By Scott N. Romaniuk

Over the past decade, Moscow has been projecting its power, and boldly testing the cohesion and determination of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union (EU), and their closest allies in many different regions either considered unstable or contested for their strategic value. Some of these clashes took place immediately after the Soviet Union dissolved while others occurred during the turn of the century and closer to (even up to) the present day. Violent political and ethnic conflict has occurred in the former Soviet republics but also well beyond the borders of the Russian Federation as it exists today. Not all of those conflicts have proven decisive; many remain in stalemate or are simply “frozen.” A non-exhaustive list of those conflicts includes: Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Crimea, Novorossiya, and Syria.

The Arctic attracted headlines more than half a decade ago when Russia planted a flag at the bottom of the Arctic Ocean. Russia has also been intensifying its military flights that violate European and North American airspace in addition to sending ships to the Caribbean, South Asia, and testing United States (US) coastal security. Much of the world’s attention has been focusing on the EU’s ongoing migrant crisis, the “Arab Awakening,” the rise of ISIS in the Middle East, and the current multifaceted conflict in Syria and Iraq. But Moscow’s interest in the Arctic has remained in place. Many analysts argue that war is brewing. Others maintain that while he is willing to test his adversaries, Putin clearly recognizes which issues would be suicide for Russia.

Will Russia and Canada come to blows over the Arctic? If so, what are the stakes, and is Canada ready?

Interest in claiming Arctic territory is primarily driven by the quest for Arctic resources. Until recently, the resources of the Arctic were deemed too difficult and expensive to develop. But with increasing access and soaring energy prices, the Arctic’s wealth, which is conservatively estimated to contain up to 25 percent of the world’s remaining oil and gas reserves, including over 100 billion barrels of oil, is being explored with ever greater fervor; even despite Royal Dutch Shell PLC’s recent decision to hit the stop button on its multi-billion dollar search for oil in Alaska’s Chukchi Sea. Nonetheless, these resources, which have not yet been exploited, are estimated at some $20 trillion – 15 times that of Canada’s entire economy. The oil is far more attractive on the Russian side because of the current state of the country’s infrastructure in the region, including numerous harbor facilities. Compared to Russia’s 17 points of safe harbor, Canada’s Nanisivik is still in the planning phase.

Senator Lisa Murkowski stated that the Northwest Passage was completely ice-free in 2008 for the first time in history. The absence of ice on this normally dangerous route captured the attention of many countries. Even China, India, Italy, Japan, Singapore, and South Korea have been admitted to the Arctic Council as observers 2013 due to their growing interests. As interest in the Arctic and its issues grows, the inadequacy of existing instruments and institutions fosters legal, resource, as well as military and defense contestation. The Arctic Council focuses principally on issues of climate change/impact and biodiversity yet is ill-equipped to address issues pertaining to Arctic militarization. There is the Nordic Defense Cooperation (NORDEFCO) union, which consists of Denmark, Iceland, Sweden, and Finland, but the group of nations does not preside over Arctic interests in relation to Canada exclusively.

In response to the ice-free summer, Canada announced its intentions to establish an Arctic military training facility and deep-water port on the Northwest Passage. Additionally, Ottawa reported that it would undertake the construction of a handful of ice-strengthened patrol boats and icebreakers that would be in operation by 2014. The aim was to assert sovereignty in the Arctic. That plan has fallen drastically short of expectations in Ottawa and came to be known as Canada’s ‘Arctic inaction.’ The single icebreaker that was to be built came with the enormous price tag of $720 million (which eventually rose to $1.3 billion) and an expected delivery date of 2017. The Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) is simply not ready for future military conflict in the Arctic despite the Arctic/Offshore Patrol Ships (A/OPS) project initiated under the leadership of Stephen Harper. The A/OPS initiative was also a dismal failure. Moreover, The RCN has not been present in the Arctic for well over five decades. Since the 1950s, the Canadian Coast Guard (CCG) has been tasked with “protecting” the Arctic.

Delays and budgetary constraints have left Canada exposed to Russia as its immediate rival in the region. Noting Putin’s imperial ambitions, Canada’s new Liberal government can hardly turn its attention from the high north and what should be one of Canada’s most important foreign policy areas. The changes evident in the building program of the Russian navy demonstrate that at least one critical element of Russia’s armed forces has been and continues to be dimensioned approximately to the country’s most critical needs, and along lines that enables it to preserve its strategic dividends in this particular part of the world. That is not to say that the Russian military would likely hold a monopoly in military terms over the entire Arctic region, but certainly there is a gradation of power and strategic control, the bleeding point of which is Russia’s current legal and political territory.

Moscow is currently directing some of its resources toward the renewal of its old military bases and even building new ones to support its current and future Arctic endeavors. In its new doctrine, the Arctic is a naval priority. The Kremlin has also recently stated that it will strengthen its naval forces in the Arctic and Atlantic regions in response to NATO military exercises that have been held close to Russia’s borders. Against a backdrop of Canadian attempts to sort out its budgetary problems and no vision for the immediate future of Canada’s Arctic security, Moscow announced that its navy will be receiving a new fleet of icebreakers. In early 2015, the largest Arctic war games ever took place with roughly 35,000 Russia troops, 50 surface and sub-surface ships, and over 100 aircraft. Russia’s plans also include upgrading the airfield on Novaya Zemlya to accommodate modern fighter aircraft as well as sophisticated S400 air defense systems. Moreover, a newly formed 6,000 troop military group comprised of a couple of motorized infantry brigades will be stationed in the Murmansk area in the Kola Peninsula and the Yamal-Nenets Autonomous Region. When the military is ready to move into the north, this is a good indication that critical infrastructure will either follow or is already in place.

Right now Russia owns 22 icebreakers with another 19 specialized ships held by Russian industry, and about 25 ice-capable attack submarines. By contrast, only three out of four of Canada’s decrepit Victoria-class submarines are available for operations. These boats are essentially worthless and have been holding the RCN back through ballooning upkeep costs and commitment to a $1.5 billion life-extension plan to enhance the functionality of the aging fleet. Completing scrapping the program, in favor of just one or two newer submarines, and committing its new boats exclusively to Arctic role would be a positive step for the Canadian government. Commander Jeff Bierley, of the US Navy submarine Seawolf explained that the “submarine is the best platform to operate in the Arctic because it can spend the majority of its time under the ice.” Nearly three decades ago, the Canadian government concluded that it needs 10 nuclear-powered submarines if it were to consider enforcing its claim to Arctic sovereignty at all feasible. Today it has none. But even small, non-nuclear (i.e., diesel-electric) attack submarines would be incredibly effective at protecting Canada’s Artic waters and would pose a significant threat to larger nuclear submarines operating under the icecaps. Although outnumbered by the US fleet of 41 nuclear powered attack submarines, Russia’s warships will likely outclass the old and decaying Royal Canadian Navy for years to come. The sovereignty issue needs to be critically important to all NATO members and to all EU (even European) countries. Former Defense Minister Perrin Beatty once reasoned that, “NATO has to appreciate the fact that, if it is abhorrent for Europe to have a single square inch of European soil invaded by a foreign power, it is no less abhorrent for Canadians to contemplate a single square inch of their territory being penetrated in a similar way.”

Even though no open conflict has yet been witnessed between countries over the Arctic’s resources, a road map to violence is emerging. This is not based on the energy element or climate change but Russia’s military program alone makes a considerable contribution. Bearing this possibility in mind, Russia has begun a process that will equip its national foreign policy with the teeth necessary to actively seek to acquire economic interests in Arctic zones, as well as to defend claims made with regards to economic, political, and strategic elements. Even in spite of a strained economy, challenges inside Russia, commitments lying far from Russia’ borders, and a declining list of reliable allies, Putin is pressing forward with his Arctic ambitions and compelling Arctic states to face the reality of a militarized high north. What can be obtained in the Arctic is expressed in terms of what kind of resources one puts into it, be it military, human, financial, or political resources. These represent powerful new strings in the bows of those wishing to obtain ownership over the wealth of the Arctic. For Canada, the needs are everywhere, and while daunting, cannot be ignored or receive paltry responses for another three or four decades.

This article was published at Geopolitical Monitor.com

By Max Lane*

The economy remains President Joko Widodo’s central priority. While he has not had the opportunity to continue or repeat the spate of infrastructure project openings seen earlier this year,2 by August and September the government was issuing a very large number of new policies which together amount to a substantial package of deregulation. This deregulation package, it is clearly hoped, will encourage private foreign investment, especially in infrastructure projects – which Widodo has concluded, rightly or wrongly, is the main hope for stimulating economic activity and therefore growth.

The extent of the deregulation packages (see below) exposes the centrality of economic growth, via infrastructure, in Widodo’s political programme – the programme on which he will base his popularity, which is still in decline.3 Other areas of leadership which Widodo talked about during his election campaign, such as the high profile “Revolusi Mental”, which was supposed to change bureaucratic mentality, remain elusive. Some of those who campaigned for him were also assuming, or hoping, that he would take initiatives in the area of reconciliation and justice around past major human rights violations. The previous President, Yudhoyono, had been rumoured at one point to be ready to make a state apology to the victims of the 1965-66 massacres, which he never did. Many Widodo supporters hoped that the new President would do something along these lines on the 50th anniversary of the massacres, i.e. this year in 2015. However, spokespersons for the President stated that no thought had been given to the question and the central issue in the President’s mind was managing the economy.4 This has always been Widodo’s central orientation.

This emphasis on infrastructure and economic growth appears as a narrowing of Widodo’s political leadership agenda. Indeed, even at this point his flagship social safety net policies, the Kartu Indonesia Sehat (Healthy Indonesia Card) and the Kartu Indonesia Pintar (Smart Indonesia Card), still do not seem to have been prioritised for an urgent launch and extension. Perhaps this is being planned via the next budget, due January, but there has been no substantial advance to date.

Infrastructure and economic growth seem all-consuming at the moment. This article will assess the additional pressures on Widodo that are entrenching this narrow agenda. It will also describe the nationalistic contortions in politics created by a deregulation of the economy to foreign business activity and a desperate search for foreign capital.

2015: NEW PRESSURES ON GROWTH

In July 2015, it was already clear that economic growth in Indonesia was slowing. The World Bank’s July Quarterly Report on Indonesia assessed that the country was entering a period of “slower gains”.5 Growth was estimated to have dropped from 5.2% to 4.7%, the slowest pace since 2009. At the same time in July, foreign direct investment figures indicated a drop, even if slight, when measured in U.S. dollars. During this period the rupiah also started to decline substantially against the US dollar, as did many other countries’ currencies throughout the world. Institutions like the World Bank, as well as government economists, did not see any of these developments to be posing unsolvable problems. However, outside technocratic discussions, the three indicators of declining growth, declining foreign investment and sliding rupiah did create a political atmosphere where Widodo came under increased pressure to show that he was managing the economy well. Widodo himself was also being held to a statement that by October the economy would “take off” (meroket).6

This political pressure is also, in a substantive way, an economic pressure. The all-out search for funds, both utilising pension and BPJS monies (Health Care and Social Security Agency),7 as well as seeking foreign investment and foreign loans does underpin Widodo’s economic strategy. Maximising investment in infrastructure is a necessity for Widodo, made all the more politically urgent by the atmospherics of the three declining indicators. As of October, although the rupiah has strengthened somewhat, these three indicators still impact on the political atmosphere. Reporting of the slowing growth rate and declining investment was, of course, widespread. The association of a rapidly declining rupiah with the krismon (monetary crisis) disaster of 1997 also stirred negative sentiments. The media, including via social media, ridiculed some government officials’ claims that “the people” were not worried about the drop in the rupiah. Nationalist critics became more vocal in their questioning of Widodo’s economic capability.

Pressured by both objective need (given his infrastructure based strategy) and political atmosphere, Widodo has embarked on extensive deregulation. Although he never really used the term “deregulation” in his election campaign, he did make it abundantly clear that he was in favour of streamlining regulation in order to make it easier for businesses “to do business”. The most obvious example of this orientation was the rapid push to set up a one-stop system for companies to get necessary permits and satisfy various compliance issues. Widodo had from all accounts successfully established such a one-stop business permit centre in Solo while he was Mayor.

