As we come to the close of Pres. Obama’s second term and near the 2016 presidential election, it’s time to make a few predictions about the role Israel will play in the coming campaign and how U.S. foreign policy will play out in the region.  To do this, I have to make a prognostication about who will win the election.  At this point, I’d say the odds-on favorite to win is Hillary Clinton.  To be very clear, I don’t support her and won’t vote for her (I support Bernie Sanders in the primary campaign).

If you look at every GOP presidential candidate, I don’t think any of them have the gravitas to beat Clinton.  I don’t by any means think she’s a stellar candidate.  She obviously has flaws and blind spots.  She can be beaten–Barack Obama showed that in 2008.  But I don’t think that will happen this time around.

So if Hillary wins, what are the prospects for Israel-Palestine?  In a word, bleak.  Even bleaker than they are today.

The truth is that while Barack Obama offered the best chance of changing the dynamic in the conflict and taking bold steps toward solving it–he wasted all his efforts.  I’ve written about the reasons for his failures many times before here.  Suffice to say, that the violence we are now witnessing is in large part the result of Obama’s failures in this realm.  He had eight years to accomplish something and he did virtually nothing.  A few stabs at piecemeal measures which Netanyahu parried easily.  Then he was done.  Spent.

Clinton will have none of the positive energy that Obama had in his first two years in office.  She will not take bold stands.  She will settle for the status quo, which means more and greater violence.  Israel can continue its downward slide toward what looks more and more like fascism to me.  Israelis can continue voting in more and more extreme governments safe in the knowledge that Clinton will, at best, make feeble protestations about preserving democracy and supporting two states.  These ideas will become more and more laughingstocks.

If she serves two terms, it means eight more years of murder of Israeli Jews and Palestinians.  It means at least two or three more wars in Gaza.  It may mean a war against Hezbollah in Lebanon as well.  Given the numbers killed in the past such wars, we can expect another 10,000 dead over that span of time.  No, it’s not Rwanda.  But must we wait till 800,000 die before Hillary Clinton will get off her ass and break out of her Zio-mindset?

Hillary, as almost all readers here know, is bought lock, stock and barrel by Haim Saban.  He will not only contribute millions to her campaign (he’s contributed $2-million even at this early date in the 2016 campaign), he will draw other pro-Israel donors into the fold.  He will be the Israel Lobby’s enforcer in Hillary’s camp.  He will also get to lobby for cabinet posts and State Department staff assignments for the Zio-faithful.  Look to Dennis Ross, Aaron David Miller, David Makovsky and the whole tired bunch of Zio-mats (Zio-diplomats) to rear their ugly heads once again, regurgitating the same tired concepts which failed in the past administrations in which they served.  Ross, given his level of self-regard, may tout himself Secretary of State material (Lord help us!).  Saban will certainly be his chief champion.

The one bold stroke Obama took which he will hand to Hillary on a silver platter is the opportunity for détente with Iran.  If she continues his policy of engaging Iran and exploring the possibility of resolving intractable conflicts like those in Syria and Lebanon, in which Iran has a deep and vested interest–then she too may make a mark in the region, even if she fails on Israel-Palestine.  But that is an open question.  I don’t know if she has the courage, vision and political savvy to continue along Obama’s road.

I doubt anyone will ask me why I won’t vote for Hillary.  It seems obvious.  But in case anyone does want it spelled out, I think four or eight years of Hillary means more mass death in the Middle East.

This article was published at Tikun Olam.

In an eight-hour operation on an adult patient, Dr. Daniel Borsuk carried out a facial reconstruction using virtual surgery and 3D models, removing a vascularized piece of pelvic bone and reshaping it to adapt it to the rest of the face before transplanting it through the inside of the mouth, with no scars left at all.

Scar-free facial reconstruction is now a reality. A team led by Daniel Borsuk, a doctor at Hôpital Maisonneuve-Rosemont and a professor at the University of Montreal, recently conducted the very first such procedure in the history of plastic surgery in Canada. The hospital is part of the CIUSS de l’Est-de-l’île-de-Montréal health network. In an eight-hour operation on an adult patient, Dr. Daniel Borsuk carried out a facial reconstruction using virtual surgery and 3D models, removing a vascularized piece of pelvic bone and reshaping it to adapt it to the rest of the face before transplanting it through the inside of the mouth, with no scars left at all.

In the past, this type of procedure would have necessitated multiple interventions and left one or more scars.

“The operation, during which the latest technologies were applied to reconstructive plastic surgery, sends a real message of hope to anyone who feels they must simply live with this type of disfigurement and who often feels so self-conscious that they isolate themselves,” explained Dr. Borsuk.

For more than 25 years, Hôpital Maisonneuve-Rosemont and the Faculty of Medicine at the University of Montreal have played a key role in the field of plastic surgery, their professionals working tirelessly to achieve technological advances and make these breakthroughs available to patients.

Dr. Borsuk had already participated in a milestone moment in the history of reconstructive surgery when he was the only Canadian physician on an American face transplant team. In 2012, he took part in the most extensive face transplant ever conducted, on a 37-year-old man disfigured by a gunshot wound.

‘Frozen conflicts’ blight a number of ex-Soviet states where reformist voices seek a more democratic and liberal path. Resolving these disputes has proved exceptionally difficult as a result of vested interests, which depend on the status quo, and outside interference.

By Robert Ledger*

The frozen conflicts of the former USSR lie at the very fault line of East and West. After the Ukraine crisis erupted in early 2014, EU leaders have made efforts to encourage reform in the country. Critics say that linking economic ties with security alarmed Russia so much in late 2013 that it increased the likelihood of intervention by the Kremlin, while others say the West was too sluggish in responding to the events of the Maidan revolution. In any case, Ukraine has subsequently been the latest ex-Soviet state to be blighted by ‘frozen conflict’, in Crimea and now in Donbas. Once left to fester, these disputes – often concentrated on contested interpretations of nationality, allegiance and territory – are notoriously difficult to resolve and develop their own dynamic.

In 2009 the EU launched its ‘Eastern Partnership’ (EaP) programme, an attempt to build closer ties with six ex-Soviet countries: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. After Russian incursions into Ukraine the EU has moved to sign association agreements (‘Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements’) with the three countries where the voices for reform are loudest: Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, while the others have edged cautiously closer to Russia and its Eurasian Economic Union. Five of the six countries experience (Belarus being the exception), and to varying degrees, frozen conflict. What are the implications of these disputes?

It is worth pointing out that some of these conflicts are not really frozen. Armenian and Azerbaijani forces have repeatedly clashed over the last year in Nagorno-Karabakh, recognised as part of Azerbaijan by the international community but since the 1991-1994 war controlled de facto by Armenia. Frozen conflicts foster insecurity and instability and prevent reform and development. In each country there are reformists that seek a more democratic, liberal, and crucially pro-European course. The EU has attempted to resolve the conflicts and bring the countries into its orbit with both carrots and sticks, including promises of integration, funding, visa-free travel and trade agreements, as well as sanctions in the case of Moldova’s frozen conflict in Transnistria.

So far, however, progress has been painfully slow. Each frozen conflict contains vested interests, backed by Russia, who oppose resolution. In 2014 NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen said “Putin wants protracted, frozen conflicts in the neighbourhood.” It has been clear during the war in Georgia in 2008, and Ukraine more recently, that Russia does not want to see these states move closer to Europe, and in particular NATO. The West has been too slow to realise this and criticism of its offer to Ukraine in late 2013 has some relevance. The Kremlin has exercised a modified form of imperialism – although ‘divide and rule’ is imperialism 101 – in its ‘near-abroad’ after the uncertainty of the 1990s. Despite claiming to respect the inviolability of state sovereignty and non-interference in other states’ affairs, Russia supports corrupt elites, fuelling crime and corruption, in maintaining the status quo. This is particularly true in the case of Georgia’s frozen conflicts in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Transnistria in Moldova and now Crimea and Donbas in Ukraine. Although less obviously involved in Nagorno-Karabakh – Russia backs Armenia – it tacitly arms both sides, causing a volatile militarisation of the South Caucasus. The real losers, as ever, are the inhabitants of the conflict zones. In 2013-2014 photographer Liza Premiyak produced a fascinating photo-journal that demonstrated the trauma and prolonged under-development experienced in these frozen conflict regions.

Russia is not alone in apparently supporting frozen conflicts in order to further its interests. Other examples of conflicts that seem intractable include Kashmir, Korea, the Palestinian territories, Northern Cyprus and Kosovo, and blame for each can be apportioned to various actors, depending on your point of view. What is certain, however, is that once the dust settles and the lines are drawn, these conflicts are very difficult to settle. Into this vortex are drawn propaganda, corruption, militarisation and arms spending. Those who seek to compromise and solve the disputes are deemed unpatriotic. Civil society groups in Armenia and Azerbaijan, for instance, have sought to meet to build ties to resolve the stalemate over the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, only to be dubbed treacherous at home. The process of an increasingly draconian turn by Azerbaijan’s government and its impact on the Nagorno-Karabakh peace process was explored in TransConflict in July 2015 by Haykaram Nahapetyan. Corrupt autocrats – not brave leaders who seek to build peace – have usually been the product of this environment. The EU’s overtures to Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova could be a bold move, but much will need to change before the frozen conflicts in the region can be resolved.

*Robert Ledger is a researcher and writer on European affairs, with a particular focus on the Balkan and Caucasus regions. He has an MA in International Relations from Brunel University and a PhD in political science from Queen Mary University London. He is editor of the next issue of the Journal of International Relations Research.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu left the United States early Thursday after a three day visit to the ally country, Israeli media reported.

The visit — the PM’s first to the US since the Iran nuclear deal was finalized — included a meeting with US president Barack Obama that Netanyahu deemed during a press briefing as “one of the best meetings” to take place between the two leaders.

Despite a series of recent diplomatic blow-ups between the two parties, Obama told Netanyahu during a Monday meeting that he hoped to get a “head start” planning future aid to Israel.

US Congressional sources told Israeli daily Haaretz that Israel requested $5 billion in annual defense aid from the US that would be fixed for the next ten years.

The annual aid would far surpass the $3 billion per year currently received by Israel on a budget agreement set to end by the year 2018.

White House spokesperson Jon Earnest was not able to confirm exact plans for the future fiscal budget for US aid to Israel, but reiterated earlier this week during a press briefing the Obama administration’s “commitment to Israel’s national security.”

“We are committed to the Israelis continuing to have a qualitative military edge in the region,” Earnest said.

In addition to aid, Syria also sat high on the agenda for Monday’s meeting between Obama and Netanyahu.

Obama reportedly rejected a proposal set forth by the Israeli PM for the US to recognize Israel’s illegal annexation of the Golan Heights. The proposal was reportedly rejected in order to counter increased upset in neighboring Syria, sources told Haaretz.

The US president said the request was “unjustified” and and risked hindering US-backed Syrian opposition forces, the daily added.

Despite a muted response from Obama regarding Netanyahu’s visit this week, US Secretary of State John Kerry is expected to travel to Israel next month to continue talks with Israeli leadership.

Unilateral moves ‘possible’

On the second day of his US trip, Netanyahu said during an interview with Washington-based think tank Center for American Progress that taking “unilateral” moves in occupied Palestinian territory was “possible.”

While possible, Netanyahu added that a unilateral withdrawal from the occupied West Bank would require Israel to maintain “security presence” in the area, as would be the case in any negotiated agreement, he said.

The Israeli PM also denied that settlement expansion was taking over a significant portion of Palestinian land, saying that the “total amount of built-up land is….maybe one tenth of one percent.”

However, according to United Nation’s documentation, more than 60 percent of the occupied West Bank is under full Israeli control.

Netanyahu’s statement comes as over 200 Israeli settlements and outposts continue to expand across Palestinian land in East Jerusalem and the West Bank, interconnected by Israeli-built infrastructure and effectively making a contiguous Palestinian state impossible.

Netanyahu said that settlements were “not a core issue,” adding that a refusal by Palestinian leadership to acknowledge Israel as a Jewish state was the only impediment to establishing an independent Palestinian state.

When asked why Israel wouldn’t stop settlement expansion now, Netanyahu said, “because people live there.”

He also rejected that his leadership acted to stall peace with the Palestinians, saying that he is willing to speak with Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas “right now, without any conditions.”

Abbas has also said in the past that Palestinian leadership was open to talks with the Israeli PM, however negotiations between the two sides have repeatedly failed over the past few decades to end the ongoing Israeli occupation.

Kerry, in tandem with other international leaders, has geared up in recent weeks to set the stage to restart negotiations in the wake of ongoing violence in the occupied Palestinian territories and Israel.

By Rajeev Sharma

So, Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has just faced a humiliating defeat in the crucial elections to the Bihar assembly.

But then why the post-Bihar political narrative in India has been focused on Modi?

How come that the political discourse has been centered on Modi versus Nitish Kumar because the former is the PM and head of Indian government while the latter is just a CM or chief minister of one of India’s 29 states?

Well, that is the crux of the whole problem and Modi has himself to blame for this. Never before in the history of independent India had a premier raised the stakes of one state assembly poll so much and campaigned so extensively as Modi did in Bihar. He did not even learn from his party’s complete rout in Delhi assembly polls nine months ago where he had campaigned extensively and the BJP managed to win just three out of 70 seats.

Bihar proved to be a mini-Delhi for Modi and the BJP. Modi personally led his party’s poll campaign and addressed as many as 26 rallies in Bihar. In fact, the joke doing the rounds while the Bihar campaigning was on was that Modi would be back in the state next year for campaigning in village council elections!

The prime minister deliberately kept senior BJP leaders like L.K. Advani, Murali Manohar Joshi and Yashwant Sinha (who is a Bihari) away from the campaign and ordered his ministers to address election rallies. All the ministers roped in for campaigning in Bihar are minions and hardly capable of winning their own elections. They won their seats in the April-May 2014 general elections only because of the Modi wave.

Now cut to 2015 and there is no Modi wave. Delhi proved it nine months ago and Bihar has corroborated it now.

How did it happen? How come the Modi tsunami has fizzled out so quickly? There are several explanations for this.

