My fellow Americans,

This week I nominated Neil Gorsuch for the United States Supreme Court.

Judge Gorsuch is one of the most qualified people ever to be nominated for this post. He is a graduate of Columbia, Harvard and Oxford. He is a man of principle. He has an impeccable resume. He is widely respected by everyone. And, Judge Gorsuch’s proven track record upholding the Constitution makes him the ideal person to fill the vacancy left by the late, great Antonin Scalia, a truly fabulous justice.

Ten years ago, the Senate unanimously approved Judge Gorsuch’s nomination to serve on the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. I urge members of both parties to support Judge Gorsuch and, in so doing, to protect our laws and our freedoms.

This week we also took significant action to roll back the massive regulation that is devastating our economy and crippling American companies and jobs.

That’s why I have issued a new executive order to create a permanent structure of regulatory reduction. This order requires that for every 1 new regulation, 2 old regulations must—and I mean must—be eliminated. It’s out of control.

The January employment report shows that the private sector added 237,000 jobs last month. A lot of that has to do with the spirit our country now has. Job growth far surpassed expectations in January, and the labor force participation also grew, so you can be encouraged about the progress of our economy. It’s going to be a whole new ball game.

But there is still much work to do. That I can tell you.

Also this week, on the first day of Black History Month, I was pleased to host African American leaders at the White House. We are determined to deliver more opportunity, jobs and safety for the African-American citizens of our country. America can really never, ever rest until children of every color are fully included in the American Dream—so important. I think, probably, one of my most and maybe my most important goal. It is our mutual duty and obligation to make sure this happens.

At Dover Air Force Base on Wednesday I joined the family of Chief Special Warfare Operator William “Ryan” Owens as our fallen hero was returned home. A great man. Chief Owens gave his life for his country and for our people. Our debt to him and his family, a beautiful family, is eternal.

God has truly blessed this nation to have given us such a brave and selfless patriot as Ryan. We will never forget him. We will never ever forget those who serve. Believe me.

And I will never forget that my responsibility is to keep you—the American people—safe and free.

That’s why last week I signed an executive order to help keep terrorists out of our country. The executive order establishes a process to develop new vetting and mechanisms to ensure those coming into America love and support our people. That they have good intentions.

On every single front, we are working to deliver for American workers and American families. You, the law-abiding citizens of this country, are my total priority. Your safety, your jobs and your wages guide our decisions.

We are here to serve you, the great and loyal citizens of the United States of America.

The forgotten men and women will be never be forgotten again. Because from now on, it’s going to be America First. That’s how I got elected, that’s why you voted for me, and I will never forget it.

God Bless You, and God Bless America.

By Alice Salles*

“Big Corporation helps government regulators crush poor people.”

This is a headline fit for a series on the current war against making loans to low-income borrowers — although we’ll never see it framed this way by The Washington Post or The New York Times.

But this is exactly what’s happened with payday loans as Google has joined government regulators in an effort to get rid of the payday loan industry and keep low-income working individuals from having access to cash lenders. After all, it seems evil capitalists in the payday lending industry are offering loans at higher interest rates — loans the poor would otherwise have no access to at all.

According to Zero Hedge, Google has been working around the clock to combat “fake news,” a new category of information big media and established politicians have invented to attack news organizations that fail to spread the official narrative. As part of this war on “fake news,” Google banned “predatory” ads as well, disabling five million payday loan ads in the last months of 2016. This new policy of course helps both government regulators and established bankers who now are subject to less competition from small payday loan firms.

As someone who has used payday loans in my days of struggling with little income in Hollywood — and when no bank would help — I find it incredible that, in 2017, people don’t know better.

Why Rates for Payday Loans Are Higher

In a late 2016 article, Jonathan Lee explained that short-term lenders charge higher interest rates because they are taking on a big risk when they lend money to low-income borrowers. Some of these borrowers don’t have a credit history or even a bank account. Lee explained how payday lenders fill a real need:

[P]olicymakers are thinking with their hearts while sitting in their air-conditioned offices, away from the facts and any form of interaction with the real world of short-term loans. Just the fact that they see the short-term loan industry as “dirty” supplies sufficient reason to believe that either these policymakers are ignorantly prejudiced or plainly manipulative…

Studies show these lenders charge on average 15 percent, or $15 for every $100 loaned — a profit margin that is significantly less than the price percentage difference of products in other markets.

Nevertheless, federal regulators think the industry is too profitable, and argue that regulators should “solve for ‘balloon payments,’” by “requir[ing] that most products become installment loans with smaller, manageable payments.”

The problem with this statement is that the Bureau completely ignores the reason why short-term loans are so available to borrowers &mdash ’s because short-term loan companies can offset risk by requiring borrowers to weigh their own risk against their need to borrow.

Simply put, the short payment periods are put in place to deter those who definitely should not borrow. Additionally, making the periods longer and the payments smaller defeats the business model, making short-term lenders irrelevant because their models are defined by their expediency.

By ignoring the need for firms willing to take the a risk on low-income borrowers, regulators — and Google — ignore the payday lenders’ importance. Not only because the low-income community has no standing with big banks, but because the payday firms serve to educate the individual.

For those who have been in a low-income situation, however, the need for quick, easy loans is apparent. When I needed access to a loan quickly, I am glad I had a payday loan in my neighborhood. I needed the money then and there and I got it, but most importantly, I was truly happy the lenders imposed incentives to pay it all back. Which is what happened.

Life can be hard at times. And many people need any help they can get. And, they often need help fast. Conventional banks simply don’t offer these services.

Google is a private company and is entitled to decide for themselves who can work with them as advertisers. However, by working with regulators to attempt to put payday lenders out of business, Google is only working to further limit access to loans for low-income households, and making life even harder than it needs to be.

About the author:
*Alice Salles was born and raised in Brazil but has lived in America for the past ten years. She now lives in Compton, California and writes for The Advocates for Self-Government, Liberty Conservative, and Anti-Media.

Source:
This article was published by the MISES Institute

By Terri Moon

The United States remains committed to the defense of Japan and stands ready to enhance its alliance for regional peace, prosperity and freedom, Defense Secretary Jim Mattis said Saturday in Tokyo.

In a joint press conference with Japan’s Minister of Defense Tomomi Inada, the secretary said much has changed in Japan since he was stationed there as a young Marine Corps lieutenant.

“But one thing is certain: The alliance between the United States and Japan is enduring and will remain as the cornerstone of peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region,” he said.

Joint Regional Challenges

“As the Japanese people know so well, jointly we face many security challenges in this region; from the threat of nuclear missile provocations by North Korea to increasingly confrontational behavior by China in the East and the South China Sea, [and] we recognize the changing security situation,” Mattis said.

In their earlier joint meeting, the two defense leaders confirmed their intention to continue close coordination on those security issues and others, he said.

The secretary said he also expressed to Inada the United States’ appreciation for Japan’s stabilizing and strengthening efforts with its Southeast Asian partners, which contribute to regional peace, prosperity and freedom.

Alliance Critical to Security

“The U.S.-Japan alliance is critical to ensuring that this region remains safe and secure, not just now, but for years to come,” he said.

The United States’ 2015 defense guidelines and Japan’s peace and security legislation “lay the foundation for us to do much more together to increase interoperability between our forces, and to bolster Japan’s capabilities from peacetime to contingency, if needed,” Mattis said.

The secretary said the coming years will see important strides on both sides toward realizing their mutual goal of a strong defense of Japan and a stable regional environment in which all nations, based on broadly accepted international rules, can prosper free from fear.”

The United States is invested in the alliance by deploying its most-advanced capabilities to Japan and by maintaining a robust force structure, Mattis said.

Commitment to Realignment

“The United States also remains committed to mutually agreed-upon realignment plans. These include relocating Marines to Guam and reducing our footprint on Okinawa while maintaining the capabilities needed to keep Japan and the region secure,” he said.

Mattis and Inada also agreed their mutual efforts to build the Futenma replacement facility will continue, since “it is the only solution that will enable the United States to return the current Marine Corps air station on Futenma to Japan.”

Japan has made many noteworthy contributions to regional security and to the alliance, and the United States “deeply appreciates” them, he noted.

“But make no mistake: In my meeting with Japanese leaders, both of our nations recognize that we must not be found complacent in the face of the emerging challenges,” the secretary said.

“As our alliance grows,” Mattis said, “it will be important for both of our nations to continue investing in our defense personnel and capabilities. In this manner, we will ensure that we are true partners today and in the years to come.”

By Tilak Devasher*

There are several issues with the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) project. For one, transparency and accountability have been sacrificed because details of the projects have not been shared, there is no public bidding or even announcement. Clearly, the intention is that the major proportion of these loans will be channelled back to China to benefit only Chinese companies. Worse, since there is no transparency, issues such as cost efficiency, economic feasibility and viability, environmental concerns are likely to be ignored that could lead to serious economic and environmental issues later on. Recently, the federal minister for planning and development, Ahsan Iqbal, has laid to rest the debate about transparency by telling the Senate that the CPEC agreement is sensitive and cannot be disclosed.

As important as the provincial concerns are the issues of finances, especially because there is no clarity about them. So much so that even the governor of the State Bank of Pakistan, Ashraf Mahmood Wathra, the main financial regulator of the country, was constrained to say in an interview to Reuters that he did not know how much was going to be financed by debt and how much by equity. He openly called for the CPEC to be more transparent. The governor must be a worried man because the $46 billion CPEC is three times the reserves held by the State Bank and repayments would become a huge issue. Given Pakistan’s loan repayment situation the last thing it needs is further accumulation of unspecified debt. Even the World Bank, in its report titled Global Economic Prospects 2016, released in January 2016, has cautioned that ‘Sovereign guarantees associated with CPEC could pose substantial fiscal risks over the medium term.’ Former finance minister Hafiz Pasha has projected that loans contracted under CPEC will push the country’s total external debt to $90 billion from the current about $70 billion.

The main issue in the energy sector is not generation but productivity, distribution, line losses and poor governance. Further investment in generation will not solve the long-term issues plaguing the energy sector though they may give the impression of doing so in the immediate term. To operationalise the investment, Pakistan will have to make crucial reforms in the energy sector.

The emphasis in the energy sector is on thermal power projects based on both Thar coal and imported coal, and LNG. It is universally accepted that thermal power is far more expensive than hydropower. The emphasis, therefore, should have been on the latter. Considering that twenty textile mills have already closed down recently due to exchange appreciation, with 100 more believed to be vulnerable to power viability issues, will the industry survive a potential hike in power price? ‘No’, says All Pakistan Textile Manufacturers Association (APTMA) chairman S.M. Tanveer.

The economic corridor will be viable if it is used. The Lahore–Islamabad motorway is a case in point. Though it has been in existence for the last twenty years there is very little industrial development along its route and neither has there been any value addition to agriculture. If anything, it has only benefited the elite, enabling them to travel between Lahore and Islamabad quickly. Will the highways under CPEC meet the same fate?

For the Sharifs there is an urgency to complete the ‘early harvest’ projects before the next elections due in 2018. Not surprisingly, bulk of these projects are planned in Punjab and Sindh. Out of $28.6 billion early-harvest projects, Punjab has the lion’s share of $13 billion, Sindh $4.6 billion, KPK $1.8 billion, Islamabad $1.5 billion, and Balochistan $920 million. However, less than two years after the April 2015 launch of CPEC, several of these early harvest projects are facing delays or are in danger of being closed. These include the $1.8 billion, 870-MW Suki–Kinari hydroelectric power project; the $590 million, 330 MW coal-based power project in Punjab; a coal mining project in Thar; and four power plants listed to generate 4,620 MW of power; and also the $2.1 billion, 878-km-long Matiari–Lahore transmission line listed to supply 4,000 MW of electricity produced from coal in Sindh to cities in Punjab.

The delays and possible closure of the above projects indicate that not much thought and planning have gone into the projects. It is almost as if the federal and Punjab governments want to ram home the projects so that they can show some achievement before the next elections. In the process, there is a grave danger that the mistrust that the smaller provinces have with Punjab and their insecurities vis-à-vis the federation will get aggravated as a result of the CPEC. Unless the smaller provinces, especially Balochistan and KPK, are given a sense of ownership, the CPEC may actually damage Pakistan rather than be the game changer it is billed to be. An ominous warning has been sounded: ‘It would do us well to remember that investment in East Pakistan was also considered unsafe for security reasons. What are the planners of today driving the smaller provinces to?’

Thus, while CPEC could enormously benefit the Pak economy, expectations need to be tempered with realism, especially where financial issues are concerned. Anecdotal evidence suggests that at least some Pakistanis are beginning to realise this. For example, at a seminar held in December 2015, an adviser to the Balochistan government asked if Pakistanis will basically be fixing punctures on Chinese trucks. The reply reportedly given by the commander of Southern Command of the Pakistan Army was that Chinese companies ought to be asked to explain how Pakistan will benefit from the larger vision of the CPEC.

*Tilak Devasher was a former Special Secretary, Cabinet Secretariat, Government of India. Excerpted from his book Pakistan: Courting the abyss/Harper Collins India/Rs 599, 450 pp. Comments and suggestions on this article can be sent on: editor@spsindia.in

By Narayani Basu*

On January 8, 2017, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi embarked on what has become something of a foreign policy tradition for China — kicking off the New Year with a state visit to Africa. Since 1991, five Chinese foreign ministers have visited Africa on their first foreign trips each year.

Over a course of five days this year, Wang Yi visited five African countries — Madagascar, Zambia, Tanzania, the Republic of Congo and Nigeria. China and Africa share bilateral ties dating back to the 1950s, based on a story of mutual struggle for independence against imperialism. Since then, of course, the relationship has bloomed, with China evolving into one of the largest contributors to aid — both monetary and infrastructural — in sub-Saharan Africa. But while the statistics stack up in China’s favour (as of 2013, about 70 per cent of Chinese aid funding was geared towards infrastructure development), there have been some bumps along the way.

Between 2013 and 2014, both China and Africa experienced a fair amount of bilateral discomfort. China may have built stadiums, airports, hospitals, highways and dams across the continent, but these projects left many African countries saddled with debts, environmental conflicts and labour strikes. Indeed, in an opinion piece published in the Financial Times in 2013, the Governor of Nigeria’s Central Bank, Lamido Sanusi, alleged that Chinese investment in sub-Saharan Africa smacked of ‘colonialism’, in size and style. To top it all, Beijing was further accused of holding back a growing African economy by focusing on the pursuit of raw materials, rather than on the creation of local markets and jobs.

China, too, faced several disconcerting moments in its attempts to shore up influence in Africa. In 2014, South African President Jacob Zuma cautioned that Africa’s somewhat lopsided trade ties with China were turning out to be “unsuitable in the long term”. In Zambia, in 2015, the government had to take control of a Chinese copper mine after numerous complaints of labour abuse. That same year, Botswana’s President Ian Khama called for a reduction in new contracts to Chinese companies, citing poor construction and delays.

