By Jim Garamone

The introduction of special operations forces into northern Syria is just one part of the overall strategy to degrade and defeat the terrorist organization known as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said in an interview Wednesday during a multi-day trip to the Asia-Pacific region.

Marine Corps Gen. Joseph F. Dunford Jr. said people must remember there are nine lines of effort against ISIL, with just two of them the sole responsibility of the military: to build partnership capacity and deny sanctuary.

Special operators are reinforcing the effort to build partnership capacity in Syria, he said. “To my mind, this isn’t doing something new, it’s adding a capability so that what we’re doing is more effective,” Dunford said.

“Is this enough in Syria? No, not in and of itself,” the general said. “That is not what it was intended to be. It’s additive to our effort. It is consistent with the campaign strategy.”

President Barack Obama gave the military the authority to put special operations forces in northern Syria to be more effective in supporting partners that are working against ISIL on the ground. The Syrian Arab Coalition and the Kurdish People’s Protective Units — known by its Kurdish acronym YPG — are getting supplies and receiving close-air support in their operations against ISIL, Dunford said.

Effective Airstrikes Require Partner on the Ground

Coalition aircraft have been attacking ISIL targets inside Syria for more than a year. That has been effective in many instances — notably in the Kurdish defense of Kobane, located near the border with Turkey. But for the airstrikes to be more effective, the chairman said, there has to be an effective partner on the ground.

There are training facilities in Iraq for anti-ISIL forces, he said, because American and coalition forces can work with Iraq’s government, which provides command and control for the trained forces.

There is no effective government in Syria, and getting trainees out of Syria, vetting them for reliability, then training them and putting them back in Syria did not work, Dunford said.

Hence the new approach.

“Whether it’s enough or too much has to be understood in the context of all that we’re doing,” he said. “Of course it is not enough for us to win the fight, but it’s one of the things we are doing that’s contributing to the strategy. In this particular case, we need effective ground forces in Syria.”

The special operations effort is working with the Syrian Arab coalition, the YPG and others in order to set them up for success and to better integrate operations, the chairman said.

The special operators also allow coalition logistical support to get where it needs to go and gives coalition forces the “situational awareness of what’s going on on the ground and maybe better facilitate the delivery of combined arms in support of our partners on the ground,” Dunford said.

By Arthur Herman*

The “what if”’s of history can be as tantalizing as they are uncertain. But Ahmed Chalabi, who died yesterday at age 71, sits at the center of one of the most intriguing. Would 4,100 Americans who were killed in Iraq be alive today, and would thousands more have come home uninjured, if he had become Iraq’s president following the fall of Saddam Hussein?

The obituaries in the mainstream press, of course, say nothing about this possibility. Most have simply said that “he lied about WMDs in Iraq” — or encouraged others to do so. That is in itself a lie, as I’ll explain. But the media’s false narrative about Chalabi obscures his real importance, as the man who led Iraqi resistance to Saddam’s murderous regime for more than a decade — and might have become his successor if short-sighted and vengeful U.S. officials hadn’t destroyed his reputation instead.

Born to a wealthy Shia family which was forced to flee Iraq in 1958 when the Baath Party seized power, he graduated with degrees from both MIT and the University of Chicago, where he earned a Ph.D. in mathematics. His real passion, however, was working to bring democracy to his home country and destroy Saddam’s regime before it destroyed Iraq. So when the CIA needed someone with contacts in Iraq to build support for an anti-Saddam coup in the wake of Operation Desert Storm, it turned to Chalabi, whose Iraqi National Congress (INC) was already evolving into a powerful non-sectarian democratic organization involving Sunnis, Kurds, and Shiites like Chalabi himself.

Fast forward to 2002 and the eve of Operation Iraqi Freedom. When the Bush administration decided to reach out to Iraqi exile groups to head up a government to take over after the U.S. invasion, the INC and Chalabi in particular seemed the natural choice.

But the CIA and State Department immediately stomped on the idea. The CIA’s dislike of their former client went back to 1996, when he had warned that a coup it was organizing was already known to Saddam and traveled to Washington to get it called off. (The CIA official who went ahead and gave the green light anyway, only to watch the coup collapse and those involved get arrested and shot, was none other than George “Slam Dunk” Tenet.)

The State Department reviled Chalabi as well, for having lobbied Capitol Hill for passage of the Iraq Liberation Act, which then-president Clinton signed, the first major call for regime change in Iraq when State wanted the issue kept on the back burner.

So when the Department of Defense pushed for Iraqi exiles to assume power in Iraq as soon as possible after the invasion to avoid the appearance of a U.S. occupation, Colin Powell and the State Department said no out of fear of Chalabi. Instead Iraq got Paul Bremer and the Coalition Provisional Authority, who could neither avoid the appearance of an American occupation or control the escalating violence.

The rest is history, tragic history. It’s hard to say now what might have happened had Chalabi and other exiles been allowed to form a transition government before the invasion, as the Bush administration originally planned. As a secular-minded Shiite, Chalabi might have built the bridges to the Kurds and Sunni needed to keep Iraq from spiraling into chaos. Tens of thousands of lives – as well as U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East — might have been saved in the process.

Instead, his reward was to be pilloried in a media disinformation campaign backed by State and the CIA, that Chalabi was responsible for the WMD “lies” and was therefore responsible for the entire war. Newsweek even ran a cover story, “Our Con Man in Iraq,” to that effect.

In fact, the opposite is true. No intelligence service, not even the CIA, needed Chalabi to tell them that Saddam did indeed have WMD programs, just as Colin Powell didn’t need Chalabi to tell him that Saddam was hiding them from U.N. inspectors. But when the search for stockpiles turned up none, Powell and the CIA needed a scapegoat and Chalabi made a convenient fall guy.

No less than two independent investigations — one by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the Robb-Silberman Commission on Iraq Intelligence in 2005 — cleared Chalabi’s name of any responsibility. Yet the myth that Chalabi lied us into war, and was even a secret agent of the Iranians, lives on — and besmirches the name and memory of a man who, if he wasn’t the George Washington of his country, wasn’t its Svengali, either — and who, by healing Iraq’s sectarian breaches, could have saved us all a lot of blood and treasure.

About the author:
*Arthur Herman, Senior Fellow

Source:
This article was published at National Review’s Corner and the Hudson Institute and is republished with permission.

By Sara Jones*

At the 2015 Our Ocean Conference, Chilean president Michelle Bachelet announced the creation of a new marine park off the coast of Chile, which, if created, would be the largest fully protected marine reserve in the world. This action taken by Bachelet spurred questions across the international community over whether Chile might become the world’s next leader in ocean conservation. The project has been met with both skepticism and enthusiastic support by the Chilean nation and by the international community.

The Nazca-Desventuradas National Marine Park was unveiled in October and will encompass a surface area of 297,518 square kilometers (114,872 square miles), the equivalent of 8 percent of the world’s oceans that have been declared as no fishing areas or have no-take protections.[1] It would include the waters off the coast of Rapa Nui (Easter Island) and the waters surrounding San Ambrosio and San Félix Islands.[2] These two islands are called the ‘Islas Desventuradas’ (Unfortunate Islands) and are the namesake of the marine park. The purpose of creating this national park is to reduce the amount of fishing in the area in order to protect the ecosystems within its borders. The waters surrounding the islands have been the site of “a modest amount of fishing, mainly for swordfish” but the creation of the park designates this area as a marine protected area (MPA).[3] According to the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN), the definition of a protected area is “A clearly defined geographical space, recognized [sic], dedicated and managed, through legal or other effective means, to achieve the long-term conservation of nature with associated ecosystem services and cultural values.”[4] The IUCN stresses the importance of having a long-term plan to actually have an impact on conservation and ocean recovery.[5] The creation of a marine reserve gives the Chilean government legal means to enforce the limits that could be imposed on fishing, especially by using its navy as a deterrent.[6] Local fisherman can still fish in an area 50 miles from the coast, but industrial fishing will ideally be eliminated.[7]

Environmental and Cultural Impact

The creation of a new marine reserve in this area will bring about a multitude of environmental benefits to the area. According to National Geographic, the area that the park will protect has a unique oceanic environment which encompasses a variety of tropical and temperate species.[8] Furthermore, National Geographic writes that “About 72 percent of the species found around Desventuradas and an island chain known as the Juan Fernández archipelago—about 466 miles (750 kilometers) to the south— is endemic.”[9] Fishing and pollution are two causes of environmental degradation in the ocean; so creating a marine park to protect the ecosystems of this region is a positive step towards changing the way the sea is protected.

In addition to its environmental benefits, the marine reserve also represents an important step towards protecting the cultural interests of the people of Rapa Nui. For this community, the ocean surrounding their island is an important part of their culture and way of life. The mayor of Rapa Nui, Pedro Edmunds Paoa, said, “This marine park will not only conserve the many species endemic to the waters of Easter Island but also the traditions of our Polynesian ancestors and the Rapa Nui people…The park will be complemented by a fishing area that will allow our ancient practice of tapu—or smart fisheries management—to endure.”[10] The Rapa Nui gain their livelihood from the surrounding waters and many of them are excited about the prospect of protecting this area from industrial fishing trawlers. Joshua S. Reichart, an environmentalist from Pew Research Center, states that the marine park would not only represent an accomplishment for president Bachelet, but also a “triumph for the Rapa Nui.”[11]

Historical Context of Marine Conservation in Chile

When it comes to environmental protection of marine areas, Chile may not have much experience, but it has focused recent efforts in addressing this issue. The Nazca-Desventuradas National Marine Park is not the only marine conservation effort the country has made. At the 2015 Our Ocean Conference, Chile also announced its promise to creating a marine protected area (MPA) in an exclusive economic zone near the Island of Rapa Nui.[12] At the 2014 Our Ocean Conference, Chile agreed to join the United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement. It also fulfilled its commitment by implementing a new policy to combat IUU fishing (Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated fishing).[13] According to Oceana, an international organization dedicated to conducting research on oceans, Chile’s creation of a new national policy of IUU is “a move that gives the Chilean Navy increased resources to conduct enforcement operations in the high seas.”[14] The areas that have been protected were vulnerable areas and thus the new policy is necessary for giving Chile the legal means to more effectively regulate fishing activities.[15] Furthermore, Chile has created a new Ocean Policy Council which focuses on addressing the threats to its ocean waters and marine ecosystems. The main objectives of this council are to protect the sustainability and security of Chile’s marine environments.[16] Another measure the country has taken to protect its marine environments is the creation of a group called the Friends of the Port State Measures Agreement, which promotes support between Latin American states in the endeavor of improving the protection of marine areas.[17] In the past two years, Chile has made great efforts to address the environmental threats to its marine areas.

International Context of Marine Conservation

Chile is not the only country which has recently announced the creation of a marine reserve. The Nazca-Desventuradas National Marine Park will be the largest park of its kind in the world only if the United Kingdom does not create its marine park near the Pitcairn Islands first.[18] The Pitcairn Islands are located in the Pacific Ocean, where the United Kingdom plans on creating the largest continuous marine reserve in the world. This marine reserve has a similar goal to the Chilean project. Adam Vaughn, a reporter for The Guardian, writes that: “The zone is expected to ban commercial fishing, and will cover a 834,000 sq km (322,000 square miles) area where previous expeditions have found more than 80 species of fish, coral and algae.”[19] While this project is still underway, another marine reserve created by the United Kingdom is currently the largest marine protected area. This is encompasses the waters surrounding the Chagos archipelago in the Indian Ocean.[20]

The United Sates has also announced the creation of two new marine sanctuaries. The first is to be constructed on the western side of Lake Michigan and the second one is the Mallows Bay-Potomac River in Maryland. Both of these locations are the sites of shipwrecks.[21] Meanwhile, Cuba has announced that it is participating in negotiations with the United States to create sister marine protected areas. According to National Geographic, “The U.S. side would include the Florida Keys National Marine Sanctuary, the Flower Garden Banks in the Gulf of Mexico, and the Dry Tortugas and Biscayne National Parks. The Cuban side includes the Guanahacabibes National Park on the western tip of the country.”[22]

New Zealand has also announced a new marine reserve in the Kermadec which is northeast of New Zealands’ North Island. The recent surge in marine protection programs is heartening for supporters of marine preservation; however, they do not come without criticisms.

Support for the Nazca-Desventuradas National Marine Park

As previously noted, the new marine park in Chile is of great interest for the local fishing community and the Rapa Nui community. Although support for the program is not unanimous for either group, voices of support can be found in each.

For many local fishermen in Chile, a growing issue is the presence of industrial fishing trawlers, which are not only making it more difficult for local fishermen to gain their livelihood, but also engage in illegal fishing. In addition to this criticism of industrial fishers, local fishermen complain that they are at fault for increasing pollution in the oceans. The Guardian quoted Sara Roe, the president of a Chilean fisherman’s association: “Between 2004 and 2013, she said, there was a dramatic decline in the tuna, swordfish and barracuda her fishermen caught, forcing some into land-farming and construction jobs.”[23]

Francesca Avaka Teao, a representative of the Hanga Roa Tai fisherman association, said that “in addition to the ecological importance of these waters, culturally and since ancestral times, the sea has been synonymous to abundance, richness and connection to nature for our town. The community of Rapa Nui develops diverse activities in it, not only in terms of nourishment, but also in terms of sports, art, recreation, and world view, among others.”[24] The representative’s statement shows that the concerns expressed by the fishing community are tied to the environmental and cultural concerns expressed by the rest of the Rapa Nui community.

Criticisms of the Nazca-Desventuradas National Marine Park

While some members of the Rapa Nui community have expressed their support for the marine park, others had expressed doubt that the park would actually be created and a fear that the new marine park will encounter the same issues that the natural park on the mainland of Rapa Nui had faced.[25] The creation of Rapa Nui National Park led to a spike in tourism on the island, which some members of the community opposed. The primary concern of the Rapa Nui people is that the previous natural park was created by the government without their consultation.[26] However, President Bachelet has addressed this concern and affirmed that the marine park plan will be implemented following consent of the Rapa Nui community.[27]

At first glance, the marine park represents a strong initiative to protect the ocean. However, Russell Moffitt, a conservation analyst at the Marine Conservation Institute, criticizes the project by questioning whether the location that is being protected is really the best place to make a real environmental impact for the oceans. He says that it might be more urgent to protect near-shore waters because these areas are more impacted by fishing and pollution. He adds that protecting these areas will not be sufficient, but they are easy goals. It would be more beneficial to create a variety of types of marine reserves.[28]

What will be the fate of the ‘Unfortunate Islands’?

By creating the Nazca-Desventuradas marine park, Chile could become a leader in the international community in terms of marine preservation. Its recent efforts in preserving its marine environments with the support of local indigenous communities, is commendable. While the marine park is not without its criticisms, it has the potential for protecting important ecosystems and the culture of the Rapa Nui people. The impact that the new marine park will have is uncertain, but overall it is a positive step for marine preservation in a time where marine preservation has become increasingly important to the international community.

*Sara Jones, Research Associate at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs

Notes:
[1] Lee, Jane J., and National Geographic PUBLISHED Mon Oct 05 21:07:00 EDT 2015. 2015. “Chile Creates Largest Marine Reserve in the Americas.” National Geographic News. Accessed November 3. http://news.nationalgeographic.com/2015/10/151005- desventuradas-islands-marine-protected-area-conservation-science/.

