Saturday night turned into a horror movie at London’s Leytonstone underground station as an attacker slashed a person’s throat while shouting “this is for Syria.” Police, who had difficulty detaining the man with only a Taser, are now treating the incident as a terror act.

The attack took place in the ticket hall at Leytonstone station. Witnesses described a horrific scene, with a pool of blood on the floor and the attacker shouting, while threatening to stab others.

The victim, who reportedly had his throat cut, was transported to a hospital and remains in a serious condition with multiple stab wounds, according to paramedics.

“We are treating this as a terrorist incident,” the head of the London police’s Counter Terrorism Command, Richard Walton, said in a statement.

A total of three people were injured in the incident – one seriously and two with only minor wounds, according to police.

London police declined to comment on the reports that the attacker was shouting comments about Syria.

Police used a Taser on the suspect to apprehend him, as he repeatedly resisted arrest. A video emerged showing the attacker scuffling with an officer.

Another man can be heard chastising the already detained suspect in a separate video, repeatedly telling the attacker “You ain’t no Muslim, bruv.”

A witness provided express.co.uk with a detailed account of the attack, claiming that Syria was mentioned in the aftermath of the stabbing.

“So as I was going to Leytonstone station, was dressed to go to Christmas dinner with people from work … I just saw a lot of people running but I ignored it and kept walking to get my train, but suddenly what I saw I couldn’t believe my eyes and what I saw was one guy with a knife and a dead guy on the floor.”

“I was so scared I ran for my life. After a good 10-15 police came and got the guy and arrested him. And as he was coming out this is what he said ‘This is what happens when you f*** with mother Syria all of your blood will be spilled,’” the witness claimed.

The Metropolitan Police have confirmed that officers were called to the scene at 7:06 pm local time on Saturday after reports of a stabbing. “Met officers attended the scene. A man was arrested at 19:14hrs and taken to an east London police station where he remains in custody,” a Met spokesperson said. “A Taser was discharged by one of the Met officers.”

The attack comes just days after a majority of MPs in the UK parliament backed Prime Minister David Cameron’s plan to launch air strikes on Islamic State (IS, ISIS/ISIL) targets in Syria. Before early on Wednesday, RAF jets had only been taking part in the US-led coalition campaign in Iraq, as the PM’s motion on bombing Syria was defeated in August 2013. The previous vote, however, would have authorized attacking Syrian Army Forces loyal to President Bashar Assad.

There was no immediate reaction to the stabbing attack from either Cameron or foreign secretary Philip Hammond, both of whom said that the UK would be “safer” after the vote in favor of bombing Syria.

On the other hand, some of the staunchest opponents of the new overseas bombing campaign, including the Labour Party leader Jeremy Corbyn, were quick to react to the news. Corbyn called the incident “absolutely shocking,” adding that his thoughts were “with the [stabbing] victim and his family.”

Leytonstone station will remain closed while police are investigating the incident and there will be no service between Liverpool station and Woodford/Newbury Park for the rest of Sunday.

Revived political Salafist discourse in Malaysia invokes the idea that non-violent Salafism is peaceful. “Peaceful Salafism” arises to assuage existing fears about Salafism and provides a legitimising sense of comfort for radical. Salafis have to end the dogma of hate in their multi-religious society to curb radicalisation.

By Muhammad Haziq Bin Jani*

Salafism in Malaysia has garnered renewed attention with the increasing presence of Salafi ulama within the United Malays National Organization (UMNO) youth wing. Although it is unlikely that these new UMNO Salafis would uproot the largely traditionalist Islamic bureaucracy and institutions in Malaysia, their presence has reinvigorated the nexus between Salafism, politics and extremism. Their emergence is accompanied by the attempt by scholars to define modern Salafism and elucidate its nuances and strands – Modern Salafism, Islamist Salafism, Puritanical Salafism and Militant Salafism.

This attempt clarifies the interplay between particular behaviours, habits and tendencies of modern Salafis and their parent ideology or worldview. To be sure, blanket terms, including Salafism and Islamism obfuscate our understanding of the reality of modern Salafism and result in heuristics that link Salafis, scholars or laymen, with horrific mental images of the atrocities carried out by Salafi jihadis. Inversely, a blanket term such as “Peaceful Salafism” hides the presence of extremists, radicals, terrorists and their supporters and perpetuates a false sense of comfort that non-violent Salafis should be uneasy about.

Peaceful Salafism

To contrast non-violent Salafism with Jihadi Salafism, the term “Peaceful Salafism” has been bandied about by pundits. While not meant as a serious analytical category, it attempts to describe the non-violent Salafi imagination in Malaysia, regardless of whether one is a political or quietist Salafi. Quietists are perceived to be peaceful because they shun street activism and focus their activities on proselytisation. Political Salafis are perceived so because unlike their violent counterparts, they attempt to achieve their end – an Islamic utopia – through political participation rather than armed strife. Peacefulness is either being unchallenging of the political status quo or pursuing ends through the means of peaceful politics.

But it is not incontrovertible that peaceful Salafism is all that peaceful. While field research by Maszlee Malik and Khalil al-Anani (2013) shows that political participation has tamed radical Salafi elements in Egypt, the same cannot be said about political Salafism’s foray into the mainstream of Malaysian politics. Despite having an Islamist space in social and political arenas, Malaysia has hosted local and regional radical groups such as Al-Ma’unah, Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia and Jema’ah Islamiyah.

The mechanism that encourages peacefulness among groups that decide to lay down their arms for the political process is the promise of continued or even increased relevance and popularity in society. This mechanism is not foolproof. As long as a total and radical Islamisation of Malaysia towards the end of an iconographic Islamic utopia is not fully achieved, radicals and supporters will feel unsatisfied and seek to realise “Daulah Islamiyah Baqiyyah wa Tatamaddad” (an Islamic State that is forever lasting). This was revealed in a Facebook posting on armed jihad written by a Malaysian Abu Sayyaf fighter who encouraged his followers to pursue armed jihad all over the world, from Syria to Pattani, Ambon-Poso and Mindanao.

Not all peaceful

Radicals like him may be militant or Jihadi Salafists, but radical followers and supporters, numbering in the thousands, are from the different strands of Salafism. What ties them together is a subscription to an exclusivist position on the Salafist doctrine of Al-Wala’ wal-Bara’ (Loyalty and Enmity) that draws narrow theological boundaries between oneself and the putative ‘Other’. This duality is at odds with the Malaysian society they live in, which is democratic–ostensibly a heinous innovation–and multi-religious. When confronted with their cognitive dissonance, they either put aside their worldview, or concur that Malaysia is yet to be Darul Islam.

Now that UMNO has co-opted the Salafi ulama for religious legitimacy, there is a rekindling of political discourse within the Salafi worldview. For instance, Fathul Bari, the current Executive Committee member of UMNO youth who once elaborated on his taxonomy of kafirs (infidels) before he joined UMNO, has recently expressed his displeasure regarding “Puji Kafir, Hina Islam” (praising infidels while insulting Islam). Fathul Bari argues that, despite the value deficiencies of Muslim societies and governments, such as corruption and poor governance, placing a positive value upon the perceivable good of infidel societies and governments is an act of shirk (idolatory).

The Islamist party, PAS also legitimises its electoral fights with UMNO by arguing that UMNO does not satisfy their vision of Muslim rule. PAS and UMNO engage in piety-outbidding through the contention of the Islamic-ness of Malaysia. Otherwise, another example of piety-outbidding between PAS and UMNO centres on the confusing debate over the legitimacy of teaming up with non-Muslims in their respective coalitions, because, as ideologues like Fathul Bari would argue, some kafirs are Kafir Harbi and meant to be fought and opposed, especially if the latter oppose their understanding of Islam. The problem with this discourse is that it falls neatly into the already highly-racialised politics in Malaysia, encouraging racist rhetoric and allowing UMNO Supreme Council member Annuar Musa to brag that his “racism is based on Islam”.

Trajectory of Peaceful Salafism

Salafi scholars have to rescind the hate in their rhetoric. Peaceful Salafis cannot be ambivalent to the presence of Jihadi Salafis and their followers who dwell safely within the Malaysian “Political Salafi” and “Peaceful Salafi” climate; otherwise they would be seen to harbour jihadi hopes – no matter how latent–for an Islamic utopia in Malaysia. Jihadi Salafism and elements of Salafism that encourage kafir hatred should not be left unchallenged. Put in the context of a racialised, multi-religious society, non-Muslims and not-so-Muslims around the world, especially in Malaysia, Syria, Pattani, Ambon-Poso and Mindanao, are at risk if hatred is given a womb in which to percolate an IS brand of 100% Islam: Jihadi Salafism.

*Muhammad Haziq Bin Jani is a Research Analyst in the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore.

The perpetrators of the recent mass shootings in San Bernardino, California, did not meet in the Kingdom, a Saudi source told Asharq Al-Awsat.

“Saudi Arabia receives hundreds of pilgrims who are American citizens yearly, and they return to the US without being radicalized or harmed ideologically,” the source pointed out.

This statement came as a refutation of allegations spread by US media that Syed Farook, 28, an American citizen of Pakistani origin, became radicalized after marrying Tashfeen Malik, 27, “in Saudi Arabia last year”.

The source also said that Farook visited Saudi Arabia to perform Umrah in July 2014, and then left Jeddah. According to the source, Farook did not meet Tashfeen Malik in Saudi Arabia.

The source added that “Tashfeen Malik was not in Saudi Arabia at the time when Farook was there to perform Umrah”.

Pakistani officials said that Tashfeen Malik returned to the Layyah District in the province of Punjab, Pakistan where she lived in order to study Pharmacy at the University of Bahauddin Zakariya in Multan.

Meanwhile, a news agency that supports Daesh called “Amaaq” stated on its website that two members of Daesh carried out the attacks at the social services centre in California.

CNN quoted US officials as saying earlier that investigators believe Tashfeen Malik had pledged allegiance to Daesh terrrist Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi and that she had posted this on a Facebook page under a different name.

According to US media, security officials said that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is dealing with the incident as a possible terrorist attack.

However, it is not confirmed whether the incident was a terrorist operation while the motives for the killings are still unknown.

The EU keeps reminding the countries of the region that 20 years after the end of the Balkan wars, the progress achieved in terms of reconciliation between different ethnic groups has been way too scant. However, this refugee crisis should serve as a reminder to us all that peacebuilding is not an end-process, and peace itself is not a goal that, once attained, can be considered ‘done’.

By Mirjana Kosic*

With the wars of the 1990s still branded in the collective psyche of people in the Balkans, recent scenes of thousands of refugees from the Middle East transversing the area have prompted uneasy memories of our past hardships. They have also offered a sobering reminder of how fragile a human life is, and how world affairs most severely affect those who have the least responsibility for such calamities.

Impact on the Region

The refugee crisis has profoundly impacted the region, both positively and negatively. Like the catastrophic floods of 2014, which united erstwhile enemies in joint acts of solidarity, the refugee crisis has mobilised people throughout the region to unite and channel aid to places where it was most needed. Once again, the humanity of ordinary people prevailed, transcending the ethnic and national borders that politicians constantly entrench.

In a stark contrast to their citizens, Croatian and Serbian politicians exploited the crisis to exchange mutual attacks, invoking the war-mongering rhetoric of the 1990s. Overwhelmed by an unrelenting flux of refugees streaming through their two countries – exacerbated by Hungary’s decision to seal its borders with Serbia and Croatia – they blamed each other for inefficient handling of the crisis. This muscle-flexing culminated with the temporary closure of the border between the two countries, which incurred huge economic losses for both. Serbian and Croatian leaders were only unanimous in their condemnation of Hungary’s stringent refugee policy, claiming that – unlike Hungary – they had no intention to erect any walls or fences.

However, in a joint effort to alleviate the crisis and expedite the movement of refugees through their territories before the winter encroaches, Croatia and Serbia signed a protocol on border co-operation in late October. By providing free train transportation, which enables refugees to bypass border crossings where they had frequently been stalled, the two countries demonstrated that solutions do exist when there is a political will to pursue them.

Neither Croatia nor Serbia are final destinations for refugees, who are determined to find sanctuary in Germany or Scandinavia. It is highly disputable whether their comments on refugees would have been as understanding and welcoming, if they had been final destinations. Leaders in both countries warned that their countries are not to become ‘migrant hotspots’, with Croatian PM Milanović reiterating that ‘we have hearts, but we also have heads’.

Lessons for the EU

Croatia (already an EU member) and Serbia (aspiring to EU membership) have competed to demonstrate their adherence to ‘European values’ and behave in line with ‘European standards’. The EU itself has contributed to the crisis, through its lack of political will to reconcile internal differences and respond adequately.

