Perfectly timed for the release of “Star Wars Episode VII: The Force Awakens”, this NASA/ESA Hubble Space Telescope has imaged a cosmic double-bladed lightsabre. In the centre of the image, partially obscured by a dark Jedi-like cloak of dust, an adolescent star shoots twin jets out into space, demonstrating the fearsome forces of the Universe.

This celestial lightsabre lies not in a galaxy far, far away, but within our home galaxy, the Milky Way. More precisely, it resides within a turbulent patch of space known as the Orion B molecular cloud complex, which is located just over 1350 light-years away in the constellation of Orion (The Hunter).

Bearing a striking resemblance to Darth Maul’s double-bladed lightsabre in Star Wars Episode One, the spectacular twin jets of material slicing across this incredible image are spewing out from a newly formed star that is obscured from view, cloaked by swirling dust and gas.

When stars form within giant, gaseous clouds, some of the surrounding material collapses down to form a rotating, flattened disc encircling the nascent stars, which are known as protostars. This disc is where a potential planetary system might form. However, at this early stage, the star is mostly concerned with feeding its Jabba-like appetite. Gas from the disc rains down onto the protostar and, once nourished, the star awakens and jets of energised gas from its poles whirl out in opposite directions.

The Force is strong with these twin jets; their effect on their environment demonstrates the true power of the Dark Side with a blast stronger than one from a fully armed and operational Death Star battle station. As they stream away from one another at high speeds, supersonic shock fronts develop along the jets and heat the surrounding gas to thousands of degrees.

Furthermore, as the jets collide with the surrounding gas and dust and clear vast spaces, they create curved shock waves. These shockwaves are the hallmarks of Herbig-Haro (HH) objects — tangled, knotted clumps of nebulosity. The prominent Herbig-Haro object shown in this image is HH 24.

Just to the right of the cloaked star, a couple of bright points of light can be seen. These are young stars peeking through and showing off their own faint lightsabres. One hidden, cloaked source, only detectable in the radio part of the spectrum, has blasted a tunnel through the dark cloud in the upper left of the image with a wider outflow resembling “force lightning”.

All these jets make HH 24 the densest concentration of HH jets known in such a small region. Half of the HH jets have been spotted in this region in visible light, and about the same number in the infrared. Hubble’s observations for this image were performed in infrared light, which enabled the telescope to pierce through the gas and dust cocooning the newly-forming stars and capture a clear view of the HH objects that astronomers are looking for.

Accelerating rates of sea-level rise linked to climate change pose a major threat to coastal marshes and the vital carbon capturing they perform. But a new Duke University study finds marshes may be more resilient than previously believed.

The research, published this month in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, shows that the significant boost in marsh plant productivity associated with elevated levels of atmospheric carbon dioxide will allow marshes to trap more sediment and create more organic soil.

This, in turn, will result in increased rates of accretion that will allow marshes to keep up with rising sea levels and may increase the thresholds for marsh drowning by up to 60 percent.

Coastal marshes absorb and store large amounts of carbon dioxide from Earth’s atmosphere; they help filter out pollution in coastal waters; provide habitat for wildlife; help protect coastlines from erosion and storm surge; and can store huge amounts of floodwater, reducing the threat of flooding in low-lying coastal areas.

“Essentially, we found it’s a self-rising mechanism marshes use to build themselves up,” said Marco Marani, professor of ecohydrology at Duke’s Nicholas School of the Environment and Pratt School of Engineering. “As levels of atmospheric carbon dioxide increase, more CO2 gets taken in by marsh plants. This spurs higher rates of photosynthesis and biomass production, so the plants produce more sediment-trapping growth above ground and generate more organic soil below ground.”

The result is that the extent of marsh loss is significantly reduced, even under high rates of sea-level rise.

The study suggests this so-called “CO2 fertilization effect” may also contribute to a stabilizing feedback in the climate system as increased biomass production and organic deposition in marshes sequester larger amounts of carbon dioxide.

But there’s an important caveat.

“While elevated atmospheric CO2 levels may offset some of the threats facing marshes from sea-level rise, another equally serious threat to marsh survival — sediment starvation — will remain,” said Katherine M. Ratliff, a PhD student at Duke’s Nicholas School, who was lead author of the study.

“Suspended sediments play a fundamental role in marsh survival,” she said. “As more dams are built and as land use and agricultural practices in coastal regions continue to rapidly change, we’re seeing a sharp drop in inorganic sediment delivery to many coastal marshes worldwide. This decrease significantly undercuts the marshes’ ability to build themselves up and keep pace with rising seas.”

The new study finds that in sediment-poor marshes, the loss of area might range between 39 percent and 61 percent, even when the offsetting CO2 fertilization effect is accounted for, as the rate of relative sea-level rise increases beyond the initial threshold for marsh drowning.

To conduct their study, the researchers used a spatial model of marsh morphodynamics into which they incorporated recently published observations from field experiments on marsh vegetation response to varying levels of atmospheric carbon dioxide.

“While the effect of direct carbon dioxide fertilization has so far been neglected in marsh modeling, our research shows it is central in determining possible marsh survival under the foreseeable range of climatic changes,” Marani said.

By Moe Thuzar*

The general elections held in Myanmar on November 8, 2015, though not without flaws, plainly signaled the beginning of a new hope for the country’s transition.

About 80 percent of 30 million eligible voters cast their votes in over 300 constituencies and 41,000 polling stations countrywide. In some 600 village tracts in areas of ongoing conflict, polling was cancelled. This, and the specter of violence in the campaign period, marred the otherwise highly charged atmosphere. Ninety-two political parties—60 of which were ethnic parties)—competed for 1150 seats in the upper and lower houses of parliament, and the local assemblies in the 14 administrative states and regions. These seats do not include the 25 percent of total seats occupied by serving military officers in all assemblies.

The campaign period began on August 8. Overseas polling stations were opened at Myanmar embassies across the globe and advance voting was also offered in-country to those with official missions or health issues. There was widespread optimism that the 2015 polls would be freer and more credible than past elections (1990 and 2010), and high hopes that a “genuinely civilian government” would successfully implement badly needed political, administrative and economic reforms. But there was also fear that the incumbent would somehow rig the elections. Although the election results have showed otherwise, this sentiment has some historical moorings.

ELECTIONS PAST AND PRESENT – A QUICK OVERVIEW

The 2015 general elections are the first openly-contested elections since 1990 when the National League for Democracy (NLD) led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi won the majority of seats. That result was quickly negated however by the State Law and Order Restoration Council, the military junta that took control of the country in September 1988.

On 27 May 1990, 73 percent of 15 million eligible voters voted in the belief that the SLORC would honor its promise to transfer power to an elected government. With its win of 392 seats, the National League for Democracy (NLD) secured 79.8 per cent of the votes cast for the 492 seats up for grabs in the unicameral parliament. While the 1990 elections were not open to foreign observers, foreign media and journalists were allowed entry visas just days prior to the polls. The junta had highlighted that the elected representatives would form a constituent assembly that would draw up a new constitution for the country, and that a second round of elections would be held after that new constitution had been approved in a referendum. After an initial balking (apparently by the NLD’s “intelligentsia” group rather than the “veterans”)1 over this proposed drawn-out process, the NLD went along with the plan. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi was under house arrest at the time of the elections, and had expressed her concern that the constitutional process could “take months and months, if not years”2. Her prescient concern was borne out. It took more than 14 years from 1993 for the constitutional process to be completed, with several walkouts and hiatuses. The referendum itself was not free from controversy, taking place in the immediate aftermath of the devastating Cyclone Nargis in May 2008. During the long drawn-out constitutional process, the NLD left the discussion table3, and did not register for the November 2010 elections which were held under the framework of the 2008 Constitution.

The 2010 elections were thus an anti-climactic step that was seen by the military regime (which had changed its name to a less ominous-sounding State Peace and Development Council, or SPDC, in September 1998) as necessary for it to move forward with its professed seven-step roadmap to democracy. Compared to 1990, the 2010 elections were neither open nor fair. Of the 29 million eligible voters, 77 percent turned out to vote in candidates for the two houses of parliament at the Union level and for regional/state assemblies. For the first time in the country’s history, all parliamentary assemblies had 25 percent of their total seats reserved for non-elected military members. With the NLD not in the running, most of the votes cast for change went either to the National Democratic Force, a splinter group of the NLD, or smaller parties. There were no observers or foreign media, and the voting took place amidst widespread reports of rigging. The Union Solidarity and Development Party – which had transformed itself from the SPDC’s “people’s arm” Union Solidarity and Development Association, won with 76.5 percent of the overall votes. The National Unity Party, which had transformed from the former Burma Socialist Programme Party won the second largest number of votes, as it had in 1990.

The main element characterizing the 2010 elections can be summed up as apathy. This was deepest in what can be termed the educated middle-class, i.e., people with tertiary education, with exposure to the world and plugged in to events, with higher personal incomes and a degree of autonomy in their work. Many from this group decided not to vote because they believed that their votes wouldn’t count or because they had no confidence in the elections. There was also a certain show of support for the NLD’s boycott in the decisions not to vote. Yet, these intellectuals were also beset with angst over their
“abdication of responsibility” by not going to the polls. Civil servants seemed to have thought that they did not have a choice but to vote for the USDP, while former civil servants – some of whom had held quite senior positions – had no such compunctions and largely voted for change. Military personnel down to the rank and file, and their families, were expected to “make the correct choice”, i.e., vote for the USDP. Their votes were cast in advance. There was less emotion among the lower-income groups, who acted more out of so-called pragmatism. This was more evident in the provinces/rural areas where the promise of direct benefits in the form of improved roads, electricity, water and other amenities ensured the vote.

In the urban areas, the vote of the lower-income groups were divided among industry-workers and lower-ranking civil servants, and people like taxi drivers and rickshaw men. The former voted for the USDP because 1) they had to and/or 2) they hoped for direct benefits in living standards. The latter mostly wasted their vote because “they believed the elections were rigged for the army to win”. Apathy was prevalent among many first-time voters in the 2010 elections, who were not interested in the platforms of various political parties. Some tried the pragmatic approach and voted for “continuity”, citing reasons of “stability”. And then there were those who felt their votes counted to create a space – however small – for democratization. Theirs were the votes largely responsible for small numbers of opposition seats in parliament.

The scenario and sentiments in 2015 could not have been more different. First, the NLD was clearly back in the game, after rejoining the political process in 2012 and sweeping 43 out of 44 seats (45 available)4 in the by-elections of 1 April 2012.

There was also more political awareness and engagement by the electorate, who now had greater access to varied sources of information. First-time and repeat voters alike were keen to make their vote count for future generations, and were open about their desire for change. Citizens living overseas queued assiduously (in some cities, for days) to cast their vote at the overseas polling stations, and those who could, traveled home to vote. Red became the color of change, and people openly sported the NLD logo everywhere they could. Thus, the sense of anticipation surrounding the 2015 elections was similar to that in 1990. Myanmar’s Union Election Commission opened up the election process to international observers, some of whom arrived days ahead to monitor the campaign and to cover the polls in different parts of the country. Foreign and local media actively followed campaign trails.

Daw Suu – who had been under house arrest before and during the 1990 and 2010 elections – hit the campaign trail early. To a populace inured to decades of authoritarian rule, and in the most open space afforded in decades to voice views and opinions, the NLD’s campaign message of “It’s time (to change)” struck a resonant chord across all income groups and social backgrounds.

