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US Navy Successfully Intercepts Missiles During War Games In Europe

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The US Navy says it has successfully tested its anti-missile defense system during an exercise in Europe, when anti-ship cruise missiles fired from the Scottish coast were shot down by a pair of guided interceptors with the help of tracking from allied ships.

The exercises on Tuesday involved the US Navy and its European allies. A Dutch ship tracked the target and relayed targeting information about the missile to the US naval ship, the USS Ross. A guided missile interceptor built by Raytheon was then fired on the dummy target from the Ross.

“This was the first time a Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) Block IA guided interceptor was fired on a non-US range and the first intercept of a ballistic missile threat in the European theater,” said a US Defense Department press release.

Admiral Mark Ferguson, commander of US Naval Forces Europe-Africa, said the exercise “demonstrated the commitment of the US to the defense of Europe” through its ships and “our shore station in Romania…as well as…our allied sailors.”

Ferguson said the test, carried out by the Maritime Theater Missile Defense Forum, demonstrated the group’s ability to “safely conduct effective coalition sea-based defense against simultaneous anti-ship and ballistic missile threats.”

The sea exercises involved ships from the US, Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain and Britain.

Riki Ellison, founder of the Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance, a nonprofit group that advocates for missile defense systems, told Reuters that the successful test means the US Navy can reduce the number of ships it needs for missile defense missions in the Mediterranean by relying on allied ships for threat targeting.

“It is great timing because it demonstrates our capability to track and intercept the kind of missiles that are being fired in and against Syria,” Ellison told Reuters. “It proves that sensors from another country’s ship can be used to give the Navy early warning of potential threats, and those ships can be used to protect American ships.”

Ellison did not indicate to Reuters where the threats to the US might be coming from.

The war games occurred just two weeks after NATO’s secretary-general, Jens Stoltenberg, told reporters that the alliance planned to boost its Response Force by adding two more headquarters in Eastern Europe – in Hungary and Slovakia.

NATO’s Response Force, established in 2003, is comprised of land, air, sea and Special Forces units capable of rapid deployment. It was created to perform a range of tasks, including immediate defense response, crisis management, peace support operations, disaster relief, and protection of critical infrastructure. The NRF can include anywhere from 13,000 to 40,000 military personnel.

Stoltenberg called the current reinforcement the biggest “since the end of the Cold War” and said they had already set up six small headquarters in Eastern Europe.

Russia, however, considers NATO’s expansion hostile and destabilizing, and has repeatedly criticized what it describes as a military buildup near its borders. Moscow has also criticized plans to continue with the missile defense system after a deal with Iran over its nuclear agreement was finalized, seeing as the US had said the missile defense system was intended to contain that country.

“We don’t see any reasons [the missile defense system] should continue, especially at such a rapid pace and with a clear ‘projection’ on Russian territory,” Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov said in August, adding that “the US administration is making up artificial excuses to justify their decision – made under the influence of other motives – to continue the creation of a missile defense system in Europe.”

The US has denied that its program is aimed at Moscow.


West Berlin In The Cold War: The Baltic States Today Reconsidered – Analysis

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By Ivars Ijabs*

About a year ago Edward Lucas, a journalist and political commentator of The Economist, invited the NATO and the West to treat the three Baltic countries, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, as they treated West Berlin during the Cold War.[1] Indefensible from the military point of view, this part of Berlin served as a proof of the Western commitment to collective defense – and, simultaneously, as a living testimony of the superior development of liberal, capitalist democracies. In Lucas’ opinion, the Baltic countries could play the same role vis-à-vis newly resurgent Russia, whose aggression in Ukraine has dramatically changed the security situation in Europe. Does the Baltic-West Berlin comparison have only rhetorical value, or is there real substance to it?

Since the Russian annexation of Crimea in early 2014, movement toward a ‘West Berlin scenario’ can indeed be observed. First of all, Russia’s recent behavior has not helped to ease the security concerns of its neighbors. Russian troops are still in Ukraine; extensive military exercises have been conducted along the Baltic borders; the Kremlin’s rhetoric is still distinctly anti-Western and threatening towards what it describes as “American puppets” in Europe. Secondly, NATO is expanding its presence in the region. Beginning in summer 2015, the U.S. has begun pre-positioning heavy military equipment in the Baltics; in October, Great Britain decided to station a small number of troops in Poland and the three Baltic states “to deter Russian aggression”[2]; extensive NATO exercises are held in the region with a renewed vigor. Thirdly, the Baltic elites themselves also seem to be rather happy about the perspective to become the leaders of the new West Berlin. In their view, this status might raise the international profile of these small and previously rather remote Eastern European countries. The Baltic lands have a long history of serving as an imaginary “outpost” in one direction or another. Now, it seems, this tradition is revived in a new international setting.

Currently, there are few signs of a détente in Western-Russian relations, and the three Baltic States will most probably see more attention to themselves from both sides. Russia will continue to harass the Balts by economic and ideological means. NATO, however cautiously, will reinforce its presence in the Baltics and provide political support. Nevertheless, the parallels between the Baltics and West Berlin of the Cold war era are really thought-provoking. Of course, history doesn’t repeat itself. There are significant differences both in terms of place (geography and demography) and time (historical situation). Nevertheless, a comparison with the famous Cold War enclave might be useful to illuminate the problems Baltic States are facing, when dealing with their security problems in the new geopolitical situation. This comparison shows that, when facing a Western long-term stalemate with Russia, the domestic challenges of the Baltics are of no less importance than the NATO military support.

Regarding economics and infrastructure, West Berlin emerged after the almost complete devastation caused by the Second World War. The separation from the Soviet zone was caused mainly by Moscow’s attempts to freeze the Western allies out of their Berlin zones of occupation. The Berlin airlift of 1948-49 was the most prominent example. This caused a complete reorientation of West Berlin’s economy towards the West. The Baltic situation is different in this regard. The Baltic countries still have significant economic ties with Russia and its allies. Moreover, these ties tend to be asymmetrical, which makes these countries vulnerable to potential blackmail and pressure. In the energy sector, for example, Russia is still the most important source of hydrocarbons for the Baltics. Natural gas, one of the most widely used sources of energy in the Baltics, makes Latvia and Estonia almost exclusively dependent on imports from Russia. Of course, a few initiatives have already been implemented to reduce the Baltic dependence on Russian hydrocarbons – the most prominent being the Lithuanian LNG (liquid natural gas) terminal opened in 2014[3]. Also the EU has been instrumental in diversifying the Baltic energy markets. However, the political lobby of the Russian energy sector is very strong in the Baltics, and complete independence from it is a very far and abstract perspective.

Similar problems also arise with regard to transit to and from Russia through the Baltic States. Transit trade still constitutes a significant proportion of Baltic economies, despite the current Western sanctions and Russian counter sanctions. There is also very little precise information about the size of the Russian investment in the Baltic economies (it is assumed to be quite substantial), and to what extent it could be used as a political tool. If the Baltic States are the West Berlin of the 21st century, these represent important differences.

There are some basic questions about Baltic economies. The famous German enclave was heavily subsidized. Initially, this was paid for by the Western allies, later, by the Bonn government and its Berlinförderungsgesetz. These measures were intended to make West Berlin into a showcase of successful capitalist development despite communist encirclement. Can the Baltic countries play the same role vis-à-vis authoritarian and increasingly isolationist Russia? One the one hand, all three Baltic countries show quite robust economic growth, and wages and consumption levels are rising more swiftly than in most European countries after the 2009 crisis. However, the two largest Baltic countries, Lithuania and Latvia, are among the poorest in the EU, and all three suffer from significant levels of emigration to the more affluent Western EU member states. Although EU financial support has undoubtedly helped to overcome the recent crisis and will help also in the future, Brussels will not subsidize the Baltic economies indefinitely. Therefore, full economic convergence of the Baltic economies with the rest of the EU is not a short-term, but a medium-term perspective, at best.

This leads us to a further difference between West Berlin and the Baltic States. An absolute majority of West Berliners of the Cold War era were convinced of the superiority of the Western way of life. Indeed, many East Germans risked their lives to get into the city. Although one sees increasing middle-class immigration from Russia to the Baltics, the situation there is much more complicated. Latvia and Estonia inherited from the Soviet era their substantial Russian speaking immigrant minorities, which often are weakly integrated in the restored democratic states. It is certainly not fair to treat these minorities as “fifth columns” or potential threats to the Baltic independence. Nevertheless, their geopolitical views and values tend to be rather different from Latvian and Estonian majorities. The Baltic Russophones often sympathize with Putin’s Russia. Although they do not want to see the Crimean scenario repeated in the Baltics, their support for the country’s integration in the EU, and, especially, NATO is significantly lower among than among ethnic Latvian and Estonian majorities.[4]

This cleavage has become particularly visible with the recent intensification of the informational warfare. For most Baltic Russophones (and for many ethnic Latvians and Estonians as well), the Moscow-controlled Russian TV channels often serve as the only source of information about the world. This leads to growing resentment about Western influence in the post-Soviet space, anti-American sentiments, and various conspiracy theories intended to justify Russia’s actions in Ukraine. The Baltic governments have done little to provide Russophone minorities with alternatives to the Kremlin-controlled TV channels. Estonia recently opened a Russian-language TV channel ETV+. But Latvia, the country with the largest Russophone minority, has not followed its path, because of financial and ideological reasons. Yet this just reproduces the Latvian elite’s usual reluctance to deal with the integration issues seriously. Therefore it remains to be seen to what extent these minorities can be made into loyal “West Berliners.”

Finally, there is one more significant difference between the Baltic countries and West Berlin: the level of political capacity and democratic commitment. Formally, West Berlin was ruled by the Berlin House of Deputies; in fact, it functioned as the twelfth federal land of the Federal Republic of Germany. This, however, didn’t prevent the West Berlin government from enjoying high levels of popular support. In the Baltics, the situation seems to be the opposite: they are fully-fledged sovereign, democratic countries. However, with a possible exception of Estonia, the trust into parliaments and governments is among the lowest in the EU[5]. The low levels of popular legitimacy also affect the political culture of the Baltic States. Widespread alienation from the political life, weak and unpopular political parties, and support for populist and extremist causes – all these phenomena are widespread. Probably the most telling recent example was the Baltic reaction to the European Commission’s plan to distribute the Mediterranean asylum-seekers according to quotas. Although none of the Baltic countries rejected the plan in its entirety, reactions were quite telling. The most prominent politician who expressed her negative view on the issue, was the Lithuanian president, Dalia Grybauskaitė, who commented during the June EU Summit that „that she had no intention of contributing to any solution” of the migrant problem.[6] The former liberal foreign minister of Estonia Kristiina Ojuland commented that African and Arab immigrants were “a threat to the white race ,” and therefore should not be admitted to Europe.[7] The event that got most international acknowledgment was the anti-immigration demonstration organized by the Latvian far-right “National Alliance ,” which is a part of the government of that country.[8] Posters like “No to the Genocide of the White Peoples ,” “Down with the cosmopolitan liberalization!” and “We are ready to welcome Swedish refugees when they will run away from immigrants’ demolished Stockholm!” were heard. In short, although the Baltic elites usually are promoting a staunchly pro-Western self-image to the outside world, their commitment to the Western values in domestic politics is often rather dubious. Such discrepancies, as well as a predisposition for populist politics, are hardly among the things a new West Berlin can afford.

It is important to remember that the historical West Berlin was not created according to some pre-given blueprint. It was rather a product of complex historical circumstances and developments, whereby the divided city was only one of the factors in a much larger game. For this reason, all attempts to re-create the “West Berlin model” in the current Baltic security situation seem to be deeply misguided. Nevertheless, there are some obvious lessons the Baltic countries could learn from the Berlin experience. First, it is necessary to root the Baltic economies deeply in the West, at the same time promoting the economic growth as a national security measure of high priority. Second, the Russophone minorities, often seen by Russia as “compatriots” to be saved and patronized, have to be made stake-holders of the sovereign Baltic democracies. Third, it is important to strengthen democratic institutions and the respect for human rights. This is a particularly complicated task, taking into account the upsurge of right-wing traditionalist populism all over Europe. If these lessons can be learned, then the comparison with Berlin has served its purpose.

About the author:
*Ivars Ijabs
is an Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Latvia, Riga. His research interests include history of political ideas, nationalism, and problems of democratization of Central Eastern Europe and Russia. He has served as a board chairman of the Soros Foundation Latvia; currently he is a member of the expert group on legal and political issues under the auspices of the State President of Latvia.

Source:
This article was published by FPRI.

Notes:
[1] Edward Lucas, Against Putin, it’s Time to Channel JFK, The Politico, August 22, 2014, http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/08/only-obama-can-stop-putin-now-110264

[2] Britain to station troops in Baltic region ‘to deter Russian aggression, The Guardian, October 8, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/oct/08/britain-station-troops-poland-latvia-lithuania-estonia-russian-aggression

[3] Floating LNG terminal “Independence” sails into Klaipėda, Delfi.lt, October 24, 2014, http://en.delfi.lt/lithuania/energy/floating-lng-terminal-independence-sails-into-klaipeda.d?id=66226156

[4] Ivars Ījabs, Critical, but not Serious: Latvian Russophones in the Shadow of Ukraine, https://ivarsijabs.wordpress.com/2015/05/02/critical-but-not-serious-latvian-russophones-in-the-shadow-of-ukraine/

[5] See Standard Eurobarometer 83 (Spring 2015), http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb83/eb83_en.htm

[6] Mediterranean migrants: EU leaders agree voluntary intake after heated talks. The Guardian, June 26, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/26/eu-leaders-hash-out-voluntary-system-to-address-mediterranean-migrant-crisis

[7] “Former liberal MEP Ojuland calls African refugees a ‘threat to the white race’,” Estonian Public Broadcasting, May 28, 2015. http://news.err.ee/v/politics/society/d9be1eba-8bed-4969-91f7-e90fa17e9a67

[8] Demo voices discontent over immigration policy from moderate to extreme,” Latvian Public Broadcasting, August 4, 2015. http://www.lsm.lv/en/article/societ/society/demo-voices-discontent-over-immigration-policy-from-moderate-to-extreme.a140217/

Pakistan: Malignant Brew In Sindh – Analysis

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By Ambreen Agha*

On October 13, 2015, at least four persons, including two terrorists, were killed in separate incidents of violence in Karachi, the provincial capital of Sindh. In one incident, Karachi Metropolitan Corporation’s (KMC) Additional Director, Arshad Hussain, was shot dead near Askari Park in Gulshan-e-Iqbal Town. Two terrorists, identified as Zohaib and Mahmood, were killed in two separate Police encounters in the Kalari and Chakiwara areas of Lyari Town. Zohaib, affiliated with the Wasi Lakho Gang, was reportedly involved in killing of Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) Member of Provincial Assembly (MPA), Waja Kareem Dad, on August 17, 2011 in the Kharadar area of Saddar Town. Mahmood was associated with the Baba Ladla Gang. In another incident, Police recovered an unidentified dead body from Gulshan-e-Ghazi area of Baldia Town.

On October 8, 2015, two Police Officials, identified as Head Constable Abdul Ghafar and Constable Pervaiz Ali, were shot dead while they were on a routine patrol near Char Minar within the limits of the New Town Police Station in the Bahadurabad area of Gulshan Town. In another incident, a traffic Policeman identified as Rehan Sarwar was killed at his residence in the Aram Bagh area of Saddar Town.

On October 7, 2015, a ‘criminal’, identified as Amir Baloch, son of Shah Jehan Baloch, was killed in retaliatory firing by the Police that had come under attack by him and his accomplices while patrolling the Garden West Road area, adjacent to the Lyari Expressway. The Police recovered one TT pistol and five rounds of ammunition from his possession. Amir’s other accomplices, however, managed to escape. Amir was associated with the Lyari Gang.

According to partial data compiled by the Institute for Conflict Management (ICM), Karachi has recorded a total of 627 terrorism and gang-related fatalities, including 314 civilians, 45 SF personnel and 268 terrorists/criminals in the current year (all data till October 18, 2015). In the corresponding period of 2014, the number of such fatalities stood at 1,012 fatalities, including, 658 civilians, 117 SFs and 237 terrorists/criminals.

ICM data confirms that gang and terrorism-related fatalities in the city have decreased considerably since the launch of ‘targeted action’ on September 5, 2013. Since then, Karachi has recorded 2,233 terrorism and target killing fatalities, including 1,296 civilians, 722 terrorists/criminals and 215 Security Force (SF) personnel (data till October 18, 2015). During the corresponding period prior to the start of the action, there were 3,259 fatalities, including 2,762 civilians, 240 terrorists/criminals and 257 SF personnel. Though there was a 31.48 per cent decline in the total, the decline in SF deaths was much smaller, at 16.34 per cent.

According to a detailed report released on July 8, 2015, by the Pakistan Rangers in Sindh, since the launch of the ‘targeted action’ on September 5, 2013, the Rangers had carried out 5,795 operations during which they had apprehended 10,353 suspects and recovered 7,312 weapons and 348,978 rounds of ammunition. The Rangers also traded fire with suspected ‘criminals’, engaging in a total of 224 ‘encounters’, in which 364 suspected criminals were killed and another 213 were arrested. The Rangers also arrested 82 abductors and in the process secured the release of 49 abducted persons from captivity. In addition, a total of 826 terrorists, 334 ‘target killers’, and 296 extortionists were arrested during this period.

On September 4, 2013, the Federal Cabinet had empowered the Rangers to lead the ‘targeted action’ with the support of the Police, against criminals involved in the “four heinous crimes of target-killing, kidnapping, extortion and terrorism”. Federal Minister of Interior Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan, laying emphasis that this was to be a ‘targeted action’ or ‘exercise’, rather than an operation, had announced that a committee headed by the provincial Chief Minister Syed Qim Ali Shah would “manage, administer and control” the action.

Despite the decline in fatalities, there is much to suggest that the ‘targeted operation’ is yet to create an environment of security in Karachi. On the completion of two years of the ‘exercises’ on September 4, 2015, Karachi Police Chief Mushtaq Mahar admitted that a significant presence of sleeper cells of terrorist groups in the provincial capital. Similarly, on October 12, 2015, Inspector General of Police (IGP), Sindh, Ghulam Hyder Jamali, had warned that “three terrorist organisations” operating in a nexus were planning to carry out attacks in Karachi in the month of Muharram (First month of the Islamic Calendar. It is the period of mourning by the Shia Muslims). Muharram started on October 15, 2015.

Though the IGP did not reveal the identities of the “three terrorist organisations”, the Counter-Terrorism Department (CTD) anti-sectarian intelligence chief Khurram Waris stated on October 13, 2015,

…al-Qaeda in Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and LeJ [Lashkar-Jhangvi (LeJ)] which is now linked with the Middle Eastern terrorist group Daesh [known as Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS/Islamic State, IS)] and working together, are involved in many terrorist activities in Sindh in the recent past, including murdering Police Officials in Karachi. AQIS was now leading the other two groups. All three groups in the Province are headed by commanders known only by their code names, Umer, Mistry and Bengali. They have been accused of being involved in killings and other terrorist activities in Hyderabad and Karachi Districts. They were responsible for the recent killing of traffic Policemen in Karachi…The interrogation of the arrested militants further revealed that the groups were also generating funds for their organisations by committing robberies and kidnappings-for-ransom, extorting traders, and collecting donations using fake madrassa receipts.

Five traffic Policemen have been killed in Karachi in the current year. The first such incident was recorded on August 30, 2015, when two traffic Policemen, identified as Nizam Hussain and Shair Muhammad, were killed by unidentified militants near the Sunday Bazaar in the Metro Shopping area in Gulshan-e-Iqbal Town. On September 2, 2015, a traffic Police Constable was shot dead and two others sustained injuries when unidentified militants opened fire at them in the Site-B area of SITE Town. A traffic Police Official, identified as Assistant Sub-Inspector (ASI) Zulfiqar, was shot dead near Malir Kala Board in the Malir Town on September 30, 2015. A traffic Policeman, identified as Rehan Sarwar, was killed at his residence in the Aram Bagh area of Saddar Town on October 8, 2015.