1. Unification of key opposition parties. The onset of the Modi era has brought forth a BJP versus the rest scenario. Congress Vice President Rahul Gandhi had said after his party’s rout in last year’s general elections that Modi had got 31 percent votes, which meant that 69 percent votes were cast against him. Nobody took Gandhi seriously till recently and that’s why the Modi juggernaut continued to roll on pummeling the opposition in assembly elections in Maharashtra, Jharkhand, Haryana and even in the Muslim-dominated state of Jammu and Kashmir. Gandhi this time ensured that his Congress party joined hands with two major regional parties opposed to the BJP, Nitish Kumar’s Janata Dal (United) and Lalu Yadav’s Rashtriya Janata Dal. As a result this grand alliance got two-thirds majority in the 243-seat Bihar assembly and the Congress won 17 seats as against just four in 2010 when the Congress had contested elections on its own.

2. Negative campaigning by the BJP. Modi and his party colleagues initially did the right thing by focusing on development but as the five-phase polling picked up momentum their campaign increasingly became shriller and negative. Modi himself threw barbs at Nitish Kumar and Lalu Yadav and did not even spare Lalu’s daughter. This did not go down well and hurt the Bihari pride, triggering a very effective slogan by the Nitish-Lalu team: Bihari versus the Bahiri (the outsiders).

3. Increasing intolerance. Filmmakers, historians, literary writers, intellectuals and even scientists increased pressure on the Modi government by returning their government awards in protest against rising intolerance when Bihar polls were at their peak. This was coupled with irresponsible remarks by the BJP’s loose canons, which were aimed at polarizing the voters on communal lines. The BJP sought to milk the beef controversy and came up with posters of cow with the save-cow message. India’s vibrant social media lampooned the BJP for using the cow saying the cow gives milk, not votes. One tweet said how the BJP used the cow for political means but ended up with dung on its face.

4. The Amit Shah factor. Modi gave a free run to his handpicked BJP President Amit Shah who camped in Bihar for months and ran the election campaign like the CEO of a multinational company. After all, Shah had got BJP 71 out of 80 seats in Uttar Pradesh in last year’s general elections. But this time his authoritarian style proved to be counterproductive. His remark that defeat of BJP in Bihar will be celebrated in Pakistan with firecrackers sealed the BJP’s fate.

5. RSS chief’s remark on reservation. The anti-reservation remark by Rashtriya Swayamsewak Sangh chief Mohan Bhagwat before even the first vote was polled gave ammunition to the Nitish-Lalu combine and proved to be the BJP’s undoing as Bihar’s majority population is backward and dependent on reservation. This raises the conspiracy theory whether the RSS did so deliberately to cut Modi to size.

The immediate impact of the Bihar results will be that Modi’s political stature will be shriveled and pruned. Moreover, his stature abroad too will inevitably be reduced.

By D. S. Rajan*

There is no doubt that the summit meeting held between the leader of mainland China, Xi Jinping and his Taiwanese counterpart Ma Ying-jeou (Singapore, November 7, 2015) has been  historic; it  marked first of such an occasion  in 66 years since the end in 1949 of the civil war in China. How the meeting came about? According to Ma (http://www.wsj.com/articles/taiwan-china-meeting-a-push-for-peace-ma-yin…),   the seeds for the meeting were sown after a 2013 encounter during an Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation gathering in Bali between Zhang Zhijun, leader of Beijing’s Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) and Wang Yu-chi, then the head of Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council (TMAC). Since then, the two met on multiple occasions, including in  Nanjing and in Taiwan. Ma further disclosed that during a meeting in October 2015, with Andrew Hsia, Wang’s successor, Zhang raised the idea of a joint Xi-Ma meeting and both sides began discussing an appropriate location. The inference thus is that the initiative for the meeting came from mainland China; this would be of great interest to the analysts.

The summit is significant politically for the two sides in the current context. In the case of China, the meeting marks an initial but significant breakthrough achieved by President Xi Jinping in realizing the most important domestic goal- peaceful reunification with Taiwan. The timing of the meeting is particularly and equally significant. It has coincided with Xi’s full consolidation of political power within the country and launch of major foreign policy initiatives (e.g the ‘belt and road’ proposal and ‘Asia for Asians’ concept) to serve the stated aims of common development and prosperity in the region. However, there seems to be a fear that such initiatives reflect China’s ambition to spread its strategic influence externally. The Singapore event can especially be considered as part of Xi’s drive towards reducing tensions in the region which have arisen due to China’s building of artificial islands in the South China Sea. Xinhua (November 6, 2015) claimed “there is a new look and feel to China’s diplomacy. Never before have China’s leaders been so keen to reach out to the world beyond their borders”.

The summit is also a land mark event for Taiwan. It  has come prior to the presidential and parliamentary elections there scheduled for January 2016 in which the believed sure winner is the pro-independent opposition party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP); the expectation is that the DPP’s Tsai Ing-wen, the prospective next Taiwan President   may be opposed to continuing the summit process initiated by Ma. From the mainland’s perspective, Tsai’s assuming charge has to be met with ‘strongly defensive’ responses from it including application of the 2005 Anti-Secession Law; this may result in new challenges to the cross-Straits relationship (“Provocative words expose Tsai’s true intent”, Global Times, November 9, 2015, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/951528.shtml).

One should at the same time not exaggerate the importance of the summit for mainland-Taiwan reunification. Xi seems realistic and not in a hurry for quick results. In fact, he foresees serious challenges for the unification cause in the post-Ma period. According to the Chinese officials, Xi told Ma in the meeting that “as long as the 1992 consensus and the co-ideas can be honored, we will be more than willing to communicate with our counterparts, but the forces seeking Taiwanese independence are the most real threat to cross-strait peace.” In the words of Professor Andrew Nathan of Columbia University, the USA, “the time is not ripe for Beijing to ’close the deal’ on Taiwan unification, so they have to wait, refrain from triggering a crisis, and hope for an improvement in China’s image among the Taiwan voters.”  Taiwan is also cautious; Ma acknowledged (November 12, 2015) that the gap between the two sides remains vast and indicated his desire to maintain the status quo.

The summit process if proceeds further has a definite meaning for the Asia-Pacific region as a whole. If a conducive atmosphere for an ultimate mainland China – Taiwan reunification emerges, the US may develop reasons to reexamine its Taiwan policy. Hypothetically, if sovereignty of Taiwan becomes a non-issue for the mainland and Taiwan one day, there may be no place for Taiwan Relations Act in the US scheme of things, a situation which may cause a new transformation in Washington-Beijing ties. Also, a united China if it comes will be a big new factor in regional geo-politics. The implications for regional trade will be enormous.

It should be important for analysts to note that for reasons best understood, the two sides have avoided giving any sign that the Xi-Ma meeting was a formal one between two presidents.   They agreed to term it as one held between ‘’leaders across the straits’’. Xi and Ma called each other “mister” and shared the expenditure for the meeting. No national flags were displayed and no joint communiqué or statement was issued on the occasion.  

No full details on the closed door Xi-Ma meeting are available so far, preventing an accurate   analysis on what can be expected following the meeting. However, from the publicized remarks made by the two leaders prior to the meeting and the observations made by the  Chinese Minister of the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council, Mr Zhang Zhijun, at a  press conference held subsequent to the meeting  (full texts given in Annexure for record), the following broad picture seems to emerge:   

• Atmosphere of the Summit: The Xi-Ma meeting was held in an atmosphere of ‘mutual respect’.  Of particular interest is the noting by mainland officials that the two reviewed bilateral ties in the last 66 years in a “in a spirit of mutual respect and a commitment to peaceful development.”

• Common Stress on “Chinese nation”: While both the leaders mentioned about ‘rejuvenating the Chinese nation’, what distinguishes Xi’s stand from that of Ma is the emphasis of the former that both mainland and Taiwan come under one sovereignty. Xi said that “the fundamental principle is that Taiwan and the Mainland China actually belong to one Chinese nation, and it is not a relation between two countries. It should always be deemed as one sovereignty.  We are closely-knit kinsmen, and blood is thicker than water”.

• Consensus on “1992 Consensus”: Most important is consideration by both Xi and Ma that the “1992 consensus” reached by the two sides is the “political foundation of cross straits relationship”. It may be recalled that under the consensus, a formula was tacitly agreed upon by Beijing and Taipei allowing dialogue between them, along with a condition that there is only “one China” with each side free to interpret what “one China” means. The Ma administration in Taiwan says the term “one China” refers to the Republic of China; Beijing on its part of late seems to ignore the provision for different interpretations by limiting itself to insisting that the term refers to “one china” of which Taiwan and the mainland are indivisible components (http://nationalinterest.org/feature/china-demolishes-the-taiwan-consensus-12396). In any case, during the meeting, the two leaders mentioned only about the consensus, without making any reference to freedom to interpret. This indicates their strong desire not to give importance to technical aspects of the consensus and instead pursue the dialogue process set by them.

• Mainland- Taiwan Hotlines: As reported by Chinese officials, Xi agreed with Ma’s proposal to set up a cross-strait hotline, so as to help improve exchanges and dialogue.

• Changed mainland perception of Taiwan: During the summit, the mainland gave a clear message that its perception on Taiwan has changed. As noted by Chinese officials, Xi told Ma during the meeting that “since the historic developments from 2008 onwards, relations are at its best since 1949 with much exchanges and cooperation. It is not adversarial like in the past, with no enmity and conflict now”. Thus, Taiwan is a non-adversary for the mainland now; such thinking   may have implications for Beijing’s security policy towards Taiwan in future.

• Missile issue discussed? : According to Ma, Xi said that “the Chinese military deployments do not target Taiwan”.  This indicates that China’s known option on to use force to reunify Taiwan or the matter of Chinese missiles deployed on the Taiwanese coast, could have figured during Xi-Ma talks. The People’s Daily, the official mouthpiece of the ruling Communist Party, warned against “Taiwan independence forces” in an editorial (November 8, 2015) but it made no reference to China’s intention to use force against them. The state-run Global Times (November 9, 2015) however has referred to China’s Anti-Secession Law (2005) suggesting use of force by the mainland.(the law’s Article 8 stated that “the State shall use non-peaceful and other necessary means if Taiwan independence forces, under whatever name and method, accomplish the fact of Taiwan’s separation from China or if a major event occurs which would lead to Taiwan’s separation from China, or if all possibility of peaceful unification is lost”). It appears that Beijing’s rhetoric for an offensive action against Taiwan is likely to grow in intensity after the expected assuming of power in the latter by the pro-independence DPP.  It is another matter, whether or not this will actually happen.

• Military Security Mechanism? : Also, in the context of the summit, there is no publication of any Chinese material reiterating Beijing’s earlier declared position on a cross-straits peace agreement and military security mechanism. Despite the apparent silence in this regard on the part of both the sides, chances are that this subject could have come up for discussion in the summit and that the talks on it still remain inconclusive. (The then Chinese Communist Party chief Hu Jintao had said in the party’s 18^th Congress in 2012 that “we hope the two sides will discuss the establishment of a cross-Straits military security confidence-building mechanism to maintain stability in their relations and reach a peace agreement through consultation so as to open a new horizon in advancing the peaceful growth of these relations)”.

• Mainland Nod to Taiwan’s diplomatic space: Chinese officials quoted Xi as saying during the meeting that his country “knows Taiwan wants to participate in international events, and as long as it doesn’t go against the One China policy, we can actually arrange through friendly consultation. Both sides can coordinate on this without hurting ties”. China’s Taiwan Affairs Office Minister Zhang Zhijun has also said that Beijing is willing to consider and discuss the issue of Taiwan’s international space as long as no perception of ‘two Chinas’ is created. Are signals towards China’s conditional willingness now not to object to Taiwan’s getting more diplomatic space emerging?

• Veiled warning to the US: Xi stated before the closed door meeting started that “we must act together and show the world that the Chinese people across the Straits have every ability to handle our own issues and to contribute to the peace and stability in the region, and the world”. The usage ‘’handling our own issues” appears to hide a caveat- no foreign power should interfere in cross-straits issues. An oblique Chinese message to the US?

• Beijing-Taipei hotlines: The two sides seem to be in favour of establishing hot lines between Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council and the mainland’s Taiwan Affairs Office.

• Trade agreement? :Xi talked about the need for a bilateral consensus on a mainland China-Taiwan trade agreement.  It would be interesting to watch how the proposal would develop in future, particularly after the expected regime change in Taiwan.

• Taiwan in Silk Road projects and AIIB? : Xi’s invitation to Taiwan to participate in the Chinese “One Belt, One Road project” and in the AIIB, ‘using the relevant methods’ is notable. Ma’s response on this is not clear.

What are the motivations behind Xi and Ma in agreeing for such a summit? For Xi, the immediate aim appears to be putting pressure on the Taiwan presidential hopeful, Tsai, to stick to the 1992 consensus principle, but with no encouragement to Taiwan independence forces. In a long term, for the mainland leader, the priority lies in fulfillment of national rejuvenation task; he may feel that this will not be possible without reunification with Taiwan for which events like the Singapore summit may be desirable.  As far as Ma is concerned, he may not gain much from the summit. Ma has denied the perceptions that he is aspiring to create a legacy of cross-strait co-operation as he demits office. Even then, one can not dispute the validity of such perceptions.

*The writer, D. S. Rajan, is Distinguished Fellow, Chennai Centre for China Studies, Chennai, India. Contributing date – November 11, 2015. Email: dsrajan@gmail.com

Annexure

Transcript of Ma’s remarks in the first 10 minutes of the meeting that was open to the media:

Mr Xi, friends from the two delegations across the straits, and people present today,

Today, I and Mr Xi in our capacities as leader across the straits, we are holding the future of the two sides across the straits and history.

In April 1993, Mr Koo Chen-fu and Mr Wang Daohan held talks and they inked four agreements that laid the foundations of a mechanism for cross-straits dialogue.

When I spoke with the founding Prime Minister of Singapore Lee Kuan Yew, I said that the foundations of the cross-strait relationship should be based on well being of our people.

What is behind us is the long history of the relationship. In the past few years, we decided to replace conflict with people dialogue and we have stuck to the path of prosperity and wellbeing.