In contrast, the incumbent USDP, ran on a performance platform which seemed to indicate status quo. Deliverance of election promises made in 2010 had been uneven across constituencies. Nationally, the main performance deliverable that the USDP administration could focus on was the achieving of a nationwide ceasefire agreement with ethnic armed groups and starting political dialogue towards constitutional change. The significance of the nationwide ceasefire agreement signed on 15 October 2015 was diluted somewhat by the fact that only eight of the 16 armed ethnic groups came to the table as signatories. The only reform measure popularly received seemed to have been the privatization of the telecommunications industry which led to normalization of prices for mobile phones and cellular phone smart cards. This broadened public communication and information-sharing, and played a large part in spreading election campaign news widely, and in keeping track of polling results.

On the morning of November 8, keen voters were queuing at polling stations long before the opening hour of 6 a.m. Voter turnout was high, at 80 percent of 30 million eligible voters. Taking a page from other election experiences in Southeast Asia, voting ink was introduced for the first time in Myanmar, and voters displayed their ink-stained fingers proudly. Despite earlier concerns over possible election violence, voting was conducted with discipline. So, too, was the vote-counting process after polling closed at 4 p.m. Predictably, interest in the outcome of polls was largely focused on the two dominant large parties: the NLD and the USDP. In a bid for transparency, polling stations announced their respective results publicly. These were then shared widely by social media, thus allowing for real-time tracking of the results. They indicated a clear win for the NLD from the very start.

The NLD swept 390 of the 491 seats in both houses of parliament, a resounding 79.4 percent5. The USDP retained 42 seats, and the Arakan National Party came a distant third with 22 seats. The NLD thus holds the majority of seats in both houses of parliament: 59 percent of the 433 seats in the lower house (People’s Assembly or Pyithu Hluttaw), and 60 percent of the 224 seats in the upper house (National Assembly or Amyotha Hluttaw). The NLD also dominates with 476 of 629 seats across the 14 state/regional assemblies.
POST-ELECTION SENTIMENTS

The November 8 election results have set the stage for a second election in parliament in early 2016 to choose the top three executive positions (president and two vice-presidents). Both houses of parliament, and the military bloc, will each nominate a candidate.

The candidate with the largest number of votes will be confirmed as President, with the two runners-up taking each of the two vice-presidential posts. With its parliamentary majority, the NLD looks set to bag the president and one of the vice-president positions. The USDP, with some negotiating in parliament, may yet be able to swing the second vice-president position. Under the current 2008 constitution, Daw Suu is not eligible to be nominated or selected for either post, but she has stated clearly that she will maintain a position “above the President” in leading the country, thus exercising both her leadership and accountability for the country’s future direction. She has also cautioned the elected NLD candidates not to hold any aspirations for executive (or cabinet) posts, and has instead emphasised her intent to have a “conciliation government” comprising a mix of ethnic stakeholders and technocrats. The NLD’s majority is thus seen to be more necessary in parliament for important legislative changes to be pushed through.

On the part of the USDP, several high-level candidates including President Thein Sein, have conceded defeat with grace. President Thein Sein has publicly assured a smooth handover. This has been echoed by the Commander-in-Chief, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing. Both met with Daw Suu in highly publicised meetings on 2 December. Daw Suu and her parliamentary colleague, Thura U Shwe Mann, had met in the immediate aftermath of the elections. The invitation to meet with all these principals was first extended by Daw Suu. In an unexpected move, Daw Suu also met with former SPDC supremo, Senior General Than Shwe, on 4 December in Naypyitaw, in a move apparently facilitated by Speaker of the House Thura U Shwe Mann, who maintains a good working relationship with Daw Suu. U Shwe Mann had been ousted from his position as acting chairman of the USDP in August 2015, giving rise to speculation about cracks in the USDP’s campaign strategy, and to his future role.

There are wide differences in how various segments of the populace view the 2015 general elections and their aftermath. The intellectuals – usually the best informed – are also the most critical, and there is some concern about a new elected team’s ability to govern. Still, the overall mood, which has been for “anything but the USDP”, fueled votes cast with hope for a better future. Macro-level reform measures by the USDP seems not to have touched the populace who has instead mainly felt the brunt of continuing electricity shortages and rising food prices. Thus, “change” presented a better option to most than continuity. The internal split in the USDP did not help matters. Yet, in the days preceding the election, the USDP camp displayed considerable confidence that they would do well in the polls.

MYANMAR’S POST-2015 FUTURE

Myanmar today remains a rather divided society on several key issues and concerns. The ethno-nationalist narrative is still strong, muzzling any voices speaking out on how the Rohingya issue is to be tackled. The conflation of this issue with religion resulted in no Muslim candidates being fielded by either of the large parties. This poses some concern for the space for religious minorities in the Buddhist-dominant society.

Congratulatory messages from the USDP leadership, including the President, to the NLD, and the conciliatory gesture by Daw Suu to the President, the Speaker and the Commander-in-Chief for dialogue on the country’s future, are good indicators that both the large parties are playing the game. In fact, an NLD-government would need to be even more inclusive and conciliatory than the USDP has ever been, as the constitutional odds are still stacked against too abrupt a change. The military has a say over who should be the home and defense ministers, and the unspoken understanding still remains not to cross any “red lines”. At this point though, what these red lines will be for the military (or the forces behind it) are still unclear.

Between now and the parliamentary session in early 2016 to elect the president and vice-presidents, it is important for the different principals in Myanmar’s political game to start discussing a practical modus vivendi. Already, moderate voices are cautioning that aspirations for “complete change” may not be realistic, and that pushing the envelope too far too soon may result in the military stepping in again. However, the military under Senior General Min Aung Hlaing seems reluctant to create another mess. Daw Suu realizes this, and thus very early on in the aftermath of the November 8 polls, called through her public exhortation to “lose nobly and win humbly”, for quiet celebrations and for her supporters not to insult the dignity of those who had lost.

As regards external relations, Daw Suu has reiterated continuity with the non-aligned foreign policy “that has been very successful… since independence”. Thus, Myanmar’s foreign policy looks likely to continue along the broad principles that motivated the initial opening and diversifying of external partnerships. Bilateral relations with neighbors such as China, Thailand, and to a certain extent India, will be important for Myanmar to balance, even as it continues to expand its role and participation in ASEAN. The normalization of relations with the United States may encourage the repeal of some of the sanctions enacted into federal law.

The 2015 elections are certainly not the be-all and end-all for Myanmar’s democratization and transformation. Institutions are still weak, as is capacity on the ground. The NLD can no doubt use the commitment of its supporters to help change mindsets. Thus, much depends on how the NLD’s conciliation government is conceptualized and negotiated. The Thein Sein administration had set the tone for more technocrats and experts to be part of the executive, and this looks likely to continue with the NLD’s commitment to have a representative mix of ethnic members and technocrats in its executive set-up. Ceasefire negotiations with the remaining eight insurgent groups may also require a continued role for the chief negotiator Aung Min (who lost his seat in the elections), as he had built personal relationships with the leaders of the insurgent groups when helming the negotiations for the Thein Sein government.

Going forward, the new government will have to continue with realities of the economy, relations with neighbours and partners, and civil-military relations. The “Rakhine issue” will not go away, and the NLD is aware that this requires delicate handling. However, there are many priorities for the new government to tackle.

Results of a first-ever poll undertaken by the FIDH, an international human rights NGO, on the human rights commitments of political parties in Myanmar, were released on 3 November in Yangon. Of the 19 participating political parties, 42 percent refused to respond to the issue of Muslim Rohingyas, and 74 percent indicated their disinclination to amend the 1982 Citizenship Law. Only 21 percent agreed that the next government should implement measures against discrimination and intolerance against religious minorities. However, some 63 percent thought that the next government should focus more on redress for land confiscation victims; 47 percent prioritized the release of all political prisoners; 36 percent called for a safe environment for the voluntary return of all refugees and internally displaced persons to their homes; and 31 percent emphasized the independence of the judiciary from the executive. These priorities are not mutually exclusive, though the results of this poll suggest that the political parties view these as issues that can be addressed independently of each other6.

Myanmar’s elections are arguably one of the most important political events in Southeast Asia in 2015. Already, the election results and their aftermath present potential consequences for Myanmar’s challenging triple transition that started in 2011. The new government will also be presented with continuing the tasks of 1) negotiating a lasting end to the decades-long internal conflicts; 2) entrenching democratic institutions and habits after decades of authoritarian rule; and 3) expanding the country’s regional role and reach. The following considerations also underpin the next steps in Myanmar’s journey towards change and democracy:

• The future role and status of the NLD as the ruling party.
• The different interest groups and factions seeking to influence Daw Suu. (Dealing with the military may be the least of her worries).
• Daw Suu still remains the most pivotal point of focus for national reconciliation. Yet, there are questions of “life after Daw Suu” for both the NLD and the country.
• National reconciliation covers more than the relationship between the military and the NLD. The many pressing internal issues to be tackled may yet turn Myanmar’s attention more inward-looking.

About the author:
* Moe Thuzar is Fellow at ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute.

Source:
This article was published by the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute as ISEAS Perspective 70 (PDF).

Notes:
1 Kyaw Yin Hlaing (2008). “The State of the Pro-Democracy Movement in Authoritarian Burma/Myanmar”, Myanmar/Burma: Challenges and Perspectives, ed. Xiaolin Guo, Institute for Security and Development Policy: 2008. p. 99
2 Excerpted from Daw Suu’s interview with Dominic Faulder on 1 July 1989, which was published in the Asiaweek edition of 21 July 1989, and also included in “Freedom from Fear and Other Writings” (Penguin, UK: 1991) as Chapter 17, The People Want Freedom.
3 A statement issued by the National Democratic Front on 1 December 1995 supporting the NLD’s boycott of the constitution convention process and calling for dialogue, refers to letters from the NLD dated 28 November 1995 to the Chairman of the National Convention Convening Commission, stating its (NLD’s) decision not to participate in the National Convention.
4 The NLD contested 44 out of the 45 seats available.
5 The numbers do not include the military-held seats: 110 in the lower house, and 56 in the upper house. Without the military’s 25 percent, the seats up for grabs are 323 seats in the lower house and 168 seats in the upper house.
6 Full report on the poll findings at: https://www.fidh.org/en/region/asia/burma/political-parties-neglect- human-rights-priorities

By Jim Garamone

Americans cannot give in to fear from terrorism, President Barack Obama said Thursday in a televised address from the National Counterterrorism Center in McLean, Virginia.

The president also said that counterterrorism professionals are working around the clock to deter threats directed at the United States.

Obama spoke following a meeting at the center hosted by Director of National Intelligence Jim Clapper. Vice President Joe Biden, Attorney General Loretta Lynch and Secretary of Homeland Security Jeh Johnson were among the participants.

“At this moment, our intelligence and counterterrorism professionals do not have any specific and credible information about an attack on the homeland,” the president said.

However, the president said the nation is now experiencing “a new phase of terrorism, including lone actors and small groups of terrorists like those in San Bernardino.”

Obama said lone actors and small groups of terrorists “are harder to detect, and that makes them harder to prevent.”

He added, “But just as the threat evolves, so do we. We are constantly adapting, constantly improving, and upping our game, getting better.”

‘Much Better’ Prevention

The president said he regularly meets with intelligence professionals “for an in-depth review of our efforts to prevent terror attacks against our citizens around the world and here at home.”

Obama added, “We examine any known and emerging threats, we review our security posture and we make sure we are taking every measure to protect our people.”

Obama said he knows “that a lot of Americans were anxious and that’s understandable,” in the aftermath of the terror attacks in Paris and San Bernardino, California.

However, U.S. officials have taken extraordinary steps to strengthen national security since the 9/11 attacks, the president said.

“We’ve gotten much better at preventing large complex attacks like 9-11,” Obama said. “Moreover, we have the best intelligence, counterterrorism, homeland security and law enforcement professionals in the world. Across our government these professionals … are relentless, 24-hours-a-day, 365-days–a-year.”

