Good morning, Sabah Alkhyr, and welcome to this important conference on Islamic Finance.

Let me start by thanking the Central Bank of Kuwait and His Excellency Governor Mohammad Yousef Al-Hashel for hosting and co-organizing today’s conference. I would like to commend His Excellency for his relentless efforts and enthusiasm in promoting Islamic finance. I would also like to thank the Middle East Center for Economics and Finance for co-organizing today’s event.

It is a pleasure to be back in Kuwait, to see all of you gathered here today to discuss Islamic finance. We have a great day ahead of us, with promising panel discussions. We at the IMF are keen to participate, to listen, to collaborate, innovate, and develop the promise of Islamic finance in a sound and sustainable way, by managing risks appropriately and ensuring financial stability. We see this conference today as the opportunity to do so, as the gateway for action to help lift Islamic Finance to full potential. I would like to touch on a few issues that are, in my view, central to our deliberations today.

Before discussing the ongoing challenges that we need to tackle to unlock the promise of Islamic Finance, we should recall what promise Islamic Finance holds—to foster inclusive growth and support the livelihood and aspirations of the people in the region and beyond. And we know, inclusion is key to promote invigorating, reinforcing growth and shared prosperity.

1. The Promise that Islamic Finance Holds

So let me turn to the promise that Islamic finance holds: while Islamic Finance is not new and has been practiced for centuries around the world, it has gained in popularity of late. Total Islamic finance assets are estimated at around $2 trillion, practically a ten-fold increase from a decade ago, and outperforming the growth of conventional finance in many places.

It is easy to see the appeal of Islamic Finance. Here are just two:

First, Inclusivity: Islamic finance has the potential to contribute to higher and more inclusive economic growth by increasing access of banking services to underserved populations. To this day, a large segment of the Muslim population—who are a primary, but not the only, market for Islamic finance around the world—remain financially underserviced, with only one-quarter of adults having access to bank accounts.
In addition, Islamic finance’s risk-sharing features and the strong link of credit to collateral means that it is well-suited for Small and Medium-Sized Enterprise (SME) and startup financing—which we know can promote inclusive growth. For the same reason, Islamic finance has shown its value in infrastructure investment, which can spark productivity gains and catalyze high value-added growth.

Second, Stability: Islamic finance has, in principle, the potential to promote financial stability because its risk-sharing feature reduces leverage and its financing is asset-backed and thus fully collateralized. In addition, besides deposits, Islamic banks offer profit-sharing and loss-bearing accounts that can help mitigate losses and contagion in the event of banking sector distress. This leads, de facto, to higher total loss-absorbing capital, one of the key objectives of the new global regulatory reform.

I think it is also fair to say that Islamic finance’s underpinning principles of promoting participation, equity, property rights and ethics are all “universal values”.

And yet, despite these important benefits and the clear potential, there is still a long way to go to fulfill the maximum potential of Islamic finance. Today, it represents less than 1 percent of global financial assets and is still very much concentrated in a few markets. So there is clearly room to grow, especially given that the features of Islamic products can appeal to a much wider group.

Of course, as Islamic finance expands and takes on greater importance in countries’ financial systems, it will be important to nurture this development in a safe and sound manner. There are also a number of important policy issues that will need to be tackled to reap its full benefits.

Let me turn to that now.

2. Unlocking the Potential of Islamic Finance

What are the key elements required to unlock the full potential of Islamic finance in an effective and prudent way? I see several priorities:

(a) Creating an Enabling Environment

The first priority is to level the playing field and create an enabling environment for Islamic finance to develop, while being mindful of risks.

This means adapting financial regulations that take into account the defining features of Islamic finance and do not disadvantage Islamic banks. For example, capital requirements for banks should be adapted to account for Islamic finance’s risk-and-profit sharing model—which allows for some loss-bearing by investors and reduces risk weights applied to equity-like financing.

Leveling the playing field also means harmonizing the tax treatment of Islamic finance products with similar conventional contracts. Income tax systems typically recognize interest gains on debt instruments as a deductible expense. This debt bias puts Islamic finance at a competitive disadvantage and discourages risk-shared financing. Some countries can already remedy this disadvantage under their existing tax systems, but others still have to review their tax legislation.

We also need greater consistency in the application of regulation and supervision to Islamic banks and governance across jurisdictions. Islamic standard setters—including the Islamic Financial Services Board and the Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions—have done an impressive job in establishing the rules of the road. In so doing, they have cultivated closer cooperation with conventional financial standard setters, which bodes well for global financial stability.

More needs to be done to enforce these rules. IMF surveillance suggests that the current standards are not being applied consistently across countries. This could stifle the development of Islamic finance, or encourage its growth in a manner that creates systemic vulnerabilities.

I look forward to hearing your views on how to implement these necessary changes both at the national and global levels.

(b) Developing the industry and markets

The second priority for policymakers is to further develop the industry and markets. What do I mean by that?

Many countries could encourage further improvements in Islamic banking to boost financing for small- and medium-sized enterprises.

For instance, information about the creditworthiness of SMEs needs to be strengthened, including collateral availability. More efforts are needed to train well-qualified staff, who can help meet the high demand for Islamic finance products. And Islamic banks need to bolster their risk management capacity for SME lending.

Some of these initiatives will be led by the industry itself. Others will also need to play their roles—with regulators ensuring that adequate credit risk systems are in place, with development banks partnering with Islamic banks for SME financing and capacity building, and with governments fostering financial education and literacy.

In addition to strengthening the industry, many countries could further develop Islamic financial markets.

Think of the growth potential of Sukuk. Over the past decade, total outstanding Sukuk assets have seen a ten-fold increase to about $300 billion. Most of these assets remain concentrated in the Gulf States and Malaysia. But interest has been growing in other parts of the world. Luxembourg, Hong Kong, South Africa, and the United Kingdom are among a growing number of other countries that have issued Sukuk bonds in recent years.

The challenge for policymakers is to help this market reach its full potential.

For example, more regular sovereign issuance is needed at different maturities to help establish benchmarks and develop secondary markets. Sovereign Sukuk plans need to be embedded in governments’ debt management strategies. And the market needs to be supported by strong legal and regulatory frameworks. The latter would help address persistent uncertainty over investors’ rights.

Many countries also need to develop money and interbank markets for Shari’ah-compliant instruments to help Islamic banks manage liquidity needs more effectively. An underdeveloped market forces Islamic banks to hold excess liquidity buffers. It also limits central banks in the conduct of their monetary policies, particularly in countries with large Islamic banking systems.

Here, I would like to commend the role of the International Islamic Liquidity Management Corporation. It was successfully established by your central banks to create and issue short-term Shari’ah-compliant instruments to facilitate effective cross-border liquidity management.

(c) Ensuring financial stability

The third priority for policymakers is to further strengthen regulation and supervision to ensure financial stability.

I already stressed the need for greater international consistency in the application of regulatory and supervisory standards. This is essential not only because it helps level the playing field, but because it helps manage the specific risks associated with Islamic finance and prevents regulatory arbitrage.

At the same time, we should ensure that Islamic financial institutions are not under-regulated or over-regulated, and that standards are adapted to take into account the specific features of Islamic products.

The gradual implementation of the Basel capital and liquidity requirements adapted for the features of Islamic finance will be key. This transition may not be easy for Islamic banks, particularly regarding liquidity. But it can be seen as an opportunity for development of new instruments and markets, and will need to be completed to ensure the resilience of national banking systems.

Already Islamic finance is considered systemically important in 10 countries, where it accounts for more than 15 percent of total financial assets. Of course, with increased clout comes increased responsibility on the part of Islamic banks—and a growing need for oversight.

Financial safety nets—including deposit insurance and lender-of-last-resort facilities—also need to evolve to take into account the specific features of Islamic finance. Without these upgrades, countries may not have the tools to adequately respond to shocks to individual financial institutions. Nor would they have the capacity to prevent spillovers to the conventional banking system.

From the IMF’s perspective, we are also looking to raise our game. As you know, financial stability lies at the heart of the IMF’s work. We have, over the past year, done a large amount of analytical work to deepen our understanding of Islamic finance’s implications for financial stability and economic growth. We are keen to pursue this agenda and to further strengthen our policy advice by incorporating best practices for Islamic banking and finance into our surveillance work.

3. Conclusion

So, let me conclude by quoting Ibn Khaldun, the great 14th-century scholar, once said: “He who finds a new path is a pathfinder, even if the trail has to be found again by others; and he who walks far ahead of his contemporaries is a leader, even though centuries pass before he is recognized as such.”

Unlocking the true potential of Islamic finance requires this strong leadership. It also requires strong cooperation among all stakeholders—from the Middle East to Asia and beyond; from Islamic banks to policymakers, to regulators, to international financial institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank and the Financial Stability Board.

We all know that effective cooperation yields success.

The IMF has worked closely with key standard-setters to assist them in developing international norms for Islamic financial institutions, and has helped with the establishment of the Islamic Financial Services Board.

We continue to work on a bilateral basis with our member countries—providing technical assistance in areas such as Islamic bank regulation and supervision, the development of Sukuk markets, and monetary policy implementation in countries with a large Islamic finance presence. We also aim to cover Islamic finance more systematically in our bilateral surveillance of countries where it is important.

At the same time, we have benefited greatly from the guidance of the major Islamic finance standard-setters and multilateral institutions in our analytical and policy work on Islamic finance. They now form an External Advisory Group for our work in this area, which we highly value. I am also very pleased that the Islamic Development Bank and the IMF have agreed to expand our partnership to support capacity development in Islamic Finance.

So cooperation has already been quite successful, and has yielded important results. We are keen to deepen our engagement—by listening to your views and by building on today’s conference.

Together, we can foster a 21st-century version of Islamic finance that can deliver on all its promises. That is to promote financial inclusion and stability, meet the needs of financially underserved populations, lift potential growth, and create better opportunities of all people.

Thank you—Shukraan.

*Christine Lagarde, Managing Director, International Monetary Fund at the Islamic Finance Conference, Kuwait City, November 11, 2015

(EurActiv) — Few issues have caused more friction between Israel and the European Union than EU plans to impose labelling on goods produced in Jewish settlements on occupied land. And if Israel is right about the timing, the tensions could get worse.

The European Commission, the EU’s executive, is keeping tight-lipped about when the labelling measures will be approved.

But Israeli officials are convinced it will happen at a meeting in Brussels on Wednesday and are doing all they can to lobby against it. US senators have written to the EU’s foreign policy chief urging her not to go ahead with the move.

“This is a discriminatory policy,” Energy Minister Yuval Steinitz said on Tuesday, a common Israeli refrain. “We all remember when Jewish products were last labelled in Europe,” he said, referring to Nazi Germany’s anti-Semitic policies.

The EU does not recognise Israel’s occupation of the West Bank, Gaza, East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, lands it captured in the 1967 Middle East war, and says the labelling policy aims to distinguish between goods made inside the internationally accepted borders of Israel and those made outside.

“It’s an indication of origin, not a warning label,” the EU ambassador to Israel, Lars Faaborg-Andersen, told Reuters.

Some EU countries already affix labels to Israeli goods, differentiating between those from Israel and those, particularly fruits and vegetables, that come from the Jordan Valley in the occupied West Bank. If the Commission goes ahead on Wednesday, all 28 member states would have to apply labels.

From an economic point of view, the effect may be minimal. Consumers that want to avoid Israeli settlement goods probably already do so. Those who want to actively support Israel may now seek out settlement products to buy.

Israel’s Economy Ministry estimates the impact will be about $50 million a year, affecting fresh produce such as grapes and dates, wine, poultry, honey, olive oil and cosmetics.

That is around a fifth of the $200-$300 million worth of goods produced in settlements each year, but a drop in the ocean next to the $30 billion of goods and services Israel exports to the EU annually, a third of all its exports.

Israeli ministers have cast the EU’s plans as akin to a boycott of Israel, regarding it as little different to the boycott, sanctions and divestment (BDS) movement that Palestinians – who seek a state on occupied land including the West Bank and East Jerusalem – have advocated in recent years.

They have also accused the EU of double standards, saying EU labelling is not enforced in other places of occupation, such as northern Cyprus, Western Sahara, Kashmir or Tibet.

Faaborg-Andersen dismissed any suggestion of a boycott, pointing out that the EU was not telling consumers what to do – labels merely help them decide if they want a product or not.

He also said that the case of Cyprus, in which the north is not under government control and goods produced there are considered to be from Cyprus, “is an internal EU issue”.

The island has been split since a 1974 Turkish invasion; the the south is controlled by Cyprus’s internationally recognised government and is an EU member country.

While the ultimate impact may be marginal, some farmers in the West Bank could cease activity, said Yaron Solomon, head of the settlement department at Israel’s Farmers’ Union.

Also potentially affected are the more than 20,000 Palestinians who work in settlements, earning salaries far higher than those working on Palestinian-run farms.

That argument holds little sway with EU officials.

The World Bank estimated in 2013 that easing restrictions on Palestinian activity and production in areas under full Israeli military occupation would add $3.4 billion a year to the Palestinian economy, boosting opportunities. Most of these restrictions are in place to protect Israeli settlements.

Some Jewish producers say their business will be unaffected.

Shiloh Wineries, which exports half of the more than 100,000 bottles of wine it produces annually, built its business around its West Bank location of Shiloh – the ancient capital of Israel before Jerusalem. The company said that biblical reference is what appeals to many Jews and Christians.

“I think sales will continue to grow,” said Shiloh winemaker Amichai Luria.