Small wonder, then, that Beijing has seen the need to severely reboot its foreign policy towards sub-Saharan Africa. During high-profile tours to the continent between 2014 and 2015, Chinese President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang laid the foundations for a more multilaterally focused agenda, assuring African leaders that, in addition to infrastructural aid, China’s policy in Africa would now encompass industrial cooperation, environmental protection, and the reduction of poverty — all areas which African leaders claimed had been hitherto neglected by Beijing.

The new policy was further fleshed out by Xi at the second summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), held in Johannesburg in December 2015, when he announced a $60 billion aid package covering industrialisation, agricultural modernisation, infrastructure, financial services, green development, trade and investment facilitation, poverty reduction and public welfare, public health, people-to-people exchanges, and peace and security.

On this current trip, then, Wang Yi will be looking to capitalise on the successes related to that summit, many of which were seen throughout 2016, including the opening of the Addis Ababa-Djibouti railway and progress on the Mombasa-Nairobi line, as well as the development of industrial parks and special economic zones.

In particular, China is pushing for African countries to board the One Belt, One Road (OBOR) bandwagon. The OBOR initiative was first proposed by China in 2013, with the aim of constructing a trade and infrastructure network, connecting Asia with Europe and Africa, in the footsteps of the ancient Silk Road trade routes. Formally, OBOR emphasises five areas of cooperation: 1) coordinating development policies; 2) forging networks of infrastructure and facilities; 3) strengthening investment and trade flows; 4) enhancing financial cooperation and 5) deepening social and cultural exchanges.

The choice of Africa harks back to China’s 14th century maritime fleets, which reached Africa’s eastern coasts, specifically modern-day Kenya. Indeed, while Kenya is the hub of the African OBOR, other projects will be specifically undertaken in Bizerte, Tunisia; Dakar, Senegal; Dar es Salaam, Tanzania; Djibouti, Djibouti; Libreville, Gabon; Maputo, Mozambique; and Tema, Ghana.

One example from this extensive network is the port of Bagamoyo, in Tanzania. Construction on the development of the port, financed by China and Oman, began in 2016. Once complete, the port is expected to become the biggest port in Africa, handling 20 times more cargo than the port at Dar es Salaam. With links to the central corridor railway and the TAZARA railway, as well as a parallel highway linking the port to the Uhuru-Zambia Highway, the plan is to construct Bagamoyo as a strategic pillar of the African OBOR and Maritime Silk Route, connecting the port with other East African countries, including Mozambique, Malawi, Zambia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, Kenya, South Sudan, Comoros, Madagascar, and Seychelles.

This is a welcome step in African eyes. The rationale here is as simple as it always was — a continent sorely lacking in aid and resource infrastructure will always appreciate the interests of a rising superpower, especially when those interests come with large sums of money, and very few strings attached. This, despite the fact that some of the world’s newest economic hotspots are located across sub-Saharan Africa, and that East African economies have stabilised due to their proximity to critical Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOCs) in the Indian Ocean.

For China, too, the participation of countries like Madagascar in the ambitious OBOR initiative will be vital. As Africa’s largest island, and a country which has had direct links with the ancient Maritime Silk Route, it is a natural extension of the 21st century Silk Road that China has in mind. Indeed, Malagasy President Hery Rajaonarimampianina is touting his country as the gateway through which the modern Silk Road can enter Africa. Tanzania, whose leader Wang met on January 9, has also stated its intentions towards becoming a bridgehead of the OBOR initiative’s access to Africa.

Wang’s visit to Africa ended on January 12, but the outcomes of the visit — even if they are, for the moment, renewed promises and accelerated infrastructure construction — are promising not just for the continued progress of the African OBOR, but also for the deepening of Sino-African ties.

China’s plan for strengthening OBOR in Africa comes not only in a post-Brexit world, but in the face of a new administration in the United States, led by Donald Trump, which has barely mentioned any foreign policy towards Africa. There is no doubt that a rich geopolitical opportunity is up for grabs, as far as both Beijing and sub-Saharan Africa are concerned.

*Narayani Basu is a freelance journalist with special interest in Chinese foreign policy, East Asian regional security and resource diplomacy in Africa and Antarctica. Comments and suggestions on this article can be sent to editor@spsindia.in

Japan has limited domestic energy resources that have met less than 10% of the country’s total primary energy use each year since 2012. Japan’s domestic energy resources met more than 20% of the country’s total primary energy use before the removal of nuclear power following the Fukushima plant accident.¹ Japan is the third largest oil consumer and net importer in the world behind the United States and China. Furthermore, Japan also ranks as the world’s largest importer of liquefied natural gas (LNG) and the third-largest importer of coal behind India and China.

Figure 1. Map of Japan. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook

The country’s lack of sufficient domestic hydrocarbon resources has led Japanese energy companies to actively participate in upstream oil and natural gas projects overs as by providing engineering, construction, financial, and project management services for energy projects around the world. Japan is one of the major exporters of energy-sector capital equipment and has a strong energy research and development (R&D) program supported by the government. This program pursues domestic energy efficiency measures to increase the country’s energy security and to reduce carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions.

In March 2011, a 9.0 magnitude earthquake struck off the coast of Sendai, Japan, triggering a tsunami and causing serious damage at the Fukushima-Daiichi nuclear reactors. The damage to Japan’s energy infrastructure resulted in an immediate shutdown of about 10 gigawatts (GW) of nuclear electric generating capacity. The plants that were not immediately damaged were gradually shut down as a result of scheduled maintenance and lack of government approvals to return to operation. For nearly two years between mid-2013 and mid-2015, Japan suspended nuclear power generation for the first time in more than 40 years. Starting at the end of 2015, electric utilities received the necessary approvals to recommission a few reactors. Public opposition to nuclear power post-Fukushima and delays in the approval process create uncertainty as to the timing and degree to which Japan can revive its nuclear sector and the role nuclear power generation will play in the long-term future of the country.²

Nuclear power generation in Japan represented about 27% of the power generation prior to the 2011 earthquake, and it was one of the country’s least expensive sources of electric power. Japan replaced the significant loss of nuclear power with generation from imported natural gas, low-sulfur crude oil, fuel oil, and coal. This substitution of more expensive fossil fuels led to higher electricity prices for consumers, higher government debt, and revenue losses for electric utilities.

Japan imports virtually all its fossil fuels. Japan spent an additional annual average of approximately $30 billion for fossil fuel imports in the three years following the Fukushima accident. The yen’s depreciation against the U.S. dollar and soaring natural gas and oil import costs resulting from a greater reliance on fossil fuels and sustained high international oil prices through the first half of 2014 continued to deepen Japan’s trade deficit. The trade balance reversed from a 30-year trade surplus, which was $65 billion in 2010, to a deficit that reached a record $116 billion (12.8 trillion yen) in 2014. The low oil and natural gas price environment since late 2014 has helped to ease the trade deficit to $22 billion (2.8 trillion yen) in 2015 and has provided some financial relief for Japanese utilities.³

Japan’s current government intends to resume using nuclear energy as a baseload power source with necessary safety measures. The government believes the use of nuclear energy is necessary to reduce current energy supply strains and high energy prices faced by Japan’s industries and end users. The government’s new energy policy, issued in April 2014, emphasizes energy security, economic efficiency, emissions reduction, and safe use of nuclear power. Key goals and plans to balance the country’s fuel portfolio include strengthening the share of renewable and alternative energy sources, diversifying from oil to reduce dependence in the transportation sector, and developing advanced and efficient generation technologies for fossil fuel use.⁴ These efforts occur in the context of the government’s goal to reverse more than two decades of economic stagnation in Japan and its goal to provide economic revitalization through public infrastructure spending, monetary easing, labor market reform, and business investment.

Total primary energy consumption

Petroleum and other liquids

Japan was the fourth-largest petroleum consumer and third-largest net petroleum importer in the world in 2016. The country relies almost solely on imports to meet its oil consumption needs because Japan’s oil resources are limited.

Sector organization

Domestic exploration and supply

Overseas exploration and production

The Japanese government’s energy strategy encourages Japanese companies to increase energy exploration and development projects around the world to secure a stable supply of oil and natural gas.

Oil imports

Japan, the third-largest global net oil importer, is highly dependent on the Middle East for most of its supply. The country is seeking to diversify its supply sources in Russia, Southeast Asia, and West Africa.

Refining

Natural gas

Japan relies on LNG imports for nearly all of its natural gas supply and ranks as the world’s largest LNG importer.

Sector organization

Exploration and production

Consumption

Liquefied natural gas imports

Japan accounted for about 32% of global LNG purchases in 2016 and reached record-high imports in 2014 as the Fukushima disaster spurred greater demand for LNG in the power sector. More than a third of the country’s LNG imports are from Southeast Asia, but Japan has a diverse portfolio of supply sources.

Overseas exploration and production

Electricity

Japan was the world’s third-largest producer of nuclear power, after the United States and France, prior to the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant accident in March 2011. After the Fukushima disaster, the composition of fuel used for power generation shifted heavily to fossil fuels, particularly LNG, which became the primary substitute for nuclear power.

Sector organization

Electricity price reform

Electricity generation

All of Japan’s nuclear power generation capacity was removed from service between September 2013 and August 2015 as a result of new, stringent safety inspections and several levels of regulatory approval required to restart facilities. Oil and natural gas replaced all of the lost nuclear generation immediately after the Fukushima incident, and coal generation began to supplant oil-fired power after 2013. As nuclear capacity gradually resumes operation following government approval of facilities, Japan anticipates reducing the current share of fossil fuel generation.

Fossil fuels Fossil fuels accounted for an estimated 764 TWh of Japan’s net electricity generation in 2015, representing about 82% of the total generation, up from 62% in 2010. The share of fossil fuel-powered generation rose substantially for the first time in several decades in the wake of the Fukushima disaster when electric utilities turned to hydrocarbons as substitutes for the lost nuclear power generation.

According to Japan Electric Power Information Center, there are currently more than 60 major thermal power plants owned by the top 10 electric utilities and J-Power. Several combined-cycle LNG-fired or coal-fired plants are under construction or are in the planning stages.⁴⁸ The country’s aging oil-fired power plants are used primarily to meet peak demand. Some facilities have dual-fuel (coal/oil or natural gas/oil) capabilities to provide more flexibility in fuel sources that have been useful during the loss of nuclear generation capacity.

Coal, typically used as a baseload source for power generation, remains an important fuel source for generating electricity in Japan. Domestic coal production dwindled to virtually nothing by 2002, and Japan began importing all of its coal, primarily from Australia. Coal imports grew to 210 million short tons of coal in 2015 from 193 million short tons in 2011, after more coal-fired generation capacity came online.⁴⁹ Japan, which was the world’s top coal importer for decades, dropped to the third-largest importer in 2015, just below China and India because of the rapid coal consumption growth in these countries.⁵⁰

Some coal-fired power plants located near the earthquake epicenter off the coast of Fukushima experienced significant damage following the 2011 earthquake. As a result, coal use declined slightly in 2011 when the country relied heavily on natural gas and oil for power generation to replace lost nuclear capacity. Once new coal-fired capacity was commissioned in 2013 and international coal prices plummeted, electric utilities increased coal purchases for power generation. Coal’s share in the power sector was an estimated 23% before Fukushima and rose to 31% by 2015. The government plans for coal to account for 26% of the market share by 2030, maintaining the fuel’s importance as a baseload for power generation.⁵¹

Japan has the highest efficiency rate of coal-fired technology in the world. The country is installing new, clean coal plant technologies, such as ultra-supercritical units or integrated gasification combined-cycle technology, to meet environmental targets and to replace some of the decades-old coal power plants. Although no significant coal-fired capacity is expected to come online before 2020, Japanese companies plan to develop about 45 additional coal power plants, adding more than 20 GW of capacity in the next decade. Coal is expected to displace some of the expensive oil-fired power generation. The pace of development depends on how many nuclear units can return to service and whether the government will grant environmental approvals to each coal-fired power plant in light of Japan’s commitment to reduce its greenhouse gas emission levels by 2030.⁵²

Natural gas has increased its role in the power sector, particularly after nuclear power was removed from service starting in 2011. Natural gas, which accounted for 30% of Japan’s electricity generation in 2010, increased its share to 42% in 2015.⁵³ Post-Fukushima, natural gas has been the first choice of nuclear fuel substitution for utilities because of the cleaner-burning nature of natural gas compared to other fossil fuels. Japan is replacing many of its older, less efficient natural gas-fired power plants with more efficient combined-cycle units. Currently, there are three natural gas-fired power plants with a combined 4.8 GW of capacity under construction and scheduled to come online by 2020.⁵⁴ The expected return to operation of some nuclear reactors in 2016 and beyond and the growing role of renewable energy in the country’s energy portfolio are likely to depress LNG imports and natural gas use in the power sector. By 2030, LNG is expected to provide 27% of the country’s power generation.

Before the 2011 earthquake, Japanese utilities began removing oil-fired generation capacity because of the higher operational costs, aging units, and environmental downsides. Some utilities brought back mothballed oil generation facilities to compensate for lost nuclear power. Total oil demand for power, primarily from residual fuel oil and direct crude oil burn, climbed sharply from an estimated 175,000 b/d in 2010 to 590,000 b/d in 2012 when oil produced 18% of power generation. Overall power consumption declined, and the other less-expensive fuels began to fill the gap. Oil use in the power sector retreated to 270,000 b/d and a 9% share of electricity production by 2015.⁵⁵ Any nuclear power generation that returns to service will continue to replace oil supply for electricity in Japan, and some oil-fired facilities are once again being mothballed.

Nuclear

Before the Fukushima accident, Japan was the third-largest nuclear power generator in the world behind the United States and France. However, the country lost all of its operating nuclear generation capacity by 2013 as its facilities were removed from service because of earthquake damage or for regular maintenance.

By the end of 2017, Japan will have 42 operable nuclear reactors with a total installed net generating capacity of about 40 GW, down from 54 reactors with 47 GW of capacity in 2010.⁵⁶ More than 10 GW of nuclear capacity at the Fukushima, Onagawa, and Tokai facilities ceased operations immediately following the earthquake and tsunami. Other reactors were permanently damaged from emergency seawater-pumping efforts and are not scheduled to return to service. The government officially decommissioned all six reactors at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant, which had a combined capacity of 4.6 GW. By 2017, another 2.6 GW of capacity is slated for decommissioning from small reactors that are at least 40 years old. The cost to upgrade these facilities to comply with the new regulations and extend their lifespan outweigh the cost of closing them.⁵⁷

General maintenance standards in Japan require nuclear facilities to come offline every 13 months for inspections. Following the Fukushima disaster, the Japanese government required facilities to pass stress tests and receive local government approval. As reactors were removed from operation, they remained offline. By May 2012, Japan did not have any nuclear generation for the first time in more than four decades. The government returned two reactors, Kansai Electric’s Ohi Units 3 and 4, to service in July 2012, leaving Japan with only 2.4 GW of capacity for about a year. These two reactors were again removed from service in September 2013 for scheduled maintenance, leaving Japan without operational nuclear capacity for another two years.

