There are thousands more North Caucasians as well as other citizens of the Russian Federation fighting on the side of the Islamists in the Middle East that Moscow admits, Akhmet Yarlykarpov says, the result in large measure of an ISIS recruiting effort that the Russian authorities have not yet found a way to counter.

Russian officials say 2500 North Caucasians are fighting in Islamist groups in the Middle East, but experts in the region say that the real number is vastly higher: 3,000 from Chechnya, and as many as 5,000 from Daghestan, the MGIMO expert says (kavpolit.com/articles/ig_eto_vyzov_na_kotoryj_pridetsja_otvechat_globaln-21548/).

And those figures, he says, do not include those who have gone to Syria and Iraq from other republics in the North Caucasus or from numerous regions across the entire Russian Federation. Consequently, official statistics dramatically understate the level of Russian participation in ISIS and the threat to Russia at home.

But perhaps Moscow’s most serious error in this, Yarlykarpov says, is that the authorities have underestimated the strength of Islamist recruiters working both via the Internet and face to face with young people across the country, people who are quite capable of exploiting social and political dissatisfaction to win the young to their side.

It is impossible to determine whether social conditions or the work of the recruiters is the primary factor, he continues; but he notes that “the problem of the mass departure of North Caucasian young people to the Middle East appeared much earlier than ISIS, already from 2011 when the well-known events in Syria began.”

Young people in the North Caucasus are animated by the desire to achieve social justice, the Moscow expert says. And recruiters for Islamist groups are taking full advantage of that. “As a result, we have an unprecedented flow of young people to that region, not only from the North Caucasus but in general from Russia.”

The Internet plays a key role and is available to almost everyone, but there are Islamist and ISIS recruiters “everywhere in Moscow, in St. Petersburg, in the North and in the republics of the North Caucasus,” Yarlykarpov says. One reason for that is that the authorities do not fully understand the recruitment process.

Scholars like himself have had a difficult time studying this issue, he says, because they have access in most cases only to those fighting the recruiters and not to the recruiters themselves. As a result, there are many gaps and even errors in even the best analytical works that have been prepared.

The Russian authorities have had “undoubted success” in suppressing Islamist groups, but they have had less success in coping with the recruiters, in many cases because the government has underrated the nature and extent of the problem they present.

Given that Islamist terrorist groups and even an Islamic State are likely to be around for some time, Yarlykarpov says, it is critically important that these recruitment networks be identified and means found to disrupt or otherwise oppose them. Force alone, as the Israelis have learned, isn’t enough.

Now, ISIS is a much more serious threat than Al-Qaeda, but it is important to counter it in ways that do not increase the risk that it in turn will be succeeded by something even worse, the MGIMO expert says. And in this, it is necessary to recognize that borders in the Middle East are likely to be redrawn along religious sectarian lines.

“’The Caliphate’ in the ISIS version already has been formed;” indeed, it has existed “at a minimum for two years, expanding in some places and contracting in others. That means we shouldn’t be discussing “the possibility of a caliphate’ but rather focusing on its existing version in reality.”

The task is urgent especially in the North Caucasus and Russia. Force alone won’t work, but “practically nothing” is being done as far as counterpropaganda is concerned: “There is no literate systematic work with recruiters and so on. As with any complex problem, this one will require a complex approach.

Many in Russia are talking about relying on “traditional Islam.” But they forget that this is “a mosaic” of various trends rather than a single thing; and they do not want to recognize that the representatives of what they call “traditional Islam have very little authority among young people.”

Unless all these things change, Yarlykarpov concludes, the flow of young people from Russia to the banners of ISIS and its allies will continue.

By Alba Çela*

It was this time 25 years ago when the Albanians joined together to overthrow a brutal communist dictatorship under the slogan “We want Albania to be like the rest of Europe!” While they knew nothing of the long and arduous procedural tasks that align the integration process with the many bureaucratic steps of candidate status and negotiations, the Albanians had a European dream. They wanted a free, democratic and modern state where economic welfare and the rule of law and justice were available to all, just like they thought was the case in western Europe. In the early 1990s, hopes were high that Albania would soon join the European Union.

Today, a quarter of a century later, Albania has barely managed to gain official EU candidate status after long and repetitive attempts. Albania remains one of the laggards of EU integration and of transition in general, despite being one of the few countries in the region free of legitimacy, border and minority problems. Apart from technicalities, deep and extended internal political conflicts combined with the low degree of state presence and functionality has been holding Albania back.

This is not to say that there have been no important changes during the last 25 years. In fact, the process of change in Albania has been quite radical, and the country looks, feel and operates in a completely different way now. However the challenges of building a full democracy, a functional market economy, and of achieving the major milestone of becoming an EU member state have become increasingly daunting. As the majority of opinion polls show today, Albanians have very little trust in their political and economic systems.

Challenges

Rule of law is the essence of what does not go well in Albania, from the cumbersome daily life details to the grand stories of state capture. The state has often faced problems related to the complete control of its territory and now it is facing difficult reforms of the judiciary as well as targeting corruption. As laws are constantly being fitted to the acqui communitaire, the state is yet to guarantee their implementation fully, transparently and consistently for all of its citizens.

Albania has yet to find its economic niche, exploring and focusing on many options from tourism to agriculture, from services to the mining industry. A long-time dependent on foreign remittances, Albanians now have seen this source of income being cut off from the financial crisis hitting its neighboring countries, Greece and Italy, which host the overwhelming share of Albanian migrants. The economy still needs major infrastructure investment in order to be connected to the rest of the region; hence it has eagerly welcomed the recent Berlin Process, which strengthens the interconnectivity approach to regional cooperation and economic development.

Finally, the Albanian society has been, for most of its transition time, in upheaval seeking to accommodate the new values of capitalism and consumerism and slowly shedding the traumas of dictatorship. However, a lot of necessary changes are required in order for the citizens to become more responsible, more involved and more active so as to keep their politicians accountable and also to contribute to the integration into the EU itself.

Albania meets the world

During its time as a communist state, Albania was so isolated from the rest of the world that the best example to illustrate its situation would be today’s North Korea. The country broke all relations, even with its communist counterparts – first with Yugoslavia, then with the Soviet Union, and finally, even with its last anchor in the global system, the People’s Republic of China. After the regime change, Albania started to establish its presence in the international arena. Its relations with many neighbors and other states in the region such as Serbia or Greece have gone through many changes. From an optimistic view, the country’s current trends seem to be heading towards normalization. Albania is praised by the international community as an exporter of security in the volatile western Balkan region, having primarily maintained a cool head towards ethnic nationalism. Albania has been a NATO member since 2009, which strengthens its position in the region and enables it to take part in the global dialogue about security and peace.

Where are we going?

Considering recent developments, such as the reluctance of the European Union itself to keep pursuing enlargement and the simultaneous crisis in Greece, Ukraine and Syria (with the aftermath of the refugees crisis), it is safe to say that accession still remains a pipe dream for the time being. It is important to highlight that the EU, even now, is a much different entity than the one Albania began the process of joining in the 90s. What better witness to this than the famous declaration of Commissioner Juncker that there would not be any new accession within his mandate! Even though this declaration reflected the mere reality that no country would be ready in the western Balkans anyway, the symbolic negativity it conveyed about enlargement resounded throughout the region.

In fact, the European Union institutions are doing overtime in many countries of the region, trying to convey the message of unyielding European perspective in the face of ever-more reluctant attitudes towards enlargement, both from various member states and from political figures in the European Parliament.

Albanians, trapped in the difficulties of transition, have had very little time to reflect on whether their European dream still fulfills their aspirations. However given the strong pro-western sentiment in the country, both on a societal level and within the political elites, the entire system is geared towards integration with no qualms and very few questions. Integration continues to provide the impetus and legitimacy for many national reforms and actions. The next step in line for the process is to set a date to open negotiations.

As we say in Albania, there is no Plan B.

*Alba Çela is Deputy Director at the Albanian Institute for International Studies, Tirana based think-tank.

**This article was first published in Analist monthly journal’s November issue in Turkish language.

We appear to be moving ever closer toward a world war against the Islamic State.

No sane person welcomes war. Yet if we do go to war against ISIS we must keep a watchful eye on 5 things:

1. The burden of fighting the war must be widely shared among Americans.

America’s current “all-volunteer” army is comprised largely of lower-income men and women for whom army pay is the best option.

“We’re staring at the painful story of young people with fewer options bearing the greatest burden,“ says Greg Speeter, executive director of the National Priorities Project, whose study found low- and middle-income families supply far more Army recruits than families with incomes greater than $60,000 a year.

That’s not fair. Moreover, when the vast majority of Americans depend on a small number of people to fight wars for us, the public stops feeling the toll such wars take.

From World War II until the final days of the Vietnam War, in July 1973, nearly every young man in America faced the prospect of being drafted into the Army.

Sure, many children of the rich found means to stay out of harm’s way. But the draft at least spread responsibility and heightened the public’s sensitivity to the human costs of war.

If we go into a ground war against ISIS, we should seriously consider reinstating the draft.

2. We must not sacrifice our civil liberties. 

U.S. spy agencies no longer have authority they had in the post-9/11 USA Patriot Act to collect Americans’ phone and other records. The NSA must now gain court approval for such access.

But in light of the Paris attacks, the FBI director and other leading U.S. law enforcement officials now say they need access to encrypted information on smartphones, personal and business records of suspected terrorists, and “roving wiretaps” of suspects using multiple disposable cell phones.

War can also lead to internment of suspects and suspensions of constitutional rights, as we’ve painfully witnessed.

Donald Trump says he’d require American Muslims to register in a federal data base, and he refuses to rule out requiring all Muslims to carry special religious identification.

“We’re going to have to do things that we never did before….we’re going to have to do certain things that were frankly unthinkable a year ago,” he adds.

We must be vigilant that we maintain the freedoms we are fighting for.