Outside the one-stop centre scenario, things have been, however, more complicated. Some of the first decisions of the Widodo government confirmed or even further enhanced regulation, which was very unpopular with foreign investors, especially those from the “West”, the United

States and Europe. Key unpopular regulations included:

1. The requirement that all transactions taking place in Indonesia be in rupiah. The use of US dollars was no longer possible. International companies now had to pay their international staff in rupiah, as well as for all other purchases. This was, first of all, a break from practice and therefore unwelcome, as well as introducing problems related to the sliding value of the rupiah. There was a one-year prison sentence to be imposed for the use of US dollars for domestic transactions.8 9
2. The requirement that all export and import transactions be carried out through Letters of Credit. This was extremely unpopular with international companies located in Indonesia, imposing bureaucracy and potential delays in payment for transactions. There is a facility for this to be waived, but this requires Ministerial discretion.10
3. The revision of the Negative Investment List in May, 2015. This list, known as the DNI, is the list of areas of the economy where foreign investment is banned or highly constrained. An extension of the list to “more heavily restrict foreign investment in a number of other sectors, including telecommunications, agriculture, oil, gas, electricity and power”11 is seen by, for example, the American Chamber of Commerce as a general disincentive to foreign investment. Some slight softening of regulations, for example, in pharmaceuticals is not seen as counterbalancing the heavier restrictions.12 There are already signs that the government will retreat on some of these restrictions, with the Trade Minister announcing a review and calling for public submissions on the List. The Jakarta Globe reported that “Indonesia’s chief economics minister Darmin Nasution has previously said a revision to the negative investment list will be part of economic stimulus measures that the government is rolling out.”13 A loosening of restrictions would be a retreat from an earlier nationalistic stance.
4. The requirement that all expatriate staff pass a test in the Indonesian language early on in their assignment in Indonesia.

All of these requirements have a certain nationalist popular appeal. While having that appeal, they all work against the campaign to convince investors, especially Western investors, to bring large scale funds into Indonesia. Foreign investors, through their companies and representative bodies such as Chambers of Commerce, have made their criticisms known.

Furthermore, especially from Western investors, including those already operating in Indonesia, increased social regulation was another discouragement for further investment. The increased social regulation, mainly driven by initiatives from conservative Islamic parties, included the ban on the sale of alcohol in supermarkets, the introduction of a Bill in parliament banning all consumption of alcohol, new laws banning a man and a woman living together if unmarried. While some of these were still Bills, they were seen as symptomatic of a trend that would be creating a less attractive environment to large numbers of expatriate staff.14

Under pressure to maximize the inflow of foreign funds, Widodo has now introduced two deregulation packages.15 Before we look at the politics of these packages, it is important to note the reversal of some of the more obviously symbolically nationalistic policies. In August, the requirement for expatriates to pass an Indonesian language test – a requirement affirmed in June – was rescinded, together with a promise that residency permits for expatriate staff would be made easier to get.16 Soon after, the regulations banning sale of alcohol in supermarket outlets were also eased.17

The Economic Policy Package Stage I (Paket Kebijakan Ekonomi Tahap I) was released on 9 September.18 The Second Stage was released on 29 September.19 The third came on October 8, which emphasised the lowering of fuel, electricity and gas costs for industry as well as a ‘streamlining’ of the administration of accessing land for the purposes of investment. The major thrust of the three packages was to reduce regulatory issues for business, and also lower some costs. There were also some more specific measures outside that realm. For example, free visa entry was extended to over 70 countries, although another nationalist ‘distortion’ was included in that Australia was still excluded from the free visa regime,20 although that too has now been reversed.21 There were also regulations which were allegedly streamlined so as to speed up the flow of village development funds to villages.

The deregulation appears large scale with literally hundreds of regulations being rescinded or amended. While some of the rhetoric has emphasised increasing the competitiveness of national companies, a more heavy emphasis has been on attracting foreign investment. There were also changes to make it easier for foreign investors to enter the property market.22 According to Cabinet Secretary, Pramono Anung:

“This is all to provide positive signals to society and neighbouring countries that Indonesia is a friend to whomever wants to invest their capital in Indonesia.”23

The clear focus towards making it easier for foreign investors to invest in Indonesia has become, as it was for the Suharto government in the 1960s and 70s, the primary feature of the Widodo economic strategy. The key target – though not the only one – is foreign investment for infrastructure projects, which it is hoped will attract other investments in productive activity.

The government’s intense activities to attract foreign investment are partly due to its inability to mobilise large-scale capital from within Indonesia. This inability is, first of all, a reflection of the relative lack of capital available in Indonesia as reflected in its low per capita income, of only US$4000. Additionally, the government, comprising parties with close relations with large private conglomerates, and facing a parliamentary opposition likewise well-connected, is not prepared to increase taxes for the private conglomerate sector, whether foreign or domestic- owned. The government has not met its target as regards taxation collection from middle and lower income levels. According to the World Bank: “Revenue was targeted by the Budget to increase by 30 percent but fell 1.3 percent in 2015 through May.”24 As indicated in an earlier ISEAS Perspective, Widodo has instructed government departments to assess what monies are available in social and other insurance funds that could be used for infrastructure development.25

CONTRADICTIONS WITH NATIONALISTIC SENTIMENT

The economic policies being pursued by President Widodo should be no surprise. During his election campaign, most clearly in his nationally televised dialogue with the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce (KADIN), Widodo promised an approach aimed at encouraging a private sector driven growth process. He indicated that key to encouraging such a process was his promise to “cut, cut, cut” when it came to regulation. In the same dialogue with KADIN, he indicated he wanted to attract investors and that he was open to approaching foreign lenders. While this was a clear policy perspective espoused by Widodo, he had to do it in a climate where nationalistic rhetoric was high, including a nationalistic rejection of what was referred to as neo-liberalism. In Indonesia, neo-liberal economic policies are often seen as policies of deregulation that make it easier for foreign investment to operate in Indonesia, sometimes, it is claimed, at the expense of domestic business. Non-Government Organisations, large numbers of economists as well as politicians have used this anti-neoliberal, nationalistic rhetoric to attack the earlier Megawati and Yudhoyono governments. There is a widespread sentiment that Indonesia’s natural resources are controlled by foreign corporations and that Indonesia is a milk cow for those interests.

In 2015, this kind of issue remained also very high-profiled, primarily because Widodo’s main opponent, Prabowo Subianto, took a nationalistic posture, making an accusation that hundreds of billions of dollars were being sucked out of the country by foreign corporations. Criticism of the level of taxes paid by the giant mining enterprise, Freeport, in western Papua has been one symbolic, but resonant, manifestation of this sentiment. During October, there has been further discussion, even disagreement, in Cabinet over how the extension of Freeport’s contract should be handled. Coordinating Minister for Maritime Affairs, Rizal Ramli, – who has a long reputation for profiling himself as a nationalist economist – has insisted that Freeport must be asked to pay more royalties.26

The existence of such a nationalistic sentiment is now a consolidated given in Indonesian politics. After Suharto opened the door so widely to foreign investment in 1967, nationalist politics had been totally defeated, as manifested in the physical crushing of the nationalist left. In 2015, Widodo faces a revived nationalistic sentiment. It is crucial to note, however, that this sentiment has no effective political vehicle.27

As indicated below, however, the parliamentary opposition, whose leader Prabowo Subianto, spearheaded the anti-“leakage” rhetoric of the election campaign, has not been able to fully use this issue, due to some of its own disposition towards the “foreign”.

This situation faced by Widodo has resulted in various nationalist contortions. While there has been the backtracking on Indonesian language testing for expatriates, the easing of visa restrictions for foreign workers, easing of regulations on alcohol sales and the deregulation packages of September 9 and 29, there has also had to be various counter-balancing nationalistic posturing – although, again, this has sometimes become hard to sustain in practice. Most of this nationalistic posturing too is being presented more as a sub-text, secondary to main policy prescriptions, and more for atmospherics. To date, however, it must be still noted that the government’s insistence on the use of rupiah for all transactions, the use of Letters of Credit and the extended Negative Investment List have not been explicitly repealed, although now, the Negative Investment List, is being reviewed and may see a retreat.

The nationalistic posturing can be seen in the initial statements of officials relating to Singapore’s protests around the haze-generating fires in Sumatra. Vice-President Jusuf Kalla was very dismissive. More recently, former democratic and anti-corruption activist, but now Chief of Staff for President Widodo, Teten Mazduki, made the comment that Singapore should in fact be grateful for the 9 months of oxygen that Indonesia supplies to Singapore.28 However, while initially dismissive of Singaporean offers of help to fight the fires, Widodo eventually accepted the offer, along with those from other countries.29

Another nationalistic posturing has been connected to the negotiations with China and Japan about the building of a fast train between Jakarta and Bandung. The project was finally granted to China after extended negotiations, and after an initial statement that the project would not go ahead at all.30 China won the contract by assuring Indonesia that it could fund the project without any Indonesian budget funds. Japan protested the decision, partly arguing that Indonesia had changed some of the conditions.31 While Indonesian officials promised Japan their investments were welcome in other areas, including for another fast train, the media, including social media, played up the decision as Indonesia asserting its power against a major player such as Japan that was wanting Indonesia to contribute financially to the project. At the same time, others have protested the cooperation with China, partly mobilising on the basis of local anti-Chinese sentiment, but also latching on to the general sentiment that somehow Indonesia is a milk cow for foreign business.

As can be seen, the nationalistic rhetoric is being confined very much to the level of “sub-text”. The issues are not substantial, and sometimes need to be reversed. This nationalistic rhetoric remains at the “sub-text” level for two major reasons. First, of course, nationalistic rhetoric runs directly counter to the fundamental basis of Widodo’s economic strategy, which is to maximise the role of foreign investment in the economy and which has overwhelming support from the whole elite. Widodo’s initial infamy in Indonesia among critics of neo-liberalism were his power-point sales pitches direct to foreign businesses in several countries to come and do business in Indonesia. The direct reversal of some policies, such as the Indonesian language test for expatriates, is symptomatic of the contradiction.

This orientation towards opening the economy was also manifested in Widodo’s appointment of Singapore-based private sector investment fund manager, Thomas Lembong, as Trade Minister. Lembong accompanied President Widodo during his visit to the United States, where it was announced that Indonesia wanted to eventually join the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which would certainly require further opening up.32

A second reason is the absence of any effective political force in Indonesia trying to use the nationalistic rhetoric as its main focus for opposition to Widodo. The most obvious potential here is the Red and White Coalition (KMP, Koalisi Merah Putih), formally led by Prabowo Subianto, who used the nationalist card during the election campaign. Fadli Zon, the senior member of parliament from Prabowo’s party, Gerindra, has been a constant critic of Widodo on a range of issues. On fundamental economic policy, such as the two Economic Policy Packages, the criticism has been relatively soft, taking a “wait and see” attitude33. Zon has been more active promoting his credentials as an anti-corruption politician, being elected head of an international body of parliamentarians against corruption, and defending the existence of the Indonesian Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK). The soft critique of economic policy is consistent with the KMP’s posture since the beginning of Widodo’s Presidency. The KMP has supported Widodo’s budget amendments and other policies, apparently wanting to make sure that any eventual economic failure by Widodo will be seen as his own work, and not the result of harassment from the opposition in the parliament. Moreover, there do not seem to be any ideological or fundamental policy disagreements from the KMP with Widodo’s economic policies. In any case, credibility of any potential anti-foreign agitation by Zon and other KMP politicians is compromised by their taking obsequious selfie photos with Donald Trump at a Trump rally in the USA. The high costs charged to the Indonesian taxpayer, of the parliamentarians’ study tour, which included spouses and children, also damaged their general credibility.