At the McLean center, people from across the government pore over the latest information — analyzing it, integrating it, connecting the dots, the president said.

The greatest U.S. strength in the fight against terrorism “is our own strength and resilience,” Obama said. “When Americans stand together, nothing can beat us. Most of all we cannot give in to fear or change how we live our lives, because that is what terrorists want.”

Hundreds of politicians at various levels are suspected to be corrupt and dishonest in India. As a matter of fact, the distinction between politicians and criminals have become thin, as many criminals enter politics, contest elections and win and then become ministers and rule the country. Long back, Bernard Shaw said that politics is the last resort for the scoundrels and many people in India now think that Bernard Shaw is correct. The politicians remain as the most suspected and perhaps hated tribe in India.

Unfortunately, despite of strong anti-corruption laws in the country, the corrupt politicians always find way to escape from the clutches of law, by circumventing the law, prolonging the judicial process by cleverly exploiting the loopholes and they remain in public life with all their ill gotten wealth intact Rarely, a corrupt politician has been effectively punished and if this has been done in some cases, it is an exception and not a rule.

As large number of electorate in the country belong to lower income group and are often only semi literate and are susceptible to monetary temptations, the politicians who amass huge wealth by adopting corrupt means , hoodwink the gullible people by money power, muscle power and by cleverly posturing to win elections.
Politics has made inroads into every aspect of life today in India and therefore every aspect of life appears to be getting corrupt. The Election Commission of India and Judiciary have failed to check corruption inspite of huge powers that they have.

While there is corruption in India not only amongst politicians but also amongst bureaucrats and professionals belonging to every walk of life , there is no doubt that politicians are the fountain head of corruption. Without catching hold of the corrupt politicians , punishing them and ensuring that they would not enter parliament and assemblies, rooting out corruption in India is not possible.

Modi’s promise

Certainly, there is widespread frustration and anger amongst large section of citizens that dishonest politicians continue to hold sway over national politics and the government but the people seem to be helpless .

Indian electorate were highly impressed when Narendra Modi promised before 2014 parliamentary election that he would root out corruption and cleanse the parliament and legislative assemblies and ensure that corrupt people cannot enter these all powerful bodies. Such promise and assurance really helped Modi to win the confidence of the people and emerge victorious in the election.

Modi need to act

Now, having been in power for 18 months, Indians expect Modi to fulfil his promise. But, Modi appears to be finding it difficult.

The present noise made by Rahul and his mother , when they are facing court hearings about dishonest dealings and the vituperative language used by Kejriwal when his confident and principal secretary was investigated for corruption charges and the media publicity that they get only clearly highlight how difficult would be Modi’s task of checking corrupt politicians .

The National Herald case convincingly exposes Rahul and his mother that they have indulged in dishonest practices. Kejriwal appointing a corrupt person as his principal secretary clearly show that his claim that he is the anti corruption crusader is hollow and untrue.

When the politicians face corruption charges and realize that they are on weak grounds, they make all sort of drama , use all sorts of language and level vague and unproved allegations against the government and divert the attention of the people from their misdeeds.

The politicians in India facing corruption charges make lot of noise and indulge in mud slinging and use the media to mislead the people. Unfortunately, the Indian visual and print media want only sensation and give prominence to mutual accusations without caring to conduct quality discussions to expose the corrupt people, keeping the interest of the country in view.

The Modi government has come to power promising that it would root out corruption. It has to take full blooded efforts to catch the corrupt persons and punish them. Case of Rahul and Kejriwal is now a test for Modi’s commitment to fight the corrupt forces.

Certainly,the corrupt persons will fight back like a wounded leopard as it is a question of survival for them. The country is now watching as how determined Modi is in rooting out corruption and in facing the onslaught of attack from multiple directions from various corrupt politicians. Modi has to fight and in the process of fighting the corrupt forces if he would go down, let it be so for the sake of probity in public life.

*N. S. Venkataraman,  Nandini Voice for the Deprived, nandinivoice.com

A Hindu group is urging Turkey to portray Hinduism appropriately in its textbooks after a report indicated misleading information about Hinduism.

A new study, “Compulsory Religious Education in Turkey: A Survey and Assessment of Textbooks,” sponsored by United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF), stated:…only superficial, limited, and misleading information is given about…Hinduism.

The study, quoting an eighth grade world religions book, found that Hinduism was placed under “not divine” (not based on God’s revelation) category of religions, thus implying a second-class status. The textbook provides brief overview of Hinduism and states that “the most visible aspect of Hinduism is the caste system, and presents a brief breakdown of different castes, followed by beliefs in Brahma and multiple gods by Hindus, and concepts of karma and re-incarnation”, per this study.

Hindu statesman Rajan Zed, in a statement in Nevad, urged Turkey to urgently revise the language about Hinduism, ensuring that it was written by Hinduism experts. He or other Hindu scholars would gladly help if asked, Zed indicated.

Hinduism should be taught in the way Hindus saw themselves and not how Turkey perceived Hinduism, Zed, who is President of Universal Society of Hinduism, pointed out.

Rajan Zed further urged Turkey to have more objective religious education in schools instead of reinforcing negative stereotypes about “other” religions.

Zed suggested that opening-up the Turkish children to major world religions and non-believers’ viewpoint with objective information would make them well-nurtured, well-balanced, and enlightened global citizens of tomorrow.

USCIRF, based in Washington DC and chaired by Dr. Robert P. George, is “an independent, bipartisan U.S. federal government commission…dedicated to defending the universal right to freedom of religion or belief abroad.” The study was lead by Ziya Meral, a researcher & Director of London headquartered Centre on Religion and Global Affairs.

Chinese leadership claims Taiwan to be a part of China. Taiwan has been governed separately from the mainland since 1949, when the American-supported Nationalist forces retreated to the island after being defeated in the Chinese civil war by the Communists.

The relations between China and Taiwan have been characterized by limited contact, tensions, and instability. In the early years, military conflicts continued, while diplomatically both governments competed to be the “legitimate government of China”. More recently, questions around the political and legal status of Taiwan have focused on the alternative prospects of political unification with China or full Taiwanese independence.

The People’s Republic of China remains hostile to any formal declaration of independence and maintains its claim over Taiwan. At the same time, non-governmental and semi-governmental exchanges between the two sides have been increasing. From 2008, negotiations began to restore the “three links” (transportation, commerce, and communications) between the two sides, cut off since 1949.

After more than seven years of calm relations between China and Taiwan, leaders in Beijing are beginning to warn that tensions will rise again if the winner of Taiwan’s next presidential election, in January, fails to make a clear commitment to the notion that there is only one China. On March 4th President Xi Jinping said “pro-independence forces” in Taiwan were the biggest threat to peace in the Taiwan Strait. His remarks were clearly intended as a warning to Taiwan’s independence-leaning Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which has a good chance of returning to power.

Like Israel that does not like foreign signatories to visit Palestine (Gaza Strip), China also opposes any country to ignore the Chinese control over Taiwan and asks foreign countries not to sell arms to Taiwan. .

US arms

The US government agreed on December 16 to sell Taiwan $1.83 billion arms, marking the first US arms shipment to the island in four years, and officially notified Congress of the arms deal package for Taiwan, despite resistance from China – Taipei’s rival. The agreement includes two frigates, anti-tank missiles, TOW 2B anti-tank missiles, AAV-7 Amphibious Assault Vehicles and a range of other military equipment.

The sale is significantly smaller than the $5.8 billion package approved by the United States in 2011, and it is not expected to alter the military balance across the Taiwan Strait, which has tilted in Beijing’s favor after years of large increases in military spending by the mainland, whose annual military budget is now more than 13 times greater than Taiwan’s. There’s also support for Taiwan’s capabilities in intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance and a weapons system to defend against anti-ship missiles.

The US State Department said the package was aimed at supporting Taiwan’s attempts to develop more advanced and asymmetric defensive abilities. The frigates were being offered at a price of $190 million as surplus items. The bundle also contains $416 million of firearms, upgrade kits, support and ammo for Raytheon’s Close-in Weapons System. The arms package is the first offered by the USA to the self-governing island in four years.

The mandate arrived after Congress passed laws approving the deal. The USA has announced more than $12 billion in arms sales to Taiwan since 2010, but none since $5.9 billion in sales in September 2011 that included upgrades for Taiwan’s F-16 fighter jets. That drew a high-level diplomatic protest from Beijing, which suspended some military exchanges with the United States. It did not seriously impair ties.

US lawmakers welcomed the announcement. There were calls from both parties for more frequent arms sales to Taiwan. Eliot Engel, the top-ranking Democrat on the House Foreign Affairs Committee said the sale would contribute to peace and stability across the strait. Sen. John McCain, Republican chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, said the USA should avoid extended periods during which “fear of upsetting the USA-China relationship may harm Taiwan’s defense capabilities.” The USA maintained there’s no need for it to hurt the relationship, which has also been strained by China’s island-building in the South China Sea and alleged cybertheft.

In the meantime, President Barack Obama has sought greater cooperation with China on issues such as climate change, and the two sides have increased military exchanges to reduce the risk of conflict. State Department spokesman John Kirby said the USA was in contact with both Taiwan and China about the sale, which he said was consistent with US support for Taiwan’s ability to defend itself under the Taiwan Relations Act. Kirby added: “We still want to work to establish a better, more transparent, more effective relationship with China in the region and we’re going to continue to work at that.”

Damage

Even before its announcement, Beijing, which regards Taiwan as part of its territory, demanded it be scrapped to avoid harming relations across the Taiwan Strait and between China and the USA. China said such sales “damaged the peaceful growth of ties to the other side of the Taiwan Strait and Sino-US ties and said Beijing advocated Washington “to earnestly understand the high susceptibility and serious damage of weapons sales to Taiwan.”

China, which views Taiwan as part of its indivisible territory, has consistently opposed US-Taiwan weapons sales and reiterated that stance, summoning Deputy Mission Chief Kaye Lee of the US Embassy in Beijing. The statement from Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister Zheng Zeguang called the deal “a serious violation of international laws as well as China’s territory and security interest.” That was followed by a formal diplomatic protest, although at a lower level than in previous such instances.

American and European Union companies are banned from selling military technology to China and Chinese companies have extensive links with major overseas firms that often have weapon-making divisions.

China resolutely opposes the sale of weapons to Taiwan by the USA. “In order to safeguard the nation’s interests, the Chinese side has decided to take necessary measures, including the imposition of sanctions against companies participating in the arms sale to Taiwan,” Zheng said. Such sanctions have been threatened in the past, although there’s no evidence they’ve had any meaningful effect.

China routinely protests about arms sales to Taiwan, which Beijing considers as its renegade province. This is the first time China announced plans to impose sanctions on American firms. The White House said there clearly was no change in the longstanding US “one China” policy. Previous US weapons sales to Taiwan have brought powerful disapprobation in China, which considers Taiwan a renegade province.

China urges the US to abide by the clear commitment it has made in the three joint communiques, revoke the arms sale plan, and stop military contact with Taiwan, so as to avoid bringing further damage to China-US relations and bilateral cooperation in major areas.

The brand new sales come at a period of heightened tensions between America and China over the South China Sea -made islands to maintain territorial claims that were grand. Although Washington will not recognize Taiwan as a state that was separate from China, it’s given under the Taiwan Relations Act to ensuring a credible defense can be maintained by Taipei.

US arms sales to Taiwan are guided by the Taiwan Relations Act and based on an assessment of Taiwan’s defense needs,” McKeeby said. “Our longstanding policy on arms sales to Taiwan has been consistent across six different US administrations,” he added. “We believe our consistent policy has contributed to the security of Taiwan, and has also supported the maintenance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.” Consisting almost exclusively of defensive weapons, the military package includes anti-aircraft and anti-ship systems.