Japan’s current government under Prime Minister Abe and industrial interests in Japan favor re-commissioning nuclear power plants to lower energy costs. However, interested parties are considering safety concerns and resistance from anti-nuclear government factions and the public. Japan’s most recent 2014 Strategic Energy Plan stated that nuclear power is an important source of baseload power, but that dependence on nuclear generation will be offset as much as possible by improved efficiency and by the acceleration of renewable energy supplies.⁵⁸

As of December 2016, restart applications for 25 reactors and an application for the new Ohma plant, representing more than half of Japan’s remaining operable capacity, had been filed with the NRA.⁵⁹ Seven of the facilities, with a combined capacity of 5.8 GW, have received approvals from the NRA, and three are currently operating. Kyushu Electric’s Sendai 1 and 2 units in southwestern Japan restarted service in late 2015,⁶⁰ and Shikoku Electric’s Ikata 3 reactor began operating in August 2016.⁶¹ Kansai Electric’s Takahama Units 3 and 4 started operations in early 2016, although local public opposition resulted in a district court immediately issuing an injunction to stop the operations at both facilities. Kansai Electric has filed an objection, and the restart of these reactors is delayed until there is legal resolution. The NRA extended the life of the much older Takahama Units 1 and 2 reactors, pending necessary upgrades, and these facilities are expected to return to service in 2019.

Two nuclear reactors (Ohma Unit 1 and Shimane Unit 3), with a combined capacity of 2.7 GW, are under construction and nearly complete, but work was suspended on these plants following Fukushima. Both units must be approved under the new standards before they can begin operations. The reactors that were in the planning phase before Fukushima are currently cancelled or delayed indefinitely as the country focused on bringing back some of the operational reactors. The timeline for restarting many of these reactors is uncertain because of the more stringent regulations and the need to overcome political opposition and restore public confidence in several provinces.

Japan has a full nuclear fuel cycle, including enrichment and reprocessing of used plutonium and uranium fuel. This process provides Japan with greater energy security and resource conservation, and it reduces Japan’s reliance on imported fuels. Historically, Japan has promoted nuclear electricity as a means of diversifying its energy sources and reducing carbon emissions, emphasizing safety and reliability. According to the FEPC, nuclear power has made a great contribution to Japan’s energy security by reducing its energy imports by reducing its carbon dioxide emissions. Overall, carbon emissions have risen substantially since Japan’s operating nuclear capacity was reduced. Japan’s commitment to lower greenhouse gas emissions by 2030 is also driving the country to optimize its fuel slate and to promote nuclear use for power generation.⁶²

Hydroelectricity and other renewables

Japan’s installed hydroelectric generating capacity was 50 GW in 2014, accounting for about 16% of total electricity capacity.⁶³ About half of the installed capacity consists of large power plants. Like nuclear power, hydropower is a source for baseload generation in Japan because of the low generation costs and a relatively stable supply. Net hydroelectric generation was 84 TWh in 2015, making up about 8% of Japan’s total net generation mix. The Japanese government has invested in small hydropower projects to serve local communities, and the capacity of pumped storage facilities is growing. However, the potential for hydroelectricity growth in Japan is limited.⁶⁴

As part of the revised energy policy plan, Japan is trying to encourage increased use of renewable energy for power generation from sources such as solar, wind, geothermal, and biomass. Renewable energy, apart from hydroelectricity, made up slightly more than 3% of Japan’s total energy consumption and about 8%, or 79 TWh, of the country’s total electricity generation in 2015.⁶⁵ Japan wants to boost generation from both hydroelectricity and other renewables to 22—24% by 2030. The Japanese legislature approved generous feed-in tariffs (FIT) for renewable sources in July 2012, obligating electric utilities to purchase electricity generated by renewable fuel sources, including small hydroelectricity projects, at fixed prices for up to 20 years. The costs are shared by government subsidies and by end users.

Most renewable capacity growth since 2012 has occurred in solar energy as a result of heavy investment in large-scale PV units. Japan’s solar generation capacity reached 34 GW at the end of 2015, which is more than five times higher than capacity in 2012.⁶⁶ Although solar capacity climbed sharply in the past two years, many projects have encountered problems connecting to the grid and challenges selling the electricity to the regional utility firms, slowing the process for actual generation increases.⁶⁷ Japan’s government revised the FIT subsidy levels down and modified the FIT policy for project tendering in 2016 to reduce the backlog of large-scale solar projects. Japan has one of the largest biomass markets for power generation in the world, and the government is providing financial incentives to promote more biomass projects.⁶⁸ The potential for geothermal power in Japan is significant, but strict regulations have kept geothermal power from growing in the country. After Fukushima, Japan lifted restrictions on geothermal development in national parks.⁶⁹

Figure 8. Japan’s key nuclear power plants in relation to the Fukushima earthquake
Source: Financial Times via Petroleum Economist.

Notes:

• Data presented in the text are the most recent available as of February 2, 2017.
• Data are EIA estimates unless otherwise noted.

Endnotes:

¹EIA International Energy Statistics and BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 2016 for 2015 data.
²International Energy Agency, Medium-Term Gas Market Report 2014, Box 1: “Three years after the Fukushima accident, how is Japan coping in the absence of nuclear”, page 23; World Nuclear News, “Japan’s post-Fukushima nuclear shutdown ends,” August 11, 2015.
³Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry, Energy Situation in Japan, October 2015, page 2 (used average annual exchange rate based on U.S. Internal Revenue Service); Japan’s Ministry of Finance, Trade Statistics of Japan, Value of Exports and Imports, Calendar Year 2015 (accessed January 2017); Newsbase AsianOil: “In the Shadow of Fukushima”, July 30, 2014 and “LNG Imports Push Japan’s Trade Deficit to Record High”, July 30, 2014.
⁴Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry: FY2013 Annual Report on Energy (Energy White Paper 2014) Outline, June 2014 and Fourth Strategic Energy Plan, April 2014.
⁵BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2016.
⁶Oil & Gas Journal, Worldwide Look at Reserves and Production, December 7, 2015.
⁷Reuters, “Exclusive: China in $5 billion drive to develop disputed East China Sea gas“, July 17, 2013; Rigzone, “Roller Coaster Year in Territorial Disputes in East, South China Seas“, December 26, 2014; Bloomberg, “China-Japan Tensions Rise Around Disputed East China Sea Isles,” August 8, 2016.
⁸International Energy Agency, Monthly Oil Database (accessed January 2017).
⁹International Energy Agency, Oil Market Report, April 11, 2014 “OECD Asian Economies Building Storage to Take Advantage of Globalized Trade”, page 33 and Bloomberg, “Japan Expands, Extends Oil Storage Lease Contract With Abu Dhabi”, November 9, 2014.
¹⁰Petroleum Association of Japan, Petroleum Industry in Japan 2015, page 9; FGE, Asia-Pacific Databook 1, Spring 2016, page 57.
¹¹FGE, Asia-Pacific Databook 1, Spring 2016, page 54-57, S&P Global Platts, “Interview: Japan’s Gyxis to triple overseas LPG trade, double VLGC fleet in 3 years,” May 15, 2015.
¹²Reuters, “Japan’s JOGMEC says could accelerate investment in oil, gas”, June 19, 2014; Petroleum Association of Japan, Petroleum Industry in Japan 2015, page 25.
¹³EIA, data based on Short-term Energy Outlook, January 2017.
¹⁴Petroleum Institute of Japan, Oil Statistics, Crude Oil Import by Countries and by Source (accessed January 2017) (via Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry data).
¹⁵Nikkei Asian Review, “Japan oil companies not thirsty for Iran crude,” July 8, 2016; S&P Global Platts, “Japan’s Iran oil imports seen rising in 2016 with record shipping insurance,” March 30, 2016.
¹⁶Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Exchange of Diplomatic Notes for the Entry into Force of the Japan-United Arab Emirates (UAE) Nuclear Cooperation Agreement“, June 11, 2014.
¹⁷Reuters, “Japan to import U.S. crude in May, second cargo since export ban lifted: sources,” March 16, 2016.
¹⁸Petroleum Association of Japan, Oil Statistics, Location of Crude Distillation Capacity in Japan (as of October 2016) and FGE, Energy Insights, Issue #237, “What’s Next for Japan’s Oil Refining Industry?,” April 26, 2016; BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2016.
¹⁹BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2016.
²⁰International Energy Agency: Oil Market Report, July 11, 2014. “METI Outlines New Plans for Japanese Refinery Industry Rationalisation”, page 55; S&P Platts, “Japan refiners urged to promptly cut nameplate capacity in line with regulation,” November 5, 2014; FACTS Asia Pacific Databook 2, Fall 2016, pages 40-44.
²¹Reuters: “Japan refiners headed towards consolidation after 2017 – analysts”, November 20, 2014.
²²Newsbase AsianOil. “Japanese Refining Sector Faces Further Consolidation”, November 26, 2014; FACTS Global Energy, Energy Insights, Issue #233, “JX/TonenGeneral Merger: The Final Step Towards Japan’s Refining Industry Consolidation” January 14, 2016.
²³Reuters, “Japan’s Idemitsu family issues fresh call for management to end Showa Shell merger,” August 9, 2016; Reuters, “Idemitsu family, in fight with management, buys Showa Shell shares to block acquisition,”August 3, 2016; FGE, Energy Insights, Issue #237, “What’s Next for Japan’s Oil Refining Industry?,” April 26, 2016; FGE, “Idemitsu-Showa Shell Stalemate to Delay Japan’s Refining Industry Consolidation,” July 12, 2016.
²⁴International Energy Agency, Medium-Term Gas Market Report 2016, page 24. FACTS Global Energy, Energy Insights, Issue #234, “Japan’s Power/Gas Sector Deregulations: Part 1- Overview,” page 3.
²⁵International Energy Agency, Medium-Term Gas Market Report 2016, pages 24-25.
²⁶International Energy Agency, Natural Gas Information 2016.
²⁷INPEX Corporation, Our Business webpage (accessed January 2017).
²⁸JAPEX Annual Report 2015, page 15.
²⁹Japan Oil, Gas, and Metals National Corporation, “Gas Production from Methane Hydrate Layers Confirmed“, March 12, 2013; Financial Times, “Methane Hydrates Could be Energy of the Future“, January 17, 2014; Rigzone, “Japan Progresses Methane Hydrate Project, Ignores Industry Downturn,” July 11, 2016.
³⁰IHS Energy, Japan LNG Market Profile, November 1, 2016, page 17.
³¹IHS Energy, Japan LNG Market Profile, November 1, 2016, page 16 and IHS Energy, Japan LNG Data Sheet, January 4, 2017.
³²Reuters, “Japan’s Tepco, Chubu Electric name fuel venture Jera“, April 15, 2015; FACTS Global Energy, Energy Insights, Issue #238, “Japan’s Power/Gas Sector Deregulation: Part 3-Alliances”, April 28, 2016; Nikkei Asian Review, “Kansai Electric, Tokyo Gas form united front to tackle market deregulation“, April 12, 2016.
³³IHS Energy, Historical LNG Trade Data, December 5, 2016 and IHS Energy Market Trade Data Sheet: Japan, January 4, 2017.
³⁴The Federation of Electric Power Companies of Japan, Electricity Review Japan 2016, page 10.
³⁵IHS Energy, Historical LNG Trade Data, December 5, 2016 and IHS Energy Market Trade Data Sheet: Japan, January 4, 2017.
³⁶IHS Energy, Japan LNG Market Profile, November 1, 2016, pages 10-13; IHS Energy Market Trade Data Sheet: Japan, January 4, 2017; International Gas Union, IGU World LNG Report – 2016 edition, page 47.
³⁷IHS Energy, LNG Market Data Sheet: Japan, January 4, 2017; Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry, Statistics: Spot LNG Prices webpage (accessed January 2017) and Newsbase NRG, “Japan India Will See Lower LNG Prices, Just Not Through Consortium”, September 2014.
³⁸FACTS Global Energy, Gas/LNG Flash Alert, “An Overcommitted Osaka Gas and its Plans to Resell LNG”, September 23, 2016.
³⁹IHS Energy Market Trade Data Sheet: Japan, July 5, 2016.
⁴⁰S&P Global Platts, “Jogmec to guarantee 75% of loans to LNG projects that lower Japan’s import costs“, June 21, 2013.
⁴¹The Federation of Electric Power Companies of Japan Electricity Review Japan 2014, page 20.
⁴²Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry, FY2013 Annual Report on Energy (Energy White Paper 2014) Outline, June 2014.
⁴³FACTS Global Energy, Energy Insights, Issue #219, Japan’s Official Power Generation Mix Target for 2030″, May 21, 2015.
⁴⁴U.S. Energy Information Administration; World Nuclear Association, Nuclear Power in Japan (updated December 28, 2016); International Atomic Energy Agency, Power Reactor Information System Country Statistics for Japan (accessed January 2017).
⁴⁵Japan Electric Power Information Center, Inc. Operating and Financial Data (accessed January 2017).
⁴⁶FACTs Global Energy, Energy Insights, Issue #234 and #236, “Japan’s Power/Gas Sector Deregulation: Part 1-Overview,” January 15, 2016 and “Japan’s Power/Gas Sector Deregulation: Part 2- Nationalization of the Nuclear Sector is Under Consideration,” April 18, 2016; METI, “Electricity Market Reform in Japan,” October 2014; METI, “Japan’s Electricity Market Deregulation,” June 2015.
⁴⁷World Nuclear News, “Japan Continues to Count Cost of Idled Reactors“, June 17, 2014; The Federation of Electric Power Companies of Japan, Electricity Review Japan 2016, page 3; Forbes, “Five Years After Fukushima, Japan Launches Massive Electric Sector Deregulation,” April 4, 2016.
⁴⁸Japan Electric Power Information Center, Inc. Operating and Financial Data (accessed January 2017).
⁴⁹United Nations Comtrade Database, International Trade Centre (accessed January 2017).
⁵⁰U.S. Energy Information Administration; United Nations Comtrade Database, International Trade Centre (accessed January 2017); World Coal Association, Coal Statistics webpage (accessed January 2017).
⁵¹FACTS Global Energy, Energy Insights, Issue #219, Japan’s Official Power Generation Mix Target for 2030″, May 21, 2015.
⁵²FACTS Global Energy, Energy Insights, Issue #219, Japan’s Official Power Generation Mix Target for 2030″, May 21, 2015; Reuters, “FACTBOX-Japan’s construction plans for new coal-fired power stations,” April 22, 2016; Reuters, “Japan doubles down on coal power as trading houses curb investment“, June 16, 2016.
⁵³EIA estimates derived from International Energy Agency electricity data (2016).
⁵⁴Japan Electric Power Information Center, Inc. Operating and Financial Data (accessed January 2017).
⁵⁵International Energy Agency, Statistics: Japan, Oil for 2010; International Energy Agency, Oil Market Report, August, 11, 2016, page 9; Federation of Electric Power Companies of Japan, Electricity Generated and Purchased (Bulletin), FY 2010.
⁵⁶U.S. Energy Information Administration; International Atomic Energy Agency, Power Reactor Information System, Country Statistics, Japan (accessed January 2017); World Nuclear Association, Nuclear Power in Japan (updated December 28, 2016); FACTS Global Energy, East of Suez Gas Service, LNG Market Report, Issue #80, May 25, 2016, pages 1-4; Federation of Electric Power Companies of Japan, Electricity Review Japan 2016, page 17.
⁵⁷World Nuclear Association, Country Profiles, Nuclear Power in Japan (updated December 28, 2016).
⁵⁸Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry, Fourth Strategic Energy Plan, April 2014.
⁵⁹World Nuclear Association, Country Profiles, Nuclear Power in Japan (updated December 28, 2016).
⁶⁰Reuters, “Japan restarts second reactor at Sendai nuclear plant,” October 14, 2015.
⁶¹World Nuclear News, “Fifth Japanese power reactor restarted,” August 12, 2016; Nuclear Energy Institute, Japan Nuclear Update (accessed January 2017).
⁶²The Federation of Electric Power Companies of Japan, Electricity Review Japan 2016, pages 8 and 10; World Nuclear Association, “Climate Targets Blown in Japan“, August 1, 2013.
⁶³U.S. Energy Information Administration.
⁶⁴The Federation of Electric Power Companies of Japan, Electricity Review Japan 2016, page 6.
⁶⁵BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 2016; EIA estimates derived from International Energy Agency electricity data (2016).
⁶⁶Bloomberg, “Japan’s Solar Boom Showing Signs of Deflating as Subsidies Wane“, July 5, 2016; PV Magazine, “Japan clears up uncertainty over its renewable energy FIT“, May 31, 2016; Japan Renewable Energy Foundation: A Statement of the Basic Energy Plan of Japan, April 21, 2014.
⁶⁷Bloomberg, “Solar’s $30 Billion Splurge Proves Too Much for Japan“, October 9, 2014, and The Economist, “Solar Shambles: Japan has failed to learn from Germany’s renewable energy mess“, November 29, 2014.
⁶⁸Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO), “Japan’s Biomass Market Overview“, November 2015.
⁶⁹JOGMEC, “Current Situation of Geothermal Power Generation in Japan“; Geothermal Energy Association, 2013 Geothermal Power: International Market Overview, November 2013. Geothermal Potential and Resource Assessments in Japan, IGA Workshop in Essen, November 14, 2013, National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology, Japan.