We can swear to the whole world our determination to peaceful development of people’s rights. We follow different political systems, but we develop dialogue in terms of military and economic cooperation. This is not done overnight. There are over 40,000 of cross-strait student exchanges annually. There are US$170 billion of trade value across the straits. These are the fruits of our relations.

The ancient book of “shang shu” says we have to really trust each other and seek pragmatic strategies. In the past few years, we have reached a couple of cooperative deals. This is in line with expectations across the straits and also the global community.

I want to make five proposals for peaceful development:

In 1992, we reached the 1 China consensus. This is the political foundation of cross straits relationship that we both stick to. It is on this foundation that we reached 23 agreements, making the relationship its very best in 66 years.

Second, we have to reduce animosity across the straits. We are never enemies like before. We cannot develop animosity and we need to resolve conflict through dialogue.

Third, increase exchanges and cooperation. We need to establish institutions on each other’s side and create win-win cooperation with each other.

Fourth, we need need hotlines on both sides. As the two exchange foundations across the strait, we have established communication mechanisms. We also have to establish hotlines between Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council and China’s Mainland Taiwan Affairs Office.

We are all descendents of the chinese people. We should cooperate together and rejuvenate the Chinese nation.This is not out of our self-interests but for the benefit of our future generations. We must value what people value and safeguard peace across the strait to ensure win-win cooperation.

Mr Xi, today’s cross-strait relations most peaceful since 1994. In the past few years, I always see Taiwanese students discuss and research with Chinese students. I have seen them study together. This is very heartfelt. They are all very passionate and innovative..

Transcript of what Chinese President Xi Jinping said in the first 10 minutes of the meeting that was open to the media: (http://www.todayonline.com/singapore/transcript-china-president-xi-jinpi…)

History has left bad memories and deep regrets for untold families on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. But the Strait cannot prevent relatives and friends from missing each other.

The power of kinship in the 1980s finally pushed forward the dialogue across the strait. Since 2008, the two sides across the strait have made progress along the road towards dialogue.

In the last seven years, the two sides across the straits have made much progress in the development of cross-Strait relations, and these are due to the hard work of the people from both sides.

It is because of the work that has been done over these last seven years that we are able to take this historic step today. At this juncture, I would like to extend my sincere gratitude to all those who have made efforts to push forward cross-Strait relations.

No matter how much difficulty we have gone through, no power can separate us because we are closely-knit kinsmen, and blood is thicker than water. Now we are at a juncture in our relationship. We cannot repeat historical tragedy. We cannot lose the fruits of our development. People across the Strait should continue to push forward a peaceful development and enjoy the fruits of peace together.

We should learn and reflect from the history of the cross-Strait relationship. We must be responsible for history, and make wise decisions that will stand the test of time.

We must act together and show the world that the Chinese people across the Straits have every ability to handle our own issues, and to contribute to the peace and stability in the region, and the world.

I hope the two sides across the Strait can work together and stick to the 1992 consensus. Consolidate our political foundation, continue down the path of development, and ensure that our ties continue to develop in the right direction.

We should deepen our exchanges and cooperation, increase the well-being of people across the strait, and push forward the great rejuvenation of the Chinese people.

This is all I have to say for now. Thank you.

Transcript of remarks after Xi, Ma meet,  made by Zhang Zhijun, Director of Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council.  

Both sides waited 66 years since 1949 for the first meeting between the leaders of both sides – Mr Ma and Mr Xi. Both sides met in the spirit of mutual respect and a commitment to peaceful development. Both sides had a sincere and in-depth exchange where they reviewed the last 66 years of the relationship.

Both sides have, in recent years, moved towards peaceful development, and we have seen the results of this.

Mr Xi said that this meeting has opened a new chapter. Cross-Strait relations have been marred by conflict, separation and much anxiety among the people, leaving scars on many families. But since 2008, when both sides began the path for peaceful dialogue, the situation has changed. Mr Xi has said that no matter how much tribulation both sides have to face, nothing can separate us. We are closely knit kinsmen and blood is thicker than water.

We are now at a historical crossroads in our relationship. Today, we want to talk about how to avoid the tragedy of the past from occurring once again, so that our next generation may enjoy a better future.

We will stick to the 1992 consensus and work towards peaceful development of ties. We will enhance cross-Strait exchanges and cooperation.

During the closed door session, Mr Xi listened to Mr Ma and said that now we are faced with a new situation, and we should bear in mind the well-being of the people and move with the times such that we can rejuvenate the Chinese nation.

On that note, Mr Xi came up with four points. First, we should stick to the political foundations of the cross-Strait relations. Over the past few years, it is our willingness to stick to the 1992 consensus and our opposition to Taiwanese independence that made a peaceful development of cross-Strait ties possible. Without that, the whole relation across the Straits would have collapsed. The 1992 consensus is very important in that it clarifies the fundamental nature of the cross-Strait relationship, according to Mr Xi. Taiwan and the Mainland China actually belong to one Chinese nation, and it is not a relation between two countries. It should always be deemed as one sovereignty. Mainland China and Taiwan belong to one nation, and one country and this cannot be changed. This is a fundamental principle that we should honour.

According to Mr Xi, it is our wish that the Taiwanese political parties will honour the 1992 consensus no matter what we have done in the past. As long as the 1992 consensus and the co-ideas can be honoured, we will be more than willing to communicate with our counterparts, and we shall never accept separationists.

Secondly, cooperation between both sides must also be enhanced, said Mr Xi. Since the historic developments from 2008 onwards, relations are at its best since 1949 with much exchanges and cooperation. It is not adversarial like in the past, with no enmity and conflict now.

We must strive for win-win cooperation, and resolve the feelings of enmity. We must stick to the path of peaceful development.

On the idea of a hotline between both sides, Mr Xi said we must strengthen exchanges and dialogue, as well as look at how to solve long running problems while resolving differences. This will help with timely communications and prevent misunderstandings. The two ministers can link up.

Both sides must mutually respect each other. So that this does not get in the way of exchanges and hurt people. Mr Xi said that he knows Taiwan wants to participate in international events, and as long as it doesn’t go against the One China policy, we can actually arrange through friendly consultation. Both sides can coordinate on this without hurting ties.

However, currently the biggest impediment to improving ties further is talk of independence. This will only bring harm to people, and the people must unite together.

Thirdly, both sides must be united. Let people have better lives. That is the basic principle. As long as we can help keep peaceful relations and maintain Chinese sovereignty, both sides should try their best. We are happy to share the benefits of economic developments with Taiwan. To that end, we should expand our economic cooperation.

Mr Xi said that we must try to seek consensus on a trade agreement, and invite Taiwan to participate in the Chinese One Belt, One Road project, and we are agreeable with Taiwan participating in AIIB using the relevant methods.

Many Taiwanese people have not been to China. We welcome them, and we hope for more cross-Strait exchanges.

We are inseparable entities. A strong nation is to the benefit of our people. We must have a strong Chinese nation, and we are closer to reaching the goal of Chinese Rejuvenation now than ever before.

This is the 70th anniversary of the end of WWII, which we won through great sacrifice. Mr Xi says that we need to encourage the scholars on both sides to collaborate on historical materials so that we can work together better to safeguard the honour and dignity of our people. In this meeting, we have reached a consensus on propelling relations forward.

We acknowledge the outcomes of 2008. What has been achieved since then is peaceful development, regional stability, increased exchanges and enhanced cooperation. Both sides mutually benefit from this. All our people are kinsmen. We must rejuvenate China. This consensus will be meaningful towards the development of cross-Strait ties in future.

It’s a bit like threatening to walk out of a marriage of four decades because your husband doesn’t put the top on the toothpaste tube.” — Mark Leonard, European Council on Foreign Relations Director, New York Times, Nov 10, 2015

The European Union has its problems. These may, in the long term, prove terminal, unless internal, and dramatic reform take place across its various institutions. The critique of Europe from Britain has, however, often been framed as that of Britannia against the tyranny of continental ambitions, the dark cloud of land-based despotism. This version has had its moments. Prime Minister David Cameron’s rather insipid efforts to renegotiate Britain’s relationship with the EU is certainly not one of them.

The issue of Europe – and more precisely, the EU – has been at the forefront of his populist platform. He had repeatedly promised, to the scorn of many of his European counterparts, a change in the relationship with Brussels that will be palatable to the British voter, and the EU establishment.

On the referendum planned for 2017, Cameron has stressed Churchillian themes of destiny and opportunity. “You will hold this country’s destiny in your hands; this is a huge decision for our country, perhaps the biggest we will make in our lifetimes.”

The demands cover a range of specifics. They include a proposed safeguard against discrimination based on currency, with Britain continuing to treasure its pound. They highlight a fundamental cessation of the principle of seeking “ever closer union” with the EU, which is actually misread – the aim of the foundation documents suggest “an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe.” The familiar ground of cutting red tape is also pitched.

None of those proposals seem particularly startling. The real thrust lies behind the language of isolating, and insulating Britain from institutions that have done to regulate Albion’s own tendencies to tyranny. A desire to run roughshod on human rights, for instance, has been frustrated by European legal institutions.

Perhaps the greatest of red herring Cameron has thrown in is the supposed problems posed by migrants. This has been the classic Tory platform, taking the baton to the poor and desperate, while emphasising the element of emergency. The EU might be a bureaucratically ridden entity, stacked to the rafters with regulations, but it does have one fundamental principle going for it: the principle of free movement.

The principle of mobility has openly been defied by several states keen on seeking a rather different EU. Hungary, with a government fearing the Islamicisation of Europe, has been the noisiest in this regard, blatantly sealing its borders with razor wire. Countries such as Denmark have imposed controls on movement.

Cameron has taken his queue in this regard, running down refugees, and migrants more broadly speaking, at key moments of political debate. Benefits (and here, the wording is important) for low income workers would be restricted for up to four years after arriving in Britain, which is tantamount to saying that the country will accept labour without humanitarian assurances. (The policy is actually suggested as a deterrent.) Cameron’s figures on this, those claiming that 40 percent of recent European Economic Area migrants received an average of around £6,000 a year of in-work benefits, seem suspect.

European negotiators may end up pushing Cameron in the corner on this one, suggesting that any equivalent cut or reduction in benefits for European nationals should be accompanied by similar treatment for British employees.

Cameron has already anticipated this. “I understand how difficult some of these welfare issues are for some member states, and I’m open to different ways of dealing with the issue.”

The proposal makes a nonsense of the non-discriminatory principle of the European zone, notably in terms of labour and movement. Other European leaders have been conciliatory, if only because they doubt Cameron can pull it off. In German Chacellor Angela Merkel’s words, “we want to work through these proposals with the aim of working towards a solution.”

But even the welfare demand is not seen as enough by those who wish for a breezy, total exit. Nigel Lawson, former Conservative chancellor, thought Cameron’s suggestions “disappointingly unambitious.” Emphasis has been made on superficial change over substantive reform. And if there is a prime minister who has shown himself to be prone to shameless gimmickry, Cameron is it.

Such negotiating cycles with Brussels may prove to be pure measures of calculation, designed to play to appropriate home audiences while not disrupting the status quo. It is hard to see any giving in on the issue of reconstituting the EU’s internal market, which is governed by doctrinaires and dogmatists. Should that happen, other states will also make noises, as, indeed, they already are. In that case, Britain will need the support of other Europeans for the project of reform, rather than a specifically British model of change.

By Elise Harris

The two Italian journalists who made headlines last week for authoring books on confidential Vatican financial documents are under investigation, and could face criminal charges.

In a Nov. 10 statement, the Vatican announced that journalists Gianluigi Nuzzi and Emiliano Fittipaldi are currently being investigated for publishing the books, which contain leaked information from a former Vatican financial reform commission.

The investigation follows the arrest of two former members of the Commission for Reference on the Organization of the Economic Administrative Structure of the Holy See (COSEA).

The commission was established by the Pope July 18, 2013, as part of his plan to reform the Vatican’s finances. It was dissolved after completing its mandate.

Msgr. Lucio Angel Vallejo Balda and Francesca Chaouqui – both former members of the commission – were taken into custody last week by the Vatican Gendarmerie for stealing and leaking information in connection with two books.

Information from the leaked COSEA documents was used for Nuzzi’s book “Via Crucis,” released in English under the title “Merchants in the Temple,” and Fittipaldi’s book “Avarice: The Papers that Reveal Wealth, Scandals and Secrets in the Church of Francis.”

According to the Vatican statement, the journalists are being investigated for violating Law IX of the Vatican City State, which was established July 13, 2013, and holds that stealing confidential documents is a crime punishable with time in prison.

The leaking of documents was officially criminalized by the Vatican in 2013, when Nuzzi published a book containing confidential information given to him by Pope Benedict XVI’s butler in what came to be known as the “Vatileaks” scandal.

The Vatican statement made known that others who, due to their position, could be complicit in having acquired the documents in question, are also being investigated, though no names were given.

On Sunday Pope Francis spoke out about the leak for the first time, saying the act does little to help his ongoing reform efforts, but assured that the process would continue to move forward.

The stealing and publication of the documents was a “mistake,” and “a deplorable act that does not help,” the Pope said Nov. 8, explaining that he had called for the study connected with the confidential documents, with which he was well acquainted.

In his post-Angelus comments, Francis acknowledged that many have been “troubled” by the news of the scandal in recent days.

Nonetheless, he offered his assurances that his reform would move forward.

“This sad fact certainly does not deter me from the reform efforts which we are pushing forward with my collaborators and with the support of all of you,” he said, stressing the importance of prayer for the Church.

The support of the entire Church is needed, he said, “because the Church is renewed with prayer and with daily holiness of every baptized person.”

“Therefore I thank you and ask you to continue to pray for the Pope and for the Church, without losing peace, but moving forward with faith and hope.”