Reed Foster, a military capabilities expert from consultancy IHS Aerospace, Defense & Security, said that the US defense industry does little business with China so any action taken by Beijing was unlikely to have a big impact. “There’s nothing revelatory, it mostly 1970s technology that’s been around for decades. It’s nothing that would be used to invade,” he told CNN. The military hardware being sold is not cutting edge and is in line with Taiwan’s existing capabilities. The deal had been expected.

The arms sale, according to China, severely goes against international law and the basic norms of international relations, severely goes against the principles in the three China-US joint communiques and severely harms China’s sovereignty and security interests, he said. “No one can shake the firm will of the Chinese government and people to defend their national sovereignty and territorial integrity, and to oppose foreign interference,” Zheng told the US envoy.

Bilateral law

The United States is required to provide weapons for Taiwan’s defense under a law dating to 1979, when Washington was shifting diplomatic recognition to Beijing and away from Taipei. In many ways, China’s reaction to the latest arms sale followed a familiar pattern. The last American arms sale to Taiwan, four years ago and bigger than the sale just announced, also resulted in a United States diplomat being summoned at night to the Foreign Ministry in Beijing to receive stern rebukes, as the Chinese view arms sale to Taiwan as an affront to their sovereignty. Earlier arms sales resulted in the suspension of meetings between the two militaries, which was not part of China’s initial response to the sale this time.

Medeiros, who now leads the Asia practice for the Eurasia Group in Washington, said that the timing of the sale, coming before next month’s presidential elections in Taiwan, helped to reduce diplomatic fallout from the sale.

Poll outcome

Taiwan’s president, Ma Ying-jeou, has sought to improve ties with mainland China and met last month in Singapore with President Xi Jinping of China, the first time the leaders of Taiwan and China have ever held a summit meeting. But Ma’s party, the Kuomintang, is expected to lose the presidency to the Democratic Progressive Party, which favors a more distant relationship with the mainland and the assertion of Taiwan’s own identity. The timing clearly was calibrated to avoid having to do it after the election. That would have been particularly provocative.

The weapons sale to Taiwan is subject to congressional approval. Members of both the Republican and Democratic parties have expressed support for the sale. Taiwan is an inalienable part of China’s territory. China strongly opposes the US arms sale to Taiwan.

Absent from the arms package is any assistance from the USA to help build diesel-electric submarines, a top priority for Taiwan, which wants to replace its aging fleet. The proposed sale includes two Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigates, ships first commissioned by the United States Navy in the 1970s; data link systems; surface-to-air missiles; antitank missiles; amphibious assault vehicles; and shipborne rapid-fire guns intended to counter missiles.

The companies that manufacture the weapons systems the United States government announced now include Raytheon, which makes antitank missiles, a shipborne close-in weapons system and the shoulder-launched Stinger antiaircraft missile. Lockheed Martin makes the Javelin anti tank missile with Raytheon, which was also part of the proposed sale.
US and the European Union imposed arms embargoes on China after the deadly crackdown on student protests in and around Tiananmen Square in Beijing in 1989. Still, some military contractors, such as Boeing and United Technologies, have extensive nonmilitary businesses in China.

It also comes after just one-month before elections in Taiwan, where the ruling pro-Beijing party looks unlikely to win, and a historic meeting between the leader of Taiwan and China in November. “It gives hope to the incumbent party. They’ve kept relations with both China and the US warm. That’s a positive message,” said Foster. One year ago, Congress passed the Naval Transfer Act authorizing the sale of up to four Perry-class frigates to Taiwan in December 2014.

Obama signed the transfer act into law but until Wednesday, the administration had yet to notify Congress of its plans to move forward with the sale. Congressional sources and analysts consider the delay in the proper acceptance of the sales was because of the Obama administration’s desire to keep steady working relationships with China, an increasingly strong competitor that is tactical but in addition a critical economic partner as the planet‘s second-biggest market.

Washington said the deal does not indicate a change in US policy toward China that would alter normalized relations between the two countries. But the timing of the sale comes amidst heightened tensions between the USA and China due to recent Chinese territorial claims in the South China Sea.

Congress has 30 days to review the sale, but it’s unlikely to raise objections. There’s been mounting bipartisan concern that Taiwan is inadequately armed to defend itself against an increasingly powerful mainland China.

Back in the early 1990s, a war broke out in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Over 100,000 people lost their lives, and over two million were displaced. Rape, prison camps and genocide of Bosnian Muslims became common during the war, and it would eventually be marked as the worst conflict in Europe ever since the end of the Second World War.

Peace was established on November 21, 1995, as part of the General Framework Agreement For Peace, commonly known as the Dayton Accords. Formally signed on December 14 of 1995, the Dayton Accords are remembered today as an unfair treaty that ended the war but preserved the hostilities.

Background

The war in Bosnia and Herzegovina was started as a series of mass atrocities against Bosnian Muslims, and it was fuelled by the indecisiveness of UN and NATO, and the bias of the European Union. In fact, to prevent themselves from being killed, Bosniaks repeatedly sought the lifting of the arms embargo. With the arms embargo in effect, the Bosniaks had no means of self-defence against the heavily armed and well-equipped Serbian and Croatian armies.

However, members of the European Union constantly refused to adjust or eliminate the arms embargo, thereby leaving the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina without any medium of self-defence. As Taylor Branch noted in his famous book, “The Clinton Tapes”, Europe was more than pleased to see Bosnian Muslims being massacred by the Serbs and Croats:

That an independent Bosnia would be “unnatural” as the only Muslim nation in Europe.

President Francois Mitterrand of France had been especially blunt in saying that Bosnia did not belong, and that British officials spoke of a painful but realistic restoration of Christian Europe.

After all, in Europe, Islamophobia and racism is not a recent phenomenon.

Srebrenica

Situation went out of hand in the year 1995, when the Srebrenica Massacre took place. It was a planned genocide, wherein over 8000 Bosnians were killed, and over 40,000 people were expelled from a UN “safe zone”, that was supposed to be protected by Dutch peacekeepers. To make matters even worse, the Western powers, as per declassified US documents, were aware of the fact that Serbs were planning to attack Srebrenica.

Following the Srebrenica incident, NATO launched a bombing campaign in the region, and eventually, the momentum shifted in favor of ceasefire. Peace negotiations in Dayton, Ohio (USA) led to the Dayton Accords, signed between Franjo Tudjman, the president of Croatia, Slobodan Milosevic, the president of Serbia, and Alija Izetbegovic, the president of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Milosevic would later get the recognition he deserved and be tried as a war criminal, but for certain Serbs, he remains a war hero even today.

Outcome

The Dayton Accords ended the war, but failed to eliminate hostilities. In fact, it was an unfair treaty, simply because the parties involved had their own share of flaws. The Bosnian delegation lacked unity and a common goal — definitely not a surprise; after all, if Muslim entities were united, none of the Western atrocities would have happened in the first place! The Serbian delegation, led by Milosevic, had no interest in peace and just wanted to get away with their crimes. The Croatians, on the other hand, couldn’t care less about their neighbours. As noted by Richard Holbrooke, Chief of the American delegation at Dayton:

Each of the parties challenged the prospects for success in their own way: the Bosnians were disorganised, Milosevic dishonest, and Tudjman disengaged.

Conclusion

Following the Dayton Accords, Bosnia and Herzegovina was divided in two parts: nearly 51% of the territory was given to the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, whereas 49% of the territory went to Republica Srpska. Quite naturally, the Accords failed to do justice: the establishment of Republica Srpska meant that a new entity was created that was based on genocide and ethnic cleansing of innocent people. By bowing before the demands of Milosevic and creating Republica Srpska, the creators of Dayton Accords overlooked the crimes of genocide and simply rewarded the criminals.

Today, two decades have passed, but the shadow of the 1990s conflict still lingers. Heterogenous co-existence is unheard of in the region, and nationalist and communal tensions are still rampant.

However, an element of credit should be given to the Dayton Accords. Back then, the war would not have ended in the absence of the Accords. Plus, today, in spite of ethnic polarisation, Bosnia and Herzegovina is still one united state. The future cannot be predicted, and while ethnic, regional and communal tensions still exist, prospects of peace are not fully weak either.

By Michael McDonald

Every year around the world, hundreds of millions of children wait anxiously for Santa Claus to arrive and bring presents and good cheer. But what if Santa never came? What if this year the reindeer all fall ill, perhaps due to Crazy Reindeer disease (the analog to Mad Cow) and Santa is forced to cancel Christmas? The result would be devastating.

Fortunately, for any children reading, official word from the North Pole is that Santa’s sleigh has some new upgrades this year that allow it to run on good old fashioned jet fuel if the reindeer fail. And with the current glut of oil around the world, fuel prices are so affordable that even if the reindeer are feeling up to their usual task, Old Saint Nick might just give them the night off and choose to fly with fuel nonetheless.

So how much oil does Santa need for his rounds on the night of the 24th?

Well the answer is complicated by a number of factors most importantly, we just don’t know a lot of about Santa’s rounds, the shape of the sleigh, the air speed of the craft, or the weight of all those presents. But, we can take some educated guesses.

One 42 gallon barrel of oil is typically used to make a variety of different products. About 51 percent of the average barrel ends up being used for gasoline, while 12 percent ends up being used for jet fuel. Let’s assume then that Santa’s going to use standard jet fuel, and that 12 percent ratio holds – so for each gallon of jet fuel, we need around 8 gallons of oil. Recognizing that the byproducts of a processed barrel of oil are greater than the original 42 gallons, this 2:1 ratio is still a good place to start as a rough rule of thumb.

Next we need to get a rough idea of Santa’s fuel economy. How many miles does he go on a gallon of jet fuel? It’s not clear how much Santa’s sleigh weighs, or what it is shaped like, but we can probably envision it as something like a cross between a Suburban, a C-5 Galaxy fright aircraft, and an F-22 Raptor fighter jet. The sleigh looks blocky like a Suburban, carries about the same level of cargo as much as C-5 might, yet has the speed of a fighter jet. The fighter jet and c-5 achieve a fuel economy around the range of 0.1 miles per gallon to 0.5 miles per gallon. A 747 for instance burns around 5 gallons of fuel per mile.

But of course, those aircraft are all much larger than Santa’s sleigh. (Imagine poor Rudolph trying to pull a Dreamliner!) A Lear Jet uses around 1 gallon of fuel per 2.75 miles (based on a speed of 465 knots or 535 miles per hour). A Piper Cub uses about 1 gallon per 15 miles. Santa’s fuel economy is going to fall off the faster he goes, and to get to all the children of the world in one night, he is going to need to go a lot more than the Piper cub’s 65 knots per hour. Just to take off, Santa is going to need to hit about 180 miles an hour, and probably more than that given the sleigh designer’s seem to have a weak grasp on Bernoulli’s principle. Thus the Suburban is probably a good size comparison for Santa’s sleigh, and one might estimate the sleigh gets about 5 miles to 1 gallon of jet fuel (8 gallons of oil).

Now how far does Santa need to go? There are around 7.3 billion people in the world, which works out to around 1.5 billion households around the planet based on around 5 people per household. Now not everyone celebrates Christmas of course, but many Christians and non-Christians alike do. By some estimates, perhaps 45% of the world’s population celebrates Christmas. That means that Santa needs to visit about 675 million households. With about 7 households per square mile, and assuming that households celebrating Christmas are clustered (which seems logical given religious clustering), that means that Santa has to cover around 94 million square miles of households.