[2] Vaughan, Adam. 2015. “Chile to Create One of World’s Largest Marine Parks around Easter Island.” The Guardian, October 5, sec.

Environment. http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/oct/05/chile-creates-one-of-worlds-largest-marine-parks-around- easter-island.

[3] Lee, Jane J., and National Geographic PUBLISHED Mon Oct 05 21:07:00 EDT 2015. 2015. “Chile Creates Largest Marine Reserve in the Americas.” National Geographic News. Accessed November 3. http://news.nationalgeographic.com/2015/10/151005- desventuradas-islands-marine-protected-area-conservation-science/.

[4] http://www.iucn.org/?uNewsID=10904

[5] Ibid.

[6] Vaughan, Adam. 2015. “Chile Plans World’s Biggest Marine Park to Protect Easter Island Fish Stocks.” The Guardian, September 13, sec. Environment. http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/sep/13/chile-plans-easter-island-marine-park-fishing.

[7] Vaughan, Adam. 2015. “Chile to Create One of World’s Largest Marine Parks around Easter Island.” The Guardian, October 5, sec.

Environment. http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/oct/05/chile-creates-one-of-worlds-largest-marine-parks-around-easter-island.

[8] Lee, Jane J., and National Geographic PUBLISHED Mon Oct 05 21:07:00 EDT 2015. 2015. “Chile Creates Largest Marine Reserve in the Americas.” National Geographic News. Accessed November 3. http://news.nationalgeographic.com/2015/10/151005- desventuradas-islands-marine-protected-area-conservation-science/.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Manager, rea Risotto The Pew Charitable Trusts. 2015. “Pew and Bertarelli Praise Chile’s Creation of Easter Island Marine Par k.” Accessed November 3. http://pew.org/1Gp8XWG.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Our Ocean 2015 Initiatives. Oct. 6, 2015.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Simon, Madeleine. 2015. “Chile Announces New Policy Against Illegal Fishing.” Oceana. Accessed November 3. http://oceana.org/blog/chile-announces-new-policy-against-illegal-fishing.

[15] Simon, Madeleine. 2015. “Chile Announces New Policy Against Illegal Fishing.” Oceana. Accessed November 3. http://oceana.org/blog/chile-announces-new-policy-against-illegal-fishing.

[16] Our Ocean 2015 Initiatives. Oct. 6, 2015.

[17] Ibid.

[18] Vaughan, Adam. 2015. “Chile Plans World’s Biggest Marine Park to Protect Easter Island Fish Stocks.” The Guardian, September 13, sec. Environment. http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/sep/13/chile-plans-easter-island-marine-park-fishing.

[19] Vaughan, Adam. 2015. “Pitcairn Islands to Get World’s Largest Single Marine Reserve.” The Guardian, March 18, sec. Environment.

http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/mar/18/pitcairn-islands-marine-reserve-budget-2015.

[20] Ibid.

[21] Lee, Jane J., and National Geographic PUBLISHED Mon Oct 05 21:07:00 EDT 2015. 2015. “Chile Creates Largest Marine Reserve in the Americas.” National Geographic News. Accessed November 3. http://news.nationalgeographic.com/2015/10/151005-desventuradas-islands-marine-protected-area-conservation-science/.

[22] Ibid.

[23] Vaughan, Adam. 2015. “Chile Plans World’s Biggest Marine Park to Protect Easter Island Fish Stocks.” The Guardian, September 13, sec. Environment. http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/sep/13/chile-plans-easter-island-marine-park-fishing.

[24] “Comunidad Rapa Nui Celebra Anuncio de Bachelet Sobre Creación Del Área Marina Protegida Más Grande Del Mundo.” 2015. El Mostrador. Accessed November 3. http://www.elmostrador.cl/noticias/pais/2015/10/05/comunidad-rapa-nui-celebra-anuncio-de-bachelet-sobre-creacion-del-area-marina-protegida-mas-grande-del-mundo/. (Quote translated by author)

[25] Vaughan, Adam. 2015. “Chile Plans World’s Biggest Marine Park to Protect Easter Island Fish Stocks.” The Guardian, September 13, sec. Environment. http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/sep/13/chile-plans-easter-island-marine-park-fishing.

[26] Ibid.

[27] Vaughan, Adam. 2015. “Chile to Create One of World’s Largest Marine Parks around Easter Island.” The Guardian, October 5, sec. Environment. http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/oct/05/chile-creates-one-of-worlds-largest-marine-parks-around-easter-island.

[28] Lee, Jane J., and National Geographic PUBLISHED Mon Oct 05 21:07:00 EDT 2015. 2015. “Chile Creates Largest Marine Reserve in the Americas.” National Geographic News. Accessed November 3. http://news.nationalgeographic.com/2015/10/151005- desventuradas-islands-marine-protected-area-conservation-science/.

The Russian Air Force has carried out 81 sorties hitting 263 Islamic State (IS) targets in two days in Syria, the Defense Ministry said in a statement.

Russian jets hit targets that mostly belong to Islamic State and other militants in such provinces as Aleppo, Damascus, Deir ez-Zor, Idlib, Latakia, Raqqa, Hama and Homs, Igor Konashenkov, a Defense Ministry spokesman, said Thursday. After their combat missions all the jets returned to the Russian Khmeimim airbase in Latakia, he said.

Russian Su-24M bombers destroyed IS repair facilities with seven armored vehicles near an airport in Aleppo province, Konashenkov said.

“In the area of the populated locality of Raqqa, SU-34 bombers hit two fortified block posts belonging to the terrorists, located on the outskirts of the city. Direct aerial bomb hits destroyed the terrorists’ fortified structures housing four units of automobile and armored vehicles,” the spokesman said.

He added that Russian airstrikes also hit a base belonging to one of the ISIS-affiliated gangs in the gorge of the Jebel-Mgar mountains near Damascus, destroying a ammunition warehouse, command post and hidden military equipment.

Su-24 bombers have carried out a strike hitting an IS stronghold near the city of Tadmur in the Homs province, the ministry said in a statement. The strike destroyed a tank in a firing position, a ZSU-23 anti-aircraft system, and a mortar battery, he added.

“The destroyed IS stronghold was located more than 30 kilometers from ancient Palmyra,” Konashenkov said. “Let me point out that Russian aircraft have been hitting only terrorist targets far away from architectural monuments.”

Su-25 fighters also targeted a warehouse storing anti-tank missile systems belonging to the Al-Qaeda affiliate Al-Nusra Front in Idlib province, northwest Syria.

“According to data obtained via the joint information center in Baghdad, several days ago a consignment of anti-tank missile systems was delivered to one of the warehouses located in the area of Maarat al-Numan city in Idlib province,” Konashenkov said, adding that the weapons were intended to be used against the advancing forces of the Syrian army.

“After the information had been confirmed via several channels, a pair of SU-25 jets carried out strikes hitting the target and destroying the warehouse together with its contents.”

Russia launched airstrikes targeting ISIS and other terror groups in Syria on September 30, following a formal request from President Bashar Assad. Russian aircraft have made over 1,600 sorties and hit more than 2,000 terrorist facilities since the start of the operation in Syria, Chief of the Main Operations Department at the Russian General Staff Colonel-General Andrey Kartapolov said Tuesday.

More than 50 aircraft and helicopters, including the Sukhoi Su-34 and Su-24M bombers, Su-25 attack aircraft, Su-30SM fighters and Mil Mi-8 and Mi-24 helicopters are taking part in Russia’s ongoing military operation against terror groups in Syria.Russia’s Caspian Flotilla ships also delivered a massive strike on ISIS targets in Syria using Kalibr NK ship-born cruise missiles on October 7.

Kremlin has repeated on multiple occasions that Russia’s military forces would not take part in any ground operations in Syria.

By Hasan Selim Ozertem

Turkey’s political scene has experienced four elections over the last two years. After the local and presidential elections in 2014, Turkish voters took to the ballot box on two more occasions in 2015 to decide who would govern their country until 2019. Unable to attain a parliamentary majority on 7 June, according to unofficial results, the AK Party received 49.4 percent of the vote and 317 out of 550 seats in parliament in the elections on 1 November 2015.

Voter turnout was over 85 percent and once again four parties managed to pass the 10 percent electoral threshold. Looking at the results, we can say that the elections have produced a few certain outcomes for Turkish politics. First, the AK Party will be able to establish a one-party government, but still faces limitations when it comes to changing the constitution. Second, the ethnic nationalist political parties failed to preserve the popularity they exhibited in the June elections. Third, the electorate extended the AK Party a valuable line of credit; seeing that it has now been afforded the necessary political support, it will need to address the country’s pressing economic and political challenges.

Considering this context, this analysis is composed of three parts. First, I will look at the main discussions following the 7 June elections, and then I will engage in an evaluation of the outcomes of the 1 November snap elections. Lastly, I will formulate some projections about the possible scenarios and challenges awaiting Turkish politics.

AK Party’s Dilemma: Coalition Formula or Return to the Ballot Box

The results of the 7 June 2015 elections were surprising for both the AK Party and the opposition in Turkey. Here, the AK Party, under the leadership of Ahmet Davutoğlu, faced a dilemma in that it had lost its majority in the parliament, receiving only 40.9 percent of the vote and 258 out of 550 seats. In order to form a government the party would have to establish a coalition with one or more of the opposition parties, alternately, it could also call for another round of elections. But most important of all may have been the AK Party’s interpretation of the message received from the Turkish electorate. On the night of the elections, Davutoğlu stated that the AK Party received this message from the constituency and that it would take the necessary steps instantly.

With the release of the 7 June election results, both experts close to the party and many other commentators argued that several reasons led to the AK Party’s loss of popularity. Among these were the mismanaged party campaign that overemphasized changing the parliamentary system to a presidential one; a lack of attention paid to promising concrete projects for the future; new but unknown faces in the party lists; policies towards Kurds; and the failure to manage perceptions of the AK Party after the corruption probes made public on 17 and 25 December 2013. While the AK Party analyzed these issues and prepared a list of lessons to draw therefrom, Davutoğlu began making his rounds to the opposition parties to discuss the possibility of coalition negotiations, and in the end, the only positive signal he received was from the main opposition party, the Republican People’s Party (CHP). After 35 hours of “exploratory talks” spanning over a month, the AK Party and the CHP both failed to end up with a coalition model. At a press conference, CHP leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu said that his party received an offer not for a coalition, but for a transition government that would carry Turkey over the next three months until to the next elections. After talks with the CHP collapsed, Davutoğlu didn’t receive a positive response from the Nationalist Action Party (MHP), and by that time both Davutoğlu and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan had openly articulated the possibility of snap elections. Following this, 1 November 2015 was announced as the date for snap elections.

In the 7 June elections, the CHP, MHP, and HDP respectively received 25, 16.3 and 13.1 percent of the vote and their combined number of seats in parliament exceeded that of the AK Party for the first time since 2002. Nevertheless, the opposition parties put forth a poor performance in the aftermath. Even though they pursued an active campaign against the AK Party, they failed to cooperate to elect the Speaker of the Parliament. This was a lost opportunity for these parties seeing that their failure had granted the AK Party a chance to recover. Davutoğlu and Erdoğan had gained the psychological and legislative superiority over the opposition and this in turn shaped the AK Party’s campaign in the run-up to the snap elections.

Snap Elections: AK Party’s Victory, Opposition Parties’ Dilemma

The AK Party’s share of the vote increased by more than 4 million on 1 November compared to the previous elections. Nevertheless, it should be underlined here that none of the pre-election polling surveys predicted that the AK Party would receive almost half of the overall vote on 1 November; the closest prediction was 47 percent, whereas others ranged between 40-44 percent.

Looking at the results, it can be seen that both Kurdish and Turkish nationalists voted for the AK Party on 1 November, whereas they casted their respective votes for the HDP and the MHP on 7 June. Moreover, the AK Party has now become the main address for the conservative electorate who voted for parties other than the AK Party, or the MHP, in the previous elections. According to unofficial results, the AK Party’s popularity increased by more than eight percent, almost half of which came from the MHP’s constituency, a quarter of which came from the Kurds and the remaining two percent came from others. Among the opposition, while the popularity of the MHP and the HDP decreased, that of the CHP increased, albeit only by 0.4 percent.

The preliminary results show that two factors were influential in the voters’ behavior. First, Turkish society opted to forego the risk of a coalition scenario that might bring further economic and political uncertainty. Second, the atmosphere of instability that resulted from the reemergence of attacks perpetuated by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) throughout the summer and the active struggle against this terrorist organization helped the AK Party to attract both Kurdish and Turkish nationalists’ votes. Additionally, the avoidance of framing the election as a referendum on the presidential system as well as the low profile of President Erdoğan during the campaign period contributed the results.

The power vacuum that emerged after the inconclusiveness of the 7 June elections caused economic and political risks to increase due to the absence of a legitimately elected government. Turkey’s economy had become more prone to rising risks in global markets, and just as in other developing countries the Turkish Lira depreciated, capital outflows hastened and investment slowed. Such economic difficulties became even more problematic in the southeastern part of the country as the PKK attacks caused stark disruptions to the normal flow of daily life. While the AK Party emphasized the importance of stability under a single party government and adopted a populist economic agenda in its party program, the opposition parties failed to address the concerns of the society, which still suffers from the trauma of the 2001 economic crisis, and couldn’t promise anything new compared to their 7 June party programs. Moreover, the majority of Turkish society seems to approve of the AK Party’s fight with the PKK, whereas they are not happy with the link between this terrorist organization and the HDP.

It should be noted here as well that the AK Party also took advantage of its control over an important part of the media, whereas the opposition had limited access to mass media organs in Turkey. Additionally, lacking the ability to receive aid from the national treasury, the opposition parties couldn’t compete with the AK Party’s financial resources during the campaign period. The fatal blasts in Ankara also pushed parties to slow, or completely halt, their campaigns in order to avoid the risk of other such calamities occurring at their future rallies. All of these factors, resulted in underrepresentation of the opposition parties throughout the election period, whereas, having comparative advantages, the AK Party managed to reach out to its constituency in a more robust manner.

Tomorrow’s agenda

One of the main debates on election night was “whose success are we talking about after the AK Party’s victory?” It is true that Davutoğlu has gained important leverage as a leader after his party received 49.4 percent of the vote. However, during his victory speech after the release of the preliminary results, he mentioned AK Party cofounder and Turkish President Erdoğan several times to roaring applause. In this regard, the ongoing speculation of Abdullah Gül’s return to the political scene as a savior of the party he helped to create seems to be out of the question for the time being. The results consolidate Ahmet Davutoğlu’s position as the leader of the party, but it is for sure that there is still a delicate balance that is being maintained between him and President Erdoğan.

In his “balcony speech”,[1] Davutoğlu said that he is ready to cooperate with the opposition to prepare a new constitution that will eliminate the legacy of the 1980 military coup that was left behind in the country’s legal code. This is actually an important statement seeing that the political parties failed to come together to draft a text after 2011. According to the election results, despite its success, the AK Party still does not have the necessary majority to unilaterally change the constitution or to bring it to a referendum, which would require 367 or 330 seats respectively. This actually makes it obligatory for the party to cooperate with the opposition if it wants to replace or reform the constitution. It cannot be ruled out that a debate on a new constitution might pave the way for heated discussions revolving around the enactment of a presidential system in place of the current parliamentary one.