During his current visit to Laayoune, King Mohammed VI launched a series of key projects to improve infrastructure in the southern provinces. 77 billion dirhams are allocated to all those projects that seek to create centers of competitiveness and relies on main pillars as economic development, social promotion, good governance, sustainability and reinforcement of good governance. The new model of development was hailed by local media as well by the inhabitants of the southern provinces. Everybody was looking forward to the launching of those great projects that will give the inhabitants the opportunity to see and greet the King. However, the personal physician of King Mohammed VI prescribed a suspension of the sovereign’s activities for 10 to 15 days after that HM the King contracted a severe flu syndrome during the recent royal visit to India, said on Tuesday a statement by HM the King’s personal physician.

“During the recent royal visit to India, HM King Mohammed VI have contracted a severe flu syndrome which worsened during the sovereign’s current trip to the city of Laayoune,” said the statement.

“Following the evolution of this flu syndrome with bronchopulmonary and oropharyngeal symptoms, mainly a loss of the voice, HM the King’s personal physician prescribed a suspension of the sovereign’s activities for of period of 10 to 15 days,” it added

So the monarch’s activities will be suspended for a while but for sure he will resume his visit to the southern provinces to launch those projects that aim to provide for the restructuring of the phosphate sector through the project “Phosboucraa for industrial development”, the promotion of the agricultural and fisheries sector and the development of environment-friendly tourism. A brand new University Hospital Center will be built in Laayoune and a town with high-tech industrial facilities in Foum El Oued, and promoting the Hassani culture to make it a lever for local development. Protection of water and fisheries resources, development of renewable energy, preservation of diversity and natural systems, and the reinforcement of the southern provinces’ connection with the Kingdom’s provinces and prefectures as well as with the rest of the world are also on the top agenda.

These new projects, launched during the historic visit King Mohammed VI is making to the Sahara on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the Green March celebrated last Friday, aim to make of the Sahara provinces a gateway to West Africa.

Morocco which has started implementing the advanced regionalization process in the Southern provinces, part of its desire to increase, as put by the King, “the chances of finding a lasting solution to the artificial dispute over our territorial integrity,” Moreover, the advanced regionalization is also the Moroccan perception of a solution to the dispute. Indeed, the advanced regionalization in Morocco provided in the constitutional reform is a “transitional stage” to the Sahara autonomy. Implementation of advanced regionalization in Morocco is the complement of the Moroccan offer combined dynamic and sustainable Sahara conflict.will conclude a series of program-contracts between the central government and the regions to determine each party’s obligations regarding the execution of development projects. So for the southern provinces, a new, ambitious, environmentally sustainable and socially equitable growth model that would be in line with constitutional requirements as well as with the commitments made by Morocco with respect to promoting democracy and advanced regionalization.

The Green March 40th anniversary with the royal speech, the landmark projects and the encounter between the King and the inhabitants of Laâyoune sent a clear message to the international community: Now, Morocco is in its Sahara or as put by King Mohammed VI, “Morocco will remain in its Sahara, and the Sahara will remain part of Morocco, until the end of time.”

Many analysts and politicians have suggested that Russia is under great threat from the extreme Russian nationalist right either because they genuinely believe it or because it works to the advantage of Vladimir Putin who can thus present himself to the world as less dangerous than those who might take his place.

But Russian nationalists, especially in the wake of Putin’s aggression against Ukraine, are divided and generally under the control of one or another parts of the power vertical. It is possible they could escape that control and threaten the regime, but the likelihood of that anytime soon seems relatively small.

One consequence of this focus on the nationalist right, Kseniya Kirillova argues, is that most observers have ignored what may be an even greater threat to the current powers that be in Russia: one from the left powered by people who’ve not adapted well to post-Soviet realities and are thus nostalgic for Soviet times (svoboda.org/content/article/27297269.html).

The Russian journalist who currently lives in San Francisco says the threat she is talking about does not come from the leadership of the KPRF, which remains quite loyal to the Kremlin, but rather “genuine convinced supporters of the rebirth of ‘a red project,” most of whom are quite young.

She points to three reasons for the emergence of this group as a threat to Putin. First, many Russians are “sincerely nostalgic for Soviet times” because then they received “a social package which did not depend on their personal efforts, abilities and achievements” and because they never fit in to a market economy.

Second, Kirillova continues, “the current authorities have not offered [such people] a model of the future.” The Kremlin has put out propaganda memes like “the Russian world” and “a special path of development,” but its supporters haven’t given them much “specific content.” Instead, they have idealized not the future but the past – and the past is the Soviet Union.

Third, the Soviet past, as Sergey Kara-Murza of the Center for the Study of Crisis Society, argues, “corresponds to “the deep cultural code of Russians and thus ‘Soviet’ and ‘Russian’ are in fact synonyms” in the minds of many. Others, like Vladimir Somov, have made similar points.

And fourth, the Kremlin has promoted such view of the Soviet system by “idealizing certain elements of the Soviet system in order to exploit images of the past, for strengthening the authoritarian political system and for justifying the growing ambitions of Vladimir Putin personally.”

Pro-Putin propagandists have sought to rehabilitate Stalin, the Cheka, and all those who in Soviet times sought to identify and destroy enemies foreign and domestic. Indeed, Kirillova says, the chief characteristics of the Soviet mentality have been revived with one exception – there has been no move to restore communist ideology.

As the followers of Sergey Kurginyan who are ready to come to Moscow with portraits of Stalin, any restoration of that ideology could threaten the regime because of its appeals to social justice and equality, two values at odds with those of Putin and his closest supporters in the regime.

So far, Kirillova argues, Putin has been able to operate without reviving those elements of the communist ideology by his “creation of extreme conditions, unceasing wars, and suggestions that ‘Russia is surrounded by enemies.” But those values too can lead people back to communism:

“It is well known,” the Russian journalist continues, “that authoritarian regimes operative on civic passivity while totalitarian ones require the mobilization of the population. However, there is an opposite dependence as well: constant mobilization of the population gives rise to an increased demand for a totalitarian ideology.”

Putin asks Russians for sacrifice as did communist ideology but he doesn’t provide the social justice components that the communists offered even if they did not always supply. As the demands for the first increase, so too are heard ever more often voices saying “corruption ‘in military times’ is ‘sabotage, diversion, and treason.’”

“The longer [Moscow’s] aggressive foreign policy in conjunction with the growth of repressions, the cult of Stalinism and play on nostalgic attitudes continues,” she suggests, “the greater the probability that an ever greater part of the population will begin to demand ‘genuine socialism.’”

And she concludes: The constant suggestion by the authorities that “’to win the war, [Russia] must be like the USSR’ can turn against those who articulate that idea.” As the standard of living falls for most while the rich build ever bigger palaces, social revolts could easily occur led “not by the liberals as the authorities fear but under socialist banners.”

As other options narrow, a small but growing number of Syrians are attempting a new and circuitous route to Europe: flying more than 3,000 miles to Mauritania in West Africa and then travelling overland with smugglers on the ancient salt roads from Mali through the Sahara.

By Katarina Höije*

The low, mudbrick houses slowly come into focus against the desert sky as the old, beat-up pickup truck enters the Tilemsi Valley, near Gao, some 1,200 kilometres northeast of Mali’s capital, Bamako. As the vehicle comes to a halt, a dozen or so men descend to stretch their legs. Women and children remain in the hot car.

Among the men is Mohamed Abdelaziz*. He left his hometown of Homs in western Syria in early 2012, when fighting intensified between government forces and the Free Syrian Army.

After spending time in a refugee camp in Lebanon, he recently joined some trailblazing Syrians on a long and hazardous journey: first to Mauritania in West Africa, then south to Bamako in Mali, before heading northeast to Gao and on northwards along the ancient trade routes that crisscross the Sahara desert.

“There are very few safe routes and those that remain are becoming increasingly difficult to cross,” Abdelaziz told IRIN. “I considered going through Turkey to reach the Greek islands, but eastern European countries are all closing their borders.”

He said staying in Lebanon was not an option as it was difficult to find work or obtain legal status.

The road less travelled

Mauritania is one of the few Arabic-speaking countries where Syrians can travel without visas, and there is a growing community of several hundred living in the coastal capital Nouakchott.

Abdelaziz was reluctant to say how he ended up in Mauritania before coming to Mali, but it is likely that he is part of the growing trend of Syrians flying directly there from Lebanon.

“We have seen an increase this year [of Syrians in Mauritania],” Sébastien Laroze, a Mauritanian-based representative of the UN refugee agency UNHCR told IRIN. “They board a plane in Beirut… and arrive straight in Nouakchott… where [they] travel in groups to Mali… and then continue together to Algeria.”

Syrians used to fly directly to Algiers and cross the western border into Morocco to reach the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, a popular gateway into Europe. But Algeria imposed new visa restrictions on Syrians in March, prompting an increasing number to attempt this riskier and much longer journey.

“Since Algeria enforced visa regulations on Syrian nationals, we have seen more and more Syrian refugees moving from Mauritania through northern Mali and crossing into Algeria assisted by smuggling networks,” UNHCR’s spokesman in Rabat, Anthony Berginc, told IRIN.

“Once in Algeria they might spend up to two years before continuing to Morocco, some with the goal of reaching Europe.”

One recent report suggests a backlog of between 700 and 1,500 Syrians are waiting in the Moroccan border town of Nador for their chance to walk to the Spanish customs post at Melilla. Although many of these Syrians came overland through Egypt, Libya and Algeria, it suggests the route from Mauritania and through the Sahel is becoming more popular.

A smuggler’s paradise

Human traffickers in Mali told IRIN that they help transport as many as a dozen migrants – of mixed nationalities – every few days from Bamako to Gao and then on to In Khalil, a lawless, smugglers haven next to the Algerian border.

From there, it is a journey of several hours in pickup trucks across the desert to Tamanrasset, an ancient salt route long used by traders on camel back. An alternative route, popular with migrants from Western and Sub-Saharan Africa, tracks east through the Sahel to Agadez in Niger and joins up with the established Central and East African migration pathways to Libya, where there is a chance of a boat to Europe.

Routes through the Sahel are notoriously dangerous. Dozens of people die crossing the Sahara desert each month, according to the International Organization for Migration, although it is almost impossible to determine the precise number due to the vast area and the inhospitable environment.

The lawless Kidal region, north of Gao, is also a crossroads and a haven for smugglers: tobacco, cocaine and other goods are trafficked routinely through In Khalil and other border routes. African migrants have long used this area to cross into Algeria, but smugglers said a significant number of those recently being smuggled across the border are Syrian.

Amadou Maiga,* who smuggles cigarettes, petrol and food supplies through the Sahel, said he had started taking on “human goods” as well.

He told IRIN that the number of Syrians who attempt the route each month is increasing. Recently, he helped 35 Syrian refugees make their way across Mali. Another four were sleeping on the floor of his workshop.

“They are all desperate to reach Europe,” Maiga said.

The IOM recently gave assistance to a group of 36 Syrians – including 17 children and nine women – who had come from Mauritania and were heading through Gao to Algeria. It is not clear if this was the same group Maiga was referring to.

“It is becoming more evident that it is not an isolated case,” IOM’s representative in northern Mali, Aminta Dicko, told IRIN in an email. “We think that more and more of them (Syrians) are on this route.”

More Syrians = more money

Along the way, the migrants’ money is transforming life in remote desert towns.

In a country where most people live on less than $2 a day, the Syrians, who can afford to pay for a higher quality of service, are a welcome addition.

Depending on the mode of transport, the cost of the trip normally starts at $300, once all middlemen’s fees are included. Some migrants have paid much more, depending on the route and the risks involved, according to drivers and smugglers in Gao. With 15 to 20 people per car, drivers can earn upwards of $4,000 for a single journey.

“People become millionaires in a few years,” a Bamako businessman with connections in the trans-Saharan smuggling ring, told IRIN.

Policemen, soldiers, and local officials who turn a blind eye to the migrant trade often earn more in bribes than they do from their regular salaries.

Long stretches of the route from Bamako to Gao and on into Algeria are controlled by armed groups, such as Ansar Dine and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. Trucks and private cars passing through Gao and Kidal are regularly either stopped and robbed of cargo, or forced to pay hefty “taxes” imposed by rebel groups.

“You can always negotiate with the armed groups, as most of them are just here for the money,” said Oumar Diallo,* a former tourist guide turned smuggler.

Is the genie out of the bottle?

In Gao, where residents say that Syrians often linger for weeks after reaching what is considered the “gateway to the Sahel,” business has picked up in recent months. Once a sleepy town, the streets next to the main market are jammed with Toyota pickups. New villas, built with cement, are starting to outnumber the mud-brick homes.

“It’s like a boomtown with lots of people profiting,” Abdrahamane Togora, who monitors migration patterns for the government in Bamako, told IRIN.

Togora worries, however, that the growing demand for human smugglers could attract criminal groups as well, particularly those involved in the illegal arms or drug trades, or traffickers keen to exploit or deal in human cargo.

“We can’t stop people from moving, but we are certainly following the situation,” he said. “If you tried to stop the business, they, the traffickers, would not accept it.”

Maiga agreed. “The Malian army can’t control the territory and the authorities don’t dare to intervene.”

He explained that although it might be illegal, once you have ‘valid’ papers, there is little the authorities can do to prevent people from getting on a truck. “Soldiers and police can stop the trucks, but as long as the passengers don’t say ‘we paid this person to bring us here,’ it’s very difficult to expose the traffickers and smuggling networks.”

Maiga said he had no plans to stop transporting Syrians through the Sahel. “I can help these people, so that’s what I do.”

No good option

Official figures on how many migrants are now taking the ancient trade routes through the Sahel are not available. The IOM says the Malian government is responsible for tracking migrants and refugees who arrive there. The government told IRIN it is “monitoring the situation.”

The Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime says between 5,000 and 20,000 migrants were smuggled last year through Mali towards Libya, including by trans-Saharan nomadic tribes, such as the Tuareg in northern Mali and southern Algeria. The vast majority of these are non-Syrians from Central and Western Africa who are finding Ceuta and Melilla to be an increasingly difficult avenue to access Europe, as they are often left to languish in Morocco indefinitely, in deplorable conditions.