In an attempt to defend her more lenient refugee policy, German Chancellor Angela Merkel warned about the possibility of ‘military conflicts becoming necessary again’ in the Balkans. By suggesting that conflicts in the region are inevitable, Merkel implied an almost innate proclivity of its people towards wars and instability. Such portrayal of the region reveals a hegemony within the EU, delineating the lines of its periphery. Sadly, it also shows that Europe has not learned a basic lesson from the Yugoslav wars – not to revert to stereotypes that conveniently exonerate the EU from taking action. Instead, it should acknowledge that it does have a responsibility to act, and that whatever occurs at its broad periphery has a profound effect on the entire continent.

Another lesson from the 1990s that has been ignored is the importance of conflict prevention. It is usually too late, too expensive and too ineffective to merely ‘manage’ a conflict or crisis once it is already rampant. Indicators of an impending crisis must not be ignored, however far away they appear. The refugee crisis, therefore, should not have come as a surprise, because millions of Syrian refugees have been living in camps in Turkey and Jordan since 2011. But this has been ignored, and until this summer was perceived as ‘their’ problem.

It was only when people started drowning on the shores of Europe and suffocating in the trucks of traffickers exploiting human misery, that the EU found itself confounded and required to find a solution.

The solution, however, will not come in the form of a quick financial fix, as recently promised by the EU and the UN to countries on the Balkan route in order to ‘deal with the migration crisis’. By doing that, the region will be turned into a buffer zone or protective belt, created to prevent further refugees’ flows into the EU. That would make it a place that will forever remain at the periphery of Europe, and will always be seen as a junior ‘other’, only capable of producing conflicts and crises, dependent on outside help.

The EU keeps reminding the countries of the region that 20 years after the end of the Balkan wars, the progress achieved in terms of reconciliation between different ethnic groups has been way too scant. However, this refugee crisis should serve as a reminder to us all that peacebuilding is not an end-process, and peace itself is not a goal that, once attained, can be considered ‘done’.

*Mirjana Kosic is the co-founder and executive director of TransConflict Serbia, an organization undertaking conflict transformation projects and research throughout the Western Balkans.

This article was originally published by Insight on Conflict and is available by clicking here.

By D. S. Rajan*

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has officially revealed guidelines on military reforms ,  which can be considered as definite pointers to the likely shape of China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and People’s Armed Police (PAP)  by the set dead line of 2020.

The guidelines have come  through  an  “important” speech delivered by China’s leader Xi Jinping in his officially described capacities of the General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the President of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Chairman of the Central Military commission (CMC) and the head of the CMC’s  leading small group on deepening defence and military reforms[1], at the CMC Reform Work Conference (Beijing, November 24-26, 2015) as well as  the subsequent statements on military reforms made by the CMC and senior officials in the PRC.   As revealed officially,  the CMC organized more than 860 seminars and forums prior to the conference to solicit suggestions on military reforms, surveying opinions of nearly 700 PLA units and government departments and more than 900 high-ranking officers. One has to look seriously at the latest guidelines, which though lacking in specifics, constitute the second significant move   in China since the earlier announcement by Xi Jinping on September 3, 2015, of a troop cut by 300,000.

By reading through the guidelines, one can get a broad idea of China’s planned military reforms with 2020 as target year which is as follows:

Stated rationale for Reforms:  “China is progressing from a large country to a large and powerful one; defense and military development stands at a new and historic starting line. Taking into consideration the world’s larger picture as well as profound and complicated changes in the international landscape, we must deepen defense and military reforms with greater wisdom and courage” (Quote from Xi);  “Reforms are for developing a modern military system capable of winning information-age warfare” (Global Times Analyst, November 27,2015);  “ Military reforms  will not change China’s defense policy which  will remain defensive in nature  and that the Chinese armed forces will always be a staunch force to safeguard world peace and regional stability” ( quote from Senior Colonel Yang Yujun of the PRC Defence Ministry);  “The future reform of the military command would be based on the nation’s existing strategy as the missions of the armed forces have expanded from safeguarding national security to more global tasks, such as overseas peacekeeping and escort missions” (quote from  Beijing-based military expert Zhao Xiaozhuo).

Stated Aims of Reforms: “ (i) Achieving a breakthrough in military administrative system and joint combat system; (ii) getting rid of systemic hurdles, develop combat capability and build a powerful national defense and (iii) strengthening the absolute leadership of the Party over the military” (State-run Global Times). On (iii) above, the PLA is to maintain “correct political direction, under a series of designs and arrangements to consolidate the basic principle that the CCP has absolute leadership of the armed forces” (Quote from Xi).

Identified Areas of reform:

(i) Reforms in Military Administration and Command: “A new structure will be established, in which the CMC’s centralized and unified leadership and the CCP Central Committee, take charge of the overall administration of and command over the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the Chinese People’s Armed Police; battle zone commands focus on combats; and different military services pursue their own construction” (quote from Xi). “Under the CMC’s leadership, the area commands will focus on engagement, while the PLA army, navy and air force will focus on developing their respective force” (Xinhua). “The reform will establish a three-tier CMC – battle zone commands – troops command system and an administration system that runs from CMC through various services to the troops” (quote from Xi). “The CMC will greatly reduce its departments and personnel and give more power to lower-level authorities. The reform aims to enable the CMC to focus on its core missions, integrate similar functions, and intensify supervision and better act as a coordinator. After the reform, the decision on some specific matters will be left to lower-level authorities” (quote from Senior Colonel Yang Yujun of the PRC Defence Ministry).

(ii) Setting up of a Command Mechanism over and above the  four  Staff Departments:  “An army leadership mechanism would be set up to centralise a command structure previously shared by four staff departments, including those responsible for logistics and politics. This  joint operational command structure was needed to ensure the ability to win a modern war” (Yang Yujun, PRC Defence Ministry).

(iii) Establishing  a general command centre for land forces:  “This will be  part of integrating the administrative system and the joint battle command system, enabling the CMC to directly administer and command various military departments”  (quote from Xi). “ This would help complete military service and facilitate future joint operations” ( Chinese Analyst Zhao Xiaozhuo).

(iv) Regrouping  Military Regions (called military area commands in China); “The current regional military commands will be adjusted and regrouped into new battle zone commands supervised by the CMC” (quote from Xi).  “The regrouping is a structural reform aimed at  better integrating  the command over the PLA” (Xinhua).

(v) Regulating  power within the military: “This would demand a strict system to regulate and supervise the use of power. Decision-making, enforcement and supervision powers should be separated and distributed in a manner that ensures they serve as checks and balances on each other but also run in parallel” (quote from Xi ).

(vi) Curbing  military corruption: “The problem of weak discipline enforcement and inspection, auditing and judicial supervision processes of the military should be solved. Corruption in the military needs eradication with stricter rules and systems. A new discipline inspection commission will be established within the CMC and disciplinary inspectors will be sent to CMC departments and zone commands” (quote from Xi).

(vii) Reforming  Military judicial system: “The CMC will have an audit office and a political and legal affairs commission. The independent and fair exertion of judicial power by military courts and procuratorates will be ensured with adjustments to the military judicial system” (quote from Xi).

(viii) Making  military innovative: “The military to stand in strategic commanding heights  in future competition and should promote innovations to drive its  fighting capability. More to be done is  developing national defense science and technology, including frontier research in both major technology and new concepts” (quote from Xi).

(ix) Improving personnel management: “Military personnel management should be streamlined with adherence to the CCP’s leadership so that the military’s human resource can be turned into the army’s capability in combat.  Reforms will be carried out and deepened in the management of all personnel, as well as the systems of medical care, insurance, housing and payments for servicemen. A revolution of the management of the military will be rolled out with modern management techniques so that the army is managed professionally” (quote from Xi).

(x) Optimizing military structure: “The structure of troops will be optimized to improve the quality and efficiency of the army. China will cut its troops by 300,000. Administrative and non-combatant personnel in the military will be downsized. The proportion and structure of forces among different services will be streamlined to suit new security needs and operations” (quote from Xi).

(xi) Strengthening civil-military cooperation: “Cooperation between civil and military bodies is to be encouraged and the defense industry is to be opened for the private sector” (CMC Statement).

The announced reforms guidelines covering 11 areas as identified above appear highly significant.  Xi Jinping could already eliminate from the military certain powerful rivals like Generals Guo Boxiung and Xu Xaihou (now deceased);  under such circumstances, the decisive role sought to be allotted now to the CMC in matters of military administration and command, may imply more capacity on his part  to challenge potential rivals if any in the armed forces  and fully  cement his hold on the country’s military and police establishments. Besides already serving as CMC chairman, Xi is already the head of  a number of new leading small groups, including ones on   comprehensive reforms, state security and internet security. Thus, the leader appears keen to fully consolidate his overall political power in the country. It remains to be seen whether or not he will be successful in this regard. Important to watch will therefore be future trends in domestic politics.  Secondly, the latest guidelines need be seen in the context of China’s unending assertiveness with respect to territorial issues. Any capacity of the PRC to achieve its aim of creating    a “strong military” capable of fighting wars under information conditions through implementing the guidelines by the set deadline of 2020, may, in the ultimate count, have negative implications for regional efforts to find a peaceful solution to territorial disputes, especially with respect to  the maritime claims in South and East China Seas.   The following remarks of   Ni Lexiong, the Director of  defense policy research center at Shanghai University of Political Science and Law,  seem to be noteworthy in this respect  – “ The growing tensions between China and its neighbors are behind the drive to reform the military to make it more combat ready”.

*The writer, D.S.Rajan, is Distinguished Fellow, Chennai Centre for China Studies, Chennai, India.Email: dsrajan@gmail.com

Annex

Xi is determined to modernize the military at the same time as China gets more assertive in its territorial disputes in the East and South China Seas. China’s navy is investing in submarines and aircraft carriers, while the air force is developing stealth fighters.

The troop cuts are part of long-mooted reforms to simplify and further professionalize the military, especially command and leadership structures that are still largely run along Soviet lines.

As part of this move, China’s seven military regions, which have separate command structures that tend to focus on ground-based operations, are expected to be reduced, though Xi did not explicitly say this.

Xi said that the military region structure would be redrawn and a joint operational command structure set up – a move previously flagged by the military which is meant to help coordination between different parts of the defense system.

China has been moving rapidly to upgrade its military hardware, but operational integration of complex and disparate systems across a regionalized command structure is a major challenge.

In the past, regional level military commanders have enjoyed latitude over their forces and branches of the military have remained highly independent, making it difficult to exercise the centralized control necessary to use new weapons systems effectively in concert.

It is not clear if the government will give more information about the reform plan.

The troop cuts and broader reform program have already proven controversial, though, and the army’s official People’s Liberation Army Daily has published a series of commentaries in recent weeks warning of opposition to the reforms.

Xi said that the whole of the armed forces was “ardently anticipating” the reforms and “firmly upheld” them.

China has previously faced protests from demobilized soldiers, who have complained about a lack of support finding new jobs or help with financial problems.

A protest by thousands of former soldiers over pensions was reported in June, although the Defence Ministry denied any knowledge of the incident.

The PLA is already reeling from Xi’s crackdown on deep-seated corruption in China, which has seen dozens of officers investigated, including two former vice chairmen of the Central Military Commission.

Xi said there would be a new military discipline body – he again gave no details – and stepped up efforts to root out graft.

(Reporting by Ben Blanchard and Michael Martina)

Even the pledged admirers of Bill Gates, widely acclaimed as the greatest innovator and philanthropist of present time, would be surprised to know about the cynicism of Bill Gates on the potential benefits of renewable energy for saving countries like India from an impending energy crisis and to provide the ecological gains to mankind by ensuring reduction in use of fossil fuel (coal, oil, natural gas), that cause global warming.

On careful reading of the speech of Bill Gates, his admirers may give him the benefit of doubt, and state that he was just thinking aloud and even before crystallizing his thoughts, he blurted out his views in premature manner. There is no doubt that the negative views of Bill Gates on renewable energy are ill advised and certainly is not in tune with reputation that he commands.

At the same time, it is gratifying to note that Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has fixed renewable energy target of 175 GW for the year 2022, during his recent speech in the Paris Climate Conference.

Given the past experience in India of fixing the target and not achieving them even half way on several occasions, many people may suspect that the Prime Minister may be unreasonably ambitious. Perhaps, those who admire Narendra Modi for his capability to think big and his habit of announcing tall targets in dramatic manner, may say that the Prime Minister has fixed target of 175 GW of renewable energy by 2022, with the objective of enthusing the countrymen to work towards such big target and work hard to achieve it. Probably, he has thrown the target as challenge for the Indian administrators, scientists and technologists.