By Dr. Sudhanshu Tripathi*

As West Asia is an extended part of Greater Asia and the UAE is an important core member of this region just as India is in East Asia, both countries need to explore and consolidate the roots of their social and cultural ties coming down today since ages. Indeed, both India and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) enjoy strong bonds of close friendship having legacy of age-old cultural, religious and economic relations which certainly require a new thrust in the present era of eastward shifting global geo-politics.

In fact, several new developments have compelled the UAE and other West Asian nations to follow the “Look East” policy where India continues to be a traditionally favoured destination for them due to its proclaimed commitment towards eternal values like world peace, solidarity, non-violence, non-alignment and also being a prominent founder member of the Non-Aligned Movement.

Among these developments are the mounting Islamic State terror in the region and in the world, crumbling regional security architecture supported by the US, declining oil revenues of oil producing countries in the region and rising Chinese presence in the region based upon its brute military force etc., as worth mentioning. In fact, the rising Chinese imperialist-militarist assertions and aggressions not only in the Asia-Pacific over South China Sea but in the entire Indo-Pacific along with its revival of Grand Silk Road Strategy have aroused suspicions about its “Middle Kingdom” complex and that, perhaps, pushes forward the Gulf monarchies like Saudi Arabia, Oman etc. to seek friendly relations with India.

On its part, India too is pursuing it “Look West” policy towards the Gulf for its energy security and other geo-strategic goals, besides maintaining close cordial relations with Iran.

Although the relations between India and the UAE flourished after coming into power of Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan as the Ruler of Abu Dhabi in 1966 and subsequently with the creation of the UAE Federation in 1971, no Indian prime minister could visit the country during the following three decades — the last one only in 1981 when the then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi visited the UAE.

The bilateral relations received a fresh impetus particularly after Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to the UAE in August 2015 followed by the visit by Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan — the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi and Deputy Supreme Commander of the UAE Armed Forces — in February 2016.

Thus “Indo-UAE relations have become much closer and stronger, and this can only become better in coming years”, said Yousuf Ali, Chairman of Lulu Group and Board member of Abu Dhabi Chamber of Commerce & Industry. Similarly Indian Charge d’ Affaires at the Indian Embassy in Abu Dhabi, Neeta Bhushan, also holds that Indo-UAE relations have become much closer and stronger with these reciprocal visits.

During this visit of the Indian Prime Minister, both sides agreed to upgrade their bilateral relations to a new comprehensive strategic partnership. Since then, both sides are pursuing sincerely to improve their mutual relations in all areas of human endeavour.
It is in this context that the visit of Sheikh Mohammed Bin Zayed Al Nahyan to India to grace the country’s 68th Republic Day as chief guest (January 24-26, 2017) has aroused a remarkable euphoria and celebrations in New Delhi which are being visualised as another sign of the consolidating bi-lateral relations between the two nations.

Obviously, the Modi government is keen on pushing forward the strategic nature of bilateral relations between these two traditional friends, particularly in the context of ongoing turmoil and insecurity caused by ISIS and also because the new American President Donald Trump is at loggerheads with China over South China Sea and Taiwan, as they make sincere efforts to forge an overarching and deepening engagement which is being described as a strategic government-to-government partnership reaching out to people at large. But the continuing tensions between China and the US as well as Beijing’s close links with Iran may trouble the Gulf countries. Also the uncertainty over policies that President Trump may pursue to deliver on his campaign promise to tackle China may weigh on the Gulf monarchies’ interactions with China.

Ever since the creation of the UAE Federation in 1971, trade relations between these two friends have played a major role in giving momentum to their close ties. At the heart of its foreign policy, the UAE is very much interested in extending bridges of cooperation and friendship with India. In fact, the UAE’s foreign policy, since being laid by the late founding father, Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan, has been attaching paramount importance to these ties, which rose to a new height when Sheikh Zayed paid a historic visit to India in 1975 and had talks with then Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, the Indian President and senior statesmen.

Today, President Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan is not only pursuing the same path as Sheikh Zayed, but has also added further vibrancy, momentum and strength to these relations. In the overall realignment of the country’s foreign policy goals, India attaches considerable importance to relations with UAE with respect to its coordinated strategy in international relations spreading over economic, political, security and strategic interests.

Sheikh Mohammed’s visit comes at a time when the Indian economy is opening up more sectors to foreign investments. The Indian economy is recovering strongly as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) said in its annual projection of the “World Economic Outlook (WEO)”, forecasting its growth for the current and next fiscal at 7.6 per cent — up from 7.4 per cent estimated in July for both the years. Last year the World Bank said India’s GDP could grow 7.6 per cent in 2016-17 and 7.7 per cent in 2017.

According to January 2015 figures, the total foreign direct investment (FDI) from the UAE to India was estimated to be $3.01 billion. During Modi’s visit, the two sides had agreed to establish a UAE-India Infrastructure Investment Fund, setting an ambitious target of $75 billion to support investment in India’s infrastructure. Both sides have set up a task force to nudge investments under this fund. The growing warmth in their mutual relations has set expectations rising among the business community.

The UAE and India are making tremendous efforts to push their economic investment and trade cooperation to new heights. As per forecasts, India is expected to rise as the world’s third largest economy by 2030 after the United States and China. “The UAE was the third key trade partner to India after China and the US in 2013 and 2014.The two-way trade has seen meteoric growth over the years, rising from $43.5 billion in 2009 to nearly $60 billion in 2014 from just $180 million in 1971. The UAE-India bilateral trade continued to grow in strength with Indian exports of goods and commodities expected to surge to $100 billion and two-way trade exchange to $160 billion by 2030”, making the UAE the largest trade partner to India in the world.

According to a study by the UAE Ministry of Economy, “India is the number one trade partner of the UAE with a relative share of 9.8 per cent of the total UAE non-oil trade. It also ranked first in the UAE’s overall exports with a relative share of 14.9 per cent and ranked second in the UAE’s re-exports to the world accounting for 8.7 per cent of the UAE’s total re-exports. India also ranked third in the UAE’s total imports with a relative share of 9.2 per cent.”

The UAE is the largest Arab investor in India, accounting for 81.2 per cent of total Arab investments in India, and is ranked 11th in the world in terms of foreign direct investments in India. The total UAE investments in India amounted to $8 billion, including $2.89 billion in the form of direct foreign investments. “The value of investments by Indian companies in the UAE is estimated at more than $55bn, according to statistics by the Indian Business and Professional Council.” The UAE also hosts the largest Indian community overseas, with more than 2.6 million Indians living and working in the UAE.

As regards peace and security of the region, the UAE pays due attention to regional security in Asia and puts India at the forefront of its international partnerships besides broadening a comprehensive dialogue with a view to deepening and diversifying their mutual engagement. There are particularly strong opportunities for UAE-India security cooperation in combating terrorism against the backdrop of mounting ISIS terror in Syria and Iraq and various other global terror outfits like Taliban in Afghanistan and Jaish-e-Mohammed and Haqqani networks in Pakistan.

In recent years, UAE, like Saudi Arabia, has embarked on a closer relationship with India on security and counter-terrorism because the Islamic State (Daesh) is openly calling for total destruction of established monarchies in the region. In any eventuality then, India is at closest proximity to step into any vacuum that arises if the US pulls out of the region to focus on China under its “Rebalance to Asia” policy.

Thus, at a time when the UAE desires a trusted strategic partner cum net security provider and also a reliable customer and India needs the uninterrupted supply of reasonably priced crude oil and investments into its territory for economic reasons, which are declining and moving towards the US and Europe, the visit of the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi is a welcome change for ensuring growth and welfare of the peoples of both the countries as they lie at the heart of India-UAE relations.

Indeed both governments wish to sincerely nurture these relations not only for ensuring their own mutual progress, prosperity, security and stability but also that for the entire extended Asian region and even beyond.

*Dr. Sudhanshu Tripathi is Associate Professor of Political Science at M.D.P.G. College, Pratapgarh, Uttar Pradesh. Comments and suggestions on this article can be sent on: editor@spsindia.in

With Francois Fillon’s presidential campaign roiled by scandal less than three months before voting starts, France’s major companies are increasingly looking toward Emmanuel Macron, a business-friendly political novice who’s only just begun sketching details of how he would govern, Bloomberg reports .

Most corporate leaders had quietly placed their bets on Fillon, a center-right stalwart who was prime minister from 2007 to 2012. Fillon’s pledges to slash government spending, reform labor laws and ease regulations on business were one attraction. But he also looked to be a firewall against the far-right National Front’s Marine Le Pen, whose proposals to exit the euro and erect trade barriers are anathema to French multinationals.

Le Pen is likely to take first place in the initial round of voting on April 23, according to public-opinion polls, though no survey has shown her winning in the second round.

Until recently, Fillon was favorite to beat her in the runoff. But his support has been eroded by reports his wife and two of his children earned more than 900,000 euros ($969,000) in public funds as parliamentary aides without actually doing a commensurate amount of work. The turmoil in Fillon’s camp is prompting companies and trade groups to take a closer look at other candidates — especially Macron, a 39-year-old former economy minister under Socialist President Francois Hollande who’s running as an independent.

The latest poll, released Saturday, February 4 by BVA, shows Le Pen winning 25 percent in the first round, and qualifying for the run-off with Macron, who’d get 21-22 percent. Fillon would receive 18-20 percent and be eliminated. In a hypothetical second round, Macron would crush Le Pen 66-34 percent while Fillon would beat her 60-40 percent.

“Macron has found himself in pole position, almost by default,” says Paul Boury, a Paris lobbyist who represents several major corporations and trade associations.

While French business leaders are famously discreet about politics, they reach out informally to candidates, often quizzing them over private lunches and dinners. Fillon’s backers include Henri de Castries, former chairman of insurance giant AXA, and Pierre Danon, former head of cable TV company Numericable. But the courtship ritual has been upended, as some now view Fillon’s damaged candidacy as beyond repair.

A telecommunications industry leader, speaking on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the matter, says corporate leaders should now focus on Macron instead and make contact with Socialist nominee Benoit Hamon, while waiting to see whether Fillon’s Republican party replaces him.

The leader of a major trade association who asked not to be named because his group doesn’t comment publicly on politics said the whole Republican candidacy may be a writeoff, as he sees no one on the bench with the skills to mount a successful national campaign. Fillon has said he won’t step aside unless he’s placed under formal investigation.

By Anil Kamboj*

The Border Security Force (BSF) contingent that proudly marches down Rajpath as part of the Republic Day parade belongs to a Central Armed Police Force of India which played a critical but little-known role in the 1971 war for the liberation of Bangladesh.

The BSF comprises a sizeable 186 battalions (about 245,000 personnel) and is one of the finest security forces in the world. It has its own Air Wing, Water Wing, Artillery, Intelligence set up, and camel / horse mounted troops besides normal troops.

The BSF was only about five years old when K.F. Rustamji (the first Director General of BSF) was called by then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and tasked with an onerous responsibility — and the force rose to the challenge.

The PM authorised the Border Security Force (BSF) to take on Pakistani troops in erstwhile East Pakistan, several months before the India-Pakistan war erupted on December 3, 1971. She said: “Do what you like, but don’t get caught.” A little later, on March 29, 1971, the then Indian Army Chief, General S.H.F.J. Manekshaw (later Field Marshal) issued orders that BSF was to provide limited assistance to the Bengali guerrillas who were pitted against the Pakistani troops.

Thus, the BSF entered the scene during a surcharged atmosphere and amid rising expectations. Initially a secret party which consisted of some handpicked energetic officers and about 100 men well versed in commando raids, demolition, etc. was prepared. This party was organised to carry out tasks in support of the freedom struggle by the people of East Pakistan. The aim was to provide aid to the freedom fighters to carry out their assignment successfully.

On March 30, 1971, when Major Ziaur Rahman (Maj Zia and his troops had defected from Pakistan Army and had become Mukti Bahinis) could not continue to broadcast the message for his countrymen on behalf of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman from a radio station near Chittagong, a one kilowatt radio transmitter was established inside BSF Battalion HQ in Bagafa in South Tripura, in the officers’ mess.

Major Ziaur Rehman (who later became Army Chief and President of Bangladesh), along with Superintendent of Police Rangamati District (East Pakistan) and his two daughters, crossed over to India through Belonia in Tripura and was received by A.K. Ghosh, Commandant Bagafa BSF Battalion. They were then brought to Bagafa.

On April 3, 1971, they restarted the broadcast from Bagafa Transmission Station. Initially both the daughters of Superintendent Police Rangamati sang devotional songs and this was followed by a motivational speech by Major Ziaur Rehman to his countrymen. This transmission station used to broadcast every day at a given time.

Later, Major Ziaur Rahman was escorted to BSF HQs at Agartala and introduced to other senior BSF officers. After some time, a proper transmission station was constructed near BSF Frontier HQs Salbagan Agartala and further broadcast was carried on from this station with effect from May 25, 1971.

