By Jai Kumar Verma*

United Jihad Council (UJC) took the responsibility of January 2 attack on Pathankot Airbase, however it was the handiwork of Jaish-e-Mohammed (J-e-M) and UJC owned it on behest of the sinister Inter Services Intelligence (ISI). UJC was constituted in 1994 on the initiative of ISI to unite the diverse terrorist groups operating in Jammu & Kashmir, so that more terrorist acts can be carried out.

Pathankot airbase, which is located near India’s border with Pakistan, was penetrated by six Pakistani terrorists who were equipped with lethal weapons. All six terrorists were killed, but in the encounter 7 security personnel including a Lieutenant Colonel were also martyred. The coordinated, joint operation in which National Security Guard (NSG), Indian Army, Punjab Police and Air Force participated continued for a long time because of the large area of the airbase, the intelligence reports which gave the number of terrorists in two digits. To top that, the need to sanitize the airbase that contains more than 3000 families was paramount.

Pathankot Airbase is the first line of defence against Pakistan making it strategically very important. It houses MiG-21 fighter planes as well as Mi-25 and Mi-35 attack helicopters. The ISI trained terrorists were instructed to destroy these very airplanes and helicopters in the base.

But, for the response from the Indian side, the J-e-M terrorists could not cause major damages to the high value assets because the intelligence agencies had prior information about the assault which was further confirmed with the abduction and subsequent release of the Gurdaspur Superintendent of Police Salwinder Singh. Unfortunately the security agencies wasted precious time to react on the information of SP Gurdaspur as there were few loopholes in his story. The authenticity of the facts and role of Salwinder Singh are being probed.

Interestingly, the security agencies had also sent the NSG commandos to Pathankot one day before the assault. National Security Advisor (NSA) Ajit Doval who is an expert on both Pakistan and terrorism himself had supervised the operation making coordination between various security agencies rather smooth. The Air Force base at Pathankot was also warned to enhance security arrangements; a kind of preparedness that prevented any major damages from being caused to the high value assets including aircrafts that were present in the base.

It seems that General Raheel Sharif, 15th Chief of Staff of Pakistani Army, was upset on the success of Modi’s stopover in Lahore and his successful meeting with Nawaz Sharif. Pakistani Army which flourishes on anti-India propaganda and on harping Kashmir issue discourages cordial relations with India. It knows that if Nawaz succeeds in establishing friendly relations with India, it will enhance the importance of the Pakistani civilian government which is not acceptable to an army that has effectively been the political master of the country.

Besides Pakistani army there is also a strong lobby backed by terrorist organizations, businessmen and others, who flourish on anti-India rhetoric, hence oppose amiable relations with India.

It has been reported that the ISI which works hand-in-glove with the Pakistani army had hatched the conspiracy through J-e-M, which itself was created to foment troubles for India. Given their anti-India stance, it does not come as a surprise that the intention behind the attack on the Pathankot base, apart from causing damage and massive casualties, was to stall the Foreign Secretary talks from taking place.

Should the talks get scuttled; the anti-India lobby in Pakistan will find a convenient alibi for blaming India for scrapping the negotiations and point-out to the increasing danger from India as well as from Afghanistan where the Indian influence is enhancing. However, Modi government should not become prey to the ploy of Pakistani army by postponing the negotiations.

Indian government should stress that it is competent to take stern action against terrorists and all the terrorists were killed without loss of any valuable asset and dialogue will continue.

All the senior leaders including Prime Minister Modi appreciated the great courage of security personnel especially the persons who gave the supreme sacrifice. The martyred security forces personnel performed their duty, now the indebted nation should reciprocate. The family members of martyred personnel must get Rs.1Crore within a week and then remaining benefits should be given.

Air Force bases, naval installments should be guarded by trained security agencies like Sashtra Seema Bal (SSB), Central Industrial Security Force (CISF) etc. instead of Defence Security Corps (DSC), Air Force or Navy personnel who are neither trained nor equipped for security of important installations.

The security agencies should also launch an enquiry to ascertain the route from where the terrorists infiltrated. The possibility that there are some hidden rivulets or tunnels cannot be ruled out. The terrorists took shelter in the area for about 24 hours and they were well versed with topography of the area hence it must be investigated that whether there were some support agents or sleeper cell who assisted the terrorists.

Unfortunately Pakistan does not reciprocate peaceful initiatives of India and continues sending terrorists to India, waging a low-intensity war against the country. Now India must covertly assist various secessionist movements in Pakistan including Balochis, Sindhis, Pashtuns, Muhajirs, Hindkowans, Chitralis and Saraikis. More assistance should be rendered to Saraikistan Movement as Punjabi rulers in Pakistan do not want trouble in Punjab Province.

The theory that strong Pakistan is in interest of India is outdated and erroneous. India must ensure that Pakistan remains weak and engaged in its internal problems and has neither time nor resources to foment trouble in its neighbouring countries.

*Jai Kumar Verma is a Delhi-based strategic analyst. He can be contacted at: editor@spsindia.in

More than two years after the American Medical Association declared obesity a disease, a strong majority of Americans believe Congress should approve legislation to require Medicare to cover FDA-approved medicines to treat obesity.

Seventy-one percent of Americans believe Medicare should invest in programs to reduce the rate of obesity, according to a national Ipsos poll commissioned by The Gerontological Society of America. The poll also found:

• 87 percent of Americans believe obesity is a problem in their state.
• 69 percent of Americans believe Medicare should expand coverage to include prescription obesity medicines.
• 77 percent were unaware that federal law specifically prohibits Medicare from covering patient costs for prescription obesity medicines.
• 69 percent of Americans were unaware that the FDA has found that current prescription obesity medicines are safe and effective in treating obesity.

Under the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003, Medicare is prohibited from covering prescription obesity medicines. In the 13 years since the legislation passed, however, multiple medicines have been approved as safe and effective by the FDA.

The Treat and Reduce Obesity Act, which was introduced by Congress last year, would require Medicare to cover prescription obesity medicines. The legislation enjoys significant bipartisan support including 11 cosponsors in the Senate and 125 cosponsors in the House.

“Public policy and society seldom associate obesity with advanced age,” said The Gerontological Society of America Executive Director and CEO James Appleby, BSPharm, MPH. “But recent research has shown that, for those who are over 65 and significantly overweight, the risk of mortality is far greater that it is for younger individuals with excessive body weight. The preponderance of evidence is clear: Obesity at an older age carries with it a plethora of health problems like diabetes and heart disease and the likelihood of premature death”

“Medicare must begin covering medicines to treat obesity because chronic diseases are a primary driver of higher costs in the Medicare system — and, as we know, obesity is a primary cause of chronic disease,” former Health and Human Services Secretary Tommy G. Thompson said. “Common sense tells us that if Medicare begins covering these medicines, it would reduce the long term costs associated with obesity-related chronic diseases.”

These are findings from an Ipsos poll conducted Dec. 9 to 15, 2015, on behalf of The Gerontological Society of America. For the survey, a sample of 1,006 adults age 18+ from the continental U.S., Alaska and Hawaii was interviewed online in English. The poll has a credibility interval of plus or minus 3.5 percentage points for all respondents. Post-hoc weights were made to the population characteristics on gender, age, region, race/ethnicity and income.

Researchers from the University of Granada (UGR) have proven that frying in Extra Virgin Olive Oil (EVOO) is the cooking method that increases the phenolic fraction present in raw vegetables used in Mediterranean diet (potato, pumpkin, tomato and eggplant) the most. This means an improvement to this foods in the cooking process.

In an article published in Food Chemistry magazine, researchers have proven that vegetables fried in EVOO improved their antioxidant capacity and the amount of phenolic compounds, which prevent chronic degenerative pathologies such as cancer, diabetes or macular degeneration.

The aim of this research was to determine the effect of applying various cooking methods on the antioxidant capacity and the amount of phenolic compounds (total and individual concentrations) present in vegetables consumed in the Mediterranean diet.

The Mediterranean diet of the Spanish population is characterized by a high intake of vegetables and EVOO. These are both an important source of dietary phenols, whose consumption has been associated with the prevention of chronic degenerative pathologies. This kind of antioxidants can be modified during the processing of the foods, increasing or decreasing their concentrations.

With this goal in mind, the researchers conceived an experiment in which they cooked 120 grams cubes of potato (Solanumtuberosum), pumpkin (Cucurbitamoschata), tomato (Licopersicumesculentum) and eggplant (Solanummelongena), all of them without seeds or skin.

Fried, boiled, or with a mix of water and EVOO

The vegetables were fried and sautéed in EVOO, boiled in water, and boiled in a mix of water and EVOO. The experiments were controlled so the processing conditions were guaranteed. The ratio between vegetable and cooking element was constant, following traditional Spanish recipes.

Processed vegetables were kept in right conditions for the measurement of moisture, fat, dry matter and total number of phenols, as well as the measurement of the antioxidant capacity, by various methods. Parallel to this, the research was completed with the determination of the content in individual phenolic compounds typical of each vegetable, using high-performance liquid chromatography (HPLC).

The results showed that using EVOO for frying vegetables increases their fat content and reduces their moisture, while this is not observed in other cooking methods.

“Comparing the content of phenols with that of raw vegetables we found increases and reductions alike, depending on the chosen method. Oil as a mean of heat transfer increases the amount of phenolic compounds in vegetables, opposite to other cooking methods such as boiling, where heat transfer is done through the water,” explained one of the authors of this paper, professor Cristina Samaniego Sánchez from UGR.

EVOO transfers phenols to the vegetables

This is due to a transfer of phenols from EVOO to the vegetables, enhancing the latter with oil-exclusive phenolic compounds which are not naturally present in raw vegetables.

“Therefore, we can confirm that frying is the method that produces the greatest associated increases in the phenolic fraction, which means an improvement in the cooking process although it increases the energy density by means of the absorbed oil,” said Samaniego.

All the cooking methods increased the antioxidant capacity of all four vegetables. It was a reduction of it or an absence of significant changes after boiling them in water, in certain cases.

Samaniego stresses that each cooked vegetable developed a specific profile of phenols, moisture, fat, dry matter and antioxidant activity determined by the original characteristics of the raw vegetables and the cooking method applied.

“When the phenolic content of the raw vegetable is high, the total content of phenols is increased even more if EVOO is used in the process, and boiling doesn’t affect the final concentration. Therefore, we must stress that frying and sautéing conserve and enhance the phenolic composition. Hydrothermal cooking methods can be recommended when the food is consumed together with the cooking water, as the addition of EVOO improves the phenolic profile and compensates for the deficiencies of the raw food,” the researcher stressed.

Snowshoe hares that camouflage themselves by changing their coats from brown in summer to white in winter face serious threats from climate change, and it’s uncertain whether hare populations will be able to adapt in time, according to a North Carolina State University study.

Based on field research with radio-collared snowshoe hares in Montana, mismatched snowshoe hares suffer a 7 percent drop in their weekly survival rate when snow comes late or leaves early and white hares stand out to predators like “light bulbs” against their snowless backgrounds.

“This is one of the most direct demonstrations of mortality costs for a wild species facing climate change,” said L. Scott Mills, professor at NC State’s College of Natural Resources and study co-author. “In previous research we showed that climate change is causing snow duration to decrease, and that hares have little ability to adjust their molt timing or behaviors to compensate for the mismatch. Here we take the next step of showing that mismatch does indeed kill.”

“This paper shows that the mismatch costs are severe enough to cause hare populations to steeply decline in the future unless they can adapt to the change,” said Marketa Zimova, lead author of the journal article in Ecology Letters and doctoral student with Mills at NC State.

