Ancient Britons may have intentionally mummified some of their dead during the Bronze Age, according to archaeologists at the University of Sheffield.

The study is the first to provide indications that mummification may have been a wide-spread funerary practice in Britain.

Working with colleagues from the University of Manchester and University College London, Dr Tom Booth analyzed skeletons at several Bronze Age burial sites across the UK. The team from the University of Sheffield’s Department of Archaeology found that the remains of some ancient Britons are consistent with a prehistoric mummy from northern Yemen and a partially mummified body recovered from a sphagnum peat bog in County Roscommon, Ireland.

Building on a previous study conducted at a single Bronze Age burial site in the Outer Hebrides, Dr Booth used microscopic analysis to compare the bacterial bioerosion of skeletons from various sites across the UK with the bones of the mummified bodies from Yemen and Ireland.

Archaeologists widely agree that the damp British climate is not favorable to organic materials and all prehistoric mummified bodies that may be located in the UK will have lost their preserved tissue if buried outside of a preservative environment such as a bog.

Dr Booth, who is now based at the Department of Earth Sciences at London’s Natural History Museum, said, “The problem archaeologists face is finding a consistent method of identifying skeletons that were mummified in the past – especially when they discover a skeleton that is buried outside of a protective environment.”

Booth expained that, “To help address this, our team has found that by using microscopic bone analysis archaeologists can determine whether a skeleton has been previously mummified even when it is buried in an environment that isn’t favourable to mummified remains.”

“We know from previous research that bones from bodies that have decomposed naturally are usually severely degraded by putrefactive bacteria, whereas mummified bones demonstrate immaculate levels of histological preservation and are not affected by putrefactive bioerosion,” Booth added.

Earlier investigations have shown that mummified bones found in the Outer Hebrides were not entirely consistent with mummified remains found elsewhere because there wasn’t a complete absence of bacterial bioerosion.

However, armed with a new technique, the team were able to re-visit the remains from the Outer Hebrides and use microscopic analysis to test the relationship between bone bioerosion and the extent of soft tissue preservation in bone samples from the Yemeni and Irish mummies.

Their examinations revealed that both the Yemeni and Irish mummies showed limited levels of bacterial bioerosion within the bone and therefore established that the skeletons found in the Outer Hebrides as well as other sites across Britain display levels of preservation that are consistent with mummification.

The research team also found that the preservation of Bronze Age skeletons at various sites throughout the UK is different to the preservation of bones dating to all other prehistoric and historic periods, which are generally consistent with natural decomposition. Furthermore, the Sheffield-led researchers also found that Bronze Age Britons may have used a variety of techniques to mummify their dead.

Dr Booth added, “Our research shows that smoking over a fire and purposeful burial within a peat bog are among some of the techniques ancient Britons may have used to mummify their dead. Other techniques could have included evisceration, in which organs were removed shortly after death.”

Booth said that, “The idea that British and potentially European Bronze Age communities invested resources in mummifying and curating a proportion of their dead fundamentally alters our perceptions of funerary ritual and belief in this period.”

The research also demonstrates that funerary rituals that we may now regard as exotic, novel and even bizarre were practiced commonly for hundreds of years by our predecessors.

Also, this method of using microscopic bone analysis to identify formerly-mummified skeletons means that archaeologists can continue searching for Bronze Age mummies throughout Europe.

“It’s possible that our method may allow us to identify further ancient civilizations that mummified their dead,” Dr Booth said.

By Adam Simpson*

The Yemeni crisis is entering a new phase. A conglomeration of forces ostensibly linked to exiled President Abdorabbo Mansour Hadi has, for now, pushed the Houthi rebels and their allies out of the South. Aided by Saudi airpower and Emirati armored divisions, anti-Houthi cadres are consolidating territory in central Yemen. These forces have announced plans to soon move on Yemen’s capital, Sana’a.9

Hadi’s exiled government is already making plans for Yemen’s future, with the ousted Yemeni president affirming his intention to impose a federalist model “whether it is wanted or refused.”10,11 Perhaps the most significant outcome of the National Dialogue Conference (NDC) was an understanding that decentralizing Yemen is the only sensible way of maintaining Yemen’s broader unity. However, Hadi’s tough talk is unproductive. The implementation of decentralization processes requires local support and is often vulnerable to security crises and exploitation by corrupt political actors. Furthermore, such efforts require a confidence in the central government that Hadi fails to inspire.

Despite the deepening divisions across Yemen, virtually all factions have negative views of Hadi. Even among his supposed anti-Houthi allies—the separatist Southern Herak and the Islamist Islah party (Yemen’s Muslim Brotherhood branch)—Hadi is viewed with tremendous disdain. Undoubtedly, the Houthis and their allies, cronies of the former President Ali Abdullah Saleh, will act to secure their own interests, as they did in their bungled coup attempt. Yet, regardless of how the Yemeni crisis ends, Hadi’s enemies and their constituencies will have to be considered and accommodated in any successful federal project.

Hadi’s government has been supported fervently by the Saudis and other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members and quietly by Western powers. His lack of popularity within Yemen, however, is deeply problematic. The Saudi-led international coalition arrayed behind Hadi is unlikely to relinquish its insistence on his leadership. While Hadi’s leadership lacks longevity as long as it fails to garner meaningful support on the ground, his initial test of competence will revolve around accessing humanitarian aid that can be distributed robustly and without political conditions or regional favoritism.

Whatever political processes Hadi seeks to pursue, the public will remain uninterested in his ideas as long as ten million children remain in dire need of assistance, and famine looms on the horizon.12,13,14 Yet Hadi’s government does not have the resources to meet these needs. Furthermore, aid efforts alone will require an enormous amount of support from the international community that created and sustained the exiled president’s war effort.Therefore, the reconstruction of Yemen will require a concomitant herculean effort.15

The closest attainable grand bargain to satisfy all of these disparate and aggrieved factions is the already existent outcomes of the NDC, yet championing the NDC alone will not build faith in Hadi. Instead, the government-in-exile should focus on attaining new micro-agreements based on local constituencies, while building the functional power-sharing bodies that can cultivate confidence in its national and subnational efforts. Territorial and political autonomy is necessary for securing participation in the many areas where trust in the central government is at an all-time low.

Loyalty to Hadi remains a farfetched objective. Yet his government is in a position to secure allegiances— however fragile—as a practical interlocutor based on rational self-interest. Saudi Arabia’s bombardment and the Houthis’ shelling have only resulted in wide- spread devastation to the war-torn country’s infrastructure. Using reconstruction as a carrot for broader participation in Yemen’s renewal—an incentive not without controversy—is infinitely more productive than the authoritarian language employed to cow political skeptics. Hadi’s tough talk is only threatening if the leader is given more credit than he is due. Based on his perception across Yemen’s political spectrum, however, his talk remains merely unbelievable and serves only to undermine the vital project that the exiled president seeks to undertake.

The gravest challenge facing Hadi’s government will be to fill the security vacuums that are emerging amidst the conflict while at the same time building the federal structure. Although al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has agreed to leave Mukalla, it will likely take away money and arms pilfered from the city’s banks and military bases.16 Alongside reports of AQAP fighters buttressing the popular committees, thus forcing the Houthis to retreat, other reports indicate that the terrorist group is digging into neighborhoods in Aden—despite the government’s partial denial.17,18,19

Beyond AQAP, numerous armed groups have emerged, including the Southern Herak, a formerly non-violent group pushed by the ongoing conflict to take up arms. As Yemen’s military is split between Saleh and Hadi loyalists, local insecurity threatens to further balkanize the country. Demobilization of subnational armed groups and militias requires a sense of security among the population. Attempts to forcibly disarm such groups are neither prudent nor possible; thus the government should focus on building and professionalizing community-based security forces that emphasize transparency and consultation. Given the low probability of Yemen achieving any semblance of stability in the near-term, is it critical for such initiatives to be pursued at the local level as the opportunities become available.

Though the enormity of Yemen’s turmoil leaves the country at a considerable deficit moving forward, in many ways sectors of the country long beholden to corruption and clientelism now have a clean slate—if not a vacuum—on which to build. Hadi is not the ideal leader to pursue the delicate path of decentralization and federalism, but without serious amendments to the political calculus of his GCC and Western allies that in turn support his exiled government, Hadi’s leadership role remains an unfortunate fact, the pitfalls of which must be mollified as much as possible. The risks of decentralization are high, yet given the alternative of continued internecine conflict and humanitarian disaster, Yemen’s unity remains a critical component of stability and renewal.

About the author:
*Adam Simpson is the Project Assistant for the Middle East Strategy Task Force, an initiative of the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East.

Source:
This article was published by Gulf State Analytics in GSA Report August 2015 (PDF)

Notes:
10  Mkhcv, Dhuazn. “Deputy Interior Minister for ‘Online Source’: There is no truth to the control of al-Qaida on the Tawahi in Aden.” Al-Masdar Online. Al-Masdar Online, 23 Aug. 2015. Web. 8 Sept. 2015. <http:// almasdaronline.com/article/74644&gt
11  “Yemen Celebrates New Map of Six Regions.” Yemen Times. Yemen Times, n.d. Web. 8 Sept. 2015. <http://www.yementimes.com/en/1754/news/3462/Yemen-celebrates-new-map-of-six-regions.htm>.
12  Al Jazeera. “Children bearing brunt of war in Yemen, UNICEF says.” Al Jazeera America. Al Jazeera Amer- ica, 19 Aug. 2015. Web. 8 Sept. 2015. <http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/8/19/children-bear- ing-brunt-of-war-in-yemen-unicef-says.html>.
13  “1.8 million children estimated to suffer from malnutrition in Yemen: UNICEF.” Xinhuanet. XINHUANET. com, 20 Aug. 2015. Web. 8 Sept. 2015. <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-08/20/c_134535716. htm>.
14  “Yemen crisis: Famine threatens war-torn country, warns UN.” BBC. BBC, 20 Aug. 2015. Web. 8 Sept. 2015. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-33998006>.
15  At Security Council, UN relief chief cites ‘incomprehensible’ scale of human suffering in Yemen.” UN News Centre. UN News Centre, 19 Aug. 2015. Web. 8 Sept. 2015. <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story. asp?NewsID=51680#.Vdxf-PlVhHx.>.
16  “A local official: preliminary approval from the base to avoid the destruction of Hadramout and foreign interventions.” Al-Masdar Online. Al-Masdar Online, 22 Aug. 2015. Web. 8 Sept. 2015. <http://almas- daronline.com/article/74609>.
17  “Al-Qaida Militants Deploy in Yemen’s Aden, Raise Flag Over Port.” Haaretz. Haaretz Daily Newspaper, 23 Aug. 2015. Web. 8 Sept. 2015. <http://www.haaretz.com/news/middle-east/1.672500>.
18  “Yemen Officials: Al-Qaida Exploits Chaos to Seize 3 Towns.” Newsmax. Newsmax Media, 6 Aug. 2015. Web. 8 Sept. 2015. <http://www.newsmax.com/World/MiddleEast/ML-Yemen/2015/08/06/ id/665729/>.
19  Mkhcv, Dhuazn. “Deputy Interior Minister for ‘Online Source’: There is no truth to the control of al-Qaida on the Tawahi in Aden.” Al-Masdar Online. Al-Masdar Online, 23 Aug. 2015. Web. 8 Sept. 2015. <http:// almasdaronline.com/article/74644>.