3. We must minimize the deaths of innocent civilians abroad.

The bombing raids have already claimed a terrible civilian toll, contributing to a mass exodus of refugees.

Last month the independent monitoring group Airwars said at least 459 civilians have died from coalition airstrikes in Syria over the past year. Other monitoring groups, including the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, also claim significant civilian deaths.

Some civilian casualties are unavoidable. But we must ensure they are minimized – and not just out of humanitarian concern. Every civilian death creates more enemies.

And we must do our part to take in a fair portion of Syrian refugees.

4. We must not tolerate anti-Muslim bigotry in the United States.

Already, leading Republican candidates are fanning the flames.

Ben Carson says no Muslim should be president.

Trump says “thousands” of Arab-Americans cheered when the Twin Towers went down on 9/11 – a boldface lie.

Ted Cruz wants to accept Christians refugees from Syrian but not Muslims.

Jeb Bush says American assistance for refugees should focus on Christians.

Marco Rubio wants to close down “any place where radicals are being inspired,” including American mosques.

It’s outrageous that leading Republican candidates for president of the United States are fueling such hate.

Such bigotry is not only morally odious. It also plays into the hands of ISIS.

5. The war must be paid for with higher taxes on the rich.

A week before the terrorist attacks in Paris, the Senate passed a $607 billion defense spending bill, with 93 senators in favor and 3 opposed (including Bernie Sanders). The House has already passed it, 370 to 58. Obama has said he’ll sign it.

That defense appropriation is larded with pork for military contractors – including Lockheed Martin’s F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, the most expensive weapons system in history.

Now Republicans are pushing for even more military spending.

We cannot let them use the war as a pretext to cut Social Security and Medicare, or programs for the poor.

The war should be paid for the way we used to pay for wars – with higher taxes, especially on the wealthy.

As we move toward war against ISIS, we must be vigilant – to fairly allocate the burdens of who’s called on to fight the war, to protect civil liberties, to protect innocent civilians abroad, to avoid hate and bigotry, and to fairly distribute the cost of paying for war.

These aren’t just worthy aims. They are also the foundations of our nation’s strength.

By Michael Lelyveld

Despite gains in developing renewable energy sources, China will remain the world’s biggest producer and consumer of coal for the next 25 years, international experts say.

Renewables like solar, wind and nuclear energy will provide nearly a third of China’s power by 2040, the Paris- based International Energy Agency (IEA) said in an annual report.

But although China’s coal consumption may be nearing a plateau, it will stay at high levels over a prolonged period, leaving it as the world’s largest single source of energy-related greenhouse gas (GHG), according to IEA data released earlier this month.

The influence of China’s emissions on global warming will peak and start to fade gradually over the forecast period as it reduces coal use and pursues its transition to a service- led economy with slower growth rates.

The IEA’s 700-page World Energy Outlook report has shifted its focus away from China and onto India for the first time, noting the impact of factors like industrial development and the needs of an estimated 240 million people who still lack access to electricity.

The numbers are a measure of the challenges that government leaders face as they gather at the United Nations climate change summit in Paris next week to reach an agreement on limiting global warming effects.

India will take over from China as the largest source of growth in world coal use, nearly doubling its consumption from 2020 to 2040, the report said.

That will make it a major source of carbon dioxide (CO2), surpassing the United States by 2035, according to the forecast.

In 2013, coal accounted for 29 percent of world energy but 46 percent of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions, the agency said in an earlier report.

As in China previously, developing India has argued that its emissions are proportionally far less than those of industrialized nations. On a per capita basis, India emits about one-tenth as much as the United States, the report said.

But coal use is expected to climb as India narrows the gap.

“All the numbers are indicating that India will be the number one country in terms of coal consumption worldwide,” the Washington Post quoted IEA executive director Fatih Birol as saying.

But the forecast data in the back of the IEA’s book suggests that displacing China as the top coal consumer and CO2 emitter will take a long time.

In 2040, China will still be burning twice as much coal as India and seven times more than the United States, according to the projections.

China’s share of world CO2 emissions will decline from 27.4 percent in 2020 to 24.9 percent in 2040, but it will dwarf the 14-percent portion of India and the U.S. share of 10.9 percent.

The numbers suggest that the shift of focus from China to India may be premature, said David Fridley, staff scientist at the China Energy Group of the U.S. Department of Energy’s Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory in California.

“The fact that Chinese coal demand has nearly tripled in 15 years to me continues to be the story, since it’s the single largest source from a single country of global emissions,” Fridley said in an email message.

Half the coal consumed in the world

Coal consumption and energy-related CO2 emissions are both expected to peak in China around 2030 in keeping with a landmark agreement reached with the United States last year.

China’s coal use in 2035 will be the same as in 2013, the report said. The country now accounts for about half the coal consumed in the world.

Despite the improvement, the long duration of China’s coal consumption at world-leading levels ensures that its emissions will remain a primary cause of global warming for the foreseeable future, since GHG effects on climate change are cumulative.

In 2040, China will burn 4.8 percent less coal than in 2030, while its CO2 emissions will be 3.3 percent less, according to IEA estimates.

Over the same period, coal use will rise 35 percent in India and fall 8.9 percent in the United States.

But even in 2040, China will still be using 63 percent more coal than the United States and India combined.

The projections are based on the IEA’s “new policies scenario,” which includes firm climate change commitments from countries, as well as announced intentions like carbon emissions trading that may not have implementation plans in place.

Based on those policies, the IEA estimates that global temperatures since the start of the industrial era will rise 2.7 degrees Centigrade (4.8 degrees Fahrenheit) by the end of the century, exceeding the United Nations’ danger limit of 2 degrees Centigrade (3.6 degrees Fahrenheit).

Greater efforts are possible under the IEA’s more ambitious scenario, which is designed to meet the 2-degree goal. But that would require China to reduce coal burning by over 20 percent in 2020-2030 with another 20-percent cut by 2040, based on the forecast data.

Barring a major policy change at the Paris summit, that seems unlikely to happen.

A separate report this month by the environmental group Greenpeace East Asia said that China is continuing to approve and build new coal-fired power plants with a 40-year lifespan at a rapid rate, although existing generators are severely underutilized.

The policy, driven in part by cheap coal prices and profits at the provincial level, could lock in patterns of coal consumption and emissions for decades to come.

There are also concerns that long-range emissions forecasts based on projections of declining economic growth in China could go widely off the mark if the government steps in with stimulus policies to stop the slide.

Fridley compared the uncertainty to forecasts of peak gasoline use in the United States several years ago during the recession. The predictions turned out to be wrong when the economy recovered and growth in fuel consumption resumed.

China’s slowdown could also be cyclical, particularly if the government decides to stem industrial losses with supplies of cheaper coal-fired power.

“I think in both cases, we’re seeing an inflection point, though not necessarily a continued decline,” Fridley said. “The China coal story isn’t over.”

China may have created even greater uncertainty about the forecasts of its emissions with a recent data revision showing that coal consumption for some years was understated by as much as 17 percent.

Fridley said the new census accounting for 2013, reported in a recent front page story by The New York Times, was known to his research team as far back as February, but the new figures imply the release of about 1 billion tons of additional CO2.

It is unclear whether more revisions are in the offing, but the inaccuracies may further cloud confidence in China’s official data and its emissions pledges for the Paris climate conference.

In a late amendment to its annual report, the IEA said the revised accounting from the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) would increase its estimate of China’s energy-related CO2 in 2040 by 1.7 percent.

(EurActiv) — Belgium maintained the highest security alert for Brussels on Monday with the metro system and schools to re-open only on Wednesday after authorities said there was an imminent threat of a Paris-style attack in the Belgian capital.

The alert level for Brussels would remain at the highest level four while in the rest of the country it would stay at three.

“We are still confronted with the threat we were facing yesterday,” Belgian Prime Minister Charles Michel told a news conference. He said potential targets remained shopping malls, shopping streets and public transport.

“I can confirm that the threat of an attack is serious and imminent,” Prime Minister Charles Michel said after a meeting with key members of his cabinet.

“We want progressively to return to normality…. Schools in Brussels will open on Wednesday and the metro on Wednesday as well. For the metro it could be in a progressive way,” he said.

Belgium Charges Suspect in Connection With Paris Attacks

A man arrested in a raid on Sunday has been charged in connection with the Paris attacks, the country’s federal prosecutor said, as the capital remained locked down on Monday., without giving the man’s name or any other details.

Prosecutors said that the people arrested on Sunday didn’t include Salah Abdeslam, a suspect in the Paris attacks who has been at the center of an international manhunt for over a week.

A further 15 people arrested on Sunday were released after questioning, the prosecutor’s office said. Three are still detained.

Brussels has been on its guard since it emerged that at least three jihadists behind the Paris assaults lived in the city. Abdeslam, who’s now the focus of an international manhunt, comes from the Molenbeek district of the capital. Belgian counter-terrorism officers have carried out 29 raids in Brussels, Charleroi and Liege within the last day, federal prosecutors said.

“The area around the Radisson Hotel is still silent, but just over 100 meters away, school-children are doing gym at a sports center: life continues”, said to MISNA from Bamako Niek De Goeij, representative in Mali of the Catholic Relief Service (CRS), whose offices are not far from the hotel that came under attack on Friday by an armed commando.

A second group, the Front de Liberation du Macina, also claimed the attack that left 27 dead, saying it acted in coordination with Ansar Dine (or Ansar Eddine). The attacks was conceived “in response against the Barkhane forces”, the French military mission currently engaged alongside the Malian army, stated Ali Hamma, spokesman of the armed group. The same organization was indicated as responsible for the attack also by Mali’s President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta, who had set aside previous claims by the Al Mourabitoun and al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.

Meanwhile, as three days of national mourning begin today, Bamako is attempting to return to its daily routine. “The city was quiet Saturday, though with a visible security force presence, while Sunday activities began to resume as normal”, added De Goeij. Also the CRS and other NGOs are gradually reopening their offices, despite the uncertainty. “Naturally, our first question was ‘what will happen now?’ It was the second attack after that in March against ‘La Terrasse’ club and the situation appears more complex, but the NGOs have already put in place stricter security measures, which should be enough to protect us”, concluded De Goeij.