The good news for snowshoe hares is the finding that different individuals molt at different times, enabling natural selection to favor those better suited for the changing snow conditions. However, whether evolution through natural selection can save hares quickly enough is uncertain, especially given the rapid rate of change.

“Ultimately, to promote species persistence in the face of climate change induced mismatch, the reduction of its cause is essential and must be done via climate change mitigation,” Zimova said. “But in the meantime, we should maintain large and connected populations to foster evolutionary rescue and its ability to allow wild animals to adapt to the changing conditions.”

Camouflage mismatch has the potential to impact at least 14 species worldwide that change coat colors seasonally, Mills says. His team of researchers is expanding the coat color research to other species globally, including mountain hares, white-tailed jackrabbits, weasels and arctic foxes.

By Ebrahim Rahimpour*

Xi Jinping, Secretary General of China’s Communist Party and the President of the People’s Republic of China, is to visit the Islamic Republic of Iran on January 22 and 23, upon an official invitation by his Iranian counterpart, Hassan Rouhani, and after paying similar visits to Saudi Arabia and Egypt. During his stay in Tehran, the Chinese president will be heading a high-ranking political and economic delegation. Jinping’s accompanying delegation will consist of a large number of senior Communist Party and government officials, including members of the Political Bureau of the Communist party, deputies to prime minister, ministers and high-ranking officials, as well as senior officials of major Chinese state-run organs and companies. Xi Jinping’s visit to Iran will come 14 years following a visit to the Islamic Republic of Iran by the former Chinese president, Jiang Zemin. It will be also his fifth official meeting with Rouhani after the latter was elected president. Previous meetings between the two heads of state occurred on the sidelines of international and regional meetings in Bishkek (2013), Jakarta (April 2015), and New York (during the current year), and also during Rouhani’s official visit to Beijing in June 2014.

According to available historical documents, official relations between Iran and China date back to more than 2,000 years ago and to the time when the Ashkanid dynasty ruled the Iranian Plateau and China was under the rule of the Han dynasty. Since that time and especially through the historical Silk Road, trade and cultural exchanges prospered in the course of time between these two ancient and pacifist cultures on the two sides of the Old Continent, and those relations have continued up to the present time. Following reestablishment of political relations between the two countries in modern times and since 45 years ago, especially following victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, bilateral relations between Tehran and Beijing entered a new phase, which was marked with all-out expansion of cooperation between the two countries in all fields on the basis of mutual respect, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs and protection of both sides’ national interests.

In this way, due to numerous historical and cultural commonalities as well as abundance of common political views between the two sides on various regional and international issues, on the one hand, and the complementary role of the two countries’ economies, on the other hand, necessary ground was provided for all-out growth and development of relations under guidance of the two countries’ leaderships. These relations have stood the test of time over more than three decades now.

By implementing correct economic policies since the late 1970s and also through perseverance of its nation, the People’s Republic of China has turned into a great and effective power in the world. As a result, China is currently the world’s second biggest economy, the biggest exporter of technical and engineering goods and services in the world, and a country with the biggest foreign exchange reserves. China, at the same time, is the biggest importer of crude oil, which makes it the main driving force behind the world’s economic growth. The country is also among the biggest consumers of energy and its huge consumer market, with a population of 1.4 billion, has been always a top priority for commodity exporters from other parts of the world. As a result, during the past years, China has come up as the foremost trade partner of Iran, the biggest customer of our country’s crude oil and the most important market for Iran’s goods and non-oil exports.

As restrictions and sanctions imposed on the Iranian nation by the Western countries escalated during past years under pretext of the country’s peaceful nuclear program, China’s high economic, industrial and technological potential provided a valuable opportunity for development of bilateral relations between Tehran and Beijing. Such potential can also form a strong foundation for further development of those relations in the future. On the other hand, and in view of measures taken by the new Iranian administration, which culminated in the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), a new chapter will be opened in Tehran’s relations with Beijing. Therefore, there is hope that the Chinese president’s visit to Tehran will take place in forthcoming days and with the removal of sanctions, will help elevate bilateral cooperation to the level of strategic ties in all fields.

During his stay in Iran, Xi will hold bilateral meetings with his Iranian counterpart and also with other senior officials of the Islamic Republic. The two countries are also expected to sign a document on developing strategic relations between Iran and China. Chinese delegates and their Iranian counterparts will sign about 17 additional documents, including agreements and memorandums of understanding in political and economic fields to boost bilateral cooperation in such areas as energy, industry and mine, technology, investment, finance and banking, transport, culture and media, environment, and development of manpower, which will undoubtedly usher the two countries’ cooperation in a whole new phase. The two countries will also have the opportunity to share views and efforts on regional and international issues of interests, and conduct consultations on the new idea of the Chinese president with regard to reviving the Silk Road, which has come to be known as the “One Belt, One Road” initiative.

Due to its special and strategic position in West Asia, Iran can be a trustworthy partner for China in order to realize the idea of reviving the Silk Road both on land and in sea as bedrock for its own economic development and development of those countries that are located along the road, especially by providing communication and transportation facilities.

Last but not least, the forthcoming visit to Tehran by Xi Jinping, as the first leader of a great foreign power to come to the country after the implementation of JCPOA began, is also important from another viewpoint, especially due to recent developments in our country’s relations with some neighboring states and existing crises in the Middle East region. For this reason, the visit has drawn a lot of attention from experts on regional issues and international analysts because analysts believe that the visit is a sign of Beijing’s new approach to bilateral relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran as a big power in West Asia and in the sensitive regions of Persian Gulf and Middle East. It goes without saying that such a new approach in Iran’s relations with China will soon reveal its important impacts on developments in the region and international system.

Ebrahim Rahimpour
Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister for Asia, Oceania, and CIS Countries

Source: Iran Newspaper
http://iran-newspaper.com/
Translated By: Iran Review.Org

By Sushant Sareen*

Much like in all the previous 67 years of its existence, Pakistan finds itself on the crossroads even in the 68th year. The good things that happened in 2015 on the economic, security, diplomatic and political fronts are fragile and not irreversible. In 2016, Pakistan will have to consolidate the gains made in 2015. If it does not, matters could go downhill pretty quickly. It is in this sense that Pakistan is at a crossroads once again; and whether it will be able to sustain the momentum of 2015 and stay on the bumpy road to reform; or whether it will change course and take yet another wrong turn; or even slip back down the path it traversed in 2015, will decide how 2016 will end.

Overview

Over the course of 2015, the real ruling establishment – the Pakistan military – opened up just too many fronts. Apart from continuing operations in North Waziristan against the ‘bad’ – Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) – terrorists, the army also got very deeply involved in anti-terror and anti-crime operations in Karachi; anti-insurgency operations in Balochistan; anti-corruption drive in Sindh and within its own ranks; and anti-terror operations (albeit intelligence-based) in Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The army was called upon to supervise elections, provide security backup to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) project, and become judge, jury and executioner in the military courts that were set up.

Its role in forging the foreign policy on India, Afghanistan, and the US became more hands-on and intrusive. The army chief was also the chief diplomat, and apart from hobnobbing with both the Afghans and the Americans, he was also trying to assuage the Saudis who were unhappy over Pakistan’s refusal to participate in Riyadh’s war against Yemen. In 2015, even as the army was encroaching in virtually every sphere of government activity and arrogating to itself the veto on every critical national decision, it continued to form and control the policy on India, not only sabotaging peace initiatives taken by Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif but also deciding on matters of conflict and cooperation with India – whether on the Line of Control (LoC), or on issues related to trade, transit or terrorism.

It will not be easy for the military to maintain momentum of the myriad fronts it has opened; and even less so because, with every new front it opens, its list of adversaries and those who would like to see it falter if not fail, grows. This becomes even more critical given the sheer lack of capacity and capability in the civilian dispensation, which will find it difficult to benefit from the inevitable slack that will come as a consequence of the Pakistan army spreading itself so thin.

Political

The ruling Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) will find itself firmly ensconced in 2016. The challenge that could have come its way from the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) was has been quite snuffed out over 2015. While the PTI will not roll over and play dead, the sort of pressure it was able to build on the government (with the hidden hand of the military propping it up), is unlikely in 2016.

Most issues on which the PTI agitated – e.g. election fraud – have more or less been settled and are unlikely to get any traction in 2016. However, the PTI is trying to latch on to new issues, most potent being the clamour over the CPEC. But this is a double-edged sword because while the PTI might be able to rouse public opinion in provinces like Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan on the Punjab-centred CPEC, it is unlikely to go down well with the electorate in the province that is the controlling authority of Pakistan – Punjab. Without stirring Punjab up, the PTI will be unable to shake the PML-N. But, if the PTI can build up a solid movement against the PML-N on the CPEC issue, it can bring Nawaz Sharif under pressure.

Whether this will be enough to destabilise the PML-N government is another matter. Unless the PML-N government commits some very egregious mistake because of its proclivity for high-handedness, any challenge the PTI mounts will not cause too much trouble.

As for other political challengers, there are none on the horizon. The Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) is practically on its deathbed and has completely lost the political plot. It is unlikely that the PPP’s fortunes will be resurrected by Bilawal Bhutto Zardari because none of his slogans – most of them taken from a different era of his grandfather and mother – strike no resonance with the public, and will not, in 2016. Religious parties could begin agitating against the government on the issue of the crackdown on terrorism and extremism, but if the army supports the government, or as is more likely, leads the drive against extremism, then there will not be much these parties will be able to achieve.

The danger, however, is that the army could just as easily use the religious parties to keep the government under pressure. After all, the military-mullah alliance has worked well for both the military and the mullahs. Of course, the mullahs will have to dance to the tune of the military and shed some of their pretensions of being autonomous in charting their political course.

Civil-military Relations

Civil-military relations will be the biggest political driver in 2016. Again, nothing new here. But 2016 is the year of transition in the military. Gen Raheel Sharif is to retire in November. There is already talk of whether or not he will get an extension. This will be a difficult decision for Nawaz Sharif to make – does he stick with the devil he knows or take his chances with the devil he does not? Gen Sharif has managed to assert himself and insert the military into the decision making processes of the government like it hadn’t happened since the end of former Pakistan Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto’s first government. But he has also let the civilian facade continue. His successor may not.

There is also a chance that the next General may have different ideas on controlling terrorism and extremism. On the other hand, Nawaz Sharif might decide to go for a new army chief because the next man would take at least a year before he comes into his own, long enough for the former to try and change the power balance. It is another matter that these sorts of calculations have a record of going terribly wrong, and no one knows this better than Nawaz Sharif who has had an uneasy relationship with every single army chief.

Economy

On the economic front, 2016 is unlikely to see any major take-off. Cut through the window dressing of national accounts by the Chartered Accountant finance minister, and there isn’t very much to celebrate. The only bright spot, if at all it can be called that given all the controversies surrounding it and the fuzzy economics underlying it, is the CPEC. Apart from the investment coming under the CPEC, there is hardly any other green field investment in Pakistan. The macro-economic indicators, in spite of all the fudging, still do not look very good. Savings remain very low; investment has not quite picked up; revenue collection remains anaemic; public debt is spiralling; growth numbers are not anything to write home about; and the external sector remains fragile.

In 2016, it is unlikely if the Pakistan economy will be the toast of town. But if there are no major external shocks – destabilisation in West Asia, disruption of the remittances, oil shocks etc. – the economy will meander along.