By Carnes Lord

Recently, the subject of military “professionalism” has gripped the attention of top echelons of the Department of Defense (DOD) to a degree that is perhaps unprecedented. Most notably, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) General Martin E. Dempsey has directed each of the Services to review and rearticulate its understanding of the profession of arms in the context of its particular missions, traditions, and practices.

Former Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel signaled his own concern with such matters by appointing a two-star admiral as his special assistant for military professionalism and ethics. And at both the joint and Service levels, serious attention is starting to be given to improving and systematizing the way the U.S. military develops its leaders and communicates what it expects of them. In the discussion that follows, I focus on the issue of military professionalism in a broad joint or DOD perspective, leaving aside for the most part Service-related professionalism issues.

There are several proximate reasons for the renewed focus on military professionalism. A steady drumbeat of scandal has dogged the military in recent years: the Abu Ghraib abuses in Iraq, desecration of enemy corpses in Afghanistan, cheating on proficiency tests, personal corruption, and sexual misbehavior of all kinds. Particularly alarming is the widespread and well-publicized incidence in the military (including relatively senior ranks) of sexual harassment and sexual assault, which has resulted in intense political pressure on the military to take drastic steps to address this problem. At a more fundamental level, however, there seems to be a sense among Pentagon leaders that the demands of “the long war” have taken a psychological toll on our military—especially the Army and Marine Corps—that has contributed to a noticeable erosion of the traditional values underpinning the professional ethos of the Armed Forces.

Compounding these concerns is what can only be described as the continuing disintegration of traditional moral and cultural values in the larger society. The weakening of organized religion in much of the country, the breakdown of the family, the impact of Hollywood and popular music, and related developments pose a formidable challenge to the good order and discipline of a military that, thanks to the Internet and contemporary social media, is even more inextricably embedded in civilian society and culture than ever before.

Our military leadership has for the most part resisted the temptation to blame bad behavior by the troops on the external environment (“the culture made me do it”). It is, rightly, sensitive to the danger of encouraging those in uniform to look down on their civilian counterparts. At a certain point, however, one wonders whether some hard choices will not have to be made in this respect. The Marine Corps has long recognized that the socialization of young recruits necessitates a certain countercultural stance toward American society.1 The time may well be approaching when the other Services will have to follow suit if American military professionalism is to be sustained over the long run.

What is military professionalism? Surprisingly little serious thought seems to have been given to this question since Samuel P. Huntington’s classic work The Soldier and the State, published more than a half-century ago.2 Many seem to understand “professionals” as merely the opposite of “amateurs”—that is, people who are paid to do a job requiring a high level of competence and skill. (Like professional football players, so the joke goes, military officers are skilled at what they do and “look good in a uniform.”) A recent survey of junior Army officers revealed considerable uncertainty and doubt as to the meaning of professionalism in that Service. One respondent claimed, “I know very few Army officers [who] consider [themselves] under the term ‘professional’ in the same category as doctors and lawyers.” Some felt that Army professionalism had been degraded by various monetary incentives; others cited pervasive micromanagement and lack of trust on the part of senior leaders as factors undermining their professional status.3 All of this is symptomatic of a larger problem extending throughout the Services: the creeping bureaucratization of the military establishment.

A government bureaucracy, like a traditional business corporation, is a hierarchical structure designed to maximize efficiency through highly routinized processes and behaviors. The military Services are and indeed have always been bureaucracies, with the pathologies inherent in such organizations. But the Services have also had a professional component that has served to limit and counteract the ill effects of bureaucracy. A key aspect of professionalism is institutional autonomy. The military art cannot be reduced to a set of routinized rules of behavior but requires independent or discretionary judgment and the intellectual and moral preparation to exercise it responsibly.

By the same token, a true profession is self-policing in terms of recruitment, the setting of standards of competence, and promotion. Professionalism rightly understood serves a particular mission that the professional body alone has a socially recognized ability to perform. When professionalism is eroded by bureaucratization, the accomplishment of that mission has a tendency to take second place to the care and feeding of the organization and its individual members. At this point, professional pride tends to be eclipsed by a trade union mentality and loyalties become focused on the organization more than on the larger society it is meant to serve. When this happens in a military organization, the trust the broader society reposes in that organization is at risk and fundamental frictions in the civil-military relationship are likely to result.

In Huntington’s well-known analysis, military professionalism is the key to healthy civil-military relations—what he calls “objective control” of the military by its civilian superiors. Under a system of objective control, the military is conceded substantial autonomy in the areas just mentioned in return for its respect for and noninterference in the decisionmaking of the civilian leadership. But this is possible only if the military is a professional one. By contrast, nonprofessional forces (for example, civilian militias) require “subjective control”—that is, direct and continuous involvement by the political authorities in managing them.4

It has to be said at once that the American experience has never been completely congruent with Huntington’s objective control model.5 But his argument about the importance of military professionalism for the civil-military relationship remains a fundamental insight. Since the end of the Cold War, some observers have called attention to what they believe to be signs of growing frictions, if not an incipient crisis, in civil-military relations in the United States. Others have expressed concerns over an alleged “militarization” of American foreign policy as exemplified in the increasingly important diplomatic roles of our regional combatant commanders. Whatever the truth of the matter (it is easy enough to argue that such concerns are sometimes grossly exaggerated), any rethinking of military professionalism today needs to be centered in these larger issues.6

Every profession must understand and accept its mission and the nature of the competencies that enable it to achieve the mission. These competencies are sometimes referred to in the relevant literature as “jurisdictions.”7 These jurisdictions are not necessarily stable but rather are subject to change over time, as the mission itself evolves in differing circumstances or other competing organizations vie for them. They are subject to negotiation and renegotiation both horizontally (with competing organizations) and vertically (with higher authority). In Huntington’s study, the mission or jurisdiction of the military profession is famously said to be “the management of violence.” This is clearly inadequate, both because it is too general (remember the professional football player) and because it is too narrow to account for all the competencies militaries necessarily (or often, or ideally) require. A more current term, subject to similar objections, would be warfighting.

There is a considerable lack of agreement and basic clarity about the current jurisdictions of the U.S. military, both within and outside its ranks. Perhaps most striking is the issue of “strategy.” The U.S. military over the years has tended to be reluctant to take full ownership of strategy as a mission, and at times has seemed to abdicate it in favor of civilians (in the case of nuclear strategy or McNamaran systems analysis) or to higher authority (the State Department or National Security Council). It is sometimes suggested that the ascendency of operational art at the expense of strategy in current military parlance has been significantly motivated by an essentially bureaucratic desire to minimize civilian interference in the military sphere.8 It is doubtful that any of the Services have really operationalized strategy in their personnel and education systems. There has been a proliferation of so-called strategy documents in the military and within the U.S. Government generally in recent years. Few if any of these have anything to do with genuine strategic thinking. Meanwhile, the performance of the American military and government at the strategic level in Iraq and Afghanistan over the last decade has clearly left much to be desired. Was this a failure of the military profession? If not, why not?

There is an obvious link between the orphaned condition of strategy in American national security policymaking and other jurisdictional arenas, which remain problematic and contested. The most important of these are counterinsurgency; postconflict stability and reconstruction operations; engineering and business expertise; language and cultural expertise; and the contracting-out of traditional military missions (for example, security in a war zone). Arguably, it is incumbent on a truly professional military to recognize the need to clarify and, where necessary, to re-adjudicate its jurisdictions. For the most part, the U.S. military does not seem to recognize this to the extent it should. One recent important exception is the doctrinal elevation of stability and reconstruction operations to the same status as warfighting as a military mission in the wake of our manifest failure to manage the postconflict situation in Iraq. It remains to be seen, however, what the operational realities of this move will turn out to be in the strategic environments of the future. This stands in stark contrast to the way the U.S. military establishment prepared for postwar governance and reconstruction during the later years of World War II.9

Another significant arena in which the tension between military professionalism and bureaucracy is evident is resource allocation. To the extent that the military seems to be dominated by Service parochialism in its search for funding rather than by an honest assessment of what is good for the military as a whole in achieving its mission, military professionalism is undermined. When this happens, civilian authority (Office of the Secretary of Defense, Office of Management and Budget, Congress) is likely to intervene in the process and impose its own solution, with significant damage to the autonomy of the military and the trust necessary to maintain it. Service parochialism will clearly never be completely eradicated. However, in spite of the mantra of “jointness,” one can argue it is regarded by many in the military today with unwarranted complacency. The extent to which Service parochialism not only tarnishes public and congressional perceptions of the military but also sets a poor leadership/ethical example throughout the chain of command does not seem to be well understood.

A related issue central to military professionalism and civil-military relations is the ability and willingness of military leaders to “speak truth” to civilian power in supporting their independent military judgment. If the main interest of the leadership is protecting the military’s bureaucratic equities, it will tend to develop a transactional relationship with the civilian hierarchy that mutes disagreement or challenges to policy in exchange for favorable treatment on matters of immediate concern to it. This was central to the failure of the Joint Chiefs to challenge wrong-headed civilian decisionmaking during the Vietnam War and perhaps more recently as well.¹⁰ It is a fundamental failure of military professionalism.

Finally, let us return briefly to the question of military professionalism and ethics. In the bureaucratic world of the U.S. military today, ethics for all practical purposes amounts to little more than broad slogans—“honor, courage, commitment” in the case of the Navy and Marine Corps—supported by a labyrinth of quasi-legal programmatic regulations and mandatory training requirements. The focus is on preventing negative outcomes rather than encouraging positive ones, but the implicit message is one of lack of trust in the force to do the right thing. Any attempt to recover a genuine and robust professionalism in the Armed Forces should begin by coming to grips with this profoundly demoralizing state of affairs.

Source:
This article was published in the Joint Force Quarterly 78 which is published by the National Defense University.

Notes:

1. The classic account is Thomas E. Ricks, Making the Corps (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997).
2. Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957). See also Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (New York: Free Press, 1960).
3. Gayle L. Watkins and Randi C. Cohen, “In Their Own Words: Army Officers Discuss Their Profession,” in The Future of the Army Profession 2^nd ed., dir. Don M. Snider and ed. Lloyd J. Matthews (Boston: McGraw Hill, 2005), chap. 5.
4. Huntington, chap. 4.
5. For a recent perspective, see especially Mackubin Thomas Owens, U.S. Civil-Military Relations After 9/11: Renegotiating the Civil-Military Bargain (London: Continuum, 2011).
6. The contemporary debate on civilian control of the U.S. military was initiated by Richard H. Kohn, “Out of Control,” The National Interest 35 (Spring 1994), 3–17. On the combatant commanders’ role, see Dana Priest, The Mission: Waging War and Keeping Peace with America’s Military (New York: Norton, 2003), as well as Carnes Lord, Proconsuls: Delegated Political-Military Leadership from Rome to America Today (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), chap. 8.
7. See James Burk, “Expertise, Jurisdiction, and Legitimacy of the Military Profession,” in The Future of the Army Profession, chap. 2.
8. Justin Kelly and Mike Brennan, Alien: How Operational Art Devoured Strategy (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, September 2009).
9. See especially Richard Lacquement, “Mapping Army Professional Expertise and Clarifying Jurisdictions of Practice,” in The Future of the Army Profession, chap. 9; and Nadia Schadlow, Charles Barry, and Richard Lacquement, “A Return to the Army’s Roots: Governance, Stabilization, and Reconstruction,” in The Future of the Army Profession, chap. 11.
10. H.R. McMaster, Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam (New York: HarperCollins, 1997).