The most efficient mechanism for Santa to cover these households is a very complex mathematical problem. But assuming Santa wants to fly diagonally over each square mile (for a distance of 1.41 miles based on the Pythagorean Theorem), and households are on average distributed proportionally across this each 1 mile block, then Santa will have to fly over 2.41 miles of ground to cover each square mile as efficiently as possible. (You can use a variety of mathematical algorithms to model the most efficient flight path depending on population dispersion – this is just a reasonable approximation based on the assumptions outlined above).

As a result, Santa needs to travel around 226 million miles to deliver all of the presents to the world’s children. This assumes minimal idle time on each rooftop (he’s got to scarf down those cookies quickly), and abstracts away from the extra fuel needed for each takeoff.

Given our 5 miles per gallon of jet fuel efficiency calculated above, that means Santa needs around 45 million gallons of jet fuel for his annual voyage. With jet fuel going for around $1.20 a gallon right now on the spot market, and prices looking historically low, this puts the total fuel cost of Santa’s journey at a bit less than $54 million for one night. On second thought, maybe it’s time to break out the hay for those 8 reindeer.

Article Source: http://oilprice.com/Energy/Energy-General/How-Much-Oil-Is-Needed-To-Power-Santas-Sleigh.html

The escalating Turkish-Russian crisis following Turkey’s downing in November of a Russian war plane promises to spill onto European soccer pitches with FC Lokomotiv Moscow set to play Fenerbahce SK, notorious for its fiery fan base, in a Europa League match.

With Russia seeking to punish Turkey with punitive economic and sporting sanctions and Russian President Vladimir Putin refusing this week to meet his Turkish counterpart, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the expected clash between the two teams as well as between fans is likely to not only raise tempers in both countries.

It will also demonstrate once more the inextricable relationship between sports and politics at a time that world soccer body FIFA unwittingly is putting the incestuous ties between the two high on its agenda by seeking advice on how to embed United Nations guidelines on human rights into its processes, procedures and decision-making.

Ignoring Mr. Putin’s snub, Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu said he was looking forward to the February matches between Lokomotiv and Fenerbahce.

“The Turks and Russians who will fill the stadiums here and in Russia are not adversaries, and still less enemies. If the match is played in a gentlemanly spirit and helps reduce the tensions between the countries, then something positive will come from a draw that could seem negative,” Mr. Davutoglu told A-Haber TV.

Turkish fans have a tendency to pick their own battles rather than take into account their government’s interests. Fans, who carry their Turkish nationalism on their sleeve, played a key role in mass anti-government protests in 2013.

The Lokomotiv-Fenerbahce clash could prove to be the first of more confrontations on European pitches if both Turkey and Russia progress in qualifiers for Euro 2016. “We already hit them in the air and now on the turf — wait for us, Lokomotiv Moscow,” said Turkish soccer fan Huseyin Uysal on Twitter.

The tensions and the reputation of Turkish fans as Europe’s scariest soccer enthusiasts will not only raise concerns about crowd control but also fears that stadia where the two teams battle it out on the pitch could be targets for jihadist attacks.

Fears of clashes between Turkish and Russian fans persuaded Russian soccer authorities to recently council supporters of FC Zenit Saint Petersburg supporters not to travel to Belgium for the team’s European Champions League match against KAA Gent because of the Belgian town’s large Turkish community.

Islamist fans shocked when in November they twice shouted Allahu Akbar, God is Great, during moments of silence to commemorate the victims of the Islamic State attack in Paris held at the beginning of two matches. One of the Paris targets was a friendly between France and Germany at Paris’ Stade de France that French President Francois Hollande was attending.

Russia, slated to host the 2018 World Cup, had already demonstrated its political control of soccer immediately after the downing in November of the Russian plane with the country’s sports ministry banning clubs from hiring Turkish players and ordering Russian clubs to cancel winter training sessions in Turkey that they had planned.

Russian Sports Minister Vitaly Mutko said that any future World Cup-related contracts would not be awarded to Turkish construction companies but that existing commitments would not be affected. “They won’t be here in the future but at the moment they have contracts and these will not be looked into,” Mr. Mutko said.

The bans as well as some refusals to play Turkish sports clubs may however already be backfiring and handing Turkey at least some small victories in what promises to be extended chilly relations with Russia.

Turkey is counting that its sporting points will translate into political victories as Russia becomes ever more bogged down in the Syrian quagmire rather than emerging as Mr. Putin had hoped as the saviour who defeated extremist political violence. Like the more than one-year old US air campaign against the Islamic State, Russian military hardware has hardly dented Islamist opposition to the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad despite Moscow’s ability to coordinate with Syrian ground forces.

Mr. Mutko, a former chairman of the St. Petersburg team who doubles as head of the Russian Football Union (RFU) and a member of FIFA’s executive committee, admitted this week that Russia had made a mistake by stopping volleyball clubs from travelling to Turkey for European championship matches. Two Russian teams were handed technical defeats as punishment for not playing the Turkish games despite their insistence that security concerns had prevented them from going to Turkey.

In rare Russian praise for Turkey since the downing of the jet, Mr. Mutko appeared to be making an about face by stating that “The Turkish side is capable of providing security and there were never any problems in this regard. If they were unable to host tournaments of such level, the international organizations would have never given them the rights to do it,” Mr. Mutko said.

FIFA has suggested that Russian soccer could be violating the world body’s rules and regulations if it decisions proved to be politically influenced. “FIFA will monitor the situation and any potential issues on a case-by-case basis, should there be any appearance of a breach of FIFA statutes or regulations,” a FIFA spokesperson said.

Mr. Mutko’s dual position as a member of Mr. Putin’s Cabinet and head of the RFU makes a mockery of FIFA’s assertion that sports and politics are separate. They also make a mockery of FIFA’s alleged policing to ensure that the two don’t mix and underline the need to acknowledge rather than deny a relationship that is unbreakable.

Turkey’s Russian soccer and sports travails were not earning it a great deal of empathy in far flung places like Argentina. Argentinian soccer club Racing Club de Avellaneda refused a Turkish Airlines offer for sponsorship while another team, CA San Lorenzo de Almagro, turned down a similar offer from Azerbaijan, a Turkic republic with close ties to Turkey. The two clubs cited repression of dissent and freedom of expression in both Turkey and Azerbaijan as reasons for their rejection of the offers.

The recent Heart of Asia Conference-Istanbul Process was an attempt to bridge the existing gap between the Asian partners and the stakeholders with the greater objectivity for the attainment of regional peace and development goals. Together with its 14 members, 17 supporting countries and the 11 regional and international organizations, the Istanbul Process has become a unique framework in its nature which demands for sincere and productive cooperation for a stable, flourishing Afghanistan in particular, and exertion for the regional prosperity in general.

The Heart of Asia-Istanbul Process is the structured arrangement initiated through the procedures of holding a sequence of conferences held in Istanbul in 2011, in Kabul in 2012, in Almaty in 2013, 2014 in Beijing, 2015 in Islamabad and the 2016 to be hosted by India. Having a particular focus on the mutual effort and cooperation for the development of Afghanistan, the Heart of Asia stresses to strive for exploring variety the result-oriented opportunities necessary for closer ties for the mutual benefit through bilateral trade, economic cooperation, energy, education, regional infrastructure development projects, and a collective response to counter the common threats of counterterrorism, counter-narcotics, and disaster management issues.

The focal point of the Heart of Asia Conference was the replication of longing to endorse the regional development and enhanced bilateral trade interactions, mutual economic gains and addressing the security challenges that is very essential for the progressive and productive environment which in turn will enhance the quality of life and bring tremendous employment opportunities for the people in the region.

For curbing the menace of terrorism all the regional countries have to cooperate with each other. The greater role of Pakistan for the national, regional and international security by means of its sacrifice and the firmness are evident through the successful military operation of Zarb-i-Azb and the National Action Plan reflect the zero tolerance attitudes that will never allow extremism to flourish on its soil are the unflinching vows to eliminate the roots of terrorism once forever. Similarly, the current political and military leadership in Pakistan is on the same page realizing the fact that the economic development is closely associated with the peace and stability in the country as well as in the region.

Given, the landlocked position of Afghanistan and other Central Asian Countries, Pakistan has an important geopolitical position through which it intends to an exceptional trade opportunity for Afghanistan and the Central Asian countries under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) project.

Pakistan is committed to play its role in Afghan reconciliation process for the durable peace in the region and realizes the importance of association of China and the US is instrumental in achieving these goals. The violent split triggered after the death of Mullah Omer, shattered the process of peace talks between the Afghan Government and the Taliban, but however, through the constant efforts of the US, China, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and particularly Pakistan, the possible resumption of the peace process and the consequent stability can become the ray of hope for the enduring peace goals for Afghanistan.

Furthermore, the dream of durable peace can only be achieved through concrete steps to curb the flow of money generated through the drug-trafficking and organized crime. Afghan leadership under the Unity Government is also ardent on the development of the mechanism of regional cooperation to thwart the means and resources that enable the penetration of the terrorists into the society and believes in the need of a joint move towards the elimination of terrorism and extremism.

The more important issue remain with the question that the initiatives like the Heart of Asia-Istanbul Process and the desired development goals can only be achieved through the meaningful negotiation between the regional states in order to settle-down their core issues and long-lasting disputes moreover, the particular focus is needed for Afghanistan and all the developed nations must stand for the industrial development, better education and employment within and abroad, social and political coherence particularly through the international scholarships and foreign exposure of the Afghan youth, better training and equipment of the Afghan National Army (ANA), and of course, the peace talks must be expedited.

The sovereignty and the national integrity of Afghanistan is the only guarantee of the regional peace and development, therefore, the regional countries and the international community must strive through collective efforts and continue its support for Afghanistan so that a politically, economically and militarily stable Afghanistan may not become a liability for any other country in the future.

By Dr. Shamshad Akhtar and Ambassador William Lacy Swing

Over land, by air and by sea, the people of Asia and the Pacific are on the move – this is the finding of the forthcoming Asia-Pacific Migration Report, the result of United Nations research led by the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) and the International Organization for Migration. More than 59 million migrants lived in receiving countries of the Asia-Pacific region in 2013, while the number of people migrating from countries of the region has doubled since 1990, reaching more than 95 million. Their destinations vary, but include countries such as Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, the Russian Federation and Kazakhstan, as well as countries further afield in the Middle East, Europe and North America.

The factors underlying these mass movements of men, women and children vary. Many migrant workers leave home to seek jobs or higher wages in the growing economies of South-East Asia or the oil-rich countries of the Middle East. Others are refugees fleeing violence and persecution, stateless people trying to find dignity and recognition, or students hoping to access educational opportunities not available in their own countries.

People move using formal channels where possible, but informal, irregular ones where they cannot. Irregular migrants are at risk from people smugglers, who pack them onto overcrowded and unsafe boats; traffickers and unscrupulous employers, who exploit them for profit; and authorities who do not recognize that even if some irregular migrants may have broken laws, they are all still human beings with rights.

Migrants risk isolation, xenophobia, and abuse – and yet, still they come. Why? Because despite all of these risks, migration is the single best opportunity for many people to improve not only their own lives but also those of their families and communities. The remittances they send – Asia-Pacific countries received more than $249 billion in remittances in 2015 alone – lift people out of poverty, feed children, pay for their health and education, and help to build resilient homes and communities.

But we should always remember that migrants move not only for their own benefit. They are also responding to needs in countries of destination for labour. When they arrive, they work, generating wealth, expanding GDP, sometimes even sustaining industries. This is as true for those at the low end of the skill spectrum as for doctors, engineers and innovators.