Policemen from other divisions are also being targeted. On September 30, 2015, Lyari Superintendent of Police (SP), Aftab Nizamani, survived an attempt on his life while two attackers were killed by the Police in retaliatory firing in the Chakiwara area of Lyari Town. Karachi-West Senior Superintendent of Police (SSP) Azfar Mahesar, noted, on September 2, 2015, that “a new wave of targeted killing of Policemen” has begun.

The active presence of IS in the city has also been confirmed, with IGP Jamali confirming, on October 12, 2015, that the group was operating in Sindh and had established links with LeJ, and that IS and LeJ were involved in the May 13, 2015, Safoora Goth carnage in Gulshan Town, where 45 Ismaili Shias travelling in a chartered bus were killed. This incident manifested the first and sudden emergence of IS activity in Karachi.

On October 13, 2015, a list prepared by the Karachi East SSP’s office reportedly mentioned 53 suspected terrorists who were operating in a manner bearing the hallmark of Daesh. According to the report these terrorists belonged to different parts of the country and were based in Karachi.

Much earlier, confirming the presence of IS, in a ‘secret information report’ submitted by the Balochistan Government to the Federal Government, dated October 31, 2014, the Provincial Government had warned of increased IS footprints. The report from the Home and Tribal Affairs Department of Balochistan stated,

It has been reliably learnt that Daesh has offered some elements of Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) and Ahl-e-Sunnat Wal Jamat (ASWJ) to join hands in Pakistan. Daesh has also formed a ten-member Strategic Planning Wing.

IS is, consequently, no more a perceived threat, and has matured into a real danger. It has augmented its strength by aligning itself with splinter groups of mainstream terrorist organizations operating in Pakistan, making the situation all the more precarious.

Indeed, accepting the danger, Chief of Army Staff (CoAS) General Raheel Sharif in a meeting with the Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif on September 1, 2015, reaffirmed the resolve that the ‘targeted operation’ in Karachi would continue, irrespective of its political fallouts. Similarly, President Mamnoon Hussain stated on September 30, 2015, that the ‘targeted action’ in Karachi would continue till the ‘complete restoration of peace and elimination of terrorism’.

Curiously, IGP Jamali claimed, on October 4, 2015, that “peace and order has been restored in the metropolis by eliminating terrorism, target killing and extortion.”

Karachi has long been known as “the most dangerous mega-city in the world”, but the ‘targeted action’ has clearly impacted on the will, capacity and activity of the terrorist-criminal nexus in the city. There has, moreover, been no serious terrorist attack in the metropolis since the May 13, 2015, Safoora carnage. Dangers, nevertheless, persist, and the presence of terrorist organizations and particularly the emergence of Daesh (IS), are grounds for some alarm, as is the nexus between Daesh, AQIS, TTP and LeJ. These actors, with their wider national and global networks and agendas, retain enormous potential for state destabilization.

*Ambreen Agha
Research Assistant, Institute for Conflict Management

Bangladesh: Lethal Remnants – Analysis

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By S. Binodkumar Singh*

On October 5, 2015, three unidentified assailants tried to slit the throat of Luke Sarkar (52), Pastor of the Faith Bible Church, at his house in the Ishwardi upazila (sub-District) of Pabna District. He survived the attack with minor injuries. Later, on October 12, 2015, five Jama’atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) terrorists, including its Pabna ‘regional chief’ Rakibul Islam Rabbi aka Rakib were arrested over this murder attempt.

On October 5, 2015, Muhammad Khijir Khan (66), the former chairman of the Power Development Board (PDB), a freedom fighter and a pir (revered religious instructor, usually of Sufi orientation) was killed by seven unidentified armed men by slitting his throat at his Madhya Badda house in the national capital, Dhaka. On October 15, Tariqul Islam Tarer alias Mithu, an organizer of JMB arrested from Delduar upazila in Tangail District, in his confession to killing Khijir Khan, stated, “As Khijir Khan was a so-called pir and his activities were contradictory to religious ideology, it was our (JMB) responsibility as believers to kill him.”

Shockingly, since December 2013, four pirs and six of their family members and assistants had been murdered by Islamist extremists.

On December 22, 2013, assailants slit the throats of six people, including pir Lutfur Rahman Faruk (60); Faruk’s son Monir Hossain; the house’s caretaker Monju; and Faruk’s followers Shaheen, Rasel, and Mojibur Rahma at Ramkrishna Mission Road in Dhaka city.

On September 5, 2015, unknown assailants slit the throat of a pir, Rahmat Ullah (60), along with an attendant inside his shrine in the Bayezid area of Chittagong city.

On September 7, 2015, assailants shot dead another pir, Hazrat Moulana Mohammad Salahuddin Khan Bishal (30), in his sleep in the Vorotpur area of Atghoria upazila in Pabna District.

Further, on August 29, 2014, the chief imam (religious teacher) of the Supreme Court mosque Shiekh Nurul Islam Faruqi (60) was killed at his East Rajabazar house in Dhaka city by 10 unidentified assailants.

Islamic extremists have been blamed for all these incidents.

Compounding the problem, foreigners in Bangladesh have become targets of Islamic extremists in recent months. On September 28, 2015, an Italian charity worker Cesare Tavella (50), a technical director working at Netherlands-based development organization Interchurch Organization for Development Cooperation (ICCO), was killed by three unidentified armed men in Dhaka city’s Gulshan area. Search for International Terrorist Entities (SITE) Intelligence Group, a website that tracks online activity of Jihadi organizations, disclosed that a communiqué by Islamic State (IS) claimed that ‘a security detachment’ tracked and killed Cesare with ‘silenced weapons’ in the streets of Dhaka city. The claim was immediately denied by Bangladesh authorities.

On October 3, 2015, Japanese national Hoshi Kunio (66), researching on a new strain of grass in Bangladesh, was gunned down by three unidentified armed men when he was going by rickshaw to his two acres grass farm at Alutari in the Kaunia sub-District of Rangpur District. Reuters and Vice News quoted IS tweets declaring, “There will continue to be a series of ongoing security operations against nationals of crusader coalition countries; they will not have safety or a livelihood in Muslim lands.”

Dismissing IS claims on October 4, 2015, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina Wajed stated, “I can say that no outfits like the IS can carry out their activities here. Our intelligence agencies are very much alert. We don’t want to see any activities of such outfits in Bangladesh.” The Prime Minister accused the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) – Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI) combine of having a hand in the killings of the foreigners: “The style of the killing of the two foreign nationals is similar … These were well planned. I want to remind you of a BNP leader’s remarks before and after the [Italian national’s] murder. If you compare the remarks, the matter will become clear.”

Significantly, on October 2, 2015, Abdul Moyeen Khan, a senior BNP leader, referring to these attacks, had stated, “Such downward trends will continue until there is some kind of political reconciliation between the two major political parties in Bangladesh.”

Also, rejecting IS involvement in the murders, Home Minster Asaduzzaman Khan Kamal on October 5, asserted, “IS is not behind these murders. A vested group is seeking to create anarchy in the country. They are conducting these killings but we will track them down and bring them to justice.”

Indeed, according to an intelligence report submitted to the Ministry of Home Affairs on October 4, 2015, anti-liberation forces, enraged that war criminals are being tried, convicted and executed, are murdering foreign nationals in the country to cast the Government in a bad light. The War Crimes (WC) Trials, which began on March 25, 2010, have thus far indicted 35 leaders, including 18 from JeI, six from the Muslim League (ML), five from Nezam-e-Islami (NeI), four from BNP and two from the Jatiya Party (JP). On August 11, 2015, International Crimes Tribunal-1 (ICT-1) awarded the death penalty to Bagerhat District Razakar leader Sheikh Sirajul Haque alias Siraj Master (73) and life imprisonment to another Razakar leader Khan Akram Hossain, for genocide, murder, abduction and forceful conversion of Hindus to Islam during the Liberation War in 1971. Earlier, verdicts had been delivered against 22 accused, including 16 death penalties and six life sentences. Each judgment resulted in violence unleashed by fundamentalists, led by the BNP-JeI combine. According to partial data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), the country has recorded at least 471 Islamist extremist violence-related fatalities since March 25, 2010, including 263 civilians, 27 Security Force (SF) personnel and 181 extremists (data till October 18, 2015).

Islamist extremists have been targeting secular and free-thinking people, with four bloggers killed in 2015 alone. On August 7, 2015, Niladri Chattopadhyay Niloy alias Niloy Neel (28), a secular blogger and a Gonojagoron Mancha (People’s Resurgence Platform) activist was hacked to death at his Goran residence in the Khilgaon area of Dhaka city; on May 12, 2015, Ananta Bijoy Das (32), a progressive writer, blogger, editor of the science fiction magazine Jukti, and an organizer of the Gonojagoron Mancha, was hacked to death with machetes by four assailants in the Subidbazar Bankolapara residential area of Sylhet city; on March 30, 2015, another blogger and online activist, Oyasiqur Rahman Babu (27), was hacked to death in broad daylight in Dhaka city for his allegedly atheist views; and on February 26, 2015, Bangladesh-born American citizen blogger Avijit Roy (42), the founder of the Mukta-mona.com blog, was hacked to death in Dhaka city.

Meanwhile, on September 23, 2015, Ansarullah Bangla Team (ABT, Volunteers of Allah Bangla Team) issued a hit list of secular bloggers, writers and activists around the world, including nine bloggers based in the UK, seven in Germany, two in the US, one in Canada and one in Sweden. The statement featured a logo comprising a black flag carrying the seal of the prophet Mohammed and the phrase: “We do not forget, we do not forgive” in English. Disturbingly, the killing of bloggers in Bangladesh propelled the country onto the Global Impunity Index of the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ). The CPJ, in a report published on October 8, 2015, observed,

At least four Bangladeshi bloggers have been hacked to death by apparent Islamic extremists this year alone, and a total of five of Bangladesh’s seven victims of unsolved murders over the last decade are bloggers who criticized religious extremism. Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and the nominally secular ruling Awami League party have done little to speak out for justice in these crimes, allowing political interests to trump rule of law.

While sporadic incidents by Islamist extremists have raised tensions in the country and concerns across the world, the threat of conventional terrorism continues to lurk in the background. On September 6, 2015, intelligence agencies unearthed a plot to blow up over 100 Navy and Coast Guard bases and oil refineries in southeastern Chittagong city. The little-known Hilf ul Fuzul al Islami (Islamic Alliance of the Virtuous), in collaboration with several other banned Islamist groups, were responsible for the plot, which was believed to be in retaliation to the escalating security clampdown against the Islamists.

On October 6, 2015, Chittagong Metropolitan Police (CMP) Detective Branch (DB) Additional Deputy Commissioner (ADC) Muhamad Babul Akhter disclosed that JMB was aiming to set up a stronghold in Chittagong District’s heavily forested hilly areas and claimed that there were 1,000 JMB militants in the District, discreetly working as sales persons at stationary shops, day laborers and hawkers to conceal their identity. Some have set up small shops in densely-populated areas of the city to enable contact within the group when required.

Further, on October 11, 2015, talking about JMB’s link with another outfit, Allahr Dol (Allah’s Party), TM Mujahidul Islam, Superintendent of Police (SP) of Lalmonirhat District, observed, “The people who have been organizing under the banner of Allahr Dol are all from the JMB. As JMB is banned, they are now trying to reorganize under a different umbrella and are applying new techniques.” Allahr Dol’s activities have so far spread to Lalmonirhat, Kurigram, Rajshahi and Dinajpur Districts in the north; Khulna District in the south-west and Jhalakathi District in the south. The outfit also gets support, shelter and backup from the local chapter of JeI.

Referring to the current situation on October 5, 2015, Supreme Court Chief Justice Surendra Kumar Sinha noted,

We are trying hard to combat terrorism. It is a global issue, which India and Bangladesh are facing at the same time. Terrorism has become a major problem now… In Bangladesh, terrorism has become a serious threat to our national security. It has become a threat to life, economy and political as well as religious pluralism in Bangladesh.

The recent attacks against religious figures and foreigners’ in Bangladesh are reaction to the assertiveness demonstrated by the Government led by Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina Wajed, as a result of which the threat from Islamist terrorism in Bangladesh has been minimized. The speedy WC Trials have worried the radicals, and their response has been an escalation of such violence.

Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina Wajed on October 13 said that those behind the recent killing of two foreigners would be hunted down and tried: “There will be no place for terrorists and militants in Bangladesh… we’ll surely find out the killers … and bring them under the purview of law.” Earlier, on October 6, 2015, Bangladesh Inspector General of Police (IGP) AKM Shahidul Hoque had stated, “Anyone may personally believe in their (IS) ideology. But we will not let our country become a terrorist state. We will thwart all conspiracies that are being hatched for our country.”

Dhaka has acted with determination against the long established terrorist and radical Islamist formations in Bangladesh. Controlling randomized violence by their dispersed fragments, as well as incipient groups that are rising out of the wide base of a population radicalized over the decades, in some cases inspired by global Islamism, is, however, proving a difficult task.

*S. Binodkumar Singh, Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management

UN Report Highlights Implementation Gaps In Cutting Red Tape For International Trade

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The United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), together with all four other United Nations regional commissions, today launched the first global report on the implementation of measures to simplify import, export and transit procedures, calling for more to be done to cut trade costs and promote growth.

The inaugural Global Report of the Trade Facilitation and Paperless Trade Implementation Survey provides data for 119 countries and serves as a useful basis for bench marking and monitoring trade facilitation performance. Within the Asia-Pacific region, the report shows Singapore and the Republic of Korea leading East Asia in moving goods effectively. India tops the South Asian subregion, with Russia and Turkey leading in Europe and Central Asia. The top trade facilitation performer among these economies is the Netherlands.

According to the new report, efficient movement of goods is key to maintaining trade competitiveness, and enabling effective engagement of firms, in particular small and medium enterprises, with regional and global production networks. The global average implementation rate of the ambitious set of trade facilitation measures considered in the report is about53 per cent. Developed economies average more than75 per cent implementation, while Pacific Island developing economies barely reach 26 per cent.

As highlighted in the report, accelerating implementation of paperless trade measures will be crucial to reducing trade costs. The report also recommends the adoption of modern information and communication technologies, as well as development of legal frameworks to enable the exchange of electronic trade data and documents across borders.

United Nations Under-Secretary-General and Executive Secretary of ESCAP Dr. Shamshad Akhtar said: “These ‘next generation’ trade facilitation measures have great potential to reduce costs and boost trade, increasing the Asia-Pacific region’s export potential by more than$250 billion annually. This can only be achieved, however, through more effective cooperation between countries at the regional and global levels.” Dr. Akhtar added that more than 20 ESCAP member States are already actively engaged in developing an innovative regional agreement for the facilitation of cross-border paperless trade, and she encouraged other Asia-Pacific member States to participate.

The report outlines the extent to which key measures of the recent World Trade Organization Trade Facilitation Agreement are currently being implemented, showing that a significant number of developing economies, particularly in East Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, have already acted on many of the commitments associated with the arrangement. For most countries, however, much still remains to be done. An integrated step-by-step approach is suggested, starting with building up institutional arrangements and inter-agency cooperation.

Overall, the report finds that most economies have already taken concrete steps towards streamlining trade procedures. The United Arab Emirates leads the Middle East and North Africa region and Benin and Mauritius lead in Sub-Saharan Africa. Several leaders emerge in Latin America and the Caribbean including Mexico, Colombia, Ecuador and Chile.

The survey, led by ESCAP, was developed in collaboration with the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and implemented by all of the United Nations regional commissions, namely: the UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), the UN Economic Commission for Europe (ECE), the UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), and the UN Economic and Social Commission for West Asia (ESCWA). The report was produced with the support of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, (UNCTAD), the International Road Transport Union (IRU), the International Trade Centre, (ITC), OCO and the Latin American and Caribbean Economic System (SELA).

Can OSINT Be Used To Create Hit Lists? – OpEd

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Are Internet trolls now actively moving from the realms of attention seeking, stalking and character assassination to social media-facilitated terrorism and murder?

By Mathew Maavak*

Recently, a US professor mailed me inquiring about the possible misuse of Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) to intimidate people who did not subscribe to the mainstream political narrative. She was concerned about the ramifications.

I told her that there was a difference between OSINT and trolling. Many claim to know and employ OSINT, whereas they are merely provoking, intimidating and bullying people online. Left unchecked, this form of psychopathology can lead to violence and even murder.

We have heard of the possibility of “Murder by Internet” or “Virtual Murder” or “Remote Murder” in various guises and methods, but these mainly involved cinematic-worthy hi-tech hackings into hospital life support systems, sabotaging critical systems during a high-risk task, or taking over a driverless car by remote and crashing it and the occupants into permanent oblivion. Or electronically scramble one’s pacemaker with a portable interference device. The possibilities are endless.

But remote murder can be effectuated on a much more mundane level. Just create a hit list of “undesirable people” online, and deliberately cultivated psychopaths will do the rest.

For instance, if a group of neo-Nazis or ISIS holy warriors wanted to take prevalent levels of Western anti-Semitism to the next level, all they have to do is identify Jewish people in one particular area; get their foot soldiers ready (usually neo-Nazis and ISIS jihadis); and publish the geolocations or addresses of their targets online. A mass WhatsApp broadcast can alert psychopaths to a temporary free blog which will have details like names, photos, locations, and addresses etc. The rest would not be too difficult and it could be Kristallnacht in less than an hour. The police won’t be able to respond in a timely fashion to protect fairly dispersed targets.

Perhaps, the most egregious example of an Internet Hit List today is the one published by the Ukrainian politician Anton Gerashchenko. The list apparently contains the names and addresses of 8,000 pro-Russian sympathizers who are currently targeted for elimination. This list was reportedly linked to a Facebook post, but despite numerous complaints by concerned citizens, it was not taken down.

Now get this: This Ukrainian neo-Nazi wants ISIS militants in Syria to take revenge against Russian forces in Syria “in accordance with Sharia law.” He is willing to provide help in locating and identifying Russian personnel in Syria so that militants in the Caucasus region can target them for murder upon their return. And, I am sure their families as well.

As a Russian lawyer noted hastily during a discussion on this subject; this online bazaar for murder is not limited to Russians:

“Gerashchenko is a psychopathic scum that provided for creation of a Web site on which by now personal data of about 8,000 of Ukrainian and Russian citizens, including children — alleged “foes of the Ukraine” — are published. Some opposition journalists like Oles Bouzina who were on the list got murdered by the neo-nazis. http://m.vz.ru/society/2015/10/8/771210.html.

Anatoliy Shariy… (a Ukrainian opposition journalist who’s “on the list” as well) on the Web site created by Gerashchenko’s efforts: http://youtu.be/Ch8UYTau97k.

This shocking attempt to use social media to get people killed has been conveniently ignored by Kiev and its Western allies. Isn’t there an ongoing “war on terror”? Isn’t this a blatant form of terrorism as well?

Hit Lists linked to Facebook posts apparently don’t bother its founder Mark Zuckerberg. He has other priorities, like acquiescing to German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s request to monitor “hate speech” online. The “hate speech” in question happens to be citizen dissent against the current refugee influx into Germany. The German authorities, in true time-honoured Stasi tradition, will decide what constitutes hate speech and xenophobia. The accused may end up losing employment and custody of their children.