Security

2016 will be a crucial year on the terrorism front. The first few weeks do not seem to bear out the bombastic declaration by Gen Sharif that this will be the year in which terrorism will be defeated in Pakistan. A lot will depend on how the situation pans out in Afghanistan; and the portents are not good. Apart from the fact that Pakistan has continued to back its proxies among the Taliban, there are new players emerging due to the fragmentation in the Taliban ranks.

Despite Pakistan’s efforts to get the Taliban faction supported by it into the driving seat in Afghanistan, it looks as though even Pakistan’s own Afghan proxies might try to assert their autonomy from their patrons. If this happens, then the security situation, not just in Afghanistan but also in Pakistan, will go into a tailspin. The vast, ungoverned spaces straddling the border between the two countries will become the playground for all sorts of terrorist groups. The entry of the Islamic State (IS) into the AfPak region is also going to change the contours of terrorism.

The traction the IS is gaining among a new set of terrorists as well as the its attraction to some of the breakaway factions of the Taliban will remain a source of concern; and worse, destabilisation in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. Any uptick in terrorist violence will not just further damage the investment climate but also could risk the CPEC on which Pakistan appears to be basing its entire economic future.

Relations with India

Relations with India will go through the familiar cycle of engagement followed by estrangement. Despite all the euphoria generated by the December 2015 thaw – the meetings between the NSAs of both countries, followed by the visit of the Indian External Affairs minister to Islamabad where she announced the ‘comprehensive bilateral dialogue’, and topped by the flying visit of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi to Lahore – among the incorrigible optimists, there isn’t anything on the ground to suggest that Pakistan has made a paradigm shift in its India policy. The Pathankot attack is one indication that nothing has changed insofar as use of terrorism as an instrument of state policy is concerned, or, for that matter, the ability of the powers that be in Pakistan to sabotage any engagement process between New Delhi and Islamabad.

Chances are that both sides will start the process of engagement. Pakistan will make a show of moving against the Jaish-e-Mohammad terrorist organisation. But once the attack moves out of the front pages, it will be business as usual.

Therefore, by all accounts, the familiar trajectory of India-Pakistan engagement will be repeated. The best that can be hoped for is that violence along the LoC will be kept under control. For how long, is anybody’s guess. There is high probability of terrorist violence inside Kashmir. Some of this will be Pakistan-driven but some will be driven by the international jihadist narrative. But all of it will tend to be linked with Pakistan (which too will be tempted to dabble in the affairs of Kashmir), which in turn will lead to tensions between the two countries. There is also a high probability of another big terror attack within a few months, especially if the Indo-Pak engagement gathers some pace.

All in all, there is not much that can be expected from the India-Pakistan track in 2016.

* Sushant Sareen
Senior Fellow, Vivekananda International Foundation

Recent major terrorist attacks in Southeast Asia, including the Bangkok and Jakarta bombings, indicate a resurgence of terrorism in this region. While terrorism is a big threat to the national and regional security, its harm to the economy cannot be ignored.

By Chia-yi Lee*

Islamic State’s footprint has recently expanded to Southeast Asia, as shown by the terror attacks on 14 January in Jakarta. Countries in this region, including Malaysia, Singapore, Vietnam, and Philippines, have been on high alert and stepped up safety measures against terrorism.

The Jakarta attacks represent the expansion of the IS to Southeast Asia, and clearly they will have other plots in the region. The regional governments should be prepared for future attacks and protect the region’s economy. One terrorist incident may not pose a direct and significant risk to the economy, but a series of attacks definitely will. Foreign tourists will be scared away and not come back in the short term. Foreign investors will lose their trust in a country or not feel secure to come to the whole region.

Negative Impact of Terrorism

The challenges faced by the governments in this region are big and manifold. Governments not only need to manage the threats posed by the IS followers, to deal with rising religious extremism, and to restore the public’s confidence, but also they may suffer from the negative impact on the economy. The potential economic impact is very likely to be felt in tourism and foreign investment.

The economic consequences of terrorist attacks could be negative. The 9/11 attacks, for example, caused the US stock market to fall dramatically. While Indonesia’s stock market has remained intact after the Jakarta attacks, a direct effect can be on the tourist industry, which is an important part of the Indonesian economy.

Tourists are soft targets for terrorists. By attacking foreign visitors, terrorists not only aim to hurt the target country’s economy but also garner greater international media coverage. Such media coverage, ironically, helps terrorist groups to spread fear and to disseminate propaganda.

Foreign Visitors as Main Target

Recent terrorist attacks in Southeast Asia seemed to mainly aim at foreign visitors. Soon after the Jakarta attacks, IS claimed responsibility and said foreigners were the targets. The Bangkok bombing on 17 August last year was also aimed at foreigners. When foreigners are clearly the major terrorist targets, visitors from overseas would avoid traveling to the terrorist hotspots. After the 2002 terror attacks in Bali, for instance, the number of visitors fell by 32 percent, resulting in huge losses in tourism revenues.

Moreover, foreign governments are very likely to issue travel warnings for their citizens after deadly terror attacks. At least 23 countries have advised their citizens to travel with caution or not to travel to Thailand in the wake of the Bangkok bombing in August 2015. A number of foreign embassies in Jakarta have also issued travel alerts following the Jakarta attacks. These warnings may discourage tourists from visiting Indonesia.

Indonesia’s Tourism Minister Arief Yahya maintains that tourism is not affected by the recent terror attacks in Jakarta. There were no cancellations of bookings or trips to Indonesia’s major tourist destinations such as Yogyakarta or Bali. This, however, is because Jakarta is geographically far from Indonesia’s popular tourist spots. If subsequent terrorist attacks occur in Indonesia, tourists will lose their confidence and may turn to other safer countries.

Another form of terrorism often aimed at foreigners is kidnapping. Terrorists kidnap tourists to seek publicity or high ransom. In September 2015, three foreign tourists were abducted in southern Philippines by the militant group Abu Sayyaf. Kidnapping events like this have made southern Philippines be considered as an unsafe place for tourists. While kidnapping is not widespread in Southeast Asia, one such event may severely deter foreign tourists.

Foreign Direct Investment Impeded

The other aspect of the economy that could potentially be damaged by terrorism is foreign direct investment (FDI). Compared to the impact of terrorist attacks on tourism, which is usually short-term, losses in FDI can pose greater impact on the region’s economic prospect. FDI has played an increasingly important role in promoting economic growth in Southeast Asia. If foreign investors are deterred or driven away, it is difficult to lure them back.

Foreign investors do worry about the danger of terrorism. According the survey results from the A.T. Kearney Foreign Direct Investment Confidence Index in 2004, 2005, and 2007, leading executives of international companies responded that terrorism is one of their major concerns while making overseas investment decisions. If Southeast Asia is considered as a region plagued with frequent terrorist activities, foreign companies will avoid doing business here.

Losing foreign capital can seriously hurt a country’s economy. Indonesian President Joko Widodo has set attracting foreign investment as a priority. If the Indonesian government does not show a strong will to combat terrorism after the Jakarta attacks, the endeavour to invite foreign investors may be jeopardised.

Preventing Future Attacks

Anti-terrorism efforts, such as revising anti-terror laws and tightening security measures, should not be delayed by the Indonesian government. This is not only to provide citizens a safe homeland, but also to signal to foreign investors the government’s commitment to fighting terrorism. Such efforts are also important for other developing countries in this region that seek foreign investment.

Governments in this region have been working hard to promote economic integration and to accelerate economic growth. These efforts should not be ruined by terrorists. If regular attacks occur, governments of targetted countries will be thought incapable of maintaining a safe environment by foreign tourists or investors. So regional governments should pay particular attention to this threat and fight hard to prevent any future terrorist attacks for security as well as economic reasons.

*Chia-yi Lee is Assistant Professor at the Centre for Multilateralism Studies (CMS) of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.

Around 22,000 jihadists have been killed by the US-led coalition fighting the Islamic State group since mid-2014, France’s Defense Minister said on Thursday, January 21, AFP reports.

“The figure given by the coalition… is about 22,000 dead since the start of operations in Iraq and Syria,” Jean-Yves Le Drian told the France24 news channel, adding that the figure was “approximate”.

He also sounded upbeat about a series of military successes against IS in recent months.

“We haven’t seen a large offensive by Daesh for some time,” Le Drian said, using an alternative name for the group. “Daesh is in a very fragile position but we must remain very careful,” he added.

The coalition air strikes against IS began in the summer of 2014 and intensified following last November’s jihadist attacks in Paris, with strikes notably targeting IS oil production facilities, a key source of income for the group.

In a major setback for the group, IS lost the Iraqi city of Ramadi to US-backed local forces last month.

By Dan Glazebrook*

Nigeria’s Boko Haram are now officially the deadliest terror group in the world. That they have reached this position is a direct consequence of British Prime Minister David Cameron and co’s war on Libya – and one that was perhaps not entirely unintended. According to a report just released by Global Terrorism Index, Boko Haram were responsible for 6,644 deaths in 2014, compared to 6,073 attributed to ISIS, representing a quadrupling of their total killings in 2013. In the past week alone, bombings conducted by the group have killed eight people on a bus in Maiduguri; a family of five in Fotokol, Cameroon; fifteen people in a crowded marketplace in Kano; and thirty-two people outside a mosque in Yola.

In 2009, the year they took up arms, Boko Haram had nothing like the capacity to mount such operations, and their equipment remained primitive; but by 2011, that had begun to change. As Peter Weber noted in The Week, their weapons “shifted from relatively cheap AK-47s in the early days of its post-2009 embrace of violence to desert-ready combat vehicles and anti-aircraft/ anti-tank guns”. This dramatic turnaround in the group’s access to materiel was the direct result of NATO’s war on Libya.

A UN report published in early 2012 warned that “large quantities of weapons and ammunition from Libyan stockpiles were smuggled into the Sahel region”, including “rocket-propelled grenades, machine guns with anti-aircraft visors, automatic rifles, ammunition, grenades, explosives (Semtex), and light anti-aircraft artillery (light caliber bi-tubes) mounted on vehicles”, and probably also more advanced weapons such as surface-to-air missiles and MANPADS (man-portable air-defence systems). NATO had effectively turned over the entire armoury of an advanced industrial state to the region’s most sectarian militias: groups such as the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and Boko Haram.

The earliest casualty of NATO’s war outside Libya was Mali. Taureg fighters who had worked in Gaddafi’s security forces fled Libya soon after Gaddafi’s government was overthrown, and mounted an insurgency in Northern Mali. They in turn were overthrown, however, by Al Qaeda’s regional affiliates – flush with Libyan weaponry – who then turned Northern Mali into another base from which to train and launch attacks. Boko Haram was a key beneficiary. AS Brendan O’ Neill wrote in an excellent 2014 article worth quoting at length: “Boko Haram benefited enormously from the vacuum created in once-peaceful northern Mali following the West’s ousting of Gaddafi. In two ways: first, it honed its guerrilla skills by fighting alongside more practised Islamists in Mali, such as AQIM; and second, it accumulated some of the estimated 15,000 pieces of Libyan military hardware and weaponry that leaked across the country’s borders following the sweeping aside of Gaddafi. In April 2012, Agence France-Presse reported that ‘dozens of Boko Haram fighters’ were assisting AQIM and others in northern Mali. This had a devastating knock-on effect in Nigeria. As the Washington Post reported in early 2013, ‘The Islamist insurgency in northern Nigeria has entered a more violent phase as militants return to the fight with sophisticated weaponry and tactics learned on the battlefields of nearby Mali’. A Nigerian analyst said ‘Boko Haram’s level of audacity was high [in late 2012]’, immediately following the movement of some of its militants to the Mali region.”

