the-talibans-new-emir.php.
61. Paraphrase of comments in a speech by Indian Home Minister Rajnath Singh at a countert- errorism conference on March 19 as reported in “Indian Muslims not swayed by extremism, says Rajnath Singh,” The Indian Express, March 20, 2015, available at http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/happy-that-the-influence-of-islamic- state-on-the-indian-youth-is-negligible-rajnath-singh/.
62. Shishir Gupta and Toufiq Rashid, “Young Indians joining ISIS call for jihad in West Asia,” Hindustan Times, August 6, 2014, available at http://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/kashmiri-youth-joins-jihad-in-syria-says- intel/article1-1248672.aspx; “Only a small number of Indian youth join ISIS: Govt,” Zee News, December 17, 2014, available at http://zeenews.india.com/news/india/only-small-number-of-indian-youth-join-isis- govt_1516226.html; “‘Negligible’ support from Indian youth for ISIS: Rajnath Singh,” The Hindu, December 16, 2014, available at http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/negligible- support-from-indian-youth-for-isis-rajnath-singh/article6697793.ece.
63. “Majeed reading books on Gandhi, says he had falling into honey trap,” The Times of India, March 20, 2015, available at http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/mumbai/Areeb-Majeed- reading-books-on-Gandhi-says-he-had-fallen-into-honey-trap/articleshow/46614693.cms.
64. Aman Malik, “Indian Police Zero In On Mehdi Masroor Biswas, Alleged ISIS Sympathizer, Who Denies Involvement,” International Business Times, December 13, 2014, available at http://www.ibtimes.com/indian-police-zero-mehdi-masroor-biswas-alleged-isis-sympathizer- who-denies-1752514; Aravind Gowda, “Police say they have enough evidence to charge Mehdi Masroor over IS tweets,” Daily Mail, January 28, 2015, available at http://www.daily- mail.co.uk/indiahome/indianews/article-2930762/Police-say-evidence-charge-Mehdi-Mas- roor-tweets.html.
65. “Migrant Worker Protection Agency Anticipates ISIS Movement,” Tempo.Co, March 20, 2015, available at http://en.tempo.co/read/news/2015/03/20/055651620/Migrant-Worker- Protection-Agency-Anticipates-ISIS-Movement.

Pakistan Keen To Keep Ties With Iran And Saudi Arabia – Analysis

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Open for trade, Iran may test two rivalries – its own with Saudi Arabia, another between Pakistan and India.

By Debalina Ghoshal*

The Iranian nuclear deal, if implemented, could alter many strategic equations in West Asia, including Iran’s relations with neighbors India and Pakistan.

The nuclear deal is sure to give Iran an upper hand in West Asia. However, strengthening Indian-Iranian relations may not bode well for Iranian-Pakistani relations.

Undivided India and Iran have shared long historic and cultural ties dating back from the Indus Valley Civilization. Cultural and economic ties however, deteriorated during the period of Aurangzeb’s rule in India and worsened during the British colonial rule in India. Further, with the partition of India and Pakistan in 1947, after India lost geographic contiguity with Iran, Pakistan became a crucial factor in determining relations between Iran and India.

Pakistan, formed as an Islamic state, soon discovered Iran as a close friend, and the Cold War brought Iran and Pakistan even closer. During the Cold War, both Iran and Pakistan were aligned with the United States and joined the Central Treaty Organisation, CENTO. Both countries designated the other with most-favored-nation status. India on the other hand, followed a non-alignment policy, refraining from aligning with either the Soviet Union or the United States. India’s closeness with the Soviet Union during the Cold War befuddled Iranians and prevented Iran and India from fostering closer ties. This along with India’s support for Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, who was unifying the Arab world while overthrowing monarchies, also brought Pakistan and Iran closer to each other. Meanwhile, Pakistan’s venture to develop nuclear weapons during the 1970s strained relations with the United States and resulted in a cut-off for economic assistance.

Later in 1979, during the Iranian Revolution, Pakistan sent a high-level official to Iran to support friendly ties and demonstrate recognition of the revolution and new leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Pakistan had reasons to support the revolution: 20 percent of its population was Shiite, and Pakistan may have feared an increase in sectarian violence spreading from the Sistan Balochistan region in Iran to its own troubled Balochistan region. On the other hand, India did not view the Iranian Revolution in a positive light, and the United States cut off diplomatic ties and imposed sanctions after the revolution and hostage crisis at the US embassy in Tehran. These factors strengthened the ties between Iran and Pakistan.

Still, Pakistan is a Sunni-dominated state while Iran is Shia-dominated, and there has long been a tussle between the two states for greater hegemony in West Asia. Iranians want a Shia-dominated West Asia, while Pakistan prefers Sunni domination.

The downturn in relations between Iran and Pakistan probably started after the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Pakistan borders Afghanistan. Given India’s closeness with the Soviet Union, Pakistan sought help from the United States during the invasion. Further, Pakistan’s support to the Taliban in Afghanistan resulted in Iran distancing itself from Pakistan. Despite this, Pakistan supported Iran during the Iran-Iraq War throughout the 1980s. Pakistan was reported to have provided nuclear expertise for Iran’s nuclear energy program, namely for the P1 and P2 centrifuges.

With the end of Cold War and US closeness with the Arabian states, amid emerging common strategic and economic interests, relations between India and Iran started to improve. The Indian prime minister visited Iran in 1993 and the Iranian president visited India in 1995.

Post-9/11, the US invaded Afghanistan in 2001 to wage a war against the Taliban. An emerging rift between the United States and Pakistan once again drew Iran and Pakistan closer together, though the volume of trade between the two countries continued to remain low. One reason was the sanctions imposed on Iran following the Iranian nuclear impasse. Likewise, border skirmishes between Iran and Pakistan provided minimal scope for improved relations between the two counties. Iran protested sectarian violence against the Shia population in Pakistan’s Baluchistan region by Sunni militants.

