By Robie Mitchell and Mark Cameron*

Guatemala appears to be, for better or worse, entering the denouement of a climactic year for its ongoing corruption investigation, which saw its peak just weeks ago when the Guatemalan National Congress voted to strip former President Otto Perez Molina of his political immunity. Molina is now facing trial for his suspected involvement in the custom house bribery scandal known as “La Linea.” At least 28 officials within the national customs group called SAT collaborated to collect bribes in exchange for lowering the tariffs that were legally required to be levied on corporations, and included various importers, lawyers, and even a former intelligence agent. All told, the ranks of the guilty swelled to 64.¹ To keep the scam from becoming too blatant, importers still paid 40 percent of what sum was expected, paid 30 percent to the corrupt officials, and pocketed the other 30 percent as savings.² The Guatemalan people were defrauded $328,000 weekly in this scheme, or the equivalent of the minimum daily wage for 1,682 industrial laborers.³ In Guatemala nearly 53 percent of the population lives in poverty according to the World Bank, and access and funding to health services and education is lacking. It is difficult to understand why Guatemala’s political and economic elites never imagined they would be caught and punished for their abuse of power on this scale.

Today, Molina sits in a military detention facility facing charges of customs fraud, conspiracy, and bribery.⁴ His chances of avoiding prosecution appear slim. Former Head of Customs Claudia Azucena Méndez Asencio testified on Monday, September 21 to a meeting that took place between Molina, Carlos Enrique Muñoz the then Chief of Tax Administration, and Salvador Estuardo González—known as “Eco”—who is said to be one of the principle leaders of La Línea.⁵ The arrests of such high-ranking officials represents an impressive feat for the country’s popular sectors and social movements.⁶

Credit for the removal of Molina’s impunity and his subsequent arrest, has been most markedly handed to the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG), as well as the international actors who financially and logistically back the commission through the United Nations. The CICIG began its investigation into corruption and impunity within the Guatemalan state in September 2007. While due credit is owed to the relentless work done by the CICIG to root out corruption and impunity among Guatemalan officials, who for the previous half-century had been considered “untouchable,” the role of popular mobilization should not be understated. The protests that have emerged in recent months have put to test the democratic strength of Guatemala’s institutions. Moreover, the success of these protests represents one of the most significant inroads for the left in Guatemala, and the northern triangle as a whole, since the U.S.-backed coup of the democratically elected President Jacobo Arbenz in 1954. The question that remains in the wake of the excitement that filled the streets of Guatemala following the resignation of Molina, is whether or not this mobilization directed at unseating Molina—dubbed by some media outlets the “Central American Spring”—will continue to press for further reforms. As the presidential electoral process continues and the country prepares for a new leader, it is important to understand what hangs in the balance of this uncertainty. Acknowledging how the historic memory of civil war informs the current dynamics sprouting from the social and political landscape is key in contextualizing the importance of Guatemala’s elections.

Military Regime to Clandestine Forces: Oligarchic Control Persists

The reassertion of civilian control in Guatemala was not realized for more than forty years following the usurpation of Arbenz in 1954. After his ousting, the state fell under the control of a series of oppressive military regimes, during which a violent and bloody civil war erupted between the ruling armed forces and a leftist guerilla insurgency. After three decades the war finally came to an end with the signing of the “Agreement on Firm and Lasting Peace” during the Presidency of Alvaro Arzú in 1996, but not before more than 45,000 people were disappeared and more than 200,000 killed in the conflict.⁷ The military regime originally had enjoyed the support of U.S. aid, with which they were able to crush the rural peasant resistance movement and continuously silence opposition in an authoritarian state. The repression of rural and indigenous peoples grew to such an extreme, however, that the U.S. government eventually denounced the Guatemalan military in the late 1970s.⁸ As the civil war winded down, Guatemala’s economic elites, represented by oligarchical groups such as the Coordinating Committee of Agricultural, Commercial, Industrial, and Financial Associations (CACIF), looked to redefine their relationship with the Guatemalan military as they no longer needed the military’s protection from leftist revolutionaries.⁹ Essentially, the mob could not keep up the racket, and had to stop selling “fire insurance”.

The military’s transition from a power was only made possible with its loss of support from Guatemala’s oligarchical business sector. Business leaders, though, did not stop supporting the military rule out of any sense of ethical obligation. Rather, they were self-interested individuals that accurately predicted a change in the political winds. In fact, the Guatemalan elites limited the scope of democratization in some respects by jumping to the front of the anti-military populist movement and directing it in an economically favorable path.¹⁰ The primary goal of these business elites was to distance themselves from the military’s waning reputation and stabilize internal affairs. In this way they would be able to attract foreign investment and to end Guatemala’s international isolation.¹¹ The CACIF banded together with Guatemalan civil society and the international community to resist the military’s domination of the government, albeit for their own ends.

Broad cross-cutting cooperation that worked in tandem against the military was most apparent after the CACIF refused to back the military’s right-wing puppet, President Jorge Serrano Elias, who tried to disband Congress and suspend the constitution in 1993. It is important to reiterate that the business community’s decision to cooperate, which might better be called a decision to co-opt, was made with their own interests in mind. Sure, the business community withdrew their support from the military and endorsed the democratic process, but, as was the case with revolutionary France in 1848, they wanted to create an ostensibly democratic state while maintaining their entrenched system of privileges. This consisted of undermining democratic institutions through patrimonial influence in order to maintain the traditional order and the system of land ownership within the country.¹² While the formal relationship between the military and economic elites had been undone, a new and arguably more sinister system had begun to emerge.

The open and apparent systematic corruption, political exclusion, and violent repression during the more than 40 years of military rule had begun to shift to one more akin to a clandestine subversion of the law, rather than outright disregard for the rule of law; this transition allowed those in power to maintain legitimacy in a “democratic” state, while in reality continuing to exclude the vast majority of Guatemalans from the political and economic realms. Hand in hand with the co-opting of the country’s democratic transition by the economic elite, was the emergence of various clandestine groups, known as Illegal Clandestine Security Apparatuses (CIACS).¹³ These groups were formed following the military’s loss of state control and consisted of former high-ranking military personnel, many of whom were trained at the U.S. founded Escuela de las Americas (School of the Americas)—today known as The Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation. Guatemalan Analyst Arturo Matute of the International Crisis Group explains how the role of CIACS changed following the civil-war, “[a]fter the conflict ended, some CIACS mutated into profit-oriented criminal groups, using their ability to influence or infiltrate state criminal justice institutions to commit illegal activities with impunity.”¹⁴ These groups “…drew from their past connections to become a type of parallel government.”¹⁵ Drawing from their status and influence, the CIACS enjoyed considerable access to all levels of government.¹⁶ Among the most well known of these groups were Cofradia, La Montaña, and Sindicato—the last with which former-President Otto Perez Molina was associated.

At the heart of the organization of the CIACS was the Estado Mayor Presidencial (EMP) (the Presidential High Command). Originally created in the 1970s to protect the president and his family, the EMP gradually turned into an intelligence gathering service and a tool for silencing opposition within the country.¹⁷ In 2003 the EMP was formally dissolved, and some hope of reform emerged. However, Amnesty International (AI) gave only its cautious approbation in a report that year,  “[w]e [Amnesty International] welcome the abolition of the EMP, as called for by the 1996 Peace Accords, but regret that it has only come about after almost 7 years of continued national and international insistence…we are also very concerned at signs that the military may continue to have influence over the new intelligence structure.” AI identified within the report that more than 30 percent of former EMP officers would be absorbed into the new agencies created to fill the role of the EMP.  Ultimately, there was little change realized, and in 2006 the international community was asked to provide help in undoing the entrenched corruption within the state.

Since the return to civilian rule in 1996 every administration has been characterized by venality—extending to the highest levels of government. The removal of Otto Perez Molina’s political immunity, and his subsequent arrest, will be remembered only as a battle won in a long-fought war against corruption and impunity within the country.

The Truth Commission and Growing Political Consciousness

Development of a politically conscious civil society in Guatemala did not take place overnight.¹⁸  Hampered by the civil war and waves of political repression, its development has been long, winding, and has its origins in the results of The Commission for Historical Clarification.¹⁹  The aim of this truth commission was twofold—to prevent future human rights abuses and allow for social healing through truth.²⁰  Victims of heinous criminal acts perpetrated during the Guatemalan civil war provided over 9,000 testimonials from September of 1997 to February of 1998; 35 civilian organizations participated by contributed testimony as well.²¹ In working towards these goals, the truth commission inadvertently inspired confidence in the Guatemalan people’s ability to push back against the yoke placed upon them by the country’s military and oligarchical forces. Legal consequences of the truth commission’s reports include its use as evidence in the trial of military officials accused of assassinating an anthropologist, Myrna Mack, in 1990.²² Of course, there were setbacks. General Rios Montt’s deputy, Antonio Portillo, not only escaped prosecution, but also went on to become the President of Guatemala. This was hardly justice for his victims.²³ In 2013 a huge victory was realized with the conviction of General Rios Montt for genocide, however, this victory was quickly annulled with the reversal of the results of the trial only ten days after the ruling. Montt walked free.

The growing political consciousness and strength of the Guatemalan people over the last two decades has manifested itself in the enormous mobilizations—estimates go as high as 100,000 for protests in August—that have been activated in recent months. As Sergio Castañeda described it, “…the population, which was accustomed to silence and political apathy, had awoken.”²⁴ The demonstrations were not called for by any specific political party; rather they were organized out of grassroots movements and universities, making use of social media. The only congressperson that gave this movement voice in the National Assembly was Amilcar Pop of the Winaq party. Pop stood alone on many occasions in his fight against corruption in the state. He was the first to call for the resignation of Otto Perez Molina in the National Assembly, an action for which he received constant death threats.

Consequently, the Guatemalan electorate has become suspicious of the motivations of political actors as they head into the run-off elections. The run-off presidential elections on October 25^th, then, need to be seen within this post civil-war conceptual framework. There is an expectation that this election has the possibility to be the beginning of a real democratization process, instead of a continuation of a false democratization that has ignored the economic suffering of most Guatemalans. However, it appears that it will take much more than just merely electing a new president. Mike Allison, a professor of political science at the University of Scranton in Pennsylvania, referring to the three main candidates before the first presidential round of voting, said that he “[has] little faith that either Morales, Baldizon, or Torres will lead the change voluntarily.”²⁵

Prospects for Change

Even though corruption still runs rampant in the Guatemalan government, the oligarchy exerts a disproportionate amount of influence in the political realm, and the proceedings from truth commissions and trials have not yet completely healed the social fabric of Guatemalan society, there is room for hope in the upcoming presidential elections. The two remaining contenders for the presidency are Jimmy Morales and Sandra Torres. Morales, a comedian and entertainer, is running for president with the backing of the Frente de Convergencia Nacional (FCN).²⁶ Torres, a former first lady who was married to Molina’s predecessor Alvaro Colom, is running under the banner of the Unidad Nacional de la Esperanza (UNE).²⁷

Morales’ campaign catchphrase, “not corrupt, nor a thief” gives the outside world an indication of how low President Molina’s job performance has set the bar for the country’s president and how fed up Guatemalans have become with the political establishment. Morales’ platform has three parts to it: advocating for better health services, education services, and to create employment opportunities.²⁸ And throughout each of his promises, he reiterates that corruption will be rooted out and dealt with harshly. In terms of policy, to reduce corruption Morales wants to institute external audits on government programs, spend more on the judiciary so that they can find and prosecute corrupt officials, convene a National Constituent Assembly that will try to amend Guatemalan electoral laws, and make governmental procurements open to both the media and the public.²⁹ Economically, Morales is focused on developing small businesses, referred to in his platform as micro, small, and medium enterprises, or MSMEs. Morales believes that small business development will be spurred on by better access to credit, improved business education within Guatemala, and more autonomy to farmers within social programs.³⁰

Morales is a political outsider, an attribute that has played a large role in his success as a candidate. Just as in the current U.S. primary presidential race, voters in Guatemala are fed up with traditional politicians. Morales, however, does have some questionable ties and allegiances based on his affiliation with the FCN party, which is made up of ex-military personnel from the Asociacion de Veteranos Militares de Guatemala (AVEMILGUA). Members of the FCN are some of the very actors that have contributed to the weakening and corrupting of institutions in the country. Torres’ UNE, on the other hand, has more institutional ties and is further to the political left than Morales’ FCN.

The UNE trace their political lineage all the way back to the social democratic government of Juan Jose Arevalo—along with that government’s accomplishments in education, social welfare, and in establishing a labor code. The UNE also cites similar successes under the social democratic government of Alvaro Colom, who is Sandra Torres’ ex-husband.³¹ Indeed, these presidencies are known for policies that were, on the whole, good for the people, but Torres cannot coast on the coattails of past social-democrats without also bringing up the failures of Colom to root out long-standing corruption in the Guatemalan government—corruption that became so severe under Molina that it resulted in his arrest. Nevertheless, Torres seems more willing to use the force of the state to fight oligarchical powers than her opponent.³² Just as Morales has some questionable affiliations, so too does Torres. Her ex-husband, Alvaro Colom, is the former president of Guatemala and is remembered for the fumbling of the Alfonso Portillo trial, as well as his inability to curb corruption during his term (Mike Allison, Al Jazeera). Torres’ sister, Gloria Torres, and her sister’s two daughters were charged with embezzling money from Guatemala’s municipalities in 2011, and Torres’ niece stands accused of tax fraud.³³

An interesting division has emerged within the Guatemalan electorate. Torres pulls the majority of her support from rural and indigenous populations in Guatemala. With a platform focusing on social programs, this is not surprising. In Guatemala, of the 53 percent of the population living in poverty in the country, according to the Worldbank, the vast majority of the impoverished population comes from rural and indigenous communities. Morales on the other hand, has seen the majority of his support from urban regions. In some ways this gives him the upper hand, as this portion of the electorate will likely have greater access and ability to vote. In order to win though, both candidates will have to pull votes from the other side. This will most likely require coalition building with candidates who lost in the first round.³⁷ While both Torres and Morales face the unique opportunity to lead the country into a new era of democracy and political inclusivity, many in the political class are unenthused by their choices.

Andres Quezada, one of the young leaders of the #justiciaya (justice now) campaign, criticized the first round of elections stating, “[t]oday is nothing to celebrate, it’s a tragedy. Elections should be about change and hope and a better future, but there are no genuine or worthy candidates to vote for. If I vote, I will be legitimizing a corrupt system. That isn’t democracy; it’s a vicious cycle we have to break.”³⁴

Tempered Optimism

Although it is unclear whether or not the upcoming run-off elections will deliver the political and structural change that many hope will reduce crime and corruption while increasing living standards, the mere fact that elections will be happening is indicative of broad, positive, and gradual change in Guatemala’s political system since the end of its bloody civil war. Arguably, though, the candidates’ in the current election have centrist platforms that are so in-line with the interests of the traditional elite that they will not be put in conflict with the worldview of the oligarchy anyway. “There’s been no plans for government, no debate about how to create jobs or control corruption, just good intentions,” warned Phillip Chicola, political analyst for the Chamber of Commerce.³⁵

As with any democracy, a system of checks and balances is essential in ensuring the legitimacy and accountability of bona fide institutions. In the case of Guatemala, the fourth check—that of the people—it appears, will be the deciding factor in how the country moves forward. The CICIG is set to finish off its investigations in 2017 and with this pressure taken off of the state, it will be up to the left parties—Winaq and the UNRG—as well as grassroots mobilizations to carry on the vociferous fight against corruption that has been witnessed in the country since April. Going by the high percentage of Guatemalan’s that voted in the September 6^th election that decided who the run-off candidates would be, this conflict-driven growth of political participation, while not guaranteed, seems to be occurring.³⁶

*Robie Mitchell and Mark Cameron, Research Associates at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs

End Notes

1. Arron Daugherty, “Guatemala’s Big Corruption Scandel, Explained,” Insight Crime, 6/20/2015, http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/guatemala-la-linea-customs-scandal-explained, par. 4.
2. Ibid
3.     Guatemala new low minimum wage “setback on sustainable development” – UN rights, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=15575&LangID=E#sthash.tEw6z3xo.dpuf
4. Tulio Juarez. “Otto Perez Molina es ligado a proceso y MP pide enviarlo a prision provisional.” El Periodico 9/8/2015.
5.     Tulio Juarez “Exintendente confirma reunion de “Eco” y Otto Perez Molina en la Casa Presidencial.” El Periodico. 9/21/15.
6.     WOLA, “A Wola Report on the CICIG Experience,” http://www.wola.org/publications/WOLA_report_international_commission_against_impunity_guatemala
7.     Ibid
8.     Mark Ruhl. “The Guatemalan Military Since the Peace Accords: The Fate of Reform under Arzú and Portillo.” Latin American Politics and Society (Spring 2005), p. 58.
9.     Ibid
10.  Roman Krznaric, “The World View of the Oligarchy in Guatemalan Politics.” University of Essex (2003), p. 2.
11.  Mark Ruhl. “The Guatemalan Military Since the Peace Accords: The Fate of Reform under Arzú and Portillo,” p. 58.
12.  Roman Krznaric, “The World View of the Oligarchy in Guatemalan Politics,” p. 2.
13.  “CIACS.” InSight Crime. http://www.insightcrime.org/guatemala-organized-crime-news/ciacs
14.  Arturo Matute. “Ending Corruption in Guatemala.” International Crisis Group. 4/30/15. http://blog.crisisgroup.org/latin-america/2015/04/30/ending-corruption-in-guatemala
15. “CIACS.” InSight Crime. http://www.insightcrime.org/guatemala-organized-crime-news/ciacs
16.  Ibid
17.  Mark Ruhl, “The Guatemalan Military Since the Peace Accords: The Fate of Reform under Arzú and Portillo,”. p. 57.
18.  Michael Shifter, Funding Virtue: Civil Society Aid and Democratic Promotion, The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (2000), p. 252.
19.  Amy Ross, “Truth and Consequences in Guatemala,” GeoJournal 60 no. 1 (2004), p. 73.
20.  Amy Ross, “Truth and Consequences in Guatemala,” p. 76.
21.  Ibid
22.  Amy Ross, “Truth and Consequences in Guatemala,” p. 77.
23.  Ibid
24. Manuel Rodriguez. “USAC llama a movilización para exigir cambios al sistema.” La Hora.

http://lahora.gt/usac-llama-a-movilizacion-para-exigir-cambios-al-sistema/

25.  Whitney Eulich, “How Guatemala’s anti-corruption drive is shaking its political elite,”  The Christian Science Monitor. 9/15/15. par. 9.
26.  Frente de Convergencia Nacional,  http://www.partidofcn.multimediaguatemala.com/site/
27.  Union Nacional De La Esperanza, http://www.une.com.gt
28.  Jimmy Morales, website: http://www.jimmymoralesforpresident.com/el-plan.html
29. Jimmy Morales, website: http://www.jimmymoralesforpresident.com/el-plan.html, pdf: http://nebula.wsimg.com/d4bba73bdb30aec2080d27¹²7bb85698?AccessKeyId=7FD583990212AFE8D5CC&disposition=0&alloworigin=1
30.  Ibid
31.  Union Nacional De La Esperanza, http://www.une.com.gt
32.  Ibid
33.  Michael Lohmuller. Elections Offer Little Respite for Guatemala’s Corruption-Weary Public. http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/elections-offer-little-respite-guatemala-corruption-weary-public
34.  Nina Lakhani. “Can  a Vote Defeat Entrenched Corruption?” AlJazeera. http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2015/09/guatemala-vote-defeat-entrenched-corruption-150906105727982.html
35.  Ibid
36. Whitney Eulich, “How Guatemala’s anti-corruption drive is shaking its political elite,” par. 8.
37. Grecia Ortiz. “Morales y Torres, nuevo pulso urbano y rural por la Presidencia.” La Hora.