However, a careful analysis of renewable energy potential in India would make it evident that such target of 175 GW is reasonable , much needed and well within the achievable capability of India.

Present scenario and the huge target:

The present scenario is that India has around 38,O96 MW of renewable power, consisting of wind power of 24,677 MW, solar power of 4579 MW, small hydro power of 4161MW, bio power of 455O MW and waste to power of 127 MW.

Given the target of 175 GW by 2022 and the present capacity of around 38 GW, India need to build renewable energy capacity of around 19 GW every year between 2016 and 2022. Is it possible ? It is possible, if Modi government would be able to pursue the task with great determination, focused attention, innovative approach and creation of appropriate public opinion in favor of such target.

By fixing the target of 175 GW of renewable energy by 2022, Narendra Modi has placed himself and his governance capability on trial.

India has the on shore wind power potential of around 103 GW .With around 7600 km of coastal line, India has the potential of around 350GW of offshore wind power.

India has the advantage in terms of higher solar radiation compared to countries such as Germany, USA, Japan, Australia, Italy, which have made significant progress in solar power segment in the recent years. Potential of solar power in India is as high as 5000 million kilo watt hour per year. Small hydro power potential in India is around 20 GW.

Obviously, Modi government has to largely rely on the capacity build up of wind power and solar power to achieve the target of 175 GW by 2022. It has fixed target of 100 GW of solar power by 2022.

Challenges ahead:

There are challenges ahead and obviously Narendra Modi must be aware of this daunting task when he fixed the target of 175 GW by 2022.

One MW of solar power capacity needs land area of around 5 to 7.5 acres. Similar extent of land area would be required for onshore wind power also.This means that more than one lakh acre of land have to be made available for building up around 19000 MW(19 GW) of renewable power capacity every year. Such land has to be acquired without disturbing agriculture farm holdings.

Of course, there are lakhs of acres of unused and wasted land available in the country and such land has to be identified and put to use for building up the renewable power projects. The suitability of the land for the purpose also need to be ascertained.

Another big challenge is the building up of grid capacity in tune with the capacity build up for renewable power, so that the generated power can be handled.

Building up of capacity of 19 GW per year and creating the required additional grid capacity will call for investment of around Rs.1,50,000 crores per year. As the year 2016 will commence in the next few days, we see a scenario where no provision has been made to have the necessary investment to build the envisaged renewable energy capacity every year.

There are other issues such as absence of any production capacity in the country for polycrystalline silicon, which is one of the essential input material for solar cell. One MW of solar power capacity would need 20 tonne of polycrystalline silicon.

Though some initial steps have been taken to build offshore wind power project in coastal region of Tamil Nadu and Gujarat, it is still in very preliminary stage.

Let the nation strive to achieve the target:

While one can say that Narendra Modi’s target is technically achievable and the doomsayers would very much doubt that the target can be achieved, the nation would be well advised to believe that target would be possible and it should strive towards achieving the target to the best of its ability, notwithstanding whatever may be the views of Bill Gates.

Sri Lanka’s President Maithripala Sirisena requested the politicians not to spread narrow racist ideas among the Sinhala Buddhist community to achieve their narrow political gains.

Sirisena made these observations participating in the debate on the expenditure of the Defence Ministry in Parliament on Friday, in his capacity as the Defence Minister.

Sirisenat emphasized that even though some extremists spread rumours on national security the government will fulfill all its duties to strengthen the national security and will never allow to endanger the national security of this country.

The President recalling the Jawaharlal Nehru’s quote that “Patriotism is the last refuge of a scoundrel” said that the true patriotism means creating a peaceful nation to live in peace and harmony while ensuring a non-recurrence of the past events that led to the conflict.

Expressing his views regarding the blames for the release of alleged LTTE suspects he said that to prevent Northern youth taking arms into their hands we should win the confidence of them and initiatives like this will strengthen the national reconciliation process.

Ex LTTE Eastern Commander Karuna Amman was released under the previous regime and he became a Member of Parliament a Minister moreover he was appointed as the SLFP Vice President. Pillayan an ex-LTTE leader was also appointed as the Chief Minister of the Eastern Province and another prominent LTTE leader Kumaran Pathmanathan was also released under the previous regime. Over 12,000 LTTE prisoners were released under the Mahinda Rajapaksa’s government.

Sirisena questioned then how can the present government’s current policy on prisoners would be wrong and if the previously released 12,000 LTTE prisoners do not have the capability to pose a major threat to the national security how could this small number of persons will pose a threat to the national security.

Sirisena said that the majority of people in the North and East elected him as the President of this country to strengthen the national reconciliation process and said that he will always be committed to build a prosperous and peaceful country for the people of this country as well as for the future generations while ensuring a non recurrence of the war.

“As a government when fulfilling its duties towards the national security the government will take every possible steps to improve the quality of Tri-Forces,” Sirisena added.

The Swiss cabinet has announced it wants to limit immigration from the European Union with a safeguard clause as part of its efforts to implement an initiative approved by voters in February 2014.

In the event that it is unable to reach agreement with the EU, the cabinet has instructed the justice ministry to draft a dispatch on a unilateral safeguard clause which will take effect if immigration reaches a certain threshold. This dispatch should be ready by the beginning of March 2016.

In a statement on Friday, the cabinet said it had decided to continue the ongoing consultations with the EU, with the aim of achieving a “mutually acceptable solution which respects the constitution while complying with the Agreement on the Free Movement of Persons”.

“This would safeguard the bilateral path and re-establish the legal certainty that is so important to Switzerland’s economy,” it said, pointing out that two academic studies commissioned by the State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO) had indicated that termination of the first series of bilateral agreements would have serious consequences for the Swiss economy.

Nearly a quarter of Switzerland’s 8.2 million residents aren’t Swiss citizens.

The cabinet statement explained that the aim of a unilateral safeguard clause would be to allow the independent control of immigration by imposing temporary and targeted restrictions on permits for persons from EU/EFTA states.

The parameters of this safeguard clause will be set out in the Foreign Nationals Act. “In this way, a specific threshold will be set for the immigration of citizens of EU and EFTA states, which, if exceeded, would lead to quantitative limits and quotas being introduced the following year.”

The cabinet said it would specify the types of permit and purposes of residence to which the limits and quotas will apply. When making these decisions, it will give special consideration to Switzerland’s general economic interests and the recommendations of a new immigration commission, as proposed in the consultation draft.

“We want to continue discussions with the goal of reaching an agreement on a protection clause. That’s the best way,” Swiss President Simonetta Sommaruga said.

She said unilateral action was not the preferred path because it is fraught with legal uncertainty. “It wouldn’t be clear what measures the European Union would take,” she said.

The Swiss Trade Union Federation welcomed the cabinet’s intention to maintain, if possible, bilateral relations with the EU, saying cancelling them would have “fatal consequences” for the Swiss economy. At the same time, the federation called for an “economically compatible implementation” of the mass immigration initiative.
Initiative approved

On February 9, 2014, Swiss voters narrowly approved a rightwing proposal to curb immigration. It imposes limits on the number of foreigners allowed in and may signal an end to the country’s free movement accord with the European Union.

The initiative was approved by just 50.3% of votes cast and was passed by a majority of cantons.

The move by the conservative right Swiss People’s Party will see the reintroduction of quotas, as well as a national preference when filling job vacancies and restrictions of immigrants’ rights to social benefits.

Critically, it also stipulates that Switzerland will have to renegotiate its bilateral accord with the EU on the free movement of people within three years or revoke it. This in turn could threaten other bilateral agreements with the EU. Officials in Brussels have said in the past they won’t renegotiate the matter.

At least 30 people have been killed and 80 others injured after a triple suicide bombing on an island in Lake Chad, according to security officials.

Saturday’s blast, in a part of the lake controlled by Chad, has been attributed by local security sources to Boko Haram rebels.

Three insurgents blew themselves up in three different locations across the island, according to the same security source speaking on condition of anonymity.

The latest bombing comes after the Chadian authorities declared a state of emergency in region on Nov. 9 following repeated Boko Haram attacks.

The region is an area most exposed to attacks from Boko Haram, which is active also in Niger, Nigeria and Cameroon.

Original article

According to the Nation magazine and many others, there are two options available to the US government. One is increased hostility perhaps leading to nuclear war with Russia. The other is a joint US-Russia-and-others war on ISIS.

Many in the United States who generally oppose war and who look for information outside the US corporate media manage to recognize the US focus on overthrowing the Syrian government, with Iran next on the list. They notice the lack of US concern over Saudi and Turkish assistance to ISIS. And at least in the backs of their minds they remember that the destruction of Iraq was the critical ingredient in the creation of ISIS.

But they’ve been as frightened by the beheading videos as any Donald Trump fanatic screaming for the eradication of Muslims — all right, maybe a bit less frightened, but still very frightened. So they find refuge in the idea that Russia really wants to destroy ISIS, and they urge the United States to help. The alternative of war with Russia is unthinkable. But why in the world should that be the only alternative?

A Russian media outlet, no doubt hoping I would advocate a unified war on ISIS, sent me these questions on Thursday. First they wanted me to comment on this remark by President Vladimir Putin: “Today we are again facing the destructive barbaric ideology and we do not have the right to allow that the newly found obscurantists reach their goals. We need to throw away all arguments and differences to create one powerful fist, a united antiterrorist front which would act on the basis of international law and under the UN auspices.”

Second, they wanted me to comment on these statements by Putin: “Russia has many old, reliable friends in Turkey, who should know we don’t put them on level with ruling top officials.” and “Russia knows who in Turkey [is] making money on stolen oil, recruiting fighters.”

I sent back these answers, asking them to use all or nothing, which I suspected meant they would use nothing:

1. What President Putin proposes and many even on the left in the United States support, a united front against terrorism sounds right until you examine the details. He means a united war, a united bombing of people’s homes, a united counterproductive effort to make things better that will make things worse, using large scale terrorism to produce more small scale terrorism. This may be better than a disunited front. It’s certainly better than a nuclear confrontation between Russia and the maniacs so respectably running Washington D.C. straight toward armageddon, but it’s not a solution to the problem, it’s not an alternative to destructive cycles of violence, it’s just a different spin on the same wheel.

2. Washington would rather be wrong than agree with Russia. NATO would rather die than agree with Russia, for if it agrees with Russia it loses its reason to exist and dies anyway. What does bringing the world down with it matter? Yes, of course, the United States is less interested in destroying ISIS than in destroying Syria, but a big strong united focus on destroying ISIS will never destroy ISIS. It will only spread it across the globe. Imagine the a united front kills everyone in half of Syria and Iraq, as would have to be done to destroy ISIS. Muslim hatred of the United States would sweep the globe and Muslim hatred of Russia, and bombs in Russian airplanes, right along with it. Is that what Putin wants? Is that what Russians want? A united attempt to actually seriously reduce, rather than increase, terrorism would establish a ceasefire, an arms embargo, humanitarian aid, assistance to refugees, and the sort of intense investment in green energy that right now only goes into killing people.

To these comments I received the reply:

“I would use all, personally. Some of the things you wrote here, I’m afraid, are controversial for our editorial board as the main idea here in Russia is that it is ‘better to fight IS in Syria and Iraq than on Russian territory.’ Many Islamist volunteers from Northern Caucasus promise to come back to Russia and kill innocent people in terrorist acts. We have lost a full plane of civilians flying from Cairo and many people here are afraid. However, I promise to send your message (which I think was your main point) that ‘a big strong united focus on destroying ISIS will never destroy ISIS.’ This quote I will necessarily include. Thank you for your understanding!”

Sound familiar? Fight em there, not here. Use blowback to justify escalation. Where have we seen this movie before?

I failed to be understanding and asked them to use nothing of my quote rather than part of it. They agreed to use nothing, no hard feelings. I encouraged them to think about this:

Generating more terrorism is not a solution to terrorism, and the excuse of being scared and unable to think straight still leaves mistaken thinking. The United States has demonstrated these mistakes for years now. I remember when Russians pointed out that the United States had made all of Russia’s earlier mistakes in Afghanistan and moved on to new ones; that was right, and the United States refused to listen. Don’t, Russia, make all of the US mistakes in Iraq and start inventing your own. This path leads to hell.

I sent that to my Russian journalist friend who was sounding identical to a war-supporting American of exactly the sort that peace activists usually disagree with. The next response I received only heightened the similarity with US war advocates and US media:

“I personally agree however I do not understand how could we stop Islamic State. What is your recipe?”

Sigh.

I sent back this:

I’ve been answering this for well over a year many dozens of times at http://davidswanson.org

Here’s my latest.