“Those who fail to reconcile freedom and security fail in everything,” said European Parliament President Martin Schulz, citing the credo of late German statesman Helmut Schmidt, whose funeral he had just attended.

“Security has to be organized, but we must not let our freedom be curtailed by those who want to scare us,” Schulz said, adding that the brutal attacks on France ten days ago targeted Parliament’s values too. MEPs held a minute’s silence for terror victims everywhere, including Mali, Syria and Iraq.

Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, who died on 10 November, worked with French President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, to lay the foundations for the Euro and Economic and Monetary Union, Schulz recalled.

Mr Schmidt’s straightforwardness, principled intellectual brilliance, and analytical rigour were unique. He steered Germany confidently and with unparalleled leadership through difficult domestic and global economic times.

His credo on tackling terrorism, adapted from French philosopher Albert Camus, was “Those who fail to reconcile freedom and security fail in everything,” said Mr Schulz.

A Hindu group would like the existing Hindu shrine in the Prayer Room at Bryn Mawr College (BMC) campus in Pennsylvania to stay.

Hindu statesman Rajan Zed, in a statement in Nevada today, said that BMC needed to recognize the intersection of spirituality and education, which was important in Hinduism. He suggested that either the Hindu shrine should continue in the Prayer Room or BMC should provide designated and exclusive prayer-meditation hall to Hindu students for rituals, quiet reflection, festivals and spiritual exercise, which would help in their personal growth.

Zed, who is President of Universal Society of Hinduism, pointed out that it would be a step in the positive direction in view of reported presence of a considerable number of Hindu students at BMC, as it was important to meet their spiritual needs. Some other universities/colleges in USA now offered Hindu prayer rooms.

Moreover, Hindu students would need some religious objects to worship. Not having a prayer space in the campus would cause hardship to them as there was reportedly no Hindu temple in the campus vicinity, Rajan Zed indicated.

BMC should provide adequate security so that Hindu objects were not stolen again as it reportedly happened over the summer, Zed added.

The overall cultural image and treasures of the Autonomous Republic of Nakhchivan, are significantly enriched through the study of the Goynuk Fortress, Gulum Gulum Sacred Place, Ganza Bath House, Gulustan Tomb and the Gulustan Bridge.

The fifteen hundred years old architectural monument of Ganza Bath House in Ganza Village (Ordubad Region) is considered as one of the oldest monuments in Nakhchivan. It is located towards the North east section of Haji Huseyngulu Mosque. This religious monument was built by Haji Huseyngulu and belonged to the bath houses group of buildings.

When I visited this monument in late 2014, observed that the entrance to the bath house was on the North east side, the building was 22.6 meters in length, 9.4 meters in width and the total height was 5.6 meters. The 213 square meters bath house consisted of a cloak room and bathing with subsidiary rooms joined by two domes. The cloak rooms are joined by other corridors and little verandas. A pond with hot water was built near the bathing room. In ancient times the water was delivered to the pond by means of ceramic pipes from the mountains, it was filtered into a water tank, warmed up and reached the bathhouse and every pond. Visitors in the bath house would take hot water from the pond running into the bathing room and cold water from other tubes. Underneath the bathing room and adjacent rooms there are installed special heating channels. The bath-house had three smoke channels. Some of the differences that characterize this building were that the walls, dome and spanned ceilings have been built by stones. One of them is over the furnace to the south of bathing room; the other two are in the north of the bathing room.

The difference between these bathing houses from the ones of the Middle Ages is that the walls, dome and spanned ceilings of this have been built of stones. The inner ambience of the bath house is enlightened by smoke ducts installed in the dome and in the center of the spanning ceilings. Under the floor passed the tubes that were used to heat the water in the pond.

The architecture style belongs to Ajami who is the author of the geometric and semi geometric structures with glazed ornaments that are a breathtaking tradition that contribute towards strengthening the architecture heritage of Azerbaijan.

Gulustan tomb, located left to Aras River, is surrounded by pastures that once were ancient settlement buildings that unfortunately all have been destroyed. At the present there are the remnants of the walls hit by mortar in some places. One of them is 48 meters in length and 45 meters in width. During the excavations one can find glazed and unglazed ceramic items burned in pink color. The glazed archeological artifacts are a characteristic for the developed period of the Middle Ages. Based on the archeological discoveries, Gulustan tomb settlement has been established during the period of X-XIV centuries.

Gulustan Bridge or the ZIYA – UI MULK bridge, located over the Aras River, continues to be an important landmark in understanding the culture and architectural accomplishments of the Silk road era, well as remarkable complexities that Nakhchivan’s architects have applied over the centuries; these dynamic characteristics deserve a greater attention by UNESCO and other international organizations that address the preservation of cultural, archeological and ancient architecture monuments of the World. The region of Nakhchivan within the context of Azerbaijan’s wealth in cultural and architectural landmarks, has earned a special place due to its strategic location and its magnificent contribution towards adding important new perspectives in the study of world history.

The Ziya-UI Mulk Bridge was built of hewed stones where the Aras River was weaving, rubbing through the edges of the mountain base near Julfa. By establishing a bridge, the important role of an ancient city – the ruins of which are easily observed until today – that has became the center stage of the Silk Way. The bridge was very strong, had a very beautiful presence with two larger and ascending spans. On both sides of the higher bridge there was a door of stone. One of the spans was used as a caravan station. Construction techniques of this bridge continue to be admired by today’s international architects. At the present there are only five support structures of the bridge; all supports are in bad condition with the exception of the first column.

Stones of other columns are found in the area, a step bearing four lines of round shaped spaces is found, it is very likely that these structures were holding wood frames that helped support the area from river erosion, such hollows are seen in other sections of the bridge. In the section of bridge support, facing the river there are the remnants of a bid door divided into three parts with thin and high partitions as well as in the second support section inside the river there are three partitions. The wall remnants are the very same ones that were described in the works of Ali Yazdin, a middle ages historian who has extensively written about the Autonomous Republic of Nakhchivan. According to the Encyclopedia of Nakhchivan Monuments: “Lime solution and the rosy sandstone were used as the main construction materials in building the mosque, in different parts of the construction site, square angled bricks laying are still visible, which are a characteristic of this highly productive period. In 1386 Amir Teymur came to Nakhchivan from Marand and Zar Valley while using the connection established through this bridge. The remnants of ZIYA-UI MULK Bridge are called by the locals as the Bridge of Alexander. According to Hamdullah Gazvini, a XIV century historian, in his work “Nuzhat Algulub” (Entertainment of Hearts) asserts that the bridge was built by Ziya-Ul Mulk Nakhchivani, however there is no information about life and activity of this architect.

Gulustan Tomb, built in the Middle Ages, near Gulustan Village in Julfa region, was built under the influence of Momuna Khatun Tomb at the beginning of the XIII Century; it is included in the collection of tower shaped tombs of Azerbaijan. This unique piece of architecture was built of red sand stones, but it rostrum with original structure (cubic formed corners) built by hewed stones. Contrary to the other tombs in Azerbaijan, the vault of Gulustan tomb is situated above ground. The rostrum consists of section pyramid outside but cylindrical structure inside.

The upper pyramid section in plan turns into twelve angles and another chamber is built above. Due to their special importance, the government of Nakhchivan has recently decided to renovate the historic sites and monuments in Julfa region. The upper cover of the tomb was completely destroyed; unfortunately it is very difficult to ascertain the pyramidal cover of the tomb. As we have seen in other tombs designed by Ajami Nakhchivani, the Gulustan tomb has the same geometric designs that are present in other medieval tombs; according to the Nakhchivan Monuments Encyclopedia “there are three systematically repeated geometric designs in [in the upper-outer sides]. The body part joining with the bottom as well as the point of passage to the tower has been encircled with a belt of stalactite form. The structure of the Gulustan Tomb is unique, breathtaking and inspires many scholars who are keen to observe an exemplary structure where the square bottom section emerges as a perfect circle towards the upper section, from a cubic shape to a perfect conic base.

Gulustan Tomb is a living proof of the cultural unity between the ancient tribes of Azerbaijan and the Seljuq Empire during the XI-XIII centuries. Hope remains high in order for UNESCO to pay more attention and grand proper recognition to historic Nakhchivan, a remarkable landmark in order to further understand the life and works of human architecture and European culture.

BG Group said Monday it has taken a 35% holding in Block 12 offshore Cyprus which includes the Aphrodite gas discovery.

This upstream position provides a potential source of gas to Egypt where BG Group holds equity in the two train LNG export facility at Idku, as well as LNG offtake rights to lift 3.6 mtpa.

Operated by Noble Energy, the Aphrodite gas discovery is approximately 170 kilometres south of Limassol.

Completion of the transaction is subject to certain regulatory approvals as well as customary closing conditions.

By K.N. Pandita

Paris carnage shadowed the G-20 Antalya (Turkey) summit. Besides a press release summing up an economic and developmental agenda, the summit released a 9-point agenda on its fight against terrorism.

G-20 was not so specific and vociferous on its policy on terrorism in any of its previous summits. This shows that it takes terrorism seriously now even if the Mumbai carnage of 2008, which claimed over 200 innocent souls, did not scratch its humanistic sentiment.

The agenda merits very close study. Despite reassuring intentions, it demands clarification on a number of points. It has to be read along with the lengthy press statement of President Obama on terrorism, which was issued simultaneously. That shows how much hobbled is the thinking on terrorism. Contradictions are subtle.

The statement starts with condemnation of heinous attacks in Paris and Ankara, which “are not acceptable to G-20.” Are the attacks that happened prior to these two, including the 9/11 and 26/11, acceptable to G-20? Obviously not. All terrorist attacks are worthy of condemnation.