The President of India, President Mukherjee will pay first State visit to Israel from October 13-15, 2015. The upcoming visit symbolizes the changing dynamics of India-Israel relations as well as is part of India’s wider re-engagement strategy viz. West Asia. India established diplomatic relations with Israel in 1992 and since then the relationship has evolved into a multi-dimensional partnership. The two countries are engaged in a range of issues of bilateral interest including cooperation in agriculture, science & technology, education, etc. The visit will further cement bonds of cooperation between the two sides and enhance mutual understanding.

India’s Israel policy has been always under the cloak of secrecy, restricted mostly to hi-tech military cooperation, but this veil is being gradually lifted especially due to the active efforts of the new Indian Government under Modi Administration. India is now engaging more openly with Israel with respect to the technological cooperation in agricultural sector, renewable energy, water management, as well as continued Israeli support in capability building of Indian defence forces. Israel is one of the largest suppliers of military hardware to India and most of the cooperation is in the niche sectors. Both countries have shared history of facing terrorism from their respective neighbourhoods and this aspect has played a vital role in bringing them together in sharing security concerns and expertise. India has often described Israel as India’s reliable partner. The relationship between these two countries has flourished despite India’s continued support to the Palestinian cause.

India-Israel defence cooperation is moving beyond the traditional buyer-supplier relationship, the armed forces of India and Israel are likely to hold the first-ever joint exercise since diplomatic relations were established between the two countries in 1992. The elite Special Forces of the two countries are likely to take part in a joint exercise after the Joint Working Group (JWG) on Defence Cooperation finalises dates and venues. Even though Israel is one of the biggest weapon suppliers to India, the two countries have not carried out any joint military exercise due to political sensitivities within India regarding ties with Israel.

Israel and India collaborate closely in combating terrorism with ‘Mossad’ and other agencies working with the Indian Intelligence agencies on a regular basis.  However, these ties are rarely mentioned in public domain. Joint exercises between the militaries of the two countries will send a signal that India and Israel are taking their strategic and Defence ties to a new level.

The current visit however seeks to push the envelop of the bilateral relationship further, by expanding cooperation in the field of agriculture, science & technology, education, etc. Cooperation with respect to agricultural sector is important for India as making agriculture profitable to farmers is a matter of great importance. Agriculture employs roughly 50 per cent of country’s labour force but contributes only up to 16 per cent of the GDP. Farmers in India are yet to benefit from the technological advancements shaping country’s services and manufacturing sector. Introduction of better’s crop varieties and advanced farming techniques have a potential of transforming the lives of rural communities across India.

Israel’s envoy to India Ambassador Daniel Carmon said, “Agriculture is one of the main pillars of Israel-India relations and we are about to enter the 3rd phase of this agreement that will expand our cooperation even further. We are working with India in Agriculture since 2006 when both countries signed a cooperation agreement that today includes 26 centres in 9 states, with full partnership between MIDH and MASHAV, Israel’s Agency for International Development Cooperation. The aim of Indo-Israel Centres of Excellence, spread all over India, is to ensure food security- increase productivity and improve the quality of produce.”

Israel’s expertise in water resource management and cultivation of arid land can be crucial in helping India ensure food security for more than 1.2 billion people. India has not only adopted Israeli technologies like drip-irrigation but successfully introduced new crops with the help of Israeli experts to the region, such as an olive plantation in Rajasthan.

Bilateral trade between the two countries has had a healthy growth from US$ 200 million in 1992 (comprising primarily trade in diamonds), bilateral merchandise trade has diversified and reached US$ 5.19 billion in 2011. However, the past few years have seen a decline in total trade due to the global economic recession. In 2014, the bilateral trade stood at US$ 4.52 billion.

The visit of the President will also be a precursor to the much anticipated visit of PM Modi to Israel, which is expected to take place early next year. With the visit of President Mukherjee to Israel, India is trying to balance its interests in the West Asia region. By already actively engaging with UAE and perhaps a few more countries in the Gulf and West Asia in the coming months, India can blunt any possible criticism when PM travels to Israel. PM Modi’s prior visits and engagement with the Arab world would create the required space for him to meaningfully deepen and strengthen Indo-Israeli ties. And all this he can do while also earning the distinction of being the first Indian Prime Minister to have the courage to travel to Israel.

*Shashwat Tiwari is a Strategic Affairs Researcher at Oval Observer Foundation, New Delhi. He can be reached at shashwat.tiwari@ovalobserver.org He tweets @ishashwattiwari

Racism and bigotry is on the rise across the globe.

Many of the western governments won’t allow building of a mosque on Muslim owned properties. Even if the central government sometimes may have no bars for such mosque constructions, the local Christian community, much given to racism and bigotry, may not permit construction of a mosque in its locality.

Such objections against mosques are called democracy here – a flawed one, obviously, by the locals that have not learned that in a liberal democracy the majoritarian views should not trample religious and cultural rights of a minority.
If you are looking for a connection with 9/11, think again. Such anti-Mosque objections are decades old. I remember the strong objections that came from local Christian community when Muslims in nearby Voorhees Township, NJ wanted to build a mosque nearly 25 years ago.

My local Muslim community in suburban Philadelphia has been struggling for years to get the necessary permit towards building a mosque, and so is the case with many Muslim communities across America today where they are denied the right to construct a new mosque or expand an existing one to cater to the growing needs of the community.

Oddly, all these objections are happening in the ‘land of the free’ where things are supposed to be better for the minorities in comparison to other place around the globe!

Often times, the hate-mongering talk show hosts and media-made or self-acclaimed pundits serving at the altar of merchants of death and perpetual wars are responsible for spicing up racism and bigotry against Muslims. Rather than reporting news they help to create news. They twist and distort facts and feed fear and hatred to put one community against another. They would lecture us about how terrible the condition is for the women and minorities, esp. in the Muslim countries, without ever visiting such countries, let alone living there. They give a bad name to the profession of journalism.

Consider, for instance, Fox TV’s Sean Hannity program where the host, a college drop-out, audaciously asked his guest to cite a Muslim country where women and minorities are respected. What an ignorant person! A simple Google search could have educated him. But he did not care to do that homework, and instead opted to spread his lies and distortions.

These anti-Muslim zealots and pundits won’t tell their audience that for centuries the religious minorities have co-mingled and co-existed without facing any persecution in Muslim countries and that many minorities have held high positions and even have headed the state. Many women leaders have held the top post in the Muslim majority countries like Indonesia, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Turkey – some of the most populous Muslim countries of our time. Consider, e.g., Bangladesh, which has been ruled by two women (Sheikh Hasina and Khaleda Zia) for nearly a quarter century since 1991 (with a small break of couple of years in 2007-2008). The speaker of the parliament (Shirin Sharmin Chaudhury) and leaders of the two major opposition parties (BNP and JP) are all women. The chief judge (Chief Justice S.K. Sinha) in the highest apex court (the Supreme Court of Bangladesh) is also a non-Muslim. As I have shown elsewhere the proportion of Hindus employed in government jobs in Bangladesh is much higher than their actual percentage within the overall population, and no one is discriminated on the basis of caste or creed in Bangladesh. People of all faiths are free to practice and preach their religion. Religious holidays for all the religious communities are observed. While like many third-world developing countries Bangladesh has her share of political problems no one can deny her enviable records in the areas of empowering women and minorities.

In contrast, in Sean Hannity’s America, there is neither a single Muslim Senator nor are Muslim religious holidays observed officially.

Hateful guys like Hannity are either unaware of the truth or cares very little about it, and as such, would rather live in their self-delusional lunatic fringe keeping their audience also half-educated or ill-informed. They are, however, adept in recycling their worst thoughts and fears, and false ideas on their audience. Since hatred, sadly, sells in our world, they have found willing patrons to patronize the sale of their deadly capsules of intolerance and hatred

Women rights and empowerment is all empty talks for them and nothing else!

Down south in Australia the Muslim community has been facing similar problems with mosques. The City of Greater Bendigo ticked off plans to build the mosque in June last year but objectors took the case to the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (VCAT) to argue the development would cause traffic and social issues. VCAT dismissed those concerns, but protests have continued, causing tension in the local community, and the city center was shut down in August when hundreds of people gathered for counter-rallies.

Police were called in to escort Bendigo councillors from their regular meeting last month after anti-mosque protesters began chanting and hurling abuse at them from the public gallery.

Mayor Councillor Peter Cox said the mosque would go ahead despite the ongoing protests. “Council can’t change its mind on the mosque at this point in time, we made our decision 15 months ago, the decision’s been upheld by VCAT, the permit’s been issued,” he said. “While there’s a court of appeal that still has to go they can proceed with their permit at this point in time.”

Rival rallies have been held in the central Victorian city of Bendigo by groups for and against the construction of a local mosque. Today, the United Patriots Front (UPF)   held a rally, which was the second time in two months that nationalist and far-right groups had demonstrated against the city council’s approval of a mosque in Bendigo, Victoria.

Anti-racism groups, operating under the banner of the Bendigo Action Coalition, also marched from the city’s town hall to Rosalind Park as 400 police watched on. Anti-racism activist Tashara Roberts called on those present at the rally to respect those opposite them, “even the idiots”. “It is our responsibility as forward-thinking citizens to take every opportunity to educate fellow Bendigonians, and show them why we hold the beliefs that we do, and we must do so peacefully and respectfully. We must lead by example, we must show tolerance, even to the idiots.”

Bendigo City Mayor Peter Cox said he did not understand why the UPF had targeted Bendigo. He said the council had to better understand what was driving people’s fears about Bendigo’s future. “Part of the Australian constitution is that we can practice our belief systems, however there are concerns and fears that people have, we need to talk to those people,” he said. “I really don’t understand how people can look at their TV sets in their lounge room about terrorism around the world and link it to building a mosque in Bendigo.”

Earlier Saturday, Victoria Police Assistant Commissioner Stephen Leane labeled the police presence in Bendigo a “major operation”. There was also a heightened police presence at other mosques across the state, including in Melbourne.
Are the planned protests in Australia against mosques linked to anti-mosque protests here in the USA? I won’t be surprised to find the unholy link. After all, this week, an anti-Muslim group, which absurdly calls itself Global Rally for Humanity, has similarly called for nationwide protests at mosques in the USA on Friday and Saturday (Oct. 9 and 10). It asked its “patriots” across the country to set up protests in their cities with multiple Facebook pages, and instructed organizers to “remember to do your homework and find a local mosque in your area.”

Though the group’s Facebook page lists no contacts, the Chicago-based Center for New Community identified Phoenix activist Jon Ritzheimer, an ex-Marine and “Oath Keeper”, as the architect of the plan. He is affiliated with the right-wing Three Percenters militia group. He has posted several videos on YouTube promoting the protest, according to the Montgomery-Alabama-based Southern Poverty Law Center.  He gained media attention earlier this year for coordinating the Freedom of Speech Rally Round 2, which drew hundreds of armed protesters and several hundred counter-protesters. Last month he threatened to arrest lawmakers who supported the nuclear deal with Iran.

In May, when Ritzheimer staged a heavily armed protest outside the Islamic Community Center of Phoenix, Arizona he had said he wanted to see similar rallies nationwide.

“We’ve never had this many events targeting mosques in this kind of national way,” Heidi Beirich, director of the Intelligence Project at the Southern Poverty Law Center, said in a conference call earlier this week. “This is widespread in a way that these things have not been before.”

Although Ritzheimer has miserably failed to rally his ‘patriots’ against Muslims the planned demonstrations underscore a growing anti-Islam movement in the U.S., which has been exacerbated by rhetoric on the presidential campaign trail and the refugee crisis in Europe. And this is a warning sign for America. If serious the authorities should be able to easily connect the dots in finding the masterminds behind such hateful protest rallies not just within the USA but across the globe.

This year marks the 20th anniversary of wolf reintroduction in Yellowstone National Park. From 66 released originally they’ve increased to over 300 and are no longer endangered. That they thrive here is not surprising, for they are creatures of this raw land in a way that we aren’t. Wolves are fitted to this environment, and so to understand them, we have to know the country that nurtures them.

The area from Yellowstone to central Idaho has one of the lowest densities of human population in the United States. Those who do live here are held in thrall by land and weather, too harsh for most of our species. The elements keep us ever on the defensive without even noticing us.

People claim to own this country, but she owns us. Daily she teaches us how small our power is: we are like children clinging to a shaggy bison, helpless riders on a massive beast. We had enough power to exile the wolves, but then the wilderness was no longer whole, the grazing herds became unhealthy, and we had to bring back these culling predators. The banishment was short from their time frame.

The mountains they lope around are the eruption of a force that begins to rise in the Dakotas, gathers momentum as it buckles the prairie into ridges and ravines, then thrusts the earth’s crust into peaks. Humans read time on the land, and it dwarfs us: Rivers cut the earth for millennia, then vanished into the bottoms of their canyons, leaving them lime dry. Glaciers sheared off mountains, scraping them down to flat mesas. Epochs of wind are still gnawing the buttes into knobs of pocked rock. Now it’s time for wolves again. A missing totem, Sunmánituthaka of the Sioux, has been restored, an ancient spirit returned to us.

Their example may help us better to endure the wheel of the seasons here. Weather weighs on us all, refusing to be ignored. Winter lasts half the year, burying the earth in snow. Bears, badgers, and rattlesnakes retreat into hibernation. Wolves just nap in the blizzards, wrapped in their tails. Antelope nudge through the white mantle to graze, watched now by stalking topaz eyes. People creep in line.

As the storms tire, winter yields, then breaks like river ice; sudden blue holes fracture the gray lid into cumulus floes. The mountain runoff swells the streams into roily torrents. The land wakes up slowly, knowing her first flowers will be sacrificed to May snow. Humans are last to thaw.

Spring blows our fences down. Elk huddle in the lee of bluffs as gales curry the earth’s green pelt. Clouds mound together till they darken and break, gashing lightning, spilling hail, drifting purple veils of rain while half the sky stays blue and clear. Wolf whelps nurse in their dens.

The summer sky widens, stretching the land taut across horizons like curing buckskin. The wind winnows pliant grasses, chaps the earth, snaps amaranths and turns them into tumbleweeds bowling across the range till they snag on fences and pile up to build shelter for seedlings. People plow the dirt. Young wolves romp.

The sun scorches through the thin air, driving streams underground and shrinking water holes into puddles beached with alkali. In the dry light, colors fade, sagebrush pales dust green, wheat straw blanches on shimmering hills. Prairie rises from shady coulees to distant ridges of sleeping dinosaurs. Valleys timbered with aspen and pine slope into granite cliffs which soar to snowy crags. Howls chorus above them again in wild polyphony. The land, tough as weathered leather, charges on toward everywhere.

Humans haven’t conquered this country; we haven’t even got a saddle on her; we’re just would-be bison riders holding on however we can. When she stampedes, which is mostly, we cling too tightly to love the ride, but at less than a gallop we can loosen our grip, lift our faces to the wind, and flow with the earth as she rolls beneath us.

While we’re riding, quickly out of the corner of our eye, we can glimpse the wolves running free again. They belong here.

*William T. Hathaway’s new novel, Lila, the Revolutionary, is the story of an eight-year-old Indian girl who sparks a world revolution for social justice. Chapters are posted at www.amazon.com/dp/1897455844. He was a Fulbright professor of creative writing at universities in Germany, where he currently lives. A selection of his writing is available at www.peacewriter.org.

The Eurasian Economic Union –officially in existence since 1 January 2015– is the most ambitious attempt yet at economically integrating the post-Soviet space. What are its successes and limitations so far? How does it alter Russia’s relations with the West? Should the EU engage it as a partner?

By Gonzalo Pozo-Martín*

The creation by Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia (to be soon followed by Kyrgyzstan) of a Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) crowns a decades-long process aimed at the restructuring and gradual integration of the post-Soviet space. Moscow has high hopes for the EEU, and expects to use it as a platform through which to reinforce its leading role in the region and to vindicate its status as a great power in a multipolar global order.

Additionally (though less conspicuously), Moscow hopes to benefit economically from the EEU, in particular, by using it to claw back part of the commercial ground already lost to the EU, China and the US. The birth of the EEU is thus a considerable foreign-policy coup for Vladimir Putin, but one which might yet prove to be short-lived. The EEU’s existence begins at a highly uncertain and volatile time for the Russian economy, plagued by economic sanctions, capital flight, currency devaluation and low hydrocarbon prices. The disadvantages of joining the EEU are becoming increasingly manifest, and its record on commercial integration is mixed.

Critically, the EEU’s life has begun with the noticeable absence of the Ukraine, which Russia had tried hard to cudgel and wheedle into membership –in the process causing the onset of armed conflict there. The EEU is also precarious in the structural sense: it is, essentially, an elite project taking root in a political context in which corruption is rife and legal standards feeble. Though some have called for the EU’s engagement with the EEU, at the time of writing no honest dialogue, let alone beneficial partnership, seems either likely or possible between the two blocs. And yet time now plays on Brussels’ side.

Analysis

The term ‘Eurasian Union’ has become the shorthand for the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU, or Евразийский Экономичеcкий Cоюз – Evraziiskii Ekonomicheskii Soyuz), an international organisation established through a 1,000-page treaty signed by Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia on 29 May 2014. The document marked New Year’s Day of 2015 as the EEU’s effective inauguration date. Armenia soon volunteered (or perhaps, more accurately, was soon ‘encouraged’ to do so) to become a cosignatory to the agreement in October 2014, gaining full membership on 2 January 2015. Kyrgyzstan, currently a candidate state, is scheduled to join before the year 2015 is out. The EEU has further extended invitations to Azerbaijan and Tajikistan (the latter’s frictions with Kyrgyzstan make its membership unlikely for now) and suggested that Uzbekistan follow suit (Tashkent has already clarified this will not be the case). Its current and scheduled membership overlaps with the so-called Union State between Russia and Belarus, and almost coincides with that of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation, which also includes Tajikistan.1

The EEU’s fundamental function is to establish a common economic area based on the (eventual) free circulation of goods, capital and labour. In spirit and institutional design it is loosely modelled on the EU and has provisions for the full creation of a single market along with the development of common production and transport infrastructure –progress is uneven, of course, and the development of a single market in key sectors like energy has been postponed until 2025–. Critically, the EEU clears the way for a closer coordination of monetary policy and leaves open the possibility of a currency union.2 The map below (Fig. 1, released on the EEU’s presentational brochure of 2015, but based on 2013 and 2014 data), offers an overall idea of its considerable dimensions.

According to official EEU figures, the organisation includes over 179 million people, covers more than 15% of the world’s surface (20 million km2) and generates a combined GDP of US$2411,2 billion –an estimate on 2013 prices. To give an indication of its relative size, and following IMF data (GDP/PPP), the EEU’s economy was, roughly, seven times smaller than that of the US and the EU, six times smaller than China’s and about half the size of India’s, slightly surpassing Brazil’s.4 Further, the EEU turned over US$932.9 million in foreign trade and was capable of industrial output worth US$1.5 trillion. Unsurprisingly, the Russian Federation accounts for over four fifths of its entire GDP, population size and geographical surface. Russia is overwhelmingly the organisation’s centre of economic and demographic gravity.

Politically and diplomatically, the EEU represents the highest and institutionally most comprehensive stage of economic integration within the geography of the former Soviet Union. It is the culmination of a sustained, if often uneven and faulty, effort at gradually coordinating trade, investment, monetary policy and economic cooperation within the post-Soviet space. The process goes back all the way to the treaty founding the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

Though at different times other ex-Soviet Republics have played an active role in that progression, its most consistent drivers have been Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan. It is therefore hardly surprising that the characteristics of their political systems (including, alas, the most negative ones, such as corruption, authoritarianism and a high degree of concentration of wealth and power in the hands of a minute corporatist elite) should appear stamped on the EEU’s origins and evolution, beyond its official institutional design. Plainly, the vertical nature of Eurasian integration makes it especially vulnerable to economic fluctuations, leadership changes and international instability –exactly the conditions which have dominated post-Soviet affairs over the past year.