Here’s Johan Galtung’s answer.

Here’s an organizational answer from last October.

Here’s an answer this week from a former ISIS prisoner.

Here are former US officials explaining how what they did until the moment they retired was counterproductive.

I got back: “Thanks, I’ll read that.”

I believe that was sincere. But I wonder what the “editorial board” will read. I suspect Russian and US editorial boards could swap their reading lists and hardly notice, just like ISIS and anti-ISIS fighters swapping the US bullets in their US guns.

Reprinted with permission from DavidSwanson.org.

By K.N. Pandita*

Farooq Abdullah, as is his wont, has once again stirred the hornet’s nest. He says let Pakistan keep its part of the State and we keep ours.

Had things been that simple, Kashmir would not have earned the sobriquet of ‘Gordian knot’ nor would have Pakistan lost its eastern part. Pakistan would not have finally volunteered to become the Frankenstein of its terror devilry.

Farooq has won the wrath of “nationalists” of both countries. Yet his statement merits cool and unemotional appraisal. He may be a mad cap but he has a method in his madness.

In the past, India threw some hints that she would not be averse to a partition of Kashmir along the existing Line of Control (LoC). There were no takers of the idea in Pakistan.

In 1964, an embattled and disillusioned Nehru sent Shiekh Abdullah to Pakistan with the offer of Confederation (India, Pakistan, and Kashmir). General Ayub turned it down.

The six-month long Swarn Singh – Bhutto Kashmir talks broke down in the sixth round when Bhutto rejected his counterpart’s offer of dividing the valley with Wular Lake as the watershed.

Pakistan’s acceptance of the division of Kashmir along LoC has to come from the Pakistan army and not the civilian government. Why is the Pakistan army not reconciled to the formula? Let us try to understand.

A ceasefire in Kashmir was the joint plan of the Pak army and British intelligence agency. The British had attained the ulterior motive of Pakistan retaining control over Northern Areas.

The Anglo-American bloc looked rather askance at Nehru’s pseudo-socialism. This sucked Pakistan into the vortex, first the Baghdad Pact, and then SEATO and CENTO. India drifted towards the nebulous ‘non-aligned’ concept, voluntarily though unwittingly, making her stand on Kashmir tenuous. Clinching the Soviet bloc and simultaneously pontificating non-alignment was the great charade. The two newly independent countries, sucked into the ideological collision of the Cold War era, began distancing from each other. The Pakistan army found a godfather in the Pentagon.

The separation of Bangladesh from West Pakistan remains a living story of the Pak army’s utter disgrace. Surrounded by a pack of eccentric jokers in the name of advisers and foreign office policy planners, Indira Gandhi lost on the negotiating table in Shimla what she had gained on the ground. Destiny had made her pay for her father’s fantasia.

The Pak army has vowed to take revenge for its disgrace. Consequently, it does not allow civilian government to have any say on Kashmir, a policy stoutly supported by her western handlers.

The Pak army has strategic utility for the Anglo-American bloc even after the collapse of the Soviet Union. It protects the Saudi monarchy, which in turn, basks in the sunshine of American patronage. Therefore, the Anglo-American bloc has become the big benefactor of the Pakistan army, regularly refurbishing her war machine and making lavish offers of grants under one or the other head. With their close camaraderie with Pentagon moles, Pakistani generals, after their retirement, manage emigration to the U.S. with comparative ease.

It is the Pentagon that keeps the Kashmir pot boiling for Pakistan. The Pakistan army has made it a national issue by spreading enormous disinformation. Pakistan’s political leadership lacks the vision and statesmanship required for a country to pave its own path.

Additionally, the Pakistan army has paralyzed the civilian government in Islamabad by floating jihad brigades like LeT, JM, HuM and many others. LeT makes no secret of its Kashmir agenda. Kashmiris on our side of the LoC have succumbed to powerful anti-India diatribe of ISI. Hence Kashmir separatists are more loyal to ISI than the Pakistanis. In the formative days of Kashmir Liberation Front, Farooq and Amanullah Khan together held a Kalashnikov and raising it high from the platform of a public rally in PoK told people that ‘this’ would liberate Kashmir from Indian ‘stranglehold.’

With the Pakistan army having achieved success in alienating the Kashmir Muslim community from India, with fidayeen infiltrating from all vulnerable inlets and galvanizing local terrorist-fundamentalist chapters into attacks on army, BSF, and police establishments, Pakistan is in very comfortable position to dictate terms to India rather than succumb to India’s supplication for partition of Kashmir. Farooq knows it better than anybody else does.

The unanimous parliamentary resolution of 1994 is a paper tiger with no life and substance in it. That was a device initiated by late PM Narasimha Rao to obfuscate the Pakistan sponsored anti-India resolution on Kashmir at the Human Rights Commission in Geneva. It was part of Rao’s strategy of undermining the Pakistani resolution when he put the London-based Hinduja mega business house to placate Iran. The trick worked. Much water has flowed down the river since that event and the resolution has lost its teeth. Having the will and strength to take it back is one thing; adventuring in practice is another. Nuclear countries cannot and should not think along those lines.

At the same time, no political leader or party in Kashmir, in or out of power, ever moved a blade of grass to emphasize upon the masses of people in Kashmir that their interest and future lay in a democratic and secular India. Not only have they not, these parties, in or out of power, are harping on finding a political solution to Kashmir issue. In simple terms they want to convey to New Delhi that Kashmiri Muslims are not happy with the existing arrangement. Imagine how much strength Pakistan draws from this loose and dubious talk.

Today, Pakistan is far better convinced that India is on slippery grounds in Kashmir, land is with them not the people. Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus service, LoC cross border trade, rehabilitation of lured Kashmiris back in Kashmir, breakdown in state administration and above all drastic radicalization of Kashmir Muslim society all have come together to make it very much unrealistic to expect Pakistan accepting division along LoC as the solution of the tangle.

Pragmatically speaking, Farooq is perfectly right in what he has said. But the question is will Pakistan accept it and stop her anti-India tirades? From the Indian point of view, legality of accession remains unassailable. Investment in Kashmir’s development is extraordinary especially in road and rail connectivity. Income per capita in J&K is the highest in the country. It is the only state in India where nobody goes to bed with an empty stomach. What cogent reason do Kashmiris have to remain alienated? Yet they are, and yet Farooq, Mufti and all other mainstream politicians want a “political solution of Kashmir” without ever proposing a single formula of that solution. Their repeated slogan of Kashmir as a political issue has one and only one purpose: convey to Pakistan not to settle for division of Kashmir.

Farooq is fully acquainted with this entire scenario. His contribution would be to take up the thread where his father had left it. He should proceed to Islamabad and engage Pakistani leaders, Generals, ISI musclemen, and above all Anglo-American policy planners to agree to the formula of what is with you is yours and what is with me is mine in Kashmir.

This article appeared at Geopolitical Monitor.com

There is increasing evidence that parents’ lifestyle and the environment they inhabit even long before they have children may influence the health of their offspring. A current study, led by researchers from the Novo Nordisk Foundation Center for Basic Metabolic Research, sheds light on how.

Researchers in Associate Professor Romain Barrès’ laboratory compared sperm cells from 13 lean men and 10 obese men and discovered that the sperm cells in lean and obese men, respectively, possess different epigenetic marks that could alter the next generation’s appetite, as reported in the medical journal Cell Metabolism.

A second major discovery was made as researchers followed six men before and one year after gastric-bypass surgery (an effective intervention to lose weight) to find out how the surgery affected the epigenetic information contained in their sperm cells. The researchers observed an average of 4,000 structural changes to sperm cell DNA from the time before the surgery, directly after, and one year later.

“We certainly need to further examine the meaning of these differences; yet, this is early evidence that sperm carries information about a man’s weight. And our results imply that weight loss in fathers may influence the eating behaviour or their future children,” says Romain Barrès.

Inspiration

“Epidemiological observations revealed that acute nutritional stress, e.g. famine, in one generation can increase the risk of developing diabetes in the following generations,” Romain Barrès said. He also referenced a study that showed that the availability of food in a small Swedish village during a time of famine correlated with the risk of their grandchildren developing cardiometabolic diseases.

The grandchildren’s health was likely influenced by their ancestors’ gametes (sperm or egg), which carried specific epigenetic marks – e.g. chemical additions to the protein that encloses the DNA, methyl groups that change the structure of the DNA once it is attached, or molecules also known as small RNAs. Epigenetic marks can control the expression of genes, which has also been shown to affect the health of offspring in insects and rodents.

Molecular carrier

“In our study, we have identified the molecular carrier in human gametes that may be responsible for this effect,” said Barrès.

By detecting differences in small RNA expressions (where the function is not yet determined) and DNA methylation patterns, the researchers have proven that weight loss can change the epigenetic information men carry in their spermatozoa. In other words, what is transmitted in the father’s sperm can potentially affect the development of a future embryo and, ultimately, it can shape the child’s physiology.

“We did not expect to see such important changes in epigenetic information due to environmental pressure,” says Barrès. “Discovering that lifestyle and environmental factors, such as a person’s nutritional state, can shape the information in our gametes and thereby modify the eating behavior of the next generation is, to my mind, an important find,” he adds.

Obesity

If we consider it in an obesity context, a worldwide heritable metabolic disorder which is sensitive to environmental conditions (diet and physical activity) the discovery that weight loss in fathers-to-be potentially affects the eating behavior of their offspring is ground-breaking.

“Today, we know that children born to obese fathers are predisposed to developing obesity later in life, regardless of their mother’s weight. It’s another critical piece of information that informs us about the very real need to look at the pre-conception health of fathers” said Ida Donkin, MD and one of the lead authors of the paper. She continues, “And it’s a message we need to disseminate in society.”

“The study raises awareness about the importance of lifestyle factors, particularly our diet, prior to conception. The way we eat and our level of physical activity before we conceive may be important to our future children’s health and development,” said Soetkin Versteyhe, co-first author of the paper.

It is still early days in this field of research, but the study disrupts the current assumption that the only thing our gametes carry is genetic information, and there is nothing we can do about it. Traits that we once thought were inevitable could prove modifiable, and what we do in life may have implications not only for our own health but also the health of our children and even our grandchildren. This work opens up new avenues for investigations of possible intervention strategies to prevent the transmission of disorders such as obesity to future generations.

Are all scientists atheists? Do they believe religion and science can co-exist? These questions and others were addressed in the first worldwide survey of how scientists view religion, released today by researchers at Rice University.

“No one today can deny that there is a popular ‘warfare’ framing between science and religion,” said the study’s principal investigator, Elaine Howard Ecklund, founding director of Rice University’s Religion and Public Life Program and the Herbert S. Autrey Chair in Social Sciences. “This is a war of words fueled by scientists, religious people and those in between.”

The study’s results challenge longstanding assumptions about the science-faith interface. While it is commonly assumed that most scientists are atheists, the global perspective resulting from the study shows that this is simply not the case.

“More than half of scientists in India, Italy, Taiwan and Turkey self-identify as religious,” Ecklund said. “And it’s striking that approximately twice as many ‘convinced atheists’ exist in the general population of Hong Kong, for example, (55 percent) compared with the scientific community in this region (26 percent).”

The researchers did find that scientists are generally less religious than a given general population. However, there were exceptions to this: 39 percent of scientists in Hong Kong identify as religious compared with 20 percent of the general population of Hong Kong, and 54 percent of scientists in Taiwan identify as religious compared with 44 percent of the general population of Taiwan. Ecklund noted that such patterns challenge longstanding assumptions about the irreligious character of scientists around the world.

When asked about terms of conflict between religion and science, Ecklund noted that only a minority of scientists in each regional context believe that science and religion are in conflict. In the U.K. – one of the most secular countries studied – only 32 percent of scientists characterized the science-faith interface as one of conflict. In the U.S., this number was only 29 percent. And 25 percent of Hong Kong scientists, 27 percent of Indian scientists and 23 percent of Taiwanese scientists believed science and religion can coexist and be used to help each other.

In addition to the survey’s quantitative findings, the researchers found nuanced views in scientists’ responses during interviews. For example, numerous scientists expressed how religion can provide a “check” in ethically gray areas.

“(Religion provides a) check on those occasions where you might be tempted to shortcut because you want to get something published and you think, ‘Oh, that experiment wasn’t really good enough, but if I portray it in this way, that will do,'” said a biology professor from the U.K.

Another scientist said that there are “multiple atheisms,” some of which include religious traditions.

“I have no problem going to church services because quite often, again that’s a cultural thing,” said a physics reader in the U.K. who said he sometimes attended services because his daughter sang in the church choir. “It’s like looking at another part of your culture, but I have no faith religiously. It doesn’t worry me that religion is still out there.”