CONCLUSION

The pattern of increasing openness to foreign investment, especially for infrastructure, will remain central to Widodo’s Presidency. This will continue to generate a contradiction with the widespread nationalistic sentiment. This contradiction will require continuing low level nationalist posturing. The absence of an effective nationalist political vehicle, although new parties are forming, will allow this posturing to remain at a low level, until there are major failures in the infrastructure programme or worsening growth or a serious decline in FDI figures.

About the author:
*Max Lane is Visiting Senior Fellow with the Indonesia Studies Programme at ISEAS- Yusof Ishak Institute, and has written hundreds of articles on Indonesia for magazines and newspapers. He maintains a blog called maxlaneonline.com.

Source:
This article was published by ISEAS as ISEAS Perspective 64 (PDF).

Notes:
1 A list of areas in the economy where foreign investment is banned or restricted.
2 Max Lane, The Politics of Widodo’s Prioritisation of Accelerated Infrastructure Construction, http://www.iseas.edu.sg/images/pdf/ISEAS_Perspective_2015_43.pdf
3 http://www.smh.com.au/national/the-honeymoon-is-over-for-jokowi-20150709-gi98ug.html
4 http://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20150922144216-20-80296/jokowi-tak-akan-minta-maaf-kepada- korban-tragedi-g30s/
5 Indonesia Economic Quarterly, July 2015: “Slower Gains” – http://www.indonesia- investments.com/upload/documents/World-Bank-Indonesia-Economic-Quarterly-July-2015-IEQ-Indonesia- Investments.pdf
6 http://bisniskeuangan.kompas.com/read/2015/08/05/192311826/Jokowi.Mulai.September.Pertumbuhan. Ekonomi.Indonesia.Akan.Meroket
7 See Max Lane, The Politics of Widodo’s Prioritisation of Accelerated Infrastructure Construction, http://www.iseas.edu.sg/images/pdf/ISEAS_Perspective_2015_43.pdf
8 http://www.bi.go.id/id/peraturan/sistem-pembayaran/Pages/se_171115.aspx
9 http://bisniskeuangan.kompas.com/read/2015/04/09/154921326/Jaga.Stabilitas.Rupiah.BI.Keluarkan. Peraturan.Baru
10 http://www.hukumonline.com/berita/baca/lt551cf0e82975a/mendag-terbitkan-aturan-ketentuan-penggunaan- l-c-ekspor-barang-tertentu
11 http://www.amcham.or.id/opinion/4585-indonesia-s-revised-negative-investment-list-is-truly-negative
12 http://www.amcham.or.id/opinion/4585-indonesia-s-revised-negative-investment-list-is-truly-negative
13 http://jakartaglobe.beritasatu.com/business/indonesia-seeks-public-submissions-revised-negative-investment- list/
14 Communications with Western expatriates in the Jakarta business scene.
15 Another package was introduced on 15 October aimed at regulating wages. This policy package restricted annual rises to the minimum wage to that based on a strict formula and now only allows for a review of minimum ages every five years. The package has been condemned by all unions. It has been welcomed by employers. http://www.bbc.com/indonesia/berita_indonesia/2015/10/151015_indonesia_reaksi_paketekonomi4 16 http://www.indonesia-investments.com/id/news/todays-headlines/no-indonesian-language-proficiency-test- for-foreign-workers-in-indonesia/item5857
17 http://m.news.viva.co.id/news/read/674713-bir-boleh-dijual-di-minimarket-jakarta–ini-kata-ahok
18 http://setkab.go.id/inilah-pokok-pokok-paket-kebijakan-ekonomi-tahap-i-september-2015/
19 http://www.bbc.com/indonesia/berita_indonesia/2015/09/150929_indonesia_paket_ekonomi2
20 Visa Free Entry has now also being made available to Australians. http://www.jakpost.travel/news/47- countries-including-oz-to-enjoy-visa-free-entry-by-october-1ZCPNJATvSdOaGHg.html
21 It has become incumbent on Indonesian governments to maintain some sense of sanction against the Australian government since a series of scandals regarding Australian spying in Indonesia and statements by former Prime Minister Tony Abbott considered to have been undiplomatic.
22 http://economy.okezone.com/read/2015/09/09/470/1211353/jokowi-dukung-investasi-asing-di-properti- indonesia
23 http://www.bbc.com/indonesia/berita_indonesia/2015/09/150929_indonesia_paket_ekonomi2
24 http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2015/07/08/indonesia-economic-quarterly-july-2015 Presumable the target was for January-May.
25 Max Lane, op cit.
26 http://nasional.tempo.co/read/news/2015/10/14/078709386/sambil-gebrak-meja-rizal-ramli-tolak-us-3-m-dari- freeport
27 Several new parties have established themselves all of which make nationalistic appeals, however, none yet have broken onto the national stage in a serious way at this point in time.
28 http://m.tribunnews.com/nasional/2015/09/28/teten-masdukisingapura-harus-memahami-kesulitan-kita
29 http://dunia.news.viva.co.id/news/read/684485-singapura-lega-ri-akhirnya-mau-terima-bantuan-lawan-asap 30 http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/jakarta-scraps-high-speed-rail-project
31 http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/eca4af84-67fa-11e5-97d0-1456a776a4f5.html#axzz3oJI3Cr9s (Japan cries foul after Indonesia awards rail contract to China.)
32 http://www.nationmultimedia.com/business/Indonesia-not-ready-to-join-TPP-30271769.html

BHP Billiton provided an update Thursday on the incident at the Samarco Mineração S.A (Samarco) iron ore operation in Minas Gerais, Brazil that occurred last Thursday (November 5, 2015), noting that “Samarco has advised that, at this stage, there are nine fatalities. Samarco has also advised that four people previously unaccounted for have been found and 19 people remain unaccounted for.”

BHP Billiton and Vale each hold a 50 percent interest in Samarco.

“We offer our deepest sympathies to the families and friends of those who have died as a result of this tragic incident,” BHP Billiton said.

BHP Billiton said its immediate priority is the welfare of the Samarco workforce and the community. The local authorities have advised that through the emergency response, 637 people have been evacuated and temporary accommodation has been provided. Samarco and authorities are providing water and food aid to affected communities.

BHP Billiton and Vale have pledged to support Samarco in establishing an emergency fund for community support and rebuilding works.
“It is our intention to work with the authorities to ensure that this fund is functioning as soon as practicable,” BHP Billiton said.

Minimising the environmental impact of this incident is also a priority and an Environmental Recovery Plan is to be developed by Samarco with the support of an external expert.

BHP Billiton said that at this stage, the tailings extend 440 kilometres downstream and 11 communities have been affected. Samarco has put in place a water monitoring program for the ongoing analysis of the water quality of the Gualaxo do Norte, Carmo and Doce Rivers. Samarco is working with relevant authorities to manage river water quality and ensure availability of potable water.

Samarco employees have been put on paid leave and options are being considered by Samarco for managing the workforce longer term.

Samarco is continuing to monitor the impacted tailings facilities, including the Germano dam. In conjunction with independent experts, Samarco is developing a plan to reinforce the dam structures and stabilise the area.

According to BHP Billiton, Samarco operations were immediately stopped following the incident and Samarco’s operating licence has been suspended. The Samarco operations will remain suspended as authorities commence investigations and rectification work plans are developed.

Samarco and representatives of BHP Billiton and Vale are meeting with lead insurers in Brazil this week.

The EU economy is showing resilience in the face of external circumstances, but the European Central Bank’s March inflation forecast was too positive, ECB President Mario Draghi admitted to MEPs on Thursday. This regular “monetary dialogue” meeting with the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee focused on the Eurozone economic outlook and the ECB’s role in macro-economic adjustment programs.

The Bank is ready to go the extra mile if the inflation outlook weakens, reiterated Draghi.

“If we were to conclude that our medium-term price stability objective is at risk, we would use all the instruments available within our mandate to ensure that an appropriate degree of monetary accommodation is maintained,” Draghi said.

Draghi also hinted that the Bank’s assets purchase program could be prolonged beyond September 2016, and that “other instruments could also be activated to strengthen the impact of the program if necessary”. The bank will re-examine the need for monetary policy accommodation in December, he added.

“Irish banking crisis was homemade”

Irish MEPs Brian Hayes (EPP), and Matt Carthy (GUE) repeated previous criticisms of the ECB’s role in macro-economic adjustment programs, saying that its former President Jean-Claude Trichet had “forced the Irish government into a new bailout program by threatening finance minister Michael Noonan that the Bank would otherwise cut off its Emergency Liquidity assistance (ELA)”. Marian Harkin (ALDE) urged Mr Draghi to break the links between bank financing and sovereign debt and called for fairer burden sharing, “as the Irish measures were more painful than in other bailout countries”.

Draghi replied that the ECB had always worked within its mandate and that decisions to provide emergency liquidity to banks had been “intimately linked to the success of macroeconomic adjustment programs, especially when the soundness of the financial sector depended on it”.

Rejecting claims that the ECB had “blackmailed” Ireland, Draghi described its bank crisis as “homemade”. He noted that the Irish government had already taken a series of measures before the ECB stepped in and it was it was the Irish government that had decided to accept a third package. To illustrate the scale of these bailouts, he pointed out that private investors suffered losses of up to €44 billion even before they began, and that the first bailout had amounted to €4 billion, and the second to €2 billion.

Countering criticism that he had failed to attend the Irish Parliament’s committee of inquiry into the banking crisis, Draghi said he answers to the European Parliament, not to national parliaments.

Low interest rates

In the second part of the debate, in which he was asked about low interest rates resulting from the ECB’s monetary policy measures, and replied in his role as chair of the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), Draghi said that “too low interest rates for a long time are not good for banks, insurance and pension companies. But having said that, our mandate is not to make these companies profitable, it is to reach our price stability objectives. None of our critics suggest that we should increase interest rates today, but we will monitor any potential risks.”

An EU-funded market analysis has enabled an advanced protective clothing start-up to identify a new sector buzzing with potential: motorcycling.

Combining the latest advances in sensor and wireless technology with comfortable protective clothing has opened up new partnership possibilities across a range of sectors. Numerous end users stand to benefit from the inclusion of smart technology in protective clothing.

For example, while French high-tech start-up IN&MOTION has pioneered intelligent active protection systems for ski racers, the company’s ambitions do not stop at the chair lift. ‘We wanted to investigate whether this technology platform could be used by end users in different markets,’ explains project coordinator Rémi Thomas, co-founder of IN&MOTION.

The wearable ski racing air bags developed by the company combine sensor and wireless communication technology that can detect unavoidable falls and inflate in less than 100 milliseconds. User can reactivate the device after deployment, thanks to easy-to-handle consumable parts, making it cost-effective.

The innovation will be used at international racing events as of the 2015/2016 ski season. With the right partners, Thomas is confident that the sensor and wireless technology platform can be adjusted to suit motorcyclists.

To this end, the recently completed six-month EU-funded INE IAPS project enabled the company to carry out an assessment of the technical challenges and market potential of adapting the airbags to suit the needs of motorcyclists. The risk of fatality or sustaining serious injury in motorcycling accidents remains poorly addressed by existing body protection devices, which have to date failed to adequately integrate sensor and wireless technologies.

‘We spent time discussing these issues with stakeholders, including end users (motorbike riders) and equipment and clothing manufacturers,’ explains Thomas. ‘The feedback has been encouraging in that, while there is a clear demand for high tech protection, there is still dissatisfaction with what is currently available on the market.’

This was the first stage of the project; establishing that a viable market exists for advanced protective clothing in the motorcycling sector. The second stage involved analyzing technical challenges and seeing what elements of the company’s platform might need to adapted in order to better suit the needs of bikers.

Feedback from the industry here has proved very useful. ‘We are a business to business company,’ explains Thomas. ‘To us, it makes sense to combine our technological expertise with the knowledge of companies that understand the market better and know exactly what end users are looking for.’ The next step will be to develop and tweak the technology to suit the specific needs of this sector, and to find partners capable of turning the concept of smart protective motorcycle clothing into a commercial reality.