When the so-called freedom-loving West curtails dissent via draconian panoptic means, and yet allows its champion social media bedlamites to incite xenophobic hate, exhortations to murder, as well as provide the identity and locational details of target groups, what does it say about “Western values?” What does it reveal about the West’s protestations of “human rights” that are perennially promoted by a global network of suspect NGOs?

Gerashchenko’s Hit List was detected early enough as it has appeared in the common vernacular. But what happens if your name and address were included into a similar list in a foreign script or in a coded form and you were unaware of it? Would you be forewarned early enough to take precautions?

I was reminded of this scenario when the US Jewish campus fraternity AEPi issued an anti-Semitism security warning recently.

According to AEPi executive director Andrew Borans, the threat is real. “Unfortunately, we’ve already seen a number of incidences of anti-Israel and anti-Jewish rhetoric and violence on campuses this fall.”

But the nature of such attacks may change in tandem with the ongoing social media-facilitated Arab intifada. Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu described this latest variation in terror tactics as one where “Osama Bin Laden meets Mark Zuckerberg.

The Gerashchenko Matrix – which I like to call this particular form of social media terrorism – has transcended the borders of Ukraine into Israel. It is going global. But Israeli security services are well-versed in Arabic and may have already cracked any coded messages used online to incite terror.

But what about scattered members of the Jewish community, or for that matter, any other targeted community anywhere? How will one know if his or her name, location, photos and details are already entered into a hit list database in a foreign language or any other coded form known only to the perpetrators?

How many unsuspecting people, including children, could die as a result of the actions of a madman incited by psychopaths running wild on the social media?
I used the anti-Semitism scenario as it is the most likely combined target of two of the most nefarious ideologies today: A resurgent Western Nazism and Global Jihad, spearheaded by ISIS and Al Qaeda.

For some reason, the West gives these sociopaths a free pass, while their internet warriors wage unceasing 24/7 trolling activities against the West’s perceived enemies. Most of the time, this includes anyone who does not buy into the Western establishment’s political narrative hook, line and sinker. US-led online kommissars are reducing the cyberspace into a totalitarian Gulag Archipelago. All in the name of “freedom”!

This is a part-fantasy world where neo-Nazis feign to be pro-Israel, but conveniently attack those who expose long-standing attacks against Jews in Ukraine as –believe it or not – anti-Semites! The logic is so twisted that it rightfully belongs to Goebbels’ playbook.

Here is where they find common cause with certified ISIS sympathizers who also proclaim their love “for Jews” online –to establish some sort of juvenile bona fide – but whose trolling activities are replete with threats of violence and murder against those who expose their sinister intent.

Recently, I got myself actively engaged with a group of trolls at the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC) group on LinkedIn. There was a group of US Internet Rambos who had long driven out intelligent debates, along with intelligent members, through their 24/7 disruptive activities. Personally, I have long regarded these trolls, who continually feign sympathy for the “plight of ordinary Ukrainians and Syrians”, as fronting for some yet-to-be-ascertained neo-Nazi and/or ISIS cause.

If my hunch was right about the nature and raison d’etre of this group, their actions would be predictable enough. Trolls have their limits when their lies catch up with them. The most likely response expected should be at the fundamental level of the Gerashchenko Matrix – namely online character assassination. (The graduated levels before the apex denouement of murder will be unveiled in due time in a peer-reviewed paper of mine).

OSINT Hit ListAs anticipated, the screenshot (to the right) is the foreseen reaction, up and about on the internet within 48 hours of the commencement of a heated debate, and unsigned by any particular author.

If the author wanted credibility, he could have included the entire LinkedIn screenshot referred to in his insensate tripe — in toto. But that was conveniently left out, for it would have exposed this group as having neo-Nazi and ISIS sympathies.

But the poison pen author did include the name of my late thesis supervisor to provide a cheap veneer of verisimilitude to his libellous post. Trolls stoop so low that they have no qualms about tarnishing the reputations of long-deceased people resting in their graves. Now, anyone who was once related in any way in any grave anywhere in the world can be made into a material witness in the “trollground” of cyberspace. All the troll needs to do is google up the name of the target, and find people – past and present – who are somehow related or connected to the target, and then spin a malicious yarn.

This is what Marie Harf referred to as social media evidence, where any canard posted online becomes truth by itself, again echoing the latest US variant of its Goebbelsian national life. This is how the US wins hearts and minds today, at the junction where “Osama Bin Laden meets Mark Zuckerberg.”

What next? An actual assassination? Where does one take the issue of social media terrorism up? The US Embassy in Kuala Lumpur? Many of these trolls are actually ex-employees of various US intelligence and military services, at least as their stated LinkedIn profiles go.

But if the US Embassy in Kiev is doing little or nothing to voice concern over the fate of 8,000 civilians including women and children in its ally’s Internet Kill List, one wonders whether the US government is actively fostering this troll phenomenon that is beginning to take a murderous function creep.

Islamic State In Afghanistan: A Growing Threat To Pakistan? – Analysis

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The ISIS chapter in Afghanistan has emerged as an imminent threat to the region, specifically after it gained control of areas in the Nangarhar province. The province’s critical location along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border and the group’s readiness to feed demand for narcotics trade grant it strength.

By Sara Mahmood*

Since July this year, the ISIS chapter in Afghanistan has taken control of seven districts in the southern part of the Nangarhar province. The province is located along the east of Afghanistan, and borders Pakistan. The control of physical territories indicates that the group is no longer on the fringes of the region. The group has established Shariah courts and prisons, closed down more than 60 educational institutions and recruited local children into its ranks of militants. It has also released barbaric videos aimed at terrorising those who stand up to their violent penchant for control and have perpetrated incidents of violence in the province.

The Pashtun population has been largely resistant to ISIS’ recruitment efforts, and has fended off the terrorist group’s attempts at enforcing a foothold in the areas under its control. Yet, the ISIS chapter in Afghanistan has managed to carve out areas for control and has been involved in door-to-door recruitment campaigns while they forcibly marry local women to its fighters. According to a recent UN Report, the entity has managed to gain supporters from 25 of the 34 provinces in the country. These developments indicate that ISIS in Afghanistan has become a more pressing threat to stability within the country, and Pakistan as well.

Nangarhar’s strategic location

ISIS’ foothold at the border with Pakistan is of strategic significance to the politics of the region. Firstly, the location represents a passage for transit trade and trade with Pakistan, along the Kabul River Valley, connecting Kabul to Peshawar in Pakistan. In this current period of post-US withdrawal, Afghanistan is in the throes of the early stages of state re-building. It requires economic revival, which can result in part through trade with Pakistan. Moreover, Pakistan is the country’s largest trading partner and the neighbour has been Afghanistan’s second largest export market in the past. ISIS could leverage on its foothold and take control of the trading routes to disrupt economic ties between the two countries.

Secondly, Nangarhar province borders the porous Durand Line – that separates Pakistan from Afghanistan – which provides an easy passageway for the movement of militants. Residents from the province have routinely travelled to Pakistan to seek medical care, job opportunities and meet family members on the other side. The ISIS militants could move along the same route to conduct attacks in Pakistan and market pro-ISIS propaganda. ISIS does not recognise the existence of this border. In fact, in a recent attack on a Pakistani security forces check-post along the Durand Line, ISIS denounced the territorial separation between both nations.

Afghanistan has continued to blame Pakistan for not cracking down on the Taliban and Haqqani network insurgents operating from Pakistan. Similarly, Pakistan has pointed fingers at Afghanistan in the past, and recently for the attack at the Badaber Air Force camp in Peshawar. This blame game is bound to escalate as ISIS members conduct related attacks in Pakistan that will further pit the two countries against each other.

A substantial aspect of Nangarhar’s strategic importance to ISIS rests in local drug production. Nangarhar was the country’s second largest opium poppy producer until a massive 96% decrease was reported in 2008, making it Afghanistan’s success story. However, by 2014, opium production in Nangarhar increased by 16%, turning it into the fourth largest opium producer in the country. In addition to opium, heroin and hashish are being produced. ISIS could capitalise on the production of these drugs, whilst expanding existing cultivation of opium in the province.

Furthermore, the illicit drug trade in the country is deeply entrenched and prevalent, facilitated by the porous borders on the east. In the past, the drug trafficking industry represented close to half of the Afghan Taliban’s financial network. Similarly, ISIS in Afghanistan’s Nangarhar province points towards exploitation of the drug smuggling industry.

Exploiting porous Af-Pak border

Despite extending and maintaining solid control in various parts of Nangarhar, ISIS has struggled to make a mark internally. Prior loyalties and commitments to groups like the Haqqani network and Afghan Taliban have staved off ISIS’ approach from gaining traction. However, despite this setback, the group has an estimated 3,500 members, and is relying on a growing number of defections from the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban to form its support base and membership.

Since July, the US has stepped up its drone strikes in the province. Similarly, the Afghan National Army (ANA) has launched operations in a district with strong ISIS presence. Still it bears amplifying that these kinetic efforts will not have a lasting impact in a province that is home to the notorious Tora Bora caves that provided refuge for Osama Bin Laden before he escaped to Abbottabad. The ISIS members will easily seek shelter in the widespread mountainous regions and resurface after the military operation. Moreover, the Afghan forces will not be able to effectively counter the presence of ISIS due to resource overstretch.

Threat to Pakistan-Afghanistan relations

Moreover, the cross-border infiltration coupled with the precarious location of the province indicates that any efforts to dismantle the physical sanctuary of the group will be futile. The members and supporters can easily seek safe-haven in Pakistan faced with military efforts to hamper its operational visibility only to return whenever the incursions pass.

ISIS in Afghanistan will gain ground beyond the physical sanctuary in Nangarhar province in terms of increased support from defectors and further attacks within the country and in Pakistan. Possible capitalisation of the drug trafficking industry will strengthen the group financially and make it more capable to conduct high intensity attacks on sensitive targets.

ISIS’ activities will strain Pak-Afghan relations, leading to an escalation of violence in the territory it controls. However, while the group’s members simply represent a rebranding of militants with limited local following, the increase in actors, alongside the Afghan Taliban and Pakistani Taliban, will lead to further instability for the country and the region.

*Sara Mahmood is a Research Analyst with the International Centre for Political Violence & Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.

China’s GDP Drives Economic Debate – Analysis

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By Michael Lelyveld

China’s latest official figures are likely to sharpen the already acrimonious debate about the true pace of the country’s economic growth.

On Monday, the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) announced that China’s third-quarter gross domestic product (GDP) rose at a 6.9-percent rate, nearly matching official performance numbers for the first half and government goals for this year.

The result topped forecasts of 6.7-6.8 percent from economists surveyed by news organizations, but the official GDP figure was the lowest since 2009.

Industrial output growth of 6.2 percent for the first nine months was down only slightly from the first-half mark of 6.3 percent. Retail sales growth of 10.5 percent for the period barely budged from the first-half level of 10.4 percent, according to the NBS.

The official GDP estimate may renew widespread doubts about NBS data after months of concerns that China’s economy has been slowing more significantly.

For over a year, President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang have asserted that China’s “new normal” growth of “about 7 percent” is more sustainable than the breakneck expansion rates of at least 8 percent in the past.

But far deeper drops in “surrogate” indicators like power consumption and rail freight have spurred suggestions that actual GDP growth has been far lower, a suspicion that has shaken stock markets around the world.

Confidence in NBS numbers has been further eroded by a series of the agency’s own reform efforts to curb data fraud by local officials seeking to advance their careers. How successful these have been is anyone’s guess.

“That China’s official economic data cannot be trusted is now received wisdom among western economists, investors and policymakers,” said a recent analysis by the London-based Financial Times, which found more reasons to believe the NBS than not.

Aside from arcane arguments about NBS “smoothing” of data, “convergence” adjustments and the transparency of “GDP deflators,” there are serious doubts about whether China has kept growing at even moderately high rates when its own official surveys show contraction in manufacturing month after month.

The questions have been compounded by low growth or declines in sectors that have paralleled GDP in the past.

Power consumption in the first three quarters edged up only 0.8 percent, according to the National Energy Administration (NEA), while rail tonnage plunged 10.9 percent through August, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) has said.

Despite reports that the property market shows signs of rebounding, output of building materials have dropped over eight months with cement down 5 percent, flat glass down 8 percent and steel off 2 percent, the NDRC said.

While exports have declined 1.8 percent in the first three quarters, imports plunged 15.1 percent in yuan terms, reflecting low prices and weak demand, according to earlier customs figures.

Consumer price inflation tells the same weak demand story, averaging 1.4 percent so far this year. Producer prices have fallen for 43 months in a row, down 5.9 percent in September from a year earlier, the NBS said.

Actual GDP will be lower

In recent months, China experts and economists including Thomas Rawski of University of Pittsburgh, Gary Hufbauer of the Peterson Institute of International Economics and Derek Scissors of the American Enterprise Institute have told Radio Free Asia that actual GDP growth is more likely to be in the range of 4-5 percent.

“It’s consistent with maybe 4 percent at best,” Hufbauer said in August after the NEA reported that first-half total energy use rose only 0.7 percent.

Others, including Harvard University economists Dwight Perkins and Dale Jorgenson, argue that the doubts underestimate the impact of the rising service sector, which generated 49.5 percent of first-half GDP with far less energy than industry, again according to official data.

Over the first three quarters, the service sector share of GDP rose to 51.4 percent, the NBS said.

Last month in an interview, Perkins dismissed those who would lower GDP estimates due to “surrogate” indicators like energy and freight figures, saying they were “just wrong.”

“These people fade from the scene and their work is long forgotten,” he said.

In an email message this month, Yukon Huang, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and former World Bank director for China, said there is “no close relationship” between GDP growth and power use or rail tonnage.

Power consumption is typically low during down cycles because of cutbacks in energy-intensive heavy industry, Huang argued.

“Since GDP growth these days is largely driven by services, … such indicators are meaningless,” he said.

In official figures for the third quarter, the service sector expanded at an 8.4-percent rate while manufacturing growth decelerated to 6 percent.

In a recent press conference for the National Bureau of Asian Research, Peterson Institute senior fellow and China economist Nicholas Lardy said energy and rail freight may have been valid indicators in the past, but no longer.

“I don’t defend the Chinese data to the last decimal point, but I am of the view that they’re growing in this neighborhood of 7 percent,” he said.

Lardy cited newer, less familiar indicators like a 50-percent jump in first-half box office receipts and a 15-percent increase in domestic tourism.

Such signs of growing consumerism are harder to find than the regular NBS reports on industrial output, said Lardy.

“We get almost no data like that for the service sector,” he said. “You have to scrounge around and find the data.”

Whether box office receipts are a better indicator than energy use remains to be seen, but both sides seem to see a need for verifying the official GDP claims.

Li Keqiang’s skepticism

One reason is the skepticism voiced by Li Keqiang himself in a now-famous leaked memo from 2007, when he served as Communist Party secretary of northern Liaoning province.

NBS data were “man-made” and “for reference only,” Li said. Instead, he relied on indicators like power consumption and rail freight, popularizing such surrogate measures as the “Li index.”

Despite the passage of time, Li’s criticism of NBS accounting has continued to weigh on its credibility, while on the flipside of the issue, world stock markets have wavered wildly with each NBS report, whether economists trust them or not.

Perceptions may sway economic activity as much as accuracy, as questions about China figured in the U.S. Federal Reserve Board’s decision to delay an expected increase in interest rates last month.

In a presentation on Sept. 30, NBS director Wang Baoan blamed anticipation of the Fed’s interest rate hike for capital outflows and depreciation of other Asian currencies, effectively strengthening the yuan and punishing China’s exports.

“The appreciation … has reduced the competitiveness of Chinese goods and is the main reason for the slump in Chinese exports,” Wang said.

Weak global demand is likely to be a greater cause for China’s export complaints, but the logical links suggest an echo effect for China stemming from GDP doubts.

The perceptions of China’s economy may also have strategic effects.

In an online broadcast by Yahoo Finance this month, a panel of experts discussed China’s challenges and bilateral relations with the United States.

“But with China’s economy in decline, the Sino-American rivalry may intensify as economic growth slows,” a summary by Yahoo Finance said.

So far, neither side in the debate over China’s official GDP estimates has argued that the economy is declining. The question is whether it is growing at moderately slower or much lower rates.

But markets and analysts may take exponential leaps from the uncertainties surrounding official GDP.

China’s official press has shown frustration with the GDP debate.

“The time has come for foreign entrepreneurs and analysts to cease pontificating over China’s GDP growth, and instead adapt to the slowing economy and embrace the business opportunities that it offers,” the official Xinhua news agency said in a commentary last month.


The Islamization Of Thailand – Analysis

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The perceived relative homogeneity of Thai culture and society is being challenged on multiple fronts today. So much has been said about the socio-economic division within Thai society, epitomized by the ‘red’ verses ‘yellow’ shirt movements, and political outcomes over the last decade and a half.

However very little is said, publicly anyway, about the growing influence upon Thai society, that Thailand’s Muslim population is now projecting at many levels.
The current Muslim population of Thailand is between 5-6%, depending upon which set of statistics you consult. This consists of a number of dispersed ethnic groups throughout the country. About 18% of Thailand’s Muslims live within the Southern provinces of Songkhla, Satun, Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat, who are primarily of the Malay, Javanese, and Acehnese origins, agricultural based, that practice the ‘Malay’ culture. These groups are domiciled around what was the former Greater Petanni Sultanate, that came to being around 9th Century, and was annexed by Thailand in 1909 from British influence.

Along the West and East Coasts of the Peninsula across Trang, Krabi, Phuket, Ranong, Nakkon Si Thammarat, and Surat Thani, are a mixture of Sea Gypsy, Thai, somewhat intermarried with the ancestors of Arab and Pakistani traders of the past. These groups were once primarily fisheries and agricultural based. Unlike the Petanni group who still keep a strong ‘Malay’ identity, this group primarily communicate in Thai and have on the whole integrated well with Thai society.

In other provinces, descendents of immigrants from the Rohingya in Myanmar, the Cham from Cambodia, Pakistanis and Indians from South Asia, and the Hui from Yunnan, China in Northern Thailand. A group of Muslims from Persia and Arabia engaged in trade and commerce, migrated to the old Ayutthaya Empire, and integrated with the nobility of Thai society at the time, and are still well integrated today. The rest of Thailand’s Muslim population is made up of a growing number of converts from those who have worked overseas.

Most Muslims in Thailand are Sunni following the Shaffie school, although there are a small number of Hanafi, and Shiites around the Thornburi area. Small deviating groups like Al-Arqam banned in Malaysia, flourish in Thailand.

Military rule tended to repress the Muslims in the South for some years, where Thai authorities liked to scapegoat and blame all Muslims for the troubles in the south. However Royal patronage of Islam due to the insurgency has given Islam much more exposure. The image of a Muslim as a dark skinned Southern ‘khaeg’ has radically changed in Thailand. Consequently there is now much less employment discrimination against Muslims today and a number of Muslims have held high offices in government, police, and the military.

Islamic affairs are coordinated by the Central Islamic Council of Thailand which has five councilors appointed by the King. This body links the Government and Islamic communities, where education, the construction of mosques, pilgrimage to Mecca are assisted.

Under the Central Islamic Council are provincial councils. Today there are 38 provincial Islamic committees nationwide, which govern many local Islamic issues within their respective communities. Many committees operate Islamic schools which teach both the national and Islamic curriculum. There are a number of Ulama who tend to come from a select number of well known families within the various Muslim communities around Thailand. These families often operate private Madrasas (Islamic schools), some teaching both curriculum and some teaching only the Islamic curriculum. Some families operate Pondoks, numbering over 1,000, which just teach Islam. This is particularly the case in Nakkon Si Thammarat, where this generational heritage is very strong. The descendents of early teachers are still community leaders like the former ASEAN Secretary General Dr. Surin Pitsuwan .