The recent Washington summit took the US-China bilateral relations onto a new level, while President Xi’s UN visit gave a glimpse of China’s new global role.

Currently the U.S.-China bilateral relations are characterized by very different trajectories of power. As President Barack Obama is on his way out, President Xi Jinping is just getting started. In turn, the U.S. presidential election cycle, particularly its aggressive rhetoric, may cast shadows over bilateral progress.

Before the summit, there was much speculation in the United States about China’s ability and willingness to execute reforms amid challenges in the mainland and a volatile international environment. At the eve of his first state U.S. visit, President Xi addressed these concerns in a Wall Street Journal interview. “Like an arrow shot that cannot be brought back,” he said, “we will forge ahead against all odds to meet our goals of reform.”

Xi’s aim was to deter any concern that China is faltering in its transition toward more sustainable growth. That interview differed from those of an elder generation of Chinese leaders. It was plain-speaking, diplomatic but clear, and confident. And it precipitated the successes of the summit.

Significant economic progress

As President Xi concluded his state visit, the summit had resulted in almost 50 tangible outcomes that reflect significant progress and possibly substantial breakthroughs.

Trade, investment and tourism. Last year, U.S.-China trade amounted to $592 billion. China is America’s second-largest trading partner, third-largest export market, and biggest source of imports. Despite periodic friction, these ties are expanding. Even as U.S. presidential campaigns continue to blame China for “taking our jobs,” Beijing and Washington are completing the highly-anticipated U.S.-China bilateral investment treaty (BIT). A similar momentum prevails in people-to-people exchanges as the two nations made 2016 the U.S.-China tourism year.

Internationalization of the Renminbi. Intriguingly, although Washington has stayed out from the new China-proposed development banks (Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, BRICS New Development Bank), the two may have agreed to facilitate Renminbi trading and clearing in the United States. Wall Street cannot be a bystander as London is busy building a Shanghai-London Stock Connect, reminiscent of the Shanghai-Hong Kong Connect.

Climate change. Last fall, the United States unveiled its target to cut greenhouse gas emissions 26-28 percent below 2005 levels by 2025, while China disclosed its target to peak emissions around 2030 and increase the non-fossil fuel share of energy to about 20 percent by 2030. However, last week, cooperation moved to a new plane as China announced the 2017 launch of a nationwide carbon-emissions trading system that will cover heavy pollution sectors, such as iron, steel, power generation, paper, aluminum and chemicals, which account for three-quarters of China’s energy-related carbon emissions. Through the China South-South Climate Cooperation Fund, Beijing also pledged $3.1 billion to help countries address climate change.

In the process, China expanded the pool of major donors beyond just industrialized countries. The bilateral joint statement signals that both nations are now fully committed to a successful global agreement in Paris.

Vital strategic gains

The most impressive steps were taken in cyber security; a highly contested and secretive part of the bilateral agenda.

Cybersecurity. After Edward Snowden’s dramatic disclosures about massive worldwide cyber hacking by the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) and U.S. allegations about hacking by Chinese military, bilateral cyber security talks were suspended a year ago. Now both nations pledged to refrain from state-sponsored cyber theft of intellectual property, while announcing they would launch a bi-annual high-level dialogue mechanism on fighting cyber theft by the end of the ongoing year.

Military. In military relations, Washington and Beijing expanded their cooperation on confidence building measures to include air-to-air safety and crisis communications. The latter is particularly critical as both sides remain concerned about accidental crisis events that could unleash unnecessary hostilities without appropriate communications safeguards.

Anti-corruption cooperation. In the anti-graft activities, the two nations pledged to enhance cooperation on criminal investigations, repatriation of fugitives and asset recovery issues. This is vital for the Chinese anti-corruption struggle; a core part of President Xi’s domestic agenda led by Wang Qishan. But the pledge is also important in the United States to send a signal that America is not a harbor for corrupt foreign political leaders.

However, the gains of the Washington summit went beyond the core bilateral economic and strategic agenda.

Regional and global cooperation

By conservative estimates, the U.S. military occupies almost 700 “base sites” outside America, while an increasing share of its military capacity is shifting to Asia Pacific. In a recent interview, Xi said pointedly that “China has no military base in Asia and stations no troops outside its borders… The Asia-Pacific should be a cooperative ground for enhanced China-U.S. coordination and collaboration rather than their Coliseum for supremacy.”

Possible rapprochement in South China Sea disputes. In Washington, the White House presented its traditional concerns about the regional disputes, while Xi reiterated China had the right to uphold its territorial sovereignty, but also said it did “not intend to pursue militarization” of the artificial islands built in the region. In the summit, there may have been progress in the South China Sea issue. The two nations may share a tacit understanding on what is acceptable and what is not in the South China Sea.

Regional free trade. In Asia Pacific, the White House has lobbied to undermine China’s free-trade plans, while seeking to complete its controversial Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement. Yet, the TPP leaves out China, India, and Indonesia; Asia’s three largest economies. In the short-term, Washington seeks to complete the TPP; in the medium-term, the White House knows only too well that any major Asia-Pacific free trade deal must make room for both the U.S. and China.
In the White House, President Xi highlighted the potential of the U.S.-Chinese bilateral relations. In the United Nations, he shifted the spotlight on China’s bilateral cooperation with the U.N.

Permanent peacekeeping. In his first address to the U.N., President Xi said that China would set up a permanent peacekeeping force of 8,000 troops and contribute another $100 million in military assistance to the African Union for peacekeeping missions in the next half a decade.

Development investments. China will set up a “China-U.N. peace and development fund with an initial pledge of $1 billion to support developing countries to realize a broad “post-2015″ global sustainable development agenda.” Moreover, Beijing will continue to increase investment in the least-developed countries (LDCs), aiming at a total of $12 billion by 2030. Finally, China shall forgive some debts owed by the LDCs this year while launching some 600 projects to cut poverty and boost development overseas in the next five years.

China’s new global role

For a decade, China has been accused in the West for not being a “responsible stakeholder” internationally. In reality, Beijing has been reluctant to embrace institutions whose structures, leaders and policies were dictated by advanced economies in the postwar era.

As President Xi’s visit to Washington and the UN suggests, Beijing has begun to influence those structures, their leaders and policies in a way that respects the past role of the advanced economies, but will make room for the increasing economic and strategic role for emerging, developing and least-developed countries.

“China will never seek hegemony, expansionism or a sphere of influence,” Xi said in the U.N., adding that militarism was like “putting a stone on a nation’s feet,” hampering development. After a century of colonial humiliation, invasions and destruction, it is a lesson that China will not forget and that is only too familiar to many nations in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East.

What China seeks is peace and stability for economic development.

The original was released by China.org, China’s official government portal on October 2, 2015.

In the tradition of chasing voters for empty-suit politicians, President Barack Obama and his administration, Presidential hopeful Hillary Clinton, and a large-number of Democratic Party minions have been beating the drum for racial discord especially between minorities and local law enforcement. Sadly, the denizens of America’s newsrooms have been more than happy to help these politicians create an anti-cop narrative.

During the 2008 presidential election cycle, the majority of American voters decided the election of the first black president, besides being a historic event, would help heal the racial divide that liberals claim is a blot on the country’s character. However, a large percentage of voters believe President Barack Obama actually widened the country’s racial division, especially the use of anti-police rhetoric coming from the White House, administration officials and the Attorney General at that time, Eric Holder, according to a poll released recently.

A major part of the current “war on cops” is considered to be prima facie evidence of a serious increase in racial division during the Obama administration. The growing tension between police departments and the black Americans they serve is blamed on the White House, politicians seeking re-election, and idealists posing as unbiased journalists, especially those in the nation’s inner cities.

During her presidential campaign, Hillary Clinton has often made reference to police officers mistreating blacks and Latinos. In the midst of an appearance on the campus of Columbia University, Clinton said that the U.S. justice system needs an overhaul. “There is something profoundly wrong when African-American men are still far more likely to be stopped and searched by police, charged with crimes, and sentenced to longer prison terms than are meted out to their white counterparts. There is something wrong when a third of all black men face the prospect of prison during their lifetimes,” Clinton said.

As a result of the recent shootings, ambushes and out-and-out assassination of police officers, the latest occurring in Texas and Nevada, 58% of voters said in a Rasmussen Reports poll that they believe there is indeed a war on police in America today. Some respondents criticized President Obama for his televised comments about the police following incidents only involving white police officers and black suspects.

Sixty percent (60%) of voters believe comments critical of the police by some politicians make it more dangerous for police officers to do their jobs. Only 17% believe most politicians raise racial issues to address real problems. Seventy percent (70%) think they talk about race and discrimination just to get elected.

“From the time a black child learns to read, write and comprehend English, he or she is bombarded with news stories, motion pictures, magazine articles and novels telling them white people hate them or want to take away their freedoms or are keeping them down on the lower rungs of socio-economic ladder. Hell, I’d hate white people if I was constantly being told they want me poor or worse — dead,” said former police officer Iris Aquino. “And the angry blacks know they can’t get their hands on this nation’s most powerful and wealthy, so they attack a symbol of American government: the police,” she added.

As far as overall race relations, only 20% of likely voters believe President Obama has succeeded in bringing the races closer together, according to the Rasmussen Reports survey. Forty-seven percent (47%) say they believe President Obama — who is mixed-race — has caused greater division between different races. Twenty-seven percent (27%) say his words and actions have had no major impact either way.

Surprisingly, a higher number of blacks and minorities believe Obama succeeded in bringing unity. Forty-four percent (44%) of African Americans polled said they feel the president has brought all Americans closer together. But a meager 16% of whites and 21% of other minority voters (Hispanics, Asians) agree. Most whites (54%) believe Obama has driven the races further apart, a view shared by only 21% of blacks and 38% of other minority voters.

“Women give Obama more credit than men do for bringing Americans of different races together, but both are equally likely to see him more as a racial divider. The older the voter, the more likely he or she is to think the president has driven us further apart racially,” said Rasmussen pollsters in a statement.

“This past January, just 17% of all Americans rated race relations in this country as good or excellent, down by half from 34% the year before. Only eight percent (8%) of voters think race relations have gotten better since Obama’s election in 2008, and unlike many questions dealing with race, blacks and whites don’t disagree much on this one,” the officials added.

Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu was right about one thing (and only one thing) when he addressed the UN General Assembly. “Israel’s values,” he said, “are on display every day.”

Indeed they are, clearly visible in

• the theft of more and more Palestinian land and water to give momentum to Israel’s on-going colonization of the occupied West Bank, a process that could and should be described as ethnic cleansing slowly and by stealth;
• the introduction of more and more racist and repressive legislation such as the recent draconian terrorism bill (described by one Israeli analyst as “wildly authoritarian) which lets the government define any group it dislikes, including civil ones, as a terrorist organisation;
• and contempt for, and defiance of, UN Security Council resolutions and international law.