That NATO’s Libya war would have such consequences was both thoroughly predictable, and widely predicted. As early as June 2011, African Union Chairman Jean Ping warned NATO that “Africa’s concern is that weapons that are delivered to one side or another…are already in the desert and will arm terrorists and fuel trafficking”. And both Mali and Algeria strongly opposed NATO’s destruction of Libya precisely because of the massive destabilisation it would bring to the region. They argued, wrote O’Neill, “that such a violent upheaval in a region like north Africa could have potentially catastrophic consequences. The fallout from the bombing is ‘a real source of concern’, said the rulers of Mali in October 2011. In fact, as the BBC reported, they had been arguing since ‘the start of the conflict in Libya’ – that is, since the civil conflict between Benghazi-based militants and Gaddafi began – that ‘the fall of Gaddafi would have a destabilising effect in the region’.” In an op-ed following the collapse of Northern Mali, a former Chief of Staff of UK land forces, Major-General Jonathan Shaw, wrote that Colonel Gaddafi was a “lynchpin” of the “informal Sahel security plan”, whose removal therefore led to a foreseeable collapse of security across the entire region. The rise of Boko Haram has been but one result – and not without strategic benefits for the West.

Nigeria was once seen by the US as one of its most dependable allies on the African continent. Yet, following a pattern that is repeated across the entire global South, in recent years the country has been moving ever closer to China. The headline grabbing deal was the $23 billion contract signed in 2010 with the Chinese to construct three fuel refineries, adding an extra 750,000 barrels per day to Nigeria’s oil producing capacity. This was followed up in 2013 with an agreement to increase Nigerian oil exports to China tenfold by 2015 (from 20,000 to 200,000 barrels per day). But China’s economic interests go far beyond that. A Nigerian diplomat interviewed by China-Africa specialist Deborah Brautigam told her that “The Chinese are trying to get involved in every sector of our economy. If you look at the West, it’s oil, oil, oil and nothing else.” In 2006, China issued an $8.3 billion low-interest loan to Nigeria to fund the building of a major new railway, and the following year China built a telecommunications satellite for Nigeria. Indeed, of last year’s $18 billion worth of bilateral trade between the two countries, over 88% was in the non-petroleum sector, and by 2012 Nigerian imports from China (it’s biggest import partner) totalled more than that of its second and third biggest import partners, the US and India, combined. This kind of trade and investment is of the type that is seriously aiding Africa’s ability to add value to its products – and is thereby undermining the Western global economic order, which relies on Africa remaining an under-developed exporter of cheap raw materials.

Nor has China’s co-operation been limited to economics. In 2004, China supported Nigeria’s bid for a seat on the UN Security Council, and in 2006, Nigeria signed a Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of a Strategic Partnership with China – the first African country to do so. It is a partnership with a solid base of support – according to a BBC poll conducted in 2011, 85% of Nigerians have a positive view of China; perhaps not surprising when even pro-US security think tanks like the Jamestown Foundation admit that “China’s links with Nigeria are qualitatively different from the West’s, and as a result, may potentially produce benefits for the ordinary people of Nigeria”. Symbolising the importance of the relationship, current Chinese Premier Li Keqiang made Nigeria his first foreign destination after taking up the role in 2013.

This growing South-South co-operation is not viewed positively by the US, which is witnessing what it once saw as a dependable client state edge increasingly out of its orbit. The African Oil Policy Initiative Group – a consortium of US Congressmen, military officials and energy lobbyists – had already concluded in a 2002 report that China was a rival of the US for influence in West Africa that would need to be deterred by military means, and China has been increasingly viewed by US policymakers as a strategic threat to be contained militarily ever since. A report by US Chief of Staff Martin Dempsey just this July highlighted China as one of the major ‘security threats’ to US domination, for example – although Obama’s ‘Pivot to Asia’ policy had already made this clear back in 2013.

Is it such a stretch, then, to think that the US might actually want to cripple its strategic rival, China, by destabilising her allies, such as Nigeria? After all, despite continued US links to Nigeria, it is China, more than any other foreign partner, who has the most to lose from the Boko Haram insurgency, as the Jamestown Foundation makes clear: “Unlike most other foreign actors in the country, [the Chinese] are investing in fixed assets, such as refineries and factories, with the intention of developing a long-term economic relationship. Consequently, stability and good governance in Nigeria is advantageous for Beijing because it is the only way to guarantee that Chinese interests are protected”.

If the US increasingly sees its own strategy in terms of undermining Chinese interests – and there is every sign that it does – the corollary of this statement is surely that instability in Nigeria is the only way to guarantee that Chinese interests are threatened – and, therefore, that US strategic goals are served. The US’s lacklustre efforts in backing Nigerian efforts against Boko Haram – from blocking arms deliveries last year, to funding the fight in all of Nigeria’s neighbours, but not Nigeria itself – as well as its suspension of Nigerian crude oil imports from July 2014 (“a decision that helped plunge Nigeria into one of its most severe financial crises”, according to one national daily) would certainly indicate that.

* Dan Glazebrook is a freelance political writer who has written for RT, Counterpunch, Z magazine, the Morning Star, the Guardian, the New Statesman, the Independent and Middle East Eye, amongst others. His first book “Divide and Ruin: The West’s Imperial Strategy in an Age of Crisis” was published by Liberation Media in October 2013.

Researchers in Japan have successfully revived a microscopic creature called a tardigrade (informally known as a ‘water bear’) that has been kept frozen for 30 years. Until this new record was set, the previous interval between freezing and reviving a tardigrade had only been nine years.

Researchers from the National Institute of Polar Research in Tokyo defrosted and revived two of the microscopic animals from a batch of samples collected from Antarctica in 1983, local Japanese media outlets report. The sample had been stored at -20 °C for just over three decades and then thawed in May 2014, in controlled conditions and over several days.

Whilst one of the revived samples died after just 20 days, the second went on to successfully reproduce, laying 19 eggs of which 14 successfully hatched.

The tardigrade is only 1 mm in length, has eight legs and a segmented body. Genetic studies have shown that they originally lived in freshwater environments before adapting to life on land where they seek out moist habitats such as soil, mosses, leaf litter and lichen.

When they’re frozen, the creatures enter a state called cryptobiosis, a form of extreme hibernation that many microscopic organisms use to survive difficult environments. The tardigrade’s metabolism slows down to less than 0.01 % of its normal level, it sheds almost all of the water in its body, and curls up into a ‘tun’ state, in essence a tiny, indestructible pellet.

It is believed that some tardigrade species replace the water in their cells with a natural antifreeze, called glyzerol, or crystalline sugars to preserve their structure. This is important as retaining water is often a source of internal harm to an organism – for example, water damages cells as it freezes.

Despite their miniscule size, tardigrades are considered one of the most resilient creatures alive today. Not only can they survive in extreme temperatures, but it has also been successfully exposed to radiation, and in 2007 the tardigrade became the first animal to survive in outer space, enduring sub-zero temperatures, a lack of oxygen and strong solar winds.

Scientists are hoping to better understand how tardigrades are able to survive such hostile conditions for so long. The next stage for the Japanese research team will be to develop a better understanding of the tardigrades’ overall long-term survival mechanism. ‘We want to unravel the mechanism for long-term survival by looking into damage to tardigrades’ DNA and their ability to repair it,’ researcher Megumu Tsujimoto commented.

However it must be noted that although the survival rate for these tardigrades was indeed impressive, they have not been able to beat the current record for survival in a frozen state. This title is currently being held by a nematode worm that managed to survive for nearly 40 years before being revived.

Source: CORDIS

Church leaders, participating in the International Eucharistic Congress in Cebu, are lamenting the absence of Christians from the Middle East, who have been under threat by Islamic State militants.

“The Eucharist is supposed to be open to all,” said Archbishop Jose S. Palma of Cebu, congress president. “But there are Christians from the predominantly Muslim countries where it is not easy to celebrate the Mass. They also hunger for God.”

Worse, Archbishop Palma said Christians are being persecuted and even killed in those countries.

“The Lord knows the longings of people and the longing itself is meritorious. We express our solidarity with them through our prayers. May they fulfill their longing to be united with the Lord,” he said.

Palma made these remarks during a press conference at Cebu Doctors University where the International Eucharistic Congress Theological Symposium was being held in the run-up to the event.

This year’s World Economic Forum Annual Meeting is the first opportunity to take stock of the victories of 2015, Ban Ki-moon, Secretary-General, United Nations, New York, told participants. Now it is time to act. “We have delivered the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the Paris Climate Agreement (COP21),” he said. “The only agenda greater than our promises is to deliver and implement these two important agreements.”

Ban said the 17 SDGs and climate change are indivisible because climate change undermines development gains. “Now, we have a holistic approach,” he said. “The SDGs move us towards development models that are more sustainable.” He pointed to the critical nexus between development and climate change – disaster risk reduction, which also undermines development gains.

The Paris Climate Agreement gave the private sector “an unprecedented opportunity” to foster a race to the top of climate ambitions, Ban added. There is much work ahead.

Laurent Fabius, Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Development of France, praised the private sector for its commitment and engagement during the Paris Climate Agreement negotiations. “Companies are doing a wonderful job. Now we have to be sure that new initiatives will be taken on by civil society.” COP21 has social implications, including migration, and questions of war and peace. “This agreement is a major pillar for security. We have to explain this to those who don’t understand this. This is not the final point, it is a turning point,” he said.

Daniel Kablan Duncan, Prime Minister of Côte d’Ivoire, said his country is committed to changing its energy mix. The country is experiencing exponential growth, which is set to hit double-digit GDP in the next four years. Yet, Duncan is committed to fighting deforestation and cleaning up the country’s transport sector.

Sharan Burrow, General Secretary, International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC), Brussels, a Co-Chair of the World Economic Forum Annual Meeting 2016, has been advocating for multilateral partnerships to deliver green growth and good jobs. “We cannot have a future based on inequality and climate devastation,” she said. Achieving the SDGs and realizing the promises of COP21 will require “incredible systems change … it will be faster than any industrial revolution we have faced to date.” Burrow pointed to the good news that jobs in renewable energy are outpacing those in other sectors by 20 times. She called for a Transition Fund funded by a small percentage of carbon pricing or by reducing fossil-fuel subsidies.

Erna Solberg, Prime Minister of Norway, pointed to the success of the Tropical Rainforest Alliance 2020 that her country supports. “It is one of the biggest contributions you can make,” she said. “We are building up a structure and learning from that together with local authorities and governments.” Governments face the dilemma of using taxpayers’ money to fund programmes that do not always work, Solberg added. The SDG targets will not be met unless jobs are created and there is social fairness. A challenge ahead is the fear that decarbonizing economies will lead to job loss.

There was enormous momentum from the private sector during the Paris Agreement negotiations, said Paul Polman, Chief Executive Officer, Unilever, United Kingdom. “The private sector understood the enormous costs and threats involved, but also the enormous opportunities presented in changing our system.”

Success will depend on addressing market inefficiencies, including fuel subsidies and the need to put a price on carbon; building on existing market momentum and rolling more people into it; and eliminating the inefficiencies in the global financial system.

The will is there. Polman pointed to a new initiative launched today in Davos to put business at the centre of sustainable development. The Global Commission on Business and Sustainable Development is a multistakeholder initiative to make the compelling business case for the private sector to engage in achieving the SDGs.

It is time to put a price on carbon. Europe has done it; China and Canada are set to follow. Jim Yong Kim, President, World Bank, Washington DC, pointed out that many corporations are already operating with an internal price on carbon. “If you are not working with an internal price on carbon, you should start tomorrow,” he said. If you are not prepared to think about low-carbon solutions, you will be at a disadvantage.