The traditional Ulama in Thailand have great influence over how Islam is interpreted within their respective communities, where this tends to be a force for fragmentation rather than Ummah cohesion. As a consequence Thai Muslims don’t speak with one unified voice in Thailand, and there is very little consensus over many issues.

The various Thai Muslim communities are very distinct from each other.
Most Ulama in Thailand have only undertaken Islamic studies at college or university and tend to take a conservative Islamic perspective about social issues. This is even more so in the ‘Deep South’ where issues of Malay language, conflicts between civil and military policy, and ‘outsiders’ have led to the perception that the Central Government in Bangkok is intent on having a ‘war’ with Muslims, through ‘Siamization’.

Thus through the Ulama system and issues of the ‘Deep South’ a very conservative approach to Islam is accepted, with suspicion about anybody bringing ‘outside teachings’.

Muslims in Central Thailand on the other hand, especially around Bangkok, appear to be much more progressive and open to exploring integrative ideas that lead to community evolvement and assimilation with the rest of the Thai community. This is also the case in the young urban population, who are very tolerant and tend not to follow the taboos of their ‘Malay’ counterparts in Malaysia. In Thailand, non-Muslims are welcome into mosques, and it is very common for Muslims and non-Muslims to carry on friendships and dine out together.

There are signs of a deeper Islamization all over Thailand, from the shopping centres where you see many more women wearing Islamic dress, to the landscapes of towns and cities where many new mosques and Islamic schools can be seen springing up. Many Muslim households display Arabic verses of the Al Quran outside their homes. Some of these influences like in Chiang Mai has very old historical roots, however in other places, a very noticeable increase in Muslim presence can be felt with Muslim restaurants appearing to cater for new Muslim settlers in many areas.

From the business perspective, Thailand has become very innovative within the commerce sector through the development of ‘Halal’ tourism, ‘Halal’ hotels and resorts, Islamic banking, Islamic micro-finance, ‘Halal’ housing and condominium projects, as well as food and beverage products. There is a general awareness developing among Muslim entrepreneurs about ethical business opportunities, utilizing the ‘Tawhid’ as an ethical business model.

The ‘deep south’ as it is known by Thais has thriving market and trade economies in the major towns of Petanni, Yala, and Narathiwat. The author on a recent trip through the area found markets open very early and thriving with trade. Entrepreneurship and small business seemed to be very buoyant, even with warnings from various quarters not to go there.

Professor Winai Dahlan, the founder and director of the Halal Science Centre at Chulalongkorn University has developed a complete Halal logistical tracking system and protocols called Hal Q, which has not just been widely accepted by Muslim businesses in Thailand, but has been taken onboard as an industry standard by many multinational food manufacturers in Thailand. In addition, many Arab countries have also adopted this system and come to Thailand for training on Halal logistic management, putting Thailand more than a decade in advance of any system Malaysia has to offer. This has enabled Thailand to become one of the foremost Halal food manufacturers in the region today.

The Islamization of Thailand is being pushed through demographic changes. Muslim parents are having more children than their non-Muslim counterparts today in Thailand, and this is shifting the population balance towards a higher percentage of Muslims. This is particularly so in the rural areas of the ‘deep south’. To some extent this appears to be under the official radar. However some websites now report the Muslim population in Thailand to be as high as 10%.
The growing percentage of Muslim population within Thailand will have a number of effects upon Thai society over the coming years. Just as the South was Thai-ized in the period 1902-1944, now Thailand is being Islamized in a way never seen before.

The Thai-Muslim sense of identity will need accommodation within existing narratives of what is ‘Thainess’ today. “Thainess’ will have to allow some plurality in the future. Although as mentioned before, the younger generation of Muslims see themselves as Thais, it is the small extreme groups that will put pressure for new dualities of ‘Thainess’.

One can see an acknowledgement of this by the Thai army in their signs outside military bases in the south. Signs outside military bases once said, “For Country, Religion, Monarchy, and People”. Now they read “For Country, Religions, Monarchy, and the People”.

However the road to these accommodations will be a rocky one due to the long historical struggle in the south. The conflict is between a number of ‘separatist groups’ and the government. Various interests have painted this as a religious based conflict, especially with the attack upon monks and Buddhists over the last decade. However history shows that this struggle is more about ethnic identity, than Islam, where many leaders of these ‘separatist groups’ have called themselves ‘Bangsa Petanni’, rather than Muslims. Internal interests and outside interests like the United States have tried to widen the perspective of the Southern problems, which thankfully have been rejected by various Thai Governments over the last few years.

The Islamization of Thailand represents just as a challenge as the rich and poor divide of Thailand, which has had such a profound influence on the political scene over the last decade. Discussion of Islamization of Thailand has been generally suppressed, except within the higher circles of power. Great changes in Thai society are inevitable in the near future, due to the Islamization of Thailand.

US Vice-President Biden Won’t Run For President – Statement

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US Vice President Joe Biden in an announcement made Wednesday that he won’t be running for President and seek the Democrat Party’s nomination. “I believe we’re out of time,” to mount a realistic campaign, Biden said in the White House Rose Garden, adding, “the window has closed.”

Following is the complete statement by US Vice President Joe Biden:

THE VICE PRESIDENT: Good morning, folks. Please, please, sit down.

Mr. President, thank you for lending me the Rose Garden for a minute.

THE PRESIDENT: It’s a pretty nice place. (Laughter.)

THE VICE PRESIDENT: As my family and I have worked through the grieving process, I’ve said all along what I’ve said time and again to others, that it may very well be that that process, by the time we get through it, closes the window on mounting a realistic campaign for President, that it might close. I’ve concluded it has closed.

I know from previous experience that there is no timetable for this process. The process doesn’t respect or much care about things like filing deadlines or debates and primaries and caucuses. But I also know that I could do this if — I couldn’t do this if the family wasn’t ready. The good news is the family has reached that point. But as I’ve said many times, my family has suffered a loss and I hope there would come a time — and I’ve said this to many other families — that sooner rather than later, when you think of your loved one it brings a smile to your lips before it brings a tear to your eyes. Well, that’s where the Bidens are today — thank God. Beau is our inspiration.

Unfortunately, I believe we’re out of time — the time necessary to mount a winning campaign for the nomination. But while I will not be a candidate, I will not be silent. I intend to speak out clearly and forcefully, to influence as much as I can where we stand as a party and where we need to go as a nation.

And this is what I believe. I believe that President Obama has led this nation from crisis to recovery, and we’re now on the cusp of resurgence. I’m proud to have played a part in that. This party, our nation will be making a tragic mistake if we walk away or attempt to undo the Obama legacy. The American people have worked too hard and we’ve come too far for that. Democrats should not only defend this record and protect this record, they should run on the record.

We’ve got a lot of work to get done over the next 15 months, and there’s a lot that the President will have to get done. But let me be clear that we’ll be building on a really solid foundation. But it all starts with giving the middle class a fighting chance.

I know you in the press love to call me “Middle-Class Joe” and I know in Washington that’s not usually meant as a compliment — it means you’re not that sophisticated. But it is about the middle class. It isn’t just a matter of fairness or economic growth. It’s a matter of social stability for this nation. We cannot sustain the current levels of inequality that exist in this country.

I believe the huge sums of unlimited and often secret money pouring into our politics is a fundamental threat to our democracy. And I really mean that. I think it’s a fundamental threat. Because the middle class will never have a fighting chance in this country as long as just several hundred families, the wealthiest families, control the process. It’s just that simple.

And I believe we have to level the playing field for the American people. And that’s going to take access to education and opportunity to work. We need to commit — we’re fighting for 14 years — we need to commit to 16 years of free public education for all our children. We all know that 12 years of public education is not enough. As a nation, let’s make the same commitment to a college education today that we made to a high school education a hundred years ago.

Children and child care is the one, biggest barrier for working families. We need, as the President proposed, to triple the child care tax credit. That alone will lead to a dramatic increase in the number of women able to be in the workforce and will raise our economic standards. There are many equitable ways to pay for this. Often you hear, well, how do you pay for this? There are many equitable ways to pay for this. We could pay for all of this with one simple step — by limiting the deductions in the tax code to 28 percent of income. Wealthy folks will end up paying a little bit more. But it’s my guess — and I mean this sincerely — it’s my guess they’ll be happy to help build a stronger economy and a better educated America.

I believe we need to lead more by the power of our example, as the President has, than merely by the example of our power. We’ve learned some very hard lessons from more than a decade of large-scale, open-ended military invasions. We have to accept the fact that we can’t solve all the world’s problems — we can’t solve many of them — alone. The argument that we just have to do something when bad people do bad things isn’t good enough. It’s not a good enough reason for American intervention and to put our sons’ and daughters’ lives on the line, put them at risk.

I believe we have to end the divisive partisan politics that is ripping this country apart. And I think we can. It’s mean-spirited. It’s petty. And it’s gone on for much too long. I don’t believe, like some do, that it’s naïve to talk to Republicans. I don’t think we should look at Republicans as our enemies. They are our opposition; they’re not our enemies. And for the sake of the country, we have to work together.

As the President said many times, compromise is not a dirty word. Look at it this way, folks — how does this country function without consensus? How can we move forward without being able to arrive at consensus? Four more years of this kind of pitched battle may be more than this country can take. We have to change it. We have to change it.

And I believe we need a moonshot in this country to cure cancer. It’s personal. But I know we can do this. The President and I have already been working hard on increasing funding for research and development — because there are so many breakthroughs just on the horizon in science and medicine. The things that are just about to happen, we can make them real with an absolute national commitment to end cancer as we know it today. And I’m going to spend the next 15 months in this office pushing as hard as I can to accomplish this. Because I know there are Democrats and Republicans on the Hill who share our passion — our passion to silence this deadly disease. If I could be anything, I would want it to be the President that ended cancer, because it’s possible.

I also believe we need to keep moving forward in the arc of this nation toward justice — the rights of the LGBT community, immigration reform, equal pay for women and protecting their safety from violence, rooting out institutional racism. At their core, every one of these things — every one of these things is about the same thing. It’s about equality. It’s about fairness. It’s about respect. As my dad used to say, it’s about affording every single person dignity. It’s not complicated. Every single one of these issues is about dignity.

And the ugly forces of hate and division, they won’t let up, but they do not represent the American people. They do not represent the heart of this country. They represent a small fraction of the political elite. And the next President is going to have to take it on.

Most of all, I believe there’s unlimited possibilities for this country. I don’t know how many of the White House staff and personnel have heard me say repeatedly that we are so much better positioned than any country in the world. I’ve been doing this for a long time. When I got elected as a 29-year-old kid, I was called the optimist. I am more optimistic about the possibilities, the incredible possibilities to leap forward than I have been at any time in my career. And I believe in my core that there’s not country on the face of the Earth better positioned to lead the world in the 21st century than the United States of America.

Washington just has to begin to function again. Instead of being the problem, it has to become part of the solution — again. We have to be one America — again.

And at our core, I’ve always believed that what sets America apart from every other nation is that we, ordinary Americans, believe in possibilities — unlimited possibilities. Possibilities for a kid growing up in a poor inner-city neighborhood, or a Spanish-speaking home, or a kid from Mayfield in Delaware, or Willow Grove in Pennsylvania — like Jill and I. To be able to be anything we want it to be; to do anything — anything — that we want, that’s what we were both taught. That’s what the President was taught. It was real. That’s what I grew up believing. And, you know, it’s always been true in this country. And if we ever lose that, we’ve lost something very special. We’ll have lost the very soul of this country.

When I was growing up, my parents, in tough times, looked at me and would say to me and my brothers and sister, “Honey, it’s going to be okay.” And they meant it. They meant it. It was going to be okay. But some of you who cover me, I say go back to your old neighborhoods. Talk to your contemporaries who aren’t as successful as you’ve been. There are too many people in America today, too many parents who don’t believe they can look their kid in the eye and say with certitude, “Honey, it’s going to be okay.” That’s what we need to change. It’s not complicated.

That will be the true measure of our success. And we’ll not have met it until every parent out there can look at their kid in tough times and say, “Honey, it’s going to be okay” — and mean it. That’s our responsibility. And I believe it’s totally within our power. The nation has done it before in difficult times.

I’ve had the very great, good fortune and privilege of being in public service most of my adult life, since I’ve been 25 years old. And through personal triumphs and tragedies, my entire family — my son Beau, my son Hunter, my daughter Ashley, Jill — our whole family — and this sounds corny — but we found purpose in public life. We found purpose in public life. So we intend, the whole family — not just me — we intend to spend the next 15 months fighting for what we’ve always cared about, what my family has always care about, with every ounce of our being. And working alongside the President and members of Congress and our future nominee, I am absolutely certain we are fully capable of accomplishing extraordinary things.

We can do this. And when we do, America won’t just win the future, we will own the finish line.

Thank you for all being so gracious to Jill and me for the last six or eight months — and for our whole career, for that matter. But I’m telling you, we can do so much more. And I’m looking forward to continuing to work with this man to get it done.

Thank you all very much. (Applause.)

Putin Forces Obama To Capitulate On Syria – OpEd

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The Russian-led military coalition is badly beating Washington’s proxies in Syria which is why John Kerry is calling for a “Time Out”.

On Monday, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry called for an emergency summit later in the week so that leaders from Russia, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Jordan could discuss ways to avoid the “total destruction” of Syria. According to Kerry, “Everybody, including the Russians and the Iranians, have said there is no military solution, so we need to make an effort to find a political solution. This is a human catastrophe that now threatens the integrity of a whole group of countries around the region,” Kerry added.

Of course, it was never a “catastrophe” when the terrorists were destroying cities and villages across the country, uprooting half the population and transforming the once-unified and secure nation into an anarchic failed state. It only became a catastrophe when Vladimir Putin synchronized the Russian bombing campaign with allied forces on the ground who started wiping out hundreds of US-backed militants and recapturing critical cities across Western corridor. Now that the Russian airforce is pounding the living daylights out of jihadi ammo dumps, weapons depots and rebel strongholds, and the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) is tightening their grip on Aleppo, and Hezbollah is inflicting heavy casualties on Jabhat al Nusra militants and other Al Qaida-linked vermin; Kerry’s decided it’s a catastrophe. Now that the momentum of the war has shifted in favor of Syrian president Bashar al Assad, Kerry wants a “Time out”.

Keep in mind, that Putin worked tirelessly throughout the summer months to try to bring the warring parties together (including Assad’s political opposition) to see if deal could be worked out to stabilize Syria and fight ISIS. But Washington wanted no part of any Russian-led coalition. Having exhausted all the possibilities for resolving the conflict through a broader consensus, Putin decided to get directly involved by committing the Russian airforce to lead the fight against the Sunni extremists and other anti-government forces that have been tearing the country apart and paving the way for Al Qaida-linked forces to take control of the Capital. Putin’s intervention stopped the emergence of a terrorist Caliphate in Damascus. He turned the tide in the four year-long war, and delivered a body-blow to Washington’s malign strategy Now he’s going to finish the job.

Putin is not gullible enough to fall for Kerry’s stalling tactic. He’s going to kill or capture as many of the terrorists as possible and he’s not going to let Uncle Sam get in the way.

These terrorists–over 2,000 of who are from Chechnya–pose an existential threat to Russia, as does the US plan to use Islamic extremists to advance their foreign policy objectives. Putin takes the threat seriously. He knows that if Washington’s strategy succeeds in Syria, it will be used in Iran and then again in Russia. That’s why he’s decided to dump tons of money and resources into the project. That’s why his Generals have worked out all the details and come up with a rock-solid strategy for annihilating this clatter of juvenile delinquents and for restoring Syria’s sovereign borders. And that’s why he’s not going to be waved-away by the likes of mealy-mouth John Kerry. Putin is going to see this thing through to the bitter end. He’s not going to stop for anyone or anything. Winning in Syria is a matter of national security, Russia’s national security.

Here’s Kerry again: “If Russia is there to help Assad find a way to a political solution as well as to fight Daesh (ISIS) and extremism, then there is the possibility of a very different path.”

Putin has offered solutions from the very onset, it was Washington that rejected those remedies. Putin supported the so called Geneva communique dating back to 2012. In fact, it was then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton who threw a wrench in the proceedings by demanding that Assad not be part of any transitional governing body. (Note: Now Obama has caved on this demand.) Russia saw her demand as tantamount to regime change, which it was since Assad is the internationally-recognized head of state and fully entitled to be a part of any transitional government. US rejectionism sabotaged efforts for internationally-monitored “free and fair multi-party elections” and ended any chance for a speedy end to the war. Washington was more determined to get its own way (“Assad must go”) then to save the lives of tens of thousands of civilians who have died since Clinton walked away from Geneva.

And now Kerry is extending the olive branch? Now Washington pretends to care about the “total destruction” of Syria?

I’m not buying it. What Kerry cares about is his hoodlum “head-chopper” buddies that are being turned into shredded wheat by Russian Daisy Cutters. That’s what he cares about. Take a look at this from RT:

“Syrian President Bashar Assad “does not have to leave tomorrow or the next day,” the US State Department (spokesman Mark Toner) has stated. Washington allows that Assad may take part in transitional process, but can’t be part of Syria’s next government…

“… this isn’t the US dictating this. This is the feeling of many governments around the world, and frankly, the majority of the Syrian people,” Toner said.

When asked to clarify “how long” the State Department thinks the transition process could take, Toner failed to give an exact time period.

“I can’t put a timeframe on it. I can’t say two weeks, two months, six months,” he said, adding that the US is looking for “a political resolution to the conflict.”…

Toner then admitted that the US is still in the “process to start the process,” stressing that this was “an urgent issue” that “has gone on too long.” (‘Assad doesn’t have to leave tomorrow, can be part of transitional process’ – US State Department”, RT)

“A process to start the process”?? Hello?

Toner is backpeddling so fast he’s not even sure what he’s saying. Clearly, the administration is so flustered by developments on the ground in Syria, and so eager to stop the killing of US-backed jihadis, that they sent poor Toner out to talk to the media before he’d even gotten his talking points figured out. What a joke. The administration has gone from refusing to meet with a high-level Russian delegation just last week (to talk about coordinating airstrikes in Syria), to completely capitulating on their ridiculous “Assad must go” position today. That’s quite a reversal, don’t you think? I’m surprised they didn’t just run a big white Flag up over 1600 Pennsylvania Ave. while the Marine Band played Taps.

But don’t think that this latest humiliation will derail Washington’s plan for destroying Syria as a functioning, sovereign state and carving it into a million powerless statelets that pose no threat to Big Oil’s pipeline corridors, or US military bases, or Israel’s sprawling Zionist Valhalla. Because it won’t. That plan is still right on track despite Putin’s efforts to crush the militants and defend the borders. The latest iteration of the Syria dissolution strategy was articulated by Council on Foreign Relations president Richard Haass who said:

“….the United States and others should pursue a two-track policy. One track would channel steps to improve the balance of power on the ground in Syria. This means doing more to help the Kurds and select Sunni tribes, as well as continuing to attack the Islamic State from the air.

Relatively safe enclaves should emerge from this effort. A Syria of enclaves or cantons may be the best possible outcome for now and the foreseeable future. Neither the US nor anyone else has a vital national interest in restoring a Syrian government that controls all of the country’s territory; what is essential is to roll back the Islamic State and similar groups.