This point is often overlooked. Instead, migrants are often regarded as problems or turned into scapegoats, accused of “stealing” jobs and depressing wages. In fact, the evidence suggests otherwise; generally, the impacts of migration are positive. If all migrant workers were to leave Thailand, for example, the GDP would shrink by 0.75 per cent. A ten per cent increase in the number of labour migrants in Malaysia actually raises the employment of national workers by one per cent, often releasing them to access better-paid, higher-skilled jobs.

This is not to deny the real challenges that migration can bring. Some national workers at the lower end of the labour market may find their wages depressed and employment opportunities reduced – but only slightly. This is not an effect of migration, but rather a result of the social and economic conditions that kept these people in vulnerable, low-paid employment in the first place, and which enable the exploitation of migrant workers.

The best way to ensure that migration supports development is to enable people to migrate in a regular way, with dignity and respect for their rights, to meet labour market needs. The alternative of vulnerable migrant workers is not only contrary to the values of human rights, it also means that national workers are vulnerable too.

We should use the opportunity of International Migrants Day, on 18 December, to recognize, celebrate and facilitate the contribution that migrants make to the development of countries in Asia and the Pacific. Let us go further, and reject the stereotypes, embrace the evidence, and take the necessary steps to maximize this contribution and prevent negative impacts. In particular, we should lend our support to meeting the challenge set in the new Sustainable Development Goals: to build a new migration system that enables people to move safely and prevents abuse for the benefit of all.

*About the authors:
Dr. Shamshad Akhtar is an Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations and Executive Secretary of the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP). She has been the UN’s Sherpa for the G20 and previously served as Governor of the Central Bank of Pakistan and Vice President of the MENA Region of the World Bank.

Ambassador William Lacy Swing is the Director-General of the International Organization for Migration. He has previously served as Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara

On the backdrop of a strong consensus of Sufi masters (mashaikh) and scholars (ulama) over a decision to organize an international Sufi conference titled “World Sufi Forum”, All India Ulama and Mashaikh Board, the leading Sufi organization in South Asia has embarked on this mission with great gusto.

Notably, the Board’s president and founder, Syed Mohammad Ashraf Kichchawchchvi has attained renewed energy in an untiring dissemination of his universal message of peace and pluralism that he plans to deliver to the wider Muslim world through the World Sufi Forum.

In this context, the president of All India Ulama & Mashaikh Board recently visited the neighboring Muslim country of Bangladesh, where Islam has 1.7 billion adherents, according to the latest study in 2015. Ashraf Kichchawchchvi met with both the Muslim masses and religious leaders alike to present his program to work out the Sufi ideology of peace and counter-terrorism. He is quoted to have said that his visit to Bangladesh was aimed at apprising the Bangladeshi Muslims of the pressing need to integrate for this cause supporting the Sufi leaders’ initiative with all means possible.

Syed Mohammad Ashraf met the Bangladesh-based members of the AIUMB International wing, which is locally known as “Anjuman e Ashrafia” and has a huge following in the country. On this occasion, he addressed attendees in the capital of Dhaka and asked the Islamic clerics, intellectuals and Sufi sheikhs of Bangladesh to take part in the International Sufi Conference that is to be held in Delhi in March 2016.

According to his organizers, the public meetings and small-scale gatherings proved fruitful and garnered a lot of support for the international Sufi conference with countless people pledging to attend the event. Numerous Islamic scholars came forward with their proposals to read research papers in the upcoming two-day international seminar. Even one of the renowned Qaris (Qur’an reciters) wished to render his service of the Quran recitation, a prime part of the function.

It is worth mentioning that Bangladeshis enjoy a good following of the Sufi preceptors as a result of the herculean efforts made by ancestors of Syed Mohammad Ashraf, the AIUMB president. According to their preserved history, they did great deal of service there in an effort to create a strong base of Sufism. Therefore, Sufi followers and disciples are now united for peace and counter-extremism under the banner of Anjuman Ashrafia extending their vital support to the international Sufi event in India.

In this context, it would be interesting to trace back the history of Sufi culture and tradition in Bangladesh. Islam was first introduced to Bangladesh during the caliphate of the Prophet Muhammad’s first four companions, known as Khulafa-e-Rashidin (the rightly guided caliphs). Modern researchers have found that inhabitants of this land were well-acquainted with Islam much earlier than the Muslim conquest of Bengal. Arab merchants visited the Chittagong port even in the pre-Islamic period. But it was a small group of Prophet’s companions who came to Chittagong in 618 during the lifetime of the Prophet (pbuh). They preached Islam in various parts of Bangladesh for years and then went to China. Thereafter, several delegations of the early Arab Muslims arrived in this land to preach the faith, tradition and culture of Islam. The most notable among them were the Sufi saints, who came to be known as Pirs and Fakirs in Bangladesh. They contributed the most pivotal part in preaching Muslim culture in the country. For instance, the famous Sufi saint of Bangladesh, Shah Jalal of Yemeni origin, who was a descendant of the Prophet’s family and belonged to a family of saints, had a large share in it.

The Sufi saints, followed by a group of Prophet’s companions, preached moderate, progressive, multi-cultural and pluralistic Islamic tradition, which was the main reason behind its successful spread in this land of ancient Vedic culture. These Muslim mystics (pirs and faqirs) reached out to every section of Bangladeshi society and preached the universal values of infinite love, mutual respect, religious harmony and social affinity in place of retrogressive and ritualistic views in the name of religion. Thus, their egalitarian messages stressing the ideals of peace, pluralism, human equality, universal brotherhood and social justice attracted the countless natives of Bangladesh towards their Islamic faith tradition.

In contemporary Bangladesh, the impact of Sufism can be seen through the prism of arts and culture. The multi-faceted Sufi tradition reflects an essentially peaceful and pluralistic culture that connects contemporary Bangladeshi Muslims to their old-age Indo-Islamic heritage. The most redeeming features of Sufism’s appeal in Bangladesh continue to be its inbuilt qualities of openness, wide embrace and social accommodation. Therefore, it can be fairly considered a completely peaceful, non-confrontist, inclusive and subversive trend in Bangladesh.

However, many opine that the spirit of Sufi culture and tradition in the country is now beginning to wane. It has been reduced to only occasional Shrine visitation, spiritual consultation or observance of Sufi-oriented rituals and festivals. Today’s fakirs and pirs in Bangladesh also seem to have done away with their effort to keep alive the mystical Sufi culture of pluralism and moderation. Though they still engage in their occupations in the mazars (shrines of the saints), that outnumber the mosques and madrasas in some areas, they have almost lost an impacting ideology that continued to preach peace and moderation for centuries. Now their business is merely providing spiritual consultation to the shrine visitors and devotees, who look up to them as their peer-o-murshid (spiritual guru) and seek consultation in relation to the issues in their life and career. As Sufi masters, pirs and fakirs are no longer the influential ideologues in the country, radical thought is taking roots in some parts. The orthodox clergy began to play their part in reshaping the common religious mindset of Muslim community, adversely impacting the harmonious culture in the country.

Nevertheless, the peace-loving and spiritually inclined moderate Muslims of Bangladesh are waking up to this reality and are eager to reclaim the lost legacy of harmonious Sufi tradition in the country. It is upon this backdrop, that what the apex body of Indian Sufi Sunni Muslims, the AIUMB, is trying to do in Bangladesh assumes great significance.

*Ghulam Rasool Dehlvi is an English-Arabic-Urdu writer and classical Islamic scholar and a Doctoral Research Scholar, Centre for Culture, Media & Governance (JMI Central University). He can be contacted at grdehlavi@gmail.com

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which the P5+1 (the five permanent UN Security Council members plus Germany) and Iran signed earlier this year, marked a watershed moment in international diplomacy. For 20 months, the P5+1 and Iran negotiated an accord to freeze Tehran’s nuclear program in exchange for an unfreezing of Iran’s economic relations with the world. At this juncture, many analysts are shedding light on the greater geopolitical implications of the nuclear agreement, the lifting of sanctions on the Islamic Republic, and how this will impact countries which complied with the sanctions regime, yet have an interest in exploring commercial opportunities in Iran.

Italian-Iranian relations are a case in point. From Rome’s perspective, the JCPOA opened the door for many Italian firms to tap into the Iranian market. Tehran officials have long seen Italy as one of Iran’s closest partners in the West. Undoubtedly, the level of trust between Iran and Italy is higher than between Tehran and most Western nations.

Not lost in the equation is the armed group Daesh (“Islamic State”), which considers its home in Iraq and Syria. Both Europeans and Iranians view Daesh as a grave menace to international security. Although the European Union and Iran have their differences with respect to the crises in Iraq and Syria, there is a growing call in European capitals for greater collaboration with Tehran in the international effort to counter the extremist group and its regional offshoots. Federica Mogherini, an Italian politician and the current High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, articulated this position shortly after global powers and Tehran signed the JCPOA. Mogherini wrote, “Cooperation between Iran, its neighbors and the whole international community could open unprecedented possibilities of peace for the region, starting from Syria, Yemen, and Iraq.”

Earlier this month, Gulf State Analytics sat down with Cinzia Bianco, an Italian expert on Middle Eastern geopolitics, to discuss the context in which Italians and Iranians eye opportunities to pursue a mutually advantageous relationship in 2016 and beyond.

The text of the interview follows:

Gulf State Analytics: Iran has a relatively untapped market of 78 million people and a USD 400 billion economy. As European companies eye post-sanctions opportunities in Iran, what role do Italian firms see for themselves as Iran slowly reintegrates with the global economy? Who are the actors in Italy most interested in moving into Iran’s economy?

Cinzia Bianco: Indeed, Italian firms are eager to capitalize on the lifting of sanctions against Iran and fully exploit the country’s economic potential. Traditionally, Italy’s long-standing and diversified economic relationship with Iran has been centered around the petrochemical sector and related services, as well as the steel, mining, automotive and machinery sectors.

Relatively untapped promising sectors include transportation and infrastructure. Major Italian firms in these sectors have had a long-standing presence in Iran and they were more reluctant to comply with the sanctions. At this point, they are ready to get back in business. Some of the big Italian companies include Alitalia, which had a good presence in the logistics sector; Danieli, a major global player for plant making in the steel industry; multinational corporations specializing in engineering and construction for oil and gas projects such as Snamprogetti and SAIPEM (both subsidiaries of the energy major ENI) – and Tecnimont SpA, which since last March has allegedly been involved in preliminary talks regarding the realization of auxiliary infrastructures for the petrochemical complex in Asaluyeh, southern Iran – and Ansaldo Energia, an integrated operator for power generation plants. In addition to that, being rich in mineral resources such as lead, zinc, iron, and copper, the mining industry and its ancillaries are also looking at Iran with tangible interest, both as an investment spot and as a source of import. The food industry seems promising in both directions. Iran still has a sizeable portion of unexploited arable land, which might be of interest to Italian investors, and it is a big market for the export of Italian food. Finally, in addition to the big multinational companies, countless small and medium sized-enterprises are examining ways to tap into Iran’s market, in particular as a market for the export of “Made in Italy” products of the most diverse categories –  from the usual textile and fashion, to luxury goods, to technology, and to medicine.

Gulf State Analytics: Before the UN Security Council imposed economic sanctions on Iran in 2006, Italy was one of Iran’s most important trade partners. How did sanctions impact Italian-Iranian relations?

Cinzia Bianco: Undeniably, sanctions took a major toll on Italian-Iranian trade. However, the real hit came in 2012, when a wide range of financial and commercial sanctions, established by the EU in 2010, were fully implemented. The trade exchange between Italy and Iran had hit a peak in 2011, reaching USD 7.66 billion (EUR 7 billion), and has significantly declined since 2012. Due to the effects of international sanctions, Italian exports toward Iran have registered a decline of 24.3 percent in 2013 and a further decline of 22.6 percent in 2014. Because Italy’s “triangulated exports” (mostly consumer goods) via two key Italian partners – Turkey and the UAE – had to be halted, the sanctions hit even harder. One of the main sectors impacted was energy. Until 2011, Iran had been one of Italy’s main energy providers (Italy imported roughly seven percent of Iranian crude oil production). Italy’s energy market has thus suffered significantly since the 2012 oil embargo, also given that its sources had been already compromised by the instability in North Africa, Italy’s main source of oil imports.