To complicate matters, the term ‘Eurasian Union’ denotes something which goes well beyond the EEU. Writ large, this other Eurasian Union is essentially a geopolitical, if not a territorial, concept, evoking an eventual integration of all the peoples that, notwithstanding their national differences and political sovereignty, make up the liquid geography of ‘Eurasia’. In its fullest version, then, this other Eurasian Union could be described as the institutional intergovernmental expression of a civilisational entity (or is it identity?) formed by all those who inhabit the hazy in-between lands of Europe and Asia, while being neither Asian nor European.

The distinction between the factual and visionary senses of ‘Eurasian Union’ is important because the Russian leadership often juxtaposes them when stating its wishes and objectives. A good (if not isolated) example of this can be found in President Putin’s speech at the 2013 Valdai International Discussion Club, where he argued that the future of the EEU was not to be seen only as a collection of mutually beneficial agreements but as a ‘project for the defence of the identity of peoples of a historical Eurasian space in a new age and a new world’.5 Further, in an earlier piece for Izvestiya (2011), the then Prime Minister Putin explained that the EEU was an open-ended project, providing a bridge ‘towards the next, higher level of integration: Eurasian integration’.6

In this way (deliberately or not) Putin has sometimes fused the actual construction of the Eurasian Union (EEU), with both the idea of a transitional phase towards a deeper stage of Eurasian integration and a broader historical process involving the potential re-articulation of an alleged Eurasian civilisation around Russian culture and values. Additionally, Putin’s Eurasian idea recognises the realities of the 21st century (as the Kremlin understands them). First (and in case anyone still harboured any hopes), Eurasian integration is not/cannot be seen as an effort to restore the USSR.7 Secondly, Eurasian integration reflects the fact that the international system is increasingly multipolar, with Russia as one great power axis (державa – derzhava) among several others. Thirdly, it recognises that the world economy is moving towards global integration, and here, whatever the specific Russian variations on the free-market theme, the Kremlin’s commitment to capitalism and ‘trade liberalisation’ is made clear beyond any possible doubt. Eurasian integration, we are assured, is about conjugating Russia’s own best national interests with its growing role within global capitalism.8

The Russian elite’s outlook on Eurasian integration is thus multifaceted and often vague. It sits between far-reaching aspirations and bare compromises leaving open visible gaps between overall interests, actual capabilities and concrete realities. As a consequence, the EEU can only be, from its very inception, the object of great expectations and considerable disappointments for the Kremlin. Particularly in the context of friction with the West and given the high Russian ambitions it feeds, the EEU’s existence and profile will continue to be defended by Russia, regardless of its shortfalls and limitations and no matter the level of disaffection of its other members. The Russian elite sees the EEU as a strategic and symbolic priority and so it is committed to doing whatever it takes to maintain and defend it. This, however, will prove costly, especially in the short and mid terms. Given the project’s elite-driven nature it is likely that pressure and arm-twisting will increasingly displace incentives and cooperation as the EEU’s chief unifying logic.

How does the EEU work and who does it work for?

The EEU’s roots lie in a number of negotiations and agreements conducted under the auspices of the CIS during the mid-1990s, with two of those meriting special mention. The first was a treaty signed in January 1995 promising the creation of a Customs Union (CU, Таможенный союз – Tamozhennyi Soyuz) originally between Russia, Belorussia and Kazakhstan, and later coming to include Kyrgyzstan (1996) and Tajikistan (1997). The second important step, designed to promote and strengthen the original CU proposals, was the March 1996 Agreement for Increased Cooperation in the Economic and Humanitarian Spheres. It was signed by Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia and established a Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEc, Евразийскoe Экономичеcкoe Сообщество – Evraziiskoe Ekonomicheskoe Soobshchestvo). EurAsEc came into official existence on 10 October 2000, and from that point also included Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan (as well as Uzbekistan between 2005 and 2008).9

While the CIS’s ability to articulate a process of economic or institutional integration had proved insufficient throughout the 1990s –mostly given the low commitment of its members and its focus on security issues– Putin successfully used EurAsEc as a platform for a more selective and substantial integration effort in the 2000s. Putin, and then Dmitry Medvedev (President between May 2008 and May 2012) prioritised Eurasian integration, in great part as a challenge to what they saw as the West’s intensifying and illegitimate encroachment on its near abroad (ближнее зарубежье – bliznee zarubezhye): in particular, the Colour revolutions in the Ukraine, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan and the EU’s inception of the Eastern Partnership (EaP) after 2003. The effort culminated in 2007 with the establishment of a CU from 1 January 2010 as well as the creation, from 1 January 2012, of a Single Economic Space (SES, Единoe экономическоe пространствo – Edinoe ekonomicheskoe prostranstvo) to oversee the steps for the creation of a single market. The last stage in the Putin/Medvedev integration roadmap was the creation of the EEU as a legal entity in 2015 (that future is now the present).

Internally, the EEU is, in appearance, designed in the image of the EU, with a permanent executive body (the Eurasian Economic Commission) formed by a College and a supervisory body called the Council (at the deputy-prime-ministerial level). The Commission, however, must abide by the resolutions of the Eurasian Intergovernmental Council (at the prime-ministerial level) and, in turn, it must abide by the decisions of the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council (heads of state). Additionally, there is a Court of the EEU, whose headquarters are in Minsk, which resolves disputes and guarantees that members abide by the EEU’s rules. However, the parallels with the EU begin to vanish here. At the insistence of Belarus and especially Kazakhstan, the EEU, unlike the EU, has no legislative branch.

Within the CU most decisions required approval by a two-thirds majority of votes but, simultaneously, the weighting system implied that no decision could be taken without Russia. Within the EEU, however, decisions have to be reached by unanimity, a clear attempt by Moscow to allay any fears that the new organisation might only end up institutionalising Russian domination. In practice, however, most general decisions are taken by the Supreme Council, and dropped on inferior-level organs which supply the technical substance and concentrate on the nitty-gritty. Ironically, the unanimity rule does not always act as a check on Russian power. Operationally, it forces members to call frequent meetings of the Supreme EEU council, where Russian diplomatic and political influence is most visibly exerted. In practice, therefore, the power of decision in the EEU is highly concentrated, harnessing the broader process of Eurasian integration to the interests and whims of its elites and institutionalising mutual elite dependence and Russian control.10

From an economic standpoint, the foundation of the EEU is based on the CU and SES, thus naturally predicated on the elimination of internal customs barriers, and the adoption of a common tariff level for trade with third countries. All that had to be achieved in some form of balance with the provisions of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), of which Russia, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan are members. Up to 2014 the average tariff levels of most EEU states were considerably lower than Russia’s. As a result, a country like Kazakhstan ended up adopting a much higher tariff level for third countries, which precludes it from the benefits of trade with the EU and China, to an enormous loss for its economy: this adjustment additionally complicates Kazakhstan’s on-going accession to the WTO as well as the status of other EEU members within it.

The problems derived from Russia’s overwhelming economic and political weight in the organisation have become even more visible after the EU and US-sponsored sanctions began to hit the Russian economy. By the end of 2014, capital flight from Russia had reached a record US$151.5 billion; if this were not enough, the Ministry of Finance (MinFin) estimates 2015 levels to be between US$100 billion and US$130 billion.11 Compounded by the very adverse effect of persistently low international oil prices since October 2014, the rouble began to lose value from October 2014. In the worst moments of the depreciation (mid-December 2014), the Russian Central Bank raised interest rates to 17% (a 100% hike) and spent over US$80 billion in foreign reserves (about a fifth of the total) to keep its currency from sinking even deeper. Despite these desperate measures, the rouble continued to fall until February 2015, shedding about a quarter of its strength to the dollar and the euro in the process. At the time of writing, the Russian economy is in recession, expected to shrink by over 3% in 2015: inflation is in double digits, unemployment (5.8%) is at a 13-year high and real wages are contracting.12

The damage inflicted by the Russian crisis on the economies of the EEU has been extensive, thus substantially reducing its economic appeal and raising concerns that it is only making their lot worse. The problems have been mainly two. First, in the context of the rouble’s devaluation within a customs union, non-Russian goods have suddenly become uncompetitive relative to depreciated Russian merchandise. Belarus paired its currency to the rouble, so it has been able to survive the worst blows; Kazakhstan, on the other hand, has been hit very hard, being forced to depreciate the tenge by almost 20% in 2014, and using up an estimated US$2 billion every month to prevent the national currency from sliding further.13 Secondly, the contraction of the Russian economy is drying up remittances from Central Asian migrant workers; in fact, remittances to the region are declining more rapidly than anywhere else on the planet. This is particularly serious given that Tajikistan (invited to join the EEU) and Kyrgyzstan (a prospective member) are the world’s two most remittance-dependent economies (see Figure 2).
The value of remittances is expected to continue falling deep into 2015: by 12% in Belarus, by 18% in Armenia and Kazakhstan and by 23% in Kyrgyzstan, where this source of value accounts for a third of GDP.14

Taking into account that commercial integration within the region actually narrowed by 13% in the first quarter of 2014, and that members continue to denounce Russian non-compliance on basic provisions concerning the circulation of goods, the EEU’s economic record already seems deficient.15 In the wake of the crisis, the EEU is not delivering more intraregional trade (in fact, all evidence suggests that it is strengthening Russia’s bilateral commercial links to the other members and, ironically, some members’ bilateral relations with the EU); nor is it providing a chance for local Belarusian or Kazakh industries to compete in the world market; nor is it helping the Armenian and Kyrgyz remittance economies; and, finally, nor does it seem to be helping diversify and develop the region.

In fairness, the EEU can still claim one success (and it is not an unimportant one): the very fact that it has survived where analogous integration experiences in the 1990s would have folded. That said, however, the EEU requires additional incentives to trudge on, and such incentives are not derived from Eurasian economic integration per se but from an assortment of Russian carrots and sticks. For instance, Moscow has offered to front the bill of any potential WTO fine arising from the implementation of the EEU tariff regime. Additionally, it has thrown in subsidies, loans and cash transfers in bilateral deals with members like Kyrgyzstan, Belarus and Armenia, whose loyalty to the project has needed some urgent propping up. Also, Moscow continues to promise faster and better access to the Russian labour market –one of the areas in which the EEU has moved most quickly– even though Russian public opinion is widely against an increased presence of migrant workers from different corners of the former Soviet Union.

These additional economic costs are, all in all, worth it for Moscow; the EEU is Russia’s best bet against continuing Western economic and political penetration. In the post-Soviet space, only Belarus keeps Russia as its main trading partner; in all other cases Russia comes second or even third to the EU and, particularly in Central Asia, to China. Critically, the EEU goes some distance to alleviating the Kremlin’s ‘day-after-tomorrow’ anxieties and ensures its influence in the region after the dreaded disappearance of Lukashenko, Nazarbayev, or indeed, Putin himself. The EEU is, as far as Moscow is concerned, an antidote against a potential new round of elite disentanglement from Russian control (such as that witnessed in the Ukraine following Yanukovich’s flight).

Russia, the EEU and the EU

In the context of the deep and protracted breakdown in Russia’s relations with the West and, particularly, of the long-stalling EU-Russia partnership, several voices, both in academic and policy circles, have begun vindicating the EEU’s potential as a platform from which to end the current stalemate. Last November, for instance, Germany’s Foreign Minister, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, advised that contacts between both organisations might go a long way to defuse mutual tensions and suspicions, adding that such an initiative is heartily welcomed by EEU members like Kazkhstan.16 The Russian leadership, in its turn, continues to state its wish for closer cooperation; Steinmeier’s counterpart in Moscow, Sergey Lavrov, has repeated the EEU’s offer of a free trade agreement with the EU.17

As some analysts have argued, a European acknowledgement of the EEU as an equal partner could be a way of reassuring Moscow that the EU’s eastern enlargement is not a relentless, never-ending expansion process, but rather one built on the recognition that there can be different, legitimate and not necessarily exclusive frameworks for post-Soviet integration. Accordingly, in engaging with the EEU, the EU would be able to deal with Russia in a space in which its decision-making power is curtailed by its other members’ veto rights (as shown above, the EEU’s resolutions must be agreed on unanimously). So ironically, it is claimed, the very thing which triggered off the Ukrainian crisis might still offer a way of overcoming it.18

For others still, the EEU is bound to end up cooperating with the EU. In fact, they argue, the scope for mutual benefit and concerns implied by this partnership would be so vast that any substantial links would have to come from an inter-regional ‘megadeal’ between the two blocs; one that might start with trade liberalisation but would necessarily have to reach out to a much deeper and more comprehensive level in the longer term.19

Clearly, the obvious stumbling block when thinking about possible EU-EEU links concerns the future of states which find themselves in between, such as the Ukraine and, to a lesser extent, Moldova, Georgia and Azerbaijan. Of course, the possibility of avoiding ‘either or’ decisions, and seeking closer relations with all neighbours (West and East) is always there: closer trade integration and even free-trade agreements with both the European and Eurasian spaces are possible, at least in principle. Indeed, European policy-makers are right to stress the fact that an Association Agreement within the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) with the Ukraine would not prevent it from seeking closer commercial ties to Russia if it were to choose so.20

It should be noted that the EU’s stance on this, while commendable now, was not as constructive when it mattered, at a crucial moment in 2013 when Yanukovich was unceremoniously rebuffed for proposing precisely this type of EU-Russia-Ukraine triadic relation. But leaving that aside for the moment, the more important point is that complementary associations with both the EEU and EU are impossible at the point of substantial membership. The EEU, for instance, is based on a customs union that would render incompatible any simultaneous EU-sponsored DCFTA deal. At the point of a customs union, then, the EEU does draws the line, handing non-member states a clear ‘in-or-out’ choice.

In any case, this is not solely a technical issue, but a political one: both the EU and Russia overplayed their hand in the run-up to the Vilnius summit of November 2014, when Yanukovich fatefully decided to turn down the Association Agreement with the EU. In other words, it was both the EU’s and Russia’s political behaviour (rather than a technical or legal impossibility) that helped chaos break out in the Ukraine. Both sides, in their very different degrees of responsibility for the ensuing conflict, would do well to change this mind-set in the future, especially if EU-EEU dialogue is to be credible.

More generally, however, for the EU to acknowledge the EEU as a partner would also imply crediting Russia’s international leadership in an important regional organisation and, by extension, implicitly accepting its legitimacy as hegemon, even when, as argued here, this legitimacy frequently derives from coercive and elite-driven measures. To put it bluntly, Belarus’s and Kazakhstan’s membership of the EEU stem from a range of interests and possibilities which have no resemblance to those underpinning Armenia’s or Kyrgyzstan’s ‘Eurasian choice’ (in their case, they chose what they could). Contrary to what some have argued, even if Brussels were to show Moscow that it accepts Eurasian integration for those who ‘choose’ it, it is at best unlikely that, reciprocally, Moscow might therefore feel compelled to recognise the Ukraine’s or Georgia’s hypothetical ‘European choices’.

At any rate, such speculations can only make sense if it is conveniently agreed to forget the Russian Federation’s recent annexation of the Crimea and its continuing efforts in rendering other Ukrainian territories ungovernable from Kiev. It is far more likely that the fate of the Crimea has been sealed, at least in the short and mid-term, by the need to find some workable compromise with Russia on the Donbass.

Conclusions

The successful creation of the EEU marks a key change in post-Soviet politics; the Russian elite is heavily invested in its durability and is ready to make sacrifices in order to sustain it. At the same time, the EEU is seriously challenged by its own political and economic contradictions. In the context of sanctions, countersanctions and open conflict in the Donbass, the economic basis on which to broker cooperation between the EU and EEU is, to say the least, limited. For as long as the Kremlin is haunted by the spectre of the Ukraine’s potential EU membership, a substantive EU-EEU dialogue is likely to remain perfunctory and superficial, pragmatically confined by the progress of hostilities. Nevertheless, the EU has a huge stake in closely observing the evolution of Eurasian integration and monitoring its ability to survive into 2016.

About the author:
*Gonzalo Pozo Martín, Lecturer in International Political Economy at the Department of European and International Studies, King’s College London, and since September 2014 a researcher on the ‘The Vision of Eurasia’ project sponsored by the Baltic Sea Foundation and Södertörn University in Stockholm

Source:
This article was published by Elcano Royal Institute

Notes:
1 The Union State was created by Russia and Belarus in 1996 (established since 1999) in an attempt to forge a confederation; former Soviet republics such as Kazakhstan or Moldova have at different times expressed an interest in joining while Abkhazia and South Ossetia currently have observer status. The Collective Security Treaty Organisation is a security and military alliance formed originally in May 1992.

2 In practice, the problems derived from the rouble devaluation have, for the time being, dampened any appetite for a currency union. ‘Lukashenko: edinaya balyuta EAES budet ne pri moei presidentskoi zhizni’ (‘Lukashenko: there will be no single EEU currency during my Presidency’), RiaNovosti, 29/I/2015.

3 These are relatively conservative valuations and are anyway subject to permanent variations and revisions. If one considers World Bank GDP/PPP data from 2014, for instance the overall economic size of the EEU reaches a more impressive US$4 trillion.

4 Eurasian Economic Commission (2015), ‘Evraziiskaya ekonomicheskaya integratsiya. Tsifry i Fakty’ (Eurasian economic integration. Figures and facts), II/2015. GDP/PPP comparative figures based on IMF Data and Statistics (January 2013-April 2015).

5 ‘Будущий Евразийский экономический союз, о котором мы заявляли, о котором мы много говорим последнее время, это не просто набор взаимовыгодных соглашений. Евразийский союз – это проект сохранения идентичности народов, исторического Евразийского пространства в новом веке и в новом мире’ (emphasis added). See footage of this fragment at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SsXyfoVcHxM (especially from 0’30’’).

6 ‘на следующий, более высокий уровень интеграции – к Евразийскому союзу’. Vladimir Putin (2011), ‘Novyi integratsionnyi proekt dlya Evrazii – budushee, kotoroe rozhdaetsya segodnya’ (‘The new integration project for Eurasia – A future which is being born today], Izvestiya, 3/X/2011.

7 Presenting the EEU as an attempt to restore the USSR by stealth makes for attention-grabbing headlines. To give but two examples (from reputable Polish media outlets), see ‘Niewielu Chętnych do nowego ZZZR’ (‘Few keen on new USSR’), Gazeta Wyborcza, 13/X/2014; and ‘Unia Eurazjatycka konkurencyjna dla Europy?’ (‘Is the Eurasian Union a competitor for Europe?’), Polskieradio.pl, 3/I/2015. In his Izvestiya piece, Putin calls such speculations ‘naïve’.

8 Putin, 2011.

9 All these treaties and agreements are available from the website of the Eurasian Economic Union.

10 A notorious example concerns Armenia’s EEU membership, which followed after Russian pressure prevented it from pursuing an association agreement with the EU.

11 ‘MinFin ozhidaet ottok kapitala iz Rossii v 2015 godu v $90-100 mlrd’ (‘Ministry of Finance is expecting capital flight from Russia at $90-100 billion in 2015), RiaNovosti, 2/III/2015.

12 World Bank (2015), Russia’s Monthly Economic Development, 10/IV/2015.

13 This dynamic has presented the Russian economy with some perverse advantages; for instance, the higher demand for cheaper Russian cars in Kazakhstan has allowed the industry to survive the worst consequences of Western sanctions. ‘Rossiiskie avtozavody namereny udvoit’ eksport’ (‘Russian car makers intend to double exports’), TASS, 15/II/2015.

14 World Bank (2015), ‘Migration and development brief 2015’, 13/IV/2015, p. 19.

15 ‘Tamozhennyi Soyuz ne srastaetsya torgovlei’, Kommersant, 19/V/2014.

16 Frank-Walter Steinmeier, ‘Europäische Friedensordnung steht auf dem Spiel’ (‘European peace framework is at stake’), Die Welt, 16/XI/2014.