Iran-India relations continued to grow with the New Delhi Declaration signed in 2003 between the Iranian president and Indian prime minister.rivalsTable

Rivals: Pakistan broke from India in 1947, and the two energy importers have been at odds since; energy exporters Iran and Saudi Arabia tussle in the Middle East (Data sources: World Bank, Global Firepower, CIA World Factbook, Observatory of Economic Complexity)

Pakistan is not oblivious to the opportunities presented by the recent US plan to lift sanctions from Iran once the current nuclear agreement is concluded. The end of sanctions gives Iran an opportunity to attract investments, initiating economic growth and development for the country of 78 million citizens. Other countries will enhance economic and trade cooperation with Iran. For example, progress could be made on an Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline project stalled for years due to the US sanctions.

In 2014, with the P5+1 – the five members of the UN Security Council plus Germany – progressing on the Iranian nuclear deal, Nawaz Sharif paid an official visit to Iran, the first by a Pakistani prime minister in 16 years, to discuss “bilateral issues and expansion of economic cooperation” as well as road and rail connectivity between the two countries. That same year Islamabad also expressed interest on extending a preferential trade agreement with Iran. The Joint Economic Commission between Iran and Pakistan is proceeding in a positive direction. The two signed a memorandum of understanding that included a joint investment committee, with cooperation in small-scale industries and connectivitybetween the ports of Karachi and Chabahar.

India also has a vested interest India in Chabahar Port, which would provide easy access for India to Afghanistan and Central Asia. The sole purpose to develop the port was to have access in Afghanistan without depending on Pakistan.

The scope for economic cooperation is great. Pakistan is not ready to jeopardize relations with Iran. Yet Pakistan must balance that relationship with its Saudi ties.

During the Yemen crisis, Saudi Arabia intervened by launching airstrikes against the Houthi rebels and sought help from Sunni Pakistan – no surprise since Islamabad had sent its troops during the First Gulf War, 1990-91, to Saudi Arabia, stationed under US coalition forces to fight the Iraqis led by Saddam Hussein. Pakistani troops are now stationed in Saudi Arabia. There’s little doubt that Pakistan owes much to Saudi Arabia for bailing out Islamabad during economic crisis, especially post-1998 when Pakistan suffered economic sanctions following its nuclear tests, and aiding Islamabad during natural disasters, including the 2005 earthquake and 2010 flood.

Moreover, Saudi Arabia is alleged to have provided financial aid for Pakistan’s nuclear-weapons program in return for a cooperation pact. Despite all this, Pakistan’s domestic front opposed providing any military assistance to Saudi Arabia in Yemen – the parliament passed a unanimous resolution limiting Pakistan’s role in the crisis to mediator and demanded the nation maintain its neutrality. Days before Pakistan’s decision to maintain neutrality in the crisis, Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif visited Islamabad to dissuade the country against joining Saudi Arabia in the attacks on Yemen.

All this serves as evidence that Islamabad is keen to improve relations with Iran even at the cost of disappointing Arab allies. Moreover, though Saudis repeatedly express discontent over the US-led nuclear deal with Iran, Saudi Arabia also shows interest in improving ties with Iran, an interest reciprocated by Iran. Pakistan could play a mediator in improving relations between the two countries – crucial to increasing stability in West Asia. Pakistan is in no mood to jeopardize relations with Iran and is keen to continue cordial ties with Saudi Arabia. Improved Iranian-Saudi relations would be conducive for Pakistan in balancing relations with both as well as to isolate Israel. The region’s leaders must tread carefully in balancing ties with Iran. This is particularly true for Pakistan, considering India’s already high trade volume with Saudi Arabia and Iran.

*Debalina Ghoshal is a research associate at the Delhi Policy Group, New Delhi, India

CSTO Summit Participants Show Determination To Fight Terrorism – Analysis

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The regular session of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) Collective Security Council completed its work in Dushanbe on September 15, 2015. Adequate response to the biggest current military and political challenges, including an upsurge in activity by terrorist and extremist groups and destabilization of the situation on the CSTO countries’ borders dominated the meeting which was attended by the presidents of Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.

The summit’s main focus was also on the results of unannounced inspections for carrying out the Collective Rapid Reaction Forces’ (RRF) objectives. It was noted that the goals were achieved; the CSTO crisis response mechanisms connected with use of forces and means of collective security were successfully tested as well as the combat readiness of the CSTO contingents to implement a package of measures in accordance with national plans.

According to the President of Kyrgyzstan Almazbek Atambaev, expanding influence of the Islamic State terrorist group in Afghanistan poses a direct threat to security of CSTO countries.

“We are concerned about numerous cases of recruitment and departure of our citizens to participate in the armed conflict on the side of IS. Their subsequent return for continuation of terrorist activities and recruitment in their countries causes special vigilance,” he said and added that in such situation it is important to focus on solving practical problems.

The President of Belarus Alexander Lukashenko said that smoldering conflicts were exacerbated, with new hotbeds of instability appearing in the Middle East, Afghanistan and near the borders of CSTO.

“Therefore it is important to pay great attention to the development and successful operation of CSTO RRF,” he stressed speaking at the CSTO Collective Security Council expanded meeting.

Meanwhile, the President of Armenia Serzh Sargsyan drew attention to the fact that the organization has passed its 20-year period of formation, and stated the need for a new long-term strategy.

“This work should be continued in a systematic way, having clearly designated focus of development in the medium term. Therefore, I suggest as one of the first priorities to finalize the strategy of CSTO collective security until 2025, and adopt it in 2016,” he said.

In turn, the Russian President Vladimir Putin recalled that Islamic State controls significant stretches of territory and plans to expand its activities to Europe and Asia.