Since the entry into force of the cease-fire in 1991, the final status of Western Sahara remains to be determined, the “great powers” and the Security Council of the UN, in a resolution adopted at the unanimously April 25, 2013, reaffirmed the primacy of the autonomy initiative presented by Morocco. The UN text reiterates that “the status quo is unacceptable and that we must find a solution to the dispute between the Kingdom of Morocco to Algeria. Mohammed VI can even take advantage of efforts “serious and credible” made by his country to find a solution to the question of Western Sahara

In the past, many UN envoys including former US Secretary of State James Baker, deployed efforts in an attempt to find an acceptable solution to this 40 years old conflict but in vain. Mediation is an effective and useful way of dealing with intractable conflicts. This is not to suggest that every intractable conflict can be mediated. Many conflicts are just too intense, the parties too entrenched for any mediator to achieve very much. Some intractable conflicts like the Sahara issue, go on and on with little signs of abatement. They cease to become intractable only when there is a major systemic change. How then can we distinguish between conflicts that can be mediated and those that cannot.

Mediators can engage in an intractable conflict only after a thorough and complete analysis of the conflict, issues at stake, context and dynamics, parties’ grievances, etc. Intractable conflicts are complex and multi-layered. A mediation initiative is more likely to be successful if it is predicated on knowledge and understanding rather than on good intentions only. A good analysis and a thorough understanding of all aspects of the conflict are important prerequisites for successful mediation in intractable conflicts.

Mediation must take place at an optimal or ripe moment. Early mediation may be premature and late mediation may face too many obstacles. A ripe moment describes a phase in the life cycle of the conflict where the parties feel exhausted and hurt, or where they may not wish to countenance any further losses and are prepared to commit to a settlement, or at least believe one to be possible. In destructive and escalating conflicts, mediation can have any chance of success only if it can capture a particular moment when the adversaries, for a variety of reasons, appear most amenable to change. Timing of intervention in an intractable conflict is an issue of crucial importance, and one that must be properly assessed by any would be mediator.

Given the nature and complexity of intractable conflicts, successful mediation requires a co-ordinated approach between different aspects of intervention. Mediation here requires leverage and resources to nudge the parties toward a settlement, but also acute psychological understanding of the parties’ feelings and grievances. The kind of mediation we are talking about here is mediation that is embedded in various disciplinary frameworks, ranging from problem-solving workshops to more traditional diplomatic methods. No one aspect or form of behavior will suffice to turn an intractable conflict around. Diverse and complementary methods, an interdisciplinary focus, and a full range of intervention methods responding to the many concerns and fears of the adversaries, are required to achieve some accommodation between parties in an intractable conflict.

Mediating intractable conflicts require commitment, resources, persistence, and experience. Mediators of high rank or prestige are more likely to possess these attributes and thus are more likely to be successful in intractable conflicts. Such mediators have the capacity to appeal directly to the domestic constituency and build up support for some peace agreement. Influential, high ranking or prestigious mediators have more at stake, can marshal more resources, have better information, and can devote more time to an intractable conflict. Such mediators can work toward achieving some visible signs of progress in the short term, and identify steps that need to be taken to deal with the issues of a longer term peace objectives. Influential mediators can work better within the constraints of intractable conflicts, and more likely to elicit accommodative responses from the adversaries.

Mediation in intractable conflicts is more likely to be effective if there are no sections in each community committed to the continuation of violence. Such parties are usually described as spoilers. Many political analysts considered the Polisario as spoilers who seem to lose more from a peaceful outcome than from the continuation of tension. All these factors provide some guidance on when mediation might make a contribution to intractable conflicts, and when this will be extremely difficult. Surely other factors are present too, factors such as commitment to mediation and willingness to achieve a suitable outcome, desire to stop a cycle of tension, etc. These may be hard to identify and assess, but their presence or absence will surely affect the process and outcome of any mediation effort.

The ball is now in the camp of Sahrawis and their Algerian ally. Long will they continue to turn a deaf ear to the diplomats who advocate realism, refusing to exert any pressure on Rabat and recall the words of Peter van Walsum, the Special Envoy of the Secretary General of the UN in the region , who said that “independent Western Sahara was not a realistic proposition”

On the ground, the viability of the autonomy solution proposed by Morocco is translated by symbolic gestures. One of these gestures is the refusal of some Sahrawi refugees, who come from the Tindouf camps to the Moroccan southern provinces in the context of the family exchange visit program organized periodically by the UNHCR, to go back to Tindouf and who willingly choose to stay in their homeland. Convinced of the Moroccan government?s sincerity to settle this artificial territorial dispute through its autonomy proposal, many Sahrawis who returned to their homeland, have seized this unique opportunity to put an end to the sufferings and hardships they endured in the camps of Tindouf in the Algerian desert.
If the Sahrawis want to take up the autonomy challenge, they must “take their future in their own hands” and seize the opportunity of the different projects initiated and the tremendous efforts made by Morocco in its southern provinces.

In his address to the nation on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the glorious Green March King Mohammed VI made a blunt, clear statement to the other conflicting party : “…we proposed the Autonomy Initiative for the Southern Provinces, which was judged by the international community to be both serious and credible. As I pointed out last year in my address commemorating the anniversary of the Green March, the Initiative is the most Morocco can offer. Its implementation will hinge on achieving a final political settlement within the framework of the United Nations Organization.”

One of the world’s longest imprisoned peaceful political activists, Murod Juraev, was finally released from a jail in Uzbekistan on November 12, 2015, after 21 unjustified years behind bars, nine human rights groups said today. Juraev, a 63-year-old former member of parliament, had been imprisoned since September 18, 1994. His original nine-year sentence was extended by 12 years for alleged violations of prison rules; during this time, he was repeatedly tortured and became seriously ill.

The Uzbek authorities should thoroughly and meaningfully investigate credible allegations that Juraev was tortured; that his sentence was arbitrarily extended, which was approved by judges in hearings that violated fair trial principles; and that he was denied appropriate medical care in prison, the groups said. The government should allow him to resume his peaceful political activism. The Uzbek government should also immediately and unconditionally release the numerous other peaceful activists and human rights defenders who remain in prison following politically motivated, unfair trials.

The last 21 years have been a living hell that Murod Juraev and his family should never have had to experience,” said Steve Swerdlow, Central Asia researcher at Human Rights Watch. “The Uzbek authorities should see to it that those who are alleged to have tortured Juraev and arbitrarily extended his prison sentence are promptly investigated and brought to justice.”

The human rights groups are Amnesty International, Christians’ Action for the Abolition of Torture (ACAT-France), the Association for Human Rights in Central Asia (AHRCA), Freedom House, Human Rights Watch, International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), the International Partnership for Human Rights (IPHR), the Norwegian Helsinki Committee, and the Uzbek-German Forum for Human Rights.

In November 2013, the United Nations Committee Against Torture – a body of 10 independent experts that monitors governments’ implementation of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment – found that Juraev and numerous other peaceful activists and human rights defenders were arbitrarily imprisoned in retaliation for their work and criticism of the government. The committee expressed concern that many wrongfully held activists have been subjected to torture or other forms of ill-treatment.

Juraev was a member of parliament from 1991 to 1992, a prominent member of the Erk opposition party, and served as the mayor of Mubarak, in Kashkadarya province. Juraev drew President Islam Karimov’s personal ire by being the first official to dissolve a city committee of the Communist Party after the fall of the Soviet Union.

On September 18, 1994, he was detained in Kazakhstan and forcibly returned to Uzbekistan. He was beaten during his arrest. He suffered multiple concussions and a broken rib, but it is unclear whether these injuries were from the beating or from a car accident following his arrest. On May 31, 1995, Juraev was convicted in a case in which a number of members of the banned Erk party were accused of plotting to overthrow the government. A court sentenced him on various charges to 12 years in prison, later reduced to nine years on appeal. He was held in prison 64/45 in Almalyk, Tashkent province.

Prison authorities arbitrarily extended Juraev’s sentence in 2004, 2006, 2009, and 2012 for “violations of prison rules.” On each occasion the extension came just before the end of his sentence. Juraev’s alleged violations of prison rules included “incorrectly peeling carrots” in the prison kitchen and “non-removal of shoes when entering the barracks.”

“Uzbek authorities repeatedly punish a wide variety of prisoners they see as potential government critics by arbitrarily extending their prison terms on often absurd grounds,” said Brigitte Dufour, director of International Partnership for Human Rights (IPHR). “This leads to the intolerable situation where prisoners are sentenced to de facto life imprisonment for political reasons.”

Juraev is badly in need of medical attention. In 2011, ACAT-France reported that he had been severely tortured in prison, that he had become extremely thin, and that he had contracted tuberculosis. Juraev’s wife met with him in October 2013 and told a rights activist that he had lost all of his teeth, had trouble eating, suffered from constant headaches and stomach pain, and was experiencing periodic numbness in his right arm. During a November 2014 meeting with Human Rights Watch, she said Juraev had become a “skeleton.”

In spite of his poor health and severe back pain, prison authorities subjected Juraev to daily heavy labor, forcing him to work in a brick factory. The prison warden repeatedly told him that his was a “special case,” that he had been marked as a repeat offender, and that it was dangerous for other inmates even to communicate with him.

“Juraev’s treatment at the hands of the Uzbek authorities violates core human rights standards, and he deserves justice,” Maisy Weicherding, Amnesty International researcher on Central Asia, said. “The Uzbek government regularly points to its progress in reforming its criminal justice system, but these claims ring hollow unless the allegations in this case are effectively investigated.”

Among its other recommendations, the UN Committee Against Torture called on Uzbekistan as a matter of urgency to carry out “prompt, impartial, and effective investigations into all allegations of torture and ill-treatment and prosecute and punish all those responsible” and to “ensure that high-level officials in the executive branch publicly and unambiguously condemn torture in all its forms, directing this especially to police and prison staff.”

Uzbekistan’s international partners, including the United States and the European Union, should use every means of influence at their disposal and reiterate their calls to Tashkent to address its human rights record, including by releasing all those whose detention is unlawful and arbitrary under international standards, the rights groups said. One place to begin is at the UN Human Rights Council, where members can express serious concern with Uzbekistan’s systematic refusal to cooperate with UN experts on human rights and its continuous flouting of its human rights obligations.

Members of the UN Human Rights Council should underscore their concern about human rights violations in Uzbekistan and the government’s continued refusal to allow visits from 13 of these UN monitors, including the special rapporteur on torture. The council should establish a dedicated, country-specific position to ensure sustained scrutiny and reporting on the human rights situation in Uzbekistan.

“Juraev’s family and local activists had the courage to campaign for his freedom for many years at great personal risk,” said Nadejda Atayeva, president of the Association for Human Rights in Central Asia. “It is now of the utmost importance for Uzbekistan’s international partners to be willing to do the same to prevent the ongoing arbitrary detention of many people who have been punished simply for peacefully exercising their right to freedom of expression.”

Among prisoners whose sentences have been extended on politically motivated grounds for alleged violations of prison rules are: Muhammad Bekjanov, former editor-in-chief of the banned Erk political opposition party newspaper, who has spent 16 years in prison and whose sentence has been extended twice for disobeying prison rules; Yusuf Ruzimurodov, a journalist who was tried alongside Muhammad Bekjanov in 1999 and received an additional sentence in May 2014, though it was not clear for how long; and Azam Farmonov, a human rights activist arrested in 2006 and convicted of extortion after an unfair trial without a lawyer present. He was repeatedly tortured and ill-treated in Jaslyk prison 64/71. His prison term ended in April, but a former detainee told Farmonov’s wife on May 21, 2015, that her husband’s term had been extended by an additional five years.

“Uzbekistan should immediately and unconditionally release and ensure the rehabilitation of all those who are detained solely for peacefully exercising their right to freedom of expression,” said Jeremie Beja, Asia-Central Asia-Russia desk manager at ACAT.

Sri Lanka’s President Maithripala Sirisena pledged that he would do everything possible to introduce a new system of governance by abolishing the Executive Presidency as desired by late Venerable Maduluwave Sobitha Thero.

The President made this pledge participating in the cremation ceremony of the Venerable Maaduluwaawe Sobhita Thero with full State Honors, at the Parliament Grounds in Sri Jayawardenapura Kotte, today.

“I am here today as the President and the new government existed comprising the Prime Minister mainly because of the initiatives taken by the National Movement for Social Justice headed by late Ven Maduluwave Sobitha Thero,” Sirisena said that adding that inspiration gave an immense courage to form a good governance government to take the country towards the right path.

President Sirisena further said that he will commit himself to build a democratic and just society, as Thero had desired.

During Venerable Maduluwave Sobitha There’s lifetime, he not only performed his duties regarding religious affairs, but also he did a struggle to build a new country with good governance, Sirisena added.

Sirisena said that he will take every possible step to fulfill Most Venerable Maduluwave Sobitha Thera’s wishes to develop Sri Lanka that ensures social justice while working in accordance with the guidance and advices given by the late Nayaka Thera.

The entire country was sorrowful when he fell ill because he was loved and respected by everybody, however, proving the impermanency in life as we Buddhists are aware he passed away.

Sirisena also wished the late Nayaka Thera may attain the supreme bliss of Nibbana.

Representative of Tri Nikaya and other religions, Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe, Speaker Karu Jayasuriya and several others spoke at the funeral.

Despite recent economic turbulence in China, the investment case for Spanish companies remains strong. It is still not too late to enter the Chinese market but investors need to be clear on their value proposition and realistic about how they will execute their plans.

By Sarah Owen-Vandersluis*

Recent attention has focused heavily on economic uncertainty in China and the potential effects of a Chinese ‘hard landing’ on the world economy. This view has been compounded by rough-handed attempts to manage the stock market and by unexpected currency fluctuations in August 2015. However, looked at in the medium term, the Chinese market continues to post strong growth rates, there are signs that consumer demand is holding up and changes in policy are creating new avenues for inbound foreign investment. This paper argues that there remain good opportunities in China for Spanish investors.

Analysis

It has long been clear that China is increasingly important as a global economic power. This has become more evident over the past few years, as China has sought to rebalance its economy to drive consumer demand and improve the position of Chinese companies in global supply chains. At the same time, business and the regulatory environment in China have also been changing rapidly, creating new and interesting opportunities for investors despite a tougher competitive environment within China.