17 ‘Lavrov hopes free trade zone for EU, Eurasian Economic Union still possible’, Sputnik, 8/IV/2015.

18 This, at any rate, is the gist of a recent comment by Ivan Krastev & Mark Leonard (2014), ‘The new European disorder’, European Council on Foreign Relations Essay, XI/2014.

19 Evgenyi Vinokurov (2014), ‘Мегасделка двух союзов’ (‘A megadeal of two Unions’), Izvestiya, 2/X/2014.

20 But note that what are meant here are commercial relations with Russia and the EEU within the framework of CIS free-trade agreements. Naturally, even the mere prospect of the Ukraine joining the EEU is unlikely.

High anti-incumbency and attrition losses will cost the Congress dearly, but the exit of Himanta Biswa Sarma has ended the long running factional feud.

Though the Congress has lost a strategist par excellence with formidable networking skills, the infighting within the Congress has come to an end. A united fight with collective might can fetch the Congress face saving numbers. But the BJPs appeal as ‘a party with a difference’ may lose credibility if its arch rival trains its guns at the party for inducting those with a dubious past.

The BJP state unit, in the grip of factionalism since the last few months, is now embroiled in internal bickering as the newcomers are likely to turf out some of the old timers. The current BJP state chief is not known to be all-embracing and questions have been raised against his style of functioning, which only dents the party’s prospects. With the induction of Sarma’s followers into the party fold and the other student leaders with their supporters, the rebellious voices within the BJP might get noisier as the process of assimilation of ‘ideological strangers’ is not always a smooth sail. An internal survey of the BJP shows that selection of wrong candidates and brewing acrimonies could upset the party’s expectations.

The BJP will have to fight a perception battle on many fronts. There are undercurrents of growing anger on the real or perceived abdication of electoral promises by the BJP. Since Modi is a development freak, the BJP has faced relentless criticism for the discontinuation of the NEIIPP, which according to Congress sources, have stalled the state’s development plans. If Congress figures are to be believed, the NEIIPP has brought 576 small to large industrial units to Assam and Rs 12780 crores into the state. The Congress is likely to again raise the issue of withdrawal of National Mission on Food Processing which has allegedly brought an uncertain future for over hundred food processing units in the state.

Since the last few months, the chief minister has been crying foul over the withdrawal of the special category status for Assam. Congress has often leveled charges that the change in the funding pattern has derailed the state’s growth trajectory. As the state goes into poll mode, the BJP could come under blistering attacks for having thrown the state off the path of growth when Modi is breathlessly pitching for development.

Anti-BJP forces can now ridicule the Gujarat development model, with the Patidar agitation threatening to throw that state back to the days of caste-centric political upheavals of the mid-1980s. Mass demonstrations by Gujarati youths for increasing joblessness following shutdowns of textile and diamond units, and small and medium enterprises and for the prohibitive costs of education and healthcare, have raised serious doubts on the state’s growth model. Sixteen months into prime-ministership, Modi has been unable to unleash the kind of development that would eventually generate millions of jobs. Deep structural flaws still remain to be unclogged from the wheels of development. Instances of unfulfilled promises can be blown out of proportion to agitate the minds of those who had taken the word of Modi’s magic to heart.

Regional forces have hit the streets asserting that Assam has been the only state, among the four states involved in the Land Boundary Agreement, to have lost land. Now the state is witnessing regular outbursts of fiery rage against the Central notification granting refugee status to minority communities from Bangladesh and Pakistan. GK Pillai’s opinion that the notification is against the spirit of the Assam Accord has come in handy for whipping up long dormant sub-nationalist passions by projecting the BJP as a party that first ceded the state’s land to Bangladesh and went on to settle ‘lacs’ of migrants in Assam. The notification without a nation-wide re-settlement policy gave grist to the rumour mills insinuating that the BJP is working against the interests of the ‘indigenous’ Assamese.

BJPs political foes have never missed a chance to lambast Modi, who in the course of election rallies, had declared that Bangladeshis will have to quit India after the 16th of May 2014, but as of date, India is yet to press Dhaka to sign a deportation treaty. Without a deportation treaty, NRC update is an exercise in futility.

Congress has already fired salvoes at BJP over escalating prices of essential commodities and non-implementation of the Food Security Act and such attacks will only sharpen as the polls get closer. Another issue which the CM has harped on is the cut in social sector spending. He has said that the Centre has slashed funds for RKVY, NHM, ICDS and RMSA in Assam. Apart from the privatization of the marginal oil and gasfields of ONGC and OIL in the state, the CM has bemoaned that Assam has not received oil royalty at pre-discounted rates like Gujarat due to which the state has suffered Rs 10000 crores in oil royalty. Emotional issues of food, oil and social security are a deadly concoction which, with clever wordplay, can become potent enough to bog down a steamrolling BJP campaign.

The hue and cry over the Centre not offering a special aid package for the flood devastated people may have had its desired effect. Political opponents have questioned that if Modi could unveil a Clean Ganga Mission, then why a Brahmaputra flood control mission could not be announced. Congress has hit out at the Centre for not releasing even a fraction of the Rs 6700 crores for maintenance, repair and strengthening of embankments. Then, there are rumblings against the Centre for not being pro-active enough in resolving inter-state border spats and land encroachments by miscreants which have claimed several Assamese lives. Centre’s perceived apathy towards the loss of lives in floods and territorial disputes can infuriate the inhabitants of flood-prone and border areas. Such perceptions, if not dealt with by the BJP effectively, will alienate the aggrieved voters.

BJPs rivals may stoke other contentious issues when electioneering gains momentum, like Assam being deprived of a fair share of smart cities, that the ‘promised’ Rs 15 lacs to every Indian is still awaited and ‘good days’ have not dawned either. The BJP state unit is yet to raise awareness on how the flagship ‘Make in India’ program will benefit the state. It must pointedly counter the growing apprehension that the Gandhi Parivar has only been replaced by the Sangh Parivar. But then, Modi’s gritty espousal of development and aspirational politics, charisma and communication skills could carry the day for the state BJP despite the odds stacked against it, given that the PM enjoys wide popularity according to the latest Pew rating.

Hillary Clinton made a statement about the Israel-Palestine conflict (you can watch her entire talk on MSNBC starting at 1 hr:29 minutes) on the campaign trail in Iowa that was so stupid that I thought it was worth highlighting.  In answer to a question from the audience, she said:

“I know what the hard decisions are – for the Israelis it is security – how you secure it against a now volatile neighborhood. Security is a real issue and it is not something you can quickly resolve. For the Palestinians, it is autonomy – for them to make their own decisions and not be continually under the authority of the Israelis. And that is really where the two collide.”

“And now it is very difficult to figure out how either the Palestinians or the Israelis can put together a deal until they know what is going to happen in Syria, and until they know if Jordan will remain stable. It’s a really dangerous and complicated situation” she added.

But she said that no one should ever give up on pushing for a two-state solution, and should keep pushing for more support and relief for the Palestinians “so they can have more authority over the territories they are largely responsible for.”

There you have it.  Israel is entitled to security.  But Palestine is entitled to…autonomy?  Really, is that what Palestinians want?  Hey, I thought Hillary was secretary of state for four years and promoting a Palestinian state.  Did she all of a sudden decide she doesn’t?

What sort of locution is “having more authority over the territories they are largely responsible for?”  What does this mean?  It somehow feels like she’s been trapped in a time warp going back to before the U.S. government supported a two state solution.  Or possibly she’s so beholden to those right-wing pro-Israel donors like Haim Saban that she can’t even bring herself to say the “S” word (for “state”).

No, no, no. We can’t vote for such a candidate either in a primary or general election.  She simply won’t do.  She will have to win or lose without my vote.

But Bernie Sanders is no gift either.  I’m not sure what’s going on with Bernie.  He is laser-like and focused on the progressive side of virtually every issue but two: Palestine and guns (more on that another time).  In the past, he’s spoken out far more forcefully in favor of Palestine than now.  When he was the mayor of Burlington, he even advocated a cut-off in U.S. aid for Israel (see video).  Of course, it’s far easier to be progressive in a liberal bastion like Burlington than on the national stage in Washington DC.  After all, Barack Obama even broke bread with Ali Abunimah when he was a lowly state senator in Chicago.

But what disturbs me is that a politician known for being fearless in expounding his views on every subject, all of a sudden gets a frog in his throat when it comes to the Middle East.  It certainly doesn’t revolve around campaign cash because he’s not beholden to the pro-Israel fat cats like Hillary is.  But there is one major elephant in the room which he must fear: the Lobby.  He’s been around the House long enough to see several careers go up in flames after Congress members crossed the Lobby and paid the price for it.  He knows that Aipac and other major pro-Israel players have access to the media and can spin his campaign in any direction they wish.  All he has to do is take a tiny baby step toward supporting BDS or using words like apartheid or war crimes and the Lobby will be on him like flies on s(^t.

But I can’t tell you how troubling it is to hear a candidate you think might be “the entire package” muddle about with mealy-mouthed statements about supporting a two-state solution.  Bernie’s no dope.  He’s got to know that train left the station a long time ago.

But I think he’s petrified of the issue.  It’s torpedoed the foreign policy of a number of presidents.  Look what happened when Barack Obama tackled something as small as a settlement freeze.  Bernie knows there’s no easy fix.  He knows it will require an immense coördinated effort among international powers, not to mention somehow bringing along the parties themselves.  Why go there? That’s what he figures, I guess.

Further, Bernie’s campaign centers on domestic policy.  His passion is economic justice and equality of opportunity.  He appears to have very little interest in foreign policy.  He never talks about it.  To him, I think Israel is a distraction.  A detour into a minefield he’d rather avoid.

Though I can understand the tactical reasons for remaining mute about Palestine, he’s doing a disservice to progressive values.  I don’t think in this day and age you can run a credible presidential campaign that avoids foreign policy.  And you can’t be a truth-telling candidate if you refuse to tell the truth about this issue.

This article was published at Tikun Olam.

After a four-year hiatus, Democratic presidential candidate Hillary Clinton finally returned to a major network Sunday morning political talk show a few weeks ago. Everything boiled down to one question: Who is the real Hillary Clinton?

“I am a real person with all the pluses and minuses that go along with being that!” she said, rebuffing arguments that she does not come across personable enough on the campaign trail.

It was an honest enough answer that managed to cause a stir in itself, especially when Clinton gave what may be construed as an even more revealing description of herself in an interview with Buzzfeed’s Another Round podcast.

“You guys are the first to realize that I’m really not even a human being,” she said after the interviewer noted that she didn’t sweat in hot weather. “I was constructed in a garage in Palo Alto a very long time ago.”

Often Clinton calculates that a minus should be a plus, or a plus a minus. Here are six issues over which the real Hillary – robot or human – has taken opposing sides at different times.

Rushing to War

Clinton couldn’t have reasonably been expected to vote against the Iraq War in 2003. Not after backing her husband’s presidency which oversaw the codifying of regime change policy, a no-fly zone, bombing campaigns and starving sanctions.

But it’s worth noting the words carefully chosen by Senator Clinton in 2002 when she explained her approval for going to war as well as her politicization of the war in 2007.

In February 2007, Clinton said, “Our president rushed us into war in Iraq,” less than five years after she prepared her pro-war vote with this remark: “A vote for it is not a vote to rush to war.”

This year, Clinton said her Iraq War vote was “a mistake.” In search for a lesson she might have learned from the mistake, what is Clinton saying about Syria now?

“The Russians would have to be a part of it, or it wouldn’t work,” Clinton said last week about her proposal – another no-fly zone like her husband enforced in Iraq – to the war in Syria.

But what about just a couple weeks ago? In September, Clinton said, “I hope we’re not turning to the Russians” when pressed about the failure of training so-called “moderate” Syrian rebels.

Late to the gay rights party … Not that there’s anything wrong with that

“I believe marriage is not just a bond, but a sacred bond between a man and a woman.”

More than a year after Clinton came out in favor of gay marriage, an NPR interview went badly for her.

“So, what’s it like when you’re in office and you have to do all these political calculations to not be able to support something like gay marriage that you actually believe in?” the host asked.

Clinton cited her stint as Secretary of State doing international work on raising awareness of equal human rights for gay people. “Being out of domestic politics,” she says, is why she didn’t come out in favor of gay marriage any sooner. But her timing worked politically, just as it had for her before with LGBT issues.

As a presidential candidate in 2007, Clinton was asked about comments by the then-chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Peter Pace, who said homosexuality was immoral. Did the real Hillary agree? “I am going to leave that to others to conclude,” she told ABC News.

Her gay supporters were outraged, and soon the talking point changed. “I disagree with what he said and do not share his view, plain and simple.” But the first statement had been on a mass media show, while the second had been targeted for the fewer activist-types who needed consolation.

Campaigning is a gas

The Keystone XL pipeline is another one of those hard choices for Clinton. Much like how her position at the State Department precluded her from commenting on domestic issues, her being out of the State Department precludes her from commenting on this domestic issue.

Her response set in motion a string of political consequences. They came in the forms of heckling protesters and coverage of Senator Bernie Sanders’ mega-crowds against the proposal.

Trader or traitor?

On international trade agreements, Clinton again finds herself under pressure to reimagine how she can stand on her experience while leaping away from it at the same time.

“NAFTA was a mistake to the extent that it did not deliver on what we hoped it would,” she said in 2007 of the North American Free Trade Agreement signed by Canada, the US and Mexico under her husband’s term.

“I think, on balance, NAFTA has been good for New York and America,” Hillary Clinton said just three years prior.

Enter the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Once for it, now she’s against the secretive deal she had more direct input on it than any other candidate.

Gunning for votes

Gun control is another issue where Clinton has veered to the political right when it suits her.

Needing to make her mark before the 2008 Democratic primary in Nevada, Hillary Clinton opposed national gun registration. She said, “I don’t want the federal government preempting states and cities like New York that have very specific problems.”

Also in 2008 she said, “What might work in NYC is certainly not going to work in Montana. So, for the federal government to be having any kind of blanket rules that they’re going to try to impose, I think doesn’t make sense.”

What’s changed? Now she’s up against Sanders, who himself has flip flopped on a previous position that gun manufacturers should not be held liable for crimes committed with their products. For the first time in a Democratic primary, Clinton feels safe moving to the left on an issue. She recently proposed stricter, more encompassing executive orders she promises to take as president.

On both sides of the border

“We’ve got to do several things and I am, you know, adamantly against illegal immigrants,” sounds like something Donald Trump would say, but in this case it’s the Democratic frontrunner telling it like it is to a talk radio host in 2003.

Leading immigration reform advocate Rep. Luis Gutierrez (D-Illinois) must be pleased to hear Clinton’s new policy, exalting herself above even President Obama, who controversially used a pen and phone to advance immigration reform.

“If Congress continues to refuse to act, as president, I would do everything possible under the law to go even further,” the real Clinton said.

At another point, Clinton expressed support for a path to citizenship for undocumented immigrants but qualified her statement by saying Congress needs to pass legislation and that the president “can do as much as possible, which I will do.” Her statement was booed by the crowd.

Clinton seems to change with the seasons, and in most cases it’s in campaign season.

By Catherine James

The replacement of four provincial governors in northern Afghanistan could stem years of steady gains made by the Taliban in the region, where thousands of people have been displaced by violence.

While an insurgency has raged in the south since the Taliban government was toppled by an American-led invasion in 2001, northern Afghanistan was for years considered one of the most secure areas in the country. Since 2009, the insurgents have been steadily gaining ground in the north and clashes with pro-government forces have intensified, along with the disruption of humanitarian aid.

The World Food Programme temporarily suspended operations in Badakshan Province last month after five of its vehicles disappeared along with their drivers (they were later released). In their most brazen assault yet, outnumbered Taliban fighters last week captured Kunduz, the first provincial capital to fall to the insurgents in the almost 14 years of war since their ouster.

Taliban and pro-government forces continue to battle for control of Kunduz and fighting has forced humanitarian agencies and residents to leave the city. The wounded have little access to medical care since Médecins Sans Frontières evacuated after a US airstrike hit the charity’s hospital on 3 October, killing at least 22 people.

Kunduz resident Faisal Rasuli told IRIN by phone that his neighbour, who was wounded in crossfire last week, died after bleeding out for hours.

“The (government) hospital is far and we have no access because the city is still not fully under the control of the government,” he said.

Leadership changes

Analysts have criticised the government of President Ashraf Ghani for failing to shore up security forces in Kunduz Province and impose his authority. Instead, pro-government militias have been allowed to commit abuses against locals and feed anti-government sentiment.

In the wake of the humiliating, if temporary, loss of Kunduz city, Ghani has appointed new governors to four neighbouring provinces, according to a brief statement posted Wednesday night to a government Facebook page. The leadership changes in Takhar, Faryab, Baghlan and Sar-i-Pul are seen as an attempt to ensure that the Taliban is not able to repeat its military successes in those provinces.

“They didn’t tell any of us why we are going there, but it’s clearly because of the Kunduz situation,” Mohammad Yasin Zia, the new governor of Takhar, told IRIN.

The new appointments signal a shift in tactics by Ghani, a former World Bank economist who has become known for eschewing Afghanistan’s tradition of mixing ethnicity and politics and instead appointing people based on education and experience.

This time he has installed governors based on their ethnic, tribal and religious affiliations, said Zia.

That strategy is in keeping with Afghan traditions, said Ali Mohammad Ali, a security analyst with the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, a Kabul-based think tank.

“Afghanistan is a tribal country and ethnicity is part of the political culture,” Ali said. “These new appointments are more aligned with the understanding of tribal leaders and with their consultation.”

Ali said Ghani’s previous decision to send Omar Safai, an ethnic Pashtun, to govern Kunduz, a province where Pashtuns are a minority, had contributed to dissatisfaction with the government and allowed the Taliban to gain support.

Safai was in Tajikistan when the Taliban took Kunduz city and has not returned, and Ghani has yet to name a successor as fighting continues. But Ali said the appointment of Zia in neighbouring Takhar Province was a clear attempt to help quell the insurgency in Kunduz.

Zia formerly served as head of Afghanistan’s counter-terrorism unit and then as deputy chief of the country’s intelligence agency, the National Directorate of Security.

“This man’s appointment to govern the province neighbouring Kunduz could be extremely effective in regaining control in the area,” Ali said.

Yet, Ali said the political gains made by appointing well-connected governors need to be matched on the battlefield if the strategy is to work.

“The government needs to go back on the offensive and get out of the defensive mode,” he said. “Instead of reacting to the action of the enemy, they really need to go after them.”

Dire conditions

The human toll of the government’s attempt to take back Kunduz could be seen over the past week as those who could escape streamed out of the city.

The WFP said it began distributing provisions today to some of those displaced by the fighting. More than 1,000 families who fled to the cities of Mazar-e-Sharif and Taluqan received a month’s worth of food, while 1,800 people in a temporary camp outside Mazar-e-Sharif were given bread made of wheat flour fortified with vitamins and minerals.

But the UN’s food assistance agency said it was “seriously concerned about the safety and food security of people remaining in Kunduz, as fighting intensifies.”

Accounts from those trapped in the city are grim.

“The dead bodies were piled in the streets and had been making the city smell really bad, but they have been cleared from my area in the last two days,” Rasuli told IRIN.

The Chinese Communist Party is sending signals that it will intensify control over the Catholic Church and other religions during its upcoming summit on religion, the first such meeting during the three-year leadership of Xi Jinping.

Zhongguo Mingzu Bao, the official newspaper on religious issues, noted in an Oct. 8 commentary that Xi is “serious” on religion.

Though the article did not specify individual religions, it alluded to church, clergy and dioceses, an apparent reference to the Catholic Church and other Christian churches.

The article implied that Xi is seeking to minimize foreign influence on Chinese institutions, saying that all religions should be managed by religious organizations from within China. “There is no need for certain groups and individuals outside China to worry about this,” it said.