In fact, drawing a framework about the terms of reference between the President and the Prime Minister is a critical issue. Over the last year, the delicate balance between Erdoğan and Davutoğlu gave the former serious room to maneuver as an executive power beside the parliament. With or without a new constitution, the main expectation is that Erdoğan will continue to occupy his dominant position in Turkish politics as the first popularly elected president. Until now, both have largely succeeded in avoiding stepping on each other’s toes; from now on, the way that this dynamic is institutionalized, whether in de facto or de jure terms, will define the character of Turkish politics for the foreseeable future.

There are also urgent issues waiting to be addressed other than defining the new rules of the game. Two issues high on the agenda are the economy and the Kurdish issue. For a long time, the AK Party’s economic technocrats such as Ali Babacan and Mehmet Şimşek have been reiterating the need to frame and implement economic reforms. Considering the recent fluctuations in global markets that have been exerting strong effects on developing economies, it is important to strengthen the Turkish economy in order to increase its impermeability to potential risks. This will require the preparation of a well-framed reform package buttressed by the political will of the new government. Moreover, it would not be wrong to expect the Kurdish issue to be addressed as soon as possible by the new government considering the fact that Erdoğan stated “the process had been put into deep freeze” but not outright terminated. The results show that the AK Party received strong political support from both Kurds and Turks on 1 November, and this time around it will be able to find serious counterparts in the parliament that are committed to a political solution. The approach to this problem is not only important for domestic peace in Turkey, but it also has implications for regional balances considering the situation in Syria and Iraq. However, the way that the issue is handled will now be more important than before.

Apart from these challenges, there is a need to decrease the political tension in Turkey, which has peaked over the last two years due to election rallies as well as ominous domestic and regional developments. In this regard, the AK Party needs to pave the way for a smooth transition in Turkey by adopting a constructive tone and participatory political approach both within the parliament and society at large. This might help the AK Party to consolidate its power and turn back to its “factory settings of 2002” in order to build “a new Turkey”, as was the desire expressed by the party leadership during the campaign period.

Note: This analysis was firstly published at Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies’ webpage (http://english.dohainstitute.org/release/e6fb5e01-69b4-49f5-91fe-a7ff7ba063f0)

[1] It has become a tradition for the leader of the AK Party to deliver a speech from the balcony of the party’s headquarters in Ankara on election night.

By Monish Tourangbam*

Gun rights, as rooted in the US Constitution’s second amendment, and gun control, reflective of rising gun-related crimes in the United States has been a primary issue in American politics. The tug of war is basically between those who argue gun ownership as a way of defending oneself and others, and those who see owning guns as a ticket to rising violence. Moreover, the philosophy of gun rights has been constantly propagated as one of individualism and liberty—core American values. It is also guided by a quintessential American disbelief in the government’s ability to come to one’s rescue at times of mortal danger. From the Columbine High School Massacre in Colorado to the recent massacre at Umpqua Community College in Oregon, repeated incidents of reckless gun ownership and its violent consequence has rocked American society and political debates. However, American as well as observers abroad seem resigned to the idea that the dust would soon settle down and it will be business as usual.

So, what are American politicians saying this election season on the divisive issue of gun control and gun rights? How strong is the National Rifle Association’s (NRA) influence to stem any substantive steps towards gun control, and what do public opinion polls say? Will President Obama’s passionate call for stricter gun laws from the pulpit bring any change, or will he go towards the sunset in 2016 with having done practically nothing on this issue?

In the recently concluded Democratic debate in Las Vegas, gun control was a major issue of debate. This is unlike previous election seasons when democratic candidates were more cautious about talking gun control for fear of losing rural white voters and some critical swing states like Ohio and Colorado. A general outrage was seen at the continued inaction on restricting gun owners and gun manufacturers. Democratic Presidential candidate Hillary Clinton said, “We have to look at the fact that we lose 90 people a day from gun violence….This has gone on too long and it’s time the entire country stood up against the NRA.”

The NRA has been a ubiquitous feature of the gun control debate, often being seen as that ultimate wall standing on the way to effective actions towards stricter gun control laws in the United States. The money power of the group coupled with the loyalty and the political activism of the members apparently make it a formidable force against gun-control advocates. It reportedly has an operating budget of some quarter of a billion dollars and between 2000 and 2010, it spent fifteen times as much on campaign contributions as gun-control advocates did. Given the increasing number of gun-violence related deaths in the US, it is ironic that the NRA website says, “There’s never been a more important time to become a member.”The group has aggressively created a fear psychosis among the people that the gun control candidates were out to destroy the “sacrosanct” right to bear arms.

But over the years, groups opposing the gun rights activism, and supporting gun control advocacy have also increased their campaigns. For instance, Michael Bloomberg’s Super PAC, Independence USA, has spent millions backing gun-control candidates, and he has pledged fifty million dollars to the cause. Many of these campaigns are now directed to supporting candidates who call out for and fight for stricter screening and background checks for gun buyers. Post the Oregon massacre, President Obama pitched for tighter gun laws like never before, urging Americans to become “single issue voters.” He said that helping elect officials who were sensitive towards the gun laws issue was the only way to bring about some action in the Congress.

According to President Obama, Americans should not elect officials who “oppose gun safety measures,” even if they were “great on other stuff.” Republican presidential candidate Jeb Bush drew flak from President Obama for referring to the Oregon mass shooting as “stuff happens.” “Look, stuff happens, there’s always a crisis. And the impulse is always to do something and it’s necessarily the right thing to do,” Bush said. Bush has an A+ rating from the NRA, like his fellow Republican opponent Ted Cruz. Both have consistently opposed stricter gun laws.”The Second Amendment to the Constitution isn’t for just protecting hunting rights, and it’s not only to safeguard your right to target practice….It is a Constitutional right to protect your children, your family, your home, our lives, and to serve as the ultimate check against governmental tyranny — for the protection of liberty,” said Cruz.

While Democrats increasingly swear by the rising number of Americans who support stricter gun laws, including barring convicted criminals and those with mental illness from buying guns, the debates regarding people’s support for gun control or gun rights are not that clear. While there seems to be increasing outcry against gun-related violence, people’s opinion seems to be more complicated when it comes to seeing gun ownership as the cause for these incidents. Periodic public opinion polls give varying results regarding Americans’ support for gun rights versus gun control. While a December 2014 Pew survey tilted the scale towards the former, a more recent mid-July 2015 survey slightly shifted the scale towards the latter. Americans, in general, seem to think that crime is rising in the country. But at the same time, there seems to be a rising perception among this group that owning guns, and not controlling them, could make them safer. As opposed to Americans previously citing hunting as the main reason for owning guns, they now increasingly cite protection as the main reason.

Responding to the surge of activism among the Democratic leaders on the need for gun control, NRA spokesman Andrew Arulanandam said, “The only problem with the Democrats anti-Second Amendment strategy is that the vast majority of Americans disagree with them on this issue.” There seems to be hardly any consensus emerging on the effectiveness of background checks to stem gun-related violence. Gun rights advocates have branded the entire background checks system as not only flawed but unconstitutional as well, likening it to controversial initiatives like the prohibition or the war on drugs. On other hand, those who speak for gun control recognize the loopholes in the National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS) run by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). However, they deem it necessary and vouch for the need to fix it rather than dismiss it as wholly ineffective.

Gun ownership and the related constitutional right are reflective of the course of American history and culture that prides individualism and a generic lack of faith in the government to come to the individual’s rescue. However, given the complexities in finding the balance between preventing rising mass shootings and an age-old American “common-sense” of owning guns, the fight between gun control and gun ownership will continue to be a divisive issue in US politics and elections.

*Monish Tourangbam is an assistant professor at the Department of Geopolitics and International Relations, Manipal University, Karnataka

With the collapse of the Communist countries in the 1990’s and their conversion to capitalism, followed by the advent of neo-liberal regimes throughout most of Latin America, Asia, Europe and North America, the imperial regimes in the US and EU have established a new political spectrum, in which the standards of acceptability narrowed and the definition of adversaries expanded.

Over the past quarter century, the US and EU turned their focus from systemic adversaries (anti-capitalist and anti-imperial states and movements) to attacking capitalist regimes, which (1) had adopted nationalist, re-distributive and Keynesian policies; (2) had opposed military interventions, coups and bases; (3) had aligned with non-Western capitalist powers; (4) had opposed Zionist colonization of Palestine and Gulf State-financed Islamist terrorists; (5) and had refuse to follow the financial agendas dictated by Wall Street and the City of London investment houses, speculators and vulture funds.

The Western imperial regimes (by which we mean the US, Canada and the EU) have exercised their political, military, economic and propaganda powers to (1) eliminate or limit the variety of capitalist options; (2) control the kinds of market-state relations; and (3) secure compliance through punitive military invasions, occupations and economic sanctions against targeted adversaries.

The ‘Media Troika’: the Financial Press and Political Warfare

The major financial newspapers of record in the United States have played a key role in disseminating the post-communist political line regarding what are acceptable capitalist policies: The Wall Street Journal, (WSJ), the New York Times (NYT), and the Financial Times (FT) – the ‘Troika’ – have systematically engaged in political warfare acting as virtual propaganda arms of the US and EU imperialist governments in their attempts to impose and/or maintain vassal state status on countries and economies, ‘regulated’ according to the needs of Western financial institutions.

The propaganda Troika not only reflects the interests and policies of the ruling elites, but their editors, journalists and commentators shape policies through their reportage, analyses and editorials.

The Troika’s methods of political operation and the substance of their policies preclude any kind of balanced reportage.

Day in and day out, the Troika (1) fabricates ‘crises’ for adversaries and illusory promises of ‘recovery’ for vassals; (2) distorts and/or omits favorable information regarding adversaries, dismissing targeted regimes as ‘authoritarian’ and ‘corrupt’. In contrast, obedient and submissive rulers are described as ‘pragmatic’ and ‘realist’. The Troika attributes ‘military threats’ and ‘aggressive behavior’ to adversaries engaged in defensive policies, while labeling vassal state invasions or aggression as justified, retaliatory or defensive.

A close reading of the reportage by the stable of Troika scribes over the past 2 years reveals the repeated use of vitriolic and highly charged terms in describing adversarial leaders. This prepares the reader for the one-sided, negative assessment of past, present and future policies adopted by the targeted regime.

Once the imperial states and the Troika decide on targeting a government and its leaders, all the subsequent ‘news’ is designed to present the motives of these leaders as ‘perfidious’ and the economic and social impact of their policies as ‘catastrophic’.

And whenever the ‘Troika’s’ analyses or predictions or prognostications turned out to be blatantly wrong – there are never corrections. Brazen lies are glossed over with nary a ripple in their smooth fabric of propaganda.

Once a government is designated as ‘enemy’ (ripe for ‘regime change’), the Troika recycles the same hostile messages almost daily. The readers, upon viewing Troika headlines, already know at least three quarters of the content of the ‘article’. A small portion of a report may refer tangentially to some particular event or policy decision for which the diatribe launched.

Working hand-in-hand with Western imperial regimes, the Troika targets the same regimes, using the exact same terms dished out by imperial policy spokesmen and women.

In this essay, we will discuss the main regimes and policies targeted by the Troika and its Western imperial state partners. We will then proceed to evaluate Troika facts, interpretations and their track record from the beginning of the onslaught to the present. We will conclude by examining the conversion of the mainstream ‘serious’ financial press into a triumvirate of tub-thumping warmongers.

The Troika’s Targeted Regimes: Trumpeting Their Sins and Denying Their Successes

The Troika’s propaganda war not only converges with the imperial states’ destabilization policies (‘regime change’) but also is aimed at specific policies and agreements among supposed allies, partners and even vassal states.

The intensity of vitriol and the frequency of hostile articles vary according to the level of conflict between the imperial regime and its target for ‘regime change’. The greater the conflict the more violent the language.

We find intense Troika hostility, in the form of frequent, hysterical attacks, directed against Russia, China, Venezuela, Argentina and Palestine. Even any suspected ‘deviations’ by vassals, like Chile or Brazil, in the form of popular domestic social legislations, are subjected to stern scolding and warnings of dire consequences.

The Troika Maligns Russia

The Troika’s attacks vary to some degree with each target. In the case of Russia, the Troika routinely denounces President Vladimir Putin as an authoritarian ruler who has undermined Russian democracy. They claim Russia’s economy is in crisis and facing imminent collapse. They vilify Russia’s military assistance to the Syrian government of Bashar Assad. They question the viability of Russia’s military treaties and economic agreements with China. In sum, the Troika portrays Russia as a once peaceful, democratic law-abiding country (during the kleptocratic years of Boris Yeltsin in the 1990’s), which has been taken over by former secret KGB officials who have embarked on reckless overseas military adventures, while repressing their own ethnic Muslim populations (in Chechnya and Dagestan) and which is being run into the ground because of mismanagement and Western economic sanctions. They never bother to explain why the ‘authoritarian’ Putin maintains a consistently high citizen approval despite the Troika’s litany of evils…

Troika-Backed Ukrainian Puppet Secures 1% Approval:

In December 2013, US Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Victoria Nuland, the foul mouth diplomat, puppet dominatrix and austerity zealot, bragged that Washington had poured $5 billion dollars into Ukraine in order to pursue ‘regime change ‘and install a puppet regime headed by President Petro Poroshenko and Prime Minister (‘Our Man Yats’) Arseniy Yatsenyuk as Prime Minister. Obedient to his Western sponsors and the Troika, Yatsenyuk proceeded to sign off on an IMF bailout and austerity program slashing salaries and pensions of Ukrainian citizens by half, reducing GNP by 25%, ending fuel and food subsidies and tripling unemployment. These policies brought windfall profits for his billionaire crony capitalists and intensified corruption. The Troika labelled the Nuland’s putsch a ‘democratic revolution’, applauding Yastenyuk for vigorously applying the IMF dictated program and predicted a prosperous future…

As discontent spread and anger mounted among Ukrainian citizens, Yatsenyuk continued to feed his own ego by reading the Troika’s puff-piece editorials lauding his courage for staying the course of austerity and ignoring his compatriots’ opinion polls, up until the October 25, 2015 elections.

As the elections neared, opinion polls revealed that 99% of the electorate (which excluded millions of restive citizens of the Donbas region) completely rejected Arseniy (now known as ‘Nuland’s arsehole’) Yatsenyuk. Faced with the universal rejection of his starvation policies and crony capitalism, he withdrew his party (the Popular (sic) Front) from the election, but not from the ‘democratic’ government…

For two years the Troika had praised the Kiev junta, fabricating ‘reports’ about Kiev’s positive economic ‘reforms’ ….which had benefited the 1% corrupt oligarchs while impoverishing the masses. The Western propaganda mills systematically distorted popular reaction among the Ukrainian citizens, citing imaginary ‘anonymous experts’ and phantom ‘men in the street’ in praise of the debacle. Never had the Troika engaged in such blatantly deceptive ‘journalism’ as its account of the two years of pillage and mass immiseration under Prime Minister Yatsenyuk. And when ‘Yats’ was faced with total repudiation, he blithely dismissed Ukrainian public opinion, claiming he was ‘not concerned by temporary (sic) political party ratings’. His indifference with an electoral repudiation of 99% is rooted in a delusion that he will remain Prime Minister because he is widely praised by the EU, the US, the IMF … and the media Troika.

The Troika and China: Here Comes the Crash . . .?

In its ‘journalistic pivot to Asia’, the Troika deprecates China’s high-growth economy by questioning its data and by repeatedly predicting the impending crisis, breakdown and mass disaffection.