Thomas is also keen to organize simulated tests in order to provide scientific proof of the airbag’s benefits for motorcyclists. This has not been done to date, and would strengthen the commercial positioning of the product when it comes to market. ‘We have identified a number of potential institutions,’ he says. ‘All this, of course, takes time and investment.’

CORDIS: Source: Based on an interview with the project coordinator.

Crude oil and other liquids

Canada’s oil sands are a significant contributor to the recent and expected future growth in the world’s liquid fuel supply, and comprise most of the country’s proved oil reserves, which rank third globally.

Overview

Sector organization

Exploration and production

Western Canada Sedimentary Basin

Trade

Pipelines

Rail

Downstream

Natural gas

Canada is one of the world’s largest producers of dry natural gas and the source of most U.S. natural gas imports.

Overview

Reserves

Exploration and production

Trade

Virtually all of Canada’s natural gas exports are transported to the United States via pipeline. In 2013, Canada began trucking very modest volumes of LNG to utilities in New England to meet inventory requirements in anticipation of winter demand in both 2013 and 2014. In 2014, total export volumes of LNG were less than one-third of an already modest amount that entered the United States in 2013. Canada also began exporting compressed natural gas (CNG) to the United States in 2014, totaling 303 MMcf.

The United States imported 2.6 Tcf of natural gas from Canada in 2014, of which one-tenth of 1% (435 MMcf) was LNG and CNG combined. Total U.S. imports of Canadian natural gas are significantly lower than the peak levels of 3.8 Tcf in 2002 and 2007. Canada is the source of nearly all (about 97%) of U.S. natural gas imports, most of which come from western provinces. Although the United States is a net importer of natural gas from Canada, it exported nearly 770 Bcf of natural gas to Canada in 2014, increasing significantly from levels seen a decade earlier. As prospects for domestic U.S. natural gas production continue to improve, the United States is expected to require lower natural gas imports while exporting more to its trading partners.

Pipelines

Canada’s natural gas pipelines
Source: Canadian Energy Pipeline Association

Canada’s natural gas pipeline system is highly interconnected with the U.S. pipeline system. TransCanada operates the largest network of natural gas pipelines in North America, including 13 major pipeline systems and 42,100⁴⁰ miles of gas pipelines in operation. Within Canada, TransCanada operates a 25,100-mile network at a total average volume of 14 Bcf/d⁴¹ that includes the NGTL System, the Canadian Mainline, the Foothills, and the Trans Quebec and Maritimes that connect supply in western Canada to the United States. Spectra Energy operates a 1,800-mile, 2.9 Bcf/d pipeline system connecting western Canadian gas supply regions with markets in the United States and Canada.⁴² Spectra Energy also operates the Maritimes and Northeast Pipeline linking eastern Canadian supplies with consumers in the eastern United States. Enbridge and Veresen operate the Alliance Pipeline, a 1,423-mile pipeline system, delivering 1.3 Bcf/d from the WCSB to Chicago, Illinois, which is a significant source of natural gas and NGLs for the U.S. Midwest.⁴³

Liquefied natural gas (LNG)
Import terminals
Because changes to North American natural gas supply fundamentals have diminished Canada’s need for imported liquefied natural gas (LNG), plans for only two LNG terminals remain under consideration. Canaport, Canada’s first and to date only operational regasification terminal, began importing LNG in June 2009. The Canaport terminal, operated by Repsol in partnership with Irving Oil, has a nameplate processing capacity of 1.2 Bcf/d⁴⁴. According to the BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2015, Trinidad and Tobago was the only source of Canada’s LNG imports, supplying 21 Bcf in 2014.⁴⁵

Export terminals
The changing outlook for North America’s natural gas is also supported by the number of applications for LNG export licenses in the United States and Canada. In Canada, 28 companies have applied for 35 LNG export licenses. As of September 2015, 12 of these applications were approved by the NEB. Most of the export terminals approved for development are on Canada’s west coast in the province of British Columbia.⁴⁶

Kitimat LNG, a facility that was originally proposed as an import terminal, is now slated to become an export terminal, pending a final investment decision. Kitimat will initially process 1.3 Bcf/d of LNG, the feedstock for which will be shale gas produced in British Columbia.

LNG Canada is another project approved for exports. Shell, in cooperation with Mitsubishi, KoGas, and PetroChina, is pursuing a two-train, 1.6 Bcf/d export terminal near Kitimat that would come online in 2020. LNG Canada received a conditional approval by the British Columbia government, although the final investment decision may not be made until mid-2016.

Coal

As government policy attempts to lower domestic coal consumption, up to 50% of Canada’s increasing coal production is being exported.

Reserves

Production and consumption

Electricity

Canada is a net exporter of electricity to the United States, and most of its power needs are met by hydroelectricity.

Generation

Capacity

Trade

Notes:

Endnotes:

The Los Angeles Times and the New York Times want the U.S. Supreme Court to reject the religious liberty claims put forth by Catholic non-profits challenging the constitutionality of the Health and Human Services (HHS) mandate. Both newspapers either underplay or ignore the central issue involved in this case.

The Los Angeles Times says the Obama administration “has offered religious schools and charities that object to some birth control methods a reasonable and respectful accommodation.” It says they do not have to pay for services they deem objectionable: all they need to do is inform the government of their reservations and let insurance companies and the government take it from there. The New York Times says essentially the same thing. But it also slams Catholic organizations for their “well orchestrated assault on the right of women to control their own bodies….”

Both papers miss the central issue involved: The federal government has no legitimate business telling Catholic organizations that hire and/or service non-Catholics that they forfeit their claim as a Catholic entity. The word “catholic” means universal. Therefore, any Catholic group that discriminates against non-Catholics in their social service programs is in clear violation of the very definition of that term.

The Obama team picked up this pernicious definition of what constitutes a Catholic organization from the ACLU. This is at the heart of the objections by the Little Sisters of the Poor: Preposterous as it sounds, the nuns are declared to be insufficiently Catholic because they do not limit their services to Catholics! This is the real assault on women’s rights.

So even if the accommodation were deemed not to be a “substantial burden” on these Catholic groups, the government should have no right to invoke such spurious hiring and servicing criteria in deciding which Catholic groups are legitimate and which are bogus.

After 271,000 were jobs added in October, US unemployment rate fell to 5.0 percent. Meanwhile, average annual hourly earnings climbed by the most since 2009. As a result, the dollar strengthened and treasuries plunged. The report was seen as a green light for the Fed’s chief Janet Yellen and her deputy Stanley Fisher, who recently held out the possibility of a December rate increase.

Nevertheless, US employment suffers from structural deceleration, which will force the Fed to normalize slowly and gradually. Moreover, old tensions loom in the new labor markets. While only 4.4 percent of whites were unemployed, the figure was higher for Latinos (6.3 percent) and blacks (9.2 percent). After half a century of civil rights struggle, black Americans remain twice as likely to be unemployed as whites.

According to the alternative employment figure, which includes both the jobless and part-time employed, 11 percent of the US labor force is without a steady job, while the labor force participation rate remains at 62.4 percent — the same as in the 1970s.

The global prospects of a premature rate hike look even worse.

Dark history

Since the 1980s, the Fed’s monetary tightening has consistently reduced employment and output far more than the Fed anticipated, while causing huge collateral damage across the world. In the early 1980s, the Fed’s then-chief Paul Volcker resorted to harsh tightening that devastated US households. In much of Latin America, it resulted in a “lost decade” as growth plunged from 7 to -3 percent.

In the late 1980s, Alan Greenspan’s rate hikes undermined the struggling S&Ls (savings and loans associations), forcing Washington and state governments to bail out insolvent institutions.

In the early 1990s, Greenspan again seized tightening but soon reversed his decision, which undermined expansion. In the first case, global growth decelerated to less than 1 percent; in the second, it plunged to 0 percent and then to -4 percent in developing nations.

In 2004-2007, Greenspan and Ben Bernanke seized tightening, which led to the Great Recession, while contagion spread across Europe and Japan.

In low-income economies, growth stayed at 5-7 percent, largely thanks to China’s growth and stimulus package.

Extraordinary global vulnerability

Today, however, the world economy is more fragile than ever since World War II. Despite cyclical recovery, Europe’s growth is sustained by zero-bound rates and quantitative easing. In Japan, Abenomics has contained contraction but not stagnation.

As the Chinese economy is rebalancing, it cannot boost global growth as before. India’s prospects have brightened in the Modi era, but growth remains below potential. And while Russia suffers from the West’s misguided sanctions, Brazil’s contraction has worsened.

Premature rate hikes could fuel the US dollar’s sustained appreciation, which will contribute to external crises in emerging economies with soaring foreign currency debt and sharp exchange rate depreciations.

Since oil and commodities remain denominated in dollars, a premature hike may cause low-income resource producers to suffer a triple-whammy — growth contraction, dollar pressures, and exports decline.

Without traditional defenses

Internationally, the aftermath of the Great Recession has forced major central banks in the West to live with zero-bound interest rates. Consequently, premature hikes will occur at a time when these banks lack most of their traditional defenses.

The Fed’s actions have global consequences, but no mandate for international accountability. What the world desperately needs is truly global governance and a basket of multiple reserve currencies.

As China will soon host the G20 meetings and the IMF will discuss the role of renminbi as an international currency, change is in the air. Meanwhile, misguided Fed decisions could contribute to a potentially huge storm, which we all must face without lifeboats.

A slightly shorter version of the commentary was released by Shanghai on November 12, 2015

US Congressman Peter DeFazio said, “The decision by the Oregon Fish and Wildlife Commission to remove gray wolves from the Oregon endangered species list is outrageous. With only 81 known wolves in the state, the gray wolf needs protection now more than ever.”

On Monday, November 9, the Oregon Fish and Wildlife Commission voted to delist wolves.

According to DeFazio, although the Commission is supposed to base their decisions in sound science, “they instead caved to powerful ranching and other special interests. I’m urging the Governor and the Legislature to act and correct this wrongheaded decision, before it is too late for the gray wolf.”

Congressman DeFazio has fought for protections for the gray wolf throughout his time in Congress. On November 5, he sent a letter to the Oregon Fish and Wildlife Commission urging them to keep the gray wolf on Oregon’s endangered species list.

In 2013, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) recommended removing federal protections for gray wolves across most of the lower 48 states. In January 2014, a peer review from an independent, objective panel of top wolf scientists evaluated the proposed delisting and the science behind it.

According to DeFazio, the reviewers unanimously found the Service did not use the “best available science” when they decided to remove the gray wolf from protections under the Endangered Species Act (ESA). Rep. DeFazio has sent multiple bipartisan letters to the USFWS and Secretary of the Interior Sally Jewell, urging them to continue protections for the gray wolf under the ESA.

“Let us say no to all the tongues that preach curses for our country,” said President Pierre Nkurunziza, in an intervention at a prayer celebration, in a bid to set aside fears of the risk of a genocide in the country, sparked by opposition activists.

Though never pronouncing the actual term, Nkurunziza urged the nation’s citizens to “not remain prisoners of the past”, insisting on “breaking the cycle of violence that marked the history of our nation”. The exiled opposition activist Marguerite Barankitse instead spoke explicitly of genocide and the government has requested her extradition. Barankitse in particular stressed that some terms used recently by the president of the senate and President Nkurunziza were identical to those used to mobilize those responsible for the massacre of Tutsis and moderate Hutus during the 1994 Rwandan genocide.

Despite reassurances from the President, international concern continues mounting: a vote could already be held today on the draft resolution presented by France to the UN Security Council. Based on reports in circulation, the text foresees sanctions for those responsible for the violence. Anonymous Security Council sources, cited by the French weekly Jeune Afrique, indicated also a possible deployment of UN peacekeepers of the MONUSCO mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, to impede the crisis from expanding. A move of this sort would however need to be approved by the Burundian government or a UN Resolution authorizing the use of force.

By Henriette Jacobsen

(EurActiv) — A healthier diet with meals cooked from scratch instead of sugary, processed foods and drinks is the most cost-effective way of tackling diabetes, said experts as part of a panel discussion on World Diabetes Day (12 November).