“It’s obvious that control on religions is to be tightened,” a priest, who identified himself as Father Peter, told ucanews.com. “It was theory and slogans in the past. Now it becomes a real game to play.”

The article was posted on the newspaper’s social media site, with the headline referring to Xi by his nickname “Xi Dada.”

Citing Xi’s speech at the central United Front Work Department meeting in May, the article said the president has stated very clearly that all religions must adapt to socialist policy. It is “a common principle for all religions to comply with” since Communist China was founded in 1949, it said.

The Chinese government has established patriotic associations for all five recognized religions — Buddhism, Catholicism, Daoism, Islam and Protestantism.

The Vatican has objected to China’s control over church operations, in particular the appointment of bishops and administrative boundaries of dioceses.

In September, the United Front Work Department, which oversees religion, announced new regulations that prevent foreign involvement in China’s religious institutions and ban party members from following a faith.

“I am a businessman, not a politician” — Tajuddin Abdul Rahman, Deputy Minister of Agriculture and Agro-based Industry at the opening of Herbal Asia, Matrade Exhibition Centre, October 1, 2015.

Unlike most of the rest of the world that is heading along the track of multiculturalism, Malaysia seems to be locked in a limbo of racial introspection it cannot get out of.

This introspection is however more than mere racism, it is the overt part of an elaborate structure that has maintained a small elite in power for over 45 years, since the notorious May 13 riots back in 1969.

The direct discussion of this subject has basically been criminalized since the 1970s and deemed too sensitive to debate, which means there has been little public discourse on the matter of who really exercises power, how, and for whom within the country.

This has helped to enshrine a structure of political-cabalism, based upon a neo-Malay-feudalism, which has used a form of ‘Malaysian apartheid’ to support this elite in position and privilege over the rest of Malaysians they rule (as opposed to govern).

Ever since the British Colonial era, Malaysia has been divided and described through racial paradigms. The major races that represented the Malay Peninsula got together to negotiate and steer Malaya to independence in 1957, and into the Federation of Malaysia in 1963. Perhaps the most important artefact from this era is the race is still recorded on Malaysian Identity Cards today, which is hurting the sensitivities of a number of Malaysians.

However with a rekindled Malay nationalistic sentiment remerging in the 1960s, an opportunity after the 13th May 1969 racial riots arose for a group of Malay politicans to seize the reigns of power. Mahathir Mohamad, supported by a group of ‘ultras’ including Syed Nasir Ismail, Musa Hitam, and Tunku Razaleigh, moved to dispose of the then Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman, representing the moderate Malay aristocracy.

(Tun) Abdul Razak Hussein (father of the current Prime Minister) was installed as Prime Minister in what some describe as a ‘coup’ to succeed Tunku Abdul Rahman in 1970.

As Tunku Abdul Rahman had already invoked a state of emergency in 1969 after the 13th May riots, and ruled by decree through the National operations Council, (Tun) Abdul Razak as Prime Minister through was able to use this short window was to pass through the New Economic policy (NEP) without any hindrance, as parliamentary approval wasn’t necessary. The NEP was based upon many ideas within Mahathir Mohamad’s book The Malay Dilemma, extremely controversial at the time.

At the time, the NEP was seen, even internationally as a necessary affirmative action policy. The NEP stipulated the use of quotas in granting educational places at school and universities, the use of quotas in the public service, favouritism to Malays in the granting of business licenses, the development of Malay reserve land restricting non-Bumiputera purchases, subsidies on the purchase of real estate, quotas on public equity holdings, general subsidies for Bumiputera businesses, and exclusive Bumiputera mutual funds (ASN, ASB), which gave better rates of return than commercial banks.

When the Malaysian Parliament was reconvened in 1971, both the Sedition and Internal Security Acts were strengthened to limit any discussion about matters concerning Malay special rights, the Malay rulers, and citizenship, under the premise of preserving ‘intercommunal harmony’. These restrictions also applied to members of parliament, thus weakening the principal of ‘parliamentary immunity’, i.e., the NEP was above parliamentary sovereignty, which attracted much international condemnation at the time.

It is during this time that a concerted covert effort was made to create a ‘secret leadership’ to maintain and support what was called the ‘Malay Agenda’.

According to an interview with an anonymous high ranking official within the Razak Government at the time, most executive positions, civil service placements, and high ranking police and army personnel were filled with people sympathetic to the ‘Malay Agenda’.

The author’s source also stated that it was during the Razak era that selected bureaucrats and other people stated creating and acquiring corporate assets with the objective of channelling funds back to UMNO to fight future elections, to ensure victory.

The ‘Malay Agenda’ meant running government and agencies within government with the objective of looking after ‘Malay’ interests ahead of others. The ‘Malay Agenda’ was rarely spoken about in the open but had a wide appeal among all levels of Malay society, including some members of royal families, at the time.

This was the start of crony capitalism in Malaysia, the making of a kleptocracy. This loose ruling political-cabal was developed in the Malay-feudalistic tradition, in the sense that it required giving total loyalty to the leader of UMNO, the Prime Minister, without question.

A very small proportion of this group became very rich through the implementation of this special agenda. These original beneficiaries are now considered socially as the ‘old money’ in Malay society today.

Malaysia rejected multiculturalism for its own form of ethno-religious form of ‘Malaysian apartheid’, supported by the Malay-feudalistic social structure that was enhanced rather than dismantled over the two decades after independence from Britain. The mythology that the Chinese, who already control the economy, also aim to take political control of Malaysia was dissipated as propaganda to install a fear into the Malay population. Propaganda became one of the prime tools used by the government with the formation of the Biro Tata Negara (BTN) to indoctrinate civil servants and students on the “Malay agenda”.

Section 153 of the Malaysian constitution became the proclaimed legal basis of ‘Malaysian apartheid’ measures. The Reid Commission had only intended to be a temporary measure, to be reviewed by the parliament within 15 years. Section 153 states that “….it is the responsibility of the Yang Di-Pertuan Agong to safeguard the special position of the Malays and natives of any of the States of Sabah and Sarawak”, thus turning Malay into political construct, as there is no single Malay tribal grouping. The authorities over the years attempted to Malayanize the indigenous peoples of the Malay Peninsula, the Orang Asli, through encouraging their conversion to Islam and adoption of Malays customs.

When Dr. Mahathir came to the Prime Ministership in 1981 due to then Prime Minister Hussein Onn stepping down because of poor health, he pursued an ambitious agenda which included extending the business interests of UMNO. Much of these business interests were controlled by proxies and nominees such as Tajudin Ramli and Halim Saad. Further, Dr Mahathir with his Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim embarked on a program to produce Malay millionaires who would bring up other Malays into the business sphere.

Ironically under Dr. Mahathir, a period of liberalization came with Wawasan 2020, where the country grew very optimistic under the premise of ‘Malaysia Boleh’. There appeared to be a great working relationship between the different racial based parties within the Barisan Nasional, and Malaysian appeared to genuinely have pride in their nation.

These short ‘golden years’ for Malaysia were soon eclipsed by the Asian economic crisis of 1997 and the sacking by Dr. Mahathir of his then deputy Anwar Ibrahim in 1998. A bitter election was fought between the BN Government and newly formed Barisan Alternative in 1999, leading to the BN Government winning with a greatly reduced majority.

Many misread the Abdullah Badawi period as further liberalization, although he publically fought corruption. However, Badawi still cracked down hard on dissent such as not allowing open discussion on Malaysia’s ‘social contract’, and allowed the police to act heavy handed at the Bersih rally in 2007. A new group of entities entered into the corporate scene which led to a number of scandals, by the notorious ‘boys on the 4th floor’, who included Khairy Jamaluddin. Dr. Mahathir became Badawi’s chief critic. Badawi’s poor election performance in 2008, and criticism of his apparent enjoyment of the trappings of power led to his replacement with Najib Tun Razak in 2009.

Najib Tun Razak came to power promising a transformation of government and a completely new paradigm in race relations with the well promoted 1Malaysia slogan. However, after being the vanguard of moderation internationally, his actions domestically showed none of the moderation he had promised. Najib was totally silent when organizations like Pekasa made outlandish statements about race. His greatest modus operandi is silence when government organs and NGOs undertake extreme actions in defending Malays and Islam. Bajib’s persona as a moderate leader completely disappeared after the poor election performance in 2013, where he personally blamed the Chinese in his ‘Chinese Tsunami’ statement on election night.

Post GE13, has seen a definitive return to repression by the BN Government in power. Its closely aligned newspaper organ Utusan Malaysia has been continually allowed to publish headlines and statements, such as ‘Apa lagi Cina mahu’, which were inflammatory in the post-election environment.

GE13 also weakened the MCA, Gerakan, and MIC to the point where they no longer have any effective say in government, a far cry from their days of great influence within the cabinet during the 1970s and 80s. All political parties became totally subservient groups within an UMNO dominated BN. This is ironically a result of opposition electoral success in 2013.

Extreme groups have been allowed to make anti-Chinese rhetoric and racial insults with impunity under the Najib Government, thus keeping Chinese groups quiet through producing an atmosphere of fear and tension. This is a purposeful tactic to suppress any opposition.

In terms of popular vote, the BN Government is now in reality a minority one, capturing less than 50% of total votes cast. However through the first past the post voting system, the BN is almost ensured to continue winning elections in the future. This is especially the case with the poor electoral strategy that the Pakatan Rakyat employed last election, focusing on the urban areas, rather than the rural areas. To compete with the BN, the opposition must make major changes to its electoral strategy, but will come up against a ‘hardened Umno’ organization at grassroots level. In addition, the opposition today is in so much disarray, the effective leader of the opposition to the government appears to be Dr. Mahathir.

Rather than reaching out to win the ‘hearts and minds’ of all Malaysians, UMNO has seen the decline of electoral support for BN component parties as an opportunity to consolidate power within its own right. GE13 has allowed UMNO and the political-cabal that controls it to manoeuvre even more on the ‘Malay Agenda’.

Since 2013, economic and social policy has been allowed to degenerate into blatant racial discrimination, and now has become something even more sinister.

The Malaysian civil service is being cleaned out. For example in Sabah, civil servants from ethnic groups like Dusun/Kadazan are slowly being weeded out and replaced. A bureaucratic ethnic cleansing is going on within the civil service. Other indigenous ethnic groups are no longer acceptable. Likewise, the universities are being cleansed of dissidents. There is a purge going on in Malaysia that has even taken the Deputy Prime Minister and attorney general out. This is supplemented with a clampdown on ‘whistleblowers, and anybody within existing agencies that have potential to turn against the political-cabal.

Any potential resistance, including reporters and the media, to the political-cabal that currently controls the country is being eliminated. Malaysia is now facing a repressive phase in government that one has not seen since Dr. Mahathir’s “Operation Lalang” in the late 1980s.Only this time it is much wider.

The effects of this imposed policy of ‘Malaysian apartheid’ upon the country today are profound, and can be summarized as follows:

1. A feudal social structure has been developed with four sections of populace;

i) The Malay elite who rules the country and their associates,
ii) A Malay middle class which is predominantly urban,
iii) A Malay rural class, and
iv) The rest of the Malaysian population.

Politically, this rural Malay class has kept the Malay elite in power, while the educated middle class is turning away from UMNO.

2. A brain drain is happening from Malaysia at present, which does not only include Chinese and Indian, but Malays as well. The political-cabal of elite leaders aren’t really concerned with this brain drain, as this seen as a good opportunity to weaken potential future opposition. This loss of creative and innovative people is leaving a rent seeking mentality within the country, at a time, creativity and innovation is really needed to develop the Malaysian economy. The leadership have intentionally nurtured the development of an unquestioning population, which is reflected in the Malaysian education system, as the best means to maintain a docile electorate that will not look at political issues like corruption very seriously.

3. There has been a general failure to eradicate poverty throughout rural Malaysia, as limited resources have been used to prop up the feudal warlords of UMNO through ‘white elephant’ rural development projects throughout the country. Many UMNO warlords have made it big through receiving contracts while their areas remain inadequate with basic infrastructure, and rural assistance such as farm extension services and even proper roads and irrigation. There are still large numbers of Malays who cannot afford to attend university, through the lack of any general assistance schemes available in most other countries. Poverty is still a major problem within Malaysia, where the government has been claiming undue successes.

4. The Malaysian economy is skewed with inefficiencies and market restrictions that hinder its transformation into a mature developed sustainable economic system. Companies are allowed to have monopolies, the restricted issuance of import permits has created inefficient markets, and general lack of transparency is making the Malaysian market unattractive to investors. A 2012 Asian Development Bank (ADB) report cites the two main reasons for Malaysia’s net capital outflow as the distortions introduced into the economy by the NEP, and the widespread presence and overbearing influence of Government Linked Companies (GLCs). The restriction of tenders to Bumi companies has created an inefficient Ali Baba business model, which raises the cost of both government and business. GLCs and other government owned companies openly compete with entrepreneurs in the market with an unfair advantage, thus stifling innovation, and the willingness of private individuals to take business risks. Malaysia still needs economic growth to absorb new entrants to the workforce in the coming decade.

5. Meritocracy doesn’t exist within the Malaysian civil service, universities, or other agencies. People are forced to adopt a feudal stance of seeking favour from superiors to get promotions and survive within these organizations. Under such an environment there is no chance for creativity, critical thinking, or even honesty. ‘Ketuanan Melayu’ is now turning hegemonic is a dangerous way that can spill off Malaysian shores. This stands Malaysian in a poor position to be internationally competitive in the future.

6. The divide and conquer political strategy of the Government, use of bullying through third party NGOs, and straight threats and arrogance has had a major effect upon the people of Malaysia. Many have lost hope and respect for the leadership of their country. Many are now resentful. There is potential for outbreaks of violence due to the uncontrollability of some extreme ‘ultra’ groups allowed to roam free in society today. The country thinks in terms of race, even to the point where a near diplomatic incident nearly occurred with China a few weeks ago, the second most powerful country in the world. This is not healthy and will not stand Malaysia well within the international community. The dissent generated by this ‘divide and conquer’ political strategy is fodder that allows the political-cabal to use state apparatus to strengthen their hold on power, as the current spate of arrests indicates.

7. What the policies of the Government and resulting social structure of society has created is a small elite class of rulers who act upon the axiom that ‘we are the law’. Comments by the Defence Minister Hishammuddin Hussein (a cousin of the current prime minister), indicate the ruling elite’s distain even for the constitutional monarchy of Malaysia. The elite is now in an unquestionable position of power unable to be dislodged by the rule of law. They are unashamed by scandal and control all the elements of power through their network of loyalists through the civil service, police, armed forces, and judiciary.

8. Finally, it could be argued that Malay self-confidence has been destroyed and replaced with a national inferiority complex, that the elite can use and play to at their whim. There is a condescending attitude by the elite that ’Malays are backward’ and need special protection by the BN/UMNO Government. Thus a whole section of the population is continually told they need help. The concept of ‘Ketuanan Melayu’, according to UKM Professor Noraini Othman has connotations of enslavement, with a Malay master and servant relationship implied. Tun Dr. Ismail Abdul Rahman went further and said that the ‘special position of the Malays’ in the constitution is a slur on the ability of the Malays.
The political-cabal that was set up in the 1970s by Prime Minister Tun Razak, has been transferred across from leader to leader since that time. Each prime minister inherited a complete network of loyalists to the ‘Agenda Melayu’.
This has been their strength. However cracks appeared in this political-cabal when Mahathir tried to make an agreement with both his successors, which according to him have not been kept. In addition, the scandals of the present prime minister are beginning to test those loyal to the “Agenda Melayu’, to the point where some may begin to feel guilty about their loyalty to the current leadership of the political-cabal and ‘spill the beans’. Hence the sackings, demotions, transfers and arrests of late.

This however will not mean self-destruction to Malaysia’s political-cabal. It’s a fight over control and not reform. Winner will take all. Perhaps Dr. Mahathir was naïve in thinking that he could still exercise control and influence over this political-cabal, once he stepped down from the leadership of UMNO and the nation. This is one of the biggest mistakes of his political career.

The very nature of UMNO itself, once a party of school teachers, junior civil servants, farmers, and fishermen, which transformed into a party of contractors, small entrepreneurs, and professional rent seekers, will serve Najib well as he tries to consolidate his position. The party is run along feudal lines where booty is distributed around the country through lucrative contracts to those who head the party at state and district levels to maintain their loyalty and support. The influence of this on public policy and development planning is rarely discussed, even though it leads to massive misallocations of funds into projects that have little, if any community or economic benefit. This prevents any policy approach to planning and implementation, drastically lowering the quality of government.
Najib can reward his warlords, maintain their loyalty, and even put more of his loyalists in place for the coming election, win it, and even end up having more power than he has now. This scenario is Dr. Mahathir’s worst nightmare, and why he is working so hard to remove Najib before the next election.

To date very few international bodies have heavily criticized this “Malaysian Apartheid”. The Malaysian Government will continue to get away with repressing its populace with divide and conquer tactics. There is no front against Malaysia, like there was against South Africa. No one interested in putting sanctions upon Malaysia.

However, Swiss Islamic intellectual Dr. Tariq Ramadan foresees a credibility gap for Malaysia in international affairs where he says “As Malaysian Muslims complaining about discrimination by the West, should first acknowledge the injustices against minorities in their own country”. Until Malaysia sorts out its own racism, any stand upon Israel and Palestine seeps into hypocrisy.

This Malaysian Apartheid will continue into the foreseeable future and anybody who tries to oppose it will meet the Roth of bullying tactics to subdue them, as is being played out now with the latest round of arrests. The Malay position will remain a taboo subject for years to come, hence Malaysian sensitivities when any non-Malaysian comments on Malaysian internal affairs.

This also means that the question as to whether the NEP/NDP has been protecting or marginalizing the Malays will not be discussed. This is an important question for the future of Malaysia and the challenges that lie ahead. As former Prime Minister Ahmad Badawi once said “Malays who can’t learn how to walk without crutches will end up in a wheelchair”. Dr. Mahathir took this further and said, “Unfortunately, the protection and privileges accorded by the New Economic Policy (NEP) may weaken the Malays further by lulling the next generation into complacency, thinking that the NEP’s affirmative action will always be there for them to fall back upon….. The NEP can make the users so dependent that their inherent capability regresses.”

This dooms the country into the ‘middle income trap’, where the capabilities, creativity and innovation needed to lift the Malaysian economy into high valued activities, does not exist. Economic and social prosperity is risked so that Kleptocratic rule can continue unabated in Malaysia. Malay self-respect has also been sacrificed in this quest to hold power.

The system of discrimination has only benefitted in preserving a feudal hierarchy within Malaysian society where the new lords are political dynasties which are now fighting each other openly using 1MDB as the platform. This is not about corruption, but which family dynasty and surrounding group rules, rather than any promise of social reform.

At a news conference at the United Nations, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov may have been on thin ice when he defended Russian intervention on behalf of Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad. He pointed to the chaos that followed US targeting of other Arab autocrats like Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi. Russia’s track record however is no less chequered with its defeat in Afghanistan and its devastating campaign in Chechnya that has put in power a lackey of President Vladimir Putin, seemingly willing to do his wet work.

Either outcome in Syria could cost Russia dearly. Defeat in Syria in a war in which rebel forces would become the proxies of Saudi Arabia and Turkey would destroy Russia’s ambitions of becoming a power in the Middle East and North Africa.

A proxy war

To be sure, Russia’s air campaign in Syria, in contrast to that of the US-led coalition, has in the Syrian military a relatively capable ground force which theoretically gives it a strategic advantage. The combination of superior air power and ground troops however proved insufficient to clinch victory for the Soviets in Afghanistan.

The first signs that a similar situation could develop in Syria emerged barely two weeks after Russia launched its air campaign. Media reports suggest that Saudi Arabia has begun supplying the US-backed rebel Free Syrian Army (FSA) with TOW guided anti-tank missiles. The US has in the past equipped the FSA with the same type of missiles, which have proven effective in halting Syrian military advances. The FSA most recently employed the missiles to halt a Russian-backed offensive to the north of Hama.