Historically, Spanish companies have been underrepresented in China compared with US, UK, French and German companies. Only 0.27% of foreign direct investment (FDI) received by China in 2013 came from Spain, a level 6.5 times lower than Germany, two times lower than France and slightly less than the UK.¹ Moreover, China is only the 17th largest destination of Spanish FDI, totalling €4.5 billion and accounting for 1.35% of total Spanish FDI.²

(1) China’s strong investment fundamentals

Much has been made of the Chinese economic slowdown, recent state interventions in the stock market and the devaluation of the Renminbi (Yuan). For instance, GDP growth has fallen from 9.7% in the 1st quarter of 2011 to 7% in the 2nd quarter of 2015 and manufacturing output is lower. There can be no doubt that the events of August have also created an environment of heightened uncertainty for investors.

However, it should be borne in mind that the reduction in GDP growth is not an economic free-fall, but rather a controlled exercise to reduce pressure on the economy and thereby reduce social and environmental pressure as well. There is also a desire to drive a more sustainable and qualitative growth based on private consumption rather than investment and a commensurate shift into promoting greater value-added activities –both at home and abroad–.

Thus, the effects of market instability this summer should not be overstated. Clearly, activities to support the stock market and to devalue the currency were both unexpected and not completely successful. However, the medium-term impact on growth and investment opportunities is not perceived to be large, for several reasons. The exposure of the consuming classes to the stock market is relatively low: it is estimated that only one in four of the Chinese middle class, roughly 90 million, invest even part of their savings in the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets.³ While a degree of confidence in government may have been lost, there are no significant signs that the near term uncertainty has impacted longer term growth in demand.

The wider transition to a higher value added, consumption and innovation based economy is a significant challenge – and is critical to the nature and level of future economic engagement of China with the rest of the world. Critics have rightly questioned whether China can execute this transition successfully – and this, as with much in China, is not yet fully clear. However, medium term investment indicators remain very strong and the ‘new normal’ is in itself economically attractive. According to data from the Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China (MOFCOM), during the first eight months of the current year, foreign investments (excluding the financial sector) have grown by 9.2% compared with the same period of last year, totalling US$85 billion.⁴

Three key trends are worth highlighting. First, the Chinese middle class is growing rapidly and consumption remains strong. Secondly, private investment is continuing to increase significantly, commensurate with a relaxation on regulations impacting domestic and foreign companies. Thirdly, engagement with the rest of the world is critical to the performance of the future Chinese economy, whether via foreign investment into China or the development of Chinese interests overseas –both of which are growing rapidly, also enabled by a relaxation of controls in a number of areas–.

Starting with the first trend, the rise of the middle classes and consumption, it is estimated that China’s middle class will account for around 93% of the urban population by 2030 due to income growth and rapid urbanisation.⁵ According to the OECD, Asia will account for 85% of the world’s middle class by 2030, 4.9 billion people, of which China will be the main contributor.⁶

The desires of the Chinese middle class are stimulating a solid growth in consumption. For instance, nationwide expenditure per capita grew from ¥3,200 (€1,609)⁷ in 2013 to ¥4,491 (€1,778) in 2014. The second-quarter 2015 figure of¥7,546 (€1,093) also gives cause for optimism about the robustness of Chinese demand.⁸

It is clear, too, that current investors continue to see this potential. In the midst of the Chinese stock-market crisis, Tom Cook, CEO of Apple, took the unprecedented step of speaking outside of the results cycle to remind investors that demand for Apple products appears to remain undiminished, with the App Store reporting record figures in August 2015. Additionally, Cook affirmed that ‘China represents an extraordinary opportunity over the long term’.⁹

When it comes to the second trend, private sector investment is growing, up by 18.1% in 2014, and 2.4 percentage points higher than the overall fixed-asset investment growth rate.¹⁰ This brought the share of total fixed-asset investment up from 63% in 2013 to 64.1% in 2014, indicating that the private sector is becoming more active than the state-owned sector. In the first eight months of 2015, investment in fixed assets (excluding rural households) reached ¥33,897.7 billion, up 10.9% year-on-year in nominal terms.¹¹

The third trend, inward and outward investment for Chinese growth is very much linked to economic flows with the rest of the world. In 2014 China became the largest recipient of FDI worldwide, overtaking the US for the first time, with record inflows of US$119.6 billion. This represented 1.7% growth compared with 2013. Importantly, FDI into the service sector grew by 7.8%.¹² Within this, European companies’ investments in China grew by 25% between 2009 and 2013, demonstrating the importance of Chinese-European trade and investment relationships and underlining the continued opportunities ahead.

Similarly, China’s 2014 ODI (outflows) grew by 11.3%, reaching US$120 billion last year.¹³ Again, Europe was a critical growth region, with an increase of Chinese ODI of 77% between 2009 and 2013.¹⁴

Interestingly, the target industries for Chinese ODI reflect the wider shift in priorities discussed above, with higher value-added areas becoming much more attractive. For example, two sectors that have not been on the radar of Chinese companies for most of the last decade but which have seen rapid growth recently are agriculture/food and commercial real estate –both reaching €5 billion in outbound investment in the past two years–.¹⁵

Enabling this growth in investment there has been a significant liberalisation of controls on FDI. To be clear, though, this process of liberalisation has not been completely transparent or linear. In fact, the current system of regulation remains complex and difficult to interpret –and changes are implemented over long periods, sometimes in ways which are not predictable–. For this reason, and despite liberalisation, many investors continue to feel that regulation is a high barrier to entry, both in its complexity and in its uneven implementation. For example, in a recent survey of US investors by the American Chamber of Commerce in China, 65% of respondents indicated that non-transparent or inconsistent rule-making limited their ability to invest in China, and 57% believed that foreign companies were being ‘singled out’.¹⁶ Similarly, George Magnus, one of the most distinguished voices in respect of China, has indicated that ‘we should expect progress to be slow or limited’.¹⁷

Nonetheless, there has been a recent simplification of investment procedures and new sectors have been opened to foreign involvement. While change is slow and unpredictable, there is definitely a shift taking place. The new 2015 ‘Foreign Investment Catalogue’ reduced the number of restricted sectors from 79 to 38 and significantly opened up investment in a number of key areas including telecommunications (especially e-commerce), finance, real estate and insurance companies, hospitals and care for the elderly, mining, oil field exploration and auto/airplane parts.¹⁸ Clearly, the new catalogue fits with the broader trend of increased liberalisation, more openness and fewer restrictions for foreign investors, all of which should have a welcome effect on the investment climate in China.

Changes for financial services companies are especially worth noting. The 2015 catalogue has reclassified foreign investment in financial companies, trust companies, currency brokerage companies and insurance brokerage companies from the restricted to the permitted category. Additionally, the limitations on foreign shareholding and the business scope of securities companies have been relaxed.

This change of policy reflects China’s determination and effort to make the financial sector more competitive and free-market through the presence of foreign investors. This opens up a wide range of opportunities for foreign players in a market with a growing banking penetration due to the migration of millions of people from rural to urban areas. There are also great opportunities since the Chinese rapidly adopt new technology, which is likely to boost financial inclusion and drive the transformation of banking platforms. However, financial activities in China still remain highly regulated and the market continues to be dominated by local companies. This is expected to change but near-term opportunities are likely to be limited.

Overall, in the coming few years, there should be a greater degree of cooperation between Chinese and foreign companies to boost growth in Chinese on-shore economic activities and, importantly, to develop technologies, processes and assets that will foster a higher growth and diversification in key segments in China. This policy change creates specific opportunities for foreign investors to access all of these sectors more effectively than before.

(2) The opportunities for Spanish companies

In general, the Spanish ‘brand’ is generally well regarded in China and political relations between Spain and China are strong. The establishment of a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in 2005 and Spanish support in the EU are clear examples of this sentiment. Moreover, it is not unusual to hear from Chinese representatives that ‘Spain is the best friend of China in Europe’.

Looking specifically at areas of strength for Spanish enterprises, a number of them align very well with the developing interests of Chinese companies –and Chinese consumers–

Food/agribusiness

Spanish food and beverage products tend to be well-regarded in China. There are opportunities in the mass subsector (due to the significant growth in potential customers) but also in higher value niche areas –eg, gourmet or organic–. Due to wider concerns about food safety in China, healthy and organic products of western origin are particularly of interest to the Chinese middle classes. Bodegas Torres was one of the pioneers to enter China in 1997, first through a joint venture (JV) and two years later opening its own branch. Since then, China has become its main market outside Spain.¹⁹ Similarly, Chinese investors have been very interested in Spanish companies –Fosun, for example, taking a stake in Grupo Osborne–²⁰ with a view to accessing the Chinese market in partnership or –as in the recent acquisition of Miquel Alimentació by Bright Food– to market Spanish products in China and improve its know-how in the European Fast Moving Consumer Goods (FMCG) sector.²¹

To put it into perspective, China is expected to become the world’s leading consumer of pork on a per-capita basis, surpassing the EU by 2022.²² At the same time, China is already the biggest importer of milk, but the country’s continued strong demand is expected to drive a further 60% increase in dairy product imports over the next decade.²³

Consumer brands

The Chinese urban middle class, with its growing income, aspires to consume the same products as Westerners, and for this reason Western brands are highly regarded. Most notably, the fashion and leisure sector has a huge potential. For instance, the Chinese market is very important for Inditex. With 514 shops of all of its brands, China is the fashion company’s second-largest market after Spain. Pablo Isla, president of Inditex, recently said: ‘we look forward to open a significant number of new shops in China this year and the next one. Our business in China continues to be strong, and our sales are performing positively. We are continuing to see big expansion opportunities’. ²⁴ There are good examples among smaller companies as well. In the luxury-accessories field, Abbacino –a family-owned company from Mallorca– has established several points of sale, including corners and own-brand shops in Shenzhen, Beijing and Shanghai.²⁵ This demonstrates compellingly that there are opportunities across the retail and consumer sectors.

A key part of Beijing’s plan to boost consumption-driven growth in China is the construction of increasingly upmarket shopping malls, and enticing more and more people to spend money in them. According to a recent report, 44% of all global shopping market completions last year were in China, home to nine out of the top 10 cities for mall space under construction.²⁶

Civil infrastructure

The urbanisation process underway in China is generating opportunities in infrastructure and engineering fields such as energy and power, transport and telecommunications, water supply and sanitation and environmental protection. Técnicas Reunidas, an international engineering and construction company for oil and gas production, refining and petrochemicals, and power generation projects, arrived in China in the mid-80s. Twenty-five years after its first project, it has been awarded a further 25 contracts.²⁷ A further instance is Gamesa, a global technological player in the wind-energy industry that has been the first foreign company to receive certification from the National Energy Administration of China.²⁸

The idea, foundation and leadership of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank is a clear example of how important the investment in infrastructure is for the future of China. With a capital stock of US$100 billion, the new multilateral institution has been designed to provide financial support for infrastructure development and increased interconnectivity in the region.²⁹ This is expected to result in significant future projects.

Tourism

According to the World Tourism Organisation, China will become one of the world’s leading tourist destinations for both local domestic tourism and foreign visitors. It is expected that the tourism sector will increase its share of Chinese economic growth significantly: the direct contribution of travel and tourism to China’s GDP is expected to be 7.4% for the period between 2014 and 2024, a large increase over the 2.6% registered in 2014. China’s tourism industry already ranks 3rd in the world in total contribution to GDP and it is expected to continue to grow.³⁰

The hotel industry has already been open to foreign investments for more than two decades and studies show that Chinese hotels managed by foreign brands have achieved a better financial performance than those managed by local brands.³¹ NH Hotel Group, through a JV with HNA, is operating six hotels with 1,300 rooms in Beijing, Haikou and Tianjin. The idea of the partnership is to increase hotels under management to reach 30 hotels in the next five years.³²

The opportunity is not limited only to China as a destination but also as a source of millions of tourists overseas. China has been the largest outbound market in spending terms since 2012, with US$129 billion spent overseas in 2013.³³ According to a recent report by the Fung Business Intelligence Centre and China Luxury Advisors, Chinese spending abroad increased by 23% in 2014 –by 2020 this is expected to double, reaching €422 billion–. In 2020 the prediction is that there will be almost 235 million Chinese travellers.³⁴ Tourism to Spain is expected to follow the trend. Current tourist levels are relatively low: in 2014 only 287,873 Chinese tourists visited Spain, but this accounted for 13.8% more than the previous year.³⁵

It is expected that Chinese tourists abroad will increasingly prefer independent, high-quality travel, in contrast to the recent trend for escorted experience/shopping trips. The trend is beginning to show in Chinese outbound FDI –Fosun’s acquisition of Club Med is another example of the attractiveness of the European leisure sector for the growing Chinese middle class–.³⁶

(3) Key challenges and points for consideration

Although the growth figures look attractive, there are clearly significant challenges to entering or expanding in China, and access to a fast-growing market is in itself not a guarantee of success. The competitive environment is maturing rapidly and the playing field is not always seen to be level. The regulatory environment is complex and often not transparent to newcomers. For many products and services there is not a single Chinese market –demographics, consumer tastes and operating models can differ significantly across the country–. Reliable market and customer information is often more difficult to obtain, requiring local knowledge and significant analysis. Cultural differences –in ways of working as well as customer trends– always require extra attention. And, importantly, change is occurring rapidly across all of these dimensions, requiring flexibility and adaptation at a pace unfamiliar to many European companies.

These challenges require an approach to business in China which is well-thought through and very specific to the local/regional environment. For those seeking to make a new entry, there are three key points:

1. Be clear on the value proposition and the planned operating model. A detailed and local market assessment is essential to understand customer needs and be sure that the proposition is viable. Constantly testing assumptions is critical: very rarely can a proposition and operating model be imported successfully to China from other geographies with minimal change.
2. Invest time, effort and cash in developing and sustaining the new business. The time required to be successful in the Chinese market is often longer than for other markets and greater investment is usually required at the early stages to demonstrate proof of concept and build local relationships –perhaps before the business case has been proved–. It is essential to invest time in guanxi, the kind of personal networking needed to open doors that would otherwise remain closed. Ongoing changes to business models are not uncommon as adaptation occurs. IKEA, for example, had to change its stock (eg, bed sizes), pricing policy and store layout to match the expectations of customers. Constant monitoring of consumer trends is necessary to ‘future proof’ the model, given the pace of change in Chinese demographics and living styles.³⁷
3. Local partnering in a formal sense is essential and will, in itself, require a degree of investment. Even in industries where partnering is not required, there has been a new resurgence in JVs –though the basis of mutual benefit has changed–. For foreign investors, JVs offer local insight and often access to less-penetrated markets. For the Chinese partners, a JV brings access to brands, technologies and expertise, as well as mechanisms for their own expansion to markets outside China. There are several examples in different sectors of JVs between Chinese and Spanish companies: HNA and NH in hotels, Santander and Bank of Shanghai in finance,³⁸ Euskaltel with ZTE in IT,³⁹ Mapfre and PICC in insurance⁴⁰ and Repsol and Sinopec in oil and gas.⁴¹ There are likely to be many more in the near future.