Finally, many scientists mentioned ways that they would accommodate the religious views or practices of the public, whether those of students or colleagues.

“Religious issues (are) quite common here because everyone talks about which temple they go to, which church they go to. So it’s not really an issue we hide; we just talk about it. Because, in Taiwan, we have people [of] different religions,” said a Taiwanese professor of biology.

Ecklund and fellow Rice researchers Kirstin Matthews and Steven Lewis collected information from 9,422 respondents in eight regions around the world: France, Hong Kong, India, Italy, Taiwan, Turkey, the U.K. and the U.S. They also traveled to these regions to conduct in-depth interviews with 609 scientists, the largest worldwide survey and interview study ever conducted of the intersection between faith and science.

By surveying and interviewing scientists at various career stages, in elite and nonelite institutions and in biology and physics, the researchers hoped to gain a representative look at scientists’ views on religion, ethics and how both intersect with their scientific work.

Ecklund said that the study has many important implications that can be applied to university hiring processes, how classrooms and labs are structured and general public policy.

“Science is a global endeavor,” Ecklund said. “And as long as science is global, then we need to recognize that the borders between science and religion are more permeable than most people think.”

The Russian authorities do not understand that the Muslim Spiritual Directorates (MSDs) they have created not only are not part of the Islamic tradition but are completely incapable of reaching the new generation of Muslims in the Russian Federation or of interacting usefully with Muslims abroad, according to Ruslan Kurbanov.

Kurbanov, a senior researcher at Moscow’s Institute of Oriental Studies, says that “Russian bureaucrats, who are accustomed to the idea that society doesn’t decide anything ignore the interests of the Muslim community even more than they do other groups” (onkavkaz.com/posts/105-moskva-i-mudzhtahidy-mira-situacija-kriticheskaja.html).

That may have worked in Soviet times, but “over the course of the post-Soviet years, a new generation of educated Muslim youth has grown up which has its own independent opinions and positions relative to key events in the country and in the world arena,” opinions that reflect its close links with Muslim communities and Muslim scholars abroad.

That means, Kurbanov continues, “this educated Muslim youth of Russia at one and the same time alongside its Russian citizenship and identity is already an inalienable part of the global 1.5 billion-strong Muslim war.” That is something Russian officials must understand and act accordingly.

“Attempts to drive this independent thinking youth under the propaganda of Russian television just like attempts to drive it into a vertical of MSDs, on the example of the vertical of the Russian Orthodox Church are condemned to failure in advance,” he argues. Officials must recognize that the way Muslim groups are run is very different from the way Christian ones are.

“Muslims have never had a single vertical of administration or a single center for the adoption of decisions of a kind like the Orthodox patriarchate or the Catholic papal throne.” But more than that, the centers where decisions are made for Muslims in Russia are beyond the borders of Russia.

As Kurbanov points out, “historically inside Islam has been formed an absolutely different structure of administration of the community of believers,” one that takes the form of “a numerous corporation of scholarly theologians, fahids, and mujtahids.” They and not any patriarch or pope make the key decisions.

The most important of these groups today and the one Russia should reach out to but hasn’t is the World Union of Muslim Scholars. The reason Moscow hasn’t is that the group frequently takes independent positions the Russian government doesn’t like, and instead of interacting, Moscow has isolated itself.

One of the leaders of the World Union, Sheikh Ali al-Karadahi hs even proposed creating a Russian council which “would develop norms of Muslim law” appropriate for “the specific conditions of the life of Russia’s Muslims.” Such groups have existed in other countries for decades, but Russia has refused al-Karadahi’s offer.

Unless Russia acquires its own major Muslim scholars and unless they enter into active dialogue with Muslim scholars abroad, the dialogue between Moscow and its own Muslims will be a dialogue of the deaf. And that will be an increasing tragedy for the Russian government and for Russia’s Muslims, Kurbanova says.

As Russia becomes ever more deeply involved in the conflicti n Syria, “which is viewed by the majority of Muslims of the world as a Sunni-Shiia clash,” failure to develop “direct dialogue between Moscow and the World Council” will have the most negative consequences all around.

By Shastri Ramachandaran*

The ending of China’s one-child policy, which gained notoriety for its coercive implementation, is a landmark event of immense economic and political significance, but there are serious question marks about whether it can effectively produce the positive economic fallout that its architects expect.

The importance of the October 29 decision of the Communist Party of China (CPC) to jettison the 35-year-old draconian one-child policy in favour of a new, universal two-child norm is primarily political as underscored by the fact that the announcement was made in a communique released at the conclusion of the four-day conclave – Fifth Plenum – of the CPC’s 18th Central Committee.

The main purpose of the plenum was to finalise China’s 13th Five-Year Plan – the first since Xi Jinping became President – and map the road ahead for the world’s second largest economy, which has had to contend with a falling growth rate in the last few years. China now aims to strive for a GDP growth rate of 6.5 to 7 percent during the five years of this Plan ending in 2020.

Some observers have even gone so far as saying that the CPC’s decision on the country’s birth policy is almost as important as Deng Xiaoping’s signal to open up the economy for reforms in 1978.

It was the overriding compulsion to ensure the success of Dengist reforms that dictated the adoption of the one-child policy, also in 1978, to be ruthlessly enforced from 1980. Paradoxically, the market forces unleashed by Deng were celebrated for economic reforms but not seen as being based on the political and bureaucratic tyranny of the one-child policy.

If the coming into force of the one-child policy was ‘historic’, then the reversal of the policy is no less historic. The excesses of China’s one-child policy – such as forced abortions and sterilisations, denial of residence permits and jobs, and exclusion of “illegal” children – were much worse and affected a wider section of people than the thuggishly-executed terror of population control that Indians suffered during Indira Gandhi’s “Emergency” (June 1975-March 1977).

Fear of the consequences had its effect on Chinese couples. “Ten years after my marriage, my husband and I wanted at least one sibling for our six-year-old daughter,” said shopkeeper Yan Xu (not his real name). “But we weren’t allowed to do that in the 1990s. Couples who went against the rules and had a second child lost their jobs. The second child also had no legal status. So we gave up on the idea.”

The CPC credits the one-child policy with preventing 400 million births in the last 35 years, thus contributing to China’s turbo-charged growth since the 1980s. The one-child norm addressed social, demographic and economic concerns that could have been hurdles to the reforms inspired by “paramount leader” Deng Xiaoping.

The two-child policy being widely welcomed has to be seen in this context – where strong-arm methods of enforcing Deng’s birth control policy would become a thing of the past. The horrors of that policy and the nightmare it became to hundreds of thousands are now being openly recounted in the Chinese media. What emerges through these stories, which were always known but not told as it is now narrated and prominently put out by the media in China, is that people feel somewhat liberated, freed of a certain lurking fear, about which they could not speak in public.

At a broader level, this is reflected in the ongoing open debate, with divergent views being expressed on the demographic consequences, economic prospects and political impact of the, literally, life-changing decision for millions. Whether viewed through the prism of politics, demography or economics, it seems to be a positive decision, one which the state could not have avoided for much longer for reasons that are obvious.

The relaxation of the one-child rule, which did not apply to minorities and rural families, began in 2013. If either of a couple was the only child, the couple was allowed two children. This easing of the norm was seen as clearing the ground for scrapping the one-child law in the course of time.

Thus, it was a matter of time, which was utilised to encourage open debate of the policy especially in academic circles, and political timing – before the ruling party formally announced the two-child policy.

Economic assumptions

Coming to the economic assumptions linked to the decision, these are unlikely to be borne out – at least in the near term; in any case, that is what the demographic trend of recent years indicates. The economic slow-down has raised concerns about China’s ambition of emerging as an all-round, “moderately well-off society” in the CPC’s 100th year.

As the official China Daily observed: “These five years are likely to be make or break, and the country will either be mired in the dreaded middle income trap, or survive the pains of transformation and accomplish a sustainable economic rebirth.”

An ageing population, with a decline in the number of those in the working age of 16-59, has added to the worries arising from the slow-down. The ageing population not only does not constitute part of the labour force but is a drag on the productivity of the population in the working age group, especially when young couples have to look after ageing parents in the absence of adequate social, structural or financial support from the state.

A decline in the working population also means a decline in consumption and spending; which, in turn, further weighs on an economy looking to boost growth through consumption especially at a time when exports are falling.

China’s ageing population, which was 110 million in 2010, is rising and expected to touch 210 million in 2030 and estimated to account for one-quarter of the population by 2050. The United Nations reckons that between 2010 and 2030, China would be losing 67 million workers. Official statistics in China show that the proportion of the working age group in the population peaked in 2010 (at 74.5 percent) and has been on the decline since 2011. Last year, 66 percent – 916 million – were in the 16-59  age group.

There is no way that the two-child policy can alter any of these facts, figures or trends in the short-term; and, after that, too, it would be overly optimistic to expect a sudden surge in the working population. On the contrary, current evidence suggests that the prevalent demographic trend is likely to continue – because of a lower fertility rate, and also because only a small percentage of those able and “eligible” are willing to go in for more than one child.

In 2013, when the birth control policy was relaxed – allowing a second child where one spouse was an only child – an estimated 11 million couples were eligible to add one more to the family. But, less than 10 percent (1.1 million) of these – not even 2 million as expected officially – had applied to have a second child.

On today’s calculations, 90 million couples are eligible to have a second child. If the experience of 2013 is anything to go by, it is expected that not even 10 percent of those may exercise that option. Besides, the bulk of those who go in for a second child may be rural families because they tend to be more interested than ‘urbanites’ in having bigger families.

In urban areas, few families even want more than one child and, rapid, widespread urbanisation has reinforced the one-child norm. Urban living is expensive, stressful and too restrictive to support large families. There are many deterrents to child-bearing. Rising costs of housing, nursing and education, lack of adequate social, familial and state support for child-bearing alongside late marriages and more women joining the workforce are only a few of the reasons for most couples opting for one child or no child.

Meanwhile, with the fertility rate falling to 1.5 percent on average, another distressing fact is the gender ratio where males outnumber females. Such an adverse ratio, as the Indian experience has also shown, can have undesirable social consequences.

Apart from the declining falling fertility rate and the imbalanced gender ratio, which do not encourage expectations of the “balanced population growth” required for an economic transformation, the ratio of children in the population is also falling. The dwindling child population reinforces the perception that fewer couples are going in for more than one child.

No-child families increasingly the fashion

If one-child families are the norm, no-child families are increasingly the fashion. The declining child population also indicates that the shortage of economically productive workers would continue and is unlikely to be remedied by the two-child policy.

The one-child policy created the ‘Little Emperor Syndrome’ of only children being pampered with excessive amounts of attention from parents and grandparents. But this one child was king only until his parents retired, when he and his wife (again with just one child) were likely to find themselves supporting both sets of parents (besides any surviving grandparent) with their limited space, income and resources.

Those born in the 1980s, and now be in their mid-thirties, are unlikely to risk another child in a system where social security, including pensions, is far from adequate. Neither the children of the 1980s nor those born in the 1990s responded in overwhelming numbers to the limited easing of the one-child policy in 2013. Many of child-bearing age can either not afford or do not want a second child because of the expenditure associated with bringing up another child.

All of this adds up to a scenario in which:

• It will not be easy to reverse the falling birth rate;
• There are many difficulties to be overcome for ensuring a rise in population of the workforce;
• The cost of bringing up more than one child as well as the socio-economic burden of caring for the aged remain major deterrents to the creation of a more productive and larger workforce; and
• The two-child policy cannot resolve the looming population crisis.

“The two-child policy won’t lead to a baby boom,” argues Prof Mu Guangzong of Peking University’s Population Research Institute. “The reform is not likely to make a big dent in the trend of population growth. Over the past two years, husbands and wives of child-bearing age have not responded positively to the two-child policy.”

According to Guangzong, “more aggressive approaches would be required to reverse the trend and fuel population growth … [Besides] the looming labour shortage will upset sustainable socio-economic development.”

The policy paving the way for more babies to be brought in to the world by making baby boomers of those born in the 1980s and 1990s cannot succeed unless, for example, the ageing population is provided for and taken care of. According to one report of the 13th Five-Year Plan, nearly 200 million have yet to be covered by the insurance plan for the elderly.

China, which has a record of achieving targets – and well before the stipulated date – may fall short of the mark when it comes to an increase of 30 million in the working-age population by 2050.

China needs a baby boom. Yet it would be premature to expect or fear one unless the CPC’s new population policy extends to correcting distortions in the population structure and forms part of a larger and more encompassing reform strategy focused on sustainable livelihood for all, including the aged.