In another comparison to Afghanistan, some 40 rival rebel groups in Syria, including Ahrar al-Sham, Islam Army and the Levant Front, banded together in a bid to counter the Russian offensive. “This new reality requires the region’s countries and the allies in specific to hasten in forming a regional alliance to face the Russian-Iranian alliance that occupies Syria,” the groups said in a statement that was referring to Turkey and Saudi Arabia.

In contrast to Afghanistan, Syria could develop into more than just a proxy war with Sunni countries like Turkey and Saudi Arabia. Writing on CNN’s website, Nawaf Obaid, a policy analyst with close ties to Saudi intelligence and the military warned that “now, following a successful Saudi-led campaign to wrest Aden and the rest of south Yemen from Houthi, Saleh and Hezbollah fighters” Saudi Arabia was able to turn its attention to Syria.

A Saudi-led “coalition of the willing”?

The Russian intervention had made it “increasingly clear that the Saudis are going to be forced to lead a coalition of nations in an air campaign against the remnants of Syrian forces, Hezbollah and Iranian fighters to facilitate the collapse of the Assad regime and assist the entry of rebel forces into Damascus …. The situation on the ground in Syria is ripe for a concerted air campaign that can assist the two major rebel coalitions ready to take Damascus and turn the course of the war,” Obaid said.

Speaking in Washington Saudi Prince Sultan bin Khaled al Faisal, a retired Saudi military commander, said in what was a veiled reference to Syria that the kingdom could put together an air coalition that would include war planes from Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain and possibly Jordan, Morocco, Pakistan and Malaysia.

Russia may be banking on the assumption that Sunni Muslim countries may be capable of arming and funding rebel groups but that Saudi Arabia and its allies are far from achieving their objectives in Yemen. The north of the country remains under control of the Houthis and only a division of Yemen would at this point allow the Saudis to disengage from the country militarily.

The risks of failure

Nonetheless, a proxy war with the world’s major Sunni Muslim powers would diminish Russia’s ability to turn success in Syria into the kind of power it could leverage regionally. Even worse, the demise of Assad would deprive Russia of its closest ally in the Middle East. And if that were not bad enough, a rebel victory in Syria that includes Islamist and jihadist forces could mean that at least some of the estimated 3,000 Chechen and Russian foreign fighters in Syria decide to return home emboldened like their Afghan predecessors by the defeat of a major power. And finally, a defeat at the hands of Western weaponry could lower global interest in cutting deals with the Russian arms industry.

On the upside a Russian defeat of Islamic State (IS) would hold out the prospect of the restoration of Syria and Iraq as nation states within their original post-colonial borders that would be governed by regimes sympathetic and grateful to Moscow. For now, Putin has support from Russia’s predominantly Sunni Muslim community that opposes IS. That support could wane if Russia were to emerge as the major force in stymying non-IS Sunni Muslim rebels in achieving their goals in Syria.

Putin clearly stated after meeting senior Saudi officials in Moscow that he does not want Russia to be dragged into the confrontation between Sunni and Shias. That could prove to be a difficult act given Russia’s alliance with Iran, the fact that Assad is an Alawite, a sect closely aligned with Shiism and Iran, and that Saudi Arabia and its allies are determined to thwart Putin’s ambitions.

Russia’s only way out of what is likely to be a quagmire like Afghanistan, would be to ultimately install a Chechen-style Sunni potentate in Damascus. That would at best buy Russia time and possibly placate Saudi Arabia and its Sunni allies. A potentate would however more likely than not prove to be a stop gap.

This article was published at RSIS

Belarusian leader Alexander Lukashenko won the country’s presidential elections with over 83 percent of the votes, the Central Election Commission chairwoman announced Monday.

“Across the country, Alexander Lukashenko gained 83.49 percent of the votes,” Lidia Yermoshina said.

With some 5.1 million out of the nearly 7 million registered voters casting their ballots in favour of the four-term president, this year’s election is the most successful for Lukashenko. In the four campaigns dating back to 1994, his support peaked at 83 percent in 2006 and was lowest at 75.65 percent five years prior.

Lukashenko’s best showing was in the Mogilev region at 88.29 percent of the votes. He graduated from university, taught at a school and served in the army in the region. A mere 65.58 percent voted in favour of Lukashenko in the Belarusian capital of Minsk.

Yermoshina said “Say the Truth” campaign activist Tatyana Korotkevich placed second with nearly 4.42 percent of the votes. She is followed by Chairman of the Liberal Democratic Party Sergei Gaidukevich with 3.32 percent and head of the Belarusian Cossacks organization Nikolai Ulakhovich with 1.67 percent. Some 6.4 percent voted for none of the above.

The Central Election Commission results do not include ballots cast outside Belarus.

Upon his arrival in New York, where he will take part in the UN Security Council, Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy responded to the European Commission’s forecasts on Spain for the coming year. Rajoy stressed that the deficit ceiling set will be met.

“We are very calm because Spain has recovered economic activity,” Rajoy said.

In response to questions from the press, Rajoy referred to the warnings from the European Commission about the Spanish public accounts for 2016. In this regard, Rajoy claimed that “Spain will not miss the deficit target”.

According to Rajoy, “Spain has recovered economic activity, Spain has recovered jobs and this has all led to increased revenue, and hence, we can and will meet the deficit target.”

“For that reason, I am very calm, as indeed are the Spanish people, in knowing that we will meet the deficit target,” Rajoy added.

Rajoy recalled that, since he came to power, “we have always met the deficit target,” and added that the European Commission was “probably” thinking “about other times in which we deviated by up to three points.”

Furthermore, Rajoy underlined that this year the Spanish economy will grow by “more than double” the rate of other major European economies.

According to the forecasts from the International Monetary Fund, Europe as a whole will grow this year by 1.5%, whereas Spain, in contrast, will grow by 3.1%, Rajoy said.

The Spanish Prime Minister also pointed out that Spain is the EU country that is creating the most jobs.

“I believe that in the next four years, unless we change economic policy, we can create some 2 million jobs at a rate of half a million a year,” Rajoy said.

After being isolated due to his aggression towards Ukraine and annexation of Crimea, Russian President Vladimir Putin is apparently back in the game. This time it is far from his traditional sphere of influence: Syria.

Under Mr. Putin’s leadership, Russia has sent armaments and warplanes to Syria without any coordination with the United States and coalition forces fighting the Islamic State or ISIS. This development has caught Washington by surprise, and is now mulling on how to respond to this latest Russian intervention. While Russia deems it legitimate to secure its interests by helping the Assad regime in its struggle of survival against ISIS and other armed groups in the country, it also has a major geopolitical agenda that needs to be taken seriously by the US and rest of the western nations.

And that is Russia will not accept a regime change in Damascus by the US, as occurred in Iraq and Libya. For President Putin, regime changes in the aforementioned two states have led to the rise of terrorism and extremism in the region. In addition, his efforts to bolster Assad must be seen as Russia supporting its only ally in the region, and a country that has had a longstanding relationship with Russia over the decades. Another reason is to maintain its strategic naval base in Latakia region that is essential in projecting Russian military power across the Middle East and Mediterranean Sea.

To this end, Russia will commit itself via whatever political and military efforts it takes to support the Al-Assad regime to hold on to power and fight the Islamic State and perhaps other opposition groups inside Syria.

There is no doubt that Russia’s decision under the guise of fighting ISIS and helping Assad will further complicate the Syrian dilemma and make it much harder to find a political settlement for the already war-ravaged country. Furthermore, a Russian military buildup is also in stark contrast to the US strategy in the region, particularly with regard to the issue of Syria’s future. For the United States, a political settlement sans Assad and his associates in power is the key to end the current Syrian crisis. While Russia’s aim is to support Assad and his forces, which Washington believes is responsible for killing of hundred thousands of its own innocent civilians. The United States also sees Assad in power as magnet for various groups to fight in Syria due to his ruthless force against, and suppression, of his own people.

Given these widespread rifts between the United States and the Russian Federation in their policies toward Syria, it is highly unlikely that the two countries would reach an agreement that could effectively fight the Islamic State, as well as bring an end to the current bloodshed in Syria.

Russia has also stepped up building its own coalition against the Islamic State that according to US officials will not serve a good cause in the current fight against ISIS. The Russian coalition, which consists of regional countries such as Iran, Iraq and Syrian regime, will coordinate military and intelligence operations against ISIS and other extremist groups. According to some reports, Russian military and intelligence personnel have already reached Baghdad in order to set up a command and control center that can ensure unity of efforts among coalition countries.

Moreover, it appears that Mr. Putin’s goal behind building the coalition is to show that he does not only want to have Assad in power, but also to fight the Islamic State with what he calls real and genuine partners. Indeed, it is interesting to see Iraq — a major US ally — inside the new coalition formed by Russia.

While it may seem odd, if not unthinkable, to see Iraq work with the Russians against the will of the United States by allowing access to its airspace for the Russian planes to transport military cargoes to Syria and share vital intelligence, for Baghdad it is all about the defeat of ISIS. The main reason that Iraq is eager to join the Russian coalition is because Washington has been loath to support the Shia-led government without any significant Sunni representation to fight the Islamic State. Now that the Russians are keen to help the Iraqis against ISIS, Baghdad is more hopeful that the Russian intervention could lead to a paradigm shift on the battlefields against the seemingly invincible forces of ISIS. That help is something the Iraqis have been expecting from the United States for a long time.

It is important to note that while the United States and Russia may not agree on every aspect of their respective strategies towards Syria, one common factor that can bring the two major powers together is the threat from the Islamic State and other terrorist organizations in the region. The two states are cognizant of the fact that ISIS shares equal animosity towards Russia and the US and will seize every opportunity to inflict harm.

Therefore, this very threat should prompt the two countries to coordinate their military strategies in order to eradicate an invasive cancer that has already spread across the Middle East and is rapidly gaining footholds in different regions. As for the future of Syria, the US and Russia again may not agree on every strategy due to their conflicting geopolitical interests in the region, however, they can certainly work towards a political solution that can eventually lead to a peaceful transition of power from the Assad regime. This could take place by a moderate political force that can stabilize and rebuild the once peaceful, united and colorful Syria.

*Ahmad Murid Partaw, former Afghan Senior National Representative SNR to the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) and a recent graduate of Political Science from the University of South Florida (USF) in Tampa, FL. His research focuses on Afghan politics and the Middle East. He is an Alumni of the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies (NESA) as well as United States Special Operations Command (SSOCOM) and Joint Special Operations University (JSOU). His most recent piece, The Dynamics of Peace and Political Change in Afghanistan, was published in Foreign Policy Journal FPJ.

By John Manfreda

Since 2009, China has been taking a much more active role in its pursuit of international oil contracts. In 2009, for the first time, Saudi Arabia exported more of its oil to China than it did to the U.S. China also made large investments in Saudi Arabia’s oil refining industry as well. But China’s oil investments didn’t stop there; they also pursued oil producing Canadian assets in 2011-12.

When it comes to Chinese energy industry, there are three major state owned companies. One is called China National Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC), which is an oil and gas producer, another is called PetroChina, which is another oil producing company, and its third company is Sinopec, which is primarily a refining company.

Lately though, China’s large investments are being made in the mid-stream sector of the oil and gas industry, the one sector China doesn’t have a national company for. This is the part of the industry that transports oil and gas from producing wells to the refineries, so oil can be turned into liquid fuel.

One of China’s most recent mid-stream deals included building a pipeline from Iran to Pakistan, which is being built despite objections from the U.S. The stated reason though, isn’t to satisfy China’s energy consumption, but to help alleviate Pakistan from its current energy problems.

China’s other recent mid-stream pipeline deal was made with Russia. Unlike the pipeline that will travel from Iran to Pakistan, this pipeline deal was made as a means to satisfy China’s growing thirst for oil. The pipeline will transport crude oil from Russia to Daqing, China.

This may be why China is now on the verge of creating a new mid-stream pipeline company. The state backed China Securities Journal stated that, the government of China will start stripping away pipeline assets from its three largest firms mentioned above, and then they will sell those assets to private investors. The journal states that this move is aimed at reducing the monopoly its state owned enterprises have enjoyed since their creation. It also said that the move will create more competition within the energy sector, and hopefully reduce the corruption that has been brewing in the Chinese energy industry.

While this sounds legitimate on the surface, there are reasons to believe that these actions will have very little effect.

And that is largely because China is only selling mid-stream assets. These state owned enterprises will still have monopolies on its upstream and downstream assets. And the new company emerging will have a new monopoly on the mid-stream sector of China’s oil and gas industry. Instead of competition, it is more likely that this creation of a new mid-stream company will be used as a way for the Chinese government to help monitor and control its transportation and flow of energy.

If China was really concerned about corruption in the oil and energy sector, stemming from the oligopoly that these state-owned enterprises enjoyed, then they would take away all of their assets, and then sell them to the private investors and entrepreneurs. They wouldn’t create a new mid-stream company, which will basically have its own monopoly in the mid-stream sector.

Nevertheless, what we do know is that China will be a major energy player for the foreseeable future. On a demand basis, its crude consumption has increased by 10 percent on a year over year basis (YOY). This summer alone, China has already made two new pipeline deals with three different countries. And China is also actively filling up its strategic petroleum reserves (SPR).

Given China’s large and growing energy sector, there is a degree of logic in the government creating a new mid-stream company, allowing the state to monitor energy flows. But in terms of its stated reason for creating a new mid-stream company in order to reduce corruption, I just don’t buy it.

Article Source: http://oilprice.com/Energy/Energy-General/China-To-Continue-Expanding-Its-Influence-In-The-Oil-And-Gas-Sector.html

By Jos Boonstra*

The South Caucasus comprises the former Soviet states of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. It lies at the crossroads of Europe, the Middle East and Asia and is subject to the often conflicting geopolitical influences of Russia, the European Union (EU), Turkey, and the United States (US). Iran might have an influential role in the region in the future. Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia are far from being helpless pawns in this geopolitical contest for influence and affiliation. Indeed to some degree they play these external actors off against each other.

Armenia looks north to Russia for support; Azerbaijan is wary of integration initiatives but close to Turkey; and Georgia’s objectives are fixed westwards towards the EU and US. Together these three countries and the five ‘external’ actors constitute a dense web of interdependent relationships that affects governance and values; security and conflict; and trade and energy.

Russia, however, is by the far the most dominant power as recent and on-going conflicts illustrate: Russia-Georgia war of August 2008 and the current war in Ukraine show very clearly that Russia is prepared to use force to safeguard its interests in neighbouring regions. It will not tolerate closer EU and NATO relationships with former Soviet republics in the South Caucasus. Meanwhile the political will to devote attention and resources to the South Caucasus is more modest in Ankara, Brussels and Washington, not least because of other pressing matters such as the conflicts in Ukraine and Syria. Clearly not every region can be a top priority for the EU, US or Turkey. This paper argues, however, that more awareness and possibly cooperation are needed on the part of Ankara, Brussels and Washington to counter Russian influence and ensure stability. The South Caucasus is a highly combustible powder keg – especially the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict – with the potential to have impacts well beyond its small mountainous area.

This paper sets out a few proposals as to how the EU can increase its engagement with the South Caucasus. It builds on a previous FRIDE working paper – Challenging the South Caucasus security deficit (April 2011)1 – that argued that the EU needed to focus on the South Caucasus to fill the security vacuum left by the partial withdrawal of regional and international organisations such as the Organisation for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). It also proposed that the EU develop a road map outlining objectives for the region, particularly in the field of security. This suggestion remains valid today as the EU reviews its European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and drafts a new Global Strategy for Foreign and Security policy.

Although this paper looks at these issues from a European perspective, it also draws on recent papers from two US think-tanks. The first by the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute – A Western Strategy for the South Caucasus (February 2015)2 – stresses the need for increased US-EU cooperation and attention to the region, while outlining a series of proposals to inject new life into western strategic involvement. The second by the Brookings Institution – Retracing the Caucasian Circle (July 2015)3 – makes the case for increased US, EU and Turkey cooperation in the South Caucasus.

The first part of this paper addresses the main interdependencies among external actors and the South Caucasus in a rapidly evolving regional setting. It does so in the light of developments over the last year, especially tenser EU/US-Russia relations and the war in Ukraine. The second part discusses the interests of the EU, Russia, Turkey, the US and Iran (with its potential return after more than a century) in the South Caucasus. The third and final section outlines basic steps that the EU can take to influence democracy and security in the South Caucasus.

A web of interdependent relations

The security, governance and economic development of the South Caucasus are adversely affected by the complex fractious relationships between the individual countries themselves and the geopolitical rivalries and conflicting approaches of powerful external actors that seek to influence the region. This complex situation influences affiliations and integration initiatives, as well as trade, energy, and security. Tensions between the EU/US and Russia over Ukraine are further entrenching these interdependent relations and hampering development in the South Caucasus. Russia essentially considers Eastern Europe, including the South Caucasus, as its backyard where it can act militarily if it feels cornered. For its part, Turkey treads a fine diplomatic line in its dealings with the region so as to maintain good trade relations with both the South Caucasian countries and Russia while remaining on good terms with the EU and the US. This explains its moderate response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea. The EU and the US are all too aware of increasing Russian influence in the South Caucasus but are unsure as to how to counter it. They fear that a tougher stance over Russia’s involvement could lead to conflict, and with so many demands from other regions of the world, they do not regard the South Caucasus as a top priority.

Democracy and affiliation

The Maidan revolution and subsequent war in Ukraine sharpened the divide between the EU’s Eastern Partnership (EaP) programme and Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) project. The South Caucasus states have felt obliged to choose to develop an Association Agreement (AA) with Brussels (without the prospect of membership) or to integrate with Russia. Armenia has joined the EEU and Georgia is implementing an AA. Meanwhile Azerbaijan has been able to avoid picking sides thanks to its abundant oil and gas reserves which make it much less dependent on external powers. The choice between the EU and Russia has become more important as regional organisations – the OSCE and the Council of Europe (CoE) – have largely lost their authority and influence in the South Caucasus, while the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s (NATO) role remains modest despite Georgia’s membership ambitions.

The choice of affiliation with the EU or Russia also involves choosing a specific economic and political development path. Deeper ties with the EU imply democratic reforms, while integration with Russia’s EEU project means strengthening existing regimes that rely on Moscow for economic benefits and security guarantees. Essentially the EU (plus the US) and Russia seek the exact opposite in their relations with these countries. However, both seem to be better in blocking the other’s plans (an enlarging EEU or a successful EaP) than achieving their own goals (a Moscow-loyal Armenia that is averse to EU cooperation or a fully democratic and secure Georgia resulting from EU association).5 Although efforts to promote Western- style democracy have not had many concrete results, the attraction of the EU remains powerful to the peoples of the South Caucasus and thus carries the potential for democratic reform promoted by the grassroots. But Russia’s direct influence through both coercion (security guarantees and discount energy) and threats (military action and trade embargos) is also omnipresent in the region. The current stand-off over values and affiliation between the EU and US on the one hand (Turkey does not actively promote democracy although is an EU candidate itself ) and Russia on the other will make it difficult for either project to succeed.

Security and conflict

The different allies of the South Caucasus countries do not guarantee their national security. Armenia is a member of the Russian-dominated Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), but it cannot be sure that Russia would intervene in a renewed war over Nagorno- Karabakh. Azerbaijan is closely allied with Turkey, but cannot count on Ankara should it go to war with Armenia.

Georgia has sought NATO membership for some time but beyond the 2008 NATO Bucharest Summit’s vow that one day it will join, it has not moved much closer to full membership. This geopolitical landscape makes the region unstable and open to a range of security threats including organised crime and Islamic State (IS) recruitment.