The Troika describes China’s defense policy as a ‘military threat to its neighbors’ and labels its overseas trade and investment policies as ‘neo-colonial exploitation’.

China’s national campaign against corruption and its prosecution of corrupt officials is dismissed by the Troika as a ‘political purge by a power-hungry president’.

The Troika attributes Chinese advances in science and technology as mere ‘cyber-theft of Western innovations’.

The movement of Chinese workers (internal migration) to areas with better paying jobs and investments is called ‘colonization’.

The Chinese government’s response to terrorism and armed separatists from Tibet and the Western Uighur regions is denounced as “Beijing’s systematic violation of the human rights of minorities”.

The Troika Castigates Capitalist Argentina (for a Decade of Growth)

Argentina has been on the Troika’s radar for a decade, despite the fact that it has a center-left government, which rescued capitalism from a total collapse (the Crisis of 1998-2002) restoring the growth of profits. Multi-nationals, like Monsanto and Chevron, enjoy huge returns on their investments in Argentina.

The Troika denounces the government for running up budget deficits while ignoring the impact of a Manhattan court judgement to award a group of Wall Street ‘vulture fund’ speculators ‘interest payments’ of one-thousand percent on old pre-crisis debt.

The Troika claims the regime engages in populist excesses, which prevent large-scale inflows of investment capital.

The Troika describes the recent slowdown in the economy as a ‘deep crisis’, which requires ‘deep structural changes’ (namely the elimination of social funding for pensioners, low income wage earners and school children).

The Troika paints a catastrophic picture of Argentina: a decaying economy run by a demagogic political leadership engaged in falsifying data…to mask an imminent collapse…

Troika and its ‘Hate Venezuela’ Campaign

The Troika’s journalists and editorial writers, portray Venezuela as an unmitigated disaster: a stagnant and collapsing economy, ruined by an authoritarian populist regime repressing peaceful opposition dissenters.

According to the Troika, Venezuela is incapable of providing basic goods to consumers. Instead it resorts to draconian confiscation of goods from honest businesses – unjustly accused of hoarding and profiteering. The daily reality of manufactured ‘shortages’ is consistently ignored.

When the Venezuelan government attempts to stop violent cross border raids by Colombian paramilitary gangs and smugglers it is denounced as arbitrarily repressing Colombian immigrants.

When Caracas arrests opposition leaders because of their well-documented involvement in violent street demonstrations, promoting the sabotage of power plants and clinics and for planning coups, they are portrayed as violating the ‘human rights of legitimate dissidents.’.

The Troika never mentions the tens of millions of US dollars provided by Washington to opposition NGOs to pursue its destabilization campaign against Venezuela. It labels US-funded opposition NGO’s as “independent civil society organizations” (just like Ukraine before the putsch).

For almost 2 decades, the Troika has praised Venezuelan opposition groups as formidable critics of the Chavez-Maduro government, but has never explained to their readers why such ‘formidable’ groups have been soundly defeated in 14 of the 15 elections.

The Troika and Palestine: In Defense of Israeli Terror

In its Middle East coverage, the Troika consistently depicts the Palestinians as violent terrorists and aggressors while describing Israelis as their victims. According to the Troika, the Israeli army is engaged in justifiable ‘reprisals’ when they bomb and slaughter Palestinian civilians trapped in Gaza. The endless dispossession of Palestinians of their homes, farms and rights and the violent settler occupation by Israeli Jewish colonists is presented as the just settlement of Jews escaping persecution.

No mention or little importance is given to:

1. Israeli-Jewish desecration of Islamic and Christian religious sites;
2. Israeli systematic terror and mass jailing of peaceful protesters.

Palestinian resistance is described as ‘incendiary, irrational violence’.

The Troika journalists produce ‘articles’ which are virtually indistinguishable from the press handouts of the Zionist Power Configuration in the US. The Troika even chastises their partner US-EU regimes for their bland criticism or expression of shock at Israel’s most egregious crimes.

The Troika echoes Israeli and Zionist attacks on international tribunals charging Israeli officials with crimes against humanity. The Troika claims they lack ‘balance’.

The Troika and Syria: Armchair Generals

The Troika has demonized the Syrian government of Bashar Assad while backing jihadi terrorists dubbed ‘rebels or ‘moderates’. It has long argued for greater direct military intervention by NATO armies to overthrow the government in Damascus.

The Troika, masquerading as an independent ‘financial press’ publishes scores of articles by dozens of ‘armchair generals’ who concoct military strategies against Damascus while ignoring heavy economic costs, the social catastrophe of 4 million internal and external Syrian war refugees and the grave consequences of the splitting up a once-unified secular nation-state.

The Troika and Wayward Neo-Liberals

The Troika even chastises states and governments which have adopted ‘free market policies’ but maintained or introduced moderate social palliatives. For example, the Chilean regime of Michelle Bachelet fell victim to Troika criticism for promoting a mild increase in corporate taxes and implementing trade union legislation allowing for greater workers’ rights. According to the Troika, these mild reforms have led to economic stagnation, a decline in investment and greater social polarization.

Evaluation: Unmasking the Troika’s Distortions, Fabrications and Falsifications

The Troika’s ‘journalism and editorializing’ on Russia has totally distorted its recent political and economic history. Like all confidence men, Troika journalists and editors mix a few threads of facts with patent falsehoods, magnifying defects and minimizing achievements, ignoring positive long-term trends and emphasizing episodic negatives.

The Troika’s accounts of Russia’s recent military and diplomatic assistance to the Syrian government’s struggle against Islamist terrorists, ignores the achievement in reversing IS advances and stabilizing the central government.

The Troika paints a specter of Great Russian geopolitical expansion and ignores the long-standing political partnerships and alliances between Russia and major countries in the region, Iraq, Iran, Lebanon, Syria and Jordan.

With matters ‘economic’, the Troika describes the ‘catastrophic’ impact of US-EU sanctions against Russia over Ukraine, while ignoring the positive long-term results for Russia’s economy –greater self-reliance and investment in manufacturing and agriculture as a stimulus to local producers and the emergence of alternative overseas suppliers and markets, especially China and Iran.

The Troika highlights Russia’s two-year recession while ignoring a decade and a half of substantial growth after the catastrophic ‘Yeltsin’ years.

The Troika falsifies past and present political developments. They discretely praise the Western-backed violent gangster-oligarchs who ruled Russia during the pillage years of the 1990’s as a democracy while denouncing the relatively peaceful and competitive elections under the Putin Presidency as ‘authoritarian’.

The Troika resorts to similar propaganda ploys with China. Any slowdown from China’s three decades of double digit growth gets spun as an imminent collapse, ignoring the fact that the US-European business community can only dream of China’s still robust growth rate of 7%.

The allegations of Chinese cyber theft of Western science and technology ignore the obvious fact that China’s enormous public investment in basic and applied science and technology in dozens of centers of excellence has produced stunning achievements and levels of scholarship. A review of the international scientific literature and journals – paints an entirely different picture of Chinese advances from that described by the Troika.

Chinese economic growth through seaborne exports requires major investment and commitment to its maritime routes and security. To counter Chinese growth and assert US supremacy, Washington has signed new, provocative military pacts with Japan, Australia and the Philippines and escalated the intrusion of its planes and ships into Chinese waters and airspace. The Troika labels China’s defense of its waterways as an “aggressive” military threat to its regional neighbors, while US military investments in bases in Asia and constant intelligence gathering exceed Beijing’s five- fold. US warships brazenly violate China’s 12 mile maritime boundary.

Troika scribes completely ignore the recent history of US and Japanese empires invading dozens of Asian countries, establishing colonies, and killing scores of millions of people. In contrast to the enormous US strategic ring of military bases and communications outposts throughout the Asia-Pacific region, China has no foreign bases or overseas troops – a fact one will never learn from the ‘Troika’

The Troika’s campaign against Argentina, permeating its pages, minimizes the role of a short-term contemporary slow-down in international demand for commodities and attributes Argentina’s problems to its welfare programs, capital controls and state regulation. The Troika fails to acknowledge the past decade of growth, prosperity and rising living standards among the people in Argentina.

The source of Argentine stagnation is not because of a lack of free market policies but the Fernandez regime’s accommodation and promotion of the interests of international bankers, virtually all foreign debt holders (except one notorious ‘vulture’!) and extractive capitalists (agribusiness, Monsanto, Barrack Gold etc.).

The Troika ignores ‘the decade of infamy’ – the 1990’s – during which Argentina served as a bargain bazaar for the privatization of lucrative public enterprises and eventually collapsed in the 2001 crash with major bank closings, one hundred thousand bankruptcies and five million unemployed (30% of the labor force) – a thoroughly pillaged economy. Instead the Troika fabricates an ideal world of past free market prosperity in order to condemn contemporary Argentine, ignoring the real historical record of a liberal debacle and Keynesian recovery.

Venezuela is currently in a severe crisis, as the Troika scribes remind us in their shrill reports – blaming it entirely on ‘populist’ (i.e. public spending on social welfare) and ‘nationalist’ policies.

The Troika ignores the well-documented sabotage by the importers and distributers in the private business community, hoarding, excess profiteering and currency speculation. These problems are exacerbated by the sharp decline of oil revenues resulting from international market forces, and not merely government mismanagement.

The Troika tells their readers that the Chavez and Maduro governments are authoritarian, ignoring the dozen and a half free and competitive elections since Chavez’ ascent to power. Moreover, the Troika has remained rather quiet over their verbally violent editorial support for the opposition business-led and US embassy-backed military coup in 2002 and an aborted coup in 2014.

Conclusion

The Troika: the Wall Street Journal, New York Times and the Financial Times have repeatedly made false prognoses regarding the economic performances of governments targeted for ‘regime change’. Their economic predictions were repeatedly wrong and their readers among the investor public would have lost their shirts if they had taken their cues from the Troika’s editorial pages and bet ‘short’ against China and the rest…

Their perverse denunciations of Russian and Chinese military defense activities are sharpening world tensions. Their support for ethnic separatists in the Russian Caucuses and western China has encouraged acts of terrorism leading to the deaths of hundreds of Chinese workers murdered by Uighur and Tibetan terrorists, hundreds of Russians at hands of Chechen terrorists and thousands of Russian-speakers in Ukraine’s Donbas region.

The Troika cannot be relied on for reliable information, especially regarding the economic, political and foreign policies of US and EU adversaries (those targets for ‘Regime change’).

At most their polemical screeds give the discerning reader an insight into the propaganda line promoted by the Western powers.

Moreover in recent times, the Troika has become even more strident and militaristic than the ruling elites. The Troika’s armchair generals mocked Obama for not sending ground troops into Syria; chastised the US and EU for signing the nuclear agreements with Iran; and embraced Israel’s systematic murder of Palestinians.

Unreliable and more given to strident invective than reporting the facts in a balanced way, the Troika has lost credibility for intelligent, serious readers who strain to ‘read between the lines’ when they write that a government is ‘unpopular’ during elections. More likely than not, the incumbents sweep the elections and retain popular majorities as has been the case so far in Russia, Argentina, Venezuela and elsewhere.

If and when the Troika succeeds in promoting more wars, as it has been doing in Iraq, Libya, Syria, Yemen and Somalia, each and every militaristic adventure will lead to economic and social disasters spawning millions more refugees.

When imperial governments, like England, adopt conciliatory policies toward China, eschewing zero sum confrontations, in favor of win-win cooperation, the Troika’s armchair generals are sure to mock and accuse the conservative government of ‘kowtowing’ to authoritarians – dismissing the $30 billion dollar investment deals.

The Troika has gone far beyond its earlier role of presenting the line of imperial regimes. They now march, rather independently, to the military drum of real and imagined nuclear warriors and terrorists. Welcome to the “free press” and the ‘lies of our Times’!

By Le Hong Hiep *

The conclusion of the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership (TPP) Agreement negotiations on 5 October 2015 has been hailed by the twelve participating countries as a landmark for regional economic integration. The agreement is also seen by many experts as having far-reaching regional and global strategic implications. As a member of the TPP, Vietnam will stand to benefit from the agreement both economically and strategically, but the country will also be faced with considerable challenges. How Vietnam will capitalize upon the opportunities and handle the challenges may shape the country’s economic, political and strategic trajectory for years to come.

This essay provides a preliminary assessment of the potential economic, political and strategic impact of the TPP on Vietnam. It argues that Vietnam may gain significantly in terms of GDP growth, export performance and FDI inflow. In the long term, the economy will also benefit if further legal, institutional and administrative reforms are undertaken along with improvements in the state-owned and private sectors. Politically, immediate impacts will be limited, but the country may become more open and conducive to further liberalization in the long run. In strategic terms, the agreement will help the country improve its strategic position, especially vis-à-vis China in the South China Sea, although such an impact is not imminent and should not be exaggerated.

The essay is divided into four sections. The first provides an overview of Vietnam’s recent international integration agenda and its participation in TPP negotiations. The other three will analyse the agreement’s economic, political and strategic impacts on the country.

VIETNAM’S PARTICIPATION IN TPP NEGOTIATIONS

Since the adoption of Doi Moi in the late 1980s, Vietnam has been consistently pursuing broader and deeper international economic integration to support its economic growth. Various official documents of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) have stressed the importance of international integration as a tool to develop the country.1 Most recently, in April 2013, the Central Committee of the CPV passed Resolution No. 22-NQ/TW on international integration, confirming that “proactive and active international integration is a major strategic orientation of the Party aimed to successfully implement the task of building and protecting the socialist Fatherland of Vietnam” (CPV, 2013). Such guidelines have resulted in Vietnam’s rather liberal foreign trade agenda over the past two decades.

A major indication of this policy is Vietnam’s aggressive pursuit of both multilateral and bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) with various partners, especially in recent years (see Table 1).

Table 1: Vietnam’s FTAs and their status

Among the FTAs that Vietnam is pursuing, the TPP is of particular importance for a number of reasons. First, as TPP member countries account for 39% of Vietnam’s total exports in 2014, deeper integration with these economies will enhance Vietnam’s export performance. As Vietnam has not concluded a bilateral FTA with the United States, the TPP will also be an alternative solution to boost Vietnam’s exports into this important market. 2 Such considerations were highly relevant after the 2007-08 Global Financial Crisis broke out and constrained Vietnam’s export performance, a major engine of the country’s growth.3 In addition, a greater inflow of foreign direct investment (FDI) may be another healthy impact of the TPP on the country’s long-term economic prospects.4

The high standards set by the TPP provided yet another important incentive for Vietnam to pursue the trade deal as certain segments within the country’s leadership expected to use the agreement to push for substantive domestic reforms (see for example Vinh, 2015), especially regarding state-owned enterprises (SOEs).5 Meanwhile, Vietnam’s policy makers also view the TPP as a measure to balance against China’s unwarranted economic influence. In 2014, for example, China accounted for 29.6% of Vietnam’s total imports, and Vietnam ran a deficit of US$28.96 billion in its trade with the northern neighbour (General Department of Customs, 2014). Such a heavy dependence on China for imports has been seen as a security vulnerability for the country. TPP’s strict regulations such as the “yarn forward” rules of origin6 are therefore expected to help Vietnam improve its trade position vis-à-vis China in the long run.