As with any JV, it is critical to ensure that expectations are aligned and that both parties are gaining –in many recent cases the benefit offered to Chinese partners must go beyond financial investment–. As shown by a number of the JVs mentioned above, access to Western or Latin American markets and co-development of technology are increasingly important.

China can be a complicated and cash-consuming experience for many companies, but the market also continues to show great potential. As with other developing countries, it is essential for the long-term sustainability of the internationalisation process to have local knowledge and support to understand the local environment, enable the development of workable business models and minimise risk.

Conclusion

In summary, China remains an important, if complex and changing, market. The investment potential for Spanish business remains strong, and there are particular opportunities emerging now for industries in which Spanish companies are very strong –such as civil infrastructure, food and beverages, tourism and consumer goods. A carefully planned approach to ‘looking East’ should be a serious part of the Spanish corporate strategic growth agenda.

About the author:
*Dr. Sarah Owen-Vandersluis, Partner, KPMG Strategy, and Governor, London School of Economics

Source:
This article was published by Elcano Royal Institute

Notes:

¹ Ken Davies (2013), ‘China Investment Policy: An Update’, OECD Working Papers on International Investment, 2013/01, OECD Publishing.

² Secretary of State for Trade – Datainvex database.

³ ‘La bolsa china se colapsa en su pero sesión en ocho años’, Cinco Días, 27/VIII/2015.

⁴ ‘Official from the Department of Foreign Investment Administration Comments on China’s Input of FDI in January-August’, 14/IX/2015.

⁵ ‘OECD Yearbook 2012 – Better policies for better lives’.

⁶ Homi Kharas (2010), ‘The Emerging Middle Class in Developing Countries’, OECD Development Centre Working Paper, nr 285, January.

⁷ ¥/€ exchange rates used: 8.20 (2013); 8.15 (2014); 6.90 (2nd quarter 2015).

⁸ National Bureau of Statistics of China.

⁹ Brian X. Chen (2015), ‘Apple Stock Reacts After Tim Cook Email Praises China Sales’, New York Times, 24/VIII/2015.

¹⁰ Ministry of Commerce Website (2015), ‘China’s 2014 fixed-asset investment growth further cools’, 20/I/2015; ‘China’s Economy Realized a New Normal of Stable Growth in 2014’, NBS, 20/I/2015.

¹¹ National Bureau of Statistics of China.

¹² MOFCOM (2015), ‘Spokesman of the Ministry of Commerce Comments on China’s Foreign Investment Utilization Ranking First in 2014’, 2/II/2015.

¹³ MOFCOM (2015), ‘Statistics of FDI in China in January-December 2014’, 27/I/2015.

¹⁴ National Bureau of Statistics of China.

¹⁵ Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS) (2015), ‘Chinese FDI in Europe and Germany, Preparing for a New Era of Chinese Capital’, June.

¹⁶ AmCham China (2015), ‘China Business Climate Survey Report’.

¹⁷ George Magnus, ‘China’s Silk Road Financial Diplomacy Takes Shape’, International Banker.

¹⁸ Lan Lan (2015), ‘Foreign investment restrictions to be cut’, China Daily, 14/III/2015, citing the new Catalogue.

¹⁹ ‘Bodegas Torres continua su expansión en China y tendrá 37 tiendas este año’, La Vanguardia, 5/X/2011; ‘Torres China se consolida como la segunda importadora de vinos’, GastronomiaAlternativa.

²⁰ Gemma Martinez (2014), ‘El gigante chino Fosun compra el 20% de Osborne y entra en el consejo’, Expansión, 19/VIII/2014.

²¹ Lluís Pellicer (2015), ‘El gigante chino Bright Food cierra compra de Miquel Alimentació’, El País, 30/IX/2015.

²² OECD-FAO (2013), ‘Agricultural Outlook 2013’, OECD Publishing.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Miguel Jiménez, ‘¿En qué países está abriendo más tiendas Inditex este año?’, El País, 17 September 2015.

²⁵ ‘Los complementos de Abbacino aceleran en China y Estados Unidos’, Modaes.es, 25 June 2013.

²⁶ Patti Waldmeir, ‘China leads the way for shopping malls’, Financial Times, 28 June 2015.

²⁷ ‘25 aniversarios del primer proyecto de Técnicas Reunidas en China’, Fundación Consejo España China, 28 March 2013.

²⁸ ‘Gamesa certifica su turbina G97-2.0 MW según estándares chinos’, Europa  Press, 15 October 2015; Enrique Utrera, ‘Gamesa se derrumba un 10%’, Expansión, 20 August 2015 ; ‘Gamesa firma dos nuevos contratos en China’, Expansión, 8 January 2015.

²⁹ Gavriel Wildau, ‘AIIB launch signals China´s new ambition’, The Financial Times, 29 June 2015.

³⁰ Travel & Tourism – Economic impact 2015 China; World Travel & Tourism Council

³¹ ICEX.

³² ‘NH arranca su ofensiva sobre China junto a HNA con seis hoteles en 2015’, Preferente.com, 25 September 2014.

³³ United Nations World Tourism Organization, ‘Over 1.1bn tourists travelled abroad in 2014’, 27 January 2015.

³⁴ Kevin Rozario, ‘Chinese retail spend to hit $422bn by 2020’, The Travel Retail Business, 18 October 2015.

³⁵ ‘Los turistas chinos que visitaron España en 2014 se incrementaron un 14%’, hosteltur – citing Turespaña, 18 March 2015.

³⁶ Denis Cosnard, ‘Club Med to focus on wealthy Chinese travellers after €939m takeover’, The Guardian, 13 January 2015.

³⁷ Paula M. Miller, ‘IKEA with Chinese Characteristics’, China Business Review, 1 July 2004.

³⁸ Ángeles Gonzalo Alconada, ‘Santander se refuerza en China al firmar un acuerdo estratégico con Bank of Shanghai’, Cinco Días, 11 December 2013.

³⁹ Javier Vadillo, ‘El grupo chino ZTE crecerá con Euskaltel por el sur de Europa’, Cinco Días, 17 November 2014.

⁴⁰ Moncho Veloso, ‘Mapfre aspira a facturar más de 30.000 millones en tres años con su expansión global’, ABC, 14 March 2014.

⁴¹ ‘Repsol vende a Sinopec el 40% de su filial de Brasil a un precio récord’, Cinco Días, 2 October 2010.

Nationalize the mines to protect jobs: this is the request by the Confederation of Unions of Zambia after the announcement by the Swiss Glencore firm that it will halt in extraction activities at one of the nation’s main copper mines.

“We wish to take this opportunity to earnestly appeal to adhere to our advice, failure to which the government should take over the running of the mines,” said Confederation of Trade Unions of Zambia president, in regard to the risk of job cuts at the Mopani mine.

The union echoed comments by President Edgar Lungu who warned last week that he would not allow Glencore to lay off workers at Mopani as part of its plan to suspend production for 18 months at the mine.

Glencore’s Zambia unit plans to lay off more than 3,800 workers in Africa’s second-biggest copper producer, citing lower metal prices and rising production costs.

Gradual melting of winter snow helps feed water to farms, cities and ecosystems across much of the world, but this resource may soon be critically imperiled. In a new study, scientists have identified snow-dependent drainage basins across the northern hemisphere currently serving 2 billion people that run the risk of declining supplies in the coming century. The basins take in large parts of the American West, southern Europe, the Mideast and central Asia. They range from productive U.S. farm land to war-torn regions already in the grip of long-term water shortages.

Snow is an important seasonal water source mainly around large mountain chains. From higher elevations, snowmelt runs gradually into the lowlands during spring and summer growing seasons, when human demand peaks. But global warming is upsetting this convenient balance. Studies show that in many areas, more winter precipitation is falling as rain, not snow, and washing away directly; the snow that does fall is settling at progressively higher elevations, and melting earlier. The new study estimates snow’s potential to supply present human needs in both current and projected climates, taking both weather trends and population into account.

“Snow is important because it forms its own reservoir. But the consequences of reduced snowpack are not the same for all places–it is also a function of where and when people demand water,” said lead author Justin Mankin, a postdoctoral fellow at Columbia University’s Earth Institute based jointly at the institute’s Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory and its affiliated NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies. “Water managers in a lot of places may need to prepare for a world where the snow reservoir no longer exists.” The study appears this week in the journal Environmental Research Letters.

As the world warms, scientists have been observing declining snow accumulations in many regions, a trend that is expected to continue. Once-permanent snowfields are disappearing in the Rocky Mountains from Colorado to northern Montana, as well as in the Himalayas and other areas. A recent study showed that this year the snowpack in California, which is suffering an ongoing drought as well as long-term warming, reached its lowest point in 500 years.

Mankin and his coauthors calculated the possible future effects, based on how many people consume water from snowmelt. They looked at 421 drainage basins spanning the northern hemisphere, combining multiple climate models with present water-use patterns and demographics. From these data, they identified 97 basins currently serving some 2 billion people that depend on snowmelt, and run at least a two-thirds chance of declines, given present water demands.

The researchers further zeroed in on 32 of those basins, with the largest populations–collectively nearly 1.45 billion people–where present snowmelt meets a substantial proportion of human demand. These are the most sensitive to any changes, and have the most at stake. Among them are the basins of northern and central California, where much of U.S. produce is grown; the basins of the Colorado and Rio Grande rivers, which serve much of the American West and northern Mexico; the Atlas basin of Morocco; the Ebro-Duero basin, which feeds water to Portugal and much of Spain and southern France; and a series of basins covering eastern Italy, the southern Balkans, several Caucasus nations, and northern Turkey.

Also on the list is the volatile Shatt al Arab basin, which channels meltwater from the Zagros Mountains to Iraq, Syria, eastern Turkey, northern Saudi Arabia and eastern Iran. Studies suggest that warming climate has already decreased rainfall and increased evaporation across much of the eastern Mediterranean and Mideast, and a study earlier this year suggested that the spreading civil war now engulfing the region was sparked in part by a record 2006-2010 drought.

The study concentrates only on human water supplies, but lack of snowpack may have wider ecological consequences. In the American West, land managers fear that forest fires undamped by snow might start earlier in the year, and food sources for nesting birds might start running out in late summer. Native trout depend on a steady flow of cold water during summer, so some species could face extinction.

The news is not uniformly bad. Across most of North America, northern Europe, Russia, China and southeast Asia, rainfall alone is projected to keep meeting human demand. Many changeable factors can affect water supply and demand, so the projections contain large uncertainties; in large regions, the models show that changing climate is about as likely to increase water supply as to decrease it, in the form of greater seasonal rains. All things considered, supplies could stay about the same in India’s Indus and Ganges basins, home to about 1 billion people. This is true also of the Huai, a sub-basin of China’s Yellow River, with a current population of more than 130 million. And at least temporarily, accelerated melting of glaciers in the Himalayas and outlying ranges may actually increase water supplies to wide areas, including central Asian countries like Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan.

“Managers need to be prepared for the possibility of multi-decadal decreases in snow water supply,” said Mankin. “But at the same time, they could have large multi-decadal increases. Both of those outcomes are entirely consistent with a world with global warming.”

Yoshihide Wada, a researcher at the Netherlands’ Utrecht University who studies global water resources, said the study makes a “convincing argument” that “climate change will add another stressor over many regions” where water scarcity is already an issue. He said this would be especially so in semi-arid areas where irrigation is supplemented by shrinking supplies of groundwater. If anything, the study could underestimate some risks, he suggests, because it does not account for projected increases in population.

What Mankin calls the “irreducible near-term uncertainties” in many projections will leave water managers faced with whether to make big infrastructure investments or not. Some areas may be able to compensate for shrinking snowmelt by expanding storage reservoirs or pumping more groundwater. But Wada says reservoirs are so expensive, many areas may not be able to afford them. And groundwater has limits; in parts of California, farmers are pumping up so much water, the land surface is visibly sinking–a trend that probably cannot be maintained for more than a few decades. Wada says more efficient irrigation methods, water recycling and switches to less water-intensive crops may be more realistic solutions.

By Felix K. Chang*

Until September, Indonesia seemed sure to increase its defense budget in the coming year.  Rising concern over Chinese actions in the South China Sea had already prompted Indonesian leaders to pledge themselves to do more to safeguard Indonesia’s maritime claims in the region.  Indonesian President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo promised to turn the Indonesian military into “a regional maritime force respected by countries in the East Asia region.”  A senior Indonesian military official was more direct—putting China on notice that Indonesia would defend its maritime space around the Natuna Islands, including those parts that fall within China’s nine-dash claim line in the South China Sea.[1]

But to properly defend Indonesia’s maritime interests, the Indonesian military has had to reorient itself onto what it calls a “maritime axis.”  That process was formalized in its 2010 Strategic Defense Plan.  It detailed what Indonesia would need to do to modernize its long-neglected navy and air force.  Since 2011, both have begun to procure newer equipment.  The navy ordered three Type 209/1400 diesel-electric attack submarines from South Korea, two Sigma-class corvettes from the Netherlands, and a number of fast attack craft from Indonesian shipyards.  It also acquired three small British-built frigates.  Meanwhile, the air force acquired the first of 24 retired American F-16C/D fighters, which will be refurbished and outfitted with new radar systems to give them better maritime and strike capabilities.