The summit speaks of the spread of terrorist organizations and the significant rise of terrorism globally. However, it does not shed any light on the reasons for spread of terrorist organizations. It does not make any mention of state-sponsored terrorist organizations. Without identifying regions/countries where terrorism has struck roots with the connivance of state agencies, including their armed forces, anti-terror resolutions lose their weight. G-20 members know the regions and countries since they are dealing with them.

The resolution “unequivocally condemns all acts, methods, and practices of terrorism, which cannot be justified under any circumstances, regardless of their motivation, in all their forms and manifestations, wherever and by whosoever committed.” Presuming that this is a firm commitment, the agenda says nothing about the “national liberation” slogan coined by terrorists in justification of their acts of terror. Terrorists legitimize their criminality by labeling it as struggle to liberate Islam from the stranglehold of big economic powers or “foreign occupational forces.” The resolution should have specifically stated which movement the G-20 considers a true national liberation movement, and which is outright terrorism. It should have highlighted the dividing line.

We may ask whether an armed movement is a genuine ‘national liberation movement’ when it begins its mission with ethnic cleansing of minorities. Terrorists usually project themselves as activists of national liberation movements.

This contradiction spills over to the UN Charter also, which allows external ‘moral, political and diplomatic’ support to a so-called “national liberation movement.” The US Constitution allows US intervention in regions of conflict to support national liberation movements. Clarification of this enactment becomes unavoidable in the light of the resolve of the G-20. The focus is on “national liberation movement.”

The United States in Iraq and Afghanistan, and Pakistan in Kashmir have taken shelter behind this provision of the UN Charter. Incidentally, as we say one man’s terrorist is another man’s hero, one country’s overt and covert intervention in another country is ‘humanistic support’ while similar action by another country is ‘intervention or illegal occupation.’

As far as financing channels for the terrorists are concerned, we know that terrorists raise trusts, charity organizations, NGOs, and other institutions as cover for receiving and disbursing funds. They seldom use banks channels. Many of these organizations have come up in G-20 member states. President Putin of Russia said that he knew about 40 organizations that are functioning in G-20 member states that play conspicuous roles in funding terrorism globally.

Even when a government in terrorist-affected country points out the involvement of specific international organizations in clandestine money laundering, the concerned countries, instead of investigating and checking the irregularity, try to shield or even justify it. That is a form of state-sponsored terrorism. The resolution should have made it clear that such institutions and agencies will be working against the law and against the interests of the mother country. If the country takes no action to curb their clandestine financial activities, international community should be empowered to deal with it effectively.

The resolution states that, “The fight against terrorism is a major priority for all of our countries…..” This sounds hollow when we look in retrospect. The most powerful and daring act of promoting terrorism was, first, the Soviet incursion into Afghanistan in 1979, and second, joint American and Pakistani response to it. This event laid the foundation of worst type of terrorism ever known to humankind.

American success in defeating the Soviets through a proxy war in Afghanistan became prelude to terror-proxying on the international plane. Not only that, its most devastating fallout was that of igniting the flames of Islamic religious extremism in the entire region. Afghanistan, with its shining history of secularism, was pushed into the vortex of the worst known sectarianism in the form of Taliban, thanks to General Babar of Pakistan, who had the blessings of Benazir Bhutto the then prime minister of Pakistan.

What an irony. Today the United States is fighting the same Taliban in whose shaping she played a crucial role. Today the U.S. is calling them terrorists and fundamentalists while they were her heroes and super cops when they were awash with Kalashnikovs.

Finally, the anti-terror resolution of G-20 states that, “continued and recent terrorist attacks all across the world have shown once again the need for increased international cooperation and solidarity in the fight against terrorism.” Did the world community cooperate with India when two decades ago India placed before it the looming threat to international peace in the wake of rising crescendo of religion-based terrorism in its part of the globe? Did they cooperate with India when external terrorists planned Mumbai carnage? Are they cooperating with India in asking the sponsors of Mumbai terrorism to bring the culprit to book? The summit calls for increased international cooperation only when terror has struck so fiercely in France.

What validity such a flamboyant statement can have when we know the U.S. has been selling sophisticated weapons and war material to such countries as are characterized by their own experts as the breeding grounds of international terrorism. Did not Pakistan’s former military ruler publicly acknowledge raising, abetting and sponsoring terror organizations on its soil to realize political goals? Has not the US categorized a number of organizations in such countries as “terrorist organizations” and imposed ban on them? The organizations were banned obviously after ascertaining their connections with benefactors, including those in the army. Was not Osama bin Laden found in a country that denied his presence on its soil until last moment?

In the final analysis, we hope that G-20 countries are serious in issuing the anti-terrorist statement in Turkey. It should not have minced words and adopted ambiguous polemics in addressing a crucial issue faced by the democratic and free countries around the world. It should have identified the countries that are irrefutably harboring terrorist organizations on their soil, providing them with all support under the rubric of “national liberation movements” and, in addition, projecting themselves as victims of terrorism.

The G-20 should have not only identified such countries but also notified them for imposition of UN sanctions. This would have convinced the world that G-20 is serious in combating terrorism. That would have sounded the death-knell to global terrorism.

This article was published by Geopolitical Monitor.com

By Susanna Mocker

‘Diversity is our pride and our strength’ declared Indian Prime Minister Modi at a public diplomacy spectacle in London last week. This was very reminiscent of President Juncker’s last state of the European Union address. The two unions of 28 and 29 states respectively, share a strategic partnership since 2004. On paper, the partners make a great couple: the world’s most populous democracy and an entity of 28 democracies considering itself a normative power; a subcontinent launching the ‘Make in India’ campaign and the world’s biggest trading bloc; a state seeking technological innovation and a union applying for one third of the world’s patents; a remarkably young country excelling in healthcare and a rapidly aging continent wondering how to take care of the elderly. India-EU relations certainly have a lot of potential but to date untapped potential. There was no EU-India summit since 2012 although Modi has visited France, Germany, Ireland and the UK in his 18 months as prime minister.

Why has the strategic partnership failed to take off? Being realistic about the meaning of strategic relationships, Godement remarks that ‘the term “strategic” refers more to the absence of divisive issues, than to a joint strategy in the traditional sense.’ The EU-India relationship, however, is characterized by a number of divisive issues. They can be divided into diplomatic sensitivities and deep-rooted structural problems. Both need to be tackled together. Sensitive issues include the unresolved case of two Italian marines who shot two Indian fishermen in 2012 and the EU’s ban on 700 generic drugs made and tested in India. This was a blow to India’s 20 billion USD pharmaceutical sector and contributed to the suspension of the FTA negotiations.

At a recent EU-India think tank conference in Delhi, the one statement made by most participants was ‘we need to get to know each other better.’ The supposedly shared values of the strategic partnership were never spelt out and the partners keep searching for common ground. For the EU democracy goes hand in hand with human rights and the Indian democracy is identified as lacking in this respect. As a post-colonial country, with a strong tradition of non-alignment, India is not eager to be preached to and wants to identify and tackle its own problems. Indian intellectuals also challenge European calls for comprehensive democracy by pointing towards the international system, which is in dire need of democratization. Home to one-sixth of humanity, India claims a seat at the table – in particular in the UNSC. The EU, unable to back this demand due to internal debate, stands to miss the opportunity to engage with an increasingly important BRICS member, who is in principle eager to constructively support the current world order. Apart from the stalled summit process the EU and India only meet in the margins of other international gatherings such as the G20. Additionally, limited staff in the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, imposes viable problems.

From a security point of view, the EU is deeply disappointed about India not backing the sanctions against Russia and Iran. India claims adherence to the principle of non-interference. A statement that can be doubted not only due to India’s recent interference in Nepalese affairs. Vice versa, Delhi fails to see how Brussels could help in balancing sensitive relations with Pakistan and the elephant in the room, China.

One way to do so would be trilateral cooperation with ASEAN, since both partners share the interest of strengthening the Association and its much needed Asian counterbalance to China. EU-ASEAN cooperation on maritime security, cyber security, counterterrorism and connectivity provides a good basis to be built upon in trilateral cooperation.

Trade is the remaining stronghold of EU-India relations. The EU is India’s number one trading partner with trade increasing from 28.6 billion EUR to 72.5 billion EUR between 2003 and 2014. However, the EU’s share of India’s overall trade decreases as the country diversifies its trade. The 2007 negotiations for a comprehensive FTA stalled due to Indian concerns about opening its markets. Red tape remains a considerable problem for trade and investment with India. In the ‘Ease of Doing Business Index’ India ranks as 130, while some EU member states rank as high as position 3. With TPP concluded, China pursuing ‘One Belt One Road’ in India’s neighbourhood and Modi pushing for economic reforms, there is a good chance to resume EU-India trade negotiations if the drugs issue is meaningfully addressed. In negotiating with a developing country, the EU needs to be more forthcoming. At the same time, the EU has been criticized for dropping the human rights clause that is usually a standard element in its FTAs, criticism that is only to become louder as freedom of expression and freedom of religion are sharply declining since Modi took office. Given both the chances and obstacles, the EU and India individually need to consider how much they are willing to pay for a comprehensive FTA, a minimal FTA or no FTA at all.

Inextricably linked to trade are sustainability and climate change. On the eve of COP21, the two partners could hardly be further apart. India remains a fierce proponent of ‘Common But Differentiated Responsibilities’ and will continue to use coal, the most polluting energy source, on a large scale. The EU should therefore seek to support domestic initiatives like ‘Clean Ganges’ or ‘100 Smart Cities’, while ensuring socially inclusive outcomes.

The wishful thinking of 2004 was replaced with a sense of disappointment in the EU-India relationship. In many ways the apparent disconnect is emblematic for the changes the world has meanwhile undergone. The EU should not miss the historic opportunity to engage with an important player of the coming decades and to be seen as a partner of rising powers, rather than a status quo power engaged in protectionism. A summit in early 2016 will be essential to kick-start relations but it should be well prepared and each side should have realistic expectations of what the other can deliver.