Gulf State Analytics: What can the opening of Iran do to improve Italy’s dismal economic conditions? Does Italy view Iran’s market as an opportunity to increase national exports? What does Iran see in Italy as an economic partner?

Cinzia Bianco: Since the 2009 financial crisis, domestic consumption in Italy has been the most stagnant of all EU members. Many view increased exports as a means to overcoming the crisis and perhaps achieve economic growth.

In addition to the usual destinations and emerging markets in China, the GCC, Turkey, and Eastern Europe, Iran is seen as a promised land for Italian products. The numbers look good. According to SACE (the Italian state-owned credit rating agency), the opening up of the Iranian market could spur Italy’s export for a total of USD 3.28 billion (EUR 3 billion) within in the next four years. Of course, this is a preliminary assessment. Nonetheless, the opportunity is real, given that post-sanctions Iran will presumably seek medium- and high-range products, which absolutely include products that fit the “Made in Italy” description.

Gulf State Analytics: Do Italian firms’ links with the U.S. complicate their prospects for pursuing lucrative opportunities in Iran?

Cinzia Bianco: Throughout the past this has been a tricky issue, but mainly with the U.S. government, rather than with private American firms. Tension mounted with Washington when several Italian companies, including Italy’s energy giant ENI along with other European firms, showed a certain reluctance to comply with the U.S.-imposed sanctions. However, if the JCAOP proves successful, there is little reason to expect Italian companies to refrain from pursuing economic opportunities unfrozen by the deal.

Across Europe the “rush for Iran” has already begun with several European firms competing to organize business trips to Tehran.

Only the Italian companies that have structural connections with American firms would find it difficult to engage Iran’s market decisively and unilaterally. Of course these companies would probably opt for discussing their development plans with U.S. partners in order not to alienate them. Indeed, whatever profit Italian firms might hope to gain from Iran is hardly worth such a high price. On the other hand, U.S. companies seeking to explore Iran may find Italian firms to be important partners for coordination purposes.

Gulf State Analytics: Do economics alone explain Italy and Iran’s growing interest in one another? Do security dilemmas in the Middle East (Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, etc.) factor into the equation? Do Italy’s ties with the Gulf Arab states and/or Israel place pressure on Rome to proceed cautiously vis-à-vis Iran?

Cinzia Bianco: Like other Mediterranean countries, Italy’s interest in Iran has never been just about economics. Even more so, Iran’s positive view of Italy is not solely related to its position in the world’s economy. Many Italians and Iranians agree that the relationship rests chiefly upon cultural connections. Both Italy and Iran represent ancient civilizations and the two nations have long been interested in the other from a historical, literary, and archeological point of view.

Official diplomatic ties date back to the 1950s and remained solid throughout the 1979 Islamic Revolution, which brought a sizeable Iranian community in exile to Italy, and the Iran-Iraq war. In 1999, when President Mohammad Khatami visited Rome, Italy was the first country to receive the visit of an Iranian leader after the Revolution. Building on this history, in 2004, the Iranians sought to pressure the P5+1 group into incorporating Italy into the nuclear file, yet Italy opted out. Officials in Rome did not want to side either against Italy’s good trade partner – Iran, nor against the country’s main strategic ally – the U.S.

During the years leading up to the Iranian nuclear agreement, however, Italy took a more clear-cut position. Former Minister for Foreign Affairs Emma Bonino was the first diplomatic head of a European nation to visit Iran after Hassan Rouhani’s election in 2013. At that point Italian diplomats were already pushing for Iran’s inclusion at the Geneva II negotiating table on Syria. Somewhat echoing the Iranian leadership, Italy’s leadership often emphasizes that there is no military solution to the Syrian conflict, only a political one. In both Syria and Iraq, Italy is keen on recognizing Iran’s sustained efforts in the fight against Daesh (“Islamic State”). Rome shares Tehran’s concerns about stability in Afghanistan, where Italy is present with a sizeable contingent, at least by Italian standards. President Rouhani has been very supportive of giving a seat to Italy at the UN Security Council, a declared goal of Prime Minister Matteo Renzi’s government.

However, not everything in the Rome-Tehran relationship is rosy. One of Italy’s most important international commitments is the leadership of the UNIFIL mission in Lebanon. This has raised difficult questions more than once regarding the role of Hezbollah, Iran’s longa manus in Lebanon. This factor feeds into an intangible halo of uncertainty that represents an obstacle to transform the latent convergence of interests into a real partnership. The same is true with respect to Italy’s existing connections with Israel, the growing ones with Gulf Arab countries, and especially Rome’s relationship with Washington, a high priority for Italy’s leadership.

Gulf State Analytics: Several weeks after the P5+1 and Iran signed the JCPOA, Italian officials invited Iranian President Hassan Rouhani to Italy. He accepted, and planned to make Rome and the Vatican his first two stops on an outreach campaign trip to Europe, which was canceled due to the November 13 attacks in Paris. What did Rouhani’s plans to make Italy and the Vatican the first two stops tell us about the state of Italian-Iranian relations five months after world powers and Iran signed the JCPOA?

Cinzia Bianco: Although it is a bit early to say, Rouhani declared that he was pleased that his first visit abroad after signing the nuclear agreement will be to Italy and he underlined the good economic, cultural and political relationships between Italy and Iran. The president of Iran further acknowledged that on international and political issues, Italian leaders have always taken a moderate stance on Iran, which will definitely pay off in terms of trust. He went even further, maintaining that Iranians consider Italy as a friend in the West and that they view Italy as their potential gateway to Europe. To what extent these declarations were rhetorical remains to be seen. Certainly his postponed visit, which will include business meetings and bilateral meetings with the highest Italian institutions, will help understand whether a new phase of the relationship, especially on the economic front, will begin.

Gulf State Analytics: What is the likely future of the Rome-Tehran relationship?

Cinzia Bianco: From the Iranian side, a high-level political visit has been planned to Italy. From the Italian side, there has been no political visit yet and the main activity has been a business trip, which the Ministry for Economic Development organized in partnership with other Italian institutions. The delegation was big in number and profile. Last month, 178 companies, 20 business councils, and 12 financial institutions participated in the Bilateral Economic Forum in Tehran, which ended with the signing of four Memoranda of Understanding in the fields of tourism and trade. Undoubtedly, this was a remarkable initiative. However, it was less significant than what the Iranians had planned – a visit by Rouhani to Italy and the Vatican. Ultimately, there might be a discrepancy at this moment between what the Iranians expect from Italy and what Rome can realistically provide Tehran.

At the end of the day, Italy will always be aligned with the EU. Put simply, unless Iran shows a certain amount of goodwill in terms of being a constructive player in the region (especially in Syria and Iraq), the medium-term future of the relationship cannot be certain. We will probably witness a two-speed future in the bilateral relationship – a faster pace on economic development and a slower pace on political cooperation. Surely the potential to strengthen the bond exists. Time will tell if both sides are willing to pursue it.

This article was first published by GSA here.

The orld’s two most populous nations must remedy gaps in health care to realize their full economic potential.

By Zeena Johar and Xue Ying Hwang*

China and India, often cited as two rising economic powerhouses, are less than fully equipped in terms of health care, a key attribute of national economic development, according to Amartya Sen. Emergence of the United States, Europe, Japan and Korea as developed economic powerhouses validates Sen’s argument. China and India, representing one out of three people on the planet, must step up efforts to remedy the gaps in health care to realize their economic potential.

India and China have adopted insurance as a tool to provide health-care access and mitigate catastrophic expenditures. India has 20 percent penetration of insurance while China has managed over 95 percent penetration. Each nation has adopted an independent route towards achieving universal health coverage. Despite good intentions, both nations are struggling with the complexities of deploying insurance. China struggles with issues of limited health-insurance benefits and high out-of-pocket expenditure. India on the other hand struggles with variability across a myriad of insurance schemes and limited engagement of the private sector.

The United Nations reiterated its global commitment towards ensuring universal access to health care at the Sustainable Development Summit 2015. World leaders adopted a set of 17 Sustainable Development Goals to end poverty, fight inequality and injustice, and tackle climate change by 2030. Like the Millennium Development Goals, SDGs rigorously focus on global priorities such as maternal health, preventable deaths in newborns, and communicable diseases like AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria – and renewing focus on non-communicable diseases. One ambitious goal is to achieve universal health coverage, including financial risk protection and access to quality essential health-care services for all.

For India, achieving universal health coverage is also a national priority. Penetration remains low,  with 5 percent coverage by private insurance. Two significant sources of health-insurance coverage in India are sponsorship by employers or the government at the federal or state level.

Formal employment in India is available to 20 percent of the Indian workforce. Two significant employer-sponsored health-care insurance schemes in India, according to the World Bank, are the Employees’ State Insurance Corporation launched in 1948, providing access to more than 55 million beneficiaries, and the Central Government Health Scheme launched in 1954, providing access to over 3 million beneficiaries.

A pivotal moment in federally sponsored health insurance in India was the launch of Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana , or RSBY, to families living below the poverty line. RSBY provides access to hospitalization for more than 100 million beneficiaries through a personalized smart card across a wide network of private-sector providers. India has many other state-sponsored health-care insurance schemes that target the population living below poverty line. Government-sponsored insurance in India stands out for proactive engagement of the private sector.

With India’s abysmally low penetration of insurance, the health-care sector continues to thrive on unregulated out-of-pocket spending by customers seeking medical care. For a patient in India, there is an inherent bias to seek care in private facilities because of perceived higher quality and benefits. These private facilities, having complete control over pricing their services, have little incentive to implement cost-effective strategies. One expected benefit as health insurance penetration rises in India is the ability of insurance payers to better negotiate prices for procedures and services with providers.

Unlike India, China’s main obstacle to achieving universal coverage is not insurance penetration, but rather the extent of financial protection within the existing insurance schemes. In 2011, 95 percent of China’s population was covered under one of its three main national health insurance schemes: New Rural Cooperative Medical Scheme, Urban Employees Basic Medical Insurance and Urban Residents Basic Medical Insurance. China’s three national schemes were each established within the past two decades in response to restructuring after Deng Xiaoping’s market reforms.

Yet, as reported by The World Bank, in 2013, individual out-of-pocket payments across all three schemes accounted for 34 percent of total health expenditures. Unable to afford the excessive out-of-pocket burden, 35 percent of urban households and 43 percent of rural households could not access health care – the limited access and financial protection benefits lead to financial strain.

In comparing the health-insurance landscape across India and China, there are notable features. In India, federal- and state-sponsored insurance schemes were seen as instrumental to enhancing private-sector participation in health-care delivery in locations beyond large cities. State-sponsored health-insurance schemes in India purchase from and contract with the private sector for delivery of insured services. As the private sector provides for more than 80 percent of India’s health-care needs, such public-private synergies present an effective solution. Hence, leveraging the strength of the Indian health-care private sector, most government-sponsored insurance schemes actively recruit private hospitals as part of their network.

In China, on the other hand, health insurance has been modeled as a tool to improve efficiency and control rising costs of government facilities, introducing accountability.

In India, the health insurance is scattered among players from across the government and private sector. India’s health insurance has huge variations in coverage. Most health-insurance schemes in India cover hospitalization with few provisions for outpatient, primary or preventive care. Coverage on hospitalization can include waiting periods, exclusions and other details that limit financial support for the insured.