Going back to basics is one of the most important ingredients to fight the high rates of diabetes which have increased progressively over the past 50 years, with an estimated 387 million adults having diabetes in 2014, the vast majority of whom have type 2 diabetes.

A healthy diet can help protect against non-communicable diseases, including diabetes, heart disease, stroke and cancer.

According to the WHO, an increased daily intake of sugar is associated with increased risk of obesity and type 2 diabetes and has to be addressed. The global per-capita food consumption has increased by over 50% over the past 50 years. Sugar is found in the vast majority of processed foods, especially in sugar-sweetened beverages.

Mexico is one example of a country where low-quality diets are having devastating consequences for the population.

Speaking at a diabetes conference in Brussels, organised by the International Diabetes Federation (IDF), an advocate for people with diabetes, Judith Arrieta Munguia from the Mission of Mexico to the EU said Mexico occupies the 1st spot in the number of people living with type 2 diabetes in the world. The country also holds a second spot in the world when it comes to the number of obese people.

Munguia said that Mexicans over the past 20 years have gone away from eating traditional Mexican food and instead tried to adopt a Western lifestyle, including an unhealthy diet, as promoted on TV.

Now the government has a strategy which includes taxing sugar and fats, educating people on how to cook, but also teaching them about Mexican products. While Mexico is the world’s largest producer of berries, these healthy foods are rarely eaten by Mexicans.

“We are trying to go back to the tradional ways people used to eat. We have lots of natural, Mexican products such as fruits, vegetables with fibres, beans, herbs… We are going back to the roots,” Munguia stated.

Going back or forward?

Jo Ralling, campaign director at the Jamie Oliver Food Foundation, said her foundation has over the last year focused on raising awareness of sugary drinks and children’s huge consumption and the effects on their bodies, but agreed that the root of the problem lies elsewhere.

“The whole issue goes back to food education and the fact that food education has basically been lost by this generation. It’s not part of the school curriculum anymore and there’s a whole generation of adults who have lost their ability to cook. That is one of the reasons they are turning to the foods and processed products which have a high sugar content in them,” Ralling said.

“A really simple message that we need to send is ‘cook from scratch’, using basic ingredients and knowing what you are eating,” the campaign director added.

However, Tim Lobstein, director of policy at World Obesity Federation, challenged her view and said it would be better to look forward rather than looking back and instead focus on the role of the food industry.

“Certainly, the food industry has to learn that in order to tackle obesity, we need to eat less. And that is not a welcomed message for the industry when they are trying to sell more. We should eat less food and most of it should be vegetables. We can’t go back to the intense labour in the kitchen from the 1930s,” Lobstein said.

Evil sugar?

While most of the panelists wanted to mainly tackle sugar in people’s unhealthy diets, Francesco Branca, director of Nutrition for Health and Development at the World Health Organisation (WHO), emphasised that the amount of fat in a diet also contributes to increased glucose and therefore diabetes.

Therefore, the WHO is also calling for the food industry to produce food with lower amounts of fat in diets, particularly saturated fat.

“Trans-fatty acids, which we still have in some parts of the world in the diets, are also responsible for the increased glucose. They should be removed and instead we would like to see more unsaturated fat. We would also like to see more fibres in diets coming from for example vegetables and whole-grain cereals,” Branca said.

By Conn Hallinan*

For the past eight decades Saudi Arabia has been careful.

Using its vast oil wealth, it’s quietly spread its ultra-conservative brand of Islam throughout the Muslim world, secretly undermined secular regimes in its region, and prudently kept to the shadows while others did the fighting and dying. It was Saudi money that fueled the Mujahedeen in Afghanistan, underwrote Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Iran, and bankrolled Islamic movements and terrorist groups from the Caucasus to the Hindu Kush.

It wasn’t a modest foreign policy, but it was a discreet one.

Today that circumspect diplomacy is in ruins, and the House of Saud looks more vulnerable than it has since the country was founded in 1926. Unraveling the reasons for the current train wreck is a study in how easily hubris, delusion, and old-fashioned ineptness can trump even bottomless wealth.

Oil Slick

The kingdom’s first stumble was a strategic decision last fall to undermine competitors by scaling up its oil production and thus lowering the global price.

They figured that if the price of a barrel of oil dropped from over $100 to around $80, it would strangle competitors that relied on more expensive sources and new technologies, including the U.S. fracking industry, companies exploring the Arctic, and emergent producers like Brazil. That, in turn, would allow Riyadh to reclaim its shrinking share of the energy market. There was also the added benefit that lower oil prices would damage oil-reliant countries that the Saudis didn’t like — including Russia, Venezuela, Ecuador, and Iran.

In one sense it worked. The American fracking industry is scaling back, the exploitation of Canada’s tar sands has slowed, and many Arctic drillers have closed up shop. And indeed, countries like Venezuela, Ecuador, and Russia have taken serious economic hits.

But it may have worked a little too well, particularly with China’s economic slowdown reducing demand and further depressing the price — a result that should have been entirely foreseeable but that the Saudis somehow missed.

The price of oil dropped from $115 a barrel in June 2014 to around $44 today. While it costs less than $10 to produce a barrel of Saudi oil, the Saudis need a price between $95 and $105 to balance their budget. The country’s leaders, who figured that oil wouldn’t fall below $80 a barrel — and then only for a few months — are now burning through their foreign reserves to make up the difference.

While oil prices will likely rise over the next five years, projections are that the price per barrel won’t top $65 for the foreseeable future. Saudi debt is on schedule to rise from 6.7 percent of GDP this year to 17.3 percent next year, and its 2015 budget deficit is $130 billion.

The country is now spending $10 billion a month in foreign exchange reserves to pay the bills and has been forced to borrow money on the international financial market. Recently the International Monetary Fund’s regional director, Masood Ahmed, warned Riyadh that the country would deplete its financial reserves in five years unless it drastically cut its budget.

Buying the Peace (While Funding War)

But the kingdom can’t do that.

When the Arab Spring broke out in 2011, Saudi Arabia headed it off by pumping $130 billion into the economy, raising wages, improving services, and providing jobs for its growing population. Saudi Arabia has one of the youngest populations in the Middle East, many of whom are unemployed and poorly educated. Some 25 percent of the population lives in poverty. Money keeps the lid on, but — even with the heavy-handed repression that characterizes Saudi political life — for how long?

Meanwhile they’re racking up bills with ill-advised foreign interventions. In March, the kingdom intervened in Yemen’s civil conflict, launching an air war, a naval blockade, and partial ground campaign on the pretense that Iran was behind one of the war’s factions — a conclusion not even the Americans agree with.

Again, the Saudis miscalculated, even though one of their major allies, Pakistan, warned them they were headed for trouble. In part, the kingdom’s hubris was fed by the illusion that U.S. support would make it a short war. The Americans are arming the Saudis, supplying them with bombing targets, backing up the naval blockade, and refueling their warplanes in mid-air.

But six months down the line the conflict has turned into a stalemate. The war has killed 5,000 people (including over 500 children), flattened cities, and alienated much of the local population. It’s also generated a horrendous food and medical crisis and created opportunities for the Islamic State and al-Qaeda to seize territory in southern Yemen. Efforts by the UN to investigate the possibility of war crimes were blocked by Saudi Arabia and the U.S.

As the Saudis are finding out, war is a very expensive business — a burden they could meet under normal circumstances, but not when the price of the kingdom’s only commodity, oil, is plummeting.

Nor is Yemen the only war that the Saudis are involved in. Riyadh, along with Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, are underwriting many of the groups trying to overthrow Syrian president Bashar al-Assad. When anti-government demonstrations broke out there in 2011, the Saudis — along with the Americans and the Turks — calculated that Assad could be toppled in a few months.

But that was magical thinking. As bad as Assad is, a lot of Syrians — particularly minorities like Shiites, Christians, and Druze — were far more afraid of the Islamists from al-Qaeda and the Islamic State than they were of their own government. So the war has dragged on for four years and has now killed close to 250,000 people.

Once again, the Saudis miscalculated, though in this case they were hardly alone. The Syrian government turned out to be more resilient than it appeared. And Riyadh’s bottom line that Assad had to go just ended up bringing Iran and Russia into the picture, checkmating any direct intervention by the anti-Assad coalition. Any attempt to establish a no-fly zone against Assad will now have to confront the Russian air force — not something that anyone other than certain U.S. presidential aspirants are eager to do.

The war has also generated a flood of refugees, deeply alarming the European Union, which finally seems to be listening to Moscow’s point about the consequences of overthrowing governments without a plan for who takes over. There’s nothing like millions of refugees headed in your direction to cause some serious re-thinking of strategic goals.

The Saudis goal of isolating Iran, meanwhile, is rapidly collapsing. The P5+1 — the U.S., China, Russia, Great Britain, France, and Germany — successfully completed a nuclear agreement with Tehran, despite every effort by the Saudis and Israel to torpedo it. And at Moscow’s insistence, Washington has reversed its opposition to Iran being included in peace talks around Syria.

Bills Coming Due

Stymied in Syria, mired down in Yemen, and its finances increasingly fragile, the kingdom also faces internal unrest from its long marginalized Shia minority in the country’s east and south. To top it off, the Islamic State has called for the “liberation” of Mecca from the House of Saud and launched a bombing campaign aimed at the Kingdom’s Shiites.

This fall’s Hajj disaster — a stampede that killed more than 2,100 pilgrims and provoked anger at the Saudi authorities for their foot dragging on investigating it — have added to the royal family’s woes. The Saudis claim just 769 people were killed, a figure that no other country in the world accepts. And there are persistent rumors that the deadly stampede was caused when police blocked off an area in order to allow high-ranking Saudis special access to the holy sites.

Some of these missteps can be laid at the feet of the new king, Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, and of a younger, more aggressive generation of Saudis he’s appointed to key positions. But Saudi Arabia’s troubles are also a reflection of a Middle East in transition. Exactly where it’s headed is by no means clear, but change is in the wind.

Iran is breaking out of its isolation. With its large, well-educated population, strong industrial base, and plentiful energy resources, it’s poised to play a major regional, if not international, role. Turkey is in the midst of a political upheaval, and there’s growing opposition among Turks to Ankara’s meddling in the Syrian civil war.

Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, is impaled on its own policies, both foreign and domestic. “The expensive social contract between the Royal family and Saudi citizens will get more difficult, and eventually impossible to sustain if oil prices don’t recover,” Meghan L. O’Sullivan, director of the Geopolitics of Energy project at Harvard, told the New York Times.

However, the House of Saud has little choice but to keep pumping oil to pay for its wars and keep the internal peace. Yet more production drives down prices even further. And once the sanctions come off Iran, the oil glut will become worse.

While it’s still immensely wealthy, there are lots of bills coming due. It’s not clear the kingdom has the capital or the ability to meet them.

*Foreign Policy In Focus columnist Conn Hallinan can be read at Dispatches from the Edge and the Middle Empire Series.

The Short-Term Energy Outlook released on November 10 forecasts average North Sea Brent crude oil prices of $54/barrel (b) in 2015 and $56/b in 2016. Forecast West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude oil prices average $4/b lower than the Brent price in 2015 and $5/b lower in 2016.

Current values of futures and options contracts continue to suggest high uncertainty in the price outlook (Market Prices and Uncertainty Report). Based on contracts traded during the five-day period ending November 5, the lower and upper limits of the 95% confidence interval for the market’s expectation of monthly average WTI prices are estimated at $35/b and $66/b for February 2016 widening to $28/b and $95/b for December 2016 (Figure 1). Key market uncertainties include the pace and volume at which Iranian oil reenters the market, the strength of oil consumption growth, and the responsiveness of non-OPEC production to low oil prices.

Global petroleum and other liquids production continues to outpace consumption, leading to inventory expansion throughout the forecast period. However, the current average price forecast for Brent crude oil in 2016, which is $2/b lower than in last month’s outlook, is associated with a further reduction in the outlook for supply growth that in turn reduces the surplus of supply over consumption.