Georgia’s potential NATO membership is one of the most incendiary issues. Russia regards it as a direct threat to its own political, military and energy interests in the region (and towards Russia itself ). On 27 August NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg argued in Tbilisi that Georgia is already on track to move towards membership, although he could not say if a Membership Action Plan (MAP) will be on the cards at the July 2016 NATO Summit in Warsaw.6 NATO did not come to Georgia’s defence in 2008 when Russia invaded, and would be unlikely to do so today. Western policies have offered democratisation prescriptions backed up with funding but have neglected to attend to national security concerns of South Caucasus countries; giving Russia in turn a free hand.7

Russia also plays an essential role in the protracted conflicts of the region. The conflicts over Abkhazia and South Ossetia will not be resolved as long as they remain centrepieces of Russia’s influence in the South Caucasus and Georgia more specifically. These two areas’ integration with Russia seem to only differ on paper and in name with Russia’s annexation of Crimea: In November 2014 Russia signed a ‘Treaty of Alliance and Strategic Partnership’ with Abkhazia, and in March 2015 (on the one year anniversary of the Crimea annexation) Moscow sealed the ‘Treaty on Alliance and Integration’ with South Ossetia, in effect incorporating the strip of Georgian territory into Russia.

The Geneva talks – the format that brings together Russia and Georgia as well as representatives from Abkhazia and South Ossetia and chairs from the EU, OSCE and the United Nations (UN) – have not had substantial results after 32 rounds of talks. In the last session of 1 June 2015, Russia complained that Georgia’s integration into NATO would be a security threat to the South Caucasus, objecting to the planned NATO-Georgia Joint Training and Evaluation Centre and NATO exercises in Georgia.8 While these talks were previously described as frank, open and even constructive, Russia increased its involvement in drawing borders. A week later on 10 July Russia continued its earlier demarcation of the ‘state-border’ between South Ossetia and Georgia one and a half kilometres on Georgia-proper territory, swallowing up farmland and houses of Georgian residents, coming dangerously close to Georgia’s East-West Highway, and taking control of one kilometre of the BP-operated Baku-Supsa oil pipeline. Other external actors had no response besides expressing disapproval and concern. Georgia is the main partner of the EU and the US in the Caucasus; a situation that is constantly threatened by Russia.9

Last year’s events in Ukraine have affected national security thinking in Armenia and Azerbaijan. Armenia wonders what would have happened if they had signed an AA with the EU and passed on Russia’s EEU offer – restricted energy flows; or worse, withdrawal of support to Armenia’s defence? Azerbaijan meanwhile interpreted the Maidan protests as a sign of what Western governments could possibly be preparing in Baku: As a reaction, foreign-funded NGOs and think tanks were evicted or shut down while persecution of critics intensified. On a very different note, the Azerbaijani government is also disappointed with the EU/US stance of supporting Ukrainian territorial integrity, but not offering similar support for Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity concerning Nagorno-Karabakh.

The largest security threat in the South Caucasus is the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, with regular incidents on the line of contact and a constant threat of these incidents spiralling into mass conflict between the two sides. The current economic downturn in Armenia (due to its closeness to the Russian economy) and Azerbaijan (due to low oil prices) could further destabilise the conflict as both governments might want to distract the population’s attention from their economic problems.

Over the last few years the 18-year old OSCE Minsk format – which brings together the war- ring parties and co-chairs from the US, France and Russia – has proven to be ineffective at conflict resolution though remains the only format to manage the conflict. The 2007 ‘Madrid principles’ by the OSCE Minsk Group were one of the last attempts at resolution. The failure to have Armenia and Azerbaijan endorse the principles was quickly followed by a Russian initiative led by then President Medvedev until 2011 which also ended without a result.

The EU and the US had accepted a Russian lead hoping that Moscow could persuade both sides into an agreement. However, it is now evident that resolving the conflict is actually not in Russia’s interest since it would reduce Armenia’s dependence on Russia while offering new opportunities for Azerbaijan. A resolution to the conflict currently seems further way than ever.

Energy and trade

The South Caucasus countries depend on each other and on external actors in the energy and trade fields, which makes them vulnerable in some respects. Armenia does not have trade dealings with Azerbaijan and Turkey, and largely depends on Russian energy supplies and to a large extent on transit through Georgia. This means that Armenian trade will be very dependent on the EUU, although an expansion of trade with Iran would be welcomed and the EU is now its number one trade partner.10 Azerbaijan will become increasingly dependent on new markets for gas and current markets for oil, since the government has neglected to diversify its economy. Deliveries to Turkey – again through Georgia – are essential: From 2019 onwards Azerbaijani gas going west could reach EU countries in modest quantities when the TANAP pipeline through Turkey to South East Europe becomes operational. So far Azerbaijan has been wary of potential competition from other gas-producing Caspian littoral states – Turkmenistan or Iran. Meanwhile Georgia is dependent on transit revenues and delivery of Azerbaijani gas for its own consumption although it has a substantial hydroelectric sector.

In the energy sphere external actors are fairly (inter)dependent on their small South Caucasus neighbours (both as a source of energy and as important transit routes). For the EU, gas imports from Azerbaijan and beyond would constitute a welcome addition to the mix of imports, but would not substantially lessen dependence on Russian gas (plus others, foremost Norway), especially for Central and Eastern European countries. Turkey relies on Russian gas deliveries (mostly via the Blue Steam pipeline through the Black Sea) for over half its needs, but also has other sources (Azerbaijani gas for instance); a Southern Corridor as foreseen by the EU would be the basis of Turkey’s envisioned geopolitical role as an energy transit hub. In that sense Russian President Putin’s proposal of building Turkish Stream (instead of a South Stream that bypassed Turkey) is welcomed, though not at the expense of Southern Corridor plans with the EU and Azerbaijan. For Russia the main dependency is on the South Caucasus not becoming a viable and substantial alternative for the EU to Russian gas. The US plays no direct role in this configuration in the South Caucasus beyond the business interests of large energy companies, while Iran for the foreseeable future is unlikely to be able to complicate the current configuration of Russian obstruction, Turkish opportunism and EU hesitation.

The hostile relations between Russia and the West have a negative effect on the development of the South Caucasus. They have increased Armenia’s dependence on Russia, emphasised Georgia’s strategic importance at the expense of its development and strengthened Azerbaijan’s believe that it can exploit its energy resource strength to play Russia and the EU/US off against each other. These hostile relations have also severely limited any opportunity for Georgia-Russia rapprochement over Abkhazia and South Ossetia while paralyzing efforts to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

Of vicars, soldiers, merchants and diplomats

As a result of the Ukraine crisis and Russian aggression, external actors in the South Caucasus have fortified their already entrenched positions, interests and preferences. All five major external actors have their own interests: What are these and how can they be categorised?

Through the 2009 EaP (which is part of the broader 2004 European Neighbourhood Policy) the EU has become a major investor and actor in the South Caucasian countries. It is the largest donor to the region (under the European Neighbourhood Instrument well over €1 billion has been committed for the period 2014-17 for the three recipient states excluding regional funding, global EU instruments and individual member state assistance).12 The EU is also the largest trade partner of all three countries: Armenia (27.9 per cent of total trade), Azerbaijan (44 per cent) and Georgia (26.7 per cent).13 The aim is to use development aid, democratic reform and a broad (and often fragmented) policy of engagement to promote stability and development in the region and forge closer ties. Nonetheless Brussels’ clout in the South Caucasus remains modest.

The difference between Europe’s expressed interests and what it actually can achieve remains substantial, mostly due to the lack of a hard security component and limited political interest. This is shown by the EU’s lack of involvement and influence in helping to resolve the region’s protracted conflicts or presenting a reliable counterweight to Russia’s hard security influence. Hence the EU can be characterised as a merchant due to its leading role in trade and a vicar in its push for democratic and human rights values.

The gap between rhetoric and action also has its bearing on energy and values. Efforts to secure reliable gas imports from Azerbaijan (and beyond from Central Asia and the Middle East) to reduce EU dependence on Russian gas imports, are often highlighted as a priority but little has been achieved over the last decade.

Three significant problems have blocked the EU’s objective of building a Southern Corridor. First, imports from Turkmenistan and Iran via the Caspian Sea and South Caucasus will be very expensive because of pipeline production costs, and will need to overcome many hurdles regarding Caspian demarcation and relations between Azerbaijan and third states. Second, most of the countries that could provide gas to such a corridor are fairly unstable dictatorships (Turkmenistan) or non-proven potentially expensive new options (Iran). Third, Azerbaijan alone will not provide much more gas to the EU, even after completion of the TANAP pipeline in 2019.

Democracy and human rights constitute a third priority and are a major part of EU foreign policy. The track-record of EU democracy promotion has been weak so far with the exception of Georgia. Armenia has not shown much progress in its democracy ratings over the last decade while Azerbaijan has substantially regressed. Where human rights are concerned the EU has a mixed record as well. In the case of Azerbaijan, criticism and concern has been expressed (with the European Parliament leading the way), but at the same time Brussels has sought to persuade the unwilling and annoyed Azerbaijanis back into the fold of EaP mechanisms; this while Belarus, that has a roughly similar poor human rights record, is still on the EU’s sanctions list. This double standard on the part of the EU spurs resentment among its neighbours.

Russia is the dominant power in the Caucasus and is itself a Caucasus country. One of its main concerns is controlling the borders between the Russian northern Caucasus republics (most of which remain unstable and violent) and the South Caucasus. In the South Caucasus Russia’s main interest is not to lose ground to EU and possibly US interests – Turkey has presented itself as less of a threat since it does not seek to influence South Caucasus countries directly, and is regarded as a partner by Moscow despite its NATO membership. In the wake of Russia’s declining trade position in the region and its feeling of being besieged by NATO and the EU, Moscow seeks to avoid developments rather than encourage new initiatives in the region. This also applies to energy diplomacy where Russia seeks to avoid the establishment of a Southern Corridor that would link Azerbaijan, Turkey and Europe at the expense of Russian exports and control of infrastructure.

Russia’s primary interest is to help shape regimes in neighbouring countries that are friendly to Moscow’s interests; do business in a similar ‘way’ and want to integrate into joint structures (the EEU and CSTO). To this end Moscow also uses soft power mechanisms, foremost through Russian media active in Armenia, Azerbaijan and to a lesser extent Georgia. It tends also to use coercive instruments such as military action and trade embargos. However, South Caucasus countries prefer to keep integration with Russia at bay while seeking a constructive relationship with their northern neighbour. This has led to a situation in which Georgia sees Moscow as a direct threat but pursues practical ties in trade and at the Geneva talks; Armenia feels forced to accept Russia’s patronage but explores modest alternatives through cooperation with the EU; and Azerbaijan develops relations with Russia as part of its policy to play third parties off each other.

Since Russia cannot rely on healthy relations with its three southern neighbours it tries to apply a divide and rule policy through protracted conflicts. In recent years Moscow has beefed up and modernised its military presence in Armenia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In Georgia the conflicts of Abkhazia and South Ossetia are controlled by Russia, in part because these regions border Russian territory and have been largely incorporated into the Federation. Russia also plays a substantial role in the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh through its role as a peace broker (the diplomat), support to Armenia and weapon deliveries to both (to ensure a military balance). Russia is not keen to help resolve any of these conflicts as it uses the managed instability to its advantage, placing the other countries in a dependent situation. Russia mixes diplomacy with military might in such a way to keep the region in limbo and avert its potential for development and local integration. Russia’s objectives and interests are therefore diametrically opposite to those of the EU, the US and Turkey that all three seek development of the South Caucasus, stability and increased energy and trade links.

Turkey is an important player in the South Caucasus but has yet to achieve its full potential. The reason for this is that other crises demand more urgent attention (foremost Syria, IS and the Kurds) and Ankara prefers to pursue its energy and trade interests and avoid increased tensions that could aggravate Russia. Turkey is partially dependent on Russian and Azerbaijani gas, but also seeks to become an important transit hub for both producers and European customers which implies a balancing act. Turkey thus seeks to court Russia, the EU and Caucasus countries when necessary but is also able to partially curb them if Ankara’s security interests are tested to the limit.14 While Ankara will need to develop a South Caucasus policy that carefully balances different interests, it is also a NATO member and has deep historical ties with all three South Caucasus states. Turkey has thus the capacity to go beyond a merchant-diplomat role and also promote values (through its civil society) or provide hard security (the soldier). Prospects for Turkish involvement however remain dim as the ruling Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) primary priorities are of a domestic nature – including President Tayyip Erdogan’s claim to power and political survival – while its main foreign policy concerns are also linked to internal matters: the refugee crisis, the Kurds, and Syria.

Turkey would like to normalize relations with Armenia, and was engaged in an initiative in 2007-10 to this end. However, this initiative was not received well in Baku, which demands that Ankara maintain the link between opening its borders with Armenia and progress in the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

In the South Caucasus, the Turkish ‘zero-problems’ foreign policy did not fare well in the face of various interdependencies with Azerbaijan and Russia in 2010. Since then Turkish efforts to seek progress on the border with Armenia or play a role in resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict have been mostly low-profile and behind the scenes. International commemorations this year of the 1915 Armenian genocide did not help on both matters.

A third Turkish interest – or maybe better, set of assets – are kinship, business and civil society relations. Ankara might not be in the business of democracy promotion like the EU and the US, but it plays an important soft power role throughout the South Caucasus through historic, cultural and language ties. It is these relations that make Turkey – also geographically as a partially Caucasus state – a direct stakeholder. Turkey’s broad informal influence and contacts can be used for a variety of purposes, from promoting development and education to playing a subtle role in conflict resolution.

For the time being Ankara continues its balancing game between Russia and the EU/US, which greatly helps to restrain Russia from acting in the South Caucasus against Turkey’s direct interests. Among these actors Turkey has become a linchpin country as both Russia and the West seek Turkey’s cooperation; Russia in energy and trade preferring Turkey to not get too involved in the region, and the EU and US in seeking Turkish activism (as an EU candidate country and NATO member) in the South Caucasus.

Among the main external actors in the South Caucasus the US stands out since it is geographically so far removed from the region. However, the US has been active in the South Caucasus since the fall of the Soviet Union and is the only country with a truly global reach. American priorities in the South Caucasus are difficult to define. Over the last decade, US interest in the region has been rather low and it has tended to rely on its close partners’ more active involvement – the EU and Turkey (as well as confidence in Russia in 2009-12 as part of the then US-Russia ‘reset’). Currently US energy and trade dealings are small and its main interests are stability and democracy promotion. With this stability the US hopes that the region can be a bulwark against Russian revisionism and an unstable Middle East.

From the 1990s to the mid-2000s the US was an active player in South Caucasus energy politics, and took initiative in the Minsk Group on Nagorno-Karabakh. After the December 2003 Rose revolution, Georgia became central to almost all US priorities in the region. The US has been inclined to extend NATO membership to Georgia but its European allies have been hesitant owing to concerns about Russian reactions. Armenia is also relevant to Washington, in part because of the politically vocal Armenian diaspora in the US. Meanwhile Azerbaijan played an important transit role for the US and NATO in Afghanistan, although current relations have been severely damaged (as with the EU) over human rights and the notion in Baku that the US might be developing plans for a democratic revolution in Azerbaijan.

Washington’s democracy promotion agenda in the South Caucasus has long focused on Georgia (as a ‘beacon of democracy’ in President George W. Bush’s narrative) although ample resources have also been allocated to Armenia and Azerbaijan in the past. While the EU sees Azerbaijan as a potential energy provider, the US is more interested in Azerbaijan’s secularism and strategic position in the wake of an unstable Middle East and questions about Iran’s future direction. In that sense the EU is the merchant and the US the soldier, although both preach a values agenda.

The US is keen to see the South Caucasus develop, solve its conflicts and further integrate into Europe – but the time when Washington could initiate these processes is over, and the EU plays a more influential role given its proximity and economic influence. Nowadays the US is likely to support any initiative taken by Ankara or Brussels that could help resolve conflicts, especially to counter Russian revisionism in Georgia, Ukraine and/or elsewhere. The US role remains limited – though indispensable for Western influence in the region –, curtailed by distance and Russia’s anti-Americanism; in that sense the US policy towards the South Caucasus is now part of a broader policy of countering Russia.

Iran cannot be qualified as a ‘soldier’ as it has no direct or even indirect (via regional organisations) security involvement in the region. Due to its long absence from the Caucasian scene it is no ‘diplomat’, and would find it difficult to find a place at the crowded negotiation tables to help resolve conflicts. A ‘vicar’ also seems unlikely in a region that is predominantly Christian Orthodox, with the exception of Azerbaijan which is Shiite Muslim like Iran, but follows a strict secular policy. A ‘merchant’ it already is, and this role might be enhanced as international sanctions on Iran could be lifted by the end of 2015.

Given that Iran is home to over 15 million ethnic Azerbaijanis, Azerbaijan (population just over 9.5 million) is a major priority for Iran. There is also a religious component to their relationship as both populations are largely Shiite but live under different systems: Azerbaijan’s secular government (with a Soviet heritage) and Iran’s theocracy. There are a few bones of contention between the two. Iran maintains good relations with Azerbaijan’s arch enemy Armenia.

Similarly Baku has dealings with Israel. In addition, a dispute over the delimitation of the Caspian Sea and its resources influence bilateral relations.
Although Iran boasts the second largest gas reserves in the world it has not been able to export; it even imports gas from Turkmenistan. It will take enormous – Chinese or Western – investments to start producing and exporting in either direction. Iranian gas could render the Southern Corridor a more significant source of natural gas for Europe, but this depends on how Tehran positions itself with regards to the West – and how keen Azerbaijan is to block access by Iran or profit from transit as well.

Tehran’s likely third priority is trade with Georgia and foremost Armenia. For the latter Iran has been the only open shared border besides Georgia. Armenia will be keen to expand further on trade and on energy cooperation, while Georgia (though a staunch Western ally) is also keen to extend its business and trade through links with Iran. These prospects could constitute a positive role for Iran in the region without much cost for other external actors.

Iran’s role in the South Caucasus is unclear. It seems unlikely that Tehran will become a substantial factor in the near term as energy infrastructure (if agreed on and built) will take many years to come into being. In addition the region is not a top priority for Tehran given its other pressing priorities such as the rivalry with Saudi Arabia, its policy towards Israel, and broader Middle East challenges, foremost IS. In that sense Iran – like Turkey, the EU and the US – is not interested in becoming too involved in South Caucasus conflicts, leaving Russia to dominate the region from a security point of view. Although Russia would like to have a partner in countering the West, it is unlikely to welcome much Iranian influence in the South Caucasus which it firmly considers its sphere of influence.

Increasing EU engagement

On 20-22 July this year, European Council President Donald Tusk visited Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. Tusk encouraged all three to intensify cooperation with Brussels through the EaP, but also devoted ample attention to the protracted conflicts by speaking out against new border demarcation activities by Russia in South Ossetia, and by urging Armenia and Azerbaijan to curb the violence on the line of contact in Nagorno-Karabakh. While not spectacular news, it constituted an important expression of interest by Brussels.

The South Caucasus needs increased attention from the EU, specifically more high-level visits by officials from the EU and its member states to complement the work of the EU’s Special Representative (EUSR) and the activities of the European External Action Service in the region. Increased contact and visits need to be accompanied by a clearer vision. The following four avenues of potential EU policy thinking could help strengthen the EU’s position in the region to the benefit of the South Caucasus and the EU alike:

Reviewing EU policies

The EU is reviewing several policies this year and next. Most notably Brussels is examining its European Neighbourhood Policy (including its Eastern Partnership component), planning to complete the review in autumn 2015 and is developing a Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy to be ready by June 2016 to replace the landmark 2003 European Security Strategy.

In a recent preparatory study for the new Global EU Strategy, High Representative Federica Mogherini assessed the current global environment including the EU’s role with regard to its eastern neighbours: ‘Our approach towards our eastern partners needs to include robust policies to prevent and resolve conflict, bolster statehood along with economic development, and foster energy and transport connectivity’.15 These aspects certainly apply to the South Caucasus and are central parts of a European approach to the region alongside democracy promotion and human rights.