Ahmed (not his real name) is an Egyptian soccer fan—and a fugitive. He has been expelled from university, convicted twice in absentia, and sentenced to two long terms in prison. He moves around Cairo in a protective crouch, speaks in a low voice to avoid being overheard, and looks furtively over his shoulder as he organizes flash protests against the government of General-turned-President Abdel Fattah al Sisi.

Ahmed is a leader of a militant soccer fan group called Ultras Nahdawy (“ultra” is a term for a hardcore soccer fan first used in Italy). Like other such groups, it is constantly in danger of being banned by the Sisi government under new, sweeping anti-terror legislation that targets dissent as much as political violence. Ahmed sees Nahdawy, founded by soccer fans as a Muslim Brotherhood support group in 2012, together with the main anti-Sisi student organization, Students Against the Coup, as a healthy outlet for disaffected youth at risk of radicalization. “We don’t like violence but we are not weak”, Ahmad insists, sipping coffee in a hip café in a middle-class Cairo neighborhood. “Hope keeps us going. We believe that there still are options. We created options on Tahrir Square. This regime is more brutal [than the Mubarak regime] but there still are options.”

Yusuf Salheen echoes Ahmed’s words. A 22-year-old leader of Students Against the Coup, created in 2013 after security forces killed more than 600 people at a Brotherhood sit-in, he studies Islam at Cairo’s prestigious Al Azhar University. Salheen was luckier than Ahmed and more than 1,500 other students who have been detained by security forces, not to mention 2,000 others merely ejected from their institutions of higher learning: He defended himself successfully in a university hearing called to debar him. “We are absolutely concerned that if we fail things will turn violent. Going violent would give the regime the perfect excuse. We would lose all public empathy. We hope that Egyptians realize that there are still voices out there that are not giving up and are keeping protests peaceful despite all that has happened”, he said.

The concerns of Ahmed and Salheen are real. Sisi has brutally repressed all opposition, including the Muslim Brotherhood, which was banned as a terrorist organization immediately after the military coup in 2013 that deposed Mohammed Morsi, a Brother and Egypt’s first and only democratically elected president. The crackdown has left disaffected youth with a stark choice: Either apathetically accept a status quo in which the government fails to offer them any prospect of a socially and economically viable future, or engage in violent resistance. The student groups and soccer clubs try to offer a third choice: nonviolent resistance.

With stadiums closed to the public for much of the past four years to prevent them from becoming anti-government rallying points, militant soccer fans have had fewer opportunities to live out either their passion for their team or their frustration with Egypt’s politics. Nonetheless, there are multiple potential flashpoints to watch in the coming months.

One is the final outcome of the retrial of 73 people accused of causing the deaths of 74 members of Ultras Ahlawy (fans of storied Cairo club Al Ahli SC) in a politically motivated brawl in the Suez Canal city in 2012. The details of what happened in Port Said remain murky, but what is clear is that the national security forces manipulated the traditional rivalry between the Ahlawy and Masri fans and allowed the deadly brawl to proceed while ensuring that the Ahli supporters could not escape.

The accused include supporters of Port Said’s Al Masri SC as well as nine security officials and executives of the club. Many people believe that security forces began the brawl to punish Ahlawy for its role in toppling President Hosni Mubarak in 2011 and opposing the military government that succeeded him. A court sentenced 21 of the Al Masri fans to death in 2013, sparking a popular revolt in cities along the Suez Canal that forced then-President Morsi to declare an emergency and deploy troops to the region.

A June retrial reduced the number of death sentences to 11, but appeals are still pending. They could well spark the next confrontation. Whatever the court finally decides, one set of ultras—whether Al Masri’s Green Eagles or Al Ahli’s Ultras Ahlawy—is likely to express their anger at the verdict. Al Masri fans have already protested against the June development in the streets of Port Said.

A second court case and potential flashpoint involves 16 members of the Ultras White Knights (UWK), supporters of Al Ahli arch-rival Al Zamalek SC, who are charged with causing the deaths of 20 fans at Cairo stadium in February. Prosecutor Hesham Barakat and Zamalek President Mortada Mansour have accused the UWK of having accepted funds from the Brotherhood in return for provoking the stadium incident. Barakat asserted that some of the alleged Brothers had confessed to planning and funding the incident in an attempt to dissuade foreign investors.

To many people, the charges seem trumped up. Cairoscene, an Egyptian news website, opined that the assertion of a conspiracy between the UWK and the Brotherhood “seems ridiculous, considering there was clear evidence that security was mismanaged. Fans were forced to enter through one singular metal cage, which ultimately collapsed. At the same time police fired tear gas at the crowds arguably fuelling the stampede that resulted in many of the deaths.” The charges against the UWK reinforced the conviction of the group, shared by other ultras, that the regime is targeting them. ”We have no confidence in the justice system or the government’s willingness to ensure that justice is served”, said one UWK member.

Meanwhile, the ban on spectators in Egyptian stadiums, which was at the root of the Cairo stadium incident, continues to keep unrest high among fans. Repeated attempts to reopen stadiums have stalled, with the government, the clubs, and stadium owners failing to agree on what kind of security would be needed to prevent a resurgence of anti-government protests within the stadiums. Testing the water before a relaxation of the ban, Egypt’s interior ministry agreed to allow 25,000 fans to attend a November 17 qualifier between Egyptian teams for the 2018 World Cup qualifier against Mali. The game took place without incident in a stadium secured by the Falcon Group, a private security firm closely tied to Sisi. (It provided security for his 2013 election campaign and began securing universities with rebellious student bodies in the same year, causing many deaths and even more injuries.) This success may lead to a re-opening of stadiums under tight security. However, alarmed by the attacks in Paris that included a stadium, Egypt’s authorities will probably follow Turkey’s failed attempt to depoliticize stadiums by introducing electronic ticket systems that register personal details of spectators.

The fans got a chilling reminder of how the regime views them from a leak to Al Jazeera earlier this year. On an audio recording, Interior Minister Muhammad Ibrahim, a member of the Morsi government instrumental in overthrowing it and facilitating the military takeover, is heard discussing with senior officers of Egypt’s notorious Central Security Force (CSF) how the government can crack down on protesters. He suggests that the CSF should shoot protesters using anything “permitted by law without hesitation, from water to machine guns.” The meeting on the tape is thought to have occurred not long before a major anti-government protest in November 2014, at which police killed at least four people.

Ibrahim goes on to say that no attempt at political change in Egypt would succeed without the support of the military and the police—in his words, “the strongest institutions in the state.”

Egypt’s first groups of ultras emerged in 2007, inspired by similar groups in Serbia and Italy formed by militant fans who found each other online. The European ultras expressed their aggressive support for their clubs and artistic appreciation of the game through intimidating chants, poetry, banners, fireworks, flares, smoke guns, and continuous jumping up and down during matches. The Egyptian fans took up these passionate (and dangerous) displays with enthusiasm. They also adopted the ultras’ analysis of the power system governing the sport’s professional teams. It defines the fans as a club’s only true supporters, the club management as corrupt pawns of a repressive government, and players as mercenaries who offered themselves to the highest bidder. The Egyptian fans embraced the ultras’ principle, “All Cops are Pigs”, as their own—a no-brainer in a country whose security forces, to many the face of a repressive regime, are its most hated institution.

The ultras’ power analysis emboldened them to claim ownership of stadiums in a country that tolerated no independent or uncontrolled public space, and put them in direct confrontation with security forces determined to uphold the established order. But the ultras had an advantage: they aimed at the Achilles’ heel of the Mubarak regime.

Aside from the mosques, the stadiums were the only public spaces that the government could not simply shut down entirely, because nothing evokes the kind of deep-seated passion in Egyptians that soccer and religion do. Eager to crush the threat but recognizing the political benefits of influencing one of the most important activities in the lives of Egyptian men, the regime had little alternative but to fight for control.

The ultras’ regular clashes with security forces in the stadiums made the games a magnet for thousands of frustrated and angry youth, turning the sum total of rival fan groups into one of Egypt’s foremost social movements alongside the Brotherhood and labor. By the time mass protests against Mubarak erupted in early 2011, the ultras had become highly organized, politicized, street fight-hardened shock troops who formed the demonstrators’ first line of defense against security forces, persuading the protesters to stand their ground in Cairo’s Tahrir Square.

Ahmed and Salheen hope to repeat that performance in an environment that is far more repressive and brutal than the Mubarak era. In a replay of the ultras’ role in the toppling of Mubarak and the protests against subsequent military governments, Ahmed and his fellow ultras form the front-line defence against security forces in demonstrations on campuses and in popular neighborhoods. They use the same tactics of chanting, jumping up and down, and using flares and firework they employed in support of their clubs. Security forces have killed some 17 members of Nahdawy, which has branches in most Egyptian universities, in the past two years.

Between protesting and avoiding capture (or worse), Ahmed and Salheen have their plates full. Scores of ultras and students are on trial for protesting on campuses and in neighborhoods during the past two years, as well as for soccer-related actions like the storming of Zamalek’s headquarters and Cairo airport’s arrival hall.

The regime targets ultras not only on the streets and in the courts but also in the military, which asks conscripts whether they belong to a militant soccer fan group. Those that respond affirmatively are singled out. “They were immediately ordered to do 100 push-ups during which an officer shouted at them: ‘You are the lowest creatures. You sacrifice yourselves for your club, not for your religion or country’”, a conscript who hid his affiliation recounted. At the same time, fringes of Nahdawy and Students Against the Coup’s audience of ultras and students have grown increasingly radical.

“This is a new generation. It’s a generation that can’t be controlled. They don’t read. They believe in action and experience. They have balls. When the opportunity arises they will do something bigger than we ever did”, said one of UWK’s original founders, who has since distanced himself from the group. He said that Sisi would be unwise to repeat Mubarak’s mistake of underestimating the groundswell of anger and frustration among Egypt’s youth at the closing of the stadiums to the public and at the security forces’ strict control over university campuses.