Global oil inventory builds in the third quarter of 2015 averaged 1.6 million b/d, down from 2.0 million b/d in the second quarter, which had the highest level of inventory builds since the fourth quarter of 2008. The pace of inventory builds is expected to slow in the fourth quarter to roughly 1.2 million b/d.

In 2016, inventory builds are expected to slow further to an average of 0.4 million b/d as global liquids output is expected to be unchanged from 2015. The 0.4 million b/d reduction in projected 2016 inventory builds from last month’s STEO mostly reflects lower forecast oil production in Canada and the United States.

EIA expects non-OPEC production to grow by 1.1 million b/d in 2015, and then decline by 0.3 million b/d in 2016, which would be the first annual decline in non-OPEC production since 2008. The shift in expectation from non-OPEC production growth to declines in 2016 is mostly because of lower expected growth in Canada and larger expected declines in U.S. onshore production.

The reduction in forecast growth in Canada reflects persistently low oil prices resulting in announced delays or cancellations of projects previously scheduled to come online during the forecast period, including Shell’s October announcement canceling the 80,000 b/d Camron Creek project. However, some oil sands projects continue as planned, including the Imperial Oil and Cenovus oil sands projects scheduled to come online by the end of 2016.

U.S. crude oil production is projected to increase from an average of 8.7 million b/d in 2014 to 9.3 million b/d in 2015 and then decrease to 8.8 million b/d in 2016. Expected crude oil production declines through September 2016 are largely attributable to unattractive economic returns in some areas of both emerging and mature onshore oil production regions, as well as seasonal factors such as anticipated hurricane-related production disruptions in the Gulf of Mexico. Reductions in 2015 cash flows and capital expenditures have prompted companies to defer or redirect investment away from marginal exploration and research drilling to focus on core areas of major tight oil plays. Reduced investment has resulted in the lowest count of oil-directed rigs in about five years and in well completions that are significantly behind 2014 levels.

According to the latest survey-based reporting of monthly crude oil production estimates, U.S. production averaged 9.4 million b/d through the first eight months of 2015. This level is 0.1 million b/d higher than the average production during the fourth quarter of 2014, despite a more than 60% decline in the total U.S. oil-directed rig count since October 2014. However, EIA estimates total crude oil production has declined almost 0.5 million b/d since April, averaging 9.1 million b/d in October. EIA expects U.S. crude oil production declines to generally continue through September 2016, when total production is forecast to average 8.5 million b/d. Forecast production begins increasing in late 2016, returning to an average of 8.9 million b/d in the fourth quarter.

EIA forecasts OPEC crude oil production to increase by 0.9 million b/d in 2015, led by production increases in Iraq. Forecast OPEC crude oil production increases by 0.2 million b/d in 2016, with Iran expected to increase production once international sanctions targeting its oil sector are suspended. Under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) between the P5+1 and Iran that was announced on July 14, sanctions relief is contingent on verification by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that Iran has complied with key nuclear-related steps. While much uncertainty remains as to the timing of sanctions relief, EIA assumes sanctions will ease in the second quarter of 2016. As a result, EIA forecasts Iranian crude oil supplies will increase by more than 0.2 million b/d on average in 2016, reaching roughly 3.3 million b/d by the end of the year.

EIA expects global consumption of petroleum and other liquids to grow by 1.4 million b/d in both 2015 and 2016. Projected real gross domestic product (GDP) for the world weighted by oil consumption, which increased by 2.7% in 2014, is expected to rise by 2.3% in 2015 and by 2.7% in 2016.

U.S. average regular retail gasoline price and diesel fuel prices increase

The U.S. average regular retail gasoline price increased one cent from the previous week to $2.24 per gallon on November 9, down 71 cents per gallon from the same time last year. The Midwest and Rocky Mountain prices each decreased, five cents and six cents to $2.22 per gallon, and $2.18 per gallon, respectively. The Gulf Coast price increased six cents to $1.97 per gallon. The East Coast price rose five cents to $2.16 per gallon, and the West Coast price was up two cents to $2.67 per gallon.

The U.S. average diesel fuel price increased two cents from a week ago to $2.50 per gallon, down $1.18 per gallon from the same time last year. The Rocky Mountain price was the only decrease, down one cent to $2.49 per gallon. The Gulf Coast price increased three cents to $2.32 per gallon. The West Coast and East Coast prices each increased two cents to $2.71 per gallon, and $2.51 per gallon, respectively. The Midwest price was up one cent to $2.53 per gallon.

Residential heating oil price increases while propane price decreases

As of November 9, 2015, residential heating oil prices averaged nearly $2.43 per gallon, less than 1 cent per gallon higher than last week and 99 cents lower than one year ago. The average wholesale heating oil price this week is almost $1.58 per gallon, more than 4 cents less than last week and $1.13 per gallon less than a year ago.

Residential propane prices averaged just under $1.92 per gallon, less than 1 cent per gallon lower than last week’s price and 49 cents lower than one year ago. Wholesale propane prices averaged nearly 53 cents per gallon, 1 cent per gallon lower than last week’s price and 49 cents lower than last year’s price.

Propane inventories gain

U.S. propane stocks increased by 1.6 million barrels last week to 104.0 million barrels as of November 6, 2015, 22.9 million barrels (28.3%) higher than a year ago. Gulf Coast inventories increased by 0.9 million barrels and Midwest inventories increased by 0.4 million barrels. East Coast inventories increase by 0.2 million barrels while Rocky Mountain/West Coast inventories remained unchanged. Propylene non-fuel-use inventories represented 3.5% of total propane inventories.

Moscow is preparing to mark the second anniversary of the EuroMaidan in Kyiv “in its own way,” by unleashing a new disinformation campaign against Ukraine via Europe as part of its continuing campaign to destabilize Ukraine and restore Russian influence there, according to Andrey Latynin.

This disinformation campaign, the Ukrainian commentator says, is intended to increase the shift in Western and especially European opinion about Ukraine from concern about Russian actions to worries about Ukraine’s inability to rapidly carry out reforms and fight corruption (nr2.com.ua/publications/Kreml-sobiraetsya-atakovat-Ukrainu-iz-Evropy-111188.html).

Moscow then plans, Latynin suggests, to play back European coverage in Ukraine to suggest that this criticism of Ukraine emanates from there and thus promote among Ukrainians a sense of isolation from the West and distrust about Ukraine in ways that keep the original source of these stories hidden.

A campaign so organized, he says, “promises to be quite successful: its organizers apparently are well informed about the Ukrainian media scene” and know that Ukrainians no longer trust anything coming from a Russian source. But “by tradition,” Ukrainians are more trusting of those from Europe, independently of the country or the publication.

Thus, Moscow’s disinformation specialists view their chief task to get information into the hands of European journalists about Ukraine and especially about Ukrainian government and security officials and to suggest that these institutions are “disorganized” and “disorienting” Ukrainians and others.

According to Latynin, he has information that in the course of October, Russian agents approached journalists in Germany, Belgium and France with “compromising information” about leading Ukrainian government and especially security personnel. This information stressed the supposed existence of high levels of corruption and incompetence among them.

The Russians “recommended” that the European journalists “concentrate on how Ukrainian siloviki are ‘wasting time on personal enrichment instead of on the struggle with Russian aggression at the front and inside the country” and that their behavior was making any victory “impossible.”

The idea of this campaign is simple: European journalists will write stories Moscow wants to see and put them in their publications, and the Ukrainian outlets will pick them up and present them with European rather than Russian datelines.

This campaign will also have the effect of assisting Moscow in its ongoing effort to throw up obstacles on Ukraine’s path to European integration by calling into question Kyiv’s commitment and readiness to do so (apostrophe.com.ua/article/economy/2015-11-13/rossiya-gotovit-ukraine-novyie-trudnosti/2570).

Terrorists staged multiple simultaneous attacks Friday night in Paris, killing scores of people with automatic gunfire and explosions.

At least 100 people died at a single location after gunman attacked a Paris music hall and held scores of people hostage before police stormed the building, ending the standoff.

Two attackers were among the dead. Up to a thousand people were in the audience at the Bataclan concert hall where a performance by an American band was interrupted by rapid-fire bursts from Kalashnikov automatic rifles. Many people escaped during the shootout.

President Francois Hollande said he was declaring a state of emergency and ordering France’s borders closed — an unprecedented act in 21st-century Europe. In Washington, President Barack Obama said the United States was ready to help in any way possible.

Attackers reload three times

There was no immediate claim of responsibility for the attacks.

A witness inside the hall said the attackers fired into the crowd repeatedly, pausing only to reload their weapons three times. He was near an exit and managed to escape during one of those pauses.

Scores of fatalities were also reported at other parts of Paris. One of the first explosions was just outside a sports stadium where President Hollande and a large crowd were watching a football (soccer) match between the French and German national teams.

The blast was felt inside the stadium. Several other explosions took place in that area and officials say at least one may have been a suicide bombing.

Hollande evacuated

Police evacuated Hollande from the stadium, but when play was stopped many people in the crowd ran onto the pitch and huddled in fear.

Restaurants and bars in a crowded central area of the French capital, near Place de la Republique, also were targeted by the attackers, who opened fire on crowds.

Hollande called an emergency Cabinet meeting at midnight after he issued his order to close all border crossings. He also canceled his trip to the G-20 meeting in Turkey scheduled to begin on Sunday.

At the White House, Obama said the coordinated attacks in Paris were an “outrageous attempt to terrorize civilians.”

Britain’s Prime Minister David Cameron said on Twitter, “We will do whatever we can do to help.” He said he was shocked by the events in Paris and his thoughts and prayers are with the French people.

Global condemnation

At the United Nations, a spokesman said Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon “condemns the despicable terrorist attacks” and “demands the immediate release of the numerous individuals reportedly being held hostage in the Bataclan theater.”

U.S. officials said the embassy in France has been checking on the safety of all Americans in Paris. However, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security said in the U.S. capital that there was “no specific or credible threat to the United States.”

Brian Katulis, a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, told VOA the Paris attacks “all look like they were coordinated to have maximum impact, and to send a message.”

Ongoing threat

“It demonstrates that there are a lot of vulnerabilities in open societies that can be exploited by whatever terrorist groups are carrying out these actions,” Katulis said.

Friday’s spectacular assault evoked memories of an attack by Islamist gunmen in January that killed 17 people.

Paris is due to host a major international conference next month — U.N.-sponsored meetings on the global effort to control global warming.

VOA White House Correspondent Aru Pande, National Security Correspondent Jeff Seldin, Luis Ramirez, Lisa Bryant from Paris, and Jamie Dettmer contributed to this report.

UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon recently held a commemoration of the 40th anniversary of the squashing of UN resolution 3379, equating Zionism with racism. It was passed in 1975 by a vote of 72 to 35 (with 32 abstentions). The festive event this year was attended by US Secretary of State John Kerry and head of the Israeli Labour Party and Zionist Union Isaac Herzog, son of Chaim Herzog, president of Israel from 1983 to 1993, and star of the 1975 UN session.

The 1975 vote took place approximately one year after resolution 3237 granted the PLO “observer status”, following Yasser Arafat’s “olive branch” speech to the General Assembly in November 1974. It succeeded only because the Soviet Union and its allies were there to support the Arab and Islamic majority countries.

It was revoked in December 1991 by UN resolution 46/86. At the commemoration this year, Ban Ki-moon recalled Chaim Herzog’s words in 1975, “I appeal to the community of nations to always act to uphold the principles of the United Nations Charter to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours.” Such nice platitudes coming from the Israeli ambassador—community, principles, tolerance, peace…

It is odd that this year’s festivities actually celebrate the passing of the resolution, rather than its demise, commemorating the chutzpah of Israeli UN representative Herzog, who stole the show, recounting how magnanimous Israel is with its Arab citizens, who apparently held the same rights as Jews, worked in border and police defense forces, were elected to parliament, studied at universities…

He pointed to Arabs coming from elsewhere for medical treatment, and to “the fact that it is as natural for an Arab to serve in public office in Israel as it is incongruous to think of a Jew serving in any public office in an Arab country.” The UN ambassador finished his tirade by ripping up the resolution and defiantly stating he would have UN Avenues in Haifa, Jerusalem and Tel Aviv renamed Zionism Avenues.