The second track is a political process in which the US and other governments remain open to Russian (and even Iranian) participation. The goal would be to ease Assad out of power and establish a successor government that, at a minimum, enjoyed the support of his Alawite base and, ideally, some Sunnis.” (Testing Putin in Syria, Richard Haass, Project Syndicate)

Topple Assad and partition the country. Destroy Syria once and for all. That is Washington’s operating strategy. It’s a plan that was first proposed by Brooking’s analyst Michael O’Hanlon who recently said:

“…a future Syria could be a confederation of several sectors: one largely Alawite (Assad’s own sect), spread along the Mediterranean coast; another Kurdish, along the north and northeast corridors near the Turkish border; a third primarily Druse, in the southwest; a fourth largely made up of Sunni Muslims; and then a central zone of intermixed groups in the country’s main population belt from Damascus to Aleppo…

Under such an arrangement, Assad would ultimately have to step down from power in Damascus… A weak central government would replace him. But most of the power, as well as most of the armed forces. would reside within the individual autonomous sectors — and belong to the various regional governments…

American and other foreign trainers would need to deploy inside Syria, where the would-be recruits actually live — and must stay, if they are to protect their families. (Syria’s one hope may be as dim as Bosnia’s once was, Michael O’ Hanlon, Reuters)

Once again, the same theme repeated: Topple Assad and partition the country. Of course, the US will have to train “would-be recruits” to police the natives and prevent the buildup of any coalition or militia that might threaten US imperial ambitions in the region. But that goes without saying. (By the way, Hillary Clinton has already thrown her support behind the O’Hanlon plan emphasizing the importance of “safe zones” that could be used to harbor Sunni militants and other enemies of the state.)

John “Wacko” McCain has been the most strident proponent of the plan to break up Syria. Here’s part of what he said on the topic:

“We must act now to defend civilian populations and our opposition partners in Syria….we must establish enclaves in Syria where civilians and the moderate opposition to Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad and ISIS can find greater security. These enclaves must be protected with greater American and coalition airpower and likely foreign troops on the ground. We should not rule out that U.S. forces could play a limited role in this ground contingent…

“We must back up our policy in ways that check Putin’s ambitions and shape his behavior. If Russia attacks our opposition partners, we must impose greater costs on Russia’s interests — for example, by striking significant Syrian leadership or military targets. But we should not confine our response to Syria. We must increase pressure on Russia elsewhere. We should provide defensive weapons and related assistance to Ukrainian forces so they can take a greater toll on Russian forces.” (The Reckless Guns of October, Daniel Lazare, Consortium News)

Sure, let’s Kick-off World War 3. Why not?

The man should be in a straitjacket not fulminating on the floor of the Congress.

The entire US political establishment supports the removal of Assad and the breaking up of Syria. Kerry’s sudden appeal for dialogue does not represent a fundamental change in the strategy. It’s merely an attempt to buy some time for US-backed mercenaries who are feeling the full-brunt of the Russia’s bombing campaign. Putin would be well-advised to ignore Kerry’s braying and continue to prosecute his war on terror until the job is done.

(Note: As this article was going to press, the Turkish Daily Zaman reported that: “….the US and several European and Gulf states…have agreed to a plan under which Syria’s embattled President Bashar al-Assad will remain in power for the next six months during a transition period….Turkey has abandoned its determination [to get rid of Assad] and has agreed on an interim period with Assad in place,” former Foreign Minister Yaşar Yakış told Today’s Zaman on Tuesday….If the Syrian people decide to continue with Assad, then there is not much Turkey can object to.” (Report: Turkey agrees to Syria political transition involving Assad, Today’s Zaman)

This story has not yet appeared in any western media. Obama’s Syrian policy has completely collapsed.

International Commission Against Corruption Questioned As Solution In El Salvador – Analysis

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By Samira Jubis*

Following the impressive detention of Guatemalan President Otto Pérez Molina, in part due to the work of the International Commission Against Impunity (Comisión Internacional contra la Impunidad en Guatemala, CICIG), a debate has emerged in neighboring El Salvador. Although corruption has threatened advances in social justice and public security in the country, many question whether an international commission is the best solution to combat the deeply rooted culture of corruption in El Salvador.

After the peace accords of 1996, impunity and corruption in Guatemala have continued to plague the legal system due to “the military intelligence and counterinsurgency structures established during the conflict [that] were never dismantled.”[1] This challenge pressured the Guatemalan government to ask the United Nations to set up what became the CICIG, which evolved from the 2003 proposed Commission for the Investigation of Illegal Bodies and Clandestine Security Groups (CICIACS).[2] The CICIG was established to assist Guatemalan institutions in investigating, and ultimately uncovering, a political system deeply entrenched in corruption and impunity.[3]

The CICIG is a hybrid institution in that it is neither an international nor national body. Funded by the international community, including countries from the European Union as well as the United States, it operates as an adjunct to Guatemala’s judicial system.[4] It has relied on the work of experienced officials and specialists from Chile, Colombia, France and Uruguay, making use of 156 national and international officials.[5] The CICIG investigates, promotes, and supports the prosecution of the offenders. It also recommends reforms to ensure the future integrity of Guatemala’s institutions.[6] Within the legal prosecution process, CICIG can join a criminal proceeding as a “private prosecutor” with respect to all cases within its jurisdiction.[7] Due to the lack of prosecutorial powers, however, the CICIG has encountered obstacles.[8]

In 2010, then-CICIG Commissioner Carlos Castresana resigned due to the Guatemalan government’s negligence in following CICIG’s recommendations, which called for the improvement of the judiciary system. Claiming that impunity had prevailed in 98 percent of corruption cases,[9] Castresana said furthermore that the appointment of Conrado Reyes as Attorney General would only worsen the culture of impunity and corruption that is present in Guatemala. Castresana accused Reyes of being involved in drug trafficking and of having relationships with illicit organizations. When Reyes asked Castresana to show his evidence for these accusations, Reyes fired key CICIG staff members in an effort to weaken CICIG’s mandate. A week after Reyes’ nomination, Guatemala’s highest court removed Reyes from his office,[10] ruling that President Álvaro Colom’s complex procedure to select Reyes did not follow the law.[11] Although the presence of the CICIG in the country has served as a catalyst for uncovering corruption in the state, the commission’s hands are tied by the autonomy of the Attorney General.

Guatemala’s example proves that removal of tainted officials from key rule-of-law institutions is necessary for such a commission to be successful. In El Salvador, therefore, the efforts to dismantle corruption networks should be prioritized on strengthening the existing domestic judicial institutions rather than implementing a new body that would also require national efforts to function well.

In El Salvador, the Judicial Branch manages justice and enforces the law. According to article 172 of El Salvador’s constitution, the Judicial Branch includes the Supreme Court of Justice and Courts of Second Instance, with remaining courts established by secondary laws. The Supreme Court, through a Constitutional chamber, is the institution that rules on the constitutionality of laws, decrees, and regulations.[12] Along with the Judicial Branch, the Public Ministry works for the maintenance of justice within the state. The General Prosecutor of the Republic, the Attorney General, and the Prosecutor for the Defense of Human Rights serve under the jurisdiction of the Public Ministry.[13]

By law, the General Prosecutor of the Republic must defend the interests of the state and society. This institution, in collaboration with the National Civil Police, spearheads the criminal investigations, hands down indictments of offenders and, if and when guilt is established, ensures their just punishment.[14]

According to the assessment in Memorias Laborales 2014-2015, the General Prosecutor of the Republic has received an average of 8,149 corruption cases monthly.[15] The institution opened 98,331 cases in the past year, of which 66,032 remain active.[16] Attorney General Luis Martinez claims that the high volume of cases under investigation and the investigation case of the right leaning ex-president Francisco Flores represent the accomplishments of his mandate.[17] Despite obstacles presented during the investigations of the Flores case, it has moved forward smoothly.[18]

On October 5, 2013, former Salvadoran president Mauricio Funes (2009-2014) publically accused Flores (1999-2004) of stealing $10 million USD in donations to El Salvador’s government from Taiwan.[19] Flores insisted that he had used Taipei’s donations to help the victims of 2001 earthquake and to decrease endemic crime.[20] However, Flores has not presented such concrete evidence on how he distributed the funds to accomplish such social projects.[21]

Moreover, a Report of Suspected Operations (RSO) by the International Bank of Miami to the US Enforcement Network Department of Treasury (FinCen) leaves the transactions from Taipei under suspicion. Funes, who played a watchdog role during the investigation of the Flores case, brought this report to light. An RSO is an ordinary part of the investigative and judiciary process, but Attorney General Martinez’s first confirming and later denying he had received FinCen’s RSO, posed an obstacle to the investigation. Some prosecutors assigned to the case say he has been negligent throughout the investigation because of his close relationship with Flores. [22]

The investigation has encountered external obstacles as well. Members of the right wing opposition party, Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA), initially accused Funes of political opportunism in the Flores case. Such accusations, however, did not manage to impede Funes’s insistent pressure on the General Prosecutor Office to start investigations.[23] Funes’s role in this case illustrates the institutional checks and balances of El Salvador’s democracy in the effort to combat corruption and impunity. Flores is currently waiting for a preliminary hearing. His case is the first corruption case against a former president since the end of the civil war in 1992.

While no political party is immune to corruption, Salvadoran political institutions have been effective in breaking the silence by bringing corruption cases to the public’s attention and exerting pressure on investigations. Illustrative of a possible trend against corruption, the Supreme Court of Justice has recently ordered the prosecution of Deputy Reynaldo Cardoza for illicit enrichment.[24] On October 15, in response to the Cardoza case, La Fundación Nacional para El Desarollo (FUNDE) requested the Salvadoran Parliament to pass the Ley de Probidad, which aims to ease investigations of government officials who acquire wealth without being able to prove its legitimacy.[25]

Guatemala and El Salvador both suffer from corruption and impunity, but the solutions for combating such problems do not need to be the same. The Department Counselor Thomas Shannon has suggested El Salvador to consider implementing an international commission to move forward in the country’s campaign against corruption. However, this commission would not solve the root of the problem; instead, it would allow for the introduction of invasive international donors to the Salvadoran political apparatus. Due to its hybrid nature, a CICIG-like commission runs the risk that the international donors might use the commission’s jurisdictions for their own ambitions. While the commissioner Iván Velásquez claims that the CICIG is an independent institution, the commission has received criticism for following an agenda shaped by its funding sources.

The introduction of a commission similar to the CICIG can also drive El Salvador to an unhealthy international dependence in the matters of fighting against corruption. In Guatemala, the CICIG has been a vehicle to investigate corruption cases, but the commission has not been effective in promoting an independent judiciary system. The CICIG’s mandate has been extended on three occasions, in 2009, 2011, and 2013.[26] Therefore, Guatemala’s battle against corruption hangs in the balance of international donors funding the CICIG.

El Salvador has a long way to go before winning its battle against corruption. However, the country, through its system of checks and balances, has proven its institutional capacity to overcome the challenges presented when investigating high-profile corruption cases. As a result, in El Salvador, a former president is in the process of being prosecuted. At the forefront of this fight, the country should prioritize its efforts in increasing its transparency and accountability of its domestic institutions by implementing effective judiciary laws and appointing officials that adhere to those laws before calling for international intervention.

From Guatemala’s experience, a state makes progress battling corruption not only through the number of prosecuted corruption cases, but more importantly by embolding its judicial system. El Salvador will choose a new Attorney General by the end of this year. Since elections will present the country with an opportunity to advance against corruption and impunity, civil society should pressure political parties to pick their nominees on the basis of a merit system rather than political affiliations. A transparent Attorney General will permit El Salvador to progress with its campaign against corruption while demonstrating the virtues of its political system.

*Samira Jubis, Research Associate at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs

[1] Malkin, Elisabeth. “Strains in Guatemala’s Experimental Justice System.” The New York Times, July 3, 2010.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid.

[5] CICIG. “Comisión Internacional Contra La Impunidad En Guatemala – Two Years of Work: A Commitment to Justice Executive Summary.” CICIG – Comisión Internacional Contra La Impunidad En Guatemala – Inicio. Accessed October 13, 2015. http://www.cicig.org/index.php?page=two-years-of-work

[6] Ibid.

[7] Agreement between the United Nations and the State of Guatemala on the establishment of an International Commission Against Impunity (CICIG). n.d. http://www.cicig.org/uploads/documents/mandato/cicig_acuerdo_en.pdf.

powers of the commission

[8] Ibid.

[9]“Castresana Abandona La Comisión Contra La Impunidad De Guatemala | Internacional | EL PAÍS.” EL PAÍS. Last modified June 8, 2010. http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2010/06/08/actualidad/1275948003_850215.html.

[10] Malkin, Elisabeth. “Strains in Guatemala’s Experimental Justice System.”

[11] Ibid.

[12] Organization of American States. OAS – Organization of American States: Democracy for Peace, Security, and Development. Accessed October 13, 2015. http://www.oas.org/juridico/mla/en/slv/en_slv_legal_system.pdf.

[13] El Salvador Const. art. 191-194

[14] El Salvador Const. art. 193

[15] Fiscalía General de la Republica de El Salvador. Memoria De Labores 2014 – 2015 | Fiscalia General De La República. San Salvador, El Salvador: Fiscalía General de la Republica de El Salvador, 2015. http://www.fiscalia.gob.sv/memoria-de-labores-2014-2015.

[16] Ibid.

[17] Zablah, Nelson R. “Luis Martínez: “El Fiscal General Hizo Bien Su Trabajo En El Caso Del Expresidente Flores” – El Faro.” Elfaro.net. Last modified August 24, 2015. http://www.elfaro.net/es/201508/politigrafo/17288/Luis-Mart%C3%ADnez-El-fiscal-general-hizo-bien-su-trabajo-en-el-caso-del-expresidente-Flores.htm.

[18] Ibid.

[19] Labrador, Gabriel. “Expresidente Flores Dice Que Recibió Al Menos $15 Millones De Taiwán Y Que Nadie Controló Cómo Usó El Dinero – El Faro.” Elfaro.net. Last modified January 8, 2014. http://www.elfaro.net/es/201401/noticias/14396/.

[20] ElSalvador.com. “”Jamas Deposite Cheques En Mis Cuentas”: Francisco Flores.”YouTube. undefined. January 7, 2014. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_CpLXiogqfc.

[21] Lemus, Efren. “Así Se Repartieron Los Millones De Taiwán – El Faro.” Elfaro.net. Last modified October 2, 2014. http://www.elfaro.net/es/201410/noticias/16030/As%C3%AD-se-repartieron-los-millones-de-Taiw%C3%A1n.htm.

[22] Lemus, Efren. “Así Se Repartieron Los Millones De Taiwán – El Faro.” Elfaro.net. Last modified October 2, 2014. http://www.elfaro.net/es/201410/noticias/16030/As%C3%AD-se-repartieron-los-millones-de-Taiw%C3%A1n.htm.

[23] Ibid.

[24] Mélendez, Cristian. “FUSADES Pide a A.L. Acelere Reformas Sobre Financiamiento Político.” Noticias De El Salvador. Last modified October 8, 2015. http://www.laprensagrafica.com/2015/10/08/fusades-pide-a-al-acelere-reformas-sobre-financiamiento-politico.

[25] “Piden Agilidad En Estudio De Ley De Probidad – ContraPunto Diario El Salvador.” El Salvador – ContraPunto Diario El Salvador. Last modified October 2015. http://www.contrapunto.com.sv/nacionales/politica/piden-agilidad-en-estudio-de-ley-de-probidad.

[26] Lohmuller, Michael. “Mandate Renewed, But CICIG Will Not Save Guatemala.” In Sight Crime. Last modified April 2015. http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/even-with-mandate-renewed-cicig-will-not-save-guatemala.

Ukraine At A Crossroads As Elections Loom – OpEd

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Not much has been written about Ukraine’s upcoming October 25 local and regional elections. It seems that pundits are more interested in sensationalistic stories of pesky Russians destabilizing European countries than in following political debates – even though the latter are bound to be infinitely more consequential than the latest piece of Russian hardware spotted in Eastern Ukraine. Indeed, this election could be pivotal for the country, as the government of President Petro Poroshenko and Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk faces serious challenges from political rivals surging in the polls, rogue nationalist elements and powerful business interests.

A new electoral law complicates the outcome and adds more uncertainty into the equation: voters will vote both for a party and a party candidate, meaning that end results could be skewed by elements such as name recognition. Opinion polls show that Ukrainians are ready to vote later this month – fully three quarters of Ukrainians polled are either somewhat likely or very likely to cast a vote on October 25. A great deal of the impetus is certainly President Poroshenko’s job disapproval rate, as only four percent strongly approve of his performance to date, whereas forty percent strongly disapprove, the highest disapproval rate since polling began in March 2014. His cabinet is similarly unpopular, to the tune of just two percent strongly approving and fifty-four percent strongly disapproving.

Six political parties made the 5% threshold for participation in last year’s elections, and there will be no shortage of parties and candidates participating in this month’s elections. While not nearly as influential as parliamentary elections, this week’s poll will likely send several signals that should worry the Poroshenko/Yatsenyuk alliance. New parties with strong local presence have emerged on the national stage, such as Power of People and Our Land. What’s more, the nationalist Right Sector is polling at 6%, a worrisome figure for a far-right group with suspected neo-Nazi beliefs.

Poroshenko’s party, Solidarity, recently merged with Ukrainian Democratic Alliance for Reform, and named Kiev’s mayor (and former WBC, WBO andThe Ring magazine heavyweight boxing champion) Vitali Klitschko its leader in an effort to shore up support. His main ally is now reduced to ashes as Yatsenoiuk’s People’s Front is polling at 1% and has dropped out entirely from participating in the October 25 elections. The Prime Minister isn’t expected to complete his full term and will probably be replaced by Poroshenko after the local elections.

Indeed, Mikheil Saakashvili, former President of Georgia and current governor of Odessa, has been rumored as a candidate for the spot of Prime Minister. A strong supporter of the Maidan revolution, Saakashvili was appointed governor to clean up the mafia-ridden port of Odessa and locked horns with the region’s strongest oligarch Igor Kolomoyskyi. Saakashvili is not one to back down from a fight – he started a war with Russia over control of South Ossetia. However, after an interview on Poroshenko’s own television station, it’s become obvious that Poroshenko and Yatsenyuk are now in his crosshairs.

Accusing the government of “sabotage” and stating that “a total reset” was needed “on all levels” of the Ukrainian government, Saakashvili garnered tens of thousands of signatures on a petition demanding that he be appointed to replace Yatsenyuk. He’s already declined to take part in the elections, and there’s some suggestion that he’s being used by Poroshenko to keep Yatsenyuk in line, but his popularity has continued to rise, leading many to caution that it’s still too early to count him out.

Another name being mentioned in some circles is that of Dmytro Firtash. Firtash is an influential businessman, investor, and philanthropist who controls the lion’s share of Ukraine’s titanium business via his corporation RosUkrEnergo. As president of the Federation of Employers of Ukraine, Firtash is a leader in the Agency for the Modernization of Ukraine, which seeks to raise US$300 billion to improve the infrastructure of Ukraine. In 2014, Firtash orchestrated an alliance between Poroshenko and Klitschko, convincing the boxer to support Poroshenko for the Presidency. Since last year’s elections, he has addressed political issues in Ukraine from an economic standpoint on several occasions and, although financially supporting Viktor Yanukovych’s campaigns in the past, remains officially uncommitted to any of the candidates running at the present time. After being confined in Austria, where he faced down criminal charges, Firtash announced he would return to Ukraine, presumably in order to get more involved in national politics.

The other political heavyweight in the picture who is making an unexpected comeback is the “Princess Leia of Ukrainian politics,” the former Ukraine Prime Minister Yulia Timoshenko whose party is polling neck and neck with Poroshenko’s. Along with Viktor Yushchenko, she led the Orange Revolution in late 2004 and early 2005. She was twice the Prime Minister under Yushchenko, but her tenure in government has been anything but free of controversy, though. In 2010 Ukrainian prosecutors investigated her for allegedly bribing supreme court judges, and later that year opened another case regarding alleged misuse of funds. The next year prosecutors investigated her for abuse of power during the 2009 Ukraine gas crisis. While serving a seven-year sentence for the conviction on the abuse of power charges, she was re-arrested and charged with embezzlement and tax evasion. She was released from prison in February 2012 after international condemnation of the conviction as being politically motivated and was subsequently rehabilitated. She has risen to popularity largely for her position against increased autonomy for eastern Ukraine. However, it remains to be seen how great a liability her past political career and associated scandals may be should she seek office again in the near future.