The values reflected by those realities are welded together in many Israeli Jews who have been brainwashed by Zionist propaganda of which Netanyahu is the master by a sickening self-righteousness.. (Way back in 1987 this self-righteousness was described by a former Director of Israeli Military Intelligence, Yehoshafat Harkabi, as the biggest real threat to Israel’s existence),

I think the key to understanding what is driving Netanyahu to tell bigger and bigger propaganda lies to support his assertion that Israel is the victim and in danger of annihilation was in a recent analysis by Jonathan Cook.

He described Israel as (my emphasis added) “growing ever less sophisticated, ever less capable of concealing its central goals.” He added, “It looks uglier, not simply because things are getting worse but because they are finally out in the open”.

And his end thought was this (my emphasis added).

The popular shift rightwards in Israel means that even the left can no longer afford to keep its racism hidden from view. That is why it is past time for the international community to admit there is no prospect of an Israel, of either the left or right, becoming a partner for peace.

My speculation is that when Netanyahu allows his mind to engage with reality he is aware that a day may be coming when, in order to protect their own best interests, the governments of the major powers, including the one in Washington D.C., will say to Israel something like: “Enough is enough. If you do not end your defiance of international law and become serious about peace on terms the Palestinians could accept, you will be totally isolated and sanctioned.”

That’s why I believe that Netanyahu’s main message from the General Assembly platform was addressed not to the world but to Israel’s Jews. On Israeli primetime television he was saying to them, implicitly but effectively, “If the UN does not stop bashing us and the world turns against us, we must be united in our determination to tell the world to go to hell.”

How Israel’s Jews would actually react if they were put on notice that they would be subjected to complete isolation and truly effective sanctions if they did not require their government to become serious about peace on terms the Palestinians could accept can only be a matter for speculation.

My guess is that some, perhaps many, would pack their bags and leave to start a new life elsewhere. But left behind, in a walled-in, nuclear armed fortress, would be the zealots who would be prepared, as Golda Meir once said to me in a BBC Panorama interview when she was Israel’s prime minister, to take the region and the world down with them.

And they, I believe, are the constituency to whom Netanyahu was appealing from the General Assembly platform.

As I have previously written I also believe the prospects of the major powers using the leverage they have to try to cause Israel to end its defiance of international law and denial of justice for the Palestinians would be significantly improved if the Palestinians insisted on the dissolution of the corrupt and impotent Palestine Authority (PA) and handing back to Israel complete responsibility and full accountability for the occupation. (I know that’s a tough ask because many thousands of Palestinians would lose their jobs and pay).

In his speech to the General Assembly Palestinian “President” Abbas hinted that this could be a next step, but there’s no reason to suppose it will happen on his watch. He and his leadership cronies have too much to lose by angering Netanyahu that much.

As things are I am finding it more and more difficult to resist the conclusion that the story of the conflict in and over Palestine that became Israel can only end in catastrophe for all.

It is a pity that the agitation by the Terai-Madhes groups has finally resulted in India-Nepal Relations taking a nose dive, thanks to messy handling from both sides.

What is worse, the Nepal media save one newspaper as well as many political leaders in Nepal have taken to “India bashing”- though India had nothing to do with the deteriorating law and order situation in the south as well as the deteriorating economic situation in the valley due to shortage of essential supplies. With the supply of fuel restricted to odd and even numbers and later total stoppage of supplies to private vehicle owners for a few days, the people in the valley are justifiably angry and the political leaders who were responsible for the situation are not helpful either in blaming India alone when they are equally responsible for this situation.

Kathmandu streets are empty. The shops and restaurants which were having good business are seen to be without customers. In view of transport difficulties attendance even in Pasupathinath temple is thin.

K.P.Oli who is tipped to be the next Prime minister in the next few days, accused India in very strong words of deliberately blocking vital supplies. He said that the Indian Government rather than the protestors on the border are responsible for the blockage in an “unofficial protest” against Nepal’s adoption of the new constitution. Oli in view of his impending elevation could have been little more diplomatic in making such statements. It helps no one, not even Nepal!

In a Press Conference, the Indian Ambassador declared that there “is no embargo.” He said that at no check point cargo vehicles have been barred from entering Nepal. He once again clarified that the so-called demand of seven points was not India’s and reiterated that India has no position on the specifics of Nepal’s constitution.

Nepal’s Ambassador to India had also remarked that they do not have a basis to call it a blockade.

Unfortunately, the impression gained in Nepal on the other hand is that India is fully supportive of the demands of Terai Madhes and while there is palpable anger in the north, the protestors perhaps appear to be encouraged to continue their agitation with more vigour. In this situation, the fear is that while the top three triumvirate, the NC, UML and the UCPN (M)are willing to relent on some of the critical issues on the constitution, the position of the Terai-Madhes leaders may get hardened. This will only result in more hardship to the whole country and not to any particular region!

It is my view that while there may not be any permanent damage to Indo Nepal relations as the stakes are too high for both sides, internally Nepal is now deeply divided between the people of the hills and the Terai Madhes- thanks to the insensitive new constitution which took both the Terai-Madhes and the Janjathis for granted. This division thanks to the political leaders of both sides is now very deep and cannot be restored in the near future!

There are some positive developments in the last few days that should be welcome.

Firstly, the top three parties appointed three representatives, one each to get in touch with the Terain leaders to find a solution. The three- Narayan Kaji Shrestha, of UCPN (M), Agni Prasad Kharel of UML and Mahesh Acharya of Nepali Congress have already met many of the Terain leaders and the outcome is being described as “positive.”

The UML according to media reports has come out with some suggestions on the twin issues of constituency delineation and proportional representation of marginalised groups. These seem to be broadly consistent with demands made by the agitating parties.

One suggestion is that the seats under the first past the post system (FPTP) will be divided with 79 seats in the 20 southern districts and the rest 86 for the remaining 55 districts. Population wise this is very close to 82 seats that could accrue to the southern districts and should be acceptable.

Province no. 2 perhaps represents Terai less the five districts of Sunsari, Morang, Jhapa, Kailali and Kanchanpur, while no. 3 represents Kathmandu valley and its environs.

The Terai leaders say that this proposal does not address the most crucial and controversial issue of the delineation of the Terai State which is deprived of five Madhesi dominated districts.

To conclude, the downward trend in Indo Nepal relations need to be arrested and it can be done. This can be compared to a person having frequent cough and cold that goes off with or without medication. But what is worrying is the trend within Nepal of one country developing into two nations. This has to be addressed immediately.

By Sandeep Bamzai*

Amnesty schemes are morally corrosive, there is absolutely no dispute on that basic premise. Simply because they provide an unfair advantage to people who dodge the bullet on taxes. And this is gun barrel straight, no questions asked. Hapless tax payers would argue that they do the right thing by paying their taxes and despite the stiff penalty, an amnesty scheme allows ingenious tax dodgers to get away with blue murder. But this is only part of the argument against an amnesty scheme, the other more compelling reason is that more often than not it is a failure in India given the size of the parallel economy.

Like the the black cash overseas stash amnesty scheme which ended at midnight on Wednesday. It has garnered a paltry Rs 3770 crore declared by 638 individuals and entities. A 90 day window which opened on July 1 with draconian penalty provisions has pretty much been laughed away by black money hoarders. The Government must obviously be stunned with the results given that it was tom tomming dramatic returns with half page advertisements in mass circulated dailies. In fact, at the presser on Thursday morning saw glum faces as the scheme has been an unmitigated disaster and a proverbial slap in the government’s face.

Prime Minister Narender Modi in his second Independence Day speech on August 15 had said Rs 6,500 crore of undisclosed income had already come through the compliance window, then. The window had started on July 1, and by August 15, it was only half way through. Under the scheme, those coming forward had to pay a total of 60% tax, which included 30% penalty. The tax and penalty on the income declared under the window has to be paid by December 31. The harsh penal provisions for those not declaring black money and other assets overseas included a 10 year jail term and even that has not scared the hoarders. A penalty of 120% and a jail term extending up to 10 years under the Black Money (Undisclosed Foreign Income and Assets) and Imposition of Tax Act, 2015 hasn’t acted as a catalyst. The Government has egg on its face.

Even the government’s assurance, that information would be kept confidential in terms of Section 138 of the I-T Act did not see people coming forward. In panic, on September 28, just two days before the compliance window was to shut, a CBDT clarification also did not help. The clarification stated that those declaring illegal overseas assets would not face any penalty or prosecution under Foreign Exchange Management Act (FEMA) and four other laws – Income-Tax Act, Wealth Tax Act, Companies Act and Customs Act. The last domestic VDIS scheme was launched 18 years ago after which the Govt gave a commitment to the Supreme Court that it would never bring any tax amnesty scheme to bear in the country. Central Board of Direct Taxes launched on June 18, 1997 the Voluntary Disclosure of Income Scheme (VDIS) which provided income-tax defaulters an opportunity to disclose their income at the prevailing tax rates under the umbrella protection of immunity from major laws relating to economic offences. The tax payable on the disclosed income was 30% in the case of individuals and 35% in the case of other declarants, viz, corporates and firms and Rs 10,000 crore was raised at the time. A Public Interest Litigation was filed in the Supreme Court arguing that schemes like VDIS penalised honest tax payers and at the same time encouraged tax evaders. The government then had to give an undertaking to the Supreme Court that the VDIS was the last of its kind, and the government would not bring any such schemes in the future.

But in the 2013 budget, a desperate UPA announced an amnesty scheme for service tax offenders, termed Service Tax Voluntary Compliance Encouragement Scheme. The scheme was in effect till December 2013 and fetched the government around Rs 6000 crore. Finance Minister Chidambaram had later said the government will not be able to announce any more amnesty schemes for the next 20 years, due to various factors, including curbs imposed by the Supreme Court. “Such schemes cannot be announced every year. There is a Supreme Court judgement on VDIS which actually ties up our hands in announcing a scheme on the lines of VDIS,” Chidambaram was quoted as saying by the PTI.

Last October, a top brokerage had said that unearthing capital flight of black money abroad by Indians could be in the vicinity of $30 to 35 billion which would help shore up foreign exchange reserves. What we have got instead in just a tad over $500 million leaving blue sky between what the government thought it would garner and actual reality. The flop scheme is a huge setback for a Government which was committed to bringing back black money. What is worrisome is that other nations have succeeded while India has failed abysmally in this exercise. Brokerage Macquarie in a note last year had said that globally, voluntary disclosure seemed to be the most popular mechanism with countries such as the US, UK, Australia and many others introducing VDS in some form or the other pointing out that the US and Italy netted 3.6 billion euros and 5.6 billion euros respectively between 2009 and 2011 through tax amnesty schemes.

The black money hoarders have cocked a snook at the government and while the revenue department and CBDT may now go after defaulters, the horse has bolted and long gone. Even the 638 declarants, I am sure must be small fish who out of fear have come forward. The big fish remain outside the ambit of the dragnet. I wonder what the Supreme Court will have to say now.

*The writer is a Visiting Fellow at Observer Research Foundation, Delhi

By S. Samuel C. Rajiv

Prime Minister Narendra Modi met with Palestine President Mahmoud Abbas on the side lines of the 70th UN General Assembly session in New York on September 28, 2015. Vikas Swarup, official spokesperson of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), tweeted that India was ‘bonding with Palestine’. Abbas last came to India in September 2012, for his fourth visit since 2005. The previous high-level meeting at the side lines of the UNGA between the two sides was in September 2013 when Foreign Minister Salman Khurshid met with his Palestinian counterpart.