“Basic common sense and a sense of responsibility for global and regional security require the international community to join forces against this threat. We need to set aside the geopolitical ambitions, leave behind the so-called double standards and the policy of direct or indirect use of individual terrorist groups to achieve one’s own opportunistic goals, including changes in undesirable governments and regimes. As you know, Russia has proposed to immediately take on forming a broad coalition to counteract the extremists. It must unite everyone who is prepared to make, or is already making, an input into fighting terrorism, just as Iraq and Syria’s armed forces are doing today. We support the Syrian government – I want to say this – in countering terrorist aggression. We provide and will continue to provide the necessary military technology assistance and urge other nations to join in,” the Russian leader said.

According to him, the CSTO countries plan to continue strengthening cooperation between their armed forces.

“We plan a whole set of activities in this area. I would like to also stress that our cooperation within the CSTO framework is certainly not directed against anybody. We are open to constructive cooperation, and that is precisely the approach that is reinforced in the final statement,” Vladimir Putin stressed.

Commenting on the results of the summit, Ivan Monkov, research fellow at the Russian Institute of Strategic Studies department of regional security problems, called the CSTO session a significant step towards a sustainable system of collective security in the region.

“Growing international tension, isolation of Moscow and terrorist threat from Islamic State that is gaining influence necessitate increasing the combat capability of the organization. In this regard, the main attention in Dushanbe was focused on the development of the military component of the association. Reports on the results of the CSTO Collective Rapid Reaction Force unannounced inspections and joint exercises prove that the organization is able to respond to possible crisis situations on the borders of the CSTO which can no longer remain within the exclusive competence of a single country,” he said in an interview to “PenzaNews” agency.

According to the expert, the most important result of the summit was signing an agreement on collective aviation forces of the CSTO and an agreement on transportation of military and other formations, movable property and military products. Initial discussion on the creation of collective air defense system was also considered significant.

“As for terrorism, it is the first time in the 20-year history of the organization when member countries face the need to confront the real external threat posed by Islamic State, an international terrorist group, which is spreading its influence on Afghanistan. This fact calls for greater defense capability of the organization and readiness for rapid crisis response,” the speaker said.

At the same time, he praised the level of the CSTO development, highlighting the significant progress in its work.

“The CSTO gradually develops from a formal regional association into a working trans-regional structure the members of which declare their intention to stand together at the 70th session of the UN General Assembly in New York on the subject of preventing the deployment of weapons in outer space, as well as measures to combat international terrorism,” Ivan Monkov explained.

Discussing the prospects of future cooperation between the CSTO member states, he said that the determining factor is the Syrian crisis.

“In case of Bashar Assad’s defeat, the IS fighters may turn towards Iran, and then the Caucasus and the Central Asia. In this situation, the CSTO can grow from a regional military-political bloc into the guarantor of collective security of the global scale,” the expert said.

In turn, Tevan Poghosyan, the deputy of the National Assembly of Armenia, suggested that the CSTO failed so far to become an organization that places the concept of collective security at the forefront.

“In fact, the interests of the member countries of the alliance are mainly focused on cooperation with Russia but not with each other, not to mention protecting each other. It must be admitted that such associations are the most effective when working as a network system of mutual aid and interdependence. The CSTO allies have no common sentiments or goal-setting mechanisms. As a result, sometimes a member country can deliberately ignore the vital interests of its ally on the international arena,” he explained his position.

According to the politician, statements made at the summit do not constitute an adequate response to the real threats and challenges of each member country.

“Azerbaijan organizes sabotage and military attacks on the border with Armenia every day but the CSTO ignores it. I believe that Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Russia as allies of Armenia must discuss the issue. Such steps would follow the letter and the spirit of collective security,” Tevan Poghosyan said.

According to him, the CSTO will not significantly increase its importance in the international arena in the near future, while the members of the alliance will strengthen the security component in bilateral cooperation with Russia.

Richard Giragosian, director at Regional Studies Center in Yerevan, former US Senate staffer, also noted that the recent Dushanbe summit meeting of the Collective Security Treaty Organization was largely seen as a disappointment by many in Armenia.

“This negative view was due to the lack of any specific or direct mention to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in the summit declaration. Given the serious escalation in attacks from Azerbaijan, the Armenian people expected a more direct show of support from the CSTO partners,” he explained.

In the meantime, according to him, the summit’s emphasis on security and terrorism is both natural and important, for two main reasons.

“Firstly, the priority areas correctly address the rise of Islamist terrorism, namely through Islamic State, which also has direct links to the North Caucasus and Central Asia, and secondly, because of the security situation in Afghanistan, which also has an immediate impact on overall stability in the Central Asia region,” Richard Giragosian clarified.

In his opinion, the CSTO is now a Russia-dominated security group, and while this was a positive feature in the past that reflected Moscow’s willingness to provide greater security for the other members, more recently, this has become negative, as the CSTO is directly associated with Russian confrontation with the West.

Richard Giragosian also noted that future cooperation within the CSTO is challenged by the inherent rivalries and competition between the individual member states.

“The CSTO will require firm Russian leadership as a promoter and patron of cooperation within the CSTO until they can better resolve these differences,” he said.

Meanwhile, Sharbatullo Sodikov, researcher at the Analytical Center of MGIMO, expert of the Russian Council on International Affairs, assessed the prospects of further cooperation more positively.

“The CSTO nowadays is one of the largest regional organizations that has no complete analogue: it protects the security on the former Soviet Union space ― the geopolitical integrity which appeared rather recently. The urgency of the CSTO tasks lies in its foreign policy activity, the activity of the general command of its troops built on the principle of RRF. Its deepening cooperation with the UN with the aim to intensify the work in the regions of the world in order to improve security underlines the importance and influence of the Collective Security Treaty Organization,” the analyst said.

According to him, the results of the CSTO summit must not be underestimated.

“The threat of terrorist attacks on the Tajik-Afghan border was declared internationally important. Against the backdrop of growing cooperation between the UN and the CSTO, the summit decision taken in the interests of military assistance to Tajikistan has universal importance – particularly in dealing with the Tajik opposition which comes close to IS on a number of points,” Sharbatullo Sodikov said.