The popularity of the trans-Saharan route for Syrian refugees trying to get to Morocco appears to be a phenomenon that has been building since Algeria changed its visa rules in March/April. As countries in Europe continue to increase border security, particularly along the most popular Western Balkan route, many more could soon follow in Abdelaziz’s footsteps.

“To get here [to Mali] was not easy,” he told IRIN. “To continue to Europe is not easy. But to stay here is not easy either.”

*not real name

*Katarina Höije is a Bamako-based journalist

Edited by Jennifer Lazuta and Andrew Gully

While Libya has seen an extraordinary rise in terrorist violence, particularly since 2012, the frequency of attacks has been contained in Algeria since 2013, the year when terrorism started to grow considerably in Tunisia. Morocco has been notorious for an absence of attacks since 2011.1

By Fernando Reinares*

The number of terrorist attacks in the Maghreb has increased extraordinarily overt recent years. It is unlikely that their current frequency will lessen in the short term. The main scenario for such attacks is no longer Algeria but Libya. The acts of terrorism are being carried out above all by jihadist groups connected to al-Qaeda and, since 2014, followers of the Islamic State (IS). Their modalities are typical of terrorism and their targets are governmental as well as civilian. It is a terrorist phenomenon characterised by high and increasing frequency but relatively low lethality, although attacks have been recorded every year that have claimed numerous lives. In 2011, acts of terrorism in Maghreb countries accounted for 0.33% of all such incidents throughout the world; in 2014 they accounted for 4.7%.

Analysis

Over the course of 2015, the Maghreb has seen a number of particularly important terrorist acts. Prominent among these were the two consecutive attacks that caused the deaths, on 18 July, of 14 Algerian soldiers in the demarcation of Ain Defla, to the southwest of Algiers; those that claimed the lives of 18 people around the Bardo Museum, in the capital of Tunisia, on 18 March, and, on 26 June, another 38 lives in the tourist resort of Sousse; also the decapitation of 21 Egyptian Christians at an unknown location on the coast of Libya, which came to light in February; and, in the same country, the suicide attacks causing no fewer than 17 deaths in Benghazi on 25 March.

These acts of terrorism are but the most recent expression of a phenomenon that has manifestly been trending upwards in the whole of North African region since 2011, when the anti-government revolts began in Tunisia and Libya, albeit with very different political impacts. Revolts that as such did extend to Morocco and Algeria. The present analysis, based on data elaborated from information contained in the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) of the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) at the University of Maryland, explores the evolution of terrorism in the Maghreb between 2011 and 2014, paying special focus to its incidence in the different countries, the modalities adopted in carrying out that violence, the preferred targets and the fatalities caused.

Changes in the terrorism scenario

Between 2011 and 2014 a total of 1,105 acts of terrorism were recorded in the countries that make up the Maghreb (Table 1). In 2011 a mere 15 terrorist acts were committed, but  there were 90 incidents in 2012, representing a sixfold increase with respect to the previous year; this figure in turn augmented threefold in 2013, when the number climbed to 302, and then more than doubled in 2014 with 698 terrorist attacks. Although the rate at which the frequency of terrorist attacks has multiplied from one year to the next has been deceasing, their overall increase on the southern shores of the western Mediterranean is extraordinary and unprecedented. The number of terrorist acts recorded in 2014 was almost 47 times greater than that recorded in 2011.

Clearly this increasing and unprecedented terrorist activity has not affected uniformly the four countries traditionally deemed to comprise the Maghreb region of North Africa. Almost nine out of every 10 attacks taking place in the region between 2011 and 2014 occurred in Libya. In 2014, the year that saw the greatest number of attacks ever recorded in the area, as many as 95.3% of them took place in Libya. Three years prior to this, in 2011, when the region witnessed only 15 terrorist attacks, Algeria accounted for 66.7% of all these incidents. The main scenario for terrorism in the Maghreb has thus increasingly transferred from Algeria to Libya.

This does not mean that terrorism has ceased to have a significant impact on Algeria, though its frequency has undergone a clear decline, having fallen from 39 attacks in 2012 to 12 in 2014, being this last a year in which Algeria accounted for only 1.7% of all the terrorist attacks perpetrated in the entire region. Exhibiting an opposing tendency, terrorist activity in Tunisia has increased considerably over the recent years, going from just two attacks recorded in 2011 and a single incident in 2012 to no fewer than 25 in 2013 and 21 in 2014. In the latter two years the terrorist acts committed in Tunisia grew 15 times in comparison to the preceding bienium.

In short, while Libya has witnessed an extraordinary rise in terrorist activity, particularly since 2012, Tunisia has seen a considerable increase since 2013, and Algeria seems to have been contained, particularly since 2013, a nonetheless notable frequency of attacks. Morocco is salient among the four Maghreb countries analysed here for the absence of acts of terrorism, ever since the attack that took place in Marrakesh on 28 April 2011. In this incident, a bomb that had been left in a well-known café in Jemaa el Fnaa Square exploded, claiming 17 lives (although some sources put the number of deaths at 16), most of them tourists.

Old and new actors of terrorism

The information derived from open sources, as with the collected in the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), does not make it possible to identify the groups and organisations responsible for many of the attacks perpetrated in the four Maghreb countries that are the focus of this analysis for the 2011-2014 period. However, the important percentage of cases in which such an attribution of authorship is possible – around 20% in the case of Libya, almost 40% in the case of Algeria and approximately 50% in the case of Tunisia – enables certain generalisations to be made about the actors that lie behind acts of terrorism in these countries and their ideological orientation or aims in pursit of which that violence is practiced.

It is clear that the attacks carried out in Algeria between 2011 and 2014 are attributable to terrorism of a jihadist orientation, practiced above all by al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), based in the country, but also by the Movement for Unicity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA) and both the organisations Those who Sign with Blood – which in 2013 co-ordinated with MUJWA to establish a new entity, al Mourabitoun – as well as Jund al-Khilafah. Similarly, in Tunisia, there is an association between the terrorist attacks that occurred in the same period and the jihadist terrorism carried out mainly but not exclusively by the Ansar al-Sharia organisation in the country (AST) and by individuals or cells connected to AQIM.

The situation in Libya is rather different. A large majority of the attacks for which some sort of authorship information is available, where perpetrated with an Islamist or more specifically jihadist orientation, especially by the Ansar al-Sharia organisation active in the country (ASL). But other armed organisations and militias, among the many that struggle for power in a territory lacking an effective state authority capable of imposing its legitimate monopoly of force, including some of a local character and others inspired the former regime of Muammar al-Gadaffi or even ascribed to the forces loyal to the self-styled general Khalifa Haftar, have resorted to terrorist tactics as part of their repertoires of violence.

It should be added that, in respect of a few of the episodes mentioned at the start of this analysis, the emergence in June 2014 of the organisation that calls itself Islamic State (IS) as a global jihadism matrix alternative to al-Qaeda, albeit deriving from the Iraqi branch of the latter, has affected the already fragmented map of terrorism the Maghreb. Followers of IS in Algeria styling themselves Jund al-Khilafah or Soldiers of the Caliphate, already alluded to, which split apart from AQIM, killed and decapitated a French tourist in September of the same year. But it is in Libya where, following the establishment of a colony in Derna the following month, IS militants found propitious conditions to spread terrorist activities elsewhere in the region.

Main modalities of terrorism

Between 2011 and 2014, more than four out of every 10 acts of terrorism recorded in the Maghreb – 44.9% of the total to be precise, although with variations depending on the year – were committed using bombs and explosive devices (Table 2). Three out of every 10 attacks were carried out using other types of lethal weapons, used either in generic assaults against humans or in specific individual assassinations, categories that account respectively for 26.1% and 8.1% of all terrorist attacks. Such operating modalities are typical of the terrorist repertoire, which includes kidnapping and hostage-taking, which between 2011 and 2014 accounted for 13.6% of all the terrorist attacks in the region.

Suicide attacks are often considered a practice that is characteristic of jihadist terrorism, but fact is that only 26 were carried out in the Maghreb between 2011 and 2014, a figure that represents just 1.8% of all terrorist acts perpetrated in the region in this period. In absolute terms however, it is worth drawing attention to the number of suicide attacks carried out in Libya over the course of 2014: no fewer than 13 according to the STARTGlobal Terrorism Database, which is more than half the total episodes of suicide terrorism committed in the Maghreb over the four years here under consideration. This however is a reflection of the extraordinary recent escalation in terrorism in the country, since it accounts for 2.0% of the total terrorist attacks in Libya in 2014.

The targets of terrorist violence

More than half the targets of terrorist attacks in the Maghreb between 2011 and 2014 – 54% to be precise – were governmental targets of one or another kind (Table 3). In some 29,2% of recorded incidents were military targets, police targets in 12.3% of the cases, and other type of governmental targets in 13% other incidents. Citizens and private property were the targets of terrorism attacks in the Maghreb, over the same four year period, in 14.3% of the cases. This figure, when combined with attacks on businesses and commercial activities, religious figures, media outlets and journalists, educational institutions and non-governmental organizations and tourism, means that in no less than 33% of the cases the targets of terrorism in the Maghreb can be defined strictu sensu as civilians.

If the percentage of attacks against targets defined strictu sensu as civilian are added to governmental targets other than those of a military or police nature, including also those of a diplomatic nature, virtually half of all the terrorist targets in the Maghreb, between 2011 and 2014, can be broadly considered as civilian. This figure does not encompass violent political organisations, including rival terrorist entities and non-governmental armed militias, which at 5.5%, account for a significant percentage of the total terrorist targets of terrorist violence in the region during that four year period.

The victims of terrorist violence

The number of deaths caused by terrorism in the Maghreb countries between 2011 and 2014 is estimated at 1,229 (Table 4). Viewed as a whole it is evidently a terrorist phenomenon characterised by a high and increasing frequency, but – given that the ratio of deaths per attack is 1.1 –a relatively low lethality. Libya accounts for almost eight out of every 10 deaths due to terrorist activity in the region.

In 2012 this country accounted for 52.4% of deaths from terrorist violence in the Maghreb, a figure rising to 64.5% in 2013 and to 89.6% in 2014. By contrast, the percentages of deaths in Algeria show a gradual decrease, though the overall total for the period – 15.5% – remains considerable.

Of the fatalities caused by terrorist attacks in the Maghreb, those taking place in Tunisia –the 5.9% – an in Morocco –a 1.4% – are significant percentages.

The 17 deaths recorded in Morocco –1,4% of the total– came about as the result of a single terrorist attack, which, as already mentioned, was perpetrated 2011 in Marrakech. Leaving this case aside, the lethality rates oscillate between 0.9 deaths per terrorist attack in Libya and 2.3 in Algeria, scene in 2013 of an attack on a gas processing facility in In Amenas, as a result of which at least 40 members of the plant’s workforce lost their lives. That ration is only higher for the suicide terrorist attacks carried out in Libya in 2013 and 2014, resulting in an average of four deaths per attack.

Conclusion

There were 47 times more acts of terrorism in the Maghreb as a whole in 2014 than in 2011. The frequency of terrorist attacks in the region has increased year after year and, in light of the attacks that already took place during the first half of 2015, it is unlikely that there will be any let-up in Algeria and Tunisia in the short term, although there may be some diminishment in Libya by the end of the year, due largely to the process of political dialogue under the auspices of the United Nations that was set up in the country. Be that as it may, fact is that at the outset of the anti-government revolts in 2011 the number of terrorist attacks in the Maghreb represented 0.33% of the total attacks worldwide. Four years later the figure was 4.7%.

Terrorist attacks taking place in the Maghreb are fundamentally, but not exclusively, the product of jihadist organisations directly or indirectly linked to al-Qaeda and, since 2014, followers of the self-styled IS, which has found especially favourable conditions in Libya for carrying out terrorist activities both inside the country and in adjacent ones such as Tunisia. The modalities of violence used are typical of a terrorist repertoire and its targets are both governmental as well as civilian. It is a terrorist phenomenon characterised by high and increasing frequency but relatively low lethality, although attacks have been recorded every year in the region with high numbers of fatalities.

While Libya has seen an extraordinary rise in terrorist violence, particularly since 2012, the frequency of terrorist attacks has been contained in Algeria since 2013, which is also the year when terrorism started to grow considerably in Tunisia. Morocco, on the other hand, has been notorious for an absence of attacks since 2011. These major variations are above all a reflection of the different security context existing in these four countries. These contexts may be altered however, depending on factors such as, for instance, a reorientation of the Islamist sector in the case of Morocco, a deterioration of the economic conditions in the case of Algeria, the worsening of the social situation in the case of Tunisia, or the implementation of political pacts in the case of Libya.

About the author:
*Fernando Reinares, Senior Analyst on International Terrorism at Elcano Royal Institute and currently visiting professor at the American University in Washington, DC | @F_Reinares

Source:
This article was published by Elcano Royal Institute. Original version in Spanish: Evolución reciente del terrorismo en el Magreb

Notes:
1. The author wishes to thank Christopher Wall and Álvaro Vicente for their help in elaborating the tables included in this ARI.

By Bhartendu Kumar Singh*

Against the backdrop of a competitive and often conflictual relationship, China and India recently concluded the fifth joint ‘hand-in-hand’ anti-terrorism exercise at Kunming in Yunan Province of China. The two neighbours have differential perspectives on many security issues. China, for example, finds nothing wrong in fraternizing with Pakistan, hitherto, a hotbed of terrorism and in many cases, exporter of terrorism. The ‘hand-in-hand’ exercises, even if at a small scale, are therefore laudable, since they provide an opportunity for experience sharing. However, these exercises also represent the complexity of the Sino-Indian relationship and the inability of the two militaries to engage each other towards a larger, mutually gainful relationship.