According to a document released by the Ministry of Industry and Trade (MOIT), during the negotiations, Vietnam held broad consultations with various stakeholders, including the Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry, industrial associations, representatives of socio- political organizations, researchers, and independent experts. The MOIT (2015, p. 5) also states that it has well achieved negotiating mandates by:

• Successfully safeguarding Vietnam’s “core interests”. It is expected (by the Ministry) that Vietnam will significantly expand its exports as well as GDP, and create more jobs after the agreement comes into effect;
• Ensuring that commitments made by Vietnam are consistent with the CPV’s international integration agenda, and rules and norms set by international organizations to which Vietnam has been a party; and
• Securing other TPP members’ agreement to accord Vietnam with a “considerable level of flexibility” in implementing TPP’s regulations.7 A number of TPP members have also pledged technical assistance to help Vietnam fully implement the agreement.

In sum, the economic and strategic importance of the TPP and Vietnam’s international economic integration strategy accounted for the country’s strong political will to pursue the pact despite its development gap with other members. The conclusion of TPP negotiations in October 2015 was well received in the country, with the mainstream media highlighting the economic opportunities that the agreement may bring Vietnam. At the same time, cautionary notes have also been raised by government agencies and experts regarding the challenges that Vietnam will have to overcome to capitalize upon those opportunities. The following section will assess these economic impacts on the country.

ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES

So far, most analyses tend to concur that Vietnam will benefit significantly from the TPP (see for example Bloomberg, 2015; Eurasia Group, 2015; Petri, Plummer, & Zhai, 2012; Voice of America, 2015; Wall Street Journal, 2015). According to some of these, Vietnam may even emerge as the “biggest winner” among TPP member countries (Bloomberg, 2015). For example, experts from the World Bank estimate that by 2030 the TPP would cumulatively add about 8% to Vietnam’s GDP (Voice of America, 2015). Meanwhile, research firm Eurasia Group claims that by 2025, Vietnam’s GDP will be 11%, or $36 billion, higher than without the trade pact (Eurasia Group, 2015, p. 8). Drawing on analyses by “independent experts”, the MOIT has also claimed that the TPP may help Vietnam expand its GDP by US$33.5 billion and its exports by US$68 billion within a decade (MOIT, 2015, pp. 9-10).

Since the final text of the agreement has not yet been disclosed, the following sub-sections will instead draw on a summary provided by the US Trade Representaive (2015) to provide a preliminary analysis of the impact of the agreement’s key chapters on Vietnam’s economy.

Trade in Goods and Services

An important implication of the TPP for Vietnam may be its deeper participation in the global/regional production network. The anticipated movement of investments by multinational corporations from non-TPP members into the country can help improve Vietnam’s position in the network by expanding its production base and facilitating the establishment of industrial clusters, especially in the industries in which Vietnam enjoys comparative advantages, such as textile and apparel. However, the impact may be constrained if Vietnam does not act fast enough to attract these investments before and in case the TPP is expanded to include other countries, especially its FDI competitors (e.g. Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, or even China).

By eliminating or reducing 18,000 tariff lines on industrial as well as agricultural products, the TPP will create both winners and losers in Vietnam. Greater access to major markets, especially the US and Japan, will boost the export of some major product categories in which Vietnam enjoys comparative advantages, such as textile and apparel, seafood, aquaculture, agriculture and forestry products. At the same time, the livestock industry will face extreme difficulties due to its low competitiveness. The industry, however, will have 10 years to enhance its competitiveness before having to compete with duty-free imported products. Producers of product categories such as dairy, soybean, corn and animal feed inputs may also expect to face considerable challenges (MOIT, 2015, p. 12).

Textile and apparel is generally considered the biggest winner due to its well-established position in the global supply chain and to Vietnam’s relatively low labour costs. Officials from the Viet Nam Textile and Apparel Association (VITAS) estimate that once the TPP comes into effect, the industry’s export turnover could double (Viet Nam News, 2015).8 As each additional billion of dollars in textile and apparel exports is expected to create 250,000 new jobs (MOIT, 2015, p. 10), the TPP will be an essential tool for Vietnam to solve the unemployment problem, thereby avoiding social instability. The footwear industry is likely to play the same role as it is also expected to benefit significantly from the TPP.

Both multinational and local firms will benefit from the expansion of Vietnam’s textile and apparel exports. However, since more international firms will invest in the industry to take advantage of the TPP, labour supply for the industry may start drying up at some point, causing labour costs to increase in coming years.9 The upward pressure on labour costs is further intensified by the government’s schedule to increase minimum wage periodically, and especially workers’ right to an independent union as prescribed by the TPP itself. Consequently, if Vietnamese firms in the industry, especially small and medium-sized enterprises (SME), cannot improve their technology and governance to enhance productivity, they may lose out to MNEs in the long run when low labour costs are no longer their competitive edge.

Where trade in services is concerned, the TPP includes core obligations such as national treatment and most-favoured nation treatment (US Trade Representative 2015). As these are core obligations that are found in the WTO and other trade agreements to which Vietnam is already a party, the rules are compatible with the country’s roadmap of cross-border service liberalization and do not pose new challenges. However, as the least developed country in the group, Vietnam needs to quickly improve the competitiveness of its service sector before it is required to fully comply with TPP regulations. A case in point is the banking industry. Since 2012, Vietnam has been implementing a banking reform to create a leaner and healthier banking system. So far, the country has reduced the number of domestic commercial banks from 42 to 34 through state-sponsored merger and acquisition (M&A) deals between stronger and weaker banks. By October 2015, the State Bank of Vietnam (SBV) had also nationalized three banks. However, the banking system is far from stable and strong as governance remains an issue, especially among those currently or formerly state-owned. Moreover, the considerable amount of remaining bad debts continues to threaten the resilience and sustainability of the system and hinders the substantive preparation it needs to make in order to take on foreign competition.10

Investment

The TPP also requires members to adopt non-discriminatory investment policies and protections, while giving member governments the leeway to achieve legitimate public policy objectives. As Vietnam has been reliant on FDI as a pillar of its growth strategy, its government has made a lot of effort in recent years to improve the investment environment, from upgrading infrastructure to trimming red tape and improving the legal framework. A major indication is the 2014 Law on Investment, which simplifies the investment process, reduces uncertainties, and puts foreign investors on a more equal footing with domestic ones.11 Given these efforts made by the Vietnamese authorities and the TPP’s potential to expand Vietnam’s exports, it is likely that the trade pact will generate a large FDI inflow into the country once it comes into force.

State-owned Enterprises (SOEs)

SOEs play an important role in Vietnam’s economy. In 2013, for example, although representing only 0.9% of the total number of enterprises and employing 13.5% of the total work force, SOEs accounted for 32.2% of Vietnam’s GDP and 40.4% of the country’s total annual investment (GSO, 2015, pp. 62, 75-78, 103).

In essence, the TPP stipulates that member countries’ SOEs or designated monopolies will have to operate on market principles, except when doing so would be inconsistent with their mandate to provide public services. The SOEs will not be allowed to discriminate against the enterprises, investments, goods, and services of other member states. Under the agreement, member states are also required to make SOE operations transparent by providing relevant information, such as the state’s share in the ownership structure and these companies’ audited financial reports. Neither are member states allowed to provide subsidies or non-commercial assistance to SOEs which may have adverse effects on other member states’ businesses.

In this regard, Vietnam has submitted its reservations on defence and national security-related SOEs. For commercial SOEs, Vietnam has committed to exposing them to full and equal competition from private and foreign enterprises. However, Vietnam can still provide certain assistance to SOEs, though not to the extent that this may generate a negative impact on other member states’ companies.

The TPP therefore provides a significant impetus for Vietnam to accelerate its SOE reform, especially the equitization of these enterprises. Although SOE reform has been one of the three key pillars of Vietnam’s economic restructuring since 2012, its progress has been slower than expected due to unfavourable market conditions as well as resistance from certain SOE managers.12 Recently, however, the government has stepped up this effort and taken various measures such as opening up certain sectors traditionally monopolized by SOEs (e.g. coal, electricity and petrol distribution) to competition; expanding foreign investors’ ownership room in equitized enterprises; and disciplining managers failing to meet their equitization deadlines. These developments show that the Vietnamese government is aligning its SOE policy to TPP commitments, which may help improve the performance of SOEs as well as the whole economy in the long run.

Intellectual property and environment protection

The TPP seeks to set high standards on intellectually property (IP) protection, including the introduction of criminal procedures and penalties for commercial-scale infringements of intellectually property, which are seen as stricter than regulations under the WTO. The enforcement of such regulations will add costs to Vietnam’s businesses, especially SMEs, where the use of pirated software is still prevalent.13 In the long run, however, better protection of intellectual property is expected to provide stronger incentives for businesses to invest in creative industries that Vietnam is seeking to develop.

Another major concern regarding TPP regulations on IP is whether they will put constraints on Vietnam’s public health programmes such as its campaign against HIV/AIDS, due to the expected rising cost of medicines or the more restricted access to them. According to the MOIT, however, while Vietnam commits itself to the TPP’s common standards, it will have a “roadmap” of implementation commensurate with its “development level and enforcement capacity” (MOIT, 2015, p. 8). This implies that Vietnam may enjoy some flexibility in this regard, including assistance from other TPP members.

In terms of environment protection, the TPP may have some implications for certain businesses in the fishing and logging/furniture sectors. Some illegal and unsustainable fishing practices popular with small private fishing fleets will have to be repressed, while furniture companies will be advised to turn away from illegitimate yet cheaper sources of timber and related materials. The implications are uncertain, however, as they are subject to the enforceability of regulations in the Vietnamese context where violations are known to still take place and go unpunished despite an abundance of laws and regulations.

POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS

As Vietnam pursues more liberal economic reforms, optimists will have reasons to cherish the hope that one day, economic liberalization will lead to political democratization. However, this seems to be a distant scenario given the long time that it takes for democratizing effects to build up as well as the CPV’s effective strategies to maintain its grip on power while the country went through economic liberalization over the past thirty years.

A relevant cause for optimism about the TPP’s political effect on Vietnam is perhaps the CPV’s willingness to comply with the TPP’s labour regulations. Specifically, the TPP stipulates that member countries will have to protect fundamental labour rights, especially workers’ right to independent union and collective bargaining. Historical precedents, such as the Solidarity movement in Poland, show that independent labour unions can develop into influential political forces that bring about major changes. Such does not seem to be the case in Vietnam. There are several reasons for this.

First, the TPP’s labour regulations are actually drawn from the International Labour Organization’s (ILO) 1998 Declaration. As Vietnam has been a member of the ILO, its agreement to abide by the TPP’s labour regulations is just a re-affirmation of old commitments and is not tantamount to a new concession by the CPV towards political liberalization. Second, although the right to an independent union may be used by some to mobilize political changes in the long run, the CPV will most likely ensure that any labour union established will only serve economic purposes, i.e. to protect workers’ rights and economic welfare. In this connection, the Party and its security apparatus will probably construct certain tactics to “legally” constrain independent unions within certain boundaries, and to prevent them from being exploited politically.
In other words, rather than indicating a genuine relaxation of the CPV’s political control, Vietnam’s commitment to protect labour rights under the TPP is a rational choice made by the Party for other purposes. Proclaiming itself as “the vanguard of the working class”, the CPV has little reason to oppose the TPP’s labour regulations which are supposed to protect workers’ rights and welfare in the first place. Accepting these regulations will therefore contribute to the Party’s political legitimacy while giving Vietnamese negotiators ground to bargain for concessions in other areas.

That said, the TPP is likely to affect Vietnam’s political trajectory in the long run if certain conditions are met. First, it is essential that the implementation of the TPP helps accelerate the economic development of Vietnam and further expand its middle class, thereby laying the foundations for a democratic transition. Second, under competition pressures from the TPP, the CPV itself may find it necessary to undertake meaningful political reforms to free up the country’s economic potential from political and institutional constraints rooted in its one-party system. For example, at the 12th CPV Congress early next year, it is likely that the TPP will be featured as an opportunity for Vietnam, and serve as a basis for reformists to call for further economic as well as political reforms to help the country capitalize on the agreement. Finally, the TPP’s political implications will only become visible if there are mechanisms to ensure its full and effective implementation, especially regarding labour regulations. At the same time, Vietnam’s civil society also needs to develop along the way to take advantage of the narrow opening brought about by the agreement to push for broader political reforms.

FOREIGN POLICY AND STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS

The TPP is indeed the first multilateral trade arrangement outside ASEAN that Vietnam has joined as a founding member and in which it has participated in the rule-making process. The TPP will therefore serve as another landmark in Vietnam’s international integration process. By embedding Vietnam more deeply into the regional trade and production network, the agreement will also help establish the country as an important economic and strategic partner for regional countries. Gradually, Vietnam’s own security and prosperity will become a matter of regional concern. In that sense, if the TPP can help expand Vietnam’s external trade and attract more foreign investment, it may well become a strategic tool for the country to promote not only its own prosperity but also its national security.

It is also noteworthy that the TPP is an American-led initiative. As such, Vietnam’s participation in the TPP will further strengthen its ties with the US. This is particularly important given Vietnam’s recent efforts to forge a closer relationship with the US as well as other regional powers, including Japan (another TPP member), to balance against China in the South China Sea.14 As evidenced by the recent surge in foreign investment into the country’s textile material industry, the TPP will also help reduce Vietnam’s dependence on China for material imports. As such, if the TPP comes into effect, although China may remain Vietnam’s top economic partner for the foreseeable future, its relative importance to Vietnam will be reduced due to the deepening of economic ties between Ha Noi and Washington. China’s economic influence over Vietnam will accordingly be curtailed, providing Vietnam with a better strategic position vis-à-vis its northern neighbour.

CONCLUSION

The TPP is an important landmark in Vietnam’s international economic integration process. Vietnam’s participation in the agreement was driven by multiple economic, political and strategic considerations. In economic terms, the agreement is expected to help the country achieve faster GDP growth, expand its exports, and attract more foreign investment. However, as the least developed member of the TPP, Vietnam needs to address challenges to improve its competitiveness and to maximize its potential gains from the agreement.

Politically, the agreement may mobilize support for more economic as well as political and institutional reforms. Contrary to the popular expectation that the CPV’s commitment to TPP’s regulations on labour rights may indicate a relaxation of the Party’s grip on power, the agreement is unlikely to lead to any significant political liberalization. This is because the Party and its security apparatus may come up with tactics to “legally” constrain the development of independent unions and to prevent them from being exploited for political purposes.

Strategically, the TPP reaffirms international economic integration as a key pillar in Vietnam’s foreign and strategic policy. The agreement will also help Vietnam further strengthen its ties with the US and become less economically dependent on China. However, the TPP’s effect in shifting Vietnam’s strategic balance between the two great powers will not be immediate. It may take years for the TPP to help Vietnam become less economically dependent on China, and for Vietnam and the US to build on the trust premium provided by the agreement. For the time being, the agreement will serve as a facilitator rather than a driver of Vietnam-US relations, and bilateral ties, at least in the short run, will still mainly be driven by Vietnam’s perception of the China threat in the South China Sea.

In sum, the TPP is likely to generate some positive impact on Vietnam, but this should not be exaggerated, and opportunities should be evaluated alongside challenges. The key test for Vietnam is whether the country can undertake timely and effective domestic reforms, both economically and politically, to meet the challenges and to capitalize on opportunities offered by the agreement. Be that as it may, the TPP should remain a case of “cautious optimism” for the country.