“Adhering to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of the CSTO member states, the organization found an accurate method for armed resistance against Afghanistan encroachments on freedom and independence of Tajikistan, and summarized the challenges of the future – preservation of security stability in Central Asia,” he added.

Moreover, according to the expert, the RRF is an effective instrument to promote border security and sovereignty of the member states.

“It appears that the main and most successful direction of further cooperation will be an effort to avert the security threats coming to Central Asia from Afghanistan. Thus, Russia as the leading and richest member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization will set the goal: to build a new (not pro-American) coalition for fighting terrorism and extremism, and IS in particular,” Sharbatullo Sodikov said.

In turn, Stefan Meister, head of the program on Eastern Europe, Russia and Central Asia at the Robert Bosch center of the German Council on Foreign Affairs, said the results of the summit were meager.

“The Russian President is trying to link Islamic terrorism in the Middle East with the Central Asia but ignores the domestic roots of growing support for Islamic groups in some of the countries. While there is a growing Islamic pressure from Afghanistan on the Central Asian borders, for IS this region is not a target. That means Vladimir Putin used the summit to send messages to the US and the international community but less so to the region,” the analyst said.

He added that Russia is the only country that really has an interest to be a security provider in the region and help the states that need border protection in terms of weapon supply.

The expert does not see any big effect of this summit on the region, except for the ongoing cooperation in the security field.

“The focus of the organization is increasingly on domestic policy. It will stay a regional organization which helps to stabilize security first of all in Central Asia,” Stefan Meister concluded.

Meanwhile, according to Vadim Kozyulin, senior fellow at the Center for Political Studies of Russia, the summit showed that the leaders of the CSTO member states see the real threat posed by IS near their borders and get ready to face it in practical terms.

“The practical side of this preparation was a cross-cutting theme of the summit. In part this may be due to the fact that the meeting took place against the backdrop of the anti-terrorist operation conducted at this time by the special services of Tajikistan. That was why the discussion was about strengthening the Tajik-Afghan border, strengthening the armed forces. They discussed the issue of member sates’ commitment to the CSTO decisions and establishment of a permanent effective joint groups of forces, including air defense associations and special operations forces. The countries decided to establish a CSTO crisis response center on the basis of the Defense Ministry of Russia and discussed the formation of the joint aviation forces. That is about transferring some sovereign rights of the countries in hands of the organization, and this is a very serious measure,” the expert said.

“Large-scale maneuvers of CSTO forces took place in Tajikistan along the Afghan border this year. It is important from a military point of view as it allowed to work out the interaction model and rapid response to the crisis. Moreover, it has important political and psychological aspect: inhabitants of remote areas of Tajikistan understood that the CSTO would not abandon them, and the organization would be able to help by deed, not by word. At the same time, fighters from the neighboring Afghan areas got a signal that it would be better to live with their neighbors in peace, as they have serious defenders,” he added.

According to the analyst, the CSTO is a relatively young organization that still has a great track record and experience in conducting joint operations and cooperating with international organizations.

“In addition to military and counterterrorism aspects, it gained a peacekeeping component. According to international news, this element can end up being in great demand soon,” Vadim Kozyulin suggested.

He also stressed that member countries have established a good practice of cooperation both on military and on political issues.

“The world situation is heating up, new threats appear while the old ones do not vanish. That means the Collective Security Treaty Organization will have opportunities to show its worth,” the expert concluded.

The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) is an intergovernmental military alliance that is based on the Collective Security Treaty (CST) signed by Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan on 15 May 1992 in Tashkent.

Azerbaijan, Georgia and Belarus joined the block in 1993.

Later on, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan left the organization.

The Organisation’s objectives are the collective protection of freedom, territorial integrity, and sovereignty of its member-states from any external military and political aggression, international terrorism, or large-scale natural disasters.

Afghanistan: Taliban Claim US Plane Shot Down

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Verifications are still underway on a Taliban claim that they shot down a United States Army C-130 Hercules transport plane shortly after midnight Afghan time. Sources of the US contingent in Afghanistan indicated that the downing of the US plane near the Jalalabad airport left 6 US soldiers and 5 civilians dead. All the victims were reportedly engaged in the Resolute Support mission for the training of Afghani forces. The Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid instead claimed on Twitter that 15 US soldiers and an unspecified number of civilians were killed in the downing of the plane.

No official confirmation has arrived from the NATO, though the Jalalabad airport has been theater to various attacks by the Taliban due to its strategic location between the east and the capital Kabul, in addition to being home to a key army base.

Whether an attack or incidental, the crash of the US plane adds to the mounting uncertainty of the past days. Despite the arrival of reinforcements and optimistic declarations by the Afghan military authorities, in the northern city of Kunduz, invaded Monday by hundreds of Taliban militants, the NATO-backed government force counter-offensive continues. In various areas of the city operations and clashes continue, in confirmation of the determination and organization of the armed militants, which in fact had their last stronghold in Kunduz before their defeat in 2001, but also the lack of motivation and weakness of the national armed forces.

However, the progress made by the Taliban in the homonymous province, as also in the nearby Takhar and Baghlan provinces emphasize the risk that northern Afghanistan become the center of a strong advance in the next months.


Maldives: Govt Rules Out ‘Assassination Plot’ Behind Presidential Boat-Blast – Analysis

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By N Sathiya Moorthy*

Putting at rest avoidable speculation about the nation’s political Opposition being behind Monday’s blast on the presidential speedboat, the Maldivian Government has ruled out the possibility of an assassination attempt by saying that a mechanical issue was the probable cause. “Our Opposition is vocal but not violent to carry out something like this,” Mohammed Hussain Shareef ‘Mundhu’ told newsmen in Colombo, the capital of neighbouring Sri Lanka, on Tuesday.