With so many competing forces vying for power, the October 25 elections will definitely prove to be more consequential than many expect – especially if they lead to Yatsenyuk’s resignation. And with Western minds transfixed by Syria, Ukraine could be quietly heading towards a new period of political instability.

Pakistan PM In Washington: Business As Usual? – Analysis

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As Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif gears up to go to Washington for a ‘working visit’, the US has unleashed two of its “agenda points” for the trip: a civil- nuclear deal (with a lot of strings attached) and a Pakistani push for Afghan peace talks against the backdrop of an extended US presence in Afghanistan. These came even as Pakistan was ingesting the US claim that its ISI operatives were the reason for the US strike on a hospital in Kunduz city run by Doctors Without Borders (MSF), which killed 24 people.

The Pakistan Army rebutted the claims that ISI played any role in the seizure of Kunduz and described it as an attempt to deflect the pressure US had been facing for ‘its reckless’ use of force and warned that such approach could negatively affect its cooperation with the US to stabilize Afghanistan.

The other issues already on the table include US National Security Adviser, Susan Rice’s suggestion of halting reimbursements (Coalition Support Fund) for Pakistani counterterrorism operations unless Islamabad acts more forcefully against the Haqqani network. Pakistan is also being pressed to act decisively against the Lashkar-e-Taiba. Amongst this ’jostling’ is also this narrative back home that Sharif is headed to Washington to do a la-Modi as “with improved security and a relatively stable macro-economic environment, Pakistan is well placed today to promote rapid, investment-led growth”.

Nuclear Mainstreaming

According to the New York Times, the Obama administration is exploring a deal to help Pakistan join the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) if it would agree to limit the scope of its nuclear arsenal, the fastest-growing on earth. The key concerns being, one, the likelihood of Pakistan deploying a small tactical nuclear weapon that would be far harder to secure and, two, preventing Pakistan from deploying some long-range missiles that could reach well beyond India. Pakistan, of course denies the existence of any such offer.

Pakistan has been quite prickly on any discussion regarding its nuclear arsenal post the Iran nuclear deal. Sartaj Aziz, who was recently ousted from the position of Pakistan’s NSA, while speaking to BBC Urdu recently said that the US should “refrain from fanning instability in South Asia and its actions should not increase strategic and conventional imbalance in the region to the extent that there is a threat to regional security”. He also said efforts were under way to make Pakistan a member of the NSG, and was hopeful that both Pakistan and India would be accepted as members of the NSG, together.

US Drawdown

The events at Kunduz, Afghanistan the last month appear to have prompted President Obama to reverse his initial plan to withdraw almost all of the U.S. troops from Afghanistan by the time he demits office.

Under the revised plan US will now maintain the current deployment of 9,800 soldiers through next year (2016) and when Obama’s term ends in 2017, at least 5,500 troops will continue to be deployed across three more bases besides Kabul, including Bagram to the north of Kabul; in Jalalabad in the east of the country, and near Kandahar in southern Afghanistan.

The move tinged by internal political consequences, assures that the next US President will still have some major decisions to make on US engagement in Afghanistan. The Afghan government issued a statement late on 15 October praising the announcement which came after President Ghani had asserted that his government would not seek Pakistani facilitation for talks with the Taliban anymore.

In response to Obama’s announcement, the Afghan Taliban reiterated their conditions of the withdrawal of foreign forces and establishment of an Islamic government for any peace process to start. Sartaj Aziz, meanwhile, expressed optimism that traditional lull in insurgency during winter could provide an opportunity for the resumption of talks. Pakistani Foreign Office Spokesman speaking at the weekly media briefing, said: “We hosted the first round (at Murree) and we always remain ready to host another round if the Afghan government wants that. There was also this subtext that as a consequence of change in US plans, Pakistan’s leverage in playing a role in the Afghan peace talks has appreciably diminished”.

The Visit

During the visit, the Pakistani Prime Minister will do a lot more than just brief Obama on the state of Pakistani efforts to facilitate negotiations with the Afghan Taliban. Top civil and military leaders have fine tuned Nawaz’s agenda a day after US President Barack Obama announced a delay in the drawdown of coalition troops from Afghanistan. Sharif will also discuss with the US administration the new regional alliances. A comprehensive presentation on the regional stability is on the cards with particular reference to the roles of China and India.

Sharif will also discuss with the US authorities Pakistan’s need for the Coalition Support Funds, defence equipment and civil nuclear technology. Pakistani delegation is likely to take up the role of Afghan government in the collapse of talks with the Afghan Taliban and present Kabul in a negative light. The underlying message will be that the goodwill created between the two countries during the President Ghani’s earlier days in office has been dissipated.
But besides his nukes, the trickiest issue Nawaz is likely to negotiate at the White House will be the Taliban sanctuaries in Pakistan.

After the setbacks that followed Murree, which provided an opening for Taliban’s territorial gains and consequently a very weak negotiating position for the Kabul government, the US government has brought its focus back on the Taliban havens in Pakistan. This is borne out by the selection of US bases post 2016. US would be taking a cue from Pakistan’s UN ambassador statement in the Security Council: “What Pakistan will be unable to do is bring the Afghan Taliban to the table while it is being asked simultaneously to kill them.” Since Pakistan cannot bring the Taliban for negotiation, the other option is quite clear.

Pakistan Posturing

Fearing “a do more” missive from the White House, Pakistani diplomacy has been in an over-drive. Pakistani Defence Minister went on record to say that that Russia’s current military operation against the IS and other terrorist groups is helpful for Syria and the whole region. This even as a contingent of 57 Saudi personnel has arrived in Pakistan to take part in 12-day counter-terrorism exercises which would conclude on Oct 31 and involve Pakistani and Saudi Special Forces. The exercises, codenamed Al-Shahab I, will be held at the National Counter-terrorism Training Centre (NCTC), near Kharian. A first for the two countries in the domain of counter-terrorism exercises; they have in the past participated in joint military war games, called Al-Samsam.

Therefore the question remains: will Pakistani duplicity in Afghanistan, developments in the Middle East, the successful conclusion of a nuclear deal with Iran and the growing US fatigue in its ‘War on Terror’ finally see Obama take steps to rein in Pakistan and its military? Or will be ‘business as usual’ – more US funds in the guise of humanitarian and development aid and high-tech weaponry for Pakistani “counter-terrorism” efforts?

In diplomacy optics have never been a true indicator of the outcomes – a lesson India has taken over the years from the multi-layered US-Pak relations. It is quite possible that the outcome of Nawaz Sharif’s current visit to Washington, despite the preceding pyrotechnics, will disappoint India.

*Monish Gulati is the Associate Director of Society for Policy Studies. He can be reached at mgulati@spsindia.in. This article appeared at South Asia Monitor.

Brutal Repression By Pakistani Forces In PoK – Analysis

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By Jai Kumar Verma*

Islamabad is treating areas of Kashmir illegally occupied by them as a colony. Pakistan has not developed infrastructure in the area with an ulterior motive and the residents continue to lead their lives without the basic privileges the modern world of today can afford. There are no highways, no good roads, less educational institutions and age-old medical facilities.

The areas of Kashmir illegitimately taken from India consist of POK, Gilgit-Baltistan and territories given to China. Domestic or international press is not free to cover Pakistan Occoupied areas of Kashmir, hence world does not so much know about the pitiable and underdeveloped condition of the masses. But sometime back the residents of POK revolted against Islamabad.

These massive protests were not sporadic, but they were the result of colossal repression by security forces. The demonstrators shouted anti-Pakistan and pro-India slogans. They stated that Pakistan has no right to occupy the areas of Kashmir as legally they are part of India and that Kashmiris in India are enjoying much better amenities and democratic rights than Pakistan. They also desired to be a part of India.

The protesters made videos of the repression by Pakistani security forces and sent it out to several countries including India hence the world came to know about the atrocities of Pakistani security forces.

Massive demonstrations were held in several parts of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir including Muzaffarabad, Gilgit, Kotli etc. Pakistani forces used excessive force to quell the demonstrations.

Pakistani media which often write concocted stories about the human rights violations by Indian security forces in J&K were not allowed to cover these demonstrations and press has not given any publicity to the violent suppression by security forces.

Islamabad’s concern about the alleged human rights violations in J&K by Indian security forces and using brutal force in Kashmir under their illegitimate control indicates the double standards of Pakistan.

The sinister Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) which helps separatists in J&K is worried as their influence is diminishing and people want peace. The Pakistani High Commissioner in New Delhi gives importance to the leaders of All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) despite it having lost credibility and popular support so that the separatist movement continues in the valley.

Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif extended an invitation on October 10 to Syed Ali Shah Geelani Chairman of APHC to visit Pakistan. Geelani who always condemns Indian security forces had not uttered a word against oppression of Pakistani forces in POK instead while accepting the invitation, thanking Pakistan for helping Kashmiris instead.

The residents of POK pointed out that creation of Bangladesh is a proof of failure of the two nation theory; India has more Muslim population than Pakistan and that they have more rights than Shias do in Pakistan. They mention that Punjabis are exploiting all other nationalities in the country and their condition is worse than what it was under the British rule.

The Indians who visited POK mentioned that the residents are disillusioned from Islamabad and are impressed by the help rendered by Modi government during recent flood in J&K. They are also disheartened by growing extremism in Pakistan and appreciate democracy, rule of law and communal harmony in India.

Pakistani authorities conducted phony elections for 24 out of 33 seats in Gilgit and Baltistan Legislative Assembly on June 8. The authorities have imposed section 144 and put several restrictions before and after elections in the region. Several Shias of the area revealed that they were not allowed to cast votes and ballot boxes were stuffed by bogus ballot papers.

Government of India made a protest on the conduct of election as it is an integral part of India, but Pakistan rejected the protest mentioning it as an intrusion in their domestic affairs.

Several parts of Pakistan controlled areas in Kashmir are Shia majority areas. Sunni dominated Pakistan is settling Sunnis from other provinces in Shia areas to change the demography of the region.

China and Islamabad would exploit the mineral resources of the region and the benefits would go to them and the region would remain under developed. China besides minerals would also exploit water resources of the area. They cite the example of mineral rich Baluchistan which is the poorest province of the country.

Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) as well as ISI sponsored terrorist organizations like Lashkar-e-Taeba, Jaish-e-Mohammed, Jamaat-ud Dawa, Hizb-ul-Mujahidden and others run large number of terrorist training camps in Kashmir especially in Muzaffarabad, Dulai, Barali etc.

Ministry of External Affairs and Indian diplomatic missions abroad must launch a full scale campaign against the carnage and atrocities committed by Pakistani forces in the areas of Kashmir illegally captured by them. First of all it will mitigate Pakistani false propaganda against Indian security forces and secondly it will also get Pakistan on defensive.

Indian Foreign Secretary should summon Pakistani High Commissioner in India and should convey strongly that the residents of Pakistan Occoupied Kashmir have revolted against the suppression hence Pakistani government must take remedial measures as they all are Indian citizens.

The area which is adjacent to Xinjiang Autonomous Region is facing Islamic onslaught is strategically important. China which is helping various separatist outfits in India especially in North East can be reciprocated.

India which has the second largest Muslim population in the world must try to check the unwarranted growth of Islamic extremism in the region as it would be dangerous for the communal harmony of the country.

Government of India should assist the residents of POK who are legally Indian citizens and want to merge in India so that they are liberated from the draconian rule of Islamabad. India should not forget that in the past India had not assisted Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan and his party, and now ISI maintains training camps in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

India must give a strong message to Pakistan that several nationalities including Balooch, Pathans, Sindhis, Muhajiris etc are not only demanding more autonomy they want to secede from Pakistan. The terrorism and extremism has increased manifold in the country and the economy is in shambles hence instead of abetting terrorism in India Pakistan should keep its house in order.

*Jai Kumar Verma is a Delhi-based strategic analyst. He can be contacted at editor@spsindia.in


Minor Compromises Are Worthwhile For Better EU-Turkey Relations – OpEd

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By Michael Leigh*

German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s dash to Istanbul on October 18 was a gift to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Erdoğan is hoping that his Justice and Development Party (AKP) will regain its majority in the November 1 general election, after a setback last June, enabling him to call a referendum to strengthen the president’s constitutional powers.

The outcome of the general election could, therefore, settle Turkey’s political fate for years to come, and accentuate the country’s drift toward authoritarian, sectarian rule.

The chancellor’s visit, in the midst of the refugee crisis and after Turkey’s most lethal terrorist attack in decades, was intended to win the Turkish president’s support for a joint action plan to stem refugee flows that are undermining the EU’s internal open borders policy. Merkel’s trip followed the postponement of the European Commission’s annual report on Turkey until after the Turkish election. Insiders claim that the delay occurred for internal procedural reasons.

But the draft report draws attention to Turkey’s imprisonment of writers, suppression of media outlets, and other threats to the rule of law and human rights. Publication at a delicate moment would not have helped persuade Erdoğan to work together on refugees.

Both Merkel’s visit and the delayed Commission report appear to vindicate Erdoğan’s claim that Europe’s security and stability depend on Turkey. But is the EU so panicked by the refugee influx that it is showering gifts upon an increasingly authoritarian Turkish leader? Is it setting aside its principles for realpolitik?

At first sight, there are grounds for concern. A proposal to grant Turkey “safe country” status – which makes it easier to send back rejected asylum seekers and illegal immigrants to Turkey – clashes with the fear of persecution facing numerous Turkish writers, journalists, and advocates of minority rights.

The postponement of the Commission’s report may prove unwise, especially if it leaks anyway from the Brussels bureaucracy in the run-up to the elections. Merkel’s visit also came a little too close to the election for comfort.

However, there has been no general sacrifice of principle to get Turkey on board with the refugee action plan. Merkel did promise to re-energize Turkey’s stalled EU membership talks, as an inducement for cooperation on refugees. But this will actually strengthen EU scrutiny of the independence and effectiveness of Turkey’s judiciary, as well as the rule of law and fundamental rights in Turkey. Until now, this move has been, somewhat incongruously, blocked by Cyprus.

Merkel reiterated in Istanbul her own conviction, shared by many in Europe, that Turkey is a vital partner for the EU but that it is not destined for membership. The EU’s willingness to bring forward visa-free travel for Turkish citizens also depends on the fulfilment of conditions that include judicial reforms and the protection of human rights. The offer of increased financial assistance to help defray Turkey’s costs for accommodating more than 2 million refugees is also highly conditional. Overall, this package hardly amounts to interference in Turkey’s democratic process, even if elections are close.

Merkel has chosen the moral high ground in welcoming refugees to Germany but is increasingly contested, not least in her own party. Many argue that Germany lacks the physical capacity to absorb the 10,000 refugees who are arriving every day. She now needs to help ensure that Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon, as vulnerable frontline states, can cope with the huge numbers of refugees they are sheltering.

The refugee crisis amplifies the EU’s other major challenges including Greece and the euro crisis, Russia’s armed intervention in Ukraine, and the possibility of a British withdrawal. A failure on refugees would strengthen populism and euro-scepticism throughout Europe. Budgets, too, are under pressure. Splits between Berlin and central European countries on refugees may make it harder to hold the EU’s line on Russia.

Minor compromises to obtain Turkey’s cooperation are a price worth paying. Better EU-Turkey relations might also bring Ankara’s backing for an agreement to end the division of Cyprus, where settlement talks are entering a decisive phase. In any event, Turkish voters proved their independence and clear-sightedness in June and opinion polls suggest that they will stick to their convictions when they go to the polls in November.

*Sir Michael Leigh is a Senior Advisor at the German Marshall Fund of the United States. This article was originally published on October 19, 2015 with the headline: EU Should Make Minor Compromises for Turkey’s Help on Refugees and is accessible at http://www.gmfus.org/blog/2015/10/19/eu-should-make-minor-compromises-turkey’s-help-refugees.

Ethnicity And Myanmar’s Elections – Analysis

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Ethnicity is an important factor in Myanmar’s upcoming general elections. Understanding the nuances and context of ethnicity are crucial in solving the country’s woes.

By Kyaw San Wai and Naoko Kumada*

Myanmar will vote on 8 November in the country’s first inclusive polls since 1990. 32 million voters will choose representatives for 1171 seats (or three-quarters) of the national and regional parliaments. In addition, the head of the Myanmar military (Tatmadaw) will appoint the remaining quarter (around 380 seats) as provided in the constitution.

A mosaic of 92 parties and 304 independent candidates are contesting. Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) is expected to perform well, but the ruling military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) aims to retain a crucial number of seats. There are concerns about whether the elections will be free, fair and inclusive, and the results honoured. Suu Kyi remains constitutionally barred from executive office while ethnic conflict and religious tensions threaten to mar an already unpredictable vote.

November Elections

While being widely portrayed as a two-horse race between the USDP and the NLD, the upcoming polls highlight the complex role of ethnicity in Myanmar’s politics. In ethnic areas, 60 parties are canvassing votes by appealing to ethnicity and on platforms of greater ethnic rights. They will go head-to-head with the majority Bamar-dominated USDP and NLD, both of which are also fielding ethnic candidates who will campaign along similar platforms.

Ethnic regions make up around 30% of all parliamentary seats and could become a formidable voting block if interests converged: 23 ethnic parties have formed the “Nationalities Brotherhood Federation” in hopes of amplifying minority voices in parliament and push for greater rights. Many ethnic parties perceive their causes as overlapping but distinct from the NLD: they support its campaign for democracy but primarily desire greater ethnic rights and worry that Suu Kyi might continue the dominance of the Bamar, albeit with a democratic veneer. They are also weary of the popular NLD splitting the ethnic vote. Complicating the landscape further are ethnic armed groups and their political wings that subscribe to similar goals of minority empowerment but operate outside parliamentary politics.

The hope with the upcoming elections is that there might finally be a democratically elected, representative government that can sit sincerely with ethnic groups at the negotiation table. If no clear winner emerges in the November vote, these ethnic parties will become pivotal in the ensuing horse-trading. The parties will also get a second chance when the parliamentary electoral college convenes to elect the president and vice presidents, possibly in January. Ethnic parties hope that a more inclusive government reflective of the country’s ethnic diversity will be better suited to tackle issues such as resource allocation and the devolution of political authority.

Ethnic-centric identity

Ethno-centric identity, nationalism and grievances have been major underlying factors in the country’s long-running civil war, and continue to pose one of Myanmar’s main challenges. Ethnicity, often hand in hand with religion, is an integral pillar of identity for many inhabitants in Myanmar. Ethnic groups often believe that these identities and differences have existed since time immemorial and are hardwired. Such entrenched perspectives tend to make communities obstinate on issues pertaining to ethnicity and religion. And the emphasis on these differences only serves to reinforce mutual distrust between the groups.

No precise statistics exist for Myanmar’s ethnic makeup, and criteria used to delineate ethnicity are often controversial and arbitrary. Officially, Myanmar recognises 135 indigenous ethnic groups (Taing-yin-thar), defined as groups that had settled before the onset of British colonisation in 1824. The 2014 census included controversial tallies based on ethnicity and religion but these specific results will be released only after the elections. With such absence, it is roughly estimated that the Bamar form two-thirds of the population. The remainder comprises both recognised Taing-yin-thar and unrecognised/‘non-indigenous’ ethnic groups. Compounding these divisions are different religious affiliations that sometimes overlap with ethnic divisions – the Bamar, Shan and Rakhines are mostly Buddhists whereas the Kachins and Chins, along with urban Karen elites, are overwhelmingly Christians. Religion often overlaps into ethno-nationalist narratives and become entangled with ethnic and political grievances.