Modi’s meeting with Abbas can be read as a further reaffirmation of the commitment of the government to maintain continuity in India’s Palestine policy. The Modi government’s Palestine policy had come under scrutiny because of increased high-level interactions with Israel, to be capped by the upcoming visits of President Pranab Mukherjee and Prime Minister Modi to Israel, as well as its response to ‘Operation Protective Edge’, the Israeli military action from July-August 2014.

Increase in Interactions with Israel

Israeli policy makers and analysts have often expressed displeasure at the lack of high-level political interactions with Indian leaders, despite the robust strategic engagement between the two countries. Mr. Modi’s meeting with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on September 28, 2014, at the side lines of the 69th UNGA sessions, therefore garnered headlines. This was the first interaction between the Indian and Israeli Prime Ministers since the September 2003 visit of Ariel Sharon to India. Press statements noted that discussions between Modi and Netanyahu pertained to defence ties, cyber security, water management, agriculture and solid waste management. Modi also accepted Netanyahu’s invitation to visit Israel.

There have also been other contacts between senior Indian and Israeli political leaders since the Modi government assumed office. Home Minister Rajnath Singh visited Israel in November 2014 to attend a Homeland Security conference. While Singh met with the top Israeli leadership including Netanyahu, the fact that he did not go to Ramallah (as had been the norm during previous visits by senior Indian cabinet ministers) was seen as a significant departure by some analysts. In addition, Modi met with the Israeli President Reuven Rivlin in Singapore in March 2015, when both were attending the state funeral of Lee Kwan Yew. During the course of a public lecture at the United Service Institution of India on April 1, 2015, Israeli Ambassador Daniel Carmon had stated that the meeting between the two leaders was ‘pre-planned’.

Indian Response to ‘Protective Edge’

The Modi government’s response to ‘Protective Edge’ came under criticism from the combined opposition, which demanded a resolution by Parliament ‘condemning’ the Israeli action. The government, however, rejected this demand after an unprecedented debate in the Rajya Sabha on July 21, 2014. (The previous instance of Parliament ‘condemning’ Israeli military activity was in the aftermath of the Lebanon invasion in 2006.) During the debate, Foreign Minister Sushma Swaraj pointed out that there had been no such demand – either from Congress MPs or from MPs of the Communist parties – during previous instances of large-scale Israeli military escalation in November 2012 (Operation ‘Pillar of Defence’) and December 2008-January 2009 (Operation ‘Cast Lead’). In response, senior Congress leader Anand Sharma contended that the opposition wanted a resolution this time around because it was not happy with the government’s response to the latest bout of escalation between Israel and Palestinian armed groups operating out of the Gaza Strip.

Swaraj then drew the attention of the Opposition to the BRICS Fortaleza Declaration of July 15, 2014 and the statement issued by the MEA on July 21. The BRICS Declaration, issued a week after Operation Protective Edge began, while reiterating the grouping’s staple positions on the Israel-Palestine issue, curiously did not even mention the then on-going escalation. But the MEA statement had expressed ‘deep concern’ at the escalation of violence while at the same time registering India’s “alarm at the cross-border provocations resulting from rocket attacks at targets inside Israel”. Thereupon, the Opposition criticised the government for equating Israel’s military response with Palestinian rocket attacks, insisting that ‘massacre’ was only taking place on one side (in the words of Leader of the Opposition in the Rajya Sabha Ghulam Nabi Azad).

Continuity in Indian Policy

The Modi government has been reiterating the importance of relations with Israel while at the same time insisting that there has been no change in India’s Palestine policy. In this regard, it is worth noting that Modi had issued a statement on the ‘International Day of Solidarity with the Palestine People’ (issued on November 21, 2014, though the Day is generally observed on November 29). In 2013, a similar statement had been issued on the same occasion by E. Ahmed, the then Deputy Foreign Minister in the UPA government. The previous instance of a Prime Ministerial statement on the occasion was by Dr. Manmohan Singh way back in 2007.

It is also important to note that Swaraj met with Palestinian Prime Minister Rami Hamdallah in April 2015 in Jakarta, at the side lines of the Asian-African Conference commemorating the 60th anniversary of the Bandung Conference. And on May 31, 2015, she indicated (on the occasion of the Modi government completing one year in office) that she would visit Israel, Palestine and Jordan ‘soon’, while Modi would also visit, ‘though no dates have been fixed’. Recent reports suggest that the Israeli government is concerned at the delay in the finalisation of the dates for Modi’s visit and that a senior aide of Netanyahu visited New Delhi to expedite the process.

Modi’s meeting with Abbas in New York puts to rest doubts about any imminent changes in India’s policy of voting in favour of Palestinian-related resolutions at the UN. In 2014, India voted in favour of each of the 14 such resolutions moved in the UNGA. All these resolutions criticised Israeli settlement activity in the occupied territories and supported the work of the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) for Palestinian Refugees, among others. Israel on its part views these resolutions as ‘outrageous’ and funding the ‘defamation and de-legitimisation’ of Israel. Therefore, it would seem that India and Israel will continue to ‘agree to disagree’ as regards India’s voting pattern in the UN on Palestine-related issues for the foreseeable future. Further, the Modi government did not desist from sponsoring the resolution – ‘Right of the Palestinian People to Self-Determination’ – which India had been sponsoring since 1998, albeit with some breaks in between. India did not sponsor this resolution in 2001, 2005 and in 2010, though it did support the resolution during these years.

India, however, abstained at the UN Human Rights Commission (UNHRC) on July 1, 2015 on a resolution welcoming the report of the Commission of Inquiry established a year ago to investigate violation of international humanitarian and human rights law in the ‘Occupied Territories’ during ‘Protective Edge’. The resolution, among other requirements, urged Israel and its antagonists to cooperate with the International Criminal Court in its ‘preliminary examination’ of the issue.

India’s stance then was welcomed by some Israeli analysts who termed it as a ‘major change’ in its policy position. It is pertinent to note here that the Modi government had voted in favour of the July 23, 2014 resolution which established the Commission of Inquiry. Others, however, rightly contended that the abstention related to a conflict involving Hamas (designated as a ‘terrorist organisation’ by the US, EU, Egypt, among others) and pointed out that India still voted against Israel when it came to resolutions at the UNGA.

In effect, India’s voting pattern at the UN on issues relating to Israel and Palestine did not register any perceptible change in 2014. This further substantiates the view that there has not been any change in India’s Palestine policy as a result of the change in government.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.

Originally published by Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (www.idsa.in) at http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/ReaffirmingIndiasTieswithPalestine_sscrajiv_011015.html

Since its creation in 1947, Pakistan has been struggling to ensure its survival as an independent state. Pakistan was carved out of the British India, therefore, it was natural for the remaining Indian forces to wish for reuniting India. In their surge for a greater India, the governments in New Delhi never left any stone unturned to destabilize Pakistan.

Due to its vulnerable position against India in the formative phase, Pakistan joined the US bloc during the Cold War by entering into western alliances such as SEATO and CENTO. Both Pakistan and the US have been involved in various junctures from the Cold War to the War on Terror. Pakistan was the key ally in the US containment policy against the USSR and as a Non-NATO Ally in War on Terror against the Taliban. Pakistan has always been lauding the US due to the one and only objective; to deter or counter Indian aggression against its security. In sum, Pakistan’s threat perception is India centric. New Delhi’s strategic policies in the region have always been the central tenet of Pakistan’s foreign and strategic policies.

The current strategic environment in South Asia has been drastically transformed where the US has now become the strategic partner of India and its policies toward Pakistan are routed through New Delhi. The policy makers in Washington D.C. are repeating the history of what they did after the Cold War. The pro-Indian set of mind has pronged the US intelligentsia, which has lost its principles of objective analysis while producing their policy recommendations toward Pakistan.

Commenting on the US obligations to help Pakistan in 1971, in a recent article against Pakistan, Christine Fair and Summit Ganguly argue that “In fact, even though sanctions imposed on both India and Pakistan after the 1965 war legally prohibited the United States from helping Pakistan when conflict with India reignited over East Pakistan in 1971, the Nixon administration nonetheless came to Islamabad’s assistance.”

This argument about justifying the US defiance in 1971 can be refuted on the basis that under the rules of International Law, a state cannot enact such legislations which may prohibit her from fulfilling her internationally committed obligations — rather states are supposed to adjust their municipal laws in accordance with their international obligations. Supposedly, we accept this argument; will United States allow India to refrain from its international obligations under the civilian nuclear cooperation agreement through amendment in Indian Laws, which may surpass all the obligations agreed bilaterally between the US and India under the framework of strategic partnership?

Another false claim is about Pakistan’s own interest in Afghanistan through Islamist militants in 1974 and pretends that the US only joined in 1979. This assessed through a brief overview of the US containment policy given by George F. Kennan in 1946-47. The US started its containment policy through the Truman Doctrine in 1947. As part of the US Policy of Containment, SEATO and CENTO were designed and Pakistan joined them due to India’s inclination toward the USSR bloc with a so-called claim of non-alignment.

The original puzzle for the US in 1971 was the India-USSR Treaty of Friendship signed in August 1971 prior to the Indian intervention in East Pakistan. It was actually the communist threat (under the guise of India-USSR Treaty of Friendship 1971) that had deterred the US from helping Pakistan. The dismemberment of East Pakistan was, in fact, a Soviet success against the US who had refrained from fulfilling its legal, as well as moral obligations to defend its ally.

Discussing the US non-proliferation concerns regarding Pakistan, Christine Fair and Summit Ganguly nullify their claim about the ‘Pakistan bringing the US Wallet in Afghanistan’ by stating that “Others in the White House and Congress, as well as those running the CIA’s covert operations in Afghanistan, maintained that Washington should continue to set aside its nonproliferation goals in favor of countering the Soviet threat in Afghanistan”.

This statement manifests the US policy about proxy-war in Afghanistan. Since the US containment policy was formed in 1947, the US had been eager to counter Soviet dominance anywhere in the world from the Korean War to the Cuban Missile Crisis, Vietnam War and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan until it got success through Pakistan’s assistance in collapse of the USSR.

Pakistan’s importance in the current US drawdown in Afghanistan cannot be ignored or replaced with Indian presence. Ignoring Pakistan’s geographical significance and installing New Delhi in Kabul shall leave Afghanistan into another enigma.

The enactment of the Pressler Amendment 1985 in 1990 is also one of the examples about dubious US policies for Pakistan. Such amendments have always served the US national interest because they give the US President a loop to oversight his obligations in order to adjust the national security interests. The need for certification that was declined by George H.W. Bush in 1990, were later proved to be wrong when his son George W. Bush agreed to sell F-16s to Pakistan.

It was again the US national interest that compelled them to overlook their non-proliferation concerns. Is it a coincidence that the US sanctions are always enacted when they have no major interests with Pakistan? Sanctions have been one of the most efficient instruments of the US foreign policy not only with Pakistan, but also with the rest of the world.

Advice to Obama Administration regarding ‘Pakistan’s misdeeds’ referring to the 2009 white paper on the US policy towards Pakistan is a typical expression of Indian thinking about Pakistan. Perhaps, Christine Fair and Summit Ganguly have overlooked Pakistan’s sacrifices for the sake of the US interests regarding terrorism. Pakistan has sacrificed more than any country in the world by joining the US war against terror and has been a real-time front line ally of the US that proved to be the first line of the US defense against terrorism.