One of the key contributions by the BSF was to impart training to the Mukti Bahini, valiantly known as “Freedom Fighters”, who represented the armed organisations fighting against the Pakistan Army during the Bangladesh Liberation War. They comprised primarily Bengalis of erstwhile East Pakistan.

Side by side, the BSF officers and men started assisting the Mukti Fauj (later Bahini) in causing subversion and sabotage deep inside East Pakistan and even in district headquarter towns. The civilian population of Bangladesh was full of enthusiasm, working towards the liberation of the country. Volunteers were joining the ranks of the Mukti Fauj by the thousands. In this dynamic environment, BSF’s guidance and organisational skills provided the requisite support.

It was not long before BSF officers contacted the most senior leaders of the Awami League party — Tajuddin Ahmad and Amirul Islam — who had survived the massacres by the Pakistani forces. They had walked across from Dacca (Dhaka). They were immediately taken to Golok Majumdar, Inspector General BSF, Bengal Frontier, at Kolkata.

The BSF played a key role in the formation of the Bangladesh Provisional Government, in framing its Constitution and in selecting a National Flag. The BSF also contributed to the defection of Pakistan’s Deputy High Commissioner in Kolkata – the first instance of its kind.

The Revolutionary Government of Bangladesh initially started functioning from the BSF Frontier HQs Kolkata. Later they were shifted to a nearby building on Theater Road near British Council Building. This was called as Mujibnagar.

Prior to Bangladesh independence, eight postage stamps were released with different motifs by the then Revolutionary Government of Bangladesh on July 29, 1971 simultaneously from the Mujibnagar Mission located in Kolkata, London, and on Bangladesh soil opposite Nadia District in an area which had been liberated with the help of the BSF. The same day, these stamps were also released in India.

The ceremony inside Bangladesh soil had been organised by the BSF. Since Bangladesh was not yet liberated at that time, these stamps were referred to as propaganda issues. But later, after liberation they became the first issues of Bangladesh postage stamps.

The BSF acted as the link between civil and military authorities and kept them ‘clued-in’ regarding the overall situation. Even while fighting fiercely against the Pakistani troops, the force also had to manage the thousands of refugees pouring into India from all corners of Bangladesh. They were evacuated and provided shelter. BSF doctors worked round the clock to render assistance, particularly against epidemics.

Finally, on December 16, 1971, Lt. Gen A.A.K. Niazi, Commander of the Pakistan Army in East Pakistan, signed the Instrument of Surrender and the war finally ended. Whatever BSF is today is all because of a strong foundation laid by its officers and men, the ‘Unsung Heroes’.

*Anil Kamboj retired as Inspector General from the BSF and is now Professor at New Delhi Institute of Management. Comments and suggestions on this article can be sent to editor@spsindia.in

The Arab world’s “Queen” of pop, Ahlam performed a mix of her popular hits and evergreen classics, as the first Arabic female singer at Dubai Opera on Thursday.

The Emirati star made her mark on the Arab music scene by presenting a successful concert at one of the most famous opera venues in the Middle East.

Ahlam expressed her happiness as she sang her popular song “Makani.”

The audience applauded and sang with her as she performed one famous song after another, including “Aghla Insan,” “Mistaghrib” and “La Qalbi.”

The concert was one of the most awaited for thousands of her fans who came from all over the UAE as well as other Gulf countries to see their star perform. Ahlam expressed her appreciation for her fans, saying that she feels she is on cloud nine.

Elated fans rushed to the stage to greet and take selfies with Ahlam. “I shook the queen’s hands, I’m so fortunate,” said one fan.

Located in Downtown Dubai, Dubai Opera is the radiant center of culture and arts in Dubai and the shining pearl of The Opera District. After three years of construction, the $330 million concert venue officially opened its doors late last year.

With its unique 2000-seat multi-format theater, Dubai Opera is an international destination for performing arts and world-class entertainment productions.

Liquorice and its natural sweetener, glycyrrhizin, can have long-term harmful effects on the development of the fetus.

A new Finnish study supports food recommendations for families with children in that women should avoid consuming large amounts of liquorice during pregnancy. The limit for safe consumption is not known.

In the study, youths that were exposed to large amounts of liquorice in the womb performed less well than others in cognitive reasoning tests carried out by a psychologist. The difference was equivalent to approximately seven IQ points.

Those exposed to liquorice also performed less well in tasks measuring memory capacity, and according to parental estimates, they had more ADHD-type problems than others. With girls, puberty had started earlier and advanced further.

The Glaku study carried out by the University of Helsinki, the National Institute for Health and Welfare and the Helsinki and Uusimaa hospital districts compared 378 youths of about 13 years whose mothers had consumed “large amounts” or “little/no” liquorice during pregnancy. In this study a large amount was defined as over 500 mg and little/no as less than 249 mg glycyrrhizin per week. These cutoffs are not based on health effects. 500 mg glycyrrhizin corresponds on average to 250 g liquorice.

The study report was published in the American Journal of Epidemiology. The first author of the article is Academy Professor Katri Räikkönen from the University of Helsinki.

Researchers suggest that pregnant women and women planning pregnancy should be informed of the harmful effects that products containing glycyrrhizin – such as liquorice and salty liquorice – may have on the fetus.

In Finland, this is already reality. In January 2016, the National Institute for Health and Welfare published food recommendations for families with children, in which liquorice was placed in the ‘not recommended’ category for pregnant women. According to the recommendations, occasional consumption of small amounts such as a portion of liquorice ice cream or a few liquorice sweets is not dangerous.

Researchers underline that things should be kept in proportion. A large number of Finns have been exposed to glycyrrhizin in the womb. Glycyrrhizin is one of many factors that affect the development of a fetus but it is impossible to say whether it was glycyrrhizin expressly that affected the development of a certain individual.

As a result of animal experiments, the biological mechanism of the effects of liquorice is well known. Glycyrrhizin intensifies the effects of stress hormone cortisol by inhibiting the enzyme that inactivates cortisol. While cortisol is essential to the development of a fetus, it is detrimental in large amounts.

It has long been known that glycyrrhizin causes higher blood pressure and shorter pregnancies in humans, but such long-lasting effects on the fetus have not been proven before.

This is the real America, and this is the true meaning of religion.

In the small Gulf Coast city of Victoria, Texas, there are several churches, but just one synagogue, and one mosque — at least, until the mosque mysteriously burned down on January 28, 2017, according to the New York Times.

Now, in a sense, the synagogue has become a mosque: because the Jews of Victoria handed the Muslims the key to their synagogue building, so the Muslims could share this Jewish place of worship while rebuilding their own Mosque.

“Everyone knows everybody, I know several members of the mosque, and we felt for them,” said Robert Loeb, the president of Bnai Israel, which affiliates with the Jewish Reconstructionist movement.

On Sunday, the Victoria community held an interfaith event in front of the mosque. Through local donations and a GoFundMe page, the mosque raised over $900,000 in the span of one day to rebuild the mosque.

The causes of the fire are unknown, according to the New York Times; but this wonderful example of brotherly love is on public display for all true Americans to learn from this year.

This wonderful example of brotherly love is a current descendant of the following ancient fable, transmitted orally in both Arabic and Hebrew for many centuries and finally written down in several different versions in the 19th century.

It illustrates how two holy places can be as closely connected as two lungs even though they are in different religious worlds. Some say this happened in the age of Noah, and others say in the generation when Abraham was born.

“Two brothers who inherited a ‘valley to hilltop’ farm from their father divided the land in half so that each one could farm his own section. Over time, the older brother married and had four children, while the younger brother was still not married.

One year there was very little rain, and the crop was very meagre. This was at the beginning of a long term drought that would turn the whole valley into an arid, treeless, desert where even grain did not grow, and all the springs dried up.

The younger brother lay awake one night praying and thought: “My brother has a wife and four children to feed, and I have no children. He needs more grain than I do; especially now when grain is scarce.”

So that night, the younger brother went to his barn, gathered a large sack of wheat, and left his wheat in his brother’s barn. Then he returned home, feeling pleased with himself.

Earlier that very same night, the older brother was also lying awake praying for rain when he thought: “In my old age, my wife and I will have our grown children to take care of us, as well as grandchildren to enjoy, while my brother may have no children. He should at least sell more grain from his fields now, so he can provide for himself in his old age.

So that night, the older brother also gathered a large sack of wheat, and left it in his brother’s barn, and returned home, feeling pleased with himself.

The next morning, the younger brother, surprised to see the amount of grain in his barn seemed unchanged, said “I did not take as much wheat as I thought. Tonight I’ll take more.”

That same morning, the older brother, standing in his barn, was thinking the same thoughts.

After night fell, each brother gathered a greater amount of wheat from his barn and in the dark, secretly delivered it to his brother’s barn.

The next morning, the brothers were again puzzled and perplexed. “How can I be mistaken?” each one thought. “There’s the same amount of grain here as there was before. This is impossible! Tonight I’ll make no mistake—I’ll take two large sacks.”

The third night, more determined than ever, each brother gathered two large sacks of wheat from his barn, loaded them onto a cart, and slowly pulled his cart toward his brother’s barn. In the moonlight, each brother noticed a figure in the distance.

When the two brothers got closer, each recognized the form of the other and the load he was pulling, and they both realized what had happened!

Without a word, they dropped the ropes of their carts, ran to each other and embraced.”

Only God can make something holy, and God thought the brothers’ love and concern for each other made their descendants worthy to rebuild a primordial Holy House in this valley of Makka; and later to build a new Holy House on that far hill of Zion. So God sent Messengers to their descendants to guide them to do this.

When all those, both near and far, who revere these sacred places as a standard, share it in love with everyone else who reveres it, then Abraham’s request for Allah to “make this a land of peace, and provide its people with the produce of the land” (Qur’an 2:126) will be extended throughout the world; and all the children of Adam, Noah and Abraham will live in Holiness, Peace and Prosperity.

President Donald J. Trump vowed to continue the work of the previous United States (US) administration under Barack Obama by devoting all of America’s military power to “crush and destroy” the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Having emerged from the remains of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), ISIS launched an intensive campaign since 2014, blitzing its way across much of Syria and northern Iraq, and leading to a self-professed caliphate based on a Wahhabi doctrine of Sunni Islam in June that same year.

Much of the discussions about ISIS in recent days have focused on the problems of countering what has been described ad infinitum as a ramshackle force in a long and confusing conflict that can barely be described as a war. Through much of these discussions, the strategic value of the militant group and the context in which it operates has been largely discounted. Likewise, ISIS model – the group’s tactical, operational, and strategic capabilities – has been overwhelmingly underappreciated, and much of what ISIS has achieved in the past few years has defied Western military prognostications.

Despite the advocacy of a major offensive against ISIS, and in light of the West’s hesitance to commit to another possible decade-long war (or even longer), it would be more suitable to acknowledge the group’s utility and recognize that ISIS has the potential to benefit the West. Few Western analysts have expressed interest in using ISIS against Western competitors in the Middle East over an extended period of time.

Utilizing ISIS

Despite the group’s wonted atrocities, particularly its heinous attacks against soldiers and civilians alike including women and children, ISIS has the potential for serving both the US and the West as a relatively cheap insurance policy – an important and expendable military appendage in an exceedingly broad and protracted conflict in the Middle East. Keeping ISIS alive and fighting against its enemies without being provided opportunities to gain enough strength to directly challenge the US and its counter-ISIS coalition members is in line with Western security interests.

ISIS can play a key role in preserving a prostrate Iraq and ensuring a prolonged US military and civilian presence in the heart of the Middle East just as the US has done in South Korea. US officials have recently agreed to reassess the US’ military commitment to the region. A slow-but-steady increase, even if it is a way for the US to wage war on the cheap, can come in many different forms and serve a host of perennial interests. US military forces will increasingly be part and parcel to diplomatic efforts to rebuild regional security architecture in the Middle East. Iran’s recent defiance of the nuclear deal and continued efforts to acquire nuclear weapons necessitates some form of military presence and capabilities to respond other than the use of stand-off weapons and weapons systems.

Not only can ISIS play a key role by necessitating the presence of US military power, it has the capacity to impede on the strategic military capabilities of Iraq, particularly as the Iraqi Armed Forces (IAF) attempts to push back against ISIS forces the northern and western parts of the country. Aside from a few minor successes, the IAF has failed to score any decisive victories against ISIS and will be unlikely to for several reasons. First, the IAF lacks the requisite military equipment and materials to inflict serious losses on ISIS. Because ISIS logistics come from Syria, its survival is largely dependant on the integrity of its nest in a region least likely to be accessed by Western ground forces, much less Iraqi military forces.

ISIS frequently uses populations as human shields to great effect, placing Western forces at a distinct disadvantage. The absence of a unified front against ISIS has led to insufficient pressure on the group to achieve any real major territorial gains against ISIS, despite media claims that the caliphate has finally “buckled” during counterattacks that claimed large swaths of ISIS territory last year. Operational solidarity on the ISIS side deserves praise, and probably in orders taller than on the side of the West. Although ISIS lost territory over the past several months, the vastness of territory surrounding ISIS is adequate for continuing to feed the group’s logistical needs. ISIS has managed to maintain its economic and financial activities – activities in the arenas of natural resources like oil, natural gas, cement, agriculture, and revenues from extortion, kidnapping, and trafficking – while taking pleasure in a relatively unbroken influx of foreign fighters, which the group fields against the regime of Bashar al-Assad and many others on the battlefield.

Airstrikes Alone are Ineffective

Maintaining pressure on ISIS by means of airstrikes almost exclusively is neither conducive to achieving the West’s stated goals nor a fitting application of military force. An over-focus on ISIS comes with great consequences and they could be felt in other, more critical settings. The majority of the Afghan National Army’s (ANA) funding, for example, comes from the US. With the US war on ISIS having surged to approximately $8 billion USD in 2016, aid to other countries could see drastic reductions. Without Western aid, states like Afghanistan would collapse. This problem is linked further to the military and financial overstretch of the US. Since 9/11, nearly $1 trillion USD has been allocated to the wars in Afghanistan while Iraq has cost the US over $2 trillion USD. Both of those wars have been financed by the US on borrowed money.

At the moment there appears to be no political solution to the ISIS problem, and while there are ways to weaken ISIS, the gargantuan financial burden owing to military deployments and airstrikes will not bring about its destruction. Paradoxically, the US-led coalition and its military strategy is prolonging the war in Syria rather than bringing it closer to an end. At the same time, despite numerous tactical successes, the application of US and Western military force over the past few years has led to a host of unintended consequences. Using fighter jets to bomb targets is effective if the aim is to produce an environment conducive to militant extremism and in which ISIS ideology thrives. The character of that environment can resonate back home, where disenfranchised members of Western society might journey down the short road to radicalization. While each nation in the counter-ISIS coalition holds diverse, if not conflicting, strategic aims, the disparate nature of those aims have done much to erode the West’s resolve to fight ISIS, and to fight the group effectively.