About the author:
*Le Hong Hiep is Visiting Fellow at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, Singapore. He is currently on research leave from his lectureship at the Faculty of International Relations, Vietnam National University – Ho Chi Minh City. The author would like to thank Cassey Lee and Daljit Singh for their valuable comments and suggestions.

Source:
This article was published by ISEAS as ISEAS Perspective 63 (PDF).

Notes:
1 For example, the CPV’s 9th National Congress in 2001 set out the guideline on “Proactive international economic integration”. In November 2001, the CPV Politburo issued Resolution No. 07-NQ/TW on “International economic integration”. At its 10th National Congress in 2006, the CPV reaffirmed the policy of “proactive, active international economic integration together with the expansion of international cooperation in other fields”. On 5 February 2007, the Party’s Central Committee passed Resolution No. 08-NQ/TW on “Some major guidelines and policies for fast, sustainable economic development following Viet Nam’s accession to the World Trade Organization”.
2 The US is currently Vietnam’s largest export market, accounting for 19 per cent of its total exports in 2014.
3 For example, Vietnam’s annual export turnover fell 9.7 per cent from US$62.7 billion in 2008 to US$57.1 billion in 2009 (GSO, 2012, p. 492).
4 By the end of 2014, the total registered FDI stock in Vietnam reached US$290.6 billion, of which US$124.2 billion has been implemented. The top ten investors in terms of registered capital were South Korea (37.7 bil.), Japan (37.3 bil.), Singapore (32.9 bil), Taiwan (28.5 bil), British Virgin Islands (18 bil.), Hong Kong (15.6 bil.), USA (11 bil.), Malaysia (10.8 bil.), China (7.98 bil.), and Thailand (6.75 bil.) (GSO, 2015, pp. 109, 113).
5 In 2014, China accounted for 29.6 per cent of Vietnam’s total imports, and Vietnam ran a trade deficit of US$28.96 billion vis-à-vis China (General Department of Customs, 2014). Heavy dependence on imports from China has been seen by many Vietnamese policy makers and politicians as a security vulnerability for the country.
6 The rules require Vietnam to use a TPP member-produced yarn in textiles in order to receive duty-free access to TPP member markets. As China is not a TPP member, while Vietnam depends heavily on China for yarn and textile materials, the TPP has prompted a surge of foreign investment in Vietnam’s textile industry. In the long run, such developments may help reduce Vietnam’s imports of textile inputs from China.
7 The document stresses that Vietnam was actually given “the most flexibility” in implementing TPP commitments, possibly because Vietnam is the least developed country among TPP members.
8 Vietnam’s textile and garment export turnover is forecast to reach US$27.5 to US$28 billion in 2015 (Viet Nam News, 2015).
9 There have been reports on international firms’ difficulties in setting up their factories in the country due to labour shortage. See, for example, Dow Jones Business News (2015).
10 By May 2015, the bad debt ratio announced by the SBV was 3.15 per cent, down from 17.2 per cent in 2012, although some reports indicate the actual ratio might still be higher. The reduction mainly resulted from the transfer of bad debts from commercial banks to the state-owned Vietnam Asset Management Company (VAMC).
11 For example, according to the new law, a business organization with foreign capital shall be treated as a “domestic investor” if its foreign investor(s) holds less than 51% of its charter capital. In this case, the foreign investor(s) shall not be required to obtain an Investment Registration Certificate. Previous regulations require foreign investors to apply for the certificate even when they invest only 1% of a local firm’s charter capital.
12 In 2011, the government set the target of equitizing 531 SOEs by the end of 2015, but by November 2014, this had happened to only 214 SOEs (Ministry of Finance, 2015).
13 For example, according to a senior Microsoft official, 85 per cent of its softwares used in Vietnam are pirated copies. More details available at: https://www.microsoft.com/vietnam/news/genuineshop_090425.aspx. Vietnam is also on the “watch list” for intellectual property rights protection and enforcement, prepared by the Office of the US Trade Representative. More information is available at: https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2015- Special-301-Report-FINAL.pdf
14 For an analysis of recent dynamics in Vietnam’s relations with the US and China, see Hiep (2015).

References
Bloomberg. (2015, 9 Oct). The Biggest Winner From TPP Trade Deal May Be Vietnam Retrieved 20 Oct, 2015, from http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-10- 08/more-shoes-and-shrimp-less-china-reliance-for-vietnam-in-tpp

CPV. (2013). Resolution No. 22/NQ-TW Retrieved 16 Oct, 2015, from http://www.mofahcm.gov.vn/vi/mofa/nr091019080134/nr091019083649/ns140805203450/NQ22.ENG.doc/download

Dow Jones Business News. (2015, 18 Oct). Why the TPP Trade Deal Isn’t All Good for Vietnam’s Factories Retrieved 20 Oct, 2015, from http://www.nasdaq.com/article/why-the-tpp-trade-deal-isnt-all-good-for-vietnams- factories-20151018-00074

Eurasia Group. (2015). The Trans-Pacific Partnership: Sizing up the Stakes – A Political Update. New York: Eurasia Group.

General Department of Customs. (2014). Customs Trade Statistics. Retrieved 27 Jun 2014 http://www.customs.gov.vn/Lists/EnglishStatistics/ScheduledData.aspx?Group=Trade%20analysis&language=en-US

GSO. (2012). Statistical Yearbook of Vietnam 2011. Ha Noi: Statistical Publishing House. GSO. (2015). Statistical Handbook of Vietnam 2014. Ha Noi: Statistical Publishing House. Hiep, L. H. (2015). The Vietnam-US-China Triangle: New Dynamics and Implications. ISEAS Perspective, 45.

Ministry of Finance. (2015, 19 Jan). Nam 2015 tap trung tai co cau doanh nghiep Nha nuoc (Government to focus on restructuring SOEs in 2015) Retrieved 9 Mar, 2015, from http://www.mof.gov.vn/portal/page/portal/mof_vn/1539781?pers_id=2177014&item_id=158447520&p_details=1

MOIT. (2015). Hiệp định Đối tác Xuyên Thái Bình Dương (Hiệp định TPP) và sự tham gia của Việt Nam [The TPP and Vietnam’s participation]. Ha Noi.

By Elise Harris and Kevin Jones

War in Iraq and Syria have taken a heavy toll on the Chaldean Christians of the Middle East. Now Chaldean bishops like Archbishop Bashar Warda of Erbil, Iraq are asking what they can do to help Christian refugees survive and preserve their faith in times of trouble.

“For me, my plan is how to help the Christian families who decided to stay, to stay and live with dignity. That’s my big concern, the whole plan,” Archbishop Warda told CNA Oct. 28.

“To be honest, I cannot tell anyone to stay. There are hundreds of reasons which encourage people to leave. There is no one reason to really urge and help them to stay. But we hope and we have faith that this community would stay, and, please God, be strengthened by the prayers that we’ve receiving,” he said.

Archbishop Warda was one of the bishops at the Chaldean Catholic bishops’ synod, which took place in Rome Oct. 24-29.

The Chaldean Catholic Church’s patriarchal see is Babylon, based in present-day Baghdad. The Church has a presence in Iran, Syria, Lebanon, Turkey, Israel and Egypt, as well as in France and the U.S. There are over 400,000 Chaldean Catholics around the world, according to the Catholic Near East Welfare Association.

Violence in Iraq after the 2003 U.S. invasion and the rise of the Islamic State group in Iraq and Syria has resulted in the targeted killings and expulsions of many Christians. The brutal conflict has caused millions of people, including hundreds of thousands of Christians, to flee their homes.

Many have fled to Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey, while others are displaced within their home countries. Displaced Iraqi Chaldeans have tended to move to Erbil and Dohuk.

The pressures to emigrate abroad are enormous, the archbishop said. “Today if you offer a visa to all the refugees they will take it,” he explained. “But we know that some of them would leave with tears.”

“Not everyone would like to leave, because during the time when there was a possibility to go they preferred to stay.”

The Chaldean bishop in Lebanon is “doing his best” to care for the refugees and to convince them to stay in the Middle East.

Iraqi Christians who remain in the Middle East would be more likely to return to their homes in the Nineveh Plains and Mosul, Archbishop Warda said. “But once they leave the Middle East it would be the end of the story.”

The Chaldean Church does not want to force families to stay, he noted. Rather, the Church wants “just to be with them, and even help them with the material needs and spiritual and pastoral needs they want in this difficult time.”

“Everything is changing, but still, we would like to respond to the immediate needs of the refugees, which is shelter, health, education and other material issues,” the archbishop said, pointing to the bishops’ work with different Catholic aid agencies.

The Chaldean bishops are working with displaced bishops, clergy, and religious sisters from Mosul to ensure spiritual and pastoral care for their flock.

Archbishop Warda’s home city of Erbil, in the Kurdistan region of northern Iraq, is a safe region, though it shares a 650 mile-long border with territory controlled by the Islamic State group.

“The welcoming attitude of the Kurdish government was really a big help which was given to the Christian refugees, and Yazidis,” the archbishop said.

“We have in Kurdistan some 1,800,000 refugees,” he added.

The diocese itself is hosting 10,300 Christian families who left Mosul and the Nineveh Plain. But some 3,000 Christian families left since 2014.

The archbishop said it would be “very hard” to go back to Mosul. Even if it were to be freed from the Islamic State, “we need some time.”

“But to the Nineveh Plains and its villages, yes, people would really like to go back and rebuild life. It would be difficult, it is not really be an easy choice. The commitment and risk is high, especially when you have this kind of broken trust between the communities, but I think the mission of the Church and all Christians is to stay and build bridges. We’ve done it before, I think we will be able to do it again.”

He said dialogue with the Islamic State is not possible because “they would not imagine themselves in any position of dialogue.”

“We are infidels to them,” he said.

Rather, he suggested Christians could engage with other victims of the Islamic State group and “try to build bridges of peace and trust.”

At the Chaldean bishops’ synod, one group of bishops focused on the practical issues facing internally displaced persons and refugees. These issues include knowing their location, their needs and priorities, ways to help, and how to contact hem.

The archbishop said there has been “an increase in the needs” of these people.

A second bishops’ group at the synod focused on issues related to culture and identity. These include questions such as how to welcome the refugees and help them keep their identity, and also “the issue of homeland.”

The Chaldean bishops’ synod also discussed liturgical questions. Two-thirds of the Chaldean community is outside of Iraq. Second generation immigrants speak English, French, German, or Swedish.

This creates liturgical issues of language, translation, and official texts – issues which also bear on morning and evening prayer. The Chaldean bishops typically hold a synod every year. They have decided to dedicate a future synod to the Chaldean liturgy.

By Medea Benjamin*

As the first Democratic presidential debate drew to a close, moderator Anderson Cooper posed a question to Hillary Clinton: How might her presidency differ from Barack Obama’s?

Clinton smiled. “Well, I think it’s pretty obvious,” she replied to rapturous applause. “Being the first woman president would be quite a change from the presidents we’ve had.”

Indeed, a Hillary Clinton presidency would shatter the glass ceiling for women in the United States. But it would also leave intact the old boys’ military-industrial complex that’s kept our nation in a perpetual state of war for decades.

Clinton, it seems, failed to learn anything after supporting the disastrous Iraq War, which plunged a huge swath of the Middle East into chaos and cost her the 2008 Democratic presidential nomination. Instead of embracing diplomacy, she continued to champion ill-conceived military interventions as secretary of state.

In 2011, when the Arab Spring came to Libya, Clinton was the Obama administration’s most forceful advocate for intervening to overthrow Muammar Gaddafi. She even out-hawked Robert Gates, the Pentagon chief first appointed by George W. Bush who was less than enthusiastic about going to war in Libya.

Ironically, the political grief Clinton has suffered over the subsequent attack on a U.S. diplomatic outpost in Benghazi, which killed four Americans, might never have occurred if Clinton had opted against intervening in Libya’s civil war.

While House Republicans recently spent 11 hours relentlessly drilling Clinton about Benghazi and her personal email account, the larger disaster by far is the postwar chaos that’s left Libya without a functioning government, overrun by feuding warlords and extremist militants.

Clinton favors greater military intervention in Syria’s civil war, too. In her presidential bid, she’s joined hawkish Republican senators like John McCain and Lindsey Graham in supporting the creation of a no-fly zone over the country.

That puts her at odds not only with President Barack Obama, but also with her Democratic presidential rival Bernie Sanders, who warned that it could “get us more deeply involved in that horrible civil war and lead to a never-ending U.S. entanglement in that region.”

Clinton did end up supporting the administration’s Iran nuclear deal, but her support came with a history of bellicose baggage.

Back in 2008, for example, she warned that Washington could “totally obliterate“ Iran. During that presidential campaign, she chided Obama as “naïve” and “irresponsible” for wanting to engage the country diplomatically.

Even after the nuclear agreement was sealed, she struck a bullying tone: “I don’t believe Iran is our partner in this agreement,” Clinton insisted. “Iran is the subject of the agreement.” She added that she “won’t hesitate to take military action” if it falls through.

Contrast Clinton with the more moderate Secretary of State John Kerry. It’s no wonder Obama’s two signature foreign policy achievements — the Iran deal and the groundbreaking opening of diplomatic ties with Cuba — came after Clinton left.

There was a very telling moment about Clinton’s attitude during the debate when Cooper asked, “Which enemy are you most proud of?”

Alongside the NRA, Republicans, and health insurance companies, Clinton listed “the Iranians” — which could mean either the Iranian government or the nation’s 78 million people. In either case, it wasn’t a very diplomatic thing to say while her successor and former colleagues are trying to chart a new, more cooperative relationship with Iran.

When it comes to war and peace, it might not matter too much if a Republican or Hillary Clinton wins the White House. In either case, the winner will be the military-industrial complex President Dwight D. Eisenhower warned us about.

*Medea Benjamin, the founder of CODEPINK and Global Exchange, is the author of Drone Warfare: Killing by Remote Control.

The other night I phoned a former Republican member of Congress with whom I’d worked in the 1990s on various pieces of legislation. I consider him a friend. I wanted his take on the Republican candidates because I felt I needed a reality check. Was I becoming excessively crotchety and partisan, or are these people really as weird as they seem? We got right into it:

Me: “So what do really you think of these candidates?”

Him: “You want my unvarnished opinion?”

Me: “Please. That’s why I called.”

Him: “They’re all nuts.”

Me: “Seriously. What do you really think of them?”

Him: “I just told you. They’re bonkers. Bizarre. They’re like a Star Wars bar room.”

Me: “How did it happen? How did your party manage to come up with this collection?”

Him: “We didn’t. They came up with themselves. There’s no party any more. It’s chaos. Anybody can just decide they want to be the Republican nominee, and make a run for it. Carson? Trump? They’re in the lead and they’re both out of their f*cking minds.”

Me: “That’s not reassuring.”

Him: “It’s a disaster. I’m telling you, if either of them is elected, this country is going to hell. The rest of them aren’t much better. I mean, Carly Fiorina? Really? Rubio? Please. Ted Cruz? Oh my god. And the people we thought had it sewn up, who are halfway sane – Bush and Christie – they’re sounding almost as batty as the rest.”

Me: “Who’s to blame for this mess?”

Him: “Roger Ailes, David and Charles Koch, Rupert Murdoch, Rush Limbaugh. I could go on. They’ve poisoned the American mind and destroyed the Republican Party.

Me: “Nice talking with you.”

Him: “Sleep well.”