It is also noteworthy that Pakistan’s role in this regard has been acknowledged several times by the US State Department, as well as the US Secretary of State and the US President.

The strategic demands of contemporary South Asia have not changed. Pakistan is still one of the major states that are pivotal for US interests in the region, if managed properly. The current Obama Administration, as well as the upcoming new US Administration, in 2016 should not deny what Pakistan has been doing for the US and must not annoy it by repeating the same policy what it has adopted since the Cold war.

The overwhelming US tilt towards India is one of the major concerns for Pakistan where it feels betrayed by the US administrations. Although, the US tilt towards India is aimed at containing China, why can’t the US adopt a policy of engagement with China where Pakistan can be a facilitator like it did in the past by bridging the diplomatic relations between the US and China? The US strategy to build up India shall prove to be  counterproductive and lead to regional instability because of aggressive Indian ambitions, as well as postures that can never be acceptable to both Pakistan and China. Pakistan’s strategic position is yet intact and cannot be over-sighted through Indian lenses by the US policymakers. It shall not be in the US interests to adopt aggressive policies toward Pakistan as desired by India — who has left its time-tested friendship with Russia and could later defy the United States as well.

Denying support to Pakistan’s military shall not be a strategy due to the military’s vital importance for the national security of the country along with mass-support by Pakistani public. The US refusal to replace or repair the already supplied strategic weapons could add fuel to already burning sentiments of the Pakistani public towards the US. Moreover, Pakistan has now acquired the capability to fulfill such needs at home. The recent repair of AWACS aircraft by Pakistani engineers, at half the cost of American estimates, is a glaring example.

As it is evident that Pakistan has a well-established missile development program, as well as nuclear weapon capability along with the manufacturing of JF-17 Thunder fighter jets (supposed to be an alternative of the F-16 for Pakistan), it will be not be dependent on US supplies in the near future.

Despite the US efforts to stall Pakistan’s nuclear, as well as its missile development program, it could not avert Pakistan from achieving her national security objectives. The denial of military assistance to Pakistan shall also prove to be counterproductive because of the available potential market for the purpose around the world as well as the resilience of Pakistani nation to meet the challenges to their national security.

Linking the US provided military equipment with a condition to use only against terrorism, is unrealistic. How is it possible to instruct your ally about the usage of provided weapons only to serve your interests but not in case of threat to his own security? Moreover, the US provided weapon systems are irrelevant in case of Pakistan’s national security imperatives regarding India. Pakistan’s security measures against India are not dependent on conventional arms provided by the US, rather Pakistan meets the challenge of Indian aggression through nuclear deterrence. After the nuclearization of South Asia, the US military assistance to Pakistan has become less vital at the moment as it has been in the past.

The so-called posture of democratic partner (Democratic India) also needs to be evaluated. The US stance about democracy does not rest only on the electoral system of democracy, rather it is accompanied with the principles of human rights as well as protection to minorities and provision of social security at the doorsteps of the masses. Except holding elections in-time, no more requisite of a democratic nation can be found in India. At the moment, there are several freedom movements in India that aim at to save themselves from the gross-misconduct of the Indian governments. The absence of basic social services in the larger part of India, Human Rights violations in Kashmir and forced conversion of minorities to Hinduism are the modern-day evidences of so-called democratic posture of India, which is not, in any case, compatible with the US democratic values and therefore, not eligible to claim the democratic partnership with the United States.

Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are not meant for the coercion of any country in the world, except for India which is not a loop as well. It is a well-known fact that Pakistan’s nuclear program is India-centric and Pakistan has always developed its capabilities in reaction to Indian aggressive postures and doctrines. Pakistan’s nuclear facilities are under the best security arrangements in comparison with any country in the world, and this is acknowledged by renowned people in the field as well. Suggesting air strikes on Pakistan’s nuclear facilities is an immature ambition that can never be materialized due to the competence of Pakistan’s armed forces to defend their homeland.

The desires about non-intervention from the US in the India-Pakistan crises shall also prove to be self-defeating as US intervention has always benefited New Delhi’s interests. Perhaps, New Delhi is yet hesitant to accept the reality of Pakistan’s defense capabilities and wants to deliberately live in the fool’s paradise that they it can overcome Pakistan through aggressive postures. New Delhi must now shed this Utopian view with respect to Pakistan and learn to co-exist on equal footings. It is in the best interest of India to remain at peace with a nuclear Pakistan. Undermining Pakistan’s capabilities and will to defend itself will bring only suicidal outcomes. A stable and secure Pakistan is necessary for the region.

By Abhijit Singh*

The recent commissioning of the INS Kochi has triggered a debate about the desirability of building big warships. At 7,500 tonnes, the Kochi is one of the largest guided missile destroyers ever assembled by an Indian shipbuilding yard. Fitted out for a multi-mission role in the Indian Ocean with armament comprising Brahmos cruise missiles, long Range Surface-to-Air Missiles (LR-SAM), anti-submarine rockets, and torpedoes, the ship is easily the most sophisticated and powerful capital combatant to have graced the Navy’s fighting fleet.

This is the second big Indian destroyer to have been commissioned in the past fourteen months. In August 2014, INS Kolkata, the lead ship of the P 15-A class, joined the Western fleet at Mumbai. The excitement surrounding the commissioning of the two destroyers followed the enthusiastic averment of political leaders and strategic experts who sought to portray the new assets as India’s ‘battleships’ meant to assert strategic dominance in the Indian Ocean.

Not everyone is convinced of the ships’ operational utility though. Following the Kochi’s commissioning, critics of big-ship construction raised doubts about the economic logic of acquiring expensive behemoths. High cost, time delays, expensive maintenance schedules and superfluous capability add-ons, they pointed out, make large warship construction a particularly profligate activity. Given the construction cost of over Rs. 4,000 crores, sceptics wondered if the new class of ships could deliver value for money, particularly when the navy is vulnerable to the vagaries of budget cuts and is in no position to build more expensive combat platforms.

Critics have a valid point. With a peacetime mission comprising of primarily constabulary, humanitarian assistance and diplomatic flag flying deployments, the navy is unlikely to find ships of the size of Kochi very useful for such missions in the Indian Ocean. With the bulk of its operational energies spent in conducting coastal security and non-combatant evacuation missions – such as the operation in Yemen earlier this year – the navy already has a problem of sophisticated warships performing low-end tasks. The suggestion then that, in place of large redundant war-vessels, the country must focus on building light frigates, patrol boats, and utility craft for surveillance and constabulary duties does appear to have some merit.

Navalists, however, summarily reject modest estimations of the big warship’s utility in peacetime operations. Proponents of ‘battleship’ construction claim that giant warships go well beyond fighting decisive battles in conflict. By their very nature, they are also a political tool in peacetime. Besides fighting enemy ships in a conventional engagement, large warships are meant to signal political resolve by assuming a forceful posture in distant maritime theatres. Supporters also make the ‘power–projection’ argument. By virtue of their sophisticated design and fearsome looks, modern destroyers have the capability to project both fire and fear at much greater distances. Their appeal lies in the fact that besides serving as an effective strategic bulwark, such ships have the strength and resilience to absorb more punishment than any other naval platform. The thick armour-plating, combined with stealth features, makes them infinitely more survivable than smaller vessels.

For classical sea-power thinkers, big warships are indispensable assets in modern day warfare because of their size and versatility and the unique capacity to efficiently integrate the foremost innovations in naval technology involving sensors, cruise missiles, unmanned drones and directed energy weapons. Modern technological innovations are extremely power intensive and can only be mounted on large platforms. Moreover, large ships offer greater protection to sophisticated armament and sensors. Unlike smaller vessels, they do not just depend on manoeuvrability and close-in weapon systems for defence. Their superior anti-missile capability ensures a higher order of survivability from incoming missile strikes.

The more interesting tactical argument in favour of large-vessel construction is the protection such ships afford to on-board sensors and machinery. Modern battleships have a protective shield that limits the damage to key components from missile and torpedo attacks to a small area surrounding the point of contact. This ensures a direct hit does not debilitate the entire combat machinery of the ship. By contrast, an attack on a vessel without adequate protection could impact sensitive, deeply integrated technology systems on-board resulting in a complete shutdown of the command and control systems. Large warships also have a greater capacity to accommodate critical passive systems that are invaluable for fleet protection in an anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) environment.

Proponents also offer a more convincing strategic rationale for building “battleships”. Large modern war-vessels, they aver, facilitate a quantum of power projection that small ships cannot ever hope to match. This is especially true in a globalizing environment where powerful nations seek to influence regional perceptions through hard-power posturing. Indeed, despite expanding global interconnectedness and the shrinking space for conventional conflicts, navies have consistently engaged in hard-power signalling in critical strategic spaces. In East Asia, for instance, China, Japan, Russia and the US have deployed powerful naval contingents on a regular basis, often on the pretext of carrying out benign patrols. The South China Sea is, in fact, the most revealing example of a strategic build-up involving economically interdependent states, occurring in a perfectly globalizing space.

Maritime disputes in Southeast Asia also illustrate the enduring nature of geopolitics. No matter what the economic context, maritime forces must posture, position and manoeuvre to preserve national geopolitical equities. The protection of political influence in the maritime littorals, supporters argue, needs more than a fleet of small specialist vessels. It requires a powerful navy – with air-craft carriers, submarines and big-battle ships – to both project power and protect the fighting fleet from enemy attacks. Indeed, the general consensus in India’s maritime fraternity today is that modern naval arsenals, specifically anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), are far more dangerous than older weaponry. Chinese cruise and ballistic missiles are, in fact, capable of targeting Indian naval assets operating anywhere in the Indian Ocean. That makes the case for bigger, sturdier and stronger ships even more compelling.

The second argument in favour of big war-vessels concerns national brand-building. The large and powerful Kochi is a perfect poster-child for indigenisation and the Narendra Modi government’s mantra of ‘Make-in India”. The ship has been designed by the Navy’s in-house organization – the Directorate of Naval Design – and was constructed in the Mazagon Dock Shipbuilders yard in Mumbai. Supporters also point out that India isn’t the only Indo-Pacific power investing in big ships. The US is building expensive carriers, battleships and littoral combat vessels, and the Chinese have undertaken construction of two aircraft carriers, whilst significantly expanding their big amphibious ship programme. Meanwhile, Japan and Australia have placed large helicopter carriers at the centre of their maritime military strategies.

Finally, nothing conveys strategic intent as effectively as the large conventional warship. The mere presence of powerful destroyers and frigates bristling with cutting edge armament and sensors can provide a decisive psychological advantage in strategic scenarios. It isn’t sheer happenstance, navalists point out, that China has been deploying Type 054A guided-missile frigates (equipped with the YJ-83 anti-ships missiles) and submarines for anti-piracy duties in the Indian Ocean. By sending its most modern combatants for low-spectrum security tasks, Beijing has sought to stamp its military footprint in the South Asia littorals. By the same token, the US has been unapologetic about deploying its aircraft carriers for humanitarian assistance duties in the Western Pacific, even as it has chosen to deploy its littoral combat ships for functional tasks that can be performed by smaller functional assets.