However, the momentum of Indonesia’s military procurement seemed to have faltered in September, when Joko’s government submitted its proposed 2016 state budget to the Indonesian People’s Representative Council (DPR).  In that budget, the government cut the defense allocation by 6.3% from Rp 102.3 trillion ($7 billion) to Rp 95.8 trillion ($6.5 billion).  A few weeks later, the government awarded a $5 billion high-speed railway contract to a giant Chinese state-owned enterprise.  Some wondered whether Indonesia had chosen to take a softer line towards China.[2]

More likely, though, Indonesia’s weakening economy drove both decisions, rather than any easing of its concerns over the South China Sea.  Joko’s government has argued that it needed to shift resources away from military spending to fund a series of stimulus packages to revive the Indonesian economy, which has suffered as the country’s raw material exports have fallen, a problem deepened by the government’s ill-timed reforms of Indonesia’s mining industry.  With respect to the contract award, the Chinese bid was sweetened at the last minute with a financial package for the proposed railway’s construction that did not require any loan guarantees from the Indonesian government, freeing it from any liabilities if the expensive project failed to meet expectations.  That was something Japan’s competing offer could not match.[3]

Whatever the reason for the lower defense allocation, it will hinder the modernization of Indonesia’s naval and air forces.  During budgetary testimony in October, General Gatot Nurmantyo, the commander of Indonesian armed forces, told the DPR’s defense commission that the lower defense allocation would force him to delay or scrap a number of procurement programs.  That prompted some on the DPR defense commission to worry whether the Indonesian military would have enough resources to achieve its “Minimum Essential Force,” the minimum requirements needed to defend Indonesia’s maritime interests.  Hence, the commission adopted a new proposal to add Rp 37.1 trillion ($2.5 billion) to the defense budget.  Ultimately, the DPR’s budget commission pared back that proposal, but still boosted the defense budget to Rp 99.5 trillion ($6.7 billion).[4]

While the new budget still represents a decrease from a year earlier, the small increase over the government’s proposal will help to keep some procurement programs on track and offset the falling value of the Indonesian rupiah against the U.S. dollar, which has made purchases of foreign military equipment more expensive.  In any case, Indonesia has also pursued other financing means to support its military procurement.  In early September, the Indonesian Ministry of Finance arranged for PT Bank Negara Indonesia to provide credit worth Rp 980 billion ($666 million) to the military for a variety of acquisitions.  Soon thereafter, the DPR’s defense commission revealed that Jakarta was seeking to secure a $3 billion loan from Moscow to fund major acquisitions.[5]  If the loan is finalized, Indonesia’s Ministry of Defense will most likely use it to acquire Russian Su-35 fighters and Kilo-class submarines, both of which the DPR’s defense commission has already endorsed.  As the one commission member said of Indonesia: “[we are] a maritime country… so sea security must be prioritized.”[6]

Yet, even with such support for new kit, the Indonesian military will have to stretch its resources to set up adequate defenses in the South China Sea.  The military has already listed a number of infrastructure improvements on and around the Natuna Islands that need to be completed before it can station more forces there.  The improvements include the construction of facilities for 2,000 additional troops; expansion of a naval base at Pontianak; and upgrade of Ranai air base with new hangars, radar, and a longer runway.  In September, Minister of Defense Ryamizard Ryacudu visited Natuna Island to draw attention to Indonesia’s efforts to beef up defenses in the area.  He noted plans to deploy three ships and four fighter aircraft on the island.[7]

In the near future, Indonesia is expected to publish a new defense white paper.  It will likely detail the growing maritime threats to Indonesian security.  Along with Jakarta’s ongoing attempts to strengthen its navy and air force, it reflects the intent of Indonesian leaders to better protect their country’s interests in the South China Sea.  But how quickly those leaders can do so is an open question.  They have a long way to go before they can bring to fruition the robust force structure envisioned in the 2010 Strategic Defense Plan.  Despite the progress made over the last five years, the defenses on the Natuna Islands are only just beginning to improve.  For now, Ranai air base still has the air of a remote outpost, operating a single 1980s-era radar set.  Perhaps in the coming years more military hardware will finally reach it.

About the author:
* Felix K. Chang is a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. He is also the Chief Strategy Officer of DecisionQ, a predictive analytics company in the national security and healthcare industries. He has worked with a number of digital, consumer services, and renewable energy entrepreneurs for years. He was previously a consultant in Booz Allen Hamilton’s Strategy and Organization practice; among his clients were the U.S. Department of Energy, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Department of the Treasury, and other agencies. Earlier, he served as a senior planner and an intelligence officer in the U.S. Department of Defense and a business advisor at Mobil Oil Corporation, where he dealt with strategic planning for upstream and midstream investments throughout Asia and Africa.

Source:
This article was published by FPRI.

Notes:
[1] “Jokowi wants RI to be respected maritime force by 2020,” Jakarta Post, Oct. 5, 2015; Moeldoko, “China’s Dismaying New Claims in the South China Sea,” Wall Street Journal, Apr. 24, 2014.

[2] Kanupriya Kapoor and Cindy Silviana, “UPDATE 2-Indonesia rewards China’s ‘courage’ with high-profile rail contract,” Reuters, Sep. 30, 2015; Nani Afrida, “The TNI to cut back on weapons procurement,” Jakarta Post, Sep. 9, 2015.

[3] Robin Harding, Avantika Chilkoti, and Tom Mitchell, “Tokyo furious after Jakarta awards rail contract to Beijing,” Financial Times, Oct. 2, 2015, p. 6; Avantika Chilkoti and Taufan Hidayat, “Indonesia rolls out next stimulus phase in effort to lift economy,” Financial Times, Sep. 29, 2015.

[4] Lili Sunardi Senin, Kementerian, “PU Dapat Anggaran Terbanyak Dari APBN 2016,” Bisnis.com, Nov. 2, 2015; Jon Grevatt, “Indonesian parliamentary commission approves defence spending increase,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, Sep. 28, 2015.

[5] Ibid.

[6] “National scene: House support plans to buy Russian submarine,” Jakarta Post, Sep. 30, 2015.

[7] “Indonesia: Islanders on Alert,” NHK World, Nov. 11, 2015; “Indonesia’s Defense Ministry to focus on improving infrastructure in Natuna,” Antaranews.com, Sep. 21, 2015; “Indonesian military adds two thousand personnel to guard Natuna waters,” Antaranews.com, Sep. 16, 2015; Ridzwan Rahmat, “Indonesia to upgrade naval base near disputed South China Sea waters,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, May 9, 2014.

Iran’s body politic is far from tension-free. Not only does the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, keep the tightest of reins on the political process and the politicians who administer it, but Iran’s Revolutionary Guards also regard it as their bounden duty to protect the principles of the revolution by stamping on any politician with too-liberal tendencies.

Back in 2013, Khamanei had lost faith in the then president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, not least because the sanctions imposed by the US and the EU on Iran since 2005 were biting hard, and Ahmadinejad had no policy for easing them. So Khamenei backed the more accommodating Hassan Rouhani in the new presidential elections, and charged him with negotiating Iran’s way out of the sanctions.

Rouhani succeeded, but in his very success lie the seeds of his failure. On November 3 the New York Times reported that Rouhani’s hard-line adversaries in the government were promoting an internal backlash against the nuclear deal. In addition, the Revolutionary Guards Corps had started arresting pro-deal journalists, activists and cultural figures.

The development reflects the current views of the Supreme Leader. Yes, Khamenei heartily approves of the fact that the US and the EU are prepared to lift sanctions on Iran, but no, the Supreme Leader does not like the conditions they have laid down, and that Rouhani has agreed to. Perhaps reckoning that the US president and world leaders are so anxious for a deal with Iran that he has more leeway than the signed document apparently allows, Khamenei has virtually stated in black and white that Iran has no intention whatsoever of adhering to the terms of the agreement reached on July 14, 2015.

July 14 was the day that world powers, led by the US, reached a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran. Under its terms, sanctions will be lifted only when the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) verifies that Iran has implemented key nuclear-related measures, such as reducing its stockpiles of fissile materials and centrifuges.

“Adoption Day”– the day participants would start the process of implementing their JCPOA commitments – was set for October 18. On that day, therefore, the US and the EU began preparatory measures for lifting the multiple sanctions that have crippled Iran’s economy since they were first imposed in 2005. Only three days later, on October 21, Ayatollah Khamenei published a letter of guidelines to Iranian President Hassan Rouhani about the JCPOA.

This letter, the Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI) reported, was posted on Khamenei’s website in Persian, tweeted from his Twitter account, posted on his Facebook page in English, and published in English by the Iran Broadcasting Authority. In this document, clearly the definitive statement of the conditions under which Iran would be willing to execute the JCPOA, Iran’s Supreme Leader sets nine new and unilateral conditions that fundamentally change what was agreed on July 14. In short, he has virtually declared the JCPOA a dead letter.

What are these nine new conditions?

First Khamenei demands that sanctions are lifted fully, not suspended, before Iran takes steps to meet its obligations under the agreement. In addition he asserts that any endorsement by the West of the “snapback” option (the reintroduction of sanctions should Iran fail to meet the terms of the agreement) will be considered “non-compliance with the JCPOA”.

Secondly: Any future sanctions against Iran for whatever reason, including terrorism or human rights violations, will “constitute a violation of the JCPOA,” and a reason for Iran to stop executing the agreement.

Thirdly: Under the JCPOA Iran is obligated to start changing the function of its nuclear reactor at Arak and shipping out most of its stockpile of enriched uranium. In his letter Khamenei declares that Iran will not carry out these actions until after the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) closes its dossier on Iran, targeted for December 15. But the IAEA will not be able to report about Iran meeting its obligations regarding the Arak reactor and shipping out its enriched uranium by the target date, because Iran is not going to do so by then. In short, the JCPOA has been thwarted from the very start.

Fourth: Iran will change the purpose of the Arak reactor only after there is a signed agreement on an “alternative plan” and “sufficient guarantee” that it will be implemented. In other words, Iran intends to postpone fulfilling its obligations under the JCPOA regarding the Arak reactor to some unknown future date.

Fifth: Iran intends to postpone indefinitely the date set by the JCPOA for shipping out its enriched uranium to another country in exchange for yellowcake. Moreover Khamenei is demanding that Iran receive in exchange for the enriched uranium not raw uranium as per the JCPOA, but instead uranium that has been enriched, albeit to a lower level than the uranium it ships out.

Sixth: Khamenei instructs President Rouhani, while reducing Iran’s ability to enrich uranium under the JCPOA, immediately to expand Iran’s ability to enrich uranium on a 15-year long-term plan for 190,000 centrifuges. In short, he is nullifying the declared goal of the JCPOA, which is to reduce Iran’s nuclear enrichment capabilities.

Seventh: The Iranian Atomic Energy Organization must ensure continued nuclear research and development, in its various dimensions, so that in eight years’ time, Iran will not be lacking in enrichment technology.

Eighth: Khamenei declares that Iran must be involved in resolving queries about the JCPOA – a recipe for unending dispute and the ability to paralyze the execution of the agreement.

Ninth: A new committee tasked with monitoring the execution of the agreement is to be established – nominally to obviate any attempt by the US or the West to cheat, but in effect, a mechanism for creating perpetual obstacles to carrying out the agreement.

So far world opinion has turned a blind eye to Khamenei’s virtual rejection of the nuclear agreement. The US and the EU are proceeding enthusiastically with the first stages of dismantling their multiple sanctions regimes. Government officials and businessmen from around the globe are making a beeline for Tehran, eager to share in the vast commercial opportunities they see awaiting.

The nuclear agreement is the basis for Iran’s re-entry into the comity of nations, and Khamenei seems to be setting the stage for a battle of wills between Iran and the West. Will the West’s desire to come to terms with Iran outweigh Iran’s determination to give away less than their president has actually signed up to? Will the West delay the lifting of sanctions? Who will blink first?

By Reza Solat*

In all my previous analyses, I emphasized that Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu would be unrivaled winner of this round of the country’s parliamentary elections and I was of the opinion that under the present circumstances, the playground would not be under Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s control, but it is the country’s prime minister who would set the rules of the elections. Based on this background, the present article discusses reasons behind the recent election win of Turkey’s Justice and Development Party in view of the country’s internal and external environment.

1. Internal environment

A review of domestic developments in Turkey between June 7 and November 1 will shed more light on possible mechanisms that led to victory of the ruling Justice and Development Party in recent elections. Two major currents emerged in Turkey’s public opinion during this period of time: firstly, after many years, Turkish people saw their country without a party being in absolute control, and secondly, they saw the power of the opposition parties as well. In fact, during the aforesaid four months, the memory of Turkey’s coalition governments of the 1970s was revived in the internal environment of Turkey. In the meantime, Davutoglu was offered with an unprecedented opportunity to implement his theoretical strategies free from any pressure. The vote results also show that after Turkey’s Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) lost 39 parliamentary seats and the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) lost 21 seats, the Justice and Development Party’s seats increased in number.

In fact, due to measures taken by Davutoglu with the help of Erdogan to intensify security and identity-based environment of the country, the way was paved for these two unrelenting parties to be undermined as a result of which the votes given to the Justice and Development Party rose in number. The Peoples’ Democratic Party had created the impression in Turkey following June 7 that the country was in for some form of national reconciliation model, but that impression faded in a matter of the past four months and those conditions were not provided. As a result, the rift between the Turkey’s Nationalist Movement Party and the Peoples’ Democratic Party increased and all opportunities were offered to the Justice and Development Party, to ride the tide created by those rifts and change conditions to its own benefit.

The important point, which was totally evident in Turkey’s political environment following elections on June 7, was severe multipolarity of the political and social atmosphere in the country. In the meantime, the noteworthy point is the advantage that was taken from the rift that existed within the Nationalist Movement Party. The personal and age-old rivalry between Yildirim Tugrul Turkes, the son of Alparslan Turkes, the founder of the Nationalist Movement Party, and its current leader, Devlet Bahceli, became so serious that he took the risk of being expelled from the party by accepting an invitation from Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu to participate in the formation of the interim government.