Ethnicity is also tied to citizenship. The controversial jus sanguinis 1982 Citizenship Law classifies three citizenship categories with different socio-political group-based rights – only Taing-yin-thar can become full citizens while non-indigenous groups (any group considered to have arrived only after 1824) are relegated to ‘associate’ or ‘naturalised’ citizens. Communities and candidates not meeting the cut have been disenfranchised, raising concerns of inclusiveness for the elections and Myanmar’s political future in general.

The Bamar, while subscribing to the idea of a multi-ethnic Myanmar, see themselves as first amongst equals due to demographics and the exploits of the pre-colonial state. The minorities however desire complete equality, wishing to be part of the ‘Myanmar state’ but not the ‘Bamar nation’. Some ethnic activists have even advocated replacing Burmese, the lingua franca of at least 80% of the populace today, with English as Myanmar’s official language. There are also those still calling for the dissolution of the union, pointing out that Myanmar is a colonial construct incorporating certain peoples and regions that historically were not under Burmese suzerainty.

Federalism, once anathema to the military establishment, is the proffered panacea to Myanmar’s ethnic conflicts. Most political personages discussing federalism appear to have only vague, or even romanticised, notions of ethnicity-based federalism. Transplanting a foreign model of federalism divorced from Myanmar’s context would be unwise. And there is no guarantee that Myanmar’s ethnicity question will be resolved with just democracy, federalism and equal rights.

The partial nation-wide ceasefire agreement inked on 15 October after four years of arduous negotiations is a marked achievement but the process promises to be long and arduous. Having effective ethnic voices in parliament will hopefully make the negotiations more substantive and inclusive. Ethnic organisations themselves still need to better reflect segments of their constituencies, such as the women, sub-groups and the diaspora.

Best chance for minorities

The upcoming election represents the best chance Myanmar’s ethnic parties have had in decades to champion for greater minority rights from within the system. Understanding the underlying sentiments and complexities is also crucial for a peaceful and viable solution to this chronic malady. Many hope that this election will take the country a step closer towards the betterment of all of Myanmar’s inhabitants regardless of ethnicity.

*Kyaw San Wai is Senior Analyst and Naoko Kumada is Research Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University.

Fourth-Quarter 2015 US Refinery Outage Report Released – Analysis

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EIA has issued a report on expected fourth-quarter refinery outages and their potential implications for the availability of gasoline and distillate supply at the Petroleum Administration for Defense District (PADD) and sub-PADD levels. This report analyzes the availability of refinery capacity to produce diesel fuel and heating oil (distillate) and gasoline, focusing on two refinery units, the atmospheric crude distillation unit (ACDU) and the fluid catalytic cracking unit (FCCU), which are strongly correlated with distillate and gasoline production, respectively. In addition, data for planned maintenance on catalytic reforming units (CRU) and hydrocracking units (HU) are provided. The report also contains a discussion of current market conditions and average historical unplanned outages.

Refinery outages result from the planned shutdown of refinery units for maintenance and upgrades, and from unplanned shutdowns from a variety of causes such as mechanical failure, bad weather, power failures, fire, and flooding. Planned maintenance is typically scheduled when refined petroleum product consumption is relatively low.

Across the different regions of the country, fourth-quarter 2015 planned refinery maintenance is concentrated in October, and many refineries have returned to or are in the process of returning to normal operations. Less maintenance is planned for November and minimal maintenance is planned for December. Table 1 provides a by-PADD, by-month summary of the percentage of available refining capacity expected to be out of service for maintenance during October through December.

Table 1. Planned outages, percent of available capacity, 4th quarter 2015
Region Atmospheric Crude Distillation Unit (ACDU)
October November December
East Coast (PADD 1) 3% 0% 0%
Midwest (PADD 2) 13% 3% 0%
Gulf Coast (PADD 3) 2% 1% 0%
Rocky Mountain (PADD 4) 3% 2% 0%
West Coast (PADD 5) 0% 0% 0%
Region Fluid Catalytic Cracking Unit (FCCU)
October November December
East Coast (PADD 1) 0% 0% 0%
Midwest (PADD 2) 4% 1% 0%
Gulf Coast (PADD 3) 3% 1% 0%
Rocky Mountain (PADD 4) 8% 1% 0%
West Coast (PADD 5) 14% 17% 4%
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, based on Industrial Info Resources data as of September 1, 2015.

In most regions, fourth-quarter planned maintenance is light compared to last year as well as to historical levels. However, in the Midwest, 13% of ACDU capacity is expected to be offline for maintenance in October. After generally staying above the five-year range for much of 2015, PADD 2 ACDU gross inputs fell off sharply in early October. For the week ending October 9, the rolling four-week average for PADD 2 gross inputs was 209,000 barrels per day (b/d) lower than the five-year average. Despite the decrease in gross inputs, distillate inventories remain above the five-year average for this time of year and gasoline inventories are similar to where they were last year. While Midwest refineries supply most of the distillate fuel and gasoline that is consumed in the region, the Midwest also receives products from the Gulf Coast, including supplemental supply during disruptions.

PADD 5 (West Coast) planned ACDU maintenance is minimal over the period, but planned FCCU maintenance in October and November is more than 50,000 b/d higher than the 10-year average and more than 25,000 b/d higher than the 10-year maximum. The ongoing unplanned FCCU outage following the February 18 explosion at the ExxonMobil refinery in Torrance, California, has continued to put upward pressure on gasoline prices in the region. Imports of total motor gasoline to California ranged between 28,000 b/d and 68,000 b/d in March through July, compared with an average of 5,000 b/d in 2013-14. Further outages, either planned or unplanned, would exacerbate the supply situation. PADD 5 gasoline inventories declined steadily during the summer driving season, reaching a multiyear low of 25.7 million barrels on August 21. Since then, gasoline inventories have rebuilt and have been above the five-year average since September 11. Distillate inventories have been above the five-year average for much of the year.

U.S. average retail gasoline and diesel fuel prices decrease

The U.S. average retail price for regular gasoline declined six cents from last week to $2.28 per gallon on October 19, down 84 cents per gallon from the same time last year. The Midwest price fell 11 cents to $2.30 per gallon, followed by the Rocky Mountain price, which was down seven cents to $2.36 per gallon. The West Coast and Gulf Coast prices each fell five cents, to $2.70 per gallon and $2.00 per gallon, respectively. The East Coast price decreased three cents to $2.17 per gallon.

The U.S. average diesel fuel price decreased three cents from the previous week to $2.53 per gallon, down $1.13 per gallon from the same point last year. The Rocky Mountain price posted the lone price increase, up less than one cent to remain $2.52 per gallon. The Midwest, East Coast, and West Coast prices each decreased three cents, to $2.60 per gallon, $2.52 per gallon, and $2.70 per gallon, respectively. The Gulf Coast price was down one cent to $2.33 per gallon.

Propane inventories fall

U.S. propane stocks decreased by 0.6 million barrels last week to 101.6 million barrels as of October 16, 2015, 20.0 million barrels (24.5%) higher than a year ago. Gulf Coast inventories decreased by 0.5 million barrels and Midwest inventories decreased by 0.3 million barrels. Rocky Mountain/West Coast inventories increased by 0.1 million barrels while East Coast inventories remained unchanged. Propylene non-fuel-use inventories represented 4.4% of total propane inventories.

Residential heating oil price decreases while propane remains unchanged

As of October 19, 2015, residential heating oil prices averaged nearly $2.43 per gallon, 1 cent per gallon lower than last week and $1.05 lower than one year ago. The average wholesale heating oil price this week is $1.60 per gallon, 10 cents less than last week and $1.05 per gallon less than a year ago during the same week of the 2014-2015 heating season.

Residential propane prices averaged $1.90 per gallon, less than 1 cent per gallon higher than last week’s price and 49 cents lower than one year ago. Wholesale propane prices averaged 54 cents per gallon, 4 cents per gallon lower than last week’s price and 53 cents lower than the price on October 20, 2014.

Russia In The Middle-East: Altering The Geostrategic Environment – Analysis

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In the second half of September, Russia moved military forces predominated by air assets, into Bassel al-Assad international airport in the Latakia province of Syria. This deployment made it impossible for the anti-Assad forces to capture the province and also provided a logistics lifeline to the military forces of the Syrian president, Bashar al-Assad. An-124 transport aircraft and landing ships from Russia’s Black Sea fleet started to deliver equipment to the beleaguered Syrian forces. The same supply chain could also be servicing the Hezbollah forces supporting the Assad regime. On 30 September, the Russian military forces started air attacks on targets in the anti-Assad rebel-held territories. By this action Russia demonstrated its expanding political and military influence in the Middle-East and its will to initiate decisive action.

The Russian initiative complicates the situation where the US-led Western coalition is already undertaking a complex air campaign. The Russians are targeting not only the Islamic State (IS) but also all other anti-Assad rebel/jihadist forces, some of whom are directly affiliated to the Western coalition, some even trained and supplied by the US. Although a direct confrontation between the US and Russia is highly unlikely, it confuses the battlespace even further.

There is speculation that Russian air activity is a precursor to the Russian army commencing a joint counter-attack along with Syrian forces, which would mean a more direct involvement for the Russian military. If this comes to pass, the Russian Army would be clashing with the US-supplied and trained Free Syrian Army—a situation fraught with the risk of escalating consequences. A ground campaign will also create a situation where Russia may not be able to avoid mission creep; although it will provide greater flexibility to the overall campaign and provide the ability to scale up or down as required.

Russia’s Objectives

From the start of the Syrian Civil War four years ago, Russia has articulated the need for the survival of the Assad regime to enable a peaceful political transition. In the past few months a controlled regime transition has become the steadfast aim of Russian political, diplomatic and military initiatives. While the survival of the regime is indeed the priority objective, it is a short-term goal, the survival of the Syrian state as an entity being the ultimate aim.

Essentially Russia is protecting its national interests: first, Assad is being supported to be used later as a bargaining tool when the inevitable regime change has to take place as and when the volatile situation has been stabilised; and second, Russia will not give up the naval base at Tartus, the only Russian base in the Mediterranean and critical to power projection. By protecting the Assad regime from the current onslaught, Russia is also ensuring that it has a decisive role in determining the future of Syria—with or without Assad at the helm—and thereby becoming the most influential power broker in the region.

Towards this end Russia has entered into an understanding on intelligence sharing with Syria, Iraq and Iran, clearly indicating that it will not let Assad be removed in a hurry. The move took the US and its allies completely by surprise. There is an unstated understanding that the current regime has to transition to a new rule sometime in the not too distant future. Russia wants to control the timing and the modality of such a transition and also have a deciding vote on who will succeed Bashar al-Assad as the leader of the fractured State. It knows that in any negotiated settlement Assad will have an influential position and therefore Assad must remain beholden to Russia at all times. Bashar al-Assad has revealed himself to be a ruthless pragmatist and will play a transitional role that suits Russia, but is likely to drive a hard bargain for his acceptance of regime change when the time comes. However, that eventuality is far into the future, at least for now. With the Russian intervention, the strategic situation has evolved considerably and Russia is clearly implementing a dynamic strategy, the better to protect its interests.

Russia knows that a fully negotiated settlement will only eventuate, if at all, at a much later date and that event then there is no surety of the deal holding in the long-term. It therefore wants to hedge its bets and broaden the target-base and attack all jihadists, irrespective of whether they have been classified ‘good’ and/or ‘moderates’. Smarting under the US and Western enforced sanctions, Russia has carefully crafted a plan to use the Syrian conflict, which the West has not been able to prosecute effectively, to return to the international arena as an influential global power. This is the first step in its calculated move to break out of the Western imposed sanctions and engage with other nations involved in the conflict. The Syrian Civil War has from the beginning been a quagmire, with it becoming increasingly unfathomable as to who is fighting whom and for what. Conflicting national, regional and global interests have become intertwined with irreconcilable sectarian, religious and ideological doctrine.

By initiating decisive action and taking a direct role in the conflict to steadfastly support the Assad regime, Russia has clearly shown the difference between its approach and that of the US, which has been dogged by ambiguity of strategy and changing strategic aims. Like a chess Grand Master at his best, President Putin has aligned his pieces on the board in such a way that the US-led coalition can no longer act alone and ensured that the Islamic State can only be defeated with Russian participation. Isolating Russia is no longer an option for the West. Russia has also guaranteed that Assad’s post-war role is not negotiable—the choices in front of US has suddenly narrowed.

Conflicting Views

The US and Russia have opposing viewpoints regarding the Assad regime although some commonality of ultimate aims in the Syrian Civil War are also noticeable. The US sees Bashar al-Assad as the source of the current conflict and as providing the jihadist elements an opening into the Levant. It believes that removing Assad will be the first step towards resolution of the crisis. Considering the recent history of the region in Iraq and Libya, this is a rather naïve appraisal of the situation.

Russia on the other hand considers Assad as a bulwark against the further spread of the jihadist groups, a diametrically opposing view and perhaps closer to the truth than is being admitted by the Western coalition.

Even though the short-term goals are at odds with each other, both the US and Russia agree that defeating the IS is a prerequisite for the success of any negotiated transition of political authority in Syria, even though the reasons vary slightly. The IS is a direct threat to Russia with its declaration of the Islamic Caliphate that includes the volatile North Caucasus, already home to a violent jihadist separation movement. Additionally, there are an estimated 1700 Russians fighting in the army of the IS who could return home to foment trouble. The US is opposed to the IS more in an altruistic manner than as a direct threat to the homeland, at least for the present. However, there is no reason that the US and Russian strategic aims cannot be reconciled and aligned.

It has to be accepted that the current strategy of the Western coalition is unlikely to produce the desired end-state in the Syrian conflict. When viewed in a detached manner, three factors come out very clearly as being fundamental to altering the strategy in order to pave the way towards a sustainable stability.

One, functioning governance by local authorities must be established in the areas that are not IS-controlled, including the areas that are still under Assad’s control, in order to improve the credibility of the non-IS factions. Two, enforceable attack free zones within the Syrian borders, where no party is able to attack or coerce the civilian population, must be created. This will be the first step towards ensuring stability that should gradually spread. Three, the Western coalition and the Russian group should negotiate and create a common military strategy to win the war and subsequently to stabilise the future. This can only happen if the US accepts firstly that Assad has a role to play in the transition phase and secondly the importance of Russia as an influential, and perhaps even controlling, factor of the Assad regime.

After the Russian intervention, the options available to the US-led coalition reduced drastically. In fact the only viable solution to stabilise a situation that is spiralling out of control will come from arriving at an understanding for military cooperation, which should then lead to the creation of an effective coalition that involves the regional nations including both Saudi Arabia and Iran. This might sound far-fetched, considering the pervasive hostility between some of the regional countries, but is achievable if both the US and Russia are willing to pressurise their allies to do so. Within this scenario, Assad has to stay in power for the near term to ensure an orderly transfer of power after the IS has been defeated. This three step process is the only way that the IS can be defeated and the region brought back to normalcy.

Not far behind the Syrian imbroglio is the question of Iraq, which is also violently unstable at the moment. The West’s relationship with Iraq vis-à-vis the Iranian influence is vexed. Even so, Iraq has given tacit support for Assad because of the belief that his removal in the current circumstances will only strengthen the IS. Iraq has also permitted Russia to use its airspace to transport weapons and equipment to Syria and even gone to the extent of declaring that it would not be averse to Russian air attacks on IS elements operating in Iraqi territory. There is a definitive feeling that Iraq is cautiously moving away from the stranglehold of US influence.

Impact on the Region and Participants

The Russian initiative has created both short-term and far-reaching consequences for the participants in the conflict as well as for other nations in the region. Israel is the one nation that is not participating directly in the conflict but has constantly involved itself in attempting to steer the course of events as far as possible. Ever since the break-up of the Soviet Union, the Israel-Russia relationship has been complex with both nations regularly meddling in each other’s spheres of influence. Israel has managed to cultivate strong military-technological relations with a number of former Soviet States.

Almost in return, Russia has staunchly supported Iran and Syria—nations that are inimical to Israel and its perceived security needs. However, both Russia and Israel have maintained an acceptable level of reasoned cordiality in their dealings with each other. Israel is a pragmatic nation with a clear long-term view of its place in the Middle-East and the risks and challenges that it faces. It is not difficult to imagine that Israel and Russia could arrive at a mutually agreed, beneficial security deal.

Turkey’s Dilemma

The Russian air campaign creates impossible complications for Turkey’s strategy to emerge from this conflict as a stronger and more influential player in the region. Turkey’s ultimate aim is to create a pliant Sunni-led Syria that functions fully within Turkey’s own sphere of influence. The critical factor in achieving this is the removal of Assad from power and hence the concerted support to anti-Assad forces and also turning a blind eye to IS activities for a long period of time. The Russian support for Assad through the conduct of an air campaign directly negates Turkish ambitions to create a no-fly ‘safe’ zone in Syrian territory contiguous to its own. A brief background is necessary to understand the implications of recent actions by both nations.

In June 2012, a reconnaissance Phantom of the Turkish Air Force was shot down by Syrian air defence forces. Turkey immediately changed the rules of engagement and started to carryout intrusive interceptions of Syrian Air Force aircraft coming even remotely close to their border. With the start of the air campaign, the reported Russian air violations into Turkish airspace takes on a new meaning. While Russia has dismissed these violations as navigational errors compounded by bad weather, they will have to be seen as a test of Turkey’s ability and will to enforce the changed rules of engagement. Ankara is being dared and is on show.

Turkey under President Erdogan is facing a foreign policy debacle, compounded by the Russian intervention. After being recalcitrant, it opened its air bases to the Western coalition calculating that by doing so it would achieve two objectives—one, that it would hasten the fall of the Assad regime; and two, that it would facilitate Turkey’s own efforts to counter the Kurdish advance along its border with Syria. Defeating the IS is not a priority for Turkey, which declared it a terrorist group only in September 2014. However, Russia now stands as an unmoving obstacle to Turkey’s foreign policy ambitions.

After a recent Erdogan-Putin meeting there was no joint statement made, which is an ominous diplomatic speak for stating that there is ‘respectful’ disagreement between the two nations on matters that were discussed. Russia will not provide even diplomatic support for Turkey’s ambitions regarding the future of Syria, since their own ambition is at odds with that of Turkey. In the meantime Turkey has taken up the fight against the Kurdish groups—the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) in Syria and the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) in Turkey—with the real risk of these actions escalating into a full-fledged Turkish civil war. Turkey is suddenly left with very limited alternatives.

Another irksome factor for Turkey is that Russia has become the de facto guarantor-power for the security of Azerbaijan, a nation that has so far been a close ally of Turkey. The strong bilateral relationship that Turkey shared with Russia, especially the personal friendship between Erdogan and Putin, has been buffeted by the deep differences that have surfaced regarding the future of Syria.

The visions are at complete odds with each other. Diplomatic cordiality has now been stretched to the limit and could snap at any time. In these tense times, it only needs a single catalyst for overt animosity to crystallise. At the moment building the pipeline that was to carry Russian gas to Turkey has been kept on hold, an indication of the changed geo-strategic situation.

The United States

Russia-US relations were at an all-time low after Russian interference in Ukraine and the subsequent Western sanctions that were imposed on Russia. Russia believes that the intervention in Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea were legitimate actions initiated to secure Russian interests. In this event, it is not surprising that Russia considers the US to be its chief rival.

The US-led coalition’s lack of an articulated strategy to stabilise Syria is seen by Russia as an opportunity to restart a common purpose dialogue with the US, which could subsequently lead to regular bilateral talks and gradual normalisation of relationship. The fact that the US has indirectly indicated that it is not too particular about the time-frame of Assad’s departure, as long as a deliberate and orderly transition plan that will be executed at some future date exists.