“We have no reason to believe that anyone would want to assassinate the President,” Minister Mundhu said. “We are looking at an accident rather than sabotage,” he added. The minister explained that the nation lacked forensic capabilities, but experts from Saudi Arabia and the US had already arrived in the capital Male to assist, and more were to join from Australia and India.

The clarification on the ‘assassination plot’ issue became necessary after speculation began doing the rounds, based on Minister Mundhu’s early statement that the Government did not “rule out all possibilities” behind the blast, in which President Abdulla Yameen escaped unhurt. Mundhu was quick to declare the same day that he did not mean it was a ‘planned attack’.

The explosion occurred when President Yameen was returning to capital Male from the nearby Hulhule airport-island at the completion of annual Hajj p9ilgrimage. The blast on board ‘Finifenmaa’ (meaning ‘rose’ in the local language, Dhivehi) was noticed as the boat was close to the landing-point at the presidential boat-jetty in Male. First Lady Fathimath Ibrahim, who had accompanied the President on the pilgrimage, was said to have suffered back/spinal injuries. Two personal staff members of the President, including a security officer, were also injured, according to local media report.

As speculation began doing their inevitable rounds on such occasions, Minister Mundhu clarified that he did not say the explosion was a planned attack. However, he reiterated his early statement that “nothing is impossible, nothing is ruled out…One cannot say that the incident happened in a specific way”. Both Mundhu, and another Minister, ‘Sun’ Ali Shiyam, who accompanied the Yameens in the Hajj pilgrimage and was on the ill-fated boat, said that the chances of mechanical/engine failure in the well-maintained presidential launch was ‘small’.

Though the local media has been sparse in its coverage of the Opposition Maldivian Democratic Party (MDP), barring the pending court-case and allied matter involving jailed former President Mohammed Nasheed, the party was the among the first ones to condemn the boat-blast. “That such a dangerous incident should occur on board the vessel specially earmarked for presidential travel is a matter that needs to be immediately investigated and call on all relevant State institutions to take swift actions against those parties responsible for this negligence,” MDP’s International Spokesperson Hamid Abdul Gafoor said further in a prompt media statement. Ghafoor also conveyed “our profound prayers to His Excellency the President and his family…”

Threat from ISIS?

Independent of Monday’s incident, President Yameen has been facing ‘threats’, purportedly from ISIS, in recent weeks. The Government had to intervene to have YouTube pull out a social media threat to the lives of President Yameen and Vice-President Ahmed Adeeb in early September by three masked men standing by an ‘ISIS’ flag, and demanding the early release of religion-centric Adhaalath Party (AP) leader, Imran Abdulla, jailed for months after co-sponsoring an anti-Government protest rally.

President Yameen reacted by saying that he would not be cowed down by such threats, and went ahead with his planned tour of the islands. As may be recalled others, including political leaders, civil society activists and media personnel, too came to face such threats. The threats came to be viewed seriously after a member of imprisoned former President Mohammed Nasheed’s legal team was stabbed in a busy Male street during sun-light hours.

Some analysts, mainly those from outside the country, have pegged on to Monday’s incidents to refer to the purported rise of ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ and militancy in Maldives in recent years (read: Yameen presidency). While it’s true that half a dozen or so of Maldivians – not all of them ‘youth’ – have been reported killed in or by the IS in Syria, the Government has been very vociferous in calling upon the people to stay the straight path.

Ever since the first Maldivian getting killed in ‘IS war’ in Syria came to notice, the Government has also pressed religious leaders into telling the faithful in their sermons that Islam did not recognise fighting somebody else’s war, elsewhere as ‘jihad’. It is another matter that Imam, Sheikh Abdul Latheef, in his ‘super blood moon eclipse’ sermon on Sunday, likened human life to the waning and waxing of the moon, and stated that all things were ordained by God and that everything will remain the same constant way.

However, some analysts unwittingly and unwisely seemed to have taken a dig at President Yameen by saying that he might blame Monday’s explosion as a product of ‘black magic’ practised against him by his political opponents. For those not fully in the know, many Maldivian politicians believe in the occult just as their neighbourhood Sri Lankan counterparts have faith in astrology. In the common neighbourhood of India, political leaders even of ‘rationalist’ hues are known to be closet believers in astrology – which even has a horoscope cast in the name of the Indian Nation, with the ‘midnight hour’ of 15 August 1947 as the ‘hour of birth’.

Speculation and crude jokes apart, and going beyond Monday’s episode involving the presidential launch, could be – and still ‘could’ be – is a series of accidents/involving speed-boats, cruise vessels, tugs and some even in tourist resorts across the nation. Though some of the early incidents came to be attributed to the impending ‘super red eclipse’ impact on sea-swells, as traditionally believed, and the police and the Coast Guard even cautioned boat-owners to be extra-cautious, post-eclipse, the Government’s Disaster Management Centre (DMC) said that no eclipse-related incidents of the kind were reported on the day. Subsequently since, authorities have clarified that some eclipse-related sea-swells had occurred in the nation’s southern parts, where some of the reported sea-incidents had occurred.

Taken to their logical or illogical conclusion, they, however, could impact on the nation’s tourism industry, still the mainstay of Maldivian economy. With the result, if the ‘Finifemaa incident’ had brought back to focus the ‘Sultan Park episode’ in the heart of Male city, that too at the height of the pro-democracy protests, across the country in 2007, it could not be mistaken. The Government of then President, Maumoon Gayoom, half-brother of incumbent Yameen, had claimed that the blast, which thankfully did not result in any casualty, was aimed at impacting on the nation’s tourism economy.