Protracted Conflict in Syria

Intensify or prolonging the war in Syria would be a strategic and costly error, but the war in that country, which began as an uprising that quickly turned bloody and violent, provides the West with an opportunity to adjust the boundaries of power across much of the Middle East. ISIS has nestled itself in a defensive position, making “liberation” in any traditional sense a daunting feat. Short of being entirely indifferent to moral arguments and human suffering, disposing of ISIS could lead to the creation of further atrocities and less manageable outcomes:

First, the destruction of the group would result in thousands of foreign fighters returning to their home countries, exacerbating not only states’ current terrorist risks and threat levels but aggravating “lone wolf” risks as well, or even violent responses from far right groups. They would have to undergo a rigorous process of deradicalization and rehabilitation if they were to be successfully reintegrated into normal society. They might not even be interested in reintegrating.

Second, the destruction of ISIS could result in larger and more powerful or dangerous group emerging, proving even more difficult, if not impossible, to manage. A similar debate presided over the destruction of al-Qaeda some years back with arguments centering on the view that a more violent and destructive al-Qaeda following in its wake is a distinct possibility.

Third, the eradication of ISIS could result in dispersing dozens of cells or micro-groups across the Middle East and Europe, or possibly even encourage a massive relocation to North America, becoming extremely challenging to track or contain. They could have the capacity to undertake violent operations based on the same fundamentalist ideology as ISIS but in much more vulnerable locations.

Erosion of the Caliphate

Although an attractive option, capturing ISIS’ de facto capital would lead directly to the end of ISIS aggression. The defense of symbolic strongholds like Mosul and Ramadi are not necessary for the territorial continuity of the caliphate, nor are they crucial for maintaining the ISIS mythos. ISIS’ atrocities have understandably spawned an incredible compulsion to find a hasty military solution.

However, there is good reason to be cautious about driving ISIS out of Raqqa. While its loss would not immediately lead to the end of the group’s state building and regional military efforts, it could radically transform the way ISIS defines itself as a terrorist group and as the Islamic State. Syria and Iraq, and elsewhere would remain a bubbling cauldron of ISIS ideology and extremist violence. This might come as a particularly poignant idea when one considers the comparably rapid rise of the group and its departure from the expectations of most Western analysts who probably believed al-Qaeda symbolized the epitome of organized terror and non-state militancy.

ISIS Metamorphosis

The group boasts an endless supply of suicide bombers and a vast arsenal of captured military equipment. Overestimating the implications of liberating territory from ISIS could come at high costs, especially given that the area would require a military presence afterward to prevent the return of ISIS forces in addition to attracting other equally violent groups. It would be impossible to guarantee that post-conflict operations would be perceived as liberation and not illusory occupation. Plans to defeat ISIS have to be linked to visions of a post-ISIS Middle East with attention afforded to the anomalies that are less recognizable than Sunni disenfranchisement or populous disenfranchisement. The Kurdish dimension of a post-ISIS world in Iraq/Syria/Turkey necessitates focus given the level of logistical, training, and political support provided by the US and its partners.

If the West were to destroy ISIS, and its forces fragmented, ISIS operatives would retain their training and their fighting skills, which are particularly effective in urban-combat environments. ISIS could become an even more nefarious enemy if Raqqa were to be taken, and the caliphate conquered by Western forces as occupiers, crusaders, or neoimperialists. ISIS, recently described by Scott Jasper and Scott Moreland an “adaptive hybrid threat in transition,” might diverge from a character of fighting that the West is more accustomed to and for which they are better suited. The West could even see its airstrikes option taken off the table if ISIS were to scatter and take to urban environments.

The “Homefront”

ISIS has been particularly effective at demonstrating the West’s weakness in containing terrorist movements or defending its home territory. However, the group has also proven its relative inability to directly attack the West at home, with the exception of a few terrorist attacks perpetrated by individuals who acted in the name of ISIS only. Given the West’s air campaign against the self-proclaimed caliphate, it is neither strange nor surprising that ISIS has endlessly voiced its desire to strike at the heart of the West. As the past several years of militant extremist attacks in Europe illustrate, the West’s “homefront,” including US service members and military facilities, requires a great deal of “target hardening,” which also comes at a price.

ISIS Resilience

ISIS has been notorious for its indiscriminate killings and massacres. It habitually calls out governments and religions for the problems afflicting Sunni Muslims, who also suffer at the hands of ISIS. As with many terrorist groups, some legitimate grievances are brought to the fore, though ISIS fails to fit among the more politically motivated, socially involved, and progressive groups in the Middle East

ISIS has conveniently provided the West with a return address. With its proclaimed caliphate in place, the West knows precisely where to find the group, its base of operations, and exactly where would-be terrorists will rally. The caliphate provides its adherents with a place of purpose, which at least draws them away from where the West would want them the least. So far, ISIS has successfully drawn thousands of potentially terrorists and fighters from Europe to ISIS territory, where the West can track much of their movement.

ISIS’ effective and growing information operations (IO) capabilities, particularly its propaganda and foreign recruitment campaigns via the internet, have reached deep into the West and East, enabling “recruitment in place” and causing major problems for the US and for Europe. The group’s recruitment traction can be accredited to limited political and social intervention strategies in Western countries. A lack of online education, and focus on groups and minorities most at risk to ISIS recruitment seemingly warrants much of the blame. The West can learn a valuable lesson, and make inroads into protecting its own populations against the invasion of ISIS ideology and the persuasion of expressing one’s grievances by means of violence and aggression.

Eliminating ISIS would do little to prevent the atrocities committed by the Assad regime. Nor does the group’s destruction bring the West any closer to resolving the crisis complicated and multifaceted conflict in Syria. Years of civil war have only emboldened Assad against his enemies, providing additional rationale for the US and its partners to decrease the intensity of their attacks against ISIS positions. The West needs to be explicit but realistic about its political and military limitations. If the West were to draw a line in the sand, leaving Syria to Assad, the rebels, and ISIS, regional dynamics could shift in favor of the West. Pragmatically, deposing Assad offers no guarantee that his successor would be better for Syria, the US, or any other state feeling the effects of that conflict. Doubting the sincerity and intentions of the West in its “War on Terror” (WoT) is a relatively effortless matter. The ongoing WoT is not so much about eliminating terrorism as it is about preventing terrorist attacks against states based on relative value, including those closely linked to Western interests.

Conclusion

The past few years of war against ISIS has brought to the fore the possibility that the fundamentalist group can only really be deterred and its violent ideology managed. At least, it is worth considering that the ideology espoused by ISIS has enduring qualities. ISIS is not a simple group. It is a far more sophisticated and deft fighting force than the West cares to depict it as – structured by senior and former Baathists and Sunni Iraqi military skilled individuals, and benefitting from valuable tribal connections. Captured materials and weapons have given ISIS more advanced capabilities than ever before, and while its military reach remains relatively confined to the Middle East, it is there that its operability is merits a greater degree of recognition.

Delivering a fatal blow to ISIS would not promise to strengthen state security in the Middle East or even further abroad in Europe and North America. A profane Iran still stands as the principle threat to security in the Middle East. Iran has repeatedly shown its ambition in dominating the region or destabilizing those of which it has been unable to gain control. Although Iran is a Shiite country and a strong backer of Islam’s Shiite population, it does not mean that Iran is ISIS’ enemy. While ISIS’ continued existence does not come without deep security concerns, the group’s actions against Israel to produce any egregious outcome other than a brief interaction with the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) in late-2016 that failed to result in any IDF or civilian casualties.

The underlying philosophy, as noted by a higher degree of people joining its forces and its economic/financial clout, even political stature, brand ISIS anything but a simple or incompetent group of marauding men. Its caliphate will likely exist in some form or another two generations from now. ISIS would not be the only militant extremist group to serve as an instrument of US political and security strategy for years or decades. However, notwithstanding ISIS’ potential to serve the security interests of the US and the West for years or even decades, predicting the long-term costs and complications that would accompany that remains a principal challenge.

*Scott N. Romaniuk is a Doctoral Researcher at the School of International Studies, University of Trento (Italy). He is an Associate Researcher with the Center for the Study of Targeted Killing (CSTK) at the University of Massachusetts (Dartmouth) and the Bruno Kessler Foundation (FBK) (Italy). Email: scott.romaniuk@unitn.it.

The China Pakistan Economic Corridor has created a sense of both euphoria and scepticism in Pakistan. The euphoria is because of the size and scale of the corridor project which is expected to create 700,000 direct jobs and whose total cost, according to a Deloitte study, is estimated to touch US$75billion upon completion [1]. At the same time, there are also increasing concerns over the project primarily due to the lack of concrete details about the various schemes falling under it which the government is accused of not sharing with the public [2]. Against this backdrop, it is imperative to note the perceptions of the business community in Pakistan regarding the CPEC as it is one of the most crucial stakeholders in the project.

The multi-billion dollar project is widely termed as a “game-changer” for the region in view of the current state of Pakistan’s economy which is witnessing rising debt and modest growth. But recent controversies and opaqueness surrounding the project concerning corruption allegations, lack of transparency, inordinate delays, unfair trade practices by the Chinese, displacement of local populations etc, have created numerous doubts and suspicions in the minds of a ‘worried business community’ in Pakistan [3].

Already reeling under a US$5billion trade deficit with China after signing a FTA in 2006, a study by the Pakistan Business Council in 2013 ascertained that Pakistan did not benefit from the FTA as the Commerce Ministry which ‘lacked both homework and imagination’, went ahead with the agreement without having any consultation with the private sector [4].

Apparently, the same approach is being pursued by the Pakistani government for the CPEC as well which has fuelled apprehensions that once it is fully operationalized, it will further damage the domestic industry. The government has also not declared any special measures to protect its industries, while it has announced a slew of measures to protect the Chinese investments, including sovereign guarantees for the US$34.4billion Chinese investments in the power sector, at a time when its own power distribution companies are facing mounting debts [5].

Questions have also been raised on the impact of CPEC in provinces like Baluchistan and Gilgit-Baltistan. Recently a report by the Federation of the Pakistan Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FPCCI) has noted that with the current rate of influx of Chinese nationals in Baluchistan, they will outnumber the Baloch natives by 2048 [6]. Similar anxieties have also occurred from Gilgit-Baltistan where the locals fear getting displaced by rich investors from outside. While some are hopeful that the project will be a catalyst for growth in the region by opening up opportunities in trade, tourism and hydro-power sector, others argue that the local people will be left out of the gains as the government has not engaged with them and there are concerns about profits being extracted by middlemen and regarding the costly imports of coal from China when there is abundant hydropower potential in Gilgit itself [7].

Moreover, already having to cope with the dumping of cheap goods from China, the traders in Pakistan are also worried about the smuggling of such goods once the corridor opens up [4]. The State Bank of Pakistan and the Federal Board of Revenue have already highlighted rampant malpractices by the Chinese over invoicing and unprincipled dealings. Furthermore the State Bank and the Finance Ministry has also expressed concerns about the lack of local labour and indigenous content used in CPEC projects [8]. There are also fears that the government’s method of working in isolation from think-tanks and universities without taking inputs from other stakeholders like the local people and the political and business community and the lack of coordination between the various ministries involved with the project might jeopardise the entire project and lead to a disastrous impact on the economy [4].

Moreover, in stark contrast to the private sector relationship between Pakistan and China which did not exist six years ago, relations with the US have been more enduring and still remains the dominant economic partner for Pakistan. This was clearly stated by Saquib H. Shirazi, the CEO of Atlas Honda in an article in the Business Recorder where he also mentioned that besides periodic yarn exports, there are no meaningful Pakistani exports to China compared to the more holistic nature of trade with the US where Pakistan also enjoys a trade surplus of US$2billion [8].

Meanwhile, in comparison to other provinces, the CPEC is proving to be a major attraction for domestic investors in Punjab where there are expectations of huge demand as work moves ahead on the project. Abdul Basit, chairman of the Punjab Board of Investment and Trade (PBIT) states that besides domestic capital, the CPEC is also attracting foreign capital in the region. Similar sentiments were also expressed by Ijaz A Mumtaz, former president of the Lahore Chamber of Commerce and Industry (LCCI). He noted, ‘The CPEC is the last opportunity for Pakistan to get out of the vicious cycle of low growth and improve the lives of the people’ [9].

To conclude, while there are expectations of huge demand from CPEC-related work in the province of Punjab, there are also doubts and concerns in provinces like Gilgit-Baltistan and Baluchistan. Overall, however, business sentiment in Pakistan displays a sense of cautious optimism with respect to the CPEC. As Shirazi notes, ‘Proof will be in its delivery’ [8].

*Jyotishman Bhagawati, Research Intern, Institute of Chinese Studies. This article appeared at ICS Delhi Blog

ENDNOTES:

1. http://pkonweb.com/2016/10/httpwpmepol365is/

2. http://herald.dawn.com/news/1153597

3. http://www.merinews.com/article/criticism-of-china-pakistan-economic-corridor-in-pakistan/15921778.shtml

4. http://tribune.com.pk/story/1101574/cpecperilsaheadforpakistan/

5. http://southasiamonitor.org/news/cpec-will-it-be-a-game-changer-for-pakistan-or-a-nightmare-/emerging/20999

6. http://www.business-standard.com/article/news-ani/chinese-to-outnumber-baloch-natives-by-2048-fpcci-report-116122900584_1.html

7. http://www.dawn.com/news/1236159/chinapakistaneconomiccorridoraboonfortheeconomyabaneforlocals

8. http://www.brecorder.com/articles-a-letters/187:articles/69885:cpec-private-sectors-point-of-view/

9. http://www.dawn.com/news/1232178/cpectriggeredinvestment

I am a novice and have hardly any competency to trade on the dynamics of oil trade, as it is a business controlled by seven sisters and the price is determined by super powers by crating geopolitical crisis. As regards to containing oil glut I posted two blogs: 1) US shale producers to gulp Saudi market share of oil and 2) Curtailing oil production ‘an agreement of thugs to rip off consumers’.

Both of my points have credence by the persistent increase in oil prices and number of active rigs in the US and further impetus has been provided by the intentions of US President for imposing fresh sanctions on Iran.

According to a Reuters report, US companies added oil rigs for a 13th week in the last 14, extending a nine-month recovery. They are taking advantage of crude prices that have held mostly above US$50 a barrel since OPEC agreed to cut supplies in November 2016.

Drillers added 17 oil rigs in the week ended on 3rd February taking the total count up to 583, the most since October 2015, energy services firm Baker Hughes Inc said on Friday. During the same week a year ago, there were 467 active oil rigs.

Since crude prices first topped $50 a barrel in May, after recovering from 13-year lows last February 2016, drillers have added a total of 267 oil rigs in 32 of the past 36 weeks, the biggest recovery in rigs since a global oil glut crushed the market in mid 2014.

Analysts expect the US energy firms to boost spending on drilling and pump more oil and natural gas from shale fields in coming years now that energy prices are projected to keep climbing.

According to a Reuters report quoting analysts at Simmons & Co, energy specialists at US investment bank Piper Jaffray, this week forecast the total oil and gas rig count would average 795 in 2017, 911 in 2018 and 1,022 in 2019. Most wells produce both oil and gas.

Analysts at U.S. financial services firm Cowen & Co said in a note this week that its capital expenditure tracking showed 31 exploration and production (E&P) companies planned to increase spending by an average of 36 percent in 2017 over 2016. That spending increase in 2017 followed an estimated 45 percent decline in 2016 and a 37 percent decline in 2015, Cowen said according to the 65 E&P companies it tracks.