India’s maritime managers realise that in the new world, regional perceptions define maritime strategy. Since perception management is a key ingredient of maritime diplomacy, the navy must rely on aircraft carriers and large destroyers for power-projection in the Indian Ocean. This includes capabilities which are used more to attain strategic leverage than actually fight full-scale wars. Given the fractious nature of geopolitics in maritime-Asia, big warships aptly exemplify India’s growing geopolitical ambitions. Regardless of what sceptics may say then, the super-destroyer is here to stay.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India. Originally published by Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (www.idsa.in) at http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/INSKochiandtheBig-WarshipDebate_asingh_091015.html

Yesterday, the All-Tatar Social Center organized a demonstration in Kazan, Tatarstan in honor of those who defended that city against Ivan Grozny in 1552 and used the occasion to demand the restoration of the republic’s state sovereignty and an end to repression of Tatar activists and political prisoners.

The Center has been holding such October meetings every year since perestroika times, and although the number of participants now is far fewer than it was in the early 1990s, the complaints of those taking part and their demands have remained consistent and directed toward freedom and independence for Tatarstan (novayagazeta.ru/news/1697182.html).

Participants spoke about the Tatar’s loss of state sovereignty in recent years, about the inability of Tatars to be educated in their national language, the persecution of Tatars under the pretext of fighting Islamist radicalism, and the imperial aspirations of Moscow from the 16^th century to the present day.

They called for the republic’s State Council to restore to the republic’s constitution its earlier declarations about the state sovereignty of Tatarstan and about its status as a subject of international law. Both these provisions were removed over the last decade at the insistent of Vladimir Putin’s regime.

Those who were able to attend complained that several of the leading activists, including Fauziya Bayramova and Aydar Khalim, were prevented from attending by the police who stopped their car on the pretext of preventing extremism and so delayed it that they were unable to reach Kazan in time. Bayramova was able to speak to the crowd via telephone.

In an another act illustrating the way in which the Tatarstan authorities have been forced to restrict this demonstration, participants this year were not able to march to the walls of the Kazan kremlin as a group. Instead, they had to walk there separately and lay flowers at the site independently rather than as a group.

Despite these restrictions, some Ukrainian commentators celebrated the event as the beginning of the disintegration of the Russian Federation. A typical article of this kind was simply but provocatively entitled “It’s Begun” (joinfo.ua/politic/1125353_Nachalos-Kazani-proshla-massovaya-aktsiya.html).

Both the restrictions in Kazan and this enthusiasm in Ukraine sparked objections from some Russian nationalists who suggested that no one “needs such ‘a day of memory’ in Kazan and accused participants of being the worst form of the current recrudescence of what they called “bourgeois nationalism” (forum-msk.org/material/news/11026028.html).

This year’s commemoration of the defenders of Kazan corresponded with memorial meetings in neighboring Bashkortostan where Bashkir activists marked the 25^th anniversary of the declaration of their republic’s state sovereignty. At these meetings and in commentaries about them, the Bashkirs raised many of the same points the Tatars did (interfax-russia.ru/Povoljie/news.asp?id=661002&sec=1671 and kyk-byre.ru/1854-vstanem-za-respubliku-bashkortostan.html).

By Michael Lelyveld

After two years of preparation, China’s new reform plan for its vast state-owned holdings has received poor reviews, dimming hopes for one of the government’s critical economic programs.

The 20-page plan issued last month by the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee and the State Council, or cabinet, seeks to revitalize the sprawling state sector with opportunities for private and possible foreign investment.

The blueprint could potentially force changes at 155,000 state-owned enterprises (SOEs) belonging to China’s central and local governments, ranging from hydropower producers to hospitals.

SOE reform is seen as a crucial task for the government to promote economic growth. Estimates of the state sector’s share in China’s gross domestic product (GDP) run from one- third to nearly 40 percent.

While SOEs enjoy a privileged status and access to bank loans, they have fallen behind the private sector in terms of growth, productivity and efficiency.

In a report on the plan, the official Xinhua news agency described the state sector as “torpid.”

In the first seven months of the year, SOE profits fell 2.3 percent to 1.4 trillion yuan (U.S. $219.9 billion), Xinhua said. SOE assets have been valued at 105.5 trillion yuan (U.S. $16.5 trillion).

The reform is meant to “make such companies stronger and better helps (sic) to strengthen the economy, beef up defense capabilities, enhance national cohesion, as well as raise China’s status internationally,” the State Council said on its website.

“At the same time, it should also be made clear that state-owned companies are complementary with that of other types of ownership,” the government said.

The program would divide SOEs into for-profit companies and those “dedicated to public welfare,” suggesting that sectors such as education and health care would be allowed to run at a loss.

Commercial enterprises would be “market-based,” more professionally managed, more efficient and capable of operating as “fully independent market entities.”

Sectors including shipping, telecommunications and banking would be open to private investment under a “mixed ownership” concept that the government has been promoting heavily for over a year.

Mixed ownership would be spurred with mechanisms such as share sales and share rights swaps. The government has set a target date of 2020 for achieving “major reforms in key areas,” state media said.

But the stock market fell sharply in trading sessions after the guideline was unveiled, in part due to disappointment with the long-awaited plan, according to both the foreign and state-controlled press.

The Wall Street Journal called it a “modest fix to China’s brand of state capitalism,” while the official English-language China Daily said it “looks too broad to brush out problems.”

Main concern

A key concern is that the program would effectively expand the state sector rather than shrinking it by trying to draw in private capital and pushing mergers and acquisitions.

The approach is consistent with reports over the past year that the government wants to create a “national champion” in the oil industry by merging state companies to compete with international majors.

“The government should nurture a group of SOEs that are creative and can face international rivals by that time (2020),” the program said.

But the guideline’s goals are also riddled with contradictions that seem likely to frustrate its competitive goals.

SOE boards would be given more decision-making powers and intervention by government agencies would be forbidden, Xinhua reported.

But in a subsequent report, the agency made clear that the Communist Party, if not the government, would stay in control of the companies through management appointments.

“The guideline stressed the principle of the CPC in charge of executive selection in SOEs,” it said.

In a telephone briefing by the National Bureau of Asian Research during President Xi Jinping’s recent visit to the United States, China economist Nicholas Lardy at the Peterson Institute for International Economics said the message on reform was deeply mixed.

“The program that came out … was the typical conflicted document that had a few good things in it and then quite a few things that … seemed to be moving in the wrong direction,” Lardy said.

The guideline has also been criticized for its lack of specificity.

“The program is so comprehensive and so general, if not philosophical, that putting it into practice still requires a series of subsidiary programs,” China Daily said.

Although Premier Li Keqiang has praised the merits of the program, it seems unlikely that its cool reception could have come as a surprise.

“I don’t think they could possibly have imagined that this was going to energize anyone,” said Derek Scissors, an Asia economist and resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute.

“This is not a sign of anything positive whatsoever and I don’t think anybody in the government thinks that,” Scissors said.

Government and party officials have been working on the SOE document ever since the CPC’s Third Party Plenum outlined its sweeping series of reforms in 2013, but the outcome suggests that entrenched state sector interests prevailed over reformers in the prolonged policy struggle.

“They had the battle and the conservatives won,” Scissors said.

Never in the cards

Although officials have made clear since the plenum that mass privatization was never in the cards, the latest plans “are mostly about defending the status quo,” the Financial Times said.

Still, the government’s push has been driving some activity among the SOEs.

Last month, China National Offshore Oil Corp. (CNOOC) said it is forming a joint venture with MSP/DRILEX Inc., a private company based in Shanghai, for deep-water exploration, Xinhua reported.

China National Petroleum Corp. (CNPC) plans several partnering steps, including an offering to investors for 49 percent of its Xinjiang oilfields, the news agency said.

On Sept. 30, the Ministry of Finance also announced a 180-billion yuan (U.S. $28.3-billion) fund with 10 state-owned lenders to support public-private partnerships (PPP).

The move followed the ministry’s listing of 206 PPP projects valued at 659 billion yuan (U.S. $103 billion), Xinhua said.

Such opportunities may be a long way from a full opening to private investment or privatization of SOEs, but they may allow the government to claim that its program is a success.

“The best that can be said on SOE reform is that it’s going to depend very much on how they carry out this program.

If they emphasize the liberalizing aspects of it, it could have a positive effect,” said Nicholas Lardy.

“If they emphasize bigger is better and consolidation, then it’s likely to move in the other direction,” he said.

Rival factions in Libya have rejected a recent UN-brokered agreement on the formation of a national unity government.

Reacting to the deal, Mahmud Abdel Aziz, a lawmaker from the Tripoli-based General National Congress (GNC), said on Monday that it would deepen rifts in the North African nation.

“This government is rejected… it will deepen differences between the Libyan people,” media outlets quoted Abdel Aziz as saying.

The Tripoli-based government has been demanding amendments to the UN-proposed peace agreement for Libya.

Meanwhile, Ali Tekbali, a lawmaker from the internationally recognized parliament, which is based in the northeastern city of in Tobruk, also dismissed the UN plan, saying the government it has proposed is one of “divisions, not unity.”

Tekbali also noted that UN special envoy for Libya, Bernardino Leon, “wants to impose a fait accompli on us.”

The Tobruk-based parliament members are expected to meet on Monday to discuss the UN-proposed unity government.

Leon, the head of the UN Support Mission to Libya (UNSMIL), has proposed the formation of a unity government in the violence-hit country.

Since August 2014, when militias seized the capital, Tripoli, Libya has had two parliaments and two governments with one, the GNC, run by the rebels in the capital and the other, which is internationally-recognized, based of Tobruk.

Talks have been held between the two sides for months, with Leon trying to produce an agreement that will lead to the formation of a government and an end to the militancy in the country.

Libya has been grappling with violence and political uncertainty since 2011.

Original article

Saudi Arabia is committed to a political solution that would lead to Syrian President Bashar Assad giving up power, said Foreign Minister Adel Al-Jubeir in Russia.

He said the Kingdom plans to tackle challenges in the region jointly with Moscow. Al-Jubeir also reiterated that a road map discussed by global and regional powers in 2012 should be the guiding principle for any Syria talks

Al-Jubeir lauded the “constructive talks” held between Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Russian President Vladimir Putin. The talks touched on military cooperation, fighting terrorism and political coordination in areas related to the region, notably Yemen and Syria, he was quoted as saying by the SPA.

Al-Jubeir said he clarified the Kingdom’s stance over Russia’s military operations in Syria and its concern that these operations could be interpreted as an alliance between Iran, Hezbollah and Assad.

Al-Jubeir said the Kingdom’s stance on the Syrian crisis, notably toward Assad, would remain unchanged, which included that a political solution was needed based on the principles of Geneva 1.

This calls for the establishment of a transitional authority composed of the regime and the opposition to run the country’s affairs, prepare for new elections, draft a new constitution, and the removal of Assad.

Al-Jubeir expressed hope that a solution could be found that would ensure integrity of the country, preserve its military institutions and the rights of its peoples.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said he and Al-Jubeir were assigned to intensify contact between the two nations’ ministries of foreign affairs, defense and intelligence to fight against terrorism.

In response to reporters’ questions, Lavrov said that talks were taking place to ensure contact between Russia, Egypt and the moderate Syrian opposition.

Al-Jubeir, in response to a question, said that the Kingdom was at the forefront of countries fighting terrorism, and had seen many citizens martyred in the process at the hands of Al-Qaeda and Daesh.