*Shastri Ramachandran is an independent political and foreign affairs commentator.

By Seyyedeh Motahhareh Hosseini*

Following recent bomb attacks, which were carried out by Daesh terrorist group in the French capital city, Paris, a number of questions have been raised about this incident. A question, which was raised frequently was why Middle Eastern countries, especially Turkey and Iran, have been successful in controlling Daesh by preventing spillover of the crisis into their countries and fighting the risk of Daesh at borders, while many Arab, Muslim, European, Western and Asian countries have not been able to control radical Islamism as well as the tendency toward such groups as Wahhabis, Salafists, Daesh, al-Nusra Front, and al-Qaeda groups within their borders? It seems that the main concern for countries like Iran, which has common borders with radical Islamist groups like the Taliban and al-Qaeda, and Turkey, which is a major route for extremist radicals in and out of Syria, is how to prevent the spread of radicalism through their borders.

The success in preventing the spillover of such regional crises as war, unrest, dissatisfaction, anti-government ideas and flow of refugees into their soil is also a sign of political and security complexities in these two countries. Turkey has good relations with Daesh and other radical groups and most of these radical forces easily pass through its borders while the same forces turn into aggressive and high-risk forces in other countries. Turkey has been largely immune to spread of aggressive ideas of radical Islamist groups, including Daesh, because Daesh does not consider it as an obstacle and enemy. In addition, both Daesh and Turkey’s government consider Kurds as their common enemy. Other factors that have been effective in shaping Turkey’s complicated policy toward these groups include: the country’s proportionate progress in recent decades; presence of Islamist parties at the helm of political power as represented by the 13-year rule of the Justice and Development Party; inclusion of powerful mystic tendencies in Turkish people’s Hanafi religion; lack of Turkey’s participation in any kind of provocative operations against Daesh, al-Nusra Front and other Islamist groups; apparent opposition of Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to Israel; and Ankara’s membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

Iran is also faced with the threat of such extremist groups as Daesh, the Taliban, Wahhabi groups and so forth along its borders, while being considered as their enemy from a religious and ideological viewpoint. However, a combination of various domestic and regional policies has so far prevented these groups from posing a real threat to the country. From the viewpoint of border and international issues, Iran has been trying to prevent spread of their ideas, thoughts and plans among Sunni population in the county. Perhaps, this policy has been the most important factor that has so far thwarted extremist plans of these groups from being implemented in Iran.

From the viewpoint of domestic policies, Iran has been able to handle such crises as autonomy of the Iraqi Kurdistan Region, and while establishing friendly relations with the Iraqi Kurdistan Region, has prevented strengthening of secessionist tendencies among Iranian Kurds. Perhaps this policy was the second factor that helped Iran turn threats it was facing in Syria into opportunities through presence of its Quds Force in the Arab country. The Iranian people’s apprehension about the consequences of international policies in the Middle East from the time that the United States invaded Iraq up to the rise of Daesh was the third important factor that thwarted threats that stemmed from insecurity and war in neighboring countries. The success of nuclear negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 group of world powers also provided good support for Iran’s domestic and foreign policies in order to maintain stability of the Islamic Republic of Iran in one of the most critical regions of the world.

In comparison, if we looked at the policies of the West and Europe, we would see a hodgepodge of provocative and contradictory policies, especially on the part of the European countries, in the face of the Islamist groups. Such policies have made European states a destination of choice for spiteful moves of radical Islamist currents. While the number of Muslims in Europe is high, activities that are provocative to Muslims take place with high frequency across the continent. On the other hand, steps taken so far in the name of fighting the plots and conspiracies of Daesh and other radical Islamist groups, will certainly fail to fundamentally stop their violent activities and will have no effect on radical Islamism in Europe in the long term, but will only add fuel to the existing conflicts and contradictions. The main point of comparing the performance of security and police systems in European countries with those in Turkey and Iran is to show that Europeans are unfamiliar both with the nature of the Muslims’ culture, and those factors that make radical Islamist groups tick. On the opposite, local security and police apparatuses in Iran and Turkey can understand the process of policymaking and the way that such radical groups as Daesh, al-Qaeda, the Taliban as well as other Salafist and Wahhabi groups work. Therefore, by tracing their high-risk plans, they manage to defuse those plans. However, through their aggressive and confrontational approach, European countries will never be able to trace and defuse plans made by these radical groups. On the opposite, such confrontational approach to these groups will only help strengthen their vengeful motivations and pave the way for their destructive forces to infiltrate various parts of Europe.

*Seyyedeh Motahhareh Hosseini
Assistant Professor of Political Science & Expert on Central Asia and Caucasus Affairs

Reporters Without Borders (RSF) has condemned Venezuela’s Communication and Information Ministry’s decision to make foreign reporters sign a pledge ahead of the December 6 parliamentary elections in which they accept that their accreditation could be withdrawn if they fail to comply with certain conditions.

On November 30, foreign journalists wanting to cover the elections had to sign an undertaking “to not manipulate images, audio files or texts in order to change their meaning, origin, or underlying concepts (…) to transmit accurate and relevant information (…) and to respect the democratic process and peace at all times.”

RSF said it regards this deliberately vague wording as a grave attempt to pressure and censor the media during an election.

The undertaking ends: “In the event that I do not fulfil these conditions, I accept that the accreditation granted to me by the authorities will be withdrawn.” In other words, foreign journalists will have to stop working if they are deemed to have violated the terms of the pledge.

“Imposing prior censorship on the international media is unacceptable,” said Emmanuel Colombié, the head of RSF’s Latin America desk. “We urge the Venezuelan government not to obstruct the work of the media, and especially the work of foreign reporters. The Venezuelan authorities must respect their national and international obligations.”

This decision is unprecedented in Venezuela, according to the National Press Workers Union (SNTP), which immediately condemned it.

It violates both international free speech standards and Venezuela’s own regulations on the granting of accreditation to international media, as stipulated in Resolution No. 053 of 27 April 2004, published in Official Gazette No. 37930 of  May 4, 2004.

Much is at stake in the 6 December elections because the opposition could win a majority in the National Assembly. This would create problems for Hugo Chávez’s successor as president, Nicolas Maduro, whose hold on power has been weakening in recent months.

Ever since his election in April 2013, Maduro has displayed a great deal of hostility towards independent media and has been promoting the creation or reinforcement of pro-government media.

Venezuela is ranked 137th out of 180 countries in the 2015 Reporters Without Borders press freedom index.

So the warmongers are happy now, as our planes began bombing Syria within hours of Wednesday’s vote in the House of Commons, as civilians die, because they always do, and as we’re told that this is the start of years of war. What  a shame and a disgrace. This century, this millennium, since the trigger of 9/11, which Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaeda intended to destabilise us, and to drag us into wars we couldn’t win, we have been mired in disaster in Afghanistan and we plumbed the depths in Iraq, and, when the Labour government gave way to the Tory-led coalition government, and, in turn, the Tories alone, in May’s particularly depressing General Election, we got involved in the destruction of Libya and, after a burst of sanity in 2013, when Parliament voted against bombing Syria, we got back in the game with bombing against Daesh (ISIS/ISIL) in Iraq, which has now been extended to Syria.

Wars of choice, for the whole of this time, so that my son, who is 16 in two weeks, doesn’t remember a time when we weren’t at war. My son was just one year old when we enthusiastically joined the Bush administration’s invasion of Afghanistan, and hideously overstayed our welcome after toppling the Taliban. My son was three when we illegally invaded Iraq, an invasion in which our Prime Minister, Tony Blair, was not Bush’s poodle, as many in the UK think, but was the key ally who gave legitimacy to Bush’s lawless plans.

And these endless wars? They are now longer in duration than the two World Wars combined, and yet they have never had more than the faintest trace of justification — only, arguably, in Afghanistan, at the beginning, although I didn’t agree with that particular invasion either, as wars without proper plans — attributes which all these wars share — are a recipe for disaster. And here we are, 14 years later, with no end in sight, bombing more civilians in Syria.

Yes, we say we have military targets, we say we are clever, but we’re not. Bombs always kill civilians. No one knows quite how many civilians have died in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and now Syria as a result of our bombs, but it is in the hundreds of thousands, at the every least. Blood is on the hands of those who authorised our bombs to be dropped — from Tony Blair to his cabinet to the MPs of all parties who backed him, and the media who did so too, and, more recently, with david Cameron taking Blair’s place.

On Wednesday, MPs spent all day debating David Cameron’s proposals to bomb Syria — a knee-jerk reaction to the terrorist attacks in Paris, which, whatever their connection to Daesh, were carried out by European citizens. He tried to claim Daesh is a threat to our national security here in the UK, he lied about there being 70,000 moderate fighters waiting for our help, when the situation on the ground is much more complicated than that, and he called all his critics “terrorist sympathisers.” He tried to hide his desire not to be left out of the latest warmongering coalition, and he and others tried, with varying measures of failure, to disguise how, fundamentally, they like being at war.

The House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee disagreed with David Cameron, and even Britain’s newspapers, dominated by right-wingers, failed to respond enthusiastically to the pounding of war drums from No. 10. On the eve of the vote, less than 50% of the British people were convinced. And yet, on the night, the bombing was approved by 397 votes to 223. The Tories “whipped” their MPs into line (such a horrible word, although apt, like a description of public school violence), but Jeremy Corbyn gave his MPs a free vote.

Some have criticised him for this, but to do otherwise would have been to have walked into a trap — set by his own opponents within the Labour party, who, suicidally, would have used it as the trigger for a coup — I say suicidally, because Jeremy Corbyn was elected as leader by a majority of party members, and none of his opponents have shown any ability to endear themselves to members of the public, or even members of their own party, with anything approaching his appeal.

This was true, in the leadership election, for all his opponents — Yvette Cooper, Andy Burnham and Liz Kendall — and although the media enthusiastically congratulated Hilary Benn for his warmongering speech on Wednesday night (predictably, providing yet another excuse to bash Jeremy, as they do so relentlessly and so disgracefully), there is no sign that his speech (which I saw, partly, and cynically, as his leadership pitch) will endear him to people either — and, of course, to those who remember his father, the great anti-war campaigner Tony Benn, his son’s warmongering (from Iraq onwards) is profoundly depressing (see Tony Benn here, arguing against Iraq airstrikes in 1998).

Jeremy Corbyn, of course, didn’t vote for war and nor did 152 of his colleagues. I commend him, as I commend those 152 MPs, and as I also commend the other MPs who voted against the proposals: the seven Tory rebels — John Baron (Basildon & Billericay), David Davis (Haltemprice & Howden), Gordon Henderson (Sittingbourne & Sheppey), Philip Hollobone (Kettering), Julian Lewis (New Forest East), Stephen McPartland (Stevenage) and Andrew Tyrie (Chichester) — plus the 53 SNP MPs, the three SDLP MPs, the two Lib Dems who defied their whip (Norman Lamb and Mark Williams), the two Plaid Cymru MPs, and Green MP Caroline Lucas.

They established that a case had not been made for us to bomb Syria, and, as we now find ourselves embroiled in what may well be an the open-ended war, even with British troops sent senselessly to die.

Below, I’m publishing the list of the 153 MPs who voted against the Tories’ proposals, and for anyone who wants to identify which of those MPs are truly committed not just to peace (and against senseless war), but also to social justice and, I would say, the socialist values of the Labour party, I’ve also noted which of these MPs also voted against the Tories’ wretched welfare cuts, back in July, when Harriet Harman was acting leader, and 48 Labour MPs defied the whip.

As the Guardian noted at the time, Harman “had urged Labour MPs to send a message to the electorate that they were listening to concerns over welfare payments by abstaining on the welfare bill after voting for an amendment that set out the party’s objections to the bill,” but 48 principled MPs objected — including Jeremy Corbyn, then the frontrunner in the leadership contest, John McDonnell, and three of the London mayoral candidates (Diane Abbott, David Lammy and the eventual winner of that contest, Sadiq Khan). All the other leadership candidates abstained.

I’m also posting the names of the 66 Labour MPs who voted with the Tories in support of airstrikes in Syria — and I note that only one of them voted against the welfare bill in July — because I want to be on record as stating that I believe it is appropriate for everyone who supports the Labour Party, or who wants a credible alternative to the Tories, to ask if these are the kind of people who should be trying to take the party into the future — and to suggest that, if there is to be a revived and revitalised Labour Party that remembers its roots, then some of these MPs should be deselected by their constituents.