In such a scenario the US-Saudi alliance wants exports of Iran to come down, by making it a target once again by accusing it of any violation, real or part of any diabolic thinking, miles away from the ground realities. If anyone disagrees with me they should refer back to three decades of impositions of economic sanctions on Iran and attack on Iraq for having weapon of mass destruction.

French far-right leader Marine Le Pen kicked off her presidential campaign on Saturday with a promise to shield voters from globalization and make their country “free”, hoping to profit from political turmoil to score a Donald Trump-style upset.

Opinion polls see the 48-year old daughter of National Front (FN) founder Jean-Marie Le Pen topping the first round on April 23 but then losing the May 7 run-off to a mainstream candidate, if you believe in “polls”.

But in the most unpredictable election race France has known in decades, the FN hopes the scandal hitting conservative candidate Francois Fillon and the rise of populism across the West will help convince voters to back Le Pen.

“We were told Donald Trump would never win in the United States against the media, against the establishment, but he won… We were told Marine Le Pen would not win the presidential election, but on May 7 she will win!” Jean-Lin Lacapelle, a top FN official, told several hundred party officials and members.

In 144 “commitments” published at the start of a two-day rally in Lyon, Le Pen proposes leaving the euro zone, holding a referendum on EU membership, slapping taxes on imports and on the job contracts of foreigners, lowering the retirement age and increasing several welfare benefits while lowering income tax.

The manifesto also foresees reserving certain rights now available to all residents, including free education, to French citizens only, hiring 15,000 police, curbing migration and leaving NATO’s integrated command.

“The aim of this program is first of all to give France its freedom back and give the people a voice,” Le Pen said in the introduction to the manifesto.

Emmanuel Macron, a pro-European centrist candidate who polls say is likely to face Le Pen in the presidential election run-off, will also hold a rally in Lyon on Saturday to propose a radically different platform.

Opinion polls suggest Macron would easily beat Le Pen in the second round, but faith in pollsters has been shaken after they failed to predict Trump’s election win or Britain’s vote last June to leave the European Union.

Former frontrunner Fillon has been damaged by allegations, which he denies, that he paid his wife hundreds of thousands of euros of public money for work she may not actually have done. A poll on Saturday showed the conservative slipping to third place in round one.

The FN officials taking to the stage targeted Macron more than any other of Le Pen’s opponents, presenting the former investment banker as the candidate of “international capitalism.” The crowd booed his name every time.

“This presidential election puts two opposite proposals,” Le Pen said in her manifesto. “The ‘globalist’ choice backed by all my opponents … and the ‘patriotic’ choice which I personify.”

EU OVERHAUL PLEDGE

If elected, Le Pen says she would immediately seek an overhaul of the European Union that would reduce it to a very loose cooperative of nations with no single currency and no border-free area. If, as is likely, France’s EU partners refuse to agree to this, she would call a referendum to leave the bloc.

The electoral manifesto is short on macro-economic details but the FN published its growth and public finances targets on Saturday.

It says a generous policy of tax cuts and welfare increases would be made possible by fighting social security fraud, tax evasion and changing tack on the EU and migration, but without explaining how that would be done.

The program is far less detailed than her 2012 platform and has softened the presentation of a number of controversial issues, with the FN trying to find the right balance between reassuring voters and keeping its anti-establishment image.

For instance, instead of devoting a whole chapter to “the orderly demolition of the euro” as the 2012 manifesto did, the 2017 one only briefly mentions regaining France’s “monetary sovereignty.”

Opinion polls showing a majority of voters, especially the elderly, want to stay in the euro.

Immigration remains the party’s signature theme. When Franck de Lapersonne, an actor and FN supporter, told the rally that 19th century writer Victor Hugo “did not learn Arabic at school and that makes me happy,” he received the loudest ovation of the day, with the crowd chanting the party’s trademark slogan “On est chez nous” (“This is our country!”)

Le Pen and her party are facing their own scandals, including one over assistants in the European Parliament and investigations over her 2012 campaign financing.

But that leaves grass-roots supporters undeterred. “We’re fighting to win the 2017 election,” said Victor Birra, the regional head of the FN youth association.

By Svenja Brunkhorst and Jens Martens

In an unprecedented and historic move, the Sixth Committee of the UN General Assembly recently granted observer status to the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC).

The resolution was submitted by France, Albania, Colombia, the Netherlands and Tunisia and was adopted during the seventy-first session of the General Assembly. The resolution sets out the ICC’s position as observer in the General Assembly from January 1, 2017 on. For the first time, the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly (GA) has approved a business organization as an observer to the UN General Assembly.

So far, the current list of non-Member States, entities and organizations with observer status in the General Assembly was mainly limited to non-Member States, like the Holy See and the State of Palestine, and intergovernmental organizations like the African Union and the OECD. Trade unions and civil society organizations are not on the list.

The request to include the item ‘Observer status for the ICC in the General Assembly’ in the provisional agenda of the sixty-seventh session of the General Assembly was made in 2012 in a letter to the UN by the Permanent Representative of France.

At that time, the General Assembly decided to defer the decision to its sixty-eighth session, and one year later, the GA again deferred it to its sixty-ninth session. At this session in 2014, the General Assembly discussed a prospective observer status for the ICC, but no consent was reached among the UN member states. Thus France itself suggested to end the discussion and negotiate a resolution at a later stage.

In September 2016, the Permanent Representative of France again submitted a letter to the UN with the request to include the item on the observer status for the ICC in the agenda of the seventy-first session of the General Assembly. The Permanent Representative of France justified this request as follows:

“The private sector can bring key resources to the fore – knowledge, expertise, access and reach – that are often critical in order to advance United Nations Goals. […] Granting permanent observer status to the International Chamber of Commerce in the General Assembly will strengthen the relationship between the United Nations, its Member States and the global business community, and further enhance the existing inclusive models of cooperation. The request of the International Chamber of Commerce to obtain observer status and represent business views at the General Assembly is part of the historic mission to foster peace and prosperity through world trade.”

The draft resolution had been initially proposed by the representative of France to the Committee on October 11, 2016. The revised draft stipulated that granting such status would neither set a precedent nor change existing criteria for observer status.

In that regard, the representative of Venezuela stressed the importance of following established criteria for the granting of observer status while also pointing out that the draft resolution highlighted the “exceptional nature” of the ICC.

The representative of the Russian Federation emphasized that the request could not be used as a precedent and urged delegations to continue to respect the General Assembly’s criteria for international organizations that wished to become observers.

According to the ICC, the resolution was, apart from France, also supported by 22 other UN Member States. It was approved without a vote on November 11, 2016.

In response to this success, the Chairman of the ICC, Sunil Bharti Mittal, stated:

“We stand ready to ensure that the private sector plays a full role in meeting the ambition of the 2030 agenda. It’s a great honour for ICC to be granted Observer Status at the UN General Assembly. […] Given the complexity of today’s global challenges, it’s vital that business has a clear voice in UN decision making. We look forward to using this unique platform to deploy fully the resources, expertise and knowledge of world business in the work of the General Assembly.”

Since 1946, ICC has held top-level consultative status with the United Nations. With the observer status, the ICC has better access to meetings and documentations of the General Assembly.

With 6.5 million member companies in more than 130 countries, the ICC is the largest business organization worldwide. It represents particularly the interests of companies that are engaged in international business.

Many civil society organizations criticize that ICC’s positions and policy recommendations are often in fundamental contradiction to social, environmental and human rights standards.

On trade and investment: The ICC routinely calls on governments to maintain and strengthen investment protection and promotion agreements, including strong investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) provisions to ensure investors have direct access to dispute settlement and financial compensation.

On human rights: The ICC strongly opposes any international legally binding instrument to regulate, in international human rights law, the activities of transnational corporations.

On climate change: The ICC supports the interests of the big transnational oil, gas and energy corporations. In its statements it insists that governments must keep all energy options open, including conventional fuels such as coal, gas, oil, and nuclear power.

Granting observer status to the International Chamber of Commerce risks to further strengthen the power of big business and widens the imbalance between corporate interests and civil society in global policy.

Note: This article was first carried by the Global Policy Forum website in December 2016.

Why did President Donald Trump fire off an angry and threatening tweet early Thursday morning following the violent protests that had broken out the night before on UC Berkeley campus?  Here’s a copy of Trump’s tweet:

“If U.C. Berkeley does not allow free speech and practices violence on innocent people with a different point of view – NO FEDERAL FUNDS?”

Maybe the impulsive President was just angry that a controversial, rightwing speaker like Milo Yiannopoulos was unable to deliver his presentation because masked agitators began to rampage across the campus breaking windows, burning signs and wreaking havoc. That’s certainly one possibility, but there are other more intriguing explanations that seem equally likely.

Consider this: Like most Americans, Trump knows that these anarchist groups show up routinely at peaceful demonstrations with the intention of raising hell and discrediting the groups that peacefully assemble to express their opinion on one issue or another. In this case, the protestors had gathered in opposition to a man who seemingly advocates religious intolerance and Islamophobia. Trump was well aware of this.

He also knew that the UC Berkeley Chancellor and his staff did everything in their power to provide security to both the speaker and the groups that had gathered for the event.  Check out this excerpt from an article at  Bloomberg:

“Some advocates for universities and education said they were surprised by Trump’s tweet…

“I have never seen anything like this,” said John Walda, president of the National Association of College and Business Officers. “Why would you infer that you want to punish a university” when it was only trying to protect people. The university “did exactly the right thing,” he said…

The university said Chancellor Nicholas Dirks had made clear that Yiannopoulos’ “views, tactics and rhetoric are profoundly contrary to those of the campus,” but that the university is committed to “enabling of free expression across the full spectrum of opinion and perspective” and condemned the violence.

Berkeley seems to have done everything it can to protect students’ First Amendment rights, Cohn said.”

(“Trump Threatens U.C. Berkeley Funding Over Violent Protests“, Bloomberg)

So if the Chancellor had already gone the extra mile to protect free speech, then why did Trump decide to lower the boom on him? Was he genuinely angry with the Chancellor’s performance or did he interject himself for political reasons?  In other words, how did Trump stand to benefit from getting involved in this mess?

Isn’t his tweet crafted to win support from his red state base who identify Berkeley with the erratic behavior of the “loony left” that burn flags, spit on veterans, and hate America?  Isn’t it designed to discredit the millions of  liberal and progressive protestors who have peacefully participated in pro-immigration demonstrations or anti-Trump marches across the country? Isn’t Trump’s interference  intended to make him look like a strong, decisive leader willing to defend free speech against hypocritical leftists thugs who violently oppose anyone who doesn’t share their narrow “librul” point of view. Isn’t the action part of a broader plan to reinforce a stereotypical view of liberals as sandal clad, fist pumping, Marxist firebrands who want to burn down the country so they can create their own Soviet Utopia?

Isn’t this really why Trump decided to parachute into the event, to enlarge and polish his own image while exacerbating existing political divisions within the country?

Trump’s reaction to the incident in Berkeley is worth paying attention to if only to grasp that –what we are seeing– is not the random act of an impulsive man, but a governing style that requires an identifiable threat to domestic security, “the left”.  A divisive president only prevails when the country is divided,  when Americans are at each others throats and split between Sunni and Shia.  That’s the goal, driving a wedge between people of differing views, exacerbating historic animosities in order to enhance the authority of the executive and usurp greater control over the levers of state power.

Once again, we’re not excluding the possibility that Trump’s tweet may have been a “one off” by an impulsive man but, by the same token, it might be an indication of something more serious altogether.

Keep in mind, that Trump’s chief political strategist, Steve Bannon, is a man who produced documentary movies on Sarah Palin, Michelle Bachman, and Occupy (Wall Street).  According to Salon:

“Bannon does not hide his affinity for propaganda. He has cited as an inspiration Nazi propagandist and filmmaker Leni Riefenstahl. She famously directed “Triumph of the Will,” a film commissioned by Adolf Hitler in 1933 that portrays Germany as a country returning to world power.” (“Three lessons we learned about Steve Bannon from this weekend’s New York Times and Boston Globe profiles “, Salon)

So at best Steve Bannon is a public relations magician and at worst an unapologetic propagandist. But what is so telling about Bannon is his position in the administration. Bannon occupies the seat closest to the throne which shows how much emphasis Trump places on image, public perception and narrative. Bannon is Trump’s most trusted ally, the spinmeister whose job it is to create the Great Leader who is admired and loved by his loyal base but feared and despised by his enemies. All of this fits seamlessly with Trump’s Berkeley tweet.

And it also fits with Trump’s governing style which is geared to deepen divisions, increase social unrest, and create enemies, real or imagined.  In this view, Berkeley was just a dry run, an experiment in perception management orchestrated to sharpen Trump’s image as the hair-trigger Biblical father who will intercede whenever necessary and who is always ready to impose justice with an iron fist.

So the masked rioters actually did Trump a favor, didn’t they? They created a justification for presidential intervention backed by the prospect of direct involvement. One can only wonder how many similar experiments will transpire before Trump puts his foot down and bans demonstrations altogether?

Of course, that may very well be the objective.

On Saturday in its front cover page the German weekly magazine Der Spiegel posted an illustration of the U.S. President Donald Trump beheading the Statue of Liberty. It depicts a cartoon figure of Trump with a bloodied knife in one hand and the statue’s head, dripping with blood, in the other. It carries the caption: “America First”. The cartoon says it all as to the direction Trump is trying to take America.

The artist who designed the cover, Edel Rodriguez, a Cuban who came to the United States in 1980 as a political refugee, told The Washington Post: “It’s a beheading of democracy, a beheading of a sacred symbol.”

No wonder that just weeks into the new administration, a new survey has found that about half of voters in the U.S. wished Barack Obama was still in office. This result was announced by a group called Public Policy Polling, or PPP, which asked registered voters at the end of January, “Who would you rather was President: Barack Obama or Donald Trump?”

Of the 725 participants, 52 percent responded with Obama, 43 percent preferred Trump, and 5 percent weren’t sure. The group’s press release also revealed that 40 percent support Trump’s impeachment.

According to Dean Debnam, president of Public Policy Polling, “Usually a newly elected President is at the peak of their popularity and enjoying their honeymoon period after taking office right now. But Donald Trump’s making history once again with a sizeable share of voters already wanting to impeach him, and a majority of voters wishing they could have Barack Obama back.”

The issues that voters appeared most unhappy about included Trump’s recent immigration order and his team’s handling of it in addition to the growing influence of controversial adviser Steve Bannon.

The USA remains a divided country and rather than closing the gaps Trump is widening this division with his authoritarian behavior. Not only has he surrounded himself with hateful and highly polarizing guys like Bannon he is behaving like an autocrat who has no tolerance for any criticism, esp. from the media. Anyone who does not agree with him is deemed a foe by the White House who must, thus, be shut down.

Trump issued an executive order – travel restriction order (TRO), more commonly called the ‘Muslim Ban’ that barred citizens of seven Muslim majority countries to entering the United States. The travel ban, which Trump says is needed to protect the United States against Islamist militants, sparked travel chaos around the world.