In Syria and the fight against the IS, the US has painted itself into a corner. It supported the Free Syrian Army, labelling it the moderate opposition, whose intended aim was to oust the Assad regime. Through a $500 million program run out of Turkey to train soldiers for this ‘moderate’ group, the US was able to produce inly 75 soldiers for insertion into Syria, most of whom scattered at the first sign of the IS with some of them ‘donating’ their weapons and equipment to the al Qaeda elements in Syria. With the IS continuing to further their single-minded focus to create an Islamic Caliphate, getting rid of Assad has slowly, but surely, been moved down the list of prioritised objectives by the US. It is soft-pedalling the initial demand for regime change.

There is thinking that the long-term requirement to remove Assad from power could be achieved with Russia-led negotiations after the defeat of the IS. That the Russians are currently targeting the so-called moderates is now being considered, at least in some quarters of the strategy development area in the US, as a minor inconvenience. So much for the reliability of the US regarding support to friends and allies. Russia’s long-term goals of keeping Ukraine within its circle of influence and getting the economic sanctions lifted just got a fillip with the air campaign in Syria.

The US and Russia have now signed a memorandum of understanding on air safety in the Syrian airspace to minimise the risk of in-flight incidents. The agreement specifies safety protocols, the use of specific communication frequencies and the setting up of a working group to ensure smooth implementation. This is tacit acceptance by the Western coalition that the Russian Air Force cannot be willed away from the battle zone.

Europe

It is in its dealings with Europe that Russia’s frustrations at the loss of super power status manifests with great intensity. The loss of influence in the ‘near abroad’ of the Soviet era through the expansion of NATO and the transformative power of the European Union (EU) is anathema to the spread of Russian power and the nationalistic fervour of its leadership.

A united Europe is a potential threat to Russian ambition and therefore, Putin’s strategic goal is to divide, disrupt and interrupt any policy initiatives aimed at achieving some semblance of unity. The creation of energy projects that would pit European nations against each other is one of the moves that facilitates and perpetuates this approach.

Russia’s Syrian initiative is connected to the volatile situation in Ukraine. With the US and Europe pre-occupied with Syria, there is relative calm in Ukraine where the Russia-backed opposition is growing stronger and consolidating its position. Further, the Russian air campaign also has the potential to create dissonance between the US and Europe, especially with the unforeseen refugee crisis that has enveloped Europe, which in turn has increased the terrorist threat in broader Europe. European governments are becoming increasingly anxious and some have even indicated their support for ground intervention. Willingness to put boots-on-the-ground is clear indication of the enormity of the challenge that they face. Europe’s view of Assad is altering with him playing a limited role in the transition process becoming acceptable along with a tacit acceptance of the pivotal role that Russia is likely to play in any such political transition. The US non-success in defeating the IS after more than a year has eroded its credibility and has assisted Putin in his attempt to create European support for his actions in the Middle-East.

The anti-Russian sanctions are expensive and a divisive effort for the European nations who have a long-standing desire to rebuild trade with Russia. Moscow is craftily posing itself as an alternative source of power to Washington and Brussels, playing directly to populist anti-EU parties in most European nations. The aim is to further create disharmony in trans-Atlantic relationships. Russian activities in the Middle-East must not be viewed purely within the geographical boundaries of that region, but strategically in an overarching manner, with an understanding of the angst that Russia suffered immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union that led to the loss of status and power and its very long term aim to once again becoming a global power. Europe is clearly in Russia’s sights.

Saudi Arabia

It is a tense time in Russia-Arab relations. Saudi Arabia has taken few tentative steps towards improving its relationship with Russia by arriving at some agreements on economic cooperation, a move that led to speculations regarding the Saudi-US relations being in the doldrums. However, Saudi Arabia wants Russia to moderate its support for the Assad regime, especially since it supports anti-Assad forces being targeted by the Russian air campaign. There is an inherent risk in this situation since Russian air strikes could lead to inadvertent and unintended military confrontation. The Saudi monarchy is caught in a cleft stick in terms of available options; with the US ability, and perhaps more importantly, reliability, to keep regional opponents in check coming increasingly under a cloud; and the underlying belief that negotiating a full deal on Syria with Russia may lead to unknown and unpredictable consequences both in the short and long term. The US is running out of policy options to placate Saudi Arabia and may not be able to bring it back fully into the American orbit.

For Russia, Saudi Arabia could also turn out to be the joker in the pack. Russia will not have forgotten that Saudi Arabia was the prime mover in its Afghanistan debacle in the 1980s and even now provide support, both materiel and financial, to the Islamic rebels in Russia. It was also Saudi Arabian charities that financed the Chechen rebels in the 1990s. Saudi clerics have already started to paint the Russian intervention in shades of religious hue, calling it a new ‘Christian Crusade’ against Islam.

It is also possible that the Gulf nations could ramp up their support for rebel groups that are operating in the lawless Iraq-Syria region. However, Russia has cautioned the major Arab nations against supplying the jihadists with man-portable air defence systems, which they have said will be a red line, never to be crossed. The questions remain: will the Saudis create and lead a coalition to remove Assad from power, irrespective of the state of the war against the IS? And, if such a situation comes to pass, how will Russia react? Will it start a greater conflagration in the region that could subsume even non-participants in one unholy fire?

Geo-Strategic Implications

First and foremost, it has to be squarely recognised that there has been an inexorable failure of Western strategy in controlling the initial Syrian Civil War and its subsequent explosive expansion through the activities of the IS. The US has so far instituted only half-measures that have not shown any indication of success. The Russian intervention creates a small window of opportunity to initiate a long-term strategy to achieve a political solution. Russia has taken over the Syrian air base from which it can undertake missions across the entire Levant and Eastern Mediterranean and the naval base that gives it unfettered naval access to the Mediterranean Sea. It has also expanded the ground facilities and turned the air base into a major Russian base, indicating an intent for protracted use. Effectively this creates a permanent Russian footprint in the Middle-East with the ability to project power into the Arab world. The foundation for the quest for global status is gradually being laid.

Russia will protect the Assad regime, at least for the near-term, with all its resources. It will demonstrate effectiveness in its campaign and may even try to create another coalition with Syria, the Lebanese Hezbollah, Iraq and Iran to counter the Western coalition. The Iraqi government has already consented to Russian use of its airspace while the Russian air operations constrain the uninhibited freedom of operations that the Western coalition had so far enjoyed.

The violations of Turkish airspace and the reaction that it has provoked increases the chances of miscalculations spiralling out of control. The violations could also be considered probing missions that were meant to test NATO’s ability and willingness to invoke Article V that provides collective defence provisions for member nations, since Turkey is a member. Russian air activity is a serious blow to the credibility of the Western coalition.

Some strategists have opined that Russia is implementing the concept of ‘reflexive control’, a concept built on effectively shaping the environment in such a manner that the adversary is forced to choose a course of action that one wants it to choose, and is ready to counter. The decreasing effectiveness of the Western coalition and their unstated acceptance of the role that the Assad regime will play in a future power transition is a manifestation of this concept. There is already an informal Russia-Syria-Iran axis that has formed making it necessary for the US-led coalition to fundamentally reassess their geo-strategic alignment.

The facts on the ground is that Syria has already been geographically partitioned and there is no reason to believe that the country will return to its pre-war boundaries as a single entity—that is an impossibility. The next phase of the Civil War, which Russia controls, will eventually shape the contour of the region.

The long-term stability of the region is dependent on the ability of the intervening forces to settle the simmering discord in Libya, Iraq and Syria, all created by Western interference and wayward use of force. Russian viewpoint is that there are no jihadist groups that can be termed as moderate and that the difference between them is only their degree of affinity to the IS. All of them have to be treated as terrorists. The Russians have clearly, and cleverly, divided the conflict into Assad versus the rest. Russia has also demonstrated its strategic will to initiate decisive action with a willingness to take and accept risks. At the operational level, the Russian Air Force is functioning under a much more relaxed set of rules of engagement than the Western coalition, which could make a tangible difference in the war against the IS. So far the US and Russia have managed to de-conflict their missions and moves. However, the downside is that despite the flight safety agreements there is no assurance that a wrong tactical action that could lead to a confrontation at the operational level will not be made. This is the reason for some analysts to assert that the Russian intervention will create further geo-strategic disorder.

Russia is now engaged in a long-term game of patience, perseverance and persistence, willing to wait even for the next US administration to take charge and settle down more than 15 months later. It has three strategic objectives to secure. First is emphasising the sanctity and legitimacy of a sovereign government and the non-acceptance of external intervention to effect regime change. Second is to demonstrate Russia’s steadfastness in supporting its friends, in sharp contrast to the track record of the US who is seen to have abandoned its friends at will. Russia wants to be seen as a better ally than the US. However, this could become a double-edged sword. Political inconsistency and nuanced double-standards may not be avoidable in global diplomacy, especially in the prevailing volatile circumstances and Russia might find itself in the same position as the US in the future. This might become apparent to Russia only when it becomes as involved in international politics and interventions as the US has been in the past two decades.

Third, Russia wants to emerge from this conflict as the protector of the minorities in the greater Middle-East. With the IS rampaging across the region, the minorities have lost faith in the ability of the West to protect them and believe that on a number of occasions they have been sacrificed to radical Islam and/or totalitarianism. The IS has deepened the sectarian schism in the Middle-East far beyond at any other time in history. Russia believes that it can use the minorities to create an enhanced Russian influence in the region. This could involve direct involvement of Iran in the endeavour since Russian national interests are more aligned with Iran than with any other nation.

Russia is pragmatic enough to accept that the only way to end this conflict is through a negotiated political settlement. However, the collective defeat of the IS is fundamental to any progress in the political front and such a defeat cannot be achieved by a conditional fight against it. Russia’s advantage is that it is the only entity that has the influence to make Assad compromise and accept a negotiated settlement. Even so, it wants Assad to come to the negotiation table from a position of strength, although he currently controls only about 20 per cent of the country. There is also no chance of bringing the old Syria together without engaging in a bloody and protracted ground war. A future Syria can at best be a federation of quasi-independent states—controlled by Kurds, Alawites, Sunnis and Druze—the Civil War has gone too far to even hope for a reconciled country to emerge.

It is early days as yet in the renewed conflict with Russia flexing its muscle and there is still no indication regarding how long the conflict will drag on into the future. However, Russia has indicated that it wants the other regional nations, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, to be part of the negotiations regarding Syria’s future while it plays the role of the arbitrator. Saudi Arabia at least seems to be inching towards acceptance of a transition period with Assad continuing to be part of the equation. In a subtle diplomatic move it has indicated that it does not rule out talks with Iran and is conscious that it needs to continue the dialogue with US, Russia and Turkey who are the other major stake holders in the war.

It is revealing that some Western analysts have been quick to denounce Russian intervention as having been made in haste with no exit strategy. This accusation indicates the height of hypocrisy, since they seem to have forgotten that the US and its allies has not been able to articulate an exit strategy from the Middle-East for the past 14 years. The Russian action immediately exposed the bankruptcy of the US non-strategy and empty diplomatic rhetoric. The US has irrevocably damaged its reputation through fickle and ill-conceived diplomacy, injudicious employment of its mighty military forces, failed attempts at supporting a number of local forces—the list of failures is long. It is likely that the US may have abdicated the leadership of the region by default. This is a self-created vacuum of power and nature abhors a vacuum. Russia seems to be willingly stepping up to fill the emerging vacuum.

Conclusion

The Russian military intervention in the Syrian Civil War reveals two visible failures of Western, read US, policies—first, of isolating and punishing Russian for the actions that were initiated in Ukraine; and second, placing regime change as a precondition for the success of the Syrian intervention. The Western coalition, beset with weak and indecisive leadership, lacks the moral authority to ensure success even though billions of dollars have already been expended with very little to show for it. Russia has entered the fray cautiously and not without calculating the pitfalls as some people claim. Its action should be seen as reinforcing its veto in the UN Security Council with actions on the ground that metaphorically amounts to another veto. From a Russian viewpoint the air campaign in Syria is only one part of a greater ‘war’ being conducted to increase its influence in the global political environment.

For some obtuse reason, the Western coalition, including its Arab allies, seem to think that the removal of the Assad regime would in itself miraculously create a moderate alternative leadership that is entrenched in democratic values. This is delusional fantasy, if ever there was one. There is no doubt that Assad has been ruthless in his attempts to suppress the rebellion and may even be susceptible to charges of war crimes, but he has never been a threat to the broader region or a destabilising force for the outside world. The IS on the other hand is a barbaric, inhuman and philistine group that poses the biggest threat to normalcy that has so far emerged and is dedicated to the creation of a global Islamic Caliphate. The question that the Western coalition and Russia should be asking in concert is whether or not it is possible to build an all-inclusive grand coalition against the IS to ensure its defeat and destruction.

If such a coalition is to be built and be successful, certain preconditions will have to be accepted by all parties. First, Assad will have to be accepted at least as the lesser of the two evils necessary for short-term continuity of governance in order to avoid creating another Libya. Regime change will have to wait for the right time. Second at the operational level, there will be no creating of a no-fly zone in Syrian territory; there will be no ground incursions from the Turkish side of the border, even in hot pursuit; and there will be no air strikes on Assad-held sites in Syria. With the misleading confusion regarding which nation is openly or clandestinely supporting which jihadist group, it may be impossible to make the participating nations with their increasingly differing objectives subscribe to the Russian belief that there are no god or bad rebels or jihadists. However, distinguishing jihadists in such a manner is an ideological cul de sac, a dead end, and should not be pursued any further.

As it stands at the time of writing the US seems to be merely hoping that Putin fails, which unfortunately is not much of a policy option. However, who holds a stronger suite of cards is debatable and unclear although it looks as if the US will have to accept the inevitability of Assad being at least part of the initial solution in the political transition, whenever that takes place. The Sunni-ruled autocracies of the region could be coerced by the US and Russia to swallow this bitter pill to create the scene for longer-term stability, but by the same token, the reprieve might be short-lived. The sectarian divide in the region is far too deep to be papered over by coercion.

In the Middle-East for some time now, secularism has been confused with democracy much to the detriment of stability. Secularism, irrespective of the type of government, is a dire necessity in the region—unfortunately a utopian concept under the current circumstances. But unadulterated secularism may well be an ideal to be placed on the table lest the concept itself is lost.

Putin is acting to advance Russian interests and to protect his nation, which cannot be considered to be totally wrong actions whichever way one looks at it. Russia is purely pursuing the practical issue of national security. If the Russian intervention leads to stabilisation in Syria and Iraq Russia will achieve a monumental increase in its influence, prestige and status in the region as well as in the global geo-strategic environment. Getting unintentionally enmeshed in the sectarian fights of the region through mission creep remains the biggest risk to Russian intervention and will no doubt influence its future strategies.

Egyptian Soccer Fans Put Youth Disillusion With Elections On Public Display – Analysis

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As Egyptian general-turned-president Abdel Fattah Al Sisi struggled this week to get Egyptians to cast their vote in parliamentary elections, militant soccer fans put widespread youth disillusionment with the president’s autocratic rule on public display.

More than 10,000 fans rushed in response to a call by Ultras Ahlawy, the militant support group of storied Cairo club Al Ahli SC, to the Mokhtar al-Touch Stadium on election Sunday to watch their storied team train. It was the club’s first training since it last week won the Egyptian Super Cup.

Ultras Ahlawy issued the brief call on itsFacebook page that has more than 1.1 million followers. Ultras Ahlawy together with other militant fan groups has played a key role in anti-government protests in the last 4.5 years starting with the 2011 popular revolt that toppled President Hosni Mubarak.

Fan neglect of the election reflected a widespread sentiment among Egyptian youth expressed by a hashtag #badalmatantakhib or #insteadofvoting that was trending on Twitter.

“Youth see no hope for the future in the current elections. They are the ones that are every day the most attacked and accused of treason on television no matter whether they are engaged in politics or sports. How can they trust you and participate with you in the political process?,” activist Khaled Talima asked on Facebook.

Mr. Sisi’s government failed to persuade Egyptians to cast their vote on Sunday and Monday in the first of a two-stage parliamentary election, the first since Mr. Sisi staged a coup in 2013 that toppled Mohammed Morsi, Egypt’s first and only democratically elected president. The second phase of the election is scheduled for November 22 and 23.

Mr. Sisi gave government employees half a day off on Monday in the hope that they would use their free time to go to polling stations. Journalists surveying the stations estimated turnout at 15 percent at best despite pro-government and state-owned television stations repeatedly urging Egyptians to cast their vote.

The fan’s demonstrative neglect of the election and the low turnout highlight Mr. Al Sisi’s failed attempt over the last two years to depoliticize a generation that was emboldened by its success in overthrowing Mr. Mubarak after 30 years in office and angered by the fact that youth were subsequently side lined and have since seen their hard fought achievements rolled back.

Youth disillusionment was already evident in low participation in a constitutional referendum last year that paved the way for this week’s election.

The new constitution envisages a transition from autocratic rule to a presidential system with an empowered parliament. In theory, the new parliament would have the power to impeach the president, question the prime minister and withdraw its confidence in him. A majority of the 568 seats in parliament will however be filled by individuals rather than parties, many of who were associated with Mr. Mubarak’s now defunct National Democratic Party (NDP)

Critics of Mr. Al Sisi fear that with major opposition groups like the Brotherhood barred from participating in the election, the new parliament will be packed with supporters of the president who could call for a new referendum to revise the constitution, curb the assembly’s powers and strengthen the power of the presidency.

Mr. Al Sisi has ruled with an iron fist since coming to power. He has banned Mr. Morsi’s Brotherhood as a terrorist organization and cracked down on both Islamist and secular opposition and dissent. Thousands have been put behind bars and more than 1,000 people have been killed by security forces since the 2013 coup.

Mr. Al Sisi has promised to involve youth by creating a National Youth Council, increasing opportunities for youth participation in politics, and enhancing scholarship openings for study overseas.

At the same time, the president has warned students and youth from engaging in activity “with questionable political goals that serve the interests of unpatriotic groups in their endeavour to destroy the nation.”

Mr. Al Sisi’s warning appears to have fallen on deaf ears with a large number of students, fans and youths evidently putting little faith in his promises.

In astatement, Ultras Ahlawy called on soccer fans to next week attend Al Ahli’s first match in the Egyptian Premier League’s new season. Fans have largely been banned from stadia since the popular revolt against Mr. Mubarak erupted in 2011 in a bid to prevent stadia from becoming opposition rallying points and a staging ground for fan protests.

“Football fans want to return to their ordinary place. Ahli fans attended the Orlando Pirates match and a lot of training sessions without any problems,” the group noted, referring to a recent African Confederation Cup game for which the spectator ban was briefly lifted.

“We suggested many ideas to solve the problem (of the ban) but in vain. Speaking about the difficulty of allowing fans to attend matches amid the current parliamentary elections is strange. If the officials are busy with the elections, they can let the football fans go to games. They can manage the matter better by themselves,” the statement said.

“Starting the new season without fans is an extension of killing Egyptian football, so all the group members will be gathering at the Petro sport stadium to attend the match. Football is for fans,” it said in a move that could renew confrontation with security forces.

Sports Minister Khaled Abdel-Aziz promised in September to allow fans to attend home matches of the Egyptian national team but has yet to make good on his promise. The Egyptian Football Association has said for years that it was negotiating security arrangements with the interior ministry that would lead to a lifting of the spectator ban.

Some 20 fans were killed in February, when fans tried to gain entry to a stadium for a match for which the spectator ban had been lifted in an incident that reinforced the need for reform of a security force that for years has been allowed to act with impunity.

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