The logic of a past war and border differences apart, there are many reasons why China and India should be talking larger military cooperation. First, military engagement has enabled ‘relative peace’ along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), institutionalised and augmented through a series of confidence-building measures (CBMs). Compared to the troublesome Line of Control (LoC) with Pakistan, the LAC is relatively peaceful, though Chinese keep crossing the Indian side off and on.

Second, the two countries have differential border infrastructure along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). China is way ahead and it will take India at least a decade to catch up with the network of roads and railways spread across the LAC. Engaging the Chinese PLA is the best way to maintain peace in the interregnum. That would also do away with misperceptions and miscommunications that played a crucial role in 1962 war.

Third, little is known about China’s actual combat capability since it does not have any major war experience over the last 50 years, save some skirmishes with its smaller neighbours. In fact, even today, China is not very confident of waging and winning a war against Taiwan, a minnow in military parlance. Such exercises, therefore, offer India an opportunity to see Chinese combat preparations in what they call as military operation other than wars (MOOTW).

Fourth, China and India are also great powers with their own geopolitical ambitions in the Indian Ocean and Africa. Regrettably, China has been a reluctant partner in the Asian security project and the multilateral joint military exercises involving other regional powers since it prefers bilateral ventures. Sino-Indian partnership in these ventures can not only contain mutual rivalry but also provide better resilience against maritime piracy and the security of sea-lanes in the region.

However, there are few avenues for military cooperation and engagement between China and India. The LAC does not see many friendly interactions between the two militaries. Elsewhere too, China and India hardly interact in a friendly environment. The number of friendly exchanges between the two militaries is insignificant. A look at the Ministry of Defence Annual Report for 2014-15 shows that New Delhi has engaged many countries quite actively in different areas of defence cooperation commensurate with its status of a rising great power. Similarly, as the Chinese White Paper on Military Strategy (2015) reveals, the PLA would explore “new fields, new contents and new models of cooperation with other militaries, so as to jointly deal with a diverse range of security threats and challenges.” This policy toes what President Xi Jinping declared in January this year that China will place greater emphasis on military diplomacy as part of its overall foreign policy strategy. Therefore, small-scale military cooperation between the two countries does not make sense.

The two countries must, therefore, explore bigger themes for joint military exercises. Despite having perceptional differences on security, the two countries do have many common areas of concern. The Chinese for examples talk of “small scale wars, conflicts and crises” as recurrent themes. The world still faces, according to them, both immediate and potential threats of local wars. Regional terrorism, separatism and extremism are (still) rampant and have a negative impact on security and stability along China’s periphery.

Consider similar narratives from India’s MoD Annual Report (14-15): “large parts of the world continue to be affected by conflict and violence. Though the probability for a full conventional war has receded, a number of drivers have catalysed new challenges in the regional and global security landscape. The transnational threats posed by the activities of terrorist organisations have been exacerbated by the dynamics of intra and inter state conflicts and pose a danger to regions beyond the primary theatres.” In doing so, both countries can learn from each other’s best practices. India, for example, can learn from manpower reforms in Chinese military modernisation that has been achieved without any compromises on combat capabilities. Similarly, China can learn from India’s experience of handling state-sponsored terrorism and proxy wars.

The joint military exercises have been a major initiative in institutionalising dialogue between the militaries of China and India. These exercises have also enabled the two militaries to gain new knowledge about each other, indirectly supplementing the peace efforts on the LAC. There is, therefore, space for the two countries to expand the basket of cooperation for larger bilateral peace.

* Bhartendu Kumar Singh
Indian Defence Accounts Service

The views expressed are the author’s own.

By Ghazanfar Ali Khan

Saudi Arabia’s Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques King Salman opened the 4th Summit of the Arab and South American Countries (ASPA) on Tuesday by urging world leaders to help solve regional disputes, especially the Palestinian problem, and seek closer political and economic ties.

King Salman, while delivering the opening address at the ASPA Summit, said he appreciated joint efforts to fight the menace of terrorism regionally and globally.

In a brief but candid speech, the king spoke about progressively developing political and economic cooperation between the Arab world and the South American region.

He proposed setting up a “joint business council,” which would promote economic relations between the Arab League nations and the countries of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR).

King Salman recalled the “extraordinary relations” between the two blocs, saying that “this partnership has brought us onto one platform.” He called on the leaders to “bolster cooperation at all areas.” He also proposed an agreement to avoid double taxation to promote trade and investment. The inaugural session was attended by heads of state and high-ranking officials of all 22 Arab countries and 12 South American states, including Ban Ki-moon, the UN secretary-general.

Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi said that the ASPA was an excellent initiative. The realization of business opportunities demands a greater mutual understanding of the issues facing the two regions, he said.

The inaugural session was addressed by Uruguay Vice President Raul Sendic, whose country holds the UNASUR chair. In the capacity of the regional coordinator of the South American bloc, Mauro Vieira, Brazilian foreign minister, spoke during the opening ceremony. On behalf of the Arab League, Nabil Elaraby, secretary general, also delivered a speech.

Others who attended included Bahraini King Hamad bin Isa Al-Khalifa, Kuwaiti Prime Minister Sheikh Jaber Al-Mubarak Al-Hamad Al-Sabah, and Lebanese Prime Minister Tammam Salam. Somalian President Hasan Sheikh Mahmoud, Qatari Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani, Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al-Maktoum, UAE vice president and ruler of Dubai, and Speaker of the Libyan House of Representatives Aqilah Saleh also attended the summit.

Sudanese President Omar Bashir, Fuad Masum of Iraq, and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas arrived early at the venue. Other guests included King Abdallah of Jordan, Mauritania President Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz, Djibouti President Ismail Omar Guelleh and Tunisian President Al-Habib Al-Said.

From South America, the leaders in attendance included Venezuela President Nicolas Maduro, Colombian Minister of Foreign Relations Maria Angela Holguin Cuellar, Ecuador President Rafael Correa Delgado, Peruvian Prime Minister Pedro Cateriano, and Argentine Vice
President Amado Boudou.

A reliable source at the ASPA said that two documents to be issued at the end of the summit include a political one named the “Riyadh Declaration,” and the other on economic plans. The Riyadh Declaration is expected to address conflicts in Libya, Syria and Yemen, while the economic document would promote agreements and strengthen investments.

According to the Brazilian government, trade between South America and Arab countries grew by 183 percent over the past decade, from $13.7 billion in 2005 to $34.8 billion over the past year. This summit is the fourth meeting since 2005 between the two blocs. The summit, held every three years, was first hosted by Brazil in 2005, followed by meetings in Qatar and Peru.

The Syrian Arab Army (SAA) achieved its greatest victory in the four year-long war on Tuesday when it recaptured the strategic Kuweires military airbase in North Syria. Hundreds of ISIS terrorists were killed in intense fighting while hundreds more were sent fleeing eastward towards Raqqa. The victory was announced just hours after Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu said in an interview with CNN’s  Christiane Amanpour that Turkey would be willing  to invade Syria as long as Washington agreed to provide air support, create a safe zone along the Syrian-Turkish border, and remove Syrian President Bashar al Assad.

Now that Kuweires has been liberated, Davutoğlu will have to reconsider his offer taking into consideration the fact that  Russian warplanes will now be within striking distance of the border while troops and artillery will be positioned in a way that makes crossing into Syria as difficult as possible. The window for Turkish troops to enter Syria unopposed has closed. Any attempt to invade the country now will result in stiff resistance and heavy casualties.

To fully understand the significance of Kuweires, we need take a look at Amanpour’s interview with Davutoglu and see what was being planned. Here’s an excerpt:

Christiane Amanpour:  Would Turkey, under the right conditions, agree to be a ground force?

PM Ahmet Davutoğlu:   “A ground force is something which we have to talk [about] together.  There’s a need of an integrated strategy including air campaign and ground troops. But Turkey alone cannot take all this burden. If there is a coalition and a very well designed integrated strategy, Turkey is ready to take part in all senses.”

C.A.:  Including on the ground?

Davutoğlu:  Yes, of course….We have to solve the Syrian crisis in a comprehensive manner.

C.A.:  So I understand what you’re saying is that the condition for Turkey to be more involved would be an agreement by a coalition to also go after Assad?

Davutoğlu:   Yes, and against all groups and regimes that are creating this vacuum and this problem. On many days we are assisting the coalition in (the fight) against ISIS, but it is not enough. Now we are suggesting to our allies for many months–and now we are suggesting again–to create a safe haven and to push ISIS far away from our borders.

C.A.: So what do you make of the US, Europe and especially Russia saying Assad must and can stay for a period of time?

Davutoğlu:  …..The question is not how long can Assad stay, the question is when and how Assad will go. …What is the solution. The solution is very clear. It is when millions of Syrian refugees are able to return home, assuming there is peace in Syria, then this is the solution. And if Assad stays in power in Damascus,  I don’t think any refugee will go back. There is a need of a step by step strategy, but what is the endgame? What is the light at the end of the tunnel, that is what is important to the refugees.

C.A.:  Why is the Turkish government making it hard for the US government to arm and train and use Kurdish fighters as their ground troops?

Davutoğlu:   (we are not making it hard for the US government to use the) “Kurds”, but the PYD as a wing of the PKK…

There is another Kurdish group, the Peshmerga. We allowed the Peshmerga to go through Turkey to go to Kobani in order to help Kobani to be free. If the US wants to arm Kurdish fighters on the ground against ISIS, we are ready. But not Kurdish terrorists like PKK. If they want to arm and help Barzani, or Peshmerga and help them go to Syria, we are ready to help. But everybody must understand, that today PKK is attacking our cities, our soldiers and our civilians. We will not tolerate any help to any PKK-related groups inside Syria or Iraq. If that happens, Turkey will take all measures to stop it.” (“For refugees to return, Assad must go, says Turkish PM“, CNN)

Let’s recap: Even though the Russian-led coalition is conducting major military operations in Syria, Turkey is willing to invade provided that Washington meet its demands, demands that have never changed and which (we have said in earlier columns) were part of a secret deal for the use of the Incirlik airbase so the USAF could conduct sorties over Syria.

What are Turkey’s demands:

1 A safe zone on the Syrian side of the Turkish-Syrian border

2 A no-fly zone over areas where Turkish troops are conducting operations

3 A commitment to remove Assad.

For a while it looked like the Obama administration might abandon their alliance with Turkey and join with the PYD (The Kurds) in their effort to create a buffer zone where they could harbor, arm and train Sunni militants to continue hostilities in Syria. In fact, Obama went so far as to air-drop pallet-loads of weapons and ammo to the Democratic Union Party (PYD) militia just 10 days ago. (Note:  The US has already stopped  all weapons shipments to the PYD) Whether Obama did this to force Turkey into playing a more active role in Syria, we don’t know. But what we do know is that a Turkish-US alliance is more formidable than a PYD-US alliance, which is why Washington is planning to sell out the Kurds to join-forces with Turkey.

Another sign that US-Turkish relations have begun to thaw, is the fact that Obama phoned Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to congratulate him on his party’s victory eight days after the election. The delay suggests that they were working out their differences before expressions of support.   Erdogan needed the landslide victory to consolidate his power in Parliament and to persuade the military brass that he has a mandate to carry out his foreign policy.  Obama’s phone call was intended to pave the way for backroom negotiations which would take place during next week’s G-20 meetings in Ankara.  But now that the Russian-led coalition has retaken Kuweires, it is impossible to know how the US and Turkey will proceed. If Putin’s warplanes and artillery are able to seal the border, then Washington will have to scrap its plan for seizing the 60-miles stretch of northern Syria that’s needed to keep vital supplylines to US-backed jihadis open or to provide sanctuary for mercenaries returning from the frontlines.  The changing battlescape will make a safe zone impossible to defend.

The fact is, Kuweires changes everything. ISIS is on the run, the myriad other terrorist organizations are progressively losing ground, Assad is safe in Damascus, the borders will soon be protected, and the US-Turkey plan to invade has effectively been derailed. Barring some extraordinary, unforeseeable catastrophe that could reverse the course of events; it looks like the Russian-led coalition will eventually achieve its objectives and win the war. Washington will have no choice but to return to the bargaining table and make the concessions necessary to end the hostilities.

The New York Times is called the newspaper of record for good reason. It chronicles what the powerful and well-connected think and do and it is able to because it colludes with them on a regular basis. The Times can boast of some good reporting, but it generally falls short when asked to take on the task of scrutinizing United States foreign policy.

It isn’t difficult to tell what justifications the Obama administration, or any other for that matter, wants to use for taking actions around the world. A quick perusal of the Times usually reveals what presidents and secretaries of state want to have revealed. If president George W. Bush makes the case for invading Iraq, so do the pages of the Times. If the Obama administration wants to look hawkish in an election season Times reporters are called upon for the selective leaking of news about a kill list. This back and forth between solid reporting and genuflection is confusing but discernment is crucial.

There are refugees all over the world but their circumstances weren’t deemed worthy of mention by American corporate media until people began knocking on Europe’s door. Millions from the Middle East and Africa are poised to risk life and limb to cross the Mediterranean from Libya or Syria, and in so doing they make white nations and their citizens very nervous.

The New York Times has embarked on an effort to put its resources behind covering the refugee crisis. It is a subject worthy of investigation but if the reporting omits America’s responsibility for creating the misery the work is fraudulent.

As part of series called “The Displaced” the New York Times magazine featured the stories of three children from Ukraine, Syria and South Sudan. People in all three of these nations are displaced, maimed or dead because of American machinations. Instead of explaining these facts to its readers, America’s role is either omitted or falsified. Readers are left with worthless misinformation despite their intention to be well informed.

The New York Times explanation for Ukraine’s troubles always followed the White House line. The story of a boy living in the ruins of his home is described with these words. “Hastily formed separatist militias, goaded and armed by Moscow, rose up in a rebellion against a new, pro-Western government in Kiev.” The new pro-western government would never have taken power in 2014 if the United States had not been an accomplice against the former elected president. As for being goaded by Moscow, the people of Donetsk and Lugansk have close ties to Russia and didn’t want to be part of the American backed regime. That regime is also responsible for the death toll and is the biggest obstacle to peace in the region.