At the time, it was left to the late B Raman, the international terrorism expert from India, to draw a parallel with the modus adopted in the ‘London subway explosion’. Police investigations led to the arrest of a few locals, holed up in a relatively remote island, against locals protests. That was also when possibly the world began looking at the impending emergence of religious fundamentalism/militancy in the Indian Ocean archipelago. Not long after, reports of the nine Maldivians getting caught fighting, by the US forces along the Af-Pak border, set the Government thinking, and the rest of the world cautioning the nation.

*The writer is a Senior Fellow at Observer Research Foundation, Chennai Chapter

Libya: Islamic State Attacks Oil Terminal

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The fighting and violence continues throughout Libya. Islamic State (IS) militants late yesterday afternoon attacked the Es Sider (Sydra) oil terminal, leaving one dead and another two guards injured. Some sources reported two dead.

The terminal, not in function since December, was guarded by men loyal to the internationally recognized Tobruk-based government. Fighting also broke out in the same hours in Tripoli between two factions of the Fajr Libya coalition, while the Libya Herald reports a second attacks this week against the Turkish consulate. Turkish diplomats could not be contacted to confirm the authenticity of online footage on the attack, which had no date.

Libya’s Ambassador to the Holy See, Mustafa Rugibani (who responds to the Tobruk authorities), explained in a statement that the embassy’s activities were forced to cease for lack of funds, but that relations between Libya and the Vatican continue. The diplomat explained that the same problem is faced by other Libyan embassies, especially in Europe.

Seven Points Not On Arab Media Agenda: What Is There To Celebrate? – OpEd

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It has been recently announced that Arab ‘media experts’ plan to ‘celebrate’ Arab Media Day on April 21, 2016. The theme for the first day, of what is meant to be an annual tradition, is: “The Role of the (Arab) Media in Combatting Terrorism”.

The mockery is surely multi-faceted. One is the clearly politicized choice of the theme of the proposed event. The term ‘terrorism’ is a political one, and is rarely applied to violence committed by Arab regimes: it only applies to their detractors.

Another is the fact that the committee of ‘experts’ which made the decision was itself appointed by the Council of Arab foreign ministers in their Cairo meeting last May. The Council operates under the ineffectual and mostly ceremonial Arab League.

Of course, various Arab countries are enthusiastically planning to join the ‘celebrations’ with some, unscrupulously, emphasizing the importance of the ‘combatting terrorism’ theme, for obvious reasons: positioning themselves as victims of terror, never as purveyors of violence. The event – as most other common themes in Arab media – is likely to tout rulers as the saviors of nations, and condemn their detractors as terrorists, terrorism sympathizers or potential terrorists.

In reality, Arab media has little to celebrate. If anything, Arabs should lament the moral malaise afflicting their media, whether official, semi-official, independent or opposition. This is not to mention the hundreds of useless, glossy magazines that objectify women, belittle the social challenges facing Arab societies, and embrace western globalization as if Arabs only exist to consume, but not to think independently or critically.

If April 21 is to be of any value at all, it should be a day of candid discussion about urgent and practical steps required to escape the complete collapse of credibility under which most Arab media has prevailed since the so-called Arab Spring in the last four-and-a-half years.

As someone who has spent over two decades working in Arab and international media spaces, written about topics related to the Middle East, in general, and engaged in issues concerning the Arab world specifically, I wish to put forward a few suggestions for consideration by the organizers of Arab media committee:

Violence, Not Terrorism

Terms such as ‘al-irhab’ (terrorism) and ‘al-ta’asub’ (extremism) are often lobbed by Arab media in all of its platforms for a specific political end: demonizing the other. Instead, the term ‘al-‘unf’ (violence) should be used and confronted, regardless of who the party responsible for acts of violence is. While the State is often granted monopoly on violence through conveniently enacted laws, this monopoly is not meant to be used so nonchalantly and without an iota of accountability, as is currently the case.

Engaging, Challenging – Not Preaching

Arab media, in general, and commentators, in particular, tend to treat their readers with palpable pretentiousness. It is as if Arab media is the originator of wisdom and of all that is to be known. If there is any truth to that, Arab media would not be in such a poor state. Instead, owners and managers of media platforms should truly engage society: listen and learn from real people about their real life problems; understand that there exist, outside the sanctified media bubble, intellectuals and ordinary people with much wisdom and insight. Media is not meant to celebrate the seemingly endless virtues of the regime, or be celebrated for its own supposed virtues. It is a perpetual podium for ideas, challenging, difficult and rarely gratifying.

Universal Rules regarding Distortion and Fabrication

While some Arab regimes have recently enacted laws that punish journalists for promoting what certain governments perceive as fabrications and misinformation, pro-government journalists are largely exempted from such expectations. It is neither the right nor responsibility of governments to define what is true, thus permissible, and untrue, thus punishable by prison term or heavy fines. Journalists’ unions should provide moral guidance to their members, challenge those who permit themselves to serve as mouthpieces to any political party or regime and protect those who remain committed to the integrity of their profession.

Carving Space for Independent Thinking

Media is not just meant to be a platforms for opposing opinions. While this is necessary in order for the media to espouse a healthy democratic space in any society, Arab societies are hardly democratic, and opposing opinions often serve as hate fest between regimes and their enemies. Whenever possible, Arab media should open up a space for those who wish to think outside the political and ideological self-serving box. Arab intellect should not be limited to those ‘pro’ or ‘anti’ this regime or that party. There are always alternative ways of rationalizing which could, with time, offer real alternative to the status quo and conventional wisdom.

Offering Solidarity, regardless of Politics

Arab media should agree on some basic values that include standing by and defending those victimized by Arab regimes for voicing honest opinions, however critical. When a journalist suffers, is imprisoned, fined or ostracized, the entire media community loses a battle. Solidarity among journalists, regardless of personal political views or even ideological affiliation, should be enshrined into any code of conduct in any self-respecting media community anywhere.