Many are Blairites, who, to my mind, have lost touch with what the party should be, and who, since 2010, have failed to realise that being like the Tories but a bit less nasty isn’t electorally viable. it may be that socialism isn’t electorally viable, either, but I think we need to have a clear alternative to the Tories, i think we need that alternative to be socialist, and I also think it’s obvious that there are millions of us who are actually excited about the possibilities, and are hugely relieved that there is now a genuine alternative to the me-me-me-obsessed, big business-loving, poor-bashing selfishness and greed that has been mainstream politics, whether Tory or Labour, for the last 20 years.

Please note that members of the Shadow Cabinet are marked with asterisks — and of particular concern, it seems to me, should be the 11 members of the Shadow Cabinet who voted with the Tories, as opposed to the 16 who stood with Jeremy Corbyn. Please also note that there was one abstention on Wednesday by another Shadow Cabinet member, chief whip Rosie Winterton, and another four Labour MPs abstained (as did seven Tories). Five other labour MPs were not present, two of whom opposed the welfare bill. The 48th MP who voted against the welfare bill was Michael Meacher, who, sadly, died in October, but whose seat (Oldham West and Royton) was won on Thursday night by his Labour successor, Jim McMahon, with a thumping majority that reinforces Jeremy Corbyn’s leadership. Michael Meacher, of course, was one of the 36 MPs who nominated Jeremy Corbyn for his leadership bid, and I think I can safely say that he would also have voted with Jeremy Corbyn on Wednesday night.

The 153 Labour MPs who voted against airstrikes in Syria

* Diane Abbott (Hackney North & Stoke Newington) Shadow secretary of state for international development, also voted against welfare bill in July
Debbie Abrahams (Oldham East & Saddleworth) also voted against welfare bill in July
Rushanara Ali (Bethnal Green & Bow)
Graham Allen (Nottingham North)
David Anderson (Blaydon) also voted against welfare bill in July
* Jon Ashworth (Leicester South) Shadow minister without portfolio
Clive Betts (Sheffield South East)
Roberta Blackman-Woods (Durham, City of)
Paul Blomfield (Sheffield Central)
Kevin Brennan (Cardiff West)
Lyn Brown (West Ham)
Nick Brown (Newcastle upon Tyne East)
Karen Buck (Westminster North)
Richard Burden (Birmingham Northfield)
Richard Burgon (Leeds East) also voted against welfare bill in July
* Andy Burnham (Leigh) Shadow home secretary
Dawn Butler (Brent Central) also voted against welfare bill in July
Liam Byrne (Birmingham Hodge Hill)
Ruth Cadbury (Brentford & Isleworth)
Ronnie Campbell (Blyth Valley)
Sarah Champion (Rotherham)
Julie Cooper (Burnley)
* Jeremy Corbyn (Islington North) Leader of the Labour Party, also voted against welfare bill in July
David Crausby (Bolton North East)
Jon Cruddas (Dagenham & Rainham)
John Cryer (Leyton & Wanstead)
Judith Cummins (Bradford South)
Alex Cunningham (Stockton North)
Jim Cunningham (Coventry South)
Nic Dakin (Scunthorpe)
Geraint Davies (Swansea West) also voted against welfare bill in July
Peter Dowd (Bootle) also voted against welfare bill in July
Jack Dromey (Birmingham Erdington)
Clive Efford (Eltham)
Julie Elliott (Sunderland Central)
Bill Esterson (Sefton Central)
Chris Evans (Islwyn)
Paul Farrelly (Newcastle-under-Lyme)
Rob Flello (Stoke-on-Trent South)
Paul Flynn (Newport West) also voted against welfare bill in July
Yvonne Fovargue (Makerfield)
Vicky Foxcroft (Lewisham Deptford)
Barry Gardiner (Brent North)
Pat Glass (Durham North West)
Mary Glindon (Tyneside North) also voted against welfare bill in July
Roger Godsiff (Birmingham Hall Green) also voted against welfare bill in July
* Kate Green (Stretford & Urmston) Shadow minister for women and equalities
* Lilian Greenwood (Nottingham South) Shadow secretary of state for transport
Margaret Greenwood (Wirral West) also voted against welfare bill in July
* Nia Griffith (Llanelli) Shadow secretary of state for Wales
Andrew Gwynne (Denton & Reddish)
Louise Haigh (Sheffield Heeley) also voted against welfare bill in July
Fabian Hamilton (Leeds North East)
David Hanson (Delyn)
Harry Harpham (Sheffield Brightside & Hillsborough)
Carolyn Harris (Swansea East) also voted against welfare bill in July
Helen Hayes (Dulwich & West Norwood)
Sue Hayman (Workington) also voted against welfare bill in July
* John Healey (Wentworth & Dearne) Shadow minister for housing and planning
Mark Hendrick (Preston)
Stephen Hepburn (Jarrow)
Meg Hillier (Hackney South & Shoreditch)
Sharon Hodgson (Washington & Sunderland West)
Kate Hoey (Vauxhall)
Kate Hollern (Blackburn)
Kelvin Hopkins (Luton North) was teller for the rebels who voted against welfare bill in July
Rupa Huq (Ealing Central & Acton)
Imran Hussain (Bradford East) also voted against welfare bill in July
Huw Irranca-Davies (Ogmore)
Diana Johnson (Hull North)
Gerald Jones (Merthyr Tydfil & Rhymney) also voted against welfare bill in July
Mike Kane (Wythenshawe & Sale East)
Sir Gerald Kaufman (Manchester Gorton) also voted against welfare bill in July
Barbara Keeley (Worsley & Eccles South)
Sadiq Khan (Tooting) also voted against welfare bill in July
Stephen Kinnock (Aberavon)
David Lammy (Tottenham) also voted against welfare bill in July
Ian Lavery (Wansbeck) also voted against welfare bill in July
Emma Lewell-Buck (South Shields)
Clive Lewis (Norwich South) also voted against welfare bill in July
Ivan Lewis (Bury South)
Rebecca Long Bailey (Salford & Eccles) also voted against welfare bill in July
Ian Lucas (Wrexham)
Steve McCabe (Birmingham Selly Oak)
* Kerry McCarthy (Bristol East) Shadow secretary of state for environment, food and rural affairs
Andy McDonald (Middlesbrough) also voted against welfare bill in July
* John McDonnell (Hayes & Harlington) Shadow chancellor of the exchequer, also voted against welfare bill in July
Liz McInnes (Heywood & Middleton) also voted against welfare bill in July
* Catherine McKinnell (Newcastle upon Tyne North) Shadow attorney general
Fiona Mactaggart (Slough)
Justin Madders (Ellesmere Port & Neston)
Shabana Mahmood (Birmingham Ladywood)
* Seema Malhotra (Feltham & Heston) Shadow chief secretary to the Treasury
John Mann (Bassetlaw)
Rob Marris (Wolverhampton South West) also voted against welfare bill in July
Gordon Marsden (Blackpool South)
Rachael Maskell (York Central) also voted against welfare bill in July
Chris Matheson (Chester, City of)
Alan Meale (Mansfield)
Ian Mearns (Gateshead) also voted against welfare bill in July
Ed Miliband (Doncaster North)
Madeleine Moon (Bridgend) also voted against welfare bill in July
Jessica Morden (Newport East)
Grahame Morris (Easington) also voted against welfare bill in July
* Ian Murray (Edinburgh South) Shadow secretary of state for Scotland
* Lisa Nandy (Wigan) Shadow secretary of state for energy and climate change
Melanie Onn (Great Grimsby)
Chi Onwurah (Newcastle upon Tyne Central)
Kate Osamor (Edmonton) also voted against welfare bill in July
Albert Owen (Ynys Mon)
Teresa Pearce (Erith & Thamesmead) also voted against welfare bill in July
Matthew Pennycook (Greenwich & Woolwich)
Toby Perkins (Chesterfield)
Jess Phillips (Birmingham Yardley)
Stephen Pound (Ealing North)
Yasmin Qureshi (Bolton South East)
Angela Rayner (Ashton Under Lyne)
Christina Rees (Neath)
Rachel Reeves (Leeds West)
Jonathan Reynolds (Stalybridge & Hyde)
Marie Rimmer (St Helens South & Whiston) also voted against welfare bill in July
Steve Rotheram (Liverpool Walton)
Naseem Shah (Bradford West)
Barry Sheerman (Huddersfield)
Paula Sherriff (Dewsbury) also voted against welfare bill in July
Gavin Shuker (Luton South)
Tulip Siddiq (Hampstead & Kilburn) also voted against welfare bill in July
Dennis Skinner (Bolsover) also voted against welfare bill in July
Andy Slaughter (Hammersmith)
Andrew Smith (Oxford East)
Cat Smith (Lancaster & Fleetwood) also voted against welfare bill in July
Jeff Smith (Manchester Withington)
Nick Smith (Blaenau Gwent)
* Owen Smith (Pontypridd) Shadow secretary of state for work and pensions
Karin Smyth (Bristol South)
Keir Starmer (Holborn & St Pancras)
Jo Stevens (Cardiff Central) also voted against welfare bill in July
Wes Streeting (Ilford North)
Graham Stringer (Blackley & Broughton) also voted against welfare bill in July
Mark Tami (Alyn & Deeside)
Nick Thomas-Symonds (Torfaen)
Emily Thornberry (Islington South & Finsbury)
Stephen Timms (East Ham)
* Jon Trickett (Hemsworth) Shadow secretary of state for communities and local government, shadow minister for the constitutional convention
Karl Turner (Hull East)
Derek Twigg (Halton)
Stephen Twigg (Liverpool West Derby)
Valerie Vaz (Walsall South)
Catherine West (Hornsey & Wood Green)
Alan Whitehead (Southampton Test)
David Winnick (Walsall North) also voted against welfare bill in July
Iain Wright (Hartlepool) also voted against welfare bill in July
Daniel Zeichner (Cambridge) also voted against welfare bill in July

The 66 Labour MPs who voted for airstrikes in Syria

* Heidi Alexander (Lewisham East) Shadow secretary of state for health
Ian Austin (Dudley North)
Adrian Bailey (West Bromwich West)
Kevin Barron (Rother Valley)
Margaret Beckett (Derby South)
* Hilary Benn (Leeds Central) Shadow foreign secretary
* Luciana Berger (Liverpool Wavertree) Shadow minister for mental health
Tom Blenkinsop (Middlesbrough South & Cleveland East)
Ben Bradshaw (Exeter)
* Chris Bryant (Rhondda) Shadow leader of the House of Commons
Alan Campbell (Tynemouth)
Jenny Chapman (Darlington)
* Vernon Coaker (Gedling) Shadow secretary of state for Northern Ireland
Ann Coffey (Stockport)
Yvette Cooper (Normanton, Pontefract & Castleford)
Neil Coyle (Bermondsey & Old Southwark)
Mary Creagh (Wakefield)
Stella Creasy (Walthamstow)
Simon Danczuk (Rochdale)
Wayne David (Caerphilly)
* Gloria De Piero (Ashfield) Shadow minister for young people and voter registration
Stephen Doughty (Cardiff South & Penarth)
Jim Dowd (Lewisham West & Penge)
* Michael Dugher (Barnsley East) Shadow secretary of state for culture, media and sport
* Angela Eagle (Wallasey) Shadow first secretary of state, shadow secretary of state for business, innovation and skills
* Maria Eagle (Garston & Halewood) Shadow secretary of state for defence
Louise Ellman (Liverpool Riverside)
Frank Field (Birkenhead)
Jim Fitzpatrick (Poplar & Limehouse)
Colleen Fletcher (Coventry North East)
Caroline Flint (Don Valley)
Harriet Harman (Camberwell & Peckham)
Margaret Hodge (Barking)
George Howarth (Knowsley)
Tristram Hunt (Stoke-on-Trent Central)
Dan Jarvis (Barnsley Central)
Alan Johnson (Hull West & Hessle)
Graham Jones (Hyndburn)
Helen Jones (Warrington North) BUT voted against welfare bill in July
Kevan Jones (Durham North)
Susan Elan Jones (Clwyd South)
Liz Kendall (Leicester West)
Dr Peter Kyle (Hove)
Chris Leslie (Nottingham East)
Holly Lynch (Halifax)
Siobhain McDonagh (Mitcham & Morden)
Pat McFadden (Wolverhampton South East)
Conor McGinn (St Helens North)
Alison McGovern (Wirral South)
Bridget Phillipson (Houghton & Sunderland South)
* Lucy Powell (Manchester Central) Shadow secretary of state for education
Jamie Reed (Copeland)
Emma Reynolds (Wolverhampton North East)
Geoffrey Robinson (Coventry North West)
Joan Ryan (Enfield North)
Ruth Smeeth (Stoke-on-Trent North)
Angela Smith (Penistone & Stocksbridge)
John Spellar (Warley)
Gisela Stuart (Birmingham Edgbaston)
Gareth Thomas (Harrow West)
Anna Turley (Redcar)
Chuka Umunna (Streatham)
Keith Vaz (Leicester East)
* Tom Watson (West Bromwich East) Deputy leader of the Labour Party, party chair and shadow minister for the Cabinet Office
Phil Wilson (Sedgefield)
John Woodcock (Barrow & Furness)

The 5 Labour MPs who abstained in the Syria vote

Jo Cox (Batley and Spen)
Khalid Mahmood (Birmingham Perry Barr)
Steve Reed (Croydon North)
Virendra Sharma (Ealing Southall)
* Rosie Winterton (Doncaster Central) Opposition chief whip

The 5 Labour MPs who were unable to attend the Syria vote

Ann Clwyd (Cynon Valley) voted against welfare bill in July
Rosie Cooper (West Lancashire)
Thangam Debbonaire (Bristol West)
Mike Gapes (Ilford South)
Helen Goodman (Bishop Auckland) voted against welfare bill in July

The anti-ISIS coalition of many divided special interests will struggle to end the war in Syria.