The selective omission perpetrates false narratives about Russia and about the United States, too. Of course it would be difficult for the Times to suddenly confess to its role in the government’s propaganda war. It is hard to stop lying after one starts.

Nine million Syrians have been displaced since the United States and its allies attempted regime change in 2011. These people seek refuge within Syria and in neighboring nations like Jordan and Turkey. Their catastrophe can be laid directly at the United States. Yet there is no mention of this fact at all. Instead there is a rehash of the discredited official narrative.

“The protest movement started in Syria in 2011, with the uprising of citizens opposing President Bashar al-Assad’s oppressive government. By the following year, occupied with the uprising elsewhere, Assad’s security forces started withdrawing from rural pockets of Hasaka, the province where Hana’s family lived, and parts of the area quickly felt unsafe: Roaming armed gangs, whose loyalties were not always clear, were extorting farmers, like Hana’s father, for the right to farm their own land. Hana’s family began to hear about clashes between the Sunni Arab opposition and the government.”

The Sunni opposition and armed gangs did not appear out of thin air. They were acting under the direction of the United States, Turkey and Saudi Arabia. The young girl in the Times story would be living safely in her home were it not for their intervention.

American evil doing in Sudan gets less attention but has been going on far longer than interventions in Ukraine or Syria. Along with Israel, the United States thwarted Sudan’s effort to remain whole. The break-up of the nation into two countries, Sudan and South Sudan was the result of years of American and Israeli plotting. South Sudan has oil and the United States has made sure that it is anything but independent. A power struggle and yet another disastrous intervention by Ugandan president Yoweri Museveni has produced a predictable trail of death. Museveni is America’s hit man in the region and the boy whose tragic story is told is one of millions of his victims. Instead of facts we get a gruesome tale of brutality without context. The falsehoods are particularly dangerous to African people because they are made to look like brutes when they have co-conspirators in Washington and Jerusalem.

There are countless ways in which Americans are fed lies and are then encouraged to support aggression and atrocities. Displaced persons deserve to have their stories told. They should not be used to make American criminality easier to commit but that is what the New York Times has done. Of course, that is what the corporate media have always done. Reporting events accurately ought to be their goal. But instead keeping powerful people happy is what they do best.

In recent years, Turkey and Qatar have found much common ground on a host of foreign policy issues. Both Ankara and Doha have sponsored a variety of Sunni Islamist groups, seen as conduits for their geopolitical influence in the fluid Middle East. However, both countries have experienced setbacks from their engagement in some of the region’s conflicts, most notably in Syria.

Last month, the Turkish and Qatari representatives left the Vienna talks on Syria maintaining their conviction that Bashar al-Assad must relinquish power as a precondition for peace. Although Turkey’s shared border with Syria and Qatar’s deep pockets provide the two nations much potential to prolong insurgencies against the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) and its allies, it appears unrealistic to imagine Ankara and Doha achieving their objective of toppling the Syrian regime through their current strategies, especially in light of Russia’s military intervention in the country.

Turkey and Qatar’s Quest for Regional Influence

Throughout the 2000s, both Turkey and Qatar pursued efforts to expand strategic clout at a time when Washington’s relative power was declining in the aftermath of the invasion and occupation of Iraq. Since taking power in 2002, the AK Party’s leader ramped up Turkey’s role and image on the Arab street through the ideological lure of the party’s brand of “democratic Islamism,” as well as through trade and investment opportunities that the Turks offered the Arabs.

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s anti-Israel rhetoric in the aftermath of Operation Cast Lead (2008–2009) and the Mavi Marmara incident of May 2010 improved the Turkish leader’s popularity in the region in the years leading up to the Arab Awakening. Similarly, Qatar relied on its ownership of Al Jazeera and its reputation as a “fair broker” in regional conflicts to enhance the nation’s own soft-power influence far beyond the Gulf. Indeed, Al Jazeera’s coverage of the U.S.-led war against Iraq in 2003, its focus on the Palestinians’ plight and its role as a platform for Arab regime critics to voice their opinions sat well with many Arabs, whose previous media selections were heavily censored and slanted in favor of the ruling regimes.

However, the Syrian crisis and 2011’s other Arab uprisings and “revolutions” elicited reactions from Turkey and Qatar that severely damaged their reputations. By sponsoring Sunni Islamist causes in Egypt, Gaza, Libya, Syria and Tunisia, Ankara and Doha came under harsh condemnation from other powers in the region. Many quickly accused Turkey and Qatar of stoking sectarian unrest and promoting extremism.

In Egypt, both states opposed the rise of Abdel Fattah el-Sisi in July 2013. In Libya, Ankara and Doha both supported the Islamist-dominated “Libya Dawn Coalition”. Both Turkey and Qatar prevented Hamas from becoming internationally isolated through their shared support for the Palestinian group, which the U.S. State Department and EU designate a “terrorist organization”. Qatar’s willingness to break political ranks with its fellow Arab states was underscored in August, when Doha strongly distanced itself from an Arab League resolution condemning Turkey’s bombing of Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) targets in northern Iraq. Qatar expressed its “full solidarity” with Turkey as it seeks “to protect its borders and preservation of its security and stability.”

Yet it is in Syria where both countries have invested the most in their common cause. Despite their efforts to topple Assad, the regime’s resilience has highlighted the limitations of Turkey and Qatar’s means to project power beyond their borders. In 2011, the Turks and Qataris bet on Assad following the fate of Mubarak, Ben Ali and Qaddafi, and sought to be on the “right side of history.” Their miscalculations about the regime’s future were rooted in a misread of domestic issues within Syria and the dynamics of the regional forces that would ultimately come to have a profound impact on the course of events.

Unquestionably, the regime’s resilience is partially due to its brutality, but it is imperative to note that Assad has a wide network of support in Syria from groups who share common fears of the takfiris’ agenda. Given that the two most powerful factions fighting the Syrian regime are ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra—both takfiri groups—many Syrians see the secular Ba’athist regime as the only realistic bulwark against Islamist extremism in Syria. Many analysts have largely attributed the strength of hardline jihadist forces not only in Syria, but also in Libya, to Ankara and Doha’s sponsorship of Islamist networks across the region, associating Turkey and Qatar’s influence with sectarianism and extremism.

Ankara and Doha also underestimated the extent to which Assad’s foreign backers would come to his side. Indeed, Ankara and Doha’s roles in the conflict have been dwarfed by Russia, Iran and Hezbollah’s military intervention against the regime’s enemies. Despite the efforts of Ankara and Doha to topple Assad, the SAA remains by the far most powerful force on the ground and the regime is not about to disappear.

Syria’s most important strategic ally in the Middle East is Iran, which has a played a pivotal role as a military, political and economic supporter of the Assad regime throughout this conflict. That Washington and Moscow invited Tehran to join last month’s Vienna talks on Syria marked a reversal in U.S. foreign policy, given that Washington previously refused to talk directly to Iranian officials about the Syrian crisis. In the larger picture, Iran’s participation in the talks underscored not only Tehran’s important role in the Syrian conflict but that yet another ally of Assad was brought to the negotiating table.

Natural Gas Geopolitics:

It is important to note that despite the ideological dimensions of Turkey and Qatar’s role as sponsors of the anti-Assad rebellion, the geopolitics of natural gas have factored into Ankara and Doha’s alignment vis-à-vis Syria. In 2009, Assad rejected a Qatari offer to run a pipeline from the Gulf emirate’s North Field (which is contiguous with the South Pars field, owned by Iran) to Turkey and beyond via Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Syria. As a strategic ally of Moscow, Damascus’ refusal to sign the Qatari proposal was said to be driven in part by Syria’s interest in protecting Russia’s position as the EU’s number top natural gas supplier (which has tended to be overlooked as a factor in the analyses of Russia’s role in the Syrian crisis).

To the ire of officials in Doha, in 2010 Assad began negotiations for the alternative $10 billion “Islamic pipeline” with Tehran, with the objective of transiting natural gas to Syria’s Mediterranean coast via Iran and Iraq. Sixteen months after the Syrian crisis erupted, Assad signed the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Iran. Syria has often been written off from a geostrategic perspective because it does not have much oil and gas compared to other Middle Eastern states. However, the country’s potential as a regional energy corridor has itself been a significant factor influencing the ongoing Syrian conflict—one that has received little attention in Western reporting about the conflict.

Turkey, Qatar and the Sunni Arab World:

Since Saudi Arabia’s King Salman inherited the throne in January, Riyadh has softened its opposition to Sunni Islamist groups. In contrast to his predecessor, King Abdullah, who aggressively countered these groups both domestically and regionally, King Salman has sought to pursue a strategy of uniting the Sunni world against Iranian influence in the region, which he views as a graver threat than grassroots Sunni Islamist movements which represent social justice causes and embrace democratic institutions. In practice, this has entailed deeper collaboration with Turkey and Qatar in Syria, as well as diplomatic overtures to Muslim Brotherhood branches in Egypt, Gaza and Yemen.

The territorial defeats that the SAA endured earlier this year are believed to be largely attributable to Riyadh, Ankara and Doha’s stepped-up support for the “Army of Conquest” (a coalition of militias dominated by Jabhat al-Nusra and Ahrar al-Sham fighters). By pursuing deeper cooperation with Turkey and Qatar in Syria, Saudi Arabia has created a degree of tension with its two strategic allies: the UAE and Egypt, which both staunchly oppose nearly all forms of political Islam in the region. Although Egypt, Jordan and the UAE have not openly sided with Assad, their reactions to Moscow’s military campaign in Syria are indicative of their view of Russia as an important player in the regional struggle against terrorism, as well as the greater Middle East’s shifting geopolitical order, despite their Sunni Arab identities and alliances with Washington.

Although the full implications of Moscow’s strikes against Assad’s enemies in Syria have yet to be realized, Russia’s military campaign has enabled the SAA to reconquer territory in the provinces of Homs, Hama and Aleppo. As Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Qatar remain committed to their position that any transition in Syria cannot include Assad, and all three governments have condemned Moscow’s backing of the Assad regime, it remains to be seen what Riyadh, Ankara and Doha may do to change facts on the ground in Syria.

Last year Ankara and Doha signed an agreement permitting the joint deployment of troops in either country. The return of Turkish troops to the Gulf emirate 100 years after Ottoman forces withdrew from modern-day Qatar is a symbolic development. It is a huge leap, however, to imagine that the next logical step in their evolving military cooperation is a joint force in Syria. In fact, last month Qatar’s Foreign Minister Khalid al-Attiyah ruled out the possibility of deploying Qatari forces to Syria, instead vowing to continue financially sponsoring groups fighting the Ba’athist regime. Similarly, with Riyadh bogged down in Yemen, it is hard to imagine that Saudi Arabia will be committing ground forces to Syria.

Conclusion

On the surface, Turkish and Qatari officials have gone to great lengths to express support for the other. In December the Emir of Qatar visited the presidential palace in Ankara. Speaking next to the Qatari monarch, Erdoğan asserted that “together with Qatar, we [the Turks] always side with oppressed people around the world.”

It is worth asking, however, if shared geopolitical interests in Arab civil wars and a common ideology are enough to serve as the basis for a long-term strategic alliance between Turkey and Qatar. Analysts have questioned the extent to which such a development is even possible, given that the two nations lack substantial economic ties. In fact, aside from Bahrain, Qatar is Turkey’s smallest trade partner in the Gulf Cooperation Council. Last year, Turkey and the UAE’s bilateral trade volume was ten times greater than Turkey and Qatar’s total trade.

In spite of this, both nations appear determined to strengthen their military ties, seeing more upside potential. Turkey and Qatar’s common cause on the battlefields of Syria and elsewhere have brought Ankara and Doha closer than ever. On paper, at least, Doha and Ankara have the potential to contribute to Syria’s outcome, given that Turkey has a powerful military and a lengthy border with Syria, while Qatar has the deep pockets to sponsor the training and arming of rebel groups.

In practice, however, Turkey and Qatar’s strategy of regime change in Syria has obviously failed, while the two governments’ support for Assad’s Islamist enemies has also complicated their ties with their own strategic allies, trade partners and neighbors. Despite these costs and recent developments resulting from Moscow and Tehran’s deepening military involvement in Syria, Turkey and Qatar remain firmly committed to their political objective of toppling Assad.

Last month in Vienna, Turkey’s Foreign Minister Feridun Sinirlioglu reiterated Ankara’s position that “peace is not possible with Bashar al-Assad,” and his Qatari counterpart emphasized Doha’s continued commitment to financially supporting Syrians who seek to “liberate their country”. Given their common stakes, we should expect Ankara and Doha to continue devoting resources to their growing political relationship. However, it is doubtful that their combined efforts will have any kind of meaningful effect on the ground in Syria. Russia and Iran’s stepped up role military role in Syria comes at the expense of Ankara and Doha’s relevance in the conflict.

It would serve the Turks and Qataris well to swallow their pride, reconsider their strategy for Syria and adopt a more realistic approach to a jointly executed foreign policy. Rather than devoting such substantial resources to arming jihadist militias in Syria, the region could benefit a great deal from Ankara and Doha channeling their resources toward humanitarian efforts aimed at meeting the basic needs of the conflict’s innocent victims, while working with the international community to pursue a diplomatic settlement to the conflict and enhancing their own soft power in the process.

*Giorgio Cafiero is the Co-Founder of Gulf State Analytics. Daniel Wagner is the CEO of Country Risk Solutions.

After more than a three-year hiatus, the Trilateral Summit between China, Japan and South Korea has finally been revived. Although it was largely symbolic, lacking major breakthroughs, the seeming thaw in relations between the three neighbours is a welcome, albeit temporary, respite from the tensions in the region.