A number of emails on Hillary Clinton’s infamous private server — a server monitored by a company without security clearances — contained higher than “top secret” intelligence from some of the America’s intelligence community’s most sensitive operations, according to an exclusive report from Fox News Channel’s chief intelligence correspondent Catherine Herridge on Tuesday evening.

The Intelligence Community Inspector General I. Charles McCullough III sent a letter to leaders on congressional intelligence committees last week detailing the findings from a review of Clinton’s emails, Fox News reported Wednesday. A spokeswoman for the inspector general confirmed to CNN that the report was accurate.

Two separate government agencies have indicated that emails on Clinton’s server contained classified intelligence, the inspector general reported, including some on so-called “special access programs,” which exceed the “top secret” classification making the information super-secret as in “for your eyes only” secret, according to former U.S. military intelligence operative and police anti-terrorism unit detective Michael Snopes.

Select Committee on Benghazi Communications Director Jamal Ware has released the following statement:

“It is the FBI, not the Benghazi Committee, that is investigating the mishandling of classified information in connection with Secretary Clinton’s use of an unsecure, private server to conduct official U.S. government foreign policy.

“Of course, none of the Secretary of State’s emails – including one in which she appears to instruct a top aide to strip a document of its ‘identifying heading and send nonsecure’ instead of via classified, secure fax – would have been discovered if not for the work of the Select Committee on Benghazi.”

Meanwhile, the New York Times revealed that the book, “Clinton Cash: The Untold Story of How and Why Foreign Governments and Businesses Helped Make Bill and Hillary Rich” by Peter Schweizer, should have shaken up things within the Hillary Clinton for President campaign, but there was almost a total media blackout when it was released. The scuttlebutt within political circles is that the book expands the narrative about numerous cash donations made by foreign donors to the money-sucking Clinton Foundation.

According to reports already known, foreign individuals and organizations donated millions of dollars to the foundation and gave former President Bill Clinton enormous speaking fees while his wife served as President Barack Obama’s Secretary of State. She in turn is accused of granting favors from her State Department, all the while transacting business using a private email account and a Clinton owned and controlled Internet server.

Schweizer’s book uncovers a pattern of financial contributions to the Clintons that ended up giving the contributors access to policy decisions benefiting those donors, while the Clintons built up a personal mega-fortune. Already the Clintons’ trusty team of liars, smear-merchants and goon-squad members are out in full force — with the help of their news media sycophants — attacking the messenger and attacking the motives of anyone who dares to investigate these allegations.

However, truth be told, neither Bill nor Hillary Clinton is a hero of the middle-class. Historically — going back to their early days in Arkansas — at best they are narcissistic opportunists, and at worst they are criminal masterminds who run an alleged criminal enterprise with minions such as Lanny Davis, John Podesta, David Kendall and numerous others. And this behavior and these accusations are nothing new. In fact, the media was so captivated by Bill Clinton’s sexual proclivities that it intentionally or unintentionally ignored news stories that should have outraged the American population.

For example, President Bill Clinton’s FBI director, Louis Freeh — in his book titled, “My FBI: Bringing Down the Mafia, Investigating Bill Clinton, and Fighting the War on Terror” — revealed that Clinton kicked to the side of the road the American people and the families of victims of the Khobar Towers terror attack in Saudi Arabia. Clinton had promised America that he would do everything in his power to bring those responsible for the bombing that killed 19 and injured hundreds to face U.S. justice.

Freeh asserts that he became angry when Clinton refused to personally ask then Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah to allow the FBI to place boots on the ground to question the terrorism suspects the kingdom had arrested and to at least visit the crime scene where Americans died horrible deaths. Freeh wrote in his book, “Bill Clinton raised the subject only to tell the crown prince that he understood [Abdullah’s] reluctance to cooperate and then he hit Abdullah up for a contribution to the Clinton Presidential Library.” Freeh said, “That’s a fact that I am reporting.”

There were other accusations of misconduct during the Clinton dynasty and there will no doubt be more new allegations against Hillary Clinton in the coming months. The facts should appall any clear-thinking American, but alas, when it comes to the Clintons few things are clear and most voters gave up on “thinking” when they realized they could depend on Clintonian politicians to provide them with unearned largesse.

We are living in a Bolehland-Chanduland, high on the remnants of the hegemony of Mahathirism and drowned in the ganja-smelling vapes of neo-liberalist promises of Najibonomics.

Today the dominant discourse of change is that of ‘Either-Or’; discourse framed as exemplified in the ongoing debates on the Trans Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPPA), limiting our agreeing to be suicidal by agreeing to play the game of American cut-throat greed of American corporate interests.

Gleefully we will conclusively sign the agreement as we aspire to become an apprentice-enslaved-economy of a future-President-Trump-empire of a Casino Economy of Atlantic City. Our leaders are happily playing the game, out of the respect of the Obama Empire’s expansionism into Asia.

None of Malaysia’s economic leaders and advisers seem to display much understanding the political-economic-geopolitical-strategic-militaristic underpinnings of the TPPA, let alone the complex dynamics of the arms race and trade in Asia.

Consider the way we talk about liberalism.

Our leaders are agreeing to anything “liberal, liberalism, and liberalisation” (because these words sound liberating to the Malaysian ‘neo-liberals’) bankrupt of knowledge in economic history or historical materialism, but lack the understanding of alternate and humanistic systems of human and social engineering.

The education of our leaders have helped create such experts in economic planning; our vocabulary limited to those embalmed in textbooks written by children of Von Hayek, Friedman, and Reagan, and Thatcher and later perhaps, Donald Trump.

We therefore see our economic planners smile confusingly as President Barack Obama squeeze-shake his hand twisting our arms for us to sign the long-term Malaysian and TPPA living will of futuristic-euthanistic proportions.

This means signing a Kurt-Cobain-of-Nirvana-fame Grunge band-type of suicide note for generations to come to figure out life’s outcome.

We do not care if the instruments of international law governing trade will favour the primarily US-based multinational corporations to even sue us if their cigarettes, greasy burgers, or toothpicks do not sell well because our natives will protest against the killing of our children or the destroying of our rainforests with those useless and unhealthy stuff globalisation and McDonaldisation makes.

Our leaders have this sense of wonder of being treated as little brown brothers obsessed with selfies and photo ops at TPPA-like high level meetings meant to make them accept modern slavery with style, pomp and pageantry. We have not changed in the way we have been trained to think. As the Algerian thinker would call our leaders: the oppressed have become the oppressors.

Abdul Razak Hussein’s biggest mistake

But here is the bigger picture of why we are falling apart and why our centre can no longer hold and why we are plunging into a quagmire never before seen in our recent history, since Abdul Razak Hussein made the big mistake of turning our economy into one tied to the world markets – as in the Felda scheme that signified the earliest intention for Malaysia of the 70s to be suicidal at a young age, playing the International Monetary Fund (IMF)-World Bank liberal economics game of lose-lose for banana republics.

Dr Mahathir Mohamad’s triple pronged-policy – Privatisation, Malaysia Incorporated, and Look East Policy – opened up to the liberalisation of the economy, with Affirmative Action and race-based politics kept as jokers and trump cards. Herein lie the systematisation and the technologisation of a backwater partially-peasant sustaining economy integrated into the world market linked to the major financial capitals of the world.

Herein lie the birth of a ‘modern Malaysia’ that was still growing up juvenile and scared as a child of neo-colonialism; growing up retarded of the ideas modernisation embalmed in McLellandian, Rostowian and Tayloristic ‘modernisation perspectives’ and their attendant ‘nAch viral-infected Modernisation illness’ in which a full-fledged democracy and a thinking middle-class was not there to kept the country developing with economic, educational, and social sanity.
Abdul Razak, the second prime minister, thought he understood Rostowian stages well and thought that progress is a linear trajectory. He thought he could run the marathon with the best and brightest of the Kennedy Era.

He thought the post-May 13, 1969, Mageran (Majlis Gerakan Negara or National Action Council) agenda was strategised to even turn Malaysia into a great society with as sound economy with all races living in perfect harmony, even if Mahathir ruled for more than 20 years happily and draconianly, and even if later down the line Najib (a good student of Mahathir) will also be winning the game of power play ala Candy Crush and Minecraft and Mortal Combat combined.

So now, William Butler Yeats has a poem for us, ‘Things Fall Apart’. The Africanist Chinua Achebe, using Yeats’s line, could have well written about our predicament, as we nervously see how the centre is collapsing , We are now seeing the showdown and a countdown to our bungee-jumping plunge into the quagmire largely of our making.

Both Mahathirism and Najibonomics are crumbling. This is happening as a consequence of this sumo-wrestling of the two forces battling for power and wealth. It is already here: Malaysian’s own ‘Star Wars’ episode of the ‘Clone Strikes Back’ or of ‘The Rise of the Jebat and Jibaok Storm Troopers attacking the Republic of Cyberjaya’; a republic that never did fully embrace the ethics of a republic of virtue.

What then are we seeing, as we as a society crumbles to the sea like the last scene of mass drowning in our own Odyssey made into a Quentin Tarantino movie?

Many Russian opposition figures assume that Ramzan Kadyrov must be held accountable for his statements and removed from office before he can push Russian toward Stalinism, Aleksandr Skobov says; but those who say so clearly fail to recognize the nature of the threat Kadyrov’s rule poses and the radical measures needed to overcome it.

“The Chechen state built by Ramzan Kadyrov is a state of death squadrons and ton-tons macoutes, something absolutely by unthinkable in a Stalinist state,” the Moscow commentator says, even though many think that establishing a state of that kind with Vladimir Putin as its head is his goal (grani.ru/opinion/skobov/m.247853.html).

In a Stalinist state, people are “destroyed in complete correspondence with the letter and the spirit of existing laws,” and the arbitrariness and oppression of the system are implemented “only by officially authorized organs created according to all formal procedures.” Kadyrov’s state, Skobtsov says, “is not the state of Stalin.”

Instead, Kadyrov’s state is “the state of Papa Doc Duvalier;” and what is most serious, it is ever more spreading its practice throughout Russia.” In order to prevent that, Russians must face up to the fact that Putin is not going to defend Russia from Kadyrov, that holding Kadyrov responsible isn’t sufficient, and that even removing him from office won’t be enough.

Instead, Russians must recognize that “the problem of Chechnya is that it is not Russia and will now never become one. The last Chechen wars inflicted a trauma on the coexistence of Chechens and Russians in one state that is incompatible with life.” Instead, what exists now might be described as “life after death.”

Such an existence is possible “only in the ugly and repulsive form of Kadyrovshchina [the style of rule of Kadyrov] which has introduced the poison of fascism into the entire body of Russia.” As a result, the commentator says, “Putin and the Kadyrovshchina are indivisible,” and “Kadyrovshchina is the direct product of the Russian occupation of Chechnya.”

“This is the only possible means of the formal retention of Chechnya within Russia because this is the form of the survival of the Chechen people under conditions of Russian occupation.” Consequently, to address Kadyrovshchina, one must address its source – “the Russian occupation of Chechnya” that Putin re-imposed.

“Russia, of course, could formally remove Kadyrov from power.” It could do so not because of his words but because of the actions that he and others have taken there under his rule. “But removing Kadyrov from power will be insufficient to end the Kadyrovshchina. At a minimum, there will have to be a disarming and reforming of all his fighters who form a single organism of illegality and terror. And this certainly would involve a new war.”