By Chris Miller*

Recent weeks have seen jolting reversals in the world’s attempt to bring an end to the war in Syria: the horrific attacks in Paris and Turkey’s shooting down of a Russian bomber that crossed into its airspace threatening joint action against Islamic State. François Hollande’s shuttle diplomacy to Washington and Moscow underlined the fact the international community is more focused on Syria today than at any point since the UN-brokered deal to remove Syria’s chemical weapons in 2012. Yet a substantive diplomatic deal among the major players, the type of deal that would bring peace to Syria, looks far more difficult as each has contradictory security and political priorities that complicate the fight against the Islamic State.

The war is driven by multiple, interlocking layers of conflict. There are disputes among different clusters of Syrian fighters, as Sunni rebel groups in northwestern and southwestern Syria fight government forces and fend off attacks from ISIS. At the same time, there is a regional dimension, especially a region-wide conflict between Shiite Iran and Sunni powers such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. Turkey, too, maintains it has critical security interests in Syria, above all in prioritizing that Syria’s Kurdish minority does not achieve an independent state, which would exacerbate the Turkish government’s dispute with its own Kurdish minority. Finally, outside powers such as the United States, France and Russia clash over the role that Bashar al Assad’s government should play in Syria’s future and the fight against the Islamic State.

The terrorist attacks in Paris led many to expect that France would drop its longstanding demand that Assad must leave office and devote all its attention to fighting ISIS, perhaps even with the support of Assad’s forces. In such a scenario, many assumed, the West would have no choice but to come to terms with Russia. The Kremlin says it wants to fight terrorism, but has primarily focused its airstrikes not on ISIS targets but against the rebel groups around the northern Syrian city of Aleppo who are fighting Assad.

Two recent events have made a “grand bargain” about Syria between Russia and the West less likely. First, Hollande’s week of diplomatic shuttle to Moscow and Washington underscored the vast gap that remains between how the West and Russia see Syria – and how two years of war in Ukraine have eroded Western trust in Russia. Even intelligence sharing between Russia and Western powers about ISIS is a complicated task because of fears about revealing sources. Second, Turkey’s shooting down of the Russian bomber has underscored the risk involved in military operations in Syria and the danger of miscalculations.

Why did Turkey shoot down the Russian plane? Russian aircraft have violated Turkish airspace several times since Russian bombing raids began in October, at one time for more than two minutes, which Turkish and NATO officials interpret as a deliberate provocation. Turkish officials – who dislike Russia’s intervention in Syria, and who, unlike the Kremlin, want to see Assad’s fall – may have been looking to send a signal to Moscow about Turkey’s resolve. At the same time, Turkey’s action brings NATO more directly into the conflict over Syria. The United States, France, the United Kingdom and other Western countries that are NATO members pledged to defend Turkey against attack, and the Russian plane’s violation of the NATO member Turkey’s airspace brings Western disagreements with Russia back to the forefront of debate.

The other major Western disagreement with Russia is Ukraine. Some analysts have predicted that Western countries would seek to “trade” Ukraine for Syria, giving the Kremlin some of what it wants in Ukraine in exchange for Russian support for anti-ISIS operations in Syria. Though some Western analysts and officials have considered the idea of cutting a deal with Russia, there is little sign of such a trade emerging in practice. The coalition in favor of keeping tough sanctions on Russia – including the US, UK, Germany, Poland and the Baltics – remains committed to that policy. Germany, a key player in Europe’s foreign policy, remains unconvinced that more airstrikes in Syria constitute a wise policy. Berlin, therefore, sees little reason to cut a deal with Russia. Meanwhile, renewed violence in Ukraine’s war-torn Donbas region has underscored the extent to which Western and Russia disagreements about Ukraine remain.

Russia, for its part, would likely be pleased to strike a deal with the West about fighting ISIS. That would give Russia a powerful seat at the negotiating table that will decide Syria’s fate, bringing Vladimir Putin back into the fold. Such a deal would also likely preserve Russia’s naval base on the Mediterranean and other military installations in Syria.

Turkey, however, has thwarted Russian hopes for a rapid deal with the West over Syria. Turkey has a complicated relationship with its southern neighbor. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan once had a close relationship with Assad, and the two governments even had joint cabinet meetings. After Assad responded to Sunni protests with a violent crackdown, relations rapidly soured, and Turkey’s government began supporting anti-government rebels.

Today, Turkey has several goals in Syria. Most importantly, it seeks to avoid the establishment of an independent or autonomous territory in the northern Syria region that is dominated by Kurdish groups. Especially because Turkey’s relations with its own Kurds have soured since this summer, Ankara fears that an independent Kurdish region in Syria would further embolden Kurdish groups in Turkey.

A deal directing the West’s focus solely toward ISIS, with the effect of reestablishing the legitimacy of Assad’s government, would contradict Ankara’s goals. First, a deal between Assad and the Aleppo-based rebels might lead to a decentralization of Syria’s government in a way that provided further autonomy to the Kurds. Second, Turkey fears the expansion of Russian and Iranian influence in Syria.

There may be some scope for an agreement between Russia and the West about Syria. Hollande and French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius have signaled that they are willing to compromise on their opposition to Assad, suggesting that they could back a process that led to a “credible political transition” – wording that suggests that Assad could stay in the short term before being replaced by a more representative government in the medium term. Russia, too, has repeatedly stated that its commitment is to Syria’s “legitimate government” rather than to Assad personally, which appears to encompass a similar possibility of a medium-term exit for Assad.

An anti-ISIS coalition between Russia and the West would be more effective if fully supported by Saudi Arabia and Iran, two countries that have invested heavily in Syria. That looks unlikely. But even if such a deal is struck – and even, less likely, if such a deal includes most of the anti-Assad rebel groups clustered around the northern city of Aleppo – that would not stop the fighting in Syria. Nor would such a deal lead to immediate destruction of ISIS in Syria. ISIS forces are spread between Iraq and Syria. Rooting them out of their heartland in the river valleys that connect the two countries will take a more concerted military effort combining air and ground assault than any foreign powers have thus far been willing to commit. Deal or no deal, the ravages of war in Syria are unlikely to end soon.

*Chris Miller is associate director of the Grand Strategy Program at Yale and a fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. He is currently finishing a book manuscript on Russian-Chinese relations.

By Paul Stronski*

Since the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991, US-Russian relations repeatedly have been hit by surprise developments. In just the last couple of years, unexpected events have included Edward Snowden’s leaks, Crimea, Donbas, Syria, the Russian Metrojet tragedy and the Turkish shoot-down of a Russian Su-24. The list could go on. In each case, Washington was forced to make reactive as opposed to proactive policies concerning Russia or its neighbors.

This phenomenon is such that Russia’s ability to surprise is frequently presented as one of its prime tactical advantages over the West. The US Congress has even called for investigations into “intelligence failures” connected to Russia’s ability to surprise.

The focus should not be on intelligence failures. Many Russians were equally surprised by these events. The problem is that Washington repeatedly has failed to look for potential flashpoints, and, therefore, has done nothing to prepare for them. Breaking the pattern, then, should begin with identifying the next potential hot spot.

The list of potential problems is long, but the “frozen conflict” in Nagorno-Karabakh—an obscure region of the South Caucasus—stands out because it is far from frozen. The “hot” phase of the Karabakh war—the result of nationalist Armenia clashing with nationalist Azerbaijan during the twilight of the Soviet era—ended with a 1994 ceasefire agreement. Armenians ended up controlling the disputed Karabakh region along with a large swathe of Azerbaijan proper. The human cost was high: 20,000 killed, 1 million displaced, economies torn to shreds. After the war, Armenia fell firmly under Russia’s security blanket, while Azerbaijan looked to Turkey and the West, eager to find markets for its oil and gas. For the past two decades plus, the two combatants have failed to come to a lasting political settlement.

That is now part of the problem because a renewed conflict would pit Armenia, Russia’s ally, against Azerbaijan, NATO-member Turkey’s ally. Of late, both Armenia and Azerbaijan have been testing the ceasefire; if it does crumble, the conflict has the potential to develop into another proxy war between Russia and the West. The current friction between Turkey and Russia over the Su-24 downing adds a new layer of complication to an already tense situation in the Caucasus, and has raised perceptions in the Caucasus of a heightened threat level.

It does not have to be this way. The United States, Russia and France for much of the past 20 years led diplomatic efforts to manage the Karabakh conflict. These efforts have not brought peace, but they at least have prevented a renewal of large-scale fighting. Soldiers die each year, but clashes are largely contained to the front lines of the disputed territories.

Peace remains elusive because neither Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev nor his Armenian counterpart Serzh Sargsyan really want the conflict resolved. The status quo of “no real war/no real peace” is useful to them because it allows their governments to justify authoritarian policies and divert popular attention from social, economic and political problems at home. In short, these leaders find it easier to blame their respective society’s ills on external enemies than to try to implement reforms.

The problem now is the system of trilateral diplomacy that long kept large-scale fighting at bay in Karabakh is breaking down due to the broader erosion of East-West relations. As a result, the heat is being turned up on the long simmering conflict.

Aggressive language is on the rise, as local economies struggle. This is particularly problematic in Azerbaijan, where the Aliyev administration is facing a fiscal crisis brought on by the plummeting price of oil and natural gas. Baku’s increasing reliance on authoritarian governing methods also has fueled rancor in its relations with the West, diminishing Washington’s ability to influence Azerbaijan on Karabakh.

Over the past two years, occasional small-arms fire along the front lines has given way to artillery duels and mortar attacks, the downing of a helicopter, the use of drones and ambushes. The fighting claimed 72 lives in 2014, making it the bloodiest year since the ceasefire. Deaths this year look like they may have already surpassed that; fighting has moved beyond the traditional front lines to other areas of the border region. And villages have been targeted, leading to civilian deaths.

In most cases, Azerbaijan appears to be testing Armenian resolve, but Armenia is responding with resounding force. Both sides are complicit in the spike of violence this year.

Russia at times has played a helpful role in international negotiations; former Russian President Medvedev tried in vain to broker a resolution during his time in the Kremlin. At the same time, Russia also fuels the conflict by providing weapons to both sides. Eager to pull Azerbaijan back into its orbit, the Kremlin has authorized the sale of advanced weapons to Baku. This weapons flow has unnerved Armenia, which has sought to improve its relationship with the West, despite its alliance with Moscow.

Keeping the Karabakh conflict in check would seem to be in the Kremlin’s interests. The last thing Moscow needs right now is a war next to its volatile North Caucasus region, and not too far from Syria—where the Russian military is risking becoming bogged down.

With a lasting Karabakh peace settlement still looking illusive, the status quo probably suits the West too. Distracted by Syria, the Ukrainian conflict and growing terror threats at home, the West does not have the bandwidth to address yet another conflict.

Another consideration is that instability in Armenia or Azerbaijan could provide a post-sanctions Iran with an opening to increase its influence in the Caucasus at Russian, Turkish and US expense. This would occur at the same time when Tehran is trying to expand its influence in Syria and elsewhere in the Middle East.

Russia and the United States have a track record of at least trying to de-escalate the Karabakh conflict. Another war between Armenia and Azerbaijan is in nobody’s interest, and it is time to reinvigorate diplomacy to make sure there is not one.

*Paul Stronski is a senior associate in the Carnegie Endowment’s Russia and Eurasia Program, where his research focuses on the relationship between Russia and neighboring countries in Central Asia and the South Caucasus. He was Director for Russia and Central Asia on the US National Security Council Staff from 2012 to 2014; he also has served as a research analyst in the US State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research, focusing on Russia and the South Caucasus.