By Tan Ming Hui and Tsjeng Zhizhao Henrick*

On November 1, 2015, China, Japan, and South Korea held their sixth Trilateral Summit in Seoul, attended by Chinese Premier Li Keqiang, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, and South Korean President Park Geun-hye. This was the first, and much anticipated, meeting between the three Northeast Asian neighbours since 2012, following which relations deteriorated over territorial and historical disputes.

Although it did not result in major breakthroughs, the revival of an annual summit signals at least a degree of political will of the leaders to discuss issues and mitigate conflicts in a peaceful manner. It also continues the trend of warming relations among the three countries. Abe and Chinese President Xi Jinping have met twice on the sidelines of international summits in April and last November. Furthermore, Beijing and Seoul showed considerable restraint in their responses to Abe’s statement marking the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II, even though it did not meet their demands.

Return to seikei bunri

Although the politics of Northeast Asia have been riddled with nationalism, mutual distrust and animosities since World War II, the key players in the region remain close economic and trade partners. Regional relations can be encapsulated by seikei bunri, or the separation of politics and economics, a guiding principle for Japan’s post-war foreign policy.

The principle of seikei bunri began to unravel in September 2010, when a clash occurred between a Chinese trawler and the Japanese Coast Guard’s patrol boats near the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. Tensions between the two Asian giants were further exacerbated when the then-Japanese government under Yoshihiko Noda purchased and nationalised the islands in 2012, despite Chinese backlash.

In addition, diplomatic relations between South Korea and Japan deteriorated over conflicting claims to the Liancourt Rocks. Since her inauguration as president in February 2013, Park has refused to hold bilateral meetings with Abe, laying the blame on his supposed historical revisionism, especially over the comfort women issue. Thereafter in December 2013, Abe’s visit to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine saw a further cooling of relations.

The recent Trilateral Summit’s emphasis on the tightening of economic ties suggests that the leaders are ready to put aside politics for the moment, and focus on economics. In particular, the Joint Declaration for Peace and Cooperation in Northeast Asia circulated after the meeting highlighted the leaders’ pledge to work towards economic integration and the conclusion of a trilateral free-trade deal. Due to fraught relations and the existence of anti-Japanese sentiments in the country, Japanese investors had begun to withdraw from China and look elsewhere in Asia for business opportunities.

Beijing may be acknowledging the negative repercussions on its economy, and this is on top of the slowdown that the Chinese economy is currently facing. Moreover, China and South Korea are not parties to the recently concluded Trans-Pacific Partnership, and may be concerned over possible trade diversion from their economies. From the Japanese perspective, popular support for Abe has plummeted since his introduction and later passage of the controversial security bills. To regain public confidence, it is likely that he wants to shift the focus back to economic revitalisation.

Security and historical issues remain

Nonetheless, putting aside political and security matters is only a short-term solution given the highly-charged regional atmosphere. One of the more notable features of the Trilateral Summit’s Joint Declaration is the relegation of security issues to a mere few paragraphs. On the top of the security agenda, expectedly, was North Korea, particularly the call to resume the Six Party Talks and the denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula. The Joint Declaration also called for cooperation on terrorism and cyber security. Notably, however, there was no mention of the territorial disputes between the three countries.

Despite the best of intentions among the three countries, getting North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons will remain a pipe dream for a long time. North Korea appears determined to keep its nuclear stockpile as a deterrent against external invasion, as well as a bargaining tool in its negotiations with the United States and South Korea. However, the three countries—especially China—may be attempting to isolate and pressure North Korea to scale back its belligerent behaviour, especially its nuclear tests.

Secondly, there was no mention of the territorial disputes between the three countries. There was no discussion over the Senkaku/Diaoyu and Liancourt disputes though Japan and South Korea did discuss the South China Sea issue but without China.

What is clearly needed is at least some form of dialogue to manage disputes and develop confidence building and crisis mitigation measures. However no mention was made on the communication link between Japan and China that would likely be a major crisis mitigation measure once fully established.

Finally, the historical issues that continue to dog mutual relations were only given a cursory reference that the three countries should have “the spirit of facing history squarely and advancing towards the future.” While ostensibly a jointly-crafted statement, it nonetheless reveals the rift between South Korea and China on one hand, and Japan on the other: The former two often call for Japan to face up to history, but Japan professes a preference for looking to the future.

A welcome respite

It is clear that the security and historical issues have been largely sidestepped, and an incident over the disputed islands or disagreements over interpretation of history could again cause the annual trilateral meeting to be suspended. Nonetheless, the Trilateral Summit is a first step to breaking the ice. While security and historical matters are not easily resolved overnight, at the very least, the recent show of restraint and the resumption of the Trilateral Summit reflect political willingness to engage in dialogue, even if they only reach for the low-hanging fruit of economic cooperation initially.

Even though the summit may appear to be more “style” over substance and by no means a watershed, it may pave the way for more positive interactions in the future as well as greater mutual understanding over thorny issues, thereby contributing to regional peace and stability.

*Tan Ming Hui is an Associate Research Fellow at the Centre for Multilateralism Studies (CMS) and Henrick Z. Tsjeng is an Associate Research Fellow with the Regional Security Architecture Programme at S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.

Ever since World War I, if there is one region of the world that has been in constant turmoil, it is the Middle East (or West Asia, whichever way you like to call it). European imperialism, post-colonial despotism or neo-colonialism — there are a lot many reasons that can be held responsible for the plight of the Middle East. I discussed the historical factors responsible for the ongoing strife in the Middle East in an earlier article.

A century has passed since the First World War, and while the rest of the world has moved on, Middle East still continues to be in trouble, with a new issue arising every other day. As painful as it might be, the fact remains that the Middle East still has a long way to go, and the region has, so far, not risen from the ashes of the First World War.

What lies ahead for the Middle Eastern people and countries?

A Bad Scenario

Back in 2011, the world witnessed a series of dissident events — what would later be known as Arab Spring. All around the Middle Eastern world, people hailed such revolutions and protests as the harbingers of change. A new Middle East was in the making! The people’s voices!

Coming to the present day, and the dreams and fancy talks have fallen flat. Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Libya or Egypt: you name the country, and you will see that the apparatus is either on the brink of collapse, or there are murky clouds covering the future.

The only thing the Arab Spring actually accomplished was that it destabilized the region by proxy. Combine that with the fact that foreign interference in the Middle East has done total harm and zero good, and you will have a perfect recipe for disaster. As such, when you see Libya, Syria and Iraq in a state of total abyss, and the war in Yemen on the brink of escalating to Vietnamesque proportions, you won’t have a hard time looking for reasons behind all the carnage.

Beyond that, we also have the rather unwanted presence of Israel in the region, plus the ridiculous tug of war between Iran and Saudi Arabia. In the light of all of this, it will be safe to conclude that the post-Ottoman regional order, as envisioned by the Western powers, has collapsed.

The Solution?

At this point, broadly speaking, we can enumerate all that is going wrong in the Middle East:

1. Conflicts in Syria, Iraq, Libya, Yemen, etc.
2. Clash of interests between Iran and Saudi Arabia
3. Presence of foreign powers, especially NATO
4. The issue between Israel and Palestine
5. Societal problems (gender, illiteracy, you name it!)

I have omitted terrorism and the presence of players such as ISIS, simply because I consider such factions to be a by-product of a bigger conflict, and once the above five issues disappear or are resolved, it won’t be long before militancy ceases to exist.

For all of the above problems, many possible solutions have been suggested. Folks who consider religious fundamentalism to be the key culprit have called for reforms, as opposed to those who consider Islamism to be the better solution.

It is proven beyond doubt that authoritarian thuggery exists in the Middle East simply because foreign hegemons have established it as the way of the world. USA and its allies have vested interests in Middle East, and it is beneficial for them to have governments that are favorable to their cause. As such, political abuse of power is nothing new, albeit the only ones who suffer badly are the common people of the region.

Thing is, the solution isn’t far when you look for it: unification is the only way forward. As long as false borders continue to exist in the region, the Middle East will not progress. The biggest thing that went wrong after World War I was that a fake sense of nationalism came to the fore: people who were otherwise mutually related became citizens/subjects of different countries. Over the course of the century, such fake nationalist pride has only become stronger, and it is not uncommon to find the average youth of the Middle East considering themselves as Egyptians or Iraqis or Jordanians, and not as part of one coherent nation state.

Conclusion

As such, for the Middle East to truly blossom and bloom, it is essential that fake borders are abolished. That said, it seems highly unlikely that any form of unification or integration might happen during the oil era, especially because both domestic dictators and foreign hegemons are eager to keep the falsely-drawn borders intact.

How or when can unification happen? This is a question which, unfortunately, still lacks an answer. However, it is certain beyond doubt that unless the countries of the Middle East are unified to form one true nation-state, the problem will not perish. The war in Iraq and Syria will not take time to reach Bahrain, whereas the dissent in Egypt will surely escalate to Tunisia or Libya, and so on. Since the conflicts do not obey fake borders, neither should the solutions.

Of course, this might mean that certain regional superpowers and political dictators or rulers might find themselves out of business. But for what it’s worth, their presence is hardly helping anyone!

A unified Middle East will prove to be the first step towards actual world peace. For now, this is the only plausible and logical solution.

INTERPOL said it is to coordinate a global investigation led by France into an alleged international corruption scam involving sports officials as well as athletes suspected of a doping cover-up.

The announcement follows the publication of a report by an Independent Commission established by the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) investigating a number of individuals, including former officials of the International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF).

The Independent Commission’s findings follow its investigation into doping allegations aired on German television in December 2014.

During its investigation the Independent Commission requested assistance from INTERPOL’s anti-doping unit to contact national law enforcement agencies in countries where potential infractions had been identified in order to share intelligence.

In this respect, INTERPOL facilitated the Independent Commission’s contact with French authorities who agreed to undertake an international inquiry into allegations including active and passive corruption, money laundering and criminal conspiracy.

They appointed the country’s national anti-corruption department of the central directorate of judicial police (Office central de lutte contre la corruption et les infractions financières et fiscales, OCLCIFF, Direction centrale de la police judiciaire, DCPJ) to launch the inquiry, headed by French investigative magistrate Renaud Van Ruymbeke.

As part of the inquiry, French police last week raided premises belonging to individuals and companies.

In the framework of Operation Augeas launched by INTERPOL, the world police body is now working with member countries potentially linked to the inquiry, including Singapore, to seek assistance in coordinating a global investigative network and support the criminal investigation on the basis of the intelligence gathered by the Independent Commission.

Depending on the progression and outcome of the investigation, and in collaboration with the relevant authorities, the Independent Commission expects to publish the full and final version of its report by the end of 2015.

In 2009 INTERPOL and WADA signed a cooperation agreement to provide a clear framework for cooperation between the two international bodies in tackling doping.

The call for INTERPOL’s involvement by the Independent Commission is part of joint efforts by both agencies to develop best practice and inter-agency cooperation at all levels, particularly in the areas of evidence gathering, information sharing and trafficking in doping.

Spain’s Minister for Defence, Pedro Morenés, paid a visit Tuesday to the Marfil Detachment of the Spanish Air Force stationed in Dakar, the capital of Senegal.

On Morenés’ arrival, he was welcomed by the detachment leader, Lieutenant Colonel Carlos Martínez, and then, after the official honours, attended a presentation by the detachment leader concerning the activities carried out by the unit.

Subsequently, during his speech to the detachment, the Minister for Defence remembered the three servicemen from the 802nd SAR Squadron of the Spanish Air Force who lost their lives in the helicopter accident on 22 October and expressed gratitude for the work carried out by the members of the contingent, who Pedro Morenés believes are essential in the fight against terrorism and for guaranteeing stability in these African countries.

The Minister for Defence then took part in the third plenary session entitled ‘International Solutions in favour of Security in Africa’ alongside the French Defence Minister, the Ghanaian Foreign Affairs Minister, the President of the Economic Community of West African States, the Secretary-General of the European External Action Service and the President of the International Committee of the Red Cross.

At this forum, Pedro Morenés expressed his firm conviction that the majority of the challenges in this century will develop in Africa, meaning that security in Africa is a fundamental issue on the agenda for all members of the international community.

Marfil Detachment

The Marfil Detachment of the Spanish Air Force is stationed in Dakar to foster security in the Sahel region.

Its mission is to provide air transportation support to Operation Barkhane. It also supports the Spanish contingent of EUTM Mali and the UN MINUSMA Operation. Following a request from the French military authorities, authorization has been given for it to be used on medical evacuation missions.

The shortage of air transport resources in the region and the demand from operations led by France in West Africa have provided great value to the contribution made by Spain.

The detachment began operating in January 2013 and the 12th contingent is currently stationed in the field, having begun operations on 16 October and is scheduled to remain for a period of three months. It is made up of 57 servicemen and has one Hercules C-130 transport aircraft.

To November 1, 2015, the detachment has completed 3,291 flight hours, transporting 10,534 passengers and carrying 1,713 tonnes of cargo.

By Miguel Salazar and Edwin Nieves*

Since the end of the Stroessner dictatorship in 1989, Paraguay has struggled in its efforts to reform its weak institutional structures. Systemic corruption, growing poverty, and media censorship have all contributed to the perpetuation of the country’s stagnation over the years. Paraguay’s consistent failure to institute comprehensive land reform has even contributed to the rise of a local guerrilla movement that has not been neutralized by a corrupt military. While President Horacio Cartes has acknowledged the existence of corruption within the national police and military, many of Paraguay’s structural problems remain mercilessly neglected.