Understanding that Women Are Not Honorary Citizens

MENA Media Monitoring has recently criticized the marginalization of Algerian women in the country’s media. According to its report, women are given 29 percent of the media space available, while men enjoy the rest. Women are often restricted, not just in space, but also in the topics to which they are meant to contribute, thus cramped only within areas related to family, food and fashion. In fact, Algeria is, perhaps, more fortunate than other Arab media where women are even more restricted, or used as token, as opposed to being active participants in discussions of serious political weight and societal impact. Engaging women in the media is not a favor to be bestowed by men, but a right – and an essential one – for any thinking society.

Setting Serious Goals, Not Celebrating Failure

One is not oblivious to the fact that no democratic media can truly function in a non-democratic society. However, it is the failure of Arab democracies that should heighten the sense of responsibility among Arab media and journalists. Arab media should set realistic but serious goals, and re-visit these goals with utmost honesty and transparency, no matter the confines and restrictions. There are many battles to be fought and won and, certainly, a price to be paid, but none of these challenges can be undertaken under the cloak of Arab foreign ministers or League.

This is not a judgement on Arab journalism itself, for the Arab world is teeming with journalistic talents that are yet to be utilized or explored. It is an attempt at an honest reading of the unfortunate reality under which Arab media is forced to operate. Until journalists and media professionals, through collective effort and after many uphill battles, redeem some respect for their tightly controlled medium, there is no reason whatsoever to celebrate.

China As A Peer Of US: Implications Of September Joint Statement – Analysis

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By Mukul Sanwal*

China is emerging as a peer and partner of the United States in international affairs. India’s response should be to work with China in the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank and in China’s ‘Road and belt’ initiative to make the ‘Asian Century’ a reality as well as in the G20, which China will chair in 2016 (and India in 2018), to begin shaping the future global agenda, ‘global goods’ and institutions, including reform of the United Nations, while maintaining strategic autonomy to safeguard its maritime trade routes.

New partners in climate change

In the US-China Joint Statement on Climate Change, President Obama has met the criticism of the US Senate that unilateral emissions reductions should not give China a competitive advantage while President Xi has achieved for developing countries what the G77 collectively was finding difficult to attain.

On 25 September, Xi and Obama outlined their “Vision for the Paris Climate Conference”, (re) defining the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities as a system that provides flexibility to developing countries “in light of their capacities” and “that differentiation should be reflected in relevant elements of the agreement in an appropriate manner”.

They also agreed on joint support for a “global transition to a low carbon economy, renewed focus on adaptation “as a key component of the long-term response” to build resilience and reduce vulnerability and the “crucial role of major technological advancement in the transition”.

The Statement recognises that transparency provisions have to include both ‘action’ as well as ‘support’ provided to developing countries – a long standing demand of developing countries. Also, transparency provisions are expected to “provide flexibility to those developing countries that need it in light of their capacities”, emphasising differentiation.

The Joint Statement moves beyond the post-colonial North-South dichotomy and welcomes the provision of resources from countries “willing to do so;” it is no longer seen as a commitment based on notions of historical responsibility. Both countries will provide USD 3 billion each to help poor countries, with China announcing the establishment of a China South-South Climate Cooperation Fund. This puts pressure on all developed countries to enhance contributions towards the USD 100 billion to be provided by 2020. The need for bilateral investments to encourage low-carbon technologies and climate resilience, equating mitigation and adaptation (even though these terms are not mentioned) provides an opening to discuss the role of public finance in the transition.

By endorsing a global goal of “low-carbon transformation” within the 21st century – convergence on an overarching meta-global goal is a significant development which the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) were not able to achieve – the statement also serves to define the ‘Objective’ of the Convention; something which has eluded the multilateral process since 1992.

New forms of international co-operation

Xi used his address to the United Nations General Assembly to reiterate China’s call for a “new type of international relations based on win-win cooperation.” He added: “We should resolve disputes and difficulties through dialogue and consultation,” as “the law of the jungle leaves the weak at the mercy of the strong.”

Xi emphasised that China represents less powerful nations through its seat on the Security Council (“China’s vote at the U.N. will always belong to developing countries”) and projected China as a champion of the developing countries.

The trip was planned so there would be major funding announcements on each of the three days Xi was at the UN General Assembly in New York, as that is what concerns the G77 the most. He pledged establishment of an assistance fund for South-South cooperation to implement the SDGs with USD 2 billion dollars; increasing investment in LDCs to USD 12 billion by 2030; and the exemption of debt owed by LDCs, LLDCs, and SIDS on interest-free loans; a USD 10 million contribution to the UN women’s agency, a USD 1 billion ‘peace and development’ fund and USD 100 million in military aid for the African Union. He also co-hosted a women’s summit at the UN.

China already contributes more peacekeepers than other permanent members of the Security Council. Xi promised to send the first Chinese helicopter squad to join peacekeeping in Africa, train 2,000 peacekeepers from other countries in China over the next five years, and build a peacekeeping standby force of 8,000 troops. Xi’s largesse portrays China as a contributor to global growth and security amid international concerns about China’s economic stability and military ambitions.

Global rules for the new services and knowledge economy

Over time, Xi’s success in implementing sweeping market reforms aimed at changing China’s economic model from an investment and export-driven one to an innovative consumer-driven and service-oriented one may be the critical factor in shaping Beijing’s economic and foreign policies in the future, as the economic relationship with the US will remain key.

Cyber issues are now among larger concerns in the economic relationship, with bilateral trade totalling USD 590 billion in 2014 and China holding USD 1.2 trillion in US Treasury bonds. On cyber-security it was agreed that “neither country’s government will conduct or knowingly support cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property, including trade secrets or other confidential business information, with the intent of providing competitive advantages to companies or commercial sectors.” In addition, Xi and Obama agreed to create a cabinet-level mechanism and a hotline to address concerns. Both pledged to cooperate in creating a global code of conduct for cyber security. The Bilateral investment treaty Talks stalled as each side offered “negative lists” of items to be excluded and these lists can wall off industries considered strategic such as energy, aviation, telecommunications or access to state-owned industry procurement.