Acharismatic radical can rise fast in the loose organization of the ultras. Said Moshagheb, a mesmerizing, under‐educated soccer fan, was representative of the thousands of angry young men joining protests in Egypt—except he managed to oust the UWK leaders and founders in a dramatic coup in 2012 involving a melee on the pitch of an Egypt-Tunisia game. Arrested in April 2015, he was acquitted in May of charges that he had been involved in a plot to kill Al Zamalek SC President Mortada Mansour, but he remains imprisoned. Sources close to the ultras as well as Moshagheb’s family said the UWK leader had been under police surveillance for some time for smuggling arms from the Sinai, the home base for jihadi groups linked to ISIS.

Other soccer fans have travelled to join the terror group itself. A former leader of Ultras Ahlawi in the Mediterranean port city of Alexandria, Rami Iskanderiya, joined the Islamic State, the jihadist group that controls a swath of Syria and Iraq, and married a Syrian woman in the group’s Syrian stronghold of Raqqa. A third ultra, Hassan Kazarlan, was in Turkey en route to Syria when he was persuaded to return to Egypt after security forces detained his father as a hostage.

Moshagheb, Iskanderiya, and Kazarlan exemplify one response to the repression of the Sisi regime and the violence that followed the general’s overthrow of Morsi in 2013. Groups like Ultras Nahdawy and Students against the Coup hope to stymie this response. But it is difficult, and growing more so.

“Take Alf Maskan [an Islamist stronghold in Cairo]”, said an ultra and student activist. “Alf Maskan is a traditionally conservative, Islamist neighbourhood. Youth have nothing to look forward to. They are hopeless and desperate. They join our protests but their conversation often focuses on admiration for the Islamic State. They are teetering on the edge. We are their only hope, but it’s like grasping for a straw that ultimately is likely to break.”

“Success for us is our survival and ability to keep trying. The government wants to provoke us into becoming violent. Two years later, we are still active. . . . We can promise only one thing: we will stay on the street. To us football is politics; politics is in everything. That’s why we tackle politics”, Ahmed explained.

Though they oppose the regime, the soccer fans are not partisans of the Muslim Brotherhood. “Many of us are Islamists. I am a member of the Brotherhood, but that is not why we supported the Brotherhood. We don’t want to be inside the Brotherhood or the system. We supported Morsi not because he was a brother but because we wanted a revolutionary force to be in government. The Brotherhood was the only revolutionary force that had a candidate and popular support and was part of the [2011] revolution”, Ahmed said. Since there is now no alternative in sight to the military dictatorship, Ahmed and his fellow fans will go their own way.

Back in the early 20th century, celebrations of Al Ahli’s victories by anti-colonial and anti-monarchical soccer fans often exploded into anti-British protests. Twelve years after the club’s establishment, university student fans led anti-British demonstrations during the 1919 revolution. That uprising, fuelled by deep-seated resentment of British manipulation of the economy, the heavily British-staffed bureaucracy, and the war-time requisitioning of Egyptian assets, led to Egypt’s independence three years later.

The chants of protesting student soccer fans a century ago reverberate today in updated form in universities that have become security force-controlled fortresses and in flash protests in popular neighbourhoods. Almost a hundred years ago, students adapted a song written by Sayed Darwish, an Egyptian singer and composer widely viewed as the father of Egyptian popular music:

“We are the students

We don’t care if we go to prison, nor do we care about the governorate

We’re used to living on bread, and sleeping with no blankets

Al Ahli against the British Rule.”

Today they proclaim that “the students are back,” a slogan inspired by a song by Imam Mohammed Ahmed Eissa, a composer and singer known for his political songs that focus on the plight of the poor.

Students shaped Egypt’s history again later in the 20th century, by rejuvenating the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1970s. The Brotherhood had been withering under a brutal crackdown by Gamal Abdel Nasser that had forced many of its leaders to go underground or leave the country, but after Nasser died in 1970, it slowly began to revive. “Even as they rebelled against the tenets of Nasserism, the youth of this period were the products of its socioeconomic policies, from increased urbanization to greater access to education. . . . The real story of this era revolves around a vibrant youth movement based in Egypt’s colleges and universities,” said historian Abdullah Al-Arian, author of Answering the Call, Popular Islamic Activism in Sadat’s Egypt, in an interview with the online publication Jadaliyya.

For men like Ahmed and Salheen, however, the modern youth movement is less about the Brotherhood and more about aligning Islamists and revolutionary forces that run the gamut from liberal to conservative, from left to right, and from secular to religious in a united front against autocracy. “It’s not about Morsi; we have bigger fish to fry than Morsi. Most of us no longer believe in the slogan in returning Morsi to office. Thousands are suffering. I don’t give a damn about Morsi. Anything is better than this regime. There are two approaches, the reformist and the revolutionary one. We have seen dramatic shifts since 2011. Both Tahrir Square and Sisi’s junta were dramatic twists. I and many like me believe that another twist is possible even if that will take time,” Salheen said.

The uphill battle of soccer fans and students for political change is not only hampered by the government’s relentless repression. It also is stymied by the widespread apathy of an Egyptian public disillusioned by the failure of the 2011 revolt to bring reform, tired of political volatility, and desperate to see their country return to stability and trickle-down economic growth. These Egyptians may not be starry-eyed about Sisi’s ability to deliver, but they see no viable alternative.

As a shopkeeper in one of Cairo’s upmarket neighborhoods put it, “The protesters have nothing to offer. The government will crush them. Sisi is not perfect, but he’s all we have. What we need is stability to turn the economy around. If that means putting people in jail, so be it.”

This article appeared in The American Interest and is reprinted with permission.

Sometime in the first quarter of 2015, an unnamed 20-year old class 12 pass out from Azamgarh, Uttar Pradesh travelled to Syria through Turkey to join the Islamic State. In September 2015, he called his parents from Raqqa and said he wanted to return home. He was reportedly frustrated with his time spent with Islamic State fighters. He also feared for his life. In November 2014, Areeb Majeed, one of the four youths from Kalyan, Maharashtra who had travelled to Iraq/ Syria to join the Islamic State in August 2014 returned home. Although some earlier reports detailed his frustration after being tasked by the Islamic State to carry out menial jobs like toilet cleaning, recent reports quoting the charge sheet prepared by the investigative agencies indicate that he had grown homesick and returned after his family pressured him to come back even at the risk of getting arrested. Apart from these two instances of rather swift disillusionment with the grand design of the Islamic State, most of the journeys undertaken by Indians to Iraq and Syria belong to the narrative of unrepentant adventurism and religious extremism.

The Indian government initially asserted that no Indian Muslim would ever join a foreign terrorist organisation. However, it now accepts that about 23 Indian youths have joined the Islamic State so far, out of which six have died, one has returned and the rest are possibly still with the outfit. It also says that 30 people have been stopped from travelling to Iraq and Syria. In addition, nearly 150 youths in the country, mostly from South Indian states, are under the surveillance of security agencies for their alleged leanings towards the Islamic State. Given the pull impact the outfit has over several countries in South and Southeast Asia this could be a highly conservative estimate. Private estimates of the number of Indians with the Islamic State by the same intelligence agencies who feed the government are far higher.

Notwithstanding the debate over the actual numbers, the article argues that it is possible to draw patterns from incidents in which Indians have either joined or attempted to join the Islamic State or have worked on behalf of the outfit within India. This exercise excludes the Indian nationals based in foreign countries or people of Indian origin who travelled to Iraq and Syria. The patterns drawn conform to the overall objective of the Islamic State to attract a wide range of people to either spend their lives in the Caliphate, fight on behalf of the outfit, and indulge in propaganda activities at the behest of the outfit as unpaid volunteers and recruiters. This further confirms the fact that far from being outdone by official denials, domestic factors that inhibit Indian Muslim youth from joining the outfit and the anti-Islamic State decrees issued by the Muslim organisations, some Muslim youths in the country have felt the need to join the Islamic State’s war efforts.

Seven specific patterns can be inferred from such journeys that include both physical as well as ideological relocations. These patterns help in understanding whether and in what form the Islamic State may be able to reinforce itself within India in the coming months and identifying potential areas for government intervention to prevent such journeys from being undertaken.

Firstly, timing of the recruitment, journeys and attempted journeys of majority of the Indians to become a part of the narrative of the Islamic State can be linked to the outfit’s Declaration of the Caliphate in June 2014. Travel of four youths from Kalyan, Maharashtra to Iraq to join the Islamic State is probably the most known episode in the short history of outfit’s designs on South Asia. That took place within two months after the IS caliphate declaration. Similar is the case of two college students from Kerala who went missing from their homes in July 2014 and landed in Syria to join the Islamic State. The declaration also marked the beginning of the waving of the Islamic State’s flags in Kashmir. Subsequent months saw a further rise in mobilisation efforts that resulted in further recruitment.

Secondly, IS recruitment peaked after the outfit’s declaration of the Wilayat Khorasan in January 2015. Coinciding with the declaration, at least two groups of men and women attempted to join the outfit. Fourteen engineering students from Hyderabad attempting to travel to Syria were arrested at the Hyderabad airport on 6 May 2015. Similarly, nine Indians who had travelled to Istanbul on tourist visas and attempted to cross the border into Syria, were deported to India by Turkish authorities on 30 January 2015. The group included 24-year Ibrahim Nowfal from Hassan and Javed Baba from Telengana. The other seven members belonged to a Chennai based family identified as Muhammad Abdul Ahad, his wife and five children.