“Can [such a war] be justified?” Skobtsov asks. “Only in one case: if it will not be a war for retaining Chechnya under Russian rule. Otherwise it will only give birth to a new Kadyrovshchina.” Chechnya must be offered independence “after the defeat of Kadyrov’s military machine. This is all that Russia can do for the Chechen people.”

As sometimes happens, Skobtsov’s important if provocative article has appeared at the same time as two others that should be considered alongside it. In the first, Ilyas Akhmadov, who served as the foreign minister of the Republic of Ichkeria discusses his book “The Chechen Struggle” (rufabula.com/articles/2016/01/21/chechen-nazdem).

In it, he shows how Chechnya could have evolved in a vastly more positive direction if it had not been for the wars launched against that North Caucasus republic first by Boris Yeltsin and then by Vladimir Putin and for the tragic ignorance and indifference of the West to what occurred.

And in the second, Victor Buravlev, a commentator from St. Petersburg, raises the even more provocative question: he asks whether “Russia after Putin” is possible because Putin and Putinism are part and parcel of that country’s tragedy. Indeed, he says, the population of the place where Russia is designated on the map can survive “only after the disappearance of Russia, unqualifiedly and completely.”

If that happens, he suggests, there will be “a chance to build something new and to break through the vicious circle, to break the chain of revivals and to destroy the matrix. But to recognize this is complicated” because that state is “inside” Russians even if they “don’t like” that very much (facebook.com/victor.buravlev/posts/411734809021228).

At the World Economic Forum (WEF) in Davos a key topic is focusing on the “Digital Transformation of Industries”. The fourth industrial revolution is imminent. It goes by the name “Industry 4.0” and is expected to fundamentally change, among other things, the production methods and business models currently used in industrialized countries.

Experts estimate that Industry 4.0 will result in virtual data merging with real production equipment. The resulting “smart factory” will bring customers and suppliers closer together, as production orders will be sent by the customer directly to the machine, and the production data will be transferred to the distribution partner in real time. Manufacturing will become leaner and faster and respond to customers’ needs.

Additive Manufacturing – 3D printing in metal

A key component in making Industry 4.0 a reality are machines that can produce the desired components faster, more flexibly and more precisely than ever before. Less prototype construction, fewer dies, less post-processing. In future it will have to be possible to turn data into components and products at an incredible speed.

3D printers give a sneak preview of what this type of production might look like. The first of these devices were created in the 1980s, and nowadays you can buy entry-level devices for less than 700 Swiss francs. But so far, 3D printers have generally been used to make objects from plastic. The mechanical properties and the temperature stability of these objects are pretty limited as a result, which is why they are mainly used for illustrative purposes, i.e. as visual models. This is why 3D printing is often described as “rapid prototyping”.

For the fourth industrial revolution, the technique used for 3D printing will have to go one step further: from rapid prototyping to Advanced Manufacturing, the production of lasting and functional components with defined mechanical and thermal properties: products made from metals or ceramics.

Empa, the Swiss Federal Laboratories for Materials Science and Technology, is working on this topic with various research groups. One group is examining the optimized use of lasers, while another is researching new types of alloys that this technology makes feasible for the first time. A further lab is using Additive Manufacturing to build new, geometric forms that were not possible up to now with the traditional production methods available.

Researchers of the Services, Cybersecurity and Safety department of the University of Twente have invented an improved reconstruction method for facial recognition based on camera images.

The method yields a better score in ninety percent of the examined cases, and helps forensic investigators with their daily work. The researchers recently published their results in the academic journal IET Biometrics.

Facial recognition in a forensic context is a complex discipline. The reconstruction of faces on the basis of a facial model has certain limitations. To be able to use verification and identification based on forensic investigation in the courtroom, the bar for reliability and accuracy must be set very high. The daily practice of forensic investigation will benefit from the new methodology – it is estimated that the improved reconstructions will provide added value in 60 percent of the cases.

Reflection model

The researchers designed a new 3D facial reconstruction method based on the Lambert reflection model for estimating the reflection and using that estimate to create a 3D facial reconstruction. Unlike other 3D reconstruction methods, the new method does not use prior knowledge of facial features in the form of a facial model and is therefore not “biased”, which is of vital importance to forensic facial comparisons.

With this method, a 3D facial model and a frontal profile are reconstructed on the basis of images of faces in different poses.

The Thai government should urgently investigate the abduction and alleged beating and mistreatment of prominent student activist Sirawith Seritiwat by army soldiers, Human Rights Watch said Thursday.

The arrest, which Prime Minister Gen. Prayut Chan-ocha said was for violating the ban on public assembly and political activity, is itself unjustified under the right of all persons to peacefully assemble and protest.

Sirawith has been released after the Bangkok Military Court dismissed the police request for his pre-trial detention. According to Sirawith and eyewitness accounts, around 10:30 pm on January 20, soldiers from the 2nd Battalion of the army’s 2nd Infantry Regiment snatched Sirawith as he was walking with his friends outside the Thammasat University’s Rangsit Campus. Sirawith was then pushed into a pickup truck with no license plate and driven away to an unknown destination.

The ruling National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) junta denied knowledge of Sirawith’s arrest and his whereabouts until soldiers handed him over to police custody around 2:30 am on January 21. Sirawith said he was blindfolded and beaten while being interrogated by soldiers.

“The abduction and apparent mistreatment of a prominent student activist is further glaring evidence that wanton violations of human rights are the norm under the NCPO’s military dictatorship in Thailand,” said Brad Adams, Asia director. “What’s even worse is Gen. Prayut brushed off international concerns and condemnation, and appeared to tolerate the abusive treatment Sirawith received by emphasizing the military could ‘use any measure’ to carry out an arrest.”

The recent happenings in Pakistan as an aftermath of Pathankot terror attack have kindled a ray of hope among a section of the society in India. The view among the strategic community in India is divided over the sincerity of Pakistan and its responses to the evidence provided by the former nailing the involvement of the Pakistani deep state.

Indo-Pak relations are enmeshed in existence of trust deficit between the two neighbors because of the past experience which has been more than unpleasant. Hence a large section is skeptical even this time and consider Pakistan’s response to be a mere eye wash to buy time and tide over the pressure being exerted on it to prove its sincerity in eliminating the menace of terror from its soil. The situation has become further alarming with President Obama declaring Af-Pak region as safe haven for terror in his last State of Nation address. Pakistan thus is under tremendous pressure to deliver.

There is a section in India which feels that the things this time are different and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif is sincere in his efforts and for once seems to have the support of his all – powerful namesake Gen. Rahil Sharif. The Indian government on her part has displayed diplomatic finesse by putting the ball in Pakistan’s court and refusing to bow down to domestic pressure to call off the Foreign Secretary level talks. India has also welcomed the “initial positive response” of Pakistan. As per inputs being received from Pakistan all possible steps are being taken to act on the evidence provided by India including questioning of Jaish-e-Mohammed supremo Azhar Masood, who enjoys very special relations with the powerful Pakistan authorities.

The way Pakistan machinery is moving it appears that the situation this time is different as compared to the previous incidents. The analysts are busy guessing the reasons that have forced Pakistan to change its heart in using terror as an instrument of national policy. The million dollar question is “Has Pakistan given up its policy of bleeding India through thousand cuts?” Is Pakistan willing to accept a peaceful resolution of the Afghan problem?

Ostensibly, nothing seems to have changed to suggest a dynamic shift in Pakistan’s strategy in the region. Then what is it that has compelled Pakistan, more so the Army, to change track and sing the tune of peace? Is it a tactical retreat by Mullah-Military nexus to tide over the adverse international opinion? Questions are far too many, answers are elusive and in absence of answers one can only make an assessment based on available inputs. Even after seven decades of its existence Pakistan continues to remain a feudal society lacking any central unified authority.

In such a scenario the local feudal lords become extra constitutional authorities overriding the decisions of the Federal government leading to political uncertainty bordering chaos. It gives rise to the fringe elements. Successive governments in Pakistan have ignored the threat posed to nation-building by these elements. President Zia’s regime, in fact, encouraged these elements to the extent that they became means to an end. The radicalization encouraged by Zia has engulfed the nation and infected its vital organs so badly that the country is at the brink of disintegration. The Nawaz Sharif government is seized with the problem and is trying to cleanse the menace.

The Pakistan Army is also undergoing a serious crisis due to radicalization of its rank and file. It appears that Pakistan’s top brass has realized that in order to become a modern professional army it needs to get rid of the radicalized elements. The continued presence of various terror groups on its soil will make the things difficult for the army. Hence, the announcement made by Gen Rahil Sharif that 2016 will mark the end of terror groups in Pakistan.

Pakistan can also no more afford to ignore the threat posed to it by the ISIS (DAESH). The recent attack on Pakistan’s consulate at Jalalabad in Afghanistan is a grim reminder to the threat it poses to the former’s sovereignty. A radicalized Pakistan army is ill-suited to thwart this threat. A single, united Pakistan rather than a fragmented, disintegrated Pakistan suits India’s interest. It is therefore important for us to hold the hand of the present government of Pakistan so that it is able to meet the domestic challenges and purge the Mullah-Military nexus and thwart the threat posed to it by DAESH.

There is no denying the fact that Pakistan is facing a severe economic crisis. Its economy is largely dependent on the largesse it receives from USA, other friendly countries like Saudi Arabia and domestic remittances from a large expatriate community. The US Congress has voted to stop all aid to Pakistan as an aftermath of Pathankot terror attack and also frozen the sale of F16 fighter jets. Saudi Arabia is embroiled in a dispute with Iran. The tumbling prices of oil have seriously dented the oil-rich economies of the Middle East countries which will adversely affect the earnings of the expatriate community residing in these countries. Even the funds under the garb of War on Terror have been squeezed.

The much talked about China-Pakistan Economic Corridor has failed to take off with China demanding fool-proof security to safeguard its assets and projects. Pakistan has to act post haste to revive its economy before it completely collapses. It badly needs foreign investment in addition to economic aid. However, no nation will venture to invest in Pakistan in the prevailing environment. Peace and stability in Pakistan is, therefore, in its national interest. It needs to change the strategy of proliferating terror and deliver as far as its promise to eliminate terror is concerned.

Despite the ray of hope India cannot afford to lower her guard while it continues to “wait and watch.” The biggest challenge facing Pakistan is to roll back the support to terror which so far has been nourished and patronised by its Army and ISI. Demolishing and dismantling the terror network will prove to be the acid test of Nawaz Sharif government. In case Pakistan once again ditches India and returns to original agenda after overcoming the adverse international opinion, India should be prepared to exercise the option of paying back to Pakistan in the same coin.

The recent statement of Raksha Mantri Manohar Parrikar that, “Those who harm us must experience the same pain” is indicative of the Indian government’s thinking. We must continue to hone our capacity and capability building for such responses. India has many operational and strategic options without crossing the nuclear threshold which Pakistan can ill afford to ignore. I being an optimist am visualizing that this ray of hope will emerge as the dawn of a new era of Indo-Pak relations.

*The writer is a Jammu based security and strategic analyst. He can be contacted at anil5457@gmail.com

Located in a difficult zone of conflict and power struggles between multiple players, Turkey is experiencing some hard times. Difficulties regarding its foreign policy are currently coupled with turmoil in its domestic politics, rising conflict and threats against democracy.