Land Reform, Profit, and Soybeans

Soybeans cover three quarters of all farmable land in the Paraguay.[1] The majority of the Paraguayan population is rural and over a quarter of the country’s labor force is involved in agriculture. This does not include the large number of Paraguayans who are engaged in subsistence farming. However, 85% of the soy covering Paraguay is inedible and only intended for industrial use.[2] As industrial farms continue to expand in response to increases in global demand, local farmers are finding themselves under pressure. High profit margins and low taxes on soy exports continue to encourage companies and foreign investors to buy the land of local farmers who find it harder and harder to produce food for their own consumption.[3]

The United States Food and Drug Administration reports that 95% of cultivated soy plants come from genetically engineered varieties.[4] The most prevalent strain is Monsanto’s “Round-Up Ready” brand. This type of soy can be indiscriminately sprayed with the potent Monsanto pesticide “Round-Up” to eliminate competing and diseased plants.[5] Periodic saturation with pesticides also kills nearby crops grown by farmers to feed themselves and their livestock. With the companies using this seed to spread out and with larger numbers of rural farmers being displaced, land reform has become the biggest election issue in 21^st century Paraguay. However, some rural Paraguayans have refused to wait for government action. Conflicts between campesinos and landowners have been occurring at a quickening pace since the turn of the century.

Incidents are increasing with private guards and police forcibly removing farmers who refuse to vacate lands claimed by corporate entities.[6] Self proclaimed “peasants without land” have also attacked estates and other resources belonging to foreign landowners.[7] In addition to corporations, foreign immigrants bought inexpensive land under the Stroessner dictatorship and developed it into profitable farmland. However, peasants displaced by corporate expansion are now demanding access to land from these foreign landowners and corporate holdings. Over the years these conflicts have escalated into violent confrontations with no clear solution in sight. Former president Fernando Lugo’s attempts to placate the peasants and President Horacio Cartes’ strong-arm approach have both failed to resolve the situation.

Guerrilla Threat and Country-wide Corruption

The Marxist-Leninist Paraguayan People’s Army’s (EPP) origins trace back to 1992. Since then, the rebel group has waged an armed conflict against soybean barons and a negligent Paraguayan state. The EPP has operated freely throughout northern Paraguay since 2004, after the kidnap and murder of Cecilia Cubas, the daughter of former President Raul Cubas.[8] EPP rebels have funded their operations by collecting ransoms earned from high profile kidnappings, and by extorting a “revolutionary tax” from local farmers and drug traffickers under the guerrilla group’s ideological pretense.[9] Since 2008, the EPP has claimed the lives of three military officials, 13 police officers, and 26 civilians.[10] Edelio Morínigo, a police officer, was kidnapped on July 15, 2014 and is one of two current EPP hostages.[11]

Amidst rampant corruption by police officials throughout the country,[12] President Cartes pushed a decree through the Paraguayan Congress in August 2013 allowing for the military to be deployed against the EPP. Law 5036/13 modified the National Defense and Domestic Security Law which allowed the military to be used for internal security, reminiscent of the days of dictator Alfredo Stroessner. Cartes then established the Joint Task Force (FTC), operating under the command of an army officer, to combat the EPP.[13]

To date, the FTC has not produced tangible results. Military failure in northern Paraguay is particularly troubling considering the diminutive size of the rebel group, composed of roughly 30 members.[14] In fact, the group does not represent a significant threat to citizens outside of the northern Concepción/San Pedro region, leading Paraguayans to question the presence of the military task force in the area.[15] In part, the FTC’s poor results are in part due to a lack of proper oversight on the part of Cartes’ administration. Former Interior Minister Rafael Filizzola has described the task force project as “a giant improvisation”, pointing to the absence of a defined budget and the FTC’s lack of experience working with the Attorney General’s office.[16] Moreover, in its desperate efforts to locate the EPP, the Joint Task Force has committed human rights violations, many of which have not been fully investigated.[17]

The FTC has also been accused of engaging in corruption and criminal activity. General Herminio Piñánez, father of former FTC bomb squad engineer Enrique Daniel Piñánez, has accused the task force of extorting local farmers and accepting bribes from drug traffickers in northern Paraguay. He has specifically referenced General Restituto Gonzalez and police Commissar Antonio Gamarra,[18] who had allegedly threatened Enrique Piñánez after he had accused the Commissar of participating in an extortion scheme in Concepción, according to the famed ABC Color.[19] Oddly enough, President Cartes had replaced both Gonzalez and Gamarra before these accusations surfaced, claiming that the officials have not produced tangible results.[20]

Recent developments have proven to be even more damning for Paraguayan military operations. On August 31, 2015, FTC spokesman and Major Jonás Ramírez revealed to a local radio station that members of the task force were leaking intelligence to the EPP.[21] Ramírez had previously claimed that the FTC’s failure in northern Paraguay had been due to a lack of funds provided by the Paraguayan government.[22] However, a U.S. embassy official in Asunción confirmed to COHA that the United States is providing training to Paraguayan military forces. This has particularly troubling implications, as the United States could be providing support to a profoundly corrupt Paraguayan institution.

Pressured by members of the PLRA, the Chamber of Deputies approved the formation of a commission in June to investigate FTC corruption amidst corruption claims.[23] Victor Rios, along with many other PLRA Chamber of Deputy members, has recently voiced his opposition to Law 5036/13 and the FTC’s activity in northern Paraguay. Members of the Colorado party have remained silent on the issue.[24] Since the approval of the commission, however, the Paraguayan government has taken no further action on the claims of General Piñánez and Major Ramírez, who now has been removed from his prior post.

Over $60 million USD have been officially channeled from Washington to Paraguay in order to address corruption in law enforcement and other public sectors.[25] Corruption, though, is not limited to specific government sectors—it seems to permeate Paraguay’s entire political system. The country has constantly suffered from corruption at all levels as a result of a lack of adequate control institutions and the domination of Stroessner’s Colorado party since his autocratic dictatorship, which ended in 1989.[26] Systemic corruption in the country has become well known internationally; the United States continues to provide economic aid to the country in hopes of reducing incentives for corrupt behavior.[27] However, these measures have largely failed, as political figures continue to freely accept narco cash and enjoy full impunity. President Cartes himself is suspected of illicit activities.[28]

Despite speculation, the possibility of the investigation of any high-profile political figures seems unlikely. A high-ranking Paraguayan national police official has revealed to COHA that members of the police lack the authority to investigate cases of political corruption within the country. This has been perpetuated due to the lack of a central intelligence agency in Paraguay until late 2014.[29] Although the country’s newly created National System of Intelligence (Sinai) represents some progress within the country, its operations will be limited to national security, particularly the threat posed by drug trafficking and the EPP.[30]

The need to investigate and reveal systemic corruption throughout the Paraguayan government has been addressed by the country’s media. However, journalists have seen their hands tied.

Silence of the Press

Journalists that report on corruption have a complicated relationship with the Paraguayan judicial system. Freedom of the press is established in the Paraguayan constitution,[31] and the country has a fairly good reputation in the eyes of the Sociedad Interamericana de Prensa and International Press Institute. Even more significantly, the Paraguayan Congress passed a freedom of information bill in December 2013, and the judicial branch has revoked the immunity granted to members of Congress who have been accused of embezzling public funds.[32]

At the same time, freedom of the press is ironically undermined by Paraguay’s own judicial system. In 2010, Paraguayan judge Carmelo Castiglioni was awarded $50,000 USD in restitution for an article by ABC Color that criticized his ruling that former President Luiz Gonzales Macchi was innocent of embezzlement.[33] The Paraguayan newspaper argued in its article that judge Castiglioni’s political sympathies clouded his judgement.[34] Judge Mirta Elena Ozuna de Cazal ruled that ABC Color should have agreed with Castiglioni’s judgment and that freedom of the press is not absolute.[35] There is a low burden of proof for cases of libel and defamation of character, which creates a culture of de facto censorship. This culture of punitive lawsuits undermines freedom of the press when it is sorely needed.

When not subjected to lawsuits, journalists reporting on corruption have suffered outright violence. El Sindicato de Periodistas del Paraguay (SPP) reports that three attempts were made on the life of radio show host Gabriel Bustamante in July of 2010, allegedly because he charged Isidro Vera (a director of Yacyreta energy company) with corruption.[36] All three attacks were carried out by Mr. Vera’s brothers in the month following the broadcast. The murders of radio hosts Tito Palma and Hugua Nandu Martin Ocampos Paez in 2007 and 2009 respectively remain unsolved, but both men were reporting on cases of corruption leading up to their deaths.[37] Although violence against journalists has decreased since Pablo Medina’s death in 2014, additional threats and attacks on journalists continue to deter investigations into corruption in Paraguay.[38]

Paraguay continues to exhibit serious structural problems as evidenced by its high levels of poverty, unequal land distribution, and guerrilla insurgency. Evidence shows that the country’s police, military, local and federal governments are all involved in a wide range of corruption. However, President Cartes has not demonstrated any political will to address the roots of Paraguay’s current problems, while officials and journalists hoping to investigate corruption have been silenced. The continued neglect of core problems by Paraguay’s government threatens its ability to govern as well as the nation’s security.

*Miguel Salazar and Edwin Nieves, Research Associates at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs

Notes:
[1] World Wildlife Fund. La expansión de la soja en Paraguay. Accessed 2 Nov. 2015. Web

[2] Abramson, Evan. “Soy: A Hunger for Land”. North American Congress on Latin America. May/June 2009, Web

[3] O’Kray, Caleb. Paraguay Oilseeds and Products Annual. United States Food and Drug Administration. 13 Feb. 2015. Web.

[4] Ibid

[5] Carpenter, Janet and Gianessi, Leonard. “Herbicide Tolerant Soybeans: Why Growers are Adopting Roundup Ready Varieties”. The Journal of Agrobiotechnology Management and Economics. Vol. 2 (2) 1999. Web

[6] Abramson, Evan. “Soy: A Hunger for Land”. North American Congress on Latin America. May/June 2009, Web

[7] Lane, Charles. “Paraguay: The Brazilians”. Pulitzer Center on Crisis Reporting. 26 Aug 2007. Web

[8] Colmán Gutiérez, Andrés. “Guerrilleros O Terroristas: La Historia De Cómo Nació El EPP.” Ultima Hora. 21 Aug. 2013. Web.

[9] Blair, Laurence. “In Paraguay’s Remote North Guerrillas Are Still at Large, Armed and Dangerous.” The Guardian. 31 Aug. 2015. Web.

[10] “Cientos De Paraguayos Marcharon Contra El Asesinato De Cinco Policías Por Parte De La Guerrilla EPP.” Infobae. 18 July 2015. Web.

[11] Blair, Laurence. “In Paraguay’s Remote North Guerrillas Are Still at Large, Armed and Dangerous.” The Guardian. 31 Aug. 2015. Web.

[12] http://www.infobae.com/2015/05/20/1729923-cayo-corrupcion-el-jefe-la-policia-paraguay

[13] McDermott, J. (2015). The Paraguayan People’s Army: A new rebel group or simple bandits? (p. 10) Bogotá: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES).

[14] Ibid. 3.

[15] Colmán Gutiérrez, Andrés. Skype interview. 15 Sept. 2015.

[16] In an interview with InSight Crime’s Jeremy McDermott, former Interior Minister Rafael Filizzola explained the situation, “The president does not trust the police, and has put the fight against the EPP, in the hands of the military, which answers directly to him. This is a huge error. There is no budget, while the army [has] no experience of working with the attorney general’s office. There is [an] immense rivalry between the police and the army, going back to the days of the dictatorship. The whole affair is simply a giant improvisation.” McDermott, J. (2015). See: The Paraguayan People’s Army: A new rebel group or simple bandits? (p. 10) Bogotá: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES).

[17] Rolón Luna, Jorge, and Diana Vargas. Análisis De La Actuación De La Fuerza De Tareas Conjuntas, Del Ministro Público Y Del Poder Judicial En La Zona Norte Del País Desde Un Enfoque De Prevención De La Tortura Y Malos Tratos: Informe Especial N° 5/2014. (p. 3-4) Asunción: Mecanismo Nacional De Prevención De La Tortura (MNP), 2015.

[18] ““Narcoaudio” Y Denuncia De Piñánez a La FTC Debatirán Hoy En Diputados.” ABC Color. 24 June 2015. Web.

[19] Enrique Piñánez died in November 2014 as a result of the detonation of a disarmed explosive in his car—in what was officially reported as an accident: “Padre De Militar Muerto Acusa a Fuerza Conjunta.” ABC Color. 4 June 2015. Web.

[20] “Cartes Ordena Raje De Militar Que Lideraba Lucha Contra El EPP.” Hoy. 5 Aug. 2014. Web.

[21] Daugherty, Arron. “Paraguay Security Forces in Disarray Amid Guerrilla Attacks.” InSight Crime. 1 Sept. 2015. Web.

[22] FTC alega que US$ 20 millones son insuficientes para desbaratar al EPP. ABC Color (2015, July 20). Web.

[23] “Diputados Investigarán Corrupción En La FTC.” ABC Color. June 25, 2015. Web.

[24] Ibid

[25] “Paraguay.” Millennium Challenge Corporation: United States of America. Web.

[26] Cohen, David, Gerardo Berthin, and Yemile Mizrahi. An Assessment of Corruption in Paraguay. Americas’ Accountability Anti-Corruption Project, 2004.

[27] “Democracy and Governance.” USAID. September 15, 2015. Web.

[28] “La Oposición Cuestiona El Origen De Los Fondos En La Cuenta Secreta Del Presidente De Paraguay.” Eldiario.es. February 9, 2015. Web.

[29] Decreto N°2812. Presidencia De La República Del Paraguay. December 18, 2014. Web.

[30] “Paraguay Promulga En Navidad La Ley Que Crea Su Primer Servicio De Inteligencia.” Infobae. December 25, 2014. Web.