The EU does not need to formulate a specific South Caucasus strategy as it has done for other regions such as Central Asia or the Sahel: this would constitute just another rhetorical document with goals the EU alone cannot achieve. Most essentially the South Caucasus needs to be regarded as part of Europe, and should be approached as such: this would mean stepping up engagement on all fronts, as relations with the South Caucasus directly affect the EU in terms of security (conflicts, energy, and potential refugees). The South Caucasus is not only a matter for foreign policy but also for ‘internal European policy’. This means increasing EU visibility in South Caucasus countries as well as highlighting relations with European neighbours from the South Caucasus in EU member states. If framed well, such an approach should also help to enhance integration without the issue of membership being central to the relationship.

The basis for external action should not lie in creating a new mini-region within the EaP, but building stronger tailor-made bilateral ties with each of the countries: deepening integration with Georgia; building the maximum possible relationship (in the wake of its EEU membership) with Armenia; and being open to cooperation with Azerbaijan that goes beyond energy if the regime becomes more amenable to remedying its human rights shortcomings.

Democracy and human rights

As numerous EU policy documents already state, the development of democracy and respect for human rights should form the basis of EU foreign policy. Among all the reviews and redrafting of EU policies by the ‘new’ EU leadership, the review of the 2012 EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy that resulted in a new action plan (2015-19) has not received much attention.16 The EU has found it difficult to ensure member-state support and interest in this core field, possibly because many see democracy support and human rights as rather distinct matters. This also applies to the South Caucasus.

Human rights are of a universal nature and leave little room for interpretation; the South Caucasus states have signed up to numerous international human rights regimes including the CoE and should be held to this. The EU plays an important role in making their policies conditional on the human rights situation in partner countries – this means that the EU should not deviate in its reaction to human rights offences merely because of the countries strategic value for Europe.

Democracy promotion needs to be welcomed by countries to be effective. The EU should uphold democratic values in its external policies to the South Caucasus but deviate its funding and intensity of support along what is possible and welcome. This means that, in countries that are not open to democracy, their civil society needs substantial support (including educational programmes) to engage people, while less or no funding should go to a government that is averse to reform. And countries that have chosen a reform path – where democratisation and state-building go hand in hand – need substantial help that is flexible and conditional on all fronts. Thus, ‘more for more’ and ‘different for less’ in EaP jargon.

The EU needs to understand that its democracy promotion efforts have had little effect so far, but that the Union is still a potential pole of attraction for the average citizen in the South Caucasus. This asset – as well as practical democratisation assistance – should be used to counter Russian propaganda and support for authoritarian rule. However, this also means that demands for reform from the population – sometimes inspired by EU reform rhetoric – need to be answered by the EU with strong support; the EU cannot preach values and then not be prepared for the day when countries are ready to move forward.

Developing a security roadmap

In the absence of an official strategy for the South Caucasus, the EU could develop a simple and clear security roadmap for the region. Such a short document could bring together current EU involvement in security matters – the EUMM border monitoring mission in Georgia, the EUSR’s work, and several EU projects aimed at borders, Internally Displaced People (IDP), and so on – and add a list of new initiatives, for instance on security sector reform (reform of security agencies and strengthening oversight mechanisms). A road map could also devote more attention to the EU’s contribution to the OSCE and outline cooperation with NATO (owing to the EU’s large investment in the OSCE and substantial overlapping membership with NATO). Most importantly the roadmap would present ideas and options on the EU’s role with regard to the protracted conflicts: a clear position on Abkhazia and South Ossetia; and an effort, with others, to initiate talks between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh. It could also outline increased support to bring Armenia and Azerbaijan’s civil societies together in concrete projects and thereby help build confidence between the two sides.

The roadmap would not constitute a full strategy, but would serve as a list of ongoing items and projects as well as new ideas and plans. Such a vision would also counter criticism that the EU either has no security role in the South Caucasus or that the modest role it plays is too dispersed over Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), European Commission and EEAS involvement. A roadmap could also assure South Caucasus partners that the EU takes an interest in their security and the link between security and democratisation. Some of the ideas will bear fruit; others will be most likely blocked by the regional and external actors but the position would be clearer and its commitment to security issues more evident.

Cooperation with Turkey and the US

There is a significant overlap of interests between the EU, Turkey and the US. As the South Caucasus is not a top priority for these allies, concrete cooperation and joint action might be difficult but not impossible. The EU should act more strategically in the South Caucasus forging alliances with partners on topics where results can be achieved. Cooperation will need to focus on concrete matters: a discussion of conflict resolution in the case of Nagorno-Karabakh and a united position on Georgia’s protracted conflicts. In addition, they could make joint efforts to develop and protect the Southern Gas Corridor. On the ground the EU and the US will need to coordinate their democracy-related assistance more closely as well as comparing notes on security assistance. The EU could facilitate the involvement of Turkish civil society with their EU and South Caucasus counterparts, for instance through the EaP Civil Society Forum.

Since Russia has by and large diametrically opposing objectives to the EU, Turkey and the US, geopolitical difficulties are unavoidable. Every move that the EU/US make will be met with a response by Russia; the opposite is not necessarily the case as the EU and NATO will not be ready to respond to every Russian action.

Unfortunately there is little scope for cooperation with Russia although diplomatic efforts should continue. The South Caucasus is also a place where both sides meet in diplomatic and civil society circles (as far as independent civil society actually still exists in Russia). Although Iran is unlikely to play a substantial role in the South Caucasus for the time-being, the other actors should not regard Tehran as a threat but instead offer to listen to its ideas, which are likely to focus almost entirely on the economy.

Conclusion

The South Caucasus is a complicated region of interdependent relations over governance and affiliation; security and conflict; and energy and trade. The developments in Ukraine and the rift between the West and Russia have held back the region’s potential development. In the light of weakened influence of regional and international cooperation mechanisms, every powerful actor in the region will need to tread carefully. The risk of Russian intervention in Georgia if it further integrates into Euro-Atlantic structures has risen; the potential for protests and turmoil in all three states is high; and the risk of escalation of the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh remains very present.

External actors play a crucial role in shaping events in the South Caucasus; often not by meeting their own policy objectives but by blocking the policies of other actors. This most strongly applies to the competition between the EU’s EaP programme and Russian-driven EEU membership. Although Russia has lost its position as number one trade partner to the EU, it is the most powerful actor and prepared to use military force. The EU will want to avoid a new crisis in the South Caucasus and so will the US. Turkey is keen to maintain stability and have reasonable trade-based relations with Moscow. Someday Iran might be a new actor on the scene, but with little capacity beyond its troublesome relations with Azerbaijan and modestly increasing trade. This gives Russia the power to dictate to the region, although it has its own dependencies such as transport links through Georgia to Armenia; the risk of spoiling relations with Turkey; broader resentment among South Caucasus populations and its own economic downturn.

The EU’s position on the South Caucasus as well as that of the EU-US and Turkey (including NATO), is part of their broader relationship with Russia. They have two options: confront Moscow by increasing support for countries that seek closer ties, are willing to reform, and are open to negotiate to end their protracted conflicts; or avoid confrontation and accept Russia’s prerogative to dictate how South Caucasus neighbours will develop. The first option could of course prompt a reaction from Russia that could increase instability in the region but it definitely has more merit long-term. It would need to be backed by political will and resources that link the national security of the South Caucasian nations to democratisation.

The EU will need to seek closer coordination with the US and develop practical ways to include Turkey more directly, also through the EaP structures. Brussels will need to devote ample attention to Russia and the South Caucasus in the current reviews it is undertaking. As part of this exercise it could formulate a security road map of objectives and initiatives. It should further fine-tune its efforts on democratisation and adhere to one standard for human rights, condemning all violations in neighbouring countries. Russia will argue that the EU and the US are conducting the South Caucasian concert while Brussels and Washington firmly believe the opposite is the case. The EU needs to make sure its tune is harmonious for all the peoples of the South Caucasus.

About the author:
*Jos Boonstra is head of the Eastern Europe, Caucasus and Central Asia programme at FRIDE. He is also coordinator of work package 8 on the Caucasus and the wider neighbourhood in the CASCADE project.

*The author thanks Daniel Keohane and Andreas Marazis for their input as well as Leila Alieva, Nigar Göksel and Neil Melvin for reviewing an earlier draft of this paper.

Source:
This article was published by FRIDE as Working Paper 128 (PDF)

As Singapore and other smart cities become increasingly connected to the cyberspace so too does their risk of cyber threats. Smart cities need to develop a cyber-smart workforce, technology, policies and new risk management solutions.

By Michael Mylrea*

Fifty years after its establishment, Singapore is a smart city-state success story at the forefront of a third industrial revolution. Today, the Internet of Things (IoT) increasingly interconnects Singapore’s cyber and physical systems, sensors and smart technology into the digital fabric that links society and critical infrastructures such as transportation, health, finance and defence. Infrastructure investment is expected to grow by 50 percent to about S$30 billion by the end of the decade.

But as Singapore and other smart cities become increasingly connected to cyberspace, so too does their risk of cyber threats. For the next 50 years to be as prosperous as the last, Singapore and other smart cities and nations need to develop a cyber-smart workforce, technology, policies, and new risk management solutions.

Cyber Smart City: opportunity and challenge

The Cyber Smart City Opportunity of new IoT-inspired products, services and markets could boost the GDP of the world’s 20 largest economies by $14.2 trillion by 2030, according to a recent study by Accenture. This trend can be seen in Singapore’s smart buildings, where converged information and operational technologies infrastructures, control systems and sensors integrate multiple electronic systems to support building management and business functions. Smart building technology is increasing energy efficiency and conservation of natural resources. Smart transportation is making cities more efficient. Smart health solutions are making cities healthier and providing early warning against pandemics.

The Cyber Smart City Challenge is to secure all of these converged networks and devices from cyber threats. Hackers continue to exploit smart devices to steal, manipulate and disrupt cyber and physical systems. Cyber attacks have been used to infiltrate corporate networks through smart building controls, blow up furnaces in steel plants, and cause generators to fail. In 2013, Target, a large US retailer, was hacked through its smart heating ventilation and cooling system, exposing corporate networks and over 40 million customer’s credit cards. Similar vulnerabilities are prevalent in thousands of networked smart systems.

A cyber-secure smart city will require a more holistic cyber security approach that fosters a culture of cyber security. Traditional information assurance solutions to risk management are challenged by IoT’s expanded attack landscape: more networked devices exchanging larger data sets. Secondly, many industrial control systems need to be running 24/7, lack secure communication protocol and include legacy devices that are not interoperable or secure when combined with new IoT technology.

So what can Singapore do to realise the smart city opportunity and overcome the cyber security challenge?

Developing a Cyber Smart Workforce is imperative. Even as some technical cyber security defences improve, humans remain the weakest link in cyberspace. A secure architecture requires a workforce to be continually trained in best cyber security policies, practices, and technology. A cyber smart city workforce must understand how to secure converged information technology (IT) and operational technology (OT) (e.g., control systems, actuators, intelligent energy devices) environments.

Investments in human resource development should foster skills in the both “hard” and social sciences such as human and organizational learning, complex systems and behavioral psychology. The IT and OT cyber security skill set will be increasingly necessary to secure the smart technology, while the social sciences encourage smart decisions that optimize the technology and help protect us from ourselves.

Cyber smart policies and solutions

Cyber Smart Policies and Regulations are imperative for Singapore’s continued success and survival. Cyber smart policies should help increase cyber security of critical infrastructures such as financial institutions, transportation systems and hospitals. Smart cities depend on these inter-related and symbiotic infrastructures for their economic livelihood, security and survival. Unfortunately, increased networking of critical infrastructure has also made it increasingly vulnerable to cyber threats.

Smart Cities are fueled by prodigious amounts of data that becomes more valuable as it is aggregated and analysed. However, big data needs to be protected by policies that curtail industrial espionage and strengthen intellectual property protection. One incentive for doing so is increased foreign direct investment as international corporations will increasingly move and expand in nations that protect intellectual property, encourage ingenuity and seek new ways to marry man and machine through education, not malware and hacking.

Cyber smart risk management solutions should provide a holistic defence in-depth approach to secure how data is being collected, shared and stored. Advanced intrusion detection systems and firewalls combined with encrypted data between servers, devices, sensors and enterprise networks are a good place to start. New security solutions for machine-to-machine secure communications are needed.

Technical solutions are only as strong as the risk management policies in place to respond to and prevent attacks. Secure standardisation of communication protocol in IoT can help facilitate more secure and interoperable smart cities. Any effective cyber risk management solution should quickly adapt to the threat, helping to limit damage and assure continuity of operations.

The next 50 years

In considering what Singapore will look like in the next 50 years, IoT is both transformational and inspiring, but not without challenges. Smart technologies continue to be developed and deployed in our cities without a holistic cyber security strategy. As a result, Moore’s law is playing out to hackers’ advantage in that as data processing and storage costs fall we become less discerning about what data we store and send and how we store and send it.

For our future smart cities to prosper and bring in a new era of value creation, cyber security needs to be part of the IoT design and human resource development criteria. This new wave of innovation will continue to be disruptive, but it does not have to be destructive to smart cities with smart cyber solutions.

*Michael Mylrea is Manager for Cybersecurity and Energy Infrastructure at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, USA and works on energy and cyber security issues for industry and government. He is also a National Science Foundation, Executive Cyber Security Doctoral Fellow at George Washington University who contributed this RSIS Commentary.

Iranian President Hassan Rohani is planning to introduce a new economic plan after four of his ministers wrote him an open letter warning of an approaching recession. Meanwhile, the head of Iran’s Chamber of Commerce says it is naïve to believe that foreign investors will flock to the country when the nuclear agreement is implemented.

Rohani will present a new economic plan on national broadcaster Seda va Sima on Tuesday October 13, laying out what the country’s economic institutions will have to do to halt intensification of the economic recession and maintain the inflation control that the administration has already achieved, the Mehr News Agency reports.

Mehr adds the plan is likely to address reduced oil revenues, financing for the manufacturing sector in collaboration with the banking system, and the provision of liquidity.

Last week, President Rohani expressed optimism about the arrival of foreign investment in the country once the nuclear agreement is implemented, but he also stated that a return to economic recession remains a present danger.

Massoud Khansari, the head of the Tehran Chamber of Commerce, was quoted by Tasnim saying the administration needs to standardize the exchange rate for the dollar as opposed to the current two-tier system. In addition, he called on the government to withhold household benefit payments from high-income families and direct that money to subsidies for the manufacturing sector.

Many economic experts have called for a greater focus on resolving domestic problems in the country’s economic system rather than placing all bets on the elimination of international sanctions.

The former head of the Chamber of Commerce has been quoted as saying: “The economic recession was not caused by the sanctions, it was merely accelerated by them.”

By Brig. Anil Gupta (Retd.)*

Recent video footage shown on televisions across the globe highlighted the atrocities being committed by the brutal armed forces on the natives of this erstwhile part of the Jammu & Kashmir state and now under Pakistan’s illegal occupation. It reminded of the gory tales of atrocities committed in the erstwhile East Pakistan now Bangladesh.

The global community is now evincing keen interest in the area, its people and their plight. The fact is that the people of this area have been leading a life of subjugation ever since 1947 but there was no media to highlight their miserable plight. The print media occasionally tried to portray their problems, but very little heed was paid by the global community. Even we did not take much notice of the same despite the fact that they were citizens of the Dogra kingdom of Jammu & Kashmir that acceded to the Indian Union in October 1947.

At the time of partition, Gilgit and Baltistan were legal and integral part of the state of Jammu & Kashmir. In a treacherous conspiracy, Major Brown, a British, commander of Gilgit Scouts, mutinied against the Maharaja and brought the area under illegal administrative control of Pakistan in November 1947 after the Maharaja had signed the Instrument of Accession with India.

Many military historians wonder as to why India did not occupy the area despite the opportunity available during the final days of the war. After the ceasefire, in 1949, Pakistan in a master stroke kept Gilgit, Baltistan, Hunza and Nagar under its direct control rather than including them in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (POK), or so called Azad Kashmir.

For reasons unknown, the government of India turned a blind eye to this legal and historic blunder by Pakistan. Thus, the people of these areas, mainly Shias, were left at the mercy of the Sunni–dominated Pakistan which has through a well-executed plan changed the demography of the region.

In 1970, the area was named as “Northern Areas”. The nadir was reached in 1974 when then prime minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto scrapped the Citizenship Act allowing outsiders to freely buy property and settle in the region. Terror camps were also established in the area much against the wishes of the locals.

Pakistan ever since continues to be the illegal occupier of Gilgit-Baltistan, exploiting its mineral and hydraulic wealth and denying the people the basic human and fundamental rights. There are no legal institutions, no medical facilities and no professional colleges. The revenue generated from tourism and other assets in the area is not utilised for the development of the area /welfare of the local residents.

The Government of India made no effort to reach out the people of this area. Pakistan, on the other hand, played the religion card to its advantage by creating hatred against Hindus and India through the state-controlled media and school text books. India was portrayed as an enemy of Muslims and Islam and Pakistan as citadel of Islam.

The reality dawned on the people in 1988, when more than 100,000 Pakistani troopers and militants under the command of the then Brigadier Pervez Musharraf brutally attacked them and subjected them to rape, loot, arson and forced conversion. Musharraf was given the title of “Butcher of Shias”.

It compelled them to realise the actualities and have a re-think about their adopted country. They were also cautious of joining hands with POK, fearing Kashmiri domination. They continued to live like slaves and subjugated people. The area also became victim of terrorism.

To compound their miseries the footfall of Chinese soldiers and natives also increased manifold with the active collaboration of the Pakistani establishment. The Chinese investment in the area is illegal since the entire area is disputed. In brazen contempt of international conventions, Pakistan has also illegally ceded part of the area to China. Senge Sering, a scholar-activist from the area, has expressed surprise that nobody in India talks about Gilgit- Baltistan and Chinese illegal investment there.

Pakistan uses the people of Gilgit-Baltistan as cannon fodder to achieve its politico-strategic interests in the region, particularly in Kashmir. In 1998, Musharraf once again was the architect of a meaningless Kargil War that not only led to the loss of about 4000 innocent natives but also to the displacement of hundreds of thousands people who till date remain internally displaced and economically deprived.

Pakistan continues to hold hostage the innocent people of the region for its economic and strategic reasons. The status of the area though disputed has been kept ambiguous by Pakistan. Through a sham ordinance in 2009 the area was re-designated as Gilgit-Baltistan and made a province of Pakistan with its own governor and chief minister but without representation in the parliament and senate of Pakistan.

A Gilgit-Baltistan Council headed by the Prime Minister of Pakistan was also formed as a supreme body. Gilgit-Baltistan Assembly has 24 elected and nine nominated members. It has an elected chief minister. The arrangement has been termed by the natives as “colonial”. Thus, the subjugation, exploitation, discrimination and federal domination continues unabated on the hapless residents of the area.

The people want freedom from the oppressive Pakistani regime. They now look up to India and seek its support. India must provide moral, psychological and financial support to the natives of the area. After all they are our people living under illegal Pakistani occupation.

People to people contact and local trade should be encouraged through opening of trade routes across the LOC. India must object to Chinese investment and presence in the area. Whenever, Pakistan rants the ‘K issue’ it should be sternly reminded that Kashmir issue is not confined to the Sunni-dominated Valley, that comprises 11% of the geographical area of the state and is inhabited by only 22% of its total population, but also other areas and ethnic groups that form the majority in Jammu & Kashmir state, including Gilgit-Baltistan and POK. The State Subject Act should be restored and the people of Gilgit-Baltistan should have complete control over their land and resources.

*Brig. Anil Gupta (Retd.) is a Jammu based security and strategic analyst. He can be contacted at anil5457@gmail.com