After his father died in 1997, Tugrul Turkes was nominated for the leadership of the Nationalist Movement Party and was considered the frontrunner for the post. However, after six other nominees withdrew from the race in favor of Devlet Bahceli, Tugrul Turkes could not achieve the post. Since that time, he was always the second best after Bahceli and until the time he was temporarily expelled from the Nationalist Movement Party, Turkes could not have any post better that the first assistant of the party’s leader. It seems that no other development could have made Davutoglu happier. Turkes was a deputy to Davutoglu in the two-month interim government. The Justice and Development Party had pinned great hope on a shift in part of the nationalists’ votes due to presence of one of the most famous nationalist figures in the composition of the interim government, and was successful in this regard. The same situation also existed for the Peoples’ Democratic Party in a different way as they also joined the interim cabinet.

The Republican People’s Party (CHP) was the only party that refrained from taking part in the interim government in any way. As a result, its parliamentary seats increased, even compared to June 7 elections, from 132 to 134. As a result, it seems that political parties, whose representatives took part in the formation of the interim government with Davutoglu, have lost their votes in favor of the Justice and Development Party. On the other hand, from June 7 to November 1, all parties failed to allay Turkish people’s old fears of coalition governments. As a result, such old fears prompted the public opinion to turn toward the Justice and Development Party once again. Subsequently, the time interval between June 7 and November 1 was a short period, which was reminiscent of past history of Turkey, including unstable and coalition governments that were formed between the government of Turgut Ozal and the government of Bulent Ecevit. The prolongation of the process of forming the interim government caused major economic indices to fall under conditions where no government was in place, making people eager to see rapid formation of the new government.

2. External environment

The most important external factors affecting the situation in Turkey included the economic crisis in Greece, presence of Russia in Syria, and fears about insecurity in relation to Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and Daesh terrorist group. All these factors prompted Turkish citizens to turn toward Davutoglu. By blaming PKK and Daesh as responsible for three terrorist attacks that took place in various parts of the country, Davutoglu gained the votes of nationalists, who are against Kurds, on the one hand, while on the other hand, winning the votes of Kurds, who are opposed to Daesh, by accusing Daesh of having conducted the terrorist attacks. In fact, the officials of the Justice and Development Party struck a balance among terrorist groups operating in Turkey’s external environment, as a result of which they were able to take advantage of the existing rifts between two rival parties to their own benefit in the internal environment of Turkey. This is why Turkey blamed both Daesh and PKK simultaneously for the terrorist attacks. At the same time, the cease-fire between PKK and the central government in Turkey was terminated at the end of June following which the country was scene of spiraling violence, especially in the southeastern city of Diyarbakır. The soaring violence then led to securitization and bipolarity of the discourse-based conditions in Turkey. The rising wave of violence was, in fact, the most important factor that caused votes won by the Peoples’ Democratic Party to fall compared to previous elections.

*Reza Solat
Ph.D. in International Relations and Expert on Turkey Issues

FIFA has announced the five candidates who will stand for election to take over from the beleaguered Sepp Blatter as president of football’s world governing body. A vote will take place in February next year in Zurich.

Prince Ali Al Hussein, Sheikh Salman Bin Ebrahim Al Khalifa, Jérôme Champagne, Gianni Infantino and Tokyo Sexwale all made the shortlist as eligible candidates, FIFA announced on Thursday. UEFA’s currently suspended president, Michel Platini, who has recently been involved in a scandal over a CHF2 million ($2.1 million) payment made to him by Blatter in 2011, was not on the list.

Platini cannot take part in any football-related activities, including the FIFA presidential race, while under the 90-day suspension, which began on October 8. Outgoing president Blatter was also suspended at the same time, and both men are being investigated by the Swiss authorities. Blatter is under suspicion of “criminal mismanagement” and “misappropriation” of funds.

At the time of the suspensions, FIFA’s ethics committee said that “the duration of the bans may be extended for an additional period not exceeding 45 days”. Platini’s candidacy will only be assessed if his suspension is lifted before the February 26 election date.

The crisis-hit football organisation has carried out integrity checks on all of the candidates, according to a statement by the ethics committee released on Thursday. The body said this involved “a review of corporate records, litigation cases, bankruptcy proceedings, potential regulatory actions taken against the candidate and a review of media reports concerning potential red flags (fraudulent behaviour, match manipulation, human rights violations, etc.)”.

Musa Hassan Bility from Liberia was not added to the presidential shortlist after this review, although the committee will not reveal the details of their findings.

On Thursday, Blatter’s adviser Klaus Stoehlker said the suspended FIFA president had left a Swiss hospital. The 79-year-old Blatter spent about a week having his health assessed, about a month after his suspension by the FIFA ethics committee. Blatter’s daughter Corinne took him to his hometown of Visp in canton Valais to relax before he returns to his private office in Zurich next week, Stoehlker said.

Corruption trail

In an interview with the German-language newspaper the Tages-Anzeiger on Thursday, Basel University law professor and corruption expert Mark Pieth gave his views on how entrenched corruption is in the game. Pieth said that “football is a vehicle to distribute power”. Using football clubs Manchester City and Paris St-Germain as examples, Pieth commented on why he thought they were so “interesting for Sheikhs from the Arabic region”, adding it was about “buying” into a world of acceptance.

Speaking specifically about Blatter, Pieth said that his driving force was not greed, but power. “He plays with the greed of others. When Michel Platini can earn another million as a Blatter advisor in one year, it begs the question: why? This is where power and greed come together.”

On 1 November 2015, I was one of thousands of volunteers for “Oy ve Ötesi” (Vote and Beyond), an independent group of observers operating at polling stations throughout Turkey.

We eight volunteers from different educational and social backgrounds came together between 6:45- 19:00 on Sunday in a high school classroom for a common purpose. Coming from very different walks of life, we had never seen each other before. We collected a total of 374 votes, counted them, recorded them, and certified them.

I believe in democracy, for as long as we have the freedom to choose, everything will improve in time by way of mutual communication and the desire to understand one another.

In Turkey’s November 1st general elections, the average populace prioritized security and stability in an ever increasingly volatile geography.

I continue to be optimistic for our markets. We do not have the luxury to say, “après moi le deluge” (after me, the deluge).

I would say that when the appropriate time comes, then we shall be able to prioritize market transparency, accountability, independent monitoring, rule of law, separation of powers, freedom of expression, and independent free media, and it is at that time when we can engage in better practices of parliamentary democracy, the results of which will allow for a better future.

***

Let me tell you a story you from the distant past. It was years and years ago. As a major contracting company, they were never able to get any orders from big public sector organizations. No matter how much they bid and bid, and fulfilled all the necessary requirements, in the end they never got any positive results.

One day a gentleman came to their office. He said, “Make a consulting agreement with me and let me provide you with full information on the tender”. They signed an agreement with his company in Panama and sent a lump sum of money to their offshore account for consulting services.

After this, a new tender was opened, everything was kept extremely secret. All interested parties were required to submit their proposal dossiers in sealed envelopes. They all handed in their documents 5 minutes before the closing time of the tender.

After their proposal documents were submitted, they were requested to leave the offices immediately in order to avoid any undesired flow of verbal information. Client locked their doors behind us. Everything was arranged behind closed doors. Participants were later asked to declare a second, lower bid price. Blind price quoting without any inside information on competitors has no meaning. However, on that evening, their consultant sent a fax to Company’s Ankara office containing all the information on their rivals’ prices.

If there is an information leak within a public institution, it most likely originates from the top, as the lower cadres wouldn’t dare to engage in such an activity. Such occurs not only in our geography, but all over the world.

As a young engineer who recently graduated from university, I thought that this must be “the way things work”. Since then, time has passed, all of those top decision makers have retired, and the public company at hand was privatized, sold and eventually disappeared from the market. Over all of these years, these archaic procedures have continued and improved.

Today we see new procedures. Your applications for tenders will not be answered unless you are close to the top political administrators, so you should look for new opportunities in Russia’s remote regions or in the Middle East. Considering this, how can we continue to run businesses in such a fragile economy? Can we bear the burden of ever increasing costs? The system has been closed and locked, and hence the economy and investment climate are also inaccessible. Even the works of the privileged few have faced this reality.

***

I’ve had a difficult time understanding why we have shrouded natural gas prices in secrecy for so many years. I have also always envied the high investment placed in education by our northern neighbor Russia, their skilled mathematicians, their excellent market strategists. Our human capital has difficulty in matching theirs when it comes to trade negotiations in particular. Moreover, this is augmented by the fact that we should drastically and urgently reduce our dependence on their fuel supply. They will surely exploit our disadvantageous situation as long as this dependence continues.

If a trade agreement is kept behind closed doors, there is always some aspect thereof that goes against the people’s common benefit, there is always some aspect that favors top decision makers. The details of the Turkish Stream and Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP) negotiations are still unclear. What shall we receive in return for what we concede? What will be the extent of this, our northern neighbor’s Christmas gift?

We know that Russian President Vladimir Putin has an Ph.D. degree in energy economics. There are rumors that ghost writers brought together the wording of his academic dissertation. Anyhow, that is his thesis. Nonetheless, he completely assimilated the content of academic discipline with his office. Compared to his preparations, our decision makers fumble when it comes to academic and practical learning.

At the end of WWII, regardless of the huge human losses they paid on the eastern front, our northern neighbor crushed the last resistance of the Nazi German Army in May 1945. They then turned to the Far East and crushed the Japanese Army in Manchuria in August 1945.

Similarly, the country has now entered with its full weight into the Syrian theater in the most recent phase of the conflict. They have come to Syria for a long, if not permanent stay. Syria is now commencing a long-term accession to Russian territory as had also been the case for Eastern Europe and Manchuria.

We do not have weapons that can counter Russia’s SU-30 fighter planes or its T-90 war tanks. We should have designed and manufacture these weapons much earlier. There’s nothing more we can do right now other than trying to remain peaceful and independent.

***

The transatlantic superpower of the United States has no intention of interfering in the Syrian Civil War, nor does it need to become embroiled in any international conflict before the 2016 presidential elections. For a long period of time, it has pursued a “policy of indifference” towards us in our relations. In international relations, indifference is worse than insult. Leaders meeting on 15-16 November this year for the G20 Summit in Antalya, Turkey have no serious agenda. Western Leaders will come and go all in one-day. They will talk about popular and easy topic, “global warming”. They will talk about important issues among themselves in bilateral meetings, and the only thing that we will supply during the G20 Summit is the daily catering and hotel services.

On the other hand, Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad has already completed his mission. It makes no difference whether he stays or goes, Syria is now falling under Russian domination. We have limited capabilities when it comes to dealing with events south of our border. There is not much we can do. We can close our borders and we can limit or block passage between us. We are trapped to the south. The only thing we can do is to reduce our dependence on imported energy, imported fossil fuels, and imported natural gas.

***

Our general elections were held at the beginning of this month on 1 November 2015. As long as we have the freedom to choose in free elections, we should believe in and trust the common sense and common wisdom of the voters of this nation. We must understand that in these elections the voters opted for stability and security, which they have desperately needed in recent days.

By John Zaw

A hard-line Buddhist party is emerging as a key force in Myanmar’s religiously divided Rakhine state after the Nov. 8 elections, sparking concern that ethnic tensions will boil over with Rohingya Muslims bearing the brunt.

The Arakan National Party, which represents Rakhine state’s ethnic majority, claims it has won at least 21 of 29 available seats allotted for Rakhine in the national parliament, as well as 22 in state parliament, following Myanmar’s Nov. 8 elections.

So far, the country’s election commission has only issued partial results confirming that the party won five total seats, with further results expected in waves in the coming days.

However, the party’s apparent success has raised concerns among Rohingya Muslims, a minority group that has frequently found themselves in the middle of conflicts with the ethnic Rakhine majority.

Kyaw Hla Aung, a former NGO worker in Thetkaepyin, a camp for displaced Rohingya near the state capital Sittwe, said many Rohingya are hopeful that what is likely a nationwide landslide victory for opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi will bode well for the minority group.

“But we have concerns about the (Arakan National Party) gaining seats in state parliament, as more oppression could happen because of rising nationalism,” Kyaw Hla Aung said in an interview Nov. 12.

Daw Cho Cho, who lives in a displacement camp in Myaebon township, echoed these concerns.

“We are very worried that the (Arakan National Party) has pushed to deport Rohingya Muslims to other countries,” she said.

The Arakan National Party pushed Myanmar’s federal government to strip voting rights from almost 1 million Rohingya in the state before the November elections.

Rohingya are regarded by many Rakhine and others as being “Bengali” — implying they are illegal immigrants from neighboring Bangladesh — even though many have lived in Myanmar for generations.

While temporary “white card” identity documents had allowed Rohingya to vote in previous polls, the government revoked these documents earlier this year, effectively disenfranchising hundreds of thousands of Rohingya.

Despite the controversies, however, parliamentarians with the Arakan National Party are playing down the party’s nationalistic tone. Pe Than, a sitting lower house parliamentarian who was re-elected Nov. 8, said any new government in the state will act according to the law.

Still, he warned, religious tensions can’t be solved overnight.

“At present, both communities can’t stay together,” he said. “So the international community shouldn’t push for keeping both communities together and instead they should support the development of the people.”

Opposition

In the Nov. 8 polls, Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy surged to a landslide victory, taking as many as 80 percent of contested seats, with final results still coming in seat by seat. President Thein Sein and Min Aung Hlaing, the military chief, congratulated Suu Kyi and agreed to meet for reconciliation talks after the election results are officially announced.

Suu Kyi’s party appears to have won a handful of seats in Rakhine. But her National League for Democracy has not yet revealed how it will tackle the problems of apartheid-like segregation in refugee camps, where malnutrition and disease are rife.

“It’s too early to talk about the policy of solving Muslim issues in Rakhine,” said Win Htein, an executive committee member with Suu Kyi’s party and also an aide to the opposition leader.

Win Naing, a party member who won a state parliament seat in Rakhine’s Thandwe, said this is a delicate issue.

“I think we need to prioritize the rule of law so that we can move forward in solving the other issues one after another,” Win Naing said.

Persecution in the state has led to an exodus of Rohingya, who often risk a perilous boat journey to other countries in the region.