The head of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) said that without Hossein Hamedani, the IRGC commander who was recently killed in Syria, it would have been very difficult to “handle” the 2009 election protests.

Speaking at Hamedani’s funeral, Mohammad Ali Jafari said on Monday October 12 that the late commander played a pivotal role in silencing the mass protests of 2009.

The IRGC announced earlier that Hossein Hamedani was killed by ISIS forces in the suburbs of Aleppo in Syria.
Jafari spoke of Hamedani’s establishment of the “Mohammad Rasoulallah” Guard in Tehran, saying: “Destroying the enemy conspiracy in the sedition of 2009 was one of the great accomplishments of Commander Hamedani.”

The 2009 election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was challenged by other candidates with allegations of vote fraud, which led to widespread mass protests in several of Iran’s large cities. Scores were killed and hundreds were arrested. The authorities refer to the protests as “sedition”.

“Without the experience and management of Commander Hamedani during the Ashura events of 2009, handling the sedition would have been very difficult,” Jafari said.

One of the toughest clashes between protesters and Iranian security forces occurred on the day of Ashura for that year in December of 2009.

The head of the IRGC referred to Hamedani as the “most honoured martyr” of the Islamic Revolution, saying: “After the 2009 riots and silencing the sedition, he could not sit still and volunteered to join the Resistance Front in Syria” and “after transferring his experiences and carrying out his advisory duties, he gave his life to Islam”.

Iran has supported the Beshar Assad regime in Syria, and Jafari referred to Iran’s role in Syria as “support for the Islamic resistance front”.

Long-range winter weather forecasts could be twice as accurate by taking account of unusual winds miles up in the stratosphere, scientists have found.

Meteorologists at the University of Reading, European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts (ECMWF) and Environment Canada found that by taking account of changing winds in the stratosphere, forecasters could be twice as certain of their winter weather predictions for between a fortnight and a month in advance.

The findings mean that forecasters can be more certain about predicting extreme winter weather up to four weeks before it happens, giving governments, businesses, and individuals more certainty when planning for extreme events, such as floods or snow storms.

The new research was published Tuesday in the journal Environmental Research Letters.

Dr Om Tripathi, from the Department of Meteorology, University of Reading, who led the research, said, “Forecasting the weather a full month ahead is a tough ask, but that’s what businesses and emergency services really need to prepare for extreme winter weather.”

According to Tripathi, “Accurate advance notice of prolonged cold spells, such as the ‘polar vortex’ that hit North America over the past two winters, can save lives and help keep power and transport networks running.”

Tripathi added, “Our latest findings should give forecasters more confidence when issuing some winter weather forecasts up to a month in advance.”

High up in the stratosphere is the polar night jet stream, at around 40km (25 miles) above the surface of the Earth – around the height reached by record-breaking parachutist Felix Baumgartner.

Winds in the polar night jet stream usually blow from the west and have speeds of around 70mph. The research team found that during conditions in which the polar night jet stream wind speeds exceed 90mph, or reverse their direction to flow from the east, forecasts in both the stratosphere and troposphere (the layer of atmosphere closest to the ground), are more skillful.

While it was previously known that a sudden weakening of these winds, and subsequent warming of the stratosphere, was a source of predictability, the researchers found that the opposite was also true when the polar night jet stream strengthened and the polar stratosphere was unusually cold. Such stratospheric conditions occur up to 3-4 times a winter, meaning that around one in five winter ‘sub-seasonal’ forecasts (those looking 2-4 weeks ahead) might benefit from this effect.

The strength of stratospheric winds can influence the position of the jet stream in the troposphere, having a major influence on weather across the North Atlantic, and allow freezing polar air to travel further south than would normally be expected.

The researchers examined 30 years’ worth of past forecast data to see how the state of the stratosphere affected the accuracy of the forecast.

Dr Andrew Charlton-Perez, University of Reading, who co-authored the study, said, “We are only just beginning to learn how conditions in the stratosphere influence our weather several weeks later.

“The more we learn about these links, along with other processes in the tropical atmosphere and links between the land surface and the atmosphere, the more we can improve weather forecasts on this important sub-seasonal timescale,” Charlton-Perez said.

Improving sub-seasonal forecasts is the focus of several current major international initiatives including the S2S project, sponsored by the World Meteorological Organisation. This research was part of the SNAP project, which contributes to this effort by working with researchers in seven countries on stratospheric predictability and its influence on the troposphere.

(Civil.Ge) — Georgia’s PM Irakli Garibashvili said on October 12 that Tbilisi’s relations with Baku will remain “friendly and strategic” and dismissed talk of “diversification, replacement of Azerbaijani gas” supplies as “utterly absurd”.

Georgian Energy Ministry said late last week that Tbilisi was open for talks with Gazprom on possible gas supplies for private entities in Georgia in order to, as Energy Minister Kakha Kaladze and his deputy put it, “diversify” energy supplies for the country. Kaladze, who met Gazprom chief executive in Brussels in late September, reiterated on October 12 that private entities might be interesting in purchasing Russian gas if the price is acceptable.

Georgia receives most of its gas supplies from Azerbaijan; it also receives, as a transit fee, 10% of gas shipped by Russia to Armenia through a pipeline running via Georgia.

After the Georgian Energy Minister spoke about possible gas supplies from Gazprom last week, PM Garibashvili made a brief and unannounced visit to Baku on October 10, where he met Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, triggering speculation in Tbilisi that the surprise visit aimed at mending ties after potential fallout caused by Tbilisi’s suggestions over Gazprom gas supplies.

“It was shameful that [the PM] had to hastily visit [Baku] in order to put right what was messed up in previous days,” said Irakli Alasania, leader of the Free Democrats (FD).

FD lawmakers have called on the Energy Minister to appear before MPs to clarify the situation and explain why there is a need for Russian gas when Georgia already has stable supplier from Azerbaijan.

Opposition lawmaker from UNM party, Zurab Melikishvili, said: “Georgia is supplied for years already with stable and cheap natural gas from Azerbaijan. There is no problem of increasing supply if there is a demand for additional gas, but they still continue talks with Gazprom, which is damaging Georgia’s interests.”

President Giorgi Margvelashvili’s newly appointed political adviser, Pikria Chikhradze, voiced similar position and said on October 12, that Georgia was not in need of any “diversification” of gas supplies at this stage, especially when it has to do with Russia’s “political weapon” Gazprom.

PM Garibashvili told journalists on October 12, that he visited Baku for “a routine, working, friendly meeting with President Aliyev.”

He said that President Aliyev will visit Tbilisi on November 6.

“We spoke about deepening our close, strategic and friendly relations,” Garibashvili said.

“No revision of relations with Azerbaijan whatsoever is planned – we have and we will have a very close, friendly and strategic relations with Azerbaijan. How can a politician even think about revising our relations with Azerbaijan? That’s utterly absurd,” the Georgian PM said.

“There are no talks on diversification, replacement of Azerbaijani gas whatsoever; that’s utterly absurd and irresponsible politicians should not mislead people,” he said.

In his comments, the PM did not address specifically the issue of talks with Gazprom on possible gas supplies.

South Africa’s ruling African National Congress (ANC) adopted a resolution at its national council meeting calling for the country’s withdrawal from the International Criminal Court (ICC) and will present the bill in parliament, announced Obed Bapela, deputy minister in the Presidency, a key figure of the ruling party since the end of apartheid.

Bapela claimed that powerful nations “trample” human rights and through the ICC pursue “selfish interests”.

The debate on the ICC intensified in South Africa after the Hague-based court protested the nation’s refusal to carry out an ICC warrant for the arrest of Sudanese President Omar Hassan al Bashir during his recent visit to Pretoria. The Head of State is wanted for war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide in the Sudanese Darfur region.

Hopeful news at the end of last week that the Obama Administration was considering disengaging from its schizophrenic war in Syria has given way to the ugly reality that Washington’s neocons in charge will never back away from a fight (as long as they are not doing the fighting).

In the first bit of bad news, we saw the policy shift away from vetting and training rebels. The Administration announced that because the $500 million plan to train and equip vetted “moderate” rebels has been an obvious failure, the solution was to remove the training and vetting part of the project and simply send military equipment. From now on only leaders of the rebel groups would be vetted. The fighters would simply be armed, no questions asked.

What kinds of groups would be newly armed by the US? Groups with “diverse membership,” which likely means al-Qaeda affiliate the al-Nusra front, Ahrar al Shams, and other jihadists.

The new plan has materialized with considerable speed. Over the weekend we learned that Saudi Arabia delivered 500 TOW anti-tank missiles to anti-Assad Syrian rebels.

Today CNN reports that the United States has airdropped 50 tons of weapons and ammunition to its favored “Syrian Arab Coalition” forces — a US re-branded group known for its unreliability and for handing weapons over to al-Qaeda and ISIS.

In fact, according to Joshua Landis, a Syria expert at the University of Oklahoma, “probably 60 to 80 percent of the arms that America shoveled in have gone to al-Qaida and its affiliates.”

But it’s even worse and more dangerous than that. The hundreds of TOW missiles provided to the rebels by the US and its allies have for the past several days been used not against ISIS, but to strike Russian-made tanks of the Syrian Arab Army as it fights against al-Qaeda and ISIS.

Thus laid bare is the real US policy goal in Syria: to take out Assad. ISIS, not so much.

The TOW missile program is a CIA program, separate from the failed Defense Department rebel training program. The CIA has been arming and training unvetted rebels — many if not most foreign mercenaries rather than Syrians — to overthrow the Assad government since 2011 or 2012. The shot in the arm it has received from new shipments is obvious, as one rebel commander describes a recent attack on Assad’s forces:

‘It was a tank massacre,’ said Capt. Mustafa Moarati, whose Tajamu al-Izza group says it destroyed seven tanks and armored vehicles Wednesday.

More missiles are on the way, he said. New supplies arrived after the Russian deployments began, he said, and the rebels’ allies have promised further deliveries soon, bringing echoes of the role played by U.S.-supplied Stinger antiaircraft missiles in forcing the Soviet Union to withdraw from Afghanistan in the 1980s.

Administration officials are openly welcoming attacks by their proxies against Russian targets — including bases — in Syria, according to a Washington Post article:

One U.S. official who is familiar with the CIA program — and who like other officials spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss intelligence matters — said the attacks have galvanized some of the agency-equipped units.

‘Now they get to fight the Russians,’ the official said. ‘This improves morale.’ …

U.S. officials said those involved in the agency program are already exploring options that include sending in rocket systems and other weapons that could enable rebels to strike Russian bases…

So here is the strategy dreamed up by the Beltway’s best and brightest: replay the 1980s US proxy war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. It is the resurrection of the Zbigniew Brzezinski plan to create and arm the Mujahideen to take out Russia in Syria as they took out the USSR in Afghanistan.

In a 1998 interview reproduced in Counterpunch, Brzezinski openly bragged about being the father of this plan. Asked (in 1998!) whether he regretted taking action that led to the creation of Islamic extremism in Afghanistan, he scoffed:

Brzezinski: What is most important to the history of the world? The Taliban or the collapse of the Soviet empire? Some stirred-up Moslems or the liberation of Central Europe and the end of the cold war?

Most Americans hopefully still remember what happened three years after this interview and hopefully will draw the right conclusions about the Brzezinski Plan redux in 2015. The danger deepens. Obama should have disengaged.

This article was published by the RonPaul Institute.