Millions of concerned citizens around the globe – from the USA to Europe to Australia to Asia in places such as New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, Seattle, Miami, San Francisco, Atlanta, St. Louis, Denver, Salt Lake City, Philadelphia, Washington D.C., Austin, London, Paris, Berlin, Barcelona, Sydney, Jakarta and Manila – rallied against the ban condemning it as racist and discriminatory. “We say no to a ban on immigrants and we say no to walls,” read one poster in Berlin, referring to Trump’s vows to build a wall on the Mexican border.

Trump’s actions and tough talk on a number of issues in his first two weeks have deeply unsettled many world leaders. In France, where President Francois Hollande has spoken out against Trump, saying the new U.S. administration is “encouraging populism and extremism,” about 1,000 demonstrators and a large group of American expats took part in a march against Trump in front of the Eiffel Tower in Paris.

In the Philippines, protesters burned a giant portrait of Trump at a rally outside the U.S. Embassy in Manila, the capital.  Some protesters carried a large banner that read: “Fight Trump! Resist fascism and imperialism!”

Last Saturday a Seattle judge blocked the executive order saying that it was unconstitutional. The Washington state lawsuit was the first to test the broad constitutionality of Trump’s executive order. Judge James Robart explicitly made his ruling apply across the country, while other judges in similar cases have so far issued orders concerning only specific individuals. The challenge in Seattle was brought by the state of Washington and later joined by the state of Minnesota. The judge ruled that the states have legal standing to sue, which could help Democratic attorneys general take on Trump in court on issues beyond immigration.

Judge Robart probed a Justice Department lawyer on what he called the “litany of harms” suffered by Washington state’s universities, and also questioned the use of the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks on the United States as a justification for the ban. He said no attacks had been carried out on U.S. soil by individuals from the seven countries affected by the travel ban since that assault. For Trump’s order to be constitutional, Robart said, it had to be “based in fact, as opposed to fiction.”

Washington Governor Jay Inslee celebrated the decision as a victory for the state, adding: “No person – not even the president – is above the law.”

Trump tweeted, “The opinion of this so-called judge, which essentially takes law-enforcement away from our country, is ridiculous and will be overturned!”

However, his government moved swiftly Saturday to comply with a federal judge’s order halting his immigration ban — even as he denounced the judge.

Democrats immediately hailed Robart’s decision, and Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer said Trump’s criticism of the judge will be cited in the Supreme Court nomination of Neil Gorsuch.

“The President’s attack on Judge James Robart, a Bush appointee who passed with 99 votes, shows a disdain for an independent judiciary that doesn’t always bend to his wishes and a continued lack of respect for the Constitution, making it more important that the Supreme Court serve as an independent check on the administration,” Schumer said in a statement.

“With each action testing the Constitution, and each personal attack on a judge, President Trump raises the bar even higher for Judge Gorsuch’s nomination to serve on the Supreme Court. His ability to be an independent check will be front and center throughout the confirmation process.”

The judge’s decision was welcomed by groups protesting the ban.

U.S. Customs and Border Protection told airlines they could board travelers affected within hours of Friday’s ruling. Qatar Airways was the first to say it would allow passengers from Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen to fly to U.S. cities if they had valid documents. Air France, Etihad, Spain’s Iberia and Germany’s Lufthansa all followed suit after the federal judge’s ruling. The White House late Saturday filed a notice of appeal of the judge’s order and has said that the president’s actions were lawful.

Tech companies, which rely on talent from around the world, have been increasingly outspoken in their opposition to the Trump administration’s anti-immigrant policies.

The world is in a mess for quite some time. And Trump’s presidency is not easing growing tensions anywhere.

One reported contender for the post of Trump’s envoy to the EU, businessman Ted Malloch, has already stirred controversy. In a BBC interview last month, Malloch appeared to liken the EU to the former Soviet Union, suggesting that “maybe there’s another union that needs a little taming.” He later said the comment had been tongue-in-cheek.

Trump is indifferent to Russia’s belligerent behavior in Ukraine and Syria (although the US Ambassador Nikki Haley had some harsh words for Kremlin).

He has been accused of war crimes. On January 29, Anwar al-Awlaki’s eight-year-old daughter, American citizen Nawar Anwar al-Awlaki, was murdered, along with about 30 other civilian non-combatants, in the course of a raid by the US Navy’s SEAL Team Six in Yemen.

Tensions between Tehran and Washington have risen since Trump took over office. Trump’s national security adviser Michael Flynn said the Washington was putting Iran on notice over its “destabilizing activity,” and Trump tweeted Tehran was “playing with fire”.

What triggered this virtual ultimatum from the Trump administration? Iran-backed Houthi rebels, said Flynn, attacked a Saudi warship and Tehran tested a conventional missile. It should be noted that the 2015 U.N. resolution “called upon” Iran not to test nuclear-capable missiles. It did not forbid Iran from testing conventional missiles, which Tehran insists this was.

“The Saudis have been bombing the Houthi rebels and ravaging their country, Yemen, for two years. Are the Saudis entitled to immunity from retaliation in wars that they start?” asks Patrick Buchanan. “Where is the evidence Iran had a role in the Red Sea attack on the Saudi ship? And why would President Trump make this war his war?”

Iran brushed off the US threat. “We are working day and night to protect Iran’s security,” head of Revolutionary Guards’ aerospace unit, Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajizadeh was quoted as saying by Tasnim news agency. “If we see smallest misstep from the enemies, our roaring missiles will fall on their heads,” he added.

Despite the heated words, U.S. Defense Secretary Jim Mattis said on Saturday he was not considering raising the number of U.S. forces in the Middle East to address Iran’s “misbehavior,” but warned that the world would not ignore Iranian activities.

Mistrust of Trump runs very deep in Europe. Both before and after he took office, Trump has been vocal in his support of Britain’s vote last June to exit the European Union, and has made repeated and almost offhand references to the likelihood of the bloc breaking up. He has also called NATO “obsolete”.

Mainstream European political figures — already worried about populist challenges and the specter of Russian interference in their own upcoming elections — have been rattled by a rapid-fire series of controversial presidential directives and combative behavior, including a getting-to-know-you call with Australia’s prime minister that reportedly ended abruptly when Trump became irritated over a refugee agreement.

In Valletta, the ancient fortress-capital of the Mediterranean island nation of Malta, leaders arriving for the EU’s first gathering since Trump’s inauguration had some sharp words for the Trump administration — some centering on policy disagreements, and some on the president’s unorthodox style.

Trump’s remarks have been read by many in Europe as a sign that the new U.S. president has little regard for international institutions widely credited with underpinning decades of peace and economic progress. French President Francois Hollande, who spoke with Trump last weekend, was perhaps the most openly combative in his view of the U.S. leader.

“It is unacceptable that there should be — through a certain number of statements by the President of the United States — pressure on what Europe should or should not be,” the French news agency AFP quoted Hollande as saying as he arrived at the informal summit.

EU President Donald Tusk had taken the unprecedented step of warning in a letter to European leaders that Trump’s policies posed a potential “threat” to the bloc.

The prime minister of Luxembourg, Xavier Bettel, said the U.S. president’s values were “not the values I’m fighting for.”

If Trump does not rein upon his authoritarian tendencies, instead of making ‘America great again’, he will be held responsible for just doing the opposite, which was so aptly displayed when the protesters in Paris held a big poster with Trump’s tongue hanging out like a dog that said, “Make America hate again.”

By Prof. Dr. Vladislav B. Sotirovic*

The Albanian nationhood as understood in the 19th century was part of a romanticist notion of nationality, i.e., the Albanians were the Balkan people whose mother tongue was Albanian regardless of any confessional division of Albanian people into three denominations (Muslim, Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox).

Within the north Albanian tribes, especially among the Miriditi, the Roman Catholic Church was very influential. The Roman Catholic Church became the main protector of the Albanian language and cultural heritage and the main protagonist of the national identity of the Albanians in the Northern Albania. The expression of common notions of the Albanian nationhood were expressed by the Albanian political leadership in the years of the Balkan Wars 1912–1913 in slogans such as: “Neve Shqiptar nuk jemi Greke, Sllav, or Teerk, neve jemi Shqiptar” (“We Albanians are not the Greeks, Slavs, or Turks, we are the Albanians”).

The Albanian political “methodology” from the time of the First Prizren League in 1878 until the Balkan Wars was applied in preparation for unification of all “ethnically Albanian territories” in the Balkans into (a “Greater”) Albania – a single national state of all Albanians, i.e., within the ethnic borders demanded by the League in the years of its existence from 1878 to 1881. Essentially similar national-state concepts were also included in the political programs of the Albanian Peja (Pejë) League, from 1899, the Greater Albanian Kosovo Committee, from 1920, and the Second Prizren League, from 1943. This included preservation of the traditional, common law and local community as the organizational basis of the national movement followed by the demand for unification of all territories populated by the Albanians became Albanian primary national interest from 1878 onward.

Clearly, the process of creation of Albanian nationality was not yet completed at the end of the 19th century. The Albanian nation was not considered a political reality in Europe by many politicians at that time. The Albanian people were among the last ones in Europe to build up their own national identity and national community. When during the sessions of the Congress of Berlin in 1878 the question of Albania and the Albanians was put on the agenda, the German Chancellor (Kanzzelar) Otto von Bismarck decisively rejected discussing it with the explanation that there was no Albanian nationality. For him, the Albanians were the Turks. At the same time, the Serbs (either from Serbia or from Montenegro) and the Greeks considered themselves as a nation (i.e., ethnic groups which had their own state organizations), and as such were understood by Europe, while the Albanians were understood as the Balkan ethnic group (i.e., the group of people who did not have its own state).

Consequently, the ethnic group of Albanians could live only as an ethnic minority included into some of the Balkan national state(s) and could not expect more than the right to autonomy within it (them). At the turn of the 20th century many politicians in Serbia, Montenegro and Greece shared the opinion that the ethnic group of the Albanians was culturally and politically incapable of a modern national development and above all unable and insufficiently competent to establish and rule their own national state.

The backwardness of the development of Albanian society at the beginning of the 20th century was evidenced by the fact that the initiation of a process of modernization shook the Albanian tribal society, but failed to replace it with a modern industrial, parliamentary and civil society. The Albanian national movement was seen as an archaic social movement that could not reach a level of national cohesion in modern terms.

This movement produced among the Serbs, Montenegrins and Greeks a feeling of jeopardization of the political and territorial integrity of Serbia, Montenegro and Greece. For them, the theory of the Illyrian-Albanian continuity was in essence a nationalistic ideological construction which became a driving politically-ideological force for Albanian politicians to create, from the Albanian point of view, their ethnic borders according to Albanian acquired rights. Geopolitically, this project, from 1878 to the present, demands not only the territories which ethnically and historically belong to the Albanians, but goes beyond them and encompasses the entire Illyrian-Albanian ethnic population, dispersed in different areas over the neighboring Balkan regions: Kosovo and Metohija, southern parts of Central Serbia, Çameria (Greek Epirus and Greek Western Macedonia), the western portion of the Republic of Macedonia (the FYROM) and the Eastern Montenegro.

However, contrary to the theory of the backwardness of Albanian social development, the Albanian political and intellectual leadership from the turn of the 20th century has argued that the Albanians met all conditions required by contemporary political science to be recognized as a nation: 1) they have their separate ethnic, linguistic and cultural identity; 2) the Albanian settlements in the Balkans are compact; 3) the Albanians have a very precisely defined national program; and 4) they possess the abilities to build up a community and their own independent state which would be self-governed.

The Albanian political and intellectual leadership often stressed that the Albanian people with their own national idea would never be successfully integrated either into Serbian, Montenegrin or Greek societies and states. That is, in addition to numerous and diverse causes, also due to the fact that the Albanians do not belong to the Slavic or Greek linguistic and cultural groups. There is also significant divergence of national development of the Serbs, Montenegrins, Greeks, on the one hand, and the Albanians, on the other. These nations had a different kind of national movements and distinctly different political elite and national ideology. However, the Albanian national ideology of the Illyrian-Albanian ethnogenesis was created and still exists as a pure myth in the form of a quasi-scientific political propaganda for the sake of the creation of a “Greater” Albania.

Finally, the Albanians surely were among the very few Balkan peoples who managed to find an internal balance between three faiths and to build up the national identity associated with each one as Islam is followed by 70% of Albanian population (primarily from Albania proper, Kosovo and Metohija, the Western Macedonia and the Eastern Montenegro), Eastern Orthodoxy is professed by 20% of the Albanians (chiefly from the Southern Albania and the Greek Northern Epirus) and Roman Catholicism is adhered by 10% of the Albanians (mainly from the Northern Albania proper and Kosovo and Metohija).[10] In one word, the Illyrian theory of the Albanian ethnogenesis played a crucial role in forming a common Albanian identity regardless on confessional division of the Albanians.

The 19th century movement of the Albanian national awakening started half a century later in contrast to a similar process of other Balkan nations and an entire century after similar movements in Central Europe. The cause of this delay was a general national-cultural underdevelopment of the Albanian people who lived under the Ottoman Empire for centuries without cultural and ideological connections to Western Europe where the ideology and movement of nationalism emerged and spread throughout the European continent.

Subsequently, the ideas of national identification, national statehood and the concept of historical-ethnic territorial boundaries was realized by Albania’s neighbors (the Greeks, Serbs and Montenegrins) well in advance of the Albanian people. When Albanian intellectuals during and after the Great Eastern Crisis 1875–1878 theoretically shaped the thought and concept of the Albanian national idea related to the question of fixing Albanian national territories and creating an Albanian national state, they faced, and had to struggle with, Serbian, Montenegrin and Greek national aspirations towards the realization of their own national statehood. This ideological, political and military fight was focused primarily on the question upon certain “national” soils on the Balkans which would be included either into a united Serbia, united Montenegro, united Greece or united Albania: Kosovo and Metohija, Northern Epirus, Western Macedonia, Skadar (Skutari) region in the Northwest Albania and the territories around the city of Ulcinj and the Bojana river in the Eastern Montenegro.

The national program of the First League of Prizren set up the following two ultimate national goals of the Albanians: 1) the national liberation of all Albanians, of whom a majority lived within the Ottoman Empire and a minority in the independent states of Serbia and Montenegro; and 2) the creation of a national state of the Albanians in which the entire Albanian historical and ethnic territories would be incorporated into Greater Albania. This second requirement led the Albanians in subsequent decades into open conflict with the neighboring Christian states: Serbia, Montenegro and Greece. The national awakening of the Albanian people in the years of 1878–1912 resulted in the establishment of an ideology of nationhood and statehood that was, to a greater or lesser extent, challenged and opposed by all of Albania’s neighbors today – the Serbs, Greeks, Montenegrins and the Macedonian Slavs.

About the author:
*Prof. Dr. Vladislav B. Sotirovic, Mykolas Romeris University, Faculty of Politics and Management, Institute of Political Sciences, Vilnius, Lithuania

Source:
This article was published by Modern Diplomacy