Thirdly, while from all over the world, the Islamic State has managed to recruits psychopaths and adventure seekers, drawn from the disaffected populations, in India, mostly the young and educated men from well do families appear to have fallen to its radical pulls. Anwar Hussain, a minivan driver from Bhatkal, who was killed near Kandahar, was the only one among the Indian IS aspirants who came from a humble background. A large number of them had western education. Muhammad Abdul Ahad finished his Masters Computer Science from Kennedy-Western University, California; 32 year Salman Mohiuddin from Hyderabad had an MS degree from Texas Southern University in Transportation Planning and Management; the 19-year old Jabin from Kerala pursued school education in UAE; and the lone Kashmiri to have joined the outfit, the 26-year old Adil Fayaz was an MBA student at Queensland University in Australia. The rest including the four youths from Kalyan, Haneef Waseem, the 26 year old from Hyderabad, who had been killed while fighting on behalf of the IS, and many others were engineering or college students. The attraction of the Islamic State among the educated and tech savvy has been profound.

Fourthly, a definite linkage has developed between existing home grown Islamist terrorist outfits and the Islamic State. Membership of the former has overtime facilitated the shift to the Islamic State. Among the five Indians killed while fighting on behalf of the outfit are Abdul Qadir Sultan Armar from Bhatkal and Bada Sajid, both leaders of the Students’ Islamic Movement of India (SIMI)/ Indian Mujahideen (IM). Armar’s brother Shafi Armar is currently the emir of Ansar al-Tauhid (AAT), a recruitment organization for the Islamic State based in Pakistan. The IM has lost ground within India and its Pakistan based leadership has fractured with one faction joining the Islamic State. The fact that a radical past forms a useful background to join the Islamic State facilitates the transition from the existing and yet ineffective organisation was also clear from the busting of the five member Islamic State module in the country led by Imran Khan Muhammad Yusuf. Yusuf was arrested along with four others from Ratlam in Madhya Pradesh in April 2015. A drop out from a undergraduate business course he was a member of a Islamic proselytising and charity group.

Fifthly, in all the known cases so far, online radicalisation indeed played an important part. Islamic State social media pages and Islamist forums have been the usual meeting points between recruiters and these youths. The arguably coherent and learned interpretation of Islam deeply rooted in prophetic methodology as well as its regressive practices have found reverberations in the youths attempting to join the outfit. This appeared to have impacted the youths with an inclination towards more puritanical sect of Islam. Areeb Majid, for example, told his interrogators that he was a follower of the Ahl-e-hadith sect and rebelled against the use of Bollywood songs during religious congregations and was impressed by Fahad Shaikh (the other youth from Kalyan) when Shaikh pulled out the loud speaker from a vehicle during a religious procession to stop Bollywood music from being played. Before he left for Iraq, Majeed even left a note censuring his family for “sinning”, “living luxurious lives”, “watching television” and “not praying”. Zuber Ahmed Khan, a journalist from Mumbai, who was arrested on 7 August 2015 for attempting to join the outfit, wrote on his blog that “the IS does not betray those who help it on the basis of religion.”

Sixthly, such online radicalisation has further been backed up by a rather large group of facilitators/ recruiters who not only spotted the potential recruits, motivated them and even made logistical arrangements for their journey. Mansoor Biswas, an employee in a multinational firm who handled the twitter handle @Shamiwitness to propagate IS-related news is well known. While Biswas, arrested in December 2014, remained the only known amplifier of Islamic State related news in India, people like Haja Fakkurudeen Usman Ali, a Tamil Nadu resident and Afsha Jabeen, a lady from Hyderabad have played important role in directly recruiting people for the Islamic State. In case of the unnamed youth from Azamgarh mentioned in the beginning of the article, an Indian origin recruiter based in the UAE for the 25 years was instrumental. While the young man was believed to have been drawn to the Islamic State propaganda while surfing internet websites and chatrooms, it was through the UAE contact that he finalised his plans of travelling to Turkey. The intelligence agencies have a list of about 55 such facilitators/ recruiters. It is possible that most of these recruiters are part of the long established recruitment network associated with outfits like the IM/SIMI.

Lastly, majority of the recruitment and mobilisation have indeed taken place within regions with a long history of Hindu-Muslim divide, radicalisation and from the traditional recruitment grounds of proscribed outfits like the SIMI and the IM. A large number of these places are located within the states which also have witnessed Islamist terrorist incidents. Thus, a definitive linkage between existing religious divide, growth of extremism, and an existing radicalisation and mobilisation network can be established.

*Dr. Bibhu Prasad Routray is Director of Mantraya.org

By Olaya Alvarez

TTIP is a trade and investment deal between U.S. and the European Union, which is currently being negotiated, and whose purpose is to set up a free trade area cutting red tape[2], setting new coordinated rules and eliminating trade barriers.

In order to understand the agreement’s character, it is important to bear in mind that at present, U.S. and EU average tariffs are already under the 3%[3]. Thus, the core of this agreement is more likely ‘regulatory harmonization’, than the abolition of traditional trade barriers.

Among the main themes tackled by the treaty are the provisions of trade in goods and customs duties, services, culture (although audio-visual and copyright sectors are excluded), public procurement, the rules of origin[4], regulatory co-operation[5], and new rules[6].

Pursuing the explanation given by the European Commission, these are the main principles upon which negotiations are based[7]:

• No decrease of standards; but reinforce them
• Regulatory cooperation
• Domestic regulatory frameworks kept without changes

What appears of general consensus is that the main objective is protectionism to be abolished, as well as treat equally U.S. and EU companies. From this premise, several outcomes could derive in the future, most of them still remain uncertain. To this doubtful state of affairs must be added the secret character of negotiations, which are being performed among stakeholders and EU and U.S. representatives; thus, close to public debate.

When concerns within a sensitive field are manifested, European institutions strongly sustain that in any case standards will not be diminished, but improved. However, it is clear some prerogatives must be conceded by both parties within a negotiation process. Hence, it appears questionable legislative harmonization does not imply, in any sphere, a thresholds’ reduction. Furthermore, what would be the indirect outcomes of such harmonization? Beyond the concretely content ruled in the agreement, European and U.S. systems are significantly different, and important consequences could be derived even if not predicted.

As example, within the field of public contracts. At what point it will not involve any consequence in relation to labour law or environmental protection? Or in relation to the standards, (food safety, people’s rights at work and environmental protection) it is said that are not up for negotiation, and the precautionary principle[8] is upheld. But, to what extent the regulatory harmonization will affect this issues? European institutions have sustained the workers’ protection standards will be in accordance with ILO instruments[9], but this response does not clarify the agreement’s content in that point, if contained.

Referring to energy sector, it appears unclear at what point sustainable sources of energy would be promoted, or it will mean that Europe will import more fossil fuels from U.S. such as oil or natural gas, in detriment of eco-friendly sources. And, in any case, open the market to an energy power such as U.S. in terms of open access and competition will clearly derive in a non-sustainable industry of coal in Europe.

In regard to safety standards, it is said they will not be compromised, but will align technical requirements where possible: What direction the changes will adopt?

With respect to banned substances, as in the cosmetics field, it is affirmed the 1372 European banned substances will be maintained and, simultaneously EU and the U.S. would benefit from the cooperation in new scientific assessments. Nevertheless, what would be the criteria in relation to those? Would the European Union allow new substances would not allow in a previous state of affairs?

The investor-state dispute settlement issue remains still unclear, as of 16 September 2015, the European Commission has proposed a new disputes resolving system in all ongoing and future EU investment negotiations: the Investment Court System[10]. This new Court would reinforce the governments’ regulation, and would have an Appeal Tribunal. For the nonce, more concrete data are needed in order to build up a consistent opinion.

In relation to the potential impact worldwide, it appears clear that, removing customs duties and other barriers to trade, as legislative obstacles, the trade flow between US an EU will be increased. In doing so, it is estimated that countries close to the US and European production networks will increase their incomes, whilst countries within the Asian sphere such as China, Japan or South Korea would be negatively affected. Furthermore, other emerging countries which currently benefit from the trade barriers between EU and US, will be disserved[11]. In addition to that, in terms of world geopolitical balance, this agreement will reinforce the role of the two most powerful economies in the world.

Several questions arise, as the agreement’s sphere results are thundering. In spite of which, public debate is not taking place, and bargaining still remains reserve to the considered as ‘high spheres’. This does not just question the democratic heritage of democracy’s cradle, but could pose legitimation issues associated with bargaining powers. To what point European citizenship supports this agreement, given that information is not being provided?

Concluding, latter consequences will be discovered, in any case, after the agreement’s signing. Nonetheless, citizens must be given the legitimate right to an open debate, with updated information, and access to drafts periodically.

Notes:
[1] From a European Perspective.
[2] Meaning the reduction of bureaucratic obstacles to act.
[3] http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/united-states/
[4] ‘Criteria needed to determine the national source of a product.’ Source: World Trade Organization.
[5] In fields such as food safety and animal and plant health, chemicals, pesticides, pharmaceuticals, vehicles, etc.
[6] Concerning sustainable development, intellectual property rights, competition, small and médium-sized enterprises, or energy and raw materials, among others.
[7] TTIP round 10. Statement by EU chief negotiator Ignacio Garcia Bercero. Brussels, 17 July 2015.
[8] Consists on a risk management principle within the decision-making phase, by virtue of which if an action or policy could potentially have adverse effects, and if after the scientific data evaluation it leads to scientific uncertainty, the burden of proof is for those who took the action.
[9] http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/january/tradoc_153013.1%20TSD.pdf
[10] http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5651_en.htm
[11] What should development policy actors do about the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)?. German Development Institute. Briefing Paper 1/2015.

The New York Times reports: Turkish fighter jets on patrol near the Syrian border shot down a Russian warplane on Tuesday after it violated Turkey’s airspace, a long-feared escalation that could further strain relations between Russia and the West.

The Russian Defense Ministry confirmed that one of its jets, a Sukhoi SU-24, had crashed in Syria but said it had been downed “presumably as a result of shelling from the ground.”

The Russian Defense Ministry also asserted that, “The plane stayed exclusively above the territory of Syria throughout the entire flight,” and said that the two pilots had ejected.

The Turkish military did not identify the nationality of the plane but said in a statement on its website that its pilots fired only after repeated warnings to the other warplane.