Most politicians and analysts in both Moscow and the West are so used to considering the countries in between Russia and Western Europe only along an east-west axis that they fail to pay much attention to the efforts of some of these countries to promote a north-south axis – or dismiss such moves as the work of Washington or Moscow.

Many Russians see any conversations about such a north-south alliance as nothing more than an effort by Poland to recover its former greatness or Washington to push Russia even further away from Europe. And many in the West, typically dismissive of “the countries in between” as actors in their own right, also routinely cast doubt on its potential.

But in fact, this north-south grouping of countries from Baltic states in the north to Ukraine, Moldova and even Georgia in the south is currently marked by ever more intensive efforts to find ways for the governments involved to support one another both directly and by making appeals to others.

Yesterday, at a mini-NATO summit in Bucharest, nine countries – Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia signed a joint declaration calling for NATO to maintain a permanent presence in their countries to deter Russian aggression (radiopolsha.pl/6/137/Artykul/227522).

The nine countries said that this was a necessary response to “the illegal annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation, an action which casts doubt on the security of the entire continent.” In addition, the nine called on NATO to expand cooperation with the European Union and on Russia to respect international law.

The idea of a Baltic-Black Sea alliance has a long and complicated history. See in particulate Marek Jan Chodakiewicz’s magisterial Intermarium: The Land between the Black and Baltic Seas (Transaction, 2012), and the present author’s “New Polish President Makes Baltic-Black Sea Alliance a Centerpiece of His Foreign Policy,” August 13, 2015, at jamestownfoundation.blogspot.com/2015/08/new-polish-president-makes-balticblack.html.

And it is clear that the obstacles to its formation both from Moscow and the West and within its possible ranks, especially Belarus and Ukraine, are extremely large, making it easy for many to dismiss this out of hand. But there are at least two reasons why doing so is almost certainly a mistake.

On the one hand, being forced to look at a region of the world from a different perspective on that focuses on an unfamiliar matrix is useful in and of itself as a heuristic device. And on the other, discussions about the possible creation of such an alliance puts in play ideas which may resonate far beyond the scope of those who offer them.

If the document signed in Bucharest is the most obvious high-level realization of the current drive to create an Intermarium, the resolution of a meeting of NGOs from across the region in Warsaw a week ago shows the direction in which thinking about the possibilities of a different approach among those in this region are taking.

Below is a translation of the resolution of the Baltic-Black Sea Community at Warsaw, October 27, 2015, that was provided to the author by one of the participants:

“Guided by the principles of humanism and international law, the participants of the constituent conference in Warsaw adopt the following resolution:

1. We consider the Russian Federation an aggressor since March 2014 for its military intervention in sovereign Ukraine and with its seizure of Crimea and the eastern portion of the country. We demand an end of the occupation.
2. We call upon the authorities of Ukraine to create a Crimean Tatar national-territorial autonomy within Ukraine.
3. We support the action of the Crimean Tatar people by means of the economic blockade of Crimea, which is based on the principles of non-use of force.
4. We recognize the territory of the Chechen Republic Ichkeria as territory occupied by Russia since 1999.
5. We call upon the countries of the West and the Middle East to provide all possible assistance to Chechen refugees who have fled their motherland in order to save themselves from persecution by the occupiers.
6. We consider the alienation by Russia via military means of Georgian territories in 2008 as illegal and view these territories as occupied to this day.
7. We call upon FIFA to review its decision to award the 2018 World Cup competition to Russia, a country which is in occupation of others.
8. We demand that Russia withdraw its forces from all territories of the Chechen Republic Ichkeria, Georgia and Ukraine it now occupies in order to allow the restoration of legitimate authorities.
9. We welcome the efforts of the Global Coalition in support of the legislation ‘On human rights in North Korea’ …
10. We demand the withdrawal from the territory of Belarus all Russian military bases and all Russian units on Belarusian territory.”

In July of 2014, my wife and I cleared customs in the Lhasa Gonggar Airport and emerged, breathlessly, into the brilliant dryness of Tibet. We saw our last name on a placard thrust high above the crowd and towed our roller bags towards a woman in traditional Tibetan dress. She was Lhamo, our guide, and she motioned for us to bow while she threw khatas (ceremonial scarves) around our necks. Lhamo is the daughter of a family from the TAR (Tibet Autonomous Republic) and the mother of two toddlers. She learned English by studying at home and meeting foreigners. She taught us “tashi delek” (greetings), and advised us to “get used to the altitude by taking it easy.” We threw our bags into a Toyota Land Cruiser and she quietly said: “There are two things to remember at all times. Never say the words ‘Dalai Lama’ and never take pictures of police or military.” It was then that we realized this was no Shangri La; instead, we were in a highly militarized community.

Why did I want to go? It all started in 1979 when I studied Buddhism at the Lawudo Gompa in Khumbu on the flanks of Mount. Everest. The Gompa is on the border with Tibet so Tibetan monks and lamas joined the students daily. Tibet’s border was closed to foreigners, but very porous for local folks. Our teacher, Lama Thubten Zopa Rinpoche, was only in his twenties, but he commanded the program with insight. I learned lessons in detachment and humor that have stayed with me. Ever since, I have felt a special respect for Tibetans. In the years after my seminar on Mount Everest, I have wanted to know how Tibetans were doing. After all, it has been 56 since the Plateau was taken over by the PRC. Are we hearing any of the truth in the West? In a world where Tibetans are simplistically described by the PRC and Hollywood, what do Tibetans think about themselves? Finally, I wondered if Tibetan culture is resilient enough to survive a military occupation.

For ten days in July, we visited cities, monasteries, and lakes in the TAR. We had conversations with many Tibetans and Chinese visitors. During the following week, we trekked in Tibetan communities in Yunnan, just across the border from the TAR. After the three-week visit, is it possible for me to write a comprehensive report on Tibet? No way. We only saw only a few areas of Tibet and the schedule was partly controlled by Chinese officials. Nonetheless, we had many free hours in which to explore Lhasa, Shigatse, Namtso Lake and Gyantse. Regardless of limitations, I hope this study will be like a pebble in the waters of discussions about Tibet and the PRC. (Sakya 369)

THREE ELEMENTS

In the months since our visit, a mishmash of observations has been distilled into three dynamic images: (1) Tibetans thriving on the Plateau, (2) Tibetans maintaining religious customs (i.e. represented by the khata) and (3) Tibetans co-existing with military occupation (i.e. the gun). The Plateau, averaging over 4,500 meters in altitude, affects everything, from bodily strength, to the planting of barley, to yaks and goats, and, ultimately, to culture. The khata represents the Tibetans’ link to Buddhism and the Dalai Lama. The gun, representing military checkpoints and armed encampments, places continuous pressure on Tibetans and on tourists.

PLATEAU

The latitude of Tibet is the same as Florida and Georgia, so a visitor might expect a subtropical climate. Such is not the case; in fact, the arid, frigid Tibetan Plateau, nicknamed the “Roof of the World,” is the highest plateau on Earth. It is no wonder that vast areas are practically uninhabited. From the plane, I saw no signs of human existence for most of the flight from Kunming. Later, as I hiked to the some of the highest monasteries in Tibet, I noticed that Tibetans had succeeded in exploiting their environment and they were surviving. Many tourists barely function unless they have supplemental oxygen and my wife almost died from oxygen deprivation.

Being in good physical shape, though, I thought I was ready for the thin air, but I was wrong. One day, on a steep trail leading to monastic caves, I realized that I had dropped the last tourists. Lhamo turned to me and said, “You are really strong.” It is true that I compete in ultra-distance events, but I could see short, thin women passing me at every turn. Impulsively, I turned to a nun who was carrying a bag of cement and asked how much it weighed. My plan was to help her carry it, but, to my astonishment, I could not lift the bag at all. It must have contained well over 50 kilograms. I bowed with embarrassment and murmured “thuk-je-che” (thank you).

As I look back on the Tibetans’ strength, I concluded that the nun was so strong because she had more red blood cells than low landers like me, but now there is evidence that Tibetans have a further advantage, a gene protecting them from thin air: “The prevalence of the gene variant in the Tibetan population was first reported by the team in 2010. It was attributed to natural selection and adaptation to the unusually low oxygen levels. The members of the population without this gene would most like(ly) die before reproducing, ensuring the prevalence of the gene in the surviving population.” (Singh 1)

In other words, Tibetans are a good example of natural selection. Their physiological assets have made it possible to manage high-altitude agriculture. One example is the raising of the yak and female dri. Tibetans use the yak for transportation, milk, tents, butter, clothing and meat. Barley is a another compelling example of Tibetans’ resilience in the midst of a harsh environment. Barley can be grown by almost any farmer and is the people’s food. It is nourishing, filling, and tasty. It is so omnipresent that once I was overcome with the desire to help with the harvest and attempted to cut and tie barley with a peasant.

As a way to understand the overwhelming value of barley, we should look at commentaries about what happened when barley disappeared. To a visitor today, it is inconceivable that there would ever be an absence of barley and toasted tsampa, because tsampa is on every table. But, in one of the tragedies of the Cultural Revolution, the PRC decided to end not only the production of barley, but the farmers’ agricultural labor system.

In the 1960s, “the communes themselves did not even have the authority to decide what crop to plant. The led to pressure to grow wheat instead of traditional barley…But the crops continually failed because of the extreme temperature fall at night…” (Shakya 310, 312, 313) The resulting famine led to the deaths of over hundreds of thousands of Tibetans when they were “forced to replace high-altitude barley, the staple of the traditional diet, with wheat and rice, which fared poorly in Tibet’s arid climate and thin, rocky soil.” (Powers 170)

KHATA

Some cynics say the khata has become a tourist gimmick, akin to receiving a lei when arriving in Hawaii. But the khata is a good symbol of the religiosity and reverence that permeates Tibet. Today, khatas are still signs of respect and celebration. In addition, temples, chortens, prayer wheels, mandalas, koras and rosaries provide even more evidence that Buddhism is inseparable from most Tibetans’ lives. Men and women murmur prayers while counting their rosary beads; thousands load incense in temple ovens, people prostrate themselves as they make their way around major temples. We saw police monitoring Tibetan ceremonies, but the horns, dancing and singing never paused. The khatas represent religious tenaciousness.

The PRC’s attempts to delete pictures of the Dalai Lama seem effective; his image is never seen in the market or temple and his name is suppressed online. In fact, my wife and I started a travel blog, but were unable to overcome the firewalls constructed by Chinese censors. It soon became clear that certain words led to the deletion of our posts. We changed “Dalai Lama” to “yak” and we had sporadic success with a post like this one: “The yak is everywhere and nowhere; he is respected by all.” Later, our guide pointed out that the Dalai Lama’s Buddhist ancestor is Chenrezig, the embodiment of compassion. Since Chenrezig is depicted everywhere, the Dalai Lama is everywhere.

It is a remarkable irony that, due to the Chinese colonization of Tibet, the Dalai Lama has become even more famous. Paradoxically, the PRC might have more easily attained the goal of isolating Tibetans from the Dalai Lama if they had left Tibet alone. The Dalai Lama has inspired Tibetans’ self-confidence since he is the proverbial David fighting Goliath. Sakya cites an example from 1987, when the Dalai Lama spoke to the U.S. Congress. “What struck most Tibetans was the image of the Dalai Lama being enthusiastically received in the parliament of the most powerful nation in the world.” (417)

In 2015, as the Dalai Lama turns 80, one could argue that the Tibetans’ trump card is soon to be lost. However, Shakya says that Buddhism is at the heart of the Tibetans’ world. “Buddhism had always been the core of Tibetan identity, and its clergy the epitome of ‘Tibetanness’…There had always been a strong historical sense that Tibet had been the exclusive territory of the Tibetan people. This was further strengthened by the shared mythical and religious beliefs which regarded certain geographical landmarks as sacred.” (Shakya 417, 421)

GUN

After we drove out of the Lhasa airport, we passed through our first police checkpoint, and it seemed like a normal activity in the post 9/11 era. Once we entered Lhasa proper, however, we saw checkpoints on practically every block. The standard procedure for pedestrians was to place bags on a conveyor belt and walk through a metal detector. The guards were a mix of Tibetan and Han men, some of whom were belligerent to pedestrians. My wife witnessed a guard berating a Tibetan woman and pushing her to the ground.

Checkpoints out of Lhasa are roadblocks where all traffic comes to a halt. Our Tibet permits and Chinese visas were always required and they were processed in about ten minutes. We never got used to the military’s presence, perhaps because it seemed to be larger with each successive day. By Day 4, we saw processions of armored vehicles. Some convoys had 75 vehicles and all seemed to be heading for vast encampments that rose out of the Plateau every 50-100 kilometers. We did not see buildings but rather large circles of vehicles and tents. And, with each day, the detailed instructions from the checkpoints became more preposterous. Our driver had to arrive at each checkpoint at a specific minute so as to show he drove neither too fast or too slow. Once, after driving slightly too fast, the driver had to pull over for about a half hour so as not to arrive too soon. My wife and I took the chance to “visit nature,” but we were worried that somehow our wandering away from the road might be seen as a crime. I guess we were starting to get paranoid.

One way to assess the power of military rule is to evaluate its effect on the average person. In retrospect, there was only one time that we noticed abject fear. At the Pelchor Monastery we wanted to meet the head lama because we had noticed him in several BBC video segments. Due to lucky coincidences, we found his office and told him we admired his role in the videos. At first, he looked afraid, as if he expected us to criticize or punish him. We reassured him that we had great respect for his work and his ability to seem calm and wise in a video. He smiled and we hugged each other. Nonetheless, my wife and our guide felt that the Pelchor monks seemed stricken in ways we saw in no other setting. Lhamo hypothesized that, since the monks had been the focus of a foreign media production, they must have been monitored by PRC officials. They are between a rock and hard place, having to serve the Communist Party and their traditions. Fortunately, we broke through the nervous moments with donations of soccer balls, but I doubt that the levity lasted very long.

Are the immolations signs of Tibetan despair and resignation? I do not understand all of the reasons behind the 142-plus Tibetan immolations, but I imagine that many are protests against the traumatic oppression of monastic life. Tibetans, like all of us, are “vulnerable” to the effects of stress. For Fleming, there may well be “loss or trauma and unresolved historical grief.” (50)

ANALYSIS

As described by Healy in Fleming (25) the basic question is this: does the community have the “capacity…to absorb disturbance while undergoing change so as to retain… identity that preserve(s) its distinctness”? For clues outside of observations, I turn to Sakya who argues that “the majority of Tibetans see the presence of the Chinese both as an embodiment of state power and as a malevolent force which ultimately seeks to destroy Buddhism and Tibetans (italics added).” (447) After visiting Tibet and Yunnan, I agree with Sakya. Tibetans see Han Chinese as a foreign occupation by an enemy army.

Will the religion survive? In the last 25 years, I witnessed the rebirth of the Catholic Church in the formerly communist countries of Georgia, Ukraine, Poland, Bulgaria, Romania and Yugoslavia. Cuba became a communist country in the year the Dalai Lama fled to India, but the Church is thriving and the government welcomes its renaissance. In the same sense, Buddhism will never be extricated from Tibetans. It is the soul force that explains the rigors of the Plateau and what it means to be human in a spartan world.