China, primarily dominated by three health insurance schemes, experiences less product variability. The three schemes offer little to no reimbursement for outpatient services. For inpatient services, patients generally pay a deductible and then are broadly reimbursed for remaining expenses – 41 percent for the rural program, 65 percent for the urban employees program, and 45 percent for the urban residents program. Such reimbursement rates force patients to shoulder around half the cost themselves, creating incentives for patients to delay seeking care.

As India works towards securing extended coverage for its citizens and China moves towards optimizing coverage benefits, the systems should model key interventions to ensure desired success for both nations. India’s motivation to promote state-sponsored health insurance is driven by attempts to optimize shrinking public expenditures. As state-sponsored health-insurance schemes become mainstream for India, there is an urgent need to focus on strengthening delivery within both the public and private sector.

India and China each must focus on establishing appropriate governance and coordination mechanisms across the delivery value-chain. As India struggles to extend coverage and China struggles with surging out-of-pocket expenditures, a health-systems perspective and a view on end-to-end care mechanisms offer the only affordable way forward.

Insurance is a key lever in health-systems design. But for health insurance as an instrument to be truly effective, delivery systems need to be responsive. Health insurance does offer a promising answer for easing expenditures. Stronger commitment towards comprehensive care is required – commitment among providers towards preventive and primary care, commitment from payers and insurance providers towards an inclusive-care design as extended benefits.

Appropriate timing for the introduction of health insurance as a financing tool within an economy is essential. Health insurance has a much better chance of being both inclusive and effective in an economy with well- developed, managed and governed health-care infrastructure. Both India and China should align their health-insurance priorities with essential needs of their delivery systems. Both India and China should view their insurance interventions as a catalytic tool allowing them to build effective health-care delivery systems.

*Zeena Johar is a 2015 Yale World Fellow and the founder of SughaVazahvu Healthcare serving rural India. She has been recognized as an Ashoka Fellow in 2013 and Aspen Fellow in 2014. She holds a PhD from ETH, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, Zurich, in drug discovery. Xue Ying Hwang is a senior studying Molecular, Cellular and Developmental Biology in Yale College.

BG Group said Friday that the Lake Charles LNG export project has received approval from the US Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to construct and operate a natural gas liquefaction and export facility in Lake Charles, Louisiana.

FERC approval is the key remaining regulatory consent for the Lake Charles LNG project, which BG Group is developing with Energy Transfer Equity LP and Energy Transfer Partners, L.P.. Energy Transfer owns an existing LNG regasification facility in Lake Charles, which will be converted to a liquefaction facility.

The project has conditional authorization from the US Department of Energy for the export of up to 2 billion cubic feet of natural gas per day or approximately 15 million metric tons of LNG per annum.

Final investment decisions from both BG Group and Energy Transfer are expected to be taken in 2016, with construction to start immediately following a positive decision and first LNG exports anticipated about four years later.

Helge Lund, BG Group Chief Executive, said, “We are pleased to receive the approval from FERC, an important milestone as we progress the Lake Charles project towards a final investment decision. By utilising a brownfield site, and the ready supply of gas from the US grid, Lake Charles LNG offers one of the largest and most competitive new LNG supply options in the marketplace.”

BG Group is responsible for selecting the engineering, procurement and construction (EPC) contractor and managing construction.

Upon completion, BG Group will operate and be responsible for the LNG offtake from the facility.

By Shamsul Huda

The Bangladesh government is going to shoot itself in the foot as it is considering banning the country’s most organized and largest Islamist party, the Jamaat-e- Islami Bangladesh (Jamaat). A number of powerful ministers and some government-backed political organizations have started raising voices to put a stop to activities of Jamaat, which is currently under tremendous pressure — its three key leaders have already hanged and many more are under trial for the crimes against humanity during the 1971 liberation war.

If Jamaat is kept out of the country’s political arena, there is every possibility that its resolutely committed and diehard members and workers, mostly young and aged below 45, might go underground and get involved in subversive activities to destabilize the country.

Jamaat has already had its wings clipped when the Election Commission delisted it following a Supreme Court order. Now banning it will be the last nail in the coffin, probably leaving it without options other than fight back for survival.

It is not hard to fathom that Jamaat has enough brains and brawn, both politically and economically, to shake the country. According to a research paper presented by a Dhaka University Professor, Abul Barakat, on December 12, profits from the enterprises belonging to Islamist fundamentalists were estimated at nearly SR1,250 million in 2014 and their accumulated profits for the past 40 years amounted to SR 50,000 million.

Jamaat is also one of the oldest political parties in the Indian subcontinent with a long history. It was founded during the British rule of India in 1941 as Jamaat-e-Islami and metamorphosed into Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan, following the creation of India and Pakistan in 1947 when Bangladesh was assimilated into Pakistan.

With its deep roots in politics, Jamaat has experienced lots of ups and downs. Its major setback was its stand against the independence of Bangladesh and its great success was it was part of the government with two ministerial posts during the two regimes of Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) under the then prime minister Khaleda Zia.

Jamaat has undoubtedly enormous economic clout and political influence not only at home but also in some foreign countries. It has sympathizers, active members and keen supporters among an estimated 10 million non-resident Bangladeshis (NRBs) living in the Gulf states, Malaysia, the UK, the US, Australia, Canada and other countries. Saudi Arabia alone has more than 1.5 million Bangladeshi expatriates. Over half a million British citizens are of Bangladesh origin.

A good number of NRBs are alleged to be providing financial and moral support to Jamaat, which is a major concern for the current Bangladesh government. Dhaka has already alerted some of the foreign countries where Bangladeshis live and work about the issue. For instance, Bangladesh government has informed its UK counterpart that a considerable number of British citizens are involved in stoking Islamist revival in Bangladesh.

Bangladesh government of Sheikh Hasina has kept kept a check on Jamaat by putting hundreds of thousands of its workers and supporters behind bars. The aim is not only eliminating it, but also to wean it away from BNP and weaken the combined strength of opposition parties. Now, the government’s next step to ban Jamaat is likely to bolster the BNP as nearly all the Jamaat members are expected to join it.

Judged by its local support, overseas links and economic strength, Jamaat should be encountered politically. Given its Islamist ideology, Jamaat may, someday, emerge as a key political party once it is purged from war crimes in the Muslim-dominated country of 160 million people.

(RFE/RL) — Ukrainian Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk says his country won’t repay a $3 billion debt Eurobond owed to Russia by this weekend.

Yatsenyuk announced at a televised government session December 18 a “moratorium” on any debt repayments to Russia. He did not indicate when Ukraine would be ready to repay the debt.

That effectively means that Ukraine is defaulting on the debt. Moscow has previously said it will take Ukraine to court if it failed to pay on time.

The Eurobond matures on December 20, but Ukraine has a 10-day grace period before it will be considered officially to be in default.

Yatseniuk also said Ukraine would cancel payments on $507 million of Ukrainian commercial debt held by Russian banks.

Relations between the two neighbors soured after Russia annexed the Crimean peninsula in March 2014 and threw its backing behind separatist rebels in eastern Ukraine.

Ukrainian leaders have accused Moscow of sending troops and weapons to the east, a claim the Kremlin has denied.

By Georgi Gotev and Adéla Denková

(EurActiv) — The ‘Visegrad Four’ countries (Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary) found a powerful ally at the EU summit which ended today (18 December) in the person of Council President Donald Tusk, who repeated most of their arguments against the Germany-favoured project.

The leaders of the Visegrad countries, also known as V4, have reportedly argued that that the Nord Stream 2 pipeline project, which is expanding the gas supplies from Russia to Germany across the Baltic Sea, is against the strategic interests of the EU and undermines its ambition to build an Energy Union.

The move is hardly a surprise, as at least seven countries from Central Europe, including the V4, recently took positions against the project in joint letters to the EU executive at the level of energy ministers and to Tusk at Prime Minister level.

EurActiv Czech Republic asked the Czech Prime Minister if there were differences in the positions of the V4 countries with respect to South Stream. The Czech Republic did not sign the letter of the seven ministers addressed to Commission Vice President Maroš Šefčovič, but only the letter of V4 Prime Ministers and Romania to Tusk, which did not refer directly to Nord Stream.

“There are no differences among Visegrad states on this. We are ready to act together”, Sobotka said.

He added: “Together, we perceive the Nord Stream 2 project as controversial. We think it goes against the strategic interests of many countries in the EU and it economically harms Ukraine. We have – and I think we will have also in the future – a common position on this and we would like to see the European Commission to assess whether the project complies with European rules.”

He was also whether the leaders heard any clear position from the Commission and what German Chancellor Angela Merkel said during the discussion.

Sobotka said that during the summit debate, the Commission made a statement about Nord Stream 2, but added that there was no particular conclusion which would show the direction that the Commission wants to take.

According to him, Merkel described the parameters of the project and she stressed that it is up to the European Commission to assess the whole issue. Sobotka also said that some countries compared the Nord Stream project with South Stream and pleaded for an equal approach to all projects of this type.

Speaking at a separate press conference, Tusk named those countries as Bulgaria and Italy. Those are the EU countries at the two extremes of the now defunct pipeline project, which was aimed at bringing Russian gas across the Black Sea to the EU.

The adopted Conclusions diplomatically avoid mentioning Nord Stream 2. The compromise text states:

“The European Council calls for […] swift implementation of projects of common interest and optimal use of infrastructure for the benefit of a fully-functioning and interconnected market and energy security. Any new infrastructure should entirely comply with the Third Energy Package and other applicable EU legislation as well as with the objectives of the Energy Union.”

Tusk called the discussion on Nord Stream 2 “very tough, very emotional”. He invoked the geopolitical consideration that Nord Stream 2 would lead to the drying out of transit through Ukraine. This, according to estimation, would lead to loss in transit taxes of at least $2 billion a year.

Polish translation of the Conclusions?

But the interpretation he gave to the Conclusions seems to differ from the adopted text. To the very legalistic terms of the agreed Conclusions, Tusk added the geopolitical dimension and the need for the EU to deal with a dominant gas supplier such as Gazprom as a Union, not in bilateral intergovernmental relations.

Speaking in Polish, this is what he said, as translated:

“What member states have agreed today is that supply of energy, supply of gas, is a multi-faceted problem. It’s a commercial problem, it could be a purely energy matter, also it could have geopolitical and legal ramifications, so we must solve this problem as Europe and we must not seek to solve it in bilateral relations with the suppliers.”

Tusk also said that leaders had agreed that any new energy infrastructure should comply with the objectives of the Energy Union, that is, the reduction of energy dependency and the diversification of supplier sources and routes.

He said that the assessment of the Commission was that if Nord Stream 2 was to be constructed, it would increase Europe’s dependence on one supplier and concentrate 80% of Russian gas imports [to the EU] on one route.

“It would also lead to dominant position of Gazprom on the German market by increasing its share of over 50%.

“In my perspective, Nord Stream does not help diversification, nor would it reduce energy dependency. But it is of course to the Commission to conclude its technical and legal assessment on whether or not this is in line with our conclusions today,” Tusk said.

Peace talks between Yemen’s warring parties have been indefinitely halted after members of the Houthi rebel delegation suspended all negotiations in protest of ceasefire violations committed by forces loyal to embattled President Abd Rabbuh Mansour Hadi, the Associated Press reported.

Officials speaking to the AP on Friday said the Houthi delegation refused to participate in future talks unless the UN condemned breaches of a week-long truce. Violations of the ceasefire have been reported from both sides.

The violent conflict in Yemen pits Houthi rebels against forces loyal to ousted President Hadi, backed by a coalition of Arab states led by Said Arabia and supported by the United States.

Original article