Herzog didn’t mention how traditionally Jews lived freely under Muslim rule and often served Muslim leaders as advisers, how Arab anger today is directly due to Israel’s murderous, illegal actions against the rightful citizens of what was once the Roman province of Syria Palaestina. He didn’t mention the millions of Palestinians denied their basic rights because Israel is apparently free of racism.

At least the 1975 gathering had some punch. There was no substance in the commemoration in 2015. Kerry waffled, despite a weeks-long wave of violence that has claimed the lives of at least 77 Palestinians along with 10 Israelis. No mention of that. He said that a two-state solution in the Middle East was “not an impossible dream” but would require courage. Yawn.

Kerry called the 1975 resolution “ominous” because it gave “a global license to hate” the state of Israel. But then “hate” covers just about any word of criticism of Israel. After all, election fever is rising in the US and the Israel lobby is alive and well.

Bush senior’s half truths

It is more instructive to deconstruct the speech by US President HW Bush, who introduced the UN motion overturning resolution 3379 in 1991, which he said “mocks this pledge and the principles upon which the United Nations was founded. Zionism is not a policy; it is the idea that led to the creation of a home for the Jewish people, to the State of Israel. To equate Zionism with the intolerable sin of racism is to twist history.”

He was half correct. Zionism is an idea, one that turned into a policy of racial exclusion and victimization of the Palestinian natives, whose land and property the new immigrants stole, even as they conducted a state policy of terror against the natives. Bush made no explanation of why Zionism is not a policy. But the Soviet voice was gone by 1991; only the US voice was heard defending the pious hope that Israel would one day make peace with the Palestinians based on the original 1947 UN resolution 181 to partition the territory.

Bush’s claim that Zionism is not a policy of racism simply flies in the face of reality. But then the US itself was founded on an idea much like Zionism. The Puritans, Quakers and many other religious groups immigrated intending to establish an ideal (white) Christian society modeled on the Bible, an idea which also was a policy of genocide of the American natives.

The 17th philosopher Francis Bacon penned a utopian novel New Atlantis based on his enthusiastic support for establishing the British colonies in North America, depicting the creation of a utopian land where “generosity and enlightenment, dignity and splendour, piety and public spirit” are the commonly held qualities of the inhabitants of the mythical Bensalem. The idea of a “new Jerusalem” is the bedrock of the US idea.

Even such a respected philosopher was able to disregard the racist policy of genocide against the American natives in the name of “generosity and enlightenment etc.” No one noticed that, from the start, that the idea of the US (Bensalem) was a racist idea, just as its policies were. Only in the 19th century did international opprobrium finally push the US to abolish its most glaring racist policy—slavery.

But by then, the idea of a Jewish state in Palestine was already being mooted by British politicians such as Lord Shaftsbury, and Israel was finally forced down the UN throat by FDR and Truman. For Shaftsbury etal, it was merely a logical development of western ‘civilization‘.

Bush lauded the crushing of the racism resolution in 1991 as “a real chance to fulfill the UN Charter’s ambition of working ‘to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person’.” Yet he was unable to see that the emperor (himself) and his offspring were wearing no clothes, that it is Israel that is the scourge of war, the violator of human rights and human dignity.

Bush stated that the UN “cannot claim to seek peace and at the same time challenge Israel’s right to exist.” Again a half truth. No one intended to wipe Israel off the map, as long as it was a nation that followed international norms, in particular human rights of the peoples who live there or who will return there from refugee camps when a peaceful solution to the stand-off is agreed. But this is only possible if we address Bush’s other half truth that lies at the heart of Zionism, both as idea and policy.

Bush’s other mistake was to define the State of Israel as “a home for the Jewish people”. This makes Israel racist by definition, just as Hitler identified Germany as the home of the Aryan people, a similarly vague, racist definition of the state.

Bush’s lesson: don’t cross Israel

There is a bitter irony in Bush’s kowtowing to Israel in 1991. In September he had asked Congress to delay Israel’s request for $10 billion in loan guarantees to help settle Soviet Jews, trying to force Israel to stop its illegal settlement construction and negotiate a real peace. He no doubt was recalling how Eisenhower had made Israel bend to the US game plan in 1956. Ford/ Kissinger/ Carter had too, though just barely in the 1970s, curbing somewhat Israel’s colonial ambitions. Both times, ironically, US leaders relied on the Soviet ‘threat’ to give them some backbone.

But ‘in victory, defeat’. The Soviet ‘threat’, providing the US some leverage with Israel, was no more, and in the meantime, the Israel lobby in Washington had become too powerful for a president to counter. The Zionists were in no mood to swallow their pride and obey a newly holier-than-thou imperial Washington. Bush senior found he had no allies for his plan to bring Israel into line.

He scurried to the UN to burnish his credentials, but to no avail. The Israel lobby mobilized, found their ideal candidate in Bill Clinton, and Bush suddenly was being attacked in the media. Incessant negative publicity as election day approached did the trick. He lost his re-election bid, going from a 90% approval rate following the Iraq invasion to 37% on election day.

It is time for a new resolution 3379, something with teeth that will wake Israel up and push it to admit its sins. There is no hope to find a sponsor in Washington. However, the support for Palestinians struggling for their rights continues to grow. The EU, BDS and others boycott settlement goods are having their effect. Israel‘s neighbours continue to resist. As US power wanes, there is hope that the UN will once again find some backbone.

Source: ahtribune.com

US Secretary of State John Kerry is often perceived as one of the “good guys”, the less hawkish of top American officials, who does not simply promote and defend his country’s military adventurism but reaches out to others, beyond polarizing rhetoric. His unremitting efforts culminated partly in the Iran nuclear framework agreement in April, followed by a final deal, a few months later.

Now, he is reportedly hard at work again to find some sort of consensus on a way out of the Syria war, a multi-party conflict that has killed over 300,000 people. His admirers see him as the diplomatic executor of a malleable and friendly US foreign policy agenda under President Barack Obama.

In reality, this perception is misleading, although Kerry is not a warmonger as George W Bush’s top staff were, such as Vice-President Dick Cheney and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. The two were the very antithesis of any rational foreign policy such that even the elder ex-President George H W Bush described them demeaningly, according to his biographer who was quoted in the New York Times. Cheney was an “Iron-ass”, who “had his own empire… and marched to his own drummer,” Bush the Elder said, while calling Rumsfeld “an arrogant fellow” who lacked empathy.

Yet, considering that the first President Bush was rarely a peacemaker himself, one is left to ponder over whether or not the US foreign policy ailment is centered on a failure to elect proper representatives and to enlist anyone other than psychopaths. If one is to examine US foreign policies in the Middle East fairly, for example, comparing the conduct of the last three administrations — Bill Clinton, George W Bush and Barack Obama — one would find that there are abundant striking similarities. In principle, all three administrations’ foreign policy agendas were predicated on strong militaries and military interventions, although they applied soft power differently.

In essence, Obama carried on with much of what the younger Bush had started in the Middle East, although he supplanted his country’s less active role in Iraq with new interventions in Libya and Syria. In fact, his Iraq policies were guided by Bush’s final act in that shattered country, where he ordered a surge of troops to pacify the resistance, thus paving the way for an eventual withdrawal. Of course, none of that plotting worked in America’s favor, with the rise of Daesh/ISIS among others, but that is for another discussion.

Obama has even gone a step further by deciding recently to keep thousands of US troops in Afghanistan well into 2017, thus breaking a commitment to withdraw next year. Of course, 2017 will be Obama’s last year in office, and the decision is partly motivated by his administration’s concern that future turmoil in that country could cost his Democratic Party heavily in the next presidential election.

In other words, US foreign policy continues unabated, with business as usual often guided by the preponderant norm that “might is right”, and by ill-advised personal ambitions and ideological illusions like those championed by neo-conservatives during Bush the Younger’s era.

Nevertheless, much has also changed simply because American ambitions to police the world, global politics and the excess of $600 billion a year US defense budget are not the only variables that control events in the Middle East and everywhere else. There are other undercurrents that cannot be wished away, and they too can dictate US foreign policy outlook and behavior.

Indeed, an American decline has been noted for many years, and Middle Eastern nations have been more aware of this than others. One could even argue that the latter Bush administration’s rush to war in Iraq in 2003, in an attempt to control the region’s resources, was a belated effort at staving off that unmistakable decay, whether in America’s ability to regulate rising international contenders or in its overall share of the global economy.

The folly of George W Bush, Cheney and company is that they assumed that the Pentagon’s more than $1.5 billion-a-day budget was enough for the US to acquire the needed leverage to control every aspect of global affairs, including a burgeoning share of the world economy. That misconception carries on to this day, with military spending already accounting for about 54 per cent of all federal discretionary spending, itself nearly a third of the country’s overall budget.

However, those who are blaming Obama for failing to use US military strength as a lever for political currency refuse to accept that the president’s behaviour hardly reflects a lack of appetite for war, but a pragmatic response to a situation that has largely spun out of US control. The so-called “Arab Spring”, for example, was a major defining factor in the changes of US fortunes and it all came at a particularly interesting time.

First, the Iraq war has destroyed whatever little credibility the US had in the region, a sentiment that has also reverberated around the world.

Second, it was becoming clear that US foreign policy in Central and South America — an obstinate continuation of the Monroe Doctrine of 1823, which laid the groundwork for US domination of that region — has also been challenged by more assertive leaders, armed with democratic initiatives, not military coups.

Third, China’s more forceful politics, at least around its regional surroundings, signaled that the traditional US hegemony over most of East and South East Asia is also facing fierce competition. Not only have many Asian and other countries flocked to China, lured by its constantly growing and seemingly more solid economic performance, if compared to the US, but others too are turning to Russia, which is filling a political and, as of late, military vacuum.

The Russian military campaign in Syria, which was welcomed half-heartedly by the US, has signaled a historic shift in the Middle East. Even if Russia fails to turn its war into a major shift of political and economic clout, the mere fact that other contenders are now throwing their proverbial hats into the Middle East ring is simply unprecedented, at least since the British-French-Israeli tripartite aggression against Egypt in 1956, the so-called “Suez Crisis”.

The region’s historians must fully understand the repercussions of all of these factors, and that simply analyzing the US decline based on the performance of individuals – Condoleezza Rice’s hawkishness vs. John Kerry’s supposed sane diplomacy – is a trite and trivial approach to understanding current shifts in global power.

It will take years before a new power paradigm emerges fully, during which time US clients are likely to seek the protection of more dependable powers. In fact, shopping around for a new power is already under way, which also means that new alliances will be formed while others fold.

In the meantime, though, the Middle East will continue to pass through this incredibly difficult and violent transition, for which the US is partly responsible.

The Doha Round has failed to make more progress in the past 15 years partly because of shifting power in the world economy. While the multilateral trading system remains the bedrock for global rules on trade, governments need to revitalize the WTO’s negotiating role so it can respond to new challenges and contribute to strengthening multilateralism overall.

By Evan Rogerson*

So far the 21st century has not been a happy time for multilateralism. Across the whole spectrum of global issues existing multilateral structures are being challenged or simply ignored. Trade is no exception. The WTO is the newest of the global institutions, founded in 1995 on the basis of the GATT. Yet it too is challenged, to the point where its continuing relevance has been questioned.

True, member governments maintain that the multilateral trading system is still relevant and necessary. But it will not necessarily remain so in the absence of concerted action by them to adapt it to changing realities.
Lack of progress in Doha Round

The Doha Development Agenda is the WTO in the minds of many. It has now lasted nearly 15 years with no sign of a successful conclusion, though there have been some results along the way, chiefly the Trade Facilitation Agreement concluded at Bali in 2013. The WTO has failed to make more progress in the Doha Round in part because the negotiating effort has coincided rather precisely with shifting power in the world economy.