By Işık Őzel*

Turkey is no stranger to conflict, due to its position in a difficult geostrategic location. Yet it has rarely been surrounded by such diverse sources of conflict all at once. Amidst the current bloodshed in the region, it would be difficult to say which of these sources poses the greatest menace to Turkey. Sharing an 822km border with Syria, Turkey has a neighbouring civil war, hosts 2.2 million Syrian refugees and is almost adjacent to the areas controlled by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD), with which it has an uneasy rapport. Having taken a firm stance to oust the Assad regime following some U-turns, it is in the midst of the competition over regional domination between many players, the most important of which are Russia and Iran. Nevertheless, as important as its conflicts of foreign origin are its home-grown ones, particularly the renewed terrorist attacks and the rising tension in an increasingly polarised society where liberties and some of the fundamental democratic principles are being increasingly undermined. Discussing some of the current challenges faced by Turkey in both its domestic politics and its foreign policy, this paper will first analyse the emerging dominant-party regime and its challenges and then evaluate some of its pressing foreign policy issues, focusing on the civil war in Syria and its ramifications for Turkey, including the refugee crisis and the tensions with Russia as well as the recently revived EU-Turkey relations.

Analysis

Internal and external perils often pose significant challenges to incumbent political parties. Interestingly enough, the situation is reversed in the Turkish case, where such pressures seem to contribute to the further solidification of popularity for the Justice and Development Party (AKP). The AKP’s unexpected success in the re-run elections of November 2015 confirmed the establishment of a ‘dominant-party regime’ in Turkey, where the same political party has been given the mandate to govern for the fourth time since 2002. Although dominant-party regimes have historically existed in various parts of the world, including Italy, Sweden and Japan, their democratic credentials have not always been questioned because of the consecutive incumbency of the same political party. Yet what is at stake in the Turkish case is the adoption of certain features of competitive authoritarianism justified by the popular legitimacy of a dominant-party regime. Even riskier at this point are the calls by the government and by the President for a major institutional change, from a parliamentary to a presidential system.

And this was a country that seemed likely to eventually meet the Copenhagen Criteria back in 2005 when negotiations for accession to the EU were launched. A country that was held up as a role model for the Middle East when the Arab Spring began in 2010, as it was widely considered to exemplify the possible coexistence of Islam and democracy, defying Huntingtonian essentialism regarding the allegedly inherent constraints of ‘Muslim civilisation’ with respect to democratic regimes.¹ Numerous meetings were held, both in Turkey and beyond, to discuss the potential transfer of the ‘Turkish model’, bringing together intellectuals, civil society representatives and activists from Tunisia, Egypt, Syria and elsewhere with their Turkish counterparts and, at times, Turkish government officials. Nonetheless, Turkey has since been demoted from democratic role model to a ‘hybrid regime’,² in which elections are held but liberties are restricted on a day-to-day basis.

Back in the good old days (only four or five years ago), strong economic indicators also upheld Turkey’s suitability as a role model, since it was often identified as a rising star among the emerging markets, based on its impressive growth performance in the 2000s along with ‘healthy’ economic indicators. Paralleling the democratic deterioration, economic indicators have also become weaker. The country is currently considered one of the emerging markets trapped in middle income and marked by ‘fragility’.³ Such a deterioration of both its democratic and economic status has coincided with the stagnation –or perhaps the virtual ending– of its EU accession process.

(1) Establishment of a dominant party regime in Turkey: playing the fear card – the recent elections and their aftermath

Held five months after the general elections in which the AKP lost its majority in parliament, the re-run elections of November 2015 brought a big surprise even to the AKP leaders who ostensibly ‘attempted’ to form a coalition government and failed to do so, and who simply framed their electoral campaign around the following threat: ‘Vote for chaos –read ‘coalition’– or the AKP, it is up to you!’. The strategy of resorting to fear worked effectively, as hundreds of people had been killed between the two elections, 102 of them in a single attack by ISIL –although the government was reluctant to associate the attack directly with that entity–.⁴ Meanwhile, the ceasefire between the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and the Turkish State, which lasted for around two years, ended in July 2015, leading to the resumption of attacks by both sides and resulting in many casualties on a day-to-day basis. What is puzzling is that a government which clearly failed to prevent violence has been rewarded by 5 million additional votes, translating into an 8.6% rise for the AKP in only five months. The AKP government played the security card by implicitly threatening society with a greater instability that could possibly bring about civil war and a severe economic crisis.

Another apparent mystery is the decline in the ultra-nationalist vote represented by the Nationalist Action Party (MHP), which in the past would tend to experience a boost whenever the PKK’s attacks intensified. Embracing a synthesis of nationalism and Islam, mostly tilted towards the former, the MHP lost around 4.4% of its votes in five months (from 16.3% to 11.9%), as it is widely argued that its constituency not only applauded Davutoğlu’s hawkish stance towards the PKK but also penalised its own leader, Bahçeli, who was reluctant to form a coalition with the AKP.⁵ Even though terrorist insurgency did not favour the MHP this time, the phenomenon of swing-voting within the right-wing bloc endured. In the November 2015 elections, the bloc received 61.4% of the vote, in line with a historical pattern where 60%-65% of the Turkish electorate has aligned with right-wing parties, increasingly clustering towards the far right since the mid-1990s; and swing-votes within this bloc have been a common phenomenon.⁶

Another factor behind the AKP’s increased vote share was a come-back from Kurdish votes that had gone to the Democratic Party of the Peoples (HDP), popularly known as the Kurdish Party despite its nationwide representation across different ethnic groups. Up until the June 2015 elections, the AKP was able to receive a considerable share of (especially religiously conservative) Kurdish votes in South-eastern Turkey, has many Kurdish-majority electoral districts. In June 2015 the HDP was able to capture some of those votes, contributing to it surpassing the 10% threshold for the first time in history. Yet the PKK’s ending of the cease-fire seems to have penalised the HDP, which lost around 1 million votes in five months, with its national vote share shrinking from 13.1% to 10.8%. In a milieu of fear regarding basic security and the economic future, some conservative Kurdish voters retreated from the HDP and again voted for the AKP.

The votes garnered by the Republican People’s Party (RPP), the main opposition party positioned in the centre-left, remained stable, with a slight increase from 25% to 25.3%. Despite the party adopting a ‘real’ social-democratic programme after decades, the RPP was unable to carve out a greater niche, failing to break the majority right-wing bloc.

(1.1) Understanding the AKP’s resilience

Although the AKP gets votes from many different groups, both urban and rural and across different income groups, the urban poor constitute an important share of its constituency. Mostly comprised of low-skilled labour, often incorporated into the workforce through the informal economy, this group is already on the far-right cluster with its religious conservatism and pronounced nationalism. Recent research shows that the group, which lacks organisation and access to the formal economy, is indifferent to some of the core components of democracy beyond electoral mechanisms, such as the rule of law, checks and balances, political rights and individual liberties.⁷ So far, there has been a ‘happy symbiosis’ between the AKP and these groups, not only based on their clustering towards the far-right end of the ideological spectrum.

In a rather utilitarian equilibrium, the AKP governments that pursued market-oriented economic policies, simultaneously adopted rather left-wing social policy instruments, the most important of which have been the extension of the social security system to universal coverage, reform of the health system to enable access to all hospitals (both public and private) by all people and social assistance programmes such as conditional cash transfers as in Latin America. All these measures increased the popularity of the AKP governments and contributed to the sustainability of support for the party. These groups sustained their allegiance to the AKP, partly fostered by the fear of losing certain benefits if the AKP were to be replaced by a different contender.⁸ In fact, the phenomenon is not limited to Turkey, since similar measures have contributed to the resilience of the incumbent in a number of other countries, even at the expense of accepting authoritarian regimes or practices. Conceptualised as ‘responsive authoritarianism’, the government’s response to popular demands in even authoritarian contexts is rewarded by continued support for the entity in power.⁹

(1.2) Challenges posed by the recent elections

The recent electoral results pose considerable challenges for Turkish democracy, the most important of which is a probable establishment of presidentialism without adequate checks and balances, which might provide more space for authoritarian practices. President Erdoğan often makes reference to Latin American presidential systems and especially the Mexican variety, seemingly positing them as role models for Turkey. This, indeed, seems uncanny in a context where the problems of Latin American presidentialism are commonly discussed and some among them have lost their previous de jure and/or de facto power, given the consideration of the use of executive discretion as a threat against democracy. Yet this long-awaited dream of Erdoğan requires a constitutional change, which would need 13 more deputies in the National Assembly, in addition to its current 317. There are two possibilities for the AKP: to convince at least one of the opposition parties by offering carrots, or to ‘import’ some of their deputies into the AKP’s ranks –which has occurred several times in the history of the Turkish parliament–.¹⁰

Even if constitutional change is not possible, Plan B might be a sustained status quo whereby Erdoğan acts like a de facto president in a semi-presidential system.¹¹ Although there have been reactions even among the AKP rank-and-file against Erdoğan’s undermining of the constitution (at times along with the authority of Prime Minister Davutoğlu), Erdoğan’s widespread popularity might overrule such a critical stance. The structuring of the current cabinet has shown Erdoğan to be exceeding his constitutional boundaries by imposing his own list in the cabinet, rather than Davutoğlu’s, thereby denoting his absolute hegemony over the AKP.

Hence, the issue at stake is not only presidentialism vs the parliamentary system but the risk of authoritarianism, which would potentially escalate with the establishment of the former. Increasing security concerns are particularly posed by two sources, the ISIS and the PKK, and already pave the way for further authoritarianism. Within a month of the elections –and pro-democratic post-election exhortations on the part of Davutoğlu to embrace all without tolerating polarisation–, the suppression of the media and of freedom of speech has continued, leading to the imprisonment of two more prominent critical journalists.

(1.3) Rising of a hybrid regime: the deterioration of Turkish democracy

The AKP governments have increasingly adopted various instruments of ‘hybrid regimes’ and ‘competitive authoritarianism’ in which competitive elections take place without adequately granting political rights and individual liberties, similarly to Russia and Venezuela, among other examples.¹² As in similar regimes, the continuing electoral process and the legitimacy acquired by the majority support for the AKP are used to mask the violations of basic liberties, thus qualifying Turkey as a ‘hybrid regime’.¹³ In many other hybrid regimes, even the criteria of electoral democracy framed by a Schumpeterian minimalist conceptualisation (ie, fair, free and regular elections) are often jeopardised. Turkey’s experience with electoral democracy has almost succumbed to this category since electoral politics have been tainted by a pervasive repression.

The erosion in Turkish democracy has also been signalled by several democracy indices. Although the Polity-IV Index of the Center for Systemic Peace scores Turkey as ‘democratic’, both Freedom House and the Economist Intelligence Unit’s (EIU) Democracy Index, which rely on a more comprehensive understanding of democracy, underscore the recent deterioration in several aspects of democracy in Turkey. Categorising Turkey as ‘partially free’, Freedom House’s evaluation shows a regression in civil liberties (from 3 in 2004 to 4 in 2014), pinpointing the suppression of the media and of freedom of expression, while the EIU groups Turkey with the ‘hybrid regimes’, pointing out a number of dimensions in which liberties have been substantially constrained in the past few years.¹⁴

Although the recent elections reveal the relative weakness of the opposition parties, the AKP´s ‘success’ should be evaluated carefully through a filter of repression that obstructs the fairness of the electoral playing field. Opposition parties, particularly the HDP, were subject to considerable repression before the elections, and where freedom of speech and media is increasingly restricted, even free and fair elections, constituting only the minimal standards of democracy, are subject to contestation.

Tensions and pressing issues in the foreign policy realm further feed into authoritarian tendencies, as most of the issues are framed as security concerns by the AKP government. The following section examines some of the central issues in that realm.