[31] Constitución Politica de 1992. Republica de Paraguay. Base de Datos Politicos de las Americas. Georgetown University. Last Updated 11 July 2011. Web

[32] Interamerican Press Association Report: Paraguay. Mid Year Assembly 2014. Web

[33] Graber, Dean. “Editor in Paraguay Slammed with Fine for Criticizing Court Ruling” Knight Center for Journalism in the Americas. 7 Apr. 2010. Web

[34] “Castiglioni alega que fallo contra medio es histórico”. Última Hora. 7 Apr. 2010.

[35] Ibid

[36] Interamerican Press Association Report: Paraguay. Mid Year Assembly 2014. Web

[37] Ibid

[38] “Pablo Medina Velázquez.” Committee to Protect Journalists. Web.

It is not even a man bites dog story. Instead, it is just a man barks at dog story. Yet, for one National Football League (NFL) player it is a story that threatens to conclude with his incarceration.

Oakland Raiders Linebacker Ray-Ray Armstrong’s alleged barking at a dog on Sunday may cost him thousands of dollars in fines and several years in prison. Why you ask? Because Armstrong is alleged to have barked at a police dog, and, in this age of SWAT, some dogs are protected by the law much more than are ordinary people.

You see, Armstrong was at the Pittsburgh Steelers’ stadium just before a Raiders away game when, as Jacob Klinger relates the story at Penn Live, “Armstrong lifted his shirt, began pounding his chest and barking at an Allegheny County Sheriff Office bomb-sniffing dog.” Most people would consider this action to be somewhere between harmless jest and a bit rude. But, in the state of Pennsylvania, Klinger notes, it is also a felony termed “taunting a police animal” and carrying a maximum punishment of a $15,000 fine plus seven years in prison.

This article was published by the RonPaul Institute.

By Elena Kosolapova

Georgia will have the opportunity to participate in the visa-free regime with the EU beginning in 2016, according to Andrejs Mamikins, the European Parliament’s rapporteur for Georgia.

Speaking to Trend Nov. 11, Mamikins said that a very positive report on Georgia is expected from the European Commission.

He further said the report would be presented this year.

“And it can be said with almost 99 percent certainty that the visa-free regime will be introduced next year,” he confirmed.

Mamikins further said it was to some extent unfair to not grant Georgia a visa-free regime with the EU, while providing Moldova with this privilege, because these two countries are comparable in terms of their territories, populations, current territorial problems, geographical locations and geopolitical importance.

Mamikins added that the reason for Moldova’s receiving the visa-free regime before Georgia lies in the fairly strong influence by the Romanian lobby, and the fact that almost one million Moldovans have Romanian citizenship, along with citizenship in Moldova and, consequently, they were already allowed to travel freely throughout the EU.

Mamikins noted that Georgia, among the three countries newly associated with the EU, is regarded as a leading country, both in terms of the number of laws harmonized in line with EU rules, and in terms of the number of projects being implemented within the country.

“We know how it is important for Georgian society to receive the visa-free regime, and that it is of more symbolic significance, rather than of political importance,” he explained. “We know how much Georgia – a high achiever in the dialogue between the Eastern Partnership and newly associated countries – is objectively resentful over Moldova’s having the visa-free regime, while it was not granted for Georgia.”

He noted that Georgia’s preparations for introducing a visa-free regime with the EU are worth praising, and the country will almost certainly receive the regime once the report is presented.

“The visa-free procedure will be quite simple,” he said.

“Perhaps, there will be some symbolic vote in the European Parliament,” Mamikins said. “But it is not difficult to foresee that the majority of MEPs will vote for it, since one year ago they voted for Georgia’s associate membership in the EU. The European Parliament took the main decision almost a year ago. Therefore, this is a technical decision on the visa-free regime.”

Regarding the visa-free regime for other associated countries, Mamikins believes that this will not happen in 2016.

He also said there will be no visa-free regime with Ukraine, and there is little chance of a visa-free regime between the EU and Turkey.

“Turkey has been misled since 1963,” he noted. “When Turkey obtained an associate status, it was very close to beginning main negotiations on full EU membership. Then this intensity decreased due to a number of reasons, namely, domestic in Turkey and external in the EU. Many people in the European External Action Service and the European Parliament say that this dialogue must be resumed at the previous level.”

At the same time, Mamikins did not rule out that the visa regime would be slightly simplified for Turkey.

Regarding the possibility of EU-associate countries’ joining the EU, Mamikins said that neither Turkey nor other associate countries could join the EU until the end of the mandate of the current European Commission.

“This was the position and one of the key statements of the current president of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker,” he said. “But this does not mean that these countries can not cooperate with the EU in the broad format as associate members.”

Majid Azarpey and Ali Shariati, two reformist political prisoners currently held in Ward 8 of Evin Prison, began a hunger strike last Thursday November 5 after addressing a letter to President Hassan Rohani, indicating that they will not end their strike until their cases have been submitted for review.

The two political activists write: “Unfortunately, our efforts in support of the government of ‘wisdom and hope’ did not sit well with the security charge fabricators who have slapped us with a long list of false charges in an attempt to discourage your young supporters.”

The letter criticizes Rohani and his administration for “weakness in the areas of justice and intelligence”.

The two urge the Rohani administration to speak out against “extremists in the establishment and their false charges”.

In September, Ali Shariati was sentenced to over 12 years in jail for “assembly and collusion, propaganda against the regime, insulting the leader and having a satellite dish”.

Majid Azarpey, a member of the reformist National Trust party, has been held in prison without any formal charges for over five months.

On 14 January 2012, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao undertook a four and half hour visit to Kathmandu. Wen was the highest level Chinese leader to visit Nepal in a decade. Among various requests Nepal made to the Chinese premier was a 100 percent increase in the 100 million Yuan annual aid Nepal received from Beijing; extension of the railway line that China was building up to the Sino-Nepal border to Kathmandu and Lumbini; and allowing Nepali citizens residing within 30 kilometres of the Sino-Nepal border to use the pasture and graze their livestock on the other side of the border. Not just all of Kathmandu’s wishes were granted, Wen showered much more on the Himalayan kingdom.

Eight agreements including economic and technical assistance agreement with a grant assistance of 750 million Yuan for the next three years for the development of mutually agreed projects were signed. Wen also pledged special grant assistance of $20 million for financing rehabilitation of Maoist combatants. China further pledged financial and technical assistance worth 10 million yuan to enhance capability of Nepal Police. Another technical assistance package of 400,000 yuan was signed for strengthening the Armed Police Force (APF).

These agreements, far from being customary pledges usually made during high profile visits, were a continuation of Beijing’s active interest in Nepal in years prior to Mr. Wen’s visit. And the trend of the rising Chinese aid and investment profile has been sustained since then. China is building infrastructure for transport, telecommunications and hydroelectric power in Nepal. Wide ranging Investments have also been made in sectors including hotels and restaurants, electronics, readymade garment, medical services and civil construction.

Nepal ranks second in water resources in the world. More than 5000 small and big rivers flow in Nepal with an estimated hydro power potential of 83,000 megawatt (MW). Of this only 650 MW are being currently produced. In 2012, the China Three Gorges conglomerate signed a deal to invest $1.6bn in the 750-megawatt hydropower project in West Seti, in Nepal’s northwestern Doti district. West Seti project is described as one of the largest power projects in the country. In early 2015, the Nepal investment board cleared the project after the conglomerate threatened to pull out its support after waiting for three years for clearance. Financing for the US$1.6 billion plant is being provided by China Three Gorges and the Export-Import Bank of China. The investment represents China’s largest investment into Nepal, which is estimated to have at least 40,000 MW of hydroelectric potential. While construction of the West Seti plant is scheduled to begin shortly, the plant’s first generating units will come on line in 2019. The majority of the project’s output will be sold to Nepal.

Nepal figures prominently in Beijing’s Silk Road economic belt project. Here Chinese ambitions syncs well with Nepal’s aspirations for having better road and air connectivity with China to spur the globalisation of the Nepalese economy. While connectivity with India is seen as a critical and yet disruption prone supply route, road and rail links with China is being seen as means by which Nepalese goods will be able to find international markets. Not surprisingly, in December 2014, Nepal backed China’s Silk Road economic belt project by signing a four point document at the Nepal-China Inter-governmental Business and Investment Coordination meeting in Beijing. In March 2015, Beijing said it would extend a $145 million grant for the upgrade of a 114-kilometres road that links the capital Kathmandu with the Tibetan border, as well as other infrastructure projects. China wants to connect with Nepal and South Asia through an extension of the Qinghai-Tibet railway. The rail line from Lhasa has already been extended to Shigatse, Tibet’s second largest city, 253 kilometres away. The Chinese plan to build two lines from Shigatse. One would lead to Kerung, the nearest Chinese town from Nepal, from where it would be extended to Rasuwagadhi in Nepal. The other line would head to Yadong on the India-Bhutan border. Once a rail connection with China is established, Nepalese goods can be transited to the international markets through the Eurasian transportation network.

Both countries have also agreed to construct and manage dry ports along the six Nepal-China border points in a bid to facilitate bilateral trade and people´s movement. Of this the ones at Yari-Pulam, Rasuwa-Jilong and Kodari (Tatopani)-Zangmu (Khasha) are international-standard dry ports and cargo terminals and the ones at Kimanthanka-Dingri, Olangchungola-Riwu and Mustang-Ligzi are bilateral standard. China further agreed to expedite the implementation of Tatopani Dry Port and upgrading and expansion of the existing Ring Road in the Kathmandu Valley.

In August 2011, Nepal Telecom, the government-controlled telecom monopoly, awarded the contract for installing the Next Generation Network (NGN) to two Chinese telecom firms, ZTE Corporation and Huawei. While ZTE installed the equipment for NGN in Kathmandu Valley while Huawei did so in the rest of Nepal at a combined cost of $19 million. ZTE, China’s largest wireless equipment manufacturers and network solutions providers with close ties with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in 2012 built four high-technology earthquake-resistant data centres for Ncell Pvt Ltd, a Nepalese telecom company in at a cost of about $43.75 million at Biratnagar, Kathmandu, Hetauda and Pokhara. In 2014, Huawei started its commercial operations in Nepal. In addition to the existing trans-border Tatopani optical fibre connection with China set up in 2010-11, Nepal Telecom set up the second Rasuwagadhi optical fibre connection with Beijing in early 2015. Among Nepali social media users, China’s mobile messaging app WeChat appears to be the most popular means of communication.China Nepal

In 2014, China overtook India as Nepal’s largest foreign investor. A report by Nepal’s Department of Industry said that Chinese investments reached $174 million between July and December 2014, accounting for over 60 percent of the total FDI commitment. This marked a three-fold rise from the $55 million investment in the same period in the 2011-12 fiscal year, when India was the biggest source of FDI in that country. Much of this has been possible under the sustained efforts of the Federation of Nepalese Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FNCCI), especially under the framework of Nepal-China Non-Governmental Cooperation Forum established in 1996, which is working towards attracting Chinese investment to the country. The 12th meeting of the forum took place in 2013 in Beijing.

Among projects completed in the health sector is the construction of the 150-bed B.P. Koirala Memorial Cancer Hospital (1999) at the cost of $11.7 million, the 120-bed Civil Service Hospital (2006) at the cost of $16 million and the National Ayurveda Research and Training Centre at the cost of 7.14 million (2009). In July 2015, Nepal also endorsed a Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) proposal worth $360 million made by China’s Hongshi Holdings Limited to establish a cement plant in Nepal in partnership with Nepal’s Shivam Cement.

China is now the second largest tourist source country to Nepal. Such flow of tourists have increased phenomenally since 2009. According to Nepal’s Ministry of Culture, Tourism and Civil Aviation, while 32,272 Chinese tourists visited Nepal in 2009, in 2013, the number of increased to 113,173 in 2013, registering a 250 percent growth. Correspondingly, the number of weekly flights between Chinese cities and Nepal has gone up to 70. Chinese nationals have started investing in the hotel industry in Nepal’s tourist destinations. In Thamel and Pokhra for example, a number of hotels are owned by the Chinese nationals using business licenses issued by the Nepalese government. A clear pointer of the demographic shift in tourism from majority European backpackers to Chinese tourists is the unofficial renaming of a part of Thamel as Chinatown.

As the Chinese investment and tourism takes a leap Beijing is encouraging the Nepalese people to learn Chinese. In the past years, several private centres offering lessons in Mandarin have sprung up in Kathmandu and other cities catering to the increasing demand of the young who genuinely believe the language will be a pathway to a good career. In addition, instructors from Beijing have also landed in Kathmandu to give free lessons in Mandarin and set up the Confucius Centre at Kathmandu University to “spread Chinese language and culture”. China has also doubled the number of scholarships previously at 100 to attract Nepalese students.

Beijing has termed Nepal a corridor connecting China to South Asia, a position that was once endorsed by former Nepalese Prime Minister Baburam Bhattarai who said, “Nepal will be a friendship bridge between China and India.” However, this stated position of playing only a bridge is changing, partly due to India’s hardline position and partly due to a conscious policy on part of Kathmandu. The new Nepalese Prime Minister Khadga Prasad Sharma Oli has stated that he will strengthen bilateral ties with China and India. In an interview to the Xinhua newspaper Oli also expressed his commitment to maintaining Nepal’s long-standing one-China policy, saying Nepal will not allow any external forces in its territory to work against China’s core interests.

On 28 October 2015 both countries entered into an agreement for import of oil. The agreement followed China’s pledge a week earlier to provide 1000 metric ton (1,300 kilolitres) of fuel to Nepal in grant after blockades along the Indo-Nepal border created a serious fuel crisis in the country. The agreement, viewed by some in New Delhi as alarming is a part of the continuing trend of expanding Chinese footprints in Nepal. Whether New Delhi can deal with this development by overplaying its geographic advantages must remain a matter of serious debate in the coming months.

Dr. Bibhu Prasad Routray is Director of Mantraya.org, where this article was published.