New co-operative multilateralism

The United States and China will remain the key global actors in developing a multilateral consensus on global issues as long as they successfully represent the concerns of the others. In an inter-connected world, the outcome will be a new model of co-operative multilateralism supplemented by bilateral understandings between national stakeholders that do not require the mediation of the United Nations Secretariat and prolonged negotiations over obscure texts.

The post-world war multilateralism involved agenda setting by the G7 balanced by the G77 laying out their interests, or positions, at the start of a multilateral negotiation. Subsequent rounds of negotiations were designed to narrow the differences with secretariat documents suggesting consensus language and calls to capitals. Last minute compromises and trade-offs are very much part of the process, leaving most developing countries unhappy. The result has been continuing tension and the need for a United Nations secretariat to help mediate between the groups, siding more with the funders in achieving their goals. This arrangement has, at least for climate change, now lost its relevance.

The 21st century, characterised by the majority of the middle class living in cities, a post-industrial knowledge economy and global trade dominated by services rather than goods, needs to respond effectively to global concerns through means for agenda-setting and securing a global consensus very different to those adopted for a fractured world emerging from colonialism and world war. With the two largest economies and most powerful countries, that cut across the political divide, emerging as peers and partners, agenda setting will require wider consultation in the G20, which China will chair next year. India, too, must shape the contours of the new multilateralism by working with China.

New military and strategic balance in Asia

The Dongfeng (East wind) 21D “carrier-killer” missile, which made a public appearance in a military parade on 3 September 2015, with a range of 1,550 km and a projected 10 times the speed of sound (faster than anything that could intercept it) after re-entering the atmosphere can manoeuvre on to a target, making it theoretically capable of landing a large warhead on or near a moving ship. Some analysts say such missiles reduce the threat from aircraft carriers — which form the basis of current US naval strategy — just what aircraft carriers themselves did to battleships with Japan’s 1941 attack on Pearl Harbour. While the potency of the DF-21D is debated in the defence community, these capabilities are changing the balance of power in Asia against the United States requiring it to strengthen its alliance system.

The geopolitical world order established by the United States after World War II is unravelling because of the geo-economic shift to Asia. China’s Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank has served to focus minds in Europe and East Asia. The new Bank will be a rival to the IMF and World Bank and the US risks losing its ability to shape international economic rules, and global influence that goes with it. The UK described the decision as an “irresistible opportunity” and brought accusations from Washington about London’s “constant accommodation” of China, reflecting the two world-views on the emerging global order.

For India, the lesson from the failed US attempt to obstruct the new bank is that, as Asia’s urbanisation will require more than USD 8 trillion to be spent on infrastructure in this decade, countries in the region will welcome all the support they can get. Rather than be suspicious of China’s motives and seek to prevent the ‘Belt and road’ initiative, it should deal with the strategic concerns by joining in the development projects, for example, by providing the software packages required in the management of the ports. A mutual recognition of special interests of each other in the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean should be a strategic objective, and will be a strategic win-win for both.

The ‘Asian Century’ provides an integrating theme to focus minds on shaping the economic integration of Asia, where two-thirds of future global growth is going to come from, and the alignment of the rail, road, sea routes and gas pipelines from Iran, for example, can position India as a node for South and Western Asia. Including a services component in the projects will add to their productivity and support cooperation between the Asian giants; trade is a win-win proposition.

Conclusion

The global trend is that countries are gaining in influence more because of the strength of their economy than the might of their military. India can either drift into the future remaining in its periphery or it can shape the future jointly with China to become one of the two engines of the Asian economy. China is likely to remain the world’s largest producer of goods and India has the potential to be the largest producer of services in the largest consumer market. According to McKinsey and Company, the services sector will be the real driver of growth in Asia as affluence will be concentrated in cities. The ability to design, finance, build and implement the big data-technology systems will be the defining comparative advantage in the future, and India and China can work together to make this happen sharing their respective expertise. The complex interdependencies will be a strong stabilising force.

According to Prime Minister Modi, China and India are “two bodies, one spirit” and President Xi has emphasised the “need to become global partners having strategic coordination”. The G20 meeting in 2016 provides the opportunity for the Asian giants to work together to define a global agenda, ‘global public goods’ and institutions to respond to the global middle class and the Asian Century with two centres of gravity, with India seeking to achieve this joint agenda when it chairs the G20 in 2018.

*Mukul Sanwal was Director, United Nations, 1993-2008.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India. Originally published by Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (www.idsa.in) at http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/ChinaasaPeeroftheUnitedStates_msanwal_011015.html

College Campuses Are Not Gun-Free Zones – OpEd

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Wishing for something to be true does not make it true. Declaring an area to be gun-free is wishful thinking. We know campuses are not gun-free zones from the news reports of campus shootings.

Declaring an area to be a gun-free zone discourages law-abiding citizens from carrying guns there, but it encourages people who intend to commit crimes with firearms because it gives them some assurance they will not meet with armed resistance from law-abiding citizens.

Even the most dim-witted among us can surely see that such a declaration invites criminals to engage in firearm-related crimes in an area where they know law-abiding citizens will not shoot back. This could be mass shootings, robberies, rape, or any crime in which an armed criminal wants more assurance of having the upper hand. Criminals, by definition, do not obey the law.

Declaring an area to be a gun-free zone makes it more likely that a gun crime will occur there.

The argument in favor of declaring an area a gun-free zone is that despite the news reports, mass shootings and other gun crimes are relatively rare, and there is a bigger risk of accidental harm from the actions of law abiding citizens than from criminals. The benefit from preventing accidents by law-abiding citizens outweighs the increased risk of gun crimes that gun-free zones encourage.

The only reasonable argument in favor of gun-free zones is that the threat from armed law-abiding citizens is greater than from armed criminals.

This article appeared at The Beacon

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