“The aircraft entered Turkish airspace over the town of Yaylidag, in the southeastern Hatay province,” the statement read. “The plane was warned 10 times in the space of 5 minutes before it was taken down.” [Continue reading…]

A map released by Turkey shows the flight path of the Russian jet.

The finger of Turkish territory crossed is less than two miles wide. An aircraft flying at 600mph would take less than 10 seconds to enter and exit.

Given the warnings they have already received from Turkey, it’s hard to imagine that Russian pilots don’t pay close attention to their proximity to the Turkish border and, for that reason, it seems somewhat unlikely that this infringement was accidental.

At the same time, if this was a calculated provocation, it seems likely that it was calculated to be a taunt so brief that it would not result in an armed response.

The Russians seem to have miscalculated. The question now, is: have the Turks miscalculated too?

My guess — nothing more than that — is that the Russians will protest loudly while much more quietly looking for ways to deescalate.

Bloomberg reports: President Vladimir Putin accused Turkey of being accomplices of terrorism for shooting down a Russian warplane in Syria, warning of “very serious consequences” for relations.

“We understand that everyone has their own interests but we won’t allow such crimes to take place,” Putin said at talks with Jordanian King Abdullah in Sochi. “We received a stab in the back from accomplices of terrorism.”

Putin spoke after Turkey said two F-16 jets shot down a Russian warplane that violated its airspace near the border with northwestern Syria, roiling global markets and marking the first direct clash between foreign powers embroiled in the civil war. Russia’s Defense Ministry denied the plane had ever crossed the border and said it may have been hit by ground fire. Turkey’s action is the first time in decades that a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has downed a Russian military aircraft. [Continue reading…]

On October 6, Russia’s state-owned news agency, Sputnik, reported: The US and Turkey have threatened to shoot down Russian warplanes if they stray into Turkish airspace, following two accidental, momentary violations of the Syria-Turkey border by Russian military aircraft.

“Turkey’s rules of engagement apply to all planes, be they Syrian [or] Russian…Necessary steps would be taken against whoever violates Turkey’s borders, even if it’s a bird”, the Brussels-based online newspaper EUobserver quoted Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu as telling the TV broadcaster HaberTurk on Monday.

US Secretary of State John Kerry concurred, saying the violation might result in a ‘shootdown’. [Continue reading…]

The defeat in the re-elections of the UN Human Rights Council is being viewed as a humiliating failure of Pakistan. However, one should try to decipher as to what went wrong. Is it actually a diplomatic failure or is there something more to the whole episode?

The fact that Pakistan had been successfully holding the membership for past three terms and was considering running for the council’s presidency, signifies that Pakistani representatives were riding high on the confidence quotient. Why then despite this confidence, Pakistan ended up losing the seat. Couldn’t it foresee the possibility of losing or was it just simply unimaginable for Pakistan? Was it being overconfident or was it lagging somewhere; may be not enough of lobbying was done before the elections to gather the sufficient support. Who among the member states decided to withdraw their support for Pakistan and left it in a lurch? All of these speculations need to be scrutinized in order to not only find the reasons but to learn from them to avoid the mistakes in the future. However it is quite difficult to disentangle the knots and reveal what and who among these is the real culprit since the whole procedure of casting the votes is done through secret balloting.

Nonetheless the repercussions are manifold. Pakistan is dealing not just with a diplomatic failure but a psychological shock as well. The humiliation has caused Pakistan to lose confidence in international community where Pakistan despite holding the seat for three terms is suddenly not seen eligible for the membership by the majority. It also points to the decline in the international prestige. Most of all Pakistan fears that its voice on the issues related to human rights violation in Kashmir done by India, might not be given due hearing at the international forum. This might weaken Pakistan’s case against India on the Kashmir issue.

Looking at the possible reasons, one commonly being quoted is that the defeat is the result of Saudi’s estrangement in the backdrop of Pakistan’s neutral stance over the Yemen conflict. Although it might sound logical but one also has to keep in mind that GCC states have always had a give and take relationship with Pakistan. Indeed they have been a major block supporting Pakistan on various regional and international issues but simultaneously Pakistan had been returning the favor by committing for their interests more than it possibly could. Pakistan sent thousands of soldiers to safeguard KSA in 1980s. Similarly KSA extended huge financial help for Pakistan’s nuclear program. Hence a single incident of Yemen conflict cannot possibly damage the long history of trust and partnership between the two.

In fact there is no concrete evidence that the relationship has fallen victim to the Yemen Conflict. However if one buys the argument that there came a cool patch in the relationship as being dubbed by the Saudi media, then there is some lesson for Pakistan to learn from this. Pakistan needs to work towards mending the relations but not at the expense of its own national security interest. Pakistan should try to convince the Saudi counterparts about the genuine inability to spare forces as they are already engaged in FATA, as well as along the border of Afghanistan, and in war against terrorism.

It is also said that Pakistan is being targeted for legalizing the hangings of convicted criminals, which didn’t sit well with the proponents of Human Rights. In this context again two main points are needed to be kept in mind; One, executions are not prohibited under any law, they are only largely discouraged. Otherwise membership of states like KSA should have been revoked long time ago for the record number of executions which are continuously on the rise and where punishments like flogging and stoning are considered legal and effective punitive measures. Secondly, despite having a long history of sufferings at the hands of terrorists, Pakistan lifted the moratorium on death penalty only early this year after the devastating attack on a School in Peshawar.

Hence the international community needs to realize that Pakistan is not doing anything illegal or unjustified rather it should support Pakistan for taking concrete measures against terrorist elements. Therefore this very fact cannot and should not by any means be used against Pakistan at forums like Human Rights Council.

Also, GCC states only amount to 6-7 countries in a huge pool of 193 member states of the council, out of which Pakistan could hardly get 105 votes. This shows that either Pakistan’s performance on the whole has been deemed unsatisfactory collectively by most of the nations or Pakistan did not do enough lobbying for the elections, an important area that should not have been neglected.

Only KSA’s estrangement, if there is any, cannot be taken as a sole reason behind the defeat. Pakistan needs to work on the lobbying dimension too. No one can deny that Pakistan is the only country hosting largest number of refugees. Therefore, Pakistan can reclaim its position by highlighting this point more effectively.

*The author works in the Strategic Vision Institute, Islamabad and can be reached at sadia.kazmi.svi@gmail.com

Olivier Corel is the latest person wanted by French police investigating the deadly Paris attacks.

Known as the “white emir”, the 69-year-old Imam is suspected of being the mentor of Mohamed Merah, who killed seven people in the southwestern city of Toulouse in 2012.

Corel is also said to be close to Fabien Clain, a French Muslim convert, who detectives have identified as a voice claiming responsibility for Islamic State (Daesh).

The hunt, meanwhile, continues for Brussels barkeeper Salah Abdeslam, who returned to the city from Paris hours after the attacks.

Police are now examining what appeared to be an explosive belt found on Monday night in a rubbish bin in the town of Montrouge, south of Paris.

Sources say it is too soon to tell if the belt had been in contact with Abdeslam, whose elder brother blew himself up during the gun and suicide bomb attacks.

Original article

US Permanent Representative to the United Nations Samantha Power commended the commitment of the Sri Lankan government for a sustainable reconciliation during past ten months.

She made these remarks when she visited President Maithripala Sirisena on Monday at the Presidential Secretariat.

Power said the new government is performing in a more trustworthy and acceptable manner in implementing of the process of reconciliation. She suggested broadening the relationships between the officials and the institutions who are implementing this program.

She commended the transformations that are being made in the country and stated that there is a new awakening in the country due to those changes.

“It is commendable that the President of Sri Lanka, Maithripala Sirisena is giving up the power while the leaders of Asia and Africa are trying to centralize the power in their hands. This is a worthy example for the world leaders,” Power said.

Power stated these new political reforms in the country would definitely result in economic benefits. “Sri Lanka will emerge as a beacon light due to them”, she said. She also said the international community is observing the new program of Sri Lanka.

President Sirisena thanked the US government for the assistance provided for reconciliation process in the country. He further said that the reconciliation process will based on finding the truth, giving justice and ensuring non-recurrence.

Sirisena pointed out here that they have to work with different types of social groups with different ideologies inn this regard and Sri Lanka is a country which faced many challenges. “In that context the government has the responsibility to act patiently,” Sirisena said.

Sirisena apprised the Ambassador regards the steps taken by the government during the past ten months to ensure freedom, strengthen democracy and eliminate poverty.

Sirisena said that he was able to hand over the power to the Parliament and to the independent commissions which was centered on executive presidency.

Sirisena further said that the government will continue to work with commitment to the release of lands in the North and resettlement process for the remaining displaced person as well as the development of those areas.

Foreign Minister Mangala Samaraweera and Austin Fernando- President’s advisor on Foreign Affairs also gave a brief description at this event.

Mr. Atul Keshap, US Ambassador to Sri Lanka, also participated in this event.

Officers from the Provincial Information Brigade of the National Police in Madrid, in collaboration with the Secretariat-General of Penitentiary Institutions, arrested a prisoner on Monday at the Penitentiary Centre in Segovia.

The prisoner was trying to recruit and indoctrinate, from prison, inmates for Islamic State (DAESH) with the intention of training them in the ideals of the terrorist group. Furthermore, the inmate is accused of an offence of threats in the name of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of this criminal group.

The detainee, originally from Morocco, 42 years of age, is serving out a sentence for offences relating to gender-based violence and is considered to be fully radicalised. The detainee fundamentally aimed his work at recruiting other inmates whose sentences were on the verge of being completed.

This arrest has been carried out within the framework of Operation Khalya, in which another two people were arrested on 26 October for sending threatening letters. These two arrests also took place at penitentiary centres. The operation was carried out within the National Strategic Plan to Fight Violent Radicalisation (Spanish acronym: PEN-LCRV), which contains a specific section given over to combating radicalisation in penitentiary centres.