When faced with famine, military occupation, destruction of monasteries, banning of Tibetan in schools and travel restrictions, will Tibetans eventually be crushed by PRC oppression? Sakya writes that Tibetans are partially immune because “For the majority of Tibetans the high politics of China was remote and irrelevant.” However, Sakya sees earlier traumas that: “…haunt the Tibetan landscape. The people who lived through the period still express their incomprehension…” (347)

CONCLUSIONS

Using Fleming’s definition of cultural resilience, I believe that Tibetans will retain their identity and cultural distinctiveness. They will continue with festivals, songs, food, yaks, goats, poetry, chanting, language and a sense of humor. Tibetans will survive underneath the PRC’s heavy handed reforms while taking advantage of vast engineering improvements. Land, faith, and culture will protect Tibetans in two ways. First of all, as long as they are allowed to live on the Plateau, Tibetans will be inspired by the earth and its produce. Secondly, the PRC’s economic and political changes do not directly challenge the culture of day-to-day life. Underneath and around the guns is a thriving Tibetan Buddhist society.

What could break the will of Tibetans? A wholesale removal of Tibetans from the Plateau and a banning of Tibetan languages would threaten to destroy Tibetan culture. Certainly, the death of the Dalai Lama will alter the landscape, as writer Woeser points out: “(T)he fate of the Dalai Lama remains an open wound in the heart of every Tibetan. He is the supreme leader of Tibetan Buddhism and a living, breathing bodhisattva…But once he is deceased, hope becomes despair, hatred overcomes fear, and bereavement fans fanaticism.” (10) Pessimists may argue that the Tibetans have an impossible situation; after all, China’s economy will soon be the biggest in the world and China will be the greatest empire of this century. However, the Tibetan David has many advantages. A highly motivated diaspora prospers under the leadership of the Dalai Lama and his internet-savvy supporters. This Dharmsala-based community transcends the physical boundaries of China. In a sense, the diaspora applies balm on the Plateau’s psychic wounds. That is a big reason there is hope in Tibet, Amdo and Kham.

In the future, I believe it is crucial to answer these questions:

1. How do Tibetan children learn their native language when it is banned in school?
2. How is PRC censorship being affected by social media?
3. How are the immolations affecting PRC – Tibetan politics?
4. What are the effects of dams and railroads in Tibet?
5. How can monastic scrolls be safe-guarded and translated into other languages?

SOURCES:

• Craige, Tito and Kim Craige, Fearless Plateau, video, Chapel Hill: Craigeclips, 2015.
• Fleming, John and R. J. Ledogar, “Resilience: an Evolving Concept: A Review of Literature Relevant to Aboriginal Research,” Pimatisiwin, Canada: PubMed Central, Summer, 2008.
• Sakya, Tsering, The Dragon in the Land of Snows, New York: Penguin, 1999.
• Sautman, Barry and J. T. Dreyer, Editors, Contemporary Tibet, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2006.
• Singh, Aprajita. “Tibetans Breathe Easy…” Down to Earth, a publication of Common Sense, July 3, 2014.
• Powers, John and D. Templeton, Historical Dictionary of Tibet, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2012.
• Woeser, Tsering and W. Lixiong, Voices from Tibet: Selected Essays and Reportage, Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2014.

By Nick Cunningham

One casualty of the oil price downturn could be the megaproject.

For years, as conventional oil reserves depleted and became increasingly hard to find, oil companies ventured into far-flung locales to find new sources of production. Extracting oil from these frontier areas required more advanced technology and a lot more capital: Ultra deepwater, Arctic offshore, heavy oil sands, and increasingly, the Lower Tertiary.

Often these megaprojects projects were only the purview of the largest oil companies, as smaller players did not have the resources – financial or technological – to make them work. Meanwhile, smaller drillers, at least in North America, turned to shale, which required less upfront cash and could be turned around on a quick timetable.

The collapse of oil prices, however, could kill off the megaproject. The oil majors are scrambling to cut costs, and large-scale projects with high costs and long time-horizons are not making the cut. A combined $19 billion in write-downs was recorded in the last week of October as the oil industry reported third quarter earnings.

Spending on deepwater exploration is expected to be cut 20 to 25 percent industry-wide, according to Barclays, substantially higher than the 3 to 8 percent cut for exploration on all varieties of fields.

One problem for these large projects is chronic delays and ballooning costs. Around 80 percent of large projects fail to stay on budget and come online at the expected start date, according to Bloomberg. About three-quarters of them have suffered delays, and two-thirds have blown through their original cost expectations.

That could force even the oil majors to start to back away from large-scale oil projects. Royal Dutch Shell recently scrapped its Arctic program and wrote off a costly oil sands asset at Carmon Creek. The completion of Chevron’s Big Foot project in the Gulf of Mexico will be pushed back by a few years because of equipment problems.

In a glaring example of shifting priorities, ConocoPhillips announced that it was backing out of deepwater altogether. By 2017, the company says it will cease deepwater exploration and will sell off its offshore leases that it does not plan on developing. Conoco has the rights to 2.2 million acres of Gulf of Mexico territory, and it could still develop some fields, but it will stop searching for new discoveries. The decision will save $800 million in exploration costs, money that will be redirected to exploration in other areas. “We are exercising flexibility in our capital program, dramatically lowering our cost structure and divesting assets that do not compete for funding in our portfolio,” ConocoPhillips CEO Ryan Lance said in a statement.

With the largest oil companies starting to back away from the megaproject, the result could mean a greater focus on shale. Production from an average shale well is a fraction of a deepwater well, for example, and output also suffers from dramatically steeper decline rates compared to offshore. However, drilling a shale well can cost a few orders of magnitude less than a large-scale offshore project. That is a feature that is hard to overemphasize in today’s oil pricing environment.

The narrower focus on smaller projects, especially shale, could mean the end of the megaproject. The collapse in prices may mean we don’t see more white elephants like the Kashagan project in Kazakhstan, an offshore boondoggle that has required more than a decade of development, tens of billions of dollars, and still won’t come online for a few more years. Or, LNG export facilities like the massive Gorgon LNG, led by Chevron, which saw costs balloon to more than $54 billion, could be the last of its kind.

Then again, there is a question about whether or not shale can really be a major source of supply over the long-term. The International Energy Agency sees North American shale peaking towards the early part of the 2020s and declining thereafter, all but making it a blip on the radar when looking at oil production from a long-term standpoint. By the 2020s, the IEA says, the world will once again be dependent on traditional sources of supply – largely from the Middle East.

But for new sources of supply that are not state-owned, the industry may have to shift back to the mega deepwater projects that they are beginning to shun today.

Article Source: http://oilprice.com/Energy/Energy-General/Oil-Megaprojects-Wont-Stay-On-The-Shelf-For-Long.html

ArcelorMittal Europe announced Friday its results for the third quarter ending September 30, 2015 and noted while Ebitda for the quarter was €496 million, the segment recorded an operating loss of €23 million, compared with an operating profit of €125 million for Third Quarter 2014.

According to ArcelorMittal Europe, record levels of imports, particularly from China and the CIS, have placed significant downward pressure on European steel prices. As a result, the segment’s operating profit for the third quarter was negatively impacted by a €256 million exceptional charge related to the write-down of inventory following the rapid decline of international steel prices.

ArcelorMittal Europe said sales also decreased by -5.7 per cent to €6.9 billion this quarter, from €7.3 billion in the corresponding quarter last year, as a result of lower average selling prices and marginally lower steel shipments. Steel shipments in the third quarter decreased by -1.9 per cent to 9.6 million tonnes, compared with Third Quarter 2014.

Commenting on the results, Aditya Mittal, CEO ArcelorMittal Europe, said, “Record, and still rising, levels of imports are materially impacting steel prices. Certain EU anti-dumping investigations are underway, but the process is slow and needs to be more efficient in order to effectively and fairly protect European steel producers from unfair trade. The ongoing price deterioration has led us to book a €256 million exceptional charge for the quarter, meaning we have reported an operating loss for the first time in seven quarters.”

Mittal added that the, “Outlook for European steel demand remains positive, and we forecast apparent steel consumption in 2016 at similar levels to the +2 per cent we have seen for this year. However, given imports into the European market are forecast to remain at high levels, we anticipate pricing pressure to continue into 2016, which will make it challenging for European steelmakers to benefit from the ongoing demand recovery.”

ArcelorMittal Europe said that the European economy is on course for a continued gradual acceleration in 2016, supported by monetary stimulus, a competitive euro, falling commodity prices, and pent-up demand. Consumers are benefiting from low inflation and a steady recovery in employment. Better profitability, improved credit conditions and rising capacity utilisation, should help the modest investment recovery gain some momentum in 2016.

The decision to declare a State of Emergency and suspend fundamental freedoms enshrined in the constitution of the Maldives is the latest in a series of worrying developments in the country, the European Union External Action Office said in a statement Thursday.

On Wednesday, President Abdulla Yameen Abdul Gayoom declared a State of Emergency in all areas of the Maldives for “30 days from 12:00 noon as of 4th of November 2015, pursuant to the powers vested in him by Article 253 of the Constitution.”

Gayoom declared the State of Emergency on recommendation of the National Security Council following the discovery of dangerous weapons and explosive devices in two locations in the Maldives, after the joint operations carried out by the Maldives Police Service and the Maldives National Defence Force, as well receiving information of plans by some individuals to use explosives and weapons that would endanger the lives of the citizens of the Maldives and threaten national security.

Speaking on behalf on the Government, the Attorney General has assured that the highest priority of the Government and its law enforcement agencies was to ensure the safety, security, independence, and peace among the people. He also said that there will be no enforcement of curfew despite the declaration of State of Emergency.

Nevertheless, the European Union External Action Office said, “It is essential that all constitutional fundamental rights and freedoms are immediately restored and that due process of law is respected. A genuine dialogue with all political parties on the future of the country needs to be established.”

The EU expects all parties to act responsibly and to exercise restraint, the European Union External Action Office said.

Despite a 300bps cut in the discount rate and stricter regulatory actions and budgetary measures, the AKD Securities banking universe has posted 9%YoY growth in profits during 9MCY15 to Rs71.0 billion. In this regard, a combination of buoyant non-interest income, continued focus on low cost deposits and strong balance sheet growth remained the key earnings driver countering the uptick in provisions.

During 3QCY15 alone, combined profit after tax rose to Rs24.9 billion, up by 9%YoY/26%QoQ where sequential earnings growth came primarily from normalization of tax rate. With 9MCY15 results drawing to a close, the brokerage house sees banks rounding off CY15 with a decent 5%YoY growth.

However, sustainability of earnings growth in CY16 is hinged upon: 1) reversal of interest rate cycle, 2) strong non-interest income and 3) pick up in loan growth (private sector credit offtake up 6.2%YoY during September 2015.

AKD Banking Universe has posted net profit of Rs71.0 billion during 9MCY15 as compared to net profit of Rs65.1 billion during 9MCY14. Key growth drivers were 1) higher NIMs, 2) strong Balance Sheet growth, and 3) an increase of 27%YoY in non-interest income driven by dividend income /capital gains.

These were sufficient to counter impact of relatively steep increase in provisions and non-interest expenses. The 3QCY15 quarter was characterized by lower taxation and asset quality improvement – absolute NPL at Rs325 billion with NPL ratio/coverage at 14.8%/81%.

CY16 outlook: While 9MCY15 earnings performance has set the tone for decent earnings growth in CY15, CY16 is expected to be a challenging year where full impact of the policy tightening together with re-investment risk will serve to confine earnings growth to mid-single digits. That said, analysts believe prospects for improved loan growth (up 6.2%YoY in September 2015) remain in place while sizeable backlog of capital gains can be utilized to smoothen earnings in CY16.

Considering real interest rates at 400bps, foreign exchange reserves at all time high levels of around US$20 billion and contraction in current account deficit (FYTD at US$109 million as compared to US$1.6 billion during the corresponding period last year), room for a discount rate cut during November can’t be ruled out. Within this backdrop, any resultant dip in stock prices should be considered as an opportunity to add positions at attractive levels.

Aperam announced Friday results for the three-month period ended September 30, 2015, announcing an EBITDA of $108 million in Q3 2015, compared to EBITDA of $155 million in Q2 2015.

The company said that basic earnings per share of $0.40 in Q3 2015 and $1.79 for year to date September 2015 compared to $0.97 for year to date September 2014. Cash flow from operations amounted to $65 million in Q3 2015, compared to $78 million in Q2 2015. Net debt was $419 million as of September 30, 2015, representing a gearing of 19% compared to a net debt of $454 million as of June 30, 2015, Aperam said.

Looking forward, Aperam said that EBITDA in Q4 2015 is expected to be comparable to EBITDA in Q3 2015, while net debt is expected to decrease in Q4 2015.

Aperam said that it is restating a base dividend of $1.25/share (subject to AGM approval), which is anticipated to progressively increase over time, as the company continues to improve its sustainable profitability benefiting from its strategic actions.

Commenting on the results, Timoteo Di Maulo, CEO of Aperam, said, “As expected, the third quarter was marked by seasonality and decline in nickel price. However, Aperam was able to offset most of these impacts thanks to the agility and the resilience of its business model.”

According to Di Maulo, “For the fourth quarter, we remain cautious given the current economic environment but we are confident we will continue to deliver on the Leadership Journey®5 and the Top Line strategy.”

“Looking ahead, we see stainless steel fundamentals improving in our markets and we are confident in the ability of Aperam to generate sustainable cash returns. Therefore, we are happy to reinstate dividend,” Di Maulo.

The chief incumbent of the Kotte Naga Vihara, Venerable Maduluwawe Sobitha Thero, has been flown to Singapore Hospital last night for further medical treatment on the instructions of Sri Lanka’s President Maithripala Sirisena.

Sobitha Thero was undergoing treatment before that in a private hospital in Colombo.

President Sirisena, who was engaged in a state visit to Thailand, personally looked into the illness of the Venerable Thero and has instructed to take necessary measures for further treatment.

It has also been decided after discussions with Prime Minister Ranil Wickremasinghe, for the government to bear the entire cost of medical treatment of the Thero.

Within the framework of “Operation Ice”, Spanish police officers from the Information Brigade of the National Police Force in Madrid have dismantled, the group known as ‘Straight Edge’, with anarchist tendencies, resulting in the arrest of five people.

This group is considered to be responsible for attacks with incendiary devices on four bank branches in Madrid. Although this group principally carried out their criminal activities in Madrid, they are also thought to be the material authors of an attack on a bank and another on a shopping center in Barcelona.

Those arrested will be brought before the National High Court and are accused of the offences of belonging to a criminal organisation with terrorist aims, criminal damage and the glorification of terrorism. Four of those arrested live in Madrid and the fifth in Las Matas, a municipality of Madrid.

In addition to these arrests, officers from the Information Brigade of the National Police Force in Madrid proceeded, with the corresponding court order from the Central Court number 3 of the National High Court, to search several properties. The officers found material there for the manufacture of explosive artefacts, various amounts of gunpowder, fuses, as well as manuals for preparing home-made bombs. They also seized documentation and propaganda relating to the terrorist gang Grupos Anarquistas Coordinados (GAC) [Coordinated Anarchist Groups], the material authors, among other terrorist actions, of the bombs placed in the Basílica de El Pilar (Zaragoza) and La Almudena Cathedral (Madrid).

The discovery of this material confirms the links between ‘Straight Edge’ and the Grupos Anarquistas Coordinados (GAC), particularly with individuals from the GAC who were arrested by the National Police Force on 30 March within the framework of “Operation Piñata”.