(2) Foreign policy: the refugee crisis and Turkey’s precarious role

Turkey’s role in the refugee crisis was relatively unrecognised until the summer of 2015, when an influx of refugees began to arrive in Europe, creating much contention in many countries. Only recently has Turkey emerged as a key actor in the refugee crisis, even though it has hosted the largest number of Syrian refugees in the world, brought about by its ‘Open Door Policy’ in effect since 2011 and its lengthy border with Syria. Of the total 2.2 million Syrians in Turkey, only around 300,000 live in 27 refugee camps, with the rest residing in cities throughout the country, some of which host over half a million. Obviously, the refugee influx has been highly challenging given the need to provide health, education and other services in addition to jobs for a group as large as the population of a small country. Currently, around 450,000 Syrian students are enrolled in Turkish schools and there are many who are not. Most Syrians have been incorporated into the workforce through the informal economy, driving wages down in many urban centres and engendering severe tensions in the labour market. Since the beginning of the crisis in Syria, the Turkish government has spent around US$7.6 billion.¹⁵ In addition to the government’s efforts, civil society has played an important role in providing aid and cooperation with the local and central authorities in the reception of the large number of refugees, especially in the provinces close to the Syrian border. In some provinces, civil society actors have formed umbrella organisations to coordinate humanitarian action involving many players.

In October 2015 the EU embarked on a new action plan to cooperate with Turkey and to ‘share the burden’, so that the refugees would be ‘contained’ in Turkey, impeding their passage to Europe. This plan entails cost and information sharing between the parties, as well as strengthening Turkey’s capacity to control smuggling. The EU offered €3 billion in exchange for Turkey´s cooperation and embellished the offer with a perfect enticement: the prospect of faster progress in Turkey’s bid to join the EU, conditional on Turkey doing its homework to contain refugees on its own soil along with accepting those rejected by Europe. Although Turkey’s proposal for establishing a ‘safe zone’ in northern Syria, near the Turkish border, does not seem to resonate with the EU, Merkel’s offer to resume Turkey’s accession process –which has been pretty much on ice for a number of years– by accelerating the procedures on visa-free travel to the EU for Turkish citizens, has generated considerable interest in Turkey. It remains to be seen what will come of the offer.

(2.1) When the enemy becomes the allies’ hero: Kurds fighting ISIL

Unmistakably, one of the greatest challenges for Turkey in the current environment is ISIL, whose headquarters are close to Turkey’s border. The Turkish government has been accused on the basis of allegations on several fronts, the mildest of which is turning a blind eye towards ISIL and especially its fighters crossing Turkish soil in their ongoing trek towards Europe. At the other end of the range of allegations, there is the recent claim made by Russia that the Turkish state is not only monitoring the oil trade conducted by ISIL but actively taking part in it.

Allegations aside, there is the obvious ‘pragmatic’ conundrum in that ISIL and Turkey have a common enemy: the Kurdish groups that have fought against ISIL in northern Syria, given that some of these groups also take part in or provide support for the Kurdish insurgent group, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), within Turkey’s borders. As the peace process ended in a new spate of violence in July 2015, the Turkish State is currently at war with the PKK’s insurgency. To complicate matters, however, the links between the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) and the PKK are well known, and the PYD has the vocal support of the US and several other countries in the West, as do the Kurdish People’s Defence Units (YPG), which are considered the ‘only effective forces fighting against ISIL’ along with the Peshmerga of northern Iraq. Although geographically situated outside Turkey’s borders, the PYD not only aims for democratic autonomy for the Kurdish people but neither does it hide its hostility towards Turkey for the denial of Kurdish rights in general and the continuing imprisonment of the PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan by the Turkish State. Announcing the foundation of Syrian Kurdistan in 2013, often referred to as Western Kurdistan, the PYD is considered a legitimate democratic entity which has, in fact, established a de facto state in Rojava, where it collects taxes, provides public services, operates security forces and implements some of the principles of Öcalan in its statehood practices.

Although turning a blind eye to the rise of the ISIL and its links with several hubs of radical Islam within Turkey are often read as a signal of further Islamisation of the Turkish government and its support for such networks (and the greater ideal of Sunni dominance in the region, entrenched against the so-called ‘Shia axis’ between Iran, Iraq and Syria), the Kurdish challenge, which is the common denominator of the Turkish State and ISIL, needs to be taken into account when interpreting the complicated matrix of actors in and around Syria.

(2.2) Yet another external conflict: Russian-Turkish relations

Russia and Turkey, flexing their muscles over a geostrategic power struggle which has recently centred around the Syrian crisis, appear to be in the throes of a renewed rise in their historical rivalry. Having fought 13 wars in the past, these once major empires seeking to expand their influence over the neighbourhood are getting into a muddle in the wake of the Russian jet crisis which broke out on 24 November 2015, when Turkey shot down a Russian jet based on the claim that it had violated Turkish airspace. Even though Turkey has since proved its claim, with US confirmation, relations between the two countries are in dire straits. What is puzzling here is the timing of the act and the consequent crisis –and the bold reaction on the part of a NATO member–, after all, this is not the first time that Russian jets have violated Turkish air-space.

Leading to an apology crisis, the incident caused some serious turbulence in Turkish–Russian relations. Within a week after the incident, Russian state officials made accusations not only concerning the AKP government’s turning a blind eye towards the IS, but also its direct support for –and benefits through– the IS via multiple channels, most importantly the purchase of ISIL oil. President Putin went a step further and alleged that President Erdoğan and his family were directly involved in the transactions.¹⁶ Endorsed by Iran, the claims caused a major shock in the international arena, as well as within Turkey.

The severe tension between the two countries with egocentric and eccentric leaders has already borne tangible economic consequences. Russia announced a series of economic sanctions on Turkey in international trade and tourism, to harm Turkish business interests while exacerbating Turkey’s current account deficit problem. Turkey attracts around 4.5 million Russian tourists (2014 data) and the trade volume between the two countries had reached around US$50 million (2013). In the context of this recently launched trade war, Russia already imposed sanctions on imports from Turkey in various sectors, including food and vegetables, besides its threats regarding energy-related agreements already signed between the two countries (Turkey is the second largest buyer of Russian gas).

Although Russia and Turkey had been rivals during the Cold War, rapprochement between the two began before the end of the Cold War. The ‘Agreement on Natural Gas’ signed in 1984 was the turning point in expanding economic links which went beyond energy exports from Russia to Turkey, to include exports of a wide range of products as well as capital from Turkey to Russia. As early as the late 1980s, Turkish construction companies had begun to carve out a substantial share of the Russian market. Signed in 1992, Black Sea Economic Cooperation promised expansion of economic links between the two markets. In the last three decades, the Turkish business presence in the Russian market has expanded, paralleling the increased volumes of trade and new commitments to cooperate further in the future in highly strategic ventures including Rosatom establishing a nuclear power station in Turkey by 2020. In 2014, a memorandum of understanding was signed between the two countries to build a new pipeline to carry Russian gas to Turkey and then Europe, Turkish Stream Project, replacing the South Stream Project with the EU.

Nevertheless, the warming-up between the two countries has not impeded tensions. Whenever Turkey wanted to magnify its role in the region in the post-Soviet geo-strategic context, be it in Caucasia or Central Asia, it invariably hit a wall as Russia stopped its influence. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkey wanted to act as a “big-brother” for the Central Asian Turkic Republics, yet this urge was plainly blocked by Russia. Later in the 1990s, Turkey wanted to play a role in Chechenia and Abkhazia, but was again blocked. Having learned a lesson, Turkey did not meddle in the conflicts in Ukraine and Crimea, despite its re-emerging urge to “protect” the Muslim communities in geographies where it once ruled. Having rejected inclusion in the EU’s economic sanctions in response to the crisis in Ukraine, Turkey expanded its economic interactions with Russia after the crisis.

Another major conflict, emerged in the 1990s, concerns energy routes and the negotiations around them between multiple actors including the EU, Russia, Azerbaijan and Turkey. Aimed at becoming a central energy corridor to transport Caucasian oil and gas to the European markets, bypassing Russia in energy transport, Turkey wholeheartedly supported the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Oil Pipeline (BTC) which would link Caucasian energy to European markets. In clashing with Russian interests regarding control over energy corridors, the BTC (and its endorsement by the US) caused severe tensions between Turkey and Russia.

Although showing their muscles to each other on multiple occasions, the two countries have gone through a rapprochement in the 2000s based on a utilitarian equilibrium and converging at an important intersection: Their egocentric leaders have often defied the West and applauded one another for their boldness. Yet, such appreciation does not necessarily alleviate the power struggle between the two.

(2.3) Turkey’s arduous journey to the EU

One might suggest that the Turkish government has too many things on its plate right now, such that the EU is not necessarily a priority. Yet the EU’s loss of priority could very well be the consequence of the frustrating negotiating process for both parties. As Merkel’s visit and the subsequent commitments to cooperation in the refugee crisis have clearly shown, the successive Turkish governments have changed their discourse regarding the EU process and have become wholehearted supporters of it in response to positive directions provided by EU representatives –and this despite the fact that in the last seven or eight years the discourse has tilted considerably towards the direction in which the EU was not deemed to be an important goal.

Turkey’s long journey started 52 years ago when the Ankara Treaty was signed between the European Economic Community and Turkey in 1963, setting up the conditions for a Customs Union Agreement between the parties along with further cooperation. Following the signing of the Customs Union Agreement in 1995, Turkey was announced as an eligible candidate in 1999, and negotiations were finally launched in 2005. The most important democratic (and some economic, albeit under the guidance of other actors) reforms within the broad range of normalisation of civil–military relations, protection of minority rights, human rights and abolition of the death penalty, among many others, were carried out between 1999 and 2005, indicating the importance of the EU anchor in Turkey’s democratic reforms. Nevertheless, as soon as the negotiations were launched stagnation set in, as not only has political will for reforms weakened, but also many of the chapters of the acquis have been blocked. So far, of the total 35 chapters, 14 have been opened (due to blocking by some members) and only one has been closed.

This ‘anchor–credibility dilemma’ depicts the double-edged nature of the frustration between the two parties: when reforms slow down, the candidate country loses credibility; in response the EU shows a lower level of willingness to proceed with negotiations; as a result the candidate loses its will to reform further and the EU loses its anchoring capacity.¹⁷ As in all vicious cycles, it is hard to discern a first actor. If this dilemma can be resolved, the EU trajectory may well re-open and proceed. Thus, the much-needed democratic reforms could be implemented and the current reversal of democratic consolidation (often tainted by authoritarian tendencies) could be stopped. In that case, we might be able to come up with much more optimistic scenarios, as a vicious cycle of deterioration might turn into a virtuous cycle, as in the case of the AKP’s first tenure. Such a scenario is certainly not impossible.

Conclusions

In this challenging context, various readings of Turkish politics are possible. The stability of the government –supported by the political preferences of many in Turkish society– seems to stand against the tide of instability in the region, and hence it might be perceived as a positive development in itself. Nonetheless, digging into both the dynamics (including the overt threats) behind that stability, increasing polarisation in society and the cost of overall corrosion in democratic standards (using the legitimacy of popularity for authoritarian measures) might easily engender pessimistic perceptions of Turkish politics and its probable trajectory in the near future. This paper has tried to shed light on some of these different readings as to the current state of Turkish politics as well as of Turkish foreign policy.

About the author:
*Işık Őzel, Associate Professor of Political Science at Sabancı University, Istanbul

Source:
This article was published by Elcano Royal Institute.

Notes:
¹ S.P. Huntington (1996), The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, Simon&Schuster, New York.