Between 1980 and 2000, industrial countries accounted for about 70 percent of world income while emerging economies took a 20 percent share. By 2012, the numbers were 57 percent and 30 percent, respectively. In the case of trade, the industrial countries’ share dropped from 82 percent to 70 percent and the emerging economies’ share rose from 14 percent to 23 percent. The figures for economic growth and the expansion of the middle class tell a similar story, and the rapidity of these changes has been remarkable.

Such shifts in economic weight strain international governance and challenge pre-existing power configurations. Successful trade negotiations inevitably require agreement on the balance of rights and obligations among nations, and compromise on this fundamental issue has proven frustratingly elusive.

The recent proliferation of regional trade initiatives must be seen in part as a response to lack of progress in the WTO, though there are also obviously other dimensions to the desire for deeper integration. Optimists believe the mega-regionals will not only consolidate and extend beneficial integration among the parties involved but also buy time to tame geopolitical rivalry and act constructively on common global interests.

A less rosy view is that the mega-regionals will only sharpen rivalry, embed exclusion and further fragment the world economy through the entrenchment of incompatible regulatory systems. In any case, regionalism can never be a perfect substitute for multilateralism. RTAs may rival the WTO in achieving more open markets. But they cannot match the WTO’s global reach as the bedrock for rules on trade.

WTO must be responsive to new trade challenges

The WTO is much more than the Round. Its value as a force for stability has been underlined in the recent financial and economic crises. It has been a firewall against protectionism- not a perfect one to be sure, but one that has made a real difference. The system’s importance as the only global forum for examining trade policies and their impact is also undervalued.

In fact, of the three main pillars of the system – monitoring and surveillance, dispute settlement, negotiation – the first two are generally effective. The negotiating pillar, though, has undoubtedly been weakened by the stalemate in the DDA. For the long-term health of the multilateral trading system, it needs to be reinforced. This means updating both the issues that the WTO negotiates and the way it negotiates them.

To some extent, the agenda of the future will have to be that of the past. Some issues that were put at the heart of the Doha agenda in 2001 – issues such as agriculture and food security- remain just as important today. However to regain negotiating momentum the WTO also needs to show that it is responsive to trade issues that have emerged more recently. In a world deeply integrated through globalised production and consumption, the WTO needs to move towards rules which reflect interdependence. The virtual economy, investment and perhaps competition policy are just some of the issues that could receive closer attention.

The fundamentals of the system are sound. The WTO has less of a so-called democratic deficit than many other international institutions. The consensus principle is fundamental and is likely to remain so. However consensus does not need to mean veto and immobility. The challenge is to apply it in a dynamic and enabling way. This could imply taking a broader and more flexible view of possible negotiating approaches and outcomes, on the understanding that the multilateral rules are respected and that the multilateral non-discriminatory system remains the fundamental framework.

Renew vitality of multilateral trading system, strengthen multilateralism

The WTO should be able to advance on agreements in specific areas as it did 15 years ago in financial services and basic telecoms; it should have enough confidence to be able to recognize that plurilateral approaches were an important element in its past negotiations and can also be in its future; it should be able to allow those members who want to go further or faster to do so provided that the results are eventually accessible to all; and it should be able to consider “soft law” agreements, especially where these could help build confidence as basis for something more solid. In this and other ways it shouldn’t hesitate to learn from and adapt the best practices of other trade forums, like APEC.

Renewing the vitality of the multilateral trading system will also help to strengthen the broader multilateral approach which is essential to resolving many global issues. Climate change, international financial stability, international migration, health pandemics, water management, and other global challenges require new approaches to transnational and global governance structures.

Within this broader multilateral framework the WTO should continue to play an important role in ensuring that trade contributes to solutions. For this to happen governments need to match their rhetoric with action. The default option would be the continuing erosion of a key component of the global architecture.

*Evan Rogerson is Director of the Agriculture and Commodities Division of the WTO Secretariat Geneva. He contributed this essay to RSIS Commentary based on his recent seminar at the Multilateralism and Regionalism Studies Centre, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.

After Friday evening’s devastating terror attacks throughout Paris that are reported to have claimed over 100 lives, the Vatican voiced its dismay over the events and urged a “decisive” response.

“We are shocked by this new manifestation of maddening, terrorist violence and hatred which we condemn in the most radical way together with the Pope and all those who love peace,” Holy See press office director Fr. Federico Lombardi said in a statement.

“We pray for the victims and the wounded, and for all the French people. This is an attack on peace for all humanity, and it requires a decisive, supportive response on the part of all of us as we counter the spread the homicidal hatred in all of its forms.”

Numerous attacks across the city of Paris were reported on the evening of Nov. 13. Explosions were reported near the Stade de France, the national stadium where a soccer match was underway. Shootings were reported in the area of the famous Louvre museum and the nearby Les Halles shopping mall, as well as Le Petit Cambodge restaurant.

In addition, dozens of hostages were reportedly held at Bataclan concert hall. French police stormed the concert hall and later declared the hostage situation over, saying that they had killed two attackers. AFP quoted police sources saying about 100 people had been killed in the concert venue.

Amid the violence, French President Francois Hollande announced a state of emergency throughout the entire country and said that the nation’s borders would be closed.

Global leaders from U.S. president Barack Obama to British prime minister David Cameron, as well heads of state from around the world expressed outrage and sadness over the grisly attacks.

Church leaders also voiced their solidarity with the victims and their families. The U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops urged prayer for all involved, with individual bishops posting their reactions via social media.

“May St. Denis and Our Lady of Lourdes intercede tonight for the people of Paris,” Bishop James Conley of Lincoln, Nebraska said on Twitter.

“My prayers are with the people of Paris tonight. Let us pray for the victims, the hostages, and their families,” said Bishop Frank Caggiano of Bridgeport, Connecticut.

Bishop Kevin Farrell of Dallas and Bishop Michael Olson of Fort Worth also voiced prayers on Twitter.

Despite NLD’s landslide victory in Myanmar, threat lingers from rebel groups and the military may not fade in the background.

By Bertil Lintner*

The ballot count for the general election in the country once known as Burma is not yet official, but celebrations have begun. The opposition National League for Democracy, NLD, led by Nobel Peace Prize laureate Aung San Suu Kyi, appears to have scored a landslide victory and left the military’s Union Solidarity and Development Party, USDP, with a handful seats in the National Assembly. People hope for transition to democratic and civilian rule in a country where the military in different guises has held the reins of power since a coup in 1962.

Now the real work begins, and a new government led by NLD must deliver on its promises – or disappoint the people who voted for change on November 8. Expectations are enormously high after the election, and it’s often overlooked that it will be a government with limited powers, even if the NLD manages to get a majority of elected National Assembly seats, which according to preliminary results seems to be the case. The limits are evident – despite her electoral triumph Suu Kyi is barred from heading the government led by her party.

According to the 2008 constitution, citizens with a spouse or children who are foreign citizens cannot serve as president. Suu Kyi’s late husband, Michael Aris, who passed away in 1999, was British; their two sons are British and US citizens, respectively. Suu Kyi has stated that she will be “above the president,” but it is uncertain what that means and what post she would get in the new government.

The country’s constitution, promulgated after a blatantly rigged referendum in May 2008, is tailor-made to preserve the dominant role of the military – no amendments to that constitution can be done unless more than 75 percent of all MPs vote in favor of such a proposal. With the office of the commander-in-chief appointing 25 percent of all seats, the military holds what amounts to veto power over any attempts to establish a more democratic order.

Most crucially, the military is autonomous and takes orders from only the commander-in-chief, not the president and his or her government. Then, the military – and not any elected person or entity – appoints the three most powerful ministers: those of defense, home affairs and border affairs. Defense, naturally, means liaison with the military and border affairs issues relating to the frontier areas, where a multitude of ethnic armed groups are active, and cross-border contacts with authorities in Burma’s immediate neighbors. The responsibilities of the Ministry of Home Affairs include not only the police and internal security but also the powerful General Administration Department, a government-organ that oversees local governments across the country and as such is above any locally elected assemblies and officials.

All those restrictions make it difficult for the government to tackle the most pressing issue facing the country since independence from Britain in 1948: relations among the central government, the majority Burmans and the country’s many ethnic minorities and their desire to establish a federal union instead of the present, centralized system.

A multitude of ethnic rebel armies have been active in the country’s frontier areas for decades. A much-touted “Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement” between eight such groups and the government on October 15 this year, fell short of being an important step towards peace. Only two groups signing the accord could be considered genuine rebel armies: the Karen National Union, KNU, and the Restoration Council of Shan State, RCSS and its Shan State Army South. A third, the Democratic Karen Benevolent Army, or DKBA, has, in effect, been a militia on the side of the government since it broke from KNU in 1994. The fourth group, a Karen faction, is small, more of a civil society organization than a rebel army.

The fifth, the All-Burma Students Democratic Front has not been a fighting force to be reckoned with since the 1990s. The Chin National Front is a small, mainly unarmed group, and the Arakan Liberation Party is a tiny outfit with no presence in Rakhine State. It consists of a dozen or so people staying in KNU areas near the Thai border and should not be confused with the the Arakan Army, which fights alongside the Kachin Independence Army, KIA, in the north. The last of the “rebel armies,” the Pa-O National Liberation Organization is a one-man show led by a person who lives in Chiang Mai, Thailand, who set it up when the main rebel Pa-O National Organization/Army entered into a ceasefire agreement with the government in 1991.

None of Burma’s main ethnic armies active in the north signed the agreement – among them the KIA with approximately 8,000 soldiers and the country’s largest ethnic army, the more than 20,000-strong United Wa State Army, or UWSA, and their allies in northern and eastern Shan State. A total of about 40,000 ethnic troops are not part of the deal with the government. Observers see the less than half-baked agreement as little more than a face-saving gesture of the government-appointed Myanmar Peace Center, which has received vast amounts of money from the European Union and others. After several years of talks, the MPC needed something to show international donors to justify what in reality amounts to failure to achieve peace across the country.

It’s still noteworthy that three of the eight groups that actually have armed forces – the KNU, RCSS and DKBA – are based along the Thai border. Sources close to those groups assert that they were under heavy pressure from Thai authorities to sign the agreement. Thailand is eager to trade with Burma, exploit its natural resources, and develop its hydroelectric power potential. Likewise, it’s assumed that the UWSA, which has received massive support – including surface-to-air missiles, mortars, assault rifles and armored vehicles and howitzers – from China did not sign because Beijing needs it as a leverage when negotiating deals with the Burmese government. Burma’s decades-long civil war has always involved outside players, reflected in the October agreement. China has not yet reacted officially to the election result, but in line with its traditional “carrot-and-stick policy” it will most probably continue supporting the UWSA while maintaining friendly relations with the government while encouraging trade and investment.

Closer to the Burmese heartland, the new government must deal with discontent in rural areas, where farmers have seen their land confiscated and given to crony businessmen close to the military. The military’s own conglomerate, the Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings, UMEH, is believed to control or be involved in an estimated 70 percent of all major businesses in the country. Needless to say, the government has no power over the shadowy UMEH and how its fortunes are spent.

To break the political and economic power of the military will be an almost insurmountable task for the new government. The repercussions could be severe if the National Assembly fails to live up to the expectations of the millions of people who voted for the NLD – and it would not be too difficult for the mighty military to make that happen, undermining the popularity of the NLD and its charismatic leader. For after more than half-a-century of having had absolute powers, few here believe that the military will fade into the background, or as renowned Burmese author Wendy Law-Yone put it in an interview with Borderlessnewsonline the day after the election: “Dictatorships’ habits die hard in countries like Burma.”

*Bertil Lintner is a former correspondent with the Far Eastern Economic Review and author of several books on Burma/Myanmar, including “Burma in Revolt: Opium and Insurgency Since 1948” (published in 1994, 1999 and 2003), “Land of Jade: A Journey from India through Northern Burma to China,” and “The Kachin: Lords of Burma’s Northern Frontier.” He is currently a writer with Asia Pacific Media Services.